# Rd 1 vs. Georgetown CV (Solar Bank)

## 1NC

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#### A. Violation - Should refers to a future act that has not been carried out

Remo 32Foresi v. The Hudson Coal Co, SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA, 106 Pa. Super. 307; 161 A. 910; 1932 Pa. Super. LEXIS 239 July 14,

As regards the mandatory character of the rule, the word 'should' is not only an auxiliary verb, it is also the preterite of the verb, 'shall' and has for one of its meanings as defined in the Century Dictionary: "Obliged or compelled (to); would have (to); must; ought (to); used with an infinitive (without to) to express obligation, necessity or duty in connection with some act yet to be carried out." We think it clear that it is in that sense that the word 'should' is used in this rule, not merely advisory. When the judge in charging the jury tells them that, unless they find from all the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant is guilty of the offense charged, they should acquit, the word 'should' is not used in an advisory sense but has the force or meaning of 'must', or 'ought to' and carries with it the sense of obligation and duty equivalent to compulsion. A natural sense of sympathy for a few unfortunate claimants who have been injured while doing something in direct violation of law must not be so indulged as to fritter away, or nullify, provisions which have been enacted to safeguard and protect the welfare of thousands who are engaged in the hazardous occupation of mining.

#### B. This is a voting issue

#### 1. Limits – There are a huge number of past instances where the federal government has increased financial incentives or lifted restrictions – each of these is wildly unpredictable for the negative.

#### 2. negative ground – allowing counterfactuals means that every case has a different timeframe – it is impossible to create adequate generic negative ground, reading disads against this affirmative is impossible

#### 3. Resolutional context – should is etymologically the past tense of shall but in the resolution it is used in the present tense – it says “should substantially reduce”, not “should have reduced” which implies a recommendation for the future

**Haning, 92 –** acting presiding judge (KEITH BOAM et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. TRIDENT FINANCIAL CORPORATION et al., Defendants and Appellants. No. A050366 COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA, FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT, DIVISION FIVE 6 Cal. App. 4th 738; 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 177; 1992 Cal. App. LEXIS 628; 929 Cal. Daily Op. Service 4147; 92 Daily Journal DAR 6505 May 14, 1992, Decided, lexis)

**(6) Words, Phrases, and Maxims--Should.**--Etymologically, "should" is the past tense of "shall," which ordinarily implies a command, but "should" used in the present or future tense, while not synonymous with and more forceful than "may," can convey only a moral obligation or strong recommendation.

#### There counterfactual good evidence isn’t offense – you can use past to shape future policies – playing by the rules is keep to make debate meaningful

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Debate games are often based on pre-designed scenarios that include descriptions of issues to be debated, educational goals, game goals, roles, rules, time frames etc. In this way, debate games differ from textbooks and everyday classroom instruction as debate scenarios allow teachers and students to actively imagine, interact and communicate within a domain-specific game space. However, instead of mystifying debate games as a “magic circle” (Huizinga, 1950), I will try to overcome the epistemological dichotomy between “gaming” and “teaching” that tends to dominate discussions of educational games. In short, educational gaming is a form of teaching. As mentioned, education and games represent two different semiotic domains that both embody the three faces of knowledge: assertions, modes of representation and social forms of organisation (Gee, 2003; Barth, 2002; cf. chapter 2). In order to understand the interplay between these different domains and their interrelated knowledge forms, I will draw attention to a central assumption in Bakhtin’s dialogical philosophy. According to Bakhtin, all forms of communication and culture are subject to centripetal and centrifugal forces (Bakhtin, 1981). A centripetal force is the drive to impose one version of the truth, while a centrifugal force involves a range of possible truths and interpretations. This means that any form of expression involves a duality of centripetal and centrifugal forces: “Every concrete utterance of a speaking subject serves as a point where centrifugal as well as centripetal forces are brought to bear” (Bakhtin, 1981: 272). If we take teaching as an example, it is always affected by centripetal and centrifugal forces in the on-going negotiation of “truths” between teachers and students. In the words of Bakhtin: “Truth is not born nor is it to be found inside the head of an individual person, it is born between people collectively searching for truth, in the process of their dialogic interaction” (Bakhtin, 1984a: 110). Similarly, the dialogical space of debate games also embodies centrifugal and centripetal forces. Thus, the election scenario of The Power Game involves centripetal elements that are mainly determined by the rules and outcomes of the game, i.e. the election is based on a limited time frame and a fixed voting procedure. Similarly, the open-ended goals, roles and resources represent centrifugal elements and create virtually endless possibilities for researching, preparing, 51 presenting, debating and evaluating a variety of key political issues. Consequently, the actual process of enacting a game scenario involves a complex negotiation between these centrifugal/centripetal forces that are inextricably linked with the teachers and students’ game activities. In this way, the enactment of The Power Game is a form of teaching that combines different pedagogical practices (i.e. group work, web quests, student presentations) and learning resources (i.e. websites, handouts, spoken language) within the interpretive frame of the election scenario. Obviously, tensions may arise if there is too much divergence between educational goals and game goals. This means that game facilitation requires a balance between focusing too narrowly on the rules or “facts” of a game (centripetal orientation) and a focusing too broadly on the contingent possibilities and interpretations of the game scenario (centrifugal orientation). For Bakhtin, the duality of centripetal/centrifugal forces often manifests itself as a dynamic between “monological” and “dialogical” forms of discourse. Bakhtin illustrates this point with the monological discourse of the Socrates/Plato dialogues in which the teacher never learns anything new from the students, despite Socrates’ ideological claims to the contrary (Bakhtin, 1984a). Thus, discourse becomes monologised when “someone who knows and possesses the truth instructs someone who is ignorant of it and in error”, where “a thought is either affirmed or repudiated” by the authority of the teacher (Bakhtin, 1984a: 81). In contrast to this, dialogical pedagogy fosters inclusive learning environments that are able to expand upon students’ existing knowledge and collaborative construction of “truths” (Dysthe, 1996). At this point, I should clarify that Bakhtin’s term “dialogic” is both a descriptive term (all utterances are per definition dialogic as they address other utterances as parts of a chain of communication) and a normative term as dialogue is an ideal to be worked for against the forces of “monologism” (Lillis, 2003: 197-8). In this project, I am mainly interested in describing the dialogical space of debate games. At the same time, I agree with Wegerif that “one of the goals of education, perhaps the most important goal, should be dialogue as an end in itself” (Wegerif, 2006: 61).

#### Education: Historical analysis divorced from present policy choices is bankrupt --- connecting the two in an academic environment is essential for meaningfully advancing progressive politics and averting extinction

Susan Graseck 8, director of the Choices for the 21st Century Education Program at Brown University and a Senior Fellow at Brown’s Watson Institute for International Studies, “Explore the Past to Understand the Present and Shape the Future,” Social Education 72(7), pp 367–370

In Robert Heilbroner’s prophetic book, An Inquiry into the Human Prospect, published in 1974, he examined three threats to the survival of humanity that he believed world leaders would have to address in order to avert disaster—nuclear annihilation, overpopulation, and environmental catastrophe. 1 In recent years, the emerging possibilities of nuclear terrorism, the struggle of the community of nations to contend with massive starvation and major disasters, and frequent revelations on the impact of climate change have become more deeply etched into our consciousness and underscore the prescience of Heilbroner’s forecast.¶ These are **worldwide problems**, inextricably connecting national interests to global solutions. Will the rising generation be equipped to deal with the world they are inheriting? And what is our responsibility as social studies educators?¶ We all know that **our students** need more than the facts. They **need** a basic **understanding of our history**—where we came from or how civilizations have evolved and interacted. **But they also need to understand why this knowledge is important and how it relates to their present.** They need to appreciate how this knowledge is useful as we create the next chapter, the one they will “co-author.” And they need to believe it—that it is their chapter.¶ History doesn’t just happen; it is made—made by real people who faced real challenges, who had uncertainty about the future, just as we do today. Author David McCullough has said, ... history is not about the past. If you think about it, no one ever lived in the past.... They lived in the present. The difference is it was their present, not ours. They were caught up in the living moment exactly as we are, and with no more certainty of how things would turn out than we have.2¶ Astute social studies teachers move with ease between past and present; it is their stock-in-trade. We want students to understand what it was like to live at critical moments in history, to feel the moment as those living it did. We also want them to understand that history can be an important instrument that informs our approach to critical issues today.¶ Just as McCullough reminds us that history is made in the present, it is also important to remember that when history is made it becomes a piece of our world, a factor in our future decisions. In September 2002, media coverage had increased public awareness of brewing policy regarding U.S. plans in Iraq. By early 2003, the country and the wider world were in turmoil over what approach to take concerning Saddam Hussein. As Washington debated a plan of action, students in more than 4,000 classrooms, guided by their teachers, wrestled with a set of alternative policy options articulated in an online curriculum resource.¶ If we try to put ourselves back in that moment, it is difficult now to remember that the United States was wrestling with the question of what to do about Saddam Hussein and his alleged weapons of mass destruction and which nations would join with us. Should the United States (1) act alone to remove Saddam Hussein from power and eliminate his weapons of mass destruction; (2) work with the international community to eliminate Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction; (3) reject war—at least now—and continue to contain and deter Saddam Hussein; or (4) reject the use of military force and reduce our foreign policy profile? All were tough choices with real consequences. When the nation went to war with Iraq in March 2003, Washington had made its choice; and with it, a new chapter in history began to take shape.¶ As the current war in Iraq deepened, the Choices Program developed a substantive resource to engage students in exploration of the history of Iraq, from its early years to the present. Working with this resource, students acquire a contextualized understanding of Iraqi history and the history of U.S. policy in the region and, in turn, a more complete understanding of the political, social, and cultural forces at play today. Armed with this historical knowledge, students are prepared to deliberate on current policy using a framework of divergent policy alternatives that we as Americans are facing. These “options” are framed in stark terms, complete with competing policy proposals, risks, and trade-offs.3 These could also be understood as “futures”— alternative images of a moment in the future arrived at through competing approaches to the current challenge.¶ Evaluating the significance of theoretical choices is precarious, but necessary, if students are to learn how to conceptualize the future and participate in decisions in the present. **If our students are to become** competent analysts **of world affairs and** problem solvers **tomorrow**, we **must engage them in informed deliberation on the uncertainties of history** and the challenges of the present—**analysis typically conducted by scholars and policy elites.** A Jeffersonian outlook on the responsibility of **an informed citizenry** would suggest that the public **has a key role to play, to set the broad parameters within which policy is made.**¶If our students are going to be prepared to participate as active citizens shaping the world of tomorrow, they must understand that history didn’t just happen, it was made, and that they have a place in making the choices that will become the history of tomorrow. If they are to appreciate fully the dynamic nature of this continuum from past to future, they will need to acquire a variety of intellectual skills. They must be able to: • Understand multiple perspectives and competing interpretations; • Grasp the concept of multiple causation; • Contextualize the past; • Make connections across time and place; • Differentiate among fact, opinion, and interpretation; • Weigh the importance and reliability of evidence and explain its significance; • Comprehend and use primary sources; and • Formulate rational conclusions.¶ The theme of this year’s National Council for the Social Studies conference is “Embrace the Future.” If we want our students to embrace the future that we are, in fact, constructing together, we must help them understand that **we do not study history because it’s good for us,** we study it because it is also about our future. They will only understand this if they can see the continuum from past to future and view the content we teach within the context of that continuum. When we at the Choices Program say, “Explore the past—shape the future,” it is this very continuum that we have in mind.

### 1NC

#### In 1981, Reagan won passage of the sale of AWACs --- political capital was necessary.

The New York Times, 10/30/**1981** (The Price of Five Airplanes, p. Lexis-Nexis)

How can I convince foreign leaders that I am in command if I cannot sell five airplanes? That was the clincher. Having needlessly staked the Presidency on the sale of Awacs and other formidable weapons to Saudi Arabia, Mr. Reagan had to win, at all costs. In the desperate quest for Senate votes, no hospital opening or base closing was overlooked. There was no compunction about uttering even the vilest threats, of retribution against Israel and of anti-Semitism in America. All this made the contest close. And in the end, the President prevailed primarily because he played so well on the patriotism of some of the most principled opponents of the deal. They preferred the risks of a wrong policy to the danger of a discredited Presidency. So once again Mr. Reagan is an impressive winner. ''It was in the fourth quarter with goal to go,'' he told his staff. ''You pushed it over.'' But as he must be learning, politics differs from football; winning differs from success. Recall last summer's Presidential triumphs in Congress. Then, too, no weapon was spared to win the battle of the budget and the tax-cut superbowl. Yet by fall the Administration felt adrift, needing yet another great victory. Why? Because of the costly concessions spent to win passage of the tax bill. They threatened such enormous budget deficits that the money markets refused to respond to the victory with the predicted optimism. In politics, what you win, and how you win it, also count. By the most generous reckoning, what Mr. Reagan has won is some room for maneuver, an opportunity to get Saudi Arabia to repay him with significant diplomatic support in the Middle East. His re-cent arguments notwithstanding, the Saudis have been almost as recalcitrant as the toughest Arab adversaries. They not only denounced Camp David but worked against it by contributing to the isolation of Egypt and the intransigence of Palestinians. They have opposed American requests for military installations in the Persian Gulf. When pressed, in this Awacs fight, to demonstrate that they really accept Israel, they offered peace - on the P.L.O.'s terms. These very arguments against the Awacs deal define the ways in which Mr. Reagan could redeem what he says is a Saudi promise of ''substantial assistance'' in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict. But against that possibility, the President has also proved that America is vulnerable to economic blackmail. Americans were shown to be acutely sensitive to the fear of another oil embargo and, more explicitly, of losing Saudi investments and contracts. Redeeming a promise to sell weapons to Saudi Arabia was shown to be more important than keeping a promise to Congress and to Israel that such weapons would not be sold. Time will tell what else has been lost by the expenditure of so much political capital on ''five airplanes.'' Surely the greatest cost of Mr. Reagan's victory will be the political damage in Israel. For even if he is right about the Saudis' desire and capacity to make peace, he will also require difficult Israeli concessions, in land and trust, to move the negotiations forward. Those concessions cannot come from an Israel turned resentful and mistrustful. Healing words now are better than gloating, but words alone will not turn this political victory into a diplomatic success. Mr. Reagan has proved his muscle but not his wisdom. He can sell the airplanes, but can he collect their true price?

#### Reagan’s political capital was necessary to pass the AWACs deal through Congress --- failure to pass it results collapses U.S. leadership, and leads to Middle East instability

**U.S. News & World Report**, 11/9/**1981** (Impact of AWACS Decision, p. Lexis-Nexis0

The significance of Ronald Reagan's dramatic victory in the Senate goes far beyond the mere sale of AWACS radar planes to Saudi Arabia. At home-\* In a crucial arena, Capitol Hill, the President keeps almost intact his reputation as a strong leader who can get his way when he truly sets his mind to it. \* Yet, mastering Congress on major economic issues could still prove difficult for Reagan because of the political capital he used up in the AWACS fight. \* Democrats see in the rebuff to the Israeli lobby an opportunity to woo back Jewish voters who bolted to the Republican column in 1980. Abroad-\* The President looms as a stronger figure in world affairs, one capable of delivering on his promises. \* The United States wields new leverage in its efforts to bring moderate Arab states into the Mideast peace process. \* The Mideast arms race threatens to become more intense as Israel demands new weapons for itself to balance the Saudi AWACS. The October 28 Senate vote was as pivotal for the President as it was for the Saudis. The stunning 52-to-48 come-from-behind victory was widely viewed as a tribute to Reagan's powers of persuasion. In more than nine months in the White House, he has yet to lose a single major congressional battle. Yet Senate approval for the 8.5-billion-dollar arms package did not come cheaply. Many senators who agreed to vote for the sale walked away with a variety of presidential IOU's, including the right to make future judicial appointments in their districts. While the President focused on the AWACS fight, opposition to his latest budget-cut proposals mounted. In late October, Congress voted for two major appropriations bills that far exceed what the administration wants. ''We have not learned to deal effectively with several issues at once,'' admits a senior White House aide. ''It's been much tougher going for us than we anticipated.'' As Reagan turned his attention back to the budget cuts before Congress in early November, he was expected to find that many of his political chips had been spent. Some of his advisers feared that his successful style of personal persuasion might soon begin wearing thin with members of Congress. Democratic Party leaders were looking further down the road. Remembering that former President Carter alienated many Jewish voters by selling F-15s to Saudi Arabia in 1978, the Democrats hoped that Reagan's AWACS sale would work in their favor in the 1982 and 1984 elections. But such erosion will be less likely if the AWACS sale ends up advancing the cause of peace in the Mideast. In his talks with senators, Reagan repeatedly suggested that the Saudis would join the Camp David peace process in exchange for AWACS. ''Peace is again on the march in the Middle East,'' he declared in his victory statement. In the month ahead, the President can be expected to capitalize on the AWACS sale by trying to bring Saudi Arabia and other moderate Arab nations into the peace process. ''This is a fortuitous time for us to take special action in the Middle East,'' said a Reagan aide. The scheduled visit to Washington by Jordan's King Hussein in early November gave U.S. officials a chance to assess the impact of the Saudi AWACS deal on other Arab states. The Senate vote created a more favorable atmosphere for this visit. Still, U.S. policymakers acknowledge that Reagan obtained no commitment from the Saudis to join the peace process. As one White House official said: ''There are no rabbits in this hat.'' Another explained: ''Defeat might have been 3 steps backward, but victory is only 1 step or 1 1/2 steps forward.'' Peace efforts may be further complicated by the reaction of Israel. The Israeli Cabinet issued a statement saying that the Senate vote posed ''a new, serious danger. . .that must be overcome'' by the Jewish state. Some U.S. diplomats fear this view may cause the Israelis to become more rigid in future peace negotiations. Pressure for stepped-up arms shipments to Israel was inevitable in the wake of the AWACS decision. Ambassador Ephraim Evron immediately called upon Reagan to provide additional arms to his country. Administration officials indicated the U.S. was willing to comply. While the cost of victory was high, the price of defeat would have been even higher. ''The consequences of the failure to win AWACS would have been substantial and would have retarded the peace process considerably,'' says a senior White House official. Question of credibility. Defeat would have undermined Reagan's credibility in the conduct of foreign policy. In dealing with the U.S., foreign governments would have been inhibited by doubts about the President's capacity to deliver on his promises. Furthermore, diplomatic experts say, the administration's Mideast policy inevitably would have been wrecked.

#### The plan costs capital --- it’s massively unpopular.

**The Washington Post**, 7/17/**1979** (Head Start on Hill; Many of Carter’s Energy Proposals Already Moving Through Congress, p. Lexis-Nexis)

Congressional committees are prepared to consider the solar bank and various tax credits the president proposed but are waiting to receive his detailed requests. In sum, a lot of the program is on track in Congress. "Our problem," said Jackson, "is that the administration has not got its bill up here." Carter's Sunday night speech drew applause from many of the outside advisers he had called to Camp David early in his reevaluation. Clark Clifford, a veteran Washington lawyer and former secretary of defense, said Carter's speech was "well conceived, well-structured and particularly well-presented. He came across as a deadly serious man who recognizes the enormity of the challenge facing this country. I think people would respond to that kind of leadership, even if it means sacrifices." John Gardner, the founder and former president of Common Cause, said, "My reaction is that it was a very good start on persuading the American people we really have to get our backs into this." Gardner said he recognized that the substance of Carter's energy program - already drawing fire from environmentalists - would be controversial. "But after six years of bickering we have to get together on something," he said, "so I'm with him." Sol Linowitz, another senior Washington lawyer invited to Camp David by Carter, said, "He certainly struck the theme that I hoped he would, and I thought he laid it out well." Robert Keefe, a Washington consultant who also was an overnight guest of the president, said "it was a pretty good performance and succeeded in translating what he had in his mind into effective rhetoric." But in Congress, reaction was mixed, with Democrats generally enthusiastic and Republicans not.

#### Reagan influence is key to prevent a Middle East collapse --- the result would be an escalatory nuclear World War.

**The Washington Post**, 5/8/**1983** (A Mideast Solution, Or A Step Toward Holocaust?; If we don't get a peace agreement, the fire next time may be radioactive, p. Lexis-Nexis)

But if the president succumbs to the temptations to deemphasize his Mideast diplomacy, that decision will be shortsighted and perrilous in the long run. The recent history of diplomacy in the Middle East does show that active U.S. involvement in the search for peace is frustrating and dangerous. But the same history proves that exercises in non-involvement -- what the diplomats like to call "back-burner" diplomacy -- invariably lead to new disasters, each more damaging to U.S. interests -- and threatening to world stability -- than the last. To turn one's back on the unpleasant realities of the Middle East, as some now counsel, is not an escape from failure and frustration, but rather a guarantee of unavoidable future involvement in much graver trouble to come. No good can come from a passive reliance on the region's suicidal dynamics to put things right. It is an exercise in the politics of the absurd to talk of American disengagement from the Middle East. Disengagement is impossible because of our strategic interests in the region's ultimate stability, our government's commitments to important allies such as Israel, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and the perceived need to check any Soviet advances into a region whose oil is so vital to the capitalist world. Washington may not be able or willing to determine the course of events in the Middle East as it might wish. But to suddenly abandon all efforts to influence political developments in the area would not only be an act of folly, but could lead to unspeakable new horrors that could engulf nations far beyond the Middle East. The terrible progression of the five nasty wars between Israel and the Arabs since 1948 demonstrates the huge stakes the United States and the entire world have in Middle East stability. The first Arab-Israeli war in 1948 was fought with horse cavalries, small arms, and homemade armored cars built onto truck chassis. By the fifth and most recent war in Lebanon last summer, the combattants had raised the ante of violence to include day-long duels of heavy field artillery, the introduction of such ghastly instruments of destruction as phosphorus shells and cluster bombs, the blitzkrieg of fleets of modern tanks, and the relentless dive bombings of such sophisticated state-of-the-art jet planes as Israel's U.S.-made F16s. The next war, if it is not avoided, can only prove worse. But the most frightening -- and, alas, not unimaginable -- prospect is a nuclear war at some future date if peace continues to elude the region. A nuclear exchange would be a logical conclusion to the frightening arms race produced by the Middle East conflict over the years. Though Israel has studiously avoided admitting the fact, Western intelligence organizations generally agree that Israel has had atomic bombs since at least 1973. Today, it is believed, Israel has the components for seven to 10 such weapons -- enough to drop one on each major Arab capital -- stored in underground shelters. They could probably be armed for delivery in a matter of minutes. Israel obviously understands that its monopoly of nuclear weaponry in the Middle East is not unchallengeable -- hence the reckless decision to bomb two French-built nuclear reactors that were being installed outside of the Iraqi capital of Baghdad in 1981. Israel justified the bombing on the grounds that those reactors could be used to manufacture an Arab nuclear bomb. But it would be foolish to bet that Israel will forever be able to prevent the Arabs from acquiring their own bomb. Given the financial resources of the Arabs, the all-too-easily mastered technology involved, and the thousands of Arab students studying nuclear physics in universities around the world, an Arab nuclear bomb cannot be more than a decade away. If the world cannot somehow impose a viable peace in the region before then, the Middle East could well become the Sarajevo of World War III. It is to avoid that horrendous prospect that Washington must continue to search for a peace, no matter what frustrations result or what humiliations come from failures of policy. Domestic political considerations aside, the Reagan administration, and its successors, must wake up to the perilous consequences if the Middle East conflict is not resolved before a nuclear holocaust makes the whole question academic.

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#### Text: The fifty state governments of the United States should increase financial incentives for solar power through full funding of the Solar Bank.

#### 50 State action solves better

Milford 10 (Lewis – The founder and president of Clean Energy Group (CEG), “Federal Climate and Energy Legislation and the States: Legislative Principles and Recommendations for a New Clean Energy Federalism”, April, http://www.cleanenergystates.org/assets/Uploads/CEGCleanEnergyFederalismv3April2010.pdf)

States should and will remain the laboratories of experimentation and innovation on technology and economic development because most energy investment decisions are made at the state and/or local utility and customer level. 2. State and local clean energy development decisions are made closer to the markets, are often more politically durable and stable over time, and should be encouraged. 3. There is no simple, standard or optimal clean energy program design and practice that will achieve carbon stabilization; instead, all states and local jurisdictions should be given adequate federal resources and assistance to create and implement a diverse portfolio of finance, technology, and policy tools to create the necessary fifty state programs to advance a clean energy future. 4. There are many existing, experienced and “best practice” state-based, clean energy institutions that deserve continued and expanded support for their decade-long successes in these areas. 5. States can develop more nuanced and effective finance mechanisms that can leverage private sector development because they know their markets, their market players and their barriers to success. 6. Bottom-up, distributed solutions that the states can provide have always proved the most responsive and nimble solutions **that best respect the ever changing demands of locally regulated state energy investment decisions**, which are the hallmark of the US energy sector. 7. States should be given express authority to enact climate and clean energy policy and laws that are more stringent and aggressive than the federal programs.

#### the Aff reinforces centralization, making extinction inevitable – local action is the only solution

Papworth 1 (John, Founding Editor – Fourth World Review, “Peace Through Social Empowerment”, 9-5, http://www.cesc.net/adobeweb/radcon/radical.pdf)

To state that humankind is at a crossroads which will determine whether in the immediate future civilisation will survive at all, is but a statement of the obvious: The imminent global threats of nuclear and biological war, the sustained barrage of environmental hooliganism now characteristic of industrialised societies, food prospects and population pressures, which can only herald an era of mass starvation or numbers decimated by disease, and the murder of man’s creative role in work and in social and political structures, should, if there were any common awareness or concern, be prompting a whole series of emergency conferences across the globe to meet the challenges they present. Instead, for the most part, there is ignorance, passivity, and unconcern at every level of society, whilst avarice in the name of economic management, and power-seeking in the name of government, bestrides the world like a colossus. Yet it must be said, and it is surely imperative to note, everywhere there are signs of life-affirmation against a prospect of what The Duke of Edinburgh has called ‘a winter of death’ to which he claims mankind is moving. Everywhere there is resistance, and the number of grass-roots organisations across the world which have been formed in recent decades to give voice to peoples’ concerns about the general drift of affairs now runs into many thousands. A great many of these organisations are focussed on the effects rather than the causes of the global crisis, so that we have organisations opposed to war, opposed to chemical farming, opposed to corporation-style capitalism, opposed to the europlot and to the 'Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI)', opposed to the destruction of the rain forests, opposed to oceanic over-fishing, opposed to big government oppression of small nations (Tibet, Chechnya, Kashmir, Kurdistan, etc, etc), opposed to gender discrimination, opposed to the animal cruelty implicit in factory farming, opposed to genetic engineering, opposed to large dams, opposed to armaments and so on and so on. The full list is as extensive as it is remarkable and commendable; indeed one cannot but be profoundly grateful that these numerous bodies exist at all. Yet it has to be said that overall they are having only a marginal effect on the general drift to disaster and the reason for this may well be because they are largely concerned with the effects of the abuses of power, abuses that have created the crisis, rather than its causes. All too often these multitudinous campaigns stem from a quite unfounded assumption that the problem does not lie in the general scale and structure of society, or in the general body of values on which it operates, but in the failure to adopt the particular reform the campaigners may have in view. This is the principle reason why all this diverse and altruistic activity, often promoted with tremendous idealism and devotion, is yielding so little of decisive effect. In consequence the global crisis does not abate, rather does it increase at an accelerating rate. Why? The Russian Revolution of 1917 was, after all, largely the work of a mere handful of dedicated zealots and is by no means an isolated example of how a tiny minority has succeeded in imposing itself on a huge majority. There is no call here for anyone to impose anything on anybody, but if the Bolsheviks initially lacked numbers they lacked neither clarity of aim, however mistaken, nor unity, however rigidly imposed, whereas today the movement for radical reform suffers both confusion of aim and a general lack of adherence to a common purpose. Is it possible that a firm affirmation of the imperative need for localised, non-centralised decision-making in village-sized communities across the globe, as being the indispensable basis for democratic government and democratic control of events, might repair these two lacks? PART IV. PRIMARY CAUSATIVE FACTORS In posing the question we are of course pointing to the need to grasp the real nature of the causes of the global crisis. What then are those causes? We are concerned to locate here but one. Every former age can show how power has been abused to one degree or another, what is singular about the modern era is the sheer scale of that abuse; it is a scale which, armed with a vast panoply of chemical and mechanical invention, is able to dominate citizen life right down to the minutest particulars as never before. The power implied here, as indicated above, is on so enormous a scale as to be out of control, it is running amok and creating crisis situations in almost every sphere of human experience and endeavour. One of the major defects of so many organisations seeking to arrest the ensuing effects of the abuses of power is just that. So often they are seeking to restore a status quo ante, a status that produced the problem in the first place. We need to see that the massive abuses of power now dominating human affairs have their origins in the destruction of genuine peoples’ power, power at the smallest level of society, in the village, the neighbourhood, the community or whatever name we choose to give it; power which was frequently expressed in work, in localised trading, in relationships and in a wide range of social usages, common understandings and adherence to a common code of moral principle. Our prospects of countering the evil forces promoting the global crisis and of making any significant progress are bleak indeed if we do not grasp that if people have no real power to enable their moral judgements to be reflected in the general life processes of their own communities, if they do not themselves control their social structures, their schools, post office, bank, police, hospital, transport and their welfare services; if they have no local power to determine these matters, if they do not have their own locally elected representatives to sit, with others similarly elected, on boards which govern matters of wider import, including public utilities such as water, gas, electricity and not least, governing the content of radio and television, they have no effective power at all. The very structures disempower them and it is a mere abuse of language to describe any such process as democratic. Democracy, we should never cease to hold, does not mean government of the people, nor government for the people, both are essentially totalitarian concepts, it means government by the people. All else is claptrap and delusion. Once the power of people to make decisions at community level is nullified by shunting that power to ever larger centres of administration and control, then what becomes determinative is not the will of the people but factors attendant on the pursuit of power, whether in terms of place, profit or prestige, as an end in itself. . Supposing then our reform movements changed tack? Supposing they tackled the problem of giantism and of excessive size in order to restore control of affairs back in citizen hands? And suppose all these reform and protest organisations joined hands to do so? What then would be involved? They would be agents of the most thoroughgoing and peaceful revolution the world has ever seen. A revolution not to capture power but to dissolve it. To dissolve it into people’s hands where it rightly belongs in the manifold neighbourhoods, villages, parishes and human scale political structures throughout the world. They would be putting paid to the absurd notion that the citizen can have a meaningful voice or influence in political parties or in governments so enormous as to make it inevitable that power will be in the hands of those who are controlling things at the centre, a control which ensures that they control the party conferences, agendas, policies, candidate lists and so on. So persuasive is the power of established practice, and the powerful propaganda that accompanies it in asserting the natural and inevitable validity of our current institutions, that it requires a real effort of mind to recognise that far from being natural or inevitable they are neither. They are based in fact on quite unsustainable assumptions and not least of these assumptions relates to current scheming and plotting (it really is nothing less) to unite Europe under one Brussels-dominated Government. Foremost, with the horrific tragedy of two world wars uppermost in mind, there is the assumption that a united ‘Europe’ will achieve peace. Will it? Can it? The mere supposition that it can and will ignores the lessons of all the other giant federations already in existence. Have any one of them achieved peace? The USA, the most powerful of them all, has been involved in every major war of the 20th century. Is it likely that it will prove any more peaceful in the 21st? India, to take another example, despite its crippling poverty, since the transfer of colonial power from Westminster to Delhi, has had a military confrontation with every one of its neighbours. China, to take another, despite numerically being the largest state on earth yet sees fit to invade and subjugate the ancient peoples of Tibet. Russia, like all other monster states, is armed to the eyebrows with nuclear weapons and is even now waging a genocidal war against the people of the independent state of Chechnya. Brazil, to take yet another monster, is busy destroying the priceless human heritage of its rain forests, its government operates in a morass of drug-related and other forms of corruption and if it has yet to be a threat to peace beyond its borders it is only because it currently lacks the means to mount one. Is there anyone sanguine enough to suppose a united ‘Europe’ will behave differently? Its government is already a byword for corruption on a scale even the USA finds difficult to rival, and already its leading voices are urging the need for an ‘European’ army. None of this should surprise any intelligent observer; the birth of ‘Europe’ has been accomplished, insofar as it has yet succeeded, by a team of midwives difficult to distinguish from a bunch of crooks. But, we are assured, ‘Europe’ is the path to prosperity. It will be noted that the assurance is based on the supposition that a continuance of current policies of economic growth have any vestige of moral validity, or that to achieve globally the material consumption standards of an average U.S household would not require the resources of several more planets. But if uniting Europe will achieve prosperity where is the evidence? Are there any lessons to be learned here from the world’s existing giant federations? The USA is undoubtedly, in terms of per capita gross national product, the wealthiest nation the world has ever seen, but is it a form of riches, given the environmental holocaust it has engendered to achieve it, one which others ought to pursue? We may also ignore that two million of its citizens are in prison, but can we ignore its millions who live below the poverty line and that their numbers are growing? For that matter, are the other giants shining examples of economic prosperity, even assuming the forms of prosperity on offer are worthy moral objectives? Against the fact that both China and India, in per capita GDP terms, are both at the bottom of the global league table, we have to ask, why it is that of the top forty of the richest states on earth thirty have populations of less than ten million? Small may not always be beautiful, sometimes indeed it can be quite horrible, but the evidence suggests it is far more likely to be prosperous, whilst big is showing itself to be increasingly mad. This does not mean that in a world of small nations, themselves devolving power to village or urban ward level, all problems will be solved and that we shall have ushered in an era of perpetual peace, progress and happiness. Human beings are not perfect and any system of government however well contrived, will always reflect some of those imperfections. What it does mean is that if power to decide is restored to the citizen then the citizen’s moral and aesthetic judgements will then become influential, and even perhaps determinative, in the shaping of events. Not lease, small-scale government will ensure that any abuses will tend to be of limited impact. There is often a disposition to swallow wholesale the notion that the ordinary citizen does not have the knowledge or the capacity to make decisions on complex issues and that such matters are best left to experts, and that anyway administration on a large scale is cheaper and more efficient. Against this the citizen needs to ask what empowered and largely self-governing human scale community would allow nuclear bombs or nuclear energy to be produced on its territory? Or allow genetic engineering to proceed? Or car production and motorways to have precedence over public transport? Or allow its local shops to be driven out of business by giant ‘super’ markets (it is the profits which are ‘super’)? Or permit the closure of its local hospital or post office? Or allow its schools to be run by people who are not members of the community? Or permit chemical farming and factory type rearing of animals under cruelly intensive conditions? Our society abounds with abuses of power in every direction, so that the list of these questions could be extended indefinitely; the people who take up the cudgels to oppose these and other evil developments are to be applauded, but what the wide range of the questions they themselves have raised suggests is a conclusion which may often be beyond their horizons. It is simply this; that our primary problem is not war, or the environment, or population pressures, nor the squandering of the planet’s finite resources, nor the alienation from life of many millions of people; the primary problem is that of size, size developed on such a scale as to disempower people and which makes their moral judgements irrelevant to the passage of events. If we ignore that and simply focus our energies on particular abuses then, however commendable our objectives and our efforts, we are dealing with the effects of the abuses of power and ignoring their causes. It was Einstein who remarked ‘You cannot solve a problem with the mindframe that has created it’. In saying as much he was pointing to the core of our problem; a 19th century mindframe which accepts, without question or challenge, giant centralised states and economic entrepreneurship global in its scope, which together have created a doomsday scenario for the human race. No body can be healthier than the cells of which it is comprised. If the cells of small-scale community life are debilitated or non-existent in the body politic then what we are confronted with is a form of social and political leukaemia, a destroyed immune system which cannot prevent multitudinous forms of life-threatening malignancy, such as monster global wars, from flourishing. We are not going to solve the problems of the 21st century with the mind-frame of the 19th. Social empowerment, involving the deliberate creation of an organic, multi-cellular structure and process of our political and economic institutions, is today the only realistic path to enduring peace and to any genuine social progress.

### 1NC

#### **Interpretation –** “financial incentives” are funding for investors to develop a project – that excludes government purchases

**Czinkota et al, 9 -** Associate Professor at the McDonough School of Business at Georgetown University (Michael, Fundamentals of International Business, p. 69 – google books)

Incentives offered by policymakers to facilitate foreign investments are mainly of three types: fiscal, financial, and nonfinancial. **Fiscal incentives** are specific tax measures designed to attract foreign investors. They typically consist of special depreciation allowances, tax credits or rebates, special deductions for capital expenditures, tax holidays, and the reduction of tax burdens. **Financial incentives** offer special funding for the investor by providing, for example, land or buildings, loans, and loan guarantees. **Nonfinancial incentives** include guaranteed government purchases; special protection from competition through tariffs, import quotas, and local content requirements, and investments in infrastructure facilities.

#### **Violation – the plan doesn’t motivate action – it just buys a technology that already exists**

Nelson 93 (Edward W., Chairman – Payment Subcommittee in OPTN/UNOS Ethics Committee, “Financial Incentives for Organ Donation,” Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, 6-30, http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/resources/bioethics.asp?index=4)

Definition of Financial Incentives A definition of terms is **necessary prior to a discussion of the concept of financial incentives** for organ donation. First, financial incentives, as discussed here, do not mean additional monies spent for public or professional education or recognition and counseling of organ donor families. Because the concept of financial incentives fundamentally changes the process of organ procurement, it has been argued that the term "donor" is no longer applicable and would need to be replaced by a term such as 'vendor." The term "rewarded gifting" has been suggested and has been justly criticized as an oxymoron by those opposed to financial incentives and a despicable euphemism by those who promote this concept. Of greatest practical significance is the distinction between "incentive" and "payment" since a system of financial incentives may indeed be a viable option if, as interpreted by law, "incentives" do not amount to "purchases" and "donors" are therefore not transformed into 'vendors."

#### Prefer our interpretation –

#### A. Limits – they allow any aff that makes some technology more economically viable. Procurement can be applied to every technology and every industry – that explodes neg burden.

#### B. Neg ground – procurement moves the debate away from “how to motivate action” to just “doing the action” – this guts negative arguments about solvency, DA links, and CP competition based off private sector inducement.

### 1NC

#### Text – The United States federal government should allocate existing energy-related grant funding to provide cash prizes to the first private firm able to establish a Solar Bank.

#### Prizes solve better, avoid picking winners, and don’t link to politics

Adler 11 -- Professor of Law and Director of the Center for Business Law & Regulation, Case Western Reserve University School of Law (Johnathan, 3/14/11, "EYES ON A CLIMATE PRIZE:REWARDING ENERGY INNOVATION TO ACHIEVE CLIMATE STABILIZATION," http://www.law.harvard.edu/students/orgs/elr/vol35\_1/HLE101.pdf)

Traditional grant-driven funding for research and development has several limitations. 200 First, decisions about projects or efforts to fund are centralized, limiting the range of promising ventures that may receive funding and increasing the risk that research funding will not result in useful technological innovations. As the history of prizes detailed in the prior section shows, valuable technological innovations often come from surprising directions. Second, with ex ante grants, the government pays for R&D whether or not the R&D produces anything of value in return. Third, traditional grant funding is more subject to political pressure and may create negative incentives among researchers. Like traditional R&D grants, governmentsupported prizes reward innovations that “are publicly valued but not privately marketable.” 201 Yet prizes do not suffer from these other drawbacks. Therefore, the federal government should reallocate portions of existing energy-related R&D funding from traditional research grants to the creation of technology inducement prizes. Allocating grant money effectively requires the grant-making entity to pick “winners” and “losers,” something the government has rarely done well. 202 This is particularly difficult to do when the awarding agency is not the primary “customer” of the technological solution that is to be funded. 203 Supporters of increased R&D funding often point to the successes of the Manhattan and Apollo projects as examples of successful, government-directed research. 204 Yet these are poor models for the climate technology challenge. 205 As Mowery, Nelson, and Martin note, both “were designed, funded and managed by federal agencies to achieve a specific technological solution for which the government was effectively the sole ‘customer.’” 206 In the climate context, there is no single technology that will solve the problem, nor is there a single “customer” to satisfy. 207 Meeting the climate policy challenge will require the development and adoption of multiple, costeffective technological innovations that are capable of satisfying consumers (or governments) the world over. 208

#### Government can’t start energy innovation – picking winners empirically failed

Mufson 11 -- energy staff writer for the Washington Post (Steven, 11/11/11, "Before Solyndra, a long history of failed government energy projects," http://www.windtaskforce.org/page/unsustainable-subsidies)

Solyndra, the solar-panel maker that received more than half a billion dollars in federal loans from the Obama administration only to go bankrupt this fall, isn’t the first dud for U.S. government officials trying to play venture capitalist in the energy industry. The Clinch River Breeder Reactor. The Synthetic Fuels Corporation. The hydrogen car. Clean coal. These are but a few examples spanning several decades — a graveyard of costly and failed projects. 478 Not a single one of these much-ballyhooed initiatives is producing or saving a drop or a watt or a whiff of energy, but they have managed to burn through far more more taxpayer money than the ill-fated Solyndra.An Energy Department report in 2008 estimated that the federal government had spent $172 billion since 1961 on basic research and the development of advanced energy technologies. What does Washington have to show for these investments? And should the government even be in the business of promoting particular energy technologies? Some economists, executives and financiers — as well as Energy Secretary Steven Chu — argue that the government must play a role because certain technologies have non-financial benefits, such as producing fewer greenhouse gas emissions or easing U.S. reliance on foreign oil. The semiconductor industry is often held up as a model of how government money can help build a new type of economy. But others argue that the history of government attempts to reach for the holy grail of new energy technology — a history that features both political parties — is not inspiring. “We’re making very large bets, and the decisions seem to be more grounded in politics and geography than in engineering and science,” said Michael Graetz, a professor at Columbia Law School and the author of “The End of Energy.” Consider the saga of the Clinch River Breeder Reactor. In 1971, President Richard Nixon set a goal of building an experimental nuclear power plant. The Clinch River reactor was supposed to be a sort of perpetual motion machine, producing power as well as plutonium that could be used in other plants. Private utilities agreed to kick in $175 million, less than half of the $400 million that the Atomic Energy Commission estimated it would cost to build. As expenses ballooned, the government covered all the overruns. The project was criticized by activists and scientists worried about the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation. Cheap uranium undercut it. After President Ronald Reagan was elected, Clinch River survived the first round of his spending cuts, in part out of deference to Senate Majority Leader Howard Baker (R-Tenn.), a strong supporter of the reactor, which was in his home state. But finally, in 1983, with the Congressional Budget Office saying the cost might exceed $4 billion, Congress terminated the program. Blueprints had been drawn up, modeling done, components ordered and some ground cleared, but the reactor was never built. The price tag for the federal government:$1.7 billion ($3.9 billion in today’s dollars). Then there was the Synthetic Fuels Corporation. President Jimmy Carter called it the “keystone” of U.S. energy policy; Congress authorized $17 billion for it to act as a sort of investment bank, funding projects that would turn plentiful U.S. coal and shale into oil and gas. Carter set a goal of producing 2 million barrels a day of “synfuels” by 1990. Not quite. A handful of coal and auto companies tapped the new funds to build a facility that was intended to produce 50,000 barrels a day, the first of what was supposed to be a network of synfuel plants, many on federal lands. But after oil prices leveled off, then fell, in the early 1980s, the project was not economically sound, even with government help. The private partners pulled out. Congress ousted the corporation’s president in 1983 after the entity was accused of handing out money for political reasons. In 1986 the corporation closed down. It had spent $2 billion (more than $4 billion in today’s dollars). This sort of industrial policy fell out of favor in the Reagan era and into the 1990s, but then it returned, as fears of climate change spawned new “clean energy” ideas. President George W. Bush had his own pet projects. In his 2003 State of the Union address, he called for “a new national commitment” to work toward hydrogen-powered vehicles so that “our scientists and engineers will overcome obstacles to taking these cars from laboratory to showroom.” But on the road to the showroom, the hydrogen car made a wrong turn. From 2004 through 2008, the federal government poured $1.2 billion into hydrogen vehicle projects; the Government Accountability Office noted that about a quarter of that money went to “congressionally directed projects” outside the initiative’s original research and development scope. Visitors to General Motors outside Detroit could drive a vehicle powered by hydrogen, but the technology was costly, and there was no infrastructure to support the vehicles. They died in development. The “clean coal” movement has been no more successful. Politicians on both sides of the aisle have sought to put money into efforts that would make coal more appealing by taking its greenhouse emissions and burying them. After a carbon-capture project in Alaska burned through $117 million during the 1990s, Republican lawmakers tried to give the moribund project another $125 million in 2005. Just this year, the utility AEP, one of the nation’s largest emitters of carbon dioxide, abandoned a pilot project because it was too expensive — even though the Energy Department was willing to kick in $334 million, half the expected cost. A North Dakota project was shelved last December despite a $100 million federal grant. Bush launched what was supposed to be a $1 billion project to separate carbon dioxide from the emissions of a coal power plant in Illinois and bury the gas underground. Several years later, cost estimates have climbed, the project has been scaled back — and it still hasn’t broken ground. Despite this track record and the recent Solyndra failure, Energy Secretary Chu remains undeterred. Citing examples from Civil War-era railroads to airplanes to semiconductors, he has defended government’s role in funding new technologies and promising companies. “Americans have always led by looking ahead. Even in the midst of the Civil War, when our country was under incredible stress, we planned for the future,” Chu said in September. “President Lincoln signed the Pacific Railway Act of 1862, which authorized generous public financing for two private companies — Union Pacific Railroad Company and Central Pacific Railroad Company — to lower the investor risk in building railroads in unsettled territories. In 1869, the first Transcontinental Railroad was completed at Promontory Summit, Utah, revolutionizing transport in this country and opening up a world of possibilities for industry.” Enter Stanford University professor Richard White, a historian of the American West who wrote “Railroaded: The Transcontinentals and the Making of Modern America.” “I admire Steven Chu a great deal, but his knowledge of the Pacific Railway Act unfortunately appears to be about equal to my knowledge of high-energy physics,” White said in an interview. He said the legislation produced a disaster far larger than the lifeless factory that Solyndra has left behind. White said that Union Pacific and Central Pacific became two of the most hated corporations in the West, spawning political opposition wherever they went. Within 10 years of giving them land grants and loan guarantees, the federal government reversed its policy and eventually sued to recover its investment. The litigation dragged on into the 20th century. Chu has also argued that the government should help ramp up manufacturing. He says that while the internal-combustion engine was invented in Germany, Henry Ford mastered the assembly line and made the United States the world leader in automaking. However, historians note, Ford did not receive government assistance. Some experts also question the semiconductor example, in which the government purportedly created an industry through military purchases. Jack Spencer, a nuclear power and energy expert at the Heritage Foundation, said that the Pentagon supported the semiconductor industry because it wanted “to kill people better through innovation, but its goal wasn’t to create commercial enterprises.” Moreover, he added, if the broader marketplace hasn’t created enough incentives for a new technology such as solar or wind energy to thrive, then loan guarantees or grants will only postpone the death of a company. But Chu isn’t the only one who thinks the government has a role to play. David Eaglesham, chief technology officer at First Solar, a leading maker of thin-film solar panels, says government funding for basic research during the 1990s kept the company alive when it comprised about “10 guys working in Toledo.” He said the Energy Department’s National Renewable Energy Laboratory funded “pretty much everything” when it came to technology, but “at low levels.” Many policy experts say some of government’s biggest energy investment payoffs have come in the small stuff, such as testing the use of magnesium alloys to make lightweight car batteries more efficient or developing ballasts that make compact fluorescent bulbs more efficient. Still others say that the nearly $40 billion paid out by the federal government so far to subsidize corn-based ethanol is a success story; ethanol has displaced more than half a million barrels a day of petroleum. But that benefit must be weighed against whether ethanol has driven up corn prices, along with evidence that it may be worse than oil from a greenhouse gas perspective. Energy innovation is simply different from innovation in other industries, argue Edward Steinfeld and Jason Lee of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. In electronics and information technology, they note in an unpublished article, the end products are cheap, consumers buy new ones every few months or years, and much of the value is captured by the front-end designer rather than the manufacturer. (Think Apple.) Energy technologies, however, “are more expensive by several orders of magnitude, and they have much longer life cycles,” they say. “A solar panel is expected to last 20 to 25 years. Moreover, for many of these technologies, including thin-film solar, the key knowledge lies not just in upstream design, but also in learning how to produce inexpensively at high volume.” Essentially, Steinfeld and Lee conclude, “to pull off energy innovation successfully, you need scale.” And, of course, you also need to keep innovating. As First Solar’s Eaglesham says, “there’s never the last word in technology.” Doing all this requires massive sums of money — and an acceptance of the inevitability of frequent failure. That could be a tough sell in Washington, given the downfall of Solyndra and the unsteady status of some other recipients of Energy Department assistance. Massachusetts-based Beacon Power, maker of a nifty and effective — but unprofitable — method of using flywheels for electricity storage, filed for bankruptcy on Oct. 30. Ener1, a maker of lithium-ion batteries and a recipient of an Energy Department grant, was delisted by the Nasdaq Oct. 28 because of its low stock price. Perhaps the federal government is, as former Obama economic adviser Lawrence Summers put it, “a crappy VC,” or venture capitalist. Or perhaps it should stick to funding basic research. But if more recipients of Energy Department loan guarantees falter, they will become part of a long, if undistinguished, history of failure.

### Case

#### Carter lost support due to his zealotism over energy policy in the same way the aff will—the public didn’t listen to radicalism and never will

Somers 10 (Brian, Renewable World Energy, “A Road Not Taken: Solar Panels, Jimmy Carter, and Missed Opportunities for Change”, 6/23, http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/blog/post/2010/06/a-road-not-taken-solar-panels-jimmy-carter-and-missed-opportunities-for-change)

Having already been energy-conscious in those years, I personally remembered the installation of the solar collectors and also their removal. However, I knew nothing about the surrounding events, and I did not remember that Jimmy Carter did considerably more to free the U.S. from energy imports than only install a bunch of solar collectors on the roof of the White House to heat the water for the staff eating area. Hearing and seeing a replay of some of his speeches of those days from the Oval Office was thus a revelation to me. I didn't know that Carter had managed to reduce the oil imports to the U.S. by one third during his presidency. He did so by reducing the speed limit on U.S. freeways, by new regulations concerning required efficiency standards for electric appliances, and by a number of other measures.¶ Carter had gotten it wrong. He fully believed that the oil crises of 1973 and 1979 were indeed early indicators of the beginning of a world-wide fossil fuel shortage. He knew about Hubbert and Forrester and Meadows, and he truly believed that Peak Oil had come and gone right there and then, as indeed it had, at least as far as U.S. oil production was concerned.¶ He was a visionary and a zealot, and he expressed his convictions in no uncertain terms on each and every occasion, and the American public hated him for it with a passion. After all, these were the United States of America, the land of unlimited possibilities, so they had been told since their first breaths. How dared this new President tell them otherwise. How dared he express the view that the resources of this planet were finite, that there were limits to growth?¶ Shapiro, one of Carter's speechwriters expressed it well in the movie. Americans are deeply religious. They know that Moses didn't bring Ten Commandments down from Mount Sinai but eleven. **The eleventh commandment, recited rarely, is that Americans shall always have cheap energy.** It is their birthright. They live in the land of the free. They are free to fill'er up, any time and as often as they wish, and at an affordable price.¶ Jimmy Carter told them about false freedom. He told them that true freedom is the freedom of the others. True freedom is not to indulge in selfishness and grab everything for oneself because one can. This type of freedom would invariably lead to conflict and ultimately collapse. However, there exists another type of freedom, the freedom to work together for the benefit of all. Each of us should sacrifice a little so that, in the end, we could all lead better lives. This would free us of fossil fuel dependence. It would lead to a happier and cleaner world. It would lead to stability, to sustainability.¶ **He told them that they had a choice.** They could make the choice between false and true freedom, and the American people listened, because choose they did. **They elected Ronald Reagan who promised them continued exponential growth forever.**¶However, let me return to the movie. What happened to those solar panels?

#### Their counterfactual is wrong—Carter wasn’t a visionary—he installed panels as a publicity stunt—Reagan was just not crazy like Carter was

Shirley 10 (Craig, president of Shirley & Banister Public Affairs and has written two books on Ronald Reagan, including his newest, "Rendezvous With Destiny", 10/8, http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2010/10/08/craig-shirley-jimmy-carter-white-house-energy-crisis-solar-panels-ronald-reagan/#ixzz2AesOTcCm

“A new solar hot water heating system being installed at the White House costs thousands of dollars more that the original estimate and it probably won’t pay for itself in energy savings, officials said.”¶ So went the lede of a story in the Associated Press and reprinted in the Washington Post on April 6th, 1979 about President Jimmy Carter’s newest public relations stunt in the midst of the energy crisis. This was on the heels of lowering the thermostats in the White House, and later in the year, turning off the White House Christmas lights to show his concern over energy usage while also claiming he did so to show support for the hostages being held in Tehran by the Ayatollah Khomeini. In Carterland, this was seen as a public relations “twofer.”¶ Voltaire once said, “History is a pack of lies, agreed upon.” Truer words were never spoken, especially over the current handwringing by environmentalists and liberal revisionists as to why Ronald Reagan had the useless solar panels and endless pipes removed when he became president.¶ **Revisionist history is current attempting to portray Carter as a forward looking environmentalist and Reagan as some cold hearted capitalist but** as a matter of fact, in another public relations initiative, the 39th president also proposed tax credits for wood burning stoves. One can imagine a denuded American continent, bereft of any trees because Americans had cut down all the forests. Environmentalists tend to be silly people and a favored bumper sticker at the time proudly proclaimed, “Split Wood, Not Atoms.”¶ The Associated Press story elaborated, as unnamed White House officials called the solar panels an “economic dog.” Carter’s cousin, Hugh Carter, was in charge of the parsimous Georgian’s White House, but with Jimmy Carter, public relations often seemed to trump good policy, even spending policy. ¶ Several of Carter’s energy initiatives included closing off exploration for oil and gas in Alaska and western states, proposing time and again a new federal tax of 50 cents per gallon on gasoline, and the creation of the Department of Energy, one of the great government boondoggles of all time, whose goal was to solve the energy crisis. Americans have only been waiting for a little over thirty years to figure out the real mission of the DOE.¶ During his time of office, he ordered the oil companies to stop refining gasoline and instead refine home heating oil for a coming winter. The order resulted in gasoline lines that snaked around gas stations across the country. In many places including Northern Virginia, fist fights broke out among furious drivers. Rationing policies were initiated by many states, some based on Social Security numbers, others based on “odd” or “even” license plates, but these were obviously easy to beat. And often were.¶ Americans became especially furious when they learned the Congress had it very own gas station, which was selling the then precious liquid for much less than the taxpayers were shelling out. At his inaugural, Carter had arranged for “solar reflectors” to keep those in the reviewing stand warm, but according to The Economist, “electric heaters will be ready in case the sun fails to shine.”¶ At one point, Carter issued an Executive Order directing the private sector not to lower their air conditioning below 78 degrees in the summer nor raise their heat above 66 degrees in the winter. Across the country, the order was ignored. However, he did propose “inducements” to force industrial America to switch from oil and natural gas to coal. Conservationists now routinely denounce coal. ¶ He also proposed at one point that mortgages not be granted to home buyers until the federal government has certified the home was sufficiently insulated. Americans who did voluntarily cut their electricity usage found to their horror that their bills actually had gone up, a cruel reminder of how economics works.¶ Carter also proclaimed May 3 as “National Sun Day” and pressed for the creation of a Administration official to boost solar poer whose job title only lacked the title “Czar.” In Los Angeles, a race between solar cars took place, but it was never reported if any of them actually finished the contest.¶ The solar panels were originally “supposed to cost” the taxpayers “$24,000 to install and would cut utility bills by $1,000 a year to start.” Imagine that. Carter’s plan was for the panels to pay for themselves in 24 years! Even that platy went awry however, as Cousin Hugh could not find anyone to install them for less than $28,000 and, to accommodate the ugly White Elephant, another $7,000 would have to be spent tearing up the White House roof!¶ In spite of all the arguments against the useless panels, Carter had the contraption installed anyway, a monument to the **fecklessness of his so-called conservation policies**. Washingtonians laughed, “There he goes again.”¶ **Government officials---including Carter---actually discussed regulations to control access to the sun.**¶Early in his term, Carter sat before a roaring fire dressed in a sweater, calling on the American people to sacrifice and conserve energy. He called his campaign the “Moral Equivalent Of War,” but Americans felled to laugher when they realized the acronym of Carter’s plan. After the sweater incident, he picked up the nickname, “Jimmy Cardigan.” Anyone who knows about fireplaces will tell you that an open fire in a hearth sucks all the heat out of a building leaving it colder that it would have without the fire in the first place. But that night, it did make a pretty television shot for the president.¶ There was no energy crisis. There was a crisis of harebrained government regulators, interfering with the free market, who created the problems in the first place. In the 1840’s, Charles Dickens visited Washington. Unimpressed with the city and the government, he sniffed, “Few people would live in Washington, I take it, who were not obliged to live there.”

#### Their impact is a theoretical fabrication

Jarvis 00 (Darryl, Senior Lecturer in International Relations – University of Sydney, International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism, p. 128)

Perhaps more alarming though is the outright violence Ashley recommends in response to what at best seem trite, if not imagined, injustices. Inculpating modernity, positivism, technical rationality, or realism with violence, racism, war, and countless other crimes not only smacks of anthropomorphism but, as demonstrated by Ashley’s torturous prose and reasoning, requires a dubious logic to make such connections in the first place. Are we really to believe that ethereal entities like positivism, modernism, or realism emanate a “violence” that marginalizes dissidents? Indeed, where is this violence, repression, and marginalization? As self-professed dissidents supposedly exiled from the discipline, Ashley and Walker appear remarkably well integrated into the academy—vocal, published, and at the center of the Third Debate and the forefront of theoretical research. Likewise, is Ashley seriously suggesting that, on the basis of this largely imaged violence, global transformation (perhaps even revolutionary violence) is a necessary, let alone desirable, response? Has the rationale for emancipation or the fight for justice been reduced to such vacuous revolutionary slogans as “Down with positivism and rationality”? The point is surely trite. Apart from members of the academy, who has heard of positivism and who for a moment imagines that they need to be emancipated from it, or from modernity, rationality, or realism for that matter? In an era of unprecedented change and turmoil, of new political and military configurations, of war in the Balkans and ethnic cleansing, is Ashley really suggesting that some of the greatest threats facing humankind or some of the great moments of history rest on such **innocuous** and largely unknown **nonrealities** like positivism and realism? These are **imagined and fictitious enemies**, **theoretical fabrications** that represent arcane, self-serving debates superfluous to the lives of most people and, arguably, to most issues of importance in international relations.

**The plan breaks oil dependence, causes global war**

**MILLER 2010** (Gregory D. Miller, assistant professor of political science at the University of Oklahoma, “The Security Costs of Energy Independence,” Center for Strategic International Studies, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 2, pp. 107-119, April 2010, http://www.asiaresearch.ir/files/10apr\_Miller.pdf, Sawyer)

A drop in demand for oil would lead to increased probability of conflict between current oil exporters and their customers, including developed Western states, as well as between oil producers and their neighbors. This risk will be especially pronounced in regions with a high number of oil-exporting states such as the Middle East. According to the concept of interdependence, the likelihood of states going to war with each other decreases as mutual dependence between them increases, with trade being the most common measure of interdependence. This idea was reflected in the Clinton administration policy of increasing trade with China in the 1990s. Early European integration in the 1950s was similarly designed to prevent a future European war. 3 If valid, then the inverse of the theory suggests that as states reduce their demand for foreign oil, levels of interdependence between consumer states and oil exporters will fall, increasing the likelihood of conflict. Although it is unlikely that war would occur simply because of lower trade levels, the logic of interdependence theory is that **the wealth gained from trade restrains policymakers who otherwise might engage in conflict.** 4 If the United States is no longer dependent on foreign oil and if oil-exporting states no longer gain revenue from the United States, there would be fewer constraints on each state’s willingness to use violence, whether it be in the form of conventional military force or state sponsorship of terrorism.

#### Incentivizing energy is coercive

Sokolski 12 -- executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center and editor (Henry, 3/12, "Pure Risk: Federal Clean Energy Loan Guarantees," <http://www.npolicy.org/userfiles/file/ure%20Risk-Federal%20Clean%20Energy%20Loan%20Guarantees.pdf>)

 Beyond having to pay for actual defaults, though, there are two other significant risks associated with these loans. The fi rst is the moral costs of government offi cials backing commercial projects that turn out to be signifi cant money losers. Such misjudgments are rarely conceded until very late in the game (e.g., synfuels in the l970s, the Clinch River Breeder Reactor in the l980s, and corn ethanol in the l990s). Worse, in some cases, the government must cover its tracks by mandating that the public buy the product produced (e.g., ethanol) even though it clearly is not cost effective against less expensive alternatives. The net effect of such fi scal cynicism is the diversion of fi nancing – public and private – from more worthy energy innovations to projects that otherwise would fail fi nancially. More important, public faith and credit in the federal government suffers with each transaction.

#### Every instance of coercion brings us closer to tyranny and must be rejected

Browne 95, former Libertarian presidential candidate

(Harry, executive director of public policy at American Liberty Foundation, editor of Liberty Magazine, financial advisor and economist, *Why Government Doesn’t Work*, pg 66-67) \*edited for gendered language

[YELLOW]

The reformers of the Cambodian revolution claimed to be building a better world. They forced people into reeducation programs to make them better citizens. Then they used force to regulate every aspect of commercial life. Then they forced office workers and intellectuals to give up their jobs and harvest rice, to round out their education. When people resisted having their lives turned upside down, the reformers had to use more and more force. By the time they were done, they had killed a third of the country’s population, destroyed the lives of almost everyone still alive, and devastated a nation. It all began with using force for the best of intentions—to create a better world. The Soviet leaders used coercion to provide economic security and to build a “New Man”—a human being who would put his fellow (hu)man ahead of himself. At least 10 million people died to help build the New Man and the Workers’ Paradise. But human nature never changed—and the workers’ lives were always Hell, not Paradise. In the 1930s many Germans gladly traded civil liberties for the economic revival and national pride Adolf Hitler promised them. But like every other grand dream to improve society by force, it ended in a nightmare of devastation and death. Professor R.J. Rummel has calculated that 119 million people have been killed by their own governments in this century. Were these people criminals? No, they were people who simply didn’t fit into the New Order—people who preferred their own dreams to those of the reformers. **Every time you allow government to use force to make society better, you move another step closer to the nightmares of Cambodia, the Soviet Union, and Nazi Germany**. We’ve already moved so far that our own government can perform with impunity the outrages described in the preceding chapters. These examples aren’t cases of government gone wrong; they are examples of government—period. They are what governments do—just as chasing cats is what dogs do. They are the natural consequence of letting government use force to bring about a drug-free nation, to tax someone else to better your life, to guarantee your economic security, to assure that no one can mistreat you or hurt your feelings, and to cover up the damage of all the failed government programs that came before.

#### Resource production for solar is impossible

EC 12 -- European Commission, DG Environment News Alert Service, edited by SCU, The University of the West of England, Bristol (1/26/12, "Photovoltaic supply falls short of solar power targets," http://ec.europa.eu/environment/integration/research/newsalert/pdf/271na7.pdf)

Europe could struggle to meet the target set by the renewable energy sector of 25 per cent of electricity produced by solar energy by 2040 because the supply of materials, including rare metals, needed to produce photovoltaics (PV) is unlikely to meet demand. Production rates need to be drastically improved, according to a new study. Calculations based on available appropriate land, global irradiance and conversions of solar energy to electricity demonstrate that technically, solar energy could provide 7.5 to 9 times the expected electricity demand in 2050. However, several PV technologies employ rare metals, which could limit the capacity for electricity generation. The new study looked at whether current global production of rare metals could support the huge increase in solar panels generation required to meet ambitious energy targets for 2040 laid out by the European Renewable Energy Council (EREC). The scientists looked at the four main PV technologies: crystalline silicon (c-Si), amorphous silicon (a-Si), cadmium tellurium (CdTe) and copper indium gallium diselenide (CIGS). The scientists assumed that by 2040, each technology would have an equal market share of 25 per cent. This reflects the fact that although c-Si currently has the largest share (81 per cent), a shift is already taking place towards the other technologies, which require a thinner layer of PV material. They simulated a 'neutral' future scenario, where moderate technological developments gradually improve the efficiency of electricity generation, in line with current policy expectations. The results showed that the maximum demand for gallium and indium in tonnes per year for use in CIGS technology surpasses current production (2008) by a factor of 7.3 and 2.8, respectively. Even under an 'optimistic' future scenario, in which more ambitious technological advances in cell efficiency require less PV material, demand still outstrips current supply by a factor of 3.9 and 1.5, respectively. Neither cadmium nor copper were found to be seriously limiting, even when the scientists simulated a 'pessimistic' scenario in which technological advances do not meet current expectations. However, the predicted demand for tellurium was found to be 30-180 times higher than today's production rate, depending on the scenario used. Although silicon is the second most abundant element in the earth.s crust, only very high purity silicon is used in the solar industry and production will need to increase by 15 times to meet demand in the neutral scenario and by 10 times in the optimistic scenario. Even bigger shortages may result from competition with the electronics industry, which also uses high-purity silicon. On the other hand, amorphous silicon technology represents the only realistic option for large-scale electricity production since the cumulative demand by 2040 would equal just 20 per cent of production. The research shows that reaching solar power targets for 2040 will not necessarily be limited by known global reserves of silicon and rare metals, but that current production rates will be the limiting factor. Better refining techniques, increased exploitation of deposits and strategic planning of technological shifts are needed to satisfy the demand for PV materials. This poses a challenge as tellurium, indium, gallium, selenium and cadmium are by-products of other processes and are not currently mined separately. New production methods are also likely to take up to 10 years to develop and so research should be initiated soon to meet the anticipated demand.

#### Scenario planning is good

Kurasawa 4 (Fuyuki, Professor of Sociology – York University of Toronto, “Cautionary Tales: The Global Culture of Prevention and the Work of Foresight”, Constellations, 11(4))

A radically postmodern line of thinking, for instance, would lead us to believe that it is pointless, perhaps even harmful, to strive for farsightedness in light of the aforementioned crisis of conventional paradigms of historical analysis. If, contra teleological models, history has no intrinsic meaning, direction, or endpoint to be discovered through human reason, and if, contra scientistic futurism, prospective trends cannot be predicted without error, then the abyss of chronological inscrutability supposedly opens up at our feet. The future appears to be unknowable, an outcome of chance. Therefore, rather than embarking upon grandiose speculation about what may occur, we should adopt a pragmatism that abandons itself to the twists and turns of history; let us be content to formulate ad hoc responses to emergencies as they arise. While this argument has the merit of underscoring the fallibilistic nature of all predictive schemes, it conflates the necessary recognition of the contingency of history with unwarranted assertions about the latter’s total opacity and indeterminacy. Acknowledging the fact that the future cannot be known with absolute certainty **does not imply abandoning the task** of trying to understand what is brewing on the horizon and to prepare for crises already coming into their own. In fact, the incorporation of the principle of fallibility into the work of prevention means that we must be ever more vigilant for warning signs of disaster and for responses that provoke unintended or unexpected consequences (a point to which I will return in the final section of this paper). In addition, from a normative point of view, the acceptance of historical contingency and of the self-limiting character of farsightedness places the duty of preventing catastrophe squarely on the shoulders of present generations. The future no longer appears to be a metaphysical creature of destiny or of the cunning of reason, nor can it be sloughed off to pure randomness. It becomes, instead, a result of human action shaped by decisions in the present – including, of course, trying to anticipate and prepare for possible and avoidable sources of harm to our successors. Combining a sense of analytical contingency toward the future and ethical responsibility for it, the idea of early warning is making its way into preventive action on the global stage.

#### Predictions are necessary for good policy-making, even if imperfect

Chernoff 5 (Fred, Harvey Picker Professor of International Relations – Colgate University, The Power of International Theory, p. 169-170)

Conclusion Over the past century IR developed as a discipline with the primary goal of providing a basis for changing the world for the better; i.e., as a basis for the formulation of policy. Despite the fact that most critical theorists, reflectivists and anti- and post-positivists passionately wish to use the study of IR for that purpose, the meta-theories they adopt, with their attacks on prediction, undermine the project of using the study of IR to change the world. In IR and other social sciences, policy-makers **must predict** and, contrary to post-positivism, if there are no sounder generalizations available, then phenomenal regularities must be enough to go on, at least some of the time. Even for those who accept Bohman’s HT arguments against deterministic explanation in the social sciences, and who thus see explanation as perspectival, incomplete, and circular, it is possible to ground a notion of ‘prediction’ that is capable of satisfying enabling conditions (at least closely enough) to allow policy-makers to use social theory generalizations as a foundation for predictions and thus for policies. The generalizations are neither perfectly reliable nor deterministic. They are probabilistic and offer the decision-maker imperfect guarantees about the future. Still, in many epistemic circumstances that the chosen policy will lead to the desired result that he or she would have if policies were selected randomly. Bohman overlooks the need for social prediction even more than the other authors discussed. Little overlooks it, but at least makes reference to ‘probabilistic prediction’ in some of his writings. Doran begins with an argument for prediction-scepticism but then adds several qualifications, which would seem to open up some room for prediction or forecasting. However those remarks are surrounded by comments that undercut the qualifications and which thereby restore full-blown prediction-scepticism. Bernstein et al. offer a range of criticisms that fail to target the most common sorts of predictions of policy-makers and they offer an alternative that makes use of the sort of theory-based prediction they claim to have rejected. This chapter has thus sought to show that the arguments against prediction offered by each author are flawed and that the sound elements of the foundational positions sketched out by the various authors (especially Bohman and Bernstein et al.) can consistently be brought into line with some notion of ‘prediction’, when that notion is founded on probabilistic rather than deterministic generalizations. Bernstein et al. attempt to discredit ‘prediction’ by arguing that IR is much more similar to evolutionary theory than to physical sciences like classical mechanisms. Is IR very like classical mechanics or evolutionary biology? It shares many features with both but also has many dissimilarities to both and consequently is ‘very like’ neither. A major part of the strategy of the critique of Bernstein et al. has been to show that a further probing of the character of physical science reveals that the dissimilarities that Bernstein et al. claims do not hold. This is not to say that an unrestricted naturalism is justified. Far from it. Comprehensive theories like those of the physical sciences are not likely to emerge in IR. Nevertheless, theoretical and scientific-style investigation in IR has great value and holds out the possibility, at least within tightly circumscribed domains, to achieve natural-science-like consensus and well-founded prediction. Indeed, **prediction is necessary for good policy-making, even though there are limitations** due to hermeneutic interpretation, lack of governing regularities and non-linearities. These considerations lead to the conclusion that there are limitations on the types of predictions one might propose and the confidence that should be displayed in them but not to conclude that policy-makers should avoid prediction. While prediction is necessary for policy-making, prediction alone is not sufficient, since normative considerations must always be addressed. Probabilistic predictions may inform one of things like ‘socialist states go to war with non-socialists states less often than democratic states go to war with non-democracies’. But normative analysis is clearly required in order to determine whether this is a good or bad thing and what policy initiatives should be pursued.

#### -- Evaluate consequences – allowing violence for the sake of moral purity is evil

Isaac 2 (Jeffrey C., Professor of Political Science – Indiana-Bloomington, Director – Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life, Ph.D. – Yale, Dissent Magazine, 49(2), “Ends, Means, and Politics”, Spring, Proquest)

As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the **clean conscience** of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about **unintended consequences** as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with “good” may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of “good” that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

#### -- Extinction mandates consequentialism

Bok 88 (Sissela, Professor of Philosophy – Brandeis College, Applied Ethics and Ethical Theory, Ed. Rosenthal and Shehadi, p. 202-203)

The same argument can be made for Kant’s other formulations of the Categorical Imperative: “So act as to use humanity, both in your own person and in the person of every other, always at the same time as an end, never simply as a means”; and “So act as if you were always through actions a law-making member in a universal Kingdom of Ends.” No one with a concern for humanity could consistently will to risk eliminating humanity in the person of himself and every other or to risk the death of all members in a universal Kingdom of Ends for the sake of justice. To risk their collective death for the sake of following one’s conscience would be, as Rawls said, “irrational, crazy.” And to say that one did not intend such a catastrophe, but that one merely failed to stop other persons from bringing it about would be beside the point when the end of the world was at stake.For although it is true that we cannot be held responsible for most of the wrongs that others commit, the Latin maxim presents a case where we would have to take such a responsibility seriously—perhaps to the point of deceiving, bribing, even killing an innocent person, in order that the world not perish.

#### Counterfactuals are unproductive -- it is too difficult to establish causal relationships in hypothetical cases

George and Bennett 05 (Alexander and Andew, Graham H. Stuart Professor of Political Science Emeritus at Stanford University; and Associate Professor of Government at Georgetown University. Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, p. 230-1.

One may recognize that in principle any historical explanation implies a counterfactual in the sense that the historical outcome would not have occurred had the causal variables adduced in support of the explanation been different. Such a counterfactual can be said to serve the purposes of a second case and, if so, the real and counterfactual cases together might constitute a controlled comparison. However, such a claim rests on the supposition that the causal variable in question was a necessary condition for the occurrences of that outcome, at least in the particular case in question. It also assumes that the causal variable identified operated independently of other causal variables. Such assumptions are often difficult to substantiate, a fact that makes the use of a counterfactual problematic. Thus one must recognize that a plausible, useful counterfactual case is often not possible and, if attempted, does not add much, if anything, in support of a within-case historical explanation. **It is very difficult if not impossible to conduct a plausible, useful counterfactual when the explanation for a historical event is very complex**. “Complexity” can take several different forms, for example: *When many variables*, though independent of each other, are part of the historical explanation (as if often case), it is difficult to formulate a plausible counterfactual. When the historical explanation is in the form of a *sequential development over time*, and not a single variable or cluster of variables at a given point in time—i.e., when the explanation is not derived from a simple “before-after” comparison—then it is very difficult to formulate a plausible counterfactual case. When the causal variables in the historical explanation are not independent of each other but *interdependent*, then formulation of a plausible counter-factual case is exceedingly difficult, since it requires varying a number of causal variables and runs into the difficulty of weighing the precise weight of each variable. For these reasons, we believe that the burden of supporting a historical explanation must be met **not by using a counterfactual** but by employing the process-tracing method in order to infer and construct a causal chain account of how various conditions and variables interacted over time to produce the historical outcome. In any case, counterfactual support for the explanation of a historical outcome is not needed if that explanation is supported by a strong theory or generalization; or if the causal chain is highly plausible, consistent with the evidence, and survives comparison with alternative explanations.

#### Solar industry strong and domestic demand robust

Andrew 8/27 -- reporting and writing on a wide range of topics at the nexus of economics, technology, ecology/environment @ Clean Technica (2012, "1H 2012 US Solar PV Installations Grow 120%; US Poised to be World’s 3rd-Largest Market," http://cleantechnica.com/2012/08/27/1h-2012-us-solar-pv-installations-grow-120-us-poised-to-be-worlds-3rd-largest-market/)

Solar photovoltaic (PV) installations in the Americas more than doubled in the first half of 2012 (1H 2012) and will reach nearly 4.3 GW for the year. Solar PV installations rose more than 120% in the Americas in the first six months of 2012, according to IMS Research’s latest quarterly report, to reach 1.7 GW. That compares to 750 MW in the 1H 2011. Looking at the global picture, the German and Americas markets led growth in solar PV installations through June, with global installations exceeding 13 GW for the first time ever. IMS forecasts 3 GW of new solar PV capacity coming on-line for the full year, according to IMS’ “Q3 PV Demand Report.” “Despite the lackluster financial performance of the industry’s suppliers, underlying demand was robust in the first six months of this year, with first half installations 35 percent up on 2011,” commented IMS Research PV Research Director Ash Sharma. “The Americas market, led by the USA was unseasonably strong in the first half and did not show any significant slowdown resulting from the anti-dumping duties.” The US solar PV market will contribute most to growth globally in 2012, making the US the third-largest solar PV market in the world, according to IMS. The US accounted for 40% of new solar PV capacity growth in 1H 2012. The European market, in contrast, is forecast to contract nearly 3 GW for the year despite strong first-half performance in Germany. 1H 2012′s strong growth in US solar PV installations puts paid to the contention that the imposition of anti-dumping tariffs and countervailing duties on imports of crystalline solar PV cells and modules from China would stall growth in US solar PV demand, according to the Coalition for Solar Manufacturing (CASM), which filed the WTO petitions against China with US international trade authorities. “The new report by IMS Research effectively debunks two of the arguments made by Chinese solar manufacturers and their allies regarding the potential impact of tariffs on the U.S. solar market. First, preliminary tariffs did not slow growth of the U.S. solar market in the first half of 2012. Second, they have not had hurt downstream employment,” stated Gordon Brinser, president of SolarWorld Industries America Inc., the Oregon-based subsidiary of Germany’s SolarWorld AG, which leads CASM’s WTO trade litigation effort. “The IMS study notes that demand for solar in the U.S. market grew 120 percent through the end of June, compared with the same period in 2011, and did ‘not show any significant slowdown resulting from the anti-dumping duties.’ “This statement undercuts claims that dumped Chinese panels helped ignite a boom in the U.S. solar market. The fact that demand increased 120 percent – a significantly higher level than in past years, despite significantly reduced Chinese imports over the past three months – shows that there is significant demand for solar, even without dumped and subsidized Chinese products. “At the same time, the 35 percent increase in installations of solar panels cited in the IMS study shows there has been no negative impact on solar employment in the United States,” Brinser continued. “This result undermines the opposition’s prediction of tens of thousands of lost jobs if tariffs were imposed to counter the impact of illegally dumped and subsidized Chinese panels.” Moreover, Brinser added, these early indications show that the penalties being preliminarily imposed on Chinese imports are having the desired effect. “Based on what we are seeing in the marketplace, the U.S. solar market is robust, despite challenges for producers. However, as the Associated Press pointed out, the challenge is greatest for Chinese solar producers who have racked up huge losses in their attempt to dump their way to market dominance over the past two years.” Looking at global solar PV demand going forward, IMS foresees growth in solar PV installations accelerating in the second half of 2012 (2H 2012), despite slowdowns in Germany and Italy, two key European markets. The outlook beyond year-end is uncertain, however, IMS says. “IMS Research remains optimistic about the potential for the US PV market, and we predict it will grow to at least 3.5 GW in 2012 and become the world’s third largest PV market. The longer-term outlook for this market is less certain, although the speed at which it is developing so far in 2012 provides some encouragement,” IMS’ Sharma elaborated.

#### Global solar power causes a linear increase in lead poisoning deaths

Pool 12 -- Engineering and Technology Magazine (Rebecca, 3/26/12, "Solar power: the unexpected side effect," http://eandt.theiet.org/magazine/2012/03/solar-power-the-unexpected-side-effect.cfm)

Rapidly developing nations do not yet have the tightly regulated recycling infrastructure of, say, Europe and the US to safely process spent lead-acid batteries. Instead, a thriving cottage industry already exists in which hundreds of thousands of informal recyclers collect used lead-acid batteries, mostly from cars and electric scooters, and either take them to small-scale factories where they are crudely smelted or simply break them up themselves. Valuable lead is retrieved – reports estimate the lead in a single battery can provide a month's salary – but at the same time lead powder and fumes leak into the local environment. The painful results are well documented. Excessive amounts of lead in the blood can damage the digestive, nervous and reproductive systems, and cause stomach aches, anaemia and convulsions. Growing children are particularly vulnerable with moderate lead exposure causing behaviour problems and brain damage. Already, China has witnessed numerous mass poisoning incidents from domestic lead battery manufacturing and recycling. Most recently, in June last year, at least 600 people, including 103 children, were found to be suffering from lead poisoning in Zhejiang. The Chinese government responded by shutting down nearly 90 per cent of lead-acid battery makers, but industry sources say many have since reopened. Health reviews carried out by academics in China and India support these tragic incidents with research indicating some 24 per cent of children in China, and 34 per cent in India, have blood lead levels exceeding World Health Organisation safe levels. At the same time, nearly 10 per cent of China's 1.22 million sq kilometres of farmland is reported to be polluted with the remnants of lead as well as zinc and other metal production. Clearly, the rapidly growing motor industry has fuelled these problems but, realistically, how much will a booming solar industry contribute to what is an already burgeoning problem? A lot, believes Cherry. "China has an extremely rapid rate of electric scooter adoption... there are more than 100 million electric bikes, each with a car-sized battery that is changed every couple of years, that is a tremendous amount of lead," explains Cherry. "But now on top of that you have this solar ambition and that could bring in another big slug of lead." According to Cherry's figures, come 2020 China will have produced some 386kt of lead emissions while India will produce 2,030kt thanks to its more ambitious solar plans and 20 million solar lanterns. Cherry's calculations take into account the lead lost to the environment during battery production and recycling, the number of expected solar installations and how long an actual lead acid battery will last. He adds: "These losses total around one-third of 2009 lead production. They will contribute to soil and dust contamination in these countries and result in exposures to children and workers in manufacturing and recycling operations." China and India's solar ambitions are likely to be repeated. For example, huge swathes of Africa's population do not yet have access to electricity, so small-scale solar technology holds great promise. Worryingly, lead-acid batteries are the only energy storage technology in this region but as Cherry says: "Africa is even more dire in terms of its ability to recycle the batteries that would support solar power." Network connections But despite the trends for developing nations to install more solar capacity, the impact on lead emissions largely depends on how much of the yet-to-be-installed generation will be connected to the grid and how much will stand alone, providing off-grid power to communities not connected to an electricity network. Only the latter strictly requires back-up power, most likely a lead acid battery. Cherry is certain a lot of off-grid solar power systems are coming, as factored into his calculations. As he says, both Chinese and Indian governments are pouring money into electrifying rural regions not connected to the grid. In India, though, almost 25 per cent of its 80,000 villages currently without electricity cannot be connected to the grid, and will therefore require some form of renewable generation. Meanwhile, China has far fewer areas off the electricity grid but more than 700 small village power stations are already installed. Indeed, in 2006, only 3 per cent of the nation's solar capacity was grid connected, compared to 88 per cent globally. As Cherry also points out, photovoltaic systems may still use lead-acid battery back-up power even if connected to an electricity network. His studies indicate some 75 per cent of all existing photovoltaic units in China have a lead-acid battery. Here, many grid-connected units use lead acid batteries for storage as not all utilities buy power back from small-scale solar units. In addition, battery storage mitigates technical issues such as localised voltage fluctuations, voltage flicker and fluctuating power loads.

#### Increased solar power crushes the silver market

Phil et al 12 -- research study conducted by Division of Energy Technology and Division of Environmental Systems Analysis @ Chalmers University of Technology (Erik, Duncan Kushnir, Bjorn Sanden, Filip Johnson, 2/28/12, "Material constraints for concentrating solar thermal power," ScienceDirect)

The use of silver in mirrors for CSP requires a closer look as it is difficult to substitute, would constitute a large new demand for silver and the metal is potentially constrained in rate and available reserves. As Fig. 7 shows, there has been a significant supply deficit in terms of the difference between silver mining and fabrication demand for more than a decade. This deficit has been filled by drawing down government stockpiles and by recycling scrap and jewellery. The dwindling use of silver in photography has been offset by the increase in electronic, photovoltaic, medical and nanomaterial demand, applications which have a high ability to pay for silver and which do not typically result in a recyclable stock [55,56] The industrial demand for silver is thus very competitive at present, and represents 55% of fabrication demand and 75% of mine supply. The remaining demand is for new jewellery, coins, silverware and bullion. Diminishing recycled silver supplies may be difficult to compensate through mining; roughly two thirds of silver production occurs as a by-product of mining other base metals, predominantly copper and lead [56]. Furthermore, silver has been mined for thousands of years, and there is not a large potential for new primary silver mines. This situation implies that the mine supply response to higher prices would be muted for silver. There is thus a potential for a large increase in price that all prospective silver users should be considering in strategic plans. Reducing silver use for mirrors is a difficult challenge since it is already applied in extremely thin layers of about 100 nm. Alternative materials for reflective coating have been investigated, but none offer the same broadband reflection qualities [57]. The silver layer thickness could possibly be slightly reduced but there are durability and manufacturing issues strongly prohibiting layers thinner than about 50 nm [58]. A possible substitute is to instead use aluminium as reflective layer, on an aluminium substrate with a covering layer of oxides or polymer to protect from corrosion. Changing from silver to aluminium reflectors typically decreases the maximum reflectivity from w95% to w90% [59]. This decrease could be compensated by scaling up the reflector area which would increase the use of other less constrained materials and degrade the plant economics, but would not rule out feasibility. As silver is a small component of cost, the silver price would have to increase by multiples to make the increased reflector area needed for aluminium mirrors a cost-effective substitution.

#### Silver supply k2 global economy and turns solar development

SD 12 -- teaches at a local university, retired "Wall Streeter" (Silver Doctor, 6/25/12, "Silver Supply Crisis Looms, Price Expected to Soar!" http://034dc62.netsolhost.com/WordPress/2012/06/25/silver-supply-crisis-looms/)

In contrast, when the looming silver supply-crisis strikes this will produce a global, industrial crisis. Unlike gold, which must only satisfy investment/monetary demands, silver is becoming an essential raw material of the 21st century global economy. This can be illustrated by simply listing some of the current and future industrial uses of this most precious metal. Silver has reflective, chemical, and conductive properties that are superior to all other metals. This provides two key uses for silver in the production of solar energy. As the world’s most-reflective metal (reflecting 97% of all solar energy), silver is used to make the world’s best mirrors — a vital component of solar energy production. In addition, because silver is such a superb catalyst, it also can improve the efficiency of “solar cells,” by being blended with these semiconductor materials to increase the power output of any such power unit by approximately 12% (as reported by The Silver Institute).

**Econ decline causes war**

**ROYAL 10** Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense

[Jedediah Royal, 2010, Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises, in Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215]

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent stales. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level. Pollins (20081 advances Modclski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin. 19SJ) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Fcaron. 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner. 1999). Separately. Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level. Copeland's (1996. 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states arc likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Mom berg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write. The linkage, between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict lends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other (Hlomhen? & Hess. 2(102. p. X9> Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blombcrg. Hess. & Wee ra pan a, 2004). which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. "Diversionary theory" suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1996), DcRoucn (1995), and Blombcrg. Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force arc at least indirecti) correlated. Gelpi (1997). Miller (1999). and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that Ihe tendency towards diversionary tactics arc greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked lo an increase in the use of force. In summary, rcccni economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict al systemic, dyadic and national levels.' This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.

#### Global violence is decreasing – their impact is empirically denied

Pinker 7 (Steven, Johnstone Family Professor in the Department of Psychology – Harvard University, “A History of Violence”, Edge: The Third Culture, 3-28, http://www.edge.org/3rd\_culture/pinker07/pinker07\_index.html)

In sixteenth-century Paris, a popular form of entertainment was cat-burning, in which a cat was hoisted in a sling on a stage and slowly lowered into a fire. According to historian Norman Davies, "[T]he spectators, including kings and queens, shrieked with laughter as the animals, howling with pain, were singed, roasted, and finally carbonized." Today, such sadism would be unthinkable in most of the world. This change in sensibilities is just one example of perhaps the **most important and** most **underappreciated** **trend** in the human saga: **Violence has been in decline over long stretches of history, and today we are** probably **living in the most peaceful moment of our species' time on earth**. In the decade of Darfur and Iraq, and shortly after the century of Stalin, Hitler, and Mao, the claim that violence has been diminishing may seem somewhere between hallucinatory and obscene. Yet recent studies that seek to quantify the historical ebb and flow of violence point to exactly that conclusion. Some of the evidence has been under our nose all along. Conventional history has long shown that, in many ways, we have been getting kinder and gentler. Cruelty as entertainment, human sacrifice to indulge superstition, slavery as a labor-saving device, conquest as the mission statement of government, genocide as a means of acquiring real estate, torture and mutilation as routine punishment, the death penalty for misdemeanors and differences of opinion, assassination as the mechanism of political succession, rape as the spoils of war, pogroms as outlets for frustration, homicide as the major form of conflict resolution—all were unexceptionable features of life for most of human history. But, today, they are **rare to nonexistent** in the West, far less common elsewhere than they used to be, concealed when they do occur, and widely condemned when they are brought to light. At one time, these facts were widely appreciated. They were the source of notions like progress, civilization, and man's rise from savagery and barbarism. Recently, however, those ideas have come to sound corny, even dangerous. They seem to demonize people in other times and places, license colonial conquest and other foreign adventures, and conceal the crimes of our own societies. The doctrine of the noble savage—the idea that humans are peaceable by nature and corrupted by modern institutions—pops up frequently in the writing of public intellectuals like José Ortega y Gasset ("War is not an instinct but an invention"), Stephen Jay Gould ("Homo sapiens is not an evil or destructive species"), and Ashley Montagu ("Biological studies lend support to the ethic of universal brotherhood"). But, now that social scientists have started to count bodies in different historical periods, they have discovered that the romantic theory gets it backward: Far from causing us to become more violent, something in modernity and its cultural institutions has made us nobler. To be sure, any attempt to document changes in violence must be soaked in uncertainty. In much of the world, the distant past was a tree falling in the forest with no one to hear it, and, even for events in the historical record, statistics are spotty until recent periods. Long-term trends can be discerned only by smoothing out zigzags and spikes of horrific bloodletting. And the choice to focus on relative rather than absolute numbers brings up the moral imponderable of whether it is worse for 50 percent of a population of 100 to be killed or 1 percent in a population of one billion. Yet, despite these caveats, a picture is taking shape. The decline of violence is a fractal phenomenon, visible at the scale of millennia, centuries, decades, and years. It **applies over several orders** of magnitude of violence, from genocide to war to rioting to homicide to the treatment of children and animals. And it appears to be a **worldwide trend**, though not a homogeneous one. The leading edge has been in Western societies, especially England and Holland, and there seems to have been a **tipping point** at the onset of the Age of Reason in the early seventeenth century. At the widest-angle view, one can see a whopping difference across the millennia that separate us from our pre-state ancestors. Contra leftist anthropologists who celebrate the noble savage, quantitative body-counts—such as the proportion of prehistoric skeletons with axemarks and embedded arrowheads or the proportion of men in a contemporary foraging tribe who die at the hands of other men—suggest that pre-state societies were far more violent than our own. It is true that raids and battles killed a tiny percentage of the numbers that die in modern warfare. But, in tribal violence, the clashes are more frequent, the percentage of men in the population who fight is greater, and the rates of death per battle are higher. According to anthropologists like Lawrence Keeley, Stephen LeBlanc, Phillip Walker, and Bruce Knauft, these factors combine to yield population-wide rates of death in tribal warfare that dwarf those of modern times. If the wars of the twentieth century had killed the same proportion of the population that die in the wars of a typical tribal society, there would have been two billion deaths, not 100 million. Political correctness from the other end of the ideological spectrum has also distorted many people's conception of violence in early civilizations—namely, those featured in the Bible. This supposed source of moral values contains many celebrations of genocide, in which the Hebrews, egged on by God, slaughter every last resident of an invaded city. The Bible also prescribes death by stoning as the penalty for a long list of nonviolent infractions, including idolatry, blasphemy, homosexuality, adultery, disrespecting one's parents, and picking up sticks on the Sabbath. The Hebrews, of course, were no more murderous than other tribes; one also finds frequent boasts of torture and genocide in the early histories of the Hindus, Christians, Muslims, and Chinese. At the century scale, it is hard to find quantitative studies of deaths in warfare spanning medieval and modern times. Several historians have suggested that there has been an increase in the number of recorded wars across the centuries to the present, but, as political scientist James Payne has noted, this may show only that "the Associated Press is a more comprehensive source of information about battles around the world than were sixteenth-century monks." Social histories of the West provide evidence of numerous barbaric practices that became obsolete in the last five centuries, such as slavery, amputation, blinding, branding, flaying, disembowelment, burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel, and so on. Meanwhile, for another kind of violence—homicide—the data are abundant and striking. The criminologist Manuel Eisner has assembled hundreds of homicide estimates from Western European localities that kept records at some point between 1200 and the mid-1990s. In every country he analyzed, murder rates declined steeply—for example, from 24 homicides per 100,000 Englishmen in the fourteenth century to 0.6 per 100,000 by the early 1960s. On the scale of decades, comprehensive data again paint a **shockingly happy picture**: Global violence has **fallen steadily** since the middle of the twentieth century. According to the Human Security Brief 2006, the number of battle deaths in interstate wars has declined from more than 65,000 per year in the 1950s to less than 2,000 per year in this decade. In Western Europe and the Americas, the second half of the century saw a steep decline in the number of wars, military coups, and deadly ethnic riots. Zooming in by a further power of ten exposes yet another reduction. After the cold war, every part of the world saw a steep drop-off in state-based conflicts, and those that do occur are more likely to end in negotiated settlements rather than being fought to the bitter end. Meanwhile, according to political scientist Barbara Harff, between 1989 and 2005 the number of campaigns of mass killing of civilians decreased by 90 percent. The decline of killing and cruelty poses several challenges to our ability to make sense of the world. To begin with, how could so many people be so wrong about something so important? Partly, it's because of a **cognitive** **illusion**: We estimate the probability of an event from how easy it is to recall examples. Scenes of carnage are more likely to be relayed to our living rooms and burned into our memories than footage of people dying of old age. Partly, it's an intellectual culture that is loath to admit that there could be anything good about the institutions of civilization and Western society. Partly, it's the incentive structure of the activism and opinion markets: No one ever attracted followers and donations by announcing that things keep getting better. And part of the explanation lies in the phenomenon itself. The decline of violent behavior has been paralleled by a decline in attitudes that tolerate or glorify violence, and often the attitudes are in the lead. As deplorable as they are, the abuses at Abu Ghraib and the lethal injections of a few murderers in Texas are mild by the standards of atrocities in human history. But, from a contemporary vantage point, we see them as signs of how low our behavior can sink, not of how high our standards have risen. The other major challenge posed by the decline of violence is how to explain it. A force that pushes in the same direction across many epochs, continents, and scales of social organization mocks our standard tools of causal explanation. The usual suspects—guns, drugs, the press, American culture—aren't nearly up to the job. Nor could it possibly be explained by evolution in the biologist's sense: Even if the meek could inherit the earth, natural selection could not favor the genes for meekness quickly enough. In any case, human nature has not changed so much as to have lost its taste for violence. Social psychologists find that at least 80 percent of people have fantasized about killing someone they don't like. And modern humans still take pleasure in viewing violence, if we are to judge by the popularity of murder mysteries, Shakespearean dramas, Mel Gibson movies, video games, and hockey. What has changed, of course, is people's willingness to act on these fantasies. The sociologist Norbert Elias suggested that European modernity accelerated a "civilizing process" marked by increases in self-control, long-term planning, and sensitivity to the thoughts and feelings of others. These are precisely the functions that today's cognitive neuroscientists attribute to the prefrontal cortex. But this only raises the question of why humans have increasingly exercised that part of their brains. No one knows why our behavior has come under the control of the better angels of our nature, but there are four plausible suggestions.

## 2NC – T, Case

### 2NC overview

#### Their interpretation creates dozens of ridiculously unpredictable affs for which the negative has no generic ground – even if counterfactuals have some value, they aren’t predictable and belong in a history class, not a competitive debate.

#### 1. Predictability – they violate the grammatical tense of the resolution by ignoring the other words in it – our Haning evidence says should may be the past tense of shall, but that the OTHER terms in the resolution prove that should within the resolution is written in the PRESENT tense. Their interpretation only makes sense if you add words to the resolution by reading it as “should have reduced” instead of “should reduce”.

#### Grammar comes first – it’s the lens through which we all interpret the topic and without there is no meaningful limit

#### 2. Limits – they destroy them –

#### a. counterfactuals uniquely unlimit – they allow ANY criticism energy policy since we used coal to build railroads in the 19th century and oil to enhance production during the industrial revolution –

#### Produces hundreds of potential affs

Ondřej Sládek 7, researcher in the Narratology Section, Institute for Czech Literature, Czech Academy of Sciences, Between History and Fiction: On the Possibilities of Alternative History, 2007, http://www.flu.cas.cz/fictionality2/sladek.pdf

Almost every historian must have been tempted to ask the question: "What would have happened, if.?" What would have happened if there had been no French Revolution of 1789? What if Napoleon had won the battle of Waterloo? Or vice versa: What if he had lost the battle of Austerlitz? What would European have history looked like? What would have happened if there was no American Revolutionary War? What would have happened had the Munich Agreement never been signed? What would have happened if. **One may ask** dozens, or hundreds **of these and similar speculative questions**. They may serve us to generate answers - histories that have never happened, although they could have.

#### And independently turns their reform arguments --- constraints are critical to promote creative thinking

Mayer 6 – Marissa Ann Mayer, vice-president for search products and user experience at Google, February 13, 2006, “Creativity Loves Constraints,” online: http://www.businessweek.com/print/magazine/content/06\_07/b3971144.htm?chan=gl

When people think about creativity, they think about artistic work -- unbridled, unguided effort that leads to beautiful effect. But if you look deeper, you'll find that some of the most inspiring art forms, such as haikus, sonatas, and religious paintings, are fraught with constraints. They are beautiful because creativity triumphed over the "rules." Constraints shape and focus problems and provide clear challenges to overcome. Creativity thrives best when constrained.

But constraints must be balanced with a healthy disregard for the impossible. Too many curbs can lead to pessimism and despair. Disregarding the bounds of what we know or accept gives rise to ideas that are non-obvious, unconventional, or unexplored. The creativity realized in this balance between constraint and disregard for the impossible is fueled by passion and leads to revolutionary change.

A few years ago, I met Paul Beckett, a talented designer who makes sculptural clocks. When I asked him why not do just sculptures, Paul said he liked the challenge of making something artistically beautiful that also had to perform as a clock. Framing the task in that way freed his creative force. Paul reflected that he also found it easier to paint on a canvas that had a mark on it rather than starting with one that was entirely clean and white. This resonated with me. It is often easier to direct your energy when you start with constrained challenges (a sculpture that must be a clock) or constrained possibilities (a canvas that is marked).

#### b. they allow ALL current affirmatives, and add a slew of counterfactual affs on top of them. Their interpretation isn’t exclusive – our Haning evidence proves that grammatically, the fact that should is the past tense of shall doesn’t mean that the resolution should be read in the past tense, the worst case is that both interpretations are possible – which means they create an overwhelming research burden for the neg

#### 3. Ground – Consensus is generally settled on historical questions which means you can choose ones where the literature is not only slanted but actually indicates such a slanted consensus. Moreover, we know past actions didn’t cause nuclear wars or anything else extreme but the aff still has the opportunity to make counter-factual claims about failure to enact such programs causing nuclear war – this is a losing proposition – they will ALWAYS outweigh our shoddily put together strategy to whatever random time period they can find

#### AND, the abuse of unlimited topics is magnified when debating the past since we can’t have generics – every case occurs in a different timeframe which means our disadvantages and case arguments have to be written to dozens of different contexts.

#### 4. Magnitude – students must understand how history relates to the present and current problems facing society -- only an informed citizenry can deal with nuclear annihilation, environmental collapse, terrorism, etc as they face us in our current environment -- history describes those actors present and can still inform critical issues we face today, just as a justification for present action rather than a mere intelectual muse into unlikely past actions that have little to no relevance

### AT Should--Past Tense More Grammatical

1. It’s not more grammatically accurate – our 1nc Hanig evidence says that the past tense nature of should doesn’t imply a past tense reading of the entire sentence.

**2. You’re not grammatical – traditional rules governing should have been abandoned – it is just used for future obligation**

#### Prefer the precision of this interpretation

AHD 2k --- American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language in ‘00

(4th Edition, p. 1612)

Usage Note Like the rules governing the use of shall and will on which they are based, the **traditional rules** governing the use of should and would are largely ignored in modern American practice. Either should or would can now be used in the first person to express conditional futurity: If I had known that, I would (or somewhat more formally, should) have answered differently. But in the second and third persons only would is used: If he had known that, he would (not should) have answered differently. Would cannot always be substituted for should, however. Should is used in all three persons in a conditional clause: if I (or you or he) should decide to go. Should is also used in all three persons to express duty or obligation (the equivalent of ought to): I (or you or he) should go. On the other hand, would is used to express volition or promise: I agreed that I would do it. Either would or should is possible as an auxiliary with like, be inclined, be glad, prefer, and related verbs: I would (or should) like to call your attention to an oversight. Here would was acceptable on all levels to a large majority of the Usage Panel in an earlier survey and is more common in American usage than should. Should have is sometimes incorrectly written should of by writers who have mistaken the source of the spoken contraction should’ve.

3. This straight up makes no sense – if the resolution was a past-tense it would have said “should have” – they should have to come up with a coherent recognizable sentence using should in the context they talk about before you accept this interpretation

**4. Should implies the future, not the past – overall resolutional context proves**

**Russell, 8 –** Appellate Judge for the State of Iowa (Douglas, IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF CLYDE L. GUTHRIE, Deceased, JAMES GUTHRIE, CLARA LUTZ, AND DORIS DAUBER, Plaintiffs-Appellees, vs. KAITLYN BUSCH, a minor, AND BROCK BUSCH, Defendants-Appellants. No. 8-093 / 07-1427 COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA 2008 Iowa App. LEXIS 287 May 14, 2008, Filed, lexis)

Clyde's will provides, "in the event any of my children should predecease me leaving issue who survive me, then the share of such predeceased child shall go in equal shares to his or her issue who survive me, per stirpes." We find no error in the district court's conclusion  [\*6] that an intent to avoid the application of the antilapse statute is not "clear and explicit" from the terms of the will. The will states "in the event" Clyde was predeceased by a child, when in fact Clyde had been predeceased by two of his children at the time the will was written. If the will was referring to the children who had already predeceased Clyde, there would be no need to say "in the event." By stating "in the event" it is clear Clyde was looking ahead to possible future events, when one of his children who were alive when the will was written might predecease him.

Brock and Kaitlyn look to the word "should" in the phrase "in the event any of my children should predecease me" and claim the district court improperly found the word looked to the future. They claim the word should be interpreted as the past tense of "shall" to imply a duty or obligation. *See* Black's Law Dictionary 1379 (6th ed. 1990). Looking at the phrase as a whole, however, rather than at a single word, we determine the phrase is considering possible future events. *See*[*In re Estate of Grulke*, 546 N.W.2d 626, 627 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996)](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/lnacui2api/mungo/lexseestat.do?bct=A&risb=21_T11858031049&homeCsi=158155&A=0.6694179313410291&urlEnc=ISO-8859-1&&citeString=546%20N.W.2d%20626,%20627&countryCode=USA) (noting ***[HN6](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1304195988654&returnToKey=20_T11858070394&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.57843.41404972182" \l "clscc6" \t "_self)***we must ascertain a testator's intent from the entire will).

**5. The rest of the clause helps determine the meaning of should – and even if “have” doesn’t always mark pastness, their interpretation still only makes sense if the resolution said “should have”**

**Arregui, 9** – University of Ottawa (Ana, “Chisholm's paradox: detaching obligations from deontic conditionals,” <http://www.umass.edu/linguist/events/salt18/salt18-abstracts-booklet.pdf>)

3. Should vs. should have. To some extent, correct detachment patterns can be made to follow from a theory of the presuppositions of the embedded clause, and need not depend on the meaning of should. It is Tuesday, and her library book is due on Saturday. We say: She should return the book on time. On Sunday, we’ll say: She should have returned the book on time. Here, have does not mark pastness. Suppose she is required to return the book next Sunday, and she did it yesterday. It is future, but we say: She should have returned the book on Sunday. (I will also show this is not past obligation, see [4]). Following [1], (but cf. [7]/[10]), I argue that clauses with simple should differ from should have in that default perfective aspect presupposes that the embedded proposition is true only in worlds compatible with what is known about the actual world. Perfect aspect (should have) fails to carry such presupposition. If presuppositions of the embedded clause put restrictions on the modal base ([8]), [K] predicts that If she returns the book late, she should pay a fine will lead to the truth of she should pay a fine if we know that she returned the book late: she pays a fine in the best worlds compatible with what we know. With simple should cases, the presuppositions of embedded perfective aspect predict factual sensitivity. It need not be separately encoded in the meaning of should.

**6. Counterfactuals only make sense if coupled with an “if” clause**

**Smith, 6 –** University of Texas (Carlota, “The Pragmatics and Semantics of Temporal Meaning,”

<http://uts.cc.utexas.edu/~carlota/papers/tls_css_amp_0324.pdf>

I will say a little more about feature (iv). Scholars have long noticed that certain past tense have meanings such as conditional, hypothetical, contrary-to-fact, in the context of an if-clause and other conditionals. This holds across languages of several different families. (Steele 1975, Fleischman 1989; Iatridou 2000). I give some simple examples for English and French. I assume that both languages have tense; and that would is a past form of the modal will. The past tense has atemporal meaning in the context of an if-clause:

(5) a. If John passed the exam, he would succeed.

b. If John had passed the exam, he would have succeeded

a'. Si Jean passait l'examen, il y réussirait.

b'. Si Jean avait passé l'examen, il y aurait reussi.

The atemporal meaning is semantic, triggered by context; counter-factual interpretation is pragmatic; see (14) below. Participation in atemporal interpretation can be a telling semantic criterion for tense. But it is not required: some past tenses of French don't have the atemporal meanings (passé simple, passé composé); some languages have forms that code these meanings directly (arguably, the shifted past would of English).

### AT Counterfactuals Good – 2NC Cards

1. education is inevitable, even if counterfactuals are educational, so is everything else we choose NOT to discuss. There’s no reason counterfactuals have to be addressed WITHIN debates – if the cost of their education is to utterly destroy negative ground, it should be rejected.

2. it creates bad education, our interpretation is better – Debate trains us to be future policy makers, lawyers and activists. All of these require the ability to make COST-BENEFIT CALCULATIONS relying on PREDICTIVE INFORMATION to be effective. This is a skill that can only and best be taught in policy debates using the assumptions of fiat. If history is valuable and relevant it can be used as empirical examples to prove and disprove future arguments which solves all your offense

#### Predictability --- Counterfactual analysis is a niche approach for studying history that most scholars discount as fiction

Ondřej Sládek 7, researcher in the Narratology Section, Institute for Czech Literature, Czech Academy of Sciences, Between History and Fiction: On the Possibilities of Alternative History, 2007, http://www.flu.cas.cz/fictionality2/sladek.pdf

Although this kind of thinking about history, which has come to be termed "counterfactual" or "virtual" history, is applied relatively often, it can hardly be regarded as a widely accepted approach and method in terms of standard historiographic research. Many critics of counterfactual scenarios regard them as mere uncommitted and useless playthings, a "parlor-game" (Carr 2001; see Doležel 2004, 111-112) for which there is no place in serious historigraphic writing.2 They regard them fundamentally as fiction since they describe something which has not happened, which is based neither in history, nor in genuine scholarly work. On the other hand, advocates of alternative thinking about history view counterfactual scenarios as an extension of a certain method the historian uses in every stage of their work. Their advocates believe counterfactual scenarios and models of possible history have various uses; one of the most important among them has to do with the fact that they are thought experiments pointing to the significance of certain facts of history (events and situations) which did not have to happen as we have come to know them - in a single specific way.

#### Counterfactuals are futile and misleading exercises --- impossible to accurately predict how the world would have turned out

David Frum 00, “History As It Wasn't,” The Weekly Standard, Vol. 6, No. 11, Nov 27, 2000, http://weeklystandard.com/Content/Protected/Articles/000/000/011/664qtnky.asp?nopager=1

But though it's natural to speculate about the paths we personally did not choose, **historians have warned for decades** **that** it is futile and misleading to engage in such speculation about humanity as a whole. "Cleopatra's nose: Had it been shorter, the whole face of the world would have been changed," Blaise Pascal mused -- and ever since, the idea that something as contingent as one woman's beauty might be responsible for the rise and fall of kingdoms has been damned by the historical profession as the "fallacy of Cleopatra's nose."

Historians have objected to Pascal's proposition for two opposite reasons: some because they believe that the shortening of Cleopatra's nose would have changed too little to make a difference; others because they believe that it would have changed too much for the human mind to reckon with.

Those who disparage the effect of the nose-change think that historical developments are vast, virtually irresistible tides, channeled within bounds that no individual can alter. Suppose Cleopatra had been less seductive, and that as a result Mark Antony rather than Octavian had emerged the dictator of Rome. How could that make a difference? To succeed, Antony would have had to govern more or less as Octavian did; had he failed to do so, his regime would have swiftly collapsed, as the three military dictatorships before Octavian's collapsed. In other words, had Cleopatra's nose been shorter, the names on the busts in the Capitoline museum might well have been altered. But the face of the world? Hardly a jot. According to this deterministic objection, historical counterfactuals are useless because they fail to take account of how little difference any single human being can make.

The other theory, by contrast, complains that Cleopatra's nose counterfactuals are useless because they fail to reckon with **how much difference** a single human being can make. Ray Bradbury has a famous science-fiction story in which a character travels back in time to the age of the dinosaurs, accidentally steps on a single butterfly, and returns to the present -- only to discover the world entirely changed. It's ridiculous, goes this theory, to ask how Mark Antony's empire would have differed from Octavian's. Alter one fact of history and all of history is put up for grabs, in such a radical way that we here in North America could easily be pondering in Chinese what-if scenarios about our Han dynasty ancestors.

The Italian historian and philosopher Benedetto Croce delivered an especially eloquent expression of this point of view, which is disapprovingly quoted in Niall Ferguson's introduction to Virtual History: Alternatives and Counterfactuals, a recent collection of essays on the topic. The Cleopatra's nose problem, Croce complained, "arbitrarily divides the course of history into necessary facts and accidental facts." A supposedly accidental fact is then

mentally eliminated in order to espy how the first would have developed along its own lines if it had not been disturbed by the second. This is a game which all of us in moments of distraction or idleness indulge in, when we muse on the way our life might have turned out if we had not met a certain person, . . . cheerfully treating ourselves, in these meditations, as though we were the necessary and stable element, it simply not occurring to us . . . to provide for the transformation of this self of ours which is, at the moment of thinking, what it is, with all its experiences and regrets and fancies, just because we did meet that person.

And yet despite all these wise admonitions, people continue to engage in just the sort of speculation Croce and others condemn. They use it as a teaching device, to jolt people out of the complacent assumption that events had to happen as they did: The British historian Conrad Russell has a marvelous essay about how, if the wind had not abruptly shifted in 1688, the Glorious Revolution would have failed and a Catholic king would have been preserved on the English throne. At still other times it serves a moral purpose, prodding us to appreciate the importance of individuals in history: What if the car that struck Winston Churchill when he looked the wrong way before crossing Fifth Avenue in 1931 had killed him? Alexis de Tocqueville warned that because men in democratic societies feel themselves to be small and weak, they are dangerously tempted by explanations of historical events that stress inevitability. Alternative history at its best can encourage us to appreciate the daunting contingency of history -- and the supreme importance for good or ill of individual moral choice.

This point is effectively made by the best of the essays anthologized in Ferguson's book, Mark Almond's "1989 Without Gorbachev." With bitter irony, Almond argues that we do indeed owe the end of the Cold War to Mikhail Gorbachev. "After generations of dullard apparatchiks had safely guided the Soviet Union to super-power status, it was the bright-eyed Gorbachev who grabbed the steering wheel and headed straight for the rocks." Repression could still have worked in the mid-1980s, and would have found no lack of apologists in the West.

Gorbachev's perestroika, by contrast, wrecked the stagnating Soviet economy while his glasnost discredited his regime. "Gorbachev's belief that a relaxation in international tensions was in the Soviet Union's interest was profoundly misplaced. Only the 'two camps' division of the world provided the kind of global scenario in which such a strange animal as the Soviet economy could function." Had Gorbachev only held on a little longer, he would have discovered that ideological help was on its way.

The long march through the institutions of post-1960s pacifism and fellow traveling combined with nuclear panic was just about to reach its goal. It was only the surprising and total collapse of Communism . . . which brought much of the Western intelligentsia to admit that the Right had been correct. . . . Had the Wall stayed up, much of the Western elite would have remained oblivious to Communism's failings, moral as much as material, for at least another generation.

But alternative history is seldom at its best. More often it turns into heavy-handed academic drollery -- like the 1932 collection If It Had Happened Otherwise, in which (among other heavy-handed drolleries) Benjamin Disraeli becomes grand vizier to a rejuvenated Muslim kingdom in Spain. Or else into ponderously detailed constructions of imaginary societies -- science-fiction without the robots and deathrays -- as in Robert Sobel's For Want of a Nail, a prolonged counter-history of a world in which American independence was snuffed out at the battle of Saratoga in 1777.

And of course, sometimes it back-fires altogether. Reading through many counterfactual histories, one tends to find reinforced one's Tocquevillian feelings of inevitability. In Robert Cowley's What If? The World's Foremost Military Historians Imagine What Might Have Been, another recent anthology of hypothetical history, Alistair Horne considers how history might have been altered had Napoleon halted his career of conquest after the Peace of Tilsit in 1807. But to suppose that Napoleon could have somehow quit the roulette table while he still held all his winnings is to endow him with a personality entirely different from the one he actually had -- and such an unnapoleonic Napoleon would never have adventured the first profitable spin. And even if Napoleon could have gotten a grip on his egotism and refrained from starting further wars himself, his empire was so ruthless, exploitative, and menacing that sooner or later the Russians, Austrians, and British would have resumed the war against him.

As for the old chestnut about Napoleon winning at Waterloo, not even Horne can bring himself to believe it. "There were vast fresh forces of Russians, Austrians, and Germans already moving toward France. A second battle, or perhaps several battles, would probably have followed." And behind these battles would have been the strangulating power of the Royal Navy and the superior financial resources of a Britain already embarked upon its industrial revolution.

It could be said that alternative history performs as great a service when it shows that a result was inescapable as when it shows that things might have turned out otherwise. One of the most sensible essays gathered in these anthologies is Theodore F. Cook's in What If?, which convincingly argues that the likeliest result of a Japanese victory at the battle of Midway would have been not an Axis victory, but a prolongation of the war and the devastation of the Japanese Home Islands by atomic bombs. Another is Alvin Jackson's in Virtual History, which concludes that Anglo-Irish relations would have followed the same tragic course in the twentieth century whether or not the British Liberals had been able to push through the plan for Home Rule for Ireland. "Ireland under Home Rule might well have proved to be not so much Britain's settled, democratic partner as her Yugoslavia."

But what is no service to anyone is the kind of wish-fantasy that predominates in both books. Eminent historian that he is, Stephen Sears is kidding himself to imagine in What If? that a Union victory at First Bull Run would have knocked the Confederacy out of the war before it began. In Virtual History, Niall Ferguson repeats the assertion (made in greater scope in his 1999 book The Pity of War) that British neutrality in 1914 would have brought us something very like the European Union eight decades ahead of schedule while preserving England as a great power -- a hypothesis that more closely resembles the daydreams of Civil War reenactors than the realities of the early twentieth century.

As they so often do, in fact, these fantasies **reveal more about the fantasizer** than they do about the thing fantasized about. Ross Hassig contends in What If? that an independent Native American state could have survived in Mexico had Hernando Cortez been captured and sacrificed by the Aztecs (as he very nearly was) in the climactic battle for Tenochtitlan in 1521 -- a contention that tells us more about the historical profession's born-again enthusiasm for Indian culture than about the real-life prospects for a stone-tool kingdom whose people lacked immunity to European diseases. Alternative history is the last redoubt of the historical traditionalist -- the sort of historian who still cares about high politics, wars, and battles -- but dreamy multiculturalists are forcing their way into even this cloistered subgenre. Makes you shudder to think what the rest of the profession must be like.

#### Counterfactuals are unrealistic policy simulations

James D. Fearon 91, Geballe Professor in the School of Humanities and Sciences and Professor of Political Science at Stanford University, “Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science,” World Politics, Vol. 43, No. 2. (Jan., 1991), pp. 169-195, <http://graduateinstitute.ch/webdav/site/mia/users/Imene_Ajala/public/jamesfearon-couterfactuals.pdf>

Not only do counterfactual and actual case strategies both attempt to solve the same statistical problem, but both also run important methodological risks. Less obvious is that in each of the strategies, the principal risks are closely connected to the role played by counterfactuals.¶ The main risk in the first strategy is obvious and serious-how can we know what would have happened with any degree of confidence.: Historians, when confronted with the suggestion that the validity of their causal inferences necessarily depends on counterfactual argument, have often **dismissed out of hand or ignored the idea** in favor of the view that their job is to deal with reality.9 Political scientists and sociologists, too, with the exception of a neglected methodological piece by Max Weber and some recent work by Jon Elster, have also tended to avoid explicit discussion or open embrace of the counterfactual strategy, probably because it is felt that an empirical political science **must deal only with actual cases**. This belief would seem to be reflected in the title of a recent book of essays by political scientists working with counterfactual premises: What If?: Essays in Social Science Fiction. The play on "science fiction" is no accident here.10

### XT Not Reagan but Solar

#### The public didn't even support the solar bank -- Somers says the American public resented Carter for limited their growth prospects -- they regarded cheap energy as their birth-right

#### It was just a publicity stunt -- Shirley says it was politically popular in the midst of the 70's energy crisis but the panels were useless -- it increased domestic electricity prices and needlessly interfered with the market

#### Reagan wasn’t the cause of the death of solar but an illustration of how the public hates everything the aff stands for

Strickland 10 (Eliza, freelance writer focusing on science and the environment, Discover Magazine, “Jimmy Carter’s Infamous Solar Panels Won’t Return to the White House Roof”, 10/10, http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/discoblog/2010/09/10/jimmy-carters-infamous-solar-panels-wont-return-to-the-white-house-roof/)

Funny how a couple of slabs of silicon can become a national symbol.¶ In 1979, in the midst of an oil crisis, then-president Jimmy Carter tried to lead the nation to a brighter future powered by alternative energy via a symbolic gesture: installing solar panels on the roof of the White House. But instead of being inspired, the American people were freaked by Carter’s proposed program of conservation, carpooling, and cardigans, and promptly kicked him out the of Oval Office. Ronald Reagan shelved most of Carter’s ambitious energy plans, and in 1986 removed the solar panels from the roof.

#### Reagan wasn’t dogmatically opposed to solar—his administration acted to choose the best way to solve the economy

Washington Post 10 (Juliet Eilperin and Scott Higham, “How the Minerals Management Service's partnership with industry led to failure”, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/08/24/AR2010082406754.html?sid=ST2010082404823>)

Cites Ronald Reagan’s first interior secretary

"The Reagan administration was for everything," Watt says. "We wanted nuclear, we wanted solar, we wanted conservation, we wanted wind, we wanted coal. We were just doing everything we could to re-arm America, dig us out of a huge financial mess. That required energy at every level."

### Turn – Not Feasible

#### Turn --- the aff is nothing more than historical fiction --- the unrealistic nature of the idea that Reagan would do the aff deprives counterfactual history of any meaningful ability to contribute to scholarship

Ondřej Sládek 7, researcher in the Narratology Section, Institute for Czech Literature, Czech Academy of Sciences, Between History and Fiction: On the Possibilities of Alternative History, 2007, http://www.flu.cas.cz/fictionality2/sladek.pdf

To prevent counterfactual history from **becoming a mere plaything of intellectuals** and a result of **uncontrolled imagination** on the part of the historian, some basic methodological guidelines had to be specified. This task was undertaken by Niall Ferguson himself, who, apart from the emphasis on credibility and convincingness of individual alternative histories, stresses especially their **feasibility**. He writes in his introduction to Virtual History: "We should consider as plausible or probable **only those alternatives which we can show on the basis of contemporary evidence that contemporaries actually considered"** (Ferguson 1999, 86). The likelihood of the counterfactual thus depends significantly on and is constituted by context - the context of a specific actual and historical event. In other words: "the historian must place himself in the position of the contemporaries to whom the various possible alternatives were still available, for whom the selection was not closed by the actualization of one of them" (Doležel 2004, 117).¶ A historian and a counterfactual historian treat facts and events in the same way, or rather: their inputs are the same while the outputs differ. The key concept contrasting the two interpretations is the one of event. What we have in mind here is a real (actual) event which is at the root of differing courses of development and diverse interpretations. Niall Ferguson says: "A number of points emerge when we consider these [alternatives]. Firstly, what actually happened was often not the outcome which the majority of informed contemporaries saw as the most likely: the counterfactual scenario was in that sense more 'real' to decisionmakers at the critical moment than the actual subsequent events. Secondly, we begin to see where determinist theories really do play a role in history: when people believe in them and believe themselves to be in their grip" (Ferguson 1999, 88).¶ Counterfactual histories and counterfactual historical fiction¶ But let us return now to Ferguson's methodological guidelines specifying how a historian should proceed when constructing counterfactual history. His method is based on three steps: (a) the convincingness and feasibility of a counterfactual history is a necessary condition; (b) the historian must possess a thorough knowledge of the context of the period or historical event in question; (c) **only those alternatives that were regarded as feasible** by people living in the given period should be considered. **This very last requirement turns counterfactual analysis into a significant tool for the extraction of scholarly knowledge.** Background material and historical documents are objectively researchable and each counterfactual history constructed may thus be checked and verified by other scholars. "Fergusonian counterfactual history is therefore primarily a study of decision-making by historical agents, based on documents such as government records, planning papers, diplomatic exchanges etc." (Doležel 2004, 118). They are thus exclusively worlds Wt, worlds of intentional action, from the point of view of the above-mentioned typolo-gy of worlds. Only these worlds are (historically) authentic and feasible.¶ What if the historian fails to revise his/her research in the light of individual documents and pieces of evidence and starts to speculate as to whether a certain coincidence had occurred or natural forces had intervened in a different way? That is, if the historian develops the two remaining types of worlds W2 and W3 - worlds in which non-intentional action prevails? Are they still counterfactual history, or (according to Ferguson's selection criteria) ratherfiction no historian should indulge in under any circumstances?¶ Statement 6: Counterfactual history can do without uncontrolled imagination; if it fails to do so, it becomes counterfactual historical fiction.¶ If a world constructed by a historical narrative is populated with characters and objects **which cannot be regarded as historical under any circumstances, it is not a historical, but a fictional world**. The same can be said of counterfactual history. If the counterfactual historian's primary considerations are informed by speculations about the possible intervention of natural forces (W2) or unpredictable situations (W3), which are, however, beyond historical evidence, what s/he produces is counterfactual historical fiction. One of the most typical features of counterfactual historical fiction is merging imaginary characters with factual/historical events and objects. This type of literary fiction, represented by authors such as R. Harris (Fatherland, 1992), K. Amis (The Alternation, 1976) etc., has shaped an independent and extremely popular genre. It would certainly be of interest to compare the worlds of these individual novels with a view to describing the structure of fictional worlds constituted by this genre. The limited time assigned to my talk however does not permit me to attempt this task.

### Turn – Better Solar

#### Using economics and foreign policy as the problem frames for solar power are the only way to overcome deeply entrenched perspectives about its efficacy

Laird—1AC Author—1 (Frank—prof in the school of intl studies at University of Denver, PhD in Political Science from MIT, MA in Physics from University of Edinburgh, “Solar Energy, Technology Policy, and Institutional Values”, Cambridge University Press, Print.)

U.S. energy policy makers held remarkably consistent normative and technical ideas (sometimes called values and beliefs) about energy technologies for over three decades. Both types of ideas shaped the problem frame that officials used in thinking about energy policy. Policy elites who thought about the future and about new energy sources conceptualized their problems in terms of economic benefits and national security. Notions of economic benefits changed over time, from the idea that energy should be cheap to promote maximum economic growth to more refined notions that energy markets ought to be efficient to get optimal economic performance. Nonetheless, both notions point to getting energy at the lowest possible price. Discussions of national security emphasized importing oil from sources that would not be interrupted by political acts.¶ Precisely how policy makers expressed their values and beliefs depended on the contingent circumstances in which they found themselves, but both sets of dominant ideas made for a problem definition that greatly disadvantaged solar advocates. Because of its high market prices, solar was hardpressed to compete with fossil fuels, and because of its diffuse nature, it did not fit into the existing energy production system the way nuclear power promised to do. Although policy makers began to include an assortment of environmental protection values into their frames, that did little to alter the situation.¶ In addition, normative and technical ideas interacted in complex ways, and the boundary between them was ambiguous and contested.' For example, consider the apparently empirical notion held by a White House aide about the infeasibility of solar energy as a major energy source. As cited in the previous chapter, this aide took from a discussion with Congressman Mike McCormack what the aide called a "Solar fact" that getting one percent of the country's total energy from solar would require converting ten percent of all houses to solar, and would cost $70-lOS billion.2 The aide called this a "fact," the most solidly empirical of appellations. And yet, contained within this alleged fact were a number of normative and questionable empirical assumptions. It assumed empirically that the price of solar systems would not go down much. It also assumed normatively that the United States should remain a very high-consumption society, which in itself contains assumptions about the technological possibilities for energy efficiency and the normative desirability of ever-increasing material consumption. Changes in any of these underlying ideas would change this apparently simple "fact." ¶ At a more aggregate level of policy discussions, the normative and empirical ideas became just as enmeshed. As I showed in Chapter 5, Nixon administration officials regarded high levels of energy consumption as normatively desirable, as indicators of a good and progressive society.; The empirical fact of high energy consumption became a normative standard. Thus the official energy policy frame made sustaining and enlarging that consumption more than just preserving the empirical status quo; growing energy consumption was a valued social goal, not just an empirical fact. This problem frame stacked the odds against solar energy in normative as well as empirical terms. By this normative standard, the sorts of technological changes that would most enhance solar energy's prospects, particularly large improvements in energy efficiency, look normatively undesirable, whatever their technical feasibility. Conventional energy policy analysts held these intertwined empirical and normative goals deeply, as shown by their bitter attacks on Amory Lovins when he challenged that problem frame, as detailed in Chapter 6. ¶ For thirty-five years solar advocates presented their technologies that used a variety of renewable energy sources as a way to exploit a vast, inexhaustible, but diffuse, resource. Most of them for most of the period did not think that creating a solar society entailed significant social or political change. Hoyt Hottel, Maria Telkes, Farrington Daniels, and the other early solar pioneers of the I 940s and 1950s all sought to make solar affordable, largely with the assumption that it would plug into the existing energy systems, replacing fossil fuels, and enabling society and polity to continue functioning as before, with greater security and, perhaps, less pollution. Most of them saw no contradiction in promoting research and development in both solar and nuclear power, or solar and synthetic fuels, and their only complaint was that nuclear got an unfairly large portion of federal subsidies. A few of them, such as Daniels and Eugene Ayers, sometimes hinted that a substantial change in such a major technological system would affect more than how one heated a room or lit a lamp. But for most of these advocates, solar energy technology offered just another way of securing the status quo against the end of fossil fuels. They sought a new technological system to prevent the social changes that would accompany scarcity.¶ By the 1970s a new type of solar advocate emerged. These activists came to the technology from a part of the environmental movement that believed that the fundamental structures of society and politics - those concerned with industrial and agricultural production, housing, settlement patterns, and transportation - were, in some deep sense, flawed.' These ecological advocates did not simply want any and all solar technologies. They sought technologies that would reinforce and be more compatible with a qualitatively different society and politics, one in which ecological sustainability and local community self-reliance would displace increasing ecological damage, bureaucratic centralization, and anomie. For them, making a drastic change in the energy technology system would be akin to making a legislative change for all of society.' Whether the technologies they sought would have given them the society that they desired is not the point here. Rather, the point is that their social goals and ideas about technology as a social force led them to a very different framing of the energy problem and solar's role in it. Within their problem frame, solar was not only a feasible solution to the energy problem, it was the only desirable solution, the only energy technology ensemble that would encourage and strengthen the sort of society that they desired. In their frame, issues such as high initial costs and an immature industry were problems to be solved, not barriers to policy. This shared meaning of solar energy technologies bound together ecological advocates as a social group and drove their choices, leading them to champion smaller, more decentralized solar technologies and to reject schemes like the solar-powered satellites.' The problem frame that came out of this meaning led them to regard problems like costs as secondary considerations, just the opposite of conventional frames. ¶ Top-level policy makers never shared that framing of the problem or the normative values that went with it. Their public pronouncements and written internal debates show no hint that they ever even considered this alternative problem frame and set of values. The presidents and their top aides - in every administration - talked about energy almost exclusively in economic and national security terms, with occasional references to narrowly construed environmental values. Even in the Carter administration, no one outside of the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) gave any sign that they even thought about some of the more radical alternatives, and they never committed them to paper, suggesting that such ideas were not welcome in policy deliberations. ¶ These facts suggest a new interpretation of solar energy policy, particularly its rapid rise and fall in the 1970s. The conventional explanations for energy policy and solar's failure to establish itself within it do not explain all of the events recounted here. It was not enough that solar was expensive and its future costs were uncertain. That could be said of all future energy technologies, including nuclear energy. And it was not enough that the Reagan administration was ideologically hostile to solar energy. Solar advocates began losing their battles for support while President Carter was still in office, and the ideological explanation begs the question of why Reagan and his people evinced such hostility to solar energy. The association of solar energy with the ecological wing of the solar movement was a phenomenon of the 1970s, not what one might have predicted in the 1950s or 1960s. Perhaps most importantly, the events analyzed here require us to reexamine the pluralist account of solar energy policy. Pluralism must, to explain events adequately, incorporate the influence of ideas, normative and empirical, being institutionalized into official problem frames.

### AT Tech Thought Impacts

#### Tech thought is inevitable

Kateb 97 George, Professor of politics at Princeton, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_m2267/is\_/ai\_19952031

But the question arises as to where a genuine principle of limitation on technological endeavor would come from. It is scarcely conceivable that Western humanity--and by now most of humanity, because of their pleasures and interests and their own passions and desires and motives--would halt the technological project. Even if, by some change of heart, Western humanity could adopt an altered relation to reality and human beings, how could it be enforced and allowed to yield its effects? The technological project can be stopped only by some global catastrophe that it had helped to cause or was powerless to avoid. Heidegger's teasing invocation of the idea that a saving remedy grows with the worst danger is useless. In any case, no one would want the technological project halted, if the only way was a global catastrophe. Perhaps even the survivors would not want to block its reemergence. As for our generation and the indefinite future, many of us are prepared to say that there are many things we wish that modern science did not know or is likely to find out and many things we wish that modern technology did not know how to do. When referring in 1955 to the new sciences of life, Heidegger says We do not stop to consider that an attack with technological means is being prepared upon the life and nature of man compared with which the explosion of the hydrogen bomb means little. For precisely if the hydrogen bombs do not explode and human life on earth is preserved, an uncanny change in the world moves upon us (1966, p. 52). The implication is that it is less bad for the human status or stature and for the human relation to reality that there be nuclear destruction than that (what we today call) genetic engineering should go from success to success. To such lengths can a mind push itself when it marvels first at the passions, drives, and motives that are implicated in modern technology, and then marvels at the feats of technological prowess. The sense of wonder is entangled with a feeling of horror. We are past even the sublime, as conceptualized under the influence of Milton's imagination of Satan and Hell. It is plain that so much of the spirit of the West is invested in modern technology. We have referred to anger, alienation, resentment. But that cannot be the whole story. Other considerations we can mention include the following: a taste for virtuosity, skill for its own sake, an enlarged fascination with technique in itself, and, along with these, an aesthetic craving to make matter or nature beautiful or more beautiful; and then, too, sheer exhilaration, a questing, adventurous spirit that is reckless, heedless of danger, finding in obstacles opportunities for self-overcoming, for daring, for the very sort of daring that Heidegger praises so eloquently when in 1935 he discusses the Greek world in An Introduction to Metaphysics (1961, esp. pp. 123-39). All these considerations move away from anger, anxiety, resentment, and so on. The truth of the matter, I think, is that the project of modern technology, just like that of modern science, must attract a turbulence of response. The very passions and drives and motives that look almost villainous or hypermasculine simultaneously look like marks of the highest human aspiration, or, at the least, are not to be cut loose from the highest human aspiration.

#### Technological thought has been internalized---aff can’t change it

Leach 3 Neil, Professor at the University of Southern California, “Forget Heidegger”, August 15 is last date modified, <http://www.china-designer.com/magazine/leach/txt1.htm>

Adorno's further example of the car reveals how the technological has come to colonise our everyday lives not as standing reserve, but as something to which symbolic intention is always already being 'attached'. The point here is that we have to understand that our engagement with technology involves a moment of 'proprioception'. Technology may come to operate as a form of 'prosthesis' to the human body that is appropriated such that it becomes part of the motility of the body. In driving a car we come to navigate the road through that car. As such, the car as an item of technology is not divorced - alienated - from the body. Indeed it becomes a form of extension to that body. What I am arguing here is not some simplistic manifesto for cyborgs, claiming that human beings can become part human and part machine. Rather I am trying to tease out the logic of mimesis itself. For according to this logic, human beings have absorbed technology at an unconscious level, such that they have come to operate through technology, as though by way of some tele-kinesis.¶ Not only this, but technology may actually influence the way that human beings think. It may itself affect our consciousness. Let us take the example of the computer. For, if as Walter Benjamin once argued, the factory worker in the modernist age comes to absorb the jolting, jarring repetitive action of the machine, such that those movements are appropriated into the worker's own behaviour, so too people today have absorbed the thinking and fluid circuitry behind the computer screen. New conditions breed new ways of thinking. As Douglas Rushkoff observes, a new computer generation is emerging. The computer kids of today come to behave like their computers. They identify with them, play with them, and mimic their operations. Analogical reasoning is out. Non-linear, multiple-layered thinking is in - Deleuzian surfing. Fractals, rhizomes and clones, fluidity and flux - these are the buzz words of this new generation. In such a context, those who argue against the use of the computer in the contemporary design studio are failing to address the concrete ontological reality of life today, and are doing no service to the students, for whom knowledge of computer has become a 'given' within the contemporary office. It may be that the still prevalent antipathy towards digital technology is merely a form of 'denial'. As in the case of homophobics, who often deny their latent homosexuality, critics of technology may be repressing a secret fascination with technology. An individual 'in denial' may be fascinated by some personal psychic obsession, but, not wishing to acknowledge it, will project that obsession on to some external object, and then criticise it. But whether this antipathy towards digital technology is a form of repressed fascination or not, it is clearly out of place in what has become a highly digitalised world.¶ This is not to say that the computer should be accepted unproblematically within the studio. Indeed the lessons of those design schools that have accepted the computer wholesale would seem to indicate that the concerns expressed in The Anaesthetics of Architecture about the potential aestheticisation and hence anaesthetisation of social issues are borne out only too clearly in such contexts. Rather it is a call for a self-critical, theoretically informed engagement with such realms. Theory may be unable in itself to combat the potential problems of aestheticisation. Yet it may provide the first crucial step. Once a problem has been exposed, one is no longer trapped by that problem.¶ The consequences are all too obvious. Not only have we accepted technology as an essential part of our everyday life, such that the distinction once posed between techné and technology seems no longer valid, but our whole existence has become conditioned by technology. In this new digital age, as Sarah Chaplin argues, we have adopted a form of cybervisuality. An important factor, then, is our interface with that technology. For technology may take many forms. Here the question of design becomes crucial. The message of mimesis is not that human beings will adapt to anything, so that design is unimportant, but precisely the opposite. Design becomes an important mechanism for making people feel at one with their world. This relates not simply to whether a piece of technology is itself aesthetically pleasing - as is the case, say, with the iMac computer - , but in the context of digital technology it relates also to the user interface - to software programming and its compatibility with human modes of operation. Far from engendering alienation, well designed technology has the capacity to overcome alienation.¶ There was a time when Heideggerian thought made a substantial and noteworthy contribution to architectural culture in challenging the spirit of positivism that was once so pervasive. But now Heideggerian thinking must not itself go unchallenged, in that it threatens to install itself as a set of fixed values out of tune with the fluidity and flux of contemporary society. And while some would criticise postmodern thought for being relativistic in accommodating plurality and difference, and questioning the ground on which any particular statement is made, the true relativism lies surely in a tradition that forecloses even the possibility of even asking these questions, by doggedly adhering to an out of date set of values, and by failing to engage substantively with any critical discourse.¶ In an increasingly digital world, it is time, it would seem, to adopt a more flexible and tolerant attitude towards digital technology. It is time to break free from the shackles of the past. It is time, perhaps, to forget Heidegger.

### 2NC Resources

#### Resource production – European Commission cites a scientific study that concluded, even under the most optimistic scenario, demand of critical resources outstrips current supply by a factor of 4 – even if silicon and rare earth metal extraction methods improve, this will take at least 10 years, meaning they can't solve their impact

#### Production constraints collapse investment

Zuser et al 11 -- Vienna University of Technology (Anton and Helmut Rechberger, 4/11/11, "Considerations of resource availability in technology development strategies: The case study of photovoltaics," Resources, Conservation and Recycling 56(1), ScienceDirect)

If current research in the field of PV technology turns out to be practicable and economic competitive, major changes may be experienced in the next decades. Nevertheless, even though these technologies are promising, there are still numerous hurdles that have to be overcome before market penetration. The role of recycling is negligible at the moment, but will play an important role as soon as the huge amounts of installations of recent and future years will go out of service. Therefore, even if electricity production out of photovoltaics is becoming economically affordable without subsidies, it is very unlikely that ambitious scenarios like those of EREC can be achieved by 2040. From our point of view the material constraints will play a major role after an installed capacity of a few hundred GWp in the case of CdTe and CIGS because of competing market forces, production bottlenecks and maybe reserve constraints. Especially production constraints may occur, because the considered metals are byproducts of copper, zinc, lead, tin and aluminum production. Increasing the output of the by-products is very much depended on the production of “parent” metals under the given price schemes.

#### Actual solar development impossible – lead, transportation, cost-effectiveness

Mcardle 11 -- senior editor for The Atlantic who writes about business and economics, worked at three start-ups, a consulting firm, an investment bank, a disaster recovery firm at Ground Zero, and The Economist (Megan, 11/16/11, "Should We Be Bullish on Solar?" http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2011/11/should-we-be-bullish-on-solar/248608/#)

On the other hand, it's also possible that people who trade those stocks for a living--some of whom may even be as smart as James Wimberly, have considered this possibility, and don't find it very likely. What might those reasons be? 1) Mindless trend extrapolation is hours of fun for the entire family, but it is incorrect at least as often as it is correct, and possibly more often. Wimberly uses this graph: And very possibly prices will keep falling, the way that microchips have. On the other hand, maybe they'll plateau. Wimberly points out that solar panels are fundamentally a manfuacturing business, not a resource business, which is certainly promising . . . but the prices of other manufactured goods that experienced steep declines did not necessarily keep plummeting to zero. 2) Solar panel costs are not the only cost of a solar installation. According to the Energy Bible (which comports roughly with other figures I've seen online), about half the cost, or a little more, of putting in solar panels comes from the cells. The rest comes from the other stuff you need: batteries, transformers, wiring, and labor. As far as I know, the cost of these things is not falling as fast as the cost of solar panels. Assume that these costs have held relatively steady, with the labor component being the most unstable. Ten years ago, most of the cost of an installation would have been the solar panels. But as those prices decline, the installed cost (without tax incentives) will be increasingly dominated by labor and other materials. Assuming that that graph says what I think it does, that implies that even if cells become free, we'd plateau slightly north of the average electricity price. 3) There's a storage problem. Yes, intriguing things are being done with hot salt and so forth. But how attractive are the costs compared to home installations? What percentage of their total generation costs represent solar cells, versus labor and other things whose prices aren't falling so fast? Traditional batteries will not cut it, as this physicist has helpfully illustrated with a hypothetical "national battery" for all of America's electricity generation: Putting the pieces together, our national battery occupies a volume of 4.4 billion cubic meters, equivalent to a cube 1.6 km (one mile) on a side. The size in itself is not a problem: we'd naturally break up the battery and distribute it around the country. This battery would demand 5 trillion kg (5 billion tons) of lead. A USGS report from 2011 reports 80 million tons (Mt) of lead in known reserves worldwide, with 7 Mt in the U.S. A note in the report indicates that the recent demonstration of lead associated with zinc, silver, and copper deposits places the estimated (undiscovered) lead resources of the world at 1.5 billion tons. That's still not enough to build the battery for the U.S. alone. We could chose to be optimistic and assume that more lead will be identified over time. But let's not ignore completely the fact that at this moment in time time, no one can point to a map of the world and tell you where even 2% of the necessary lead would come from to build a lead-acid battery big enough for the U.S. And even the undiscovered, but suspected lead falls short. What about cost? At today's price for lead, $2.50/kg, the national battery would cost $13 trillion in lead alone, and perhaps double this to fashion the raw materials into a battery (today's deep cycle batteries retail for four times the cost of the lead within them). But I guarantee that if we really want to use more lead than we presently estimate to exist in deposits, we're not dealing with today's prices. Leaving this caveat aside, the naïve $25 trillion price tag is more than the annual U.S. GDP. Recall that lead-acid is currently the cheapest battery technology. Even if we sacrificed 5% of our GDP to build this battery (would be viewed as a huge sacrifice; nearly a trillion bucks a year), the project would take decades to complete. But even then, we aren't done: batteries are good for only so many cycles (roughly 1000, depending on depth of discharge), so the national battery would require a rotating service schedule to recycle each part once every 5 years or so. This servicing would be a massive, expensive, and never-ending undertaking. Moreover, while some sort of battery-replacement would help deal with the base-load problem (solar and wind are more variable than conventional sources, which means they have limited applications), they don't fix the transportation problem. Batteries are heavy and expensive, and as I understand it, absent some fairly radical breakthrough, they won't work at all in aviation; the energy density isn't high enough to permit the plane to take off. They're better for autos, but people don't want the limited range those vehicles currently offer. 4) To really take the market by storm, solar (plus storage) doesn't need to beat the average cost of electricity; it needs to beat the individual cost of each fuel type. DOE seems to think that by 2016 solar is still going to be a lot more expensive per kilowatt hour than other sources: Levelized energy cost chart 1, 2011 DOE report.gif It's a pretty long haul before they overtake new coal--much less already-existing coal plants, or advanced natural gas. The most obvious use for solar is as a replacement for expensive peak-load natural gas power (as I understand it, air conditioning causes most of the demand for these plants, so solar would be a nice complement.) But unless it gets massive subsidies, solar (including any storage mechanism you come up with) is going to have to individually defeat each type of electricity plant on price and/or availability, not "the average retail price of electricity"--which already includes some expensive solar and wind power. Maybe that's possible--though that would still leave transportation to worry about. But that graph doesn't show it. I'd close by restating Tyler's question in a slightly different way: if the price of solar is really likely to keep falling until it's cheaper than coal, why don't we see this revealed in the behavior of global warming activists? Where are Greens saying "We've decided to move on to more pressing issues, because clearly, the carbon emissions problem is just about solved." If solar panels really become cheap enough to replace most electric generation, that will be extraordinarily disruptive, in ways that will be both good and bad for the environment. But I'm not seeing a shift away from climate change in order to focus more on, say, sustainable water-use or species conservation. Everyone seems just as worried about climate change as they've ever been, even though such cheap solar panels would render the issue mostly moot. Revealed preference and market prices certainly can't tell you everything about the future. But they can tell you a lot about what people believe about the future.

#### Rare earth shortages specifically threaten solar

Spence 11 -- independent journalist (Timothy, 11/16/11, "Rare-earth shortage to hamper clean energy: EU study," http://www.euractiv.com/sustainability/rare-earth-shortage-hamper-clean-news-508967)

Looming shortages of metals that are in high demand and dominated by a single supplier – China – threaten Europe’s goals for cleaner transport and sustainable energy, says a new study prepared for the European Commission. The study by the Joint Research Centre says supply shortfalls of component metals in the next two decades risk the production of solar, wind and nuclear technologies as well as electric vehicles and carbon-capture systems. “This adds more evidence to the fact that Europe has to look within itself … and more toward waste management, to re-use existing metals,” said Dr. Raymond Moss, lead author of the report. The findings could have serious implications for the EU’s “Roadmap for moving to a low-carbon economy in 2050” that hinges on development of renewable energy, cleaner transport as well as modernising and integrating Europe’s electricity grids. Such ambitions depend heavily on the availability of neodymium, dysprosium, indium, tellurium and gallium, metals that are in demand globally. EU’s vital raw materials The Commission has already identified many so-called rare-earth minerals as well as metals like cobalt in its lists of 14 economically vital raw materials that are prone to supply disruption. The JRC study is part of the Commission’s examination of raw material needs. Europe depends on imports for nearly all of its rare-earth metals. Though many are in abundant supply on the planet, the metals are dispersed or difficult to access, and despite their importance to green energy, require intensive mining and processing. China controls more than 90% of the market. In July, the World Trade Organisation called on China to ease its export restrictions on 17 rare-earth metals important to energy, transport and electronics manufacturing. Shortages or limitations on supply would have serious impact on many industries. But with solar and wind power expected to account for the biggest energy growth markets over the next 20 years, the impact on alternative energy could be profound. The JRC report says five metals - dysprosium, neodymium, tellurium, gallium, and indium - are at the highest risk of supply “bottlenecks” from high demand, concentration of supply and “high political risks due to an extreme concentration of supply in China.” The study examines 14 rare-earth metals. Solar energy technologies, for example, will require half the current world supply of tellurium and 25% of the supply of indium, the report says. Europe’s wind energy technology will require about 4% of the supply of both neodymium and dysprosium. “While the percent might be small, it could have a significant effect on wind technology,” Moss told EurActiv. The concern, he said is that “90 percent of the source is in China at the moment, and they themselves have a rapidly growing demand for the same metals whilst they have also limited restrictions on export.”

### XT Scenario Planning Good

**Policymakers have an obligation to err in favor of prediction—it’s inevitable and using explicit predictions enhances decision-making**

**Fitzsimmons 7** (Michael, Washington DC defense analyst, “The Problem of Uncertainty in Strategic Planning”, Survival, Winter 06-07, online)

In defence of prediction

Uncertainty is not a new phenomenon for strategists. Clausewitz knew that ‘many intelligence reports in war are contradictory; even more are false, and most are uncertain’. In coping with uncertainty, he believed that ‘what one can reasonably ask of an officer is that he should possess a standard of judgment, which he can gain only from knowledge of men and affairs and from common sense. He should be guided by the laws of probability.’34 Granted, one can certainly allow for epistemological debates about the best ways of gaining ‘a standard of judgment’ from ‘knowledge of men and affairs and from common sense’. Scientific inquiry into the ‘laws of probability’ for any given strate- gic question may not always be possible or appropriate. Certainly, analysis cannot and should not be presumed to trump the intuition of decision-makers. Nevertheless, Clausewitz’s implication seems to be that the burden of proof in any debates about planning should belong to the decision-maker who rejects formal analysis, standards of evidence and probabilistic reasoning. Ultimately, though, the value of prediction in strategic planning does not rest primarily in getting the correct answer, or even in the more feasible objective of bounding the range of correct answers. Rather, prediction requires decision- makers to expose, not only to others but to themselves, the beliefs they hold regarding why a given event is likely or unlikely and why it would be impor- tant or unimportant. Richard Neustadt and Ernest May highlight this useful property of probabilistic reasoning in their renowned study of the use of history in decision-making, Thinking in Time. In discussing the importance of probing presumptions, they contend: The need is for tests prompting questions, for sharp, straightforward mechanisms the decision makers and their aides might readily recall and use to dig into their own and each others’ presumptions. And they need tests that get at basics somewhat by indirection, not by frontal inquiry: not ‘what is your inferred causation, General?’ Above all, not, ‘what are your values, Mr. Secretary?’ ... If someone says ‘a fair chance’ ... ask, ‘if you were a betting man or woman, what odds would you put on that?’ If others are present, ask the same of each, and of yourself, too. Then probe the differences: why? This is tantamount to seeking and then arguing assumptions underlying different numbers placed on a subjective probability assessment. We know of no better way to force clarification of meanings while exposing hidden differences ... Once differing odds have been quoted, the question ‘why?’ can follow any number of tracks. Argument may pit common sense against common sense or analogy against analogy. What is important is that the expert’s basis for linking ‘if’ with ‘then’ gets exposed to the hearing of other experts before the lay official has to say yes or no.’35 There are at least three critical and related benefits of prediction in strate- gic planning. The first reflects Neustadt and May’s point – prediction enforces a certain level of discipline in making explicit the assumptions, key variables and implied causal relationships that constitute decision-makers’ beliefs and that might otherwise remain implicit. Imagine, for example, if Shinseki and Wolfowitz had been made to assign probabilities to their opposing expectations regarding post-war Iraq. Not only would they have had to work harder to justify their views, they might have seen more clearly the substantial chance that they were wrong and had to make greater efforts in their planning to prepare for that contingency. Secondly, the very process of making the relevant factors of a deci- sion explicit provides a firm, or at least transparent, basis for making choices. Alternative courses of action can be compared and assessed in like terms. Third, the transparency and discipline of the process of arriving at the initial strategy should heighten the decision-maker’s sensitivity toward changes in the envi- ronment that would suggest the need for adjustments to that strategy. In this way, prediction enhances rather than under-mines strategic flexibility. This defence of prediction does not imply that great stakes should be gambled on narrow, singular predictions of the future. On the contrary, the central problem of uncertainty in plan- ning remains that any given prediction may simply be wrong. Preparations for those eventualities must be made. Indeed, in many cases, relatively unlikely outcomes could be enormously consequential, and therefore merit extensive preparation and investment. In order to navigate this complexity, strategists must return to the dis- tinction between uncertainty and risk. While the complexity of the international security environment may make it somewhat resistant to the type of probabilis- tic thinking associated with risk, a risk-oriented approach seems to be the only viable model for national-security strategic planning. The alternative approach, which categorically denies prediction, precludes strategy. As Betts argues, Any assumption that some knowledge, whether intuitive or explicitly formalized, provides guidance about what should be done is a presumption that there is reason to believe the choice will produce a satisfactory outcome – that is, it is a prediction, however rough it may be. If there is no hope of discerning and manipulating causes to produce intended effects, analysts as well as politicians and generals should all quit and go fishing.36 Unless they are willing to quit and go fishing, then, strategists must sharpen their tools of risk assessment. Risk assessment comes in many varieties, but identification of two key parameters is common to all of them: the consequences of a harmful event or condition; and the likelihood of that harmful event or condition occurring. With no perspective on likelihood, a strategist can have no firm perspective on risk. With no firm perspective on risk, strategists cannot purposefully discriminate among alternative choices. Without purposeful choice, there is no strategy. \* \* \* One of the most widely read books in recent years on the complicated relation- ship between strategy and uncertainty is Peter Schwartz’s work on scenario-based planning, The Art of the Long View. Schwartz warns against the hazards faced by leaders who have deterministic habits of mind, or who deny the difficult implications of uncertainty for strategic planning. To overcome such tenden- cies, he advocates the use of alternative future scenarios for the purposes of examining alternative strategies. His view of scenarios is that their goal is not to predict the future, but to sensitise leaders to the highly contingent nature of their decision-making.37 This philosophy has taken root in the strategic-planning processes in the Pentagon and other parts of the US government, and properly so. Examination of alternative futures and the potential effects of surprise on current plans is essential. Appreciation of uncertainty also has a number of organisational impli- cations, many of which the national-security establishment is trying to take to heart, such as encouraging multidisciplinary study and training, enhancing information sharing, rewarding innovation, and placing a premium on speed and versatility. The arguments advanced here seek to take nothing away from these imperatives of planning and operating in an uncertain environment. But appreciation of uncertainty carries hazards of its own. Questioning assumptions is critical, but assumptions must be made in the end. Clausewitz’s ‘standard of judgment’ for discriminating among alternatives must be applied. Creative, unbounded speculation must resolve to choice or else there will be no strategy. Recent history suggests that unchecked scepticism regarding the validity of prediction can marginalise analysis, trade significant cost for ambiguous benefit, empower parochial interests in decision-making, and undermine flexibility. Accordingly, having fully recognised the need to broaden their strategic-planning aperture, national-security policymakers would do well now to reinvigorate their efforts in the messy but indispensable business of predicting the future.

### XT – Counterfactuals Bad

#### Counterfactuals lead to policy failure—causes over-correction and paralysis

Spencer 03 (Steven, Department of Psychology University of Waterloo, 2003, Motivated social perception, http://books.google.com/books?id=bJIKwXPZKg0C&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false, p. 278)

Because counterfactual thinking tends to feed back to influence current self-regulatory concerns, if frequently engaged this process is likely to be self-perpetuating. It remains unclear what long-term consequences might result from chronic reliance on additive or subtractive forms of counterfactual thinking. Although additive counterfactuals can enhance motivation and productivity by stimulating direct goal-relevant actions, such thoughts may also hinder performance if individuals are unable to correctly identify the proper courses of action (e.g. Sherman & McConnell, 1995). Furthermore, additive counterfactuals may promote overactive responses to failure unwarranted and unproductive persistence, and an inflated sense of personal control over outcomes (Rose, 1999). Similarly, although subtractive counterfactuals can help individuals identify past mistakes and avoid future threats to well-being, over-reliance on subtractive counterfactual thought may lead individuals to be overly cautious or hyper-vigilant in avoiding unwise actions, to the point of being incapacitated or frozen in fear of potential threats. To the extent that chronic regulatory focus increases the tendency for individuals to rely on specific forms of counterfactual thought, it would be interesting for future research to more closely examine counterfactual thought possesses adopted by individuals with strong ideal and thought self-discrepancies.

# Rd 4 vs. Stanford GS (EOR)

## 1NC

### 1

#### Immigration reform will pass --- it’s a top priority.

**Foley and Stein**, **1/2**/2013 (Elise and Sam, Obama’s Immigration Reform To Begin This Month, The Huffington Post, p. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/02/obama-immigration-reform\_n\_2398507.html)

Despite a bruising fiscal cliff battle that managed to set the stage for an even more heated showdown that will likely take place in a matter of months, President Barack Obama is planning to move full steam ahead with the rest of his domestic policy agenda. An Obama administration official said the president plans to push for immigration reform this January. The official, who spoke about legislative plans only on condition of anonymity, said that coming standoffs over deficit reduction are unlikely to drain momentum from other priorities. The White House plans to push forward quickly, not just on immigration reform but gun control laws as well. The timeframe is likely to be cheered by Democrats and immigration reform advocates alike, who have privately expressed fears that Obama's second term will be drowned out in seemingly unending showdowns between parties. The just-completed fiscal cliff deal is giving way to a two-month deadline to resolve delayed sequestration cuts, an expiring continuing resolution to fund the government and a debt ceiling that will soon be hit. With those bitter battles ahead, the possibility of passing other complicated legislation would seem diminished. "The negative effect of this fiscal cliff fiasco is that every time we become engaged in one of these fights, there's no oxygen for anything else," said a Senate Democratic aide, who asked for anonymity to speak candidly. "It's not like you can be multi-tasking -- with something like this, Congress just comes to a complete standstill." It remains unclear what type of immigration policies the White House plans to push in January, but turning them into law could be a long process. Aides expect it will take about two months to write a bipartisan bill, then another few months before it goes up for a vote, possibly in June. A bipartisan group of senators are already working on a deal, although they are still in the early stages. Rep. Zoe Lofgren (D-Calif.) will likely lead on the Democratic side in the House. While many Republicans have expressed interest in piecemeal reform, it's still unclear which of them plan to join the push. Lofgren expressed hope that immigration reform would be able to get past partisan gridlock, arguing that the election was seen as something of a mandate for fixing the immigration system and Republicans won't be able to forget their post-election promises to work on a bill. "In the end, immigration reform is going to depend very much on whether Speaker [John] Boehner wants to do it or not," Lofgren said.

#### Plan costs capital

Pirog 12

[Robert, Specialist in Energy Economics, 3/2/12, <http://budget.house.gov/uploadedfiles/crsr42374.pdf>]

The Obama Administration, in the FY2013 budget proposal, seeks to eliminate certain tax expenditures that benefit the oil and natural gas industries. Supporters of these tax provisions see them as comparable to those affecting other industries and supporting the production of domestic oil and natural gas resources. Opponents of the provisions see these tax expenditures as subsidies to a profitable industry the government can ill afford, and impediments to the development of clean energy alternatives. The FY2013 budget proposal outlines a set of proposals, framed as the termination of tax preferences, that would potentially increase the taxes paid by the oil and natural gas industries, especially those of the independent producers. These proposals include repeal of the enhanced oil recovery and marginal well tax credits, repeal of the current expensing of intangible drilling costs provision, repeal of the deduction for tertiary injectants, repeal of the passive loss exception for working interests in oil and natural gas properties, elimination of the manufacturing tax deduction for oil and natural gas companies, increasing the amortization period for certain exploration expenses, and repeal of the percentage depletion allowance for independent oil and natural gas producers. In addition, a variety of increased inspection fees and other charges that would generate more revenue for the Department of the Interior (DOI) are included in the budget proposal.

#### Capital is key --- it bridges support from both parties.

Dallas Morning News, **1/2**/2012 (Editorial: Actions must match Obama’s immigration pledge, p. http://www.dallasnews.com/opinion/editorials/20130102-editorial-actions-must-match-obamas-immigration-pledge.ece)

The president’s words to NBC’s David Gregory are only that — words. What will really matter is whether he puts his muscle into the task this year. We suggest that Obama start by looking at the example of former President George W. Bush. Back in 2006 and 2007, the Republican and his administration constantly worked Capitol Hill to pass a comprehensive plan. They failed, largely because Senate Republicans balked. But the opposition didn’t stop the Bush White House from fully engaging Congress, including recalcitrant Republicans. Obama may have a similar problem with his own party. The dirty little secret in the 2006 and 2007 immigration battles was that some Democrats were content to let Senate Republicans kill the effort. Labor-friendly Democrats didn’t want a bill, either. And they may not want one this year. That reluctance is a major reason the president needs to invest in this fight. He must figure out how to bring enough Democrats along, while also reaching out to Republicans. In short, the nation doesn’t need a repeat of the process through which the 2010 health care legislation was passed. Very few Republicans bought into the president’s plan, leaving the Affordable Care Act open to partisan sniping throughout last year’s election. If the nation is going to create a saner immigration system, both parties need to support substantial parts of an answer. The new system must include a guest worker program for future immigrants and a way for illegal immigrants already living here to legalize their status over time. Some House Republicans will object to one or both of those reforms, so Speaker John Boehner must be persuasive about the need for a wholesale change. But the leadership that matters most will come from the White House. The president has staked out the right position. Now he needs to present a bill and fight this year for a comprehensive solution. Nothing but action will count. HE SAID IT … “I’ve said that fixing our broken immigration system is a top priority. I will introduce legislation in the first year [of the second term] to get that done. I think we have talked about it long enough. We know how we can fix it. We can do it in a comprehensive way that the American people support. That’s something we should get done.” President Barack Obama, in an interview on Meet the Press Sunday

#### Immigration reform expands skilled labor --- spurs relations and economic growth in China and India.

Los Angeles **Times**, 11/9/**2012** (Other countries eagerly await U.S. immigration reform, p. http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/world\_now/2012/11/us-immigration-reform-eagerly-awaited-by-source-countries.html)

"Comprehensive immigration reform will see expansion of skilled labor visas," predicted B. Lindsay Lowell, director of policy studies for the Institute for the Study of International Migration at Georgetown University. A former research chief for the congressionally appointed Commission on Immigration Reform, Lowell said he expects to see at least a fivefold increase in the number of highly skilled labor visas that would provide "a significant shot in the arm for India and China." There is widespread consensus among economists and academics that skilled migration fosters new trade and business relationships between countries and enhances links to the global economy, Lowell said. "Countries like India and China weigh the opportunities of business abroad from their expats with the possibility of brain drain, and I think they still see the immigration opportunity as a bigger plus than not," he said.

#### US/India relations averts South Asian nuclear war.

**Schaffer**, Spring **2002** (Teresita – Director of the South Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Security, Washington Quarterly, p. Lexis)

Washington's increased interest in India since the late 1990s reflects India's economic expansion and position as Asia's newest rising power. New Delhi, for its part, is adjusting to the end of the Cold War. As a result, both giant democracies see that they can benefit by closer cooperation. For Washington, the advantages include a wider network of friends in Asia at a time when the region is changing rapidly, as well as a stronger position from which to help calm possible future nuclear tensions in the region. Enhanced trade and investment benefit both countries and are a prerequisite for improved U.S. relations with India. For India, the country's ambition to assume a stronger leadership role in the world and to maintain an economy that lifts its people out of poverty depends critically on good relations with the United States.

### 2

#### Saudi Oil imports now

IER 8/28

[Institute for Energy Research, 8/28/12, <http://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/2012/08/28/u-s-oil-imports-from-the-persian-gulf-and-saudi-arabia-grow-in-2012-and-administration-policies-may-be-to-blame/>]

The Obama Administration is touting that our “dependence on foreign oil has gone down every year during the Obama Administration, including a reduction in net oil imports by ten percent—or one million barrels a day—in the last year alone.”[i] While good news, this trend is happening not because of policies or actions taken by the Obama administration, but because of 1) a poor economy and high oil prices resulting in a lower demand for oil, 2) an increase in oil production on private and state lands (not federal lands) due to less bureaucratic red tape in leasing and permitting on private and state lands, and 3) an increase in biofuel (mainly ethanol) production due to the mandates from the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007. The bad news is that while we have reduced our dependence on imports, we are getting more dependent on oil imports from the Persian Gulf, particularly Saudi Arabia. During the first five months of this year, oil imports from the Persian Gulf increased by 33 percent compared to the first five months of 2011. This was mainly due to an increase of oil imports from Saudi Arabia of 29 percent. At the same time, our total oil imports fell by 6 percent. Thus, the Persian Gulf’s share of U.S. oil imports is up 6 percentage points—from 15 percent for the first 5 months of last year to 21 percent for the first 5 months of this year—and the share of our oil imports from Saudi Arabia is up 4 percentage points, from 10 percent to 14 percent.[ii] According to data from the Energy Information Administration (EIA), the United States imported a daily average of almost 1.5 million barrels of Saudi Arabian crude over the first five months of this year, compared to a daily average of about 1.1 million barrels over the same period last year. The corresponding numbers for oil imports from the Persian Gulf oil are an average of 2.2 million barrels per day for the first 5 months of this year compared to 1.7 million barrels per day for the first 5 months of last year. The increase in oil exports from Saudi Arabia to the United States began slowly last summer and has increased this year. Even though domestic oil production is increasing, the Obama administration is finding it difficult to lower its dependence on Persian Gulf oil, especially the heavy grades of crude oil that Saudi Arabia exports and that our refineries in the Gulf of Mexico use. Some oil analysts indicate that this increasing dependency may only last a few years—until more Canadian and Gulf of Mexico production comes on line. These are issues that have been caused by the Obama administration. First, their moratorium and “permitorium” on offshore drilling after the Macondo accident resulted in 17 percent less oil production in offshore federal waters in fiscal year 2011 than the year before. Then, their failure to permit the Keystone XL pipeline that would bring heavy crude oil from Canada postponed new supplies from our Northern Ally. David L. Goldwyn, former State Department coordinator for international energy affairs in the Obama administration, stated “Until we have the ability to access more Canadian heavy oil through improved infrastructure, the vulnerability will remain.”[iii] But, the Obama Administration is not worried because it can tap into the Strategic Petroleum Reserve in the event of a self-defined crisis, it sees domestic oil production continuing to grow, and it believes Gulf area refineries can adjust their equipment to use sweeter crude oil if need be. Most of our new domestic production comes from shale oil fields in North Dakota and Texas that produce high-quality sweet grades of oil while refineries on the Gulf of Mexico coast are designed to refine the heavier oils that the United States traditionally imports from Canada, Mexico and Venezuela. Refiners are importing more oil from the Persian Gulf to replace the declining production and imports from Mexico and Venezuela and the reduced production output from the Gulf of Mexico due to the moratorium and de facto moratorium on drilling. There is also insufficient pipeline capacity from Canada to replace those losses with Canadian crude, accentuating the need for the Keystone XL pipeline. In recent years, U.S. oil imports have been declining due to increased domestic production on private and state lands, production of shale oil using hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling technology, increased production of corn-based ethanol and government mandates requiring its increased usage by refineries, and lower oil demand due to high oil prices and a poor economy. Before the Macondo accident in the Gulf of Mexico, monthly oil production from the Gulf was as high as 1.71 million barrels a day and growing, but because of the moratorium on new drilling, monthly oil production from the Gulf after the accident was as low as 1.09 million barrels per day with much of that lower oil production being replaced by imports of Saudi crude oil. Oil production from the Gulf is not expected to regain its higher production levels through 2013, according to EIA, whose forecast for offshore Gulf of Mexico oil production for this year and next is averaging about 1.35 million barrels per day.

#### Plan causes Saudi backlash

**Hulbert 9/11**

[Matthew, Forbes Contributor, 9/11/12, <http://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewhulbert/2012/09/11/saudi-oil-snub-dont-take-riyadh-for-granted-mr-president/>]

Admittedly, the independence line might win domestic votes, but it loses America international friends. OPEC – and especially Saudi Arabia – is painfully aware of the 22mb/d liquid potential North America holds over the next ten to fifteen years. They hardly need reminding of that when they’re being asked to dump more oil onto a well-supplied market for U.S. electoral gain. Just to rub it in, the unofficial architect of the Romney energy plan (Citigroup’s Ed Morse), noted in international media today that ‘the U.S. need no longer sacrifice a moral foreign policy based on human rights and democracy to secure co-operation from resource-rich despotic regimes’. Such hyperbole is neither constructive nor wise. The best revolutions are always the silent ones. The louder America shouts about its energy revolution, the bumpier any transition from a world of perceived scarcity to one of ‘total abundance’ will be. Saudi Arabia will make sure of it. America should see this Saudi snub as a warning shot; take Riyadh for granted at your peril. You won’t like the price, or indeed political implication that holds when the dream of U.S. energy independence is rudely awoken by the nightmare of on-going global energy realities.

#### Dependence on Saudi Oil key to relations

Lazazzero 08

[Joseph A. Lazazzero, Center for the Study of the Presidency and Congress, 2008, <http://www.thepresidency.org/storage/documents/Fellows2008/Lazazzero.pdf>]

Just as the U.S.-Saudi alliance was important during World War I and the Cold War, this relationship is still of significant value in contemporary politics. As in previous years, the benefits of a strong U.S.-Saudi relationship affect everything from oil dependence to international conflicts. With a limited supply of oil and growing demands from an industrializing China, the United States needs to solidify its oil agreements with Saudi Arabia. An improved Saudi-American relationship would also help to resolve the United States’ failed efforts in resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. More importantly, both the United States and Saudi Arabia have stakes in winning the War on Terrorism. Oil Dependence The United States’ demand for oil first initiated the U.S.-Saudi alliance, and it continues to be one of its most crucial components today. Roughly, 60 percent of the world’s oil supply is in the Gulf, and 25 percent of that is under Saudi soil (Cordesman, 28-42). Saudi Arabia is the world’s largest oil producer, and the United States is the largest oil consumer (Appendix 2-1). Both parties have stakes in a stable oil market (US House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, 1981). Not only does Saudi Arabia have the most oil, it has also proven itself a reliable partner in the oil industry. Saudi Arabia’s spare production capacity has allowed it to answer oil production shortages in the past. Saudi Arabia enacted such policies in 1979 after the fall of the Shah, when the Gulf War decreased oil production in both Iraq and Kuwait, in 2003 on the verge of the second Iraq war and even today with instability in oil-producing countries like Venezuela and Nigeria (Bahgat, 115). These measures have shown that Saudi Arabia is committed to keeping oil costs low and production constant. In addition, Saudi Arabia has also proven itself a more stable oil partner for the United States than other oil-producing countries. Saudi Arabia has easily managed to nationalize foreign oil companies. Unlike the bitter dispute that existed between Iran and the British Petroleum Company in the 1950’s, Saudi Arabia has slowly acquired the American company Aramco, and U.S. investors and contractors still serve on the company’s board of directors (Bahgat, 115). Prince Abdullah visited Washington DC in 1998 to meet with U.S. oil companies and called for a greater strategic energy partnership (Bahagt, 115 & Ottaway & Hamilton, A1). Thus, not only is the United States in a unique position with access to the world’s largest oil producer, but it also has serious influence and economic footholds in Saudi Arabia’s oil companies. Oil dependence between the United States and Saudi Arabia benefits the Saudi government as well. Since the first discovery of oil in 1933, Saudi Arabia has changed itself into a regional superpower. Saudi Arabia has used much of its newfound wealth on military expenditures, but it has also utilized its money to make domestic improvements. For example, Saudi Arabia committed nearly $20.14 billion to local markets in an attempt to diversify its economy. Saudi Arabia has also debated entering the World Trade Organization, a move that would undoubtedly insert an Arab voice in the Westernized globalization of the international economy (Champion, 169-171). The money from oil production has allowed Saudi Arabia to become one of the wealthiest countries in the region. Such wealth has allowed Saudi Arabia to become a member of the modernized world, increasing everything from electrical output to mobile phones.(Appendix 1-1 & 12) (Al-Farsay, 31) The importance of a continued U.S.-Saudi economic partnership in oil investments is just as significant for Saudi Arabia’s development and power in the region as it is for the United States’ demand for foreign oil. Of course, there are other countries willing to buy Saudi oil, but here is where the significance of dual protection comes into play. Starting with the Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957, which declared that an attack on Saudi Arabia’s oil fields would be equivalent to an attack on the United States, the United States can make a promise no other nation can, of protection from the world’s most powerful military (Ashton, 103-113). Thus, even if there are other countries willing to purchase Saudi oil, Saudi Arabia is still gaining significant security from its alliance with the United States.

#### US/Saudi tensions allows China to step in and solidify energy and military relations – causes war

Luft and Korin, 4 (Gal, Executive director, Institute for the Analysis of Global Security (IAGS), Washington, D.C., and Anne, Director of polity and strategic planning, IAGS, and Editor of Energy Security, “The Saudi-Sino Connection”, Commentary; Mar2004, Vol. 117 Issue 3, p26-29, 4p, Ebsco)

China is a relative newcomer to the Middle East; unlike the other great powers, it has never played a major role in the region. During the cold war, the geographically distant Chinese preferred to stay away from the intricacies of an area so beset by instability. Until Mao Zedong's death in 1976, China had not even bothered to establish diplomatic relations with most of the local capitals. Only in the late 70's did Beijing emerge from its seclusion, forging ties with Jordan and Syria and almost all of the oil-rich states. These relationships have typically revolved around trade in armaments and dual-use technology. In recent years, China has supplied ballistic missiles to Syria, provided sensitive missile and nuclear technology to Iraq, and plied Libya with missile technology. Iran, now the second largest supplier of China's oil, has become a particularly important trading partner. As relations between the two countries have expanded, the PRC has sold ballistic-missile components to Iran as well as air-, land-, and sea-based cruise missiles, giving Tehran the capability to attack U.S. naval forces in the strategically vital waters of the Persian Gulf. Even more significantly, China has provided Iran with key ingredients for the development of nuclear weapons, including reactors and significant quantities of uranium. If Iran is today well on its way toward an indigenous nuclear-weapons capacity, that is thanks in no small part to Beijing. But the biggest prize in the region is Saudi Arabia, the country that holds a quarter of global oil reserves, that is the world's largest exporter, and that is today China's number-one foreign supplier of crude oil. Could China supplant the U.S. as a major Saudi ally? At the moment it hardly seems likely. China is still a modest force in the Middle East, while the U.S. maintains large numbers of troops and formidable amounts of equipment in bases throughout the region. But given the logic of its domestic needs, Beijing is almost certain to step up its diplomatic and military efforts. Making its path easier is the fact that this also happens to be a **moment of deep tension in U.S.-Saudi relations.** Ever since September 11, 2001, when it emerged that fifteen of the nineteen men who carried out the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington were Saudi citizens, the American media have been full of tales of Saudi laxity in fighting terror, not to mention complicity in funding and inciting it. Relatives of the victims of 9/11 have filed a multi-trillion-dollar lawsuit against Saudi Islamic organizations and three top members of the royal family. A widely publicized book, Sleeping with the Devil, by the former CIA official Robert Baer, trumpets the idea of simply seizing the Saudi oil fields (an idea whose strategic rationale was first adumbrated in a January 1975 COMMENTARY article by Robert W. Tucker). Public anger at the Saudis has also begun to be reflected in the workings of the U.S. government. Under new immigration guidelines, the expedited entry procedures of the pre-9/11 era have been eliminated, and Saudi males seeking to enter this country are subject to special scrutiny. In 2002, the Pentagon's Defense Policy Board heard a RAND Corporation expert describe Saudi Arabia as the "kernel of evil" and, like Baer, advance the notion of seizing and occupying oil fields in the country's eastern province. Anti-Saudi sentiment in Congress is also running high, and there has been a steady drumbeat of opposition to the presence of American forces on the Saudi peninsula. In 2003, following the defeat of Saddam Hussein, the Bush administration responded to this pressure by withdrawing the bulk of those forces, relocating them in nearby Qatar. Though it was done quietly, the American military departure may turn out to be a major **strategic turning point**. It certainly has created new opportunities for both the Saudis and the Chinese. In Saudi Arabia itself, growing U.S. animosity has **fed doubts about America's** dependability as an ally, if not outright fears of Washington's long-term intentions. Many worry, with reason, that the liberation of Iraqi Shiites from Saddam Hussein's oppressive rule may ignite discontent among the kingdom's own Shiites, who happen to be situated geographically atop the largest oil fields. Equally disturbing for many Saudis is the American effort to revive Iraq's shattered oil industry. The infusion of an additional 6 million barrels per day into world oil markets will inevitably mean fewer petrodollars for the economically stretched kingdom. No wonder, then, that Saudi newspapers and officials alike have taken to deriding harshly what they call the American "pressure campaign" against their country. For the first time since 1973, according to the New York Times, some have even spoken openly about cutting off oil supplies unless Washington alters direction. At the very least, the Saudi government appears to recognize that it can no longer depend on the U.S. as the guarantor of its security, and that it is time to diversify the kingdom's portfolio. The internal politics of the Saudi royal family are notoriously difficult to decipher. The kingdom's de-facto ruler, Crown Prince Abdullah, heads what constitutes the pro-American faction, which has always stressed the high quality of U.S. military equipment and the reliability of U.S. logistical support. But there is increasing opposition to this view. In particular, the minister of defense, Prince Sultan (who is the father of the current Saudi ambassador to the U.S., Prince Bandar), has been enthusiastically promoting expanded Sino-Saudi relations as a hedge against American fickleness. As the Saudis watch opinion shift against them in Washington, and as fears develop that Congress may block transfers of sophisticated weaponry, the pro-Chinese element is gathering strength. THERE ARE some particularly alarming scenarios to consider here. If the Saudis were to begin worrying seriously about a future American seizure of their oil fields, they might well seek ways to deter it. Given the weakness of their own military, one option would be to acquire nuclear weapons. Although talk of a nuclear-armed Saudi Arabia may, at this juncture, seem farfetched, it is not beyond the realm of possibility. Saudi Arabia could break its military dependence on the U.S. either by entering into an alliance with some other existing nuclear power or by acquiring its own nuclear capability. In either case, China would play a crucial role. If the Saudis opted to acquire their own bomb, they would likely become the first nuclear power to have bought one off the shelf. Were this to happen, it would represent the culmination of a Sino-Saudi-Pakistani nuclear project that began in May 1974 when, following India's ascension to the nuclear club, China sent scientists to assist Pakistan in developing that country's own nuclear program. By the early 1980's, China had supplied the Pakistanis with enough enriched uranium to build a few weapons. In 2001, the CIA reported that China was continuing to lend "extensive support" to Pakistan's program. Today, Pakistan is estimated to have an arsenal of between 35 and 60 nuclear weapons. How did Pakistan, with its grinding poverty, pay for this expensive project? Some of the costs were undoubtedly carried by the Chinese in pursuit of their own interests, including their rivalry with India. But considerable evidence suggests that Saudi Arabia played a part as well. In May 1999, a year after Pakistan's first nuclear test, Prince Sultan, escorted by then-prime minister Nawaz Sharif, toured the country's uranium-enrichment and missile-production facilities at Kahuta--the only foreign dignitary allowed into a facility that was off-limits even to then-president Benazir Bhutto. There he was briefed by Abdul Qader Khan, the controversial father of Pakistan's "Islamic bomb." In 2002, Khan, in turn, led a delegation of Pakistanis to Saudi Arabia as personal guests of Prince Sultan. All told, according to Robert Baer, Saudi Arabia has poured over $1 billion into Pakistan's nuclear program. Even if Saudi Arabia does not pursue nuclear status, however, it has abundant reasons for looking east to China both for markets and for military assistance, just as China has abundant reasons for looking west to Saudi Arabia for continued access to Middle Eastern oil. And aside from these mutual interests, an alliance with China would hold other attraction for the Saudis. Unlike the U.S., the Chinese do not aspire to change the Arab way of life, or impose freedom and democracy on regimes that view such ideas with skepticism and fear. Indeed, Chinese attitudes toward the open societies of the West are markedly similar to those of the Arab despotisms themselves. The Chinese also have at their disposal immense reserves of manpower, which they can deploy to protect the oil resources of any new allies they acquire. Thousands of Chinese soldiers disguised as oil workers, for example, are used today to guard petroleum facilities in Sudan. With 11 million men reaching military age annually, China could easily replicate this elsewhere. Finally, while the U.S. is continually castigated by the Arabs for its closeness to Israel, China's ties with Jerusalem have never risen above the level of indifference. OF COURSE, many other factors must be weighed in the balance. The Chinese may well find fishing in Middle Eastern waters to be a risky business, entailing high costs in relations with other powers, and in particular with the U.S. Already there are signs of growing disquiet in Washington over China's role in the Middle East. The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, a group created by Congress to monitor relations between the two countries, issued a warning in 2002 over China's provision of "technology and components for weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems" to such Middle Eastern states as Iran, Syria, Libya, and Sudan. This was characterized as "an increasing threat to U.S. security interests." Significantly, the report took special notice of China's growing dependence on imported oil, calling it a "key driver" impelling relations with "terrorist-sponsoring governments" in the region. If such concerns continue to mount, China could find itself gaining in one region only to lose in another. The Chinese economy may be heavily dependent on Middle Eastern oil, but it is also heavily dependent on trade with the U.S. The shelves of Wal-Mart alone account for 10 percent of China's exports to the U.S. and 1 percent of China's GDP. Whether and under what circumstances the U.S. would ever choose to exercise its leverage is another matter. Right now, any collision over Middle Eastern oil is more a potential than an actual threat. Besides, if predicting the future is risky at all times, the present moment makes the exercise almost foolhardy. That the Middle East is in an exceptionally volatile condition goes without saying. And as for China, its astonishing economic growth may yet turn out to be a bubble; if it pops, so will its high rates of energy consumption. Then, too, even if stellar economic growth continues, the Chinese may find attractive alternatives to oil: the country is extremely rich in coal and natural gas, and, since it has not yet invested heavily in an expensive petroleum infrastructure, it could develop ways to harness fuels produced from coal and biomass (both of which it has in abundance) and thus overcome its dependence on imported oil altogether. Still, it is worth bearing in mind that the U.S., which has been trying for three decades to break its addiction to Middle Eastern oil, has only become more dependent with each passing year. Whether the Chinese can do better remains at best an open question. For the time being, the trend lines are what they are: oil reserves elsewhere are being depleted faster than in the Middle East, and before too long that region will contain the last remaining reservoir of cheaply extractable crude. If each barrel the U.S. needs is also sought after by China, a superpower conflict **in the world's most unstable region can once again become an omnipresent danger**. At that point, as Napoleon foresaw, the world will surely tremble.

#### Causes global nuclear war

**Hunkovic, 9** (Lee J, American Military University, “The Chinese-Taiwanese Conflict: Possible Futures of a Confrontation between China, Taiwan and the United States of America”, [http://www.lamp-method.org/eCommons/ Hunkovic.pdf](http://www.lamp-method.org/eCommons/Hunkovic.pdf))

A war between China, Taiwan and the United States has the potential **to escalate into a nuclear conflict and a third world war**, therefore, many countries other than the primary actors could be affected by such a conflict, including Japan, both Koreas, Russia, Australia, India and Great Britain, if they were drawn into the war, as well as all other countries in the world that participate in the global economy, in which the United States and China are the two most dominant members. If China were able to successfully annex Taiwan, the possibility exists that they could then plan to attack Japan and begin a policy of aggressive expansionism in East and Southeast Asia, as well as the Pacific and even into India, which could in turn create an international standoff and deployment of military forces to contain the threat. In any case, if China and the United States engage in a full-scale conflict, there are few countries in the world that will not be economically and/or militarily affected by it. However, China, Taiwan and United States are the primary actors in this scenario, whose actions will determine its eventual outcome, therefore, other countries will not be considered in this study.

### 3

#### The 50 U.S. states and relevant subnational territories should provide a tax credit for tertiary recovery that uses industrial carbon dioxide.

#### States solve

NEORI 12 (National Enhanced Oil Recovery Initiative along with Center for Climate and Energy Solutions and the Great Plains Initiative, "CARBON DIOXIDE ENHANCED OIL RECOVERY: A CRITICAL DOMESTIC ENERGY,

ECONOMIC, AND ENVIRONMENTAL OPPORTUNITY," February, http://www.neori.org/NEORI\_Report.pdf)

STATE INCENTIVES FOR CO2¶ -EOR DEPLOYMENT TO ¶ COMPLEMENT FEDERAL SUPPORT¶ Some states’ support for deployment of specific CO2¶ capture projects exceeds that of the federal government ¶ in terms of dollar value over the life of a project. Indeed, ¶ commercial capture projects now under construction ¶ or nearing construction are located in states that have ¶ significant incentive policies in place to complement ¶ available federal grants, tax credits and other support.¶ As with the new federal tax credit recommended in ¶ this report, state anthropogenic CO2¶ -EOR incentives for ¶ commercial CO2¶ capture and pipeline projects have the ¶ potential be revenue positive at a time when most states ¶ face profound fiscal challenges. These incentive policies ¶ can stimulate production and economic activity that ¶ would not otherwise occur by making available new CO2¶ supplies to produce additional oil from already developed fields that would otherwise not be produced using ¶ conventional technologies. ¶ While implementation of a more robust federal tax ¶ credit is critical to reach much greater EOR deployment ¶ levels, a number of states with EOR potential still lack ¶ adequate incentives to complement federal policy and ¶ encourage commercial project development. They now ¶ have the opportunity to build on the experience of states ¶ that have pioneered incentives and to spur CO2¶ -EOR expansion by adopting or modifying those states’ existing ¶ policies to meet their specific needs. ¶ Toward that end, the Initiative has identified and ¶ recommends the following state policies for consideration and adoption by other states, based on their likely ¶ effectiveness in helping critical projects get across the ¶ commercial finish line:¶ A. Severance tax reduction and/or extension of existing severance tax reduction for oil produced with CO2¶ from anthropogenic sources.¶ • How the incentive works: Provides a percentage reduction in the severance tax for oil production, if the ¶ taxpayer uses CO2¶ -EOR techniques and/or uses ¶ anthropogenic CO2¶ for EOR. This incentive provides an incentive to pursue CO2¶ -EOR and for EOR ¶ projects to use CO2¶ from manmade sources. The incentive also reduces the cost of using manmade CO2¶ . ¶ This incentive would only work for states that have a ¶ production or severance tax. ¶ • Examples:¶ • North Dakota, Wyoming and Oklahoma provide ¶ an exemption for incremental oil from a qualified tertiary recovery project that uses CO2¶ (S.B. ¶ 2034 – ND; § 39-14-204 - WY; §68-1001(D)(4) - ¶ OK).¶ • Texas extended its current 80% severance tax ¶ reduction for EOR projects that use manmade ¶ CO2¶ from a 7-year period to 30 years (H.B. 469). ¶ B. Cost recovery (Mississippi - Kemper IGCC project). ¶ • How the incentive works. Regulatory approval for cost ¶ recovery enables a utility to recover certain costs ¶ through rates paid by customers. Cost recovery approval provides significant financial certainty to attract the private investment necessary for a project to ¶ proceed to construction and commercial operation.¶ • Example:¶ • Mississippi’s Public Service Commission (PSC) ¶ approved cost recovery for Mississippi Power’s ¶ Kemper County IGCC project for up to $2.88 ¶ billion in total project costs. This project will ¶ provide CO2¶ to EOR projects in Mississippi (Mississippi PSC report).¶ C. Long-term off-take agreements ¶ • How the incentive works. Allows projects to enter into ¶ long-term contracts for supply of a project’s output ¶ in states that need legislative approval to do so. ¶ Long-term off-take agreements provide significant financial certainty, similar to regulatory cost recovery.¶ • Examples:¶ • Indiana’s Utility Regulatory Commission approved a 30-yr. contract for the Indiana Finance ¶ Authority to purchase substitute natural gas ¶ (SNG) for 30 years from the Indiana Gasification project at a formula price that includes ¶ protections against price fluctuations for natural ¶ gas (Indiana press release). Indiana Gasifica-tion has an off-take agreement with Denbury ¶ Resources to provide CO2¶ for Denbury’s EOR ¶ operations.¶ • Illinois’ Clean Coal Portfolio Standard guarantees that the initial clean coal facility in Illinois ¶ with a final air permit may enter into 30-year ¶ contracts with utilities and other retail suppliers. ¶ Clean coal facilities must capture and sequester ¶ at least 50% of CO2¶ emissions, if the facility is in ¶ operation before 2016 with CCS requirements ¶ ramping up to 90% for facilities that commence ¶ operation from 2017 onward (S.B. 1987). Such ¶ a facility would provide a large-scale, long-term ¶ source of industrial CO2¶ for use in EOR. ¶ D. Tax credits, exemptions or abatements. ¶ • How the incentive works. Provides tax credits, exemptions and abatements for taxes that would otherwise be incurred, such as property tax abatement, ¶ franchise tax credits, and sales tax exemption for ¶ sale of captured CO2¶ . These tax policies reduce the ¶ incremental capital cost of capture, compression, ¶ infrastructure and purchase of manmade CO2¶ .¶ • Examples:¶ • Texas provides a franchise tax credit capped at ¶ the lesser of $100 million or 10% of total capital ¶ costs for the first three ‘clean energy projects’ ¶ built in Texas. A qualifying project, defined as ¶ a ‘clean energy project,’ must capture and be ¶ capable of supplying CO2¶ for EOR and storing ¶ a minimum of 70% of the CO2¶ emissions. In ¶ Texas, a franchise tax is akin to a tax on gross ¶ receipts for corporations (H.B. 469). ¶ • Texas provides local property tax deferral for ¶ periods that are consistent with the timeframe ¶ of large-scale clean energy projects (H.B. 3896).¶ • Mississippi provides for a reduced tax rate of ¶ 1.5% on the sale of CO2¶ used in EOR or for geologic storage (H.B. 1459).¶ • Montana provides a reduced tax rate of 3% tax ¶ rate on equipment used for carbon capture, ¶ transport and sequestration (H.B. 3).¶ E. State-level bonding of CO2¶ pipeline projects and/or ¶ capture and compression facilities at anthropogenic ¶ source locations. ¶ • How the incentive works. Infrastructure authorities ¶ commonly may issue bonds, make grants/loans, ¶ plan/coordinate infrastructure, or participate in ¶ infrastructure build-out (e.g., own, construct, maintain, operate a facility). Supports project financing, ¶ development and planning of infrastructure or ¶ facilities deemed to be in the public interest.¶ • Examples:¶ • North Dakota & Wyoming have pipeline authorities that may participate in the development of ¶ CO2¶ pipelines, including providing grants, loans ¶ and bonding authority (North Dakota Pipeline ¶ Authority; Wyoming Pipeline Authority).¶ F. Inclusion in Portfolio Standards. ¶ • How the incentive works. Requires that a certain ¶ percentage of all electricity generated in a state must ¶ come from specific sources, such as CCS projects. ¶ Portfolio standards that include CCS are an effective ¶ tool to establish financial certainty in state policy requirements, by allowing for regulatory cost recovery ¶ of investments made to meet statutory obligations.¶ • Examples:¶ • Ohio’s Alternative Energy Portfolio Standard ¶ (AEPS) provides that 12.5% of the 25% alternative energy standard come from sources such as ¶ clean coal technology that is designed to prevent ¶ and control CO2¶ emissions (S.B. 221).¶ • Illinois’ Clean Coal Portfolio Standard requires ¶ utilities and other retail suppliers to purchase ¶ up to 5% of electricity from clean coal facilities. ¶ The states goal is that cost-effective clean coal facilities will generate 25% of electricity consumed ¶ by 2025 (SB 1987).

### 4

#### Interpretation – “financial incentive” is a distinct category that requires a cash transfer, not a tax credit

Manage 6 (12 Manage, management portal which contains over 400 methods and theories along with more than 1500 management terms, “Incentives,” 3-9, http://www.12manage.com/description\_incentives.html)

Definition Incentives. Description.

An Incentive is any extrinsic reward factor that motivates an employee or manager or team to achieve an important business goal on top of his/her/their intrinsic motivation. It is a factor aiming to shape or direct behavior. In an optimal form, executives and employees should be remunerated well (but cost-effectively) where they deserve it, and not where they do not. Pay-offs for failure should be kept to a minimum. Furthermore, to be effective, a layered or gradual approach is better than an all-or-nothing incentive. A smart executive reward scheme is one of the pillars to ensure entrepreneurial behavior and maximizing shareholder value (Compare: Value Based Management). An incentive is unlike coercion, in that coerced work is motivated by the threat or use of violence, punishment or negative action, while an incentive is a positive stimulation. Incentives can also be used as Anti Hostile Takeover Mechanisms.

categories of incentives. Classes

Financial Incentive. Also called, Remunerative Incentive, this category involves offering a material reward (often in the form of money) in exchange for certain results or behavior. In business, this is the most important category. The many variants include:

Profit sharing (the traditional, oldest approach).

Merit pay (merit wage or salary increase, often depending on the results of an appraisal).

Scientific Management (Taylor) and Piece-Rate systems (very effective on productivity, but may lead to quality issues).

Pay for Performance or Gain Sharing.

Moral Incentive. Where a particular behavior is widely regarded as the right thing to do, or as particularly admirable, or where the failure to act in a certain way is condemned as indecent.

Coercive Incentive. Where a failure to behave in a certain way or to achieve certain results can be expected to result in physical force being used.

Furthermore, incentives can be either a:

Personal Incentive (motivating a specific individual person).

Social Incentive (motivating any individual in certain circumstances).

#### Voting issue –

#### A. Limits – each category is massive, they explode the topic by allowing hundreds of new, conceptually distinct incentives – makes neg research impossible.

#### B. Ground – different generics apply by category – forcing the aff to spend government money is the only stable mechanism for disad links and counterplan competition.

#### At best you are FX- the tax credit is for CCS, not Oil Production

NEORI 12 (National Enhanced Oil Recovery Initiative along with Center for Climate and Energy Solutions and the Great Plains Initiative, "CARBON DIOXIDE ENHANCED OIL RECOVERY: A CRITICAL DOMESTIC ENERGY,

ECONOMIC, AND ENVIRONMENTAL OPPORTUNITY," February, http://www.neori.org/NEORI\_Report.pdf)

¶ Therefore, NEORI participants recommend a carefully targeted and fiscally disciplined production tax credit ¶ program to be administered by the U.S. Department ¶ of the Treasury. Performance-based and competitively ¶ awarded, the program is designed to provide just enough ¶ incremental financial support, and nothing more, to ¶ enable important CO2¶ capture and pipeline projects to ¶ come into commercial operation and begin supplying ¶ CO2¶ to the EOR industry.¶ The tax credit includes the following key features designed to foster the commercial deployment of anthropogenic CO2¶ capture and pipeline projects, while ensuring ¶ project performance and a revenue- positive outcome for ¶ American taxpayers. It would be:¶ • Provided to owners of CO2¶ capture equipment, installed on a broad range of industrial processes, with the potential to supply significant volumes of CO2¶ to ¶ the EOR industry;¶ • Limited to covering the additional incremental costs ¶ of CO2¶ capture, compression, and transport at new ¶ and existing industrial facilities and power plants;¶ • Allocated through competitive bidding in pioneer ¶ project, electric power and industrial tranches (so ¶ that like technologies with similar costs bid against ¶ each other);¶ • Awarded to qualifying projects over a ten-year ¶ period based on performance (the credit can only ¶ be claimed upon demonstrating the capture and oil ¶ field storage of the CO2¶ );¶ • Designed with transparent registration, credit allocation, certification, and public disclosure (to provide ¶ project developers and private investors the financial certainty they need to move forward with projects);¶ • Created with no limits on project scale or on the ¶ aggregation of different CO2¶ sources into a single ¶ project (to enable smaller industrial CO2¶ suppliers to ¶ participate effectively);¶ • Measured to ensure that the program achieves ongoing technology innovation, CO2¶ emission reductions, ¶ and cost reductions for CO2¶ capture, compression, ¶ and transport; and¶ • Designed with explicit safeguards to penalize noncompliant projects, limit taxpayer expenditure, and ¶ modify the program to ensure net positive federal ¶ revenues (within the ten-year Congressional budget ¶ scoring window and over the long term).¶ A section-by-section analysis of the proposed federal ¶ production tax credit can be found in Appendix A and ¶ the detailed policy design recommendations are in Appendix B.

#### Independent voter- thousands of alternative processes of enactment make it impossible to be negative, explodes limits

### 5

#### The United States federal government should provide a tax credit for enhanced oil recovery in the United States that uses industrial carbon dioxide.

#### Solves the Aff – all their evidence is about “enhanced oil recovery”

#### Competes -

#### “Tertiary recovery” includes natural gas

INGAA 12 (Interstate Natural Gas Association of America, “Tertiary Recovery,” 2012, http://www.ingaa.org/cms/2666.aspx)

Tertiary Recovery Enhanced methods for the recovery 'Of oil and natural gas that require a means for displacing the oil or natural gas from the reservoir rock, modifying the properties of the fluids in the reservoir, and/or the reservoir rock to cause movement of the oil or natural gas in an efficient manner and providing the energy and drive mechanism to force its flow to a production well.

**Natural gas prices rising now**

**Conti 12** (John J., Assistant Administrator of Energy Analysis, United States Energy Information Administration, “Annual Energy Outlook 2012,” June 2012, <http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/pdf/0383(2012).pdf)>

U.S. **natural gas prices** are determined largely by supply and demand conditions in North American markets. At current (2012) price levels, natural gas prices are below average replacement cost. However, over time natural gas prices rise with the cost of developing incremental production capacity (Figure 103). After 2017, natural gas prices rise in the AEO2012 Reference case more rapidly than crude oil prices, but oil prices remain at least three times higher than natural gas prices through the end of the projection (Figure 104). As of January 1, 2010, total proved and unproved natural gas resources are estimated at 2,203 trillion cubic feet. Development costs for natural gas wells are expected to grow slowly. **Henry Hub spot prices** for natural gas rise by **2.1 percent per year** from 2010 through 2035 in the Reference case, to an annual average of $7.37 per million Btu (2010 dollars) in 2035.

#### Plan causes CBM development – frees up new supply

**Herzog 4** (Howard Herzog, Senior Research Engineer in the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Energy Initiative and Dan Golomb, Affiliated Professor and Professor Emeritus, University of Massachusetts School of Marine Sciences, Laboratory for Energy and the Environment, Contribution to Encyclopedia of Energy, 2004, <http://sequestration.mit.edu/pdf/enclyclopedia_of_energy_article.pdf>)

Unmineable Coal Seams. Abandoned or uneconomic coal seams are another potential storage site. CO2 diffuses through the pore structure of coal and is physically adsorbed to it. This process is similar to the way in which activated carbon removes impurities from air or water. The exposed coal surface has a preferred affinity for adsorption of CO2 than for methane with a ratio of 2:1. Thus, CO2 can be used to enhance the recovery of coal bed **methane** (CMB). In some cases, this can be very cost effective or even cost free, as the additional methane removal can offset the cost of the CO2 storage operations. CBM production has become an **increasingly important** component of **natural gas supply** in the United States during the last decade. In 2000, approximately **40 billion** standard cubic meters (scm) of CBM was produced, accounting for about 7 percent of the nation’s total natural gas production. The most significant CBM production, some 85 percent of the total, occurs in the San Juan basin of southern Colorado and northern New Mexico. Another 10 percent is produced in the Black Warrior basin of Alabama, and the remaining 5 percent comes from rapidly developing Rocky Mountain coal basins, namely the Uinta basin in Utah, the Raton basin in Colorado and New Mexico, and the Powder River basin in Wyoming. Significant potential for CBM exists worldwide. A number of coal basins in Australia, Russia, China, India, Indonesia, and other countries have also been identified as having a large CBM potential. The total worldwide potential for CBM is estimated at around two trillion scm , with about 7.1 billion tons of associated CO2 storage potential.

**That massively lowers prices**

**Ryan 12** (Sebastian, Property Mentor Group, “Low Natural Gas Prices Hurting The Independent Oil And Gas Industry,” 8-7-12, <http://www.propertymentorgroup.com/low-natural-gas-prices-hurting-the-independent-oil-and-gas-industry-atpg-gsx-fst-sm-kwk/121294/>)

Low natural gas prices and a weak global economy have **weigh**ed **on the** independent oil and gas **industry** and companies such as Chesapeake Energy Corporation (NYSE:CHK) and Noble Corporation (NYSE:NE). **Excessive supply** has dogged natural gas prices for much of 2012, and could keep doing so if demand does not rises. Many industry players have reported less than stellar numbers recently, which reflects the difficult times. Noble Energy in its latest quarter managed to increase its GAAP sales year-over-year while GAAP earnings per share contracted by 2.5%. Cheniere Energy, Inc. (AMEX:LNG) recently said it has received funds for a liquefied natural gas export plant in the state of Louisiana. The facility is estimated to be able to export more than 1 billion cubic feet per day before the end of 2015. Among decliners, ATP Oil & Gas Corporation (NASDAQ:ATPG) has been one of the worst performers in 2012 with a year-to-date performance of -80.03%. The stock, as of last close, traded 35.60% up from its 52 week low and was 89.85% behind its 52 week high. Its latest closing price was -77.50% down from the SMA200 while the distance from SMA 50 and SMA 20 was -60.12% and -39.52% respectively. ATPG engages in the acquisition, development, and production of oil and natural gas properties primarily in the Gulf of Mexico and the United Kingdom sector of the North Sea. Another worst performing stock Gasco Energy Inc (NYSE:GSX) operates as a natural gas and petroleum exploitation, development, and production company in the United States. Gasco Energy Inc has a performance down -47.83%. Its price, as of the latest close, was up 20.00% compared with the 52 week low and was 63.64% below the 52 week high.

**Kills Uranium Market**

**Cowie 12** (Dr. Alex Cowie, Editor, Money Morning, “How Low Natural Gas Prices Are Causing Energy Havoc,” 8-1-12, <http://countingpips.com/forex-news/2012/08/how-low-natural-gas-prices-are-causing-energy-havoc/>)

Uranium is now in the cross hairs. ‘Permanently **cheap’ natural gas** is giving the economics of nuclear energy a run for its money too. The uranium spot price held above $52/ lb between last September and this May. But in the last few months, the **uranium price** has been slipping, and is back down to $49 / lb, which is a worrying sign. The CEO of General Electric, Mr Immelt, also had a few words to say about uranium. His company is a major manufacturer of nuclear equipment. He recently said (my emphasis in bold): ‘It’s just hard to justify nuclear. Really hard. Gas is so cheap and at some point, really, **economics rule** … So I think some combination of gas, and either wind or solar … that’s where we see most countries around the world going.”

**Hurts Kazakhstan’s revenue**

**McDermott 11** (Roger, Senior Fellow, Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, “Kazakhstan: Countering nuclear proliferation, Action to develop a nuclear and terrorist-free world,” in Kazakhstan 2011: Twenty Years of Peace and Creation, *First: The Forum for Global Decision Makers*, 2011, <http://www.firstmagazine.com/Publishing/SpecialReportsDetail.aspx?RegionId=4&SpecialReportId=96>)

Kazakhstan’s ambitions are likely to be realized if **uranium prices stay high** and Kazatomprom is successful in further expanding its international partnerships. Kazatomprom’s most immediate task is to secure customers for its final nuclear fuel product--fuel assemblies, an extra fuel fabrication stage which Kazatomprom plans to start carrying out domestically. Having a nearly complete nuclear fuel cycle, save for enrichment, will ensure a stable cash flow for Kazatomprom and limit its dependence on the fluctuating market price of raw uranium. In the meantime, increased **uranium sales** will help alleviate the country’s overdependence on oil exports and help modernize its nuclear sector. If Kazakhstan does become the world’s leading uranium and nuclear fuel supplier, the ramifications for the country both in terms of increased **gross domestic product** and status on the world stage will be profound.

**Prevents diversification of Kazakhstan’s economy**

**Pleitgen 12** (Frederick, CNN, “Kazakhstan hopes uranium, oil and gas will fuel its future,” 7-18-12,

<http://articles.cnn.com/2012-07-18/asia/world_asia_kazakhstan-natural-resources-economy_1_vladimir-shkolnik-kazakhstan-uranium>)

Kazakhstan's mineral wealth will be a **major source of income** for decades to come, but it won't last forever. The country is trying to use it wisely to transition to a broader economic base while developing the natural resources industries to the maximum. Last year Kazakhstan was the world's top producer of **uranium**, accounting for over a third of global production. The industry's rapid expansion, plus the good quality of the uranium and the comparatively cheap method of mining it have combined to give Kazakhstan an advantage over other big exporters like Australia and Canada. With continued investment, Vladimir Shkolnik, the head of Kazakhstan's national atomic energy company, Kazatomprom, is keen to maintain that position. "We are hoping to keep our leadership position in the uranium field," he says. "We have dozens of facilities and **hundreds of mines** and we think we will remain a world leader in the uranium sector." Kazakhstan's government is also trying to encourage more foreign investment. Since independence in 1991, around $150 billion of foreign investment has flowed into the country; $18 billion dollars last year alone, according to the government. Companies like GE and Eurocopter have been attracted to the country, entering partnerships with national companies that have helped bring training and new skills to the local workforce. While money is flowing from the country's natural resources industry, the government is using some of its revenue to boost other sectors, like IT and engineering. The aim is to make the economy **more resilient** when **commodities prices fall** and better prepared for the day when the gush of oil and gas reduce to a trickle. "Of course revenues from raw materials are still by far the largest share of the country's budget," says energy analyst, Murat Karymsakov. "But in recent years the president (of Kazakhstan) has announced and put into place a plan for industrial and technological development to diversify the economy."

**Destroys stability**

**Hamm 12** (Nathan, founder and Principal Analyst for Registan, MA in Central Asian Studies from the University of Washington, “Kazakhstan’s Stability, Central Asia’s Stability,” 1-31-12, <http://registan.net/2012/01/31/kazakhstans-stability-central-asias-stability/>)

I’m paraphrasing, but on the first two items, Dr. Roberts argues that the thoroughly Soviet education and background of Kazakhstan’s leadership leaves it out of touch and unable to adequately respond to the public. The government’s response to labor strikes, including the violence in Zhanaozen, he says, show that the government was not prepared to deal with dissatisfaction over unmet **economic expectations**. Dr. Roberts says that these challenges are not extreme nor likely to cause widespread unrest in the near term, but that the stagnancy of the political system means that the government lacks mechanisms to deal with large socio-economic changes. [Note: Alima wrote about the crisis of unmet expectations at length recently.] This is good, succinct analysis of the situation that puts risks to Kazakhstan’s stability in good context. The risks are there, the government is ill-prepared to deal with them at present, but it’s unlikely that it will be overwhelmed by them soon. These risks, however, aren’t present only in Kazakhstan. They exist in similar forms and combinations throughout Central Asia. Growing segments of society throughout the region are bringing (or attempting to…) Islam into the public square, where it is responded to with shock and terror by secular officials. National economies are failing to meet the expectations, and in many areas, even the basic needs, of the public. And though nationalism is not so clearly a problem the way it is Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in the rest of Central Asia, there are small signs that society is challenging the state’s monopoly on defining what it means to be Uzbek, Tajik, Kyrgyz, etc. In talking about risks to stability, there is often a tendency to focus on presidential succession, the specter of fundamentalism and political Islam, and a more recent tendency to talk about replication of the Arab Spring. Recent history should make it abundantly clear though, that analysts, experts, and observers are taken by surprise in the region. Game-planning what happens after Karimov dies or a resurgence of the IMU activity in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan might be worthless because they assume state and society lack the mechanisms to respond to and manage succession or terrorist groups. The greatest risks to stability **throughout the region** are medium- to long-term risks arising from the three aforementioned factors and the oppositional relationship between state and society. Devising a list of indicators and warnings based on the three factors Dr. Roberts identifies — rising public religiosity, increasing nationalism, and under-performance in the economy — are more likely not only to lead to better anticipation of the trajectory of stability in Central Asia but also to provide a better idea of when serious risks to stability are likely to arise.

**Spreads throughout the region**

**Assenova 8** (Margarita Assenova, IND Director; Natalie Zajicova, Program Officer (IND); Janusz Bugajski, CSIS NEDP Director; Ilona Teleki, Deputy Director and Fellow (CSIS); Besian Bocka, Program Coordinator and Research Assistant (CSIS), “Kazakhstan’s Strategic Significance,” 2008, CSIS-IND Taskforce Policy Brief team, European Dialogue, <http://eurodialogue.org/Kazakhstan-Strategic-Significance>)

The decision by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to award Kazakhstan the chairmanship of the organization for 2010 underscores a growing recognition of the country’s regional and continental importance. Kazakhstan is a **strategic linchpin** in the vast Central Asian-Caspian Basin zone, a region rich in energy resources and a potential gateway for commerce and communications between Europe and Asia. However, it is also an area that faces an assortment of troubling security challenges. Ensuring a **stable and secure Central Asia** is important for the international interests of the United States and its European allies for several prescient reasons: • Asian Security: Because of its proximity to **Russia,** **China**, Iran, and the South Asian sub-continent, Kazakhstan’s security and stability is an increasingly **vital interes**t to all major powers. Kazakhstan’s tenure as chair of the OSCE will become an opportunity for greater multilateral cooperation in achieving this objective while strengthening the role and prestige of the OSCE throughout Central Asia.

**Nuclear war**

**Ahrari 1** (M. Ehsan, Professor of National Security and Strategy of the Joint and Combined Warfighting School at the Armed Forces Staff College, August 2001, “Jihadi Groups, Nuclear Pakistan and the New Great Game,” http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub112.pdf)

South and **Central Asia** constitute a part of the world where a well-designed American strategy might well help avoid crises or catastrophe. The U.S. military would provide only one component of such a strategy, and a secondary one at that, but has an important role to play through engagement activities and regional confidence building. Insecurity has led the states of the region to seek **weapons of mass destruction**, missiles and conventional arms. It has also led them toward policies which undercut the security of their neighbors. If such activities continue, the result could be increased terrorism, humanitarian disasters, continued low-level conflict and potentially even major regional war or a **thermonuclear exchange**. A shift away from this pattern could allow the states of the region to become solid economic and political partners for the United States, thus representing a gain for all concerned.

### Solvency

#### Not enough supply of CO2 to make EOR viable

Melzer 12 (Stephen, CO2 Consultant and Annual CO2 Flooding Conference Director, Feb, "Carbon Dioxide Enhanced Oil Recovery (CO2 EOR): Factors Involved in Adding Carbon Capture, Utilization and Storage (CCUS) to Enhanced Oil Recovery," <http://neori.org/Melzer_CO2EOR_CCUS_Feb2012.pdf>)

For the first 25 years of the CO2 EOR business, the underground natural CO2 source fields were of ¶ ample size to provide the CO2 needed for EOR. Pipelines had also been built of sufficient ¶ throughput capacity to supply the EOR project needs. Today the situation has changed. Depletion ¶ of the source fields and/or size limitations of the pipelines are now constricting EOR growth. But ¶ costs of new CO2 supplies are also a factor. With some notable exceptions like natural gas byproduct CO2, the Dakota Gasification Project in North Dakota, and the Coffeyville (petroleum coke) ¶ Gasification project in southern Kansas, the new age of anthropogenic supplies of CO2 has just not ¶ advanced to meet the supply shortages. The CO2 cost gap between industrial CO2 and the pure, ¶ natural CO2 remains a barrier. Increasing values of CO2 due to the growing demand and ¶ constricted or declining natural sources is helping change the landscape but the gap persists.

#### Linking EOR with carbon capture deters investment

Heidug 12 (Wolf, heads the International Energy Agency's carbon capture and storage unit, "Joint IEA‐OPEC workshop on CO2‐enhanced oil recovery with CCS," http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/HEIDUG\_Workshop\_Report\_IEA\_OPEC\_FINAL.PDF)

Taking into account the potential for a “win‐win” outcome, and the lack of development of such¶ projects worldwide despite this potential, workshop participants considered reasons why CO2‐¶ EOR, against most expectations, had not emerged significantly over the last ten years. Reasons¶ suggested by participants included:¶ • a lack of financial incentives in place to run CO2‐EOR operations as CCS projects. Specifically it¶ has been unclear whether CO2‐EOR, CCS or a combination of the two could be recognised¶ under carbon‐pricing mechanisms such as emission trading, the Kyoto Protocol’s CDM, or¶ other climate change policy instruments;¶ • difficulty in managing the commercial interface required to establish CO2‐EOR with CCS¶ projects given the need to balance supply and demand of CO2. On this note, the suggestion¶ was made that the dynamics between suppliers and receivers would likely change if clearer¶ obligations were placed on large point source‐emitters of CO2 (e.g. power plant operators) to¶ reduce CO2 emissions or employ CCS;¶ • increased complexity and costs for project development, operation, closure and stewardship¶ brought about by treating CO2‐EOR as a climate change mitigation technology through CCS¶ (see also Section 2);¶ • high costs and complexity of the technology. For some regions, such as in the North Sea,¶ various pre‐feasibility studies and front‐end engineering designs have suggested that the technology is presently too expensive relative to the potential income streams, and too¶ complex to develop at the current time;¶ • opportunity costs. In the US, recent oil company investment capital has flowed into shale gas¶ as a near‐term realisable opportunity, rather than into CO2‐EOR;¶ • a lack of local expertise to facilitate deployment of CO2‐EOR. This could be a challenge for its¶ future development in some OPEC MCs; and¶ • the increased business risk associated with the complexity of CO2‐EOR with CCS operations.¶ This can deter investment.¶ Conversely, it was pointed out that in some areas of the world, such as the central and southern¶ states of the USA, CO2‐EOR could need CCS in order to provide a cheap, reliable source of CO2¶ and push down the cost of delivering CO2 to the wellhead. On this basis, CCS also has the¶ potential to reduce the overall cost of CO2‐EOR operations.¶ The range of challenges and uncertainties discussed at the workshop highlighted the commercial¶ deterrent to investing in CO2‐EOR in many regions of the world. As mentioned by several¶ participants, generally speaking businesses prefer certainty when considering investment, and in¶ its absence capital will tend to flow into other areas.

#### No solvency – no tech

Aston 11 (Adam, GreenBiz.com Senior Writer Adam Aston is a veteran journalist, editor and presenter who focuses on business, clean technology and the environment, "Can big oil jump-start CCS? Expanding enhanced oil recovery could absorb decades’ worth of U.S. coal-plant CO2 emissions | Global CCS Institute," http://www.adamaston.com/?p=651)

To be sure, widespread adoption of combining EOR-CCS faces major hurdles. The report names: a lack of CO2 transport and injection infrastructure; regulations remain underdeveloped at best; and there are scant and inconsistent incentives to match up supply and demand of CO2. Each of these shortcomings, the authors conclude, could be overcome with better government coordination.¶ There’s a long way to go. To get to the levels imagined by the report – that EOR could absorb a full year’s worth of coal plant CO2 output for 15 years – the industry has a long way to go. At its current scale, the industry could only handle 3 percent of that amount.

#### No commercialization- no climate regulations

MIT 10 ("Role of Enhanced Oil Recovery in Accelerating the Deployment of Carbon Capture and Sequestration," http://mitei.mit.edu/system/files/110510\_EOR\_Report\_1.pdf)

Finally, participants discussed legislative scenarios for a national EOR-CCS program and there ¶ was general agreement that such a program could advance only in the context of a national ¶ requirement for CO2¶ emissions reductions. Participants generally agreed that comprehensive ¶ climate change legislation would provide the necessary incentives to spur a national EOR-CCS ¶ program. Participants also noted that legislation proposed in 2010 provided special incentives for ¶ EOR-CCS in the form of bonus allowances under the proposed cap-and-trade regulator regime. ¶ At the time of the symposium, some participants were unwilling to preclude the possibility that ¶ the 111th Congress might take action on comprehensive climate change legislation, although the ¶ general feeling was that this was highly unlikely. Consequently, there was less focus on policy ¶ and legislative options for CO2¶ -EOR / CCS separate from comprehensive climate change legislation. Absent comprehensive climate change legislation, there was a view that CO2¶ -EOR would ¶ evolve slowly as a niche activity providing an opportunity for “learning by doing” to inform future ¶ discussions of policy and regulation. [Note: the 111th Congress did not act on comprehensive ¶ climate change regulation.]

#### Co2-EOR is too costly and complex

Walton 12 (Rod, Tulsa World, "Fossil Energy chief delivers administration message to symposium," http://www.tulsaworld.com/business/article.aspx?subjectid=49&articleid=20120417\_49\_E1\_CUTLIN923166

The natural solution is not simple nor cheap, others have noted. One attendee who questioned McConnell's plans noted that CO2 now costs about $100 per ton, when it is only economical at $50 per ton or less. ¶ Another industry insider later said that isolating and capturing CO2 out of flue gas from power plants is time consuming and hugely expensive. The process involves compression, liquefaction of the gases and breaking them down, via a kind of fractionation, into separated parts.

### Warming

#### CO2-EOR can’t effectively reduce emissions – best case scenario is only a 4% reduction

Biello 9 (David, Scientific American, "Enhanced Oil Recovery: How to Make Money from Carbon Capture and Storage Today," http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=enhanced-oil-recovery)

Using carbon dioxide to churn out more fossil fuels—and permanently storing some of the CO2 in the process—might sound counterproductive to limiting climate change because those fuels, when burned, put more CO2 into the atmosphere. But it does reduce overall emissions by at least 24 percent, calculates petroleum engineer Ronald Evans, Denbury's senior vice president of reservoir engineering: every recovered barrel of oil eventually puts 0.42 metric ton of CO2 into the atmosphere, but 0.52 to 0.64 metric ton are injected underground recovering it. In fact, Kinder Morgan's Bradley estimates that enhanced oil recovery in the U.S. could reduce CO2 emissions by 4 percent, if done correctly.

#### CCS tech isn’t commercially viable now AND regulations take out solvency

Hallerman 7/20/12 (Tamar, Staff @ GHG Monitor, "COAL COMPANY HEADS SAY EPA PERFORMANCE STANDARDS WILL DISINCENTIVIZE CCS," http://ghgnews.com/index.cfm/coal-company-heads-say-epa-performance-standards-will-disincentivize-ccs/)

Coal company and utility executives testifying at a House Energy and Power Subcommittee field hearing this week said that proposed Environmental Protection Agency performance standards for new fossil fuel-fired units will disincentivize companies from investing in carbon capture and storage because the technology is not yet developed enough to be cost-competitive with natural gas. At the hearing, held in Abingdon, Va., the heart of Virginia coal country, the coal executives argued that the proposed rulemaking could have the opposite intended political effect on the power sector—with companies instead choosing to invest in other technologies due to CCS’ current high costs. “Simply put, performance standards will not succeed at forcing the adoption of CCS technologies,” said Dominion CEO Thomas Farrell in his testimony. “The CCS requirement will create an insurmountable hurdle to obtaining financing and securing public utility commission approval for new coal stations.”¶ Alpha Natural Resources President Paul Vining said that the rule, if finalized in its current form, could “inhibit and preclude any large-scale attempts to pursue coal-with-CCS in the first place” because the technological standards are too tight. With the CO2 emissions level currently proposed under the standard, utilities will likely opt to go for cheaper, more proven technologies like natural gas combined cycle over ones that have not been commercially demonstrated like CCS, he said. “EPA’s proposed NSPS for greenhouse gases has arguably created, for no environmental benefit, the biggest single hurdle that CCS development has faced to date,” he said.

#### CCS technology for industrial facilities isn’t cost-competitive

NEORI 12 (National Enhanced Oil Recovery Initiative along with Center for Climate and Energy Solutions and the Great Plains Initiative, "CARBON DIOXIDE ENHANCED OIL RECOVERY: A CRITICAL DOMESTIC ENERGY,

ECONOMIC, AND ENVIRONMENTAL OPPORTUNITY," February, http://www.neori.org/NEORI\_Report.pdf)

Projecting likely CO2¶ supply over time is important for ¶ projecting the size of an overall federal tax credit program. The availability of CO2¶ is constrained by capture ¶ technology, time, and overall CO2¶ potential. C2ES and ¶ GPI, with extensive input from NEORI participants, ¶ developed a realistic supply expansion scenario. In terms ¶ of capture technology, power plants, low-cost industrial ¶ sources, and high-cost industrial sources have different time horizons for development and deployment. ¶ For example, capture technology for low-cost industrial ¶ sources is closer to deployment than capture technologies for power plant and high-cost industrial sources. In ¶ terms of time, CO2¶ supply growth is constrained on an ¶ annual basis, at least in the early years of the incentive ¶ program. Power plants and industrial facilities take time ¶ and resources - material and financial - to complete, and, given current market conditions, it is unlikely for more ¶ than a few power plants or industrial facilities to go into ¶ operation in a given year during the early years of the ¶ program. Over the longer term, capture technology ¶ for existing and new facilities is likely to become available more broadly and at lower costs. CO2¶ supplies are ¶ projected to rapidly expand after an initial deployment ¶ phase and approach the total available supply for a given ¶ resource.

**The plan trades off with clean energy and efficiency**

EJLFCC 8

Environmental Justice Leadership Forum on Climate Change, The Fallacy of Clean Coal, http://www.jtalliance.org/docs/Fallacy\_of\_Clean\_Coal.pdf

The impact that government financial support has on the development and adoption of wide-scale energy technology cannot be understated. As with any government spending, the money that goes toward coal limits the resources available for other energy R&D. The continued absorption of coal’s financial costs by the federal government through investment in CCS technology will cause investment in renewable energy and efficiency to suffer. 37 In addition, government investment in CCS restricts financial investments in energy subsidies, green jobs, and efficiency programs that target low-income communities. This unintended consequence is particularly unacceptable for community groups working to position the new “green economy” as a way to bring jobs and resources to un- and underemployed populations. For these groups and others working to improve environmental, public health, and economic equality, a massive shift in government investments is needed to make alternative energy sources viable. Continuing to invest billions in non-renewable energy sources like CCS diverts funds away from new clean technologies and delays full-scale climate change mitigation strategies.

#### Long timeframe and adaptation solves

Robert O. Mendelsohn 9, the Edwin Weyerhaeuser Davis Professor, Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, Yale University, June 2009, “Climate Change and Economic Growth,” online: http://www.growthcommission.org/storage/cgdev/documents/gcwp060web.pdf

The heart of the debate about climate change comes from a number of warnings from scientists and others that give the impression that human-induced climate change is an immediate threat to society (IPCC 2007a,b; Stern 2006). Millions of people might be vulnerable to health effects (IPCC 2007b), crop production might fall in the low latitudes (IPCC 2007b), water supplies might dwindle (IPCC 2007b), precipitation might fall in arid regions (IPCC 2007b), extreme events will grow exponentially (Stern 2006), and between 20–30 percent of species will risk extinction (IPCC 2007b). Even worse, there may be catastrophic events such as the melting of Greenland or Antarctic ice sheets causing severe sea level rise, which would inundate hundreds of millions of people (Dasgupta et al. 2009). Proponents argue there is no time to waste. Unless greenhouse gases are cut dramatically today, economic growth and well‐being may be at risk (Stern 2006).These statements are largely alarmist and misleading. Although climate change is a serious problem that deserves attention, society’s immediate behavior has an extremely low probability of leading to catastrophic consequences. The science and economics of climate change is quite clear that emissions over the next few decades will lead to only mild consequences. The severe impacts predicted by alarmists require a century (or two in the case of Stern 2006) of no mitigation. Many of the predicted impacts assume there will be no or little adaptation. The net economic impacts from climate change over the next 50 years will be small regardless. Most of the more severe impacts will take more than a century or even a millennium to unfold and many of these “potential” impacts will never occur because people will adapt. It is not at all apparent that immediate and dramatic policies need to be developed to thwart long‐range climate risks. What is needed are long‐run balanced responses.

**Warming is slowing – ocean currents**

**Science Daily 8** (“Will Global Warming Take A Short Break? Improved Climate Predictions Suggest A Reduced Warming Trend During The Next 10 Years”, 5-5, http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2008/05/080502113749.htm)

To date climate change projections, as published in the last IPCC report, only considered changes in future atmospheric composition. This strategy is appropriate for long-term changes in climate such as predictions for the end of the century. However, in order to predict short-term developments over the next decade, models need additional information on natural climate variations, in particular associated with **ocean currents**. Lack of sufficient data has hampered such predictions in the past. Scientists at IFM-GEOMAR and from the MPI for Meteorology have developed a method to derive ocean currents from measurements of sea surface temperature (SST). The latter are available in good quality and global coverage at least for the past 50 years. With this additional information, natural decadal climate variations, which are superimposed on the long-term anthropogenic warming trend, can be predicted. The improved predictions suggest that global **warming will weaken** slightly during the **following 10 years.** “Just to make things clear: we are not stating that anthropogenic climate change won’t be as bad as previously thought”, explains Prof. Mojib Latif from IFM-GEOMAR. “What we are saying is that on top of the warming trend there is a long-periodic oscillation that will probably lead to a to a **lower temperature increase** than we would expect from the current trend during the next years”, adds Latif. “That is like driving from the coast to a mountainous area and crossing some hills and valleys before you reach the top”, explains Dr. Johann Jungclaus from the MPI for Meteorology. “In some years trends of both phenomena, the anthropogenic climate change and the natural decadal variation will add leading to a much stronger temperature rise.”

#### Emissions are declining now

Levi 9-25 (Michael, David M. Rubenstein Senior Fellow for Energy and the Environment – CFR, “Why Have U.S. Carbon Dioxide Emissions Plummeted?,” Council on Foreign Relations, 2012, http://blogs.cfr.org/levi/2012/09/25/why-have-u-s-carbon-dioxide-emissions-plummeted/)

U.S. carbon dioxide emissions for January-May are down six percent from 2011 to 2012. Headlines have highlighted the fact that emissions from January-March hit a twenty year low. What explains the shift? That question has been the subject of intense debate. John Hanger argues that 77 percent of that decline can be attributed to the shift from coal to gas. The folks over at CO2Scorecard, looking at January-March data, put that number at a more modest 21 percent. These are drastically different figures. What number should we believe? Part of the discrepancy comes from looking at different time periods. January-March emissions were affected more by the warm winter than April-May ones were. That makes sense because January-March is part of the winter. April-May emissions were affected more by rock bottom natural gas prices than January-March ones were. That makes sense because it was April-May when rock bottom (i.e. sub-two-dollars wellhead) natural gas prices prevailed. Let’s focus on the full January-May span, since it’s now the longest period for which we have 2011 and 2012 data, and do the analysis for ourselves. First the basics: Carbon dioxide emissions fell from 2,303 metric tons (Mt) in 2011 to 2,158 Mt in 2012, a drop of 145 Mt. (To keep things simple, the January-May time period is implicit in all this.) The basic story is that emissions from coal consumption plummeted by 132 Mt. Falling oil emissions chipped in another 18 Mt. Natural gas emissions were nearly flat; they were actually down 5 Mt. This would seem to suggest that natural gas played little role in falling emissions. Instead, it appears to suggest, reduced demand for coal is what did the trick. This’s roughly the intuition behind the conclusion from CO2Scorecard that natural gas has played a modest role in the U.S. emissions decline. Hanger contests this by making three basic points. First, he notes, “about 85% (132 of 144 million tons) of the 2012 U.S. Carbon emission decline is a product of falling emissions from coal.” Second, he argues, the decline in emissions from coal are “almost entirely as a result of more gas displacing coal generation this year. Indeed, coal’s electricity generation market share fell from 42% for all of 2011 to 32% in April and 34% in May.” Third, he observes, “Electricity demand is down 2% in the first 5 months of 2012 compared to 2011 so that is a small reason for declining emissions and probably explains about 10% of the 132 million ton decline of coal emissions.” Hanger puts these together with a few other estimates to come to his conclusion that 77 percent of the emissions decline is due to gas.

#### CO2 is not the one cause for climate change – solar radiation and ocean interactions are ignored

Patterson 11 [Norman Paterson is a Professional Engineer and Consulting Geophysicist with 60 years’ experience in Mineral and Environmental Geophysics. He obtained his Ph. D in Geophysics at the University of Toronto in 1955, and was elected Fellow, Royal Society of Canada in 1977. “Global Warming: A Critique of the Anthropogenic Model and its Consequences”, Geoscience Canada - Volume 38, Number 1, March 2011, Chetan]

WHAT CAUSES WARMING? It is likely that the cyclical warming and cooling of the earth results from a number of different causes, none of which, taken alone, is dominant enough to be entirely responsible. The more important ones are solar changes (including both irradiance and magnetic field effects), atmosphere–ocean interaction (including both multidecadal climatic oscillations and unforced internal variability), and greenhouse gases. All of these factors have been discussed by IPCC, but the first two have been dismissed as negligible in comparison with the greenhouse-gas effect and man’s contribution to it through anthropogenic CO2 . It is claimed (e.g. Revelle and Suess 1957) that the particular infrared absorption bands of CO2 provide it with a special ability to absorb and reradiate the sun’s longer wavelength radiation, causing warming of the troposphere and an increase in high-altitude (cirrus) cloud, further amplifying the heating process. Detailed arguments against this conclusion can be found in Spencer et al. (2007) and Gerlich and Tscheuschner (2009). These scientists point out (among other arguments, which include the logarithmic decrease in absorptive power of CO2 at increasing concentrations), that clouds have poor ability to emit radiation and that the transfer of heat from the atmosphere to a warmer body (the earth) defies the Second Law of Thermodynamics. They argue that the Plank and Stefan-Boltzman equations used in calculations of radiative heat transfer cannot be applied to gases in the atmosphere because of the highly complex multi-body nature of the problem. Veizer (2005) explains that, to play a significant role, CO2 requires an amplifier, in this case water vapour. He concludes that water vapour plays the dominant role in global warming and that solar effects are the driver, rather than CO2 . A comprehensive critique of the greenhouse gas theory is provided by Hutton (2009).

#### No ocean acidification – IPCC uses unrealistic data and animals will adapt

Idso and Idso 11 [Craig D., founder and chairman of the board of the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change, B.S. in Geography from Arizona State University, his M.S. in Agronomy from the University of Nebraska - Lincoln, and his Ph.D. in Geography from Arizona State University, former Director of Environmental Science at Peabody Energy, faculty researcher in the Office of Climatology at Arizona State University; and Sherwood, President of the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change, former Research Physicist with the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Agricultural Research Service, Adjunct Professor in the Departments of Geology, Geography, and Botany and Microbiology at ASU, M.S from UMinnesota, receipt of the Arthur S. Flemming Award, "Carbon Dioxide and Earth’s Future," 1-31-11, <http://www.co2science.org/education/reports/prudentpath/prudentpath.pdf>]

The chemistry aspect of the ocean acidification hypothesis is rather straightforward, but it is not as solid as many make it out to be; and a number of respected researchers have published papers demonstrating that the drop in oceanic pH will not be nearly as great as the IPCC and others predict it will be, nor that it will be as harmful as they claim it will be. Consider, for example, the figure below, which shows historical and projected fossil fuel CO2 emissions and atmospheric CO2 concentrations out to the year 2500, as calculated by NOAA’s Pieter Tans (2009). As can be seen there, his analysis indicates that the air’s CO2 concentration will peak well before 2100, and at only 500 ppm compared to the 800 ppm value predicted in one of the IPCC’s scenarios. And it is also worth noting that by the time the year 2500 rolls around, the atmosphere’s CO2 concentration actually drops back down to about what it is today. When these emissions estimates are transformed into reductions of oceanic pH, it can readily be seen in the following figure that Tans’ projected pH change at 2100 is far less than that of the IPCC. And Tans’ analysis indicates a pH recovery to values near those of today by the year 2500, clearly suggesting that things are not the way the world’s climate alarmists make them out to be, especially when it comes to anthropogenic CO2 emissions and their effects on the air’s CO2 content and oceanic pH values. Another reason to not jump on the ocean acidification bandwagon is the fact that, with more CO2 in the air, additional weathering of terrestrial carbonates likely will occur, which would increase delivery of Ca 2+ to the oceans and partially compensate for the CO2induced decrease in calcium carbonate saturation state. And as with all phenomena involving living organisms, the introduction of life into the acidification picture greatly complicates things, as several interrelated biological phenomena must also be considered; and when they are, it becomes much more difficult to draw such sweeping negative conclusions. In fact, as demonstrated in numerous reviews of the scientific literature, these considerations even suggest that the rising CO2 content of earth’s atmosphere may well be a beneficial phenomenon with many positive consequences (Idso, 2009; Idso and Singer, 2009). As an example of this fact, the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change (hereafter, the Center) maintains an online ocean acidification database that may be accessed free of charge at http://www.co2science.org/data/acidification/acidification.php, showcasing over 1100 experimental results on this topic from the peer-reviewed scientific literature (as of Jan 2011). Specifically, their Ocean Acidification Database is an ever-growing archive of the responses of various growth and developmental parameters of marine organisms immersed in seawater at or near today’s oceanic pH level, as well as at levels lower than that of today. The measured parameters included in the database pertain to changes in calcification, metabolism, growth, fertility and survival; and the data are arranged by marine organism, accessible by selecting an organism’s common or scientific name. In addition, the data have been grouped into similar types of organisms, such as bivalves, corals, fish, nematodes phytoplankton, etc. In considering the experimental results that are archived there, the mean response suggests that ocean acidification may indeed harm some organisms. However, it is critical to note that the vast majority of these experiments were performed under highly unrealistic oceanic pH conditions that will never occur, rendering their findings meaningless in terms of what might possibly happen in the real world. And as one examines the results over the more-likely-to occur pH decline range, a vastly different picture begins to appear. Returning to the Center’s ocean acidification database, consider the figure below, which depicts the percentage changes in all five of the major life characteristics examined in the database (calcification, metabolism, growth, fertility and survival) as functions of the experimentallyorchestrated declines in seawater pH from the present, where each entry in the database is represented by its own individual point. As is clearly evident, the data portray an extremely wide range of pH reduction values, the greatest of which corresponds to an increase in the air’s CO2 concentration in excess of 100,000 ppm, which is orders of magnitude greater than what anyone is expecting will ever occur. Thus, highlighted in grey are all data points that pertain to experiments conducted under pH conditions that are considered to be “far, far beyond the realm of reality.” The low-end boundary of the unrealistic highlighted region of pH reduction shown in the figure is 0.5, which represents the high-end or maximum value of most IPCC-based projections of CO2induced pH reduction, which occurs in the vicinity of AD 2300. Thus, there should be little argument – even from people who think ocean acidification is going to be a problem – in excluding all values beyond a pH decline of 0.5 when considering how acidification of the ocean might realistically affect earth’s marine life. In the next graph to the right, results of all experiments that employed a seawater pH decline that fell somewhere in the stillmore-likely-to-occur range of 0.0 to 0.3 are plotted, where the latter value is the approximate IPCC-derived pH decline in the vicinity of AD 2100. Then, within this range, highlighted in grey, is the much smaller seawater pH reduction range that comes from the work of Tans (2009), who derived a maximum pH decline that could fall anywhere within an uncertainty range of 0.09 to 0.17 by about AD 2100, after which seawater pH begins its longterm recovery. The Tans prediction range has been emphasized in this manner because his analysis is considered to be more realistic than the analysis of the IPCC. Thus, data within the pH reduction range of 0.0 to 0.17 should be considered as being most characteristic of what might possibly occur in the real world, as time marches on and fossil fuel burning continues as per business as usual. And, interestingly enough – and even incorporating pH reduction data all the way out to 0.30 – the linear trend of all the data is actually positive, indicating an overall beneficial response of the totality of the five major life characteristics of marine sea life to ocean acidification, which result is vastly different from the tremendously negative results routinely predicted by the world’s climate alarmists. The next figure illustrates the averages of all responses to seawater acidification for all five of the life characteristics of the various marine organisms (calcification, metabolism, growth, fertility and survival) analyzed over the pH reduction ranges of 0 to 0.09 (from no change to the lower pH edge of the Tans estimate), 0.09 to 0.17 (Tans estimate), and 0.17 to 0.3 (from Tans to the IPCC). The most striking feature of this figure is the great preponderance of data located in positive territory, which suggests that, on the whole, marine organisms likely will not be harmed to any significant degree by the expected decline in oceanic pH. If anything, the results tend to suggest that the world’s marine life may actually slightly benefit from the pH decline. Clearly, the results depicted above suggest something very different from the theoretical model-based predictions of the climate alarmists who claim we are in “the last decades of coral reefs on this planet for at least the next ... million plus years, unless we do something very soon to reduce CO2 emissions,” or who declare that “reefs are starting to crumble and disappear,” that “we may lose those ecosystems within 20 or 30 years,” and that “we’ve got the last decade in which we can do something about this problem.” Such scenarios are simply not supported by the vast bulk of pertinent experimental data. Two other phenomena that suggest the predicted decline in oceanic pH will have little to no lasting negative effects on marine life are the abilities of essentially all forms of life to adapt and evolve. Of those experiments in the database that report the length of time the organisms were subjected to reduced pH levels, for example, the median value was only four days. And many of the experiments were conducted over periods of only a few hours, which is much too short a time for organisms to adapt or evolve to successfully cope with new environmental conditions. And when one allows for such phenomena -- as oceanic pH declines ever-so-slowly in the real world of nature -- the possibility of marine life experiencing a negative response to ocean acidification becomes even less likely (Idso, 2009).

#### Plan causes carbon leaks- turns warming

Hecht 12 (Jeff, Staff @ The New Scientist, "Earthquake risk for carbon capture and storage schemes," <http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn21954-earthquake-risk-for-carbon-capture-and-storage-schemes.html>)

Move over fracking: carbon capture and storage schemes (CCS) are more likely to trigger earthquakes, warns the US National Research Council (NRC). Meanwhile, a separate study warns that quake-fractured rocks could undermine CCS efforts by allowing the trapped gas to leak back into the atmosphere.¶ Carbon sequestration involves pumping CO2 at high pressure below ground and trapping it in porous rocks at depths of 1 to 4 kilometres. Similar deep injection wells are used to dispose of waste water, but despite the large number of such wells, "very few [seismic] events have been documented over the past several decades", writes an NRC panel in a new report, Induced Seismicity Potential in Energy Technologies.¶ However, carbon capture and storage could see billions of cubic metres of fluid injected below ground – potentially enough to trigger more and larger quakes, the report concludes.¶ Even if those quakes do not damage property or put lives at risk, they could undermine carbon capture schemes, says Mark Zoback, a geophysicist at Stanford University in California. "If you trigger an earthquake, you are threatening the seal of the repository," he says. "CO2 is buoyant and it wants to rise and get out."¶ Although it is possible to find good sites to store CO2 where its added pressure would be unlikely to cause quakes or leaks, too few are available to handle the required volume, Zoback says. Older sedimentary rocks in the central US, where most power plants are located, are brittle and so are more likely to fracture and leak. Large-scale carbon capture and storage "is a risky, and likely unsuccessful, strategy" for controlling greenhouse warming, Zoback says. He presented his concerns yesterday to the Senate Energy Committee.

### Oil Dependence

#### Oil companies won't pursue EOR – other alternatives are more profitable

Melzer 12 (Stephen, CO2 Consultant and Annual CO2 Flooding Conference Director, Feb, "Carbon Dioxide Enhanced Oil Recovery (CO2 EOR): Factors Involved in Adding Carbon Capture, Utilization and Storage (CCUS) to Enhanced Oil Recovery," <http://neori.org/Melzer_CO2EOR_CCUS_Feb2012.pdf>)

The oil and gas sector is most often portrayed as an industry dominated by drilling for new oil and gas fields. And, in fact, most companies could be called exploration companies and make their ¶ entire living doing exactly that. However, there is a sub-industry within the larger sector which ¶ concentrates on extending the lives of producing fields, i.e., getting more oil from a given discovery ¶ (field). Tradition tends to brand these companies as production organizations, in contrast to drilling ¶ focused, exploration companies. The production companies require a larger set of engineering ¶ skills and are challenged in trying to recover more and more oil (call it advanced recovery) from a ¶ “reluctant” reservoir. History shows that the advanced recovery approach is more costly per barrel ¶ produced and monetary rewards for success come to these companies slower. In a fast paced ¶ world seeking immediate gratification; most companies opt for the exploration path to provide more ¶ immediate returns for their shareholders. Although the advanced recovery business plan leads to ¶ relatively large oil reserves and long-lived production, fewer companies over time have chosen the ¶ route and have opted for an exploration focus.

#### **No resource wars – prefer statistical evidence**

Pinker 11 (Steven, Harvard College Professor and Johnstone Family Professor in the Department of Psychology – Harvard University, “The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined,” Google Books)

Once again it seems to me that the appropriate response is "maybe, but maybe not." Though climate change can cause plenty of misery and deserves to be mitigated for that reason alone, it will not necessarily lead to armed conflict. The political scientists who track war and peace, such as Halvard Buhaug, Idean Salehyan, Ole Theisen, and Nils Gleditsch, are skeptical of the popular idea that people fight wars over scarce resources. Hunger and resource shortages are tragically common in sub-Saharn countries such as Malawi, Zambia, and Tanzania, but wars involving them are not. Hurricanes, floods, droughts, and tsunamis (such as the disastrous one in the Indian Ocean in 2004) do not generally lead to armed conflict. The American dust bowl in the 1930s, to take another example, caused plenty of deprivation but no civil war. And while temperatures have been rising steadily in Africa during the past fifteen years, civil wars and war deaths have been falling. Pressures on access to land and water can certainly cause local skirmishes, but a genuine war requires that hostile forces be organized and armed, and that depends more on the influence of bad governments, closed economies, and militant ideologies than on the sheer availability of land and water. Certainly any connection to terrorism is in the imagination of the terror warriors: terrorists tend to be underemployed lower-middle-class men, not subsistence farmers. As for genocide, the Sudanese government finds it convenient to blame violence in Darfur on desertification, distracting the world from its own role in tolerating or encouraging the ethnic cleansing. In a regression analysis on armed conflicts from 1980 to 1992, Theisen found that conflict was more likely if a country was poor, populous, politically unstable, and abundant in oil, but not if it had suffered from droughts, water shortages, or mild land degradation. (Severe land degradation did have a small effect.) Reviewing analyses that examined a large number (N) of countries rather than cherry-picking one or two, he concluded, "those who foresee doom, because of the relationship between resource scarcity and violent internal conflict, have very little support in the large-N literature." Salehyan adds that relatively inexpensive advances in water use and agriculture practices in the developing world can yield massive increases in productivity with a constant or even shrinking amount of land, and that better governance can mitigate the human costs of environmental damage, as it does in developed democracies. Since the state of the environment is at most one ingredient in a mixture that depends far more on political and social organization, resource wars are far from inevitable, even in a climate-changed world.

#### Iran can’t fund terrorism effectively or threaten the Straits

Luttwak, 07 - senior adviser at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (Edward, American Prospect, “The Middle of Nowhere”, May, <http://www.prospect-magazine.co.uk/article_details.php?id=9302>)

Then there is the new light cavalry of Iranian terrorism that is invoked to frighten us if all else fails. The usual middle east experts now explain that if we annoy the ayatollahs, they will unleash terrorists who will devastate our lives, even though 30 years of "death to America" invocations and vast sums spent on maintaining a special international terrorism department have produced only one major bombing in Saudi Arabia, in 1996, and two in the most permissive environment of Buenos Aires, in 1992 and 1994, along with some assassinations of exiles in Europe. It is true enough that if Iran's nuclear installations are bombed in some overnight raid, there is likely to be some retaliation, but we live in fortunate times in which we have only the irritant of terrorism instead of world wars to worry about—and Iran's added contribution is not likely to leave much of an impression. There may be good reasons for not attacking Iran's nuclear sites—including the very slow and uncertain progress of its uranium enrichment effort—but its ability to strike back is not one of them. Even the seemingly fragile tanker traffic down the Gulf and through the straits of Hormuz is not as vulnerable as it seems—Iran and Iraq have both tried to attack it many times without much success, and this time the US navy stands ready to destroy any airstrip or jetty from which attacks are launched.

#### Middle East war doesn’t escalate

Maloney 7 (Suzanne, Senior Fellow – Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Steve Cook, Fellow – Council on Foreign Relations, and Ray Takeyh, Fellow – Council for Foreign Relations, “Why the Iraq War Won’t Engulf the Mideast”, International Herald Tribune, 6-28, http://www.brookings.edu/views/op-ed/maloney20070629.htm)

Long before the Bush administration began selling "the surge" in Iraq as a way to avert a general war in the Middle East, observers both inside and outside the government were growing concerned about the potential for armed conflict among the regional powers. Underlying this anxiety was a scenario in which Iraq's sectarian and ethnic violence spills over into neighboring countries, producing conflicts between the major Arab states and Iran as well as Turkey and the Kurdistan Regional Government. These wars then destabilize the entire region well beyond the current conflict zone, involving heavyweights like Egypt. This is scary stuff indeed, but with the exception of the conflict between Turkey and the Kurds, the scenario is far from an accurate reflection of the way Middle Eastern leaders view the situation in Iraq and calculate their interests there. It is abundantly clear that major outside powers like Saudi Arabia, Iran and Turkey are heavily involved in Iraq. These countries have so much at stake in the future of Iraq that it is natural they would seek to influence political developments in the country. Yet, the Saudis, Iranians, Jordanians, Syrians, and others are very unlikely to go to war either to protect their own sect or ethnic group or to prevent one country from gaining the upper hand in Iraq. The reasons are fairly straightforward. First, Middle Eastern leaders, like politicians everywhere, are primarily interested in one thing: self-preservation. Committing forces to Iraq is an inherently risky proposition, which, if the conflict went badly, could threaten domestic political stability. Moreover, most Arab armies are geared toward regime protection rather than projecting power and thus have little capability for sending troops to Iraq. Second, there is cause for concern about the so-called blowback scenario in which jihadis returning from Iraq destabilize their home countries, plunging the region into conflict. Middle Eastern leaders are preparing for this possibility. Unlike in the 1990s, when Arab fighters in the Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union returned to Algeria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia and became a source of instability, Arab security services are being vigilant about who is coming in and going from their countries. In the last month, the Saudi government has arrested approximately 200 people suspected of ties with militants. Riyadh is also building a 700 kilometer wall along part of its frontier with Iraq in order to keep militants out of the kingdom. Finally, there is no precedent for Arab leaders to commit forces to conflicts in which they are not directly involved. The Iraqis and the Saudis did send small contingents to fight the Israelis in 1948 and 1967, but they were either ineffective or never made it. In the 1970s and 1980s, Arab countries other than Syria, which had a compelling interest in establishing its hegemony over Lebanon, never committed forces either to protect the Lebanese from the Israelis or from other Lebanese. The civil war in Lebanon was regarded as someone else's fight. Indeed, this is the way many leaders view the current situation in Iraq. To Cairo, Amman and Riyadh, the situation in Iraq is worrisome, but in the end it is an Iraqi and American fight. As far as Iranian mullahs are concerned, they have long preferred to press their interests through proxies as opposed to direct engagement. At a time when Tehran has access and influence over powerful Shiite militias, a massive cross-border incursion is both unlikely and unnecessary. So Iraqis will remain locked in a sectarian and ethnic struggle that outside powers may abet, but will remain within the borders of Iraq. The Middle East is a region both prone and accustomed to civil wars. But given its experience with ambiguous conflicts, the region has also developed an intuitive ability to contain its civil strife and prevent local conflicts from enveloping the entire Middle East.

#### Using CO2 for EOR causes well failures

Heidug 12 (Wolf, heads the International Energy Agency's carbon capture and storage unit, "Joint IEA‐OPEC workshop on CO2‐enhanced oil recovery with CCS," http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/HEIDUG\_Workshop\_Report\_IEA\_OPEC\_FINAL.PDF)

In contrast to the potential benefits highlighted, some participants were more circumspect in¶ their view on the role of CO2‐EOR in supporting CCS. They suggested that there could be¶ challenges in managing fields when trying to enhance storage and reduce CO2 breakthrough.¶ Several issues were raised by participants in this context, including the following:¶  Increasing the volumes of CO2 stored compared to a standard CO2‐EOR flood creates more¶ risk due to increases in reservoir pressure. This could lead more readily to fracturing of the¶ cap rock and greater displacement of in situ reservoir fluids. It was suggested that, typically,¶ conventional CO2‐EOR techniques leave CO2 in a fairly stable state in the reservoir and usually¶ below the initial reservoir pressure. Increasing the pressure in an oil reservoir could therefore¶ create problems that operators may not need or want (see below).¶  It was suggested that increasing the amount of CO2 stored during an EOR flood could be¶ difficult due to the presence of legacy wells that may not be plugged using CO2 resistant¶ cements. Increasing reservoir pressure could lead to well failure.¶  Typically during a CO2‐EOR operation, the whole field is not flooded, but rather flooding takes¶ place in phases across different zones of the field. The exact length of operations and phases¶ will be determined by oil price. Once a zone has been flooded and extraction operations¶ completed, wells within the zone will be shut in and abandoned. Once a well has been¶ abandoned, it is difficult to re‐enter flooded zones, making incremental storage difficult.¶  On an economic basis, an operator might decide to run a CO2‐EOR flood sub‐optimally, i.e. in¶ “CO2 storage mode”. Under circumstances where storing CO2 provides a greater return than oil production, sub‐optimal CO2‐EOR operations may result in oil production being foregone.

#### Turns oil advantage – kills the resources necessary for continued oil production

Magnum Hunter Resources Corporation 9 ("Hunting for the Unconventional," http://www.magnumhunterresources.com/PDF's/MHR\_AR09\_WEB.pdf)

Drilling activities are subject to many risks, including the risk that no commercially productive reservoirs will be encountered. ¶There can be no assurance that the new wells we drill will be productive or that we will recover all or any portion of our ¶ investment. Drilling for oil and natural gas may involve unprofitable efforts, not only from dry wells, but also from wells that are ¶ productive, but do not produce sufficient net revenues to return a profit after drilling, operating and other costs. The cost and ¶ timing of drilling, completing and operating wells is often uncertain. Our drilling operations may be curtailed, delayed or canceled ¶ as a result of numerous factors, many of which are beyond our control, including low oil and natural gas prices, title problems, ¶ weather conditions, delays by project participants, compliance with governmental requirements, shortages or delays in the ¶ delivery of equipment and services and increases in the cost for such equipment and services. Our future drilling activities may ¶ not be successful and, if unsuccessful, such failure may have a material adverse effect on our business, financial condition, results ¶ of operations and cash flows.¶ Our operations are subject to hazards and risks inherent in drilling for and producing and transporting oil and natural gas, such as ¶ fires, natural disasters, explosions, encountering formations with abnormal pressures, blowouts, craterings, pipeline ruptures and ¶ spills, any of which can result in the loss of hydrocarbons, environmental pollution, personal injury claims and other damage to ¶ our properties and those of others. We maintain insurance against some but not all of the risks described above. In particular, the ¶ insurance we maintain does not cover claims relating to failure of title to oil and natural gas leases, loss of surface equipment at ¶ well locations, business interruption, loss of revenue due to low commodity prices or loss of revenues due to well failure. ¶ Furthermore, in certain circumstances where such insurance is available, we may determine not to purchase it due to cost or other ¶ factors. The occurrence of an event that is not covered by, or not fully covered by insurance could have a material adverse effect ¶ on our business, financial condition, results of operations and cash flows in the period such event may occur.

#### Any CCS accident or failure kills the industry

Biello 9 (David, Scientific American, "Enhanced Oil Recovery: How to Make Money from Carbon Capture and Storage Today," http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=enhanced-oil-recovery)

Nevertheless, "the first CCS project that is done badly is the last CCS project that will be done," warns Mark Brownstein, New York-based managing director of business partnerships in the climate and air program at the Environmental Defense Fund. "In this respect, it is very similar to nuclear power."

## 2NC – T, States, Case

### A2: Perm – Do Both

#### -- Links to politics – includes immediate federal action. Perm doesn’t shield: state support is slow. Delay means it won’t take effect until after the vote.

#### Federal policies crowd out the states—reduces demand for state action

Adler 7 (Jonathan H – Professor of Law and Co-Director, Center for Business Law and Regulation, Case Western Reserve University School of Law, ., “WHEN IS TWO A CROWD? THE IMPACT OF

FEDERAL ACTION ON STATE ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION”, 31 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 67, Lexis)

A second potential negative indirect effect of federal regulation on state regulatory choices is crowding out. This occurs because federal regulation **may serve as a substitute for state-level regulation, thereby reducing the benefits of adopting or maintaining state-level protections**. Insofar as voters in a given state demand a certain level of environmental protection, there is no reason to expect states to duplicate federal efforts when a federal program satisfies that demand, particularly if a state has not already created such a program. If the federal floor is greater than or equal to the level of environmental protection demanded by a state's residents, **that state has no reason to adopt environmental regulations of its own** once the federal government has acted. To the extent that this effect occurs, it is separate from--perhaps even in addition to--the signaling effect described above. The claim here is not simply that states regulate less than they would absent federal regulation--although this claim is almost certainly true. Rather, the claim is that some states that would adopt regulations more protective than the federal floor, absent the imposition of federal regulation, have not done so due to federal regulation and may not do so in the future. If this hypothesis is correct, the net effect of federal environmental regulation in at least some states could be less environmental protection than would have been adopted had the federal government not intervened. To see how this could occur, recall that the demand for environmental regulation in any given jurisdiction tends to increase over time as wealth, [\*99] technical capability, scientific knowledge, and environmental impacts increase. n131 In any given state (as in the nation as a whole), there is an initial period ("Period A") during which the demand for a given type of environmental protection is relatively low. The costs of adopting environmental regulations in this period are greater than the benefits of adopting any such protections. These costs include the costs of developing, drafting, and passing legislation; the costs of creating a new policy program, drafting and implementing regulations, defending the regulations from any potential legal or administrative challenges, creating a means to monitor and enforce regulatory compliance; and so on. In addition, there are opportunity costs of devoting state resources and political capital to the cause of environmental protection as opposed to some other policy goal. As discussed earlier, the demand for environmental protection has tended to increase over time along with increases in living standards. n132 At the same time, increases in technical knowledge and administrative efficiency may lower the costs of a given regulatory program. Eventually, a state will enter a second period ("Period B") in which the benefits of a given environmental regulatory program are greater than the costs of initiating, implementing, and operating such a program. Absent any federal interference, the hypothetical state will not adopt environmental regulations in Period A, but will adopt such regulations in Period B. See Figure 3. This is the environmental transition discussed in Part I. In Period A, the demand for environmental protection is insufficient to justify the costs of implementing environmental protection measures. By Period B, however, the demand for environmental protection has risen due to increases in wealth and knowledge, among other factors. At the same time, increases in technical capacity and scientific understanding have reduced the cost of adopting environmental protections. As a result, in Period B a state will adopt Q[B] amount of environmental protection. n133 [\*100] The timing of Period A and Period B will vary from state to state. This is clearly the case as different states have enacted different environmental regulatory measures at different times--some before the adoption of federal environmental regulation, some after, and some not at all. Looking at the history of various environmental concerns, such as air quality, water quality, or wetlands, it is clear that many states moved from Period A to Period B for these environmental concerns at various times prior to the onset of federal regulations in the 1970s. In many other states, however, a federal regulatory floor was adopted before the onset of Period B. [\*101] For states that went through their environmental transition and entered Period B prior to the enactment of federal environmental protection, whether the adoption of a federal regulatory floor increased the aggregate level of environmental protection in that state depended upon whether preexisting state policies offered greater or lesser levels of protection than the relevant federal policies. For states in which the onset of Period B begins after the adoption of federal regulations, the enactment of a federal regulatory floor will, at the time of enactment, increase the aggregate level of environmental protection in that state. However, this may not be the case over time. In states that desire a greater level of protection than that provided by the relevant federal regulations, it is not clear that the existence of the federal regulatory floor will result in an equal or greater level of protection than would be adopted were it not for the federal regulations. This is because federal regulation will, **to some extent, act as a substitute for state regulation**. As a result, the adoption of federal regulation has the potential to reduce the demand for state regulation and, in some instances, even result in less aggregate regulation in a given state than would have been adopted absent federal intervention. In short, federal regulation can crowd out state regulation. **The potential for such a crowding-out effect is illustrated** in Figure 4. The existence of federal regulation will reduce the demand for state regulation by an amount equal to the extent to which federal regulation is a substitute for state regulation of the same environmental concern (Q[FReg]). This substitution effect will reduce the net benefit of adopting state-level environmental regulations from OCQ[B] to OC'Q'[B]. By reducing the net benefits of state-level environmental regulation in this manner, federal regulation has the potential to crowd out state-level environmental protections, even if the quantity of environmental protection demanded in the state is greater than that provided by the federal government. In such cases, the aggregate level of environmental protection will be lower with federal regulation than it would be without it. [\*102]

#### Perm fails – preemption means it’s net worse

Leshy 4 (John D., Distinguished Professor of Law – University of California Hastings College of the Law, “Natural Resources Policy in the Bush Administration: an Outsider's Somewhat Jaundiced Assessment,” Duke Environmental Law & Policy Forum, Spring, 14 Duke Envtl. L. & Pol'y F. 347, Lexis)

VI. Traditional conservative principles, like promoting free markets and **devolving governmental responsibilities to state and local governments**, have taken a back seat where they conflict with industry desires Perhaps the strongest indication of the administration's capture by industry is the manner in which it has kept the free-market ideologies of some of its key natural resource appointees firmly in check, readily sacrificing them where they conflict with industry demands. For example, in recent years, ideological conservatives, among others, have touted the resolution of longstanding conflicts over the environmental impacts of livestock grazing on arid federal lands by buying the ranches in consensual, market-based transactions, and retiring the federal lands their cattle has been grazing from livestock grazing in the future. n34 This has provided the administration with a great opportunity to put in place the principles of so-called "free-market environmentalism" favored by many of the Bush Administration's right-wing supporters. [\*356] But when the Grand Canyon Trust, a conservation group, went into the marketplace to purchase grazing permits on nearly a million acres of public lands in the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument in southern Utah, and sought to retire those lands from grazing, the Bush Administration balked. n35 The Interior Solicitor (a former official of the National Public Lands Council, a rancher trade association) issued legal opinions throwing up roadblocks to retirement, and the retirement proposal continues to languish inside the Department. n36 Even though Interior has acknowledged that retirement will improve the health of the land, n37 the administration is more concerned about placating the cattlemen's association and hard-bitten local opponents of the national monument who do not want to see even market-based land conservation. The unhappy result is that philanthropic money to invest in grazing retirements is harder to come by, much to the chagrin of free-market environmental groups, one of who recently gave the administration a "C-" in its report card on this point. n38 Another example is the administration's unwillingness to defer to state and local governments when their interests diverge from those of industry. Thus, the administration told a federal court in Nevada that federal mining law preempted efforts by a local county to regulate a proposed processing plant for federal minerals that would be located on private land. n39 The overriding federal interest here is somewhat mysterious, considering that the only use of the material being mined is to make kitty litter. n40 The administration has made a similar argument in opposing Los Angeles County's efforts to regulate a quarry on private land extracting sand and gravel owned by the federal government. n41 And it has aggressively (but so far unsuccessfully) [\*357] pushed the Congress to give it authority to preempt state regulation of rights-of-way for energy facilities. n42

#### Doesn’t solve

Zimmerman 1 (Joseph F., Professor of Political Science – State University of New York at Albany, Publius, Spring, p 16)

Examining this list, it becomes apparent that different institutional features of the federal structure are more or less important for securing these different values. Some of the values ‑ diversity, competition, and experimentalism ‑ appear to depend significantly on the existence of many states pursuing unique regulatory agendas. If all of the states pursued identical regulatory strategies, or were prevented from instituting meaningful agendas altogether, these values, as a logical matter, could not be promoted. Obviously there would be no regulatory diversity, because all of the states would structure the lives of their citizens in the same way. Moreover, this uniformity would prevent state competition and experimentation: people would have no incentive to "vote with their feet" if each state provided the same package of public goods, and experimentation by definition requires that different states attempt different solutions to the same social problems.

**States CP Solvency Extensions**

**State level incentives for EOR solve oil recovery and production**

**Center for Climate and Energy Solutions 12** ("PRESS RELEASE: ENHANCED OIL RECOVERY PLAN DRAWS BIPARTISAN WELCOME IN CONGRESS," http://www.c2es.org/newsroom/releases/eor-plan-draws-bipartisan-support)

WASHINGTON, D.C. – A coalition of industry, state, environmental and labor leaders called today for federal and state incentives to stimulate the expansion of enhanced oil recovery using carbon dioxide (CO2) from power plants and industrial facilities. The proposed measures would boost domestic U.S. oil production while reducing the nation’s CO2 emissions. ¶ The recommendations by the National Enhanced Oil Recovery Initiative (NEORI), convened by the Great Plains Institute (GPI) and the Center for Climate and Energy Solutions (C2ES), were released at an event on Capitol Hill. ¶ Senator Kent Conrad (D-ND) and Congressman Mike Conaway (R-TX) were on hand to welcome the recommendations, and Senator Max Baucus (D-MT), Senator John Hoeven (R-ND) and Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN), and Congressman Rick Berg (R-ND) offered written statements in support of the initiative.¶ In CO2-enhanced oil recovery (EOR), oil producers inject CO2 into wells to draw more oil to the surface. The practice, 6 percent of current U.S. domestic oil production, helps sustain production in otherwise declining oil fields, but limited supplies of CO2 constrain the expansion of EOR. NEORI’s recommendations would encourage the capture of CO2 from industrial and power facilities for use in EOR.¶ The centerpiece of the group’s recommendations is a proposed federal tax incentive focused on companies that capture and transport CO2, not oil companies. NEORI estimates that the tax credit would quadruple U.S. oil production from EOR, to 400 million barrels a year, while reducing CO2 emissions by 4 billion tons over the next 40 years. The U.S. Treasury Department would administer the competitively awarded tax credit. ¶ NEORI calculates that the program would pay for itself within 10 years through increased federal revenues generated by boosting domestic oil production, with an estimated net return of $100 billion over 40 years. The incentive would reduce the trade deficit by saving the United States about $610 billion in expenditures on imported oil over the same period. ¶ As an immediate measure, NEORI recommends that Congress or the Treasury Department modify the existing Section 45Q Tax Credit for Carbon Dioxide Sequestration to provide a more workable incentive to firms to capture and transport CO2.¶ At the state level, NEORI identified a range of existing state policies encouraging commercial deployment of CO2 capture technologies and projects and recommends that other states tailor and adopt them. The model state policies include tax credits, exemptions or abatements, and the inclusion of carbon capture-and-storage in electricity portfolio standards, among others.¶ “The EOR Initiative’s recommendations strike common ground among a diverse collection of interests and offer a realistic opportunity to increase U.S. oil supplies while reducing carbon emissions,” said C2ES President Eileen Claussen. “The proposal reflects practical solutions that deliver a win for our nation’s economic growth, energy security, and the climate.” ¶ “Implementing these recommendations for EOR can create a virtuous circle of increasing benefits to our nation over time,” said Brad Crabtree, policy director for GPI. “Congress and **state policymakers can expand American oil production, spur jobs, increase revenues, reduce the trade deficit and store significant CO2, all with incentives that pay for themselves**.”¶ In total, an estimated 26 billion to 61 billion barrels of economically recoverable oil could be produced in the United States using currently available CO2-EOR technologies and practices, or potentially more than twice the country’s proved reserves. Expanded use of CO2-EOR also can advance the development of infrastructure needed for long-term capture, transportation and storage of carbon emissions.¶ NEORI participants include state officials from Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Montana, New Mexico, Texas, West Virginia and representatives of:¶ Air Products, Inc. Natural Resources Defense Council¶ AFL-CIO Ohio Environmental Council¶ Arch Coal, Inc. Southern Company¶ Archer Daniels Midland Co. Summit Power ¶ Basin Electric Power Cooperative Tenaska Energy¶ Clean Air Task Force United Transportation Union ¶ Enhanced Oil Recovery Institute, University of Wyoming Wyoming Outdoor Council¶ GE Energy

#### States can effectively foster CO2-EOR deployment – they have various incentives at their disposal

Greenwald 7/6/12 (Judy, vice president for technology and innovation at the Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, "NEORI’s promise: Pairing utilities with big oil to revitalize CCS development – Part 1 | GCCSI," http://www.adamaston.com/?p=977)

Of course, states also have an important role to play in fostering CO2-EOR deployment. This is why NEORI identifies existing state policies that should serve as models for policymakers in other states to adopt and tailor to their particular needs. These policies include cost recovery for CCS power projects, long-term off-take agreements for CCS power, severance tax reductions for oil produced by CO2-EOR, and others.

**State incentives solve EOR – can foster CO2-EOR deployment and SOLIDIFIES squo state leadership on the issue**

**NEORI 12** (National Enhanced Oil Recovery Initiative along with Center for Climate and Energy Solutions and the Great Plains Initiative, "CARBON DIOXIDE ENHANCED OIL RECOVERY: A CRITICAL DOMESTIC ENERGY,

ECONOMIC, AND ENVIRONMENTAL OPPORTUNITY," February, http://www.neori.org/NEORI\_Report.pdf)

**States also have an important role to play in fostering ¶ CO2¶ -EOR deployment by implementing incentive policies** ¶ that can complement the federal production tax credit ¶ recommended in this report. A number of states have ¶ **already taken the lead**, filling the current vacuum left by ¶ the absence of adequate federal policy. Therefore, this ¶ report identifies existing state policies that NEORI members believe should serve as models for policy-makers in ¶ other states to adopt and tailor to their particular needs.

**A2 Federal Regulations Preempt**

**Federal regulations won't preempt or preclude state-level EOR incentive programs – existing waivers prove**

**NEORI 12** (National Enhanced Oil Recovery Initiative along with Center for Climate and Energy Solutions and the Great Plains Initiative, "CARBON DIOXIDE ENHANCED OIL RECOVERY: A CRITICAL DOMESTIC ENERGY,

ECONOMIC, AND ENVIRONMENTAL OPPORTUNITY," February, http://www.neori.org/NEORI\_Report.pdf)

Properly managed EOR projects have demonstrated ¶ that injecting CO2¶ into producing oil fields can safely ¶ store CO2¶ in geologic formations without leaking to ¶ groundwater resources or escaping to the atmosphere. ¶ EOR is governed by federal regulations that require the ¶ protection of underground sources of drinking water, ¶ under the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s ¶ (EPA’s) Underground Injection Control (UIC) program. ¶ **Many states have obtained authority from EPA to administer the UIC program** and have laws that meet or go ¶ further than EPA’s requirements. Permits issued by the ¶ EPA or states require that EOR operators manage their ¶ site in a manner that will prevent CO2¶ (and other formation fluids) from migrating out of the subsurface confining formation and into drinking water aquifers (Code of ¶ Federal Regulations (CFR) 40 CFR §144).

### A2: State Budgets DA – 2NC

#### Energy production isn’t key. It’s a drop in the bucket compared to huge state spending on social services, education, etc. If it links, state budgets will inevitably collapse because of future spending.

#### States are getting surpluses now – they can use those funds

Reuters 12 (“Better than expected: Some US states run surpluses”, 5/3, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/03/usa-states-budgets-idUSL1E8G3FB920120503)

Improving revenue will lead more than half of the 50 U.S. states to end this fiscal year with mild surpluses, according to a report released on Th ursday that showed the economic recovery **is finally reaching their budgets.** The National Conference of State Legislatures reported that 29 states and the District of Columbia project their fiscal 2012 revenue will exceed budgeted obligations by $9.1 billion. For most states, the fiscal year ends June 30. "Throughout the Great Recession, spending estimates often proved to be too low and revenue estimates too high, resulting in substantial state budget gaps," the NCSL said in its report. "Spending requirements have been relatively stable, and revenues continue to grow, and in some cases have returned to pre-recession levels," it added. In four commodity-rich states - Alaska, Indiana, Montana and Wyoming - the surpluses will represent 10 percent of their general fund budgets. Almost all of the states with surpluses, 21, will put some of the money into reserve funds, and 19 plan to use it in their next budgets. Two states, Arizona and Indiana, will pay off some debt and Indiana will also put part of its surplus into its employee pension fund. Many will also use the money for capital projects. REVENUES INCH UP, AS DOES HEALTHCARE SPENDING Only nine states developed new shortfalls this year, totaling $6.8 billion, and 16 states and the District of Columbia project gaps for next fiscal y e ar of $16.2 billion. Because all states except Vermont must end their fiscal years with balanced budgets, shortfalls lead them to hike taxes or cut spending. At the height of the recession, revenue declines were so large and rapid that many states had to call emergency budget sessions to wipe out new gaps. Although the economic recovery began in 2009, states have still struggled over the last few years, laying off workers and slashing spending. While the recession was fairly uniform, sparing just a few states, the recovery has been uneven, making policymakers nervous that improvements will not last. NCSL reported that one-third of states expect in this fiscal year to return to the revenue peaks they reached before the recession, while "many others do not expect a return for at least three years or longer." A recent report from the Rockefeller Institute of Government said that, on the whole, states have reached those pre-recession highs, but individually many places still lag. State lawmakers are also concerned about high unemployment, spending cuts from the federal government, demands for public programs and the global economy, NCSL found. "The tenor from legislative fiscal directors is one of cautious optimism as state budgets slowly but steadily improve," the report said. It found that tax collections have met or exceeded expectations in most states but that "performance was uneven across tax categories," with sales taxes and corporate income taxes generally stronger than personal income taxes.

#### State deficits are still high

Oliff 12 (Phil – Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, “States Continue to Feel Recession’s Impact”, 6/27, http://www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfm?fa=view&id=711)

As a new fiscal year begins, the latest state budget estimates continue to show that states’ ability to fund services remains hobbled by slow economic growth. The budget gaps that states have had to close for fiscal year 2013, the fiscal year that begins July 1, 2012, **total $55 billion** in 31 states. That amount is smaller than in past years, but still very large by historical standards. States’ actions to close those gaps, in turn, are further delaying the nation’s economic recovery. The budget gaps result principally from weak tax collections. The Great Recession that started in 2007 caused the largest collapse in state revenues on record. Since bottoming out in 2010, revenues have begun to grow again but are still far from fully recovered. As of the first quarter of 2012, state revenues remained 5.5 percent below pre-recession levels, and are not growing fast enough to recover fully soon. Meanwhile, states’ education and health care obligations continue to grow. States expect to educate 540,000 more K-12 students and 2.5 million more public college and university students in the upcoming school year than in 2007-08.[1] And some 4.8 million more people are projected to be eligible for subsidized health insurance through Medicaid in 2012 than were enrolled in 2008, as employers have cancelled their coverage and people have lost jobs and wages.[2] Consequently, even though the revenue outlook is trending upward, states have addressed large budget shortfalls by historical standards as they considered budgets for 2013. The vast majority of these shortfalls have been closed through spending cuts and other measures in order to meet balanced-budget requirements. As of publication all but five states have enacted their budgets, and those five will do so soon. To the extent these shortfalls are being closed with spending cuts, they are occurring on top of past years’ deep cuts in critical public services like education, health care, and human services. The additional cuts mean that state budgets will continue to be a drag on the national economy, threatening hundreds of thousands of private- and public-sector jobs, reducing the job creation that otherwise would be expected to occur. Potential strategies for lessening the impact of deep spending cuts include more use of state reserve funds in states that have reserves, more revenue through tax-law changes, and a greater role for the federal government. Our survey of state fiscal conditions shows that: States continue to face a major fiscal challenge. Thirty-one states projected (and in most cases now have closed) budget gaps totaling $55 billion for fiscal year 2013. (See Figure 1.) These shortfalls were all the more daunting because states’ options for addressing them were fewer and more difficult than in recent years. Temporary aid to states enacted in early 2009 as part of the federal Recovery Act was enormously helpful in allowing states to avert some of the most harmful potential budget cuts in the 2009, 2010 and 2011 fiscal years. But the federal government allowed that aid to largely expire at the end of fiscal year 2011, leading to some of the deepest cuts to state services since the start of the recession. Far from providing additional assistance to states, the federal government is now moving ahead with spending cuts that will very likely make states’ fiscal situation even worse. State finances are recovering, but slowly. The shortfall totals for fiscal year 2013 are smaller than the totals from the last few years. But they remain large by historical standards, as the economy remains weak and unemployment is still high. (Note that even if economic improvement accelerates, state fiscal recovery tends to lag recovery in the broader economy.) The shortfalls that states have projected for fiscal year 2013 are in addition to the more than $540 billion in shortfalls that states have closed over the past four years.

#### States can deficit spend now – the fed picks up the check

WC 10 (“Fed Bailouts Feed State Spending Habits”, 11/3, http://wealthcycles.com/blog/2010/11/03/fed-bailouts-feed-state-spending-habits)

The next fire the U.S. government will have to put out in trying to regain control of the failing economy is likely to be bankrupt state treasuries and cascading defaults on state and municipal bonds, according to a recent WSJ.com op-ed piece by banking analyst Meredith Whitney. Whitney claims federal bailouts of state governments are already going on. Currently states receive some 28 percent of their funding from federal government transfers, according to Whitney, plus additional funds to pay the interest on their debt through a program called “Build America Bonds,” under which the U.S. Treasury covers 35 percent of the interest on state-issued bonds. But with the advent of a GOP-controlled Congress, there may not be the political will to rescue failing states, which receive some 28 percent of their funding from federal government transfers, according to Whitney’s article. Such federal subsidies (courtesy of the American taxpayer) are one reason states have been able to keep spending like there’s no tomorrow. “The largest 15 states by GDP spent on average over 220% of their tax receipts….,” Whitney writes. “The root of the problem is simple: State governments have spent recklessly and unsustainably.” Adding to the severity of the problem is the fact that local governments are likewise dependent on state funding to support their own deficit spending and interest costs, currently receiving some one-third of their funding from the feds—funds once covered by state and local taxes and fees. Warren Buffett, whose company holds and insures a lot of municipal bonds, assured his stockholders recently that the federal government would bail states out. No doubt the U.S. government will do so if it can. But with yesterday’s GOP sweep of Congress and the mood of voters hardened against more federal spending, states may no longer be able to take their Uncle Sam’s generosity for granted. Whitney urges states to bring spending under control before they are forced to go begging legislators from their fiscally conservative neighboring states for yet more hand-outs. Rampant overspending by state governments contributes enormously to the currency and debt bubbles that are rapidly inflating, and it contributes to the Fed’s sense of panic. As I wrote in the WealthCycles.com article The Road Ahead, unsustainable debt would be a nightmare for the Fed in a deflationary economy: In a deflation, even though both prices and wages fall, debt does not. For example, if you borrowed $100 to buy a pair of shoes, you still owe that $100—even though wages have been cut so you’re making less money, and even though you can now buy that same pair of shoes for say $10. Magnify that scenario by trillions, and you have a picture of our government’s fiscal dilemma in the event of a deflation. In a nutshell, terror of this deflationary scenario is why the U.S. government, the Fed and Fed Chair Ben Bernanke are willing to crank out new dollars at never-before-seen volumes in a desperate attempt to prevent it. With the Fed’s announcement today of its latest plans for inflating the currency supply by another $800 or $900 billion over the next six months à la QE2, it seems this prediction is still playing itself out, and tomorrow's dollars will have even less purchasing power than today's.

#### They expand the federal deficit – causes economic collapse

Bergsten 5 (Fred, Director – Institute of International Economics, The Nation, 1-3, Lexis)

Robert Rubin, former secretary of the Treasury, also stresses the psychological importance for financial markets of expectations concerning the American budget position. If that deficit is viewed as likely to rise substantially, without any correction in sight, confidence in America's financial instruments and currency could crack. The dollar could fall sharply as it did in 1971-73, 1978-79, 1985-87, and 1994-95. Market interest rates would rise substantially, and the Federal Reserve would probably have to push them still higher to limit the acceleration of inflation. These risks could be intensified by the change in leadership that will presumably take place at the Federal Reserve Board in less than two years, inevitably creating new uncertainties after 25 years of superb stewardship by Mr. Volcker and Alan Greenspan. A very hard landing is not inevitable but neither is it unlikely.

### 2NC No XTC

#### Experts agree

Hsu 10 (Jeremy, Live Science Staff, July 19, pg. <http://www.livescience.com/culture/can-humans-survive-extinction-doomsday-100719.html>)

His views deviate sharply from those of most experts, who don't view climate change as the end for humans. Even the worst-case scenarios discussed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change don't foresee human extinction. "The scenarios that the mainstream climate community are advancing are not end-of-humanity, catastrophic scenarios," said Roger Pielke Jr., a climate policy analyst at the University of Colorado at Boulder. Humans have the technological tools to begin tackling climate change, if not quite enough yet to solve the problem, Pielke said. He added that doom-mongering did little to encourage people to take action. "My view of politics is that the long-term, high-risk scenarios are really difficult to use to motivate short-term, incremental action," Pielke explained. "The rhetoric of fear and alarm that some people tend toward is counterproductive." Searching for solutions One technological solution to climate change already exists through carbon capture and storage, according to Wallace Broecker, a geochemist and renowned climate scientist at Columbia University's Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory in New York City. But Broecker remained skeptical that governments or industry would commit the resources needed to slow the rise of carbon dioxide (CO2) levels, and predicted that more drastic geoengineering might become necessary to stabilize the planet. "The rise in CO2 isn't going to kill many people, and it's not going to kill humanity," Broecker said. "But it's going to change the entire wild ecology of the planet, melt a lot of ice, acidify the ocean, change the availability of water and change crop yields, so we're essentially doing an experiment whose result remains uncertain."

#### Warming will be slow, there’s no impact, and adaptation solves

William Yeatman 9, Energy Policy Analyst at the Competitive Enterprise Institute, February 3, 2009, “Global Warming 101: Science,” online: <http://www.globalwarming.org/2009/02/03/global-warming-101-science/>

A “planetary emergency—a crisis that threatens the survival of our civilization and the habitability of the Earth”—that is how former Vice President Al Gore describes global warming. Most environmental groups preach the same message. So do many journalists. So do some scientists.

In fact, at the 2008 annual meeting of Nobel Prize winners in Lindau, Germany, half the laureates on the climate change panel disputed the so-called consensus on global warming.

You have probably heard the dire warnings many times. Carbon dioxide (CO2) from mankind’s use of fossil fuels like coal, oil, and natural gas is building up in the atmosphere. Carbon dioxide is a greenhouse gas—it traps heat that would otherwise escape into outer space. Al Gore warns that global warming caused by carbon dioxide emissions could increase sea levels by 20 feet, spin up deadly hurricanes. It could even plunge Europe into an ice age.

Science does not support these and other scary predictions, which Gore and his allies repeatedly tout as a “scientific consensus.” Global warming is real and carbon dioxide emissions are contributing to it, but it is not a crisis. Global warming in the 21 st century is likely to be modest, and the net impacts may well be beneficial in some places. Even in the worst case, humanity will be much better off in 2100 than it is today.

The following is a summary of key points:

Average Annual Heat-Related Mortality: People will not drop like flies from heat waves in a warming world. Heat-related mortality will continue to decline as the world warms.

Far more people die each year from excess cold than from excess heat.

Global warming will not make air pollution worse.

Global warming will not lead to malaria epidemics in Northern Hemisphere countries.

Contrary to Gore, no “strong, new scientific consensus is emerging” that global warming is making hurricanes stronger.

Global Death & Death Rates Due to Extreme Events, 1900-2004: Since the 1920s, death rates related to extreme weather declined by more than 98 percent globally. The impression conveyed by An Inconvenient Truth—that global warming is making the world a more dangerous place—is false.

Gore’s warning that global warming could shut down the Atlantic branch of the oceanic thermohaline circulation (THC) and plunge Europe into an ice age is science fiction.

Gore’s warning that sea levels could rise by 20 feet is science fiction. Sea level rise in the 21 st century is likely to be measured in inches, not in feet.

The world warmed at a rate of 0.17°C per decade since 1978, according to the temperature record compiled by the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Since most climate models predict that warming will occur at a constant—that is, non-accelerating—rate, it is reasonable to expect that global warming in the 21 st century will be close to the low end of the IPCC’s forecast range, of 1.4°C to 5.8°C.

The actual warming rate may be only half the 0.17°C per decade rate implied in the IPCC temperature record, because the IPCC has not adequately filtered out the warming biases from local factors like urbanization and improper management of monitoring equipment.

A warming near the low end of the IPCC range would produce both benefits—longer growing seasons, more rainfall, fewer cold deaths—and harms—more heat waves, more drought, some acceleration of sea level rise—but nothing resembling catastrophe.

Even in the IPCC high-end warming forecasts, human welfare would improve dramatically over the next 100 years. In the IPCC fossil-fuel-intensive development scenario, per capita GDP in developing countries increases from $875 per year in 1990 to $43,000 per year in 2100—even after taking into account an additional 110 years of global warming. Even in the IPCC worst-case scenario, global warming is not the civilization-ending catastrophe Al Gore purports it to be.

#### Previous temperature spikes disprove the impact

Singer 11 (S. Fred, Robert M. and Craig, PhD physics – Princeton University and professor of environmental science – UVA, consultant – NASA, GAO, DOE, NASA, Carter, PhD paleontology – University of Cambridge, adjunct research professor – Marine Geophysical Laboratory @ James Cook University, and Idso, PhD Geography – ASU, “Climate Change Reconsidered,” 2011 Interim Report of the Nongovernmental Panel on Climate Change)

Research from locations around the world reveal a significant period of elevated air temperatures that immediately preceded the Little Ice Age, during a time that has come to be known as the Little Medieval Warm Period. A discussion of this topic was not included in the 2009 NIPCC report, but we include it here to demonstrate the existence of another set of real-world data that do not support the IPCC‘s claim that temperatures of the past couple of decades have been the warmest of the past one to two millennia. In one of the more intriguing aspects of his study of global climate change over the past three millennia, Loehle (2004) presented a graph of the Sargasso Sea and South African temperature records of Keigwin (1996) and Holmgren et al. (1999, 2001) that reveals the existence of a major spike in surface air temperature that began sometime in the early 1400s. This abrupt and anomalous warming pushed the air temperatures of these two records considerably above their representations of the peak warmth of the twentieth century, after which they fell back to pre-spike levels in the mid-1500s, in harmony with the work of McIntyre and McKitrick (2003), who found a similar period of higher-than-current temperatures in their reanalysis of the data employed by Mann et al. (1998, 1999).

#### No impact to warming

Idso and Idso 11 (Craig D., Founder and Chairman of the Board – Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change, and Sherwood B., President – Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change, “Carbon Dioxide and Earth’s Future Pursuing the Prudent Path,” February, <http://www.co2science.org/education/reports/> prudentpath/prudentpath.pdf)

As presently constituted, earth’s atmosphere contains just slightly less than 400 ppm of the colorless and odorless gas we call carbon dioxide or CO2. That’s only four-hundredths of one percent. Consequently, even if the air's CO2 concentration was tripled, carbon dioxide would still comprise only a little over one tenth of one percent of the air we breathe, which is far less than what wafted through earth’s atmosphere eons ago, when the planet was a virtual garden place. Nevertheless, a small increase in this minuscule amount of CO2 is frequently predicted to produce a suite of dire environmental consequences, including dangerous global warming, catastrophic sea level rise, reduced agricultural output, and the destruction of many natural ecosystems, as well as dramatic increases in extreme weather phenomena, such as droughts, floods and hurricanes. As strange as it may seem, these frightening future scenarios are derived from a single source of information: the ever-evolving computer-driven climate models that presume to reduce the important physical, chemical and biological processes that combine to determine the state of earth’s climate into a set of mathematical equations out of which their forecasts are produced. But do we really know what all of those complex and interacting processes are? And even if we did -- which we don't -- could we correctly reduce them into manageable computer code so as to produce reliable forecasts 50 or 100 years into the future? Some people answer these questions in the affirmative. However, as may be seen in the body of this report, real-world observations fail to confirm essentially all of the alarming predictions of significant increases in the frequency and severity of droughts, floods and hurricanes that climate models suggest should occur in response to a global warming of the magnitude that was experienced by the earth over the past two centuries as it gradually recovered from the much-lower-than-present temperatures characteristic of the depths of the Little Ice Age. And other observations have shown that the rising atmospheric CO2 concentrations associated with the development of the Industrial Revolution have actually been good for the planet, as they have significantly enhanced the plant productivity and vegetative water use efficiency of earth's natural and agro-ecosystems, leading to a significant "greening of the earth." In the pages that follow, we present this oft-neglected evidence via a review of the pertinent scientific literature. In the case of the biospheric benefits of atmospheric CO2 enrichment, we find that with more CO2 in the air, plants grow bigger and better in almost every conceivable way, and that they do it more efficiently, with respect to their utilization of valuable natural resources, and more effectively, in the face of environmental constraints. And when plants benefit, so do all of the animals and people that depend upon them for their sustenance. Likewise, in the case of climate model inadequacies, we reveal their many shortcomings via a comparison of their "doom and gloom" predictions with real-world observations. And this exercise reveals that even though the world has warmed substantially over the past century or more -- at a rate that is claimed by many to have been unprecedented over the past one to two millennia -- this report demonstrates that none of the environmental catastrophes that are predicted by climate alarmists to be produced by such a warming has ever come to pass. And this fact -- that there have been no significant increases in either the frequency or severity of droughts, floods or hurricanes over the past two centuries or more of global warming -- poses an important question. What should be easier to predict: the effects of global warming on extreme weather events or the effects of elevated atmospheric CO2 concentrations on global temperature? The first part of this question should, in principle, be answerable; for it is well defined in terms of the small number of known factors likely to play a role in linking the independent variable (global warming) with the specified weather phenomena (droughts, floods and hurricanes). The latter part of the question, on the other hand, is ill-defined and possibly even unanswerable; for there are many factors -- physical, chemical and biological -- that could well be involved in linking CO2 (or causing it not to be linked) to global temperature. If, then, today's climate models cannot correctly predict what should be relatively easy for them to correctly predict (the effect of global warming on extreme weather events), why should we believe what they say about something infinitely more complex (the effect of a rise in the air’s CO2 content on mean global air temperature)? Clearly, we should pay the models no heed in the matter of future climate -- especially in terms of predictions based on the behavior of a non-meteorological parameter (CO2) -- until they can reproduce the climate of the past, based on the behavior of one of the most basic of all true meteorological parameters (temperature). And even if the models eventually solve this part of the problem, we should still reserve judgment on their forecasts of global warming; for there will yet be a vast gulf between where they will be at that time and where they will have to go to be able to meet the much greater challenge to which they aspire

### 2NC Slow Now

#### Gas and developing countries offset US emissions reductions

Marshall 12 (Michael, climate reporter – New Scientist, 8/20/’12, <http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn22196-lowest-us-carbon-emissions-wont-slow-climate-change.html>)

It looks like good news, but it's not. The US has recorded a sharp fall in its greenhouse gas emissions from energy use. Thanks to a rise in the use of natural gas, emissions are at their lowest since 1992. The fall will boost the natural gas industry, but in reality the emissions have simply been exported. According to the US Energy Information Administration (EIA), energy-related CO2 emissions in the first quarter of 2012 were the lowest in two decades. Emissions are normally high between January and March because people use more heating in the winter, but last winter was mild in the US. The EIA says that an increase in gas-fired power generation, and a corresponding decline in coal-fired, contributed to the fall in emissions. Burning natural gas produces fewer emissions than burning coal, and natural gas is currently unusually cheap in the US thanks to a glut of shale gas extracted by hydraulic fracturing or "fracking". If gas companies continue to expand their shale gas operations, the US could generate even more electricity from gas, and its emissions could fall for several years, says Kevin Anderson of the University of Manchester, UK. However, this will not slow down climate change. US coal consumption has fallen, but production is holding steady and the surplus is being sold to Asia. As a result, the US is effectively exporting the coal-related emissions. "Gas is less bad than burning the coal, but only if you keep the coal in the ground," Anderson says. Proponents of natural gas argue that it is a "transition fuel" that we can burn for a few years while we install low-carbon infrastructure such as wind farms and nuclear power stations. That viewpoint looks increasingly untenable. "If we want even an outside chance of [limiting global warming to] 2 °C, there is no emission space for gas," Anderson says. In order to hit the 2 °C target, global emissions need to peak by 2020 before dropping again, which means making a rapid transition to low-carbon energy.

**Decade of cooling – 98-08 was the coolest decade on record**

**Carter 11** (Robert M., PhD, University of Cambridge, marine geologist and research professor at James Cook University in Queensland, Australia, Climate Change Reconsidered: 2011 Interim Report, 8-29-11, <http://www.nipccreport.org/reports/2011/pdf/FrontMatter.pdf>)

Recent reconstructions of climate history find the human influence does not stand out relative to other, natural causes of climate change. While global warming theory and models predict polar areas would warm most rapidly, the warming of Greenland was 33 percent greater in magnitude in 1919–1932 than it was in 1994–2007, and **Antarctica** **cooled** during the second half of the twentieth century.  Perlwitz et al. (2009) reported ―**a decade-long decline** (1998–2007) in globally averaged temperatures from the record heat of 1998‖ and noted U.S. temperatures in 2008 ―not only declined from near-record warmth of prior years, but were in fact colder than the official 30-year reference climatology … and further were **the coldest** since at least 1996.‖  New research disputes IPCC‘s claim that it has ferreted out all significant influences of the world‘s many and diverse urban heat islands from the temperature databases they use to portray the supposedly unprecedented warming of the past few decades.

**Temperature tracking data confirms**

**Morano 8** (Marc Morano, the communications director for the Republican minority on the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee, “Earth's 'Fever' Breaks: Global COOLING Currently Under Way,” 2-27-8, http://epw.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Minority.Blogs&ContentRecord\_id=5CEAEDB7-802A-23AD-4BFE-9E32747616F9

Excerpt: All four major global temperature tracking outlets (Hadley, NASA's GISS, UAH, RSS) have released updated data. All show that over the past year, global temperatures have **dropped precipitously**. A compiled list of all the sources can be seen here. The total amount of cooling ranges from 0.65C up to 0.75C -- a value large enough to erase nearly **all the global warming** recorded over the past 100 years. All in one year time. For all sources, it's the single fastest temperature change every recorded, either up or down. […] Over the past year, anecdotal evidence for a cooling planet has exploded. China has its coldest winter in 100 years. Baghdad sees its first snow in all recorded history. North America has the most snowcover in 50 years, with places like Wisconsin the highest since record-keeping began. Record levels of **Antarctic sea ice**, record cold in Minnesota, Texas, Florida, Mexico, Australia, Iran, Greece, South Africa, Greenland, Argentina, Chile -- the list goes on and on. No more than anecdotal evidence, to be sure. But now, that evidence has been supplanted by hard scientific fact. All four major global temperature tracking outlets (Hadley, NASA's GISS, UAH, RSS) have released updated data. All show that over the past year, global temperatures have dropped precipitously.

**Peer-reviewed sources agree**

**Carter 11** (Robert M., PhD, University of Cambridge, marine geologist and research professor at James Cook University in Queensland, Australia, Climate Change Reconsidered: 2011 Interim Report, 8-29-11,

<http://www.nipccreport.org/reports/2011/pdf/03Temperature.pdf>)

In a paper titled ―A strong bout of natural **cooling in 2008**‖ published in Geophysical Research Letters Perlwitz et al. (2009) discuss the ―**precipitous drop** in North American temperature in 2008, commingled with a decade-long fall in global mean temperatures.‖ The authors begin their narrative by noting there has been ―a decade-long decline (1998–2007) in globally averaged temperatures from the record heat of 1998,‖ citing Easterling and Wehner (2009). In further describing this phenomenon, they note U.S. temperatures in 2008 ―not only declined from near record warmth of prior years, but were in fact colder than the official 30-year reference climatology (0.2°C versus the 1971–2000 mean) and further were the coldest since at least 1996.‖ With respect to the geographical origin of this ―natural cooling,‖ as they describe it, the five researchers point to ―a widespread coolness of the tropical-wide oceans and the northeastern Pacific,‖ focusing on the Niño 4 region, where they report ―anomalies of about -1.1°C suggest a condition colder than any in the instrumental record **since 1871**.‖ The researchers then push ahead in search of the cause of the global and U.S. coolings that sparked their original interest, seeking out what connects them with other more primary phenomena, the anomalous and significant oceanic coolings. Perlwitz et al. first **discount volcanic** eruptions, noting ―there were no significant volcanic events in the last few years.‖ Next, they write that solar forcing ―is also unlikely,‖ because its radiative magnitude is considered to be too weak to elicit such a response. And these two castaway causes thus leave them with ―coupled ocean-atmosphere-land variability‖ as the ―most likely‖ cause of the anomalous coolings.

### 1NC Negative Feedbacks

#### Negative feedbacks check runaway warming -

#### A. Water Vapor

Sweger 11 [Dr. Daniel M. Sweger, AB (Physics, Duke University, 1965) and Ph.D. (Solid State Physics, American University, 1974) has been a research scientist at NIST, where he was active in a variety of research areas, including cryogenic thermometry, solid state and nuclear physics, and molecular spectroscop, “ Earth’s Climate Engine Exploring the Dynamics of Earth’s Climate”, March 17th, 2011, http://junksciencearchive.com/Greenhouse/Earth-s\_Climate\_Engine.pdf, Chetan]

The role of water vapor in determining surface temperatures is ultimately a dominant one. During daylight hours it moderates the sun’s energy, at night it acts like a blanket to slow the loss of heat, and carries energy from the warm parts of the earth to the cold. Compared to that, if carbon dioxide has an effect, it must be negligible. It is also clear from the data presented above that water vapor acts with a negative feedback. The data clearly shows that the relationship between the amount of water vapor in the air and temperature is negative; that is, the higher the amount of water vapor in the atmosphere the lower the surface temperature. In that regard, it almost acts as a thermostat. As the air cools as a result of an increasing moisture content in the atmosphere, there is a decrease in the amount of water vapor produced by evaporation. Eventually this decrease of the level of water vapor being introduced into the atmosphere results in a decrease in moisture content. At this point more sunlight reaches the earth’s surface resulting in higher temperatures and increasing evaporation. In the positive feedback mechanism as proposed by the global warming proponents this behavior would be reversed. Then the data would show a positive relationship between moisture content and temperature. But it does not.

#### B. Sulfate aerosols

Hausfather 8 – Zeke, Regular Contributor to the Yale Forum on Climate Change, June 24th, [“COMMON CLIMATE MISCONCEPTIONS Why Reducing Sulfate Aerosol Emissions Complicates Efforts to Moderate Climate Change” The Yale Forum on Climate Change and the Media, http://yaleclimatemediaforum.org/ccm/0608\_sulphate\_aerosol\_emissions.htm]

With all the attention surrounding carbon dioxide these days, it is easy to forget that there are a number of other important natural and human-driven factors ("forcings" in climate circles) that influence Earth's climate. Among the most important of these are sulfate aerosols, microscopic particles smaller than a millionth of a meter suspended in the air. Sulfate aerosols are produced primarily from sulphur dioxide (SO2) emitted during the combustion of fossil fuels. Along with ozone precursors, they are primary causes of acid rain and of lung irritation and ground-level haze or smog in polluted areas. Sulfate aerosols also have a strong cooling effect on Earth, both through their ability to scatter incoming light and because of their propensity to increase cloud formation and reflectivity. Among the most significant changes in climate change modeling between the 2001 IPCC Third Assessment Report (TAR) and the Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) in 2007 was a revision of the expected trajectory of human-induced sulfate aerosol emissions. In the earlier report, scientists assumed that aerosols would increase in rough proportional to economic growth. The authors of the 2007 report realized that emissions of aerosols, which have direct and immediate negative health effects to those in the area surrounding their emission, will likely be targeted for reductions as countries like China and India become wealthier. This emissions reduction would mirror a similar process that occurred in Europe and the United States. Sulfate aerosols are the most significant substance in a category of aerosols tending to help cool the climate. Aerosols decrease radiative forcing in two ways: through direct aerosol effects as a result of an increased scattering and absorption of incoming solar radiation, and through indirect effects resulting from their ability to serve as cloud condensation nuclei. An increased number of cloud condensation nuclei have a number of different effects: they increase the reflectivity of clouds by making them denser and giving them higher liquid water content, they increase the height of clouds, and they increase cloud lifetime. Figure One, below, shows the major climate forcings over the past 120 years. The major positive forcings include CO2 at 1.66 watts per meter squared (W m-2), methane (CH4) at 0.46 W m-2, nitrous oxide (N2O) at 0.16 W m-2, and various halocarbons (CFCs, HCFCs, etc.) at 0.34 W m-2. Aerosol direct effects account for -0.5 ± 0.4 W m-2 negative forcing, with SO2 comprising -0.4 W m-2. Indirect effects are around -0.7 W m-2, with a large uncertainty range of -1.8 to -0.3 W m-2. Aerosols are the primary reason why Earth is still at around 380 parts per million CO2-equivilent (CO2e), rather than the 460 ppm CO2e projected if all the positive forcings were added together. Conveniently enough, aerosols pretty much cancel out the warming from all the non-CO2 greenhouse gases. 0608\_ccm\_Fig1.jpg - 31186 Bytes Figure One. Radiative forcing of major climate factors over the past 123 years. Figure from Hansen et al 2005. There are a number of different projections for sulfate aerosol emissions over the next century based on assumptions regarding the rate of economic growth, population growth, and technological development. Figure Two, below, shows an aggregation of all models of anthropogenic sulfate emissions used in the most recent IPCC report. Specific scenarios vary widely, but the median value across all models results by the year 2100 in sulfate aerosol emissions of 35 million metric tons, roughly one half of current emissions. 0608\_ccm\_Fig2.jpg - 55341 Bytes Figure Two. Projections of future aerosol emissions for SRES (Special Report on Emissions Scenarios) and post-SRES scenarios. Figure from the third working group of the latest IPCC report. A reduction of anthropogenic SO2 of around 50 percent worldwide over the next century, as projected in the most recent IPCC report, would result in a significant warming effect on the global climate. Sulfates are extremely short-lived particles, and emission reductions would have immediate effects on radiative forcing. A 50 percent reduction in sulfate aerosol emissions would reduce by half their current radiative forcing of -0.83 W m-2. This change in forcings would increase global temperatures by roughly 0.36 degrees C (.64 F) relative to a scenario where aerosol emissions remain constant. Figure three below shows the practical implications of a reduction in aerosols in the next century. If current greenhouse gas concentrations remain constant at current levels, scientists project about 1.34 degrees C (2.41 F) warming relative to pre-industrial temperatures by the end of the century (the world has already warmed 0.74 degrees C (1.33 F) in the past century, and 0.60 degrees C (1.08F) additional warming is in the pipeline as a result of Earth's thermal inertia). A reduction of anthropogenic atmospheric sulfate aerosols by 50 percent means that 1.34 degrees C (2.41 F) warming suddenly becomes 1.70 degrees C (3.06 F). Constant 2005 GHG Concentrations Constant SO2 1.34 degrees C (2.41 F) Reduced SO2 1.70 degrees C (3.06 F) Figure Three. Based on a simple calculation of radiative forcings of the current atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases at equilibrium, assuming a climate sensitivity of roughly 0.87 degrees K. Also assuming that anthropogenic SO2 represent only 72 percent of total atmospheric SO2 flux and that the indirect aerosol effects of SO2 account for around 62 percent of total indirect aerosol forcing, or -0.43 W m-2

### AT Ocean Acidification

#### No ocean acidification – IPCC uses unrealistic data and animals will adapt

Idso and Idso 11 [Craig D., founder and chairman of the board of the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change, B.S. in Geography from Arizona State University, his M.S. in Agronomy from the University of Nebraska - Lincoln, and his Ph.D. in Geography from Arizona State University, former Director of Environmental Science at Peabody Energy, faculty researcher in the Office of Climatology at Arizona State University; and Sherwood, President of the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change, former Research Physicist with the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Agricultural Research Service, Adjunct Professor in the Departments of Geology, Geography, and Botany and Microbiology at ASU, M.S from UMinnesota, receipt of the Arthur S. Flemming Award, "Carbon Dioxide and Earth’s Future," 1-31-11, <http://www.co2science.org/education/reports/prudentpath/prudentpath.pdf>]

The chemistry aspect of the ocean acidification hypothesis is rather straightforward, but it is not as solid as many make it out to be; and a number of respected researchers have published papers demonstrating that the drop in oceanic pH will not be nearly as great as the IPCC and others predict it will be, nor that it will be as harmful as they claim it will be. Consider, for example, the figure below, which shows historical and projected fossil fuel CO2 emissions and atmospheric CO2 concentrations out to the year 2500, as calculated by NOAA’s Pieter Tans (2009). As can be seen there, his analysis indicates that the air’s CO2 concentration will peak well before 2100, and at only 500 ppm compared to the 800 ppm value predicted in one of the IPCC’s scenarios. And it is also worth noting that by the time the year 2500 rolls around, the atmosphere’s CO2 concentration actually drops back down to about what it is today. When these emissions estimates are transformed into reductions of oceanic pH, it can readily be seen in the following figure that Tans’ projected pH change at 2100 is far less than that of the IPCC. And Tans’ analysis indicates a pH recovery to values near those of today by the year 2500, clearly suggesting that things are not the way the world’s climate alarmists make them out to be, especially when it comes to anthropogenic CO2 emissions and their effects on the air’s CO2 content and oceanic pH values. Another reason to not jump on the ocean acidification bandwagon is the fact that, with more CO2 in the air, additional weathering of terrestrial carbonates likely will occur, which would increase delivery of Ca 2+ to the oceans and partially compensate for the CO2induced decrease in calcium carbonate saturation state. And as with all phenomena involving living organisms, the introduction of life into the acidification picture greatly complicates things, as several interrelated biological phenomena must also be considered; and when they are, it becomes much more difficult to draw such sweeping negative conclusions. In fact, as demonstrated in numerous reviews of the scientific literature, these considerations even suggest that the rising CO2 content of earth’s atmosphere may well be a beneficial phenomenon with many positive consequences (Idso, 2009; Idso and Singer, 2009). As an example of this fact, the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change (hereafter, the Center) maintains an online ocean acidification database that may be accessed free of charge at http://www.co2science.org/data/acidification/acidification.php, showcasing over 1100 experimental results on this topic from the peer-reviewed scientific literature (as of Jan 2011). Specifically, their Ocean Acidification Database is an ever-growing archive of the responses of various growth and developmental parameters of marine organisms immersed in seawater at or near today’s oceanic pH level, as well as at levels lower than that of today. The measured parameters included in the database pertain to changes in calcification, metabolism, growth, fertility and survival; and the data are arranged by marine organism, accessible by selecting an organism’s common or scientific name. In addition, the data have been grouped into similar types of organisms, such as bivalves, corals, fish, nematodes phytoplankton, etc. In considering the experimental results that are archived there, the mean response suggests that ocean acidification may indeed harm some organisms. However, it is critical to note that the vast majority of these experiments were performed under highly unrealistic oceanic pH conditions that will never occur, rendering their findings meaningless in terms of what might possibly happen in the real world. And as one examines the results over the more-likely-to occur pH decline range, a vastly different picture begins to appear. Returning to the Center’s ocean acidification database, consider the figure below, which depicts the percentage changes in all five of the major life characteristics examined in the database (calcification, metabolism, growth, fertility and survival) as functions of the experimentallyorchestrated declines in seawater pH from the present, where each entry in the database is represented by its own individual point. As is clearly evident, the data portray an extremely wide range of pH reduction values, the greatest of which corresponds to an increase in the air’s CO2 concentration in excess of 100,000 ppm, which is orders of magnitude greater than what anyone is expecting will ever occur. Thus, highlighted in grey are all data points that pertain to experiments conducted under pH conditions that are considered to be “far, far beyond the realm of reality.” The low-end boundary of the unrealistic highlighted region of pH reduction shown in the figure is 0.5, which represents the high-end or maximum value of most IPCC-based projections of CO2induced pH reduction, which occurs in the vicinity of AD 2300. Thus, there should be little argument – even from people who think ocean acidification is going to be a problem – in excluding all values beyond a pH decline of 0.5 when considering how acidification of the ocean might realistically affect earth’s marine life. In the next graph to the right, results of all experiments that employed a seawater pH decline that fell somewhere in the stillmore-likely-to-occur range of 0.0 to 0.3 are plotted, where the latter value is the approximate IPCC-derived pH decline in the vicinity of AD 2100. Then, within this range, highlighted in grey, is the much smaller seawater pH reduction range that comes from the work of Tans (2009), who derived a maximum pH decline that could fall anywhere within an uncertainty range of 0.09 to 0.17 by about AD 2100, after which seawater pH begins its longterm recovery. The Tans prediction range has been emphasized in this manner because his analysis is considered to be more realistic than the analysis of the IPCC. Thus, data within the pH reduction range of 0.0 to 0.17 should be considered as being most characteristic of what might possibly occur in the real world, as time marches on and fossil fuel burning continues as per business as usual. And, interestingly enough – and even incorporating pH reduction data all the way out to 0.30 – the linear trend of all the data is actually positive, indicating an overall beneficial response of the totality of the five major life characteristics of marine sea life to ocean acidification, which result is vastly different from the tremendously negative results routinely predicted by the world’s climate alarmists. The next figure illustrates the averages of all responses to seawater acidification for all five of the life characteristics of the various marine organisms (calcification, metabolism, growth, fertility and survival) analyzed over the pH reduction ranges of 0 to 0.09 (from no change to the lower pH edge of the Tans estimate), 0.09 to 0.17 (Tans estimate), and 0.17 to 0.3 (from Tans to the IPCC). The most striking feature of this figure is the great preponderance of data located in positive territory, which suggests that, on the whole, marine organisms likely will not be harmed to any significant degree by the expected decline in oceanic pH. If anything, the results tend to suggest that the world’s marine life may actually slightly benefit from the pH decline. Clearly, the results depicted above suggest something very different from the theoretical model-based predictions of the climate alarmists who claim we are in “the last decades of coral reefs on this planet for at least the next ... million plus years, unless we do something very soon to reduce CO2 emissions,” or who declare that “reefs are starting to crumble and disappear,” that “we may lose those ecosystems within 20 or 30 years,” and that “we’ve got the last decade in which we can do something about this problem.” Such scenarios are simply not supported by the vast bulk of pertinent experimental data. Two other phenomena that suggest the predicted decline in oceanic pH will have little to no lasting negative effects on marine life are the abilities of essentially all forms of life to adapt and evolve. Of those experiments in the database that report the length of time the organisms were subjected to reduced pH levels, for example, the median value was only four days. And many of the experiments were conducted over periods of only a few hours, which is much too short a time for organisms to adapt or evolve to successfully cope with new environmental conditions. And when one allows for such phenomena -- as oceanic pH declines ever-so-slowly in the real world of nature -- the possibility of marine life experiencing a negative response to ocean acidification becomes even less likely (Idso, 2009).

#### No impact—negligible pH change and animal response

NIPCC 10 (Nongovernmental International Panel on Climate Change, multi-national scientific coalition comprised of leading climate scientists, “Speculations beyond the Scope of Reality,” http://www.nipccreport.org/articles/2010/may/05may2010a1.html, AM)

In the introductory material to their paper on potential effects of predicted near-future increases in CO2-driven ocean acidification on shell-producing calcification in a certain species of oyster, Watson et al. (2009) report that over the past two centuries, CO2 emissions from deforestation and the burning of fossil fuels have increased atmospheric CO2 concentrations from 280 to 380 ppm, citing NOAA/ESRL records produced and maintained by Pieter Tans. They additionally say that the portion of this extra CO2 that has been taken up by the planet's oceans has caused a 0.1 unit drop in the pH of their surface waters, which would appear to be correct. However, they predict there will be a further reduction in ocean pH of 0.3 to 0.5 units by 2100, citing the work of Haugan and Drange (1996), Orr et al. (2005) and Caldeira and Wickett (2005), while noting that these predicted changes in ocean pH "are not only greater but far more rapid than any experienced in the last 24 million years," citing Blackford and Gilbert (2007), or "possibly the last 300 million years," citing Caldeira and Wickett (2003). But how likely are such predictions? Consider the findings of Tans himself, who Watson et al. approvingly cite in regard to the CO2 history they mention. In a paper published inOceanography, Tans (2009) concluded that the future trajectory of oceanic pH will likely be significantly different from that suggested by the scientists cited by Watson et al., while at the same time bravely criticizing the IPCC reports that have also accepted the highly inflated acidification predictions of those scientists. Indeed, whereas Watson et al. and the IPCC accept the claims of those who project a decline in pH somewhere in the range of 0.3 to 0.5 between now and the end of the century, Tans' projections yield a pH decline somewhere in the range of 0.09 to 0.17, which is much smaller, and which would be expected to have significantly reduced biological impacts compared to those suggested by the experimental work of Watson et al. for that future point in time. Based on the results of their experiments and the maximum decline in ocean-water pH that they accept, for example, Watson et al. predict a significantdecline of 72% in Sydney rock oyster (Saccostrea glomerata) larval survival by the year 2100. However, utilizing Watson et al.'s data, but with the maximum ocean-water pH decline calculated by Tans, one obtains a non-significant larval survival decline of only 14%, based on interpolation of the graphical results portrayed in Watson et al.'s paper. In like manner, similar assessments of changes in antero-posterior measurement yield asignificant decline of 8.7% using Watson et al.'s assumptions about ocean pH, but a non-significant decline of only 1.8% according to Tans' pH calculations. Corresponding results for dorso-ventral measurement were a significant decline of 7.5% with Watson et al.'s pH values, but a non-significant decline of only 1.5% with Tans' values; while for larval dry mass there was a decline of 50% in Watson et al.'s analysis, but an actualincrease (albeit non-significant) of 6% using Tans' pH analysis. Last of all, for empty shells remaining there was a significant decline of 90% in the Watson et al. study, but a non-significant decline of only 6% when Tans' pH projections were used. In summation, based on their experimental data and the ocean pH projections for the end of the century that are promoted by them and the IPCC, Watson et al. find what they characterize as "a dramatic negative effect on the survival, growth, and shell formation of the early larval stages of the Sydney rock oyster." On the other hand, employing the pH values projected by Tans, there are no statistically significant reductions in any of the five biological parameters measured and evaluated by Watson et al., which is an amazingly benign response to an environmental threat that is being suggested by some to be more serious or extreme than it was at any other time that it may have reared its ugly head over the past 300 million years!

#### Increased CO2 raises pH and expands coral growth rates

Idso 9 [Dr. Craig Idso - 1-12, CO2, Global Warming, and Coral Reefs: Prospects for the Future (<http://www.co2science.org/education/reports/corals/corals.php>)]

But why would anyone believe that the recent calcification decline implies that Porites coral growth “will stop,” and that the end will come “by 2050”? They believe it because certain scientists (such as James Hansen) and politicians (such as Al Gore) imply much the same thing, as even De’ath et al. do. But when they feel compelled to be as correct and as true to their data as possible, such as when writing in Science, the three researchers from the Australian Institute of Marine Science clearly state that “the causes for the Great Barrier Reef-wide decline in coral calcification of massive Porites remain unknown.” And when the causes of the recent decline in coral calcification rate are admitted to be unknown, it seems foolish indeed to predict, not only that the decline will continue, but that it will lead all the way to the demise of the studied coral, and especially at a specified future date, which, we might add, De’ath et al. appropriately do not do in their Science paper. Moving on, a second good reason for not believing that the ongoing rise in the air's CO2 content will lead to reduced oceanic pH and, therefore, lower calcification rates in the world's coral reefs, is that the same phenomenon that powers the twin processes of coral calcification and phytoplanktonic growth (photosynthesis) tends to increase the pH of marine waters (Gnaiger et al., 1978; Santhanam et al., 1994; Brussaard et al., 1996; Lindholm and Nummelin, 1999; Macedo et al., 2001; Hansen, 2002); and this phenomenon has been shown to have the ability to dramatically increase the pH of marine bays, lagoons and tidal pools (Gnaiger et al., 1978; Santhanam, 1994; Macedo et al., 2001; Hansen, 2002) as well as to significantly enhance the surface water pH of areas as large as the North Sea (Brussaard et al., 1996). In one recent example, Middelboe and Hansen (2007) studied the pH of a wave-exposed boulder reef in Aalsgaarde on the northern coast of Zealand, Denmark, and a sheltered shallow-water area in Kildebakkerne in the estuary Roskilde Fjord, Denmark, reporting that, in line with what one would expect if photosynthesis tends to increase surface-water pH, (1) "daytime pH was significantly higher in spring, summer and autumn than in winter at both study sites," often reaching values of 9 or more during peak summer growth periods vs. 8 or less in winter, that (2) "diurnal measurements at the most exposed site showed significantly higher pH during the day than during the night," reaching values that sometimes exceeded 9 during daylight hours but that typically dipped below 8 at night, and (3) that "diurnal variations were largest in the shallow water and decreased with increasing water depth." In addition to their own findings, Middelboe and Hansen cite those of (1) Pearson et al. (1998), who found that pH averaged about 9 during the summer in populations of Fucus vesiculosus in the Baltic Sea, (2) Menendez et al. (2001), who found that maximum pH was 9 to 9.5 in dense floating macroalgae in a brackish coastal lagoon in the Ebro River Delta, and (3) Bjork et al. (2004), who found pH values as high as 9.8 to 10.1 in isolated rock pools in Sweden. Noting that "pH in the sea is usually considered to be stable at around 8 to 8.2," the two Danish researchers thus concluded that "pH is higher in natural shallow-water habitats than previously thought." With each succeeding year, the physical evidence against the CO2-reduced calcification theory continues to grow ever more compelling, while support for the positive view promoted here continues to accumulate. Working in the laboratory, for example, Reynaud et al. (2004) grew nubbins of the branching zooxanthellate scleractinian coral Acropora verweyi in aquariums maintained at 20, 25 and 29°C, while weighing them once a week over a period of four weeks. This exercise revealed that coral calcification rates increased in nearly perfect linear fashion with increasing water temperature, yielding values of 0.06, 0.22 and 0.35% per day at 20, 25 and 29°C, respectively. These data reveal an approximate 480% increase in calcification rate in response to a 9°C increase in water temperature and a 160% increase in response to a 3°C increase in temperature, the latter of which temperature increases is somewhere in the low to midrange of global warming that climate alarmists claim will result from a 300 ppm increase in the air's CO2 concentration; and this positive temperature effect far outweighs the negative effect of rising CO2 concentrations on coral calcification via ocean acidification. Working in the field, or, more correctly, the ocean, Carricart-Ganivet (2004) developed relationships between coral calcification rate and annual average SST based on data collected from colonies of the reef-building coral Montastraea annularis at twelve localities in the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea, finding that calcification rate in the Gulf of Mexico increased 0.55 g cm-2 year-1 for each 1°C increase, while in the Caribbean Sea it increased 0.58 g cm-2 year-1 for each 1°C increase. Pooling these data with those of M. annularis and M. faveolata growing to a depth of 10 m at Carrie Bow Cay, Belize, those from reefs at St. Croix in the US Virgin Islands, and those of M. faveolata growing to a depth of 10 m at Curacao, Antilles, Carricart-Ganivet reports he obtained a mean increase in calcification rate of ~0.5 g cm-2 year-1 for each 1°C increase in annual average SST, which is even greater than what was found by Lough and Barnes for Porites corals. In another important study, McNeil et al. (2004) used a coupled atmosphere-ice-ocean carbon cycle model to calculate annual mean SST increases within the world's current coral reef habitat from 1995 to 2100 for increases in the air's CO2 concentration specified by the IPCC's IS92a scenario, after which concomitant changes in coral reef calcification rates were estimated by combining the output of the climate model with empirical relationships between coral calcification rate and (1) aragonite saturation state (the negative CO2 effect) and (2) annual SST (the positive temperature effect). Their choice for the first of these two relationships was that derived by Langdon et al. (2000), which leads to an even greater reduction in calcification than was predicted in the study of Kleypas et al. Their choice for the second relationship was that derived by Lough and Barnes (2000), which leads to an increase in calcification that is only half as large as that derived by Carricart-Ganivet (2004). As a result, it can be appreciated that the net result of the two phenomena was doubly weighted in favor of reduced coral calcification. Nevertheless, McNeil et al. found that the increase in coral reef calcification associated with ocean warming far outweighed the decrease associated with the CO2-induced decrease in aragonite saturate state. In fact, they calculated that coral calcification in 2100 would be 35% higher than what it was in pre-industrial times at the very least. And, of course, they found that the area of coral reef habitat expands in association with the projected ocean warming. Finally, in a study devoted to corals that involves a much longer period of time than all of the others we have discussed, another research team (Crabbe et al., 2006) determined the original growth rates of long-dead Quaternary corals found in limestone deposits of islands in the Wakatobi Marine National Park of Indonesia, after which they compared them to the growth rates of present-day corals of the same genera living in the same area. This work revealed that the Quaternary corals grew “in a comparable environment to modern reefs” -- except, of course, for the air’s CO2 concentration, which is currently higher than it has been at any other time throughout the entire Quaternary, which spans the past 1.8 million years. Most interestingly, therefore, their measurements indicated that the radial growth rates of the modern corals were 31% greater than those of their ancient predecessors in the case of Porites species, and 34% greater in the case of Favites species.

#### Acidification doesn’t hurt ocean life

Idso et al 08 [Research Physicist with the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Agricultural Research Service, Vice President of the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change with a PhD in Botany, former Director of Environmental Science at Peabody Energy in St. Louis, Missouri and is a member of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, American Geophysical Union, American Meteorological Society, Arizona-Nevada Academy of Sciences, Association of American Geographers, Ecological Society of America, and The Honor Society of Phi Kappa Phi [11-26, CO2 Science, Ocean Acidification and Jellyfish Abundance, Vol. 11, No. 48 (<http://www.co2science.org/articles/V11/N48/EDIT.php>)]

In a paper recently published in Limnology and Oceanography, Richardson and Gibbons (2008) say there has been a drop of 0.1 pH unit in the global ocean since the start of the Industrial Revolution, and that "such acidification of the ocean may make calcification more difficult for calcareous organisms," resulting in the "opening [of] ecological space for non-calcifying species." In line with this thinking, they report that Attrill et al. (2007) have argued that "jellyfish may take advantage of the vacant niches made available by the negative effects of acidification on calcifying plankton," causing jellyfish to become more abundant; and they note that the latter researchers provided some evidence for this effect in the west-central North Sea over the period 1971-1995. Hence, they undertook a study to see if Attrill et al.'s findings (which were claimed to be the first of their kind) could be replicated on a much larger scale. Working with data from a larger portion of the North Sea, as well as throughout most of the much vaster Northeast Atlantic Ocean, Richardson and Gibbons used coelenterate (jellyfish) records from the Continuous Plankton Recorder (CPR) and pH data from the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) for the period 1946-2003 to explore the possibility of a relationship between jellyfish abundance and acidic ocean conditions. This work revealed that there were, as they describe it, "no significant relationships between jellyfish abundance and acidic conditions in any of the regions investigated." In harmony with their findings, the two researchers note that "no observed declines in the abundance of calcifiers with lowering pH have yet been reported." In addition, they write that the "larvae of sea urchins form skeletal parts comprising magnesium-bearing calcite, which is 30 times more soluble than calcite without magnesium," and, therefore, that "lower ocean pH should drastically inhibit [our italics] the formation of these soluble calcite precursors." Yet they report "there is no observable negative effect of pH." In fact, they say that echinoderm larvae in the North Sea have actually exhibited "a 10-fold increase [our italics] in recent times," which they say has been "linked predominantly to warming (Kirby et al., 2007)." Likewise, they further note that even in the most recent IPCC report, "there was no empirical evidence reported for the effect of acidification on marine biological systems (Rosenzweig et al., 2007)," in spite of all the concern that has been raised by climate alarmists claiming that such is, or should be, occurring. In light of this body of real-world evidence, or non-evidence, Richardson and Gibbons conclude (rather generously, we might add) that "the role of pH in structuring zooplankton communities in the North Sea and further afield at present is tenuous."

#### Coral species are highly resilient – they can adapt

Idso et al 08 Research Physicist with the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Agricultural Research Service, Vice President of the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change with a PhD in Botany, former Director of Environmental Science at Peabody Energy in St. Louis, Missouri and is a member of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, American Geophysical Union, American Meteorological Society, Arizona-Nevada Academy of Sciences, Association of American Geographers, Ecological Society of America, and The Honor Society of Phi Kappa Phi [9-24, High-Temperature Tolerance in Corals, Vol. 11, No. 39 (<http://www.co2science.org/articles/V11/N39/EDIT.php>)]

As for the significance of these and other observations, the Australian scientists say that "the range in bleaching tolerances among corals inhabiting different thermal realms suggests that at least some coral symbioses have the ability to adapt to much higher temperatures than they currently experience in the central Great Barrier Reef," citing the work of Coles and Brown (2003) and Riegl (1999, 2002). In addition, they note that "even within reefs there is a significant variability in bleaching susceptibility for many species (Edmunds, 1994; Marshall and Baird, 2000), suggesting some potential for a shift in thermal tolerance based on selective mortality (Glynn et al., 2001; Jimenez et al., 2001) and local population growth alone." Above and beyond that, however, they say that their results additionally suggest "a capacity for acclimatization or adaptation." In concluding their paper, Maynard et al. say "there is emerging evidence of high genetic structure within coral species (Ayre and Hughes, 2004)," which suggests, in their words, that "the capacity for adaptation could be greater than is currently recognized." Indeed, as we note in our Editorial of 20 February 2008, quoting Skelly et al. (2007), "on the basis of the present knowledge of genetic variation in performance traits and species' capacity for evolutionary response, it can be concluded that evolutionary change will often occur concomitantly with changes in climate as well as other environmental changes." Consequently, it can be appreciated that if global warming were to start up again (it has been in abeyance for about the last decade), it need not spell the end for earth's highly adaptable corals.

### Agriculture

#### Rice yields doubled with an increase in CO2 concentration

Carter et al 11 [Dr. Robert M. Carter is a stratigrapher and marine geologist with degrees from the University of Otago (New Zealand) and the University of Cambridge (England)., Dr. Craig D. Idso is the founder and chairman of the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change, Dr. S. Fred Singer is one of the most distinguished atmospheric physicists in the U.S. He established and served as the first director of the U.S. Weather Satellite Service, now part of the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and earned a U.S. Department of Commerce Gold Medal Award for his technical leadership. “Climate Change Reconsidered – 2011 Interim Report of the Nongovernmental International Panel on Climate Change” <http://www.nipccreport.org/reports/2011/pdf/2011NIPCCinterimreport.pdf>, Chetan]

In much the same vein, Yang et al. (2009) declared, ―rice is unequivocally one of the most important food crops that feed the largest proportion of the world‘s population,‖ that ―the demand for rice production will continue to increase in the coming decades, especially in the major rice-consuming countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America,‖ and that ―accurate predictions of rice yield and of the ability of rice crops to adapt to high CO2 environments are therefore crucial for understanding the impact of climate change on the future food supply.‖ In fact, they forcefully state—and rightly— that ―there is a pressing need to identify genotypes which could optimize harvestable yield as atmospheric CO2 increases.‖ They set out to do that in a standard paddy culture free-air CO2 enrichment (FACE) experiment conducted at Yangzhou, Jiangsu, China over the period 2004–2006. The team of eight researchers grew a two-line inter-subspecific hybrid rice variety (Liangyoupeijiu) at ambient and elevated atmospheric CO2 concentrations of 376 and 568 ppm, respectively, at two levels of field nitrogen (N) application: low N (12.5 g N m -2 ) and high N (25 g N m -2 ), measuring numerous aspects of crop growth, development, and final yield production in the process. The Chinese scientists found the 51 percent increase in atmospheric CO2 concentration employed in their study increased the final grain yield of the low N rice crop by 28 percent and that of the high N rice crop by 32 percent. As a result, and ―compared with the two prior rice FACE experiments (Kim et al., 2003; Yang et al., 2006),‖ they state, ―hybrid rice appears to profit much more from CO2 enrichment than inbred rice cultivars (c. +13 percent).‖ Yang et al. describe Liangyoupeijiu as ―one of the most popular ‗super‘ hybrid rice varieties in China (Peng et al., 2004),‖ and it appears it will become increasingly ―super‖ as the air‘s CO2 content continues to rise, helping China to lead the way in future food production.

#### Warming will enhance global vegetation and biomass production

Carter et al 11 [Dr. Robert M. Carter is a stratigrapher and marine geologist with degrees from the University of Otago (New Zealand) and the University of Cambridge (England)., Dr. Craig D. Idso is the founder and chairman of the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change, Dr. S. Fred Singer is one of the most distinguished atmospheric physicists in the U.S. He established and served as the first director of the U.S. Weather Satellite Service, now part of the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and earned a U.S. Department of Commerce Gold Medal Award for his technical leadership. “Climate Change Reconsidered – 2011 Interim Report of the Nongovernmental International Panel on Climate Change” <http://www.nipccreport.org/reports/2011/pdf/2011NIPCCinterimreport.pdf>, Chetan]

The three scientists report that for the totality of terrestrial plants included in their analysis, ―warming significantly increased biomass by 12.3%‖ and there was a ―significantly greater stimulation of woody (+26.7%) than herbaceous species (+5.2%).‖ They also found the warming effects on plant biomass production ―did not change with mean annual precipitation or experimental duration‖ and ―other treatments, including CO2 enrichment, nitrogen addition, drought, and water addition, did not alter warming responses of plant biomass.‖ Given such findings, the Chinese researchers conclude, ―results in this and previous meta-analyses (Arft et al., 1999; Rustad et al., 2001; Dormann and Woodin, 2002; Walker et al., 2006) have revealed that warming generally increases terrestrial plant biomass, indicating enhanced terrestrial carbon uptake via plant growth and net primary productivity.‖ Thus, we can logically expect that (1) the ongoing rise in the air‘s CO2 content will soften its own tendency to increase global temperatures, while simultaneously (2) enhancing Earth‘s terrestrial vegetation with greater growth rates and biomass production, both in the agricultural arena and throughout the planet‘s many natural ecosystems

### 1NC Straight of Hormuz

#### No closure – economic importance and self-preservation prevents escalation.

**Dadsetan**, 1/24/**2012** (Andysheh – research intern for the Defense-Industrial Initiative Group, Iran’s Defense Posture: Not So Dire Straits, Center for Strategic and International Studies, p. http://csis.org/blog/irans-defense-posture-not-so-dire-straits)

Iran’s history of threats and coercion dovetails with their military production and deterrence policies. It is very doubtful that Iran will actually close the Strait themselves, though the Islamic Republic has many contingencies in place should the West make the first move. In fact, for Iran to block the Strait would ultimately create greater economic strife within the already-embattled Republic; an estimated $73 billion in annual revenue comes from oil sales, making up 50 percent of the national budget and 80 percent of Iran’s exports. With a large portion passing through the Strait of Hormuz, the closure of the strait would cause just as significant, if not more, damage to the Islamic Republic than to the global oil markets and is likely to foment greater domestic unrest and shake the already weak Iranian economy. This should be placed within the context of Iran’s overall military structure and doctrine, which reveals a country that has learned to concentrate more on self-preservation than power projection. If Iran cut itself off from oil revenue, essentially its lifeblood, it would cause greater harm to the Iranian establishment than the current sanctions alone. As more countries sign up to sanction Iran, however, the Islamic Republic will find itself in an economic crisis and will likely return to negotiating before committing regime suicide. Despite some critics who see the sanctions as a clear sign of a policy of regime change, the western states have openly declared their intentions of returning to negotiations and inviting Iran to make the first overture toward restoring diplomacy. The threat to close the Strait of Hormuz is just one in a long line of wild claims and misrepresentation by Iranian officials. The military buildup and use of asymmetric naval forces ties into a larger diplomatic strategy, with greater utility in future negotiations rather than in a face-off with western nations. With prudent planning and cooperation with the international community, the United States’ heightened sanctions may avoid a military conflict – in spite of Iranian coercion – and prove to be among the most effective policy tool for putting the squeeze on this bellicose regime.

#### No oil shock impact – adaption and alternate routes.

Wall Street Journal, 12/28/**2011** (Strait of Hormuz Closure May Not Be Oil’s Doomsday, p. http://blogs.wsj.com/dispatch/2011/12/28/strait-of-hormuz-closure-may-not-be-oils-doomsday/)

Now crude markets are rattled again by repeated warnings by Tehran that it could block the Strait of Hormuz—a narrow corridor through which one-third of the world’s seaborne oil exports transits—in case sanctions escalate into a de facto embargo. Yet, even such a scenario may not end up with the doomsday climax it may appear at first blush—as there would be plenty of ways to mitigate it. For idle oil traders, toying with oil-supply disruptions in the Persian Gulf has turned into a favorite pastime during numb holiday periods—a bit like watching characters playing ping pong with cannon balls in a Looney Tunes cartoon. A recent report alleging Iran is building nuclear weapons has led to speculation the fuse could soon be lit—either by a preemptive Iranian blockade of the strait or an airstrike by the U.S. or Israel. With the euro zone seemingly on the brink, most oil consumers don’t find the prospect amusing. But even if one assumes such a scenario were to materialize, it may not be the disaster movie oil markets expect. For one, Gulf oil’s stakeholders have gone through similar turmoil before—and they have now developed an impressive toolbox to cope with the risk. For instance, the called “tanker war” between Iran and Iraq led the U.S. to protect third-party oil vessels and, wary of further unrest, Washington has since heavily expanded its naval presence in the region. Iran doesn’t have the firepower to match and that may limit its chances to close the strait. Tehran may only be able to block the strait for a short period, according to Kevin Liu, a director at U.K. risk consultancy Exclusive Analysis. “Iran has the capability to disrupt shipping in the strait for up to a few weeks but its relative military weakness means it could not block traffic indefinitely,” he wrote in a recent report. Neither is the strait the only way to ship oil from the Gulf. Arab sheikdoms could still divert some of their crude through onshore pipelines going to the Red Sea or Oman. Releases from strategic stockpiles—set up after an earlier disruption due to a 1973 embargo also emanating from the Gulf—could also act as a buffer.

### 2NC Straight of Hormuz – No Closure

#### Iran won’t close the strait – exports make up 50% of Iran’s budget and would collapse its economy. Iran is using threats to gain diplomatic concessions. That’s Dadsetan 2012.

#### Tankers are immune to attacks and U.S. superiority prevents closure.

**Thompson**, 12/28/**2011** (Mark – Pulitzer Prize-winner, covers national security for Time , Can Iran Close the Strait of Hormuz, Times, p. http://battleland.blogs.time.com/2011/12/28/can-iran-close-the-strait-of-hormuz/)

History offers some guidance. In the 1980s, the “tanker wars” between Iran and Iraq in the Persian Gulf – which led to 544 attacks and 400 civilians killed over eight years – the oil flow dropped by 25% before returning to normal levels. Insurances rates also would rise – perhaps from a penny to $6 a barrel, Mills estimates – a steep hike in insurance premiums, but not that much when tacked on to a $100 barrel of oil. “Despite the increased risk,” Mills notes, “history shows us that insurance will remain available at a reasonable rate for the value of the cargo shipped.” Iran has scant chance of covertly mining the strait, U.S. military officers say. Small boats or anti-ship missiles would make more military sense. But Iran’s trio of Russian-built Kilo-class submarines, as well as a dozen smaller subs, would be vulnerable to U.S. anti-submarine warfare. “The (U.S.) Navy,” Mills wrote, “would be eager to permanently eliminate the Iranian submarine threat in a naval conflict.” And attacks Iran launched against tankers aren’t guaranteed to work. “Most tankers today are of newer, double-hulled designs; coupled with internal compartmentalization, this tends to limit damage from an explosion,” Mills’ study said. “There are relatively few areas of vital machinery that could disable the vessel if damaged, and much of the vital machinery is underwater.” But what about all that oil? “The crude oil they carry tends to absorb and dissipate the shock caused by an explosion, reducing the effectiveness of the warhead,” Mills wrote. “And the crude oil is not very flammable, reducing the chance of fire or secondary explosion.”

#### Even if Iran succeeds, it will be for too short of a period.

**Thompson**, 12/28/**2011** (Mark – Pulitzer Prize-winner, covers national security for Time , Can Iran Close the Strait of Hormuz, Times, p. http://battleland.blogs.time.com/2011/12/28/can-iran-close-the-strait-of-hormuz/)

“While closing the Strait may be possible for Iran for a short period of time, the U.S. military would prevail in a conflict with Iran in order to re-open the Strait at a great cost to the Iranian armed forces,” Brenna Schnars wrote in a 2010 study at the Naval Postgraduate School. “With international mistrust concerning the Iranian nuclear program already at the height of world concerns, an Iranian closure of the Strait would only enrage the majority of the international community, as their economies would severely suffer without its oil imports from the Persian Gulf.” U.S. Navy Commander Rodney Mills examined the military implications of an Iranian move to shut the strait in a 2008 study at the Naval War College. His bottom line: There is consensus among the analysts that the U.S. military would ultimately prevail over Iranian forces if Iran sought to close the strait. The various scenarios and assumptions used in the analyses produce a range of potential timelines for this action, from the optimistic assessment that the straits would be open in a few days to the more pessimistic assessment that it would take five weeks to three months to restore the full flow of maritime traffic.

#### Chinese interests prevent closure.

**Singh**, 1/3/**2012** (Michael – managing director of the Washington Institute, The Real Iranian Threat in the Gulf, Foreign Policy, p. [www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC06.php?CID=1789](http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC06.php?CID=1789))

China, on the other hand, would find its oil supplies significantly threatened by an Iranian move against the Strait. China's most significant oil supplier is Saudi Arabia. China also happens, however, to be Iran's primary oil customer and perhaps its most important ally: Beijing provides Iran with its most sophisticated weaponry and with diplomatic cover at the United Nations. Thus a move to close the Strait would backfire strategically by harming the interests of -- and likely alienating -- Iran's most important patron and cutting off Iran's own economic lifeline, while doing little to imperil U.S. supplies of crude.

#### Hormuz is resilient to attacks.

**Luttwak 7** (Edward, Senior Associate – Center for Strategic and International Studies, “The Middle of Nowhere”, Prospect, 5-26, http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/2007/05/themiddleofnowhere/)

Arab-Israeli catastrophism is wrong twice over, first because the conflict is contained within rather narrow boundaries, and second because the Levant is just not that important any more. The second repeated mistake is the Mussolini syndrome. Contemporary documents prove beyond any doubt what is now hard to credit: serious people, including British and French military chiefs, accepted Mussolini’s claims to great power status because they believed that he had serious armed forces at his command. His army divisions, battleships and air squadrons were dutifully counted to assess Italian military power, making some allowance for their lack of the most modern weapons but not for their more fundamental refusal to fight in earnest. Having conceded Ethiopia to win over Mussolini, only to lose him to Hitler as soon as the fighting started, the British discovered that the Italian forces quickly crumbled in combat. It could not be otherwise, because most Italian soldiers were unwilling conscripts from the one-mule peasantry of the south or the almost equally miserable sharecropping villages of the north. Exactly the same mistake keeps being made by the fraternity of middle east experts. They persistently attribute real military strength to backward societies whose populations can sustain excellent insurgencies but not modern military forces. In the 1960s, it was Nasser’s Egypt that was mistaken for a real military power just because it had received many aircraft, tanks and guns from the Soviet Union, and had many army divisions and air squadrons. In May 1967, on the eve of war, many agreed with the prediction of Field Marshal Montgomery, then revisiting the El Alamein battlefield, that the Egyptians would defeat the Israelis forthwith; even the more cautious never anticipated that the former would be utterly defeated by the latter in just a few days. In 1973, with much more drama, it still took only three weeks to reach the same outcome. In 1990 it was the turn of Iraq to be hugely overestimated as a military power. Saddam Hussein had more equipment than Nasser ever accumulated, and could boast of having defeated much more populous Iran after eight years of war. In the months before the Gulf war, there was much anxious speculation about the size of the Iraqi army—again, the divisions and regiments were dutifully counted as if they were German divisions on the eve of D-day, with a separate count of the “elite” Republican Guards, not to mention the “super-elite” Special Republican Guards—and it was feared that Iraq’s bombproof aircraft shelters and deep bunkers would survive any air attack. Now the Mussolini syndrome is at work over Iran. All the symptoms are present, including tabulated lists of Iran’s warships, despite the fact that most areover 30 years old; of combat aircraft, many of which (F-4s, Mirages, F-5s, F-14s) have not flown in years for lack of spare parts; and of divisions and brigades that are so only in name. There are awed descriptions of the Pasdaran revolutionary guards, inevitably described as “elite,” who do indeed strut around as if they have won many a war, but who have actually fought only one—against Iraq, which they lost. As for Iran’s claim to have defeated Israel by Hizbullah proxy in last year’s affray, the publicity was excellent but the substance went the other way, with roughly 25 per cent of the best-trained men dead, which explains the tomb-like silence and immobility of the once rumbustious Hizbullah ever since the ceasefire. It is true enough that if Iran’s nuclear installations are bombed in some overnight raid, there is likely to be some retaliation, but we live in fortunate times in which we have only the irritant of terrorism instead of world wars to worry about—and Iran’s added contribution is not likely to leave much of an impression. There may be good reasons for not attacking Iran’s nuclear sites—including the very slow and uncertain progress of its uranium enrichment effort—but its ability to strike back is not one of them. Even the seemingly fragile tanker traffic down the Gulf and through the straits of Hormuz is not as vulnerable as it seems—Iran and Iraq have both tried to attack it many times without much success, and this time the US navy stands ready to destroy any airstrip or jetty from which attacks are launched.

### 2NC Straight of Hormuz – Adaptation

#### Tankers and oil traders will adapt – they have risk management tools and alternate routes such as pipelines through the Red Sea. It would be impossible for Iran to shut them out. That’s WSJ 2011.

#### Iran cannot stop tankers from going through the Strait. History is on our side.

**Gholz**, September/October **2009** (Eugene – associate professor of Public Affairs at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, The Strait Dope, Foreign Policy, p. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/08/12/the\_strait\_dope)

But the conventional wisdom may be wrong. Regardless of how we assess the credibility of Iran's threats, we should also assess Iran's capabilities. Iranian military exercises apparently emphasize three weapons in the strait: small suicide boats, mobile antiship cruise missiles, and sophisticated sea mines. Using these tools, how hard would it be for Iran to disrupt the flow of oil? The answer turns out to be: very hard. Iran would have to disable many of the 20 tankers that traverse the strait each day -- and then sustain the effort. Iran cannot rely on the psychological effects of a few hits. Historically, after a short panic, commercial shippers adapt rather than give up lucrative trips, even against much more effective blockades than Iran could muster today. Shippers didn't stop trying during World War I. Nor did the oil trade in the Gulf seize up during the 1980s Tanker War, when both Iraq and Iran targeted oil exports. Instead, tankers tend to move around dangers. The strait is deep enough that even laden supertankers can pass safely through a 20-mile width of good water, not just the 4-mile-wide official channel. Tankers already take other routes when it is convenient; during a conflict, they would surely scatter, as they did in the 1980s. Although the strait is narrow compared with the open ocean, it is still broad enough to complicate Iran's effort to identify targets for suicide and missile attacks. The area is too large to cover with a field of modern mines dense enough to disable a substantial number of tankers, especially given Iran's limited stockpile. What's more, tankers are hard to damage with mines or the small warheads on modern missiles. And a big ship pushes a tremendous amount of water out of its way when it is moving; tankers' bow waves would fend off most small boats attempting suicide attacks. Terrorists hit the USS Cole and the Limburg because their targets were stopped. Surprisingly, oil tankers also do not burn well. They generally have too much fuel and not enough oxygen to sustain a blaze. Only a tiny fraction of their bulk contains sensitive equipment that, if damaged, would disable the ship. The suicide attack on the Limburg was a lucky shot that hit a boundary between a full cargo cell and an empty one full of air, so the fuel-air mixture caught fire. Even so, three days later, the ship was able to move under its own power, and after repairs, it returned to the global tanker fleet. Over five years of the Iran-Iraq War, 150 large oil tankers were hit with antiship cruise missiles, but only about a quarter were disabled. So what? By presuming that Iran can easily close the strait, Western diplomats concede leverage, and the current U.S. habit of reacting immediately and aggressively to Iranian provocations risks unnecessary escalation. Iran would find it so difficult, if not impossible, to close the strait that the world can afford to relax from its current hair-trigger alert.

### 2NC Middle East War

#### Stability comparatively outweighs motives to go to war

Fettweis 7 (Christopher J., Assistant Professor of National Security Affairs in the National Security Decision

Making Department – US Naval War College, “On the Consequences of Failure in Iraq,” Survival, 49(4), p. 83-98)

Without the US presence, a second argument goes, nothing would prevent Sunni–Shia violence from sweeping into every country where the religious divide exists. A Sunni bloc with centres in Riyadh and Cairo might face a Shia bloc headquartered in Tehran, both of which would face enormous pressure from their own people to fight proxy wars across the region. In addition to intraMuslim civil war, cross-border warfare could not be ruled out. Jordan might be the first to send troops into Iraq to secure its own border; once the dam breaks, Iran, Turkey, Syria and Saudi Arabia might follow suit. The Middle East has no shortage of rivalries, any of which might descend into direct conflict after a destabilising US withdrawal. In the worst case, Iran might emerge as the regional hegemon, able to bully and blackmail its neighbours with its new nuclear arsenal. Saudi Arabia and Egypt would soon demand suitable deterrents of their own, and a nuclear arms race would envelop the region. Once again, however, none of these outcomes is particularly likely. Wider war No matter what the outcome in Iraq, the region is not likely to devolve into chaos. Although it might seem counter-intuitive, by most traditional measures the Middle East is very stable. Continuous, uninterrupted governance is the norm, not the exception; most Middle East regimes have been in power for decades. Its monarchies, from Morocco to Jordan to every Gulf state, have generally been in power since these countries gained independence. In Egypt Hosni Mubarak has ruled for almost three decades, and Muammar Gadhafi in Libya for almost four. The region’s autocrats have been more likely to die quiet, natural deaths than meet the hangman or post-coup firing squads. Saddam’s rather unpredictable regime, which attacked its neighbours twice, was one of the few exceptions to this pattern of stability, and he met an end unusual for the modern Middle East. Its regimes have survived potentially destabilising shocks before, and they would be likely to do so again. The region actually experiences very little cross-border warfare, and even less since the end of the Cold War. Saddam again provided an exception, as did the Israelis, with their adventures in Lebanon. Israel fought four wars with neighbouring states in the first 25 years of its existence, but none in the 34 years since. Vicious civil wars that once engulfed Lebanon and Algeria have gone quiet, and its ethnic conflicts do not make the region particularly unique. The biggest risk of an American withdrawal is intensified civil war in Iraq rather than regional conflagration. Iraq’s neighbours will likely not prove eager to fight each other to determine who gets to be the next country to spend itself into penury propping up an unpopular puppet regime next door. As much as the Saudis and Iranians may threaten to intervene on behalf of their coreligionists, they have shown no eagerness to replace the counter-insurgency role that American troops play today. If the United States, with its remarkable military and unlimited resources, could not bring about its desired solutions in Iraq, why would any other country think it could do so?17 Common interest, not the presence of the US military, provides the ultimate foundation for stability. All ruling regimes in the Middle East share a common (and understandable) fear of instability. It is the interest of every actor – the Iraqis, their neighbours and the rest of the world – to see a stable, functioning government emerge in Iraq. If the United States were to withdraw, increased regional cooperation to address that common interest is far more likely than outright warfare.

#### Err Neg – their authors exaggerate

Luttwak 7 (Edward, Senior Associate – Center for Strategic and International Studies, “The Middle of Nowhere”, Prospect Magazine, May, http://www.prospect-magazine.co.uk/article\_details.php?id=9302)

Why are middle east experts so unfailingly wrong? The lesson of history is that men never learn from history, but middle east experts, like the rest of us, should at least learn from their past mistakes. Instead, they just keep repeating them. The first mistake is "five minutes to midnight" catastrophism. The late King Hussein of Jordan was the undisputed master of this genre. Wearing his gravest aspect, he would warn us that with patience finally exhausted the Arab-Israeli conflict was about to explode, that all past conflicts would be dwarfed by what was about to happen unless, unless… And then came the remedy—usually something rather tame when compared with the immense catastrophe predicted, such as resuming this or that stalled negotiation, or getting an American envoy to the scene to make the usual promises to the Palestinians and apply the usual pressures on Israel. We read versions of the standard King Hussein speech in countless newspaper columns, hear identical invocations in the grindingly repetitive radio and television appearances of the usual middle east experts, and are now faced with Hussein's son Abdullah periodically repeating his father's speech almost verbatim. What actually happens at each of these "moments of truth"—and we may be approaching another one—is nothing much; only the same old cyclical conflict which always restarts when peace is about to break out, and always dampens down when the violence becomes intense enough. The ease of filming and reporting out of safe and comfortable Israeli hotels inflates the media coverage of every minor affray. But humanitarians should note that the dead from Jewish-Palestinian fighting since 1921 amount to fewer than 100,000—about as many as are killed in a season of conflict in Darfur.

#### Empirically denied

Yglesisas 7 (Matthew, Associate Editor – Atlantic Monthly, “Containing Iraq”, The Atlantic, 9-12,

http://matthewyglesias.theatlantic.com/archives/2007/09/containing\_iraq.php)

Kevin Drum tries to [throw some water](http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/archives/individual/2007_09/012050.php) on the "Middle East in Flames" theory holding that American withdrawal from Iraq will lead not only to a short-term intensification of fighting in Iraq, but also to some kind of broader regional conflagration. Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay, as usual sensible but several clicks to my right, also [make this point briefly](http://www.democracyjournal.org/article.php?ID=6555) in Democracy: "Talk that Iraq’s troubles will trigger a regional war is overblown; **none** of the **half-dozen** civil wars the Middle East has witnessed over the past half-century led to a regional conflagration." Also worth mentioning in this context is the basic point that the Iranian and Syrian militaries just aren't able to conduct meaningful offensive military operations. The Saudi, Kuwait, and Jordanian militaries are even worse. The IDF has plenty of Arabs to fight closer to home. What you're looking at, realistically, is that our allies in Kurdistan might provide safe harbor to PKK guerillas, thus prompting our allies in Turkey to mount some cross-border military strikes against the PKK or possibly retaliatory ones against other Kurdish targets. This is a real problem, but it's obviously not a problem that's mitigated by having the US Army try to act as the Baghdad Police Department or sending US Marines to wander around the desert hunting a [possibly mythical](http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2007/0710.tilghman.html) terrorist organization.

#### Mideast escalation is exaggerated

Luttwak 7 (Edward, Senior Associate – Center for Strategic and International Studies, “The Middle of Nowhere”, Prospect, 5-26, http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/2007/05/themiddleofnowhere/)

Arab-Israeli catastrophism is wrong twice over, first because the conflict is contained within rather narrow boundaries, and second because the Levant is just not that important any more. The second repeated mistake is the Mussolini syndrome. Contemporary documents prove beyond any doubt what is now hard to credit: serious people, including British and French military chiefs, accepted Mussolini’s claims to great power status because they believed that he had serious armed forces at his command. His army divisions, battleships and air squadrons were dutifully counted to assess Italian military power, making some allowance for their lack of the most modern weapons but not for their more fundamental refusal to fight in earnest. Having conceded Ethiopia to win over Mussolini, only to lose him to Hitler as soon as the fighting started, the British discovered that the Italian forces quickly crumbled in combat. It could not be otherwise, because most Italian soldiers were unwilling conscripts from the one-mule peasantry of the south or the almost equally miserable sharecropping villages of the north. Exactly the same mistake keeps being made by the fraternity of middle east experts. They persistently attribute real military strength to backward societies whose populations can sustain excellent insurgencies but not modern military forces. In the 1960s, it was Nasser’s Egypt that was mistaken for a real military power just because it had received many aircraft, tanks and guns from the Soviet Union, and had many army divisions and air squadrons. In May 1967, on the eve of war, many agreed with the prediction of Field Marshal Montgomery, then revisiting the El Alamein battlefield, that the Egyptians would defeat the Israelis forthwith; even the more cautious never anticipated that the former would be utterly defeated by the latter in just a few days. In 1973, with much more drama, it still took only three weeks to reach the same outcome. In 1990 it was the turn of Iraq to be hugely overestimated as a military power. Saddam Hussein had more equipment than Nasser ever accumulated, and could boast of having defeated much more populous Iran after eight years of war. In the months before the Gulf war, there was much anxious speculation about the size of the Iraqi army—again, the divisions and regiments were dutifully counted as if they were German divisions on the eve of D-day, with a separate count of the “elite” Republican Guards, not to mention the “super-elite” Special Republican Guards—and it was feared that Iraq’s bombproof aircraft shelters and deep bunkers would survive any air attack. Now the Mussolini syndrome is at work over Iran. All the symptoms are present, including tabulated lists of Iran’s warships, despite the fact that most areover 30 years old; of combat aircraft, many of which (F-4s, Mirages, F-5s, F-14s) have not flown in years for lack of spare parts; and of divisions and brigades that are so only in name. There are awed descriptions of the Pasdaran revolutionary guards, inevitably described as “elite,” who do indeed strut around as if they have won many a war, but who have actually fought only one—against Iraq, which they lost. As for Iran’s claim to have defeated Israel by Hizbullah proxy in last year’s affray, the publicity was excellent but the substance went the other way, with roughly 25 per cent of the best-trained men dead, which explains the tomb-like silence and immobility of the once rumbustious Hizbullah ever since the ceasefire. It is true enough that if Iran’s nuclear installations are bombed in some overnight raid, there is likely to be some retaliation, but we live in fortunate times in which we have only the irritant of terrorism instead of world wars to worry about—and Iran’s added contribution is not likely to leave much of an impression. There may be good reasons for not attacking Iran’s nuclear sites—including the very slow and uncertain progress of its uranium enrichment effort—but its ability to strike back is not one of them. Even the seemingly fragile tanker traffic down the Gulf and through the straits of Hormuz is not as vulnerable as it seems—Iran and Iraq have both tried to attack it many times without much success, and this time the US navy stands ready to destroy any airstrip or jetty from which attacks are launched.

## 1NR – Politics

### aImpact 2NC

#### DA outweighs the case ---

#### Escalation is highly probable.

**Geller 2005** (Daniel S. – Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science at Wayne State University, The India-Pakistan Conflict: An Enduring Rivalry, Ed. T. V. Paul, p. 99)

In fact, both the May-July 1999 military engagement between India and Pakistan over Kashmir and the crisis of December 2001-June 2002 after the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament mirrored the conflict escalation pattern for nuclear-armed states. Each side initiated troop mobilization and general military alerts, coupled with the evacuation of civilians from border-area villages. However, the outcome of the future confrontations for India and Pakistan may not adhere to the pattern established by other nuclear dyads. Elements are present in this dyad that were largely absent between other nuclear-armed antagonists and that make the escalation of war more probable. Among those factors are the presence of a contiguous border between India and Pakistan, a history of multiple wars, and an ongoing territorial dispute. These factors, among others,79 increase the likelihood that an Indo-Pakistani dispute will turn violent and that the violence will escalate to war irrespective of the presence of nuclear weapons.

#### That escalation has a high probability of being nuclear.

**Raghavan**, Fall-Winter **2001** (Lieutenant General V. R. – former Director General of Military Operations for India, Limited War and Nuclear Escalation in South Asia, The Nonproliferation Review, p. 1)

The status of India and Pakistan as declared nuclear powers with growing nuclear arsenals has raised the risks of a nuclear exchange between them, if the two countries engage in a large military conflict. The political leadership in both countries does not seem to have **fully grasped the implications of nuclear weapons** in relation to the ongoing conflict in Jammu and Kashmir. This conflict could lead to a limited war, as it has triggered three wars in the past. The risks involved in fighting a limited war over the Kashmir issue and the potential for such a war to escalate into a nuclear exchange are at best inadequately understood, and at worst brushed aside as an unlikely possibility. Despite this official stance, however, a close examination of Indian and Pakistani military and nuclear doctrine reveals elements that could contribute to the rapid escalation of a limited war to include nuclear weapons. Strikingly, India and Pakistan have not revealed warfighting doctrines for the post-1998 condition of nuclear weapons readiness. It is not clear, for example, what threats to its security would compel India to declare a state of war with Pakistan. There is also no indication of the circumstances that would induce Pakistan to seek a larger war with India. The political objectives that a limited war might seek to achieve have also not been articulated in official and public discourse in the two countries. This article examines the possibility of limited war between India and Pakistan, and the potential of such a conflict triggering a nuclear war. It examines the considerations that could push each of the two countries to fight a limited war. It discusses how such a war might be waged and the circumstances that would likely precipitate an escalation to a nuclear exchange. The doctrinal beliefs and decisionmaking processes of the two countries are examined to trace the likely escalatory spiral towards a nuclear war. The article concludes that the probability of a nuclear war between India and Pakistan is high in the event the two countries engage in a direct military conflict.

### Turns Case

#### **US Indian relations solves warming and oil dependence**

Scherr 9 (Jacob Sherr, “Director, Global Strategy & Advocacy” at NRDC (National Resources Defense Council) and Bidisha Banerjee, Cameron Speth Fellow, NRDC, “Greening U.S-India Relations”, <http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/jscherr/greening_usindia_relations.html>, July 16, 2009)

Yesterday Hillary Clinton discussed her upcoming trip to India at the Council on Foreign Relations, noting that "external affairs minister Krishna Nai will lay out a broad-based agenda that calls for a whole of government approach to our bilateral relationship." [and] Meera Shankar, the Indian ambassador to the U.S., also recently spoke about the transformation in Indo-U.S. relations. As we observed last month, Hillary is calling for a "dramatic expansion in our common agenda." Because climate change is one of the gravest threats to security of both our nations, cooperation on climate and clean energy should be a central element of this new approach. Clinton said she will be accompanied by Todd Stern, Special Envoy for Climate Change. She plans to visit a LEED-certified building in India, which she called "a perfect example of what India would be capable of doing" to achieve "win-win approaches" to climate change. The Secretary of State is right - and India is already making important strides on climate solutions. India's first LEED Platinum building, the CII-Sohrabhji Green Business Center, was built in Hyderabad in 2003. It was a public-private partnership that included technical assistance from the U.S. Agency for International Development ("USAID"). Most likely, she will visit one of the two LEED Platinum buildings in Gurgaon, near Delhi (Wipro and ITC Green Centre). India has at least fifteen LEED certified buildings, with plans for 1000 buildings by 2012. USAID involvement in kick-starting modern green building in India is a terrific example of the potential for a much higher level of Indo-U.S. green collaboration on climate and clean energy. What other opportunities exist? Our initial recommendations are contained in a letter Peter Lehner, our Executive Director, sent earlier this week to Secretary Clinton. Peter first points out why India has a critical role to play in addressing climate change and outlines what India is already doing to address greenhouse gas emissions: "Currently, India [it] has the second-fastest growing economy in the world, and is the world's fourth-largest emitter of greenhouse gases. Yet, more than 400 million Indians lack access to electricity. The middle-class is projected to grow from 50 million today to over 500 million by 2025. Energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions could skyrocket. Between 1990 and 2005 India's carbon dioxide emissions grew by 65 percent, and they are projected to increase by 70 percent by 2020 under a business-as-usual scenario. At the same time, it is important to recognize that India is already taking significant domestic measures to constrain its emissions. Last year, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh released The National Action Plan on Climate Change, outlining eight core national missions through 2017. For example, the plan sets an ambitious target of 200,000 MW of installed solar capacity by mid-century - which would make India a world leader in solar power. Similarly, India's Bureau of Energy Efficiency has adopted policies including an Energy Conservation Building Code that will reduce India's greenhouse gas emissions 20 percent by 2021 as compared to a business-as-usual trajectory. With support from the US Agency for International Development, the Indian government has launched programs that improve energy efficiency in existing buildings and new municipal buildings. The Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate has also implemented innovative projects in India such as demand side management and renewable energy entrepreneurship. State governments have also taken significant steps, such as Himachal Pradesh and Haryana's programs to distribute free compact fluorescent lights to their residents... Business associations and civil society organizations are also actively encouraging a lower-carbon future in India. The Confederation of Indian Industries (CII) has issued a report, "Building a Low-Carbon Indian Economy," which recommends implementation of domestic measures that would reduce India's greenhouse gas emissions 27 percent below business-as-usual projections by 2030. CII's Green Building Centre was also the first LEED platinum building outside of the US and continues to promote advancements in green building materials. The Energy and Resources Institute (TERI) recently launched Light Up a Billion Lives, a village-based solar lantern program for alternative lighting. The non-profit Development Alternatives promotes innovative biofuels projects to provide electricity to villages. Overall clean energy investment in India increased to $3.7 billion in 2008 with a 12 percent growth from 2007. These sustainable energy investments will also provide more reliable energy services for multinational information technology companies operating in India....." Peter then lists the following opportunities for collaboration that hopefully will be discussed during the Secretary's visit: Support policy and technical collaboration for key missions identified in India's National Action Plan on Climate Change. The key missions include: solar energy power generation; enhanced energy efficiency for all sectors and promoting demand side management; energy efficient urban planning focused on public transportation; water efficiency projects; Himalayan ecosystem protection; sustainable agriculture; and strategic knowledge regarding climate change. Expand and intensify US-India energy dialogue. Currently, the US-India renewable energy working group has met only once. Expanded discussions on energy efficiency, demand side management, and cleaner sources of energy are critical to building a sustainable energy future. Renew and increase funding for USAID's Energy Conservation and Commercialization (ECO-III) program. Through ECO-III many successful energy efficiency projects have been launched in India, including registered LEED green buildings and state implementation programs of the Energy Conservation Building Code. Although funding for the ECO-III program has been considerably reduced, renewed investment in ECO-III and/or successor programs are essential to promote low-carbon growth and international technology and funding transfers. Address energy poverty through deployment of energy efficiency and renewable technology. Black carbon, a component of soot emitted by wood-burning cook stoves and diesel fuel, is a major contributor to climate change globally and constitutes a substantial portion of India's global warming pollution. The wood-diesel fuel mix also drives deforestation and results in severe air pollution, especially for the rural and urban poor. Similarly, these at risk populations are disproportionately affected by both water and energy shortages resulting from inefficient supply systems. Programs such as USAID's water/energy projects should be expanded and include efforts to reduce black carbon, a low-hanging fruit mitigation measure. Cooperate with India to build its climate change institutional capacity. The US should begin now to help build institutional capacity in India to utilize effectively anticipated increases in technology transfer and international financing for climate change mitigation and adaption after the Copenhagen conference. There is an identifiable need to assist the development of measurable baseline emissions and the impact upon emissions from policy measures in India. There is also need for greater cooperation on developing innovative technologies, such as integrated photovoltaic systems, ground source heat pumps, indirect/direct evaporated cooling, and energy efficient data centers. In addition, increased cooperation on science and policy focused on climate health and adaptation to climate impacts are needed given that India's poor are anticipated to be among the hardest hit by projected global warming effects. For example, the US Geological Survey is a leader in mapping and monitoring water scarce resources and could share expertise with Indian hydrologists to identify populations vulnerable to climate change impacts. The letter concludes with the hope "for a transformation of US-India cooperation on climate and clean energy" which will put us on a "path to safer, healthier world."

### Nuclear War Turns Warming

**Nuclear war causes warming**

**Turco et. Al** **08**

Toon: chair of the Dept of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences and a member of the Laboratory for Atmospheric and Space Physics at the University of Colorado @ Boulder. Robock is a Proff of atmospheric science at Rutgers University in New Brunswick, New Jersey. Turco is a professor of atmospheric science at the University of California, Los Angeles, (Owen B. Toon, Alan Robock, and Richard P. Turco, “Environmental consequences of nuclear war,” 2008 American Institute of Physics, December 2008 Physics Today 37-42, http://www.plu.edu/~haykm/332\_Course\_Material/current\_events/NuclearWar.pdf)

Complementary to temperature change is radiative forcing, the change in energy flux. Figure 3b shows how nuclear soot changes the radiative forcing at Earth’s surface and com- pares its effect to those of two well-known phenomena: warming associated with greenhouse gases and the 1991 Mount Pinatubo volcanic eruption, the largest in the 20th century. Since the Industrial Revolution, greenhouse gases have increased the energy flux by 2.5 W/m. The transient forcing from the Pinatubo eruption peaked at about −4 W/m 2 (the minus sign means the flux decreased). One implication of the figure is that even a regional war between India and Pakistan can force the climate to a far greater degree than the greenhouse gases that many fear will alter the climate in the foreseeable future. Of course, the durations of the forcings are different: The radiative forcing by nuclear-weapons-gen- erated soot might persist for a decade, but that from green- house gases is expected to last for a century or more, allow- ing time for the climate system to respond to the forcing. Accordingly, while the Ice Age–like temperatures in figure 3a could lead to an expansion of sea ice and terrestrial snow- pack, they probably would not be persistent enough to cause the buildup of global ice sheets. Agriculture responds to length of growing season, tem- perature during the growing season, light levels, precipita- tion, and other factors. The 1980s saw systematic studies of the agricultural changes expected from a nuclear war, but no such studies have been conducted using modern climate models. Figure 4 presents our calculations of the decrease in length of the growing season—the time between freezing temperatures—for the second summer after the release of soot in a nuclear attack.

Indo pak would obviously draw in ME powers

### U 2NC

#### Immigration reform will pass --- the election has given Obama a mandate and weakened GOP opposition. That’s the 1NC Foley and Stein 1/2 evidence.

#### Prefer our ev because it is predictive and post-dates their evidence.

#### Immigration reform has momentum and a compromise is likely.

**Grant**, **12/28**/2012 (David, Immigration reform: Is 'amnesty' a possibility now?, Christian Science Monitor, p. <http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2012/1228/Immigration-reform-Is-amnesty-a-possibility-now>)

The momentum of President Obama's resounding victory in November's election – with a big push from Latinos and other minority groups – has catapulted immigration policy to the top of Washington's 2013 agenda, making reform not only possible but also likely. The shift in the political conversation has been so dramatic that even a pathway to citizenship for some of the estimated 12 million undocumented immigrants in the United States – long rejected out of hand by most Republicans and some Democrats – could be part of the deal. The task is momentous. It involves weighing the wishes of industries from agriculture to high-tech, as well as the sensitivities of opening the door to immigrant workers at a time when unemployment remains high. The past only reinforces the potential difficulties ahead. In 1986, Republicans felt betrayed when Democrats stripped the enforcement provisions from a bill that offered citizenship to some 3 million illegal immigrants. By 2005, the issue had become so politically toxic to conservatives that they blocked President George W. Bush's push for a new round of immigration reform. Yet with Election 2012 highlighting the electoral consequences of America's changing demographics, the next year appears to be ripe for compromise. How reforms might take shape could be a major point of contention between the parties, but lawmakers on both sides suddenly see an opportunity for what could be their most expansive achievement of 2013.

#### It will pass --- capital is key.

Financial Times, **1/2**/2013 (Fiscal fights threaten US policy goals, p. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/8f8ef804-5501-11e2-a628-00144feab49a.html?ftcamp=published\_links%2Frss%2Fworld%2Ffeed%2F%2Fproduct#axzz2GrNoEPIS)

Of all the issues crowding Mr Obama’s agenda, immigration has the best hope of passing in some form, as the disastrous vote recorded by Republicans among minorities in 2012 gives them a huge incentive to address the issue. But on everything else, with the Republicans remaining in control of the House, Mr Obama needs all the skills of cajoling, seducing and manipulating Congress that he has so far shown no signs of developing. “I find it remarkable that the president apparently continues to believe that he will not have to deal with people that he does not agree with,” said Mr Galston. “A president who is not disdainful of the art of legislating can get things done.”

#### GOP support ensures passage.

Financial Times, **1/2**/2013 (White House builds immigration pact, p. <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/e6b2805c-4ac9-11e2-929d-00144feab49a.html#axzz2GrNoEPIS>)

As they try to avoid further alienating the US’s fastest growing demographic, Republicans are eager to deal with the issue of immigration reform and get it off the table before the 2014 midterm elections. That could help its passage through Congress and help repair relations following Mr Romney’s presidential bid. “This was a big mistake from the start of the Republican primaries, when the candidates had very ugly positions and antagonised Latinos,” said Alfonso Aguilar, executive director of the Latino Partnership for Conservative Principles and an influential Republican voice on immigration. “Now we’ve got to get back to the principles of George W. Bush and reclaim this issue,” he said, referring to the former president’s relatively open approach to immigration. In a Latino Decisions poll taken on the eve of the election, 31 per cent said they would be more likely to vote Republican if the Republican party took a leadership role in supporting comprehensive immigration reform with an eventual pathway to citizenship for undocumented immigrants.

### U – AT: Thumpers (Generic)\*\*\*

#### Prefer issue specific uniqueness --- our Foley and Stein evidence assumes their thumper and predicts that Obama still has enough capital to push immigration reform.

#### It’s at the top of the docket.

**Weber**, **1/1**/2013 (Joseph, Guns, immigration, fiscal issues emerge as top priorities for Obama, new Congress, Fox News, p. <http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/01/01/gun-control-immigration-reform-fiscal-issues-emerge-as-top-issues-for-new/>)

But in the near term, immigration legislation appears to be high on the docket in the next Congress and second Obama administration term. Washington has tried for years to change the country's immigration policy -- to strengthen border security and stem the flow of illegal immigrants into the U.S.; to reform the visa system for the benefit of those legal immigrants following the rules; and figure out how to address the millions of illegal immigrants already here. Legislative efforts by Democrats and Republicans on comprehensive immigration reform had reached a standstill -- until the issue re-emerged during this election cycle when Obama suspended deportation for many young immigrants brought to the U.S. illegally by their parents. Republicans have since signaled their intentions to be the first to introduce and pass more comprehensive legislation to deal with the roughly 11 million illegal immigrants in the United States, especially after Obama won re-election with roughly 71 percent of the Hispanic vote. However, Obama appeared to re-stake his turf Sunday, saying he would introduce legislation next year to fix “our broken immigration system.”

### U – AT: Fiscal Cliff Thumper

#### Immigration reform is at the top of the docket.

**Estes**, **1/2**/2013 (Adam Clark, Obama’s Push for Immigration Reform Starts Now, p. http://www.theatlanticwire.com/politics/2013/01/obamas-push-immigration-reform-starts-now/60525/)

Everybody knew that Obama was going to tackle immigration reform in his second term. We just didn't know how soon. Well, the word is out, and it's good news for anybody eager for lawmakers to tackle an issue that's troubled the country for years. Obama will take on immigration reform this month. A fresh report from The Huffington Post's Elise Foley and Sam Stein quotes anonymous administration officials and Democratic aides in explaining that the president is going to move fast on immigration reform, as well as gun control, and advocates couldn't be happier. None of this is a tremendous surprise, though the expedited timeline is sort of curious. Obama's been talking about sweeping immigration since he took office and, at least until 2009, has left many guessing if and when that's going to happen. He made progress last year when he kept 800,000 young people who had been brought to the United States illegally as children from being deported, making a DREAM Act-like policy initiative as the DREAM Act itself floundered in Congress. Immigration remained an issue through the election, and almost as soon as Obama won his second term, whispers of a renewed push for immigration reform started, though the White House vowed to deal with the fiscal cliff first. Obama then reiterated his commitment to tackle immigration soon on his Meet the Press appearance last weekend. With a fiscal cliff deal (sort of) sealed, it would appear it's immigration time, and details about how the president will handle the challenge are trickling out. Stein and Foley say that California congresswoman Zoe Lofgren will lead the Democratic effort in the House and pushes back at the idea that House Speaker John Boehner will be able to stonewall the effort. "In the end, immigration reform is going to depend very much on whether Speaker Boehner wants to do it or not," she said. Democrats will inevitably have to navigate more than Boehner's will, but some say that the challenge of the fiscal cliff has Capitol Hill ready for some easier negotiations. Or as one pro-immigration reform executive told HuffPost, "The chance to legislate through regular order on immigration reform might have leaders in both parties working together and singing 'Kumbaya.'"

#### Immigration is before economic issues.

**York**, **1/2**/2013 (Byron, For Obama, the Economy Never Comes First, Town Hall, p. http://townhall.com/columnists/byronyork/2013/01/02/for-obama-the-economy-never-comes-first-n1477781)

Many Republicans have accused Barack Obama of ignoring the economy. That's not true. The problem with Obama is not that he has ignored the economy, but that it was never his top priority in his first term as president, even as millions of Americans suffered the consequences of a devastating economic downturn. Now, with many still struggling, we know the economy won't be Obama's top concern in his second term, either. On “Meet the Press” on Sunday, when the president was asked to name his top priority for the next four years, he first listed immigration reform. “That's something we should get done,” Obama said. The economy came after that, as the president continued: “The second thing that we've got to do is to stabilize the economy and make sure it's growing.” Obama's third priority for his new term is to manage the explosion in U.S. energy production “in a way that also deals with some of the environmental challenges that we have.” Given that the energy revolution -- fracking and the discovery of huge new sources of gas and oil -- is a key driver of economic growth, Obama's third priority is, in effect, to put the brakes on his second priority. During Obama's first term, when economic conditions bordered on desperate, Republicans often criticized him for putting the economy behind other concerns, most notably national health care. Indeed, the president and Democrats sometimes conceded the criticism when they talked about making a “pivot” to the issue of jobs and the economy from whatever policy pursuit Obama felt was more important at the time. When the time came to run for re-election, Obama finally started talking about the economy -- a lot. He talked about it, and why his economic plan was superior to Mitt Romney's, so much that audiences might well have come away with the impression that economic recovery was the president's top second-term priority. Turns out they would have been wrong. At the same time, even though Obama has long said he wants to pursue immigration reform, he didn't talk about it much in his standard stump speech. In fact, in the speech he used in the final days of the campaign, Obama didn't talk about immigration reform at all, unless one counts his accusation that Republicans want to “turn back the clock 50 years for women, and for immigrants, and for gays.” But now, it's immigration reform first, the economy second.

### U – AT: Gun Control Thumper

#### Immigration reform is moving ahead despite a push for gun control.

Financial Times, **1/2**/2013 (White House builds immigration pact, p. <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/e6b2805c-4ac9-11e2-929d-00144feab49a.html#axzz2GrNoEPIS>)

The White House is building a coalition of allies, including labour unions and Hispanic groups, to help generate support for comprehensive immigration reform, capitalising on the grassroots network that helped President Barack Obama defeat Republican Mitt Romney in November. Although the continued fiscal uncertainty is taking precedence and gun control has been catapulted to the top of the agenda, preparations to launch an all-encompassing immigration bill are proceeding apace. Groups including the SEIU labour union and voter mobilisation organisations such as Mi Familia Vota are among those preparing to promote comprehensive immigration reform that includes the “big enchilada” of a pathway to citizenship for the estimated 11m people in the US illegally. “2013 is our window of opportunity,” said Eliseo Medina, secretary-treasurer of the SEIU, one of the US’s biggest unions, representing healthcare and public service employees. “We are going to be conducting a very aggressive grassroots campaign to get people to contact their members of Congress and tell them they need to pass immigration reform now. It will be unlike anything we’ve ever done before,” he told the Financial Times. Mr Obama already has about a dozen people, led by Cecilia Munoz, his director for domestic policy, working on the issue, along with officials from the departments of homeland security, justice, agriculture and commerce. The president is likely to make his first big push for immigration reform in his State of the Union address after his inauguration later this month, and officials are preparing a bill that will be ready for introduction in the Democrat-controlled Senate.

#### Doesn’t trade off.

**Bennett**, **12/30**/2012 (Brian, Immigration reform could get overshadowed in Congress, Los Angeles Times, p. <http://articles.latimes.com/2012/dec/30/nation/la-na-immigration-20121230>)

"As horrific as the tragedy was in Connecticut, in the grand scheme of things, these issues can run on parallel tracks," said Mary Giovagnoli, director of the Immigration Policy Center, a think tank based in Washington. "They are not in competition; they are complementary," said Angela Kelley, an expert on immigration at the Center for American Progress, a liberal think tank in Washington. "The White House can walk and chew gum, as can lawmakers." "If [lawmakers] are working 40 hours a week, they should be able to get both done," she said.

### Yes Capital – Immigration Specific

#### The election gave Obama capital for immigration.

**Dominguez**, **12/26**/2012 (Jaime – lecturer at Northwestern University, A Sleeping Giant No Longer, The Huffington Post, p. http://www.northwestern.edu/newscenter/stories/2012/12/opinion-dominguez-huffpo.html)

Which suggests that Obama's administration should now begin to move forward on immigration reform. At the moment, the political capital is on Obama's side. The administration has already begun the effort with Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA). By executive order, DACA has enabled undocumented immigrants who were brought to this country before age 16 the chance to obtain Social Security Numbers for purposes of formal employment and to apply for driver's licenses and financial aid -- without fear of deportation. The next logical step is for the president to push Congress to reintroduce and pass the DREAM Act. With one House controlled by Democrats and the other by Republicans, it will be clear which party is willing to move forward on a matter that is so important to so many Latinos. If Republicans reject such reforms, they will do so at their own future political peril. Nor should the Democratic Party be blackmailed into allowing Republicans to propose a watered version of the DREAM Act that does not include a pathway to citizenship. For instance, Sen. Marco Rubio has proposed a DREAM Act "lite," which only confers permanent legal status. Public support is on the Democrats' side. A CNN exit poll shows that 65 percent of voters -- including 37 percent of Republicans -- support giving undocumented immigrant working the U.S. a path to legal status. A majority (65 percent) of non-Latinos support the DREAM Act, including its path to citizenship.

### Winners Lose

**1. No evidence the plan would be a win – if unpopular policies were all it took to trigger the link turn Obama’s approval rating would be sky-high now**

**2. Link outweighs the link turn on timeframe**

**Silber 07** [PhD Political Science & Communication – focus on the Rhetoric of Presidential Policy-Making – Prof of Poli Sci – Samford, [Marissa, WHAT MAKES A PRESIDENT QUACK?, Prepared for delivery at the 2007 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 30th-September 2nd, 2007, UNDERSTANDING LAME DUCK STATUS THROUGH THE EYES OF THE MEDIA AND POLITICIANS]

Important to the discussion of **political capital** is whether or not it can be replenished over a term. If a President expends **political capital** on his agenda, can it be replaced? Light suggests that “capital declines over time – public approval consistently falls: midterm losses occur” (31). **Capital can be rebuilt, but only to a limited extent**. The decline of capital makes it difficult to access information, recruit more expertise and maintain energy. If a lame duck President can be defined by a loss of **political capital**, this paper helps determine if such capital can be replenished or if a lame duck can accomplish little. Before determining this, a definition of a lame duck President must be developed.

**3. Winners don’t win – controversies hurt capital – Obama will do a poor job spinning the plan**

**GERSON 12 – 19 – 10** Washington Post Political Commentator

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/16/AR2010121604039.html>

In some areas - such as education reform or the tax deal - Obama's governing practice is better than his political skills. But these skills matter precisely because political capital is limited. The early pursuit of ambitious health-care reform was a political mistake, as former chief of staff Rahm Emanuel internally argued. But every president has the right to spend his popularity on what he regards as matters of principle. Political risks, taken out of conviction with open eyes, are an admirable element of leadership. Yet political errors made out of pique or poor planning undermine the possibility of achievement. Rather than being spent, popularity is squandered - something the Obama administration has often done. Why so many unforced mistakes? The ineffectiveness of Obama's political and communications staff may be part of the problem - and the administration is now hinting at significant White House personnel changes in the new year. But an alternative explanation was on display this week. Perhaps Democrats did not elect another Franklin Roosevelt or John Kennedy but another Woodrow Wilson - a politician sabotaged by his sense of superiority.

### PC Key/Real

**Best studies prove you’re wrong – capital is key.**

**Beckmann and McGann 8**. [Matthew, Associate Professor of Political Science at UC Irvine, Anthony, “Navigating the Legislative Divide: Polarization, Presidents, and Policymaking in the United States” Journal of Theoretical Politics Vol 20]

Here we propose a theory that casts some early rays of light onto the policy consequences of polarization in Congress. Building from a simple theoretical model in which the president seeks to promote his preferred policies in the Senate (see Snyder, 1991; Groseclose, 1996), we assess differences in the chamber’s preference distribution – from normal to unanimous to bimodal – as well as the ‘political capital’ at the president’s disposal.2 Results show that absent the president, ideological polarization makes amassing the votes needed to beat the status quo difficult, so gridlock frequently prevails. The same is true when the president lacks political capital to spend. However, when endowed with abundant capital, facing a polarized legislature enables presidents to pass policies closer to their ideal than would have been possible in an assembly characterized by greater ideological homogeneity. Hence the familiar prediction of blanket ‘gridlock’ is overblown. Instead, comparative statics show that the consequences of ideological polarization in Congress are conditional: they depend on the nature of the preference distribution, the involvement of the president, and the political capi- tal at his disposal.

**DICKINSON CONCLUDES NEG – prefer this evidence because its from a peer reviewed journal and isn’t just a random blog post.**

Dickinson, yes the same damn one, 2009 (Matthew, professor of political science at Middlebury College. He taught previously at Harvard University, where he also received his Ph.D., working under the supervision of presidential scholar Richard Neustadt, We All Want a Revolution: Neustadt, New Institutionalism, and the Future of Presidency Research, Presidential Studies Quarterly 39 no4 736-70 D 2009)

Small wonder, then, that initial efforts to find evidence of presidential power centered on explaining legislative outcomes in Congress. Because scholars found it difficult to directly and systematically measure presidential influence or "skill," however, they often tried to estimate it indirectly, after first establishing a baseline model that explained these outcomes on other factors, including party strength in Congress, members of Congress's ideology, the president's electoral support and/or popular approval, and various control variables related to time in office and political and economic context. With the baseline established, one could then presumably see how much of the unexplained variance might be attributed to presidents, and whether individual presidents did better or worse than the model predicted. Despite differences in modeling assumptions and measurements, however, these studies came to remarkably similar conclusions: individual presidents did not seem to matter very much in explaining legislators' voting behavior or lawmaking outcomes (but see Lockerbie and Borrelli 1989, 97-106). As Richard Fleisher, Jon Bond, and B. Dan Wood summarized, "[S]tudies that compare presidential success to some baseline fail to find evidence that perceptions of skill have systematic effects" (2008, 197; see also Bond, Fleisher, and Krutz 1996, 127; Edwards 1989, 212). **To some scholars, these results indicate** that Neustadt's **"president-centered" perspective is incorrect** (Bond and Fleisher 1990, 221-23). In fact, the aggregate results reinforce Neustadt's recurring refrain that presidents are weak and that, when dealing with Congress, a president's power is "comparably limited" (Neustadt 1990, 184). The misinterpretation of the findings as they relate to PP **stems** in part **from scholars' difficulty in defining and operationalizing presidential influence** (Cameron 2000b; Dietz 2002, 105-6; Edwards 2000, 12; Shull and Shaw 1999). But it is also that case that scholars often misconstrue Neustadt's analytic perspective; his description of what presidents must do to influence policy making does not mean that he believes presidents are the dominant influence on that process. Neustadt writes from the president's perspective, but without adopting a president-centered explanation of power. Nonetheless, if Neustadt clearly recognizes that a president's influence in Congress is exercised mostly, as George Edwards (1989) puts it, "at the margins," his case studies in PP also suggest that, within this limited bound, presidents do strive to influence legislative outcomes. But how? **Scholars often argue that a president's most direct means of influence is to directly lobby certain members of Congress**, often through quid pro quo exchanges, **at critical junctures during the lawmaking sequence**. **Spatial models of legislative voting suggest that these lobbying efforts are most effective when presidents target the median, veto, and filibuster "pivots" within Congress.** This logic finds empirical support in vote-switching studies that indicate that presidents do direct lobbying efforts at these pivotal voters, and with positive legislative results. Keith **Krehbiel** analyzes successive votes by legislators in the context of a presidential veto and **finds** "modest **support for the** sometimes doubted stylized fact of presidential power as persuasion" (1998,153-54). Similarly, David **Brady** **and** Craig **Volden look at vote switching by members of Congress in successive Congresses on nearly identical legislation and also conclude that** presidents do influence the votes of at least some legislators (1998, 125-36). In his study of presidential lobbying on key votes on important domestic legislation during the 83rd (1953-54) through 108th (2003-04) Congresses, Matthew **Beckman shows that in addition to these pivotal voters, presidents also lobby leaders in both congressional parties in order to control what legislative alternatives make it onto the congressional agenda** (more on this later). **These lobbying efforts are correlated with a greater likelihood that a president's legislative preferences will come to a vote** (Beckmann 2008, n.d.).

### Impact 2NC

#### DA outweighs the case ---

#### Escalation is highly probable.

**Geller 2005** (Daniel S. – Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science at Wayne State University, The India-Pakistan Conflict: An Enduring Rivalry, Ed. T. V. Paul, p. 99)

In fact, both the May-July 1999 military engagement between India and Pakistan over Kashmir and the crisis of December 2001-June 2002 after the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament mirrored the conflict escalation pattern for nuclear-armed states. Each side initiated troop mobilization and general military alerts, coupled with the evacuation of civilians from border-area villages. However, the outcome of the future confrontations for India and Pakistan may not adhere to the pattern established by other nuclear dyads. Elements are present in this dyad that were largely absent between other nuclear-armed antagonists and that make the escalation of war more probable. Among those factors are the presence of a contiguous border between India and Pakistan, a history of multiple wars, and an ongoing territorial dispute. These factors, among others,79 increase the likelihood that an Indo-Pakistani dispute will turn violent and that the violence will escalate to war irrespective of the presence of nuclear weapons.

#### That escalation has a high probability of being nuclear.

**Raghavan**, Fall-Winter **2001** (Lieutenant General V. R. – former Director General of Military Operations for India, Limited War and Nuclear Escalation in South Asia, The Nonproliferation Review, p. 1)

The status of India and Pakistan as declared nuclear powers with growing nuclear arsenals has raised the risks of a nuclear exchange between them, if the two countries engage in a large military conflict. The political leadership in both countries does not seem to have **fully grasped the implications of nuclear weapons** in relation to the ongoing conflict in Jammu and Kashmir. This conflict could lead to a limited war, as it has triggered three wars in the past. The risks involved in fighting a limited war over the Kashmir issue and the potential for such a war to escalate into a nuclear exchange are at best inadequately understood, and at worst brushed aside as an unlikely possibility. Despite this official stance, however, a close examination of Indian and Pakistani military and nuclear doctrine reveals elements that could contribute to the rapid escalation of a limited war to include nuclear weapons. Strikingly, India and Pakistan have not revealed warfighting doctrines for the post-1998 condition of nuclear weapons readiness. It is not clear, for example, what threats to its security would compel India to declare a state of war with Pakistan. There is also no indication of the circumstances that would induce Pakistan to seek a larger war with India. The political objectives that a limited war might seek to achieve have also not been articulated in official and public discourse in the two countries. This article examines the possibility of limited war between India and Pakistan, and the potential of such a conflict triggering a nuclear war. It examines the considerations that could push each of the two countries to fight a limited war. It discusses how such a war might be waged and the circumstances that would likely precipitate an escalation to a nuclear exchange. The doctrinal beliefs and decisionmaking processes of the two countries are examined to trace the likely escalatory spiral towards a nuclear war. The article concludes that the probability of a nuclear war between India and Pakistan is high in the event the two countries engage in a direct military conflict.

### EOR – 2NC

#### **Plan unpopular- seen as unaffordable government subsidies by congress and Obama – That’s Pirog**

#### Oil subsidies cause fights – plan has no support

NFN, 12 (News From Nowhere, “The Politics of Energy”, July 6, http://newsfromnowhere.info/archive/issue-15-april-20-2012/the-politics-of-energy)

The oil industry is one of America's biggest recipients of corporate welfare, sucking up $4 billion in taxpayer subsidies every year. It's a worthy cause, of course: Big guns like Exxon-Mobil rake in a paltry $9 billion each quarter in profits (free and clear – not gross income), so they need the charity of the working-class taxpayer to stay afloat. But the oil industry came pretty close to losing their subsidies last week, when the Close Big Oil Tax Loopholes Act, backed by President Obama, came to a vote in the U.S. Senate. The bill failed on a 51-48 vote. Even though a majority supported the bill, proponents didn’t get the 60 votes they needed for ‘cloture,’ which moves the bill to a vote. Some 88% of oil and gas industry campaign contributions went to Republicans last year, and the investment paid off. In the Senate that was able to buy the votes of all but two – Olympia Snowe and Susan Collins, the two famously moderate Republicans from Maine. The 48 Senators who voted against removing the oil industries subsidies received almost $18 million in campaign contributions from the employees and political action committees of oil and gas companies during their Congressional careers, while the 51 Senators who voted to get rid of the taxpayer subsidies received $3.7 million. Want to know what’s driving America’s politics? Follow the money. Certainly **today's political climate is** not nearly as favorable to the oil industry as the halcyon days of the Bush administration. With the former CEO of Arbusto Petroleum at as Chief Executive and his trusty sidekick Dick Cheney of Halliburton fame occupying the White House, they stacked federal agencies with oil executives and lobbyists, appointing the industry's most vacal supporters to oversee regulation. Gale Norton, protege of James Watt at the Mountain States Legal Foundation, spent her career as a lawyer defending the biggest polluters in the oil industry, was appointed as Secretary of the Interior, in charge of the Bureau of Land Management, the agency that regulates most federal oil and gas operations. (Now she works for Shell). Steven Griles, a notorious coalbed methane industry lobbyist who did a lot of his dirty work in Wyoming's Powder River Basin, was appointed Assistant Secretary in charge of Lands and Minerals.

**Plan is massively unpopular – drains capital**

**Mills 11** - \*MSc in Geological Sciences @ Cambridge

Robin, “Capturing Carbon: The New Weapon in the War Against Climate Change,” Google Book

CCS already labours under something of a public relations disadvan­tage, due to its association with the unpopular petroleum, coal and electricity industries. It needs only to attract support from politicians, lawyers and real-estate agents to be completely condemned. CCS might suffer from its promotion by the Bush-era initiative on the 'Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate', widely (and rather accurately) perceived as a literal and metaphorical smokescreen for pol­luting countries and industries to escape mandatory carbon curbs8 and dismissed as 'a nice little PR ploy' by none other than former presiden­tial candidate John McCain.9 The debate is further clouded by 'clean coal', a term trotted out by industry groups such as the American Coa­lition for Clean Coal Electricity. Indeed, coal has become vastly cleaner in recent years in terms of non-greenhouse pollutants such as sulphur dioxide. But to be meaningful at all, 'clean coal' has to include carbon capture on at least 85-95% of its emissions. Otherwise, as in Joel and Ethan Coen's satirical adverts,10 'clean coal' becomes a byword for hype, empty spin and evading environmental responsibility. Such bad press leads the public to be suspicious of carbon capture's environmental and safety credentials. There is a natural cynicism when industry proposes a solution so convenient to itself, however solid the scientific arguments. Scrutiny is intensified when the oil and coal indus­tries take the lead in campaigning against climate change bills, as dur­ing August 2009,n and score PR own-goals such as forging letters opposing environmental legislation. Part of this lobbying is a reaction to elements of the proposed legislation, rather than to the idea of limit­ing carbon dioxide emissions per se, but the subtlety of this message can easily be lost. Carbon capture may come to be seen—indeed, is sometimes already seen—as just one more tactic from the energy industry to delay or avoid taking real action on climate change.12 The major elements of the fossil fuel industry, particularly in the USA, were so slow to acknowledge the reality of climate change, denied the science at every turn, and still continue to spread doubt and misinformation, even allegedly generating fraudulent grass-roots campaigns.1" By doing so, they set themselves up to be the villains of the piece. To some extent, the global debate over carbon capture (and, indeed, over climate change legislation) is now being held hostage by the ideological clash in the USA between left and right. In Europe, a few mavericks apart, business and environmentalism agree much more closely than they might realise on the science of climate change, and the key solutions. Such public opposition can lead to lengthy delays, lawsuits, planning inquiries, permitting challenges and direct protests, against new CCS power plants, carbon dioxide pipelines and storage sites. A backlash from taxpayers or electricity consumers might be caused by percep­tions that heavy subsidies or rising power prices are being used to sup­port carbon capture. The substantial government aid being given to renewable energy in many developed countries may be more popular. Government programmes, as with America's FutureGen, may be more vulnerable to cuts amid the fickle winds of political fortune than those led by companies planning for their future. Recovery from the financial crisis will, at some point, have to be paid for by spending cuts and tax increases, and this may crimp funding for new technologies, however environmentally vital.

#### And independently it’s a flip flop from Obama’s existing agenda- that’s Pirog - kills PC

Goddard, 9 (Taegan, Creator – Political Wire, (One of the Most Widely-Read and Influential Political Web Sites on the Internet), "Does Obama Practice a Different Kind of Politics?", CQ Politics, 3-19, [http://innovation.cq.com/ liveonline/51/landing](http://innovation.cq.com/liveonline/51/landing))

#  Dan from Philadelphia: How quickly is Obama burning through his political capital? Will he have anything left to actually keep some of his promises? With potential shifts from his campaign stances on the question of Gitmo, Iraq troop withdrawals and taxing employer healthcare benefits, it seems he is in for tough fights on all fronts. # Taegan Goddard: That's a great question. I think Obama spends some of his political capital every time he makes an exception to his principles -- such as hiring a lobbyist to a key position or overlooking an appointee not paying their taxes. Policy reversals such as the ones you note burn through even more of this precious capital.

### Energy Spending – 1NC

#### **Plan pisses off the GOP- saps capital**

Leone 12

[Steve is the Associate Editor of Renewable Energy World. “Part 2: Political Reality and the Way Forward for Renewable Energy,” April 3, <http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2012/04/part-2-political-reality-and-the-way-forward-for-renewable-energy>]

In Washington, it’s hard enough to craft legislation even in relatively amicable times. In the tense atmosphere on the Hill today, meaningful legislation takes a ringside seat, and the game becomes theater. That’s where we are now. In one corner is the House budget, essentially the Republican Party’s line in the sand that’s been drawn over the size of the federal government. A key component of this is the federal government’s more limited role in supporting a clean energy future. In the other corner is the White House and the Democrat-controlled Senate, which has vowed to stonewall any legislation that it says caters to the super-wealthy and the entrenched fossil fuels industry. Like two tired boxers in the ring, they’re content to leave it in the hands of the judges — in this case the voters, who will in many ways determine the force with which our federal government pursues a national policy built on clean energy. But the real prospects for any meaningful legislation is likely to come after the election, when the rhetoric cools and when political capital comes due. Until then, most industry observers don’t expect much chance of any real federal renewable energy legislation passing through a divided Congress. That means no Clean Energy Standard, no revival of the 1603 Treasury grant program, no extension of the Production Tax Credit until the end of the year at the earliest. There are just too few vehicles that can be used to pass any of the measures, and too little trust between key negotiators to find find common ground. One of the last best hopes — the transportation bill — included an amendment that addressed some of these concerns. Ultimately, the amendment went nowhere, and the renewable industry was left looking months down the road to when something could get resolved. The question now is will it be too late. For 1603 to be brought back to life, it would require a major shift in thinking, especially in the House. The PTC has a better shot, but international players in the wind industry are already indicating that they’ll get out of the market if the credit tied to energy produced expires. Will they wait around until the end of the year to see if it can be revived? It’s increasingly looking like the answer may be no.

# Rd 5 vs. Harvard HT (DoD SMR’s)

## 1NC

### 1

#### The United States Federal Government should substantially increase investment in smart microgrid technology for its military bases in the United States via a diverse portfolio tailored to individual installation circumstances, including non-nuclear renewable energies for on-site generation, increased backup generation capacity, improvements in energy efficiency and energy storage, intelligent local energy management, and accelerated implementation of the SPIDERS project.

#### Solves the entire aff

Hallett 11-20 (Michael, US Strategic Engagement Staff Officer at NATO, Allied Command Transformation, “Microgrids: A Smart Defense Based NATO Contribution to Energy Security,” Journal of Energy Security, November, http://www.ensec.org/index.php?option=com\_content&view=article&id=390:microgrids-a-smart-defense-based-nato-contribution-to-energy-security&catid=130:issue-content&Itemid=405)

Microgrids: an energy system resilience increasing tool Microgrids provide a useful focal point through which we can examine the utility of NATO’s contribution to energy security. A microgrid can be defined, according to Peter Asmus as “an integrated energy system consisting of distributed energy resources and multiple electrical loads operating as a single, autonomous grid either in parallel to or ‘islanded’ from the existing utility power grid.” Microgrids have two important overlapping capabilities from the military perspective: increased multi-source (natural gas, diesel, oil, wind, solar, methane, etc.) power generation capability for bases (both in home countries and in expeditionary operations in austere environments) and in providing continuity of service separate from the main power grid.

### 2

#### The United States federal government should offer third-party contractors an exclusive power purchasing agreement in order to obtain electricity from small modular reactors for its military installations in the United States.

#### Competes --- “its” means possession

#### “Its” denotes possession

Glossary of English, 5 (http://www.usingenglish.com/glossary/possessive-pronoun.html)

Mine, yours, his, hers, its, ours, theirs are the possessive pronouns used to substitute a noun and to show possession or ownership. EG. This is your disk and that's mine. (Mine substitutes the word disk and shows that it belongs to me8.)

#### Possession means control over

Oxford Dictionaries, 11 (http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/possession)

Possession Pronunciation:/pəˈzɛʃ(ə)n/ noun 1 [mass noun] the state of having , owning, or controlling something: she had taken possession of the sofa the book came into my possession he remains in full possession of his sanity

#### Alternative financing arrangements reduce costs and spur unique commercial spillover

Fitzpatrick et al 11

[Ryan Fitzpatrick, Senior Policy Advisor for Clean Energy at Third Way, Josh Freed, Vice President for Clean Energy at Third Way, and Mieke Eoyan, Director for National Security at Third Way, June 2011, Fighting for Innovation: How DoD Can Advance CleanEnergy Technology... And Why It Has To, content.thirdway.org/publications/414/Third\_Way\_Idea\_Brief\_-\_Fighting\_for\_Innovation.pdf]

The DoD has over $400 billion in annual purchasing power, which means the Pentagon could provide a sizeable market for new technologies. This can increase a technology’s scale of production, bringing down costs, and making the product more likely to successfully reach commercial markets. Unfortunately, many potentially significant clean energy innovations never get to the marketplace, due to a lack of capital during the development and demonstration stages. As a result, technologies that could help the military meet its clean energy security and cost goals are being abandoned or co-opted by competetors like China before they are commercially viable here in the U.S. By focusing its purchasing power on innovative products that will help meet its energy goals, DoD can provide more secure and cost-effective energy to the military—producing tremendous long-term savings, while also bringing potentially revolutionary technologies to the public. Currently, many of these technologies are passed over during the procurement process because of higher upfront costs—even if these technologies can reduce life-cycle costs to DoD. The Department has only recently begun to consider life-cycle costs and the “fullyburdened cost of fuel” (FBCF) when making acquisition decisions. However, initial reports from within DoD suggest that the methodology for determining the actual FBCF needs to be refined and made more consistent before it can be successfully used in the acquisition process.32 The Department should fast-track this process to better maximize taxpayer dollars. Congressional appropriators— and the Congressional Budget Office—should also recognize the savings that can be achieved by procuring advanced technologies to promote DoD’s energy goals, even if these procurements come with higher upfront costs. Even if the Pentagon makes procurement of emerging clean energy technologies a higher priority, it still faces real roadblocks in developing relationships with the companies that make them. Many clean energy innovations are developed by small businesses or companies that have no previous experience working with military procurement officers. Conversely, many procurement officers do not know the clean energy sector and are not incentivized to develop relationships with emerging clean energy companies. Given the stakes in developing domestic technologies that would help reduce costs and improve mission success, the Pentagon should develop a program to encourage a better flow of information between procurement officers and clean energy companies—especially small businesses. Leverage Savings From Efficiency and Alternative Financing to Pay for Innovation. In an age of government-wide austerity and tight Pentagon budgets, current congressional appropriations are simply not sufficient to fund clean energy innovation. Until Congress decides to direct additional resources for this purpose, the Defense Department must leverage the money and other tools it already has to help develop clean energy. This can take two forms: repurposing money that was saved through energy efficiency programs for innovation and using alternative methods of financing to reduce the cost to the Pentagon of deploying clean energy. For several decades the military has made modest use alternative financing mechanisms to fund clean energy and efficiency **projects when appropriated funds were insufficient**. In a 2010 report, GAO found that while only 18% of renewable energy projects on DoD lands used alternative financing, these projects account for 86% of all renewable energy produced on the Department’s property.33 This indicates that alternative financing can be particularly helpful to DoD in terms of bringing larger and more expensive projects to fruition. One advanced financing tool available to DoD is the energy savings performance contract (ESPC). These agreements allow DoD to contract a private firm to make upgrades to a building or other facility that result in energy savings, reducing overall energy costs without appropriated funds. The firm finances the cost, maintenance and operation of these upgrades and recovers a profit over the life of the contract. While mobile applications consume 75% of the Department’s energy,34 DoD is only authorized to enter an ESPC for energy improvements done at stationary sites. As such, Congress should allow DoD to conduct pilot programs in which ESPCs are used to enhance mobile components like aircraft and vehicle engines. This could accelerate the needed replacement or updating of aging equipment and a significant reduction of energy with no upfront cost. To maximize the potential benefits of ESPCs, DoD should work with the Department of Energy to develop additional training and best practices to ensure that terms are carefully negotiated and provide benefits for the federal government throughout the term of the contract.35 This effort could possibly be achieved through the existing memorandum of understanding between these two departments.36 The Pentagon should also consider using any long-term savings realized by these contracts for other energy purposes, including the promotion of innovative technologies to further reduce demand or increase general energy security. In addition to ESPCs, **the Pentagon** also **can enter into** extended agreements with utilities to use DoD land to generate electricity, or for the **long-term purchase of energy**. **These** **innovative financing mechanisms**, known respectively as enhanced use leases (EULs) and power purchase agreements (PPAs), **provide a valuable degree of certainty to third party generators**. In exchange, the **Department can leverage its existing resources**—either its land or its purchasing power—**to negotiate lower electricity rates** and dedicated sources of locallyproduced power with its utility partners. **DoD has unique authority among federal agencies to enter extended 30-year PPAs**, but only for geothermal energy projects and only with direct approval from the Secretary of Defense. Again, limiting incentives for clean energy generation to just geothermal power inhibits the tremendous potential of other clean energy sources to help meet DoD’s energy goals. Congress should consider opening this incentive up to other forms of clean energy generation, including the production of advanced fuels. Also, given procurement officials’ lack of familiarity with these extended agreements and the cumbersome nature of such a high-level approval process, the unique authority to enter into extended 30-year PPAs is very rarely used.37 DoD should provide officials with additional policy guidance for using extended PPAs and Congress should simplify the process by allowing the secretary of each service to approve these contracts. Congress should also investigate options for encouraging regulated utility markets to permit PPA use by DoD. Finally, when entering these agreements, the Department should make every effort to promote the use of innovative and fledgling technologies in the terms of its EULs and PPAs. CON C L U S ION **The Defense Department is in a unique position to foster and deploy innovation in clean energy technologies**. This has two enormous benefits for our military: it will make our troops and our facilities more secure and it will reduce the amount of money the Pentagon spends on energy, freeing it up for other mission critical needs. If the right steps are taken by Congress and the Pentagon, the military will be able to put its resources to work developing technologies that will lead to a stronger fighting force, a safer nation, and a critical emerging sector of the American economy. **The Defense Department has helped give birth to technologies and new economic sectors dozens of times before**. For its own sake and the sake of the economy, **it should make clean energy innovation its newest priority**.

### 3

#### Electricity prices are declining

**Burtraw 8/21/12** (one of the nation’s foremost experts on environmental regulation in the electricity sector “Falling Emissions and Falling Prices: Expectations for the Domestic Natural Gas Boom” http://common–resources.org/2012/falling–emissions–and–falling–prices–expectations–for–the–domestic–natural–gas–boom/)

Moreover, the boom in domestic natural gas production could have even more immediate affects for U.S. electricity consumers. The increased supply of gas is expected to lower natural gas prices and retail electricity prices over the next 20 years, according to a [new RFF Issue Brief](http://www.rff.org/Publications/Pages/PublicationDetails.aspx?PublicationID=22019). These price decreases are expected to be even larger if demand for electricity continues on a slow–growth trajectory brought on by the economic downturn and the increased use of energy efficiency.For example, RFF analysis found that delivered natural gas prices would have been almost 35% higher in 2020 if natural gas supply projections had matched the lower estimates released by the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) in 2009. Instead, with an increased gas supply, consumers can expect to pay $4.9 per MMBtu for delivered natural gas in 2020 instead of $6.6 per MMBtu. These trends are even more exaggerated if demand for electricity were to increase to levels projected by the EIA just three years ago, in 2009.This decrease in natural gas prices is expected to translate into a decrease in retail electricity prices for most electricity customers in most years out to 2020. Compared to the world with the lower gas supply projections, average national electricity prices are expected to be almost 6% lower, falling from 9.25 cents to 8.75 cents per kilowatt–hour in 2020. Residential, commercial, and industrial customers are all expected to see a price decrease, with the largest price changes occurring in parts of the country that have competitive electricity markets. All of these prices decreases translate into real savings for most electricity customers. The savings are largest for commercial customers, who stand to save $33.9 Billion (real $2009) under the new gas supply projections in 2020. Residential customers also stand to save big, with estimates of $25.8 Billion (real $2009) in savings projected for 2020.

#### SMRs increase electricity prices

Freebairn 7/25/12 (Mollie, Solar consultant with Missouri Solar Applications in Jefferson City and a former scientist at the Missouri Department of Natural Resources, "Related Stories," [http://www.stltoday.com/news/opinion/guest–commentary–small–nuclear–reactors–are–too–little–too–late/article\_8f237dd0–9a8b–5912–a30d–b7a368282732.html](http://www.stltoday.com/news/opinion/guest-commentary-small-nuclear-reactors-are-too-little-too-late/article_8f237dd0-9a8b-5912-a30d-b7a368282732.html))

Ameren Missouri recently announced a proposal for a small, modular nuclear reactor. What's the problem? Well, let's begin with the folly of picking an industry that is a loser from every vantage point. Missourians know from Ameren's repeated attempts to push through a nuclear plant proposal that private investors dismiss nuclear power plants as economically unsound.¶ According to Forbes, "The Department of Energy will spend $452 million — with a match from industry — over the next five years to guide two small modular reactor designs through the nuclear regulatory process by 2022. But cheap natural gas could freeze even small nuclear plants out of the energy market well beyond that date." Where will industry come looking for its share of matching funds? If history is any guide, Missouri ratepayers will be called upon to provide those funds, enabling Ameren to raise our electricity rates in perpetuity.¶ Envisioned to create an energy hub with thousands of jobs, the small 225–megawatt nuclear reactor would have about one–fifth the capacity of a large nuclear plant, which might not come online until 2022. As a strategic energy plan, this vision delivers too little, too late.¶ Missouri's aging energy infrastructure is dominated by one nuclear and 15 coal–burning power plants, ranging between 2,389 megawatts and 273 megawatts, many in need of retirement. Strikingly, Missouri has a dozen natural gas plants with 100 megawatts to 700 megawatts of generation capacity, enough to supply 50 percent of Missouri's electricity needs. Many of those plants are sitting virtually idle. With natural gas prices at all–time lows, these plants could be brought online today, with no new investment. Doing so would reduce toxic and greenhouse gas releases drastically.¶ Wind electricity generation is coming from across the Great Plains states, spanning from Texas to the Dakotas. Electricity costs from wind generation are declining steadily. Plans are underway to construct four major new transmission corridors to deliver electricity to Eastern and Western states where it is needed. Says Clean Line Energy spokesman Mark Lawlor, "We have far more electricity than Missouri needs to meet its renewable energy standards."¶ Missouri is capable of meeting most of its own energy needs, however, by creating thousands of jobs in a wide range of industries, tapping its own renewable energy potential. The renewable energy standards law spearheaded by Renew Missouri, Missouri Coalition for the Environment, the Sierra Club and Missourians for Safe Energy, among others, and passed overwhelmingly by Missouri voters, is designed to launch renewable energy industries. A University of Tennessee study shows that increasing renewable energy generation will create 10 jobs in construction, engineering, architecture, manufacturing and marketing for every coal and nuclear job we have in the United States today. That would be 240,800 new jobs in Missouri.¶ Solar power is the renewable energy resource that Missouri possesses in greatest abundance. One of the fastest–growing sectors in the U.S. economy, according to the Missouri Solar Energy Industries Association, the U.S. solar energy market grew 102 percent last year and is on track to grow another 100 percent in 2012. Many analysts project that the United States will become the largest solar market in the world in the next few years.¶ Nuclear reactors, large or small, will cost Missourians millions to start, producing high levels of toxic radiation. Far from blazing a road to prosperity, they are a costly diversion that does not address Missouri's energy needs. A better plan is to invest in renewable energy industries to revitalize our entire economy, keeping the major investments we make to power our homes and businesses here at home.

#### Low electricity prices spurs manufacturing "reshoring" and sparks US economic growth via consumer spending and investment

Perry 12 (Mark, Prof of Economics @ Univ. of Michigan, "America's Energy Jackpot: Industrial Natural Gas Prices Fall to the Lowest Level in Recent History," http://mjperry.blogspot.com/2012/07/americas–energy–jackpot–industrial.html)

Building petrochemical plants could suddenly become attractive in the United States. Manufacturers will "reshore" production to take advantage of low natural gas and electricity prices. Energy costs will be lower for a long time, giving a competitive advantage to companies that invest in America, and also helping American consumers who get hit hard when energy prices spike. After years of bad economic news, the natural gas windfall is very good news. Let's make the most of it." The falling natural gas prices also make the predictions in this December 2011 study by PriceWaterhouseCoopers, "Shale gas: A renaissance in US manufacturing?"all the more likely: U.S. manufacturing companies (chemicals, metals and industrial) could employ approximately one million more workers by 2025 because of abundant, low–priced natural gas. Lower feedstock and energy cost could help U.S. manufacturers reduce natural gas expenses by as much as $11.6 billion annually through 2025. MP: As I have emphasized lately, America's ongoing shale–based energy revolution is one of the real bright spots in an otherwise somewhat gloomy economy, and provides one of the best reasons to be bullish about America's future. The shale revolution is creating thousands of well–paying, shovel–ready jobs in Texas, North Dakota and Ohio, and thousands of indirect jobs in industries that support the shale boom (sand, drilling equipment, transportation, infrastructure, steel pipe, restaurants, etc.). In addition, the abundant shale gas is driving down energy prices for industrial, commercial, residential and electricity–generating users, which frees up billions of dollars that can be spent on other goods and services throughout the economy, providing an energy–based stimulus to the economy. Cheap natural gas is also translating into cheaper electricity rates, as low–cost natural gas displaces coal. Further, cheap and abundant natural gas is sparking a manufacturing renaissance in energy–intensive industries like chemicals, fertilizers, and steel. And unlike renewable energies like solar and wind, the natural gas boom is happening without any taxpayer–funded grants, subsidies, credits and loans. Finally, we get an environmental bonus of lower CO2 emissions as natural gas replaces coal for electricity generation. Sure seems like a win, win, win, win situation to me.

#### Econ decline risks extinction

Auslin 9 (Michael, Resident Scholar – American Enterprise Institute, and Desmond Lachman – Resident Fellow – American Enterprise Institute, “The Global Economy Unravels”, Forbes, 3–6, http://www.aei.org/article/100187)

What do these trends mean in the short and medium term? The Great Depression showed how social and global chaos followed hard on economic collapse. The mere fact that parliaments across the globe, from America to Japan, are unable to make responsible, economically sound recovery plans suggests that they do not know what to do and are simply hoping for the least disruption. Equally worrisome is the adoption of more statist economic programs around the globe, and the concurrent decline of trust in free–market systems. The threat of instability is a pressing concern. China, until last year the world's fastest growing economy, just reported that 20 million migrant laborers lost their jobs. Even in the flush times of recent years, China faced upward of 70,000 labor uprisings a year. A sustained downturn poses grave and possibly immediate threats to Chinese internal stability. The regime in Beijing may be faced with a choice of repressing its own people or diverting their energies outward, leading to conflict with China's neighbors. Russia, an oil state completely dependent on energy sales, has had to put down riots in its Far East as well as in downtown Moscow. Vladimir Putin's rule has been predicated on squeezing civil liberties while providing economic largesse. If that devil's bargain falls apart, then wide–scale repression inside Russia, along with a continuing threatening posture toward Russia's neighbors, is likely. Even apparently stable societies face increasing risk and the threat of internal or possibly external conflict. As Japan's exports have plummeted by nearly 50%, one–third of the country's prefectures have passed emergency economic stabilization plans. Hundreds of thousands of temporary employees hired during the first part of this decade are being laid off. Spain's unemployment rate is expected to climb to nearly 20% by the end of 2010; Spanish unions are already protesting the lack of jobs, and the specter of violence, as occurred in the 1980s, is haunting the country. Meanwhile, in Greece, workers have already taken to the streets. Europe as a whole will face dangerously increasing tensions between native citizens and immigrants, largely from poorer Muslim nations, who have increased the labor pool in the past several decades. Spain has absorbed five million immigrants since 1999, while nearly 9% of Germany's residents have foreign citizenship, including almost 2 million Turks. The xenophobic labor strikes in the U.K. do not bode well for the rest of Europe. A prolonged global downturn, let alone a collapse, would dramatically raise tensions inside these countries. Couple that with possible protectionist legislation in the United States, unresolved ethnic and territorial disputes in all regions of the globe and a loss of confidence that world leaders actually know what they are doing. The result may be a series of small explosions that coalesce into a big bang.

### 4

#### **Interpretation –** “financial incentives” are funding for investors to develop a project – that excludes government purchases

**Czinkota et al, 9 -** Associate Professor at the McDonough School of Business at Georgetown University (Michael, Fundamentals of International Business, p. 69 – google books)

Incentives offered by policymakers to facilitate foreign investments are mainly of three types: fiscal, financial, and nonfinancial. **Fiscal incentives** are specific tax measures designed to attract foreign investors. They typically consist of special depreciation allowances, tax credits or rebates, special deductions for capital expenditures, tax holidays, and the reduction of tax burdens. **Financial incentives** offer special funding for the investor by providing, for example, land or buildings, loans, and loan guarantees. **Nonfinancial incentives** include guaranteed government purchases; special protection from competition through tariffs, import quotas, and local content requirements, and investments in infrastructure facilities.

#### **Violation – Purchases that don’t motivate action – they just buy a technology that already exists**

Nelson 93 (Edward W., Chairman – Payment Subcommittee in OPTN/UNOS Ethics Committee, “Financial Incentives for Organ Donation,” Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, 6-30, http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/resources/bioethics.asp?index=4)

Definition of Financial Incentives A definition of terms is **necessary prior to a discussion of the concept of financial incentives** for organ donation. First, financial incentives, as discussed here, do not mean additional monies spent for public or professional education or recognition and counseling of organ donor families. Because the concept of financial incentives fundamentally changes the process of organ procurement, it has been argued that the term "donor" is no longer applicable and would need to be replaced by a term such as 'vendor." The term "rewarded gifting" has been suggested and has been justly criticized as an oxymoron by those opposed to financial incentives and a despicable euphemism by those who promote this concept. Of greatest practical significance is the distinction between "incentive" and "payment" since a system of financial incentives may indeed be a viable option if, as interpreted by law, "incentives" do not amount to "purchases" and "donors" are therefore not transformed into 'vendors."

#### Prefer our interpretation –

#### A. Limits – they allow any aff that makes some technology more economically viable. Procurement can be applied to every technology and every industry – that explodes neg burden.

#### B. Neg ground – procurement moves the debate away from “how to motivate action” to just “doing the action” – this guts negative arguments about solvency, DA links, and CP competition based off private sector inducement.

### 5

#### Immigration reform will pass --- it’s a top priority.

**Foley and Stein**, **1/2**/2013 (Elise and Sam, Obama’s Immigration Reform To Begin This Month, The Huffington Post, p. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/02/obama-immigration-reform\_n\_2398507.html)

Despite a bruising fiscal cliff battle that managed to set the stage for an even more heated showdown that will likely take place in a matter of months, President Barack Obama is planning to move full steam ahead with the rest of his domestic policy agenda. An Obama administration official said the president plans to push for immigration reform this January. The official, who spoke about legislative plans only on condition of anonymity, said that coming standoffs over deficit reduction are unlikely to drain momentum from other priorities. The White House plans to push forward quickly, not just on immigration reform but gun control laws as well. The timeframe is likely to be cheered by Democrats and immigration reform advocates alike, who have privately expressed fears that Obama's second term will be drowned out in seemingly unending showdowns between parties. The just-completed fiscal cliff deal is giving way to a two-month deadline to resolve delayed sequestration cuts, an expiring continuing resolution to fund the government and a debt ceiling that will soon be hit. With those bitter battles ahead, the possibility of passing other complicated legislation would seem diminished. "The negative effect of this fiscal cliff fiasco is that every time we become engaged in one of these fights, there's no oxygen for anything else," said a Senate Democratic aide, who asked for anonymity to speak candidly. "It's not like you can be multi-tasking -- with something like this, Congress just comes to a complete standstill." It remains unclear what type of immigration policies the White House plans to push in January, but turning them into law could be a long process. Aides expect it will take about two months to write a bipartisan bill, then another few months before it goes up for a vote, possibly in June. A bipartisan group of senators are already working on a deal, although they are still in the early stages. Rep. Zoe Lofgren (D-Calif.) will likely lead on the Democratic side in the House. While many Republicans have expressed interest in piecemeal reform, it's still unclear which of them plan to join the push. Lofgren expressed hope that immigration reform would be able to get past partisan gridlock, arguing that the election was seen as something of a mandate for fixing the immigration system and Republicans won't be able to forget their post-election promises to work on a bill. "In the end, immigration reform is going to depend very much on whether Speaker [John] Boehner wants to do it or not," Lofgren said.

#### Plan costs capital

Sorenson 12

[Lt. Gen Jeff Sorenson, 9/28/12, <http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/economy-a-budget/259163-saving-energy-saving-soldiers-lives>]

From biofuels that could propel the Navy’s Great Green Fleet to spending billions of dollars on renewable energy, the Pentagon’s green energy initiatives have emerged as a contentious topic in Washington. Recent Congressional budget proposals could curtail military efforts to produce alternative fuels because they are currently more expensive than fossil fuels. Yet Pentagon officials insist its focus on energy conservation and renewable energy is essential for national security and improved military capability. Who’s right? Is the Pentagon’s pursuit of green energy an outrageously expensive endeavor or an operational necessity? Yes, the impending concerns about a potential $259 billion budget reduction for the Defense Department over the next five years **might make one question the fiscal sense of investing billions on renewable energy projects.**

#### Capital is key --- it bridges support from both parties.

Dallas Morning News, **1/2**/2012 (Editorial: Actions must match Obama’s immigration pledge, p. http://www.dallasnews.com/opinion/editorials/20130102-editorial-actions-must-match-obamas-immigration-pledge.ece)

The president’s words to NBC’s David Gregory are only that — words. What will really matter is whether he puts his muscle into the task this year. We suggest that Obama start by looking at the example of former President George W. Bush. Back in 2006 and 2007, the Republican and his administration constantly worked Capitol Hill to pass a comprehensive plan. They failed, largely because Senate Republicans balked. But the opposition didn’t stop the Bush White House from fully engaging Congress, including recalcitrant Republicans. Obama may have a similar problem with his own party. The dirty little secret in the 2006 and 2007 immigration battles was that some Democrats were content to let Senate Republicans kill the effort. Labor-friendly Democrats didn’t want a bill, either. And they may not want one this year. That reluctance is a major reason the president needs to invest in this fight. He must figure out how to bring enough Democrats along, while also reaching out to Republicans. In short, the nation doesn’t need a repeat of the process through which the 2010 health care legislation was passed. Very few Republicans bought into the president’s plan, leaving the Affordable Care Act open to partisan sniping throughout last year’s election. If the nation is going to create a saner immigration system, both parties need to support substantial parts of an answer. The new system must include a guest worker program for future immigrants and a way for illegal immigrants already living here to legalize their status over time. Some House Republicans will object to one or both of those reforms, so Speaker John Boehner must be persuasive about the need for a wholesale change. But the leadership that matters most will come from the White House. The president has staked out the right position. Now he needs to present a bill and fight this year for a comprehensive solution. Nothing but action will count. HE SAID IT … “I’ve said that fixing our broken immigration system is a top priority. I will introduce legislation in the first year [of the second term] to get that done. I think we have talked about it long enough. We know how we can fix it. We can do it in a comprehensive way that the American people support. That’s something we should get done.” President Barack Obama, in an interview on Meet the Press Sunday

#### Immigration reform expands skilled labor --- spurs relations and economic growth in China and India.

Los Angeles **Times**, 11/9/**2012** (Other countries eagerly await U.S. immigration reform, p. http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/world\_now/2012/11/us-immigration-reform-eagerly-awaited-by-source-countries.html)

"Comprehensive immigration reform will see expansion of skilled labor visas," predicted B. Lindsay Lowell, director of policy studies for the Institute for the Study of International Migration at Georgetown University. A former research chief for the congressionally appointed Commission on Immigration Reform, Lowell said he expects to see at least a fivefold increase in the number of highly skilled labor visas that would provide "a significant shot in the arm for India and China." There is widespread consensus among economists and academics that skilled migration fosters new trade and business relationships between countries and enhances links to the global economy, Lowell said. "Countries like India and China weigh the opportunities of business abroad from their expats with the possibility of brain drain, and I think they still see the immigration opportunity as a bigger plus than not," he said.

#### US/India relations averts South Asian nuclear war.

**Schaffer**, Spring **2002** (Teresita – Director of the South Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Security, Washington Quarterly, p. Lexis)

Washington's increased interest in India since the late 1990s reflects India's economic expansion and position as Asia's newest rising power. New Delhi, for its part, is adjusting to the end of the Cold War. As a result, both giant democracies see that they can benefit by closer cooperation. For Washington, the advantages include a wider network of friends in Asia at a time when the region is changing rapidly, as well as a stronger position from which to help calm possible future nuclear tensions in the region. Enhanced trade and investment benefit both countries and are a prerequisite for improved U.S. relations with India. For India, the country's ambition to assume a stronger leadership role in the world and to maintain an economy that lifts its people out of poverty depends critically on good relations with the United States.

### 6

#### Military procurement of nuclear power places environmental liabilities on the DoD

King 11 (Marcus, Ph.D., Center for Naval Analyses Project Director and Research Analyst for the Environment and Energy Team, LaVar Huntzinger, Thoi Nguyen, March 2011, Feasibility of Nuclear Power on U.S.Military Installations, www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/Nuclear Power on Military Installations D0023932 A5.pdf)

DoD would most likely bear the **greatest legal environmental liability if it were to own and/or license its own facility**. For example, DoD may be liable for accidents associated with transportation of nuclear fuel to and from the reactor. The Department may also be responsible for expensive plant decontamination and decommissioning. Decommissioning of former DoD defense related nuclear sites has been costly. Spent fuel and used fuel management represents another potential liability. In 2009, President Obama announced plans to discontinue the Yucca Mountain project, the proposed national repository for spent fuel. The administration has established a commission to provide recommendations for long-term management of high-level radioactive waste. High-level nuclear waste is now stored at the reactor sites, some of which are adjacent to population centers. Spent fuel pools have been identified as a potential hazard because of the possibility of sabotage possibly leading to a radiological incident [49]. The National Academy of Sciences (NAS) found that successful terrorist attacks on spent fuel pools would be difficult but possible. The poten-38 tial for such an attack should be considered when examining environmental and force protection requirements on military installations. The NAS study focused on large reactor sites. The consequences of such an attack may be relatively low at an SMR site because a smaller amount of spent fuel would be stored there.

#### DoD and DoE environmental liabilities are distinct – the plan adds costs to the Operation and Maintenance Account, or O&M

GAO 3 (General Accounting Office, “Long-term Commitments: Improving the Budgetary Focus on Environmental Liabilities,” January, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03219.pdf)

Nearly all of the $307 billion in environmental liabilities reported for fiscal year 2001 was associated with DOD and DOE. About 78 percent of these liabilities were associated with DOE and represent the environmental legacy resulting from the production of nuclear weapons. The 21 percent associated with DOD is primarily for environmental restoration of military installations and disposal of nuclear materials. 8 The remaining environmental liabilities associated with other federal agencies include such things as replacement of underground storage tanks, asbestos removal, and lead abatement. Some of this remaining 1 percent will be paid out of Treasury’s judgment fund. 9 DOD and DOE manage environmental cleanup quite differently: DOD’s decentralized activities are managed within the individual services, at the program level, while DOE’s activities are centralized within its Environmental Management (EM) program. For example, DOD considers environmental liabilities in two categories: (1) disposal and (2) environmental restoration/cleanup. Army’s chemical weapons and Navy’s nuclear-powered carriers, ships, and submarines dominate DOD’s disposal liabilities. Funding for disposal is provided to the Army, Navy, and Air Force Operation and Maintenance (O&M) accounts. Restoration/cleanup activities are largely addressed through the Defense Environmental Restoration Program (DERP), which is funded through five environmental restoration accounts for Army, Navy, Air Force, Formerly Used Defense Sites (FUDS), and Defense-wide. The funds in these accounts are then transferred to the service levels’ O&M budgets. In contrast, within DOE, facilities that have reached the end of their useful lives and require cleanup typically are transferred to EM, along with some additional funds for surveillance and maintenance. EM also receives budget authority directly through an appropriation. Thus, budgeting and funding for cleanup is almost entirely handled by EM, not individual program offices. EM’s program emphasis is on site closure and project completion. Its activities include environmental restoration, waste management, and nuclear material and facility stabilization. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the flow of cleanup funds for these two departments.

#### That causes massive cuts in inland waterway funding. Current O&M budget has enough funding, but it’s on the chopping block.

Water Resources and Environment Subcommittee 1 (House of Representatives, “U.S. REPRESENTATIVE JOHN DUNCAN (R-TN) HOLDS HEARING ON 2002 BUDGET REQUESTS FOR THE ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS AND THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,” FDCH Political Transcripts5-2, Lexis, http://lobby.la.psu.edu/\_107th/116\_WI\_SRF/Congressional\_Hearings/Testimony/H\_Trans\_WaterResEnvir\_Duncan\_etal\_050201.htm)

DEFAZIO: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I got here a few minutes late and missed some of the other opening statements, but just reflecting on Mr. Blumenauer's and Mr. Boehlert's statements, I think certainly we can always do better, and I submit we work with numerous representatives of the Corps to discuss the possibility of some reforms and new efficiencies and taking a second look at some of the parts of the mission and some of the statements they made. But more general, I'd like to comment both on this budget and the one we will hear later. Now, there's a point at which we have got to question pursuing one political goal to the detriment of a whole lot of things that are important to the American people, and I think that's what we're going to hear in both these hearings today, that we do not have a budget which is adequate to fully meet the mission of the Corps, I think a mission that would be widely agreed upon by divergent members of the committee despite concerns they might have with some aspect of past Corps operations. And the same with the Environmental Protection Agency budget, which we'll get into a little bit later. The Corps budget will be down 6.5 percent from 2001 levels. I just don't think that can be justified. We just had massive floods, and I find it ironic that I believe it was the head of the Federal -- FEMA who was chastising Davenport, Iowa for not having a permanent dike system in place, which would, of course, cost hundreds of millions, if not billions, of dollars. Yet at the same time, projects important to my district and many other districts are being slowed down to the point of where if it wasn't (inaudible), but secondly, I have one particular project in my district which is a tremendous environmental benefit (inaudible). And this year I think the budget will allow for one guy to go out there with a bucket and mix his own cement and pour cement on a daily basis. It's not adequate, and no one can make the argument that this is a good way to do the agreed upon priorities of the Corps of Engineers. We are having a drought in the Northwest. That means a heck of a lot more (inaudible) or cutting the dredging process. These things make sense or they might make sense in the single-minded pursuit of maximizing the particular (inaudible) in order to maximize the tax cuts which would slow most of the few people at the top. And anything can happen. My fishermen (inaudible). Their $47 in tax cut is not going to help get the boat over the (inaudible). And the few dollars that my people -- fishers and environmentalists and others -- who are concerned about water temperatures and salmon recovery in the (inaudible) Basin, with their $50 or $100 they're not going to be able to do anything to help speed up the construction of the cooling tower, which is going to help the salmon recovery. So at some point we are doing things to the detriment of the society, things that can only be done collectively as a society, where all our small contributions add up to major improvements in our quality of life, and we walked away from those things. And I have tremendous concern about that, and I will be pressing the Corps a bit on those issues this morning. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. DUNCAN: Thank you very much, Mr. DeFazio. Mr. Brown? Do you have any opening statement? BROWN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Being from the coast of South Carolina where 150 miles of oceanfront comes in, I know one of the concerns that we have down there is beach erosion. I know that there's a new report to try change the ratio between what the federal government contributes and what the locals contribute. Now the max match is some 65 percent for the federal and 35 percent local. BROWN: And, Mr. Chairman, I certainly would like to see (inaudible). It's an undue hardship on the coastal region already with the added construction of these new highways and water and sewer and police protection for those (inaudible) come down. I would hope that the committee will rethink the procedures that's required by the locals and hope we can maintain the 65. At one time, it was 75-25, so (inaudible), and I know we'll get good response back from that. Another area that we are concerned with is in the (inaudible) region where the -- after Hurricane Floyd we had a tremendous amount of flooding in that area, and we set a study to determine what alternatives we might have to divert the water in a 100-year flood plain in some other direction so that we would prevent the flood from occurring. But, General, thank you for being with us today. DUNCAN: All right. And thank you very much, Mr. Brown. Mr. Pascrell said he didn't have any opening statement. Mr. Berry, do you have any statement at this time? BERRY: Just to welcome the delegation from the Corps of Engineers. And I've always been a great fan of what you do considering that I live in a place that does have (inaudible). I don't like flooding either, and that baby keeps me from getting flooded, so we appreciate what you're doing with (inaudible). DUNCAN: Thank you very much. Mr. Kerns, do you have a statement? KERNS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want to thank the Corps also for being here. I've had a good working relationship. In my prior role as chief of staff for Congressman Pease. And, General Flowers, I last saw you down at the Lower Mississippi Valley Flood Control Association meeting, and what a great team you have and participate in that every year. And thank you for being here, and I look forward to working with you. That's all, Mr. Chairman. DUNCAN: Thank you very much. Mr. Mascara? MASCARA: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd like to thank the ranking member, Mr. DeFazio, for holding this very important hearing. I would like to welcome the delegation from the Corps. The Corps has been good to my district, and I appreciate the fine work that you do for the American people. The region of Pennsylvania that I represent relies heavily on its waterways. Due to the geography of the area there is no other way to move commodities in my district than down the Monongahela River. In 1998, about 25 and a half (ph) million tons of commodities passed through my district, the value of which was approximately $1.6 billion. Without the Corps, we would have a serious logistic and economic problem. The Corps has for years been the backbone of that river, which is the backbone of our local economy, and for that I thank you. I am certain there are regions all across this nation that will the same thing about what the Corps does for them. That is why I find it especially disturbing to see this budget. I have trouble understanding why an agency that has been so successful would go to the chopping block. I would like to know if this shortfall in funding will have an adverse effect on projects throughout the country generally and in my congressional district specifically and will address those when I get an opportunity to ask you some questions. Thank you again, gentlemen, for coming today. DUNCAN: Thank you very much. Mr. Latourette? LATOURETTE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman and (inaudible). Welcome; it's nice to see you again and everyone else. I'd just left the (inaudible) breakfast, and the level of O&M funding for the Corps was the subject of great discussion at that breakfast. And the steel industry in the entire United States is suffering badly, and that means the iron ore industry is on the line too in the mines of Minnesota and other parts of the country. And the observation was made by one of my colleagues on the other side of the aisle at this breakfast in concerning about the administration's funding request for the O&M account. Pointed out that under the previous administration there was a reduction of $700 million and further proposed reduction this year. And I would be most interested in hearing from the Corps today, similar to what Mr. Mascara was just talking about, and that is how that's going to impact the viability of the very important programs that the Corps conducts all around the country. It was interesting, I can remember when the previous administration zeroed out the O&M account in one budget submission, saying that these were somehow pork projects for members of Congress. Well, I've never met a member of Congress who represents a constituency that has been flooded or that can't move commerce or has boaters where their props are stuck in the mud and considers that to be a poor (inaudible). I can't think of a bad water project in the seven years that I've been here in the United States Congress. And so I would very much appreciate the Corps' observations on the budget submission as well as from the administration's point of view. And then just on a personal note, I would tell the other members of the subcommittee the general was in my office about a month ago making his annual pilgrimage to the Hill, and I brought up the fact that we have a small town in northeastern Ohio that has a creek that needs to be dredged, and they're running into some difficulties as to -- I said, "Well, you can't dredge it, because there's wetlands on either side, and if you take the dredge material and put it on the bank, you're going to impact the wetlands. But you can't take a truck and haul it out either, because you'd be driving a truck through the wetlands. Within the 48 hours the general had made sure that that town was contacted, and the problem's been taken care of. And I just want to thank you on behalf of my constituents and thank you for all you do. And I thank you, Mr. Chairman. DUNCAN: All right. Thank you very much. Ms. Millender-McDonald has joined us. Do you have a statement at this time? MILLENDER-MCDONALD: Mr. Chairman, thank you so much. Just sitting down, I am here to listen and to learn and to take notes. Thank you so much. DUNCAN: Fine. Thank you. We'll go ahead and start then with the first panel. And the first panel consists of Mrs. Claudia Tornblom who is deputy assistant secretary of the Army for Management and Budget, from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works. And also we have Lieutenant General Robert B. Flowers, chief of Engineers of the Army Corps of Engineers. And he is accompanied by Major General Hans A. Van Winkle, director of Civil Works, and Mr. Robert F. Vining, chief of Programs for the Management Division, Directorate of Civil Works. And we're pleased to have each of you here with us. And we do proceed in the order of witnesses as their listed in the file of the hearing. And that means, Ms. Tornblom, we'll start with you. You may begin your statement, please. TORNBLOM: Good morning, Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee. I am here before you today (inaudible). I am (inaudible). I'm the official responsible for the Civil Works Program. I appreciate the opportunity to testify today on the president's budget for the Civil Works Program of the Army Corps of Engineers for fiscal year 2002. I will summarize my complete statement, and with your permission, Mr. Chairman, I ask that the complete statement be entered into the record. The 2002 Civil Works budget reflects the president's overall goals to slow the growth of federal spending, provide for a tax cut and reduce the national debt, while providing greater emphasis on education and protecting social security. The budget requires appropriations of $3.9 billion. In addition to the $3.9 billion appropriations, about $514 million will be contributed by Bonneville Power Administration, non-federal cost sharing sponsors, and other additional sources. In combination, these funding sources will support total Civil Works programs for 2002 of $4.4 billion. The budget emphasizes principal Civil Works missions of commercial navigation, flood damage reduction and environmental restoration. The program currently has an construction backlog of about $40 billion,. Of this amount, $26 billion represents the requirements to complete projects clearly budgeted for construction or preconstruction engineering and design. In order to address this backlog, available funding in 2002 is directed toward construction of continuing projects. As a result, no construction or project study starts are budgeted. The study does propose two new national studies that will provide information needed by the Army and the Chief of Engineers to assess potential changes in the Civil Works Program, its policies and procedures. The first of these two studies, which was authorized in Section 223 of the Water Resources Development Act of 2000, is a 12-year program to monitor the economic and environmental results of up to five projects constructed by the Corps. The second new national study was authorized by Section 215 of the Water Resources Development Act of 1999. This study will assess the extent, causes and impacts of shoreline erosion on the coastal shores of the United States. As Congressman Brown mentioned, the 2002 budget presents a new administration policy to its shore protection projects that involve beach nourishment. For the initial sand placement of these projects, the administration proposes no change in the current 65 percent federal, 35 percent non-federal cost sharing. However, for subsequent periodic re-nourishment of such projects, the administration will seek 65 percent non-federal sharing, reducing the federal share to 35 percent. This policy applies to all nourishment work funded in 2002 and beyond. Until now, beach nourishment projects started since 1995 have not received budgetary support. Now, due to this policy change, the budget includes funding for projects of 2002 requirements regardless of when they were started. All together, about $82 million of this budget is for beach nourishment projects. For the Mississippi River and Tributaries projects, the budget targets funds to high priority flood damage reduction projects, which are on the mainstem of the Mississippi River and in the Atchafalaya River Basin in Louisiana. In the Operation and Maintenance Program, the budget gives priority, among port and harbor and inland waterway activities, to those that support higher commercial navigation use. Funds for operation and maintenance of shallow-draft harbors are limited to $47 million. Among shallow-draft harbors, subsistence harbors for isolated communities and harbors that involve relatively greater use for commercial cargo and fishing are given a higher priority, while the harbors that are essentially recreational in nature are de-emphasized. The budget includes $42 million for operation of low commercial- use inland waterways; that is, waterways with less than one billion ton-miles of traffic per year. Funds for maintenance of low commercial-use inland waterways are limited to $25 million for maintenance dredging. Again, **these funds are targeted at the waterway segments with relatively greater commercial use**.

#### Funding for waterway’s key to prevent terrorist attacks

Scott C. Truver, Winter 2008, is Executive Advisor, National Security Programs, at Gryphon Technologies LC, specializing in national and homeland security, and naval and maritime strategies, doctrines, programs and operations, the interagency task force drafting the U.S. President’s National Strategy for Maritime Security, Ph.D. in Marine Policy Studies from Naval Postgraduate School, and the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy, Naval War College Review, Vol. 61 Issue 1, “MINES AND UNDERWATER IEDS IN U.S. PORTS AND WATERWAYS,” p. 117, Ebsco Host

The United States confronts the daunting task of protecting some 95,000 miles of coastlines and thousands of miles of inland/Great Lakes waterways, 361 ports, and a territorial sea/exclusive economic zone that comprises more than 3.4 million square miles of ocean space and at any time is cluttered with thousands of naval warships, commercial vessels and fishing boats, tugs and ferries...not to ignore millions of private pleasure craft. Sorting the legal from the illegal in such a complex maritime domain is a Herculean task that challenges federal, regional, state, and local agencies, commercial entities, and other non-governmental organizations to work hand-in-glove and collaborate with allies and friends to safeguard maritime security at home and abroad. Maritime Domain Awareness––what the 2005 National Strategy for Maritime Security describes as the “effective understanding of anything associated with the maritime domain that could impact the security, safety, economy, or environment of the United States, and identifying threats as early and as distant from our shores as possible”––will thus be absolutely necessary for success against a broad spectrum of maritime threats, including mines and UWIEDs.

#### Goes nuclear

James J. Carafano, 4-28-2008, is Assistant Director of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies and Senior Research Fellow for National Security and Homeland Security in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation, The National Terror Alert, “Homeland Security Unveils Plans To Thwart Small Boat Terror Attacks,” <http://www.nationalterroralert.com/2008/04/28/homeland-security-unveils-plans-to-thwart-small-boat-terror-attacks/>

As boating season approaches, the Bush administration wants to enlist the country’s 80 million recreational boaters to help reduce the chances a small boat could deliver a nuclear or radiological bomb along the country’s 95,000 miles of coastline and inland waterways. According to a Wednesday intelligence assessment obtained by the Associated Press: “The use of a small boat as a weapon is likely to remain al-Qaeda’s weapon of choice in the maritime environment, given its ease in arming and deploying, low cost, and record of success.” While the United States has so far been spared this type of strike in its own waters, terrorists have used small boats to attack in other countries. The millions of humble dinghies, fishing boats, and smaller cargo ships that ply America’s waterways are not nationally regulated as they buzz around ports, oil tankers, power plants, and other potential terrorist targets. This could allow terrorists in small boats to carry out an attack similar to the USS Cole bombing, said Adm. Thad Allen, the Coast Guard commandant. That 2000 attack killed 17 U.S. sailors in Yemen when terrorists rammed a dinghy packed with explosives into the destroyer. “There is no intelligence right now that there’s a credible risk” of this type of attack, Allen said. “But the vulnerability is there.” To reduce the potential for such an attack in the United States, the Department of Homeland Security has developed a strategy intended to increase security by enhancing safety standards. The Coast Guard is part of the department.

#### Extinction

Mohamed Sid-Ahmed, August/September 2004, political analyst, Al-Ahram Weekly On-Line, <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/705/op5.htm>

We have reached a point in human history where the phenomenon of terrorism has to be completely uprooted, not through persecution and oppression, but by removing the reasons that make particular sections of the world population resort to terrorism. This means that fundamental changes must be brought to the world system itself. The phenomenon of terrorism is even more dangerous than is generally believed. We are in for surprises no less serious than 9/11 and with far more devastating consequences. A nuclear attack by terrorists will be much more critical than Hiroshima and Nagazaki, even if -- and this is far from certain -- the weapons used are less harmful than those used then, Japan, at the time, with no knowledge of nuclear technology, had no choice but to capitulate. Today, the technology is a secret for nobody. So far, except for the two bombs dropped on Japan, nuclear weapons have been used only to threaten. Now we are at a stage where they can be detonated. This completely changes the rules of the game. We have reached a point where anticipatory measures can determine the course of events. Allegations of a terrorist connection can be used to justify anticipatory measures, including the invasion of a sovereign state like Iraq. As it turned out, these allegations, as well as the allegation that Saddam was harbouring WMD, proved to be unfounded. What would be the consequences of a nuclear attack by terrorists? Even if it fails, it would further exacerbate the negative features of the new and frightening world in which we are now living. Societies would close in on themselves, police measures would be stepped up at the expense of human rights, tensions between civilisations and religions would rise and ethnic conflicts would proliferate. It would also speed up the arms race and develop the awareness that a different type of world order is imperative if humankind is to survive. But the still more critical scenario is if the attack succeeds. This could lead to a third world war, from which no one will emerge victorious. Unlike a conventional war which ends when one side triumphs over another, this war will be without winners and losers. When nuclear pollution infects the whole planet, we will all be losers.

#### Independently – liabilities creates resources tradeoffs that affect military training and readiness

CAS 2 (Committee of Armed Services, “HEARINGS ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2003—H.R. 4546 AND OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS,” March, http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/security/has073030.000/has073030\_0f.htm)

Today the Subcommittee on Military Readiness will hear testimony from the Department of Defense and Federal environmental agencies to address their concerns regarding the impact on military readiness and national security caused by compliance with various Federal environmental laws. The committee has been receiving a growing number of reports from the Department of Defense and the military services that their mandatory compliance with Federal environmental laws is having an increasingly adverse effect on military readiness, which over time will adversely impact national security. There have been some erroneous reports in the media that our objective today is to propose sweeping exemptions for the military that would have an adverse impact on the environment. That is not true. We are not proposing anything today. We are here to listen and to learn. It is not the intention of this subcommittee to propose or support any legislation that would harm the environment. All of us treasure our environment. We have asked the Department of Defense, the four military services, and some of the Federal regulatory agencies to provide their view on this important issue. And the reality is, we have two positive, competing values here—and sometimes they are competing values. And that is training our military to go out and win wars and also protecting the environment. We have to figure some way to balance that out. We have received requests from a few outside groups, including the National Association of Attorneys General and the Environmental Council of the States, to consider the reasonable views of local and state governments on this important issue. Time limitations today make it challenging to even hear from all of our Federal witnesses, so we are unable to include representatives from these groups on our panels today. However, as always, we welcome the views of these groups and other interested groups on any legislation that we may consider. It is essential that all Federal agencies, including the Department of Defense, be required to comply with numerous Federal environmental laws, including the Endangered Species Act, the Marine Mammal Protection Act, the Clean Water Act, the Clean Air Act, the Resources Conservation and Recovery Act, and the Noise Control Act, to name a few. However, due to the unique training and operational missions, the department often faces unique challenges in balancing its obligation to comply with these environmental laws and sustaining military readiness. The ever-increasing limitations and restrictions on lands and waters which are currently set aside for training exercises, as well as restrictions on the times and conditions under which the military training exercise can be conducted, are some examples of the environmental encroachment. Compliance with environmental laws also necessitates the use of personnel and funds which would otherwise be used to support the training, operations and maintenance requirements of the department. The department and the military services spend approximately $4 billion annually on environmental programs. This subcommittee conducted an open hearing last year to consider the constraints and challenges facing military test and training ranges. During the hearing, the department highlighted numerous examples throughout the services where its compliance with environmental laws is severely impeding its ability to adequately prepare for combat and national defense.

#### Readiness collapse causes war – turns the heg advantage

Spencer 2K (Jack, Policy Analyst – Heritage Foundation, The Facts About Military Readiness, 9-15, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/MissileDefense/BG1394.cfm>)

The evidence indicates that the U.S. armed forces are not ready to support America's national security requirements. Moreover, regarding the broader capability to defeat groups of enemies, military readiness has been declining. The National Security Strategy, the U.S. official statement of national security objectives, 3 concludes that the United States "must have the capability to deter and, if deterrence fails, defeat large-scale, cross-border aggression in two distant theaters in overlapping time frames." 4 According to some of the military's highest-ranking officials, however, the United States cannot achieve this goal. Commandant of the Marine Corps General James Jones, former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jay Johnson, and Air Force Chief of Staff General Michael Ryan have all expressed serious concerns about their respective services' ability to carry out a two major theater war strategy. 5 Recently retired Generals Anthony Zinni of the U.S. Marine Corps and George Joulwan of the U.S. Army have even questioned America's ability to conduct one major theater war the size of the 1991 Gulf War. 6 Military readiness is vital because declines in America's military readiness signal to the rest of the world that the United States is not prepared to defend its interests. Therefore, potentially hostile nations will be more likely to lash out against American allies and interests, inevitably leading to U.S. involvement in combat. A high state of military readiness is more likely to deter potentially hostile nations from acting aggressively in regions of vital national interest, thereby **preserving peace**.

### Solvency

#### Siting requirements blocks solvency

King 11 (Marcus, Ph.D., Center for Naval Analyses Project Director and Research Analyst for the Environment and Energy Team, LaVar Huntzinger, Thoi Nguyen, March 2011, Feasibility of Nuclear Power on U.S.Military Installations, www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/Nuclear Power on Military Installations D0023932 A5.pdf)

A reactor owner/operator, typically a utility, will select a site and may apply for an early site permit from the NRC. They select a reactor design, (certified under a separate process), to construct on the site and then apply for a combined operating license. Construction begins after approval. With respect to the requirement to “consider the potential impact on the quality of life of personnel stationed at military installations at which a nuclear power plant is installed and ways to mitigate those impacts,” it is impossible to talk in specific terms without knowing details about which specific power plant is being considered and the specific locations being considered. In general terms, finding an appropriate site will be challenging. Part of the reason finding an appropriate site will be challenging is because the NRC site consideration process will force full consideration of these factors. Describing the NRC site assessment process is the best and most relevant information that can be provided with respect to this aspect of feasibility at this stage in the process. The NRC approval process described in this section will require that any potential impacts on the quality of life of personnel stationed at military installations at which a nuclear power plant is proposed will be fully consdered and that ways are planned to mitigate those impacts.

#### DoD won’t apply for NRC exemptions – that guts solvency and delays the project by 10 years

King 11 (Marcus, Ph.D., Center for Naval Analyses Project Director and Research Analyst for the Environment and Energy Team, LaVar Huntzinger, Thoi Nguyen, March 2011, Feasibility of Nuclear Power on U.S.Military Installations, www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/Nuclear Power on Military Installations D0023932 A5.pdf)

The most basic licensing issue relates to whether NRC will have jurisdiction over potential nuclear reactor sites or whether DoD could be self-regulating. Our conversations with NRC indicate it is the only possible licensing authority for reactors that supply power to the commercial grid. However, DOE and DoD are authorized to regulate mission critical nuclear facilities under Section 91b of the Atomic Energy Act. There is some historical precedent for DoD exercising this authority. For example, the Army Nuclear Program was granted exception under this rule with regard to the reactor that operated aboard the Sturgis barge in the 1960s and 1970s [44]. It seems unlikely that DoD would pursue exemption under Section 91b in the future. 10 Regulating power plants is a function that lies beyond DoD's core mission. The Department and the military services are unlikely to have personnel with sufficient expertise to act as regulators for nuclear power plants, and it could take considerable time and resources to develop such expertise. Without NRC oversight DoD would bear all associated risks. The time required to obtain design certification, license, and build the next generation of nuclear plants is about 9 to 10 years. After the first plants are built it may be possible to reduce the time required for licensing and construction to approximately 6 years [45]. The timeline for certification, licensing, and construction projected by DOE for a small nuclear power plant based on an SMR is shown in figure 5 [46].

#### Military says no to nuclear

Butler 11 (Lt. Col. Glen Butler, Headquarters, North American Air Defense Command-U.S. Northern Command/J594 (Strategy, Policy, and Plans Directorate), Security Cooperation Integration Branch, 3-1-11, “Not green enough: Why the Marine Corps should lead the environmental and energy way forward and how to do it,” http://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/not-green-enough)

Fourth, SMR technology offers the Marine Corps another unique means to lead from the front—not just of the other Services but also of the Nation, and even the world.28 This potential Pete Ellis moment should be seized. There are simple steps we could take,29 and others stand ready to lead if we are not.30 But the temptation to “wait and see” and “let the others do it; then we’ll adopt it” mentality is not always best. Energy security demands boldness, not timidity.

[Their Card Ends]

To be fair, nuclear technology comes with challenges, of course, and with questions that have been kicked around for decades. An April 1990 Popular Science article asked, “Next Generation Nuclear Reactors—Dare we build them?” and included some of the same verbiage heard in similar discussions today.31 Compliance with National Environment Policy Act requirements necessitates lengthy and detailed preaction analyses, critical community support must be earned, and disposal challenges remain. Still, none of these hurdles are insurmountable.32 Yet despite the advances in safety, security, and efficiency in recent years, **nuclear in the energy equation remains the new “n-word” for most military circles**. And despite the fact that the FY10 National Defense Authorization Act called on the DoD to “conduct a study [of] the feasibility of nuclear plants on military installations,” the Office of the Secretary of Defense has yet to fund the study.33

#### No solvency—no expertise

Parthemore and Rogers 10 (Christine and Will, Bacevich Fellow – CNAS, “Nuclear Reactors on Military Bases May Be Risky,” Center for a New American Security, 5-20, http://www.cnas.org/node/4502)

The media have reported that Tennessee Sen. Lamar Alexander (R) is proposing a joint Department of Energy/Department of Defense demonstration project to examine the use of small reactors on federal sites. For some Department of Energy sites, such as Oak Ridge National Lab in Alexander’s home state — a site certainly accustomed to housing nuclear technology — demonstrating new nuclear reactor technology is largely a no-brainer. However, using nuclear reactors to power the nation’s defense installations warrants deeper consideration. Proponents of boosting this carbon-free energy source on military bases argue that these installations have unique capacities that would ease concerns over its use, namely more gates and more armed guards already on base 24/7. Likewise, the U.S. military services have unique energy security needs. Consistent energy supplies are a critical component of America’s ability to train at home and to operate globally. Energy is so important that some analysts are even exploring “islanding” the energy systems on some military installations to reduce vulnerabilities related to their reliance on often brittle domestic electric grids. Consideration of nuclear energy as part of these islanding concepts is on the rise. On the other hand, opponents contend that sufficient numbers of military base personnel may not have the requisite training in nuclear reactor management, oversight and regulatory credentials to attend to reactors in the round-the-clock manner necessary. In most cases, additional qualified personnel and improved physical security and safety requirements would be needed. As with all nuclear power generation, materials proliferation, water usage, radioactive waste management and public opinion will also be major concerns. Most military bases also strive to be integrated into their surrounding communities, and, by our experience, many base officials consider integrated electric infrastructure an important point of connection between local and military needs. Concepts for nuclear energy generation solely to supply military bases must be sensitive to what public perceptions could be in the event of extended blackouts for surrounding communities. Any legislation to consider the option of small nuclear reactors on military bases must include examination of these important concerns.

#### Investors won't participate – too much uncertainty

Bartis & Bibber 11 -- senior policy researchers at the RAND Corporation (James T. and Lawrence Van, "Alternative Fuels for Military Applications," http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2011/RAND\_MG969.pdf)

The investment climate for military alternative fuel production is highly uncertain. Although the Navy has announced a program that will involve large fuel purchases, it has not yet provided sufficient detail to encourage investment of private funds. Other DoD components have not announced that they will pay a premium price for alternative fuels for use in their tactical systems. This situation means that the private sector will look to the civilian fuel market for signals as to whether to invest in alternative fuels. For civilian applications, the prospects for alternative fuels also remain highly uncertain. At current world market oil prices, the only military alternative fuel that might be competitive without subsidy is an FT jet or FT Navy distillate derived from natural gas, coal, or a mix of coal and a small amount of biomass. But even for these leading technologies, there remains uncertainty regarding investment and production costs, especially for the first production facilities that would be built in the United States. With the $1.00 federal subsidy that has supported biodiesel production, some amount of biodiesel from crops cultivated on farmlands appears to be competitive with petroleum-derived diesel so long as world oil prices are above $50 per barrel (2009 dollars, West Texas Intermediate).1 But for renewable oils that are produced with lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions that are less than those from petroleum products, greater subsidies or higher crude oil prices may be required. As discussed in Chapter Three, there is little information available on the costs of producing hydrotreated renewable oils from jatropha, camelina, or other nontraditional crops, and even less on the economics of algae-derived fuels. Another factor impeding investment in alternative fuels is uncertainty regarding the prospects and details of legislation and regulations aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions in the United States. Legislation that assigns costs to emitting greenhouse gases will modify the relative competitiveness of different alternative fuels vis-à-vis petroleum-derived fuels. For example, for each $10 per ton charged for emitting carbon dioxide into the atmosphere, the price of conventional JP-8 would increase by about $0.13 per gallon.

#### DoD doesn’t drive the domestic market

Dimotakis 6 (Paul Dimotakis, The MITRE Corporation, 2006, December 09, 2006, Reducing DoD Fossil-Fuel Dependence, http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/jason/fossil.pdf)

The 2006 DoD fossil-fuel budget is, approximately, 2.5-3% of the national-defense budget, the range dependent on what is chosen as the total national-defense budget. iv Larger (percentage) fuel costs are borne by families and many businesses, for example, and fuel costs have only relatively recently become noticeable to the DoD. 3. At present, there is a large spread between oil-production cost and crude-oil prices. Many projections, however, including that of the U.S. Energy Information Agency, indicate that crude oil prices may well decrease to $40-$50/barrel within the next few years, as production and refining capacity increases to match demand. 4. DoD is **not a sufficiently large customer to drive the domestic market** for demand and consumption of fossil fuel alternatives, or to drive fuel and transportation technology developments, in general. Barring externalities, e.g., subsidies, governmental and departmental directives, etc., non-fossil-derived fuels are not likely to play a significant role in the next 25 years. 5. DoD fuel consumption constraints and patterns of use **do not align well with those of the commercial sector**. Most commercial-sector fuel use, for example, is in ground transportation, with only 4% of domestic petroleum consumption used for aviation. In contrast, almost 60% of DoD fuel use is by the Air Force, with additional fuel used in DoD aviation if Naval aviation consumption is included. Options for refueling ships at sea are more limited (or nonexistent) compared to those for commercial vehicles in urban areas. Options for DoD use of electrical energy on ground vehicles are limited, since one can not expect to plug into the grid in hostile territory, for example, to refuel/recharge an electric vehicle. Furthermore, drive cycles for DoD ground vehicles differ significantly from EPA drive cycles that, as a consequence, provide poor standards for fuel consumption.

### Heg

#### No risk of cyberattack and no impact if it does happen

Birch, 10/1/12 – former foreign correspondent for the Associated Press and the Baltimore Sun who has written extensively on technology and public policy (Douglas, “Forget Revolution.” Foreign Policy. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/10/01/forget\_revolution?page=full)

"That's a good example of what some kind of attacks would be like," he said. "You don't want to overestimate the risks. You don't want somebody to be able to do this whenever they felt like it, which is the situation now. But this is not the end of the world." The question of how seriously to take the threat of a cyber attack on critical infrastructure surfaced recently, after Congress rejected a White House measure to require businesses to adopt stringent­ new regulations to protect their computer networks from intrusions. The bill would have required industries to report cyber security breaches, toughen criminal penalties against hacking and granted legal immunity to companies cooperating with government investigations. Critics worried about regulatory overreach. But the potential cost to industry also seems to be a major factor in the bill's rejection. A January study by Bloomberg reported that banks, utilities, and phone carriers would have to increase their spending on cyber security by a factor of nine, to $45.3 billion a year, in order to protect themselves against 95 percent of cyber intrusions. Likewise, some of the bill's advocates suspect that in the aftermath of a truly successful cyber attack, the government would have to bail the utilities out anyway. Joe Weiss, a cyber security professional and an authority on industrial control systems like those used in the electric grid, argued that a well-prepared, sophisticated cyber attack could have far more serious consequences than this summer's blackouts. "The reason we are so concerned is that cyber could take out the grid for nine to 18 months," he said. "This isn't a one to five day outage. We're prepared for that. We can handle that." But pulling off a cyber assault on that scale is no easy feat. Weiss agreed that hackers intent on inflicting this kind of long-term interruption of power would need to use a tool capable of inflicting physical damage. And so far, the world has seen only one such weapon: Stuxnet, which is believed to have been a joint military project of Israel and the United States. Ralph Langner, a German expert on industrial-control system security, was among the first to discover that Stuxnet was specifically designed to attack the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition system (SCADA) at a single site: Iran's Natanz uranium-enrichment plant. The computer worm's sophisticated programs, which infected the plant in 2009, caused about 1,000 of Natanz's 5,000 uranium-enrichment centrifuges to self-destruct by accelerating their precision rotors beyond the speeds at which they were designed to operate. Professionals like Weiss and others warned that Stuxnet was opening a Pandora's Box: Once it was unleashed on the world, they feared, it would become available to hostile states, criminals, and terrorists who could adapt the code for their own nefarious purposes. But two years after the discovery of Stuxnet, there are no reports of similar attacks against the United States. What has prevented the emergence of such copycat viruses? A 2009 paper published by the University of California, Berkeley, may offer the answer. The report, which was released a year before Stuxnet surfaced, found that in order to create a cyber weapon capable of crippling a specific control system ­­-- like the ones operating the U.S. electric grid -- six coders might have to work for up to six months to reverse engineer the targeted center's SCADA system. Even then, the report says, hackers likely would need the help of someone with inside knowledge of how the network's machines were wired together to plan an effective attack. "Every SCADA control center is configured differently, with different devices, running different software/protocols," wrote Rose Tsang, the report's author. Professional hackers are in it for the money -- and it's a lot more cost-efficient to search out vulnerabilities in widely-used computer programs like the Windows operating system, used by banks and other affluent targets, than in one-of-a-kind SCADA systems linked to generators and switches. According to Pollard, only the world's industrial nations have the means to use the Internet to attack utilities and major industries. But given the integrated global economy, there is little incentive, short of armed conflict, for them to do so. "If you're a state that has a number of U.S. T-bills in your treasury, you have an economic interest in the United States," he said. "You're not going to have an interest in mucking about with our infrastructure." There is also the threat of retaliation. Last year, the U.S. government reportedly issued a classified report on cyber strategy that said it could respond to a devastating digital assault with traditional military force. The idea was that if a cyber attack caused death and destruction on the scale of a military assault, the United States would reserve the right to respond with what the Pentagon likes to call "kinetic" weapons: missiles, bombs, and bullets. An unnamed Pentagon official, speaking to the Wall Street Journal, summed up the policy in less diplomatic terms: "If you shut down our power grid, maybe we will put a missile down one of your smokestacks." Deterrence is sometimes dismissed as a toothless strategy against cyber attacks because hackers have such an easy time hiding in the anonymity of the Web. But investigators typically come up with key suspects, if not smoking guns, following cyber intrusions and assaults -- the way suspicions quickly focused on the United States and Israel after Stuxnet was discovered. And with the U.S. military's global reach, even terror groups have to factor in potential retaliation when planning their operations.

#### New developments sure up grid stability – solves blackouts

Kemp 12 -- Reuters market analyst (John, 4/5/12, "COLUMN-Phasors and blackouts on the U.S. power grid: John Kemp," http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/05/column-smart-grid-idUSL6E8F59W120120405)

The hoped-for solution to grid instability is something called the North American SynchroPhasor Initiative (NASPI), which sounds like something out of Star Trek but is in fact a collaboration between the federal government and industry to improve grid monitoring and control by using modern communications technology. More than 500 phasor monitoring units have so far been installed across the transmission network to take precise measurements of frequency, voltage and other aspects of power quality on the grid up to 30 times per second (compared with once every four seconds using conventional technology). Units are synchronised using GPS to enable users to build up a comprehensive real-time picture of how power is flowing across the grid (www.naspi.org/Home.aspx and). It is a scaled-up version of the monitoring system developed by the University of Tennessee's Power Information Technology Laboratory using inexpensive frequency monitors that plug into ordinary wall sockets. Tennessee's FNET project provides highly aggregated data to the public via its website. The systems being developed under NASPI provide a much finer level of detail that will reveal congestion and disturbances on individual transmission lines and particular zones so that grid managers can act quickly to restore balance or isolate failures ().

#### Military SMRs rely on foreign grids that are fragile – takes out solvency

Smith 11 (Terrence P., Program Coordinator and Research Assistant with the William E. Simon Chair in Political Economy – CSIS, “An Idea I Can Do Without: “Small Nuclear Reactors for Military Installations”,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2-16, http://csis.org/blog/idea-i-can-do-without-small-nuclear-reactors-military-installations)

Nowhere in these key points is there even a hint of, “Hey this is not necessarily the best thing since sliced bread.” My initial response to each of these “key points”: (1) Takes the assumption it is a good idea and pushes a pursuit of the capability soon and hard to maintain a competitive technological edge, before examining the wisdom of the idea to begin with; (2) Just because DoD is interested in it, does not make it a good idea; (3) Arguing that they are better than larger reactors is not an argument for them being a good idea; (4) See my first point, but add in military advantage. The report describes DoD’s interest in the reactors as stemming from two “critical vulnerabilities”: 1) “the dependence of U.S. military bases on the fragile civilian electrical grid,” and 2) “the challenge of safely and reliably supplying energy to troops in forward operating locations.” The proposed solution: small nuclear reactors that (in many of the proposed plans) are “self-contained and highly mobile.” This would allow the military to use them in forward bases and pack ‘em up and move ‘em out when we are done. But in an era where the U.S. is engaged in global fights with our bases often placed in unfriendly neighborhoods, the idea of driving around nuclear reactors and material (particularly through areas that have “ a fragile civilian electrical grid”) hardly seems like the idea of the century to me. The report counters that “some” designs promise to be “virtually impervious to accidents” and have design characteristics that “might” allow them to be proliferation-resistant. The plans that use low-enriched uranium, sealed reactor cores, ect., do make them a safer option that some current designs of larger nuclear reactors, but, again, if we are going to be trucking these things around the world, when it comes to nuclear material a “might” doesn’t sit well with me.

#### Backup capacity solves

Aimone 12 (Dr. Michael, Director of Business Enterprise Integration – Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment), “Statement Before the House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection and Security Technologies,”September 12, 2012, http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/Testimony%20-%20Aimone.pdf)

DoD’s facility energy strategy is also focused heavily on grid security in the name of mission assurance. Although the Department’s fixed installations traditionally served largely as a platform for training and deployment of forces, in recent years they have begun to provide direct support for combat operations, such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) flown in Afghanistan from fixed installations here in the United States. Our fixed installations also serve as staging platforms for humanitarian and homeland defense missions. These installations are largely dependent on a commercial power grid that is vulnerable to disruption due to aging infrastructure, weather-related events, and potential kinetic, cyber attack. In 2008, the Defense Science Board warned that DoD’s reliance on a fragile power grid to deliver electricity to its bases places critical missions at risk. 1 Standby Power Generation Currently, DoD ensures that it can continue mission critical activities on base largely **through its fleet of on-site power generation equipment**. This equipment is connected to essential mission systems and automatically operates in the event of a commercial grid outage. In addition, each installation has standby generators in storage for repositioning as required. Facility power production specialists ensure that the **generators are primed and ready to work**, and that they are maintained and fueled during an emergency. With careful maintenance these generators can **bridge the gap for even a lengthy outage**. As further back up to this installed equipment, DoD maintains a strategic stockpile of electrical power generators and support equipment that is kept in operational readiness. For example, during Hurricane Katrina, the Air Force transported more than 2 megawatts of specialized diesel generators from Florida, where they were stored, to Keesler Air Force Base in Mississippi, to support base recovery.

#### Military sustainable without renewables

Bartis & Bibber 11 -- senior policy researchers at the RAND Corporation (James T. and Lawrence Van, "Alternative Fuels for Military Applications," http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2011/RAND\_MG969.pdf)

Defense Department goals for alternative fuels in tactical weapon systems should be based on potential national benefits, since the use of alternative, rather than petroleum-derived, fuels offers no direct military benefits. While Fischer-Tropsch fuels and hydrotreated renewable fuels are no less able than conventional fuels to meet the Defense Department’s needs, they offer no particular military benefit over their petroleum-derived counterparts. For example, even if alternative fuels can be produced at costs below the prevailing costs for conventional fuels, they will be priced at market rates. Also, we are unable to find any credible evidence that sources to produce jet or naval distillate fuel will run out in the foreseeable future. If conflict or a natural disaster were to abruptly disrupt global oil supplies, the U.S. military would not suffer a physical shortage. Rather, the resulting sharp increase in world prices would cause consumers around the world to curb use of petroleum products. Less usage would ensure that supplies remained available. As long as the military is willing to pay higher prices, it is unlikely to have a problem getting the fuel it requires. If problems do arise, the Defense Production Act of 1950 (P.L. 81-774) contains provisions for performance on a priority basis of contracts for the production, refining, and delivery of petroleum products to the Defense Department and its contractors.

#### No risk of disruption --- SPR and other checks prevent a lack of supplies.

**Green**, 7/2/**2012** (Kenneth – resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, End the DoD’s Green Energy Fuelishness, Real Clear Markets, p. <http://www.realclearmarkets.com/articles/2012/07/02/end_the_dods_green_energy_fuelishness_99741.html>)

Green warriors make several arguments for the green fleet. First, they argue that when conventional fuel prices go up, military costs go up. Second, they argue that we are at perpetual risk of supply disruption. Third, they argue that the military could spur development of these new fuel technologies to make them cost competitive with conventional fuels. Fourth, they argue that new technologies that make ships and planes more energy efficient would enhance mobility and performance. Virtually none of these arguments pass a laugh test. Yes, when conventional fuels rise in price, military operating costs go up. But in a global fuel market, the market value of any liquid fuel will track with the world price of oil on an energy-content basis. Simply switching to biofuels offers no price protection in a world of fuel-fungibility. Analysts at Rand put it quite succinctly in a recent report. "Alternative liquid fuels do not offer DoD a way to appreciably reduce fuel costs." As to the risk of a supply interruption, we don't face one: Rand further observes, while the U.S. military uses a lot of fuel, when looked at in context, it uses a tiny percentage of world, or even North American production. Its consumption is less than one-half of 1 percent of global petroleum demand. The U.S. also produces over 8 million barrels a day. "we can find no credible scenario in which the military would be unable to access the 340,000 bpd of fuel it needs to defend the nation," says Rand. And, of course, there's that whole Strategic Petroleum Reserve, which can hold 727 million barrels of oil. Let's see, 727 million divided by 340,000...the SPR could power the military by itself for almost 6 years.

#### Military has no need for clean energy – adoption fails and hurts military power

O'Keefe 12 -- CEO, George C. Marshall Institute (William, 5/22/12, "DOD’s ‘Clean Energy’ Is a Trojan Horse," http://energy.nationaljournal.com/2012/05/powering-our-military-whats-th.php)

The purpose of the military is to defend the United States and our interests by deterring aggression and applying military force when needed. It is not to shape industrial policy. As we’ve learned from history, energy is essential for military success, independent of whether it is so called “clean energy” or traditional energy, which continues to get cleaner with time. There are three reasons for the Department of Defense (DOD) to be interested in biofuels—to reduce costs, improve efficiency, and reduce vulnerability. These are legitimate goals and should be pursued through a well thought out and rational Research-and-Development (R&D) program. But it’s not appropriate to use military needs to push a clean energy agenda that has failed in the civilian sector. Packaging the issue as a national security rationale is a Trojan Horse that hides another attempt to promote a specific energy industrial policy. Over the past four decades such initiatives have demonstrated a record of failure and waste. As part of the military’s push for green initiatives, both the Navy and Air Force have set goals to obtain up to 50 percent of their fuel needs from alternative sources. The underlying rationale is to reduce US dependence on foreign oil. But the Rand Corporation, the preeminent military think tank in the nation, recently conducted a study, Alternative Fuels for Military Applications; it concludes, "The use of alternative fuels offers the armed services no direct military benefit." It also concludes that biofuels made from plant waste or animal fats could supply no more than 25,000 barrels daily. That’s a drop in the bucket considering the military is the nation’s largest fuel consumer. Additionally, there is no evidence that commercial technology will likely to be available in the near future to produce large quantities of biofuels at lower costs than conventional fuels. The flipside of that argument is that the cost of conventional fuels is uncertain because of dependence on imports from unstable sources. While that is true, it misses the point. For example, our reliance on imports from the Persian Gulf is declining and could be less if we expanded our own domestic production. Until alternatives that are cost competitive can be developed, DOD should look at alternative ways to reduce price volatility, just as large commercial users do. The second reason for pursuing alternative fuels is related to the first. Greater efficiency reduces costs by reducing the amount of fuel used. The military has been pursuing this goal for some time, as has the private sector. DOD total energy consumption declined by more than 60% between 1985 and 2006, according to Science 2.0. Improvements will continue because of continued investments in new technologies, especially in the private sector, which has market-driven incentives to reduce the cost of fuel consumption. Finally, there is the argument that somehow replacing conventional fuels with bio-fuels will reduce supply chain vulnerability and save lives. Rand also addressed this issue from both the perspective on naval and ground based forces. It concluded that there is no evidence that a floating bio-fuels plant “would be less expensive than using either Navy oilers or commercial tankers to deliver finished fuel products.” It also dismissed the concept of small scale production units that would be co-located with tactical units. It concluded, “any concepts that require delivery of a carbon containing feedstock appear to place a logistical and operational burden on forward-based tactical units that would be well beyond that associated with the delivery of finished fuels.” Future military needs are met by a robust R&D program carried out by the services and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). Letting that agency and the services invest in future technologies to meet their specific service needs and maintain our military strength without political meddling is in the nation’s best interest. Advances in military technology that has civilian applications eventually enters the market place. Take for example the DARPA’s research into improved military communication that eventually developed into internet technology that revolutionized how we communicate and obtain and use information. If DOD pursues research focused on lower costs, greater efficiency, and more secure fuel supplies, the civilian economy will eventually benefit. At a time when the military if faced with substantial budget cuts, allocating scarce resources to pursue so called “clean energy” objectives is worse than wasteful. It borders on a dereliction of duty.

#### Lots of factors prevent great power conflict without hegemony

Fettweis 10 (Christopher J. Professor of Political Science at Tulane, Dangerous Times-The International Politics of Great Power Peace, pg. 175-6)

If the only thing standing between the world and chaos is the US military presence, then an adjustment in grand strategy would be exceptionally counter-productive. But it is worth recalling that none of the other explanations for the decline of war – nuclear weapons, complex economic interdependence, international and domestic political institutions, evolution in ideas and norms – necessitate an activist America to maintain their validity. Were American to become more restrained, nuclear weapons would still affect the calculations of the would be aggressor; the process of globalization would continue, deepening the complexity of economic interdependence; the United Nations could still deploy peacekeepers where necessary; and democracy would not shrivel where it currently exists. More importantly,the idea that war is a worthwhile way to resolve conflict would have no reason to return. As was argued in chapter 2, normative evolution is typically unidirectional. Strategic restraint in such a world be virtually risk free.

#### No impact to the transition

Ikenberry 8 professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University

(John, The Rise of China and the Future of the West Can the Liberal System Survive?, Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb)

Some observers believe that the American era is coming to an end, as the Western-oriented world order is replaced by one increasingly dominated by the East. The historian Niall Ferguson has written that the bloody twentieth century witnessed "the descent of the West" and "a reorientation of the world" toward the East. Realists go on to note that as China gets more powerful and the United States' position erodes, two things are likely to happen: China will try to use its growing influence to reshape the rules and institutions of the international system to better serve its interests, and other states in the system -- especially the declining hegemon -- will start to see China as a growing security threat. The result of these developments, they predict, will be tension, distrust, and conflict, the typical features of a power transition. In this view, the drama of China's rise will feature an increasingly powerful China and a declining United States locked in an epic battle over the rules and leadership of the international system. And as the world's largest country emerges not from within but outside the established post-World War II international order, it is a drama that will end with the grand ascendance of China and the onset of an Asian-centered world order. That course, however, is not inevitable. The rise of China does not have to trigger a wrenching hegemonic transition. The U.S.-Chinese power transition can be very different from those of the past because China faces an international order that is fundamentally different from those that past rising states confronted. China does not just face the United States; it faces a Western-centered system that is open, integrated, and rule-based, with wide and deep political foundations. The nuclear revolution, meanwhile, has made war among great powers unlikely -- eliminating the major tool that rising powers have used to overturn international systems defended by declining hegemonic states. Today's Western order, in short, is hard to overturn and easy to join. This unusually durable and expansive order is itself the product of farsighted U.S. leadership. After World War II, the **United States** did not simply establish itself as the leading world power. It led in the creation of universal institutions that not only invited global membership but also brought democracies and market societies closer together. It built an order that facilitated the participation and integration of both established great powers and newly independent states. (It is often forgotten that this postwar order was designed in large part to reintegrate the defeated Axis states and the beleaguered Allied states into a unified international system.) Today, China can gain full access to and thrive within this system. And if it does, China will rise, but the Western order -- if managed properly -- will live on.

### Shipping

#### Warming is irreversible

ANI 10 (“IPCC has underestimated climate-change impacts, say scientists”, 3-20, One India, http://news.oneindia.in/2010/03/20/ipcchas-underestimated-climate-change-impacts-sayscientis.html)

According to Charles H. Greene, Cornell professor of Earth and atmospheric science, "Even if all man-made greenhouse gas emissions were stopped tomorrow and carbon-dioxide levels stabilized at today's concentration, by the end of this century, the global average temperature would increase by about 4.3 degrees Fahrenheit, or about 2.4 degrees centigrade above pre-industrial levels, which is significantly above the level which scientists and policy makers agree is a threshold for dangerous climate change." "Of course, greenhouse gas emissions will not stop tomorrow, so the actual temperature increase will likely be significantly larger, resulting in potentially catastrophic impacts to society unless other steps are taken to reduce the Earth's temperature," he added. "Furthermore, while the oceans have slowed the amount of warming we would otherwise have seen for the level of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, the ocean's thermal inertia will also slow the cooling we experience once we finally reduce our greenhouse gas emissions," he said. This means that the temperature rise we see this century will be largely irreversible for the next thousand years. "Reducing greenhouse gas emissions alone is unlikely to mitigate the risks of dangerous climate change," said Green.

#### Long timeframe and adaptation solves

Robert O. Mendelsohn 9, the Edwin Weyerhaeuser Davis Professor, Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, Yale University, June 2009, “Climate Change and Economic Growth,” online: http://www.growthcommission.org/storage/cgdev/documents/gcwp060web.pdf

The heart of the debate about climate change comes from a number of warnings from scientists and others that give the impression that human-induced climate change is an immediate threat to society (IPCC 2007a,b; Stern 2006). Millions of people might be vulnerable to health effects (IPCC 2007b), crop production might fall in the low latitudes (IPCC 2007b), water supplies might dwindle (IPCC 2007b), precipitation might fall in arid regions (IPCC 2007b), extreme events will grow exponentially (Stern 2006), and between 20–30 percent of species will risk extinction (IPCC 2007b). Even worse, there may be catastrophic events such as the melting of Greenland or Antarctic ice sheets causing severe sea level rise, which would inundate hundreds of millions of people (Dasgupta et al. 2009). Proponents argue there is no time to waste. Unless greenhouse gases are cut dramatically today, economic growth and well‐being may be at risk (Stern 2006).These statements are largely alarmist and misleading. Although climate change is a serious problem that deserves attention, society’s immediate behavior has an extremely low probability of leading to catastrophic consequences. The science and economics of climate change is quite clear that emissions over the next few decades will lead to only mild consequences. The severe impacts predicted by alarmists require a century (or two in the case of Stern 2006) of no mitigation. Many of the predicted impacts assume there will be no or little adaptation. The net economic impacts from climate change over the next 50 years will be small regardless. Most of the more severe impacts will take more than a century or even a millennium to unfold and many of these “potential” impacts will never occur because people will adapt. It is not at all apparent that immediate and dramatic policies need to be developed to thwart long‐range climate risks. What is needed are long‐run balanced responses.

#### Naval force readiness high – new ship acquisitions solve

**O'Rourke 12** (Ronald, Specialist in Naval Affairs, “Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress,” 8-9-12, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL32665.pdf)

In February 2006, the Navy presented to Congress a goal of achieving and maintaining a fleet of **313 ships**, consisting of certain types and quantities of ships. On March 28, 2012, the Department of Defense (DOD) submitted to Congress an FY2013 30-year (FY2013-FY2042) **shipbuilding plan** that includes a new goal for a fleet of about 310-316 ships. The Navy is conducting a force structure assessment, to be completed later this year, that could lead to a refinement of this 310316-ship plan. The Navy’s proposed FY2013 budget requests funding for the procurement of **10 new battle force** ships (i.e., ships that count against the 310-316 ship goal). The 10 ships include one Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) class aircraft carrier, two Virginia-class attack submarines, two DDG-51 class Aegis destroyers, four Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs), and one Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV). These ships are all funded through the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN) account.

#### Naval power is good for nothing

**Reed 8** [John T. Reed, West Point Graduate and platoon leader in the 82nd Airborne Division., June, 2008.<"Are U.S. Navy surface ships sitting ducks to enemies with modern weapons?"http://www.johntreed.com/sittingducks.html]

I have read media stories that said whenever the U.S. Navy did computer war games against the Soviet Union, all significant U.S. Navy surface ships were destroyed by the Soviets within about **20 minutes** of the start of the computerized war. How? Nukes. A reader says that the Soviet submarines in the Cuban missile crisis had nuclear torpedoes which they would have used if we did an amphibious landing. I have no way to confirm that. Although the Navy ships and their carrier-based planes perform spectacularly well against third-rate enemies like Afghanistan and Iraq, I wonder how they would do against Argentina or any other enemy equipped with modern weapons. In short, I wonder if **U.S. Navy surface vessels are obsolete.** Think about it. They are large, slow-moving, metal objects that float on the surface of the ocean—in the Twenty-First Century! Ocean liners were the main way to get across the oceans for civilian passengers until the second half of the Twentieth Century. Since then, most people have used planes because they are much faster and cheaper. Except the U.S. military. Civilians essentially got rid of their “navy” around 1950. Only the hidebound military would still have a Navy in the Twenty-First Century. Nowadays, civilians only ride passenger ships for pleasure cruises. An argument can be made that the Navy does the same. Only maybe the old line, “you can tell the men from the boys by the size of their toys” is a more accurate way to put it. Navy brass want to grow up to captain a ship. A big ship. The bigger the better. Before WW II, they wanted to be captains of battleships. After WW II, British historian B.H. Liddell Hart said, “A battleship had long been to an admiral what a cathedral is to a bishop.” Now Navy officers want to captain aircraft carriers. Very exciting. Very romantic. Great fun. But obsolete. WW II in the Pacific last time they were not obsolete The last time we used them to fight worthy opponents was in the Pacific during World War II. At that time, warring navies had to send out slow-moving patrol planes to search for the enemy’s ships. The motion picture Midway does an excellent job of showing both the Japanese and the Americans doing this. Low-visibility weather would often hide ships back then. Easily detected- Those days are long gone. Surface ships are not only easily seen by the human eye absent fog or clouds, they are also easily detected, pinpointed, and tracked by such technologies as radar, sonar, infrared detectors, motion detectors, noise detectors, magnetic field detectors, and so forth. Nowadays, you can probably create an Exocet-type, anti-ship missile from stuff you could buy at Radio Shack. Surface ships can no longer hide from the enemy like they did in World War II. Satellites- Satellites and spy planes obviate the need for World War II-type patrol planes and blimps, unless someone shoots them down, in which case planes can accomplish the same thing.. Too slow- Anti-ship missiles can travel at speeds up to, what, 20,000 miles an hour in the case of an ICBM aimed at a carrier task force. Carriers move at 30 knots or so which is 34.6 miles per hour. Too thin-skinned- Can you armor the ships so anti-ship missiles do not damage them? Nope. They have to stay relatively light so they can float and go 34.6 miles per hour. Cannot defend themselves-Can you arm them with anti-missile defenses? They are trying. They have electronic Gatling guns that automatically shoot down the incoming missiles. But no doubt those Gatling guns have a certain capacity as to number of targets they can hit at a time and range and ammunition limitations. They also, like any mechanical device, would malfunction at times. Generally, one would expect that if the enemy fired enough missiles at a Gatling-gun-equipped ship, one or more would eventually get through. How many? Let’s say the capacity of an aircraft carrier and its entourage body-guard ships to stop simultaneous Exocet-type anti-ship missiles is X. The enemy then need only simultaneously fire X + 1 such missiles to damage or sink the carrier. In the alternative, the enemy could fire one Exocet-type missile at a time at the carrier. Unless they are programmed otherwise, having only one such target, all the relevant guns would fire at it, thereby exhausting the carrier task force’s anti- missile ammunition more quickly, in which case fewer than X +1 Exocet-type missiles might be enough to put the carrier out of action. As Japan’s top WW II Admiral Yamamoto said, There is no such thing as an unsinkable ship. The fiercest serpent may be overcome by a swarm of ants. U.S. warships also have electronic warfare jamming devices that screw up the guidance systems of some types of incoming missiles. These, of course, are ineffective against nuclear-tipped missiles that need little guidance. Furthermore, if the enemy uses 20,000-miles-per-hour nuclear missiles, there is no known anti-missile defense. They move too fast for the electronic Gatling guns and do not need to ever get within the Gatling guns’ range to destroy the ships. Our enemy certainly would use nukes if they had enough of them and were in an all-out war against us. Cannot hide, run, or defend themselves In summary, Navy surface ships cannot hide from a modern enemy. They cannot run from a modern enemy. And they cannot defend themselves against a modern enemy. Accordingly, they are only useful for action against backward enemies like Afghanistan and Iraq or drug smugglers.

#### Asian war is unlikely --- regional initiatives check

Bitzinger and Desker ‘8 (senior fellow and dean of S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies respectively (Richard A. Bitzinger, Barry Desker, “Why East Asian War is Unlikely,” Survival, December 2008, http://pdfserve.informaworld.com-/678328\_731200556\_906256449.pdf)

The Asia-Pacific region can be regarded as a zone of both relative insecurity and strategic stability. It contains some of the world’s most significant flashpoints – the Korean peninsula, the Taiwan Strait, the Siachen Glacier – where tensions between nations could escalate to the point of major war. It is replete with unresolved border issues; is a breeding ground for transnationa terrorism and the site of many terrorist activities (the Bali bombings, the Manila superferry bombing); and contains overlapping claims for maritime territories (the Spratly Islands, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands) with considerable actual or potential wealth in resources such as oil, gas and fisheries. Finally, the Asia-Pacific is an area of strategic significance with many key sea lines of communication and important chokepoints**. Yet despite all these potential crucibles of conflict, the Asia-Pacific, if not an area of serenity and calm, is certainly more stable than one might expect**. To be sure, there are separatist movements and internal struggles, particularly with insurgencies, as in Thailand, the Philippines and Tibet. Since the resolution of the East Timor crisis, however, the region has been relatively free of open armed warfare. Separatism remains a challenge, but the break-up of states is unlikely. Terrorism is a nuisance, but its impact is contained. The North Korean nuclear issue, while not fully resolved, is at least moving toward a conclusion with the likely denuclearisation of the peninsula. Tensions between China and Taiwan, while always just beneath the surface, seem unlikely to erupt in open conflict any time soon, especially given recent Kuomintang Party victories in Taiwan and efforts by Taiwan and China to re-open informal channels of consultation as well as institutional relationships between organisations responsible for cross-strait relations. And while in Asia there is no strong supranational political entity like the European Union, there are many multilateral organisations and international initiatives dedicated to enhancing peace and stability, including the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation. In Southeast Asia, countries are united in a common eopolitical and economic organisation – the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) – which is dedicated to peaceful economic, social and cultural development, and to the promotion of regional peace and stability. ASEAN has played a key role in conceiving and establishing broader regional institutions such as the East Asian Summit, ASEAN+3 (China, Japan and South Korea) and the ASEAN Regional Forum. **All this suggests that war in Asia – while not inconceivable – is unlikely.**

#### South China Seas are stable – China lacks capability and interdependence checks

Rosenberg 9 (David, Professor of Political Science – Middlebury College and Research Fellow at the Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies – Australian National University, “Dire Straits: Competing Security Priorities in the South China Sea”, The Asia-Pacific Journal, 3-20, http://japanfocus.org/-David-Rosenberg/1773)

From the Taiwan Strait to the Strait of Malacca, security concerns are growing around the South China Sea. While the Bush Administration sees a resurgent Chinese military threat across the Taiwan Strait and a terrorist threat in the Strait of Malacca, many countries between the Straits are more concerned about security for their maritime resources from the threats of competitors, traffickers, poachers, and pirates. Security Concerns in the South China Sea Several recent statements and appointments highlight the current Bush administration view of China's threat to Taiwan. Porter Goss, director of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, warned that improved Chinese capabilities not only threaten Taiwan but also U.S. forces in the (western Pacific) region. U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld worried that the Chinese navy was building some amphibious landing ships for possible use across the Taiwan Strait. The appointment of combative neoconservative John Bolton as U.S. ambassador to the United Nations sends a clear and ominous signal: formerly a paid consultant to the Taiwanese government, Bolton has advocated Taiwan's independence and its full U.N. membership. Then, in February 2005, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and their Japanese counterparts announced a significant alteration in the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance by identifying security in the Taiwan Strait as a "common strategic objective." Has there been any big shift in the balance of power around the Taiwan Strait that warrants this U.S. response? The Chinese defense budget has grown by double-digit increases for the past fourteen years. This year it's up by 12 percent. But that is not significantly faster than the Chinese economy as a whole is growing. China is modernizing its defenses -- adding anti-ship missiles to aircraft, acquiring AWACS-airborne early warning and control systems, guided missile destroyers and frigates. However, its power projection capabilities are limited. It lacks any long-range amphibious capability or support infrastructure to supply forces over long distances for a protracted period. It also lacks heavy cargo-carrying aircraft, comprehensive air defenses, seaworthy ships, and aircraft carriers. Given the current state of Chinese equipment and training, the Chinese have no capability to pursue an expansionist maritime policy in the Taiwan Strait or the South China Sea. [1] By contrast, the U.S. has overwhelming military superiority and an expansive network of military bases across the Asia-Pacific. The U.S. Pacific Fleet is the world's largest naval command, including approximately 190 ships, about 1,400 Navy and Marine Corps aircraft and 35 shore installations. Over 300,000 Navy, Army, Air Force, Marine Corps, Special Operations, and Intelligence military personnel are integrated under the unified command of PACOM, the U.S. Pacific Command. What are China's strategic goals between the Straits? China's Defense White Paper of 2002 emphasizes the importance of pursuing peaceful external relations initiatives through multilateral, cooperative approaches to promote domestic development. The most recent Defense White Paper, published in December of 2004, reiterates this priority. More important than statements of good intentions, however, China has taken significant steps to implement this goal. It was evident in the Framework Agreement on ASEAN-China Comprehensive Economic Cooperation, negotiated in November 2002. That led to the agreement signed in November 2004 to implement an ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (FTA) by 2010. Following the 10th Summit Meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), in Vientiane, Laos in November 2004, Beijing held its own summit with ASEAN leaders (ASEAN Plus One) and then joined Japan and the Republic of Korea in discussions with ASEAN leaders (ASEAN Plus Three, or APT). Beijing had earlier in November hosted the first Security Policy Conference of the ASEAN Regional Forum. It featured an anti-piracy drill and a workshop on countering terrorism. Regional Economic and Financial Agreements Regional economic agreements were the main achievements of these meetings. However, the ASEAN Plus Three sessions identified other areas for cooperation, including deeper cooperation in investment and finance, expanded security dialogue and cooperation, expanded cultural exchanges, and periodic progress reviews. Perhaps the most dramatic developments have occurred in regional financial cooperation. Finance ministers of the ASEAN+3 countries have launched an Asian Bond Markets Initiative and the regional central bankers group set up two Asian Bond Funds in early 2005. These are key steps in addressing one of the major weaknesses in the region's development as indicated by the currency and financial crisis that struck large parts of the region in 1997: the heavy reliance by firms on short-term bank loans for financing. As Jennifer Amyx notes, many countries in East Asia maintain high savings rates but, because of the absence of stable long-term debt markets, the savings deposited into local banks tended to be funneled out to international financial centers and then back into the region as short-term foreign currency loans. This situation creates a problem referred to as a "double mismatch" -- that is, a mismatch between debt maturities (short-term borrowing for long-term investments) and the denomination of this debt (in foreign rather than local currencies). [2] The ASEAN+3 finance ministers had earlier set up a network of bilateral currency swaps to permit a country beset by a speculative attack to draw on reserves of other nations. The program -- the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) -- went into effect at the end of 2003. Japan, with the largest reserves in the region, led negotiations over swap arrangements and will play the role of arbitrator for currency loans. China, another potential lender with substantial reserves in excess of potential needs, also lent its support to the CMI. Widespread participation by ASEAN Plus Three members in these initiatives encourages smooth financial liberalization processes and thereby bolsters regional stability. It also reinforces the efforts of various working groups to improve transparency and information dissemination and to strengthen settlement systems and regulatory reforms. China's shift to a more proactive position on regional financial cooperation has greatly facilitated these recent financial developments. As a result, interdependence between the Chinese economy and other economies in the region has deepened significantly in recent years. Today, trade by ASEAN member nations with China far exceeds trade conducted within the ASEAN grouping, while China is predicted to soon overtake the United States as Japan's top trading partner. Levels of investment in China by countries in the region are also extremely high. The worst case scenario is not Chinese domination but a Chinese meltdown, as many regional monetary authorities are quick to note.

#### No US-China war – economics

Shor 12 (Francis, Professor of History – Wayne State, “Declining US Hegemony and Rising Chinese Power: A Formula for Conflict?”, Perspectives on Global Development and Technology, 11(1), pp. 157-167)

While the United States no longer dominates the global economy as it did during the first two decades after WWII, it still is the leading economic power in the world. However, over the last few decades China, with all its internal contradictions, has made enormous leaps until it now occupies the number two spot. In fact, the IMF recently projected that the Chinese economy would become the world's largest in 2016. In manufacturing China has displaced the US in so many areas, including becoming the number one producer of steel and exporter of four-fifths of all of the textile products in the world and two-thirds of the world's copy machines, DVD players, and microwaves ovens. Yet, a significant portion of this manufacturing is still owned by foreign companies, including U.S. firms like General Motors. [5] On the other hand, China is also the largest holder of U.S. foreign reserves, e.g. treasury bonds. This may be one of the reasons mitigating full-blown conflict with the U.S. now, since China has such a large stake in the U.S. economy, both as a holder of bonds and as the leading exporter of goods to the U.S. Nonetheless, "the U.S. has blocked several large scale Chinese investments and buyouts of oil companies, technology firms, and other enterprises." [6] In effect, there are still clear nation-centric responses to China's rising economic power, especially as an expression of the U.S. governing elite's ideological commitment to national security.

#### No disease impact

Lederberg 99 (Joshua, Professor of Genetics – Stanford University School of Medicine, Epidemic The World of Infectious Disease, p. 13)

The toll of the fourteenth-century plague, the "Black Death," was closer to one third. If the bugs' potential to develop adaptations that could kill us off were the whole story, we would not be here. However, with very rare exceptions, our microbial adversaries have a **shared interest** in our survival. Almost any pathogen comes to a **dead end** when we die; it first has to communicate itself to another host in order to survive. So historically, the really severe host- pathogen interactions have resulted in a **wipeout** of **both** host and pathogen. We humans are still here because, so far, the pathogens that have attacked us have willy-nilly had an interest in our survival. This is a very delicate balance, and it is easily disturbed, often in the wake of large-scale ecological upsets.

#### No food wars

Barnett in ’00 (Jon, Australian Research Council fellow and Senior Lecturer in Development Studies @ Melbourne U. School of Social and Environmental Enquiry, Review of International Studies, “Destabilizing the environment-conflict Thesis”, 26:271-288, Cambridge Journals Online)

Considerable attention has been paid to the links between population, the environment and conflict. The standard argument is that population growth will overextend the natural resources of the immediate environs, leading to deprivation which, it is assumed, will lead to conflict and instability either directly through competition for scarce resources, or indirectly through the generation of ‘environmental refugees’. For example, according to Myers: ‘so great are the stresses generated by too many people making too many demands on their natural-resource stocks and their institutional support systems, that the pressures often create first-rate breeding grounds for conflict’.37 The ways in which population growth leads to environmental degradation are reasonably well known. However, the particular ways in which this leads to conflict are difficult to prove. In the absence of proof there is a negative style of argumentation, and there are blanket assertions and abrogations; for example: ‘the relationship is rarely causative in a direct fashion’, but ‘we may surmise that conflict would not arise so readily, nor would it prove so acute, if the associated factor of population growth were occurring at a more manageable rate’.38 It is possible though, that rather than inducing warfare, overpopulation and famine reduce the capacity of a people to wage war. Indeed, it is less the case that famines in Africa in recent decades have produced ‘first rate breeding grounds for conflict’; the more important, pressing, and avoidable product is widespread malnutrition and large loss of life.

#### They have the link backwards – the shipbuilding industry is reliant on the Navy, not the other way around

Lyons 9 (James Lyons, U.S. Navy retired admiral, was commander in chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, senior U.S. military representative to the United Nations, and deputy chief of naval operations, where he was principal adviser on all Joint Chiefs of Staff matters, “Naval shipbuilders sinking,” 2-22-9, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/feb/22/naval-shipbuilders-sinking/?page=all)

American naval shipbuilders were once the pride of the nation and the envy of the world. During the last 75 years, the nation’s shipbuilding industrial base transformed a relatively small U.S. Navy into the **greatest sea power** the world has ever known, during and after World War II. Even with today’s declining number of ships, that **dominance has been maintained** with our advanced technology and the ingenuity of the American sailor and worker. There is now a great debate about the future structure of the U.S. Navy. The outcome could well decide whether the last remaining significant heavy shipbuilding capability in the United States can survive. The debate has to do with what kind of naval surface ships the country needs to build for the future. Capable surface combatants are key because they are the backbone and most visible assets for safeguarding U.S. national security interests and ensuring freedom of the seas and economic stability. U.S. strategy has been to forward-deploy our naval forces as one of the key elements in maintaining the proper level of deterrence and stability, in order to meet our global responsibilities. Should deterrence fail, we have had the recognized naval combat power to prevail. The key has always been providing the next generation of warships with overmatching combat power and advanced technology to maintain U.S. dominance at sea. The problem today is that faced with declining numbers of naval ships, an uncertain threat environment and replacement costs spiraling out of control, Navy leadership has decided to abandon or delay procuring the next generation of surface combatants in the name of “affordability.” The chief of naval operations (CNO) recently announced a decision to truncate the purchase of the next generation Zumwalt DDG-1000 class to only two ships from originally 31 planned. Instead of moving ahead with this state-of-the-art stealthy warship with unsurpassed situational awareness and armed to provide long-range missile and gunfire support to forces ashore, the CNO chose to restart production of the Arleigh Burke class DDG-51 destroyers with their 30-year-old technology. The Navy decision to reverse course, delivered pre-emptively to a largely unconvinced Congress as well as contractors, without the benefit of supporting analysis, has left the Navy’s future shipbuilding plans in troubled waters. If the U.S. Navy is ever to have a boost phase anti-ballistic missile intercept capability, then the technology of the DDG-1000 is essential. Naval shipbuilders have fallen on hard times as orders for naval surface combatants have significantly declined. Only two major shipyards remain that produce surface combatants. The shipbuilding executives, who should be making the case, have been AWOL. Shipbuilders have an obligation, in coordination with the Navy, to bring their insight and expertise to the task of choosing the best path forward. The taxpayers also have an abiding interest in the outcome since the Navy is their first line of defense and at the end of the day, they pay the bill. Of all the stakeholders in this debate, only the shipbuilders face the prospects of extinction if the wrong program is chosen. The skills needed to build a commercial ship **do not translate** into building a naval combat ship. Constructing a naval combat ship requires technical disciplines and expertise in the work force that takes years to develop. The capital costs involved in building naval combatant ships that last at least 30 years requires a solid analytical underpinning to support the required essential investments. If the United States is to remain the leading world power, our predominate control of the sea is critical. Therefore, a wrong decision on future naval surface combatants or one with unforeseen future consequences for the shipyards could ultimately put them in a further reduced status. Inexplicably, the executives of the last remaining U.S. naval shipyards have chosen to sit this one out. They have not joined in the debate, have issued gag orders to their employees and have not helped either competing defense contractors or the Navy to make their respective case. Could it be that the corporate leaders have muzzled their shipyard executives? In July 2008, Congress demanded, but has not yet received, any compelling Navy analysis to support the CNO’s decision to curtail DDG-1000 and restart DDG-51 production. After seven months of noncompliance with the congressional mandate, one can only conclude that no substantive internal Navy analysis of cost comparisons and producibility studies exists. So why haven’t the shipbuilders provided such analysis to the Navy to present to Congress? Almost 50 states have a stake in building naval ships. Moreover, why have there been no complaints or caveats from the shipyards on the potential downsides of creating gaps in their workload, arresting development of their work force and perpetuating obsolescent technology? Surely, an industrial enterprise with the size and complexity to build modern warships has a long-term business model with appropriate cost comparisons, projections of future work and predictions of their future competitiveness and profitability. Could it be that the shipbuilders are so desperate for any and all Navy work that they are relinquishing control of their futures solely to the vicissitudes of the green shade budgeters? American shipbuilders have not always chosen to sit on the sidelines. From a standing start in the midst of the Great Depression, the shipbuilding industry led the recovery from years of economic stagnation by putting America back to work. President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s naval expansion program had set the nation on the path of building a Navy second to none, but it was the task of America’s shipyards to deliver the goods. One has only to read the daily papers to see that today’s reluctant shipbuilders may ultimately pay a high price for not taking a stand or entering the fray. Defense Secretary Robert Gates said “hard choices” on weapons spending would be necessary when he testified before congressional defense committees on Jan. 27. In an article appearing in Foreign Affairs the same month, Mr. Gates went on to say, “The United States cannot expect to eliminate national security risks through higher defense budgets, to do everything and buy everything. The Department of Defense must set priorities and consider **inescapable tradeoffs** and opportunity costs.” That budget, absent any compelling shipbuilding analysis, most likely will not be calling for increases in the Navy budget.

## 2NC – T, Electricity Prices DA, Case

### Not Procurement – A2: We Meet

#### Financial incentives excludes government purchasing---that’s voluntary or regulatory support

**Menz, 5 -** Faculty of Economics and Finance, School of Business, Clarkson University, Bertrand H. Snell Hall, Potsdam, NY, also from the Center for International Climate and Environmental Research, Oslo (CICERO), Norway (Fredric, “Green electricity policies in the United States: case study,” Energy Policy, December, Science Direct) **Italics in original**

There is considerable variation among states in both their regulatory environments and the policies that have been implemented to promote green electricity. In the following discussion, state and local policy instruments are categorized as financial incentives, rules and regulations, and voluntary measures.[7](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0301421504001648#fn7)Financial incentives include various subsidies and/or funding in direct support of green electricity projects, tax incentives (credits, deductions, or exemptions), and provisions for zero-interest or low-interest loans. Rules and regulations include requirements that utilities distribute a minimum share of electricity from renewable or green energy sources, green power purchase requirements for government entities, and net-metering requirements for consumers with small renewable generating facilities. Voluntary measures include green power products aimed at electricity consumers, green power certificate programs, and other programs to increase market support for renewable energy technologies.

### Not Procurement – 2NC Overview

#### Topical Affs must increase financial incentives – that requires the government doing something that motivates investment. That is distinct from the plan because procurement bypasses the investment process and just buys the technology – that’s Nelson.

#### Incentives are divided into three distinct categories – there is a difference between “financial incentives” and “nonfinancial incentives” – financial incentives actually promote investment in new technology, but nonfinancial incentives make a technology cost competitive by artificially creating a buyer for that technology – that’s Czinkota. Prefer it because it’s about investment strategy and has intent to define.

#### There’s a clear and fair list of topical affs: loans, loan guarantees, tax credits, rebates, direct grants are all topical incentive affs, not to mention every restriction they could have read.

#### Here’s evidence that there is a topical version of their plan – governmental definitions conclude you can use financial incentives to purchase new technology, but that is distinct from procurement.

DOE 7 (Department of Energy, “Regulatory Impact Analysis for Today's Energy Conservation Standards for Residential Furnaces and Boilers,” September, http://www1.eere.energy.gov/buildings/appliance\_standards/residential/pdfs/fb\_fr\_tsd/ria.pdf)

2.2 Non-Regulatory Policy Assumptions

2.2.1 No New Regulatory Action

The case in which no new regulatory action is taken with regard to residential furnace and boiler efficiency constitutes the base case scenario described in Chapter 10 of the Furnace and Boiler TSD. 1 This case defines the basis of comparison for all other scenarios. By definition, no new regulatory action yields zero energy savings and an NPV of zero dollars.

2.2.2 Financial Incentives Policies

DOE considered scenarios in which the Federal government would provide two types of financial incentives: **tax credits and rebates**. Tax credits could be granted to consumers who purchased target-level furnace and boiler equipment, or the government could issue tax credits to manufacturers to offset costs associated with producing such equipment. The government also could provide consumers with a cash rebate at the time of purchase. DOE’s evaluation of financial incentive policies used a comprehensive study of the potential for energy efficiency in California performed by Xenergy, Inc., which summarizes experience with various utility rebate programs. 2 Xenergy developed a re-parameterized, mixedsource information diffusion model to estimate market impacts induced by financial incentives for energy-efficient appliances. The basic premise of this mixed-source model is that information diffusion drives technology adoption. The model is formulated to characterize the influences of both internal and external sources of information on consumer behavior by superimposing two components in the equation, each capturing the effect of one of two different types of information source. The effects of these two types of information diffusion mechanisms are different. Internal sources of information influence consumers to purchase new products due mainly to word-of-mouth from early adopters, while external information sources influence consumers to change their adoption decisions as a result of marketing efforts and information coming from outside the consumer group. The mixed-source model describes a combined impact of the two information-source types, and specific parameterization determines consumer adoption behavior. (Appendix X of the TSD contains further details.) Xenergy’s model combined these two information diffusion mechanisms and generated a set of “implementation curves,” which Xenergy calibrated using evaluation data from utility rebate programs conducted in the1990s. Consumer response to rebate incentives appears to be a combination of the two information source types. The implementation curves illustrate the increased penetration of efficient equipment (i.e., increased market share) as a result of consumer response to benefit/cost (B/C) ratio changes induced by a specific rebate program. The implementation curves are used to depict various diffusion patterns based on perceived barriers to consumer purchase of high-efficiency equipment. There are implementation curves for varying levels of market barriers, from “no barriers” to “extremely high barriers.” These curves provide a means to study the impact of changing the B/C ratio, by reducing the initial equipment cost through financial incentives, on the consumer participation rate. To further understand the impacts of financial incentives policies, DOE used studies on forecasting the impact of consumer tax credits. 3, 4 This research differentiated the impact of tax credits into the “direct price effect,” which arises from the incremental equipment cost savings, and the “announcement effect,” which is independent of the rebate amount. The announcement effect derives from the credibility that a particular technology receives from its inclusion in an incentive program, as well as changes in product marketing strategy, and the resulting modifications in markups and pricing. DOE assumed that the direct price effect and the announcement effect would also apply to rebate programs, and that half of the increases in RIA-5 market penetration associated with rebates would be due to the direct price effect and half to the announcement effect. Consumer Rebates DOE modeled the impact of the consumer rebate policy by determining the increase in market penetration of target-level equipment relative to the base case. For non-weatherized gas furnaces, DOE estimated the impact of increasing the B/C ratio via a rebate that paid 26 percent of the incremental installed cost between a non-weatherized gas furnace meeting the base case efficiency level a and a unit meeting the target efficiency. DOE based the 26 percent rebate amount on rebate programs for condensing gas furnaces throughout the nation. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 The average rebate in these programs amounted to about 26 percent of the incremental installed cost for condensing furnaces. For gas boilers, DOE assumed that the rebate would cover 60 percent of the incremental installed cost between a boiler meeting the base case efficiency level and a unit meeting the target efficiency. It based this amount on the average rebate level in programs for 85 percent AFUE gas boilers, b which amounted to about 60 percent of incremental installed cost. 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 15 DOE assumed the rebates would remain in effect until they had transformed the market so that the market shift in efficiency shares seen in the first year of the program would be maintained throughout the forecast period (2015–2038). DOE first calculated the B/C ratio for the unit meeting the target level relative to the base case with no rebate. It then calculated another B/C ratio for the unit meeting the target level, with a rebate, relative to the base case unit. Because of the incremental cost reduction due to the rebate, the B/C ratio for the rebate policy unit is larger (see Table RIA.3). a The base case is a market weighted-average of units at several AFUE levels. b While the target level (82 percent) is lower than 85-percent AFUE for these rebate programs, DOE assumed that a rebate program could be designed to pay an equivalent percentage of the incremental installed costs of the targeted gas boilers. RIA-6 Table RIA.3 Benefit/Cost Ratios for Today's Standard and Rebate Policy Cases NWGF\* at 90% AFUE GB\*\* at 82% AFUE Benefit (Lifetime Operating Cost Savings) $524 $333 Incremental Installed Cost (Increased Installed Cost) $698 $168 B/C Ratio with no rebate 0.8 2.0 Rebate Amount Adjusted Incremental Installed Cost (Increased Installed Cost after Rebate) $180 $518 $101 $67 B/C Ratio for Rebate Policy Case 1.0 5.0 \*NWGF = non-weatherized gas furnace \*\*GB = gas boiler DOE then used the curves shown in Figures RIA.1, RIA.2, RIA.4, and RIA.5 to estimate the increased percentage of consumers who would purchase the units that meet the policy target levels if given a rebate incentive. For non-weatherized gas furnaces at a 90-percent AFUE standard level, DOE chose the “moderate barriers,” since 90 percent AFUE imposes an economic burden for a large fraction of southern customers. For gas boilers at the 82-percent AFUE standard level, DOE chose the “low barriers,” since these efficiency levels are a common product with relatively large market share in 2004. DOE also used the “low barriers” curve for the other product classes. Figures RIA.1 and RIA.2 show the penetration rates of target-level units as a function of B/C ratios. Using this method, DOE estimated that, for the non-weatherized gas furnace product class, the market share of equipment meeting the policy target due to a rebate policy would increase by 1.2 percent at a target level of 90-percent AFUE. For the gas boiler product class, DOE estimated that the market share of equipment meeting the policy target due to a rebate policy would increase by 19 percent for 82-percent AFUE units. To calculate the impacts of this policy, DOE adjusted the base case shipments projection in the NES model to reflect these percentage increases in market share of efficient furnace and boiler models. RIA-7 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 Participant Benefit-Cost Ratio Max mu i m Penetration Rate Moderate Barriers Curve Penetration Rate = 1.1% at B/C ratio of 0.8 Penetration Rate = 2.3% at B/C ratio of 1.0 Change of Penetration Rate = 1.2% Figure RIA.1 Market Penetration Curve for Non-Weatherized Gas Furnaces at 90 Percent AFUE Level 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 Participant Benefit-Cost Ratio Max mi um Penetrat oi n Rate Low Barriers Curve Penetration Rate = 38% at B/C ratio of 2 Penetration Rate = 57% at B/C ratio of 5 Change of Penetration Rate = 19% Figure RIA.2 Market Penetration Curve for Gas Boilers at 82 Percent AFUE Level RIA-8 Consumer Tax Credits DOE assumed a consumer tax credit equivalent to the amount covered by rebates (i.e., 26 percent of the incremental cost between non-weatherized gas furnace base case equipment and equipment meeting the policy target levels, and 60 percent of the incremental cost for gas boilers). DOE estimated that the consumer participation rate would be lower than that for consumer rebates. Research on tax credits has shown that the time delay to the consumer in receiving a reimbursement via tax credit, plus the added transaction costs in tax return preparation, make the tax credit incentive less effective than a rebate received at the time of purchase. Based on previous analysis, 16 DOE assumed that only 60 percent of the customers who would take advantage of a rebate would take advantage of the tax credit. Using a similar approach as for the rebate policy, DOE estimated that the market share of target-efficiency gas furnace units would increase due to consumer tax credits by 0.7 percent over the base case at the 90-percent AFUE level. For gas boilers at 82-percent AFUE, the market share would increase by 12.5 percent. DOE assumed the impact of this policy would be to permanently transform the market so that the shipment-weighted efficiency gain seen in the first year of the program would be maintained throughout the forecast period. Manufacturer Tax Credits DOE assumed that a manufacturer tax credit program would effectively result in a lower price to the consumer by an amount equivalent to that provided by rebates (i.e., 26 percent of the incremental price difference for furnaces meeting base case efficiency levels and those meeting the policy targets, and 60 percent of the incremental price difference for boilers). Because these tax credits would go to manufacturers instead of consumers, DOE assumed that manufacturers would pass on the reduced costs, causing the direct price effect. However, DOE assumed that the announcement effect would not occur because the program would not be visible to the consumers. Since the direct price effect is approximately equivalent to the announcement effect, 3 DOE assumed that half of the consumers assumed to take advantage of consumer tax credits would purchase more-efficient products with a manufacturer tax credit program. As a result, DOE estimated that the market share of efficient non-weatherized gas furnaces would increase due to manufacturer tax credits by 0.4 percent over the base case at the 90-percent AFUE standard level and by 6.2 percent for gas boilers at the 82-percent AFUE standard level. DOE assumed the impact of this policy would be to permanently transform the market so that the shipment-weighted efficiency gain seen in the first year of the program would be maintained throughout the forecast period.

2.2.3 Voluntary Energy-Efficiency Targets

For a non-weatherized gas furnace target level of 90-percent AFUE, DOE assumed that the voluntary target would be achieved through manufacturer participation in a gradual phaseout of production of units below 90-percent AFUE. It assumed that this phaseout would increase from 2015. 17 RIA-9 For gas boilers at 82-percent AFUE, DOE modeled the voluntary efficiency target policy assuming expansion of existing Energy Star endorsement labeling programs conducted by the Environmental Protection Agency and DOE for these two products. 18 The Energy Star program sets minimum energy-efficiency specifications for various products, including furnace and boiler equipment. Energy Star encourages consumer adoption of these products through marketing to promote consumer label recognition, adoption of the specifications by various efficiency incentive programs, and manufacturer production and promotion of Energy Star-compliant appliances. For gas boilers, DOE estimated that an expanded Energy Star program that targeted 82- percent AFUE equipment could moderately increase the market share at these levels. In this case, DOE used estimates of the market impact of the existing Energy Star programs. 17, 19 For gas boilers, DOE assumed the programs resulting from this voluntary efficiency targets policy would increase projected market share of the targeted units above the penetration increases estimated by the Energy Star program by 75 percent for gas boilers at the 82-percent AFUE target level. The Energy Star level for gas boilers is 85-percent AFUE. Table RIA.4 shows the estimated market share increases from the voluntary efficiency target policy. RIA-10 Table RIA.4 Increased Market Share Penetration Levels from Voluntary Furnace and Boiler Programs for Targeted Efficiency Levels\* Year of Program Non-Weatherized Gas Furnaces and Mobile Home Furnaces Weatherized Gas Furnaces Oil Furnaces Gas Boilers Oil Boilers 90% AFUE 81% AFUE 82% AFUE 82% AFUE 83% & 84% AFUE 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034 2035 2036 2037 2038 0% 0% 0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 4% 5% 5% 5% 6% 6% 6% 6% 7% 7% 7% 7% 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 0% 0% 0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 4% 5% 5% 5% 6% 6% 6% 6% 7% 7% 7% 7% 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 0% 0% 0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 4% 5% 5% 5% 6% 6% 6% 6% 7% 7% 7% 7% 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 0% 3% 5% 8% 10% 13% 16% 18% 21% 23% 25% 26% 26% 26% 26% 26% 26% 26% 26% 27% 27% 27% 27% 27% 0% 2% 3% 5% 7% 8% 10% 12% 13% 15% 16% 17% 18% 18% 18% 18% 19% 19% 19% 19% 20% 20% 20% 20% \* The percentages in each column refer to shares of the eligible market in each case.

2.2.4 Early Replacement

Early replacement refers to the replacement of furnace and boiler units before the end of

their useful lives. The purpose of this policy is to replace old, inefficient equipment with higherefficiency units. In the 1990s, DOE studied the feasibility of a Federal program to promote early replacement of appliances under the Energy Policy Act of 1992. 20 This study identified policy options for early replacement that included a direct national early replacement program, replacement of Federally owned appliances, promotion through equipment manufacturers, consumer incentives, incentives to utilities, and building regulations. c The analysis concluded that, while cost-effective opportunities for early replacement exist, a widespread Federal early replacement program was not economically justified. Because premature retirement means that a unit may be replaced by an appliance less efficient than the eventual replacement would probably have been, energy savings would be smaller than anticipated. Early replacement programs could increase sales volatility in the long run by (continued...) RIA-11 cFor this analysis, DOE considered a program that targets the units in the stock that have efficiency levels lower than the policy target level and encourages their early replacement with products at the target efficiency level. Shipments not affected by the early replacement program have base case efficiency levels. Shipments to new construction in 2015 and beyond are not affected by this program. (Chapter 9 of the TSD describes the general approach for estimating replacements in each year; the NES model uses a retirement function that tracks the percentage of units retiring and surviving for each vintage.) DOE assumed that a portion of the furnace and boiler units in the existing stock in 2015, the first year of the analysis period, would be replaced by models meeting the target levels. It modeled this policy by assuming an increase of 20 percent (over the natural replacement rate based on units being replaced at the end of their useful lives) in the number of replaced units in the first year. It based this level on one of the cases in the report described above. DOE assumed that the program would last as long as it took to completely replace all of the eligible furnaces and boilers in the stock in the year that the program began (2015). The policy would create a jump in shipments of equipment meeting target AFUE levels relative to the base case in the early years of the program (see Figure RIA.3). As a result, more higher-efficiency units meeting the policy targets would be quickly brought into the equipment stock, leading to an immediate gain in the weighted-average equipment efficiency compared to the base case. However, unlike the other policy cases discussed, the weighted-average efficiency would drop back down to meet the levels in the base case as the eligible stock of equipment for early replacement became depleted. (...continued) encouraging a temporary increase in production followed by a lull in demand. Early replacement could be economical in localities with high energy cost conditions or environmental constraints, when replacement appliances are much more efficient than existing stock, or when a major technology breakthrough has recently occurred, creating the need for a ready market. RIA-12 c0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 Total Sh pi ments (Mill ons i ) Base Case Early Replacement Scenario 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 Figure RIA.3 Early Replacement Shipments Projections for Non-Weatherized Gas Furnaces

2.2.5 Bulk Government Purchases

DOE assumed that a bulk government purchase policy would encourage Federal, State, and local governments to purchase equipment meeting the target levels. Aggregating public sector demand could provide a market signal to manufacturers and vendors that some of their largest customers seek suppliers with products that meet an efficiency target at good prices. This program also could induce market pull” impacts through the effects of manufacturers and vendors achieving economies of scale for high-efficiency products. DOE assumed that government agencies, such as the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), would administer such a program. At the Federal level, this would be an enhancement to the existing Federal Energy Management Program (FEMP). FEMP has procurement guidelines for Federal government equipment purchasing, and Federal construction requirements include these guidelines for installing or replacing equipment. 21 DOE assumed that this policy would impact a subset of housing units for which government agencies purchase or influence the purchase of furnaces and boilers. This subset would mainly consist of public housing and housing on military bases. To represent this subset, DOE considered low-income households identified in the Residential Energy Consumption Survey (RECS) from 2001 22 (see Chapter 11 of the TSD for a description of the low-income household sample). According to RECS 2001, 7.8 percent of the households with gas furnaces and 17.5 percent of those with gas boilers were classified as low-income. DOE assumed that these same percentages of furnace and boiler shipments would go to low-income households in RIA-13 each year. To estimate the market impact, DOE considered previous analysis of the bulk government purchasing policy in the residential air conditioner RIA, 23 where it assumed a fivepercent increase in market share of higher-efficiency units over the base case due to the policy. Since DOE envisions that the policy for furnaces and boilers would build on the existing FEMP program for gas furnaces, DOE assumed that the government purchase policy would likely cause a 10-percent increase in market share in each year. Thus, an additional 10 percent (above the base case) of shipments to eligible low-income households would meet the target levels through this policy. The result is an additional penetration of equipment meeting the target efficiency levels of 0.8 percent and 1.8 percent (10 percent respectively of the low-income households with gas furnaces and gas boilers).

#### It’s a voting issue for limits –

#### They allow for hundreds of small changes. Anything that makes renewable energy more economical becomes topical – that includes eliminating tariffs, moving the grid to remote areas, adjusting price structures, changing import quotas, and not to mentions adding restrictions to coal and natural gas because it would make solar power more profitable and removes a economical obstacle for solar. That independently makes the topic bidirectional.

#### Limits outweigh – they’re the vital access point for any theory impact – its key to fairness – huge research burdens mean we can’t prepare to compete – and its key to education – big topics cause hyper-generics, lack of clash, and shallow debate – and it destroys participation

Rowland 84 (Robert C., Debate Coach – Baylor University, “Topic Selection in Debate”, American Forensics in Perspective, Ed. Parson, p. 53-54)

The first major problem identified by the work group as relating to topic selection is the decline in participation in the National Debate Tournament (NDT) policy debate. As Boman notes: There is a growing dissatisfaction with academic debate that utilizes a policy proposition. Programs which are oriented toward debating the national policy debate proposition, so-called “NDT” programs, are diminishing in scope and size.4 This decline in policy debate is tied, many in the work group believe, to excessively broad topics. The most obvious characteristic of some recent policy debate topics is extreme breath. A resolution calling for regulation of land use literally and figuratively covers a lot of ground. Naitonal debate topics have not always been so broad. Before the late 1960s the topic often specified a particular policy change.5 The move from narrow to broad topics has had, according to some, the effect of limiting the number of students who participate in policy debate. First, the breadth of the topics has all but destroyed novice debate. Paul Gaske argues that because the stock issues of policy debate are clearly defined, it is superior to value debate as a means of introducing students to the debate process.6 Despite this advantage of policy debate, Gaske belives that NDT debate is not the best vehicle for teaching beginners. The problem is that broad policy topics terrify novice debaters, especially those who lack high school debate experience. They are unable to cope with the breadth of the topic and experience “negophobia,”7 the fear of debating negative. As a consequence, the educational advantages associated with teaching novices through policy debate are lost: “Yet all of these benefits fly out the window as rookies in their formative stage quickly experience humiliation at being caugh without evidence or substantive awareness of the issues that confront them at a tournament.”8 The ultimate result is that fewer novices participate in NDT, thus lessening the educational value of the activity and limiting the number of debaters or eventually participate in more advanced divisions of policy debate. In addition to noting the effect on novices, participants argued that broad topics also discourage experienced debaters from continued participation in policy debate. Here, the claim is that it takes so much times and effort to be competitive on a broad topic that students who are concerned with doing more than just debate are forced out of the activity.9 Gaske notes, that “broad topics discourage participation because of insufficient time to do requisite research.”10 The final effect may be that entire programs either cease functioning or shift to value debate as a way to avoid unreasonable research burdens. Boman supports this point: “It is this expanding necessity of evidence, and thereby research, which has created a competitive imbalance between institutions that participate in academic debate.”11 In this view, it is the competitive imbalance resulting from the use of broad topics that has led some small schools to cancel their programs.

### Not Procurement – Limits 2NC

#### They explode limits

**Dyson et al, 3** - International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (Megan, Flow: The Essentials of Environmental Flows, p. 67-68)

Understanding of the term ‘incentives’ varies and economists have produced numerous typologies. A brief characterization of incentives is therefore warranted. First, the term is understood by economists as incorporating both positive and negative aspects, for example a tax that leads a consumer to give up an activity that is an incentive, not a disincentive or negative incentive. Second, although incentives are also construed purely in economic terms, incentives refer to more than just financial rewards and penalties. They are the “positive and negative changes in outcomes that individuals perceive as likely to result from particular actions taken within a set of rules in a particular physical and social context.”80 Third, it is possible to distinguish between direct and indirect incentives, with direct incentives referring to **financial** or other inducements and indirect incentives referring to both variable and **enabling incentives**.81 Finally, incentives of any kind may be called ‘perverse’ where they work against their purported aims or have significant adverse side effects. ¶ Direct incentives lead people, groups and organisations to take particular action or inaction. In the case of environmental flows these are the same as the net gains and losses that different stakeholders experience. The key challenge is to ensure that the incentives are consistent with the achievement of environmental flows. This implies the need to compensate those that incur additional costs by providing them with the appropriate payment or other compensation. Thus, farmers asked to give up irrigation water to which they have an established property or use right are likely to require a payment for ceding this right. The question, of course, is how to obtain the financing necessary to cover the costs of developing such transactions and the transaction itself. ¶ Variable incentives are policy instruments that affect the relative costs and benefits of different economic activities. As such, they can be manipulated to affect the behaviour of the producer or consumer. For example, a government subsidy on farm inputs will increase the relative profitability of agricultural products, hence probably increasing the demand for irrigation water. Variable incentives therefore have the ability to greatly increase or reduce the demand for out-of-stream, as well as in-stream, uses of water. The number of these incentives within the realm of economic and fiscal policy is practically **limitless.**

### Not Procurement – A2: Webb

#### Webb is Canadian and means his distinctions on incentives don’t apply

MacNevin 93, Alex -Tax Evaluation Division – Federal Department of Finance, 31 Alta. L. Rev. 539

Not surprisingly, Mr. Webb's perspective is primarily legal in focus; he is concerned with what he views as deficiencies in legal structure and channels of legal authority and recourse. As an economist, I am not qualified to discuss the legal issues raised by Mr. Webb. However, his passing reference, in a related paper to be delivered at this conference, refers to the Auditor General's estimates that there are $41 billion and $28 billion in, respectively, direct expenditure incentives and tax expenditure incentives.1 Incentives are thus ultimately about money -- that is, who gets it, why, how, how much, what is the effect and how is this accounted for -- and therefore have important economic as well as legal dimensions. While Mr. Webb's paper deals with both expenditure and tax incentives, my comments concentrate on the latter, with which I am most familiar.¶ II. THE IDENTIFICATION OF TAX INCENTIVES¶ One fundamental problem with respect to accountability in the area of taxation arises because of difficulties in defining what is or is not a tax expenditure or a tax incentive. A central aspect of accountability relates to the seemingly simple basic requirement for documenting the amounts of money foregone through various incentives. Mr. Webb notes that information on the costs of tax incentives are reported only sporadically in tax expenditure accounts, the last of which was put out by the Minister of Finance in 1985. He also points out that tax incentives are removed from the normal budgeting and estimating procedures that apply to many other incentives on the expenditure side (which, incidentally, he views as generally deficient).¶ The infrequent release of tax expenditures (or, as they were called in the 1985 document, selective tax measures) tables may in part reflect the absence of a legal requirement that they be produced on a regular basis.2 They also, however, reflect significant conceptual difficulties encountered in constructing such accounts as well as prevailing concerns about the extent of their usefulness, including their interpretation. Difficulties in this regard were highlighted in a 1988 conference on tax expenditures and accountability in taxation that was jointly sponsored by the Department of Finance and the John Deutsch Institute of Queen's University.3¶ In the opinion of many of the public finance experts who participated in the conference, tax expenditures often cannot easily be distinguished from structural parameters of the tax system. Identification of tax incentives necessitates comparison of the actual tax system with an ideal "benchmark" tax system. This is entirely different from the case of direct expenditures where no comparable reference base is required. One practical difficulty confronting tax expenditure accounting is that any view about what the tax base should be is essentially a value judgement and hence will vary from individual to individual. The result is that items which may be viewed as tax expenditures under one particular benchmark tax system may not be viewed as such under another benchmark. For example, tax deductions for retirement savings plans are a tax expenditure under an annual income tax benchmark, but are not tax expenditures under lifetime income tax or consumption tax benchmarks. Since the federal tax system contains a mixture of elements of all three of these tax regimes, considerable difficulties in identifying tax expenditures exist.¶ Related additional complexities arise because an actual tax system can only approximate the desirable characteristics of any particular normative view as to what should be taxed. For example, while economists may be able to define fairly precisely what real economic income is over a particular period of time under an income tax base, it is impractical to design an income tax system that has the actual characteristics dictated by theory. The result of is that in some instances, it is not clear how a particular tax measure or group of related tax measures should be viewed under an actual tax system that is inevitably only an imperfect approximation of a chosen "benchmark" tax system.4¶ Many examples can be given to illustrate the difficulties that arise in this respect. For example, considerable uncertainty arises about how the various provisions relating to the taxation of capital gains should be treated for tax expenditure accounting purposes under an income tax regime that taxes nominal gains on a realization basis rather than real gains on an accrual basis. The integration of the personal and corporate income tax systems gives rise to other examples. Under a view that treats the integrated personal and corporated tax systems as the benchmark, the dividend tax credit is not a tax expenditure. Under one that treats the personal and corporate tax systems as separate benchmark systems, it is.¶ The tax expenditure treatment of cash accounting for farmers and fishermen provides another example. Economists are uncomfortable on tax principle grounds with the deductibility of expenditures on inventory because such expenditures merely reflect the transfer of one asset (cash) into another asset (inventory). Accrual accounting rules, which are required of other types of businesses, effectively result in unsold inventories being added back into income at the end of the year so that no deduction in the year is permitted. Past tax expenditure accounts have identified cash accounting as a tax expenditure, although it is far from obvious that, at least for full-time farmers and fishermen, cash accounting on balance results in lower tax liabilities over time or that from their perspective it is anything more than a peculiar tax wrinkle. It is notable that there is no dollar estimate of the value of cash accounting in previous tax expenditure accounts.¶ III. THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF TAX INCENTIVES¶ One common theme that emerged from the conference on tax expenditures and accountability was that, in light of the many difficulties in identifying tax expenditures, it might be desirable to present tax expenditure information from the perspective of a number of different normative benchmark systems. This would highlight aspects of the tax system from these different perspectives. It would, however, achieve this at the cost of considerable added complexity in interpreting the accounts, particularly to users of the accounts who were not tax experts. There may, therefore, be somewhat of a conflict between the usefulness of tax expenditure accounts in their role as an instrument of tax analysis versus their role as an accountability instrument where clarity and simplicity of presentation and interpretation have high priority. It may be possible to strike a compromise by, for example, ensuring that tax expenditure accounts clearly identify the key tax measures that most reasonably could be substituted for direct expenditure programs. This would facilitate comparisons of tax expenditures data with those for comparable programs on the direct expenditure side in the Public Accounts and thereby permit a more complete assessment of the incentives and subsidies applying to particular sectors, geographical regions, and so on. Such an approach would foster the accountability objective of "functional equivalence" identified by Mr. Webb.¶ Problems with compiling tax expenditures accounts are highlighted when the very structure of the tax system undergoes major changes, such as with the income tax reform of 1988 and with the introduction of the GST to replace the manufacturers sales tax. In such circumstances, presentation of tax expenditure information must be thoroughly reformulated to reflect the revised tax regimes and, indeed, the changing benchmark norms. This can give rise to problems of lack of continuity and comparability of data over time. As an additional practical matter, significant lags in the availability of taxation data may delay the release of tax expenditure tables that reflect the new regimes. There are two and three year lags for, respectively, personal income tax data and corporate income tax data.¶ Delays in the availability of taxation data are particularly problematic since it is typically much more difficult to forecast the ultimate cost of tax incentives than is the case for direct expenditure incentives. The main reason for this is that tax incentives are almost always open-ended while direct expenditure incentives are typically subject to an overall budget constraint. The total cost of a tax incentive thus depends entirely on the usually difficult to predict take-up response of taxpayers, which can give rise to considerable uncertainty in budgeting.5¶ There are thus significant difficulties with tax expenditure analysis even as an accounting device for providing estimates of the cost of individual tax measures. Judged by the other criteria identified above they are substantially more deficient since they provide no insight whatsoever into the questions of who benefits from tax incentives, why, and what are their effects. Analytical techniques, (such as full evaluations) in addition to accounting techniques, are required in order to provide a complete picture of both the cost and the efficacy of tax measures. I would note, however, that the problems in identifying tax expenditures, particularly in an environment of changing tax structures or norms, make it difficult to systematically evaluate tax expenditures or incentives on a routine cyclical basis as is done for direct expenditure programs.¶ The limitations of tax expenditures information naturally raise questions about the appropriate amount of scarce analytical resources that should be devoted to the preparation of tax expenditure tables, rather than to alternative or complementary tools of accountability such as in-depth studies of the rationale and cost-effectiveness of particular tax measures and related groupings of tax measures; irrespective of whether there is a consensus as to their tax expenditure status under any particular benchmark tax system. The Department of Finance has long wrestled with the practical difficulties and trade-offs involved in compiling tax expenditure data and other accountability information that is, on balance, most revealing with respect to the underlying structure of the tax system. The proceedings of the John Deutsch Conference indicate clearly that there are no easy solutions to the problems.¶ IV. CONCLUSION¶ As noted earlier, Mr. Webb also makes reference to the adequacy of current budgeting procedures for tax incentives. The problem of identifying and measuring tax incentives separately from the "normal" parameters of the tax system hints at the intimate relationship between tax expenditures or (tax incentives) policy and the more limited process of modifying and improving the tax system -- that is the strict design of tax policy. This latter process is a natural component of the government's routine budget procedures and is subject to well-known budget conventions. Procedures relating to the introduction or modification of tax incentives must therefore inevitably be conducted within that somewhat restrictive environment. Can improvements be made which reflect both the need for improved budgeting procedures for tax incentives and the unique environment in which tax measures are designed and modified? I am sure they can but I am considerably less sure that such procedures can be routinized through legislative structure or guidelines.¶ In summary, I fully support the general thrust of Mr. Webb's paper of the need for improved structures and instruments of accountability. In my view, however, the pursuit of that objective must be tempered by recognition of the significant practical obstacles that arise because of the unique characteristics of tax incentives.

### 2NC – Econ Impact Overview

#### Impact outweighs and turns the case –

#### A. Magnitude – US collapse goes global and draws in every major country – treaties increase the probability of draw in and guarantees escalation.

#### B. Timeframe – decline causes lash out and outward pressure to secure economic gains – that’s Auslin.

### Turns Nuclear Power

#### Econ decline tanks nuke power – undermines necessary investment

Simpson 9 (Fiona, associate director of New York University's Center on International Cooperation, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, "The recession alone won't stop nuclear power's growth," [http://www.thebulletin.org/web–edition/features/the–recession–alone–wont–stop–nuclear–powers–growth](http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/the-recession-alone-wont-stop-nuclear-powers-growth))

None of the IAEA's projections, however, account for the financial crisis, which may negatively impact the appeal of nuclear energy. Clearly, investors that need credit to build new nuclear plants face a great deal more uncertainty and difficulty securing financing. Such a situation, on the surface, would indicate that nuclear power will be less attractive to investors. The downturn also may reduce electricity demand and thus, potentially, make the need for new power plants less urgent. At the same time, prices for natural gas and oil have fallen from earlier highs, increasing their attractiveness as energy sources (although the price of each has increased recently). Additionally, nuclear power plants have significant "front–loaded" costs, requiring much more investment at the outset than fossil–fuel burning plants, even if nuclear plants may eventually be cheaper to run. In light of the ongoing credit crunch, investors in countries that don't rely on state–owned enterprises may find the economic circumstances simply too difficult to justify an investment in nuclear power––especially if there's reliable (and domestic) access to natural gas, coal, or oil. One also would expect private lenders to shy from nuclear projects––both because they have less money to lend and because of nuclear power's history of cost overruns and delays. Finally, from the point of view of developing countries interested in nuclear power, multilateral development banks, such as the World Bank, tend to prohibit investment in new nuclear projects.

#### Econ decline hurts nuke power – kills investment

Carrington 12 (Damian, The Guardian, "Energy companies blame abandonment of nuclear plans on lack of cash," [http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2012/may/15/energy–companies–abandonment–nuclear–plans](http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2012/may/15/energy-companies-abandonment-nuclear-plans))

Investing billions in new nuclear power stations would have forced a credit–rating downgrade on energy giant RWE, the company's chief executive has revealed. The head of another big six energy company, E.ON, blamed the abandonment of its nuclear plans on a lack of "financial firepower". Tuesday's developments are the latest to demonstrate that the huge cost and decades–long payback times of new nuclear power stations are making them difficult to fund in the current economic crisis. RWE and E.ON cancelled their joint plan to build new reactors in March, while nuclear giant EDF has delayed work at its site at Hinkley and EDF's nuclear partner Centrica says the case for nuclear investment is "unproven".

### Turns Heg

#### Turns leadership

Brzezinski 97 (Zbigniew, Former National Security Advisor – The Grand Chessboard, [http://book–case.kroupnov.ru/pages/library/Grand/part\_1.htm](http://book-case.kroupnov.ru/pages/library/Grand/part_1.htm))

America’s economic dynamism provides the **necessary precondition** for the exercise of global primacy. Initially, immediately after World War II, America’s economy stood apart from all others, accounting alone for more than 50 percent of the world’s GNP. The economic recovery of Western Europe and Japan, followed by the wider phenomenon of Asia’s economic dynamism, meant that the American share of global GNP eventually had to shrink from the disproportionately high livels of the immediate postwar era. Nonetheless, by the time the subsequent Cold War had ended, America’s share of global GNP, and more specifically its share of the world’s manufacturing output, had stabilized at about 30 percent, a level that had been the norm for most of this century, apart from those exceptional years immediately after World War II. More important, America has maintained and has even widened its lead in exploiting the latest scientific breakthroughs for military purposes, thereby creating a technologically peerless military establishment, the only one with effective global reach. All the while, is has maintained its strong competitive advantage in the economically decisive information technologies. American mastery in the cutting–edge sectors of tomorrow’s economy suggests that American technological domination is not likely to be undone soon, especially given that in the economically decisive fields, Americans are maintaining or even widening their advantage in productivity over their Western European and Japanese rivals.

#### Economy key to heg

Mead 04 (Walter Russell, Senior Fellow at Council on Foreign Relations, “America's STICKY Power,” Foreign Policy, Mar/Apr, Proquest)

The United States' global economic might is therefore not simply, to use Nye's formulations, hard power that compels others or soft power that attracts the rest of the world. Certainly, the U.S. economic system provides the United States with the prosperity needed to underwrite its security strategy, but it also encourages other countries to accept U.S. leadership. U.S. economic might is sticky power. How will sticky power help the United States address today's challenges? One pressing need is to ensure that Iraq's econome reconstruction integrates the nation more firmly in the global economy. Countries with open economies develop powerful trade–oriented businesses; the leaders of these businesses can promote economic policies that respect property rights, democracy, and the rule of law. Such leaders also lobby governments to avoid the isolation that characterized Iraq and Libya under economic sanctions. And looking beyond Iraq, the allure of access to Western capital and global markets is one of the few forces protecting the rule of law from even further erosion in Russia.

### Turns China

#### Growth prevents miscalculation and war with China

Glaser 5/2/12 (“China is Reacting to Our Weak Economy” Bonnie S. Glaser (senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.) 5/2/2012 http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/05/02/are–we–headed–for–a–cold–war–with–china/china–is–reacting–to–our–weak–economy)

To maintain peace and stability in the Asia–Pacific region and secure American interests, the United States must sustain its leadership and bolster regional confidence in its staying power. The key to those goals is reinvigorating the U.S. economy. Historically, the Chinese have taken advantage of perceived American weakness and shifts in the global balance of power. In 1974 China seized the Paracel Islands from Saigon just after the United States and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam signed the Paris Peace Treaty, which signaled the U.S. withdrawal from the region. When the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev met one of Deng Xiaoping’s “three obstacles” requirements for better ties and withdrew from Can Ranh Bay, Vietnam, in 1988, China snatched seven of the Spratly Islands from Hanoi. Two decades later, as the United States–Philippines base agreement was terminated, China grabbed Mischief Reef from Manila. Beijing must not be allowed to conclude that an economic downturn means our ability to guarantee regional stability has weakened. The Chinese assertive behaviors against its neighbors in recent years in the East China Sea, the South China Sea and the Yellow Sea were in part a consequence of China’s assessment that the global financial crisis signaled the beginning of U.S. decline and a shift in the balance of power in China’s favor. The Obama administration’s “rebalancing” or “pivot” to Asia will help prevent Chinese miscalculation and increase the confidence of U.S. partners in U.S. reliability as the ballast for peace and stability in the region. But failure to follow through with actions and resources would spark uncertainty and lead smaller countries to accommodate Chinese interests in the region. Most important, the United States must revive its economy. China will inevitably overtake the United States as the largest economy in the world in the coming decade or two. The United States must not let Beijing conclude that a relative decline in U.S. power means a weakened United States unable to guarantee regional peace and stability. The Chinese see the United States as mired in financial disorder, with an alarming budget deficit, high unemployment and slow economic growth — which, they predict, will lead to America's demise as the sole global superpower. To avoid Chinese miscalculation and greater United States–China strategic competition, the United States needs to restore financial solvency and growth through bipartisan action.

#### Econ growth prevents war with China – sticky power ensures interdependence not war

Mead 04 (Walter Russell, Senior Fellow at Council on Foreign Relations, “America's STICKY Power,” Foreign Policy, Mar/Apr, Proquest)

China's rise to global prominence will offer a key test case for sticky power. As China develops economically, it should gain wealth that could support a military rivaling that of the United States; China is also gaining political influence in the world. Some analysts in both China and the United States believe that the laws of history mean that Chinese power will someday clash with the reigning U.S. power. Sticky power offers a way out. China benefits from participating in the U.S. economic system and integrating itself into the global economy. Between 1970 and 2003, China's gross domestic product grew from an estimated $106 billion to more than $1.3 trillion. By 2003, an estimated $450 billion of foreign money had flowed into the Chinese economy. Moreover, China is becoming increasingly dependent on both imports and exports to keep its economy (and its military machine) going. Hostilities between the United States and China would cripple China's industry, and cut off supplies of oil and other key commodities. Sticky power works both ways, though. If China cannot afford war with the United States, the United States will have an increasingly hard time breaking off commercial relations with China. In an era of weapons of mass destruction, this mutual dependence is probably good for both sides. Sticky power did not prevent World War I, but economic interdependence runs deeper now; as a result, the "inevitable" U.S.–Chinese conflict is less likely to occur.

#### Econ collapse turns China war

Mead 9 (Walter Russell, Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow in U.S. Foreign Policy – Council on Foreign Relations, “Only Makes You Stronger”, The New Republic, 2–4, http://www.tnr.com/politics/story.html?id=571cbbb9–2887–4d81–8542–92e83915f5f8&p=2)

The greatest danger both to U.S.–China relations and to American power itself is probably not that China will rise too far, too fast; it is that the current crisis might end China's growth miracle. In the worst–case scenario, the turmoil in the international economy will plunge China into a major economic downturn. The Chinese financial system will implode as loans to both state and private enterprises go bad. Millions or even tens of millions of Chinese will be unemployed in a country without an effective social safety net. The collapse of asset bubbles in the stock and property markets will wipe out the savings of a generation of the Chinese middle class. The political consequences could include dangerous unrest––and a bitter climate of anti–foreign feeling that blames others for China's woes. (Think of **Weimar Germany**, when both Nazi and communist politicians blamed the West for Germany's economic travails.) Worse, instability could lead to a vicious cycle, as nervous investors moved their money out of the country, further slowing growth and, in turn, fomenting ever–greater bitterness. Thanks to a generation of rapid economic growth, China has so far been able to manage the stresses and conflicts of modernization and change; nobody knows what will happen if the growth stops. India's future is also a question. Support for global integration is a fairly recent development in India, and many serious Indians remain skeptical of it. While India's 60–year–old democratic system has resisted many shocks, a deep economic recession in a country where mass poverty and even hunger are still major concerns could undermine political order, long–term growth, and India's attitude toward the United States and global economic integration. The violent Naxalite insurrection plaguing a significant swath of the country could get worse; religious extremism among both Hindus and Muslims could further polarize Indian politics; and India's economic miracle could be nipped in the bud. If current market turmoil seriously damaged the performance and prospects of India and China, the current crisis could join the Great Depression in the list of economic events that changed history, even if the recessions in the West are relatively short and mild. The United States should stand ready to assist Chinese and Indian financial authorities on an emergency basis––and work very hard to help both countries escape or at least weather any economic downturn. It may test the political will of the Obama administration, but the United States must avoid a protectionist response to the economic slowdown. U.S. moves to limit market access for Chinese and Indian producers could poison relations for years. **For billions** of people **in nuclear–armed countries** to emerge from this crisis believing either that the United States was indifferent to their well–being or that it had profited from their distress could damage U.S. foreign policy far more severely than any mistake made by George W. Bush. It's not just the great powers whose trajectories have been affected by the crash. Lesser powers like Saudi Arabia and Iran also face new constraints. The crisis has strengthened the U.S. position in the Middle East as falling oil prices reduce Iranian influence and increase the dependence of the oil sheikdoms on U.S. protection. Success in Iraq––however late, however undeserved, however limited––had already improved the Obama administration's prospects for addressing regional crises. Now, the collapse in oil prices has put the Iranian regime on the defensive. The annual inflation rate rose above 29 percent last September, up from about 17 percent in 2007, according to Iran's Bank Markazi. Economists forecast that Iran's real GDP growth will drop markedly in the coming months as stagnating oil revenues and the continued global economic downturn force the government to rein in its expansionary fiscal policy. All this has weakened Ahmadinejad at home and Iran abroad. Iranian officials must balance the relative merits of support for allies like Hamas, Hezbollah, and Syria against domestic needs, while international sanctions and other diplomatic sticks have been made more painful and Western carrots (like trade opportunities) have become more attractive. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia and other oil states have become more dependent on the United States for protection against Iran, and they have fewer resources to fund religious extremism as they use diminished oil revenues to support basic domestic spending and development goals. None of this makes the Middle East an easy target for U.S. diplomacy, but thanks in part to the economic crisis, the incoming administration has the chance to try some new ideas and to enter negotiations with Iran (and Syria) from a position of enhanced strength. Every crisis is different, but there seem to be reasons why, over time, financial crises on balance reinforce rather than undermine the world position of the leading capitalist countries. Since capitalism first emerged in early modern Europe, the ability to exploit the advantages of rapid economic development has been a key factor in international competition. Countries that can encourage––or at least allow and sustain––the change, dislocation, upheaval, and pain that capitalism often involves, while providing their tumultuous market societies with appropriate regulatory and legal frameworks, grow swiftly. They produce cutting–edge technologies that translate into military and economic power. They are able to invest in education, making their workforces ever more productive. They typically develop liberal political institutions and cultural norms that value, or at least tolerate, dissent and that allow people of different political and religious viewpoints to collaborate on a vast social project of modernization––and to maintain political stability in the face of accelerating social and economic change. The vast productive capacity of leading capitalist powers gives them the ability to project influence around the world and, to some degree, to remake the world to suit their own interests and preferences. This is what the United Kingdom and the United States have done in past centuries, and what other capitalist powers like France, Germany, and Japan have done to a lesser extent. In these countries, the social forces that support the idea of a competitive market economy within an appropriately liberal legal and political framework are relatively strong. But, in many other countries where capitalism rubs people the wrong way, this is not the case. On either side of the Atlantic, for example, the Latin world is often drawn to anti–capitalist movements and rulers on both the right and the left. Russia, too, has never really taken to capitalism and liberal society––whether during the time of the czars, the commissars, or the post–cold war leaders who so signally failed to build a stable, open system of liberal democratic capitalism even as many former Warsaw Pact nations were making rapid transitions. Partly as a result of these internal cultural pressures, and partly because, in much of the world, capitalism has appeared as an unwelcome interloper, imposed by foreign forces and shaped to fit foreign rather than domestic interests and preferences, many countries are only half–heartedly capitalist. When crisis strikes, they are quick to decide that capitalism is a failure and look for alternatives. So far, such half–hearted experiments not only have failed to work; they have left the societies that have tried them in a progressively worse position, farther behind the front–runners as time goes by. Argentina has lost ground to Chile; Russian development has fallen farther behind that of the Baltic states and Central Europe. Frequently, the crisis has weakened the power of the merchants, industrialists, financiers, and professionals who want to develop a liberal capitalist society integrated into the world. Crisis can also strengthen the hand of religious extremists, populist radicals, or authoritarian traditionalists who are determined to resist liberal capitalist society for a variety of reasons. Meanwhile, the companies and banks based in these societies are often less established and more vulnerable to the consequences of a financial crisis than more established firms in wealthier societies. As a result, developing countries and countries where capitalism has relatively recent and shallow roots tend to suffer greater economic and political damage when crisis strikes––as, inevitably, it does. And, consequently, financial crises often reinforce rather than challenge the global distribution of power and wealth. This may be happening yet again. None of which means that we can just sit back and enjoy the recession. History may suggest that financial crises actually help capitalist great powers maintain their leads––but it has other, less reassuring messages as well. If financial crises have been a normal part of life during the 300–year rise of the liberal capitalist system under the Anglophone powers, so has war. The wars of the League of Augsburg and the Spanish Succession; the Seven Years War; the American Revolution; the Napoleonic Wars; the two World Wars; the cold war: The list of wars is almost as long as the list of financial crises. **Bad economic times** can **breed wars**. Europe was a pretty peaceful place in 1928, but the Depression poisoned German public opinion and helped bring Adolf Hitler to power. If the current crisis turns into a depression, what rough beasts might start slouching toward **Moscow**, **Karachi**, **Beijing**, or **New Delhi** to be born? The United States may not, yet, decline, but, if we can't get the world economy back on track, **we may** still **have to fight**.

### Prices Low Now – Generic

#### Electricity prices falling now – gas boom, lower electricity demand

Hough 12/6/12 (Jack, Barron's, "When a Dividend Cut Says "Buy," http://online.barrons.com/article/SB50001424052748703555704578161103614771598.html?mod=BOL\_da\_aftc)

No longer. New techniques in the gas-drilling business have unlocked vast stores of the stuff from porous rock, creating a glut and depressing prices. Seven years ago, the U.S. produced more electricity from nuclear plants than gas ones, but now it produces much more from gas.¶ A weak economy and mild weather, meanwhile, have dampened electricity demand. Wholesale electricity prices have fallen, stripping nuclear operators of much of their profit power. Last month, Dominion Resources (D) said it would close a small nuclear plant in Wisconsin because it was no longer profitable to operate and there were no buyers.

#### Electricity prices will remain stable and low for 2013

Szablya 12/27/12 (Louis, Energate VP of Marketing and Product Management @ Home Energy Management, "10 home energy management trends for 2013," http://www.smartgridnews.com/artman/publish/Technologies\_Demand\_Response/10-home-energy-management-trends-for-2013-5384.html/#.UOSslm\_AfoI)

1. Base electricity prices will stay relatively low owing to natural gas prices remaining low, but gasoline prices will continue to be volatile throughout the year. The combination is likely to support ongoing interest in and sales of electric vehicles.

#### Electricity prices are historically low now – MWh price data proves

**Ryser 11/20/12** (Jeff, Platts Energy, "US and Europe through a prism of electricity prices," http://blogs.platts.com/2012/11/20/electric\_prices/)

Persistently low electricity prices are having an impact on virtually everything that touches the US power sector. Something of the opposite is beginning to be said in Europe.¶ Dozens of US-based companies reporting third quarter earnings—and earnings thus far this year—have said their revenue is down due not just to reduced demand but also due to low prices.¶ On November 12, the Moody’s ratings agency noted that a dozen big-name firms that own unregulated power affiliates, or are pure merchant generators—the list included PSEG, Exelon, PPL, First Energy, NextEra Energy, Dominion, Entergy, NRG Energy, Dynegy, Energy Future Holdings and Edison Mission Energy—have been experiencing “financial stress” for four years and can expect “little relief from today’s commodity price environment—a main cause of the stress—over the next 24 months.”¶ The ratings agency said the combination of low prices and “tepid expectations for growth in electricity volumes” could mean that companies will have to cut costs and delay capital investments.¶ Today, US wholesale peak power prices are in the high $20’s—low $30’s/MWh range. They are essentially at that low level because natural gas prices are in the $3.30/MMBtu to $3.40/MMBtu range. Five years ago, according to Platts data, that wholesale electricity price range was between $52-$55/MWh.¶

#### Electricity prices remain stable and comparatively low now – recent EIA analysis proves

Johnson 12/11/12 (Steven, Staff @ Electric Co-op Today, "Slowdown Seen in Electricity Prices," http://www.ect.coop/industry/trends-reports-analyses/slowdown-seen-for-electricity-prices/50812)

Ratepayers are getting a bit of a break on the price of electricity, according to the latest government analysis.¶ The Energy Information Administration said Dec. 11 that it expects residential retail electricity prices will increase by an average of 1.2 percent this year, and by 1.6 percent in 2013.¶ That’s a sharp dip from the 2007-2011 period, when residential prices jumped by an average of 2.4 percent every year.¶ In its Short-Term Energy Outlook, EIA anticipates prices across the country to average 11.86 cents per kilowatt-hour in 2012, and to rise slightly to 12.05 cents per kwh in 2013.¶ Prices in the industrial and commercial sectors also are holding steady, and the 2012 numbers actually will decline from 2011, EIA said.¶ The agency said the average industrial sector price of electricity was 6.82 cents per kwh in 2011. It will dip to 6.67 cents per kwh in 2012, then hop up to 6.80 cents per kwh in 2013.¶ EIA projected prices for commercial accounts for 2012 to be 10.12 cents per kwh, a slight dip from 10.23 cents per kwh in 2011. That will increase to 10.28 cents per kwh in 2013, the agency predicted.

#### Electricity prices will remain stable now – low nat gas prices, decreased electricity demand ensure

EIA 12/11/12 ("Short-Term Energy Outlook," http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/steo/report/electricity.cfm)

U.S. Electricity Consumption¶ Variations in winter weather can have a significant effect on residential electricity consumption, especially in the southeastern United States where nearly two-thirds of households use electricity as their primary heating source. Last winter, heating degree days in the South Atlantic Census division during the months of December, January, and February totaled about 21 percent below the 30-year normal. As a consequence, residential electricity consumption during those three months reached the lowest level since the winter of 2005-06.¶ Forecast heating degree days nationwide during the next three months (December-February) total about 15 percent more than last winter, which would lead to a year-over-year increase in U.S. residential electricity consumption of 8.6 percent during that period. For all of 2013, EIA projects flat growth in U.S. residential electricity sales as cooler summer weather and the associated reduction in electricity consumption for space cooling offsets the projected increase in winter electricity consumption.¶ U.S. Electricity Generation¶ The most important trend in electricity generation over the past few years has been the industry's price-driven substitution of coal-fired generation with generation fueled by natural gas. Through September this year, the price of natural gas delivered to electric generators has averaged 35 percent less than the cost during the same period last year, while the delivered price of coal is unchanged. In response, the share of total generation fueled by natural gas during the first three quarters of the year has risen from 24 percent in 2011 to 31 percent this year.¶ By January 2013, EIA expects the delivered price of natural gas will be 31 percent higher than the price during January 2012, which should begin to lower the use of natural gas for power generation. EIA projects the share of generation fueled by natural gas in 2013 to average 27.2 percent compared with an annual average share of 30.4 percent in 2012.¶ U.S. Electricity Retail Prices¶ EIA expects the nominal U.S. residential electricity price will rise by 1.2 percent during 2012, compared with an increase of 1.6 percent last year and an average annual increase of 2.4 percent during the previous five years. Residential prices during 2013 are projected to rise by 1.6 percent to an average of 12.0 cents per kilowatthour.

### SMRs – 2NC

#### SMRs produce electricity that is THREE times more expensive than conventional nuke power

Lyman 12 (Edwin, Senior Scientist in Global Security Program @ Union of Concerned Scientists, "Small Modular Reactor Panel Discussion," May 9, http://cstsp.aaas.org/files/SummaryFinalSMR.pdf)

Lyman was skeptical about the prospects for reductions in manufacturing cost resulting from the industrial learning process, and therefore argued that the US should expect smaller reactors to be more expensive per MW. Further, Lyman said that standard economics of scale point to SMRs having overnight capital costs of a factor of 2 to 3 higher per MW than large reactors.

#### SMRs increase electricity prices – the smaller the reactor the higher cost of electricity generated

Makhijani 11 (Arjun, president of the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, "The problems with small nuclear reactors," http://thehill.com/blogs/congress–blog/energy–a–environment/166609–the–problems–with–small–nuclear–reactors)

The arguments of the proponents are alluring: since they are small, SMRs could be cheaply mass produced in factories and quickly erected on site. Being small, no single reactor would be a "bet the farm" risk. Most seductively, there would be highly paid industrial jobs right here in the United States; SMRs would just roll off the assembly lines like the Model Ts of yesteryear in contrast to the custom made Lamborghinis of today. The devil, as usual, is in the details. For instance, the cost of a nuclear reactor per unit of electrical generating capacity declines with increasing size. This is because, contrary to intuition, larger reactors use less material per unit of capacity than smaller reactors. When the size of given type of reactor is reduced from 1,000 to 100 megawatts, the amount of material used per megawatt will more than double.

### Manufacturing Key to Econ/Heg

#### Manufacturing’s key to the economy – it boosts jobs and research and development. Independently it’s key to sector diversity and innovation that provides economic resiliency – that’s Ettlinger and Gordon. Prefer it – it’s qualified and assumes the recent financial crisis.

#### Independently – they’ve conceded our consumer spending link

#### Healthy manufacturing sector is vital to the US economy and US global leadership

**Vargo 10/1/03** (Franklin, International Economic Affairs National Association of Manufacturers, FDCH, lexis)

I would like to begin my statement with a review of why manufacturing is vital to the U.S. economy. Since manufacturing only represents about 16 percent of the nation's output, who cares? Isn't the United States a post–manufacturing services economy? Who needs manufacturing? The answer in brief is that the United States economy would collapse without manufacturing, as would our national security and our role in the world. That is because manufacturing is really the foundation of our economy, both in terms of innovation and production and in terms of supporting the rest of the economy. For example, many individuals point out that only about 3 percent of the U.S. workforce is on the farm, but they manage to feed the nation and export to the rest of the world. But how did this agricultural productivity come to be? It is because of the tractors and combines and satellite systems and fertilizers and advanced seeds, etc. that came from the genius and productivity of the manufacturing sector. Similarly, in services –– can you envision an airline without airplanes? Fast food outlets without griddles and freezers? Insurance companies or banks without computers? Certainly not. The manufacturing industry is truly the innovation industry, without which the rest of the economy could not prosper. Manufacturing performs over 60 percent of the nation's research and development. Additionally, it also underlies the technological ability of the United States to maintain its national security and its global leadership. Manufacturing makes a disproportionately large contribution to productivity, more than twice the rate of the overall economy, and pays wages that are about 20 percent higher than in other sectors. But its most fundamental importance lies in the fact that a healthy manufacturing sector truly underlies the entire U.S. standard of living –– because it is the principal way by which the United States pays its way in the world. Manufacturing accounts for over 80 percent of all U.S. exports of goods. America's farmers will export somewhat over $50 billion this year, but America's manufacturers export almost that much every month! Even when services are included, manufacturing accounts for two–thirds of all U.S. exports of goods and services.

### 2NC SCS

#### SCS tensions inevitable but no escalation

Meidan 12 -- analyst at Eurasia Group; research includes China's energy and environmental policies, policymaking, Chinese elite politics, and diplomacy; MA in political sciences and East Asian studies from the French Institute of Oriental Languages and Cultures (Michal, 8/7, "Guest post: Why tensions will persist, but not escalate, in the South China Sea," http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2012/08/07/guest-post-why-tensions-will-persist-but-not-escalate-in-the-south-china-sea/#axzz2GsDDT62R)

These tensions are likely to persist. And Beijing is not alone in perpetuating them. Vietnam and the Philippines, concerned with the shifting balance of powers in the region, are pushing their maritime claims more aggressively and increasing their efforts to internationalise the question by involving both ASEAN and Washington. Attempts to come up with a common position in ASEAN have failed miserably but as the US re-engages Asia, it is drawn into the troubled waters of the South China Sea. Political dynamics in China – with a once in a decade leadership transition coming up, combined with electoral politics in the US and domestic constraints for both Manila and Hanoi – all augur that the South China Sea will remain turbulent. No government can afford to appear weak in the eyes of domestic hawks or of increasingly nationalistic public opinions. The risk of a miscalculation resulting in prolonged standoffs or skirmishes is therefore higher now than ever before. But there are a number of reasons to believe that even these skirmishes are unlikely to escalate into broader conflict. First, despite the strong current of assertive forces within China, cooler heads are ultimately likely to prevail. While a conciliatory stance toward other claimants is unlikely before the leadership transition, China’s top brass will be equally reluctant to significantly escalate the situation, since this will send southeast Asian governments running to Washington. Hanoi and Manila also recognize that despite their need for assertiveness to appease domestic political constituencies, a direct confrontation with China is overly risky. Second, military pundits in China also realize that the cost of conflict is too high, since it will strengthen Washington’s presence in the region and disrupt trade flows. And even China’s oil company CNOOC, whose portfolio of assets relies heavily on the South China Sea, is diversifying its interests in other deepwater plays elsewhere, as its attempted takeover of Nexen demonstrates.

#### No SCS conflict

Economist 12 (9/22, "Could Asia really go to war over these?" http://www.economist.com/node/21563316)

Optimists point out that the latest scuffle is mainly a piece of political theatre—the product of elections in Japan and a leadership transition in China. The Senkakus row has boiled over now because the Japanese government is buying some of the islands from a private Japanese owner. The aim was to keep them out of the mischievous hands of Tokyo’s China-bashing governor, who wanted to buy them himself. China, though, was affronted. It strengthened its own claim and repeatedly sent patrol boats to encroach on Japanese waters. That bolstered the leadership’s image, just before Xi Jinping takes over. More generally, argue the optimists, Asia is too busy making money to have time for making war. China is now Japan’s biggest trading partner. Chinese tourists flock to Tokyo to snap up bags and designer dresses on display in the shop windows on Omotesando. China is not interested in territorial expansion. Anyway, the Chinese government has enough problems at home: why would it look for trouble abroad? Asia does indeed have reasons to keep relations good, and this latest squabble will probably die down, just as others have in the past. But each time an island row flares up, attitudes harden and trust erodes. Two years ago, when Japan arrested the skipper of a Chinese fishing boat for ramming a vessel just off the islands, it detected retaliation when China blocked the sale of rare earths essential to Japanese industry.

#### No SCS escalation

Storey 12 -- Senior Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, specializes in Asian security issues, with a focus on Southeast Asia (Ian, Interviewed by Ann Jung, 7/16/12, "ASEAN and the South China Sea: Deepening Divisions," http://www.nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=262)

The worst-case scenario for the United States, and indeed all stakeholders in the South China Sea, is a serious confrontation in which military force is employed. But frankly I think the chances of that happening are not very high. The best-case scenario is for China and ASEAN to agree on a credible and effective CoC that ameliorates tensions, leads to the implementation of confidence-building measures, and thereby creates an environment conducive to a peaceful resolution. I don’t think the chances of that outcome are very high either. So I think what we will see for the foreseeable future is a continuation of the status quo in the South China Sea: tensions will continue to ebb and flow, the claimants will protest each other’s moves, and ASEAN and China will keep the DoC/CoC process going if only to show that they are doing something. How long the status quo can continue is another matter. I think it has a limited shelf life, though what the post–status quo will look like is impossible to say at this point in time. But it could be very messy.

#### -- South China Seas are stable – China lacks capability and interdependence checks

Rosenberg 9 (David, Professor of Political Science – Middlebury College and Research Fellow at the Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies – Australian National University, “Dire Straits: Competing Security Priorities in the South China Sea”, The Asia-Pacific Journal, 3-20, http://japanfocus.org/-David-Rosenberg/1773)

From the Taiwan Strait to the Strait of Malacca, security concerns are growing around the South China Sea. While the Bush Administration sees a resurgent Chinese military threat across the Taiwan Strait and a terrorist threat in the Strait of Malacca, many countries between the Straits are more concerned about security for their maritime resources from the threats of competitors, traffickers, poachers, and pirates. Security Concerns in the South China Sea Several recent statements and appointments highlight the current Bush administration view of China's threat to Taiwan. Porter Goss, director of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, warned that improved Chinese capabilities not only threaten Taiwan but also U.S. forces in the (western Pacific) region. U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld worried that the Chinese navy was building some amphibious landing ships for possible use across the Taiwan Strait. The appointment of combative neoconservative John Bolton as U.S. ambassador to the United Nations sends a clear and ominous signal: formerly a paid consultant to the Taiwanese government, Bolton has advocated Taiwan's independence and its full U.N. membership. Then, in February 2005, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and their Japanese counterparts announced a significant alteration in the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance by identifying security in the Taiwan Strait as a "common strategic objective." Has there been any big shift in the balance of power around the Taiwan Strait that warrants this U.S. response? The Chinese defense budget has grown by double-digit increases for the past fourteen years. This year it's up by 12 percent. But that is not significantly faster than the Chinese economy as a whole is growing. China is modernizing its defenses -- adding anti-ship missiles to aircraft, acquiring AWACS-airborne early warning and control systems, guided missile destroyers and frigates. However, its power projection capabilities are limited. It lacks any long-range amphibious capability or support infrastructure to supply forces over long distances for a protracted period. It also lacks heavy cargo-carrying aircraft, comprehensive air defenses, seaworthy ships, and aircraft carriers. Given the current state of Chinese equipment and training, the Chinese have no capability to pursue an expansionist maritime policy in the Taiwan Strait or the South China Sea. [1] By contrast, the U.S. has overwhelming military superiority and an expansive network of military bases across the Asia-Pacific. The U.S. Pacific Fleet is the world's largest naval command, including approximately 190 ships, about 1,400 Navy and Marine Corps aircraft and 35 shore installations. Over 300,000 Navy, Army, Air Force, Marine Corps, Special Operations, and Intelligence military personnel are integrated under the unified command of PACOM, the U.S. Pacific Command. What are China's strategic goals between the Straits? China's Defense White Paper of 2002 emphasizes the importance of pursuing peaceful external relations initiatives through multilateral, cooperative approaches to promote domestic development. The most recent Defense White Paper, published in December of 2004, reiterates this priority. More important than statements of good intentions, however, China has taken significant steps to implement this goal. It was evident in the Framework Agreement on ASEAN-China Comprehensive Economic Cooperation, negotiated in November 2002. That led to the agreement signed in November 2004 to implement an ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (FTA) by 2010. Following the 10th Summit Meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), in Vientiane, Laos in November 2004, Beijing held its own summit with ASEAN leaders (ASEAN Plus One) and then joined Japan and the Republic of Korea in discussions with ASEAN leaders (ASEAN Plus Three, or APT). Beijing had earlier in November hosted the first Security Policy Conference of the ASEAN Regional Forum. It featured an anti-piracy drill and a workshop on countering terrorism. Regional Economic and Financial Agreements Regional economic agreements were the main achievements of these meetings. However, the ASEAN Plus Three sessions identified other areas for cooperation, including deeper cooperation in investment and finance, expanded security dialogue and cooperation, expanded cultural exchanges, and periodic progress reviews. Perhaps the most dramatic developments have occurred in regional financial cooperation. Finance ministers of the ASEAN+3 countries have launched an Asian Bond Markets Initiative and the regional central bankers group set up two Asian Bond Funds in early 2005. These are key steps in addressing one of the major weaknesses in the region's development as indicated by the currency and financial crisis that struck large parts of the region in 1997: the heavy reliance by firms on short-term bank loans for financing. As Jennifer Amyx notes, many countries in East Asia maintain high savings rates but, because of the absence of stable long-term debt markets, the savings deposited into local banks tended to be funneled out to international financial centers and then back into the region as short-term foreign currency loans. This situation creates a problem referred to as a "double mismatch" -- that is, a mismatch between debt maturities (short-term borrowing for long-term investments) and the denomination of this debt (in foreign rather than local currencies). [2] The ASEAN+3 finance ministers had earlier set up a network of bilateral currency swaps to permit a country beset by a speculative attack to draw on reserves of other nations. The program -- the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) -- went into effect at the end of 2003. Japan, with the largest reserves in the region, led negotiations over swap arrangements and will play the role of arbitrator for currency loans. China, another potential lender with substantial reserves in excess of potential needs, also lent its support to the CMI. Widespread participation by ASEAN Plus Three members in these initiatives encourages smooth financial liberalization processes and thereby bolsters regional stability. It also reinforces the efforts of various working groups to improve transparency and information dissemination and to strengthen settlement systems and regulatory reforms. China's shift to a more proactive position on regional financial cooperation has greatly facilitated these recent financial developments. As a result, interdependence between the Chinese economy and other economies in the region has deepened significantly in recent years. Today, trade by ASEAN member nations with China far exceeds trade conducted within the ASEAN grouping, while China is predicted to soon overtake the United States as Japan's top trading partner. Levels of investment in China by countries in the region are also extremely high. The worst case scenario is not Chinese domination but a Chinese meltdown, as many regional monetary authorities are quick to note.

#### South China Sea is no longer a concern

Bitzinger and Desker 08 Dean of the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies and Senior Fellow with the Military Studies Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University

(Richard and Barry, Why east asian war is unlikely [Survival](http://www.informaworld.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/smpp/title%7Edb=all%7Econtent=t713659919), Volume [50](http://www.informaworld.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/smpp/title%7Edb=all%7Econtent=t713659919%7Etab=issueslist%7Ebranches=50#v50), Issue [6](http://www.informaworld.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/smpp/title%7Edb=all%7Econtent=g906414492) December 2008 , pages 105 – 128)

Nowhere, perhaps, is this new 'play-nice' strategy and good-neighbour approach more tangible than in China's recent handling of the Spratly Islands dispute. From its supposed flashpoint status during the 1990s, the Spratlys have calmed down considerably, and today the status of the islands is 'no longer discussed as a major security concern'.[20](http://www.informaworld.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/smpp/section?content=a906256449&fulltext=713240928#EN0020) To its credit, China has made a concerted effort not to let the South China Sea issue become a major domestic political football (unlike the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute with Japan), nor has it seized or occupied additional islands in the Spratlys since 1995. In particular, in 2002 Beijing and ASEAN agreed to a joint Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, which affirmed the intention of the signatories to peacefully resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes, to exercise self-restraint in the South China Sea and to avoid actions that would 'complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability', including refraining from further construction on the presently uninhabited islands. In addition, in March 2005 Beijing also signed bilateral agreements with the Philippines and Vietnam for the joint exploration for oil in areas of overlapping sovereignty claims. (At the same time, estimates of likely oil and gas reserves in the South China Sea have been revised downward considerably, so there may be much less to fight over than originally believed.) This is not to say that the Spratly Islands dispute has been settled once and for all (fishing rights, for example, will continue to be important). It does stand a much better chance of being resolved peacefully, however, and without adding to tensions or hostility between China and Southeast Asia.

#### Existing agreements solve Chinese aggression

PDI 08 (3/13, "SPRATLYS DEAL NOTHING TO WORRY ABOUT FVR", L/N)

FORMER PRESIDENT FIDEL RAMOS Yesterday allayed fears over the governments joint oil exploration deal with China inthe Spratlys, saying bilateral and multilateral agreements have long been in place to ensure the peaceful resolution of border disputes. We should not panic... Because there is so much goodwill already built up among the claimants especially between China, who is the big power in this area, and the other claimants, Ramos said in an interview. After addressing an international forum on the Asean Charter, Ramos told reporters yesterday that the controversial Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking (JMSU) should not be a cause for concern since military superpower China would honor previous agreements made to ensure the non-violent resolution of lingering border questions on the Spratly islands.

#### China’s avoiding Spratlys conflict and any dispute won’t esclate

Teves 08 (Catherine J., 10/5, News.Balita, “Chinese aggression over Spratlys far-fetched: expert observer,” http://news.balita.ph/2008/10/05/chinese-aggression-over-spratlys-far-fetched-expert-observer/)

A Beijing-based Filipino journalist believes Chinese aggression over internationally disputed Spratly Islands is unlikely. ”China doesn’t want these Spratlys to be the bone of contention in Asia,” said ABC News Beijing Bureau chief producer Chito Sta. Romana at Kapihan sa Sulo forum, noting the Chinese prefer to maintain good relations with neighboring countries which are also their trading partners. He said China will likely handle the Spratly issue by continuing to use its ‘soft power’ approach consisting of investing in and aiding its neighbors instead. ”The Chinese want to avoid conflict as much as possible –- they’d rather negotiate and exert influence,” he said. Sta. Romana expressed this view as concern on possible Chinese aggression over the Spratlys re-emerged amidst Congress’ discussions on the baseline bill that’ll define the country’s territorial limits. Government is aiming to include several of the islands as part of Philippine territory. Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, China and the Philippines are pushing for respective claims over the Spratlys, a group of islands in South China Sea. Studies indicating possible presence of oil and natural gas reserves in the area further heightened these countries’ claims. China, Asia’s former ‘Sleeping Dragon,’ has financial resources for investments and aid to other countries as Sta. Romana pointed out the economy there is growing, placing it fourth worldwide. He cited trade liberalization, tempered State control and the Chinese’s determination to achieve progress as the major factors that drive their country’s economy. ”That country’s already an economic super power, having the biggest foreign reserves amounting to some US$ 1.8 trillion,” he said. If China continues such growth, he said its economy by the mid-21st century will surpass that of the United States. Sta. Romana however noted China dislikes the super power tag. ”China doesn’t want to be a super power and that means it doesn’t want to have troops worldwide,” he said. Despite economic progress, Sta. Romana said China’s armed forces still lags behind US military power. (PNA)

#### -- No escalation

Bush and O’Hanlon 7 (Richard and Michael, Senior Fellows – Brookings Institution, “U.S. Grapples With China’s Rise, Taiwan”, The Daily Yomiuri (Tokyo), 5-3, Lexis)

But most of the issues and frictions that accompany China's rise can be managed. The good news is that China and the United States, not to mention other key regional players like Japan, now have politicians and bureaucracies that are relatively good at preventing serious problems from becoming grounds for war. China will want to flex its military muscle more in the future, but it also wants economic prosperity for the political stability that comes with it. In addition, the United States and its regional partners know how to maintain open dialogue with Beijing while also sustaining vigorous defense alliances. China has enough reason to worry about nuclear weapons and global instability that it will not be totally oblivious to our concerns about proliferating countries such as Iran and North Korea. Conflict with the littoral nations of Japan, the Philippines or Vietnam over disputed seabed resources (like oil in the East China Sea or small islets in the South China Sea) is highly unlikely.

#### -- Many factors check South China Sea war

-- Geography -- ASEAN

-- Shipping Lanes -- Political Costs

Joyner 98 (Chris, Professor of International Relations – Georgetown University, New England Law Review, Spring, Lexis)

Nevertheless, several factors suggest the unlikelihood of large-scale military conflict over the Spratlys in the foreseeable future. For one, there is the geography: These islands are scattered over an immense area, nearly 200,000 square kilometers. Considerable room is available for naval patrols to maneuver and miss contact with one another. Relatedly, the Spratlys are more than 300 kilometers (185 miles) from [\*837] the Philippine and Vietnamese coasts, and more than 1000 kilometers (600 miles) from mainland China. This distance presents serious difficulties for any claimant government to patrol more than a small area of the Spratly archipelago at any one time, especially given these states’ relatively weak capabilities for projecting armed forces. No claimant state possesses sufficient logistical support capabilities to ensure effective occupation and maintain extended control over these islands, which underscores the importance of relative naval size. Even so, these conditions presumably should permit greater opportunities for confidence building measures to be considered as alternative strategies. 50 The Cold Wars passing has also fostered a sense of rapprochement throughout Asia, which makes the political costs of a large-scale military conflict in Spratlys less acceptable to the PRC or Taiwan. 51 The dynamic economic expansion of ASEAN counties, increasingly close links with the international community, and strategically significant shipping lanes through the South China Sea -- all converge to dissuade overt attempts by any state, including the PRC, to strive for regional military domination. That the economies of both the PRC and Taiwan have become increasingly interdependent with those of Southeast Asian states, including other claimants to the Spratlys, underscores that reluctance.

### AT Food / Famine Wars

#### -- Food wars are a myth – there’s zero empirical evidence

Salehyan 7 (Idean, Professor of Political Science – University of North Texas, “The New Myth About Climate Change”, Foreign Policy, Summer, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story\_id=3922)

First, aside from a few anecdotes, there is little systematic empirical evidence that resource scarcity and changing environmental conditions lead to conflict. In fact, several studies have shown that an abundance of natural resources is more likely to contribute to conflict. Moreover, even as the planet has warmed, the number of civil wars and insurgencies has decreased dramatically. Data collected by researchers at Uppsala University and the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo shows a steep decline in the number of armed conflicts around the world. Between 1989 and 2002, some 100 armed conflicts came to an end, including the wars in Mozambique, Nicaragua, and Cambodia. If global warming causes conflict, we should not be witnessing this downward trend.

Furthermore, if famine and drought led to the crisis in Darfur, why have scores of environmental catastrophes failed to set off armed conflict elsewhere? For instance, the U.N. World Food Programme warns that 5 million people in Malawi have been experiencing chronic food shortages for several years. But famine-wracked Malawi has yet to experience a major civil war. Similarly, the Asian tsunami in 2004 killed hundreds of thousands of people, generated millions of environmental refugees, and led to severe shortages of shelter, food, clean water, and electricity. Yet the tsunami, one of the most extreme catastrophes in recent history, did not lead to an outbreak of resource wars. Clearly then, there is much more to armed conflict than resource scarcity and natural disasters.

#### -- No shortages – food is abundant

Poole 6 (Holly Kavana, Institute for Food and Development Policy,“12 Myths About Hunger”, Backgrounder, 12(2), Summer, 4-9, http://www.foodfirst.org/12myths)

Myth 1: Not Enough Food to Go Around Reality: Abundance, not scarcity, best describes the world's food supply. Enough wheat, rice and other grains are produced to provide every human being with 3,200 calories a day. That doesn't even count many other commonly eaten foods - ­vegetables, beans, nuts, root crops, fruits, grass-fed meats, and fish. Enough food is available to provide at least 4.3 pounds of food per person a day worldwide: two and half pounds of grain, beans and nuts, about a pound of fruits and vegetables, and nearly another pound of meat, milk and eggs - ­enough to make most people fat! The problem is that many people are too poor to buy readily available food. Even most "hungry countries" have enough food for all their people right now. Many are net exporters of food and other agricultural products.

#### -- Democracy solves the impact

Salehyan 7 (Idean, Professor of Political Science – University of North Texas, “The New Myth About Climate Change”, Foreign Policy, Summer, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story\_id=3922)

To be sure, resource scarcity and environmental degradation can lead to social frictions. Responsible, accountable governments, however, can prevent local squabbles from spiraling into broader violence, while mitigating the risk of some severe environmental calamities. As Nobel laureate Amartya Sen has observed, no democracy has ever experienced a famine. Politicians who fear the wrath of voters usually do their utmost to prevent foreseeable disasters and food shortages. Accountable leaders are also better at providing public goods such as clean air and water to their citizens.

### 2NC Shpbuilding

#### Asian shipyards outcompete US shipyards now – no coming back

Loyd 10 (Linda, “Aker Philadelphia Shipyard, in a work drought, is counting on a marine-highways system,” 7-18-10, <http://articles.philly.com/2010-07-18/business/24968596_1_aker-philadelphia-shipyard-shipbuilding-industry-shipyard-workers>)

Since World War II, commercial U.S. **shipbuilding has dwindled**, and most of the world's big ships today are **built in Asia** - Korea, China, and Japan. It is a testament to the Philadelphia region that shipbuilding has survived at all. "That Aker is still around and operating is the consequence of achievements in the past," said Paul Bingham, managing director for global commerce and transportation for IHS Global Insight Inc. "A lot of other cities that had shipbuilding 30 years ago have seen their shipyards go away." The hurdle for U.S. shipbuilding is cost - not labor cost, but productivity and economies of scale. Korean shipbuilder Hyundai turns out 70 ships a year in each of its two yards, compared with three to five ships a year for the entire U.S. industry. The more ships a yard builds, the more productive the workers, and the lower the overhead costs. Supplier prices also drop. "U.S. shipyards are **too small** to compete with a much more efficient Asian shipyard, where it's just a critical-mass issue," Bingham said. "An Asian shipyard may launch a vessel every other week, not one per year. It's almost the difference between an assembly line, and something that's handcrafted." Even U.S. yards that cater to the military have **too little work** now because, after the September 2001 attacks, **the Navy** and the Coast Guard have not been building as many ships as they once did. Last week, defense contractor Northrop Grumman Corp. said it would seek to spin off or sell its entire shipbuilding unit and shut its yard in Avondale, La., by 2013 because of less military work.

#### Navy shipbuilding solves

The Economist 11 (“Small is the new big in naval shipyards,” 5-12-11,

<http://www.economist.com/blogs/schumpeter/2011/05/naval_shipbuilding>

THE naval ships under construction in Austal's yard on the Mobile River in Alabama are only small by military standards: the littoral combat ship (LCS), pictured above, is 127.1 metres long, with 76 berths and room for 210 tonnes of cargo. It is designed for mine hunting, anti-submarine warfare and surface-warfare close to shore. The joint high speed vessel (JHSV), which will ferry troops and equipment, is 103 metres long with 312 seats and room enough on the top deck to park a helicopter. The contracts Austal won from the United States Navy do not seem small either: $3.5 billion in late 2010 to build 10 LCSs, and roughly $1.6 billion to build 10 JHSVs. (By way of comparison, Nimitz-class aircraft carriers, of which the navy has 10, are nearly 333 metres long and cost $4.5 billion each.) To the navy, these small ships are a big deal: 27 of the 55 new battle-force ships the navy plans to build between now and the end of FY2016 are either LCSs or JHSVs. They are a big deal to Austal, too: in 2009 the company employed just over 1,000 people at its Mobile shipyard, mostly in manufacturing. Today that number stands at just over 2,100. By 2017 Austal plans to more than double that number under an expansion plan that sees them adding around 130 employees each month for the next two years. The navy also contracted with Marinette Marine, a shipyard in north-east Wisconsin, to build LCSs of a different design. After laying off 180 employees in December, it has rehired most of them and plans to began expanding later this year. Marinette and Austal share more than just a sizeable naval contract. Both are foreign owned: Fincantieri, an Italian shipbuilder, bought Marinette in 2008, while Austal's Mobile facility is its first outside its native Australia. But while Marinette has been building military vessels for decades, Austal mainly builds commercial craft. Its JHSV takes design elements from its passenger ferries (and like them is made of aluminium rather than steel). Its 34,000 square metre modular manufacturing facility in Mobile is lean and efficient: rather than building ships keel-up, in the traditional manner, it builds in an assembly-line fashion that will eventually be able to crank out two JHSVs and two LCSs each year. Its becoming a naval contractor is, in the words of its sales and marketing chief, Craig Hooper, “a Cinderella story…We are not a typical defence contractor.” Austal may not be a Raytheon or a General Dynamics, but in the world of military shipbuilding Mr Hooper's statement is not as true as it once would have been. The dominance of the traditional “Big Six” yards— Bath Iron Works in Maine, the Electric Boat company in Connecticut, NASSCO in California, Newport News Shipbuilding in Virginia, Ingalls Shipbuilding in Mississippi and Avondale Shipyard in Louisiana (which is scheduled to close by 2012)—is fading. Between now and 2013 the number of ships commissioned from mid-tier yards, such as Austal and Marinette, **is projected to rise**, while the number commissioned from the Big Six is forecast to fall. The bigger yards will continue producing the navy's largest and most complex ships—aircraft carriers and submarines—but how many of them they can build in an era of American budgetary austerity is an open question. Between 2009 and 2011 the navy decreased the numbers of both carriers and submarines in its 30-year shipbuilding plans. The little guy's day is dawning.

### 2NC AT Asia Pivot

#### Pivot fails- diplomatic tensions

Eckert 12

[Paul, Reuters, 6/15/12, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/15/us-usa-pacific-pivot-idUSBRE85E1B420120615>]

But meetings and messaging may be the easy part, Mazza and other analysts say. China's rapid military build-up and its tough stance on territorial disputes with weaker Southeast Asian neighbors has inadvertently given a boost to Obama's enhanced Asia strategy, variously called a pivot, a refocus or a rebalancing. But ahead still lies the harder work of matching the expectations of Washington's partners - **including mustering the political will to overcome U.S. fiscal deficits and dispelling a growing sense that the United States is declining while China rises**. U.S. policy also has to factor in historical ambivalence about the United States in India and several other regional democracies, as well as political disarray in long-time ally Japan. Countries with troubling human rights records like Vietnam and Cambodia have limited appeal in the U.S. Congress, while leaders of these states see political risks in getting too close to Washington. And the U.S. strategy, while drawing some verbal fire from China, has yet to be tested in a serious way. That might happen if, for example, the Philippines' ongoing showdown with Beijing over contested shoals in the South China Sea were to deteriorate into a military conflict that invoked U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty obligations to Manila.

#### Pivot causes China war

Glaser 12

[Bonnie, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Global Forecast 2012, <http://csis.org/files/publication/120413_gf_glaser.pdf>]

Under the current administration, the pendulum in U.S. policy toward China has swung from attempting to cooperate with China on global problems to pushing back against Chinese assertiveness and challenges to international laws and norms. Getting tougher with Beijing was necessary, but it has also created unintended consequences that the next administration, either a second Obama team or a Republican lineup, will have to contend with. The Obama administration’s initial policy in 2009 raised fears in many Asian capitals of a G2 condominium that would make decisions over the heads of others. Those concerns were unwarranted and short lived. Beijing interpreted the U.S. approach as weakness, which, along with China’s economic success and America’s struggles, led to a year of Chinese hubris that manifested itself in a series of intimidating actions in China’s neighborhood. Subsequent entreaties by regional states to counterbalance China increased U.S. attention to the Asia-Pacific region. Now, the U.S. Asia “pivot” has prompted Chinese anxiety about U.S. containment and heightened regional worries about intensified U.S.-China strategic competition. In the run-up to the leadership transition that will take place at China’s 18th Party Congress this fall, Beijing is inwardly focused and unlikely to act on its fears. However, 2013 could see a shift in Chinese foreign policy based on the new leadership’s judgment that it must respond to a U.S. strategy that seeks to prevent China’s reemergence as a great power. Signs of a potential harsh reaction are already detectable. The U.S. Asia pivot has triggered an outpouring of anti-American sentiment in China that will increase pressure on China’s incoming leadership to stand up to the United States. Nationalistic voices are calling for military countermeasures to the bolstering of America’s military posture in the region and the new U.S. defense strategic guidelines. For example, an article published in China’s Global Times, a jingoistic newspaper owned by the Communist Party mouthpiece People’s Daily, called for China to strengthen its long-range strike capabilities. Deng Xiaoping’s guideline to keep a low profile in the international arena, designed more than two decades ago to cope with uncertainty produced by the collapse of the Soviet bloc, is increasingly seen by China’s elite and public as irrelevant and even harmful to the task of defending Chinese ever-expanding “core interests.” Some voices are calling for **closer alignment with Moscow** and promoting the BRICS grouping (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) as a new “pole” in the international arena to **strengthen the emerging powers against the West**. Xi Jinping, who will assume the helm as China’s new leader later this year, will be under pressure from many domestic constituencies to more forcefully defend Chinese interests in the international arena. Seeking to quickly consolidate his power and enhance the legitimacy of the Communist Party, Xi and his newly installed Politburo Standing Committee colleagues may be more willing than their predecessors to test drive a policy that is more confrontational. The U.S. response to a more muscular Chinese foreign and military policy, should it appear, will have to be carefully calibrated. Ignoring greater Chinese assertiveness would fuel the belief—already emerging in China and elsewhere— that the United States is in inexorable decline. History shows that when great powers falter, China does not hesitate to seize the opportunity to advance its interests, especially in the South China Sea. As American forces withdrew from Vietnam in the mid-1970s, the Chinese grabbed the Paracel Islands from Saigon. Similarly, when the Soviet Union withdrew from Vietnam’s Cam Ranh Bay and the United States terminated its base agreement with the Philippines, China quietly occupied Mischief Reef to the dismay of Manila. Yet a hostile and overbearing U.S. response would confirm Chinese suspicions that the United States seeks to contain its rise, which could cement the emergence of a U.S.-China Cold War. In addition, it would further alarm regional states who seek at all costs to avoid having to **choose between the United States and China.**

### No Impact to Blackouts 1NC

#### No impact to blackouts – empirically proven

Birch, 10/1/12 – former foreign correspondent for the Associated Press and the Baltimore Sun who has written extensively on technology and public policy (Douglas, “Forget Revolution.” Foreign Policy. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/10/01/forget\_revolution?page=full)

Much of the concern has focused on potential attacks on the U.S. electrical grid. "If I were an attacker and I wanted to do strategic damage to the United States...I probably would sack electric power on the U.S. East Coast, maybe the West Coast, and attempt to cause a cascading effect," retired Admiral Mike McConnell said in a 2010 interview with CBS's 60 Minutes. But the scenarios sketched out above are not solely the realm of fantasy. This summer, the United States and India were hit by two massive electrical outages -- caused not by ninja cyber assault teams but by force majeure. And, for most people anyway, the results were less terrifying than imagined. First, the freak "derecho" storm that barreled across a heavily-populated swath of the eastern United States on the afternoon of June 29 knocked down trees that crushed cars, bashed holes in roofs, blocked roads, and sliced through power lines. According to an August report by the U.S. Department of Energy, 4.2 million homes and businesses lost power as a result of the storm, with the blackout stretching across 11 states and the District of Columbia. More than 1 million customers were still without power five days later, and in some areas power wasn't restored for 10 days. Reuters put the death toll at 23 people as of July 5, all killed by storms or heat stroke. The second incident occurred in late July, when 670 million people in northern India, or about 10 percent of the world's population, lost power in the largest blackout in history. The failure of this huge chunk of India's electric grid was attributed to higher-than-normal demand due to late monsoon rains, which led farmers to use more electricity in order to draw water from wells. Indian officials told the media there were no reports of deaths directly linked to the blackouts. But this cataclysmic event didn't cause widespread chaos in India -- indeed, for some, it didn't even interrupt their daily routine. "[M]any people in major cities barely noticed the disruption because localized blackouts are so common that many businesses, hospitals, offices and middle-class homes have backup diesel generators," the New York Times reported. The most important thing about both events is what didn't happen. Planes didn't fall out of the sky. Governments didn't collapse. Thousands of people weren't killed. Despite disruption and delay, harried public officials, emergency workers, and beleaguered publics mostly muddled through. The summer's blackouts strongly suggest that a cyber weapon that took down an electric grid even for several days could turn out to be little more than a weapon of mass inconvenience. "Reasonable people would have expected a lot of bad things to happen" in the storm's aftermath, said Neal A. Pollard, a terrorism expert who teaches at Georgetown University and has served on the United Nation's Expert Working Group on the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes. However, he said, emergency services, hospitals, and air traffic control towers have backup systems to handle short-term disruptions in power supplies. After the derecho, Pollard noted, a generator truck even showed up in the parking lot of his supermarket. The response wasn't perfect, judging by the heat-related deaths and lengthy delays in the United States in restoring power. But nor were the people without power as helpless or clueless as is sometimes assumed. That doesn't mean the United States can relax. James Lewis, director of the technology program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, believes that hackers threaten the security of U.S. utilities and industries, and recently penned an op-ed for the New York Times calling the United States "defenseless" to a cyber-assault. But he told Foreign Policy the recent derecho showed that even a large-scale blackout would not necessarily have catastrophic consequences.

### Grid Safe Now 1NC

#### No black-outs in the US

Wood 12 -- Senior Communications Advisor at Business Roundtable (Carter, 8/2/12, "The grid: After India, America? No, but still…" http://businessroundtable.org/blog/the-grid-after-india-america-no-but-still/)

A blackout of such scale could not happen in the United States. For one thing, we don't have 600 million people. And America's electrical grid is certainly much more resilient than the one in India, a still-developing country with ineffective governments. Still, as The Washington Post reports today, "Aging power grid on overload as U.S. demands more electricity." At CNBC, Jim Cramer asked Thomas F. Farrell II, Chairman, President & CEO of Dominion Resources, about India. Could the same thing happen in the United States? Farrell responded: Our system has a lot more rigor to it and partly because we have reserve margins, meaning we have more power stations than we need to run at any particular moment in time, so that if a power station goes out, there's a back-up to help keep the grid stable. They don't have that much excess power in India, and when they get to the root cause, they'll probably find that was somewhere in there.

#### US grid stable – frequency can be maintained by new technologies

Lamonica 12 -- senior writer covering green tech and cutting-edge technologies, contributor @ Technology Review (Martin, 8/2/12, "Outage in India Could Be a Harbinger for the Rest of the World," http://www.technologyreview.com/news/428685/outage-in-india-could-be-a-harbinger-for-the-rest/)

The primary function of grid operators is to anticipate load and to maintain a steady balance between power supply and demand. The grid signal operates at a set frequency—60 hertz in the U.S. and 50 hertz in India—and when supply and demand fall out of sync, the frequency will either dip or rise. In the U.S., grid operators have "hot" generators on standby to ramp up power in order to keep a close-to-steady frequency, but that's not the case when generators are routinely maxed out. "In a developing world country, it's tough to keep 10 percent of the generation capacity on contingency when you may use it once in a lifetime," Mansoor says. "You're not using the generator, but you still pay for it. That's tough to do." More technologies to keep that frequency steady are emerging. Sensors called phasor measurement units are designed for real-time measurement of grid frequency, and can flag potential problems. Grid operators in the United States are increasingly using automation to manage demand-response programs that lower consumption at big power users at peak times. These types of technologies as well as microgrids (see "Microgrids Keeps the Power Local, Cheap, and Reliable") stand to make electricity grids more reliable as more renewable resources come online and weather-related events, such as heat waves, strain generating resources.

#### Smart grid investments already underway

Kemp 12 -- Reuters market analyst (John, 4/5/12, "COLUMN-Phasors and blackouts on the U.S. power grid: John Kemp," http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/05/column-smart-grid-idUSL6E8F59W120120405)

(Reuters) - Smart meters are the most visible part of the power industry's attempt to upgrade the electricity network to cope with rising consumption and the integration of renewable sources of generation such as wind and solar. The U.S. federal government is spending hundreds of millions of dollars to support the roll out of smart meters that will enable more variable power pricing linked to time of use (TOU) or peak demand to encourage ordinary households and small businesses to limit their electricity use when demand is greatest and help manage pressure on the grid. Increasing the amount of "demand-side response" is crucial to improving flexibility and ensuring the grid can cope with the unpredictable output of intermittent power sources such as wind and solar, as well as small-scale distributed generation by households and businesses themselves selling power back into the network at irregular times. But the smart grid is about much more than just smart meters. The Smart Grid Investment Grant (SGIG) programme established by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) is also funding the deployment of 877 high-frequency phasor monitoring units (PMUs) linked to satellite communications and the global positioning system. The aim is to improve the robustness and reliability of the transmission grid and prevent a repeat of the cascading power failures that rolled across the north-eastern United States and parts of Canada in 2003.

### Military Backup 2NC

#### In house mitigation efforts solve

Aimone 9-12 (Dr. Michael, Director of Business Enterprise Integration – Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment), “Statement Before the House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection and Security Technologies,” 2012, http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/Testimony%20-%20Aimone.pdf)

Chairman Lungren and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify. I was asked to address the question of how the Department of Defense (DoD) would operate during a significant outage of the commercial electric power grid. Although today’s hearing is focused on the prospect of an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) event, such an event is only one scenario for a grid outage. DoD is heavily dependent on the commercial electric power grid. The Department has two closely coordinated sets of activities that focus on the need to maintain critical mission activities in the event of a commercial grid outage. One set of activities, led by DoD’s office of homeland defense, is part of the Department’s explicit “mission assurance strategy.” The other set of activities, focused on the Department’s fixed installations and led by its Installations and Environment office, falls under DoD’s “facility energy strategy.” Mission Assurance Strategy The Department has long had a major focus on mitigating risks to high priority DoD facilities and infrastructure and the critical global missions they support. Toward that end, DoD recently adopted an explicit Mission Assurance Strategy, which is focused on ensuring operational continuity in an all-hazard threat environment. This strategy entails a two-track approach. Track I includes "in-house" mitigation efforts-- activities that the Department can execute largely on its own. A key element is DoD’s Defense Critical Industry Program (DCIP)—an integrated risk management program designed to secure critical assets, infrastructure and key resources for our nation. DoD and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) work closely together as part of DCIP. Under Track I of the Mission Assurance Strategy, DCIP will continue to update the list of DoD's most critical assets and target them for special mitigation efforts through DoD’s budget and other internal processes. Track II of our Mission Assurance Strategy tackles the many challenges to DoD mission execution that require external collaboration with partners such as the Department of Energy (DOE), DHS and industry. Given that DoD mission execution relies heavily upon the energy surety of the communities surrounding our installations, Defense Industrial Base facilities spread across entire regions, and on private sector infrastructure that will collapse without electricity, this two-track approach can help **meet the challenges to DoD mission assurance that lie far beyond our military bases**.

### Forward Basing 2NC

#### Military sustainable – no credible ev that fuel sources will run out – supply disruptions won't threaten the US because prices would increase allowing the military to pay higher prices to maintain supplies – that's Bartis and Bibber

#### Fuel disruptions and supply shocks don't hurt the military – reserves check

Bartis & Bibber 11 -- senior policy researchers at the RAND Corporation (James T. and Lawrence Van, "Alternative Fuels for Military Applications," http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2011/RAND\_MG969.pdf)

Fuel Supply Disruptions. We also cannot predict whether or when the world oil market will suffer from a large and extended disruption in oil supplies as a result of conflict or natural disaster.2 But if such an abrupt disruption in global oil supplies were to occur, the United States as a whole would not suffer a physical shortage. If the disruption is short-lived, a release of the strategic petroleum reserves held by many oil-importing nations would serve to prevent a significant disruption in deliveries or increase in prices. If the disruption is so large that it cannot be fully mitigated by the release of strategic reserves, world oil prices would rise sharply, and this would cause the United States and other consumers to reduce their use of petroleum products. Prices for alternative fuels would also rise, as they should, to promote market-induced conservation.

### 2NC Heg/War – Fettweis Biz

#### No wars absent hegemony – nuclear deterrence, globalization, insituitions and democracy will exist with or without the US and will check great power conflict

#### Reject their vague assertions for conflict scenarios absent hegemony – their authors overestimate the importance of the US - *star this card*

**Fettweis 11** [Christopher J. Fettweis - Department of Political Science Tulane University and Professor of National Security Affairs at the US Naval War College, “Free Riding or Restraint Examining European Grand Strategy”, Comparative Strategy; Sep/Oct2011, Vol. 30 Issue 4, p316-332, 17p, Chetan]

**Assertions that without** the combination of **U.S. capabilities, presence and commitments instability would return** to Europe and the Pacific Rim **are usually rendered in rather vague language**. If the United States were to decrease its commitments abroad, argued Robert Art, “**the world will become a more dangerous place** and, sooner or later, that will redound to America’s detriment.”53 **From where would this danger arise? Who** precisely **would do the fighting, and over what issues?** Without the United States, **would Europe really descend into Hobbesian anarchy? Would the Japanese attack** mainland **China again**, to see if they could fare better this time around? Would the Germans and French have another go at it? In other words, **where exactly is hegemony is keeping the peace?** With one exception, **these questions are rarely addressed**. That exception is in the Pacific Rim. Some analysts fear that a de facto surrender of U.S. hegemony would lead to a rise of Chinese influence. Bradley Thayer worries that Chinese would become “the language of diplomacy, trade and commerce, transportation and navigation, the internet, world sport, and global culture,” and that Beijing would come to “dominate science and technology, in all its forms” to the extent that soon theworldwould witness a Chinese astronaut who not only travels to the Moon, but “plants the communist flag on Mars, and perhaps other planets in the future.”54 Indeed Chin a is the only other major power that has increased its military spending since the end of the Cold War, even if it still is only about 2 percent of its GDP. Such levels of effort do not suggest a desire to compete with, much less supplant, the United States. The much-ballyhooed, **decade-long military buildup has brought Chinese spending up to somewhere between one-tenth and one-fifth of the U.S. level. It is hardly clear that a restrained United States would invite Chinese** regional, must less global, political **expansion.** Fortunately one need not ponder for too long the horrible specter of a red flag on Venus, since on the planet Earth, where war is no longer the dominant form of conflict resolution, the threats posed by even a rising China would not be terribly dire. The dangers contained in the terrestrial security environment are less severe than ever before. **Believers in the pacifying power of hegemony ought to keep in mind** a rather basic tenet: When it comes to policymaking, **specific threats are more significant than vague, unnamed dangers**. Without specific risks, it is just as plausible to interpret U.S. presence as redundant, as overseeing a peace that has already arrived. **Strategy should not be based upon vague images emerging from the dark reaches of the neoconservative imagination.**  Overestimating Our Importance One of **the most basic insights of cognitive psychology provides the final reason to doubt the power of hegemonic stability: Rarely are our actions as consequential** upon their behavior **as we perceive them to be.** A great deal of **experimental evidence exists to support the notion that** people (and therefore **states) tend to overrate the degree to which** **their behavior is responsible for the actions of others.** Robert Jervis has argued that two processes account for this overestimation, both ofwhichwould seem to be especially relevant in theU.S. case. 55 First, **believing that we are responsible** **for their actions gratifies our national ego** (which is not small to begin with; the United States is exceptional in its exceptionalism). The hubris of the United States, long appreciated and noted, has only grown with the collapse of the Soviet Union.56 **U.S. policymakers famously have comparatively little knowledge of—or interest in—events that occur outside of their own borders**. **If there is any state vulnerable to the overestimation of its importance due to the fundamental misunderstanding of the motivation of others, it would have to be the United States.** Second, policymakers in the United States are far more familiar with our actions than they are with the decision-making processes of our allies. Try as we might**, it is not possible to** fully **understand the threats, challenges, and opportunities that our allies see from their perspective.** The European great powers have domestic politics as complex as ours, and they also have competent, capable strategists to chart their way forward. **They react to many international forces, of which U.S. behavior is only one**. Therefore, for any actor trying to make sense of the action of others, Jervis notes, “in the absence of strong evidence to the contrary, the most obvious and parsimonious explanation is that he was responsible.”57 **It is natural**, therefore, **for U.S**. policymakers and **strategists to believe that the behavior of our allies (and rivals) is shaped largely by what Washington does**. Presumably Americans are at least as susceptible to the overestimation of their ability as any other people, and perhaps more so. At the very least, political psychologists tell us, **we are probably not as important to them as we think**. **The importance of U.S. hegemony in contributing to international stability is therefore almost certainly overrated**. In the end, one can never be sure why our major allies have not gone to, and do not even plan for, war. Like deterrence, **the hegemonic stability theory rests on faith; it can only be falsified, never proven**. It does not seem likely, however, that hegemony could fully account for twenty years of strategic decisions made in allied capitals if the international system were not already a remarkably peaceful place. **Perhaps these states have no intention of fighting one another to begin with**, and our commitments are redundant. European great powers may well have chosen strategic restraint because they feel that their security is all but assured, **with or without the United States**.

#### Empirically the world grew more peaceful when heg declined

**Fettweis 11** [Christopher J. Fettweis - Department of Political Science Tulane University and Professor of National Security Affairs at the US Naval War College, “Free Riding or Restraint Examining European Grand Strategy”, Comparative Strategy; Sep/Oct2011, Vol. 30 Issue 4, p316-332, 17p, Chetan]

It is perhaps worth noting that **there is no evidence to support a** direct **relationship between** the relative level of **U.S. activism and international stability**. In fact, **the limited data we do have suggest the opposite may be true**. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990. 51 To internationalists, defense hawks and believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities,” argued Kristol and Kagan, “doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace.” 52 On the other hand, if the paciﬁc trends were not based upon U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: **The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered** by a less-capable United States military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. **No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums, no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races, and no regional balancing occurred** once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. **The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a** pressing **concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities**. Most of all, the United States and its allies were no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conﬂict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and kept declining as the Bush ramped the spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. Military spending ﬁgures by themselves are insufﬁcient to disprove a connection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. Once again, one could presumably argue that spending is not the only or even the best indication of hegemony, and that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was signiﬁcantly altered during this period, instability should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. However, even if it is true that either U.S. commitments or relative spending account for global paciﬁc trends, then at the very least stability can evidently be maintained at drastically lower levels of both. In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in the alternative for a moment and suppose that there is in fact a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand strategist would still recommend cutting back on engagement and spending until that level is determined. Grand strategic decisions are never ﬁnal; continual adjustments can and must be made as time goes on. Basic logic suggests that the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment. And if the current era of stability is as stable as many believe it to be, no increase in conﬂict would ever occur irrespective of U.S. spending, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation. It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that their expectations had been fulﬁlled. If increases in conﬂict would have been interpreted as proof of the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, **the only evidence we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained United States suggests that the current peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. military** spending. Evidently **the rest of the world can operate** quite effectively **without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone.**

#### International trade and economics aren’t dependent on military intervention

**Fettweis 11** [Christopher J. Fettweis - Department of Political Science Tulane University and Professor of National Security Affairs at the US Naval War College, “Free Riding or Restraint Examining European Grand Strategy”, Comparative Strategy; Sep/Oct2011, Vol. 30 Issue 4, p316-332, 17p, Chetan]

Second, it should be equally simple to demonstrate that these **states remain vigorously engaged in international trade and** **economics.** In fact, fourteen of the fifteen “most globalized” countries in 2010 are in Europe, according to the Swiss Economic Institute.10 The **major U.S. allies** appear to **believe that the market does not need protection**, and that **prosperity is no longer dependent upon active military intervention** abroad. **Multinational corporations** today **can** generally **access the entire world without** much **fear of** undue **harassment from host governments, who have strong incentives to provide a healthy, well-regulated environment for trade** and prosperity to flourish. Threats to free trade still exist from a variety of criminal predators, but their solution, according to this point of view, hardly requires costly military action. If and when local law enforcement agencies prove incapable of providing protection for the businesses that operate in their territory, modern multinationals surely have the resources to either provide it for themselves, or move out. In other words, the allies have reached the conclusion that **Microsoft does not need the Marine Corps** **and great powers no longer have to use force to guard their economic interests. Today’s market will take care of itself**.

#### Trade routes and globalization check conflict post-decline

**Preble 10** [Christopher Preble (director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute) August 2010 “U.S. Military Power: Preeminence for What Purpose?” http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/u-s-military-power-preeminence-for-what-purpose/]

Most in Washington still embraces the notion that America is, and forever will be, the world’s indispensable nation. Some scholars, however, questioned the logic of hegemonic stability theory from the very beginning. A number continue to do so today. They advance arguments diametrically at odds with the primacist consensus. Trade routes need not be policed by a single dominant power; the international economy is complex and resilient. Supply disruptions are likely to be temporary, and the costs of mitigating their effects should be borne by those who stand to lose — or gain — the most. Islamic extremists are scary, but hardly comparable to the threat posed by a globe-straddling Soviet Union armed with thousands of nuclear weapons. It is frankly absurd that we spend more today to fight Osama bin Laden and his tiny band of murderous thugs than we spent to face down Joseph Stalin and Chairman Mao. Many factors have contributed to the dramatic decline in the number of wars between nation-states; it is unrealistic to expect that a new spasm of global conflict would erupt if the United States were to modestly refocus its efforts, draw down its military power, and call on other countries to play a larger role in their own defense, and in the security of their respective regions. But while there are credible alternatives to the United States serving in its current dual role as world policeman / armed social worker, the foreign policy establishment in Washington has no interest in exploring them. The people here have grown accustomed to living at the center of the earth, and indeed, of the universe. The tangible benefits of all this military spending flow disproportionately to this tiny corner of the United States while the schlubs in fly-over country pick up the tab

#### Unipolarity is comparatively meaningless to other factors in preventing conflict

**Legro 11** (Jeffrey W. – professor of politics and Randolph P. Compton Professor in the Miller Center at the University of Virginia, Sell unipolarity? The future of an overvalued concept in International Relations Theory and the Consequences of Unipolarity, p. EBook)

Such a view, however, is problematic. What seems increasingly clear is that the role of polarity has been overstated or misunderstood or both. This is the unavoidable conclusion that emerges from the penetrating chapters in this volume that probe America’s current dominant status (unipolarity) with the question “does the distribution of capabilities matter for patterns of international politics?”3 Despite the explicit claim that “unipolarity does have a profound impact on international politics”4 what is surprising is how ambiguous and relatively limited that influence is across the chapters. The causal impact of unipolarity has been overvalued for three fundamental reasons. The first is that the effects of unipolarity are often not measured relative to the influence of other causes that explain the same outcome. When the weight of other factors is considered, polarity seems to pale in comparison. Second, rather than being a structure that molds states, polarity often seems to be the product of state choice. Polarity may be more outcome than cause. Finally, while international structure does exist, it is constituted as much by ideational content as by material capabilities. Again polarity loses ground in significance.

#### Hegemonic decline will not result in great power wars.

**Ikenberry 11** (G. John – Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, A World of Our Making, Democracy: A Journal of Ideas, Summer, p. <http://www.democracyjournal.org/21/a-world-of-our-making-1.php?page=all>)

There are four reasons to think that some type of updated and reorganized liberal international order will persist. First, the old and traditional mechanism for overturning international order—great-power war—is no longer likely to occur. Already, the contemporary world has experienced the longest period of great-power peace in the long history of the state system. This absence of great-power war is no doubt due to several factors not present in earlier eras, namely nuclear deterrence and the dominance of liberal democracies. Nuclear weapons—and the deterrence they generate—give great powers some confidence that they will not be dominated or invaded by other major states. They make war among major states less rational and there-fore less likely. This removal of great-power war as a tool of overturning international order tends to reinforce the status quo. The United States was lucky to have emerged as a global power in the nuclear age, because rival great powers are put at a disadvantage if they seek to overturn the American-led system. The cost-benefit calculation of rival would-be hegemonic powers is altered in favor of working for change within the system. But, again, the fact that great-power deterrence also sets limits on the projection of American power presumably makes the existing international order more tolerable. It removes a type of behavior in the system—war, invasion, and conquest between great powers—that historically provided the motive for seeking to overturn order. If the violent over-turning of international order is removed, a bias for continuity is introduced into the system. Second, the character of liberal international order itself—with or without American hegemonic leadership—reinforces continuity. The complex interdependence that is unleashed in an open and loosely rule-based order generates expanding realms of exchange and investment that result in a growing array of firms, interest groups, and other sorts of political stakeholders who seek to preserve the stability and openness of the system. Beyond this, the liberal order is also relatively easy to join. In the post-Cold War decades, countries in different regions of the world have made democratic transitions and connected themselves to various parts of this system. East European countries and states within the old Soviet empire have joined NATO. East Asian countries, including China, have joined the World Trade Organization (WTO). Through its many multilateral institutions, the liberal international order facilitates integration and offers support for states that are making transitions toward liberal democracy. Many countries have also experienced growth and rising incomes within this order. Comparing international orders is tricky, but the current liberal international order, seen in comparative perspective, does appear to have unique characteristics that encourage integration and discourage opposition and resistance. Third, the states that are rising today do not constitute a potential united opposition bloc to the existing order. There are so-called rising states in various regions of the world. China, India, Brazil, and South Africa are perhaps most prominent. Russia is also sometimes included in this grouping of rising states. These states are all capitalist and most are democratic. They all gain from trade and integration within the world capitalist system. They all either are members of the WTO or seek membership in it. But they also have very diverse geopolitical and regional interests and agendas. They do not constitute either an economic bloc or a geopolitical one. Their ideologies and histories are distinct. They share an interest in gaining access to the leading institutions that govern the international system. Sometimes this creates competition among them for influence and access. But it also orients their struggles toward the reform and reorganization of governing institutions, not to a united effort to overturn the underlying order. Fourth, all the great powers have alignments of interests that will continue to bring them together to negotiate and cooperate over the management of the system. All the great powers—old and rising—are status-quo powers. All are beneficiaries of an open world economy and the various services that the liberal international order provides for capitalist trading states. All worry about religious radicalism and failed states. Great powers such as Russia and China do have different geopolitical interests in various key trouble spots, such as Iran and South Asia, and so disagreement and noncooperation over sanctions relating to nonproliferation and other security issues will not disappear. But the opportunities for managing differences with frameworks of great-power cooperation exist and will grow. Overall, the forces for continuity are formidable. Of course, there are many forces operating in the world that can generate upheaval and discontinuity. The collapse of the global financial system and an economic depression that triggers massive protectionism are possibilities. Terrorism and other forms of transnational violence can also trigger political panic and turmoil that would lead governments to shut down borders and reimpose restrictions on the movement of goods and people. But in the face of these seismic events in world politics, there are deep forces that keep the system anchored and stable.

## 1NR – Politics

### v Impact 2NC

#### DA outweighs the case ---

#### Escalation is highly probable.

**Geller 2005** (Daniel S. – Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science at Wayne State University, The India-Pakistan Conflict: An Enduring Rivalry, Ed. T. V. Paul, p. 99)

In fact, both the May-July 1999 military engagement between India and Pakistan over Kashmir and the crisis of December 2001-June 2002 after the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament mirrored the conflict escalation pattern for nuclear-armed states. Each side initiated troop mobilization and general military alerts, coupled with the evacuation of civilians from border-area villages. However, the outcome of the future confrontations for India and Pakistan may not adhere to the pattern established by other nuclear dyads. Elements are present in this dyad that were largely absent between other nuclear-armed antagonists and that make the escalation of war more probable. Among those factors are the presence of a contiguous border between India and Pakistan, a history of multiple wars, and an ongoing territorial dispute. These factors, among others,79 increase the likelihood that an Indo-Pakistani dispute will turn violent and that the violence will escalate to war irrespective of the presence of nuclear weapons.

#### That escalation has a high probability of being nuclear.

**Raghavan**, Fall-Winter **2001** (Lieutenant General V. R. – former Director General of Military Operations for India, Limited War and Nuclear Escalation in South Asia, The Nonproliferation Review, p. 1)

The status of India and Pakistan as declared nuclear powers with growing nuclear arsenals has raised the risks of a nuclear exchange between them, if the two countries engage in a large military conflict. The political leadership in both countries does not seem to have **fully grasped the implications of nuclear weapons** in relation to the ongoing conflict in Jammu and Kashmir. This conflict could lead to a limited war, as it has triggered three wars in the past. The risks involved in fighting a limited war over the Kashmir issue and the potential for such a war to escalate into a nuclear exchange are at best inadequately understood, and at worst brushed aside as an unlikely possibility. Despite this official stance, however, a close examination of Indian and Pakistani military and nuclear doctrine reveals elements that could contribute to the rapid escalation of a limited war to include nuclear weapons. Strikingly, India and Pakistan have not revealed warfighting doctrines for the post-1998 condition of nuclear weapons readiness. It is not clear, for example, what threats to its security would compel India to declare a state of war with Pakistan. There is also no indication of the circumstances that would induce Pakistan to seek a larger war with India. The political objectives that a limited war might seek to achieve have also not been articulated in official and public discourse in the two countries. This article examines the possibility of limited war between India and Pakistan, and the potential of such a conflict triggering a nuclear war. It examines the considerations that could push each of the two countries to fight a limited war. It discusses how such a war might be waged and the circumstances that would likely precipitate an escalation to a nuclear exchange. The doctrinal beliefs and decisionmaking processes of the two countries are examined to trace the likely escalatory spiral towards a nuclear war. The article concludes that the probability of a nuclear war between India and Pakistan is high in the event the two countries engage in a direct military conflict.

### Nanotech 2NC (Military)

#### Immigration reform spurs military nanotech – turns all heg args

**Carafano 7** (James, Ph.D., Deputy Driector – Institute for International Studies and Director of the Center for Foreign Policy Studies – Heritage Foundation, and Andrew Gudgel, “Nanotechnology and National Security: Small Changes, Big Impact”, Heritage Backgrounder, 9-21, http://heritage.org/Research/Reports/2007/09/Nanotechnology -and-National-Security-Small-Changes-Big-Impact)

Nanotechnology is an emerging transformational technology that promises wide and dual-use applica­tions in many fields, particularly national security. The United States is the world's acknowledged leader in nanoscience, but stiff international competition is nar­rowing America's lead. Many other countries, specifi­cally European nations and China, have large, established nanotechnology initiatives. Most commer­cial applications of nanotechnology are still nascent. In the near term, the most promising develop­ments for national security will likely come from government research rather than from the applica­tion of commercial off-the-shelf nanotechnologies. To meet national security needs in the near term, the U.S. government needs to adopt new legislative and policy innovations, including promoting long-term research, distributing federal grants more widely, and promoting scientific travel and exchanges to maintain a supply of skilled experts. Over the long term, the government should remove capital and regulatory barriers to lower the cost of research and emerging technologies and should address safety and environmental issues. What Is Nanotechnology? "Nanotechnology" is derived from "nano," the Greek word for dwarf. It involves manipulating and manufacturing particles at the microscopic and even atomic levels, between 1 nanometer and 100 nanom­eters. By comparison, a human hair is roughly 100,000 nanometers wide. Combining the ability to manipulate molecular structures with advances in genomics and other bio­logical sciences has created a wealth of new research opportunities. By putting these unique properties to work, scientists are developing highly beneficial dual-use products in medicine, electronics, and many other industries that will also provide enor­mous defense and homeland security capabilities. These scientific developments are creating new industries. The market opportunities are so sub­stantial that many government and business lead­ers describe nanotechnology as "the next industrial revolution." Nanotechnology was incorporated into manu­factured goods worth more than $30 billion in 2005, and this figure is projected to reach $2.6 tril­lion by 2015.[[1]](http://heritage.org/Research/Reports/2007/09/Nanotechnology-and-National-Security-Small-Changes-Big-Impact" \l "_ftn1" \o ") However, since nanotechnology is relatively new, government research is critical for developing applications of this new technology, par­ticularly in the field of national security. A Small Beginning The birth of nanotechnology can be traced to 1981, when Gerd Binning and Heinrich Rohrer, sci­entists at IBM Research, Zurich, created the scan­ning tunneling microscope (STM). The STM was the first instrument capable of performing opera­tions at the atomic scale, such as adding or remov­ing individual electrons to or from atoms and molecules. It gave researchers the unprecedented ability to change materials "from the bottom up." The two scientists won the Nobel Prize in physics for their invention in 1986.[[2]](http://heritage.org/Research/Reports/2007/09/Nanotechnology-and-National-Security-Small-Changes-Big-Impact#_ftn2) Within a few years, scientists had demonstrated the capability to manufacture nanoparticles. The discovery of fullerines (isomers or molecules of pure carbon that can be manipulated into unique structures, such as "buckyballs") in 1985 and car­bon nanotubes (manufactured one-atom-thick sheets of carbon rolled into cylinders) in 1991 sparked further interest in nanotechnology. These molecules have novel properties that make them potentially useful in a wide variety of applica­tions, including electronics, optics, and other fields of material science. They also exhibit extraordinary strength and unique electrical properties. Carbon nanotubes are 100 times stronger than steel at one-sixth the weight, while buckyballs are hollow, mak­ing them well-suited for use as carriers of drugs or other materials.[[3]](http://heritage.org/Research/Reports/2007/09/Nanotechnology-and-National-Security-Small-Changes-Big-Impact#_ftn3) Nanotechnology Today Current commercial nanotechnological prod­ucts are limited to first-generation passive applica­tions, such as nanoparticles, coatings, catalysts, and nanocomposites (materials formed from organic and inorganic components at the nanos­cale). Products include cosmetics, automobile parts, clothing, and sports equipment. Research is quickly leading nanotechnology to converge with other fields, including biotechnology, information technology, and cognitive science. Using techniques commonly found in semicon­ductor manufacture, researchers have created adjustable "quantum dots" by making "wells" and "corrals" on silicon chips where individual elec­trons can be trapped and held. The shell of elec­trons around every atom determines its properties, such as color and electrical conductivity. By filling these quantum corrals with differing numbers of electrons, researchers can create artificial "atoms" that have the same properties as any element on- or beyond-the periodic table, although these "atoms" are temporary and lack nuclei. Simply adding or subtracting electrons from these wells changes the type of "atom." Grids of quantum corrals built across the surface of a silicon semiconductor chip would allow the creation of artificial molecules, which would theoretically allow the entire chip to have-at least on its sur­face-the physical properties of almost any mate­rial imaginable. Some aspects of current nanotechnology also blur the line with biotechnology. For example, nanoparticles (clusters of tens to hundreds of indi­vidual atoms) have been used in medical research to fight diseases, including cancer. Researchers are also exploring ways to manipulate the genetic code that have tremendous implications in the diagnosis and treatment of diseases. A nanoparticle that encapsu­lates medication with biomolecules could be designed to bind only to the cells that need the medicine. Such research could also affect other dis­ease research and possibly change the medical response to national catastrophic disaster.[[4]](http://heritage.org/Research/Reports/2007/09/Nanotechnology-and-National-Security-Small-Changes-Big-Impact#_ftn4) Nanophotonics is another growing field of nano­technology research. Photonics, which uses light, is the ability to control photons for the purpose of car­rying, processing, storing, or displaying informa­tion. Well-known applications of photonics include fiberoptic cable, television screens, computer dis­plays, and laser and imaging systems. In nanophotonics, scientists control the mor­phology of materials and, as a result, can now change how a material refracts light. Thus, nano­photonics is not simply the scaling-down of existing systems, but utilizing physics, functionalities, and design strategies that are different from regular pho­tonics to produce tiny waveguides, microscopes on a single chip, better optical communications equip­ment, and chemical and biological sensors.[[5]](http://heritage.org/Research/Reports/2007/09/Nanotechnology-and-National-Security-Small-Changes-Big-Impact" \l "_ftn5" \o ") National Security Implications In 2000, the federal government established the National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI) to pro­mote nanotechnology research at the federal level. The NNI is managed by the Nanoscale Science Engineering and Technology Subcommittee of the National Science and Technology Council, an inter­agency organization of 26 federal agencies that coordinates planning, budgeting, and program implementation among defense and national secu­rity stakeholders. This structure is vital to dissemi­nating information and fostering cross-disciplinary networks and partnerships. Both the Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) are NNI members. In addition to funding research, federal support through the NNI provides crucial funds for the cre­ation of nanotech support infrastructure, such as nanoscale research labs, and for educational re­sources to develop a skilled workforce capable of advancing nanotechnology. These programs en­courage business, including small business, to pur­sue nanotechnology opportunities.[[6]](http://heritage.org/Research/Reports/2007/09/Nanotechnology-and-National-Security-Small-Changes-Big-Impact" \l "_ftn6" \o ") Military Applications. All branches of the U.S. military are currently conducting nanotechnology research, including the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), Office of Naval Research (ONR), Army Research Office (ARO), and Air Force Office of Scientific Research (AFOSR). The Air Force is heavily involved in research of composite materials.[[7]](http://heritage.org/Research/Reports/2007/09/Nanotechnology-and-National-Security-Small-Changes-Big-Impact" \l "_ftn7" \o ") Among other projects, the Navy Research Laboratory's Institute for Nanoscience has studied quantum dots for application in nanopho­tonics and identifying biological materials.[[8]](http://heritage.org/Research/Reports/2007/09/Nanotechnology-and-National-Security-Small-Changes-Big-Impact" \l "_ftn8" \o ") In May 2003, the Army and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology opened the Institute for Soldier Nano­technologies, a joint research collaboration to develop technologies to protect soldiers better.[[9]](http://heritage.org/Research/Reports/2007/09/Nanotechnology-and-National-Security-Small-Changes-Big-Impact" \l "_ftn9" \o ") Nanotechnology has numerous military applica­tions. The most obvious are in materials science. Carbon nanotubes and diamond films and fibers have higher strength-to-weight ratios than steel, which allows for lighter and stronger armor and parts for vehicles, equipment, and aircraft. Such upgraded military Humvees would better protect soldiers from improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and small-arms fire. In another application, adding nickel nanostrands (ropes of material no wider than a few molecules), which can conduct electricity, could make aircraft more resistant to lightning strikes. The nickel strands also have magnetic properties that may prove useful in filters and energy storage devices.[[10]](http://heritage.org/Research/Reports/2007/09/Nanotechnology-and-National-Security-Small-Changes-Big-Impact" \l "_ftn10" \o ") The U.S. Army is actively pursuing nanotech­nology for use in soldiers' uniforms, equipment, and armor. As part of the planned Objective Force Warrior Soldier Ensemble, the Army hopes to cre­ate a uniform that provides flexible armor protec­tion for soldiers' limbs through the use of shear thickening liquids that solidify when force is applied to them. This would greatly reduce the weight that a soldier must carry. (Current body armor weighs around 25 pounds.) Other features of the planned uniform include medical sensors, medical treatment capabilities, communications, and individual environmental control for the soldier and integrated thermal, chemical, and biological sensing systems woven into the garment's fabric.[[11]](http://heritage.org/Research/Reports/2007/09/Nanotechnology-and-National-Security-Small-Changes-Big-Impact" \l "_ftn11" \o ") Nanotechnology would allow for more precise control of fuel combustion and detonation of explosives. Explosives and propellants could be constructed atom by atom to optimal particle sizes and ratios of ingredients so that the materials approach their theoretical limits of energy release. This would lead to smaller, more powerful rock­ets, propellants, warheads, bombs, and other explosive devices. For slower release of energy, nanotechnology would allow for more powerful batteries, fuel cells, photovoltaic panels, and perhaps even more exotic methods of generating electrical power. Researchers at the Georgia Institute of Technology recently developed piezoelectric fibers, which someday may be used in fabrics that generate their own electricity, completely eliminating the need for batteries.[[12]](http://heritage.org/Research/Reports/2007/09/Nanotechnology-and-National-Security-Small-Changes-Big-Impact" \l "_ftn12" \o ") In electronics, nanotechnology would allow the creation of ever-smaller computers and sensors, leading to integrated packages that could sense, dis­criminate, decide, report information, and provide control input to other devices. For example, tires that sense the surface over which they are traveling could automatically adjust tire pressure to maintain optimal traction. Smart sensors could be used in single-chip chemical and biological agent laboratories that would be smaller, faster, and more accurate than current testing methods. They could also be attached to miniature disposable sensor platforms, allowing monitoring of a large battlespace at mini­mal cost, effort, and danger to soldiers. In the more distant future, combining nanocom­puters, sensors, and nanomechanical architectures into one system would make possible autono­mously targeted and guided projectiles, such as bul­lets and rockets. Nanotechnology could also improve communications and information process­ing, whether on the battlefield or with the Oval Office, through microscopic computers, switches, lasers, mirrors, detectors, and other optical and electrical devices. The laws of physics and optics change funda­mentally at the near-atomic level. Instead of being masked by the manipulation of particles on the sur­face, materials can be changed at the optical elec­tronic level. Materials that display one optical or electronic property at the macro level may display a different property at the nanometer level. Remark­able mechanisms become possible, such as nega­tively refractive optics that bend light at angles and in directions otherwise impossible.[[13]](http://heritage.org/Research/Reports/2007/09/Nanotechnology-and-National-Security-Small-Changes-Big-Impact" \l "_ftn13" \o ") Such devices could lead to the development of lenses that focus almost instantaneously and light-bending camou­flage that changes as the solider or vehicle moves. One theoretical and exotic use of nanophotonic materials would be fiberoptic waveguides that actu­ally strengthen the light beams passing through them. These could be used for long-distance, strate­gic-level communications systems or high-power narrow-beam lasers. With nanophotonics, optical computing, data storage, and signal processing become possible. If the Defense Department is to remain a leader in exploiting nanotechnology, the Pentagon must ensure that it adequately understands how nano­technology could be exploited for U.S. security and competitive advantage. Homeland Security Applications. Only 0.25 percent of the government's 2004 funding for nan­otechnology goes to the Department of Homeland Security. This is inadequate given that nanotechnol­ogy could play a major role in advancing the DHS capabilities. Nanomaterials could be used to create highly sensitive sensors capable of detecting hazard­ous materials in the air. For example, carbon-based nanotubes are relatively inexpensive and consume minimal power. Other areas of nanotechnology pertinent to homeland security are emergency responder de­vices. Lightweight communications systems that require almost no power and have a large contact radius would give rescuers more flexibility. Nano­tech robots could be used to disarm bombs and save trapped victims, reducing the risks to rescue workers. Enlisting the Private Sector In the United States, the commercial nano­science industry is composed of traditional indus­trial sectors, newly formed startups, Fortune 500 companies, and academic research institutions. These groups will play a significant role in future developments of nanotechnology. The most recent analysis estimates that nanoscience will produce $2.6 trillion in economic output by 2015.[[14]](http://heritage.org/Research/Reports/2007/09/Nanotechnology-and-National-Security-Small-Changes-Big-Impact" \l "_ftn14" \o ") The U.S. is currently the global leader in nano­technology. The National Nanotechnology Initiative coordinates over $1 billion in annual federal research and grants. Total U.S. public and private spending on nanotechnology research and develop­ment totals about $3 billion annually, or one-third of the estimated $9 billion that is spent worldwide.[[15]](http://heritage.org/Research/Reports/2007/09/Nanotechnology-and-National-Security-Small-Changes-Big-Impact" \l "_ftn15" \o ") Global competition in nanotechnology is fierce, and many countries are challenging the U.S.'s supremacy, specifically in the European Union and Asia. The EU is strengthening its research and development capabilities by promot­ing partnerships among companies and universi­ties through its Nanosciences/Nanotechnology Action Plan for Europe. The Chinese government has implemented initiatives that employ over twice as many engineers as are working in nano­technology in the U.S.[[16]](http://heritage.org/Research/Reports/2007/09/Nanotechnology-and-National-Security-Small-Changes-Big-Impact" \l "_ftn16" \o ") Thus, U.S. government-sponsored research is still vital if America is to remain a global leader in the national security applications of nanotechnology. Toward the Future Congress and the Administration have done much to encourage the development of nano­science. The challenge is to maintain this momen­tum, facilitating commercial innovation and the application of new advances for national security purposes. A few key initiatives would bolster Amer­ica's global leadership in the science of small things. Smarter Funding. In the near term, government research and development funds will continue to play a critical role in jump-starting national security innovations in nanotechnology. Congress should continue to provide strong support for nanoscience research programs in the Department of Defense and other federal agencies that support national security purposes. Big Industry is currently averse to risk and is not providing the innovations needed for national secu­rity. In fact, investments in the private sector have been concentrated in just a few mature nanotech companies. In the first quarter of 2005, almost all of the venture capital invested in the nanotech indus­try went to four companies: NanoTex ($33 millon), Nanomix ($17 million), Nantero ($17 million), and NanoOpto ($12 million).[[17]](http://heritage.org/Research/Reports/2007/09/Nanotechnology-and-National-Security-Small-Changes-Big-Impact" \l "_ftn17" \o ") The NNI needs to focus grants on the companies willing to pursue national security research. In doing so, however, it must walk a fine line between fostering cutting-edge technology advances and establishing a form of corporate welfare. Funding of the private sector should be limited to projects with such prohibitive risk and entry costs that companies would otherwise be unable to pursue them on their own. Interagency Coordination. The DOD recently cited maintaining a consistent vision and stable funding as critical to future nanotechnology research and development.[[18]](http://heritage.org/Research/Reports/2007/09/Nanotechnology-and-National-Security-Small-Changes-Big-Impact" \l "_ftn18" \o ") Although federal agencies con­tinue to coordinate through the NNI, each agency retains full control of its own budget decisions and sets its own research priorities. The National Academy of Sciences has con­cluded that the "NNI is successfully establishing R&D programs with wider impact than could have been expected from separate agency funding with­out coordination." Increased coordination within the NNI would produce a centralized list of priori­ties and leverage resources even more effectively.[[19]](http://heritage.org/Research/Reports/2007/09/Nanotechnology-and-National-Security-Small-Changes-Big-Impact" \l "_ftn19" \o ") Reform of Visa Issuance and Management. Congress needs to promote policies that continue to bring the best and the brightest in nanotechnology to study and work in the United States. Current visa policies are making it increasingly difficult to recruit students and scientists and to hold scientific confer­ences in the United States. The nation's security and competitiveness relies heavily on people's ability to travel to the United States, but the current visa system is unnecessarily challenging, depriving the United States of many of the world's best and brightest scientists, students, and entrepreneurs. Long wait times for personal interviews are among the most frequently cited fac­tors that make travel to the United States difficult.

#### Solves trade/econ integration – turns their shipping impacts

#### China econ collapse goes nuclear

**Kaminski 7**

(Antoni Z., Professor – Institute of Political Studies, “World Order: The Mechanics of Threats (Central European Perspective)”, Polish Quarterly of International Affairs, 1, p. 58)

As already argued, the economic advance of China has taken place with relatively few corresponding changes in the political system, although the operation of political and economic institutions has seen some major changes. Still, tools are missing that would allow the establishment of political and legal foundations for the modem economy, or they are too weak. The tools are efficient public administration, the rule of law, clearly defined ownership rights, efficient banking system, etc. For these reasons, many experts fear an economic crisis in China. Considering the importance of the state for the development of the global economy, the crisis would have serious global repercussions. Its political ramifications could be no less dramatic owing to the special position the military occupies in the Chinese political system, and the existence of many potential vexed issues in East Asia (disputes over islands in the China Sea and the Pacific). A potential hotbed of conflict is also Taiwan's status. Economic recession and the related destabilization of internal policies could lead to a political, or even military crisis. The likelihood of the global escalation of the conflict is high, as the interests of Russia, China, Japan, Australia and, first and foremost, the US clash in the region.

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### U 2NC

#### Immigration reform will pass --- the election has given Obama a mandate and weakened GOP opposition. That’s the 1NC Foley and Stein 1/2 evidence.

#### Prefer our ev because it is predictive and post-dates their evidence.

#### Immigration reform has momentum and a compromise is likely.

**Grant**, **12/28**/2012 (David, Immigration reform: Is 'amnesty' a possibility now?, Christian Science Monitor, p. <http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2012/1228/Immigration-reform-Is-amnesty-a-possibility-now>)

The momentum of President Obama's resounding victory in November's election – with a big push from Latinos and other minority groups – has catapulted immigration policy to the top of Washington's 2013 agenda, making reform not only possible but also likely. The shift in the political conversation has been so dramatic that even a pathway to citizenship for some of the estimated 12 million undocumented immigrants in the United States – long rejected out of hand by most Republicans and some Democrats – could be part of the deal. The task is momentous. It involves weighing the wishes of industries from agriculture to high-tech, as well as the sensitivities of opening the door to immigrant workers at a time when unemployment remains high. The past only reinforces the potential difficulties ahead. In 1986, Republicans felt betrayed when Democrats stripped the enforcement provisions from a bill that offered citizenship to some 3 million illegal immigrants. By 2005, the issue had become so politically toxic to conservatives that they blocked President George W. Bush's push for a new round of immigration reform. Yet with Election 2012 highlighting the electoral consequences of America's changing demographics, the next year appears to be ripe for compromise. How reforms might take shape could be a major point of contention between the parties, but lawmakers on both sides suddenly see an opportunity for what could be their most expansive achievement of 2013.

#### It will pass --- capital is key.

Financial Times, **1/2**/2013 (Fiscal fights threaten US policy goals, p. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/8f8ef804-5501-11e2-a628-00144feab49a.html?ftcamp=published\_links%2Frss%2Fworld%2Ffeed%2F%2Fproduct#axzz2GrNoEPIS)

Of all the issues crowding Mr Obama’s agenda, immigration has the best hope of passing in some form, as the disastrous vote recorded by Republicans among minorities in 2012 gives them a huge incentive to address the issue. But on everything else, with the Republicans remaining in control of the House, Mr Obama needs all the skills of cajoling, seducing and manipulating Congress that he has so far shown no signs of developing. “I find it remarkable that the president apparently continues to believe that he will not have to deal with people that he does not agree with,” said Mr Galston. “A president who is not disdainful of the art of legislating can get things done.”

#### GOP support ensures passage.

Financial Times, **1/2**/2013 (White House builds immigration pact, p. <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/e6b2805c-4ac9-11e2-929d-00144feab49a.html#axzz2GrNoEPIS>)

As they try to avoid further alienating the US’s fastest growing demographic, Republicans are eager to deal with the issue of immigration reform and get it off the table before the 2014 midterm elections. That could help its passage through Congress and help repair relations following Mr Romney’s presidential bid. “This was a big mistake from the start of the Republican primaries, when the candidates had very ugly positions and antagonised Latinos,” said Alfonso Aguilar, executive director of the Latino Partnership for Conservative Principles and an influential Republican voice on immigration. “Now we’ve got to get back to the principles of George W. Bush and reclaim this issue,” he said, referring to the former president’s relatively open approach to immigration. In a Latino Decisions poll taken on the eve of the election, 31 per cent said they would be more likely to vote Republican if the Republican party took a leadership role in supporting comprehensive immigration reform with an eventual pathway to citizenship for undocumented immigrants.

### U – AT: Thumpers (Generic)\*\*\*

#### Prefer issue specific uniqueness --- our Foley and Stein evidence assumes their thumper and predicts that Obama still has enough capital to push immigration reform.

#### It’s at the top of the docket.

**Weber**, **1/1**/2013 (Joseph, Guns, immigration, fiscal issues emerge as top priorities for Obama, new Congress, Fox News, p. <http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/01/01/gun-control-immigration-reform-fiscal-issues-emerge-as-top-issues-for-new/>)

But in the near term, immigration legislation appears to be high on the docket in the next Congress and second Obama administration term. Washington has tried for years to change the country's immigration policy -- to strengthen border security and stem the flow of illegal immigrants into the U.S.; to reform the visa system for the benefit of those legal immigrants following the rules; and figure out how to address the millions of illegal immigrants already here. Legislative efforts by Democrats and Republicans on comprehensive immigration reform had reached a standstill -- until the issue re-emerged during this election cycle when Obama suspended deportation for many young immigrants brought to the U.S. illegally by their parents. Republicans have since signaled their intentions to be the first to introduce and pass more comprehensive legislation to deal with the roughly 11 million illegal immigrants in the United States, especially after Obama won re-election with roughly 71 percent of the Hispanic vote. However, Obama appeared to re-stake his turf Sunday, saying he would introduce legislation next year to fix “our broken immigration system.”

### U – AT: Gun Control Thumper

#### Immigration reform is moving ahead despite a push for gun control.

Financial Times, **1/2**/2013 (White House builds immigration pact, p. <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/e6b2805c-4ac9-11e2-929d-00144feab49a.html#axzz2GrNoEPIS>)

The White House is building a coalition of allies, including labour unions and Hispanic groups, to help generate support for comprehensive immigration reform, capitalising on the grassroots network that helped President Barack Obama defeat Republican Mitt Romney in November. Although the continued fiscal uncertainty is taking precedence and gun control has been catapulted to the top of the agenda, preparations to launch an all-encompassing immigration bill are proceeding apace. Groups including the SEIU labour union and voter mobilisation organisations such as Mi Familia Vota are among those preparing to promote comprehensive immigration reform that includes the “big enchilada” of a pathway to citizenship for the estimated 11m people in the US illegally. “2013 is our window of opportunity,” said Eliseo Medina, secretary-treasurer of the SEIU, one of the US’s biggest unions, representing healthcare and public service employees. “We are going to be conducting a very aggressive grassroots campaign to get people to contact their members of Congress and tell them they need to pass immigration reform now. It will be unlike anything we’ve ever done before,” he told the Financial Times. Mr Obama already has about a dozen people, led by Cecilia Munoz, his director for domestic policy, working on the issue, along with officials from the departments of homeland security, justice, agriculture and commerce. The president is likely to make his first big push for immigration reform in his State of the Union address after his inauguration later this month, and officials are preparing a bill that will be ready for introduction in the Democrat-controlled Senate.

### A2: No Push

#### Obama needs to spend capital to get CIR.

**Hesson**, **1/2**/2013 (Ted, Analysis: 6 Things To Do for Immigration Reform, ABC News, p. http://abcnews.go.com/ABC\_Univision/News/things-president-obama-immigration-reform/story?id=18103115#.UOSvpG88CSo)

On Sunday, President Barack Obama said that immigration reform is a "top priority" on his agenda and that he would introduce legislation in his first year. To find out what he needs to do to make reform a reality, we talked to Lynn Tramonte, the deputy director at America's Voice, a group that lobbies for immigration reform, and Muzaffar Chishti, the director of the New York office of the Migration Policy Institute, a think tank. Here's what we came up with. 1. Be a Leader During Obama's first term, bipartisan legislation never got off the ground. The president needs to do a better job leading the charge this time around, according to Chishti. "He has to make it clear that it's a high priority of his," he said. "He has to make it clear that he'll use his bully pulpit and his political muscle to make it happen, and he has to be open to using his veto power." His announcement this weekend is a step in that direction, but he needs to follow through.

#### Obama will push immigration reform --- it will pass.

**Jensen and Yost**, **12/20**/2012 (Thomas – Faegre Baker Daniels, and Peter A. – Faegre Baker Daniels, Obama Administration to push comprehensive immigration reform early in the new Congress, Lexology, p. <http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=b8ab89cc-d88a-42c1-b8ca-078660995587>)

Washington is currently focused on negotiations to address the looming fiscal cliff. Once that issue is resolved, the Obama Administration will shift its attention to immigration. The Administration is expected to make a major push for comprehensive immigration reform early in the new 113th Congress, starting in January 2013. Comprehensive Immigration Reform: The Administration favors a comprehensive approach to immigration reform to handle all of the major immigration issues together. Comprehensive immigration reform legislation is expected to include the following components: Some form of legalization for undocumented workers Creation of a new worker visa category for lesser-skilled positions in an effort to avoid future buildup of undocumented workers Stronger border security and interior enforcement A stronger employment verification system to ensure only authorized persons can work The Administration plans to launch a major public relations campaign early in 2013 to build support for immigration reform. President Obama may address the issue in his upcoming inaugural address or his State of the Union speech. A bipartisan group of senators has begun to meet to discuss possible legislation. It may not take long to assemble the proposed legislation due to the fact that comprehensive bills have been prepared in the past. The consensus is that the best time to move legislation will be early 2013. It is possible an immigration reform bill could pass by early summer.

### Yes Capital – Immigration Specific

#### The election gave Obama capital for immigration.

**Dominguez**, **12/26**/2012 (Jaime – lecturer at Northwestern University, A Sleeping Giant No Longer, The Huffington Post, p. http://www.northwestern.edu/newscenter/stories/2012/12/opinion-dominguez-huffpo.html)

Which suggests that Obama's administration should now begin to move forward on immigration reform. At the moment, the political capital is on Obama's side. The administration has already begun the effort with Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA). By executive order, DACA has enabled undocumented immigrants who were brought to this country before age 16 the chance to obtain Social Security Numbers for purposes of formal employment and to apply for driver's licenses and financial aid -- without fear of deportation. The next logical step is for the president to push Congress to reintroduce and pass the DREAM Act. With one House controlled by Democrats and the other by Republicans, it will be clear which party is willing to move forward on a matter that is so important to so many Latinos. If Republicans reject such reforms, they will do so at their own future political peril. Nor should the Democratic Party be blackmailed into allowing Republicans to propose a watered version of the DREAM Act that does not include a pathway to citizenship. For instance, Sen. Marco Rubio has proposed a DREAM Act "lite," which only confers permanent legal status. Public support is on the Democrats' side. A CNN exit poll shows that 65 percent of voters -- including 37 percent of Republicans -- support giving undocumented immigrant working the U.S. a path to legal status. A majority (65 percent) of non-Latinos support the DREAM Act, including its path to citizenship.

### U – AT: Fiscal Cliff Thumper

#### Immigration reform is at the top of the docket.

**Estes**, **1/2**/2013 (Adam Clark, Obama’s Push for Immigration Reform Starts Now, p. http://www.theatlanticwire.com/politics/2013/01/obamas-push-immigration-reform-starts-now/60525/)

Everybody knew that Obama was going to tackle immigration reform in his second term. We just didn't know how soon. Well, the word is out, and it's good news for anybody eager for lawmakers to tackle an issue that's troubled the country for years. Obama will take on immigration reform this month. A fresh report from The Huffington Post's Elise Foley and Sam Stein quotes anonymous administration officials and Democratic aides in explaining that the president is going to move fast on immigration reform, as well as gun control, and advocates couldn't be happier. None of this is a tremendous surprise, though the expedited timeline is sort of curious. Obama's been talking about sweeping immigration since he took office and, at least until 2009, has left many guessing if and when that's going to happen. He made progress last year when he kept 800,000 young people who had been brought to the United States illegally as children from being deported, making a DREAM Act-like policy initiative as the DREAM Act itself floundered in Congress. Immigration remained an issue through the election, and almost as soon as Obama won his second term, whispers of a renewed push for immigration reform started, though the White House vowed to deal with the fiscal cliff first. Obama then reiterated his commitment to tackle immigration soon on his Meet the Press appearance last weekend. With a fiscal cliff deal (sort of) sealed, it would appear it's immigration time, and details about how the president will handle the challenge are trickling out. Stein and Foley say that California congresswoman Zoe Lofgren will lead the Democratic effort in the House and pushes back at the idea that House Speaker John Boehner will be able to stonewall the effort. "In the end, immigration reform is going to depend very much on whether Speaker Boehner wants to do it or not," she said. Democrats will inevitably have to navigate more than Boehner's will, but some say that the challenge of the fiscal cliff has Capitol Hill ready for some easier negotiations. Or as one pro-immigration reform executive told HuffPost, "The chance to legislate through regular order on immigration reform might have leaders in both parties working together and singing 'Kumbaya.'"

#### Immigration is before economic issues.

**York**, **1/2**/2013 (Byron, For Obama, the Economy Never Comes First, Town Hall, p. http://townhall.com/columnists/byronyork/2013/01/02/for-obama-the-economy-never-comes-first-n1477781)

Many Republicans have accused Barack Obama of ignoring the economy. That's not true. The problem with Obama is not that he has ignored the economy, but that it was never his top priority in his first term as president, even as millions of Americans suffered the consequences of a devastating economic downturn. Now, with many still struggling, we know the economy won't be Obama's top concern in his second term, either. On “Meet the Press” on Sunday, when the president was asked to name his top priority for the next four years, he first listed immigration reform. “That's something we should get done,” Obama said. The economy came after that, as the president continued: “The second thing that we've got to do is to stabilize the economy and make sure it's growing.” Obama's third priority for his new term is to manage the explosion in U.S. energy production “in a way that also deals with some of the environmental challenges that we have.” Given that the energy revolution -- fracking and the discovery of huge new sources of gas and oil -- is a key driver of economic growth, Obama's third priority is, in effect, to put the brakes on his second priority. During Obama's first term, when economic conditions bordered on desperate, Republicans often criticized him for putting the economy behind other concerns, most notably national health care. Indeed, the president and Democrats sometimes conceded the criticism when they talked about making a “pivot” to the issue of jobs and the economy from whatever policy pursuit Obama felt was more important at the time. When the time came to run for re-election, Obama finally started talking about the economy -- a lot. He talked about it, and why his economic plan was superior to Mitt Romney's, so much that audiences might well have come away with the impression that economic recovery was the president's top second-term priority. Turns out they would have been wrong. At the same time, even though Obama has long said he wants to pursue immigration reform, he didn't talk about it much in his standard stump speech. In fact, in the speech he used in the final days of the campaign, Obama didn't talk about immigration reform at all, unless one counts his accusation that Republicans want to “turn back the clock 50 years for women, and for immigrants, and for gays.” But now, it's immigration reform first, the economy second.

### DOD – 2NC

#### Plan unpopular- renewables are more expensive – causes budget fights – that’s Sorenson

#### Military renewables cost capital – caught up in larger debates about renewable energy

Cardwell, 8/27 (Diane, “Military Spending on Biofuels Draws Fire”, New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/28/business/military-spending-on-biofuels-draws-fire.html?pagewanted=all&\_r=0)

When the Navy put a Pacific fleet through maneuvers on a $12 million cocktail of biofuels this summer, it proved that warships could actually operate on diesel from algae or chicken fat. “It works in the engines that we have, it works in the aircraft that we have, it works in the ships that we have,” said Ray Mabus, secretary of the Navy. “It is seamless.” The still-experimental fuels are also expensive — about $27 a gallon for the fuel used in the demonstration, compared with about $3.50 a gallon for conventional military fuels. And that has made them a flash point in a larger political battle over government financing for new energy technologies. “**You’re not the secretary of energy,**” Representative Randy Forbes, a Republican from Virginia, told Mr. Mabus as he criticized the biofuels program at a hearing in February. “You’re the secretary of the Navy.” The House, controlled by Republicans, has already approved measures that would all but kill Pentagon spending on purchasing or investing in biofuels. A committee in the Senate, led by Democrats, has voted to save the program. The fight will heat up again when Congress takes up the Defense Department’s budget again in the fall.

#### Lots of opposition – tight defense budgets

Abramson, 12 (Larry, “Military's Green Energy Criticized By Congress”, NPR, http://www.npr.org/2012/07/05/156325905/militarys-green-energy-criticized-by-congress\_

The military says it's dangerous to depend exclusively on fossil fuels, and has launched a program to develop alternative fuels for use by military vehicles. Energy consumption is a big expense for the Pentagon. But some members of Congress don't think the military should be a laboratory for finding energy alternatives, and say the military should not be spending money on this kind of research **at a time when defense dollars are shrinking**.

#### Costs PC – powerful GOP opposition

Sorcher, 12 (Sara, “Insiders Support Military’s Renewable-Energy Push”, National Journal, June 4, http://www.nationaljournal.com/nationalsecurity/insiders-support-military-s-renewable-energy-push-20120604)

The U.S. military is the single largest industrial consumer of oil in the world. “Our military has often led the way for the nation in technological and social change, and they can do so here as well,” one Insider said. But 39 percent of Insiders surveyed sided with the concerns voiced by some Republicans — such as Sens. John McCain, R-Ariz., and James Inhofe, R-Okla., who led the effort in the Senate to limit the amount of biofuels that can be used by the military. “Spending precious defense dollars on expensive biofuels is a transparent effort to raid the defense budget to subsidize an industry that is not economically competitive,” one Inside r said. “Dressing this up as a national-security initiative is the height of cynicism.” The military should not be used as a “political football” with regard to energy policy, one Insider said. “The military should not become the poster child for green energy unless that is the most efficient means to achieve the goal of reducing the logistical footprint — which today and for the foreseeable future it is not.” Insiders were even more in accord when the topic turned to the current U.S. military stance toward China.

### 1NC – SMR

#### Plan Unpopular

Fairley 10 Peter, IEEE Spectrum, May, "Downsizing Nuclear Power Plants,” [spectrum.ieee.org/energy/nuclear/downsizing-nuclear-power-plants/0](http://spectrum.ieee.org/energy/nuclear/downsizing-nuclear-power-plants/0)

However, there are political objections to SMRs. Precisely because they are more affordable, they may well increase the risk of proliferation by bringing the cost and power output of nuclear reactors within the reach of poorer countries.¶ Russia’s first SMR, which the nuclear engineering group Rosatom expects to complete next year, is of particular concern. The Akademik Lomonosov is a floating nuclear power plant sporting two 35-MW reactors, which Rosatom expects to have tethered to an Arctic oil and gas operation by 2012. The reactor’s portability prompted Greenpeace Russia to call this floating plant **the world’s most dangerous nuclear project in a decade.¶ SMRs may be smaller than today’s reactors.** But, politically at least, they’re just as nuclear.

### Winners Lose

**1. No evidence the plan would be a win – if unpopular policies were all it took to trigger the link turn Obama’s approval rating would be sky-high now**

**2. Link outweighs the link turn on timeframe**

**Silber 07** [PhD Political Science & Communication – focus on the Rhetoric of Presidential Policy-Making – Prof of Poli Sci – Samford, [Marissa, WHAT MAKES A PRESIDENT QUACK?, Prepared for delivery at the 2007 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 30th-September 2nd, 2007, UNDERSTANDING LAME DUCK STATUS THROUGH THE EYES OF THE MEDIA AND POLITICIANS]

Important to the discussion of **political capital** is whether or not it can be replenished over a term. If a President expends **political capital** on his agenda, can it be replaced? Light suggests that “capital declines over time – public approval consistently falls: midterm losses occur” (31). **Capital can be rebuilt, but only to a limited extent**. The decline of capital makes it difficult to access information, recruit more expertise and maintain energy. If a lame duck President can be defined by a loss of **political capital**, this paper helps determine if such capital can be replenished or if a lame duck can accomplish little. Before determining this, a definition of a lame duck President must be developed.

**3. Winners don’t win – controversies hurt capital – Obama will do a poor job spinning the plan**

**GERSON 12 – 19 – 10** Washington Post Political Commentator

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/16/AR2010121604039.html>

In some areas - such as education reform or the tax deal - Obama's governing practice is better than his political skills. But these skills matter precisely because political capital is limited. The early pursuit of ambitious health-care reform was a political mistake, as former chief of staff Rahm Emanuel internally argued. But every president has the right to spend his popularity on what he regards as matters of principle. Political risks, taken out of conviction with open eyes, are an admirable element of leadership. Yet political errors made out of pique or poor planning undermine the possibility of achievement. Rather than being spent, popularity is squandered - something the Obama administration has often done. Why so many unforced mistakes? The ineffectiveness of Obama's political and communications staff may be part of the problem - and the administration is now hinting at significant White House personnel changes in the new year. But an alternative explanation was on display this week. Perhaps Democrats did not elect another Franklin Roosevelt or John Kennedy but another Woodrow Wilson - a politician sabotaged by his sense of superiority.

Fights in near term outweigh

### A2: Link Turn

#### Spending battles outweigh the link turn

Rizzo 12

[Jennifer is a writer for CNN. “Military's plan for a "green" future has Congress seeing red,” 6/8/12, <http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/06/08/militarys-plan-for-a-green-future-has-congress-seeing-red/>]

The Defense Department has a grand vision for the U.S. military's energy future, including "green"-powered fleets, jets and trucks. But **members of Congress are hung up on the dollar signs that come with going green**. Language in the House and Senate versions of the defense budget largely bans the use of alternative energy like biofuels, prohibiting the military from purchasing any alternative fuel that **costs more than traditional fossil fuels like oil**. The catch: Biofuels are always more expensive than oil, about four times more. "To have the military, whose sole job is to defend this country, spending extra money simply on flying their airplanes with fuel that's available at a cheaper price, again on these restraints and **the resource restraints** that we find ourselves in, makes no sense to me," said Rep. Mike Conaway, R-Texas, who introduced the amendment.

#### Even if the plan saves money- near term losses causes fights

Snider 12

[Annie, E&E reporter, 1/16/12, “Pentagon still can't define 'energy security,' much less achieve it,” http://www.eenews.net/public/Greenwire/2012/01/16/1]

But this is not a good time to be requesting money at the Pentagon. Military budget planners have spent the past year carving nearly a half-trillion dollars in budget cuts, while top brass have worn out the thesaurus' list of synonyms for "decimate" as they decry the damage that additional looming cuts would do to their forces and weapons. At the same time, **no one has yet made the business case for investing in energy** security. Current rules require that renewable energy and efficiency projects prove they will bring savings over the long run, even if they carry an added security benefit. In fact, because the Pentagon operates on a five-year budget cycle, projects that pencil out to great investments over the long term often get turned down because they register to the budget as a near-term loss. Microgrids are still in the pilot phase and the military has not yet decided what the business model will be for them. Because the technology would help energy managers use power more efficiently on a day-to-day basis, for instance by bringing unnecessary loads offline during peak demand times, some officials say microgrids may be able to create enough savings to pay for themselves. Not all of industry is convinced, though, and a group of business executives will be suggesting financial models to Robyn's office in a report this spring. Ultimately, many say the military is going to have to decide what "secure energy" is worth to it if it wants to fix its vulnerabilities. "Until someone establishes the value of energy security, **I only have the business case to rely on, because right now the value of energy security is apparently zero**," said Dan Nolan, a retired Army colonel who writes a defense energy blog. The Navy has made a rough attempt to do this for its Surface Warfare Center in Dahlgren, Va. Like many military installations, the base sits at the end of the power line. Last year it lost electricity 11 times. Capt. Kenneth Branch, the commander for Naval Facilities Engineering Command Washington, estimates that the two days the center was without power during Hurricane Irene this summer cost it $60,000. "That's just lost industrial productivity," he said, noting that the numbers helped him justify infrastructure investments. "I also spend a lot of money on my labor trying to figure what were the problems and get back up and online." A fuller accounting could also count the costs associated with backup generators, including labor required for maintenance, the price of buying and transporting fuel, and the risk of failure. Pentagon officials say they are beginning to think through some of these calculations, but nobody is sure yet whether extra money would follow. "If the military is really serious about this, are we going to have to spend some dedicated funds on energy security?" the Army's Kidd said. "I don't know the answer to that, but I think those are the questions we need to start to ask." Looking to Congress Ultimately, the answers to those questions will come from Capitol Hill, where lawmakers have been bitterly divided on energy policy. Indeed, a military energy issue that has become a symbol of the larger energy policy debate was one of the final points to be resolved in last month's congressional budget deal. Republicans mounted an effort to exempt the military from a 2007 ban on purchasing fuels like liquefied coal that have a higher greenhouse gas content than traditional petroleum, but in the end they acquiesced, leaving the ban intact.

### AT: No Indo/Pak War

#### Deterrence can’t check

**Clary**, Spring **2012** (Christopher – Ph.D. candidate in political science at MIT, What Might an India-Pakistan War Look Like?, Precis, p. http://web.mit.edu/cis/precis/2012spring/india\_pakistan.html#.UOU\_NG88CSo)

TOWARD THE END of his presidency, Bill Clinton argued that Kashmir, the territory disputed by India and Pakistan, was 'the most dangerous place in the world.'1 Clinton's second term saw India and Pakistan undergo reciprocal tests of nuclear weapons in 1998, followed in 1999 by the Kargil war, the first conflict between nuclear weapons states since the Ussuri River clashes between the Soviet Union and China in 1969. In the years since Clinton expressed his concern about danger on the subcontinent, India and Pakistan have had two serious military crises provoked by terrorist attacks on Indian soil. On December 13, 2001, terrorists attacked the Indian Parliament building, prompting the first full mobilization of the Indian Army since 1971. More recently, a multi-day terrorist rampage in the Indian city of Mumbai beginning on November 26, 2008, led to widespread speculation that Indian leaders might resort to punitive strikes against Pakistan in retaliation. In both crises, Bush administration officials were intensely concerned that a conventional conflict could "get out of hand" leading to inadvertent conventional or nuclear escalation. Pakistan has refused to rule out the use of nuclear weapons to prevent a conventional military defeat. Therefore, India has sought to develop military options that can cause Pakistan political pain without risking nuclear escalation.2 Conventional wisdom suggests that India has gained sufficient conventional superiority to fight and win a limited war, but the reality is that India is unlikely to be able to both achieve its political aims and prevent dangerous escalation. Pakistan's military leadership has suggested that Indian seizure of substantial Pakistani territory or Indian destruction of substantial portions of the Pakistan Army or Air Force in conflict would be possible triggers for Pakistani use of nuclear weapons.3 As a consequence, India has sought to find ways to fight Pakistan without crossing these redlines. Raw numbers suggest and extant analyses have concluded that India's conventional edge is substantial and growing, increasing the likelihood that India would use military options in response to the most likely provocation: a terrorist attack inside India linked to Pakistan. Walter Ladwig, in a 2007 analysis, worried that "as the Indian Army enhances its ability to achieve a quick decision against Pakistan," Indian politicians would be more inclined to employ force to achieve political ends.4 Ladwig's work, along with others, has examined doctrinal innovation by the Indian Army, which has sought to develop limited options to be used for punitive or coercive objectives against Pakistan without leading to a full scale war. While India is developing limited options, my analysis suggests India's military advantage over Pakistan is much less substantial than is commonly believed. This means the outcomes over limited military campaigns are uncertain, with some chance they will not achieve India's political objectives. Such limited military campaigns are also risky, because if they are unsuccessful with limited force, there will be strong pressures for combatants to escalate and attempt to achieve more decisive political results. The remainder of this piece will provide short reviews of the current military balance at sea, air, and land, and examine what this balance implies for the ability of India to achieve political ends with limited military force. India's substantial quantitative and qualitative naval superiority is unlikely to be an important factor in a short, limited war. India has twelve frigates to Pakistan's six, an aging aircraft carrier and ten destroyers where Pakistan has none, twenty corvettes with anti-ship missiles compared to Pakistan's six smaller missile boats, and fourteen diesel-electric submarines compared to Pakistan's five (excluding Pakistan's midget subs).6 But the question is not which navy would win a maritime war, but rather whether the Indian Navy could beat its Pakistani counterpart so decisively and quickly that it might alter the strategic situation on land. Past India-Pakistan conflicts have been brief. Large-scale fighting lasted one month in 1965, two weeks in 1971, and two months in the 1999 Kargil conflict. As a result, the Indian Navy played a limited role in earlier Indo-Pakistani conflicts and this pattern seems likely to persist. Most analyses do not account adequately for how difficult it would be for the navy to have a substantial impact in a short period of time. Establishing even a partial blockade takes time, and it takes even more time for that blockade to cause shortages on land that are noticeable. As the British strategist Julian Corbett noted in 1911, "it is almost impossible that a war can be decided by naval action alone. Unaided, naval pressure can only work by a process of exhaustion. Its effects must always be slow…."7 Meanwhile, over the last decade, Pakistan has increased its ability to resist a blockade. In addition to the main commercial port of Karachi, Pakistan has opened up new ports further west in Ormara and Gwadar and built road infrastructure to distribute goods from those ports to Pakistan's heartland. To close off these ports to neutral shipping could prove particularly difficult since Gwadar and the edge of Pakistani waters are very close to the Gulf of Oman, host to the international shipping lanes for vessels exiting the Persian Gulf. A loose blockade far from shore would minimize risks from Pakistan's land-based countermeasures but also increase risks of creating a political incident with neutral vessels. Even if India were to be successful in establishing a blockade, new overland routes to China are likely to further protect Pakistan from strangulation from the sea. While the navy is not irrelevant, there are strong reasons to be skeptical that the naval balance has tilted in such a way as to affect strategic outcomes in a limited India-Pakistan conflict. The air balance between India and Pakistan is also thought to heavily favor the larger and more technologically sophisticated Indian Air Force. While India has a qualitative and quantitative advantage, the air capabilities gap narrowed rather than widened in the last decade. The Pakistan Air Force has undergone substantial modernization since 2001, when Pakistan exited from a decade of US-imposed sanctions. With purchases from US, European, and Chinese vendors, Pakistan has both dramatically increased the number of modern fighter aircraft with beyond-visual-range capability as well as new airborne early warning and control aircraft. Meanwhile, India's fighter modernization effort has been languid over the last decade. India's largest fighter procurement effort—the purchase of 126 Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft—began in 2001 and has been slowed considerably by cumbersome defense procurement rules designed to avoid the appearance of corruption. While over the course of a prolonged conflict, there is little doubt that the Indian Air Force would win an air superiority battle, that battle would be hard fought and take time. The longer the fight for air supremacy, the longer it is before the Indian Air Force can focus on supporting ground forces in the event of substantial army-to-army clashes. More limited air strikes against "terrorist training camps" might be attractive to decision-makers in Delhi, but they are poor targets as the camps are likely to be empty following any large-scale terrorist attack on India. Further, such air strikes create the risk of tit-for-tat dynamics where Pakistan feels compelled to give back in kind to demonstrate an ability to protect its territory from India. If the Pakistan Air Force perceives that it cannot successfully use airpower in a reprisal raid following an Indian air strike, Pakistan may use conventionally armed cruise and ballistic missiles. India's air and missile defenses would not be able to stop a missile attack and might not be able to prevent a Pakistani air strike—thus, breaking an escalatory spiral of dueling air or missile strikes would prove daunting. The ground forces balance has received the most attention from outside observers, in large part because the Indian Army has publicized its efforts at doctrinal innovation, most often referred to under the "Cold Start" moniker. However, India's ground superiority is unlikely to be sufficient to achieve a quick victory. After the December 13, 2001 terrorist attack on the Indian parliament, the Indian Army was embarrassed by political criticisms that the mobilization to the Indo-Pakistani border took too long to complete. The army worked to speed up mobilization timelines and allow for Indian Army actions against Pakistan prior to a cumbersome full-scale mobilization. The principal difficulty with limited ground options is that they prevent India from taking advantage of its main advantage: its larger ground forces. Simply put, if India chooses to employ only a portion of its army, Pakistan would choose to employ a larger portion of its own forces to stop the attack and perhaps open up other fronts on terrain favorable to Pakistan. Relatedly, because Pakistan's population centers are close the border, it is easier for the Pakistan Army to maintain most of its land forces near the border than it is for India to do likewise. The net result of both factors is that India may have difficulty mobilizing more quickly than Pakistan. Therefore, even a limited ground attack could quickly escalate to being a full-scale clash between armies, with all the incumbent risks. The net result of this analysis is to conclude that India's limited military options against Pakistan are risky and uncertain. Pakistan has options to respond to limited Indian moves, making counter-escalation likely. At least in the near-term, Pakistan appears to have configured its forces in such a way as to deny India "victory on the cheap." Therefore, India might well have to fight a full-scale war that could destroy large segments of Pakistan's army to achieve its political aims, which would approach Pakistan's stated nuclear redlines. Such a conclusion should induce caution among Indian political elites who are considering military options to punish or coerce Pakistan in a future crisis. In the event of a future terrorist attack in India blamed on Pakistan, Indian leaders are likely to have few good options and outside observers should remain intensely concerned of the dangers of escalation between these two nuclear-armed states.

### AT: US-India Relations High

#### Visa policy is dragging down US-India relations now – only CIR can reaffirm our alliance with India

Zee News 12 [“Krishna, Hillary to discuss visa fee hike in NY”, October 1st, 2012, <http://zeenews.india.com/news/nation/krishna-hillary-to-discuss-visa-fee-hike-in-ny_802978.html>, Chetan]

New York: The issue of US visa fee hike, which has hurt several Indian IT firms, is expected to come up for discussion when External Affairs Minister SM Krishna meets US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton here on Monday on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly session. India has "consistently" taken up the issue of the visa fee hike with the US and the issue will figure in talks between Krishna and Clinton, official sources said. The US had raised visa fee in 2010 to fund its enhanced costs on securing border with Mexico under the Border Security Act. Some of the top Indian companies TCS, Infosys, Wipro and Mahindra Satyam were affected by the US action and India is expected to soon seek consultations with the US at the World Trade Organization (WTO) on the issue. The sources said that young Indian professionals working in the US have been the "cornerstone" of India-US relations and are a pillar in the improved bilateral relations that has brought the two countries closer. Hiking visa fees or limiting the number of work visas available to Indian companies is tantamount to "undermining that pillar and growth in India-US relations," they added. "Raising visa fees and putting other barriers is not in consonance with the forward thinking of growing bilateral ties," the sources said. This will be the third bilateral meeting between Krishna and Clinton this year. They had previously met in India in April and again in June in Washington. The sources said that the two countries have a fairly elaborate agenda and the visa issue is one of the issues in a broader relationship. Krishna will also address the 67th session of the UN General Assembly today.