## at: coopt

#### Solar power necessitates decentralization and breaking up of energy monopolies

Scheer 2K2

(Hermann, Fmr. Asst. Prof. of Economics @ Technical Univ. of Stuttgart, Member of German Parliament, General Chairman of the World Council for Renewable Energy, President of EUROSOLAR, The Solar Economy: Renewable Energy for a Sustainable Global Future, Pg. 87-89)

The representatives of the fossil energy industry have been written out of the script for the renewable energy story, or allotted at most a secondary role; the market for renewable energy will no longer have a niche for conventional sources at least, not with turnover at high as it is at present. Conventional energy companies are bound to old fossil fuel structures by the sheer scale of their investments; their business models, based on large-scale industrial plant, will prove their own undoing in the transition to renewable energy. A solar resource base makes it impossible to retain or ever re-create the power structure that has hitherto prevailed in the energy sector. The extent to which industrial concentration and monopolization is inevitable with fossil fuels and avoidable or impossible with solar energy is compared in Table 2.2 The short supply chains for renewable energy sources will end the pressure to globalize that comes from the fossil resource base. The dense interconnections between individual energy companies and between energy companies and other industries that result from fossil fuel supply chains will no longer be necessary. Shorter renewable energy supply chains also make it impossible to dominate entire economies. Renewable energy will liberate society from fossil fuel dependency and from the webs spun by the spiders of the fossil economy.

## at: 70s not key

70s were the key fulcrum in energy path choices – analysis of it is crucial to current energy debates

Madrigal 11

Powering the Dream

Alexis Madrigal is a senior editor at The Atlantic, where he oversees the Technology channel. He's the author of Powering the Dream: The History and Promise of Green Technology.

**T**HE 1970S WERE A FULCRUM on which American society turned from one vision of the future to another. The long postwar I boom gave way to energy shocks, polluted cities, and an unpopular war. The economy was stagnant; trust in government collapsed. The great protest movements and social achievements of the 1960s did not bring equality and justice for all. The idea of limits crept into the American mind. as unwelcome as a bad odor. As Vietnam exposed the limits of military power, other geopolitical events revealed the country's energy system had limits, too. In October of 1973 the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), the cartel of oil-rich nations, asserted its global economic might by cutting off oil supplies to the United States. Although American support of Israel in the Yom Kippur War served as the immediate spark for the embargo, the crisis simply revealed the realities of the brittle American energy system. Though few believed it, American domestic crude oil production had peaked in 1970 and was headed for a long, slow decline, despite the onrush of production from Alaskan oil fields. In the three years leading up to 1973, oil imports doubled to over six million barrels a day. A country that had gotten rich selling oil to other countries began importing vast quantities of the stuff from state owned oil enterprises that were not afraid to use their mineral resources to achieve political ends.' The reaction in the United States was swift. People were horrified. For the first time since World War II. Americans could not have as much fuel as they wanted when they wanted it. Rationing ensued. Frustration abounded. America could not control its own destiny. The civic and productive systems that we had built when oil cost less than water were far-flung, low-density, and energy-intensive. Muscle cars cost just a tiny bit more to drive than VW Bugs. How had America built its cas tie on a resource that seemed more like sand than rock? What had gone wrong?2 At the same time, a new movement was spreading across America. Spurred by the increasing recognition that human beings were destroying ecosystems and their own suburban backyards, modern environ mentalism rounded into rough shape. "The residents of post-war suburbs lived in the midst of one of the most profound environmental transformations in the nations history," historian Adam Rome wrote. "Every year, a territory roughly the size of Rhode Island was bulldozed for urban dcvclopmcnt."■, The environmental problems caused by the sprawl became suburbanites' local touchpoints for the abstract notions of ecosystems and carrying capacities. Tract homes were built as cheaply as possible, often beyond the reach of city services. Instead of paving for extensions of sewer systems, developers put in poorly designed and executed septic systems with predictably poor results. "In the late 1950s, for example, suds began to pourout of the faucets of thousands of suburban homes—the residue of nonbiodegradable detergents in septic tanks had contaminated drinking wells—and the resulting outcry helped make water pollution a national concern," Rome argued. In short. "The desire to preserve wilderness was the tip of an iceberg, the most visible part of a much larger concern about the destructive sprawl of urban civilization."4 Ecology, the science of studying networks of organisms, was exploding in popularity. As a result, many ecologies became prominent political figures. The conclusions of the time were unequivocal: "Do not disturb the balance of nature"5 In the late '60s this information began to filter into the mainstream consciousness. In 1968 the New York Times ran an editorial by a local environmentalist under the headline "An Ecosystem Is a Partnership" The author wrote that unfortunately, unless we heed the warnings of ecologists, and stop upsetting the precious balance of nature upon which this planets web of lite depends, all of us may be forced to live under giant astrodomes with the same kind of environmental controls developed for space travel. The meaning of an ecosystem will then be clear to everyone.\* The first environmental television series. Our Vanishing Wilderness, ran on National Education Television in October of 1970, a few months after Earth Day brought twenty million people together to celebrate a new environmental consciousness. The show brought the destruction of the environment home to suburbanites in much the same way that graphic footage added drama to the Vietnam War. The Our Vanishing Wilderness episode about the 1969 Santa Barbara oil spill, "the spark that brought the environmental issue to the nation's attention." was titled "Everybody's Mistake."7 And the ecological position that "everything is connected to everything else," meant that vanishing wilderness might lead to a vanishing humanity." In short, the relationships between ecosystems, economies, energy, and technology became unstable. Sitting in the famed gasoline lines waiting to fill up their tanks, Americans of all stripes were forced to think more about where their fuel came from than they had in half a century. Many came up with some tremendously weird, inventive, and productive ideas. Most of the "new" policies and technologies bouncing around America in the first decade of the twenty-first century are milquetoast variants of the radical reexaminations of the country that occurred during the 1970s. Yet in popular memory this great outpouring of intellectual energy has been caricatured and reduced to cartoon hippies playing with old windmills. However, there was much, much more to the era. Everyone had a plan for fixing the way the country used heat, light, and power. Like the raucous panoply of 1840s reformers responding to industrialization. the American energy system got its own constellation of wouldbe helpers, as the seeds planted back then bore decidedly strange fruit 130 years later. Government and university energy specialists issued report after report, many pushing for large-scale projects like nuclear reactors that yielded more radioactive fuel than you put into them ("breeders") and synthetic fuel plants that converted coal into knock-off crude. Foundations convened large groups to discuss American energy: With a couple of exceptions, their sturdy, dour reports are like the existential opposite of coffee-table books. Formerly obscure researchers held conferences on "Energy Transitions'\* and argued about odd things like the return of feudalism as an unintended consequence of increased solar energy usage.\* Thermodynamics, a musty old nineteenth-century science, was suddenly on the lips of physicists like Art Rosenteld, who had formerly been more interested in quarks and gluons.10 Ecologist Howard Odum put out books seriously suggesting apportioning UN votes "in proportion to the energy budget" of a country, including its haul from the sun and fuels." Barry Commoner, an eco-socialist, published popular books attacking capitalism as the root of the environmental, energy, and economic crises racking the country. These were widely acclaimed by the mainstream media. The environmental movement figured out how to use bureaucratic levers to delay and block the building of power plants. Rodale Press, an early imprint for information on organic food, began to branch out into alternative energy. Magazines like Not Man Apart. CoEvolution Quarterly. Clear Creek, and Mother /ones came into being and emphasized deep environmental and energy issues. While in a 2006 New York Times article, then-president of the Solar Energy Industries Association Rhone Rcsch declared, "We're not just hippies in garages in Berkeley anymore," the truth is that the people interested in alternative energy have never been "just hippies in garages in Berkeley." The roots of green technology spread wider and deeper. The choices society was mulling over during the 1970s were more nuanced than commonly assumed or nusrcmcmbcrcd. The technological ideas available were not simply buckydomes and solar hot water heaters on one side versus huge nuclear and dirty coal power plants on the other. There were branches and gradients running from tripped out solar home owners through the Amory Lovins's soft path and energy efficiency all the way to the grand solar farms of Aden and Marjorie Memel. There were so many interesting things going on during the 1970s that it would be impossible to cover them all even within the space of this entire book, so we'll look at just four key themes of green-tech practice and research that emerged from the period. Responding to the chaos of the times, different groups of researchers and tinkerers brought their own approaches to the energy problem. How they succeeded and failed hold some of the most directly applicable lessons for the current resurgence of green interest^

## impact ext

#### A technocracy without a democratic debate over VALUES is the surest path toward extinction – leads to making the whole world into our laboratory in new world-threatening simulations like WARMING, BHOPAL, unregulated NUCLEAR EXPERIMENTATION, GENE modification, and environmental RACISM. The solar shutdown didn’t cause those things, clearly, but offered an opportunity for INTERVENING to stop the EXTINCTION TRAIN

## at: CF bad

#### Generic counterfactuals bad doesn’t apply –

#### 1. Not about energy – even if IR and economics is impossible to predict counterfactually, our Laird and Graetz evidence predicts the way energy debates went down post-Solar Bank – prefer the specificity of our evidence

#### 2. Not our counterfactual – their evidence assumes something like a warming advantage based on reducing CO2 30 years ago – our counterfactual serves as a DIAGNOSTIC of contingency – predictions of different events miss the point entirely

Mokyr 1

http://faculty.wcas.northwestern.edu/~jmokyr/Tetlock3.PDF King Kong and Cold Fusion: Counterfactual analysis and the History of Technology Joel Mokyr Departments of Economics and History Northwestern University Revised Jan. 2001 This is a draft. Not to be cited. Comments welcome. This paper is part of my forthcoming Neither Chance nor Necessity: Evolutionary Models and Economic History (Princeton University Press, 200?), presented at the Conference on Counterfactual History, Columbus Ohio, Feb. 4-6, 2000 devoted to the Unmaking of the West.

To fully comprehend the ex ante indeterminacy of technological history we need to face three separate sources of contingency. First, how inevitable is it that useful knowledge itself emerges? Second, how inevitable is it that such knowledge, once it exists, will be mapped into techniques? Third, given the existence of a menu of techniques, how likely is it for a given technique to be selected? To come to grips with that triplet of questions we need to formulate, however superficially, some theoretical framework that allows us to understand how useful knowledge evolves over time. As I have indicated elsewhere (Mokyr, 1998), an evolutionary framework of some kind, which is by construction non-determinist and selectionist, seems appropriate to a historical understanding of technological knowledge. Is the indeterminacy of technological history damaging to counterfactual analysis? Cowan and Foray correctly point out that precisely because evolutionary theory is rich enough to realize that history can produce a lot of different outcomes, its predictions are not very tight and counterfactual analysis runs the risk of not being very compelling. Insofar that we are trying to explain a minor technological feature this is perhaps true. But in the larger picture, evolutionary counterfactuals seem to make sense even in a highly indeterminate world, provided we are not too specific. For instance, Stephen Jay Gould famously asked if we rewound and replayed life’s tape, whether the history of life would look the same, and answered in a resounding negative.17 Others have not been so sure, but the phrasing of the question clearly suggests the obvious attractive rhetoric of the counterfactual in evolutionary tales. In Cowan and Foray’s terminology, what Gould is suggesting is a “weak” counterfactual, one that identifies important events that foreclosed certain options. If History is a branching process, consisting of a huge number of bifurcations, the present has been produced by an endless set of decisions on paths not taken. By identifying the branching points, as they note (p. 16), we can show “why the economy followed the route it did.” In the final analysis the counterfactual tale serves not as a means of prediction or a normative assessment of where we are relative to where we could have been, but as a pedagogical tool to understand why the world is as it is. Its weaknesses are that I cannot be very specific about the alternative paths that would have been taken. All I can assert is that the actual world was not the only possible one, and speculate about the point in History where other branches would have clearly led to a very different outcome. In the final analysis counterfactual analysis serves not as a means of prediction or a normative assessment of where we are relative to where we could have been, but as a pedagogical tool to understand the world as it is.

## Long 2ac

CLAIMS ABOUT “SHOULD” ARE OVERDETERMINED. IT INDICATES A NEED FOR POLICY ACTION IN PROPOSITION. WE MEET THAT.

**Trapp & Hanson ‘5** Robert Trapp is a Professor of Rhetoric at Willamette University in Salem, Oregon, U.S.A. Christine Hanson is the Press Assistant for United States Senator Bill Nelson (Democrat of Florida) and is a lecturer at George Washington University, “Debating Comparative Propositions of Policy,” Volume 5, Issue 4 June 2005 - IDEA: International Debate Education ... http://www.idebate.org/magazine/files/Magazine436a366e4843f.pdf

Merely by convention, some teachers and writers have insisted that the word “should” is a necessary and a suﬃcient indicator of a policy proposition. This convention, however, is arbitrary and does not mirror ordinary language usage. The term “should” is one of many terms that can signal a logical requirement for a plan of action.

We meet Haning evidence – “strong recommendation” – we strongly recommend the Reagan-era USfg increase financial incentives for decentralized solar – proves that there are multiple definitions of ‘should’ that doesn’t NECESSARILY require futurity

ERROR REPLICATION – dividing past counterfactual from the present crushes decisionmaking

**Johnson & Sherman ‘90** Marcia K. Johnson is a Sterling Professor of Psychology at Yale University. Steven J. Sherman is Chancellor's Professor of Psychological and Brain Sciences at Indiana University, Bloomington. “Constructing and Reconstructing the Past and the Future in the Present,” in E.T. Higgins & R.M. Sorrentino (Eds) HANDBOOK OF MOTIVATION AND COGNITATION, p. 510

Counterfactuals are thus important in determining affective reactions to actual events and to judgments of responsibility and causality. (Perhaps one reason why we are more angered by betrayals by people we trust than by people we do not trust is that we can so easily imagine trusted people as behaving otherwise.) More than this, counter factual generation is important because it affects the ways in which we think about the past and about the future. Without considering alternatives to reality, we must accept the past as having been inevitable and must believe that the future will be no different from the past. The generation of counterfactuals gives us flexibility in thinking about possible futures and prepares us better for those futures. Along these lines, Taylor and Schneider (1989) have proposed a theory of coping that focuses on the mental simulation of past, future, and hypothetical events. Such event simulation serves problem-solving and emotion-regulating functions for stressors by increasing the perceived validity of the imagined experiences, providing a framework for organizing experience, and providing a mechanism for mustering helpful emotions. In this way, counterfactual generation and the mental simulation of events can help in coping with ongoing, anticipated, or past stressful events. It is thus clear that after-the-fact counterfactual reasoning affects feelings and judgments about the past, the present, and the future. Before-the-fact reasoning, in the form of expectancies, hopes, and wishes, likewise affects these feelings and judgments, as we have seen.

Limits cause lock-in – Historical analysis of solar energy policy must be able to CHALLENGE existing frameworks of policy formation and their presentist orientation – only direct contestation of existing frames avoids depoliticization

Laird 1

Solar Energy, technology policy and institutional values

Frank Laird Associate Professor and Director, MA in International Studies Education PhD, Massachusetts Institute of Technology BA, Middlebury College Profile Associate Professor of Technology and Public Policy and Director, MA Degree in International Studies, Josef Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver; Interdisciplinary Programs in Health, Harvard School of Public Health (1985-1987); National Science Foundation research grants (1991-1992, 1998-2000, 2006-2008); Consultant, Center for Nanotechnology and Society, Arizona State University (2005-2008); Public Policy Committee, American Solar Energy Society (1999-2008), chair of committee (2002-2004); Board of Directors, American Solar Energy Society (2002-2004); Review Panel, Ethics and Values in Science Program, National Science Foundation (1993-1996); Contributing Editor, "Science, Technology & Human Values" (1993-1996); Faculty Affiliate, Center for Science and Technology Policy Research, University of Colorado (2001-present); Academic Advisory Board and Senior Faculty Associate, Center for Science, Policy and Outcomes, Arizona State University (1998-2003); American Association for the Advancement of Science, American Political Science Association, American Solar Energy Society, Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management. Research and Expertise Energy policy, especially with respect to renewable energy; environmental policy, especially with respect to climate change; science and technology policy; democracy and science policy. Programs, Centers and Institutes Center for Sustainable Development and International Peace

IMPORTANCE OF THE CASE The broad importance of energy to all aspects of life in industrial societies needs little discussion. Energy is part of every major technological activity, from agriculture and manufacturing to transportation and telecommunications. The roots of energy policy stem from the U.S. government's deep involvements in energy technologies, resources, and markets, an involvement that goes back over a century and shows no indication of disappearing.30 The government has been and continues to be involved in the research and planning for future energy resources. The Cold War powerfully influenced federal government R8cD priorities, and energy, especially nuclear energy, technologies figured prominently in those programs.31 The Cold War influence went beyond picking R&C.D priorities. As Stuart W. Leslie has argued, the military security orientation of such programs led technology and science policy in particular directions, emphasizing state-ofthe-art high performance often at the expense of technologies that could have important applications in the civilian economy.32 Such planning for the future seemed an immediate and pressing matter during most of the 1970s. It seems less so today, although there is no reason that it should. Planning for the future should not wait until a crisis strikes. Recent price increases remind us that the current low prices and ample supply of oil will not last indefinitely. A recent survey of studies of recoverable crude oil argues that world oil production is likely to peak somewhere between the years 2007 and 2014, and this conclusion does not assume any political events that will interrupt production.33 Energy could be a front-page issue again before long. Solar energy - or renewable energy, as such sources are usually called now - has the potential to be a major part of the world's energy sources as fossil fuels decline in production. As we will see, advocates have long depicted renewables as the resource that will enable the continuation of industrial civilization after the era of fossil fuels, and a recent spate of books and studies have updated and promoted that conclusion. Private analysts, solar and environmental advocates, government agencies such as the fomier Congressional Office of Technology Assessment, and some industry groups argue vigorously that renewable energy will be the cornerstone of future energy systems.34 Thus, understanding the history and dynamics of solar energy policy is important for understanding the possible changes in a technological system of great importance, now and in the future. Energy policy mostly focuses on existing sources of energy, their accompanying technological ensembles, and the conflicts of their associated regional economic and political interests. For example, the coal industry for years opposed increasing the quotas of imported residual fuel oil, typically used for home heating, into the United States, fearing that such imports would cut into their market share.35 In this type of conflict, well-established economic interests argue over policies that would affect their shares of wealth and income. The technologies and market structures involved are mature, the various interests have close, long-term relations to government agencies, and everyone acts as if they have a clear idea of which policies will advance their economic interests and which ones will not. In contrast, policy debates over solar energy are arguments over the shape of a large future technological system. Such policies necessarily confront immense uncertainties about interests and outcomes. This class of policies affects, in addition to energy, many of the most consequential technological systems of our time, including environmentally clean manufacturing, rapid changes in agriculture wrought by advances in biotechnology, and the linkages and developments in telecommunications and information technologies. Policies that governments adopt now will influence billions of dollars of investment in complex technological systems that will become constitutive parts of our society for years to come. The approach I take to this case thereby provides insights for analyzing some of these other issues. CRITIQUE OF THE POLICY-MAKING PROCESS Those who wish to challenge prevailing public policy must be able to challenge the sets of ideas that underlie the status quo. A democratic technology policy cannot content itself with giving citizens a set of cookie-cutter choices but must instead empower them to contest the underlying judgements and ideas that constitute those choices.36 Woodhouse and Collingridge stress that intelligent democratic processes must take into account the views of diverse partisans, lest unwise policies go unchallenged. Clearly, partisans who cannot challenge institutionalized ideas have very little scope for challenging policies in general. Hajer argues persuasively that substantial changes in policy require the dominance of new discourse coalitions, which entails institutionalizing new ideas.37 Langdon Winner addresses the problem that philosophical and other theoretical analyses seem to have little effect on the technologies that our societies produce, even when some actors in the system recognize that ethical and other normative issues will be greatly affected by the new technologies. Winner concludes that "the trouble is not that we lack good arguments and theories, but rather that modern politics simply does not provide appropriate roles and institutions in which the goal of defining the common good in technology policy is a legitimate project."38 This study takes Winner's critique seriously and asks why various technology policy processes, including those that provide channels through which advocates can participate, do not provide the deliberative institutions and roles that Winner calls for. In constructing technologies we do construct our future, and so our policies for the future, if they are to be democratic, require that citizens be able to challenge the institutionalized ideas that underlie the status quo.

## at: JMU Wilderson K

#### Historical Contingency is necessary to critically examine the position of the Slave and role of racism in state-formation – the variations on how that interaction can occur demands contingency

Masur 2004

Kate, assistant editor at the Freedmen and Southern Society Project at the University of Maryland, “Race and Nation: The United States in "Our America",” Radical History Review 89 (2004) 230-242

The course had four primary conceptual goals. First, I hoped to show the students that studying the nineteenth-century United States alongside other countries also experiencing colonialism, slavery, and emancipation could yield new insights, both about U.S. history and the histories of other countries. Second, I wanted the course to demonstrate that ideas about race and racism were critical in the formation of nations where slavery existed and that racism was not simply an "irrational" historical aberration. In the United States, racism became a national ideology, not characteristic only of the white South or of a few extremists. Third, I wanted to emphasize historical contingency, the idea that visions of nationhood were meaningfully contested, both in the United States and elsewhere. This would help students question whether the emergence of a segregated society after slavery was inevitable. Finally, I hoped to illuminate the agency, diversity, and sophistication of people of African descent in the era of slavery and emancipation. This goal complemented the previous one by demonstrating that some people rejected racism and advocated human equality, even in the nineteenth century. In sum, my goals were to encourage students both to appreciate the historical specificity of the nineteenth century and also think about larger historical questions regarding the formation of nations, inclusion and exclusion, international power, and the development of current-day racial predicaments. The course comprised twenty-five students and met twice a week for eighty minutes each time. The students were mostly sophomores and juniors, including several history majors. Although there were no official prerequisites, the expectation [End Page 231] for this level (300) was that students had some experience in history survey courses. Nonetheless, a number of students had never taken a history course before. Despite the university's considerable racial and ethnic diversity, the class was largely white, with (to my knowledge) just three black students, one Latino, and one student who identified himself as having one white and one Indian parent. In order to create a consistent framework for each week, I tried to reserve Tuesdays for lectures and Thursdays for discussions. The Tuesday lectures were intended to provide students with background information related to the reading, to address their questions, and to emphasize course themes. While I was reluctant to lecture too much, given the small size of the class, at midterm students said they found the lectures useful and even asked for more. I made weekly response papers a significant component of the students' semester grades (about 40 percent) and asked students to submit them to an e-mail listserv on Wednesday nights, in part to prepare the students for Thursday discussions. The listserv also allowed the students to see one another's papers. I was determined to get the students to wrestle with the readings and to practice writing about history. In my first term teaching at GMU, I had been frustrated by the lack of student engagement. I had probably assigned too much reading, and the format of that course—class discussions, midterm, final exam, and term paper—had allowed students to "learn" the texts only for the exams. For "Emancipation and Nationhood," then, I decided to assign more primary sources and the required weekly response papers. My intention was to push the students not only to do the reading but also to engage with it. I also hoped to establish a channel of communication with students who, on this largely commuter campus, rarely had time to attend office hours or stay after class. Chronologically, the course began with the Haitian revolution at the end of the eighteenth century and ended with the U.S. invasion of Cuba in 1898. These events seemed particularly fitting bookends to an era when slave emancipation and nation formation were critical—and intertwined—phenomena throughout the Americas. I organized the course around case studies that emphasized the diverse ways ideologies of nationhood were mobilized, as well as the significance of slave emancipation for challenging received visions of national identity. We began with the argument that the Haitian revolution should stand alongside the American and French revolutions as a cataclysmic event that heralded the dawning of a new era of "freedom" and forced people of European descent all over the world to consider the implications of slave insurrection and a nation governed by black people. Because the Haitian revolution was such a powerful emblem of whites' fears and blacks' aspirations in the nineteenth century, it worked well as a foundation for the course. The readings, including an overview article by Franklin Knight and a chapter from Michel-Rolf Trouillot's Silencing the Past (1995), conveyed the drama of the period. They also generated a lively discussion about why students had never [End Page 232] heard of the Haitian revolution and, by extension, whether their previous U.S. history courses had avoided discussing controversial facets of this country's history. A variety of subsequent readings identified the Haitian revolution as a pivotal event in the "American" past. As James Theodore Holly's history of Haiti, A Vindication of the Capacity of the Negro Race (1857) demonstrated, Haiti played a prominent role in the thought of black nationalist intellectuals based in the United States, who saw the island nation as an inspiration, a possible safe haven, and a living example of the capacity of people of African descent to govern themselves. We also saw, in Eric Foner's Nothing But Freedom (1983), that the example of Haiti weighed on the minds of the British as they considered slave emancipation in the West Indies. Thus, by the end of the course, when we turned to the Cuban struggle for independence from Spain, students were not surprised to learn how the Spanish used the specter of revolutionary Haiti to quell the insurgent movement and to foment fears among whites that Cuba would become "Africanized," or "another Haiti." From the Haitian revolution, we turned to the United States and considered ideologies of national identity in the early nineteenth century, placing special emphasis on black nationalism, Cherokee claims to nationhood, and the ideology of Manifest Destiny. Primary source readings from Wilson Moses's anthology, Classical Black Nationalism (1996), exposed students to African Americans' debates over the nature of black nationhood and the creation of a black nation in practice. Moses's introduction to the book—and the introductory materials for each document—were useful, but I sometimes felt at odds with Moses's insistence that true black nationalism must involve a claim to territorial sovereignty. In contrast, I wanted to emphasize that nations could also be "imagined communities" of which people might see themselves as members without laying claim to any particular piece of land. Visions of independent nationhood, even if never realized, could be tools of resistance against oppressive U.S. nationalism. The anthology was particularly good at illuminating the debates among northern black intellectuals about the meaning of black and "American" identities and about the dilemmas of living in a larger nation that rejected them as full participants. This helped convey to generally surprised students the vibrancy of the antebellum free black community. The fact that the Cherokee constituted themselves as a nation in order to defend against aggressive U.S. policies provided another pointed example of an oppressed "nation within a nation." Faced with the antagonistic and arbitrary policies of the United States and the state of Georgia, the Cherokee organized themselves as a nation, complete with a government, constitution, schools, and written language. The Cherokee Removal (1995), a document collection edited by Theda Purdue and Michael Green, proved excellent for helping the students see the complexity of Cherokee society and the multifaceted ways the Cherokee both accommodated and resisted the desires of the United States. Using the Purdue and Green text along with an article, we juxtaposed the Cherokee's efforts with the ideology of Manifest [End Page 233] Destiny, the contemporary view that the United States must become a continental nation ruled by white people.

Structural antagonism destroys progressivism and re-entrenches racism—we can acknowledge every problem with the status quo, but adopt a pragmatic orientation towards solutions

Clark, professor of law – Catholic University, ‘95

(Leroy D., 73 Denv. U.L. Rev. 23)

A Final Word

Despite Professor Bell's prophecy of doom, I believe he would like to have his analysis proven wrong. However, he desperately leans on a tactic from the past--laying out the disabilities of the black condition and accusing whites of not having the moral strength to act fairly. That is the ultimate theme in both of his books and in much of his law review writing. That tactic not only lacks full force against today's complex society, it also becomes, for many whites, an exaggerated claim that racism is the sole cause of black misfortunes. n146 Many whites may feel about the black condition what many of us may have felt about the homeless: dismayed, but having no clear answer as to how the problem is to be solved, and feeling individually powerless if the resolution calls for massive resources that we, personally, lack. Professor Bell's two books may confirm this sense of powerlessness in whites with a limited background in this subject, because Professor **Bell does not offer a single programmatic approach** toward changing the circumstance of blacks. He presents only startling, unanalyzed prophecies of doom, which will easily garner attention from a controversy-hungry media. n147

It is much harder to exercise imagination to create viable strategies for change. n148 Professor Bell sensed the despair that the average--especially average black--reader would experience, so he put forth rhetoric urging an "unremitting struggle that leaves no room for giving up." n149 His contention is ultimately hollow, given the total sweep of his work.

At some point it becomes dysfunctional to refuse giving any credit to the very positive abatements of racism that occurred with white support, and on occasion, white leadership. Racism thrives in an atmosphere of insecurity, apprehension about the future, and inter-group resentments. Unrelenting, unqualified accusations only add to that negative atmosphere. Empathetic and more generous responses are possible in an atmosphere of support, security, and a sense that advancement is possible; the greatest progress of blacks occurred during the 1960s and early 1970s when the economy was expanding. Professor Bell's "analysis" is really only accusation and "harassing white folks," and is undermining and destructive. There is no love--except for his own group--and there is a constricted reach for an understanding of whites. There is only rage and perplexity. No bridges are built--only righteousness is being sold.

A people, black or white, are capable only to the extent they believe they are. Neither I, nor Professor Bell, have a crystal ball, but I do know that creativity and a drive for change are very much linked to a belief that they are needed, and to a belief that they can make a difference. The future will be shaped by past conditions and the actions of those over whom we have no control. Yet it is not fixed; it will also be shaped by the attitudes and energy with which we face the future. Writing about race is to engage in a power struggle. It is a non-neutral political act, and one must take responsibility for its consequences. Telling whites that they are irremediably racist is not mere "information"; it is a force that helps create the future it predicts. If whites believe the message, feelings of futility could overwhelm any further efforts to seek change. I am encouraged, however, that the motto of the most articulate black spokesperson alive today, Jesse Jackson, is, "Keep hope alive!" and that much of the strength of Martin Luther King, Jr. was his capacity to "dream" us toward a better place.

## at: states cp (0:45)

President key for problem framing

Laird 1

Solar Energy, technology policy and institutional values

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INSTITUTIONS AND PROBLEM FRAMES Problem frames, and the ideas that constitute them, operate within institutions. As Schon and Rein put it, "Frames are not free-floating but are grounded in the institutions that sponsor them."21 Other scholars agree. Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane argue that ideas become powerful when they become institutionalized, and that such deeply embedded ideas can explain the phenomenon of policy inertia, of institutions sticking to a policy long after one might have expected it to change.22 To understand the ways that ideas, problems, frames, and so on influence public policy, we must investigate the ways in which ideas get institutionalized. Particular ideas come to dominate the official definition of a problem and the conceptualization of its possible solutions. These ideas also shape the institution's rules, organizational norms, and operating procedures. Substantial, enduring changes in policy require changes in the institutionalized ideas that influence policy, which can mean either changing ideas within an institution or changing which institution controls some policy. Frank Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones emphasize the latter to change institutionalized ideas and policies: This [policy] process is the interaction of beliefs and values concerning a particular policy, which we term the policy image, with the existing set of political institutions - the venues of policy action. In a pluralist political system, subsystems can be created that are highly favorable to a given industry. But at the same time, there remain other institutional venues that can serve as avenues for appeal for the disaffected.13 In short, if some policy advocates consistently fail to get the policy they want from some government institution, they can try taking their arguments to a different institution, perhaps a different congressional committee or executive branch agency. Jurisdiction over policy areas sometimes changes, and if that new institution becomes dominant, then the policy can change rapidly. The difficulty with this solution is that the new institution may not end up having decisive influence over the policy of concern, which in fact is what happened in the case of solar energy policy. Alternatively, advocates can stick with the dominant institution and try to change the ideas that guide it. New ideas can change the meaning or understanding associated with some policy solution, in this case a technology, so that it looks like a more plausible solution to an old problem. Similarly, changes in ideas can change the way the problem is framed, so that the relevant government officials consider as a plausible solution technologies that they previously rejected or did not even take seriously. Maarten Hajer's work on discourse coalitions alerts us to an important pitfall in the analysis of institutionalized ideas used to explain policy change, or the lack of it. He describes discourses as "an ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categories through which meaning is given to phenomena. Discourses frame certain problems, that is to say, they distinguish some aspects of a situation rather than others." The relationship of Hajer's discourses to the ideas and frames discussed above is obvious. He reminds us that we cannot conclude that ideas are influencing policy just because some institution has started using a particular discourse in its statements, but that we must look at the institution's practices and decisions before we conclude that the par-ticular discourse has become institutionalized and dominant in some part of policy making. Important actors may start speaking the stories of a new discourse, what he calls discourse structuration, but we must also analyze what the institutions do to see which discourses are in fact institutionalized."4 For the case of solar energy, and other future-oriented energy policies, we need to analyze which government officials were in a position to influence this kind of change and the institutional structures in which they operated, including the means by which nongovernmental actors had access to them. We will also need to analyze the ways that institutionalized ideas shaped the official definitions of problems and how some actors tried to change those definitions. The ideas held at the top levels of policy making, especially in the executive branch, are more important than are usually given credit in the policy literature. In the solar case, what appeared to be a substantial and enduring change during the 1970s, particularly at the agency level, was in fact ephemeral because, in part, of the stability of the way the issue was defined at the presidential level, despite vigorous efforts to change that definition. Making a large change in this type of institutionalized problem frame entails dramatic changes in a massive part of the nation's technological infrastructure, with all the accompanying political, economic, and social changes. Such policy changes must have high-level support, s|nce they will conflict with many other ideas, goals, and interests held by previously persuasive stakeholders and hence encounter stiff resistance from those who prize the status quo.25 Thus the key for this study will be how new values were, or were not, institutionalized in the Executive Office of the President (EOP). I will also analyze congressional actions to some extent, but on solar energy policy these were mostly reactive to executive branch actions, even in the late 1970s. The EOP was the key barrier to substantial energy policy change. I do not mean by these comments to dismiss Congress as an important influence on policy. Assorted energy advocates used congressional committees very successfully as a means of promoting their technologies and keeping pressure on the executive branch. This pressure was felt most intensely in the appropriations process. My analysis will carefully depict the interaction of the Congress with energy advocates and the executive branch. That said, this analysis still focuses primarily on the executive branch because it retained the ability to set the dominant frame for the issue. Throughout the history of energy policy, the president and his advisors remained the crucial actors for undertaking new policy initiatives linked to new ideas about policy.