# Harvard Aff Speeches

## 1AC v. Boston College KS

#### Same as Kentucky

## 2AC v. Boston College KS

### T – Energy Production

#### We meet – natural gas drilling is energy production

CMP No Date (Conservation Measures Partnership, “3 Energy Production & Mining,” *Threats & Actions Taxonomies*, http://www.conservationmeasures.org/initiatives/threats-actions-taxonomies/threats-taxonomy/3-energy-production-mining)

3 Energy Production & Mining

Definition: Threats from production of non-biological resources

Exposition: Various forms of water use (for example, dams for hydro power) could also be put in this class, but these threats seemed more related to other threats that involve alterations to hydrologic regimes. As a result, they should go in 7.2 Dams & Water Management/Use.

3.1 Oil & Gas Drilling

Definition: Exploring for, developing, and producing petroleum and other liquid hydrocarbons

Exposition: Oil and gas pipelines go into 4.2 Utility & Service Lines. Oil spills that occur at the drill site should be placed here; those that come from oil tankers or pipelines should go in 4. Transportation & Service Corridors or in 9.2 Industrial & Military Effluents, depending on your perspective.

Examples:

oil wells

deep sea natural gas drilling

3.2 Mining & Quarrying

Definition: Exploring for, developing, and producing minerals and rocks

Exposition: It is a judgment call whether deforestation caused by strip mining should be in this category or in 5.3 Logging & Wood Harvesting – it depends on whether the primary motivation for the deforestation is access to the trees or to the minerals. Sediment or toxic chemical runoff from mining should be placed in 9.2 Industrial & Military Effluents if it is the major threat from a mining operation.

Examples:

coal strip mines

alluvial gold panning

gold mines

rock quarries

sand/salt mines

coral mining

deep sea nodules

guano harvesting

dredging outside of shipping lanes

3.3 Renewable Energy

Definition: Exploring, developing, and producing renewable energy

Exposition: Hydropower should be put in 7.2 Dams & Water Management/Use.

Examples:

geothermal power production

solar farms

wind farms (including birds flying into windmills)

tidal farms

#### Counter-interpretation – Energy production is the extraction or capture of energy from natural sources

DOCC 8 (Australian Government’s Department of Climate Change, “National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Guidelines,” http://www.climatechange.gov.au/government/initiatives/~/media/publications/greenhouse-report/nger-reporting-guidelines.ashx)

Energy Production

‘Energy production’ is defined in r. 2.23:

Production of energy, in relation to a facility, means any one of the following:

a. the extraction or capture of energy from natural sources for final consumption by or from the operation of the facility or for use other than in operation of the facility; 11

b. the manufacture of energy by the conversion of energy from one form to another form for final consumption by

or from the operation of the facility or for use other than in the operation of the facility.

Energy consumption

‘Energy consumption’ is defined in r. 2.23:

Consumption of energy, in relation to a facility, means the use or disposal of energy from the operation of the

facility including own-use and losses in extraction, production and transmission.

#### Lease restrictions are on natural gas production

NaturalGas.org, no date (NaturalGas.org, “Natural Gas Supply,” http://www.naturalgas.org/business/analysis.asp)  
The production of natural gas in the United States is based on competitive market forces: inadequate supply at any one time leads to price increases, which signal to production companies the need to increase the supply of natural gas to the market. Supplying natural gas in the United States in order to meet this demand, however, is dependent on a number of factors. These factors may be broken down into two segments: general barriers to increasing supply, and those factors that affect the short term supply scenario. Short Term Supply Barriers In a perfect world, price signals would be recognized and acted upon immediately, and there would be little lag time between increased demand for natural gas, and an increase in supplies reaching the market. However, in reality, this lag time does exist. There are several barriers to immediate supply increases which affect the short term availability of natural gas supply. They include: Availability of Skilled Workers - The need to train and hire skilled workers results in lag times between times of increased demand and an increase in production. For example, from 1991 to 1999, a prolonged period of relatively low prices indicated adequate supplies of natural gas existed, and the exploration and production industry contracted in response. During this period, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics recorded a 26 percent average decrease in employment in the oil and gas extraction industry. Some of these workers left the industry altogether rather than remain unemployed. When production companies began to react to higher prices in late 1999, the need to find and train skilled workers contributed to a slower increase in activity than would have been the case if skilled workers were plentiful. To counter this problem, many production companies offer increasingly high wages, as well as scholarships and educational contributions to attract professionals to the industry. Availability of Equipment - Drilling rigs are very expensive pieces of equipment. Price volatility in the industry makes it very difficult for producers, as well as production equipment suppliers, to plan the construction and placement of drilling rigs far in advance. Prolonged periods of low prices results in reduction of the number of available rigs. When prices respond to increase demand, and drilling activity increases, time is required to build and place an adequate number of drilling rigs. For this reason, drilling rig counts are a good indication of the status of the oil and natural gas production industry. As can be seen in the graph, an increase in operational rigs lags behind period of high prices. For more information on rig counts, click here. Permitting and Well Development - Before a natural gas well actually begins producing, there are several time consuming procedures and development activities that must take place. In order to begin drilling, exploration activities must take place to pinpoint the location of natural gas reserves. Once a suitable field has been located, production companies must receive the required approval from the landowner (which in many cases is the government) to install drilling equipment and begin to drill the well. The Bureau of Land Management is responsible for issuing permits for onshore development, and the Minerals Management Service is responsible for offshore development areas. Once drilling is completed, extraction and field processing equipment must be set up, as well as gathering systems. In all, the between the location of natural gas deposits and the beginning of production can range from as little as a few months to as much as ten years. Weather and Delivery Disruptions - Although unrelated to natural gas prices or demand increases and decreases, weather patterns and anomalies can have a significant impact on natural gas production. For example, hurricanes can have an impact on the offshore production of natural gas, as safety measures require the temporary shut down of offshore drilling and production platforms. In addition, while the safety record of the natural gas industry is extremely good, malfunctions and accidents may occur from time to time that disrupt the delivery of natural gas. For example, a compressor malfunction in a large pipeline serving a major hub could temporarily disrupt the flow of natural gas through that important market center. While the effects of weather and delivery disruptions are most often of short duration, they can still have an effect on the expeditious production of natural gas. General Barriers to Increasing Supply In addition to the short term impediments to increasing natural gas supply, there exist other more general barriers to the increased supply of natural gas in the United States. These include: Land Access - The U.S. government owns more than 29 percent of all the land in the country, and an estimated 40 percent of undiscovered natural gas exists on this land. In several areas, the government has restricted access to federal lands. 59 percent of undiscovered gas resources are on federal lands and offshore waters. Outside of the western Gulf of Mexico, production companies are prohibited access to virtually all federal lands offshore the Lower 48 states. About 9 percent of resource-bearing land in the Rockies is also off limits, and access to another 32 percent is significantly restricted. The National Petroleum Council in 1999 estimated that 213 Tcf of natural gas exists in areas under federal access restrictions. This restriction is the result of presidential and congressional leasing moratoria, and affects the amount of natural gas resources that may be extracted to increase supply. Pipeline Infrastructure - The ability to transport natural gas from producing regions to consumption regions also affects the availability of supplies to the marketplace. The interstate and intrastate pipeline infrastructure can only transport so much natural gas at any one time, and in essence provides a 'ceiling' for the amount of natural gas that can reach the market. Although the current pipeline infrastructure is significant, with the EIA estimating daily delivery capacity of the pipeline grid to be 119 Bcf. However, natural gas pipeline companies must continue to continually expand the pipeline infrastructure in order to meet growing demand. To learn more about the natural gas pipeline infrastructure in the United States, click here. The Financial Environment - Exploring for and producing natural gas is a very capital intensive endeavor. In fact, the National Petroleum Council estimated in 1999 that production companies will have to invest $1.44 trillion in capital between 1999 and 2015 in order to keep pace with demand growth. This puts significant pressures on production companies, particularly small, privately owned firms, to raise the capital necessary to increase production. While efficient and transparent financial markets in the U.S. do offer options for raising capital effectively, the rate at which production companies may do so can serve as a limiting factor in the increasing availability of supplies reaching the market.

#### Prefer it –

#### Over-limits – There are no natural gas, oil, or coal affs under their interpretation. The aff can only reduce restrictions on the development of those natural resources – lease restrictions prevent companies from drilling. If that’s not T, then no aff is because every single restriction indirectly prevents companies from extracting resources.

#### No ground loss – the aff links to all their topic generics and we still claim to increase energy production

#### Competing interpretations are bad – causes a race to the bottom – they will always find a way to exclude the aff. Default to reasonability – we don’t make the topic unmanageable

### Climate Leadership – 2AC

#### Natural gas cements climate leadership

Casten 9 (Sean Casten, president of Recycled Energy Development, December 16, 2009, “Natural gas as a near-term CO2 mitigation strategy,” Grist, http://goo.gl/b8z08)

Discussions of CO2 reduction tend to start from a presumption of near-term economic disruption coupled to long-term investment in green technology. The presumption isn’t right. The U.S. could reduce its total CO2 footprint by 14-20 percent tomorrow with no disruption in our access to energy services, without investing in any new infrastructure. The Waxman-Markey proposal to reduce CO2 emissions by 17 percent over 10 years is constrained only by its ambition. This near-term opportunity would be realized by ramping up our nation’s generation of electricity from gas and ramping down our generation from coal, taking advantage only of existing assets. Its scale and potential for immediate impact deserves consideration; even partial action towards this goal would have dramatic political and environmental consequences, establishing U.S. leadership and credibility in global climate negotiations.

#### Climate leadership is key to prevent extinction

Khosla 9 (Ashok Khosla, president of the International Union for Conservation of Nature, January 27, 2009, “A new President for the United States: We have a dream,” http://goo.gl/RQsL8)

A rejuvenated America, with a renewed purpose, commitment and energy to make its contribution once again towards a better world could well be the turning point that can reverse the current decline in the state of the global economy, the health of its life support systems and the morale of people everywhere. This extraordinary change in regime brings with it the promise of a deep change in attitudes and aspirations of Americans, a change that will lead, hopefully, to new directions in their nation’s policies and action. In particular, we can hope that from being a very reluctant partner in global discussions, especially on issues relating to environment and sustainable development, the United States will become an active leader in international efforts to address the Millennial threats now confronting civilization and even the survival of the human species. For the conservation of biodiversity, so essential to maintaining life on Earth, this promise of change has come not a moment too soon. It would be a mistake to put all of our hopes on the shoulder of one young man, however capable he might be. The environmental challenges the world is facing cannot be addressed by one country, let alone by one man. At the same time, an inspired US President guided by competent people, who does not shy away from exercising the true responsibilities and leadership his country is capable of, could do a lot to spur the international community into action. To paraphrase one of his illustrious predecessors, “the world asks for action and action now.” What was true in President Roosevelt’s America 77 years ago is even more appropriate today. From IUCN’s perspective, the first signals are encouraging. The US has seriously begun to discuss constructive engagement in climate change debates. With Copenhagen a mere 11 months away, this commitment is long overdue and certainly very welcome. Many governments still worry that if they set tough standards to control carbon emissions, their industry and agriculture will become uncompetitive, a fear that leads to a foot-dragging “you go first” attitude that is blocking progress. A positive intervention by the United States could provide the vital catalyst that moves the basis of the present negotiations beyond the narrowly defined national interests that lie at the heart of the current impasse. The logjam in international negotiations on climate change should not be difficult to break if the US were to lead the industrialized countries to agree that much of their wealth has been acquired at the expense of the environment (in this case greenhouse gases emitted over the past two hundred years) and that with the some of the benefits that this wealth has brought, comes the obligation to deal with the problems that have resulted as side-effects. With equitable entitlement to the common resources of the planet, an agreement that is fair and acceptable to all nations should be easy enough to achieve. Caps on emissions and sharing of energy efficient technologies are simply in the interest of everyone, rich or poor. And both rich and poor must now be ready to adopt less destructive technologies – based on renewables, efficiency and sustainability – both as a goal with intrinsic merit and also as an example to others. But climate is not the only critical global environmental issue that this new administration will have to deal with. Conservation of biodiversity, a crucial prerequisite for the wellbeing of all humanity, no less America, needs as much attention, and just as urgently. The United States’ self-interest in conserving living natural resources strongly converges with the global common good in every sphere: in the oceans, by arresting the precipitate decline of fish stocks and the alarming rise of acidification; on land, by regenerating the health of our soils, forests and rivers; and in the atmosphere by reducing the massive emission of pollutants from our wasteful industries, construction, agriculture and transport systems.

### Helium – 2AC

#### US natural gas production is key global helium production

EIA 6 (Energy Information Administration, the official energy statistics agency of U.S. Government , “Natural Gas Processing: The Crucial Link Between Natural Gas Production and Its Transportation to Market” http://www.eia.gov/pub/oil\_gas/natural\_gas/feature\_articles/2006/ngprocess/ngprocess.pdf)

**The world’s supply of helium** comes exclusively **from natural gas production**. The single largest source of helium is the United States, which produces about 80 percent of the annual world production of 3.0 billion cubic feet (Bcf). In 2003, U.S. production of helium was 2.4 Bcf, about two-thirds of which came from the Hugoton Basin in north Texas, Oklahoma, and Kansas (Figure 2). The rest mostly comes from the LaBarge field located in the Green River Basin in western Wyoming, with small amounts also produced in Utah and Colorado. According to the National Research Council, the consumption of helium in the United States doubled between 1985 and 1996, although its use has leveled off in recent years. It is used in such applications as magnetic resonance imaging, semiconductor processing, and in the pressurizing and purging of rocket engines by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Twenty-two natural gas treatment plants in the United States currently produce helium as a major byproduct of natural gas processing. Twenty of these plants, located in the Hugoton-Panhandle Basin, produce marketable helium which is sold in the open market when profitable, while transporting the remaining unrefined helium to the Federal Helium Reserve (FHR). The FHR was created in the 1950s in the Bush salt dome, underlying the Cliffside field, located near Amarillo, Texas. Sales of unrefined helium in the United Statesfor the most part, come from the FHR.

#### This collapses US space exploration

CN 12 – Citation News, “Scientists' High-Pitched Response to Helium Shortage”, 3-22, http://www.cyberregs.com/webapps/Blog/post/Scientists-High-Pitched-Response-to-Helium-Shortage.aspx

Helium - the second lightest element in the universe with an atomic weight of 4.002602 - is an inert gas that can be cooled to temperatures of -270 Celsius without becoming a solid, **making it indispensible** in the operation of, among many things, superconducting magnets used in MRI scanners, telescopes and particle accelerators like the Large Hadron Collider. Helium also holds an important place in the defense industry. It also has some far less profound applications, which consume great quantities of the gas annually - applications such as party balloons and squeak-voice huffing. These latter applications have drawn the ire of researchers. This month, the Guardian reported that the UK's Rutherford Appleton Laboratory wasted three days and £90,000 (US$ 143,091), when, during an important experiment exploring the structure of matter, they could not obtain a supply of helium. Needless to say, the scientists were in a less-than-celebratory mood. "We put the stuff into party balloons and let them float off into the upper atmosphere, or we use it to make our voices go squeaky for a laugh. It is very, very stupid. It makes me really angry,” said Oleg Kiricheck, the research team leader. Cornell University Professor Robert Richardson is also concerned. He believes that, with our current reserves of helium, the price of the element severely discounts its real value. By his estimation, the price of a single party balloon should cost as much as $100. Richardson suggests increasing the price of helium by 20-50% to eliminate excessive waste. Although helium ranks next to hydrogen as the most abundant element in the universe, here on earth it is a finite commodity. The helium that is here is all we have! Helium is **collected during natural gas** and oil drilling. If the gas is not captured, it dissipates into earth's upper atmosphere and is lost forever. The same happens when a party balloon is released into the air, or when it self-deflates, because helium atoms are so small that they can easily move through the balloon's latex shell. Party balloons do not represent the only wasteful expenditures of helium. Macy's Thanksgiving Day parade typically uses 400 Mcf a year, although there have been recent attempts to recycle some of the helium used in the floats. NASA uses up to 75 MMcf annually to pressurize rocket tanks. The agency has made no attempt to recycle this huge amount of gas. Weather balloons also consume about 140 MMcf of helium per year. At the present rate of supply depletion, the United States will become an importer of helium from the Middle East and Russia within 10 years, and the world will run out of helium within 30 years. This would have major implications for space travel and exploration, scientific and nuclear research, medical advances and early detection of diseases. Possible solutions for this problem **should address supply**, not pricing. A drastic increase in the price of helium as a preservative measure would cause a huge spike in billing for medical procedures, such as MRIs, scientific research, and defense expenditures, as well as party balloons.

#### Extinction is inevitable without space exploration

Carreau 2 (Mark, Winner – 2006 Space Communicator Award, MA in Journalism – Kansas State University, “Top Experts See Space Study As Key to Human Survival”, The Houston Chronicle, 10-19, Lexis)

With Apollo astronaut John Young leading the charge, top aerospace experts warned Friday that humanity's survival may depend on how boldly the world's space agencies venture into the final frontier. Only a spacefaring culture with the skills to travel among and settle planets can be assured of escaping a collision between Earth and a large asteroid or devastation from the eruption of a super volcano, they told the World Space Congress. "Space exploration is the key to the future of the human race," said Young, who strolled on the moon more than 30 years ago and now serves as the associate director of NASA's Johnson Space Center. "We should be running scared to go out into the solar system. We should be running fast." Scientists believe that an asteroid wiped out the dinosaurs more than 60 million years ago, and are gathering evidence of previously large collisions. "The civilization of Earth does not have quite as much protection as we would like to believe," said Leonid Gorshkov, an exploration strategist with RSC Energia, one of Russia's largest aerospace companies. "We should not place all of our eggs in one basket."

### A2: LNG Exports Bad – Price Spike – A2: Manufacturing

#### Manufacturing is down now AND not key to the economy

Spicer 9/4 (Jonathan, “Manufacturing another headache for U.S. economy,” http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/04/us-usa-economy-manufacturing-idUSBRE8830MA20120904, accessed 9-6-12)

Manufacturing in the United States shrank at its sharpest clip in more than three years last month, a survey showed on Tuesday, the latest sign that the slowing global economy is weighing on an already weak U.S. recovery. August was the third month in a row of contraction in the factory sector, according to an Institute for Supply Management survey. Firms hired the fewest workers since late 2009, a possible red flag for the August U.S. jobs report due on Friday. ISM's index of national factory activity fell to 49.6 in August, from 49.8 in July, and shy of the 50.0 median estimate in a Reuters poll of economists. A reading below 50 indicates contraction in the key sector. "Overall, today's report keeps intact concerns that industrial output growth could slow to a crawl in the remaining months of 2012," said JP Morgan economist Michael Feroli. Manufacturing had faded as a driver of the recovery in the U.S. economy which is still struggling to add jobs more than three years after the recession was formally declared over.

#### Exports wouldn’t hurt manufacturing

Levi 12 (Michael – CFR Senior Energy Fellow, “Rebutting the IECA Attack on My Natural Gas Exports Study,” 6-20-12, <http://blogs.cfr.org/levi/2012/07/20/rebutting-the-ieca-attack-on-my-natural-gas-exports-study/>, accessd 9-17-12)

The IECA authors write, “The paper’s biggest omission is a full discussion of the opportunity that natural gas used in manufacturing brings to the U.S. economy.” A paper focused on opportunities to use natural gas in manufacturing would have been interesting, but that isn’t the paper I wrote. My paper looked in depth at how allowing exports would affect the prospects of energy intensive manufacturing relative to what they would have been otherwise. When doTing an analysis of costs and benefits, that’s the right way to proceed. Whether natural gas, more broadly, is great or awful for manufacturing, is beside the point. The IECA authors also emphasize the following point: “Manufacturing natural gas consumption creates far more jobs per unit of gas consumed than any other application.” That may or may not be the case (I’d love to see the reference) but regardless, it isn’t relevant to the exports question. As I explain at length in my study, choosing to block exports would not steer export volumes into manufacturing – for the most part, it would keep natural gas in the ground. There is no policy decision to be made between allowing X units of gas to be exported and having X units of natural gas be used in manufacturing.

### A2: LNG Exports Bad – Price Spike

#### Price spike is small – benefits the petrochemical industry

Ebinger et al 12 (Charles, Senior Fellow and Director of the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, Kevin Massy, Assistant Director of the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, and Govinda Avasarala, Senior Research Assistant in the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, “Liquid Markets: Assessing the Case for U.S. Exports of Liquefied Natural Gas,” Brookings Institution, Policy Brief 12-01, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2012/5/02%20lng%20exports%20ebinger/0502\_lng\_exports\_ebinger.pdf)

Opponents of LNG exports contend that such investments would be deterred in the future as a result of increases in the price of natural gas. However, the evidence suggests that the competitive advantage of U.S. industrial producers relative to its competitors in Western Europe and Asia is not likely to be affected significantly by the projected increase in natural gas prices resulting from LNG exports. As European and many Asian petrochemical producers use oil-based products such as naphtha and fuel oil as feedstock, U.S. companies are more likely to enjoy a significant cost advantage over their overseas competitors. Even a one-third decline in the estimated price of crude oil in 2035 would result in an oil-to-gas ratio of 14:1.101 There is also the potential for increased exports to help industrial consumers. Ethane, a liquid byproduct of natural gas production at several U.S. gas plays, is the primary feedstock of ethylene, a petrochemical product used to create a wide variety of products. According to a study by the American Chemistry Council, an industry trade body, a 25 percent increase in ethane production would yield a $32.8 billion increase in U.S. chemical production. By providing another market for cheap dry gas, LNG exports will encourage additional production of natural gas liquids (NGL) that are produced in association with dry gas. According to the EIA, ethane production increased by nearly 30 percent between 2009 and 2011 as natural gas production from shale started to grow substantially. Ethane production is now at an alltime high, with more than one million barrels per day of ethane being produced.102 Increased gas production for exports results in increased production of such natural gas liquids, in which case exports can be seen as providing a benefit to the petrochemical industry.

### A2: LNG Exports Bad – Russian Economy – 2AC

#### **Qatar takes out the link – already out competing Russia**

Satanovsky 12 (E. , “Small, but very dangerous. Qatar could oust Russia from the global gas market”, 9/4, <http://therearenosunglasses.wordpress.com/2012/04/09/small-but-very-dangerous-qatar-could-oust-russia-from-the-global-gas-market/>, originally from http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1333724880)

Ironically, the tiny but ambitious and dynamic, Qatar is the main competitor of Russia in world energy markets.While Moscow, sinking into the international political and technical problems, build pipelines, which were to allow it to solve the problems with transit countries, Doha has created sweeping the entire world network of terminals for liquefied natural gas (LNG) and formed the largest specialized fleet of 54 vessels. About stuck at the stage of negotiations, “South Stream” keep silent, but the Russian gas that goes to Europe on the “Nord Stream”, and in China and other Asian countries on the ESPO under construction, will meet in those markets most serious competition from Qatar. In 2010, the emirate has put 55.7 million tons of LNG to 23 countries. In 2011 – 77 million tons by the end of 2012 plans to sell 120 million tons. 23% of EU gas consumption has Qatari origin. During the eight years of production and export of LNG in **Qatar grew by six times**, and five-year plan involves the development of its economy to invest more than $ 96 billion in deposits and the expansion of processing facilities, while maintaining a caretaker as a series of major gas fields. Isolated from the land of Saudi Arabia, which at one time cut off from his UAE, Qatar was forced to concentrate on the manufacture and export of LNG and is now independent of the neighbor-rival. And its partners Exxon Mobil and British Petroleum have the most advanced technology liquefaction. Growing market Qatari gas is Europe. In Asia, the number of his clients are India, China, Malaysia, Pakistan, South Korea and Japan. In North America – USA and Canada. In South America, from 2011 – Argentina and Brazil (Petrobras). Competing in the EU with the Algerian and Egyptian gas, the main pressure on the emirate has a Russian “Gazprom”, pushing it even on the traditional markets such as Italy and Poland, where the LNG will begin in 2013. Active negotiations on the export of Qatari gas to the Baltic countries, Ukraine and Belarus. In Asia Qatari liquefied natural gas – **a competitor of Russian LNG** produced on Sakhalin and the Far East. Russian politicians have believed in vain that the creation of the so-called ”Gas OPEC” (Forum countries – exporters of natural gas) will be the basis of alliance of gas producers, who will be able to dictate its conditions to consumers the benefit of all market players. For Qatar, the whole point of this organization limited to the location of its headquarters in Doha, and the possibility of imitation in its framework for collective action, which allows competitors to divert attention from its offensive against their interests. At a red herring like and discussion about the emirate’s investment in the project “Yamal LNG.” While the economic cooperation of Qatar and Russia costavlyaet less than $ 20 million per year. And if Russia is open for cooperation, the presence of Russian business in Qatar is extremely complicated. The rapid expansion of Qatar’s terminal network, dumping, and the transition from the spot to supply medium-and long-term contracts do not give a reason for the optimistic estimates of the possibilities for harmonizing Russian and Qatari gas strategy. Geography of Qatar LNG terminals covers the UK, continental Europe, the U.S. (only one Golden Pass terminal on the Gulf Coast has a capacity of 15.6 million tonnes of LNG per year), Latin America, the Middle East. Requirements of European companies that rely on the Qatari dumping, the decline in prices for Russian gas complicate the situation of “Gazprom”, especially since the transition to long-term transactions Qatar **neutralized the main traditional advantage of Russia**. A precedent was a three-year contract for $ 3.25 billion signed in 2011 between Qatargas and the British company Centrica, to supply the last 2.4 million tons of LNG annually.

#### Russia’s economy is resilient – oil, metals, and financial reserves

**Garrels 8** (Annie – a foreign correspondent for National Public Radio in the United States, “RUSSIAN ECONOMY STRONG DESPITE COMMODITY FALLOUT”, 9/20/08, <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=94647099>)

For the past six years**, Russia's economy has boomed in large part because of soaring prices for oil and metals.** Russia is strong in these areas ó too strong, though, for a balanced economy. Russian shares have bled almost 50 percent of their value since May, but many analysts say Russia still remains a resilient economy. And after the Georgia invasion and weeks of harsh, anti-western rhetoric, both Russian President Dmitri Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin have tried to reassure foreign investors. When those commodities prices dropped, Russia's stock market was hit hard. "The question is if they fall significantly further," says James Fenkner with Red Star Assets in Moscow. Fenkner is one of the more cautious voices in Moscow, and other analysts like Roland Nash of Renaissance Capital look at other indicators, like direct foreign investment. "The level of foreign investment is twice the per capita of Brazil, **four times that of China**, and six times that of India this year," Nash says. "The market arguments for Russia are still very good and there is still a lot of money coming in." Too Dependent On Commodities The Russia government recognizes it is too dependent on commodities, and while their prices were high, it amassed **huge reserves as a cushion**. The country now has a balanced budget and financial analysts predict its economy will continue to grow at about six percent. Vladmir Tikhomirov, senior economist at Uralsib Financial Corporation, says this is enough to avoid a crisis, but it is not what the Kremlin hoped for. "It's not enough to make fundamental changes to the economic structures," Tikhomirov says. "Russia must have to be a more competitive and efficient economy." Moscow may now be the most expensive, glamorous city in the world, but the rest of the country lags behind. Tikhomirov says the Russia needs to improve basic infrastructure like roads as well as small and mid-size businesses. For this, Russia needs a stable global financial system

#### No link and non-unique – most nat gas is domestically used and Russia’s industry is screwed

Stratfor 12 (“Russia's Natural Gas Dilemma”, 4/9, http://www.stratfor.com/sample/analysis/russias-natural-gas-dilemma)

Russia produced approximately 510 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas in 2011, and approximately 60% of it was sold on the domestic Russian market. **Russia has one of the highest domestic consumption rates per capita of natural gas** - understandably so, since Russia is one of the world's coldest countries, and heating and electricity use is high. Russian industry also depends heavily on natural gas. Russia uses a four-tier pricing system for natural gas: two tiers for domestic prices, one for the former Soviet states and one for its European customers. Russia has long capped domestic natural gas prices, a practise left over from the Soviet era. Currently, Russia charges between $75 and $97 per thousand cubic metres (tcm) on the domestic market, with households and municipal entities, such as schools and hospitals, paying the lower price and industrial entities paying more. Most of the former Soviet states pay in the mid-$200s and Europe pays $350 to $450 per tcm. Russia's natural gas firms - primarily Gazprom - **are suffering financially** because of measures that let domestic users pay a fraction of the price Russia's foreign customers pay. In the past decade, the Kremlin has permitted Gazprom to increase its price by 14 to 25% a year. This gradual increase has prevented a massive backlash from natural gas consumers in Russia because it has been accompanied by improving economic standards in the country. However, Gazprom says this increase is insufficient. Gazprom sees four primary problems with Russia's current natural gas prices. First, **Gazprom is losing money on its domestic sales**. According to current Gazprom data, it costs Gazprom approximately $132 to produce or acquire and then distribute 1 tcm of natural gas, but its revenue from the domestic market is only $80 per tcm, which means Gazprom loses more than $50 per tcm sold domestically. Considering that the domestic market makes up 60% of sales, the loss is monumental. Gazprom has continued to stay afloat and remain strong because of its sales abroad, where its revenue is approximately $279 per tcm (double the cost of production). However, Russia's domestic natural gas consumption has grown more than 15% in the past decade (but declined during the economic crisis of 2008-2009). Gazprom is thus producing more natural gas at a loss than it would if it charged its domestic customers what it charged its foreign customers. Second, Gazprom is concerned that **its revenues from sales to Europe will decrease** amid negotiations over new natural gas prices with many of its European customers. Coupled with Europe's diversification of natural gas supplies away from Russia, this means Gazprom could soon be unable to continue offsetting its domestic losses with high profit margins from sales on the European market. Third, when winters are particularly cold, Russia curbs what it exports (mainly to Europe) to keep more supplies at home. This happened this past winter and shortages of up to 30% were seen in Austria, Romania, Germany, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Greece and Italy, all of which also experienced an extraordinarily cold winter. Although this practice might keep the population at home warm, it meant that Gazprom lost a great deal of money it could have made if more supplies had gone to Europe. Finally, Gazprom is trying to offset a recent 61% increase in mineral extraction taxes, which cost Gazprom $2.2 billion more in 2011 and could cost an estimated $5.2 billion more in 2012. The tax issue is highly controversial and interwoven with the ongoing internal political struggle in the Kremlin. The idea of restructuring the country's energy tax system has drawn both robust opposition and staunch support within the Kremlin. The increased tax came from a faction in the Kremlin that believes the government needs more funds to offset its budget deficit and that the government needed to stop coddling Russia's energy firms with low taxes. Citing these concerns, Gazprom is arguing that it **cannot continue funding future projects without more revenue** from domestic natural gas consumers. It is not that Gazprom would be unable to continue the de facto subsidisation overall; the company generates a great deal of revenue. Gazprom has some large and expensive projects planned that it does not believe it can fund without making more money. These projects include the Shtokman Arctic project, estimated to cost $15 billion to $20 billion; the South Stream pipeline, with an estimated cost of $24 billion to $31 billion; the Yamal fields project, which will cost tens of billions of dollars; and an expansion of Sakhalin, which will also cost tens of billions of dollars.

#### Russia’s natural gas sector is failing now

BR 9/7 (Business Recorder, “Gazprom profit plunges as it repays Europe”, 2012, http://www.brecorder.com/fuel-a-energy/193/1234841/)

Gazprom said Thursday its profit plunged by a quarter due top falling gas exports and billions in back payments to EU nations now probing the Russian giant for price fixing and intimidation tactics. The world's largest natural gas company attributed its 23.5 percent drop in first-quarter net income to a sharp decline in sales to both Europe and the ex-Soviet states - two of the slowest-growing regions in the world. It also reported a one-off $2.4 billion (78.5 billion ruble) payment to European clients who managed to negotiate a lower price after threatening to take the Russian state firm to court. The profit was still a strong $11.1 billion (357.8 billion rubles) and debt was down heavily. Brussels is formally probing Gazprom for effectively trying to bully eastern and central European nations into buying its pipeline gas at elevated prices and then preventing them from trading any excess supply. The probe comes a year after official raids on the offices of Gazprom's European partners and amid widening EU efforts to diversify its sources of energy supplies. Gazprom on Wednesday suggested that Russia's broader national interests were being threatened by the investigation and demanded respect for its "status as a strategic organisation" under federal law. The politics of the probe quickly resonated through the Kremlin-controlled parliament and saw some officials accuse Brussels bureaucrats of trying to gain an unfair advantage over a powerful Russian firm. "This could be just a form - and a fairly improper one at that - of (economic) competition," Russia's EU envoy Vladimir Chizhov told the Interfax news agency in Brussels. "I think that the European Commission is simply trying to lower the gas price," added ruling party energy committee member Pavel Zavalny. Gazprom - owner of both gas supplies and distribution at home - last year began renegotiating some of its long-term contracts at lower prices while adamantly resisting rules to cede control of its European pipelines. Alfa Bank analyst Maria Yegikyan said she expected the back payment to Europe to reach $4.5 billion between April and June. But the EU probe is broader and focused on whether past and current Russian company policies "prevented the diversification of supply of gas" in Europe. The investigation is expected to last as many as three years. But Gazprom's stock lost nearly two percent on Wednesday on speculation about possible fines that could be retroactive and apply to this and previous years. Gazprom reported an eight-percent decrease in European delivery volumes and 32-percent less gas to ex-Soviet states that almost exclusively rely on Gazprom shipments.

**High oil prices means Russia’s economy’s strong now and will remain strong**

[**Rapoza**](http://blogs.forbes.com/kenrapoza/)**, 12** (Kenneth, “High Oil Prices Bode Well For Russian Government”, Forbes, 1/28/12, <http://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2012/01/28/high-oil-prices-bode-well-for-russian-government/>)

High oil prices mean more cash flowing into the Russian government. The country is dependent on energy exports to keep its budget surplus in tact. Oil futures cracked $100 a barrel this week, before settling at $99.56 for the May contract for WTI crude. Still, prices like that bode well for Russia’s public coffers. International Monetary Fund’s Moscow representative, Odd Per Brekk, said in an interview with Russian newswire Ria Novosti that high oil prices actually opened a “window of opportunity” for the country to take measures to strengthen and protect its economy from the ongoing problems facing Europe, it’s biggest oil and gas customer. To take full advantage of this opportunity, Brekk said, the Russian government must undertake a complete economic transformation – keeping inflation at 3%-5%, cutting budget expenses, improving the financial sector and reducing its dependence on commodities materials. One way to do it is to use their oil wealth as a means to justify reform. Current geopolitical events are supporting high oil prices, mainly problems in Libya and Syria, and a new oil embargo against Iran. Ria Novosti also noted in its report that Iraq was contributing to high oil prices as well. As U.S. troops head home, some oil firms are looking at the security risks there and wondering if it is worth maintaining current projects. Russia’s government is expecting that the Iran oil embargo will contribute to a 10%-15% rise in oil prices, including the possibility of Iran closing the Strait of Hormuz, an important oil route in the Middle East.

#### Econ decline won’t change Russia’s foreign policy or cause domestic unrest – empirically denied

Blackwill 9 (Robert Blackwill 2009; former associate dean of the Kennedy School of Government and Deputy Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Planning; RAND, "The Geopolitical Consequences of the World Economic Recession—A Caution", http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional\_papers/2009/RAND\_OP275.pdf)

Now on to Russia. Again, fi ve years from today. **Did the global recession and Russia’s present serious economic problems substantially modify Russian foreign policy**? No. (President Obama is beginning his early July visit to Moscow as this paper goes to press; nothing fundamental will result from that visit). **Did it produce a serious weakening of Vladimir Putin’s power** and authority in Russia? No, **as recent polls in Russia make clear**. Did it reduce Russian worries and capacities to oppose NATO enlargement and defense measures eastward? No. Did it aff ect Russia’s willingness to accept much tougher sanctions against Iran? No. Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov has said there is no evidence that Iran intends to make a nuclear weapon.25 In sum, Russian foreign policy is today on a steady, consistent path that can be characterized as follows: to resurrect Russia’s standing as a great power; to reestablish Russian primary infl uence over the space of the former Soviet Union; to resist Western efforts to encroach on the space of the former Soviet Union; to revive Russia’s military might and power projection; to extend the reach of Russian diplomacy in Europe, Asia, and beyond; and to oppose American global primacy. For Moscow, these foreign policy first principles are here to stay, **as they have existed in Russia for centuries**. 26 **None of these enduring objectives of Russian foreign policy** are likely to be changed in any serious way by the economic crisis.

#### Give Russia war zero probability – politics, military superiority, and nuclear security

Graham 7 (Thomas, Russia in Global Affairs, "The dialectics of strength and weakness", http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/numbers/20/1129.html)

An astute historian of Russia, Martin Malia, wrote several years ago that “Russia has at different times been demonized or divinized by Western opinion less because of her real role in Europe than because of the fears and frustrations, or hopes and aspirations, generated within European society by its own domestic problems.” Such is the case today. To be sure, mounting Western concerns about Russia are a consequence of Russian policies that appear to undermine Western interests, but they are also a reflection of declining confidence in our own abilities and the efficacy of our own policies. Ironically, this growing fear and distrust of Russia come at a time when Russia is arguably less threatening to the West, and the United States in particular, than it has been at any time since the end of the Second World War. Russia does not champion a totalitarian ideology intent on our destruction, its **military poses no threat** to sweep across Europe, its economic growth depends on constructive commercial relations with Europe, and its strategic arsenal – while still capable of annihilating the United States – is under more reliable control than it has been in the past fifteen years and the threat of a strategic strike **approaches zero probability.** Political gridlock in key Western countries, however, precludes the creativity, risk-taking, and subtlety needed to advance our interests on issues over which we are at odds with Russia while laying the basis for more constructive long-term relations with Russia.

### Security K – 2AC

#### Case outweighs – nuclear war causes the worst forms of securitization – causes the right to take over – empirically true - WWII

#### Perm – do both

#### Framework – evaluate the aff vs. status quo or a competitive policy option. That’s best for fairness and predictability – there are too many frameworks to predict and they moot all of the 1ac – makes it impossible to be aff. Only our framework solves activism.

#### K doesn’t come first

**Owens 2002** (David – professor of social and political philosophy at the University of Southampton, Re-orienting International Relations: On Pragmatism, Pluralism and Practical Reasoning, Millenium, p. 655-657)

Commenting on the ‘philosophical turn’ in IR, Wæver remarks that ‘[a] frenzy for words like “epistemology” and “ontology” often signals this philosophical turn’, although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn. The first danger with the philosophical turn is that it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology over explanatory and/or interpretive power as if the latter two were merely a simple function of the former. But while the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is not wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, wholly dependent on these philosophical commitments. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness—but this does not undermine the point that, for a certain class of problems, rational choice theory may provide the best account available to us. In other words, while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it is not the only or even necessarily the most important kind. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that because prioritisation of ontology and epistemology promotes theory-construction from philosophical first principles, it cultivates a theory-driven rather than problem-driven approach to IR. Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action, event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, ‘theory-driven work is part of a reductionist program’ in that it ‘dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory’.5 The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since ‘whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for social-scientific inquiry, not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry’.6 Moreover, this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of empirical validity. The third danger is that the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR—what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) ‘the Highlander view’—namely, an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because the turn to, and prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things right, namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so a potentially vicious circle arises.

#### Alternative is vague – voting issue – neg can shift to get around our offense, kills faireness – also justifies permutation do the alt- also means no floating piks – their independently a voter b/c they steal all aff ground

#### No Impact – Iraq disproves, and their impact ev just says war and structural violence – no scenario for escalation and it is empirically denied

#### No single cause of violence

Muro-Ruiz 2 (Diego, London School of Economics, “The Logic of Violence”, Politics, 22(2), p. 116)

Violence is, most of the time, a wilful choice, especially if it is made by an organisation. Individuals present the scholar with a more difficult case to argue for. Scholars of violence have now a wide variety of perspectives they can use – from sociology and political science, to psychology, psychiatry and even biology – and should escape easy judgements. However, the fundamental difficulty for all of us is the absence of a synthetic, general theory able of integrating less complete theories of violent behaviour. In the absence of such a general theory, researchers should bear in mind that violence is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon that resists mono-causal explanations. Future research on violence will have to take in account the variety of approaches, since they each offer some understanding of the logic of violence.

#### -- Some threats are real – “security politics” does not motivate all violence

**Kydd 97** (Professor of Political Science – California, Riverside, Security Studies, Autumn, p. 154)

As for the Second World War, few structural realists will make a sustained case the Hitler was genuinely motivated by a rational pursuit of security for Germany and the other German statesmen would have responded in the same way to Germany’s international situation. Even Germen generals opposed Hitler’s military adventurism until 1939; it is difficult to imagine a less forceful civilian leader overruling them and leading Germany in an oath of conquest. In the case of the cold war, it is again difficult to escape the conclusion that the Soviet Union was indeed expansionist before Gorbachev and not solely motivated by security concerns. The increased emphasis within international relations scholarship on explaining the nature and origins of aggressive expansionists states reflects a growing consensus that aggressive states are at the root of conflict, not security concerns.

#### -- Self-fulfilling prophecy is backwards – failure to express our fears causes them to occur

Macy 95 (Joanna, General Systems Scholar and Deep Ecologist, Ecopsychology)

There is also the superstition that negative thoughts are self-fulfilling. This is of a piece with the notion, popular in New Age circles, that we create our own reality I have had people tell me that “to speak of catastrophe will just make it more likely to happen.” Actually, the contrary is nearer to the truth. Psychoanalytic theory and personal experience show us that it is precisely what we repress that eludes our conscious control and tends to erupt into behavior. As Carl Jung observed, “When an inner situation is not made conscious, it happens outside as fate.” But ironically, in our current situation, the person who gives warning of a likely ecological holocaust is often made to feel guilty of contributing to that very fate.

#### Alt causes right to fill in – turns the K

Olav. F. **Knudsen**, Prof @ Södertörn Univ College, **‘1** [*Security Dialogue* 32.3, “Post-Copenhagen Security Studies: Desecuritizing Securitization,” p. 366]

A final danger in focusing on the state is that of building the illusion that states have impenetrable walls, that they have an inside and an outside, and that nothing ever passes through. Wolfers’s billiard balls have contributed to this misconception. But the state concepts we should use **are in no need of** such an illusion. Whoever criticizes the field for such sins in the past needs to **go back to the literature**. Of course, we must continue to be open to a frank and unbiased assessment of the transnational politics which significantly in- fluence almost every issue on the domestic political agenda. The first decade of my own research was spent studying these phenomena – and I disavow none of my conclusions about the state’s limitations. Yet I am not ashamed to talk of a domestic political agenda. Anyone with a little knowledge of Euro- pean politics knows that Danish politics is not Swedish politics is not German politics is not British politics. Nor would I hesitate for a moment to talk of the role of the state in transnational politics, where it is an important actor, though only one among many other competing ones. In the world of transnational relations, the exploitation of states by interest groups – by their assumption of roles as representatives of states or by convincing state representatives to argue their case and defend their narrow interests – is a significant class of phenomena, today as much as yesterday. Towards a Renewal of the Empirical Foundation for Security Studies Fundamentally, the sum of the foregoing list of sins blamed on the Copen- hagen school amounts to a lack of attention paid to just that ‘reality’ of security which Ole Wæver consciously chose to leave aside a decade ago in order to pursue the politics of securitization instead. I cannot claim that he is void of interest in the empirical aspects of security because much of the 1997 book is devoted to empirical concerns. However, the attention to agenda-setting – confirmed in his most recent work – draws attention away from the important issues we need to work on more closely if we want to contribute to a better understanding of European **security as it is** currently developing**.** That inevitably requires a more **consistent** interest in security policy in the making – not just in the development of alternative security policies. The dan- ger here is that, as alternative policies are likely to fail grandly on the political arena, crucial decisions may be made in the ‘**traditional’ sector of security** policymaking, **unheeded by any but the most uncritical minds.**

#### Alternative fails – critical theory has no mechanism to translate theory into practice

**Jones 99** (Richard Wyn, Lecturer in the Department of International Politics – University of Wales, Security, Strategy, and Critical Theory, CIAO, http://www.ciaonet.org/book/wynjones/wynjones06.html)

Because emancipatory political practice is central to the claims of critical theory, one might expect that proponents of a critical approach to the study of international relations would be reflexive about the relationship between theory and practice. Yet their thinking on this issue thus far does not seem to have progressed much beyond **grandiose statements of intent**. There have been no systematic considerations of how critical international theory can help generate, support, or sustain emancipatory politics beyond the seminar room or conference hotel. Robert Cox, for example, has described the task of critical theorists as providing “a guide to strategic action for bringing about an alternative order” (R. Cox 1981: 130). Although he has also gone on to identify possible agents for change and has outlined the nature and structure of some feasible alternative orders, he has not explicitly indicated whom he regards as the addressee of critical theory (i.e., who is being guided) and thus how the theory can hope to become a part of the political process (see R. Cox 1981, 1983, 1996). Similarly, Andrew Linklater has argued that “a critical theory of international relations must regard the practical project of extending community beyond the nation–state as its most important problem” (Linklater 1990b: 171). However, he has little to say about the role of theory in the realization of this “practical project.” Indeed, his main point is to suggest that the role of critical theory “is not to offer instructions on how to act but to reveal the existence of unrealised possibilities” (Linklater 1990b: 172). But the question still remains, reveal to whom? Is the audience enlightened politicians? Particular social classes? Particular social movements? Or particular (and presumably particularized) communities? In light of Linklater’s primary concern with emancipation, one might expect more guidance as to whom he believes might do the emancipating and how critical theory can impinge upon the emancipatory process. There is, likewise, little enlightenment to be gleaned from Mark Hoffman’s otherwise important contribution. He argues that critical international theory seeks not simply to reproduce society via description, but to understand society and change it. It is both descriptive and constructive in its theoretical intent: it is both an intellectual and a social act. It is not merely an expression of the concrete realities of the historical situation, but also a force for change within those conditions. (M. Hoffman 1987: 233) Despite this very ambitious declaration, once again, Hoffman gives no suggestion as to how this “force for change” should be operationalized and what concrete role critical theorizing might play in changing society. Thus, although the critical international theorists’ critique of the role that more conventional approaches to the study of world politics play in reproducing the contemporary world order may be persuasive, their account of the relationship between their own work and emancipatory political practice is unconvincing. Given the centrality of practice to the claims of critical theory, this is a very significant weakness. Without some plausible account of the **mechanisms** by which they hope to aid in the achievement of their emancipatory goals, proponents of critical international theory are hardly in a position to justify the assertion that “it represents the next stage in the development of International Relations theory” (M. Hoffman 1987: 244). Indeed, without a more convincing conceptualization of the theory–practice nexus, one can argue that critical international theory, by its own terms, has no way of redeeming some of its central epistemological and methodological claims and thus that it is a **fatally flawed** enterprise.

#### Perm do plan and desecuritize the political

#### Conditionality

#### Methodologies are always imperfect – endorsing multiple epistemological frameworks can correct the blindspots of each

Stern and Druckman 00 (Paul, National Research Council and Daniel, Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution – George Mason University, International Studies Review, Spring, p. 62-63)

Using several distinct research approaches or sources of information in conjunction is a valuable strategy for developing generic knowledge. This strategy is particularly useful for meeting the challenges of measurement and inference. The nature of historical phenomena makes controlled experimentation—the analytic technique best suited to making strong inferences about causes and effects—practically impossible with real-life situations. Making inferences requires using experimentation in simulated conditions and various other methods, each of which has its own advantages and limitations, but none of which can alone provide the level of certainty desired about what works and under what conditions. We conclude that debates between advocates of different research methods (for example, the quantitative-qualitative debate) are unproductive except in the context of a search for ways in which different methods can complement each other. Because there is no single best way to develop knowledge, the search for generic knowledge about international conflict resolution should adopt an epistemological strategy of triangulation, sometimes called “**critical** **multiplism**.”53 That is, it should use multiple perspectives, sources of data, constructs, interpretive frameworks, and modes of analysis to address specific questions on the presumption that research approaches that rely on certain perspectives can act as **partial correctives** for the limitations of approaches that rely on different ones. An underlying assumption is that robust findings (those that hold across studies that vary along several dimensions) engender more confidence than replicated findings (a traditional scientific ideal, but not practicable in international relations research outside the laboratory). When different data sources or methods converge on a single answer, one can have increased confidence in the result. When they do not converge, one can interpret and take into account the known biases in each research approach. A continuing critical dialogue among analysts using different perspectives, methods, and data could lead to an understanding that better approximates international relations than the results coming from any single study, method, or data source.

### Elections DA – Obama Good – A2: Russia

#### 1. Romney will maintain a working relationship with Russia.

Business Insider, 9/1/**2012** (Romney Could Screw Up US Relations With Russia, p. <http://www.businessinsider.com/mitt-romneys-foreign-policy-chops-come-into-light-2012-9>)

At the same time, the potential impact of a Romney presidency should not be exaggerated. Mr Romney is not an ideological politician, and he will have solid reasons to maintain a working relationship with Russia. These include reliance on Russian transit corridors to support US forces in Afghanistan to 2015 and beyond, Russia's veto in the UN Security Council, and its potential to act as interlocutor between the US and rogue states. Finally, there is a significant element of uncertainty that stems from the lack of clarity about what Mr Romney, who has often changed his position, actually stands for. In particular, the extent of the influence on him of several competing Republican foreign policy schools (neo-conservativism, populist isolationism, realism, liberal internationalism) is unclear.

#### 2. Give Russia war zero probability – politics, military superiority, and nuclear security

Graham 7 (Thomas, Russia in Global Affairs, "The dialectics of strength and weakness", http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/numbers/20/1129.html)

An astute historian of Russia, Martin Malia, wrote several years ago that “Russia has at different times been demonized or divinized by Western opinion less because of her real role in Europe than because of the fears and frustrations, or hopes and aspirations, generated within European society by its own domestic problems.” Such is the case today. To be sure, mounting Western concerns about Russia are a consequence of Russian policies that appear to undermine Western interests, but they are also a reflection of declining confidence in our own abilities and the efficacy of our own policies. Ironically, this growing fear and distrust of Russia come at a time when Russia is arguably less threatening to the West, and the United States in particular, than it has been at any time since the end of the Second World War. Russia does not champion a totalitarian ideology intent on our destruction, its military poses no threat to sweep across Europe, its economic growth depends on constructive commercial relations with Europe, and its strategic arsenal – while still capable of annihilating the United States – is under more reliable control than it has been in the past fifteen years and the threat of a strategic strike approaches zero probability. Political gridlock in key Western countries, however, precludes the creativity, risk-taking, and subtlety needed to advance our interests on issues over which we are at odds with Russia while laying the basis for more constructive long-term relations with Russia.

#### Russian internal politics undermines a reset --- overwhelms the result of the election.

**Boyt**, 9/11/**2012** (Georgy – political analyst, Whether Obama or Romney, the Reset is Dead, The Moscow Times, p. http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/whether-obama-or-romney-the-reset-is-dead/467947.html)

It appears that Russia is moving increasingly toward confrontation rather than rapprochement with the West. The Kremlin now seems fully committed to spreading the myth that the U.S. State Department is the cause behind most of Russia's domestic problems and is bent on undermining its national security by deploying missile defense installations in Europe and by supporting the opposition. There are other disturbing signals as well. Take, for example, the United Russia bill that would prohibit Russian officials from owning bank accounts and property overseas, with particular attention paid to their holdings in the West. The ideological underpinning of this bill is that assets located in the West are tantamount to betrayal of the motherland. Then there is Russia's opposition to the U.S. Magnitsky Act. The Kremlin interprets this initiative as yet another confirmation of its suspicions that Washington is conspiring against it and that the bill's real U.S. motive is to blackmail Russian officials by threatening to freeze their overseas bank accounts and property. An increase in these anti-Western attitudes does not bode well for U.S.-Russian relations, even if Obama is re-elected in November. Regardless of which candidate wins, the reset is bound to either slowly die a natural death under Obama or be extinguished outright under Romney. As a result, the most we can likely expect from U.S.-Russian relations in the next four years is cooperation on a limited range of mundane issues. Under these conditions, avoiding excessive anti-Russian or anti-U.S. rhetoric from both sides would itself be considered a major achievement in bilateral relations.

### Elections DA – Obama Good – 2AC

#### Energy is not a key election issues --- other issues outweigh.

**The Washington Post**, 6/27/**2012** (Energy ads flood TV in swing states, p. http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/energy-ads/2012/06/27/gJQAD5MR7V\_story.html)

Energy issues don’t spark much excitement among voters, ranking below health care, education and the federal budget deficit — not to mention jobs and the economy. And yet those same voters are being flooded this year with campaign ads on energy policy. Particularly in presidential swing states, the airwaves are laden with messages boosting oil drilling and natural gas and hammering President Obama for his support of green energy. The Cleveland area alone has heard $2.7 million in energy-related ads. The disconnect between what voters say they care about and what they’re seeing on TV lies in the money behind the ads, much of it coming from oil and gas interests. Those funders get the double benefit of attacking Obama at the same time they are promoting their industry. Democrats also have spent millions on the subject, defending the president’s record and tying Republican candidate Mitt Romney to “Big Oil.” Overall, more than $41 million, about one in four of the dollars spent on broadcast advertising in the presidential campaign, has gone to ads mentioning energy, more than a host of other subjects and just as much as health care, according to ad-tracking firm Kantar Media/Cmag. In an election focused heavily on jobs and the economy, all of this attention to energy seems a bit off topic. But the stakes are high for energy producers and environmentalists, who are squared off over how much the government should regulate the industry. And attention has been heightened by a recent boom in production using new technologies such as fracking and horizontal drilling, as well as a spike in gas prices this spring just as the general election got underway. When asked whether energy is important, more than half of voters say yes, according to recent polls. But asked to rank their top issues, fewer than 1 percent mention energy.

#### -- Obama will lose –

#### Romney will win --- he has momentum.

**Bennett**, **10/25**/2012 (William – a CNN contributor, security of education from 1985 to 1988, director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy under President George H. W. Bush, Romney’s momentum can help him win, CNN, p. http://www.cnn.com/2012/10/24/opinion/bennett-final-debate/index.html)

Perhaps foreshadowing the last two weeks of the presidential race, Romney used the debate to move to the center. He emphasized peace and diplomacy and avoided at all costs any hint of sending U.S. forces to future wars. Romney also looked and acted presidential. He had a steady, levelheaded confidence and avoided any snarky, patronizing "horses and bayonets" moments. Obama used the final debate to go to the left and energize his base, attacking Romney at any opportunity while throwing in comments about teachers and classroom size -- a clear signal to his strong base with the teacher's union. Obama offered little on his plans for a second term and spent much of the debate hammering Romney. That may be why some commentators think Romney acted and appeared more like the president and Obama the challenger. One of the central facets of the Obama campaign was to define Romney as an unacceptable candidate, which they did relentlessly in states like Ohio. Yet, Romney's first debate performance shattered that image. And through the rest of the debates, he proved that he is not the man they said he was; he is not a warmonger or greedy vulture capitalist. Now, Obama is racing to put the genie back in the bottle. The electoral map is shrinking for him while expanding for Romney. Paul Begala recently admitted the Obama campaign has given up on North Carolina. Meanwhile, GOP vice presidential candidate Paul Ryan recently campaigned in Pennsylvania, a state once thought to be totally out of the reach of Romney and Ryan. According to RealClearPolitics.com's electoral map, Wisconsin, Michigan and Pennsylvania are now toss-up states and North Carolina is leaning Romney. With the wind at this back, Romney can now consolidate his resources in the most crucial states -- Ohio, Virginia, Colorado and perhaps even Wisconsin and Pennsylvania. And with the foreign policy debate in the rear view mirror, he can get back to the economy -- his strongest issue and advantage over the president. In the latest WSJ/NBC poll Romney has a six point advantage on which candidate is better at dealing with the economy, a seven point lead on jobs and unemployment and a whopping 13 point lead on fixing the deficit. Romney has the momentum. Barring any October surprise, he will likely keep the momentum. With less than two weeks to go, it may matter less what Romney and Obama say but where they say it. That will tell us all we need to know about how the campaigns feel heading into the home stretch.

#### No link – plan doesn’t happen till after the election

Lightman and Douglas 9/21 (David and William, “Unproductive Congress breaks until after November election”, 2012, <http://www.adn.com/2012/09/20/2633147/unproductive-congress-breaks-until.html>\_

Lawmakers spent Thursday pointing fingers and charging opponents with cynical political posturing. Among Congress' last decisions was a characteristic 2012 judgment: Punt action until later. It will let the farm bill, a broad measure that sets the nation's agriculture and food and nutrition assistance policies, expire Sept. 30. Congress also exits without any serious effort to edge away from the "fiscal cliff," the prospect of economy-damaging budget chaos if it doesn't act by year's end. Bush-era tax cuts are due to expire, and automatic spending cuts will take effect unless alternatives are passed. The public is noticing, as the legislative failures stir uncertainty and further roil an already-weak economy. This Congress' approval ratings were stuck at 13 percent in a Gallup survey Sept. 6-9, the lowest the pollster has ever logged this late in an election year since such measurements began in 1974. Yet lawmakers are slinking out of town, after a September session that was on and off for less than two weeks, following a summer recess that ran from Aug. 3 to Sept. 10. Congress is expected to return Nov. 13.

#### It’s too late – voters already decided

Best 10-3 (Eric, “Live Blog: First presidential debate 2012,” Minnesota Daily, 2012, http://www.mndaily.com/blogs/unfit-print/2012/10/03/live-blog-first-presidential-debate-2012)

The first presidential debate is making out to be the beginning of one of the most interesting political events of our time. The debate takes place at the University of Denver. It seems appropriate, as we in higher education know that our communities are places of exchange, of words, ideas and rhetoric. The University of Denver is known for the genesis of many political careers for countless representatives and senators. As historical as this debate stage may be, this debate will feature **new rules in politics**. It has been released that the candidates will likely talk to each other more compared to past debates. The "spin" room, the place where people give their spin on the outcome of the debate, is already hopping with political rhetoricians. There are also several political rules at work in this election. At this point in the election 80 percent of races are already decided by polls; this means that President Barack Obama will likely win this election. This is called the October rule. However, the unemployment rule is also at work, as no president has ever won an election while unemployment is above 7.2 percent, which would side with Gov. Mitt Romney. There are two main swing states that can also decide an election: Ohio and Missouri. No Republican has won the presidency without winning Ohio first, and with recent polls it seems as though Romney will lose this election based on this rule. Missouri is notorious for predicting elections, yet this was broken when Obama won in 2008 when Missouri was won by Sen. John McCain. These rules point toward a chaotic political environment right now, one that will be altered by the debate we are about to witness.

#### The plan will not affect the election --- the Minimal Effect Model proves.

**Farhi**, 7/6/**2012** (Paul – reporter for the Washington Post, Do campaigns really change voters’ minds?, The Washington Post, p. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/do-campaigns-really-change-voters-minds/2012/07/06/gJQAEljyRW_story.html>)

How can anyone accurately estimate the outcome of an election more than three months ahead of time — before the conventions, the debates, and the twists and turns of the fall campaign? Primarily because Abramowitz’s forecasting model disregards the fall campaign altogether. His method acknowledges something that political operatives, journalists and candidates rarely do: Presidential campaigns don’t matter much in determining winners and losers. Despite all the noise from the campaign trail — from the onslaught of TV ads to the daily rallies to the frenzied news coverage — factors beyond either candidate’s control largely determine the result, according to this school of thought. So much is already baked into a presidential contest that even the best managed and most effective campaign (or the most incompetent one) can’t move the needle too far. This idea has been around since at least the 1940s and has been so thoroughly studied that it has its own wonky name, the Minimal Effects Model. Simply stated, the model says that presidential campaigns have a highly limited effect on how people vote. Because of partisan loyalties and other structural factors, millions of voters have made up their minds long before the most intense electioneering begins, leaving only a disengaged few for the candidates to persuade. “When you’re in the middle of a campaign, there’s a tendency for people, especially the media, to overestimate the importance of certain events,” Abramowitz says. These include high-profile gaffes, vice presidential selections, controversial ads and other moments that capture so much attention. Except, he adds, “those things have no measurable impact [on voters’ decisions]. The media are interested in getting people’s attention, but a lot of the stories you read or see are focusing on things that are trivial. The way campaigns play out is largely determined by fundamentals.”

#### GOP will steal the election --- six warrants

**Fitrakis and Wasserman**, 9/5/**2012** (Bob – Professor of Political Science in the Social and Behavioral Sciences Department at Columbus State Community College and Harvey – senior advisor to Greenpeace USA and the Nuclear Information and Resource Service, Will the GOP Steal America’s 2012 Election, Daily Kos, p. <http://www.dailykos.com/story/2012/09/05/1128300/-Will-the-GOP-Steal-America-s-2012-Election>)

The Republican Party could steal the 2012 US Presidential election with relative ease. Six basic factors make this year’s theft a possibility: The power of corporate money, now vastly enhanced by the US Supreme Court’s Citizens’ United decisions; The Electoral College, which narrows the number of votes needed to be moved to swing a presidential election; The systematic disenfranchisement of---according to the Brennan Center---ten million or more citizens, most of whom would otherwise be likely to vote Democratic. More than a million voters have also been purged from the rolls in Ohio, almost 20% of the total vote count in 2008; The accelerating use of electronic voting machines, which make election theft a relatively simple task for those who control them, including their owners and operators, who are predominantly Republican; The GOP control of nine of the governorships in the dozen swing states that will decide the outcome of the 2012 campaign; and, The likelihood that the core of the activist “election protection” community that turned out in droves to monitor the vote for Barack Obama in 2008 has not been energized by his presidency and is thus unlikely to work for him again in 2012.

#### October surprises thump the link

Pianin 10-15 (Eric, former Washington Post editor and budget reporter, “5 October Surprises That Could Decide the Election,” Fiscal Times, 2012, http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2012/10/15/5-October-Surprises-that-Could-Decide-the-Election.aspx#KJ1DxoAWOTBhdQh5.99)

But regardless of their outcome, the debates are only part of the equation in determining who the next president will be. Other events in the closing days of the race could easily deliver that classic October Surprise. As the recent violent anti-U.S. protests throughout the Middle East and the terrorist attack in Libya that killed U.S. Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens and three other government employees showed, unforeseen events can rapidly change the complexion of the campaign. The Obama administration gave the GOP an opening by allowing constantly shifting public explanations for what happened in Benghazi on Sept. 11 when militants attacked two U.S. compounds in the eastern Libyan city. Romney and congressional Republican leaders cited the deaths of the four Americans as evidence of a security breach and failed administration policies in the tumultuous Middle East. By contrast, Obama’s claim that the long-suffering economy is improving was greatly buttressed by an Oct. 5 Labor Department report reporting that the unemployment rate dipped below 8 percent for the first time in his tenure. “Debates count, but events in the real world can count more,” said John J. Pitney Jr., a political scientist with the Claremont McKenna College in California. With the political calendar rapidly winding down to only 23 days before the election, there are a handful of other events that could help or hurt Obama and Romney as they struggle for control of the White House. A final round of national employment numbers. The Labor Department will issue the October jobs report just **four days before Election Day**. Democrats gleefully celebrated the September numbers, showing a 7.8 percent unemployment rate, and a subsequent release that put new claims for jobless benefits fell at their lowest level in more than four and a half years. Another upbeat report helps the president seal his argument that his economic policies are working. State-by-state unemployment numbers on Oct. 23. While the national jobless numbers are an important index of the recovery as a whole, unemployment in individual states gives a fuller reading of the situation in decisive battlegrounds such as Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia and Florida. The Romney campaign is desperate to overcome Obama’s lead in Ohio, a state that every Republican presidential nominee had to carry to win the election. The economy has bubbled back to life in the Buckeye state, where the unemployment rate is currently 7.2 percent, well below the national average. Layoffs. This has been another bad year for layoffs, with more than 352,185 people laid off or fired, according to Challenger, Gray & Christmas, a major employee outplacement firm. Among the worst layoffs were 1,300 at Cisco Systems, 1,200 at Archer-Daniels-Midland, 1,000 at Texas Instruments and 1,000 at Patriot Coal, according to a report by Business Insider. Another round just before the election would be **bad news for the president and good news for Romney**. This helps to explain why the Obama administration went to great lengths to discourage the aero space and defense industry from sending out tens of thousands of letters to employees just before the election warning of likely layoffs if Congress and the administration failed to block deep automatic cuts in the defense budget set to take effect in early January. Lockheed Martin and other major defense contractors recently backed down from issuing layoff letters as required under federal law after the Obama administration promised to cover their severance costs in the event of sequestration. That decision was welcome news for Obama, who had faced the prospect of mass layoff warnings in Virginia and other battleground states just days before the election. Earnings season. Obama rode to the White House in 2008 on a stock market crash — and third quarters earnings season gets into full gear on Monday with projections by FactSet that corporate revenues were flat and earnings fell by 2.7 percent. The S&P 500 index increased by 5.76 percent during that same period. That leaves three possible scenarios to explain what happened: The Federal Reserve bolstered stocks by launching a third round of quantitative easing; companies will beat those negative projections; or investors will conclude the market is overvalued. A swing in stocks affects consumer confidence in a reelection where — this time — Obama would prefer a surging market. So far the market has seen weak earnings by aluminum-maker Alcoa and oil company Chevron, but a 36 percent jump in Q3 profits for the bank JP MorganChase to $5.71 billion. The volatile Middle East. While the killings of Osama bin Laden and other top al Qaeda operatives have weakened the terrorist network, the attack on the U.S. consulate in Libya and the rise of groups affiliated with al Qaeda in the Middle East and North Africa presents a serious threat to U.S. security and interests. Another high profile attack against the U.S. before the election **could enhance Romney’s argument** that Obama is a timid commander in chief who lacks an effective strategy for that region. Pitney said the history of presidential campaigns is littered with last minute surprises at home and abroad that tipped the outcome of a close race. President Jimmy Carter’s failed last minute efforts to end the prolonged Iranian hostage crisis helped Republican Ronald Reagan unseat him in 1980. The 2008 economic crisis coming at the tail end of the Bush administration dealt a fatal blow to the candidacy of Republican Sen. John McCain of Arizona. A stock market crash, another serious flare up in the Middle East or a worsening of the European debt crisis later this month could **further harm Obama’s bid for reelection**. Pitney said that even with continued improvement in the unemployment picture it would be hard to imagine another economic event that would dramatically improve the president’s standing before Election Day. “Perceptions on the economy are largely fixed, so it would take a pretty big event to change them dramatically,” Pitney said. “And big events are likely to be **unfavorable to the president**.”

### Elections DA – Obama Good – Impact Turns

#### Obama reelection results in unilateral disarm --- kills deterrence and results in nuclear war.

**Ferrara**, 4/4/**2012** (Peter – Director of Entitlement and Budget Policy for the Heartland Institute and General Counsel of the American Civil Rights Union, served in the White House Office of Policy development under President Reagan, Obama’s Unilateral Nuclear Disarmament, American Spectator, p. <http://spectator.org/archives/2012/04/04/obamas-unilateral-nuclear-disa>)

America's Nuclear Suicide Obama's literally crazy idea is that if we just lead by example and phase out our nuclear weapons, everyone else will realize we mean them no harm, and do the same. As a result, because of the messiah, the lion will lie down with the lamb, and the world will live as one. As Gaffney further explained, "He evidently is prepared to take such a step unilaterally in order to encourage by our example other nations to join his long-standing ambition to 'rid the world of nuclear weapons.'" The problem is if President Obama is reelected, he as the commander-in-chief would be free to carry out this flower child policy on his own authority, without Congressional approval. As Gaffney further explained in the March 27 Washington Times, "Mr. Obama's subordinates are signaling, however, that he is prepared to disarm us unilaterally through what one of them, Assistant Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller, recently called 'executive action.'" Gaffney rightly concluded in his February 22 column, "It is an astonishing insight into the President's commitment to 'fundamentally transforming the United States of America' -- in the worst sense of the phrase -- that he is willing to take such steps in the midst of his reelection campaign. Imagine what he would do if the last vestiges of restraining accountability are removed in a second term." In these modern times, a full blown nuclear war would be over in a matter of days. America will not have four years to build up the arsenal of democracy if caught by surprise. A dew-eyed miscalculation on these matters literally threatens your very life, and the lives of your family and children. That is why not only President Obama must be held accountable for this national defense foolishness, but the entire Democrat party that supports and enables him. That includes his contributors, whose names are publicly available, and his voters. This is a Paul Revere moment. The survival of you, your family and your nation is at stake, far more so than even on that April night in 1775. Exercise your rights of freedom of speech and democratic participation while you still have them, indeed, while you are still alive.

#### Roe –

#### A) Romney overturns it --- restricts abortion.

**Davis**, 8/29/**2012** (Lanny J. – principal in Lanny J. Davis & Associates, served as President Clinton’s special counsel, member of President George W. Bush’s Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, currently serves as special counsel to Dilworth Paxson, and partner with former Republican National Committee Chairman Michael Steele in Purple Nation Solutions, Obama’s best argument for reelection, The Hill, p. http://thehill.com/conventions-2012/dem-convention-charlotte/245775-opinion-obamas-best-argument-for-reelection-)

Finally, Obama should remind all Americans that Romney’s election would almost certainly mean overturning Roe v. Wade, since he would almost certainly be in a position to appoint the fifth, deciding vote to the Supreme Court. If this were to happen, Obama could accurately state that state legislatures would have the right to prohibit terminations of all pregnancies under all circumstances, including those resulting from rape and incest; and that this absolute prohibition had been the law in many states before Roe was decided in 1973, and is included in the 2012 national Republican platform.

#### B) Extinction.

**Human Life Review**, Summer, **1989**, p. 116

This is what the abortion controversy is about, and what the euthanasia controversy will be about when, as must inevitably happen soon, it arises. The logical sequel to the destruction of what are called “unwanted children” will be the elimination of what will be called “unwanted lives” a legislative measure which so far in all human history only the Nazi Government has ventured to enact. In this sense the abortion controversy is the most vital and relevant of all. For we can survive energy crises, inflation, wars, revolutions and insurrections, as they have been survived in the past; but if we transgress against the very basis of our mortal existence, becoming our own gods in our own universe, then we shall surely and deservedly perish from the earth.

#### Palestinian Statehood –

#### A) Obama will do it.

**Laub**, 3/9/**2012** (Karin, In US election year, Palestinians sidelined, Yahoo! News, p. <http://news.yahoo.com/us-election-palestinians-sidelined-193334847.html>)

President Barack Obama has told the Palestinians to sit tight during a U.S. election year, while holding out the promise of a serious push for Palestinian statehood if he wins a second term, the Palestinian foreign minister said Friday. A U.S. State Department spokeswoman insisted Washington remains engaged, though U.S officials, speaking on condition of anonymity due to the sensitivity of the diplomacy, said the peace process is bogged down and prospects for resuming even low-level exploratory talks are slim. It may be politically risky for Abbas to be seen as just marking time until November. The Palestinian public is increasingly impatient with deadlock on all fronts, and Abbas could score points by reconciling with his longtime rival Hamas. But an alliance with the Islamic militants, who seized control of the Gaza Strip from Abbas' Palestinian Authority in 2007, could upset the U.S. and hurt a statehood bid later. Israel has already warned that it won't negotiate a statehood deal if Abbas forges a coalition with an unreformed Hamas. For now, Abbas appears to have his hands full just keeping the Palestinian issue from fading away — or being steamrolled by internal American politics. The Palestinians have watched in dismay as Republican candidates, eager to please Jewish donors and voters, appeared to compete over who is more pro-Israel: At one point Newt Gingrich, backed financially by an ardently Zionist Jewish billionnaire, called the Palestinians "an invented people." Obama himself struck what was perceived as a pro-Israel tone in recent weeks.

#### B) Pre-emptive nuclear war.

**Bere**, 3/28/**2003** (Louis Rene – professor of political science t Purdue, A Palestinian State and Regional Nuclear War, p. http://www.science.co.il/Arab-Israeli-conflict/Articles/Beres-2003-03-28.asp)

Until now, fears of a nuclear war in the Middle East have generally focussed on Iraq. Yet, when the current war against Saddam Hussein is concluded, it is highly unlikely that Iraq will be in any position to acquire nuclear weapons. A new Arab state of "Palestine," on the other hand, would have decidedly serious implications for certain regional resorts to nuclear conflict. Newly endowed with a so-called "Prime Minister," this state, although itself non-nuclear, would greatly heighten the prospect of catastrophic nuclear war in the area. If all goes well for the United States in Operation Iraqi Freedom, President Bush will feel compelled to reward Arab state allies and supporters with a dedicated American effort to create a Palestinian state. This state, tied closely to a broad spectrum of terrorist groups and flanking 70 percent of Israel's population, would utterly eliminate Israel's remaining strategic depth. With limited capacity to defend an already fragile land and facing a new enemy country resolutely committed to Israel's annihilation, Jerusalem would have to undertake even more stringent methods of counter terrorism and self-defense against aggression. Various new forms of preemption, known under international law as anticipatory self-defense, would be unavoidable. Significantly, a strong emphasis on preemption has now become the recognizable core of President Bush's national security policy for the United States. Several ironies must also be noted. Above all, offering Palestine as a reward for collaborative opposition to Iraq would merely exchange one terror state for another. Additionally, the nuclear risks associated with a new state of Palestine would derive not from this state directly - which would assuredly be non-nuclear - but from (1) other Arab/Islamic states (including Iran) that could exploit Israel's new strategic vulnerabilities; and/or (2) Israel's own attempts to preempt such enemy exploitations. Because the creation of a state of Palestine alongside the state of Israel would raise the area risk of nuclear war considerably, this very politicized measure should now be viewed with real apprehension. Indeed, its creation could even bring an Islamic "Final Solution" to the region. After all, every Arab map of the Middle East already excludes Israel. Cartographically, Israel has already been destroyed. Architects of the Oslo Agreements had suggested all along that a "Two-State Solution" to the Palestinian problem would surely reduce the risk of another major war in the Middle East. After all, they had always maintained, the problem of stateless Palestinians is THE source of all problems between Israel and the Arabs. Once we have "justice" for Palestinians, the argument proceeded, Arab governments and Iran could begin to create area-wide stability and comprehensive peace settlements. Harmony would then reign, more or less triumphantly, from the Mediterranean and Red Seas to the Persian Gulf. But as we should have learned by now, especially from recurring Arab violations of the "peace process," the conventional Oslo wisdom was always unwise. For the most part, Iranian and Arab state inclinations to war against Israel have had absolutely nothing to do with the Palestinians. Even if Israel had continued to make all unilateral Oslo concessions, and had continued to adhere to unreciprocated agreements, these irremediably belligerent inclinations would have endured, especially from Syria, Iraq and Libya as well as from Iran, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. If Israel should soon face a new state of Palestine, the Jewish state's vulnerability to armed attack by hostile neighbors will increase markedly. If this diminished safety is accompanied by the spread of unconventional weapons to certain hostile states, which now seems certain, Israel could find itself confronting not only war, but genocide. It is also clear that Israel's own nuclear infrastructures will become increasingly vulnerable to surprise attack from Palestinian territories.

#### Defense cuts –

#### A) Romney avoids them.

**Beutler**, 8/23/**2012** (Brian – senior congressional reporter for the Talking Points Memo, Ryan: No Compromise On Sequester If Romney Wins (VIDEO), Talking Point Memo, p. http://tpmdc.talkingpointsmemo.com/2012/08/paul-ryan-mitt-romney-defense-sequestration.php)

If Mitt Romney wins in November, he and a Republican Congress will fast track legislation early next year to replace across the board defense cuts with cuts to food stamps and other programs for needy Americans. “In January our intention is that if we don’t fix it in the lame duck is to fix it retroactively once a new session of Congress takes place,” Paul Ryan, Romney’s running mate, told a crowd in North Carolina Thursday, “We have procedural way in the Senate to advance that legislation very quickly and get it to the next President of the United States who I believe is going to be Mitt Romney, to pass that into law and retroactively prevent that sequester from taking place in January.” Ryan was referring to legislation House Republicans passed earlier this year to avert sequestration — the penalty Congress imposed on itself, on a bipartisan basis, for not reaching an agreement on more targeted legislation to reduce the deficit. Sequestration will cause deep, abrupt cuts to both defense and non-defense programs starting early next year, and for the next 10 years, unless Congress overturns it or replaces it with other savings. A number of high-ranking Democrats and Republicans have concluded that the election will determine how Congress avoids both the sequester and the impact of the expiring Bush tax cuts. Ryan says if Romney wins they’ll advance the GOP’s plan and use the budget process to avoid a Democratic filibuster.

#### B) Nuclear war.

Foreign Policy Initiative, 11/17/**2011** (Defending Defense: Defense Spending, Super Committee, and the Price of Greatness, A Joint Project of the Foreign Policy Initiative, American Enterprise Institute, and the Heritage Foundation, p. <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/11/defending-defense-setting-the-record-straight-on-us-military-spending-requirements>)

FACT: In order to maintain global leadership, the United States must make commensurate investments in defense of its national security and international interests. From the Cold War to the post-9/11 world, U.S. spending on national defense has yielded substantial strategic returns by: • protecting the security and prosperity of the United States and its allies; • amplifying America’s diplomatic and economic leadership throughout the globe; • preventing the outbreak of the world wars that marked the early 20th century; and • preserving the delicate international order in the face of aggressive, illiberal threats. No doubt, the United States has invested non-trivial amounts on national defense to help achieve these strategic objectives. But when viewed in historical perspective, the proportion of America’s annual economic output dedicated to the Defense Department from 1947 to today has been reasonable and acceptable—indeed, a fraction of what it dedicated during World War II. Figure 4 illustrates this. Moreover, in light of the various rounds of recent cuts to the Pentagon’s multi-year budget, defense spending as percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) is on track to reach its lowest point since end of World War II. Yet defense cuts in recent years have come despite the fact that the United States is facing new threats in the 21st century to its national security and international interests. As Robert Kagan of the Brookings Institution summarized in The Weekly Standard: The War on Terror: “The terrorists who would like to kill Americans on U.S. soil constantly search for safe havens from which to plan and carry out their attacks. American military actions in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Yemen, and elsewhere make it harder for them to strike and are a large part of the reason why for almost a decade there has been no repetition of September 11. To the degree that we limit our ability to deny them safe haven, we increase the chances they will succeed” (emphasis added). The Asia Pacific: “American forces deployed in East Asia and the Western Pacific have for decades prevented the outbreak of major war, provided stability, and kept open international trading routes, making possible an unprecedented era of growth and prosperity for Asians and Americans alike. Now the United States faces a new challenge and potential threat from a rising China which seeks eventually to push the U.S. military’s area of operations back to Hawaii and exercise hegemony over the world’s most rapidly growing economies. Meanwhile, a nuclear-armed North Korea threatens war with South Korea and fires ballistic missiles over Japan that will someday be capable of reaching the west coast of the United States. Democratic nations in the region, worried that the United States may be losing influence, turn to Washington for reassurance that the U.S. security guarantee remains firm. If the United States cannot provide that assurance because it is cutting back its military capabilities, they will have to choose between accepting Chinese dominance and striking out on their own, possibly by building nuclear weapons” (emphasis added). The Middle East: “… Iran seeks to build its own nuclear arsenal, supports armed radical Islamic groups in Lebanon and Palestine, and has linked up with anti-American dictatorships in the Western Hemisphere. The prospects of new instability in the region grow every day as a decrepit regime in Egypt clings to power, crushes all moderate opposition, and drives the Muslim Brotherhood into the streets. A nuclear-armed Pakistan seems to be ever on the brink of collapse into anarchy and radicalism. Turkey, once an ally, now seems bent on an increasingly anti-American Islamist course. The prospect of war between Hezbollah and Israel grows, and with it the possibility of war between Israel and Syria and possibly Iran. There, too, nations in the region increasingly look to Washington for reassurance, and if they decide the United States cannot be relied upon they will have to decide whether to succumb to Iranian influence or build their own nuclear weapons to resist it” (emphasis added). Meeting these threats will require the United States to remain engaged diplomatically and militarily throughout the globe. And that will require continued investment in national defense. However, further cuts to Pentagon spending—especially the “devastating” sequestration cut if the Super Committee effort fails—will fundamentally undermine America’s strategy to defend its national security and international interests. In Secretary Panetta’s words, “we would have to formulate a new security strategy that accepted substantial risk of not meeting our defense needs.” Conclusion: Defense spending and the price of greatness. Some today find it tempting to slash investments in America’s national security and international interests, especially given current efforts to reduce the federal debt and deficit. As this analysis has argued, however, defense spending—which has already faced nearly $1 trillion in cuts, arguably more—has done its part for deficit reduction. Moreover, further cuts to defense spending risk fundamentally eroding America’s standing and leadership role in the world.

#### Appeasement

#### A) Obama appeases – signals weakness.

**Wright**, 5/4/**2012** (Kevin – founder and director of the Old Dominion Research Group, Obama’s Foreign Policy: Continued Appeasement Will Bring the Ultimatum, Think FY, p. <http://www.thinkfy.com/content/obamas-foreign-policy-continued-appeasement-will-bring-ultimatum>)

This is the choice we face in the November election on foreign policy: stand strong and project our strength or accommodate and appease our adversaries. Both have consequences, but as Reagan said, “every lesson of history tells us that the greater risk lies in appeasement.” With President Obama’s record, the choice is crystal clear which side he stands on: a policy of accommodation and appeasement. Consider the events that have unfolded over the past three years with Russia and China: Only eight months into his first year as Commander-in-Chief, President Barack Obama waved a white flag to “our adversaries” by choosing Russia over “two key NATO allies” (Poland and the Czech Republic) in abandoning missile defense; a move that “will be hailed by the Kremlin as a big victory” and as a “sign of weakness.” Oh, and don’t forget that Obama announced the decision on the 70th Anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Poland and received no concessions from Russia in return. At the same time Obama was trying to appease Russia by abandoning missile defense plans, Obama was trying to appease the Communist Chinese by postponing a meeting with Tibetan spiritual leader Dalai Lama.

#### B) Causes global aggression.

**Chapin and Hanson**, 12/7/**2009** (Bernard - interviewer and Victor Davis - Martin and Illie Anderson senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, Change, weakness, disaster, p. http://pajamasmedia.com/blog/change-weakness-disaster-obama-answers-from-victor-davis-hanson/)

BC: Are we currently sending a message of weakness to our foes and allies? Can anything good result from President Obama’s marked submissiveness before the world? Dr. Hanson: Obama is one bow and one apology away from a circus. The world can understand a kowtow gaffe to some Saudi royals, but not as part of a deliberate pattern. Ditto the mea culpas. Much of diplomacy rests on public perceptions, however trivial. We are now in a great waiting game, as regional hegemons, wishing to redraw the existing landscape — whether China, Venezuela, Iran, North Korea, Pakistan, Syria, etc. — are just waiting to see who’s going to be the first to try Obama — and whether Obama really will be as tenuous as they expect. If he slips once, it will be 1979 redux, when we saw the rise of radical Islam, the Iranian hostage mess, the communist inroads in Central America, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, etc. BC: With what country then — Venezuela, Russia, Iran, etc. — do you believe his global repositioning will cause the most damage? Dr. Hanson: I think all three. I would expect, in the next three years, Iran to get the bomb and begin to threaten ever so insidiously its Gulf neighborhood; Venezuela will probably cook up some scheme to do a punitive border raid into Colombia to apprise South America that U.S. friendship and values are liabilities; and Russia will continue its energy bullying of Eastern Europe, while insidiously pressuring autonomous former republics to get back in line with some sort of new Russian autocratic commonwealth. There’s an outside shot that North Korea might do something really stupid near the 38th parallel and China will ratchet up the pressure on Taiwan. India’s borders with both Pakistan and China will heat up. I think we got off the back of the tiger and now no one quite knows whom it will bite or when.

#### C) Nuclear war.

**Kahn**, 10/10/**2009** (Jeremy, India’s china obsession, Newsweek, p. http://www.newsweek.com/id/217088)

The implications for India's security—and the world's—are ominous. It turns what was once an obscure argument over lines on a 1914 map and some barren, rocky peaks hardly worth fighting over into a **flash point** that could **spark a war between two nuclear-armed neighbors**. And that makes the India-China border dispute into an issue of concern to far more than just the two parties involved. The United States and Europe as well as the rest of Asia ought to take notice—a conflict involving India and China could result in a **nuclear exchange**. And it could suck the West in—either as an ally in the defense of Asian democracy, as in the case of Taiwan, or as a mediator trying to separate the two sides.

## 1AR v. Boston College KS

### Relations

#### -- Relations resilient

Kortunov 96 (Andrei, Russian Science Foundation, Comparative Strategy, p. 335)

However, surprisingly enough there seemed to be no visible, qualitative deterioration in the relationship in 1995-96. Indeed, at some points it looked as if the relations were sliding into a mini-cold war (e.g., after the notorious Yeltsin-Clinton encounter at Budapest in fall 1994 or when the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) started its air strikes against Bosnian Serbs without first consulting Moscow). But, at every juncture, each side was able to bounce back minimizing the negative impact of tensions in particular fields on the overall relationship.

#### No impact – Romney will copy Obama on foreign policy

Miller 12 (Aaron David Miller, 5-23-2012; distinguished scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars; “Barack O’Romney”, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/05/23/barack_oromney>)

And that brings up an extraordinary fact. What has emerged in the second decade after 9/11 is a remarkable consensus among Democrats and Republicans on a core approach to the nation's foreign policy. It's certainly not a perfect alignment. But rarely since the end of the Cold War has there been this level of consensus. Indeed, while Americans may be divided, polarized and dysfunctional about issues closer to home, we are really quite united in how we see the world and what we should do about it. Ever wondered why foreign policy hasn't figured all that prominently in the 2012 election campaign? Sure, the country is focused on the economy and domestic priorities. And yes, Obama has so far avoided the kind of foreign-policy disasters that would give the Republicans easy free shots. But there's more to it than that: Romney has had a hard time identifying Obama's foreign-policy vulnerabilities because there's just not that much difference between the two. A post 9/11 consensus is emerging that has bridged the ideological divide of the Bush 43 years. And it's going to be pretty durable. Paradoxically, both George W. Bush's successes and failures helped to create this new consensus. His tough and largely successful approach to counterterrorism -- specifically, keeping the homeland safe and keeping al Qaeda and its affiliates at bay through use of special forces, drone attacks, aggressive use of intelligence, and more effective cooperation among agencies now forms a virtually unassailable bipartisan consensus. As shown through his stepped-up drone campaign, Barack Obama has become George W. Bush on steroids. And Bush 43's failed policies -- a discretionary war in Iraq and a mismanaged one in Afghanistan -- have had an equally profound effect. These adventures created a counter-reaction against ill-advised military campaigns that is now bipartisan theology as well. To be sure, there are some differences between Romney and Obama. But with the exception of Republicans taking a softer line on Israel and a tougher one on Russia -- both stances that are unlikely to matter much in terms of actual policy implementation -- there's a much greater convergence.

#### Syria, Libya, and Iran – Cold-War style relations are inevitable, energy’s irrelevant

LaFranchi 12 (Howard, Foreign Affairs Correspondent, “A cold-war chill? US-Russia relations falter over Libya and Syria,” Christian Science Monitor, 3-3, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Foreign-Policy/2012/0303/A-cold-war-chill-US-Russia-relations-falter-over-Libya-and-Syria)

Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton doffed her diplomatic gloves after Russia vetoed a United Nations Security Council resolution on Syria. Calling the February veto "despicable," she laid at Moscow's feet the "murders" of Syrian "women, children, [and] brave young men." Not to be outdone, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin railed against the United States for indulging its "bellicose itch" to get involved in other countries' internal affairs. And he vowed that Russia will thwart American designs in the Middle East. Whatever happened to the "reset," President Obama's ballyhooed reorientation of US-Russia relations to a more cooperative path focused on common interests? Russia would say Libya happened – the conflict where the West and the US in particular demonstrated a zeal for intervention that struck at Russia's sense of sovereignty and of what the UN should and shouldn't do. The US would say Syria happened – revealing Russia's revived obstructionist tendencies on the Security Council and demonstrating Russia's determination to protect an old ally at the expense of the Syrian people. Both countries might say that what happened is this: The common interests that the "reset" was meant to emphasize – arms control, counterterrorism, the global economy – have taken a back seat to awakened geopolitical rivalries and diverging international visions. Add to this the fact that Mr. Putin is expected to return to Russia's presidency in elections Sunday, bringing with him a blame-the-west perspective for explaining many of Russia's ills. The result is that stormy days lie ahead for US-Russia relations, many say. Progress on issues like missile defense and NATO-Russia relations is likely to remain stalled – and could suffer serious setbacks if the Syria and Iran crises deteriorate further. "I foresee a tough year for US-Russia relations," says Andrew Weiss, a former director for Russian affairs on the National Security Council under President Clinton who is now a Russia analyst at the RAND Corp. in Arlington, Va. With little prospect for advances, he adds, the Obama administration is likely to focus on preventing backsliding. "The emphasis will be on ensuring that these fast-moving conflicts don't put the remaining areas of cooperation at risk," he says. Others say the current frictions demonstrate how relations, despite the efforts of three administrations, have never overcome cold-war mistrusts to progress to a deeper level. "Under both Clinton and Bush, the US made it look like things were moving forward with Russia by focusing on things that were easier to do and that didn't require sacrifice from either side," says Paul Saunders, executive director of the Center for the National Interest in Washington "But in both cases, they ran out of ideas on how to work together before crossing a threshold in relations that would have allowed them to weather the differences that remained," he adds. "Now it looks like something similar might be happening under Obama." If anything, keeping the Washington-Moscow relationship on an even keel is likely to be even harder now, for two key reasons: the expected return of Mr. Putin's nationalist, Russia-can't-trust-the-West perspective to the country's helm; and the conflict in Syria, which will keep Russian-Western differences center stage and will make reaching a diplomatic solution to the Iran nuclear crisis all the more remote. Some add here the fact that russia is a major oil and gas exporter, and so it **does not share America's** keen **interest in keeping down energy prices**. The Obama administration, says Mr. Saunders, a foreign-policy realist, did US-Russia relations no favors by the way it handled last year's Libya Security Council resolution. Russia abstained from that vote, which allowed the resolution to go through. "The US and its allies went way beyond the scope of that resolution," he says, "ensuring the Russians will probably go a very long time before just abstaining on a resolution like the one on Libya." He adds, "There's a straight line from there to the votes [in October and February] on Syria" resolutions, which Russia vetoed. "And that line will probably extend to anything [the US and its allies] might try to do in the UN on Iran." Not everyone foresees an unchecked downward spiral in US-Russia relations, if only because each country will continue to need the other in pursuing some international priorities. In the coming months and years, the US will need Russia's cooperation on issues ranging from Afghanistan and North Korea to disarmament and nuclear nonproliferation, says Olga Oliker, a senior international security policy analyst at RAND. "We ignore Russia and downgrade it at our own peril," she says. But she also notes, "The areas where we cooperate are increasingly not going to be at the top of our priority list." Another factor in bilateral relations will be the US presidential elections later this year. Russia is likely to put off any major decisions with the US until it knows "who's going to be sitting across the table in 2013," says Mr. Weiss. That means cooperation on easier goals like Russia's expected entry into the World Trade Organization this summer and on security for the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi, for example, but nothing substantive on missile defense. One place to watch for clues on where the relationship is going will be the Group of Eight summit in Chicago in May, if as expected Mr. Obama and Putin use the gathering to hold a side summit. Expect the ambience to be "businesslike," Ms. Oliker says – devoid perhaps of the warmth that Obama and outgoing Russian President Dmitry Medvedev shared, but also free of the harsh rhetoric that the two countries have lobbed back and forth about Syria in recent weeks. Russia has "no interest in fighting a proxy war with the US" in Syria, she says, just as the US "has no interest in seeing this escalate."

#### Obama will try to link cooperation to Iran – destroys relations

Khlopkov 9 (Anton, Director of the Center for Energy and Security Studies in Moscow; Editor-in-Chief of Nuclear Club journal, “U.S.-Russian nuclear energy cooperation: A missed opportunity,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 8-31, http://thebulletin.org/web-edition/op-eds/us-russian-nuclear-energy-cooperation-missed-opportunity)

Yet without a 123 agreement in place, Russian and U.S. scientists can't begin joint experiments for the new reactor because they can't legally exchange nuclear materials. Other promising avenues for nuclear energy cooperation that require such an agreement include: joint projects to build nuclear power plants in third countries; joint projects on the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle (provided that Washington approves the decision to use plutonium in the reactors); joint projects on fast breeder reactor-related technologies; continued commercial supplies of Russian LEU to the United States after the expiration of the HEU-LEU agreement. As for U.S.-Russian cooperation in uranium enrichment, some experts also have proposed that an enrichment facility using Russian centrifuge technology could be built in the United States if projects using U.S. centrifuge and SILEX laser-enrichment technology fail to achieve industrial-scale production--**again, something only a 123 agreement could make possible**. In Moscow, Medvedev and Obama did agree to set up a Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Security Working Group co-chaired by Sergei Kiriyenko, the head of Russia's state-run nuclear corporation Rosatom, and Daniel Poneman, U.S. deputy energy secretary. The group has the potential to facilitate U.S.-Russian nuclear energy cooperation, especially if it manages to find the right balance between the two priorities reflected in its name. However, **a lot of work still needs to be done before nuclear energy isn't contingent on other aspects of U.S.-Russian relations**. For instance, the "reset" of the U.S.-Russian relationship has led the Obama administration to increasingly link the prospects of nuclear energy cooperation to resolving the crisis over the Iranian nuclear program. That largely overturns many years of consultations between U.S. and Russian diplomats, who only 15 months ago finally managed to clear the Iranian hurdle on the way to developing bilateral cooperation in nuclear energy. Obviously, Russia and the United States should continue their joint efforts regarding Iran. And considering how little progress has been made on defusing the crisis and with the May 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference looming on the horizon, those efforts might actually need to be stepped up. But linking the enactment of a 123 agreement to progress on Iran would be **unproductive**. Simply put, Russia wants to cooperate with Washington on nuclear energy projects, but not with the Iranian string attached.

### Election – 1AR – Already Decided

#### 90% of voters are already decided

Holliday 10-8 (Jarvis, Editor and Freelance Writer, “Obama, Romney and Couponing,” Creative Loafing, 2012, http://clclt.com/theclog/archives/2012/10/08/obama-romney-and-couponing)

The presidential debate season has occurred in October, every four years, for decades. That is far too late since the campaign season now starts far too early, the presidential-nominating conventions now take place far too late (up until 1992, the Democratic National Convention, for example, used to occur by mid-July rather than early September like the 2012 DNC in Charlotte), and more money is spent on campaigning than ever before. By the time the third presidential debate occurs on October 22 in Boca Raton, Fla., absentee and/or in-person early voting will have been underway in 49 of 50 states, **with several beginning in the last week in September or first week in October**. Absentee voting began in North Carolina on Sept. 6, and early voting begins here Oct. 18. So it’s hard to understand who Obama and Romney will be talking to during the remainder of these debates, when more than 90 percent of voters have already decided who they’re voting for, and 35 percent of them are expected to cast their ballots early. I'll spread out all my coupons on the floor of my living room as I watch the next debate. I’ve got decisions to make.

#### **Even “undecided” voters are locked-in**

Drummond 10-10 (DJ, “The View from the Topside,” http://wizbangblog.com/2012/10/10/the-view-from-topside/)

With 27 days left in the race, some folks have already voted, many more already know how they plan to vote and won’t be swayed, and some have already decided not to vote, are too late to register, or plan to throw their vote away on the political equivalent of breaking wind just to make a bad odor in public. Jay Cost wrote that no election is decided by October 1, which seems to run against a lot of what has been said and written this year. http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/morning-jay-race-has-just-begun\_653404.html According to Cost, as many as twenty-two percent of voters won’t make their mind up until after October 1, with up to seventeen percent making up their mind in the last week before the election. This tells us that a lot of people will be watching what’s going on and making up their minds on those last, final events. I am a bit skeptical on that last part, though. I do agree that there will be undecideds up to Election day, and because polls push people to at least say who they ‘lean’ towards (which I still call an undecided) I think there are more undecideds than the four-to-seven percent announced in most poll results, but I also think that people know generally where they stand and how they feel about the incumbent and challenger once the general election gets underway; they are undecided mostly because they want their preferred candidate to close the deal. Once they make that decision, they are pretty much locked-in, even if for the sake of appearing reasonable they say they are still deciding. This happens a lot in certain states. What I mean is, people in places like Texas or New York, California or Utah made up their minds pretty early in the race. And the number of true undecideds is pretty low. In Ohio or Florida, though, even if people have decided how they will vote, they may be telling pollsters they aren’t sure, because they recognize that their state might swing the election one way or the other, and so even if they know how they plan to vote, they may back off saying so in public for fear of looking like they decided too quickly.

### Election – 1AR – Plan Happens After Election

#### Congress skipped town – they can’t pass it before the election

RTT News 9-22 (“Senate Passes Government Funding Bill Before Election Break,” http://www.rttnews.com/1970259/senate-passes-government-funding-bill-before-election-break.aspx?type=ts&pageNum=2)

The Congress also leaves a raft of un-passed legislation behind as it adjourns to campaign. President Barack Obama criticized lawmakers for this in his weekly presidential address Saturday, echoing some legislators calls to stay in Washington until all business is finished. "When they skipped town, Members of Congress left a whole bunch of proposals sitting on the table - actions that would create jobs, boost our economy, and strengthen middle-class security," Obama said in his video message. Specifically, Obama mentions four measures left untouched by Congress this year - one creating a veterans' job corps, one to aid farmers effected by this year's drought, one lowering rates for mortgage refinancing and one halting tax increases on small business. "All of these ideas would strengthen our economy and help the middle class right now. All of them are supported by Democrats, Republicans and Independents. There's no reason to wait," Obama added. The funding bill was passed after midnight Friday, after which the Senate adjourned. Legislators will return to Washington after the November elections.

### Election – 1AR – Plan Happens After –A2: Special Sessions

#### Congress can’t make it back in time for special sessions

Rossum 1 (Ralph, \* Salvatori Professor of American Constitutionalism, Claremont McKenna College; Ph.D., University of Chicago, 1973, Dr. Rossum is the Director of the Rose Institute of State and Local Government. He is the co-author of the textbook AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (5th ed. 1999), and author of THE POLITICS OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1978), “California and the Seventeenth Amendment,” Nexus, A Journal of Opinion, Spring, 6 Nexus J. Op. 101, Lexis)

While Gwin and the "Chivalry" Democrats defeated Broderick in 1852, Broderick was far from vanquished. He set his eye on taking Gwin's seat when his term expired in 1855, and, in fact, in 1854, he pursued a bold scheme to secure that seat by catching other likely aspirants off-guard by attempting to force the legislature to elect Gwin's successor more than a year before his term would expire. As Hubert Howe Bancroft wrote: "There was no precedent for an election by a legislature not the last before the expiration of a senatorial term; but Broderick was of the order of men who made precedents." n64 Broderick defended his proposal on several grounds: First, given the distance of California from Washington, and the uncertainties of travel, it might not be possible for a new senator to reach the capital in time for a special session of Congress in case one should be called; second, if the election were left to the next session, the legislature might deadlock, leaving the state with only on senator as it had before; and third; nothing in federal or state law forbid what was proposed. n65 Broderick's scheme, however, failed on a tie vote, thus setting up an intense show-down between the Broderick "Tammany" faction and the Gwin "Chivalry" faction in the 1855 legislature. The result of that showdown was another deadlock; after 38 ballots cast by the legislature in joint session, the legislature adjourned, leaving Gwin's seat in the United States Senate vacant for the next two years.

### Ext – Modernization Now

#### U.S. adversaries are modernizing their arsenals and other nations are proliferating.

**Ferrara**, 4/4/**2012** (Peter – Director of Entitlement and Budget Policy for the Heartland Institute and General Counsel of the American Civil Rights Union, served in the White House Office of Policy development under President Reagan, Obama’s Unilateral Nuclear Disarmament, American Spectator, p. <http://spectator.org/archives/2012/04/04/obamas-unilateral-nuclear-disa>)

Perhaps you do not know that President Obama has asked the Pentagon to develop plans to reduce America's nuclear arsenal by up to 80 percent. That would ultimately leave America with just about 300 nuclear weapons, down from a high of over 31,000 at the height of the Cold War. In 2010, President Obama completed negotiations with Russia for a New Start Treaty, which reduces America's nuclear warheads to 1,550. There were effectively no reductions in Russian weapons in return, because the collapsed Soviet empire was functionally unable to maintain the threatening nuclear arsenal it maintained during the Cold War. President Obama exhibits a very strange lack of recognition of anything that happened during the Reagan years and the 1990s when Republicans gained control of Congress. You can see that in his failure to recognize any of the Reagan economic policies and their astounding success. He acts and talks as if none of that ever happened, perversely returning to the disastrously failed Keynesian economic policies of the 1970s. Similarly, in foreign policy, President Obama acts and talks as if he doesn't know that America under Reagan/Bush won the Cold War without firing a shot, in Margaret Thatcher's celebrated phrase, and the old Soviet power is no more. When he entered office, there were no arms control treaties in effect because the old Soviet Union that was party to START I no longer existed. In this context, reopening and completing New START Treaty negotiations with the surviving Russian Federation raises troubling concerns about President Obama's seemingly eerie state of mind. It is as if, so doggedly pursuing the opposite of everything that Reagan did, he is trying to reopen the Cold War, but this time with the opposite result: America loses. The old Soviet Union cannot easily be put back together. But more troubling for America is that this is no longer a bipolar world. China is a rapidly emerging military power building new, highly advanced nuclear and space weaponry, and a navy that is on course to push American naval forces out of the Western Pacific in a couple of decades, if not sooner. While Newt Gingrich's political opponents ridiculed his proposal for an American moon base by the end of this decade, the Chinese will have one looking down on our food stamp nation within a couple of decades. As Frank Gaffney wrote in the February 22 Washington Times: The Obama Administration continues to assume that the People's Liberation Army has only a few hundred nuclear weapons -- approximately the number to which our commander in chief would like to reduce the American arsenal. A radically different estimate was recently provided, however, in a Georgetown University study led by a former Pentagon strategic forces analyst, Professor Phillip Karber….Mr. Karber's team concluded that, based on the vast infrastructure China has created to conceal its missiles [3,000 miles of hardened tunnels], it may have as many as 3,000 nuclear weapons. Nuclear weaponry is also proliferating to Iran and North Korea, and soon to their rivals as America's nuclear umbrella becomes less and less reliable. That can mean Japan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt, besides Pakistan, which already has nukes that can fall into terrorist hands. And even shrunken Russia recently announced, under its about to be reinstalled President Vladimir Putin, a new $770 billion defense modernization plan with 400 new long range nuclear missiles, quite possibly each one with multiple, independently targeted warheads. This includes modernized ICBMs and submarine launched ballistic missiles. It is all in compliance with President Obama's New Start Treaty

### Ext – Romney Overturns Roe

#### Romney will pack the Court --- that overturns Roe.

**Ingram**, 4/19/**2012** (David, Analysis: A Romney pick for top U.S. court/ Frontrunner emerge, p. http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/19/us-usa-campaign-court-romney-idUSBRE83I18U20120419)

While conservatives caution that talk is mere guesswork, an examination of Romney's record as Massachusetts governor and statements he made on the presidential campaign trail can help shape an early list of frontrunners should he defeat President Barack Obama in the November 6 election, and should he be given the chance to fill a vacancy on the nine-member bench. As a candidate, Romney has pledged to nominate judges in the mold of the Supreme Court's four most conservative justices, and he has said the court should overrule Roe v. Wade, the 1973 opinion that said women have a right to an abortion. Romney formed a committee of lawyers in August 2011 to advise him on court nominations and on legal policy questions led by prominent conservatives such as Robert Bork, whose conservative views led Democrats to block his 1987 nomination to the court. The campaign declined to comment on potential nominees. CLEMENT A FAVORITE Paul Clement, who served as U.S. solicitor general under President George W. Bush and is now a lawyer in private practice, is the favorite of many conservatives. Clement argued last month for the Supreme Court to strike down Obama's 2010 healthcare law, and he is defending laws that ban same-sex marriage and that target illegal immigrants.

#### Romney will push the Court in a conservative direction --- undermines abortion policies.

**Bouie**, 9/2/**2012** (Jamelle – staff writer at the American Prospect and Knobler fellow for The Nation Institute, Yes, we must, New York Daily News, p. <http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/yes-article-1.1149351>)

If elected President, we have every reason to think that Mitt Romney will try to implement these promises, especially since he’ll be pushed in that direction by right-wing congressional Republicans, who will insist they’ve won a mandate for “reform.” And this is to say nothing of the GOP’s Draconian positions on abortion and immigration, which would find currency in a Romney White House and serve as litmus tests for future Supreme Court nominees and federal judges.

### Abortion Bad – Modeling 2NC

#### Supreme Court rulings on Roe are modeled.

**Ernst**, April **2004** (Julia – lawyer for the Center for Reproductive Rights, 6 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 752, p. Lexis)

Since 1973, over forty countries have adopted abortion laws that permit abortion under most circumstances, and this trend continues to this day. 37 Abortion law reform has been justified on numerous grounds, including women's health, demographic considerations, and reproductive rights. In a few countries that share the United States' common law legal tradition, the reasoning of Roe has been asserted to support legalization of abortion. Roe's influence is most evident in the 1988 Canadian Supreme Court decision of R. v. Morgentaler. 38 In this case, doctors charged under a restrictive abortion provision challenged the legitimacy of that law under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 39 The majority ruled that "forcing a woman, by threat of criminal sanction, to carry a foetus to term unless she meets certain criteria unrelated to her own priorities and aspirations, is a profound interference with a woman's body and thus a violation of security of the person." 40 In a concurring opinion, Justice Wilson referred explicitly to Roe and the line of Supreme Court cases reaffirming that decision. Wilson stated: In my opinion, the respect for individual decision-making in matters of fundamental personal importance reflected in the American jurisprudence also informs the Canadian Charter. Indeed, as the Chief Justice [\*761] pointed out in R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., beliefs about human worth and dignity "are the sine qua non of the political tradition underlying the Charter". I would conclude, therefore, that the right to liberty contained in s. 7 guarantees to every individual a degree of personal autonomy over important decisions intimately affecting their private lives. 41 The reasoning of Roe and Morgentaler resonate in the approach to abortion taken in post-apartheid South Africa. South Africa's Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act, enacted in 1996, is one of the world's most liberal abortion laws, making abortion legal at a woman's request during the first twelve weeks of pregnancy. 42 The abortion law reflects principles stated in the South African constitution, also adopted in 1996, which provides in Section 12 that "everyone has the right to bodily and psychological integrity, which includes the right ... to make decisions concerning reproduction." 43 The constitution has thus explicitly incorporated principles of autonomy in reproductive decision making into broader notions of individual liberty. Evidence of Roe's reach in South African jurisprudence is found in a decision of the High Court of Pretoria, which turned to Roe to respond to a constitutional challenge brought in 1998 against the nation's abortion law. 44 In ruling on the question of whether a fetus has protected constitutional rights, the court commented, "In its landmark ruling in Roe v. Wade the United States Supreme Court held that a foetus is not a "person' within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment and accordingly does not enjoy a constitutional right to life." 45 By grounding the right to choose abortion in principles of privacy and individual liberty, the United States Supreme Court contributed to a conceptual framework that could be applied by courts of other nations. Roe's influence as a potential jurisprudential model can also be measured in the reactions of governments that oppose reproductive choice. The evident power of a constitutional approach to ensuring abortion's legality has prompted the imposition of constitutional protections for "unborn life" in some countries, particularly those where politicians are most influenced by the official position of the Catholic Church. For example, fears in Ireland that the supreme court of that country would adopt the reasoning of Roe prompted a 1983 referendum that resulted in a constitutional protection for the right to life of the fetus. 46 With a similar motivation, the Philippine [\*762] government included in the 1986 constitution a provision requiring the state to "equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception." 47 Roe's impact in the political processes of other countries may be somewhat more subtle and less apparent than its influence on courts. However, it has contributed to a general trend - one that continues, albeit with signs of a conservative countertrend - of liberalization of abortion laws by governments throughout the world. Today, over 60% of the world's population lives in the sixty-six countries that permit abortion without restriction as to reason or on broad grounds. 48 While the speed of abortion law liberalization has slowed in recent years, we are continuing to see dramatic changes in national abortion policies, with reforms aimed at making abortion more available to women. For example, in 2002, Nepal and Switzerland made abortion available at a woman's request during the first twelve weeks of pregnancy. 49 Nepal's recent shift from absolutely prohibiting abortion to removing most restrictions during the first three months of pregnancy is a particularly striking example of the continued force of abortion reform movements around the world. These liberalizations have coincided with the imposition of incremental infringements upon choice in other countries. In recent years, two countries, El Salvador and Chile, removed narrow therapeutic exceptions to their abortion bans in favor of absolute prohibitions of the procedure, even prohibiting abortions to save the life of a woman. 50 In addition, the adoption of anti-choice constitutional amendments has continued in Latin America in such countries as El Salvador and Guatemala. 51 Eastern and Central Europe is also under the sway of an increasingly powerful anti-choice movement, fueled by a post-Communist rush of religious fundamentalism and nationalism. 52 [\*763] While these conservative inroads have not yet challenged the clear trend toward abortion law liberalization worldwide, they are troubling reminders of the fragility of the advances women have made in the area of reproductive rights thus far, and parallel the threat to Roe that is currently being leveled within the United States.

#### Abortions collapse Russian population growth.

**Wattenberg 2004** (Ben – senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, Fewer: How the New Demography of Depopulation Will Shape Our Future, p. 34-35)

Eberstadt sees Russia as a broken nation, a demographic basket case, losing population by nearly a million people each year, with a TFR of 1.14, one of the lowest in the world, slated to lose about 30 percent of its population by 2050 according to UN projections, and with an age-standardized death rate among men almost 40 percent higher today than in the 196os, according to Moscow's official figures. (The female death rate is also up, but by much less.) For Russian men, life expectancy dropped by about four years during this time. Moreover, the high mortality rates are concentrated among men of working age (age 2.0-64), likely making future economic growth more difficult, according to Eberstadt. The demographer Murray Feshbach of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars notes that 50 to 60 percent of Russian children suffer from a chronic illness. Abortion rates (used as a very common means of contraception in Russia) are very high, and approximately 10 to 20 percent of Russian women become infertile after abortions.

#### Population decline sparks a Chinese land grab and Russian nationalism – turns Russia war

**Intelligence Watch Report**, 2/23/**2007** (Funding to Tackle Russia's Population Decline, p. http://www.janes.com/security/international\_security/news/iwr/iwr070223\_1\_n.shtml)

The Ministry of Health announced that it had set aside almost USD3 billion for a five-year period to deal with the growing crisis of Russia's population decline. Alongside the obvious social problems this crisis is causing, it is also producing a number of serious security concerns. The decreasing pool of recruits for the armed forces is causing unease about Russia's future ability to meet its military manpower needs. Fears among certain sections of society of Russia being overrun by non-ethnic immigrants is also seen as a key driver behind the growing problem of violent extremist nationalism across the country. This is seen most seriously in Russia's Far East region, where the severely declining population and high rates of Chinese immigration have created long-term strategic concern in Moscow of the Chinese dominating a significant portion of Russia's territory.

## 1AC v. Cal IP

#### Same as Kentucky

## 2AC v. Cal IP

### T – Restrictions – 2AC

#### We meet – we reduce access restrictions on OCS lands – the plan text specifies this

#### That’s what the restrictions are

Hartley and Medlock 7 (Dr. Peter, Professor of Economics – Rice University, Rice Scholar – Baker Institute for Public Policy, and Dr. Kenneth B., Fellow in Energy Policy – Baker Institute for Public Policy, Adjunct Assistant Professor of Economics – Rice University, “North American Security of Natural Gas Supply in a Global Market,” James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, November, <http://www.bakerinstitute.org/programs/energy-forum/publications/energy-studies/docs/natgas/ng_security-nov07.pdf>)

Access restrictions in the United States are in place due to explicit federal prohibition of drilling in environmentally sensitive areas or burdensome conditions required to secure drilling permits in other areas. In this section, we discuss the nature of such restrictions in the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) and the Rocky Mountain region (RMR), and the quantity of resources that are effectively off-limits. Figure 1 and Table 1 illustrate the geographic extent, with the exception of Alaska, and the quantity of resources that are effectively stranded. It is these quantities that we either include or remove from consideration in the scenario analyses outlined below.

#### We meet – removing the restrictions is a financial incentive for companies to drill for natural gas

#### Counter interpretation – Reduce means to rescind and revoke

OED 89 (Oxford English Dictionary, “Reduce,” Volume 13, p. 433)

23. Sc. Law. To rescind, revoke, annul.

#### **Natural gas r**estrictions prevent energy production

NaturalGas.org, no date (NaturalGas.org, “Natural Gas Supply,” http://www.naturalgas.org/business/analysis.asp)  
The production of natural gas in the United States is based on competitive market forces: inadequate supply at any one time leads to price increases, which signal to production companies the need to increase the supply of natural gas to the market. Supplying natural gas in the United States in order to meet this demand, however, is dependent on a number of factors. These factors may be broken down into two segments: general barriers to increasing supply, and those factors that affect the short term supply scenario. Short Term Supply Barriers In a perfect world, price signals would be recognized and acted upon immediately, and there would be little lag time between increased demand for natural gas, and an increase in supplies reaching the market. However, in reality, this lag time does exist. There are several barriers to immediate supply increases which affect the short term availability of natural gas supply. They include: Availability of Skilled Workers - The need to train and hire skilled workers results in lag times between times of increased demand and an increase in production. For example, from 1991 to 1999, a prolonged period of relatively low prices indicated adequate supplies of natural gas existed, and the exploration and production industry contracted in response. During this period, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics recorded a 26 percent average decrease in employment in the oil and gas extraction industry. Some of these workers left the industry altogether rather than remain unemployed. When production companies began to react to higher prices in late 1999, the need to find and train skilled workers contributed to a slower increase in activity than would have been the case if skilled workers were plentiful. To counter this problem, many production companies offer increasingly high wages, as well as scholarships and educational contributions to attract professionals to the industry. Availability of Equipment - Drilling rigs are very expensive pieces of equipment. Price volatility in the industry makes it very difficult for producers, as well as production equipment suppliers, to plan the construction and placement of drilling rigs far in advance. Prolonged periods of low prices results in reduction of the number of available rigs. When prices respond to increase demand, and drilling activity increases, time is required to build and place an adequate number of drilling rigs. For this reason, drilling rig counts are a good indication of the status of the oil and natural gas production industry. As can be seen in the graph, an increase in operational rigs lags behind period of high prices. For more information on rig counts, click here. Permitting and Well Development - Before a natural gas well actually begins producing, there are several time consuming procedures and development activities that must take place. In order to begin drilling, exploration activities must take place to pinpoint the location of natural gas reserves. Once a suitable field has been located, production companies must receive the required approval from the landowner (which in many cases is the government) to install drilling equipment and begin to drill the well. The Bureau of Land Management is responsible for issuing permits for onshore development, and the Minerals Management Service is responsible for offshore development areas. Once drilling is completed, extraction and field processing equipment must be set up, as well as gathering systems. In all, the between the location of natural gas deposits and the beginning of production can range from as little as a few months to as much as ten years. Weather and Delivery Disruptions - Although unrelated to natural gas prices or demand increases and decreases, weather patterns and anomalies can have a significant impact on natural gas production. For example, hurricanes can have an impact on the offshore production of natural gas, as safety measures require the temporary shut down of offshore drilling and production platforms. In addition, while the safety record of the natural gas industry is extremely good, malfunctions and accidents may occur from time to time that disrupt the delivery of natural gas. For example, a compressor malfunction in a large pipeline serving a major hub could temporarily disrupt the flow of natural gas through that important market center. While the effects of weather and delivery disruptions are most often of short duration, they can still have an effect on the expeditious production of natural gas. General Barriers to Increasing Supply In addition to the short term impediments to increasing natural gas supply, there exist other more general barriers to the increased supply of natural gas in the United States. These include: Land Access - The U.S. government owns more than 29 percent of all the land in the country, and an estimated 40 percent of undiscovered natural gas exists on this land. In several areas, the government has restricted access to federal lands. 59 percent of undiscovered gas resources are on federal lands and offshore waters. Outside of the western Gulf of Mexico, production companies are prohibited access to virtually all federal lands offshore the Lower 48 states. About 9 percent of resource-bearing land in the Rockies is also off limits, and access to another 32 percent is significantly restricted. The National Petroleum Council in 1999 estimated that 213 Tcf of natural gas exists in areas under federal access restrictions. This restriction is the result of presidential and congressional leasing moratoria, and affects the amount of natural gas resources that may be extracted to increase supply. Pipeline Infrastructure - The ability to transport natural gas from producing regions to consumption regions also affects the availability of supplies to the marketplace. The interstate and intrastate pipeline infrastructure can only transport so much natural gas at any one time, and in essence provides a 'ceiling' for the amount of natural gas that can reach the market. Although the current pipeline infrastructure is significant, with the EIA estimating daily delivery capacity of the pipeline grid to be 119 Bcf. However, natural gas pipeline companies must continue to continually expand the pipeline infrastructure in order to meet growing demand. To learn more about the natural gas pipeline infrastructure in the United States, click here. The Financial Environment - Exploring for and producing natural gas is a very capital intensive endeavor. In fact, the National Petroleum Council estimated in 1999 that production companies will have to invest $1.44 trillion in capital between 1999 and 2015 in order to keep pace with demand growth. This puts significant pressures on production companies, particularly small, privately owned firms, to raise the capital necessary to increase production. While efficient and transparent financial markets in the U.S. do offer options for raising capital effectively, the rate at which production companies may do so can serve as a limiting factor in the increasing availability of supplies reaching the market.

#### Energy production is the extraction or capture of energy from natural sources

DOCC 8 (Australian Government’s Department of Climate Change, “National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Guidelines,” http://www.climatechange.gov.au/government/initiatives/~/media/publications/greenhouse-report/nger-reporting-guidelines.ashx)

Energy Production

‘Energy production’ is defined in r. 2.23:

Production of energy, in relation to a facility, means any one of the following:

a. the extraction or capture of energy from natural sources for final consumption by or from the operation of the facility or for use other than in operation of the facility; 11

b. the manufacture of energy by the conversion of energy from one form to another form for final consumption by

or from the operation of the facility or for use other than in the operation of the facility.

Energy consumption

‘Energy consumption’ is defined in r. 2.23:

Consumption of energy, in relation to a facility, means the use or disposal of energy from the operation of the

facility including own-use and losses in extraction, production and transmission.

#### Prefer it –

#### They over-limit - the most common forms of restrictions are legislation and agency based – our aff involves both and is at the core of the topic – they make it impossible to be aff – most affs deal with legislative and congressional restrictions

#### Competing interpretations are bad – causes a race to the bottom – they will always find a way to exclude the aff. Default to reasonability – we don’t make the topic unmanageable

### 2ac- Arctic

#### Absent US leadership—Arctic conflicts will escalate

**Borgerson 08**

International Affairs Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations [Scott, March/April<http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080301faessay87206/scott-g-borgerson/arctic-meltdown.html>]

Washington cannot afford to stand idly by. The Arctic region is not currently governed by any comprehensive multilateral norms and regulations because it was never expected to become a navigable waterway or a site for large-scale commercial development. Decisions made by Arctic powers in the coming years will therefore profoundly shape the future of the region for decades. Without U.S. leadership to help develop diplomatic solutions to competing claims and potential conflicts, the region could erupt in an armed mad dash for its resources.

#### Goes Nuclear

**Smith 10**

[Michael Wallace Smith, Professor Emeritus at the University of British Columbia and Steven Staples, President of the Rideau Institute in Ottawa. “Ridding the Arctic of Nuclear Weapons: A Task Long Overdue”. March 2010. Canadian Pugwash Group. http://www.arcticsecurity.org/docs/arctic-nuclear-report-web.pdf]

Jayantha Dhanapala, President of Pugwash and former UN under-secretary for disarmament affairs, summarized the situation bluntly: “From those in the international peace and security sector, deep concerns are being expressed over the fact that two nuclear weapon states – the United States and the Russian Federation, which together own 95 per cent of the nuclear weapons in the world – converge on the Arctic and have competing claims. These claims, together with those of other allied NATO countries – Canada, Denmark, Iceland, and Norway – could, if unresolved, lead to conflict escalating into the threat or use of nuclear weapons.” 61 Many will no doubt argue that this is excessively alarmist, but no circumstance in which nuclear powers find themselves in military confrontation can be taken lightly.

### 2ac- Middle East

#### Hegemony key to prevent WMD conflict in the Middle East

Lesser 98 [Ian Lesser, Senior Political Scientist at RAND, Sources of Conflict in the 21st Century, p. 214]

Finally, **the** **most important extraregional variable for the future of regional security will be the U**nited **S**tates itself. Our analysis highlights the enduring nature of U.S. interests in the Middle East. The level and character of our engagement and presence, and our capacity for power projection in times of crisis, will be dominant elements in the regional security equation for the foreseeable future. The influence of the United States on the strategic environment across the region under current conditions **cannot be overemphasized**. American withdrawal—the end of America’s role as preeminent security guarantor—could transform the security picture in profound terms and could affect the propensity for conflict and cooperation far beyond the region, as other extraregional actors move to fill the strategic vacuum. One of the many potentially disastrous **consequences of U.S. withdrawal might be the much more rapid spread of w**eapons of **m**ass **d**estruction as regional powers strive to substitute for American deterrence or capitalize on their newfound freedom of action

#### The impact is global nuclear war

Steinbach 2 [John, Center for Research on Globalization, March 3, <http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/STE203A.html>]

Meanwhile, the existence of an arsenal of mass destruction in such an unstable region in turn has serious implications for future arms control and disarmament negotiations, and even the threat of nuclear war. Seymour Hersh warns, "Should war break out in the Middle East again,... or should any Arab nation fire missiles against Israel, as the Iraqis did, **a** nuclear escalation, once unthinkable except as a last resort, **would** now **be a strong probability**."(41) and Ezar Weissman, Israel's current President said "The **nuclear issue is gaining momentum(and the)** **next war will not be conventional**."(42) Russia and before it the Soviet Union has long been a major(if not the major) target of Israeli nukes. It is widely reported that the principal purpose of Jonathan Pollard's spying for Israel was to furnish satellite images of Soviet targets and other super sensitive data relating to U.S. nuclear targeting strategy. (43) (Since launching its own satellite in 1988, Israel no longer needs U.S. spy secrets.) Israeli nukes aimed at the Russian heartland seriously complicate disarmament and arms control negotiations and, at the very least, the unilateral possession of nuclear weapons by Israel is enormously destabilizing, and dramatically lowers the threshold for their actual use, if not for all out nuclear war. In the words of Mark Gaffney, "... if the familar pattern(Israel refining its weapons of mass destruction with U.S. complicity) is not reversed soon- for whatever reason- the deepening **Middle East conflict could trigger a** world conflagration." (44)

### Waiver/Guidelines CP – 2AC

#### Reducing restrictions can mean not enforcing them

Berger 1 Justice Opinion, INDUSTRIAL RENTALS, INC., ISAAC BUDOVITCH and FLORENCE BUDOVITCH, Appellants Below, Appellants, v. NEW CASTLE COUNTY BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT and NEW CASTLE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF LAND USE, Appellees Below, Appellees. No. 233, 2000SUPREME COURT OF DELAWARE776 A.2d 528; 2001 Del. LEXIS 300April 10, 2001, Submitted July 17, 2001, Decided lexis

We disagree. Statutes must be read as a whole and all the words must be given effect. 3 The word "restriction" means "a limitation (esp. in a deed) placed on the use or enjoyment of property." 4 If a deed restriction has been satisfied, and no longer limits the use or enjoyment of the property, then it no longer is a deed restriction -- even though the paper on which it was written remains. [\*\*6] Thus, the phrase "projects containing deed restrictions requiring phasing…," in Section 11.130(A)(7) means presently existing deed restrictions. As of June 1988, the Acierno/Marta Declaration contained no remaining deed restrictions requiring phasing to coincide with improvements to the transportation system. As a result, the Acierno/Marta projects should not have been included in the scope of the Budovitches' TIS.

#### The CP is functionally the same – calling it a “non-legislative” rule is just a name change

NAHB 11 (National Association of Home Builders, “Recommendations for ‘Improving EPA Regulations’,” NAHB Regulatory Affairs, 4-1, http://homebuyertaxcreditusa.net/fileUpload\_details.aspx?contentID=171584)

Over time, the agencies have used a variety of mechanisms to inform the public and to provide direction to their staffs, including interpretative rules, guidance documents, policy statements, manuals, circulars and memoranda. While these **“non-legislative” rules** can be useful in interpreting laws, highlighting how a mandate might be enforced, and are not meant to have binding legal effect, as a practical matter they often do, because **they have all the constraining power of the law**. Such rules create a real concern for the regulated community because not only do they add new regulatory requirements, they often are exempt from notice and comment by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) as either “interpretive rules” or “general statements of policy.” As such, the agencies are strongly urged to curtail the use of “non-legislative rules.” In an effort to avoid the APA requirements, agencies often issue guidance documents that they claim are non-binding, non-final agency actions, but which are actually “for all practical purposes ‘binding,’” like a final agency rule. 53 For example, EPA issued the guidance document “Urban Stormwater Approach for the Mid-Atlantic Region and the Chesapeake Bay Watershed,” which could lead Municipal Separate Storm Sewer Systems (MS4s) and state permitting authorities to believe that EPA will deem invalid any permit that includes the word “practicable.” Aside from running counter to the Clean Water Act’s requirement that MS4s “reduce the discharge of pollutants to the maximum extent practicable,” 54 the guidance document suggests that it is binding for all practical purposes. In that sense, these types of guidance documents are arguably subject to the APA’s notice and comment requirements and the EPA has violated those statutory requirements many times over by issuing voluminous amounts of guidance. 55 Similarly, OSHA issued what it calls its “Multi-Employer Citation Policy,” through which OSHA inspectors are instructed to issue hazard citations to employers on the jobsite even if their own employees are not at risk and even if they did not create the alleged hazard. 56 Because the Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) Act governs the employer-employee relationship and only applies to an employer and his or her employees, this policy effectively expands the employers’ responsibilities, but does so without notice and comment and with no opportunity for judicial 53 review. The policy is a legislative rule and it should have gone through the notice and comment procedures required by the OSH Act and the APA. 57 While some guidance is akin to rulemaking, some is issued to instruct or inform the public about agency procedures, and some is directed to agency employees. The guidance or policy memoranda tell agency employees what to do in various circumstances. Assuming the staff obey the documents, the public will be unable to get their permits, licenses, approvals, or whatever they seek from the agency until the staff are convinced the guidance has been satisfied. Though the guidance in this instance seems less like policy and more like administration, consequences can flow to the public just as if the instructions had come through a rule. In these instances, the mandatory nature of the guidance results in regulatory consequences to the public. For example, the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) has advised people living in the range of the endangered Quino Checkerspot Butterfly that they should survey – under a specified protocol – their property for the presence of the butterfly before applying for an Incidental Take Permit. At no time did FWS say that permits were conditioned on performing the specified survey, nor did FWS say it would not issue a permit unless the survey protocol was followed. However, there is no indication that FWS has ever accepted a survey that did not follow the protocol. Clearly, this purported guidance is not advice; it is a fiat. An applicant **must follow the prescribed protocol** or relinquish any chance of getting a permit. Similarly, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps), in administering the Clean Water Act §404 wetlands permitting program, creates Regulatory Guidance Letters to advise permittees about the program. 58 The Corps claims the letters “are used only to interpret or clarify existing regulatory program policy,” but it admits **the letters are mandatory** in the Corps’ district offices. 59 Further amplifying the fact that the guidance is a de facto regulation, the Corps states that it “incorporates most of the guidance provided by RGL’s (sic) whenever it revises its permit regulations.” 60 Therefore, the “guidance” must have been mandatory all along; incorporating the terms into regulations is merely a name change.

#### **No solvency –**

#### Exemptions fail – potential changes in natural gas policy deter investment – empirically proven

Pierce Jr. 4 (Richard – George W. Hutchison Professor of Energy Law, Southern Methodist University; B.S., 1965. Lehigh University; J.D., 1972, University of Virginia., “Reconstituting the Natural Gas Industry from Wellhead to Burnertip”, 2004, 25 Energy L. J. 57, lexis)

Within days of the enactment of the PIFUA, the DOE announced the existence of a national gas surplus. n146 A few months later, the DOE and Congress viewed with alarm the Iranian revolution and its effects on the supply [\*89] and price of oil. It became universally apparent that Congress had acted on the basis of a serious misunderstanding of energy markets in 1978, and that full enforcement of the PIFUA would have the disastrous effect of shifting a substantial portion of the demand for gas to imported oil. n147 Congress tacitly acquiesced in the DOE's decision to attempt to nullify the PIFUA administratively. The DOE began to issue exemptions from the gas to oil provisions of the PIFUA to anyone who applied. n148 Still, the statute reduced the demand for gas and increased the demand for oil. The process of obtaining a PIFUA exemption required time and money. n149 Moreover, firms were reluctant to invest in combustion equipment designed to burn gas knowing that the DOE could render the investment worthless at any time by beginning to enforce the PIFUA. In 1981, Congress amended the PIFUA by deleting the automatic limitations and prohibitions on gas use in preexisting combustion equipment, but retained the prohibitions on gas use in new equipment and on construction of new equipment designed to burn gas. n151 After nine years of gas surplus, Congress eliminated the artificial constraints on gas demand it imposed in 1978. This is another critical step in the process of eliminating regulatory distortion and creating a competitive gas sales market. For the first time in nine years, electric utilities and industrial consumers are free to build gas fired plants when they determine that to be the most efficient means of producing their products. Over the next decade, gas demand will increase as consumers react to their new-found freedom.

#### Destroys solvency – no investment occurs

MarEx 11 (Maritime Executive , “Gas-Only Drilling in Offshore Moratorium Areas Suggested”, 1/19, http://www.maritime-executive.com/article/2005-10-20gas-only-drilling-in-offshore-moratori)

Oil and gas industry groups are criticizing a provision in House offshore drilling legislation that would allow the government to offer "natural gas-only" leases in areas that are currently off-limits to new production. The criticism is included in wider comments by petroleum producers to the Minerals Management Service (MMS), which has begun collecting public comments as it begins preparing an outer continental shelf leasing plan for 2007-2012. MMS asked for comment on the gas-only concept. Gas-only leasing was included in a bill by House Resources Committee Chairman Richard Pombo (R-CA.) that allows states to "opt-out" of offshore leasing bans. States exercising the option could allow gas-only leasing, or oil and gas leasing. Senate legislation by Senator Lamar Alexander (R-TN.) -- and supported by chemical companies and other industries that rely on the costly fuel -- also accepts the idea. However, the American Petroleum Institute (API), in comments this week to MMS, says gas-only and gas-preference leasing would offer the "false promise" of future supplies**.** The group says the concept would create uncertainties that could dampen investment, since it is impossible to predict with certainty what types of resources will be in an area. "A company might spend up to $80 million to buy a lease, conduct seismic testing, obtain the necessary permits, and drill a well(s) to determine whether any resources are present in amounts that make the prospect economic," the group says. "A company is unlikely to know if it had met the gas only or gas preference requirement until the capital investment had been made. Companies will be reluctant to spend tens of millions of dollars to explore for and develop a prospect, only to be forced to abandon the resource, stranding substantial investments."

#### Exemptions fail – don’t commit an agency to the standards

Rossi 95 (Jim, Professor of Law – Vanderbilt University, “Making Policy through the Waiver of Regulations at the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,” Administrative Law Review, 47 Admin. L. Rev. 260, Hein Online)

First, it would be preferable for FERC to promulgate its waiver standards by rule, rather than develop these standards in adjudicative proceedings.'98 Rule- making would allow a variety of interests to focus on the reasonableness of FERC's waiver policies and would bring the policies to the political forefront. Thus, promulgating waiver standards by rule and applying them through an adjudicative exceptions process would increase the transparency of FERC's PURPA regulations, as well as their accountability to the community at large. Absent formal or informal rulemaking, FERC might consider announcing its waiver policies by general policy statement or guidelines, as the EPA has done.99 It is doubtful that such policy statements or guidelines, absent a clear intent to bind the agency, would commit the agency to the standards they articulate,200 or that they would guarantee participation in their formulation; however, guide- lines would provide a more transparent articulation of the substantive nature of available waivers than does the present process.

#### Perm – do both

#### Link to politics – all agencies are tied to Obama

**Nicholas and Hook 10** (Peter and Janet, Staff Writers – LA Times, “Obama the Velcro president”, LA Times, 7-30, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jul/30/nation/la-na-velcro-presidency-20100730/3)

If Ronald Reagan was the classic Teflon president, Barack Obama is made of Velcro. Through two terms, Reagan eluded much of the responsibility for recession and foreign policy scandal. In less than two years, Obama has become ensnared in blame. Hoping to better insulate Obama, White House aides have sought to give other Cabinet officials a higher profile and additional public exposure. They are also crafting new ways to explain the president's policies to a skeptical public. But Obama remains the colossus of his administration — to a point where trouble anywhere in the world is often his to solve. The president is on the hook to repair the Gulf Coast oil spill disaster, stabilize Afghanistan, help fix Greece's ailing economy and do right by Shirley Sherrod, the Agriculture Department official fired as a result of a misleading fragment of videotape. What's not sticking to Obama is a legislative track record that his recent predecessors might envy. Political dividends from passage of a healthcare overhaul or a financial regulatory bill have been fleeting. Instead, voters are measuring his presidency by a more immediate yardstick: Is he creating enough jobs? So far the verdict is no, and that has taken a toll on Obama's approval ratings. Only 46% approve of Obama's job performance, compared with 47% who disapprove, according to Gallup's daily tracking poll. "I think the accomplishments are very significant, but I think most people would look at this and say, 'What was the plan for jobs?' " said Sen. Byron L. Dorgan (D-N.D.). "The agenda he's pushed here has been a very important agenda, but it hasn't translated into dinner table conversations." Reagan was able to glide past controversies with his popularity largely intact. He maintained his affable persona as a small-government advocate while seeming above the fray in his own administration. Reagan was untarnished by such calamities as the 1983 terrorist bombing of the Marines stationed in Beirut and scandals involving members of his administration. In the 1986 Iran-Contra affair, most of the blame fell on lieutenants. Obama lately has tried to rip off the Velcro veneer. In a revealing moment during the oil spill crisis, he reminded Americans that his powers aren't "limitless." He told residents in Grand Isle, La., that he is a flesh-and-blood president, not a comic-book superhero able to dive to the bottom of the sea and plug the hole. "I can't suck it up with a straw," he said. But as a candidate in 2008, he set sky-high expectations about what he could achieve and what government could accomplish. Clinching the Democratic nomination two years ago, Obama described the moment as an epic breakthrough when "we began to provide care for the sick and good jobs to the jobless" and "when the rise of the oceans began to slow and our planet began to heal." Those towering goals remain a long way off. And most people would have preferred to see Obama focus more narrowly on the "good jobs" part of the promise. A recent Gallup poll showed that 53% of the population rated unemployment and the economy as the nation's most important problem. By contrast, only 7% cited healthcare — a single-minded focus of the White House for a full year. At every turn, Obama makes the argument that he has improved lives in concrete ways. Without the steps he took, he says, the economy would be in worse shape and more people would be out of work. There's evidence to support that. Two economists, Mark Zandi and Alan Blinder, reported recently that without the stimulus and other measures, gross domestic product would be about 6.5% lower. Yet, Americans aren't apt to cheer when something bad doesn't materialize. Unemployment has been rising — from 7.7% when Obama took office, to 9.5%. Last month, more than 2 million homes in the U.S. were in various stages of foreclosure — up from 1.7 million when Obama was sworn in. "Folks just aren't in a mood to hand out gold stars when unemployment is hovering around 10%," said Paul Begala, a Democratic pundit. Insulating the president from bad news has proved impossible. Other White Houses have tried doing so with more success. Reagan's Cabinet officials often took the blame, shielding the boss. But the Obama administration is about one man. Obama is the White House's chief spokesman, policy pitchman, fundraiser and negotiator. No Cabinet secretary has emerged as an adequate surrogate. Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner is seen as a tepid public speaker; Energy Secretary Steven Chu is prone to long, wonky digressions and has rarely gone before the cameras during an oil spill crisis that he is working to end. So, more falls to Obama, reinforcing the Velcro effect: Everything sticks to him. He has opined on virtually everything in the hundreds of public statements he has made: nuclear arms treaties, basketball star LeBron James' career plans; Chelsea Clinton's wedding. Few audiences are off-limits. On Wednesday, he taped a spot on ABC's "The View," drawing a rebuke from Democratic Pennsylvania Gov. Edward G. Rendell, who deemed the appearance unworthy of the presidency during tough times. "Stylistically he creates some of those problems," Eddie Mahe, a Republican political strategist, said in an interview. "His favorite pronoun is 'I.' When you position yourself as being all things to all people, the ultimate controller and decision maker with the capacity to fix anything, you set yourself up to be blamed when it doesn't get fixed or things happen." A new White House strategy is to forgo talk of big policy changes that are easy to ridicule. Instead, aides want to market policies as more digestible pieces. So, rather than tout the healthcare package as a whole, advisors will talk about smaller parts that may be more appealing and understandable — such as barring insurers from denying coverage based on preexisting conditions. But at this stage, it may be late in the game to downsize either the president or his agenda. Sen. Richard J. Durbin (D-Ill.) said: "The man came in promising change. He has a higher profile than some presidents because of his youth, his race and the way he came to the White House with the message he brought in. It's naive to believe he can step back and have some Cabinet secretary be the face of the oil spill. The buck stops with his office."

#### Court strikes down agency rulemaking – it’s a new rule that changes law

Breer and Anderson No Date (Charles A. - practices in oil and gas, coal, public lands, and Native American matters, both as a counselor and litigator, Former law clerk for Chief Justice Richard Macy of the Wyoming Supreme Court, and Scot W. – Trustee of the Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation, “REGULATION WITHOUT RULEMAKING: THE FORCE AND AUTHORITY OF INFORMAL AGENCY ACTION, http://www.dgslaw.com/images/materials/379427.PDF)

The Fifth Circuit has applied the principles of Alaska Hunters in the context of a natural resources dispute. In Shell Offshore, Inc. v. Babbitt,80 Shell Offshore challenged an attempt by the Minerals Management Service (MMS) to disallow calculation of transportation costs for royalty purposes using a FERC tariff rate. MMS regulations allowed royalty payors to use “approved” FERC tariffs when calculating transportation costs.81 MMS had accepted any rate filed with FERC as an “approved” rate, and had included tariffs for pipelines for production from the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS).82 MMS came to doubt FERC’s jurisdiction over OCS pipelines, and therefore denied Shell’s request for approval of its royalty payment calculation. MMS sent a “Dear Payor” letter to Shell requiring Shell to petition FERC to determine the scope of FERC’s jurisdiction over the offshore pipeline.83 As in Alaska Hunters, the rule at issue was not an original interpretation of a regulation, but rather a proposed change in the interpretation of the regulation. As the court noted, “If Interior had, from the beginning, interpreted their regulation as requiring an affirmation of FERC jurisdiction, their interpretation of their own regulation would be entitled to substantial deference. However, Interior changed their policy . . . .”84 As the court posed the question, “can Interior switch from one consistently followed permissible interpretation to a new one without providing an opportunity for notice and comment?”85 Citing Alaska Hunters, the court held that Interior could not. Even though the MMS interpretation, like that of the FAA in Alaska Hunters, had never been written down or officially published, the court found that the long standing interpretation created a substantial rule applicable to offshore lessees. The proposed new interpretation “as a practical matter” enacted a new substantive rule, and therefore required the opportunity for notice and comment.86 “Interior’s new practice may be a reasonable change in its oversight practices and procedures, but it places a new and substantial requirement on many OCS lessees, was a significant departure from long established and consistent past practice, and should have been submitted for notice and comment before adoption.”87 Shell and other OCS lessees are therefore entitled to rely on the existing policy until the new policy is promulgated by MMS through notice and comment rulemaking. It is important that the previous interpretation be definitive. If the interpretation is “ambiguous and incomplete,” it will not trigger the requirements of Alaska Hunters.88 [2] Judicial Review Of Informal Agency Action Should an agency deny a permit, or initiate an enforcement action, based on a guidance document or policy statement, the affected party may want a judge to review the agency’s action. Generally, an agency action is capable of judicial review only when it is final and justiciable. Justiciability is comprised of three subcategories or tests: standing, ripeness, and exhaustion of administrative remedies.89 When the agency has published a final rule after notice and comment rulemaking, judicial review is typically available to those that participated in the rulemaking process. It can be a bit more difficult to determine whether a less formal agency action, such as

the issuance of a policy or guidance document is reviewable.

### Agenda Politics – Obama Good – 2AC

#### Case outweighs –

#### -- Won’t Pass –

#### Romney will win --- he has momentum.

**Bennett**, **10/25**/2012 (William – a CNN contributor, security of education from 1985 to 1988, director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy under President George H. W. Bush, Romney’s momentum can help him win, CNN, p. http://www.cnn.com/2012/10/24/opinion/bennett-final-debate/index.html)

Perhaps foreshadowing the last two weeks of the presidential race, Romney used the debate to move to the center. He emphasized peace and diplomacy and avoided at all costs any hint of sending U.S. forces to future wars. Romney also looked and acted presidential. He had a steady, levelheaded confidence and avoided any snarky, patronizing "horses and bayonets" moments. Obama used the final debate to go to the left and energize his base, attacking Romney at any opportunity while throwing in comments about teachers and classroom size -- a clear signal to his strong base with the teacher's union. Obama offered little on his plans for a second term and spent much of the debate hammering Romney. That may be why some commentators think Romney acted and appeared more like the president and Obama the challenger. One of the central facets of the Obama campaign was to define Romney as an unacceptable candidate, which they did relentlessly in states like Ohio. Yet, Romney's first debate performance shattered that image. And through the rest of the debates, he proved that he is not the man they said he was; he is not a warmonger or greedy vulture capitalist. Now, Obama is racing to put the genie back in the bottle. The electoral map is shrinking for him while expanding for Romney. Paul Begala recently admitted the Obama campaign has given up on North Carolina. Meanwhile, GOP vice presidential candidate Paul Ryan recently campaigned in Pennsylvania, a state once thought to be totally out of the reach of Romney and Ryan. According to RealClearPolitics.com's electoral map, Wisconsin, Michigan and Pennsylvania are now toss-up states and North Carolina is leaning Romney. With the wind at this back, Romney can now consolidate his resources in the most crucial states -- Ohio, Virginia, Colorado and perhaps even Wisconsin and Pennsylvania. And with the foreign policy debate in the rear view mirror, he can get back to the economy -- his strongest issue and advantage over the president. In the latest WSJ/NBC poll Romney has a six point advantage on which candidate is better at dealing with the economy, a seven point lead on jobs and unemployment and a whopping 13 point lead on fixing the deficit. Romney has the momentum. Barring any October surprise, he will likely keep the momentum. With less than two weeks to go, it may matter less what Romney and Obama say but where they say it. That will tell us all we need to know about how the campaigns feel heading into the home stretch.

#### Post-election volatility

FA 10-26-12 (Financial Advisor, “LPL'S KLEINTOP: EXPECT A POST-ELECTION, FISCAL CLIFF VOLATILITY SURGE,” <http://www.fa-mag.com/fa-news/12733-lpls-kleintop-expect-a-post-election-fiscal-cliff-volatility-surge.html>)

Whoever wins the presidential election, equity market volatility is likely to surge in November and December, as the fiscal cliff takes center stage while bruised and triumphant egos clash with each other in the nation's capital. Anyone who expects Republicans and Democrats to sit down and merrily sing “Kumbaya” together is deluding themselves, LPL's chief market strategist Jeff Kleintop said in so many words to a group of top marketing executives in Boston at the Growth and Innovation Forum sponsored by Spectrem Group and Financial Advisor magazine on October 24.¶ "What worries me” is a strong reaction by losers and potentially winners in the days immediately after a close election, Kleintop said. He envisioned a scenario emerging from a close election in which the winners interpret a narrow victory as a mandate and the losers decide to stonewall.¶ “A lame-duck session [after Thanksgiving] will be ugly,” Kleintop predicted. “A grand compromise is unlikely. Markets are whistling past” the fiscal cliff.¶ As evidence, he cited a statement by New York Senator Chuck Schumer last week saying that any cut in the top marginal tax rate -- even if accompanied by an offsetting elimination of deductions as outlined in the Simpson-Bowles plan -- was unacceptable. Contrast that with the probable intransigence of Republicans aligned with Grover Norquist, and the picture of a Mexican standoff emerges. When one looks back at what happened during the budget negotiations in the summer of 2011, investors should remember that a more than 10 percent decline in the Standard & Poor's 500 didn't bring Congress to its senses.¶ If President Obama loses, he is unlikely to sign a temporary or permanent extension of the so-called Bush tax cuts as his final act, Kleintop noted. If Mitt Romney is elected and Republicans gain control of both houses of Congress -- a scenario that looks increasingly possible -- they are likely to temporarily extend the tax cuts while taking several months to alter the tax code.

#### Election year

Madison 12 (Lucy, “Congress back to work, but little action expected”, 9/10, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544\_162-57509835-503544/congress-back-to-work-but-little-action-expected/)

(CBS News) With just 13 days left in the final legislative session before the presidential elections, Congress returns this week with a number of crucial legislative measures on the to-do list. But there's little evidence that the perpetually deadlocked body will do much more in the next two weeks than is necessary to keep the government functional. Facing the threat of the so-called "fiscal cliff," a combination of tax increases and spending cuts scheduled to go into effect January 2013, the House and Senate must soon take up a series of contentious debates over taxes, defense and spending cuts. The Bush-era tax cuts are set to expire at the end of the year, and January 1, 2013 also marks the day when $1.2 trillion worth of budget cuts, which cut across domestic programs and the Pentagon, begin to go into effect unless Congress can reach a deal to offset them. On the same day, a payroll tax cut will expire, as will a deferment of payment cuts to Medicare physicians. Despite across-the-board urgings to address the looming fiscal cliff swiftly, most observers expect many of the relevant conversations to go up to the 11th hour, during the post-election lame duck session, when both parties are able to calibrate their actions based on how they fared in the presidential, and congressional, elections. "The fact is, whether it's the leadership or the members, all they want to do is get out of there as quickly as possible and get back there on the campaign trail," said Jim Manley, former spokesman for Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid and now senior director at the public affairs firm Quinn Gillespie & Associates. "There's not going to be a lot of appetite for doing much more than a handful of items."

#### Not in session

Lightman and Douglas 9/21 (David and William, “Unproductive Congress breaks until after November election”, 2012, <http://www.adn.com/2012/09/20/2633147/unproductive-congress-breaks-until.html>\_

Lawmakers spent Thursday pointing fingers and charging opponents with cynical political posturing. Among Congress' last decisions was a characteristic 2012 judgment: Punt action until later. It will let the farm bill, a broad measure that sets the nation's agriculture and food and nutrition assistance policies, expire Sept. 30. Congress also exits without any serious effort to edge away from the "fiscal cliff," the prospect of economy-damaging budget chaos if it doesn't act by year's end. Bush-era tax cuts are due to expire, and automatic spending cuts will take effect unless alternatives are passed. The public is noticing, as the legislative failures stir uncertainty and further roil an already-weak economy. This Congress' approval ratings were stuck at 13 percent in a Gallup survey Sept. 6-9, the lowest the pollster has ever logged this late in an election year since such measurements began in 1974. Yet lawmakers are slinking out of town, after a September session that was on and off for less than two weeks, following a summer recess that ran from Aug. 3 to Sept. 10. Congress is expected to return Nov. 13.

#### No link – doesn’t require congressional approval

Janofsky 6 (Michael, Veteran Journalist, “Offshore Drilling Plan Widens Rifts Over Energy Policy,” New York Times, 4-9, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/09/washington/09drill.html)

A Bush administration proposal to open an energy-rich tract of the Gulf of Mexico to oil and gas drilling has touched off a tough fight in Congress, the latest demonstration of the political barriers to providing new energy supplies even at a time of high demand and record prices. The two-million-acre area, in deep waters 100 miles south of Pensacola, Fla., is estimated to contain nearly half a billion barrels of oil and three trillion cubic feet of natural gas, enough to run roughly a million vehicles and heat more than half a million homes for about 15 years. The site, Area 181, is the only major offshore leasing zone that the administration is offering for development. But lawmakers are divided over competing proposals to expand or to limit the drilling. The Senate Energy Committee and its chairman, Pete V. Domenici, Republican of New Mexico, are pushing for a wider drilling zone, while the two Florida senators and many from the state's delegation in the House are arguing for a smaller tract. Other lawmakers oppose any new drilling at all. The debate could go a long way toward defining how the nation satisfies its need for new energy and whether longstanding prohibitions against drilling in the Outer Continental Shelf, the deep waters well beyond state coastlines, will end. The fight, meanwhile, threatens to hold up the confirmation of President Bush's choice to lead the Interior Department, Gov. Dirk Kempthorne of Idaho. Mr. Kempthorne was nominated last month to replace Gale A. Norton, a proponent of the plan, who stepped down March 31. Like Ms. Norton, Mr. Kempthorne, a former senator, is a determined advocate of developing new supplies of energy through drilling. While environmental groups say that discouraging new drilling would spur development of alternative fuels, administration officials say that timely action in Area 181 and beyond could bring short-term relief to the nation's energy needs and, perhaps, lower fuel costs for consumers. "It's important to have expansions of available acres in the Gulf of Mexico as other areas are being tapped out," Ms. Norton said recently. She predicted that drilling in the offshore zone would lead to further development in parts of the Outer Continental Shelf that have been off-limits since the 1980's under a federal moratorium that Congress has renewed each year and that every president since then has supported. States are beginning to challenge the prohibitions. Legislatures in Georgia and Kansas recently passed resolutions urging the government to lift the bans. On Friday, Gov. Tim Kaine of Virginia, a Democrat, rejected language in a state energy bill that asked Congress to lift the drilling ban off Virginia's coast. But he did not close the door to a federal survey of natural gas deposits. Meanwhile, Representative Richard W. Pombo, Republican of California, the pro-development chairman of the House Resources Committee, plans to introduce a bill in June that would allow states to seek control of any energy exploration within 125 miles of their shorelines. Senators John W. Warner of Virginia, a Republican, and Mark Pryor of Arkansas, a Democrat, introduced a similar bill in the Senate last month. Currently, coastal states can offer drilling rights only in waters within a few miles of their own shores. Mr. Pombo and other lawmakers would also change the royalty distribution formula for drilling in Outer Continental Shelf waters so states would get a share of the royalties that now go entirely to the federal government. Senators from Alabama, Louisiana and Mississippi are co-sponsoring a bill that would create a 50-50 split. As exceptions to the federal ban, the western and central waters of the Gulf of Mexico produce nearly a third of the nation's oil and more than a fifth of its natural gas. But Area 181 has been protected because of its proximity to Florida and the opposition of Mr. Bush's brother, Gov. Jeb Bush. By its current boundaries, the pending lease area is a much smaller tract than the 5.9 million acres the Interior Department first considered leasing more than 20 years ago and the 3.6 million acres that the department proposed to lease in 2001. This year, two million acres of the original tract are proposed for lease as the only waters of the Outer Continental Shelf that the administration is making available for 2007-12. The proposal is an administrative action that does not require Congressional approval, but it is still subject to public comment before being made final. Unless Congress directs the administration to change course, the administration's final plan would lead to bidding on new leases in 2007.

#### Natural gas production is popular

Strahan 12 (David, Energy Reporter – New Scientist, “The Great Gas Showdown,” New Scientist, 2-25, 213(2835), Academic Search Complete)

I FIRST heard the idea on a private jet flying from New York to London. The US oil billionaire Robert Hefner III, known as the "father of deep natural gas", had offered me a lift to discuss a book he was planning. The idea was, perhaps unsurprisingly, that natural gas will solve the supply problem of "peak oil" -- when global oil production starts to decline -- and dramatically cut US emissions of greenhouse gases, making it a perfect bridging fuel to a low-carbon future. With gas prices approaching record highs at the time, I was sceptical to say the least. But things have changed. Today the US is awash with cheap gas, thanks in part to the newfound ability to extract large amounts of shale gas. So could it be that Hefner, despite his obvious commercial interest, was right all along? Fellow tycoon T. Boone Pickens has also been pushing the gas agenda and their ideas have found enthusiastic support among the US public and in Congress. Replacing oil imports with domestically produced gas may promise better energy security and economic benefits. Is it the best route for cutting carbon emissions, though? Natural gas, which is mainly methane, may generate less carbon dioxide than oil and coal when burned, but as recent research has found, there's more to greenhouse gas emissions than just combustion.

#### **Turn – Republicans and natural gas industry loves the plan**

Clark 12 (Aaron, “Obama Stance on Fossil Fuel Angers Industry,” Bloomberg, 1-24, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-01-24/obama-claiming-credit-for-fossil-fuel-gains-angers-industry.html)

President Barack Obama is taking credit for higher U.S. oil and gas production and lower imports, angering industry groups and Republicans who say he is working against domestic energy production. American energy will be a major theme of Obama’s State of the Union address to Congress tonight, Jay Carney, the White House spokesman, said in a briefing yesterday. In his first campaign ad this year, Obama boasts that U.S. dependence on foreign oil is below 50 percent for the first time in 13 years. Since Obama took office, U.S. natural gas production averaged 1.89 trillion cubic feet a month through October, 13 percent higher than the average during President George W. Bush’s two terms, according to Energy Department data. Crude oil production is 2 percent higher, the department said. “To be sure that is not because the White House meant for that to happen,” said Pavel Molchanov, an analyst at Raymond James & Associates Inc. Republicans say the numbers are misleading. Onshore oil and gas production on federal lands directly under Obama’s control is down 40 percent compared to 10 years ago, according to Spencer Pederson, a spokesman for Representative Doc Hastings, a Washington Republican and chairman of the House Natural Resources Committee. In 2010, the U.S. signed the fewest number of offshore drilling leases since 1984. ‘Drill Baby Drill’ “The president is responding to what America’s gut feeling is, that we should be less dependent on foreign oil, and he’s trying to take credit for it,” Hastings said in an interview. “His policies are exactly the opposite.” Four years ago, Obama campaigned against Republican vice presidential nominee Sarah Palin’s rally to “Drill Baby Drill.” Today he is highlighting fossil fuel gains to blunt charges that his policies are contributing to higher energy costs, according to Tyson Slocum, energy program director for Public Citizen, a Washington-based consumer advocacy group, said in an interview. “The Republican narrative is that Obama is shoveling huge amounts of money to his cronies in the renewable industry, and blocking the real energy that American needs,” Slocum said in an interview. “It’s a false narrative. The administration has been focused on green energy, but they haven’t been against fossil fuels.” Federal Leases In a January report, the American Petroleum Institute in Washington said that in two years the number of new leases to drill on federal lands declined 44 percent to 1,053 in 2010. The report blamed “new rules, policies and administrative actions that are not conducive to oil and natural gas production.” Lower imports are the result of lower demand, and increasing production has come despite Obama’s policies, according to Jack Gerard, American Petroleum Institute President. The U.S. needs a “course correction” on energy policy that includes faster permitting on federal lands in the West and in the Gulf of Mexico, he said. The group, whose members include Exxon Mobil Corp., the largest U.S. oil company, convened a conference call with reporters today to comment on what Obama is expected to say on domestic energy in tonight’s address. “We hope that the actions match the words,” Gerard said on the call. “The truth is that the administration has sometimes paid lip service to more domestic energy development, including more oil and natural gas development.” Offshore Drilling The American Enterprise Institute, a Washington group that supports free markets, called Obama’s Jan. 18 decision to deny a permit for TransCanada Corp. (TRP)’s $7 billion Keystone XL oil pipeline, part of his “crusade against fossil fuels.” “The losses due to the Obama administration’s death-grip on offshore drilling and its unwillingness to open federal lands or issue timely permits for exploration far outweigh any energy gains that the White House may tout this week,” Thomas Pyle, president of the Washington-based Institute for Energy Research, said in a statement. Obama last year called on Congress to eliminate “billions in taxpayer” subsidies for oil companies and to invest instead in renewable sources of power. In 2010, he proposed drilling for oil and natural gas off the U.S. East Coast, weeks before BP Plc (BP/)’s Macondo well in the Gulf of Mexico failed, spewing 4.9 million barrels of oil and triggering a temporary administration ban on offshore exploration.

#### Nat gas lobbyists have tremendous influence in congress

Browning and Clifford 11 (James, Regional State Director – Common Cause, and Pat, Stone Senior Fellow – HUC-UC Ethics Center, “Fracking for Support: Natural Gas Industry Pumps Cash Into Congress,” Common Cause, 11-10, http://www.commoncause.org/site/pp.asp?c=dkLNK1MQIwG&b=7831813)

Natural gas interests have spent more than $747 million during a 10-year campaign – stunningly successful so far – to avoid government regulation of hydraulic “fracking,” a fast-growing and environmentally risky process used in Ohio and at least a dozen other states to tap underground gas reserves, according to a new study by Common Cause. A faction of the natural gas industry has directed more than $20 million to the campaigns of current members of Congress – including $600,000 to Ohioans -- and put $726 million into lobbying aimed at shielding itself from oversight, according to the report, the third in a series of “Deep Drilling, Deep Pockets” reports produced by the non-profit government watchdog group. Rep. John Boehner led Ohio’s Congressional delegation with $186,900 raised from fracking interests, followed Sen. Rob Portman with $91,000, Rep. Steve Chabot with $59,050, and Rep. Steve Stivers with $51,250. “Players in this industry have pumped cash into Congress in the same way they pump toxic chemicals into underground rock formations to free trapped gas,” said Common Cause President Bob Edgar. “And as fracking for gas releases toxic chemicals into groundwater and streams, the industry’s political fracking for support is toxic to efforts for a cleaner environment and relief from our dependence on fossil fuels.” The report also tracks $2.8 million in campaign contributions to Ohio’s state elected officials and notes that Ohio’s fracking regulations are among the weakest of any state. Gov. John Kasich was the leading individual recipient with $213,519, followed by former Gov. Ted Strickland with $87,450 and Secretary of State John Husted with $84,750. In Congress, the industry’s political giving heavily favors lawmakers who supported the 2005 Energy Policy Act, which exempted fracking from regulation under the Safe Drinking Water Act. Current members who voted for the bill received an average of $73,433, while those who voted against the bill received an average of $10,894. The report comes as the Environmental Protection Agency is scheduled to publish new, preliminary findings in 2012 about the potential dangers of fracking. That gives the industry a powerful incentive to increase political spending now in an attempt to shape public opinion and the debate over fracking in Congress, as well as affect the outcome of the 2012 congressional elections. “Thanks to the Supreme Court and its Citizens United decision, the natural gas industry will be free to spend whatever it likes next year to elect a Congress that will do its bidding,” Edgar said. “The industry’s political investments already have largely freed it from government oversight. Controlling the flow of that money and other corporate spending on our elections is critical to protecting our environment for this and future generations.”

#### Winners win.

Halloran 10 (Liz, Reporter – NPR, “For Obama, What A Difference A Week Made”, National Public Radio, 4-6, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=125594396)

Amazing what a win in a major legislative battle will do for a president's spirit. (Turmoil over spending and leadership at the Republican National Committee over the past week, and the release Tuesday of a major new and largely sympathetic book about the president by New Yorker editor David Remnick, also haven't hurt White House efforts to drive its own, new narrative.) Obama's Story Though the president's national job approval ratings failed to get a boost by the passage of the health care overhaul — his numbers have remained steady this year at just under 50 percent — he has earned grudging respect even from those who don't agree with his policies. "He's achieved something that virtually everyone in Washington thought he couldn't," says Henry Olsen, vice president and director of the business-oriented American Enterprise Institute's National Research Initiative. "And that's given him confidence." The protracted health care battle looks to have taught the White House something about power, says presidential historian Gil Troy — a lesson that will inform Obama's pursuit of his initiatives going forward. "I think that Obama realizes that presidential power is a muscle, and the more you exercise it, the stronger it gets," Troy says. "He exercised that power and had a success with health care passage, and now he wants to make sure people realize it's not just a blip on the map." The White House now has an opportunity, he says, to change the narrative that had been looming — that the Democrats would lose big in the fall midterm elections, and that Obama was looking more like one-term President Jimmy Carter than two-termer Ronald Reagan, who also managed a difficult first-term legislative win and survived his party's bad showing in the midterms. Approval Ratings Obama is exuding confidence since the health care bill passed, but his approval ratings as of April 1 remain unchanged from the beginning of the year, according to [Pollster.com](http://www.pollster.com/polls/us/jobapproval-obama.php). What's more, just as many people disapprove of Obama's health care policy now as did so at the beginning of the year. According to the most recent numbers: Forty-eight percent of all Americans approve of Obama, and 47 disapprove. Fifty-two percent disapprove of Obama's health care policy, compared with 43 percent who approve. Stepping Back From A Precipice Those watching the re-emergent president in recent days say it's difficult to imagine that it was only weeks ago that Obama's domestic agenda had been given last rites, and pundits were preparing their pieces on a failed presidency. Obama himself had framed the health care debate as a referendum on his presidency. A loss would have "ruined the rest of his presidential term," says Darrell West, director of governance studies at the liberal-leaning Brookings Institution. "It would have made it difficult to address other issues and emboldened his critics to claim he was a failed president." The conventional wisdom in Washington after the Democrats lost their supermajority in the U.S. Senate when Republican Scott Brown won the Massachusetts seat long held by the late Sen. Edward Kennedy was that Obama would scale back his health care ambitions to get something passed. "I thought he was going to do what most presidents would have done — take two-thirds of a loaf and declare victory," says the AEI's Olsen. "But he doubled down and made it a vote of confidence on his presidency, parliamentary-style." "You've got to be impressed with an achievement like that," Olsen says. But Olsen is among those who argue that, long-term, Obama and his party would have been better served politically by an incremental approach to reworking the nation's health care system, something that may have been more palatable to independent voters Democrats will need in the fall. "He would have been able to show he was listening more, that he heard their concerns about the size and scope of this," Olsen says. Muscling out a win on a sweeping health care package may have invigorated the president and provided evidence of leadership, but, his critics say, it remains to be seen whether Obama and his party can reverse what the polls now suggest is a losing issue for them.

#### Capital does not affect the agenda

**Dickinson 9** (Matthew, Professor of political science at Middlebury College, Sotomayer, Obama and Presidential Power, Presidential Power, http://blogs.middlebury.edu/presidentialpower/2009/05/26/sotamayor-obama-and-presidential-power/)

What is of more interest to me, however, is what her selection reveals about the basis of presidential power. Political scientists, like baseball writers evaluating hitters, have devised numerous means of measuring a president’s influence in Congress. I will devote a separate post to discussing these, but in brief, they often center on the creation of legislative “box scores” designed to measure how many times a president’s preferred piece of legislation, or nominee to the executive branch or the courts, is approved by Congress. That is, how many pieces of legislation that the president supports actually pass Congress? How often do members of Congress vote with the president’s preferences? How often is a president’s policy position supported by roll call outcomes? These measures, however, are a misleading gauge of presidential power – they are a better indicator of congressional power. This is because how members of Congress vote on a nominee or legislative item is rarely influenced by anything a president does. Although journalists (and political scientists) often focus on the legislative “endgame” to gauge presidential influence – will the President swing enough votes to get his preferred legislation enacted? – this mistakes an outcome with actual evidence of presidential influence. Once we control for other factors – a member of Congress’ ideological and partisan leanings, the political leanings of her constituency, whether she’s up for reelection or not – we can usually predict how she will vote without needing to know much of anything about what the president wants. (I am ignoring the importance of a president’s veto power for the moment.) Despite the much publicized and celebrated instances of presidential arm-twisting during the legislative endgame, then, most legislative outcomes don’t depend on presidential lobbying. But this is not to say that presidents lack influence. Instead, the primary means by which presidents influence what Congress does is through their ability to determine the alternatives from which Congress must choose. That is, presidential power is largely an exercise in agenda-setting – not arm-twisting. And we see this in the Sotomayer nomination. Barring a major scandal, she will almost certainly be confirmed to the Supreme Court whether Obama spends the confirmation hearings calling every Senator or instead spends the next few weeks ignoring the Senate debate in order to play Halo III on his Xbox. That is, how senators decide to vote on Sotomayor will have almost nothing to do with Obama’s lobbying from here on in (or lack thereof). His real influence has already occurred, in the decision to present Sotomayor as his nominee. If we want to measure Obama’s “power”, then, we need to know what his real preference was and why he chose Sotomayor. My guess – and it is only a guess – is that after conferring with leading Democrats and Republicans, he recognized the overriding practical political advantages accruing from choosing an Hispanic woman, with left-leaning credentials. We cannot know if this would have been his ideal choice based on judicial philosophy alone, but presidents are never free to act on their ideal preferences. Politics is the art of the possible. Whether Sotomayer is his first choice or not, however, her nomination is a reminder that the power of the presidency often resides in the president’s ability to dictate the alternatives from which Congress (or in this case the Senate) must choose. Although Republicans will undoubtedly attack Sotomayor for her judicial “activism” (citing in particular her decisions regarding promotion and affirmative action), her comments regarding the importance of gender and ethnicity in influencing her decisions, and her views regarding whether appellate courts “make” policy, they run the risk of alienating Hispanic voters – an increasingly influential voting bloc (to the extent that one can view Hispanics as a voting bloc!) I find it very hard to believe she will not be easily confirmed. In structuring the alternative before the Senate in this manner, then, Obama reveals an important aspect of presidential power that cannot be measured through legislative boxscores.

#### No deal coming on averting the fiscal cliff AND any tax increases/spending cuts won't immediately hurt the economy

Drum 10/3/12 (Kevin, Mother Jones, "Who's Afraid of the Fiscal Cliff," http://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2012/10/whos-afraid-fiscal-cliff)

Sarah Binder writes today that she doesn't expect this year's lame duck session of Congress to conclude a deal that will avert the "fiscal cliff" our legi-lemmings are set to march over on December 31. She has three reasons, and the first two boil down to the fact that Republicans aren't likely to suddenly stop being crazy just because we had an election, even if Obama wins.1 I can buy that. But here's reason #3:¶ Third, I’m somewhat skeptical that Democrats would have the political fortitude to go over the cliff. Democrats could have stuck to their guns in the lame duck of 2010, forcing Republicans (still in the minority) to swallow an increase in upper income tax rates as the price for extending the middle class tax cuts. That’s not the strategy Democrats chose then, and it strikes me as equally unlikely in 2012 with a GOP House majority. Going over the cliff requires Democrats to take ownership of raising taxes on the middle class at Christmas. That might be the strategically wise move for bolstering Democrats’ leverage come January. But it also strikes me as an electorally doubtful holiday gift to voters.¶ I'm not so sure about that. In this case, I think I'm with the folks who like to refer to this event as a fiscal slope rather than a fiscal cliff. Their general point is that we don't all suddenly pay thousands of dollars in taxes and cut billions of dollars in spending at the stroke of midnight on January 1st. This stuff all phases in over time.¶ That's true, and I doubt very much that there would be any serious consequences to doing a deal in February or March instead of December. In the particular case of taxes, the only thing that happens on January 1st is that withholding rates would go up slightly — and maybe not even that. The IRS has a fair amount of latitude to leave withholding rates alone for a few months if it wants to. Either way, this means that Democrats don't really have to worry about "owning" the expiration of the Bush tax cuts for quite a while. (The payroll tax holiday also expires on December 31, but that was always unlikely to be extended anyway. It doesn't have much to do with the fiscal cliff.)¶ For a few months, then, taxpayers won't see much impact. Maybe none at all. As a result, I think Democrats could pretty safely stick to their guns and extend negotiations into 2013 without much risk. At that point, with the Bush tax cuts gone and rates back up to their Clinton-era levels, they'll still have to convince Republicans to introduce a bill that cuts only the middle-income rates, not the top marginal rates, and that won't be easy. But Republicans will be under as much pressure as Democrats by that point, and they might very well be willing to do a deal.¶ In short, as long as the composition of Congress doesn't change dramatically, I don't think the calculus is much different before and after January 1st. The cliff doesn't really start to get scary until later in the year.

### China – 2AC

#### Energy abundance solves US-China conflict over the Middle East

Mead 12 (Walter Russell, James Clark Chase Professor of Foreign Affairs and Humanities – Bard College and Editor-at-Large – American Interest, “Energy Revolution 3: The New American Century,” American Interest, 7-18, http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2012/07/18/energy-revolution-3-the-new-american-century/)

On the whole, a world of energy abundance should be particularly good for U.S.-China relations. If both China and the United States have large energy reserves at home, and if new discoveries globally are making energy more abundant, there is less chance that China and the U.S. will compete for political influence in places like the Middle East. More energy security at home may also lessen the political pressure inside China to build up its naval forces. Oil may calm the troubled waters around China’s shores. The maritime disputes now causing trouble from Korea and Japan to Malaysia and the Philippines will be easier to manage if the potential undersea energy resources are seen as less vital to national economic security. Nationalist passion will still drive tough stands on the maritime issues, but nationalism is a much stronger force when powerful economic arguments share the agenda of radical nationalist groups. If the South China Sea issue is seen as both a question of national pride and, because of perceived energy supply issues, a vital national interest, Chinese policy will be much tougher than if it is simply a question of pride. Depending on the size of China’s unconventional domestic reserves (and some analysts think the country could have something like the equivalent of double Saudi Arabia’s oil reserves), China will feel marginally less constrained by Washington’s global naval supremacy. As it now stands, in any serious clash with China, the U.S. could bring Beijing to its knees with a naval blockade. With much larger domestic energy production, China would be less vulnerable to this threat. This could translate into a greater willingness to take a hard line on international issues.

#### Conflict with China will escalate to global nuclear war

**Hunkovic 9** (Lee J, American Military University, “The Chinese-Taiwanese Conflict: Possible Futures of a Confrontation between China, Taiwan and the United States of America”, [http://www.lamp-method.org/eCommons/ Hunkovic.pdf](http://www.lamp-method.org/eCommons/Hunkovic.pdf))

A war between China, Taiwan and the United States has the potential **to escalate into a nuclear conflict and a third world war**, therefore, many countries other than the primary actors could be affected by such a conflict, including Japan, both Koreas, Russia, Australia, India and Great Britain, if they were drawn into the war, as well as all other countries in the world that participate in the global economy, in which the United States and China are the two most dominant members. If China were able to successfully annex Taiwan, the possibility exists that they could then plan to attack Japan and begin a policy of aggressive expansionism in East and Southeast Asia, as well as the Pacific and even into India, which could in turn create an international standoff and deployment of military forces to contain the threat. In any case, if China and the United States engage in a full-scale conflict, there are few countries in the world that will not be economically and/or militarily affected by it. However, China, Taiwan and United States are the primary actors in this scenario, whose actions will determine its eventual outcome, therefore, other countries will not be considered in this study.

### Helium – 2AC

#### US natural gas production is key global helium production

EIA 6 (Energy Information Administration, the official energy statistics agency of U.S. Government , “Natural Gas Processing: The Crucial Link Between Natural Gas Production and Its Transportation to Market” http://www.eia.gov/pub/oil\_gas/natural\_gas/feature\_articles/2006/ngprocess/ngprocess.pdf)

**The world’s supply of helium** comes exclusively **from natural gas production**. The single largest source of helium is the United States, which produces about 80 percent of the annual world production of 3.0 billion cubic feet (Bcf). In 2003, U.S. production of helium was 2.4 Bcf, about two-thirds of which came from the Hugoton Basin in north Texas, Oklahoma, and Kansas (Figure 2). The rest mostly comes from the LaBarge field located in the Green River Basin in western Wyoming, with small amounts also produced in Utah and Colorado. According to the National Research Council, the consumption of helium in the United States doubled between 1985 and 1996, although its use has leveled off in recent years. It is used in such applications as magnetic resonance imaging, semiconductor processing, and in the pressurizing and purging of rocket engines by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Twenty-two natural gas treatment plants in the United States currently produce helium as a major byproduct of natural gas processing. Twenty of these plants, located in the Hugoton-Panhandle Basin, produce marketable helium which is sold in the open market when profitable, while transporting the remaining unrefined helium to the Federal Helium Reserve (FHR). The FHR was created in the 1950s in the Bush salt dome, underlying the Cliffside field, located near Amarillo, Texas. Sales of unrefined helium in the United Statesfor the most part, come from the FHR.

#### This collapses US space exploration

CN 12 – Citation News, “Scientists' High-Pitched Response to Helium Shortage”, 3-22, http://www.cyberregs.com/webapps/Blog/post/Scientists-High-Pitched-Response-to-Helium-Shortage.aspx

Helium - the second lightest element in the universe with an atomic weight of 4.002602 - is an inert gas that can be cooled to temperatures of -270 Celsius without becoming a solid, **making it indispensible** in the operation of, among many things, superconducting magnets used in MRI scanners, telescopes and particle accelerators like the Large Hadron Collider. Helium also holds an important place in the defense industry. It also has some far less profound applications, which consume great quantities of the gas annually - applications such as party balloons and squeak-voice huffing. These latter applications have drawn the ire of researchers. This month, the Guardian reported that the UK's Rutherford Appleton Laboratory wasted three days and £90,000 (US$ 143,091), when, during an important experiment exploring the structure of matter, they could not obtain a supply of helium. Needless to say, the scientists were in a less-than-celebratory mood. "We put the stuff into party balloons and let them float off into the upper atmosphere, or we use it to make our voices go squeaky for a laugh. It is very, very stupid. It makes me really angry,” said Oleg Kiricheck, the research team leader. Cornell University Professor Robert Richardson is also concerned. He believes that, with our current reserves of helium, the price of the element severely discounts its real value. By his estimation, the price of a single party balloon should cost as much as $100. Richardson suggests increasing the price of helium by 20-50% to eliminate excessive waste. Although helium ranks next to hydrogen as the most abundant element in the universe, here on earth it is a finite commodity. The helium that is here is all we have! Helium is **collected during natural gas** and oil drilling. If the gas is not captured, it dissipates into earth's upper atmosphere and is lost forever. The same happens when a party balloon is released into the air, or when it self-deflates, because helium atoms are so small that they can easily move through the balloon's latex shell. Party balloons do not represent the only wasteful expenditures of helium. Macy's Thanksgiving Day parade typically uses 400 Mcf a year, although there have been recent attempts to recycle some of the helium used in the floats. NASA uses up to 75 MMcf annually to pressurize rocket tanks. The agency has made no attempt to recycle this huge amount of gas. Weather balloons also consume about 140 MMcf of helium per year. At the present rate of supply depletion, the United States will become an importer of helium from the Middle East and Russia within 10 years, and the world will run out of helium within 30 years. This would have major implications for space travel and exploration, scientific and nuclear research, medical advances and early detection of diseases. Possible solutions for this problem **should address supply**, not pricing. A drastic increase in the price of helium as a preservative measure would cause a huge spike in billing for medical procedures, such as MRIs, scientific research, and defense expenditures, as well as party balloons.

#### Extinction is inevitable without space exploration

Carreau 2 (Mark, Winner – 2006 Space Communicator Award, MA in Journalism – Kansas State University, “Top Experts See Space Study As Key to Human Survival”, The Houston Chronicle, 10-19, Lexis)

With Apollo astronaut John Young leading the charge, top aerospace experts warned Friday that humanity's survival may depend on how boldly the world's space agencies venture into the final frontier. Only a spacefaring culture with the skills to travel among and settle planets can be assured of escaping a collision between Earth and a large asteroid or devastation from the eruption of a super volcano, they told the World Space Congress. "Space exploration is the key to the future of the human race," said Young, who strolled on the moon more than 30 years ago and now serves as the associate director of NASA's Johnson Space Center. "We should be running scared to go out into the solar system. We should be running fast." Scientists believe that an asteroid wiped out the dinosaurs more than 60 million years ago, and are gathering evidence of previously large collisions. "The civilization of Earth does not have quite as much protection as we would like to believe," said Leonid Gorshkov, an exploration strategist with RSC Energia, one of Russia's largest aerospace companies. "We should not place all of our eggs in one basket."

## 1AR v. Cal IP

### Impact

**Global nuclear war**

**Dibb 1** (Paul, Professor – Australian National University, Strategic Trends: Asia at a Crossroads, Naval War College Review, Winter, http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/2001/Winter/art2-w01.htm)

The areas of **maximum danger** and instability in the world today are in Asia, followed by the Middle East and parts of the former Soviet Union. The strategic situation in Asia is **more uncertain and** potentially **threatening** than anywhere in Europe. Unlike in Europe, it is possible to envisage **war in Asia involving the major powers**: remnants of Cold War ideological confrontation still exist across the Taiwan Straits and on the Korean Peninsula; India and Pakistan have **nuclear** **weapons** and ballistic missiles, and these two countries are more confrontational than at any time since the early 1970s; in Southeast Asia, Indonesia—which is the world’s fourth-largest country—faces a highly uncertain future that could lead to its breakup. The Asia-Pacific region spends more on defense (about $150 billion a year) than any other part of the world except the United States and Nato Europe. China and Japan are amongst the top four or five global military spenders. Asia also has more nuclear powers than any other region of the world. Asia’s security is at a crossroads: the region could go in the direction of peace and cooperation, or it could slide into confrontation and **military** **conflict**. There are positive tendencies, including the resurgence of economic growth and the spread of democracy, which would encourage an optimistic view. But there are a number of negative tendencies that must be of serious concern. There are deep-seated historical, territorial, ideological, and religious differences in Asia. Also, the region has no history of successful multilateral security cooperation or arms control. Such multilateral institutions as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the ASEAN Regional Forum have shown themselves to be ineffective when confronted with major crises.

### Competition

#### Reduce means diminish strength

OED 89 (Oxford English Dictionary, “Reduce,” Volume 13, p. 433)

21. e. to diminish the strength of (spirit).

#### Restrictions aren’t limited to legislation

Hartley and Medlock 9 (Dr. Peter, Professor of Economics – Rice University, Rice Scholar – Baker Institute for Public Policy, and Dr. Kenneth B., Fellow in Energy Policy – Baker Institute for Public Policy, Adjunct Assistant Professor of Economics – Rice University, “Finding Opportunities in the Changing North American Gas Market,” James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, http://www.naspd.com/pdf/national09\_hartley.pdf)

Some Federal lands and offshore areas known to contain significant natural gas reserves were effectively off-limits and likely will become so again

! Restrictions **were via legislation, executive order, regulation or administrative decisions** and some that were relaxed in 2008 have already been reinstated

! Other resources have been rendered uneconomic by Federal and State regulatory requirements that increase costs and create delays

#### It’s acceptable within the range of “should”

GAO 8 (Government Accounting Office, Exposure Draft of Proposed Changes to the International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing, http://www.gao.gov/govaud/cl\_iia080331.pdf)

The second sentence of the “must” definition used in the exposure draft instructions is more aligned with the definition of “should” as used by other standards setters, including GAO. The definition of “should” as used by GAO, which is intended to be consistent with the definition used by the AICPA and the PCAOB, indicates a presumptively mandatory requirement and contains the following language: “…in rare circumstances, auditors and audit organizations may depart from a presumptively mandatory requirement provided they document their justification for the departure and how the alternative procedures performed in the circumstances were sufficient to achieve the objectives of the presumptively mandatory requirement.” We suggest that the IIA move the second sentence of the “must” definition to the “should” definition. The definition of “must” needs to be clear that “must” indicates an unconditional requirement and that another procedure cannot substitute for a “must.” Also, we suggest adding language to the definition of “should” to indicate that substituting another procedure for a “should” requirement is allowed only if the auditors document their justification for the departure from the “should” and how the alternative procedures performed in the circumstances were sufficient to achieve the objectives of the “should” requirement. The IIA should review every “must” requirement in the Standards to determine whether there are acceptable alternatives to the procedure; if so, “should” is the appropriate word.

#### “Resolved” means law

Words and Phrases 64 (Permanent Edition)

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

### Solvency

#### CP causes uncertainty and confusion

**Anthony 92** (Robert A., Foundation Professor of Law – George Mason University School of Law, “Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals, And The Like -- Should Federal Agencies Use Them To Bind The Public?”, Duke Law Journal, June, 41 Duke L.J. 1311, Lexis)

Except to the extent that they interpret specific statutory or regulatory language, then, nonlegislative rules likepolicy statements, guidances, manuals andmemoranda should not be used to bind the public. [9](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=fc7e1839e2556e16ee93313f0611456a&csvc=le&cform=&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVlz-zSkAA&_md5=3f31cdbadbb71426f380a61d4c037ecb#n9) While these nonlegislative rules by definition cannot *legally* bind, agencies often inappropriately issue them with the intent or effect of imposing a *practical* binding norm upon the regulated or benefited public. Such use of nonlegislative policy documents is the capital problem addressed by this Article.  
Thus, under the taxonomy of the APA, [10](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=fc7e1839e2556e16ee93313f0611456a&csvc=le&cform=&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVlz-zSkAA&_md5=3f31cdbadbb71426f380a61d4c037ecb#n10) a rulemaking action that the agency wishes to make binding upon affected persons must be either a legislative rule (which binds legally) or an interpretive rule (which may bind practically). All other substantive rulemaking documents -- such as policy statements, guidances, manuals, circulars, memoranda, bulletins, and the like -- are in APA terminology "policy statements," [11](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=fc7e1839e2556e16ee93313f0611456a&csvc=le&cform=&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVlz-zSkAA&_md5=3f31cdbadbb71426f380a61d4c037ecb#n11) which the agency is not entitled to make binding, either as a legal matter or as a practical matter. These issuances will sometimes be referred to as "nonlegislative policy documents" or "policy documents." This Article accordingly will advance the general recommendation, based on the APA, that agencies observe legislative rulemaking procedures for any action in the nature of rulemaking that is intended to impose mandatory obligations or standards upon private parties, or that has that effect. To the extent that agency pronouncements interpret specific statutory or regulatory language, this general recommendation does not apply. But the Article will separately recommend that interpretations that substantially enlarge the jurisdiction exercised by the agency, or substantially change the obligations or entitlements of private parties, should nevertheless be promulgated by legislative rulemaking procedures as a matter of sound agency practice. [12](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=fc7e1839e2556e16ee93313f0611456a&csvc=le&cform=&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVlz-zSkAA&_md5=3f31cdbadbb71426f380a61d4c037ecb#n12)  [\*1316]  The use of legislative rulemaking procedures is not the only cure to be prescribed for the misuse of nonlegislative documents described herein. An agency has the option of issuing its policies in the form of policy statements that are genuinely nonbinding, thereby bringing them within the "policy statement" exemption from the APA's rulemaking requirements. [13](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=fc7e1839e2556e16ee93313f0611456a&csvc=le&cform=&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVlz-zSkAA&_md5=3f31cdbadbb71426f380a61d4c037ecb#n13) When it chooses this course of action the agency should observe an alternate process, by which it can assure that its documents are not binding and therefore will not be invalidated on the ground that they were not promulgated by the use of legislative rulemaking procedures. To achieve these outcomes, the agency should stand ready to entertain challenges to the policy in particular proceedings to which the document may apply, and should observe a disciplined system for maintaining an "open mind" when passing upon such challenges. [14](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=fc7e1839e2556e16ee93313f0611456a&csvc=le&cform=&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVlz-zSkAA&_md5=3f31cdbadbb71426f380a61d4c037ecb#n14) Finally, the Article recommends procedures through which an agency, whenever it intends a rule to be legislative, should announce that intention and inform the public about the statutory authorities and procedures by which it has acted. Although the subject is complex and evidence is laborious to assemble, it is manifest that nonobservance of APA rulemaking requirements is widespread. Several agencies rely in major part upon nonlegislative issuances to propagate new and changed elements in their regulatory or benefit programs. [15](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=fc7e1839e2556e16ee93313f0611456a&csvc=le&cform=&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVlz-zSkAA&_md5=3f31cdbadbb71426f380a61d4c037ecb#n15) This Article examines a number of agency attempts to make nonlegislative policy documents bind the public. [16](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=fc7e1839e2556e16ee93313f0611456a&csvc=le&cform=&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVlz-zSkAA&_md5=3f31cdbadbb71426f380a61d4c037ecb#n16) Frequently such rules are not challenged in court, because the affected private parties cannot afford the cost or the delay of litigation, or because for other practical  [\*1317]  reasons they must accept a needed agency approval or benefit on whatever terms the agency sets. [17](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=fc7e1839e2556e16ee93313f0611456a&csvc=le&cform=&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVlz-zSkAA&_md5=3f31cdbadbb71426f380a61d4c037ecb#n17)

The use of nonlegislative policy documents generally serves the important function of informing staff and the public about agency positions, and in the great majority of instances is proper and indeed very valuable. But the misuse of such documents -- to bind, where legislative rules should have been used -- carries great costs. Affected members of the public are likely to be confused or misled about the reach and legal quality of the standards the agency has imposed. One consequence of this uncertainty can be that affected persons are unaware that the agency intends to give its nonlegislative issuance binding effect. Probably more often, though, the private parties realize all too clearly that the agency will insist upon strict compliance, but conclude that there is little they can do to resist. In either case, the uncertainty can breed costly waste of effort among private parties trying to puzzle out how far they are bound or otherwise affected by the informal agency document. [18](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=fc7e1839e2556e16ee93313f0611456a&csvc=le&cform=&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVlz-zSkAA&_md5=3f31cdbadbb71426f380a61d4c037ecb#n18)

#### The CP is definitive – causes confusion

**Anthony 92** (Robert A., Foundation Professor of Law – George Mason University School of Law, “Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals, And The Like -- Should Federal Agencies Use Them To Bind The Public?”, Duke Law Journal, June, 41 Duke L.J. 1311, Lexis)

A particularly perverse phenomenon arises from some courts' emphasis upon the discretion retained by the agency as an indicator of the nonbinding character of its issuance. [26](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=fc7e1839e2556e16ee93313f0611456a&csvc=le&cform=&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVlz-zSkAA&_md5=3f31cdbadbb71426f380a61d4c037ecb#n26) Under this approach, the more discretion the agency reserves in a document, the better are its chances that a court will hold that legislative rulemaking procedures were not required, even though the public was plainly meant to be bound. [27](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=fc7e1839e2556e16ee93313f0611456a&csvc=le&cform=&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVlz-zSkAA&_md5=3f31cdbadbb71426f380a61d4c037ecb#n27) The theory is that the agency, by reserving discretion, has not bound itself. But the incentives work the wrong way here. The prospect of avoiding legislative procedures encourages the agency to be cagey rather than candid, and to state its rules loosely rather than precisely. A preferable test would consider whether the constraints on private persons amount to a binding of those persons. Otherwise, it is perfectly easy for a document to reserve plenty of discretion for the agency to act variantly, even where it makes clear that private parties will be held to strict conformity. [28](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=fc7e1839e2556e16ee93313f0611456a&csvc=le&cform=&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVlz-zSkAA&_md5=3f31cdbadbb71426f380a61d4c037ecb#n28) Any tactical advantage the agency may gain will come at the expense of clarity and fairness to affected private persons.  [\*1319]  To countenance nonlegislative documents that bind is inevitably to expand the agency's discretion in a most undesirable way. Although the public is bound the agency is not bound, as it would be had it used legislative rules. [29](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=fc7e1839e2556e16ee93313f0611456a&csvc=le&cform=&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVlz-zSkAA&_md5=3f31cdbadbb71426f380a61d4c037ecb#n29) It is easier for the agency to deviate from or change positions taken in policy statements, memoranda and the like than it is to deviate from or change those adopted through legislative processes. [30](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=fc7e1839e2556e16ee93313f0611456a&csvc=le&cform=&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVlz-zSkAA&_md5=3f31cdbadbb71426f380a61d4c037ecb#n30) Additionally, it may be observed generally that nonlegislative documents often are less clear and definite than legislative rules, and may enable the agency to operate at a lower level of visibility, with greater discretion and with fewer checks from the public and the courts.

#### **Natural gas rulemaking fails – it’s lawless without Congressional rules AND links to politics**

Marshaw 94 (Jerry L., Professor of Law and Organization – Yale University, “Improving the Environment of Agency Rulemaking: An Essay on Management, Games and Accountability,” Law and Contemporary Problems, 57(2), http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2167&context=fss\_papers)

As late as the presidency of John F. Kennedy, the principal image of federal administrative action was the adjudication of a case-a prosecution by the Federal Trade Commission, an enforcement action by the National Labor Relations Board, a licensing proceeding before the Federal Communications or Federal Power Commissions, or a rate proceeding at the Interstate Commerce Commission. 1 Thirty years later, when U.S. citizens think of "regulation," they tend to think of the adoption of general rules concerning workplace safety by the Occupational and Safety Health Administration ("OSHA"), or of rules governing air or water quality by the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"). 2 Nor is rulemaking the exclusive province of post-New-Frontier agencies designed with that regulatory technique prominently in mind. The politically salient activities of old line agencies-Federal Trade Commission regulation of charm school and funeral home practices or Federal Power Commission deregulation of **natural gas** pipeline prices-often feature rulemaking rather than adjudication. This "paradigm shift" was in part evolutionary, but it also contained critical elements of conscious redesign of the administrative process. Regulatory reform movements in the 1960s emphasized rulemaking and extolled its virtues of efficiency, fairness, and political accountability. 3 While Kenneth Culp Davis may have been more hyperbolic than most in characterizing rulemaking as "one of the greatest inventions of modern government," 4 he was hardly alone in the belief that a shift from adjudication to rulemaking would re-energize federal policymaking, while simultaneously making it more rational and more democratic. Today's reformers tend to view rulemaking by federal administrative agencies **more as a problem than as a solution**. From one perspective, rulemaking is a problem precisely because it has been the instrument by which large, previously unregulated sectors of the economy have been subjected to costly federal edicts. 5 Regulatory reform from this perspective lies precisely in reducing the reach of rulemaking authority and in making it subject to a realistic appraisal of the costs and benefits of governmental intervention. From a different substantive or political perspective, rulemaking is equally strenuously criticized as having failed to live up to its promise. The brave new agencies of the 1960s and 1970s may have imposed many costs on society, but they have made only halting progress toward the safer and healthier world that was then envisioned. Many regulatory programs are years, if not decades, behind in completing (sometimes addressing) their announced or statutorily mandated agenda. The older commissions that experimented with rulemaking in the 1960s and 1970s as a response to **charges of inefficiency, unfairness, or lack of accountability** have largely returned to their more familiar adjudicatory processes. The machinery of federal rulemaking is widely viewed as so creaky and accident-prone that administrators will resort to almost any other technique to attempt to get their jobs done. 6 Although to some (perhaps a large) degree these competing visions describe a dispute about policy or politics, in which the troubles with "rulemaking" or "the regulatory process" are really procedural placeholders for some substantive disagreement, there is also a sense in which the two sets of critics might perceive a common problem. While pro-regulation forces are constant in their calls for a more effective and timely rulemaking process, deregulators often have a similar interest.' The rulemaking processes of regulation are also the policy processes by which deregulation might be (sometimes must be) pursued. Thus, proregulatory laments concerning the inability of OSHA to generate rules regulating the large number of toxic substances found in U.S. workplaces might find a mirror image in deregulatory frustrations concerning OSHA's torpidity in revising archaic, but statutorily mandated, rules adopted twenty years ago. The EPA may have **missed hundreds of deadlines** in issuing rules to protect the environment, but a regulatory process that drives the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to virtually abandon its initiatives to reintroduce market discipline in energy pricing is no friend of "deregulation" either. If policymaking by rule has become moribund or "ossified" as some have argued,' there is a need to reconsider the structure of agency rulemaking as a mechanism of governance, quite apart from that mechanism's substantive effects in particular instances. This article seeks to address that general institutional question. While for many the underlying theoretical assumptions of the following analysis will be relatively nonproblematic, it makes sense to state some of them at the outset. As the analysis proceeds, these assumptions may become increasingly controversial. The first assumption is that the rulemaking process in all administrative agencies is shaped by the interaction of the agency's internal and external environments. More controversially, **the external environment is assumed to be dominant**. 9 The signals that an agency receives from its **external, legal and institutional environment** will ultimately cause the internal procedural and managerial environment of the agency to adapt in order for the agency to survive or prosper. Although not stated in precisely this way, the basic idea that U.S. political and legal institutions can hold administrators "accountable" presupposes the efficacy of external controls. 1 " This assumption has two subsidiary consequences for the sort of legal-reformist analysis that is pursued here. First, it suggests that **redesign of the external legal and institutional environment can produce desirable shifts in rulemaking or regulatory behavior**. Second, while there is no claim that internal, or managerial, reform is irrelevant to rulemaking performance (far from it), it is assumed (and sometimes argued) 1 that "good management," while necessary to regulatory success, is insufficient in the face of sufficiently stringent external constraints. A second major assumption is that all the participants in the regulatory or rulemaking process are boundedly rational and limitedly altruistic. These are modest and "realistic" assumptions, but they diverge from considerable segments of the political economy literature on bureaucratic, firm, and individual behavior. By "boundedly rational" I mean merely that individuals and institutions pursue interests or goals that are of value to them on the basis of available, but always partial, information. I assume that agents are doing the best they can to accomplish their objectives, "muddling through"" in Lindbloom's famous phrase. That they are "limitedly altruistic" assumes that all rulemaking participants have some capacity to pursue goals or values (1) that they would define as the interests of a collectivity which is broader than themselves and (2) that are not immediately congruent or compatible with their own individual or group interests. But it also assumes that individual, firm, or bureau "selfinterest" will play a role, often a crucial one, in shaping behavior. These behavioral assumptions are of great importance in analyzing the current rulemaking process and in proposing reforms to mold that process for the future. They tell us that we are operating in a realm in which neither explanatory nor prescriptive theories will be perfect. Because agents are neither perfectly rational, nor relentlessly self-interested (or altruistic), we are unlikely to develop explanatory hypotheses about current behavior that fit all the cases or to prescribe a redesign of the legal and institutional environment of rulemaking that will cure all of its perceived ills. Law reform is a messy, empiric business where the facts matter, but are often unknown, seldom uncontroversial, and sometimes unknowable. Hence theory also matters, but it must be used with care. This article's third assumption is that the contemporary complaints about the costs, torpidity, and underperformance of the rulemaking process identify a real problem. It indulges the view that rulemaking is currently so difficult and time consuming that agencies fail to accomplish missions (either of a regulatory or deregulatory sort) that are worthwhile. This assumption is heroic but necessary. Reliable information on the true costs and benefits of agency regulation or deregulation is usually unavailable. Many have firm views on the subject, but data are in short supply. Indeed, lack of "data" somewhat misstates the problem. Many of the costs and benefits of regulatory or deregulatory initiatives are not measurable in any conventional sense. The process of government defines who we are and influences what we want to be. Policymaking by rule is not just a process of instrumentally rational implementation of predetermined goals. The article begins with some evidence for a fourth assumption: that "the problem" with rulemaking in federal administrative law is one problem or a cluster of problems common to many agencies, rather than many distinct problems that should be differently defined for different agencies. It is this generic problem or problems to which this article seeks a solution. Ultimately, this assumption will need to be relaxed. It is made now only to simplify the analysis. The final assumption is that the problem with federal agency rulemaking is not fundamentally a problem of broad political sentiment or sociology. There is surely something to the notion that the current political culture both expects and reinforces underperformance on the part of federal bureaucracies (including their rulemaking efforts). And this political sentiment translates into all sorts of actions-reduced fiscal support levels from the Congress; the scapegoating and demonizing of federal bureaucrats by politicians, the media, and ordinary citizens; adversarial styles of interaction by regulated or beneficiary interests, and so on-that hardly facilitate the rulemaking process. But because these broader currents of political culture or sociology are not malleable in the short term, this article views them only as constraints on the efficacy or political viability of solutions. In short, the article begins as if there were a "problem" that has an (imperfect) institutional design "solution." A final introductory note on the ambition of this project: the task at hand is to open up ways of thinking about the rulemaking process that may lead to more specific proposals for reform. The topic is vast because it entails no less than an attempt to better understand how government can be made to function both effectively and acceptably in an administrative state dedicated to liberal democratic ideals. The analysis that follows first attempts to define the "problem" with agency rulemaking by building on the previous literature. The essay then seeks to broaden or refocus discussion in three ways. The first is to identify a set of "internal" and "external" reform strategies and their interconnections. Both internal-managerial and legal-institutional reforms almost certainly have their place in an overall strategy, but the connections between the external environment of rulemaking and the internal environment subject to managerial controls suggests that while internal reform may make quicker marginal improvements, **significant reform depends on changes in external circumstances**. The second conceptual reformulation is to bring some of the stylized analytic capacities of game theory to bear on the problem of agency rulemaking. Institutional arrangements create highly complex individual and organizational incentive structures. A little formal modeling--even if necessarily abstract and highly sensitive to its underlying quantitative assumptions-may help us to see old problems in a different and more productive way. This analysis suggests that the legal system currently provides opponents of policy changes via rulemaking with extraordinarily powerful incentives to delay or derail the process. The article ends by sketching three different general approaches to reform of the politico-legal environment of administrative rulemaking. These sketches are left at a very high level of abstraction, but seek to provoke further thought and discussion at both macro and micro levels. Strangely enough, while all the approaches ask us to decide how deeply we are committed to the WeberianProgressive 13 vision of "rational democracy" through bureaucratic governance, each reform program could begin with a similar, and apparently modest, initiative-a reversal of the now conventional presumption that affected parties are entitled to pre-enforcement (or pre-implementation) judicial review of agency rulemaking. II THE RETREAT FROM RULEMAKING A. The Case Study Literature 1. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. In The Struggle for Auto Safety, Mashaw and Harfst provide extensive documentation of the progressive loss of rulemaking momentum at the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA"). In their words: NHTSA's regulatory behavior can be described concisely. Established as a rulemaking agency to force the technology of automobile safety design, NHTSA indeed functioned in a predominantly rulemaking mode until about 1974. NHTSA's promulgated rules, however, have had extremely modest effects in forcing the development of innovative safety technology. The rules that have become operational have required already-developed technologies, many of which were already in widespread, if not universal, use in the automobile industry at the time of the standards' promulgation. Since the mid-1970s, NHTSA has instead concentrated on its statutory power to force the recall of motor vehicles that contain defects related to safety performance. It has retreated to the old, and from the reformist perspective, despised form of legal regulation-case-by-case adjudication-which requires little, if any, technological sophistication and which has no known effects on vehicle safety. 14 2. The Consumer Product Safety Commission ("CPSC"). In a 1984 article entitled Backdoor Rulemaking: A View from the CPSC, Terrence Scanlon, then a member of the CPSC, described an agency that was "easing itself out of rulemaking, [and] learning to use its adjudicatory powers to achieve the same results."" Indeed, the CPSC situation is even more dramatic than that at NHTSA. According to Scanlon, "[t]he informal consensus in the agency is that rulemaking is dead; it simply takes too much effort. The CPSC has started only one substantive rulemaking since 1981, and it withdrew that one in favor of a voluntary standard." 16 The CPSC retreat from rulemaking is confirmed by other commentators, although as we shall see, different analysts ascribe this retreat to different causes. 17 3. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration. The glacial pace of OSHA rulemaking has been often and well documented." 8 In the words of Shapiro and McGarity's 1989 article, OSHA, in particular, has been a disappointment. During its 17-year history, the agency has completed only 24 substance specific health regulations. Perhaps the best indication that this output falls below what its proponents expected is that OSHA has either no worker protection standards or inadequate standards for more than one-half of the 110 chemicals used in work places that the National Cancer Institute (NCI) regards as confirmed or suspected carcinogens. 9 Unlike NHTSA or the CPSC, none of the case study literature suggest that OSHA has either abandoned rulemaking or relaxed its rulemaking effort. Indeed, OSHA has attempted to cut through the morass of hazard-specific rules by engaging in "generic" rulemaking. This strategy has not been very successful, however. 2 ' Although OSHA has an adjudicatory technique similar to the one available to the CPSC and NHTSA, it is not clear from the existing literature whether the agency has sought to substitute the use of this technique for rulemaking. It is clear, however, that the OSHA's prosecutions under the "general duty" clause of its statute increased during the 1970s. 21 4. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC"). In his 1991 article,' Richard Pierce provided an extremely pessimistic view of future rulemaking at FERC. In short, Pierce concluded that FERC is unlikely to attempt to muster the political and bureaucratic resources necessary to adopt several extremely urgent rules governing the structure of the electricity generation market. These policies were proposed in 1988 but have since languished. And, even if the rules are ultimately adopted, Pierce's view is that the delay will make them too late to save the economy from years of costly electricity shortages. The FERC situation, while similar in predicted outcome, has some striking differences from those previously recounted at NHTSA, the CPSC, and OSHA. FERC, in its prior incarnation, the Federal Power Commission, was traditionally an adjudicatory agency. Indeed, during its first fifty years it issued virtually no rules whatsoever. This was not because adjudication had been discovered to be an efficient policymaking technique. Rather, in Pierce's account, it was because adjudication was the path of least resistance. FERC/FPC's adjudicatory process was so slow that virtually all policy disputes became moot before they were put in a posture that made them ripe for agency action. 3 Hence, if FERC has a preference for adjudication over rulemaking, it is not based on efficiency considerations. A second major difference is that FERC's rulemaking initiatives have largely been concerned with deregulation rather than regulation. Its first foray into substantive rulemaking was in the natural gas area and was designed to undo a complex system of ceiling prices that it had created over years of adjudicatory proceedings. 24 FERC was initially quite successful in adopting rules under the National Gas Policy Act of 1978, a further command from Congress to deregulate the natural gas market. FERC's rulemaking efforts, however, began to run into heavy weather in court. Indeed, in Pierce's view, the legal and political atmosphere has become so stormy that FERC cannot be counted upon to produce much-needed deregulatory activity in the electrical energy generating field. In his words, [e]ven when a major change in regulatory policy is desperately needed, urged on an agency by the courts, welcomed by Congress, and implemented in a manner that yields enormous improvements in the performance of a regulated market, FERC's experience has shown that an agency and its staff can be publicly labeled lawless and incompetent for making such a change. By contrast, FERC's traditional pattern of behavior exposed it to much lower risks. By pretending to be a specialized court, "storing" policy issues by referring them to "nigh-interminable" adjudicatory hearings, and hiding policy issues under a mountain of idiosyncratic facts, FERC minimized its political risks.

### Sequestration doesn’t hurt hege

#### No impact—defense industry is prepared

Halzack 10-24-12 (Sarah Halzack, “Defense contractors report mixed results as they gird for ‘fiscal cliff’,” <http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/defense-contractors-report-mixed-results-as-they-gird-for-fiscal-cliff/2012/10/24/66ced8be-1dcd-11e2-9cd5-b55c38388962_story.html>)

The nation’s largest defense contractors reported mixed financial results Wednesday as the companies continue to take steps to safeguard against possible federal budget cuts associated with the “fiscal cliff.”¶ General Dynamics and Northrop Grumman said they are hanging on to more cash as part of a strategy to remain as flexible as possible in an unsteady business environment. Lockheed Martin, which has already pared back its payroll, had $4.6 billion in cash on its books at the end of the third quarter.¶ General Dynamics also said Wednesday that it did not execute any share buybacks this quarter, because of what chief executive Jay L. Johnson called the “fog bank” surrounding the federal budget.¶ “I would rather keep [the cash] in my quiver right now,” Johnson said in a conference call with investors.¶ All three companies reported largely solid third-quarter earnings, which analysts attributed to high profit margins on existing programs.¶ But at the core of their concerns is the process called “sequestration,” the series of automatic budget cuts looming at the first of the year that would hack about $55 billion out of Pentagon programs next year. The combination of government spending cuts and tax increases set to take effect in January have become known as the “fiscal cliff.”¶ “This would certainly impact sales and profits and cash flows, but we are all as concerned about what it would mean to the stability of the programs,” Wes Bush, chairman and chief executive of Northrop Grumman, said in a call with analysts and investors.¶ Bush said it was likely that his company’s services business would be the first to feel the effects of such cuts because those contracts tend to be for shorter terms compared with those for its aerospace and other businesses.¶ Bush said he is also worried about the time it would take for his government customers to sort out how to implement the cuts.¶ “Just the pure mechanics of that process would be daunting,” Bush said.¶ Northrop Grumman reported a decline in revenue in its third quarter, down to $6.3 billion from $6.6 billion last year. Its profit fell to $459 million from $520 million.¶ Johnson, of General Dynamics, told investors Wednesday that he is troubled by the “indiscriminate” nature of the planned spending cuts and that because of them his company is having difficulty planning for next year.¶ “Given the lack of planning to date, however, we are also extremely concerned about the profound disruption and paralysis that implementing these cuts will likely have on our [government] customer and thus our entire industry,” Johnson said.¶ Revenue was up at General Dynamics, from $7.85 billion to $7.93 billion, but the firm’s profit dipped to $600 million from $652 million. A bright spot for the company was its aerospace unit, which was boosted by strong demand for its Gulfstream aircraft.¶ In its earnings report, Lockheed Martin issued a corporate outlook for 2013 that was based on the premise that Congress would prevent sequestration from taking effect. Still, the company stressed that it was unsure whether that would be the outcome.¶ Robert J. Stevens, Lockheed’s chairman and chief executive, said he is not just worried about the effects of this policy on his own workforce; he is concerned about the potential fallout for smaller companies in his supply chain.¶ Though the company has already said it will not issue warning notices to its workers this year about the possibility of layoffs due to budget cuts, it said those notices still could be issued next year if conditions warrant.¶ Lockheed’s chief financial officer, Bruce J. Tanner, reiterated the company’s opposition to sequestration.¶ “Across-the-board cuts are really not an effective way to reduce spending,” Tanner said.¶ Lockheed had a relatively strong quarter, pulling in a profit of $727 million, up from $700 million last year. It posted $11.9 billion in revenue, a decline from $12.1 billion the previous year.¶ However, it projects that its sales will decline at “a low single digit rate” next year. This is mostly due to weakness in its information systems and global solutions unit.¶ So while the industry is clearly on edge about the fiscal cliff, the predicament has not yet taken a toll on the big defense contractors.¶ “I think the common thread here is that all of the companies continue to execute quite well on their programs,” said William R. Loomis, managing director at the Stifel Nicolaus investment firm. “There are no big, troubled programs that are hurting results.”

### Fiscal Cliff Won’t Pass – 1AR

#### Filibusters block passage – cites senior officials

Raju 10-23-12 (Manu Raju, “Fiscal cliff casts shadow over 2014,” http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=729B2C65-7F1B-4019-9449-E691E8CCC92C)

The longer Congress waits, the more intense the political pressure will become — and the harder it will be to reach a major deficit-cutting deal.¶ Even though the votes haven’t been counted for the 2012 election, senators who are both involved in fiscal cliff negotiations and up for election in 2014 are aware that the tough decisions they make now will linger into the next cycle.¶ “If there’s a political price to be paid, if there’s capital that needs to be expended in order to save the country, I and my colleagues, I believe are willing to do that,” Sen. John Cornyn, the likely next No. 2 Senate Republican who faces reelection in 2014, told POLITICO.¶ How a deal looks obviously depends on whether Mitt Romney or Barack Obama wins — and on the party leadership in control of the next Senate and House. If Obama wins, Republicans fear they’ll be backed into a corner by an emboldened president to push through higher taxes on families earning more than $250,000. But if Romney wins, Congress will have to engineer a short-term agreement with Senate Democratic Leader Harry Reid and House Speaker John Boehner — which is no small task in and of itself — giving the new president time to develop a budget deal of his own.¶ But the winner of the race for the White House only has so much power — especially over a divided Congress and a Senate that could be tied up by filibusters. That means there must be a bipartisan compromise, a prospect certain to force endangered senators to cast votes with electoral ramifications.¶ About a dozen senators who could be party to a deal — either because of their leadership spots and committee positions or because they’ve inserted themselves into the horse-trading so far — are up for reelection in 2014. Their to-do list is a minefield: expiring Bush tax cuts for all income groups; reversing $109 billion in sequester cuts to domestic and defense programs; reinstating jobless benefits; handling the expiring payroll tax cut; and fixing payment rates for physicians serving Medicare patients. And don’t forget the national debt ceiling, which will need to be raised in the coming months.¶ Senior officials in both parties are pessimistic a sweeping deal can be reached by the end of the year. There are ongoing talks about temporarily delaying the fiscal cliff by approving a “down payment” with budget cuts coupled with a process that forces Congress to act by the middle of next year.

### No Congressional Approval

#### Hurricane Sandy means no one in Congress knows about the plan

**Politico**, **10/26**/2012 (Election in Sandy’s shadow, p. http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1012/82932.html?hp=l1)

The possibility of a killer cyclone from the tropics delivering a gut punch to the U.S. East Coast just before Election Day, threatening tens of millions of voters with soggy devastation and a possible burst of snow, was probably not a factor in any candidate’s game plan. But it’s suddenly all too real. The pre-Halloween hurricane is already affecting the presidential race, prompting both Mitt Romney and Vice President Joe Biden to cancel scheduled appearances this weekend in Virginia Beach. It’s unknown whether it will do the same to a planned campaign stop Monday by President Barack Obama with former President Bill Clinton in Prince William County, Va. Beyond that, Sandy has scrawled a giant, blustery question mark on a crucial stretch of the political calendar. The National Hurricane Center’s latest forecast projects Sandy will be either at or near hurricane strength by the time it hooks into the mid-Atlantic coast late Monday or early Tuesday morning. It swept through the Bahamas early Friday after killing 40 people across the Caribbean. The center of the sprawling storm’s projected path targets Delaware and Maryland, but that projection comes with huge amounts of uncertainty. The territory that could feel the brunt of 57 mph or greater winds — equivalent to at least a strong tropical storm — stretches from North Carolina to Massachusetts, and includes chunks of battleground states North Carolina, Virginia and Pennsylvania. Some states, such as Virginia and Maryland, have already issued emergency declarations. “This is a very dangerous scenario,” the National Weather Service’s Philadelphia-area office warned in a briefing Friday morning. The agency said likely impacts include major flash and river flooding, along with storm tides of as much as 5 feet in the Chesapeake Bay and 10 feet in Delaware Bay, worsened by the effects of Sunday’s full moon. Forecasters advised that some areas will be exposed to strong winds from the slow-crawling storm for up to two days straight. Beyond that, Sandy could merge with an eastward-moving winter storm and cold air flowing from Canada to form what the media is calling a “Frankenstorm,” which could drop as much as 2 feet of snow on West Virginia, with lighter dustings in parts of Ohio and Pennsylvania (See also: POLITICO’s swing-state map) Not even the experts are confident how this all will play out. “Sandy is a loose, unpredictable cannon,” said MIT climate researcher Kerry Emanuel, author of the 2005 book “Divine Wind: The History and Science of Hurricanes.” For one thing, he noted that late October hurricanes usually affect the Caribbean, not the U.S. East Coast. “The only thing we’re confident in is that it’s a large and dangerous storm and could have widespread effects,” National Hurricane Center specialist Eric Blake said Friday evening. And that makes Sandy one last wildcard in a razor-thin presidential race that has already taken plenty of strange loops. Here are some ways the storm could affect the outcome — with plenty of potential down side for either Obama or Romney. (See also: The latest presidential polls) 1) Early voting: Voting is under way in some states in Sandy’s potential path — including North Carolina, where state election officials are preparing for the worst. “Those counties that are already prone to flooding are already making plans for if they need to relocate resources like voting equipment,” said Veronica Degraffenreid, a liaison at the North Carolina State Board of Elections. She said board Executive Director Gary Bartlett also has emergency powers to suspend early voting in some locations if he deems it necessary. “We would take steps to ensure the safety of voters and election officials,” she said. That wouldn’t be great news for Democrats, who have been pushing as many of their supporters as possible to vote early in states that allow it. That would be doubly true in Ohio, another early-voting state — and an all but indispensable state for both Obama’s and Romney’s electoral maps. Maryland Gov. Martin O’Malley’s administration is also monitoring the storm to determine whether changes will be needed to the state’s early voting schedule, The Associated Press reported. Early voting is scheduled to start Saturday in Florida, which isn’t in Sandy’s direct path but is getting a lashing as the storm roars past. 2) Is Election Day at risk? What happens if the damage is severe enough to disrupt Election Day itself — or at least dissuade a sizable number of voters from going to the polls? One historical parallel is the two-week postponement of the New York mayoral primary that was originally scheduled for Sept. 11, 2001. But that wasn’t a national election. The possibility of a delay has already come up in Virginia, where the AP says Gov. Bob McDonnell has pointed out he has the authority to postpone the election in extreme calamities — though that’s highly unlikely. Short of all-out mayhem, emergencies can create shortages of poll workers or ballots, knock out phone systems or electricity, or force the relocation of polling places, according to a 2007 guide from the U.S. Election Assistance Commission. The guide urges election officials to “review existing State law to determine if the Governor has the power to cancel an election or designate alternative methods for distribution of ballots.” Officials are less worried about any delays in Pennsylvania, which harbors memories of widespread flooding from Hurricane Agnes in 1972. “We are confident that the situation of the weather will be handled before the election day, before we have to take steps to consider such an option,” said Matthew Keeler, spokesman for the Pennsylvania Department of State. He added that county boards of election can petition a judge to extend polling hours on Nov. 6 if needed. (Pennsylvania doesn’t have early voting.) Consolation for Obama: Many of the states in Sandy’s path — such as Maryland, New Jersey and New York — are solidly in the blue column anyway. Officials in at least one of the vulnerable states have been through this kind of drill before: The elections office in St. Lucie County, Fla., was flooded by Tropical Storm Fay just a week before its August primaries in 2008, but the election went off without a hitch. 3) The Katrina factor: Any disaster offers a chance for a president to step up and come to the aid of the public, or stumble and be regarded as a goat. In this case, Obama will have little time to recover if he fails to respond properly to Sandy — or if Republicans successfully plant the meme that he failed. The classic example of what not to do, of course, is George W. Bush’s lagging response to 2005’s Hurricane Katrina, which forever shadowed the rest of his presidency and helped Democrats take back Congress a year later. But Bush also provided a classic counter-example in 2004 with an aggressive, high-profile response to a six-week spree of four devastating hurricanes in Florida, where his brother Jeb was governor. President Bush flew to the Sunshine State four times during the crisis, personally handing out ice to residents left without power, while the federal government promptly came in with aid. Some people blamed Bush’s humanitarian efforts for distracting him from preparation for his first debate against John Kerry, but he handily won the state anyway. The White House says Obama has been getting briefings about Sandy and held a conference call Friday with top responders such as FEMA Administrator Craig Fugate — who weathered numerous hurricanes as Florida’s emergency director under Govs. Jeb Bush and Charlie Crist. FEMA is also deploying personnel to at least 14 states, including Maryland, Virginia, the District of Columbia, Pennsylvania, New York and North Carolina, while the Energy Department and the U.S. Northern Command are making preparations as well, the White House said. 4) The distraction: As with Hurricane Irene last year, Sandy is threatening the media epicenters of New York and Washington, guaranteeing that the networks will be in All Storm All the Time mode just as Obama and Romney are trying to make their final pitches to voters. That leaves a lot less time for talking heads to parse the details of Obama’s jobs plans, the economic policy speech that Romney gave Friday in Iowa, Friday’s report on GDP growth or whether it was right for the president to call his opponent a “bull——er.” This could mostly hurt Obama, who still trails in many national tracking polls and has been trying to recapture the momentum he had in September. Or it could keep Romney from closing the deal in states where he’s still behind, like Ohio.

### Agenda – Obama Good – 1AR – PC Not Key

#### Extend Dickenson – capital is irrelevant and ignores the realities of Congress. Their ev misattributes presidential success by ignoring ideological and partisan leanings, which are the true determinants of passage

#### PC false – particularly for Obama – their ev doesn’t assume 2010 midterm and many studies

Edwards, 12 (George C., Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M University. editor of Presidential Studies Quarterly and holds the George and Julia Blucher Jordan Chair in Presidential Studies in the Bush School, *Overreach: Leadership in the Obama Presidency*, p. 1-2)

In 2008, America suffered from war and economic crisis. Partisan polarization was extraordinarily high while faith in government was exceptionally low. In such times, the reflexive call is for new—and better—leadership, especially in the White House. Barack Obama answered the call, presenting himself as a transformational leader who would fundamentally change the policy and the politics of America. Even though both the public and commentators are frequently disillusioned with the performance of individual presidents and recognize that stalemate is common in the political system, Americans eagerly accept what appears to be the promise of presidential leadership to renew their faith in the potential of the presidency. Many Americans enthusiastically embraced Obama’s candidacy and worked tirelessly to put him in the White House. Once there, the new president and his supporters shared an exuberant optimism about the changes he would bring to the country. There is little question that Obama was sincere in wanting to bring about change. So were his followers. Yet a year into his administration, many were frustrated—and surprised—by the widespread resistance to his major policy proposals. The public was typically unresponsive to the president’s calls for support. Partisan polarization and congressional gridlock did not disappear. As a result, the promised transformation in energy, environmental, immigration, and other policies did not occur. When the president succeeded on health care reform, it was the result of old-fashioned party leadership, ramming the bill through Congress on a party line vote. Even worse, from the Democrats’ perspective, the 2010 midterm elections were a stunning defeat for the president’s party that would undermine the administration’s ability to govern in the succeeding years. How could this bright, articulate, decent, and knowledgeable new president have such a difficult time attaining his goals? Did the president fumble the ball, making tactical errors in his attempts to govern? Although no president is perfect, the Obama White House has not been severely mismanaged, politically insensitive, or prone to making avoidable mistakes. Ineffective implementation of a strategy is not the explanation for the lack of progress in transforming policy and politics. Instead, the problem was in the strategies themselves—in the belief that they could succeed. A common premise underlying the widespread emphasis on political leadership as the wellspring of change is that some leaders have the capability to transform policy by reshaping the influences on it. As we will see, the Obama White House believed in the power of the bully pulpit. The president and his advisors felt that he could persuade the public to support his program. They also believed that the president could obtain bipartisan support in Congress through efforts to engage the opposition. As a result of these premises, the White House felt comfortable advancing an extraordinarily large and expensive agenda. These premises were faulty, however. There is not a single systematic study that demonstrates that presidents can reliably move others to support them. Equally important, we now have a substantial literature showing that presidents typically fail at persuasion.1 In ἀe Strategic President, I challenged the conventional understanding of presidential leadership, arguing that presidential power is not the power to persuade. Presidents cannot reshape the contours of the political landscape to pave the way for change by establishing an agenda and persuading the public, Congress, and others to support their policies.2 The point is not that presidents do not matter. Of course they do. The question is how they matter—how do they bring about change? The answer I offer is that successful presidents facilitate change by recognizing opportunities in their environments and fashioning strategies and tactics to exploit them. In other words, presidents who are successful in obtaining support for their agendas have to evaluate the opportunities for change in their environments carefully and orchestrate existing and potential support skillfully.3

#### Capital barley affects the DA – 8% swing

**Beckman and Kumar**, **11** (Matthew, associate professor of political science UC Irvine, and Vimal – economic professor at the Indian Institute of Tech, Opportunism in Polarization, Presidential Studies Quarterly, September, 41.3)

The final important piece in our theoretical model—presidents' political capital— also finds support in these analyses, though the results here are less reliable. Presidents operating under the specter of strong economy and high approval ratings get an important, albeit moderate, increase in their chances for prevailing on "key" Senate roll-call votes (b = .10, se = .06, p < .10). Figure 4 displays the substantive implications of these results in the context of polarization, showing that going from the lower third of political capital to the upper third increases presidents' chances for success by 8 percentage points (in a setting like 2008). Thus, political capital's impact does provide an important boost to presidents' success on Capitol Hill, but it is certainly not potent enough to overcome basic congressional realities. Political capital is just strong enough to put a presidential thumb on the congressional scales, which often will not matter, but can in close cases.

## 1AC v. Texas GM

### 1AC

#### Contention 1 is Inherency –

#### The Department of Interior’s leasing plan effectively restricts offshore natural gas drilling on federal lands

New 6-30 (Bill, President – New Industires, \*Offers Steel Fabrication Services to Offshore Drilling Projects, “Letters: New Leasing Plan a Step Backward,” The Advocate, 2012, http://theadvocate.com/news/opinion/3484480-123/letters-new-leasing-plan-a)

In late June, the U.S. Department of the Interior released its long-awaited outer continental shelf leasing plan, which effectively blocks offshore oil and natural gas exploration in any new areas for the next five years. Unfortunately, the proposal is a step backward in our effort to achieve energy independence. Under the plan, 85 percent of America’s OCS would be off-limits at a time when exploring every possible energy source is critical to boosting our nation’s economy and creating jobs. Instead of finding out what might be available to us in expansive unexplored areas off our coasts, we will be left to search for oil and natural gas in the same, relatively small portion of the OCS we’ve been exploring for four decades. Not only does this plan run counter to President Barack Obama’s “all of the above” strategy for energy independence, but it shows an outright disregard for the requests of the Gulf Coast states –— including Louisiana — to increase domestic oil production when the Interior Department released a draft of the plan late last year. Interestingly, the Interior Department chose to release this latest version of the OCS plan on the day the Supreme Court announced its health care decision — a thinly veiled attempt to bury it in news coverage of the ruling. But that didn’t keep right-thinking lawmakers from taking notice and working on ways to get America’s economy going using sound energy policies. U.S. Rep. Doc Hastings, R-Wash., chairman of the House Natural Resource Committee, has written legislation that sensibly revises the plan. While the Interior Department’s plan is to hold just 12 oil and gas lease sales in the Gulf of Mexico, and three in offshore Alaska from 2012 to 2017, the Hastings plan would schedule 28 lease sales total, dramatically increasing drilling opportunities off the Alaskan coast and including a sale of offshore leases in a potentially rich area off the coast of Virginia. The United States is producing more oil and natural gas than ever thanks to increased production on state-owned or private land. However, production on federal onshore land is down 14 percent in the last two years, and down 17 percent on federal offshore areas. Imagine what could happen if we enact legislation that allows us to open new offshore areas.

#### Current legislation is insufficient – removing access restrictions allows for expanded energy production – certainty is key

Loris 8-6 (Nicolas, Fellow in the Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies – Heritage Foundation “Senate Energy Bill: Good Start, Room for Improvement,” Heritage Foundation, 2012, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/08/domestic-energy-and-jobs-act-good-start-room-for-improvement)

Senator John Hoeven (R–ND) recently introduced the Domestic Energy and Jobs Act (DEJA), which would greatly expand access to energy and simplify burdensome regulations that prevent projects from coming online in a timely manner. While the legislation could be improved by further increasing access and removing the top-down energy planning, DEJA would still spur economic growth and drive energy production. Increasing Access to Energy DEJA would accept the State Department’s environmental review of the Keystone XL pipeline as sufficient and allow the state of Nebraska to reroute the pipeline to meet the state’s environmental concerns. The State Department studied and addressed risks to soil, wetlands, water resources, vegetation, fish, wildlife, and endangered species and concluded that construction of the pipeline would pose minimal environmental risk.[1] The construction of Keystone XL would allow up to 830,000 barrels of oil per day to come from Canada to the Gulf Coast and create thousands of jobs. DEJA also directs the Department of the Interior (DOI) to conduct a lease sale off the coast of Virginia. The 2.9 million acres 50 miles off the coast has an estimated 130 million barrels of oil and 1.14 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. Opening access off Virginia’s coast is long overdue, and the legislation **only opens up a small portion of America’s territorial waters that are off limits**. The Offshore Petroleum Expansion Now (OPEN) Act of 2012, also co-sponsored by Senator Hoeven, would replace President Obama’s 2012–2017 Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Leasing Program with a much more robust plan that opens areas in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, in the Gulf of Mexico, and off Alaska.[2] Both DEJA and OPEN increase the royalties that states would receive from energy production, but both could go further to increase state involvement in offshore drilling decisions. Since onshore states already receive 50 percent of the royalties, Congress should also implement a 50/50 royalty-sharing program between federal and state governments involved in offshore drilling. Efficient Permitting and Leasing for All Energy Projects Another important component of DEJA is that it streamlines the permitting of all energy projects. Receiving a permit for any energy project, not just fossil fuels, takes entirely too long. Duplicative and unnecessary regulations slow the process and drive up costs. Furthermore, environmental activists delay new energy projects by filing endless administrative appeals and lawsuits. DEJA would create a manageable time frame for permitting for all energy sources to increase supply at lower costs and stimulate economic activity. DEJA also calls for an end to the lengthy permit process in the Natural Petroleum Reserve area of Alaska. It would require the DOI to approve drilling permits within 60 days and infrastructure permits within six months. Lease certainty is another critical issue. The act states that the DOI cannot cancel or withdraw a lease sale after the winning company pays for the lease. Ensuring that the federal government does not pull the rug out from under a company that wins the lease sale would provide the **certainty necessary to pursue energy projects**. Freeze and Study Environmental Regulations DEJA would also create transparency and accountability for Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulations by establishing an interagency committee that would report on the full economic impact of the rules implemented by the EPA that affect fuel prices. This includes any part of the production process that would be affected by greenhouse gas regulations. DEJA delays the implementation of Tier 3 fuel standards (designed to replace the Tier 2 regulations issued in 2000) that would lower the amount of sulfur in gasoline but could add 6–9 cents per gallon to the cost of manufacturing gasoline. The EPA has declared no measurable air quality benefits from these standards. DEJA delays the New Source Performance Standards for refineries, which would drive up the cost of gasoline for no measurable change in the earth’s temperature.[3] It would also delay new national ambient air quality standards for ozone, which are unnecessary because the ozone standard set by the EPA is already more than stringent enough to protect human health. Though the delays contained in DEJA underscore the problems with these regulations, the preferred approach would be to prohibit the implementation of these three standards altogether. DEJA would also prevent the DOI from issuing any rule under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 before 2014 that would adversely affect coal employment, reduce revenue from coal production, reduce coal for domestic consumption or export, designate areas as unsuitable for surface mining and reclamation, or expose the U.S. to liability by taking privately owned coal through regulation. While this temporary fix recognizes the federal overreach in coal production, a better approach would be to create a framework that restricts overregulation, empowers the states, balances economic growth and environmental well-being, and creates a timely permitting process for all aspects of coal production.[4] Energy Central Planning Unneeded DEJA would require the federal government to create production objectives for fossil fuels and renewable energy and allow the relevant agencies to make additional lands available to meet those objectives. The bill would also require the U.S. Geological Survey to establish a critical minerals list and create comprehensive policies to increase critical mineral production. A much simpler and effective solution would be to open all federal lands for energy production of all sources and allow the private sector to determine what sources of energy and what technologies meet America’s electricity and transportation fuel demand. Too often the use of critical minerals has been used as cover for subsidies and extensive government intervention in a major industry. If there are clear military needs for certain critical materials, these should be met by government action. Absent that, streamlining the bureaucracy that has expanded around mining and **opening access is the only necessary federal action surrounding critical minerals**.

### Plan

#### The United States Federal Government should substantially reduce access restrictions on federal lands in the Outer Continental Shelf for conventional gas production

### Cult of Wilderness

#### Contention \_\_: Cult of Wilderness

**Offshore energy development is necessary to challenge the cult of wilderness – that which is sacred should be free from all forms of human intervention and that which has fallen no longer deserves human involvement**

**Wickersham 4** (Jay, Partner, Noble & Wickersham LLP, Cambridge, MA; Lecturer in Planning and Environmental Law, Harvard Graduate School of Design and Kennedy School of Government, “Sacred Landscapes and Profane Structures: How Offshore Wind Power Challenges the Environmental Impact Review Process,” 2004, 31 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 325)

In closing, I would like to explore an unstated assumption that helps explain the opposition to the project: the cult of wilderness, which presumes that all human impacts on the natural environment are necessarily harmful. n119 To understand what I mean by the cult of wilderness, let's look at the rhetoric of opponents to the Cape Wind project. Attorney General Reilly and others have described Nantucket Sound as akin to the "Grand Canyon." n120 Robert F. Kennedy, Jr. has compared Nantucket Sound to "Yosemite," and said that for many people, "it's their only access to wilderness." n121 Historian David McCullough has said that the wind farm would ruin "one of the most beautiful unspoiled places in all America." n122 The Grand Canyon, Yosemite: these are the sacred places of the American cult of wilderness, consecrated in the scriptures of writers beginning with John Muir. n123 The legal designation that opponents favor is actually a religious term: "sanctuary." n124 One reason the wind farm turbines are proposed to be located more than three miles offshore, outside of Massachusetts territorial waters, is that Massachusetts has designated virtually all its coastal areas, with the exception of Boston Harbor, as "ocean sanctuaries," within which the construction or operation of an electrical generating station is prohibited. n125 Now there is a proposal that the federal waters of Nantucket Sound receive a comparable federal designation as a "marine sanctuary." n126 [\*342] The quasi-religious value we ascribe to wilderness is America's most original contribution to environmentalism. n127 But as historian William Cronon writes in his essay, The Trouble with Wilderness, the cult of wilderness as a sacred place may also be the greatest impediment to our development of a sound attitude toward the natural environment. n128 The cult of wilderness distorts our perceptions and our actions. n129 Because designation of a place as a wilderness, an untouched place, may be required for it to receive legal protection, it encourages us to misrepresent the nature of places that we care about, to give them a spurious history free of any human intervention. n130 Second, the cult of wilderness encourages us to disregard places that do not qualify. Places that have received a visible human imprint are fallen, no longer sacred--and so they are no longer worthy of our protection and love. n131 As Michael Pollan has written: "Americans have done an admirable job of drawing lines around certain sacred areas . . . and a terrible job of managing the rest of our land." n132 I would like to draw particular attention to the visual aspect of the cult of wilderness because of its importance in the offshore wind power debate. The Grand Canyon and Yosemite are visual icons. In addition to making pilgrimages to these sacred places, we worship their images: from the paintings of Albert Bierstadt, to the photographs of Ansel Adams, to today's postcards and television travelogues and nature shows. Much of the opposition to the Cape Wind project derives from what we must presume is a sincere and deeply-held belief that the turbine towers are ugly to look at and that introducing these elements into Nantucket Sound will irretrievably damage the visual experience of that place. n133 I am not going to argue that aesthetics have no place in environmental impact review because of their inherent subjectivity. As Dorothy Bisbee's article discusses, the regulation of visual appearance is well founded in the law, and it should not necessarily be excluded [\*343] by the NEPA/MEPA process. n134 But our analysis should acknowledge that our perceptions of beauty and visual impacts are cultural constructs, in a way that physical impacts on birds, or fish, or wave patterns, are not. As John Costonis has written in Icons and Aliens, the demand to regulate aesthetics is rooted in a sense of social dissonance. n135 Either a sacred structure or landscape (an "icon") is threatened with change or destruction, or there is a proposal to introduce a jarring element (an "alien") into a well-defined context. n136 Often the two concepts go together and project opponents claim that it is the intrusion of an alien structure that threatens to destroy an iconic landscape. n137 Yet as Costonis also points out, our notions of what is an icon and what is an alien are highly malleable: "one generation's alien is the next generation's icon." n138 In the late nineteenth century, a committee of three hundred concerned citizens organized themselves to try to protect a particularly well-beloved landscape from a large-scale industrial intrusion. n139 A landscape "without rival in the world" would be "profaned" and subject to "dishonor" due to the construction of a "ridiculously tall tower," which they characterized as "the grotesque, mercantile imaginings of a constructor of machines." n140 The iconic landscape was the city of Paris; the alien was the Eiffel Tower. In a sense, the opponents were right. The Eiffel Tower was wildly out of scale with a predominantly low-rise city; its exposed steel construction jarred with the predominant aesthetic of classical buildings rendered [\*344] in stone. n141 And yet the alien has become an icon: today the Eiffel Tower is the most recognizable and best loved symbol of Paris. n142

**Challenging the sacredness of wilderness is essential to break down cultural imperialism and solve environmental problems – dualistic notions of humanity and the environment reinforce the notion that we are separate from our surroundings.**

**Cronon 95** (William Cronon, “The Trouble with Wilderness; or, Getting Back to the Wrong Nature,”

ed., Uncommon Ground: Rethinking the Human Place in Nature, New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1995, 69-90;

http://www.williamcronon.net/writing/Trouble\_with\_Wilderness\_Main.html)

The removal of Indians to create an “uninhabited wilderness”—uninhabited as never before in the human history of the place—reminds us just how invented, just how constructed, the American wilderness really is. To return to my opening argument: there is nothing natural about the concept of wilderness. It is entirely a creation of the culture that holds it dear, a product of the very history it seeks to deny. Indeed, one of the most striking proofs of the cultural invention of wilderness is its thoroughgoing erasure of the history from which it sprang. In virtually all of its manifestations, wilderness represents a flight from history. Seen as the original garden, it is a place outside of time, from which human beings had to be ejected before the fallen world of history could properly begin. Seen as the frontier, it is a savage world at the dawn of civilization, whose transformation represents the very beginning of the national historical epic. Seen as the bold landscape of frontier heroism, it is the place of youth and childhood, into which men escape by abandoning their pasts and entering a world of freedom where the constraints of civilization fade into memory. Seen as the sacred sublime, it is the home of a God who transcends history by standing as the One who remains untouched and unchanged by time’s arrow. No matter what the angle from which we regard it, wilderness offers us the illusion that we can escape the cares and troubles of the world in which our past has ensnared us. (25) This escape from history is one reason why the language we use to talk about wilderness is often permeated with spiritual and religious values that reflect human ideals far more than the material world of physical nature. Wilderness fulfills the old romantic project of secularizing Judeo-Christian values so as to make a new cathedral not in some petty human building but in God’s own creation, Nature itself. Many environmentalists who reject traditional notions of the Godhead and who regard themselves as agnostics or even atheists nonetheless express feelings tantamount to religious awe when in the presence of wilderness—a fact that testifies to the success of the romantic project. Those who have no difficulty seeing God as the expression of our human dreams and desires nonetheless have trouble recognizing that in a secular age Nature can offer precisely the same sort of mirror. Thus it is that wilderness serves as the unexamined foundation on which so many of the quasi-religious values of modern environmentalism rest. The critique of modernity that is one of environmentalism’s most important contributions to the moral and political discourse of our time more often than not appeals, explicitly or implicitly, to wilderness as the standard against which to measure the failings of our human world. Wilderness **is the natural, unfallen antithesis of an unnatural civilization** that has lost its soul. It is a place of freedom in which we can recover the true selves we have lost to the corrupting influences of our artificial lives. Most of all, it is the ultimate landscape of authenticity. Combining the sacred grandeur of the sublime with the primitive simplicity of the frontier, it is the place where we can see the world as it really is, and so know ourselves as we really are—or ought to be. But the trouble with wilderness is that it quietly expresses and reproduces the very values its devotees seek to reject. The flight from history that is very nearly the core of wilderness represents the false hope of an escape from responsibility, the illusion that we can somehow wipe clean the slate of our past and return to the tabula rasa that supposedly existed before we began to leave our marks on the world. The dream of an unworked natural landscape is very much the fantasy of people who have never themselves had to work the land to make a living—urban folk for whom food comes from a supermarket or a restaurant instead of a field, and for whom the wooden houses in which they live and work apparently have no meaningful connection to the forests in which trees grow and die. Only people whose relation to the land was already alienated could hold up wilderness as a model for human life in nature, for the romantic ideology of wilderness leaves precisely nowhere for human beings actually to make their living from the land. This, then, is the central paradox: wilderness embodies a dualistic vision **in which the human is entirely outside the natural**. If we allow ourselves to believe that nature, to be true, must also be wild, then our very presence in nature represents its fall. The place where we are is the place where nature is not. If this is so—if by definition wilderness leaves no place for human beings, save perhaps as contemplative sojourners enjoying their leisurely reverie in God’s natural cathedral—then also by **definition it can offer no solution to the environmental** and other **problems that confront us**. To the extent that we celebrate wilderness as the measure with which we judge civilization, we reproduce the dualism that sets humanity and nature at opposite poles. We thereby leave ourselves little hope of discovering what an ethical, sustainable, honorable human place in nature might actually look like. Worse: to the extent that we live in **an urban-industrial civilization but at the same time pretend to ourselves that our real home is in the wilderness,** to just that extent **we give ourselves permission to** evade responsibility for the lives we actually lead. We inhabit civilization while holding some part of ourselves—what we imagine to be the most precious part—aloof from its entanglements. We work our nine-to-five jobs in its institutions, we eat its food, we drive its cars (not least to reach the wilderness), we benefit from the intricate and all too invisible networks with which it shelters us, all the while pretending that these things are not an essential part of who we are. By imagining that our true home is in the wilderness, we forgive ourselves the homes we actually inhabit. In its flight from history, in its siren song of escape, in its reproduction of the dangerous dualism that sets human beings outside of nature—in all of these ways, wilderness poses a serious threat to responsible environmentalism at the end of the twentieth century. By now I hope it is clear that my criticism in this essay is not directed at wild nature per se, or even at efforts to set aside large tracts of wild land, but rather at the specific habits of thinking that flow from this complex cultural construction called wilderness. It is not the things we label as wilderness that are the problem—for nonhuman nature and large tracts of the natural world do deserve protection—but rather what we ourselves mean when we use the label. Lest one doubt how pervasive these habits of thought actually are in contemporary environmentalism, let me list some of the places where wilderness serves as the ideological underpinning for environmental concerns that might otherwise seem quite remote from it. Defenders of biological diversity, for instance, although sometimes appealing to more utilitarian concerns, often point to “untouched” ecosystems as the best and richest repositories of the undiscovered species we must certainly try to protect. Although at first blush an apparently more “scientific” concept than wilderness, biological diversity in fact invokes many of the same sacred values, which is why organizations like the Nature Conservancy have been so quick to employ it as an alternative to the seemingly fuzzier and more problematic concept of wilderness. There is a paradox here, of course. To the extent that biological diversity (indeed, even wilderness itself) is likely to survive in the future only by the most vigilant and self-conscious management of the ecosystems that sustain it, the ideology of wilderness is potentially in direct conflict with the very thing it encourages us to protect. (26) The most striking instances of this have revolved around “endangered species,” which serve as vulnerable symbols of biological diversity while at the same time standing as surrogates for wilderness itself. The terms of the Endangered Species Act in the United States have often meant that those hoping to defend pristine wilderness have had to rely on a single endangered species like the spotted owl to gain legal standing for their case—thereby making the full power of the sacred land inhere in a single numinous organism whose habitat then becomes the object of intense debate about appropriate management and use. (27) The ease with which anti-environmental forces like the wise-use movement have attacked such single-species preservation efforts suggests the vulnerability of strategies like these. Perhaps partly because our own conflicts over such places and organisms have become so messy, the convergence of wilderness values with concerns about biological diversity and endangered species has helped produce a deep fascination for remote ecosystems, where it is easier to imagine that nature might somehow be “left alone” to flourish by its own pristine devices. The classic example is the tropical rain forest, which since the 1970s has become the **most powerful modern icon of unfallen**, sacred land—a veritable Garden of Eden—for many Americans and Europeans. And yet protecting the rain forest in the eyes of First World environmentalists all too often means protecting it from the people who live there. Those who seek to preserve such “wilderness” from the activities of native peoples run the risk of reproducing the same tragedy—**being forceably removed from an ancient home**—that befell American Indians. Third World countries face massive environmental problems and deep social conflicts, but these are not likely to be solved by a cultural myth that encourages us to “preserve” peopleless landscapes that have not existed in such places for millennia. At its worst, as environmentalists are beginning to realize, exporting American notions of wilderness in this way **can become an unthinking and self-defeating form of** cultural imperialism. (28)

#### We must recognize that everything is wilderness – there is no such thing as a pristine ecosystem. Only by doing this can we truly hope to view ourselves as part of our surroundings

Bailey 11 (Ronald – award-winning science correspondent for Reason, Emma Marris is a writer for Nature,

“The Myth of Pristine Nature A review of Rambunctious Garden: Saving Nature in a Post-Wild World”, 8/16, http://reason.com/archives/2011/08/16/the-myth-of-pristine)

“Nature is almost everywhere. But wherever it is, there is one thing nature is not: pristine,” writes science journalist Emma Marris in her engaging new book Rambunctious Garden: Saving Nature in a Post-Wild World. She adds, “We must temper our romantic notion of untrammeled wilderness and find room next to it for the more nuanced notion of a global, half-wild rambunctious garden, tended by us.” Marris’ message will discomfort both environmental activists and most ecologists who are in thrall to the damaging cult of pristine wilderness and the false ideology of the balance of nature. But it should encourage and inspire the rest of us. Marris begins by exposing the vacuity of the notion of the ecological baseline. “For many conservationists, restoration to a pre-human or a pre-European baseline is seen as healing a wounded or sick nature,” explains Marris. “For others, it is an ethical duty. We broke it; therefore we must fix it. Baselines thus typically don’t act as a scientific before to compare with an after. They become the good, the goal, the one correct state.” What is so good about historical ecosystems? I too have noted that ecologists when asked this same question become almost inarticulate. They just know that historical ecosystems are better. So many ecologists set the historical baseline as the condition of ecosystems before Europeans arrived. Why? The fact is that primitive peoples killed off the largest species in North and South America, Australia and Pacific Islands thousands of years ago. For example, after people showed up about 14,000 years ago, North America lost 60 or so species of tasty mammals that weighed over 100 pounds, including giant ground sloths, mammoths, mastodons, cheetahs, camels, and glyptodonts. Marris argues that the cult of pristine wilderness was created by nature romantics like John Muir. Muir is famous for advocating that the Yosemite Valley be turned into a national park. As Marris notes, wild nature for Muir was a necessity for “tired, nerve-shaken, over-civilized people” suffering from “the vice of over-industry and the deadly apathy of luxury.” And for some people it might be—but that is not a scientific claim about ecosystems and their “integrity.” In fact, Marris reports that there is precious little scientific support for the ideology that pristine nature is somehow “better” than the mélange that humanity has created by moving species around the globe. For example, she visits Hawaii where half of the plant species now living on the islands are non-native. One brave younger ecologist, Joe Mascaro, studies novel ecosystems that are developing on Hawaii that incorporate both native and non-native species. Among other things, Mascaro “found that the novel forests, on average, had just as many species as native forests” and “that in many measures of forest productivity, such as nutrient cycling and biomass, novel forests matched or outproduced the native forests.” Marris contrasts Mascaro with another ecologist, Christian Giardina, who helps manage the Laupahoehoe Natural Area Reserve in Hawaii from which he wants to extirpate non-natives. Yet even Giardina muses over dinner, “Are we so religious about this biodiversity ethic that we need to be called on it?” He answers his own question: “If you really dig down to why we should care, you end up with nothing. You are running on faith that we should care.” Although Marris doesn’t cite him, she is plowing much the same intellectual ground as University of Maryland philosopher Marc Sagoff. Sagoff has challenged ecologists to name any specifically ecological criterion by which scientists can objectively determine whether an ecosystem whose history they don't know has been invaded or not. Are invaded ecosystems less productive? No. Are they less species-rich? No. And so on. In fact, Sagoff points out that there is no objective criterion for distinguishing between "disturbed" ecosystems and allegedly pristine ones. Marris also cites research that shows that the notion of the “balance of nature” is scientifically specious. Early in the 20th century influential ecologist Frederic Clements developed the theory that each ecosystem tended toward a stable climax that, once achieved, was perfectly balanced unless disturbed by people. Each participant in the climax ecosystem fitted tightly into niches as a result of coevolving together. However, ecologist Henry Gleason, a contemporary of Clements, countered that ecosystems were assembled by chance just depending on what species got there first and were successful in competing with other species as they arrived. For the most part, 20th century ecologists fell into the Clements’ camp. Now we know now that Gleason was far more right than Clements—ecosystems are largely assembled by chance. For example, northern temperate forests are composed of an assemblage of species that mixed together as they raced northward out of various refugia as the glaciers retreated. Although Marris mentions it briefly, one of the more fascinating novel ecosystems is the accidental rainforest created on Ascension Island in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean. A little over 150 years ago, the British navy began receiving shipments of trees and shrubs from all over the world from the collections at Kew Gardens in London. Once planted, they took hold and have transformed the bare peak once known as White Mountain into Green Mountain today. Species don’t need to coevolve to create fully functioning ecosystems [PDF]; they make the best of what they have. Only when the ecologically-correct ideologies that blind us are upended can we can see the real nature that is all around us. Baselines are properly transformed into aesthetic choices rather than “scientific” mandates. For example, Marris discusses the ambitious Pleistocene Rewilding proposal in which proxy wild species from Africa might be used to replace those North American species killed off by early peoples. African cheetahs might chase after pronghorns, and elephants graze where mastodons once did. A small version of rewilding is the fascinating Oostvaardersplassen [PDF] experiment where researchers are designing an ecosystem that aims to mimic what Northern Europe might have looked like 10,000 years ago. It is stocked with herds of Konik horses and Heck cattle, thought to be respectively similar to the tarpan horses and the aurochs that once roamed Europe. The newly constructed ecosystem has attracted many wild species that have long been absent from the Netherlands. It is still missing predators, but wolves are apparently moving westward from Eastern Europe. Marris argues that the conservation and appreciation of nature can take place at far less exotic locations, such as backyards, city parks, farms, and even parking lots. If biodiversity is what is of interest, she notes that the Los Angeles area is home to 60 native tree species, but now hosts 145 species. “With eight to eleven tree species per hectare, L.A. is more diverse than many ecosystem types,” she writes. Another researcher has identified 227 species of bee living in New York City. And if some of us choose to conserve some areas as “pristine” with regard to some preferred aesthetic baseline, that’s O.K. Certainly science can be used to help achieve that goal, but such areas become essentially wilderness gardens maintained by “perpetual weeding and perpetual watching.” This gracefully written and well-argued book deserves a wide readership. One hopes that readers will take to heart Marris’ chief insight about conservation: “There is no one best goal.” She bravely and correctly concludes, “We’ve forever altered the Earth, and so now we cannot abandon it to a random fate. It is our duty to manage it. Luckily, it can be a pleasant, even joyful task if we embrace it in the right spirit. Let the rambunctious gardening begin.”

#### This dualistic relationship with nature is the root cause of our anthropocentric mindset. Starting from any other point prevents an effective understanding of oppression and humanity

Plumwood 4 (Val – Famous Australian Philosopher, “Environmental Justice”, 2004, http://www.eolss.net/Sample-Chapters/C14/E1-37-03-04.pdf)

4. Interspecies Justice The dominant position in the West has insisted that concepts of justice are confined to the human sphere and to intra-human relationships. I will argue, to the contrary, that we can map a range of ethical stances and components of justice onto interspecies relationships and human treatment of non-human nature, and that there are important insights to be gained from doing so and to be lost from refusing to do so. There are some important choices between different ways to make such mappings, some of which I discuss below. I will argue against closed, extensionist mappings of justice that try to confine interspecies ethics to sentient or conscious beings, recognizing only those nonhumans who are believed most closely to resemble humans. These positions may avoid the most extreme and blatant forms of species injustice, but they retain most of the problems of moral dualism and do little to help us change our perceptions or behavior in ways relevant to the environmental crisis. But primary concepts of justice as giving others their due, and as distributional and proportional justice, are not confined to intrahuman relationships, and have an application to the non-human sphere and interspecies relationships. An important concept of injustice as “prejudice” is concerned with the impediments to justice presented by prior reductive or oppressive conceptions of the other, as in colonialism, racism, and sexism, and this concept of justice has, I shall argue, a clear application to the non-human sphere. The denial of concepts of justice to the non-human sphere, which is thus treated ethically as “other,” is itself a form of injustice. 4.1. Prejudice and Injustice There is injustice in the traditional stances of the dominant culture that would deny any application of ethics to non-humans, treating humans, and only humans, as ethically significant in the universe, and derive those limited ethical constraints they admit on the way we can use nature and animals entirely indirectly, from harms to other humans. These extreme positions are fairly obvious and easy to recognize as forms of anthropocentrism. But just as other forms of supremacism and centrism, for example those based on race and gender, appear in various forms and guises, so there are weaker and stronger, more upfront and more subtle forms of human centeredness. Despite our contemporary context of accelerating human destruction of the non-human world, traditions of general and direct ethical exclusion for non-humans are strongly defended by many philosophers and some environmentalists. Some philosophers, most notably Kant, have advocated admitting the others of the earth indirectly to ethical status, because we can learn from cruelty to animals “bad habits” that affect our behavior towards those who really count, human beings. Such indirect positions are heavily human centered because non-humans are admitted to value only in a secondary way, entirely as a function of their relationship to humans. Other philosophers are critical of these strong forms of human centeredness, but nevertheless cling to subtler forms that remain anthropocentric and are overly restrictive in their ethical recognition of non-humans. Recent environmental ethics has produced many examples of more subtle anthropocentric forms, for example assimilationist positions that allocate moral consideration or value to non-human beings entirely on the basis of their similarity to the human. Such claims are unjust for non-humans in the same way that assimilationist frameworks that allocate worth to individuals of another culture, for example an aboriginal culture, just on the basis of their similarity to the dominant (white) colonizing culture are unjust. We should not begin this inquiry into justice for non-humans with the assumption that we start from a condition of tabula rasa, that we have no conceptual mappings already, or that they are neutral. On the contrary, those of us from Western backgrounds start out from a tradition that has consistently mapped non-humans onto human others, and accorded both less than justice. Dominant traditions over at least 25 centuries have identified the human normatively with the rational, and both the non-human and the humanother with relative absence of reason and corresponding proximity to nature and the earth. Women have been consistently identified with lack of reason and with animals and, by Hegel, with a plant-like form of existence. The humanistic revolution of the Enlightenment replaced the rational hierarchy built on a complex set of reason/nature dualisms with a simpler and starker mental and moral dualism between humans and non-humans. In the Cartesian mind/body dualism, for example, non-humans are hyper-separated from humans by their alleged lack of “thought,” and are subject to an extreme form of homogenization that consigns them uniformly to the same inconsiderable category as the least considerable and most instrumentalized among them, which for Descartes was the machine. Modern conceptions of nature, even those of supposedly liberatory versions of environmental ethics, have not fully broken with these traditions of human and rational supremacy, although they minimize our ability to render justice and our sensitivity to the other, human and non-human. Questions of justice for non-human nature—including the question of ethical recognition and the critique of human-supremacist or anthropocentric values and ethical standards—were intensely debated over the three decades of environmental philosophy at the end of the twentieth century. I am among those environmental philosophers who say that Western culture is locked into an ecologically destructive form of rationality that is human centered, or “anthropocentric,” treating non-human nature as a sphere of inferior and replaceable “others.” Human supremacism and anthropocentrism are incompatible with justice to other species. Human supremacism in its strongest forms refuses ethical recognition to non-humans, treating nature as just a resource we can make use of however we wish. It sees humans, and only humans, as ethically significant in the universe, and derives those limited ethical constraints it admits on the way we can use nature and animals entirely indirectly, from harms to other humans. But just as other forms of supremacism and centrism, for example those based on race and gender, appear in various guises, so there are weaker and stronger, more obvious and more subtle forms of human supremacism and human centeredness. Despite our contemporary context of accelerating human destruction of the non-human world, some philosophers and traditionalists have been reluctant to censure even strong forms of human supremacism. Others are critical of these strong forms, but nevertheless cling to subtler forms that remain anthropocentric and are overly restrictive in their ethical recognition of non-humans. The most human-like “higher animals,” who are claimed to be the only possessors among the non-humans of the supposedly defining human characteristic of awareness, says Peter Singer, may be admitted to the ethical sphere, but the door is firmly closed against all others. This strategy is aptly termed “neo-Cartesianism” or “minimalism.” It aims to enlarge the human sphere of justice rather than ethically to integrate human and non-human spheres, a strategy that results in minimal further admissions to the privileged class. It minimally challenges anthropocentric ranking regimes that base the worth of beings on their degree of conformity to human norms or resemblance to an idealized “rational” or “conscious” humanity; and it often aims explicitly at minimal deviations from the prevailing political assumptions and dominant human-centered ethic they are tied into. It tends to minimize recognition of diversity, focusing on ethically relevant qualities like mind, consciousness, and communication only in forms resembling the human and failing to recognize that they can be expressed in many different, often incommensurable, forms in an ethically and ecologically rich and diverse world. I contrast below this minimalist ethical stance of closure with a more generous eco-justice stance of openness and recognition towards non-humans that acknowledges ethical diversity and critiques anthropocentric moral dualism as the “othering” of the non-human world, a form of injustice that closely parallels racial and gender injustice in both conceiving and making the other radically less than they are or can become. Moral dualism makes an emphatic division of the world into two starkly contrasting orders, consisting of those privileged beings considered subject to full-blown ethical concern as “humans” or “persons,” and the remainder, considered beneath ethical concern and as belonging to an instrumental realm of resources (or, in the prevailing political context, of “property”), available to the first group. Both the traditional humansupremacist position that refuses any extension of ethics beyond the class of humans and the minimalist animal rights variation that refuses any extension of ethics beyond the class it considers conscious (persons) are moral dualisms. Typically, moral dualism organizes moral concepts so that they apply in an all-or-nothing way: for example, a being either has a full-blown “right” to equal treatment with humans, or it is not subject to any form of ethical consideration at all. As I will show below, there are good reasons to reject moral dualism. We have many opportunities to organize the ethical field differently; some ethical concepts and practices of recognition and justice, for example, can be applied to humans and also to non-human animals and nature more generally. And ethically relevant qualities such as mind, communication, consciousness, and sensitivity to others are organized in multiple and diverse ways across life forms that do not correspond to the all-or-nothing scenarios assumed by moral dualism. In both the human and the non-human case, a politics of conflict can be played out around these moral dualisms, in which the moral exclusion of the class defined as “resource” is represented as a benefit or even a moral duty to less fortunate members of the human or person class, and the rejection of moral dualism is represented as depriving underprivileged humans of resources that are rightfully theirs. Much humanist rhetoric has involved policing exaggerated boundaries of moral considerability and forming a pan-human identity in the same way as racist and macho (male-bonding) identities, building solidarity within the human group through creating an inferiorized non-human out-group of others that the pan-human identity is defined against. The exclamation “What are we—animals?—to be treated like this!” both implicitly appeals to such an identity, and implies that ill treatment is appropriate for animals. Moral dualism helps to construct concern for non-human nature in this conflictual way, as a deficit of attention or concern for some less privileged human group, although the remorseless conflict scenario this assumes can usually be reconceived in complementary rather than competitive ways. As in the case of conflicts within the sphere of human justice, we have, I believe, an overriding, higher-order obligation to try to circumvent and reduce or eliminate such justice conflicts where possible, and to avoid multiplying and reinforcing them. This translates into an obligation to favor, where they are available, complementary over competitive constructions of justice spheres, other things being equal. We need then to attend to the ways in which both human and non-human spheres of justice, although not free of some limited and sometimes manufactured conflicts of this kind, can be constructed not as competitive but as complementary approaches that need and strengthen each other. Thus we should note that moral dualism is also a moral boomerang that too often returns to strike down humanity itself when allegedly “lower” orders of humans are assimilated to nature and to animals, as they have been systematically throughout Western history. Conversely, many forms of ethical practice and sensitivity to others are not only not especially sensitive to whether these others are human or non-human, but can actually be strengthened and deepened generally when we refuse the arbitrary exclusion of non-human others and the self-impoverishment and blunting of sensibilities exclusion involves. One reason for rejecting moral dualism is that its stance of closure unnecessarily blunts our sensitivity to the excluded class and those assimilated to them, and this can involve prudential hazards as well as injustices. It is in our interests as well as the interests of the other to adopt a less impoverished ethical stance and view of the other. Thus, by refusing recognition to nature we lose not only an ethically but also a prudentially crucial set of connections that link human and non-human movements for liberation and justice**.** By blunting our sensitivity to nature and animals we lose a prudentially important set of insights that can help us to reflect on our limitations as human actors and observers and correct crucial blind spots in our relationships with the more-than-human world. Further, the attempt to articulate various forms of recognition for nature, and to counter anthropocentrism, is important for practical activism in a number of ways, and also affects the way political alliances between groups can be formed. Such a recognition is crucial for the birth of the new communicative and care paradigm for the human–nature relationship that must now, in an age of ecological limits, take the place of the mechanistic paradigm associated with the past centuries of human expansion and conquest.

#### This independently divorces our relationship with the natural world and makes ecocide inevitable

Gottlieb 94 (Roger S. Gottlieb – Professor of Humanities at Worcester Polytechnic Institute, holds a Ph.D. in Philosophy from Brandeis University, “Ethics and Trauma: Levinas, Feminism, and Deep Ecology,” Crosscurrents: A Journal of Religion and Intellectual Life, 1994, Summer, http://www.crosscurrents.org/feministecology.htm)

Here I will at least begin in agreement with Levinas. As he rejects an ethics proceeding on the basis of self-interest, so I believe the anthropocentric perspectives of conservation or liberal environmentalism cannot take us far enough. Our relations with nonhuman nature are poisoned and not just because we have set up feedback loops that already lead to mass starvations, skyrocketing environmental disease rates, and devastation of natural resources. The problem with ecocide is not just that it hurts human beings. Our uncaring violence also violates the very ground of our being, our natural body, our home. Such violence is done not simply to the other – as if the rainforest, the river, the atmosphere, the species made extinct are totally different from ourselves. Rather, we have crucified ourselves-in-relation-to-the-other, fracturing a mode of being in which self and other can no more be conceived as fully in isolation from each other than can a mother and a nursing child. We are that child, and nonhuman nature is that mother. If this image seems too maudlin, let us remember that other lactating women can feed an infant, but we have only one earth mother. What moral stance will be shaped by our personal sense that we are poisoning ourselves, our environment, and so many kindred spirits of the air, water, and forests? To begin, we may see this tragic situation as setting the limits to Levinas's perspective. The other which is nonhuman nature is not simply known by a "trace," nor is it something of which all knowledge is necessarily instrumental. This other is inside us as well as outside us. We prove it with every breath we take, every bit of food we eat, every glass of water we drink. We do not have to find shadowy traces on or in the faces of trees or lakes, topsoil or air: we are made from them. Levinas denies this sense of connection with nature. Our "natural" side represents for him a threat of simple consumption or use of the other, a spontaneous response which must be obliterated by the power of ethics in general (and, for him in particular, Jewish religious law(23) ). A "natural" response lacks discipline; without the capacity to heed the call of the other, unable to sublate the self's egoism. Worship of nature would ultimately result in an "everything-is-permitted" mentality, a close relative of Nazism itself. For Levinas, to think of people as "natural" beings is to assimilate them to a totality, a category or species which makes no room for the kind of individuality required by ethics.(24) He refers to the "elemental" or the "there is" as unmanaged, unaltered, "natural" conditions or forces that are essentially alien to the categories and conditions of moral life.(25) One can only lament that Levinas has read nature -- as to some extent (despite his intentions) he has read selfhood -- through the lens of masculine culture. It is precisely our sense of belonging to nature as system, as interaction, as interdependence, which can provide the basis for an ethics appropriate to the trauma of ecocide. As cultural feminism sought to expand our sense of personal identity to a sense of inter-identification with the human other, so this ecological ethics would expand our personal and species sense of identity into an inter-identification with the natural world. Such a realization can lead us to an ethics appropriate to our time, a dimension of which has come to be known as "deep ecology."(26) For this ethics, we do not begin from the uniqueness of our human selfhood, existing against a taken-for-granted background of earth and sky. Nor is our body somehow irrelevant to ethical relations, with knowledge of it reduced always to tactics of domination. Our knowledge does not assimilate the other to the same, but reveals and furthers the continuing dance of interdependence. And our ethical motivation is neither rationalist system nor individualistic self-interest, but a sense of connection to all of life. The deep ecology sense of self-realization goes beyond the modern Western sense of "self" as an isolated ego striving for hedonistic gratification. . . . . Self, in this sense, is experienced as integrated with the whole of nature.(27) Having gained distance and sophistication of perception [from the development of science and political freedoms] we can turn and recognize who we have been all along. . . . we are our world knowing itself. We can relinquish our separateness. We can come home again -- and participate in our world in a richer, more responsible and poignantly beautiful way.(28) Ecological ways of knowing nature are necessarily participatory. [This] knowledge is ecological and plural, reflecting both the diversity of natural ecosystems and the diversity in cultures that nature-based living gives rise to. The recovery of the feminine principle is based on inclusiveness. It is a recovery in nature, woman and man of creative forms of being and perceiving. In nature it implies seeing nature as a live organism. In woman it implies seeing women as productive and active. Finally, in men the recovery of the feminine principle implies a relocation of action and activity to create life-enhancing, not life-reducing and life-threatening societies.(29) In this context, the knowing ego is not set against a world it seeks to control, but one of which it is a part. To continue the feminist perspective, the mother knows or seeks to know the child's needs. Does it make sense to think of her answering the call of the child in abstraction from such knowledge? Is such knowledge necessarily domination? Or is it essential to a project of care, respect and love, precisely because the knower has an intimate, emotional connection with the known?(30) Our ecological vision locates us in such close relation with our natural home that knowledge of it is knowledge of ourselves. And this is not, contrary to Levinas's fear, reducing the other to the same, but a celebration of a larger, more inclusive, and still complex and articulated self.(31) The noble and terrible burden of Levinas's individuated responsibility for sheer existence gives way to a different dream, a different prayer: Being rock, being gas, being mist, being Mind, Being the mesons traveling among the galaxies with the speed of light, You have come here, my beloved one. . . . You have manifested yourself as trees, as grass, as butterflies, as single-celled beings, and as chrysanthemums; but the eyes with which you looked at me this morning tell me you have never died.(32) In this prayer, we are, quite simply, all in it together. And, although this new ecological Holocaust -- this creation of planet Auschwitz – is under way, it is not yet final. We have time to step back from the brink, to repair our world. But only if we see that world not as an other across an irreducible gap of loneliness and unchosen obligation, but as a part of ourselves as we are part of it, to be redeemed not out of duty, but out of love; neither for our selves nor for the other, but for us all.

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#### Contention 3: The Energy Revolution

#### The energy transition is failing – fracking requires massive amounts of water that drives up costs and makes new natural gas uneconomical – access to new conventional natural gas makes the transition sustainable

Dorsey 12 (Gregory, Managing Editor – Leeb’s Income Performance Letter, “Fractured Logic: The Myth of Abundant Natural Gas,” Leeb’s Market Forecast, 5-9, http://leebsmarketforecast.com/content/fractured-logic-myth-abundant-natural-gas)

A popular meme these days is the idea that natural gas is America’s salvation on the road to energy independence. Production of the clean burning fuel has reached record levels in this country and stockpiles are bursting at the seams. Natural gas prices recently dipped to their lowest level since the late 1990s below $2 before clawing their way back to $2.50. The supply glut has occurred thanks to an extraction technique known as hydraulic fracturing, or “fracking,” as it’s commonly known. In contrast to the conventional method where companies merely drill into the earth to exploit natural gas and oil deposits below the surface, fracturing entails pumping a highly pressurized mixture of water, sand and chemicals into the well. The highly pressurized cocktail opens up cracks in tight rock formations, facilitating the flow of natural gas and other hydrocarbons from the source rock. Since fracking was approved for energy production through its exemption from the 2005 Safe Drinking Water Act, its popularity has grown immensely. Fracking has allowed producers to exploit resources that were otherwise considered too difficult to access. However, we would **stop short of calling fracking a true energy revolution** for a number of reasons, just one of which we want to address today. What’s typically overlooked is the huge amount of water resources required for hydraulic fracturing. While many believe fresh water to be an abundant resource, it’s actually anything but. As we’ve pointed out in the past, natural resources tend to be inter-correlated through the energy required to extract and process them. As one resource becomes scarcer, it will affect the cost or availability of other resources as well. In the long run, we see natural gas extraction from unconventional sources as no exception. And fresh water is the key connection. The mainstream political opposition to fracking comes from the environmental concern that the chemicals injected into the ground can leak into the groundwater, contaminating an important source of drinking water. We’ll leave the environmental argument to the experts in that field, but what has become increasingly clear in our research is that the amount of fresh water required for large-scale hydraulic fracturing is massive, far surpassing any estimates put forward by the oil and gas industry today. Depending on which numbers you use, unconventional shale fracking uses between six and 50 times the amount of water as conventional gas drilling. And the bulk of that water is required up front, as opposed to being used throughout the extraction process. The higher figures come from actual operational data, while the lower estimates are just that: estimates. As a result, many of the US shale plays that have been lauded as an abundant source of clean energy may produce far less natural gas than current forecasted estimates after all costs and resource inputs are accounted for. If these unconventional shale plays require much more water than conventional wisdom expects, as we suspect they will, there will be much less gas coming on line in the future than expected. And the cost of much of the gas that may eventually be extracted will be much higher than anticipated. Either way, the result is the same, causing the natural gas market to tighten and prices to rise. So if you heat and cool your home with natural gas, enjoy the current bonanza while it lasts. The takeaway for investors, meanwhile, is not simply to pile into the energy stocks most leveraged to natural gas prices, as tempting as that may be from a contrarian perspective. Unconventional gas deposits that will require fracking now make up a large portion of total natural gas assets for many E&P companies. And while higher water requirements will drive natural gas prices northward, it will also drive up costs for unconventional producers. The result for those producers will not be pretty. We would therefore stick with conventional natural gas producers who will benefit from higher gas prices. For safety sake, companies that also have a healthy exposure to crude oil earn the highest honors.

#### Natural gas abundance is a myth – shale gas is declining and studies don’t assume increased production

Berman 12 (Art, Former Editor – Oil and Gas Journal, Geological Consultant – American Association of Petroleum Geologists, “After the Gold Rush: A Perspective on Future U.S. Natural Gas Supply and Price,” Oil Drum, 2-8, http://www.theoildrum.com/node/8914)

For several years, we have been asked to believe that less is more, that more oil and gas can be produced from shale than was produced from better reservoirs over the past century. We have been told more recently that the U.S. has enough natural gas to last for 100 years. We have been presented with an improbable business model that has no barriers to entry except access to capital, that provides a source of cheap and abundant gas, and that somehow also allows for great profit. Despite three decades of experience with tight sandstone and coal-bed methane production that yielded low-margin returns and less supply than originally advertised, we are expected to believe that poorer-quality shale reservoirs will somehow provide superior returns and make the U.S. energy independent. Shale gas advocates point to the large volumes of produced gas and the participation of major oil companies in the plays as indications of success. But advocates rarely address details about profitability and they never mention failed wells. Shale gas plays are an important and permanent part of our energy future. We need the gas because there are fewer remaining plays in the U.S. that have the potential to meet demand. A careful review of the facts, however, casts doubt on the extent to which shale plays can meet supply expectations except at much higher prices. One Hundred Years of Natural Gas The U.S. does not have 100 years of natural gas supply. There is a difference between resources and reserves that many outside the energy industry fail to grasp. A resource refers to the gas or oil in-place that can be produced, while a reserve must be commercially producible. The Potential Gas Committee (PGC) is the standard for resource assessments because of the objectivity and credentials of its members, and its long and reliable history. In its biennial report released in April 2011, three categories of technically recoverable resources are identified: probable, possible and speculative. The President and many others have taken the PGC total of all three categories (2,170 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of gas) and divided by 2010 annual consumption of 24 Tcf. This results in 90 and not 100 years of gas. Much of this total resource is in accumulations too small to be produced at any price, is inaccessible to drilling, or is too deep to recover economically. More relevant is the Committee’s probable mean resources value of 550 (Tcf) of gas (Exhibit 4). If half of this supply becomes a reserve (225 Tcf), the U.S. has approximately 11.5 years of potential future gas supply at present consumption rates. When proved reserves of 273 Tcf are included, there is an additional 11.5 years of supply for a total of almost 23 years. It is worth noting that proved reserves include proved undeveloped reserves which may or may not be produced depending on economics, so even 23 years of supply is tenuous. If consumption increases, this supply will be exhausted in less than 23 years. Revisions to this estimate will be made and there probably is more than 23 years but based on current information, 100 years of gas is not justified. Shale Gas Plays May Not Provide Sustainable Supply Several of the more mature shale gas plays are either in decline or appear to be approaching peak production. Exhibit 5 shows that total Barnett Shale production is approximately 5.7 Bcf per day (Bcf/d) and cumulative gas production is more than 10 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of gas. It also shows that production may be approaching a peak at current gas prices despite the constant addition of new wells. Exhibit 5. Barnett Shale Total Production. Source: HPDI. The Haynesville Shale surpassed the Barnett during 2011 as the most productive gas play in North America, with present daily rates of almost 7 Bcf/d and cumulative production of 3.5 Tcf (Exhibit 6). This play is most responsible for the current over-supply of gas with the average well producing 3.3 million cubic feet per day (Mcf/d) compared to only 0.4 Mdf/d in the Barnett. It is too early to say for sure, but the Haynesville Shale may also be approaching peak production. The Marcellus Shale is presently producing 2.4 Bcf/d and has produced a total of about 0.8 Tcf (Exhibit 7). In this play, production shows no sign of leveling off, as it does in the Barnett and Haynesville, and production in the Fayetteville Shale may also be approaching a peak (Exhibit 8). The Woodford Shale is already in decline (Exhibit 9). If some existing shale gas plays are approaching peak production after only a few years since the advent of horizontal drilling and multi-stage hydraulic fracturing, what is the basis for long-term projections of abundant gas supply?

#### Claims of abundant natural gas are industry bias and use manipulated data

Hughes 11 (J. David, Fellow in Fossil Fuels – Post Carbon Institute, Geoscientist – Geological Survey of Canada, and Team Leader – Canadian Gas Potential Committee, Abstract by Richard Heinberg, Senior Fellow-in-Residence – Post Carbon Institute, “Will Natural Gas Fuel America in the 21st Century?” Post Carbon Institute, May, http://www.postcarbon.org/reports/PCI-report-nat-gas-future-plain.pdf)

As this report details, all of these assumptions and recommendations need to be re-thought. What emerges from the data is a very different assessment. But if this report is right, then how could mainstream energy analysts have gotten so much so wrong? It is not our purpose to analyze in detail the social, political, and economic process whereby public relations became public policy. Nevertheless it is fairly easy to trace the convergence of interests among major players. First, the shale gas industry was motivated to hype production prospects in order to attract large amounts of needed investment capital; it did this by drilling the best sites first and extrapolating initial robust results to apply to more problematic prospective regions. The energy policy establishment, desperate to identify a new energy source to support future economic growth, accepted the industry’s hype uncritically. This in turn led Wall Street Journal, Time Magazine, 60 Minutes, and many other media outlets to proclaim that shale gas would transform the energy world. Finally, several prominent environmental organizations, looking for a way to lobby for lower carbon emissions without calling for energy cutbacks, embraced shale gas as a necessary “bridge fuel” toward a renewable energy future. Each group saw in shale gas what it wanted and needed. The stuff seemed too good to be true—and indeed it was. The biggest losers in this misguided rush to anoint shale gas as America’s energy savior are members of the public, who need sound energy policy based on realistic expectations for future supply, as well as sound assessments of economic and environmental costs.

#### New state and federal regulations are coming now – that makes fracking unsustainable

Plumer 12 (Brad, “How states are regulating fracking (in maps)”, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/wp/2012/07/16/how-states-are-regulating-fracking-in-maps/)

Armed with new drilling techniques, companies are spreading out across the United States, cracking open shale rock in search of vast new stores of natural gas. It’s not an exaggeration to say that hydraulic fracturing, or “fracking,” has revolutionized the U.S. energy industry. Cheap natural gas has become America’s top source for electricity, displacing coal and bringing back jobs to once-decaying states like Ohio.But the fracking boom has also led to plenty of environmental concerns. Local communities are worried that the chemicals used to pry open the shale rock can contaminate nearby drinking water supplies. (So far, there’s scant evidence this is happening in places like Pennsylvania, but the science is still in its infancy.) Excess gas is often vented off, producing air pollution. And the disposal of fracking wastewater underground appears to be linked to earthquakes in places like Ohio. Confronted with these worries, states have responded with a patchwork of different regulations. But there’s a lot of variation between different states. And here’s a good way to track what’s going on: A helpful series of new maps, put together by Resources for the Future (RFF), gives an overview of how 31 states with significant shale gas reserves are treating different aspects of fracking. Here, for instance, is a look at which states require companies to disclose the chemicals they use in drilling. (Fracking is exempt from federal disclosure rules under the Safe Water Drinking Act.) Some states, like Pennsylvania — which sits above the gas-rich Marcellus shale formation — now require a full disclosure of chemicals. By contrast, Kansas, which is just beginning to see widespread fracking activity, is further behind: Meanwhile, the map below details how different states treat the “venting” or release of excess gas into the air. Just 22 of the 31 gas states have restrictions on this process, which can release both heat-trapping methane into the atmosphere as well as “volatile organic compounds” such as benzene that can produce smog and trigger health problems. Some states ban this practice entirely; others restrict it to emergencies or require that operators not harm public health: There are many more maps on RFF’s Web site, which is worth poking around on. In an introductory essay, RFF’s Nathan Richardson notes that these maps still provide just a partial picture — the details of laws matter, and more importantly, different states may enforce their rules with different levels of vigor. But it’s an invaluable resource all the same. The regulation of fracking has become a low-level campaign issue, as well. The Obama administration is gradually putting forward federal regulations. The Department of Interior is drafting rules for fracking on publicly-owned lands (where about 38 percent of the country’s gas reserves sit, according to the American Petroleum Institute). The Environmental Protection Agency, meanwhile, is slowly getting in on regulation and has proposed rules that will require all producers to phase out venting by 2015 and capture their waste methane instead. Mitt Romney, by contrast, has criticized the federal approach. In his “Believe in America” economic plan (pdf), he warns that the EPA should not “pursue overly aggressive interventions designed to discourage fracking altogether.” By contrast, Romney praises states for having “carefully and effectively regulated the process for decades.” Indeed, many Republicans believe that fracking regulations should be mainly left to the states, which can issue rules more speedily and can tailor regulations to the specific needs of their communities. Environmentalists, by contrast, worry that this will create a race to the bottom whereby states pare back their rules — or enforce them weakly — in order to compete for business. Both sides agree that addressing the public health and environmental aspects of fracking isn’t costless. The International Energy Agency recently estimated that addressing all of the various concerns could boost the price of natural gas by roughly 7 percent. Yet the IEA also warned that if these rules weren’t adopted, public outcry and protests could stop the shale gas boom altogether. Anti-fracking protests like those in New York state could become the norm. And that, the IEA notes, could prove even more costly to the gas industry

#### Shoring up energy primacy is the only way to sustain leadership and prevent extinction

Hagel 12 [Chuck Hagel, Professor at Georgetown University, “The Challenge of Change”, 5/15/12, <http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/challenge-change>]

A new world order is being built today by seven billion global citizens. America’s responsibilities in this new world and to future generations are as enormous as they are humbling. The challenges and choices before us demand leadership that reaches into the future without stumbling over today. They also require challenging every past frame of reference. Sensing the realities and subtleties of historic change are not always sudden or obvious. As former Secretary of State Dean Acheson recounted, “Only slowly did it dawn upon us that the whole world structure and order that we had inherited from the 19th century was gone and that the struggle to replace it would be directed from two bitterly opposed and ideologically irreconcilable power centers.” Staying a step ahead of the forces of change requires an ability to foresee and appreciate the consequences of our actions, a willingness to learn the hard lessons of history and from our own experiences, and a clear realization of the limitations of great power. Acheson and the Wise Men of that time got it right. America led the shaping of the post-Second World War world order through strong inspired leadership, a judicious (most of the time) use of its power, and working with allies through alliances and institutions. This has helped prevent a Third World War and a nuclear holocaust. The world we face in 2012 is of a different character than even a few years ago. Many developing nations are fragile states and are under enormous pressure from terrorism, endemic poverty, environmental challenges, debt, corruption, civil unrest, and regional, tribal, and religious conflicts. The result is a climate of despair, and potential breeding grounds for radical politics and extremism. A successful American foreign policy must include thinking through actions and policies, and how uncontrollable and unpredictable global forces may affect outcomes. Eleven years of invasions and occupations have put the U.S. in a deep hole and mired us down in terribly costly commitments in blood, treasure, and prestige. Our diplomatic and security flexibility has been seriously eroded by many of the decisions of the last eleven years. Too often we tend to confuse tactical action for strategic thinking. A matter of mutual understanding American foreign policy has always required a principled realism that is true to our values as we face the world as it really is in all of its complexities. We need to accept the reality that there is not a short-term solution to every problem in the world. What we must do is manage these realities and complex problems, moving them into positions of solution possibilities and resolution. American foreign policy has always dared to project a vision of a world where all things are possible. If we are to succeed, we must understand how the world sees us. Turn on our receivers more often and shut off our transmitters. This is a vital priority for a successful 21st century foreign policy. We must also avoid the traps of hubris, ideology and insularity, and know that there is little margin for error with the stakes so high in the world today. America must strengthen its global alliances. Common-interest alliances will be required in a volatile world of historic diffusions of power. The great challenges facing the world today are the responsibility of all peoples of the world. They include cyber warfare, terrorism, preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, prosperity and stability, and global poverty, disease and environmental degradation. Our allies throughout the world share these same challenges and threats and will also be just as affected by the outcomes. These will be either our common successes or our common failures. America cannot be successful with any of these challenges, without sustained partnerships and deep cooperation in the economic, intelligence, diplomatic, humanitarian, military and law enforcement fields. The centrality of alliances and multi-lateral institutions to a successful foreign policy is fundamental. Alliances and multi-lateral institutions must be understood as expansions of our influence, not as constraints on our power. Alliances are imperfect, as are all institutions. But like “process,” they help absorb shocks. Beyond military solutions Alliances must be built on solid foundations to handle both routine and sudden unforeseen challenges. Crisis-driven “coalitions of the willing” by themselves are not the building blocks for a stable world. We need to think more broadly, deeply and strategically. American military power and force structure cannot sustain its commitments without a shift to a more comprehensive strategic approach to global threats and a more flexible and agile military. Cyber warfare is a paramount example of these new threats. The perception of American power around the world must not rest solely on a military orientation or optic. There must be an underlying commitment to engagement and humanity. Engagement is not appeasement, nor is it negotiation. It is not a guarantee of anything, but rather a smart diplomatic bridge to better understanding and possible conflict resolution. American foreign policy must reflect the realities and demands of the global economy. The global economy cannot be shut out of foreign policy. There can be no higher priority for America than to remain economically competitive in a world undergoing a historic diffusion of economic power. A nation’s strength is anchored to and underpinned by its economic strength. The connections between America’s trade, economic, and energy policies must also be synthesized into a strategic vision for American foreign policy that not only meets the challenges of our time, but frames the completeness of long-term policies for strategic future outcomes. Trade is a major catalyst for economic strength and growth at home and abroad, as well as a critical stabilizer for world peace and prosperity. America must remain the global champion of free, fair and open trade. As the world’s strongest, largest and most dynamic economy, America must continue to lead world trade. Economic strength must be as high a priority as any other foreign policy priority. America’s security and growth are connected to both the American and global economies. A centerpiece of this security is energy security. Energy security and energy interdependence are interconnected parts of a broad and deep foreign policy paradigm that frames the complexity of the challenges that face America and the world. A diverse portfolio of energy that is accessible and affordable is the core of America’s energy security. Much of the world’s energy is produced in countries and regions that are consumed by civil unrest, lack of human rights, corruption, underdevelopment, and conflict. The price of oil is driven by supply and demand and the global market. We must ensure diversification of sources of supply and distribution networks to prevent undue dependence on any one country or region. Instability and violence disrupt supply and distribution and increase prices.

#### A US-led natural gas revolution solidifies international leadership

Mead 12 (Walter Russell, James Clark Chase Professor of Foreign Affairs and Humanities – Bard College and Editor-at-Large – American Interest, “Energy Revolution 2: A Post Post-American Post,” American Interest, 7-15, http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2012/07/15/energy-revolution-2-a-post-post-american-post/)

Forget peak oil; forget the Middle East. The energy revolution of the 21st century isn’t about solar energy or wind power and **the “scramble for oil” isn’t going to drive global politics**. The energy abundance that helped propel the United States to global leadership in the 19th and 2oth centuries is back; if the energy revolution now taking shape lives up to its full potential, we are headed into a new century in which the location of the world’s energy resources and the structure of the world’s energy trade **support American affluence at home and power abroad**. By some estimates, the United States has more oil than Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Iran combined, and Canada may have even more than the United States. A GAO report released last May (pdf link can be found here) estimates that up to the equivalent of 3 trillion barrels of shale oil may lie in just one of the major potential US energy production sites. If half of this oil is recoverable, US reserves in this one deposit are roughly equal to the known reserves of the rest of the world combined. Edward Luce, an FT writer usually more given to tracing America’s decline than to promoting its prospects, cites estimates that as early as 2020 the US may be producing more oil than Saudi Arabia. So dramatic are America’s finds, analysts talk of the US turning into the world’s new Saudi Arabia by 2020, with up to 15m barrels a day of liquid energy production (against the desert kingdom’s 11m b/d this year). Most of the credit goes to private sector innovators, who took their cue from the high oil prices in the last decade to devise ways of tapping previously uneconomic underground reserves of “tight oil” and shale gas. And some of it is down to plain luck. Far from reaching its final frontier, America has discovered new ones under the ground. Additionally, our natural gas reserves are so large that the US is likely to become a major exporter, and US domestic supplies for hydrocarbon fuels of all types appear to be safe and secure for the foreseeable future. North America as a whole has the potential to be a major exporter of fossil fuels for decades and even generations to come. Since the 1970s, pessimism about America’s energy future has been one of the cornerstones on which the decline theorists erected their castles of doom; we are now entering a time when energy abundance will be an argument for continued American dynamism. The energy revolution isn’t a magic wand that can make all America’s wishes come true, but it is **a powerful wind in the sails of both America’s domestic economy and of its international goals**. The United States isn’t the only big winner of the energy revolution — Canada, Israel and China among others will also make gains — but the likely consequences of the energy revolution for America’s global agenda are so large, that the chief effect of the revolution is likely to be its role in shoring up the foundations of the American-led world order.

#### And it allows us to determine how the system functions- alters the global balance of power

Gjelten 12 (Tom, Diplomatic Correspondent – NPR, “The Dash for Gas: The Golden Age of an Energy Game-Changer,” World Affairs, Jan/Feb, http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/dash-gas-golden-age-energy-game-changer)

For a fresh perspective on geopolitical trends, look at the world through the lens of the natural gas trade. One of the reasons for Israeli unease with the Arab Spring is that the democratic uprising that took down Hosni Mubarak also brought interruptions in Israel’s supply of natural gas, much of which since 2008 has come from Egypt. Wondering about China’s new interest in Australia and Qatar? It’s about their abundant gas supplies and China’s tremendous energy needs. Desperate for signs of cooperation from North Korea? Check out reports that Kim Jong-il may agree to the construction of a natural gas pipeline that would link Russia, Pyongyang, and Seoul. From Asia to the Middle East to North America, a boom in natural gas usage is rearranging international connections, with major repercussions for global politics. Energy consumers see that natural gas is relatively inexpensive, provided it can be transported efficiently, and abundant, especially if it can be harvested from shale rock and other unconventional deposits. The International Energy Agency (IEA) predicts that over the next twenty-five years gas will be the fastest-growing energy source, overtaking coal as soon as 2030. Around the world, natural gas is fast becoming the fuel of choice for electric power generation, especially with nuclear losing its appeal in the aftermath of the Fukushima disaster. Energy experts predict gas could even displace oil in the transportation sector, as car and truck engines are redesigned. The trend has so impressed IEA analysts that the agency in 2011 boldly predicted that the world is entering “a golden age of gas.” The implications are significant. Because gas is somewhat cleaner than other fossil fuels, its rise as a fuel source should have environmental benefits. Because it is cheaper than oil, its increased use would lower energy costs and bring energy to millions of people who lack access to it now. But among the most striking consequences of a dramatic growth in natural gas consumption would be its effect on international relations. The energy trade is an important determinant of the global balance of power, and the shift to natural gas will introduce **a new set of winners and losers**, bringing greater independence to many countries and reducing the energy leverage that oil producers have traditionally enjoyed. After chairing an advisory panel on the subject for the Department of Energy, former CIA director John Deutch concluded that the prospective geopolitical shifts amount to no less than “a natural gas revolution” in global affairs. A big difference between gas and oil is the trading infrastructure. While oil can be shipped in tankers, gas has moved mainly through pipelines, thus confining it largely to regional markets. Liquefied natural gas (LNG) is facilitating the development of a global market in gas, but it is still traded largely on a country-to-country basis, with negotiated prices that are specified in contracts. As gas usage has grown, these gas deals have grown more important. In Bolivia, for instance, a determination to use natural gas wealth for political ends has affected relations with its neighbors for most of the past decade. Privately financed exploration in the late 1990s revealed that the country’s proven gas reserves were six times greater than what was previously believed, but Bolivian leaders could not agree on how to exploit them. A public outcry forced President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada to resign and leave the country in 2003 after he proposed to export natural gas to Mexico and the United States through a terminal in Chile, where it was to have been liquefied. (Anti-Chilean sentiment has run deep in Bolivia ever since a war with Chile in 1879 cost the country its Pacific access.) Bolivian gas is now sold instead to Brazil and Argentina, but disputes with Brazil over the terms of the gas contract have cast a shadow over that relationship in recent years, and management of the country’s gas exports is probably Bolivia’s top foreign-policy challenge. The Bolivian case shows how the natural gas trade is more likely to be complicated by resource nationalism than the oil business would be. In a pique, Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez can say he is prepared to cut off oil sales to the United States, but because oil is a globally traded commodity managed by middlemen, the threat is largely meaningless. For every buyer, there will always be a seller. State-to-state gas deals, by contrast, are more likely to carry geopolitical overtones. In 2005, for example, Egypt took the bold step of agreeing to sell natural gas to Israel. The gas began flowing in 2008 through a pipeline that runs across the Sinai peninsula and continues undersea to the Israeli port of Ashkelon. Israel depends on natural gas for much of its power generation, and the deal with Egypt has provided the country with more than forty percent of its gas needs. The notion of exporting gas to Israel has been highly unpopular in Egypt, however, and in the months following the collapse of the Mubarak regime, the Sinai pipeline has been repeatedly blown up, forcing Israel to fire up unused coal plants and convert several gas-fueled generating stations to run on fuel oil or diesel instead, at a cost of several million dollars. But the country had a possible solution: In December 2010, a Houston-based energy exploration company announced “a significant natural gas discovery” about eighty miles off Israel’s coast. Preliminary measurements suggested it could be the world’s biggest deepwater gas discovery in ten years and could provide Israel with enough gas to become a net exporter, providing it with more clout in its regional energy relationships. South Korea also relies on imported energy sources and is keen on natural gas, which explains its interest in a Russian proposal to build a pipeline that would carry Russian gas from Siberia across the Korean peninsula. The idea has been floated for years, but North Korean leader Kim Jong-il apparently gave the proposal his firm support during a meeting in August 2011 with Russian President Dmitri Medvedev. South Korean President Lee Myung-bak subsequently agreed to work closely with the Russians to make the project a reality. The South Koreans have offered to build a natural gas power generating plant in the north as compensation for Pyongyang’s support for the pipeline. The key to the project’s success would be a design that would reassure Seoul that the North Korean authorities had no incentive to steal the gas or cut off the supply before it reaches the south. The textbook illustration of a link between geopolitics and the natural gas trade is Russia. As of 2010, the country was the world’s top gas producer (after briefly being surpassed by the United States), with one state-controlled company, Gazprom, accounting for about eighty percent of the country’s production. Originally part of the Soviet Union’s Ministry of Gas Industry, Gazprom is in effect a state monopoly, and its power and reach are without comparison in the energy world. The company has its own armed forces, with as many as twenty thousand armed security guards and a private fleet of unmanned drones, used mainly to monitor pipelines and production facilities. The company effectively operates as an arm of the Russian state, and the company’s gas deals in Europe and Asia can legitimately be seen as an extension of Russian foreign policy, exemplifying the growing importance of “gas diplomacy.” Though its relative importance as a gas provider to Europe has diminished over the past ten years, Russia still meets about a quarter of Europe’s needs, more than any other supplier, and European governments have long been uneasy about their dependence on Russian gas. About eighty percent of the Russian gas shipment to Europe goes through Ukraine, and the flow has been cut on two major occasions at least in part because of geopolitical wrangling. In January 2006, after Kiev resisted price increase demands, Gazprom reduced the flow of gas to Ukraine, causing shortages in other European countries that received gas through Ukraine. Politics seems to have played a role in the Russian move. Ukraine at the time was moving closer to the West, and Ukrainian leaders charged that Moscow, with its price increase demands, was trying to “blackmail” Ukraine into changing its political course. The gas flow was cut once again in January 2009, causing a severe midwinter gas shortage across Europe. The two episodes convinced many European leaders that Russia was ready and willing to use Gazprom’s clout in what it considered its “privileged sphere of influence,” with the goal of bringing the former Soviet republics back under Moscow’s control. Joschka Fischer, the German foreign minister and vice chancellor from 1998 to 2005, spoke for many European observers when he wrote in 2010, “The primary goal of Russian gas policy isn’t economic but political, namely to further the aim of revising the post-Soviet order in Europe.” The eagerness of European countries to reduce their dependence on Russian gas has prompted ongoing efforts to find alternative supply routes. Iraq and the former Soviet republics of Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan are promising sources, and for about a decade European authorities have been scheming to develop a gas pipeline that would bypass Russia. The Nabucco pipeline project, launched in 2002, would bring gas from the Caspian basin across Turkey to a hub in Austria. In addition, BP and two Italian companies have been promoting pipeline projects of their own along that southern corridor. The European Commission and the United States have both given strong backing to the Nabucco project, but the pipeline planners have had a difficult time lining up the supply commitments needed to make the project economically worthwhile. Moscow has put pressure on the Central Asian states to send their gas to Russia rather than Europe, and China is pursuing supply deals of its own in the region. Among the major new developments has been the construction of new facilities to liquefy natural gas. Petroleum engineers have long known how to convert gas into liquid form through extreme cooling, but only in recent years has the LNG industry expanded to the point that it has altered gas trading patterns. The construction of dozens of new liquefaction and regasification plants around the world, along with the introduction of LNG tanker ships, has made it possible for island nations like Australia to become major gas exporters, and it has given gas-consuming countries new supply sources. The United States, Japan, China, and European countries were all quick to embrace the industry. (In the US alone, twelve new terminals have been built to receive LNG, with plants to regasify the LNG for shipment through pipelines around the country.) The development has been rapid. The International Energy Agency predicts that between 2008 and 2020 total liquefaction capacity will double. Qatar, which opened its first LNG plant in 1997, by 2006 had become the world’s top LNG producer and was investing in LNG terminals around the world. For European countries with terminals, importing LNG from Qatar or Algeria or Nigeria is another way to reduce dependence on Russian supplies. By 2035, for example, LNG is expected to supply about half of the United Kingdom’s natural gas needs, with imports from Qatar leading the way. British Prime Minister David Cameron’s February 2011 visit to Qatar, culminating in a new gas deal, put Moscow on notice that Europe had alternatives to Russian gas. Qatar and other LNG exporters have an even more inviting market in Asia. The IEA foresees China’s gas consumption growing by nearly six percent annually up to 2035. Japan, having lost much of its nuclear generating capacity as a result of the March 2011 earthquake and tsunami, is now a huge gas market as well, and LNG imports from Australia, Qatar, and the other gas exporting countries will be essential to its energy mix. Such developments were not foreseen twenty years ago. The LNG industry has diversified the gas trade, introducing new producers into the picture and giving gas importers more supply choices just as their demand for gas is growing. Without a doubt, the most revolutionary recent development in the natural gas world has been an improvement in the ability to extract gas from shale rock and other unconventional sources. Geologists have known for two hundred years that shale contains combustible gas, but the tightness of the shale formation meant that the gas was generally considered unrecoverable. In the last decade, however, energy companies in the United States have found that it is economically possible to harvest shale gas through the use of hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”), by which large amounts of water mixed with sand and chemicals are injected at high pressure into the rock formations in order to free the gas trapped inside. In addition, gas producers are now employing horizontal drilling techniques, turning their drill bits in a horizontal direction after reaching a deep shale reservoir and thus reaching more deposits from a single well. These developments have proven so promising that analysts are dramatically increasing their estimates of how much shale gas can be recovered around the world. In the United States, shale accounted for almost no gas production as recently as 2000. It now provides about twenty percent of the total production, and within twenty years it could be half. The US government’s Energy Information Administration has estimated that if recoverable shale gas reserves are included, the United States may have enough natural gas to meet US needs for the next hundred years, at current consumption rates. Such estimates are imprecise and may well be adjusted downward, but the production of shale gas has already dramatically altered the US energy picture. Just a few years ago, it was assumed that the United States would be a net importer of natural gas, with much of it arriving as LNG. But the terminals and regasification facilities that were built to facilitate LNG imports are now going largely unused. The successful production of shale gas could even mean the United States will soon be a net gas exporter. Some of the existing regasification facilities, built for LNG imports, could actually be converted to liquefaction plants, so that excess domestic gas production can be exported as LNG. If the United States became self-sufficient in natural gas, there would be significant geopolitical implications. When Arab states in 1973 imposed an embargo on oil shipments to the United States as punishment for US support of Israel, American consumers learned how vulnerable their country was to the “oil weapon” when used by potentially hostile states. As the United States moves toward energy independence, **if only in gas**, that vulnerability disappears. There would also be geopolitical effects overseas. With the United States no longer importing LNG, that gas could go to European consumers instead, and Europe’s dependence on Russia for its gas supply would diminish. In 2000, Russia was supplying about forty percent of Europe’s gas; some estimates have the Russian share sliding to ten percent by 2040. Whether the United States can maintain a sharply upward trend in shale gas production **depends on whether the reserves are as promising as they now appear to be**, whether the gas price is sufficient to cover production costs, and especially whether environmental concerns associated with shale drilling are addressed. Hydraulic fracturing requires enormous amounts of water, and recycling or disposal of the waste water can be problematic. There have been cases where shale well casings have proved defective, and contamination of the surrounding soil or water has occurred. Authorities in New York, New Jersey, and Maryland have imposed temporary moratoria on fracking in order to assess the practice and determine whether it imposes any risks to drinking water or human health.

circumstances.

#### Maintaining the U.S. supported international order solves great power war

**Kagan 12** (Robert – senior fellow of foreign policy at the Center on the United States and Europe, America Has Made the World Freer, Safer and Wealthier, 3-14, p. http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2012/0314\_us\_power\_kagan.aspx)

We take a lot for granted about the way the world looks today -- the widespread freedom, the unprecedented global prosperity (even despite the current economic crisis), and the absence of war among great powers. In 1941 there were only a dozen democracies in the world. Today there are more than 100. For four centuries prior to 1950, global GDP rose by less than 1 percent a year. Since 1950 it has risen by an average of 4 percent a year, and billions of people have been lifted out of poverty. The first half of the 20th century saw the two most destructive wars in the history of mankind, and in prior centuries war among great powers was almost constant. But for the past 60 years no great powers have gone to war. This is the world America made when it assumed global leadership after World War II. Would this world order survive if America declined as a great power? Some American intellectuals insist that a "Post-American" world need not look very different from the American world and that all we need to do is "manage" American decline. But that is wishful thinking. If the balance of power shifts in the direction of other powers, the world order will inevitably change to suit their interests and preferences. Take the issue of democracy. For several decades, the balance of power in the world has favored democratic governments. In a genuinely post-American world, the balance would shift toward the great power autocracies. Both China and Russia already protect dictators like Syria's Bashar al-Assad. If they gain greater relative influence in the future, we will see fewer democratic transitions and more autocrats hanging on to power. What about the free market, free trade economic order? People assume China and other rising powers that have benefited so much from the present system would have a stake in preserving it. They wouldn't kill the goose that lays the golden eggs. But China's form of capitalism is heavily dominated by the state, with the ultimate goal being preservation of the ruling party. Although the Chinese have been beneficiaries of an open international economic order, they could end up undermining it simply because, as an autocratic society, their priority is to preserve the state's control of wealth and the power it brings. They might kill the goose because they can't figure out how to keep both it and themselves alive. Finally, what about the long peace that has held among the great powers for the better part of six decades? Many people imagine that American predominance will be replaced by some kind of multipolar harmony. But multipolar systems have historically been **neither stable nor peaceful**. War among the great powers was a common, if not constant, occurrence in the long periods of multipolarity in the 16th, 17th, and 18th centuries. The 19th century was notable for two stretches of great-power peace of roughly four decades each, punctuated, however, by major wars among great powers and culminating in World War I, the most destructive and deadly war mankind had known up to that point. The era of American predominance has shown that there is no better recipe **for great-power peace than certainty about who holds the upper hand**. Many people view the present international order as the inevitable result of human progress, a combination of advancing science and technology, an increasingly global economy, strengthening international institutions, evolving "norms" of international behavior, and the gradual but inevitable triumph of liberal democracy over other forms of government -- forces of change that transcend the actions of men and nations. But there was nothing inevitable about the world that was created after World War II. International order is not an evolution; it is an imposition. It is the domination of one vision over others -- in America's case, the domination of liberal free market principles of economics, democratic principles of politics, and a peaceful international system that supports these, over other visions that other nations and peoples may have. The present order will last only as long as those who favor it and benefit from it retain the will and capacity to defend it. If and when American power declines, the institutions and norms American power has supported will decline, too. Or they may collapse altogether as we transition into another kind of world order, or into disorder. We may discover then that the United States was essential to keeping the present world order together and that the alternative to American power was not peace and harmony but chaos and catastrophe -- which was what the world looked like right before the American order came into being.

#### Primacy has resulted in the lowest level of war in history – best stats prove

**Owen 2011** (John – professor of politics at the University of Virginia, Don’t Discount Hegemony, p. www.cato-unbound.org/2011/02/11/john-owen/dont-discount-hegemony/)

Andrew Mack and his colleagues at the Human Security Report Project are to be congratulated. Not only do they present a study with a striking conclusion, driven by data, free of theoretical or ideological bias, but they also do something quite unfashionable: they bear good news. Social scientists really are not supposed to do that. Our job is, if not to be Malthusians, then at least to point out disturbing trends, looming catastrophes, and the imbecility and mendacity of policy makers. And then it is to say why, if people listen to us, things will get better. We do this as if our careers depended upon it, and perhaps they do; for if all is going to be well, what need then for us? Our colleagues at Simon Fraser University are brave indeed. That may sound like a setup, but it is not. I shall challenge neither the data nor the general conclusion that violent conflict around the world has been decreasing in fits and starts since the Second World War. When it comes to violent conflict among and within countries, **things have been getting better**. (The trends have not been linear—Figure 1.1 actually shows that the frequency of interstate wars peaked in the 1980s—but the 65-year movement is clear.) Instead I shall accept that Mack et al. are correct on the macro-trends, and focus on their explanations they advance for these remarkable trends. With apologies to any readers of this forum who recoil from academic debates, this might get mildly theoretical and even more mildly methodological. Concerning international wars, one version of the “nuclear-peace” theory is not in fact laid to rest by the data. It is certainly true that nuclear-armed states have been involved in many wars. They have even been attacked (think of Israel), which falsifies the simple claim of “assured destruction”—that any nuclear country A will deter any kind of attack by any country B because B fears a retaliatory nuclear strike from A. But the most important “nuclear-peace” claim has been about mutually assured destruction, which obtains between two robustly nuclear-armed states. The claim is that (1) rational states having second-strike capabilities—enough deliverable nuclear weaponry to survive a nuclear first strike by an enemy—will have an overwhelming incentive not to attack one another; and (2) we can safely assume that nuclear-armed states are rational. It follows that states with a second-strike capability will not fight one another. Their colossal atomic arsenals neither kept the United States at peace with North Vietnam during the Cold War nor the Soviet Union at peace with Afghanistan. But the argument remains strong that those arsenals did help keep the United States and Soviet Union at peace with each other. Why non-nuclear states are not deterred from fighting nuclear states is an important and open question. But in a time when calls to ban the Bomb are being heard from more and more quarters, we must be clear about precisely what the broad trends toward peace can and cannot tell us. They may tell us nothing about why we have had no World War III, and little about the wisdom of banning the Bomb now. Regarding the **downward trend in international war**, Professor Mack is friendlier to more palatable theories such as the “**democratic peace**” (democracies do not fight one another, and the proportion of democracies has increased, hence less war); the interdependence or “**commercial peace**” (states with extensive economic ties find it irrational to fight one another, and interdependence has increased, hence less war); and the notion that people around the world are more anti-war than their forebears were. Concerning the downward trend in civil wars, he favors theories of economic growth (where commerce is enriching enough people, violence is less appealing—a logic similar to that of the “commercial peace” thesis that applies among nations) and the end of the Cold War (which end reduced superpower support for rival rebel factions in so many Third-World countries). These are all **plausible mechanisms for peace**. What is more, none of them excludes any other; all could be working toward the same end. That would be somewhat puzzling, however. Is the world just lucky these days? How is it that an array of peace-inducing factors happens to be working coincidentally in our time, when such a magical array was absent in the past? The answer may be that one or more of these mechanisms reinforces some of the others, or perhaps some of them are mutually reinforcing. Some scholars, for example, have been focusing on whether economic growth might support democracy and vice versa, and whether both might support international cooperation, including to end civil wars. We would still need to explain how this charmed circle of causes got started, however. And here let me raise another factor, perhaps even less appealing than the “nuclear peace” thesis, at least outside of the United States. That factor is what international relations scholars call hegemony—specifically **American hegemony**. A theory that many regard as discredited, but that refuses to go away, is called hegemonic stability theory. The theory emerged in the 1970s in the realm of international political economy. It asserts that **for the global economy to remain open**—for countries to keep barriers to trade and investment low—**one powerful country must take the lead**. Depending on the theorist we consult, “taking the lead” entails paying for global public goods (keeping the sea lanes open, providing liquidity to the international economy), coercion (threatening to raise trade barriers or withdraw military protection from countries that cheat on the rules), or both. The theory is skeptical that international cooperation in economic matters can emerge or endure absent a hegemon. The distastefulness of such claims is self-evident: they imply that it is good for everyone the world over if one country has more wealth and power than others. More precisely, they imply that it has been good for the world that the United States has been so predominant. There is no obvious reason why hegemonic stability theory could not apply to other areas of international cooperation, including in security affairs, human rights, international law, peacekeeping (UN or otherwise), and so on. What I want to suggest here—suggest, not test—is that **American hegemony might just be a deep cause of the steady decline of political deaths in the world**. How could that be? After all, the report states that United States is the third most war-prone country since 1945. Many of the deaths depicted in Figure 10.4 were in wars that involved the United States (the Vietnam War being the leading one). Notwithstanding politicians’ claims to the contrary, a candid look at U.S. foreign policy reveals that the country is as ruthlessly self-interested as any other great power in history. The answer is that U.S. hegemony might just be a **deeper cause of the proximate causes** outlined by Professor Mack. Consider economic growth and openness to foreign trade and investment, which (so say some theories) **render violence irrational**. American power and policies may be responsible for these in two related ways. First, at least since the 1940s Washington has **prodded other countries to embrace the market capitalism** that entails economic openness and produces **sustainable economic growth**. The United States promotes capitalism for selfish reasons, of course: its own domestic system depends upon growth, which in turn depends upon the efficiency gains from economic interaction with foreign countries, and the more the better. During the Cold War most of its allies accepted some degree of market-driven growth. Second, the U.S.-led western victory in the Cold War damaged the credibility of alternative paths to development—communism and import-substituting industrialization being the two leading ones—and **left market capitalism the best model**. The end of the Cold War also involved an end to the billions of rubles in Soviet material support for regimes that tried to make these alternative models work. (It also, as Professor Mack notes, **eliminated the superpowers’ incentives to feed civil violence** in the Third World.) What we call **globalization** is **caused in part by the emergence of the United States as the global hegemon**. The same case can be made, with somewhat more difficulty, concerning the **spread of democracy**. Washington has supported democracy only under certain conditions—the chief one being the absence of a popular anti-American movement in the target state—but those conditions have become much more widespread following the collapse of communism. Thus in the 1980s the Reagan administration—the most anti-communist government America ever had—began to dump America’s old dictator friends, starting in the Philippines. Today Islamists tend to be anti-American, and so the Obama administration is skittish about democracy in Egypt and other authoritarian Muslim countries. But general U.S. material and moral support for liberal democracy remains strong.

#### Post-positivism tempers the difference between social constructions and realism. Even if we cannot perfectly understand or describe the world, we can investigate it by using social interactions that are patterned and predictable.

**Miller 2002** (Katherine Miller – Professor of Communication at Texas A & M, Communication theories: Perspectives, processes, and contexts, p. 35-36)

If positivism, in its classical and logical forms, is largely rejected, what philosophical foundation should take its place as a framework for social research? Very different answers to this question have been proposed. Some social researchers argue that flaws in the positivist foundation require a radically different philosophy of sci- ence, one in which the realist ontology, objective epistemology, and value-free axiology of positivism are vehemently rejected and replaced with forms of inquiry that honor nominalism, subjectivism, and omnipresent values. The posi- tions of these scholars are discussed in great detail in Chapters 4 and 5 as we consider interpretive and critical petspectives on communication theory. However, some scholars believe that a rejection of positivism does not require a total rejection of realism, objectivity, and the scientific goal of value-free inquiry. However, these scholars reject the notion of absolute truth, reject the unassailable foundation of observation, and reject the assumption of an always steady and upward accumulation of knowledge. In these rejections, scholars have forged a new philosophy of science that D. C. Phillips (1987, 1990, 1992) has called post-positivism. The metatheoretical tenets of this position are discussed in the next section. Metatheoretical Commitments Ontology In Chapter 2, we discussed three ontological positions: the realist, the nominalist, and the social constructionist. To summarize, a realist believes in a hard and solid reality of physical and social objects, a nominalist proposes that the reality of social entities exists only in the names and labels we provide for them, and a social constructionist emphasizes the ways in which social meanings are created through historical and contemporary interaction. Both the realist and the social constructionist positions make contributions to the ontology of post-positivist researchers in the communication discipline. Researchers in the post-positivist tradition can be seen as realists in that they support the position that phenomena exist independent of our perceptions and theories about them (Phillips, 1987). However, this realism is tempered by the argument that humans cannot fully apprehend that reality and that the driving mechanisms in the social and physical world cannot be fully understood. As J. D. Smith (1990, p. 171) states, "Realism is essential . . . because it poses 'at least in principle, a standard by which all human societies and their beliefs can be judged: they can all have beliefs about the world which turn out to be mistaken'" (Trigg, 1985, p. 22). Phillips argues, however, that a post-positivist ontology does not deny the notions inherent in approaches advocating a "social construction of reality" (Berger & Luckmann, 1967). Rather, Phillips (1990) draws the distinction between beliefs about the reality and the objective reality (pp. 42-43). Making this distinction allows a post-positivist scholar to appreciate (and investigate) multiple realities that are constructed by social collectives through communicative inter-action. For example, a post-positivist scholar could study the ways that beliefs about the imminent end of the world influence the behaviors of mountain survivalists, members of cults, and fundamental religious groups. However, the fact that a social group has arrived at certain beliefs about the world does not make those beliefs about the social or physical world necessarily true. As Phillips (1990) notes, "It is clear that Freudians believe in the reality of the id and superego and the rest, and they act as if these are realities; but their believing in these things does not make them real" (p. 43). It could be further argued that post-positivism is consistent with social constructionist views in two important ways. First, many post-positivists would argue that the process of social construction occurs in relatively patterned ways that are amenable to the type of social scientific investigation undertaken by post-positivists. Individuals have free will and creativity but they exercise that creativity in ways that are often (though not always, certainly) patterned and predictable. In the field of mass communication, Barbara Wilson (1994) argues convincingly for this point regarding her own study of children's responses to the mass media: I believe that children's interpretations and responses are as richly individualistic as snow-flakes. However, I also believe that there are common patterns that characterize a majority of young viewers and that those patterns are as predictable and explainable as the basic process by which all those unique snowflakes are formed from water, (p. 25) Second, many post-positivists would argue that social constructions are regularly reified and treated as objective by actors in the social world. Thus, it is reasonable to study the impact of these reified constructions on our communicative lives. Tompkins (1997) has made this argument with regard to his organizational communication research with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA): The engineers, scientists, managers, bureau-crats, and other kinds of members did not believe in a socially constructed world. They believed the rockets they made did in fact go to the moon. Moreover, they believed that NASA and the contractor firms who worked for them were real. They believed that these organizations could succeed or fail by objective criteria and that their bosses could hire or fire, reward or penalize individuals—actions with real consequences, (p. 369) Thus, a social constructionist ontology is consistent with a post-positivist position that emphasizes both the patterned nature of the social construction process and the regular and predictable effects that reified social constructions have on social actors. Thus, the ontology of post-positivism is not necessarily the belief in a hard, immutable, and unchanging social world implied in a strict realist stance. Rather, a post-positivist ontology entails a belief in regularity and pattern in our interactions with others. The ways in which these regularities and patterns are studied within post-positivist theory are considered in the next section.

#### The burden of “truth claims” is to disprove the factual claims of the 1AC --- no amount of theory can replace well-warranted evidence and analysis.

**Yudkowsky 2008** (Eliezer – research fellow at Singularity Institute for Artificial Intelligence, Cognitive Biases Potentially Affecting Judgment of Global Risks, Global Catastrophic Risks, p. 111-112)

Every true idea which discomforts you will seem to match the pattern of at least one psychological error. Robert Pirsig said: "The world's biggest fool can say the sun is shining, but that doesn't make it dark out." If you believe someone is guilty of a psychological error, then demonstrate your competence by first demolishing their consequential factual errors. If there are no factual errors, then what matters the psychology? The temptation of psychology is that, knowing a little psychology, we can meddle in arguments where we have no technical expertise - instead sagely analyzing the psychology of the disputants. If someone wrote a novel about an asteroid strike destroying modern civilization, then someone might criticize that novel as extreme, dystopian, apocalyptic; symptomatic of the author's naive inability to deal with a complex technological society. We should recognize this as a literary criticism, not a scientific one; it is about good or bad novels, not good or bad hypotheses. To quantify the annual probability of an asteroid strike in real life, one must study astronomy and the historical record: no amount of literary criticism can put a number on it. Garreau (2005) seems to hold that a scenario of a mind slowly increasing in capability, is more mature and sophisticated than a scenario of extremely rapid intelligence increase. But that's a technical question, not a matter of taste; no amount of psychologizing can tell you the exact slope of that curve. It's harder to abuse heuristics and biases than psychoanalysis. Accusing someone of conjunction fallacy leads naturally into listing the specific details that you think are burdensome and drive down the joint probability. Even so, do not lose track of the realworld facts of primary interest; do not let the argument become about psychology. Despite all dangers and temptations, it is better to know about psychological biases than to not know. Otherwise we will walk directly into the whirling helicopter blades of life. But be very careful not to have too much fun accusing others of biases. That is the road that leads to becoming a sophisticated arguer - someone who, faced with any discomforting argument, finds at once a bias in it. The one whom you must watch above all is yourself. Jerry Cleaver said: "What does you in is not failure to apply some high-level, intricate, complicated technique. It's overlooking the basics. Not keeping your eye on the ball." Analyses should finally center on testable real-world assertions. Do not take your eye off the ball.

## 2AC v. Texas GM

### Energy Justice

#### Nuke war outweighs structural violence – prioritizing structural violence makes preventing war impossible

Boulding 78 (Ken, is professor of economics and director, Center for Research on Conflict Resolution, University of Michigan, “Future Directions in Conflict and Peace Studies,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Jun., 1978), pp. 342-354)

Galtung is very legitimately interested in problems of world poverty and the failure of development of the really poor. He tried to amalga- mate this interest with the peace research interest in the more narrow sense. Unfortunately, he did this by downgrading the study of inter- national peace, labeling it "negative peace" (it should really have been labeled "negative war") and then developing the concept of "structural violence," which initially meant all those social structures and histories which produced an expectation of life less than that of the richest and longest-lived societies. He argued by analogy that if people died before the age, say, of 70 from avoidable causes, that this was a death in "war"' which could only be remedied by something called "positive peace." Unfortunately, the concept of structural violence was broadened, in the word of one slightly unfriendly critic, to include anything that Galtung did not like. Another factor in this situation was the feeling, certainly in the 1960s and early 1970s, that nuclear deterrence was actually succeeding as deterrence and that the problem of nuclear war had receded into the background. This it seems to me is a most dangerous illusion and diverted conflict and peace research for ten years or more away from problems of disarmament and stable peace toward a grand, vague study of world developments, for which most of the peace researchers are not particularly well qualified. To my mind, at least, the quality of the research has suffered severely as a result.' The complex nature of the split within the peace research community is reflected in two international peace research organizations. The official one, the International Peace Research Association (IPRA), tends to be dominated by Europeans somewhat to the political left, is rather, hostile to the United States and to the multinational cor- porations, sympathetic to the New International Economic Order and thinks of itself as being interested in justice rather than in peace. The Peace Science Society (International), which used to be called the Peace Research Society (International), is mainly the creation of Walter Isard of the University of Pennsylvania. It conducts meetings all around the world and represents a more peace-oriented, quantitative, science- based enterprise, without much interest in ideology. COPRED, while officially the North American representative of IPRA, has very little active connection with it and contains within itself the same ideological split which, divides the peace research community in general. It has, however, been able to hold together and at least promote a certain amount of interaction between the two points of view. Again representing the "scientific" rather than the "ideological" point of view, we have SIPRI, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, very generously (by the usual peace research stand- ards) financed by the Swedish government, which has performed an enormously useful service in the collection and publishing of data on such things as the war industry, technological developments, arma- ments, and the arms trade. The Institute is very largely the creation of Alva Myrdal. In spite of the remarkable work which it has done, how- ever, her last book on disarmament (1976) is almost a cry of despair over the folly and hypocrisy of international policies, the overwhelming power of the military, and the inability of mere information, however good, go change the course of events as we head toward ultimate ca- tastrophe. I do not wholly share her pessimism, but it is hard not to be a little disappointed with the results of this first generation of the peace research movement. Myrdal called attention very dramatically to the appalling danger in which Europe stands, as the major battleground between Europe, the United States, and the Soviet Union if war ever should break out. It may perhaps be a subconscious recognition-and psychological denial-of the sword of Damocles hanging over Europe that has made the European peace research movement retreat from the realities of the international system into what I must unkindly describe as fantasies of justice. But the American peace research community, likewise, has retreated into a somewhat niggling scientism, with sophisticated meth- odologies and not very many new ideas. I must confess that when I first became involved with the peace research enterprise 25 years ago I had hopes that it might produce some- thing like the Keynesian revolution in economics, which was the result of some rather simple ideas that had never really been thought out clearly before (though they had been anticipated by Malthus and others), coupled with a substantial improvement in the information system with the development of national income statistics which rein- forced this new theoretical framework. As a result, we have had in a single generation a very massive change in what might be called the "conventional wisdom" of economic policy, and even though this conventional wisdom is not wholly wise, there is a world of difference between Herbert Hoover and his total failure to deal with the Great Depression, simply because of everybody's ignorance, and the moder- ately skillful handling of the depression which followed the change in oil prices in 1-974, which, compared with the period 1929 to 1932, was little more than a bad cold compared with a galloping pneumonia. In the international system, however, there has been only glacial change in the conventional wisdom. There has been some improvement. Kissinger was an improvement on John Foster Dulles. We have had the beginnings of detente, and at least the possibility on the horizon of stable peace between the United States and the Soviet Union, indeed in the whole temperate zone-even though the tropics still remain uneasy and beset with arms races, wars, and revolutions which we cannot really afford. Nor can we pretend that peace around the temper- ate zone is stable enough so that we do not have to worry about it. The qualitative arms race goes on and could easily take us over the cliff. The record of peace research in the last generation, therefore, is one of very partial success. It has created a discipline and that is something of long-run consequence, most certainly for the good. It has made very little dent on the conventional wisdom of the policy makers anywhere in the world. It has not been able to prevent an arms race, any more, I suppose we might say, than the Keynesian economics has been able to prevent inflation. But whereas inflation is an inconvenience, the arms race may well be another catastrophe. Where, then, do we go from here? Can we see new horizons for peace and conflict research to get it out of the doldrums in which it has been now for almost ten years? The challenge is surely great enough. It still remains true that war, the breakdown of Galtung's "negative peace," remains the greatest clear and present danger to the human race, a danger to human survival far greater than poverty, or injustice, or oppression, desirable and necessary as it is to eliminate these things. Up to the present generation, war has been a cost and an inconven- ience to the human race, but it has rarely been fatal to the process of evolutionary development as a whole. It has probably not absorbed more than 5% of human time, effort, and resources. Even in the twenti- eth century, with its two world wars and innumerable smaller ones, it has probably not acounted for more than 5% of deaths, though of course a larger proportion of premature deaths. Now, however, advancing technology is creating a situation where in the first place we are developing a single world system that does not have the redundancy of the many isolated systems of the past and in which therefore if any- thing goes wrong everything goes wrong. The Mayan civilization could collapse in 900 A.D., and collapse almost irretrievably without Europe or China even being aware of the fact. When we had a number of iso- lated systems, the catastrophe in one was ultimately recoverable by migration from the surviving systems. The one-world system, therefore, which science, transportation, and communication are rapidly giving us, is inherently more precarious than the many-world system of the past. It is all the more important, therefore, to make it internally robust and capable only of recoverable catastrophes. The necessity for stable peace, therefore, increases with every improvement in technology, either of war or of peacex

#### War turns structural violence not vice versa

**Goldstein 2001** – IR professor at American University (Joshua, War and Gender, p. 412, Google Books)

First, peace activists face a dilemma in thinking about causes of war and working for peace. Many peace scholars and activists support the approach, “if you want peace, work for justice.” Then, if one believes that sexism contributes to war, one can work for gender justice specifically (perhaps. among others) in order to pursue peace. This approach brings strategic allies to the peace movement (women, labor, minorities), but rests on the assumption that injustices cause war. The evidence in this book suggests that causality runs at least as strongly the other way. War is not a product of capitalism, imperialism, gender, innate aggression, or any other single cause, although all of these influence wars’ outbreaks and outcomes. Rather, war has in part fueled and sustained these and other injustices.9 So, “if you want peace, work for peace.” Indeed, if you want justice (gender and others), work for peace. Causality does not run just upward through the levels of analysis, from types of individuals, societies, and governments up to war. It runs downward too. Enloe suggests that changes in attitudes towards war and the military may be the most important way to “reverse women’s oppression.” The dilemma is that peace work focused on justice brings to the peace movement energy, allies, and moral grounding, yet, in light of this book’s evidence, the emphasis on injustice as the main cause of war seems to be empirically inadequate.

#### Perm do the plan and refuse the commodification of the world-~-- the perm radicalizes reformism

Doran and Barry 6 – worked at all levels in the environment and sustainable development policy arena - at the United Nations, at the Northern Ireland Assembly and Dáil Éireann, and in the Irish NGO sector. PhD--AND-- Reader in Politics, Queen's University School of Politics, International Studies, and Philosophy. PhD Glasgow (Peter and John, Refining Green Political Economy: From Ecological Modernisation to Economic Security and Sufficiency, Analyse and Kritik 28/2006, p. 250–275, http://www.analyse-und-kritik.net/2006-2/AK\_Barry\_Doran\_2006.pdf)

EM = Ecological Modernization

Viewed in isolation EM can be painted as a reformist and limited strategy for achieving a more sustainable economy and society, and indeed questions could be legitimately asked as to whether the development of a recognisably ‘green’ political economy for sustainable development can be based on it. In this paper, it is contended that there are strategic advantages in seeking to build upon and radicalise EM. There are indications in the UK that the debate on sustainable consumption may lead to new deliberative fora for a re-negotiation of the meaning and ends of consumption. Could it be that ‘suﬃciency’ will emerge as the logical complement (on the consumer side) of the early production-side debate on EM on the limits of ‘eﬃciency’ without an ecological context? While there are various reasons one can give for this, in this conclusion we focus on two—one normative/principled the other strategic. From a strategic point of view, it is clear that, as Dryzek and his colleagues have shown, **if green and sustainability goals, aims and objectives are to be integrated within state policy, these need to attach themselves to one of the core state imperatives—accumulation/economic growth or legitimacy** (Dryzek et al. 2003; Barry 2003b). It is clear that the discourse of EM allows (some) green objectives to be integrated/translated into a policy language and framework which complements and does not undermine the state’s core imperative of pursuing orthodox economic growth. Therefore if (in the absence of a Green Party forming a government or being part of a ruling coalition, or even more unlikely of one of the main traditional parties initiating policies consistent with a radical understanding of sustainable development), the best that can be hoped for under current political conditions is the ‘greening of growth and capitalism’ i. e. a narrow, ‘business as usual’ version of EM. Or as Jonathan Porritt has put it, “We need more emphasis about the inherent unsustainability of our dominant economic model, even as we seek to improve the delivery of that model in the short to medium term” (Porritt 2004, 5). 23 On a more principled note, the adoption of EM as a starting point for the development of a model/theory of green political economy does carry with it the not inconsiderable beneﬁt of removing the ‘anti-growth’ and ‘limits to growth’ legacy which has (in our view) held back the theoretical development of a positive, attractive, modern conceptualisation of green political economy and radical conceptualisations of sustainable development. Here the technological innovation, the role of regulation driving innovation and eﬃciency, the promise that the transition to a more sustainable economy and society does not necessarily mean completely abandoning currently lifestyles and aspirations—strategically important in generating democratic support for sustainable development, and as indicated above, importance if the vision of a green sustainable economy is one which promotes diversity and tolerance in lifestyles and does not demand everyone conform to a putative ‘green’ lifestyle. Equally, this approach does not completely reject the positive role/s of a regulated market within sustainable development. However, it does demand a clear shift towards making the promotion of economic security (and quality of life) central to economic (and other) policy. Only when this happens can we say we have begun the transition to implementing the principles of sustainable development rather than fruitlessly seeking for some ‘greenprint’ of an abstract and utopian vision of the ‘sustainable society’.

#### The alt creates a political void filled by elites – locking in oppression

Cook 92 (Anthony, Associate Professor – Georgetown Law, New England Law Review, Spring, 26 New Eng.L. Rev. 751, Lexis)

The effect of deconstructing the power of the author to impose a fixed meaning on the text or offer a continuous narrative is both debilitating and liberating. It is debilitating in that any attempt to say what should be done within even our insular Foucaultian preoccupations may be oppositionalized and deconstructed as an illegitimate privileging of one term, value, perspective or narrative over another. The struggle over meaning might continue ad infinitum. That is, if a deconstructionist is theoretically consistent and sees deconstruction not as a political tool but as a philosophical orientation, political action is impossible, because such action requires a degree of closure that deconstruction, as a theoretical matter, does not permit. Moreover, the approach is debilitating because deconstruction without material rootedness, without goals and vision, **creates a political** and spiritual **void** into which the socially real power we theoretically deconstruct steps and **steps on** the disempowered and dispossessed.  [\*762]  To those dying from AIDS, stifled by poverty, dehumanized by sexism and racism, crippled by drugs and brutalized by the many forms of physical, political and economic violence that characterizes our narcissistic culture, power hardly seems a matter of illegitimate theoretical privileging. When vision, social theory and political struggle do not accompany critique, the **void will be filled** by the rich, the powerful and the charismatic, those who influence us through their eloquence, prestige, wealth and power.

#### The impact is extinction

Rorty 98 (Richard, Professor of Comparative Literature – Stanford University, Achieving Our Country: Leftist Thought in Twentieth-Century America, p. 89-94)

At that point, something will crack. The nonsuburban electorate will decide that the system has failed and start looking around for a strongman to vote for someone willing to assure them that, once he is elected, the smug bureaucrats, tricky lawyers, overpaid bond salesmen, and postmodernist professors will no longer be calling the shots. A scenario like that of Sinclair Lewis’ novel It Can’t Happen Here may then be played out. For once such a strongman takes office, nobody can predict what will happen. In 1932, most of the predictions made about what would happen if Hindenburg named Hitler chancellor were **wildly overoptimistic**. One thing that is very likely to happen is that **the gains made in the past forty years** by black and brown Americans, and by homosexuals, **will be wiped out**. Jocular contempt for women will come back into fashion. The words "nigger" and "kike" will once again be heard in the workplace. **All the sadism** which the academic Left has tried to make unaccept­able to its students will come flooding back. All the resent­ment which badly educated Americans feel about having their manners dictated to them by college graduates will find an outlet. But such a renewal of sadism will not alter the effects of selfishness. For after my imagined strongman takes charge, he will quickly make his peace with the international super­rich, just as Hitler made his with the German industrialists. He will invoke the glorious memory of the Gulf War to **pro­voke military adventures which will** generate short-term prosperity. He will be a disaster for the country and the world. People will wonder why there was so little resistance to his evitable rise. Where, they will ask, was the American Left? Why was it only rightists like Buchanan who spoke to the workers about the consequences of globalization? Why could not the Left channel the mounting rage of the newly dispossessed? It is often said that we Americans, at the end of the twenti­eth century, no longer have a Left. Since nobody denies the existence of what I have called the cultural Left, this amounts to an admission that that Left is unable to engage in national politics. It is not the sort of Left which can be asked to deal with the consequences of globalization. To get the country to deal with those consequences, the present cultural Left would have to transform itself by opening relations with the residue of the old reformist Left, and in particular with the labor unions. It would have to talk much more about money, even at the cost of talking less about stigma. I have two suggestions about how to effect this transition. The first is that the Left should put a moratorium on theory. It should try to kick its philosophy habit. The second is that the Left should try to mobilize what remains of our pride in being Americans. It should ask the public to consider how the country of Lincoln and Whitman might be achieved. In support of my first suggestion, let me cite a passage from Dewey's Reconstruction in Philosophy in which he ex­presses his exasperation with the sort of sterile debate now going on under the rubric of "individualism versus commu­nitarianism." Dewey thought that all discussions which took this dichotomy seriously suffer from a common defect. They are all committed to the logic of general notions under which specific situa­tions are to be brought. What we want is light upon this or that group of individuals, this or that concrete human being, this or that special institution or social arrangement. For such a logic of inquiry, the tradition­ally accepted logic substitutes discussion of the mean­ing of concepts and their dialectical relationships with one another. Dewey was right to be exasperated by sociopolitical theory conducted at this level of abstraction. He was wrong when he went on to say that ascending to this level is typically a right­ist maneuver, one which supplies "the apparatus for intellec­tual justifications of the established order. "9 For such ascents are now more common on the Left than on the Right. The contemporary academic Left seems to think that the higher your level of abstraction, the more subversive of the estab­lished order you can be. The more sweeping and novel your conceptual apparatus, the more radical your critique. When one of today's academic leftists says that some topic has been "inadequately theorized," you can be pretty certain that he or she is going to drag in either philosophy of lan­guage, or Lacanian psychoanalysis, or some neo-Marxist ver­sion of economic determinism. Theorists of the Left think that dissolving political agents into plays of differential sub­jectivity, or political initiatives into pursuits of Lacan's im­possible object of desire, helps to subvert the established order. Such subversion, they say, is accomplished by "problematizing familiar concepts." Recent attempts to subvert social institutions by prob­lematizing concepts have produced a few very good books. They have also produced many thousands of books which represent scholastic philosophizing at its worst. The authors of these purportedly "subversive" books honestly believe that they are serving human liberty. But it is almost impossi­ble to clamber back down from their books to a level of ab­straction on which one might discuss the merits of a law, a treaty, a candidate, or a political strategy. Even though what these authors "theorize" is often something very concrete and near at hand-a current TV show, a media celebrity, a re­cent scandal-they offer the most abstract and barren expla­nations imaginable. These futile attempts to philosophize one's way into polit­ical relevance are a symptom of what happens when a Left re­treats from activism and adopts a spectatorial approach to the problems of its country. Disengagement from practice pro­duces **theoretical hallucinations**. These result in an intellec­tual environment which is, as Mark Edmundson says in his book Nightmare on Main Street, Gothic. The cultural Left is haunted by ubiquitous specters, the most frightening of which is called "power." This is the name of what Edmund­son calls Foucault's "haunting agency, which is everywhere and nowhere, as evanescent and insistent as a resourceful spook."10

#### Alternative fails – critical theory has no mechanism to translate theory into practice

**Jones 99** (Richard Wyn, Lecturer in the Department of International Politics – University of Wales, Security, Strategy, and Critical Theory, CIAO, http://www.ciaonet.org/book/wynjones/wynjones06.html)

Because emancipatory political practice is central to the claims of critical theory, one might expect that proponents of a critical approach to the study of international relations would be reflexive about the relationship between theory and practice. Yet their thinking on this issue thus far does not seem to have progressed much beyond **grandiose statements of intent**. There have been no systematic considerations of how critical international theory can help generate, support, or sustain emancipatory politics beyond the seminar room or conference hotel. Robert Cox, for example, has described the task of critical theorists as providing “a guide to strategic action for bringing about an alternative order” (R. Cox 1981: 130). Although he has also gone on to identify possible agents for change and has outlined the nature and structure of some feasible alternative orders, he has not explicitly indicated whom he regards as the addressee of critical theory (i.e., who is being guided) and thus how the theory can hope to become a part of the political process (see R. Cox 1981, 1983, 1996). Similarly, Andrew Linklater has argued that “a critical theory of international relations must regard the practical project of extending community beyond the nation–state as its most important problem” (Linklater 1990b: 171). However, he has little to say about the role of theory in the realization of this “practical project.” Indeed, his main point is to suggest that the role of critical theory “is not to offer instructions on how to act but to reveal the existence of unrealised possibilities” (Linklater 1990b: 172). But the question still remains, reveal to whom? Is the audience enlightened politicians? Particular social classes? Particular social movements? Or particular (and presumably particularized) communities? In light of Linklater’s primary concern with emancipation, one might expect more guidance as to whom he believes might do the emancipating and how critical theory can impinge upon the emancipatory process. There is, likewise, little enlightenment to be gleaned from Mark Hoffman’s otherwise important contribution. He argues that critical international theory seeks not simply to reproduce society via description, but to understand society and change it. It is both descriptive and constructive in its theoretical intent: it is both an intellectual and a social act. It is not merely an expression of the concrete realities of the historical situation, but also a force for change within those conditions. (M. Hoffman 1987: 233) Despite this very ambitious declaration, once again, Hoffman gives no suggestion as to how this “force for change” should be operationalized and what concrete role critical theorizing might play in changing society. Thus, although the critical international theorists’ critique of the role that more conventional approaches to the study of world politics play in reproducing the contemporary world order may be persuasive, their account of the relationship between their own work and emancipatory political practice is unconvincing. Given the centrality of practice to the claims of critical theory, this is a very significant weakness. Without some plausible account of the **mechanisms** by which they hope to aid in the achievement of their emancipatory goals, proponents of critical international theory are hardly in a position to justify the assertion that “it represents the next stage in the development of International Relations theory” (M. Hoffman 1987: 244). Indeed, without a more convincing conceptualization of the theory–practice nexus, one can argue that critical international theory, by its own terms, has no way of redeeming some of its central epistemological and methodological claims and thus that it is a **fatally flawed** enterprise.

### **Chemical Industry – 2AC**

#### Natural gas revitalizes the chemical industry

Brady 12 (Jeff - NPR National Desk Reporter, “Natural Gas Boom Energizing The Chemical Industry”, 2/13, http://www.npr.org/2012/02/13/146803953/natural-gas-boom-energizing-the-chemical-industry)

Just outside of West Virginia's capital city, Charleston, on the banks of the Kanawha River, sits the Institute Industrial Park. Chemical plants have operated here continuously since World War II, when the local factories cranked out synthetic rubber. Today there are industrial pipes, tanks and buildings stretching in just about every direction. Soon, there could be more. U.S. chemical companies are the latest beneficiaries of the nation's natural gas drilling boom. Long focused on cheap gas sources elsewhere in the world, companies are now looking to expand here. A surplus of natural gas has pushed down prices, making it more attractive for chemical companies that use lots of gas to reopen shuttered plants and build new ones. Sleepy rural communities across the country are turning into industrial zones — and that worries people who live nearby. But the boom is good news for manufacturers that need cheap, plentiful supplies of natural gas. The natural gas drilling boom near Charleston has local business boosters lobbying for a huge new chemical plant, called an ethane cracker, which could bring jobs to the state. "It will take approximately 2,000 construction workers two years just to build the facility," says Matthew Ballard, president and chief executive officer of the Charleston Area Alliance. "Once up and running, there will be several hundred jobs at that cracking facility." The plant would "crack" ethane — break it down at the molecular level — and turn it into ethylene. Kevin DiGregorio, executive director of the Chemical Alliance Zone in Charleston, says ethylene is used to produce all sorts of things, from the cushions we sit on to the clothes we wear. "Everything that's not wood, or maybe brick, is made with chemicals, certainly. But probably 40 to 60 percent of it is made from ethylene," DiGregorio says. "It's very, very important to our daily lives." States Compete For Plants, Jobs The Marcellus Shale, from which nearby drillers are pulling natural gas, is particularly ethane-rich. Most natural gas contains anywhere from 2 to 8 percent of ethane, DiGregorio says, but "Marcellus natural gas contains as much as 14 to 16 percent" of ethane. Bayer CropScience, the company that operates the industrial park near Charleston, is talking with companies interested in building ethane crackers in the region. No official announcement has been made, but business leaders here are keeping their fingers crossed. The same is true elsewhere around northern Appalachia. Ohio, Pennsylvania and West Virginia are competing to lure a new ethane cracker that the oil company Shell plans to build. Firms in Canada also see opportunity in the Marcellus Shale. "We wouldn't have to go back very far — literally just seven or eight years — and the picture for the industry here in North America was pretty uncertain," says Randy Woelfel, CEO of NOVA Chemicals in Calgary, Alberta. He says high oil prices sent a lot of petrochemical manufacturing overseas to the Middle East and Asia. But now, low natural gas prices and the ethane-rich Marcellus Shale have changed everything. "That means ... that we'll be back in the hiring business, rather than the consolidation and survival/cost-cutting mode that NOVA was clearly in for much of the last decade," Woelfel says. Environmental Groups Wary As chemical companies in the U.S. look to expand, they can expect plenty of scrutiny from environmental groups, already concerned about pollution from natural gas drilling. "Clearly there are advantages to having economic development and manufacturing occur here in the United States," says Mark Brownstein, head of the Energy Program at the Environmental Defense Fund. "Our biggest concern is that we not sacrifice public health and the environment to get those jobs." Brownstein says for each new plant or expansion, tough questions will be asked about whether proposed facilities are being properly located and how they will affect local air quality.

#### Chemical industry solves extinction

Baum 99 (Rudy M., C&EN Washington, Chemical and Engineering News, Millennium Special Report, 12-6, <http://pubs.acs.org/hotartcl/cenear/991206/7749spintro2.html>)

Here is the fundamental challenge we face: The world's growing and aging population must be fed and clothed and housed and transported in ways that do not perpetuate the environmental devastation wrought by the first waves of industrialization of the 19th and 20th centuries. As we increase our output of goods and services, as we increase our consumption of energy, as we meet the imperative of raising the standard of living for the poorest among us, we must learn to carry out our economic activities sustainably. There are optimists out there, C&EN readers among them, who believe that the history of civilization is a long string of technological triumphs of humans over the limits of nature. In this view, the idea of a "carrying capacity" for Earth—a limit to the number of humans Earth's resources can support—is a fiction because technological advances will continuously obviate previously perceived limits. This view has historical merit. Dire predictions made in the 1960s about the exhaustion of resources ranging from petroleum to chromium to fresh water by the end of the 1980s or 1990s have proven utterly wrong. While I do not count myself as one of the technological pessimists who see technology as a mixed blessing at best and an unmitigated evil at worst, I do not count myself among the technological optimists either. There are environmental challenges of transcendent complexity that I fear may overcome us and ourEarth before technological progress can come to our rescue. Global climate change, the accelerating destruction of terrestrial and oceanic habitats, the catastrophic loss of species across the plant and animal kingdoms—these are problems that are not obviously amenable to straightforward technological solutions. But I know this, too: Science and technology have brought us to where we are, and only science and technology, coupled with innovative social and economic thinking, can take us to where we need to be in the coming millennium. Chemists, chemistry, and the chemical industry—what we at C&EN call the chemical enterprise—will play central roles in addressing these challenges. The first section of this Special Report is a series called ["Millennial Musings"](http://pubs.acs.org/hotartcl/cenear/991206/7749muse1.html) in which a wide variety of representatives from the chemical enterprise share their thoughts about the future of our science and industry. The five essays that follow explore the contributions the chemical enterprise is making right now to ensure that we will successfully meet the challenges of the 21st century. The essays do not attempt to predict the future. Taken as a whole, they do not pretend to be a comprehensive examination of the efforts of our science and our industry to tackle the challenges I've outlined above. Rather, they paint, in broad brush strokes, a portrait of scientists, engineers, and business managers struggling to make a vital contribution to humanity's future. The first essay, by Senior Editor Marc S. Reisch, is a case study of the [chemical industry's ongoing transformation to sustainable production.](http://pubs.acs.org/hotartcl/cenear/991206/7749sustain.html) Although it is not well known to the general public, the chemical industry is at the forefront of corporate efforts to reduce waste from production streams to zero. Industry giants DuPont and Dow Chemical are taking major strides worldwide to manufacture chemicals while minimizing the environmental "footprint" of their facilities. This is an ethic that starts at the top of corporate structure. Indeed, Reisch quotes Dow President and Chief Executive Officer William S. Stavropolous: "We must integrate elements that historically have been seen as at odds with one another: the triple bottom line of sustainability—economic and social and environmental needs." DuPont Chairman and CEO Charles (Chad) O. Holliday envisions a future in which "biological processes use renewable resources as feedstocks, use solar energy to drive growth, absorb carbon dioxide from the atmosphere, use low-temperature and low-pressure processes, and produce waste that is less toxic." But sustainability is more than just a philosophy at these two chemical companies. Reisch describes ongoing Dow and DuPont initiatives that are making sustainability a reality at Dow facilities in Michigan and Germany and at DuPont's massive plant site near Richmond, Va. Another manifestation of the chemical industry's evolution is its embrace of life sciences. Genetic engineering is a revolutionary technology. In the 1970s, research advances fundamentally shifted our perception of DNA. While it had always been clear that deoxyribonucleic acid was a chemical, it was not a chemical that could be manipulated like other chemicals—clipped precisely, altered, stitched back together again into a functioning molecule. Recombinant DNA techniques began the transformation of DNA into just such a chemical, and the reverberations of that change are likely to be felt well into the next century. Genetic engineering has entered the fabric of modern science and technology. It is one of the basic tools chemists and biologists use to understand life at the molecular level. It provides new avenues to pharmaceuticals and new approaches to treat disease. It expands enormously agronomists' ability to introduce traits into crops, a capability seized on by numerous chemical companies. There is no doubt that this powerful new tool will play a major role in [feeding the world's population](http://pubs.acs.org/hotartcl/cenear/991206/7749food.html) in the coming century, but its adoption has hit some bumps in the road. In the second essay, Editor-at-Large Michael Heylin examines how the promise of agricultural biotechnology has gotten tangled up in real public fear of genetic manipulation and corporate control over food. The third essay, by Senior Editor Mairin B. Brennan, looks at chemists embarking on what is perhaps the greatest intellectual quest in the history of science—humans' attempt to understand the detailed chemistry of the human brain, and with it, human consciousness. While this quest is, at one level, basic research at its most pure, it also has enormous practical significance. Brennan focuses on one such practical aspect: the effort to understand [neurodegenerative diseases like Alzheimer's disease and Parkinson's disease](http://pubs.acs.org/hotartcl/cenear/991206/7749health.html) that predominantly plague older humans and are likely to become increasingly difficult public health problems among an aging population. [Science and technology are always two-edged swords.](http://pubs.acs.org/hotartcl/cenear/991206/7749secu.html) They bestow the power to create and the power to destroy. In addition to its enormous potential for health and agriculture, genetic engineering conceivably could be used to create horrific biological warfare agents. In the fourth essay of this Millennium Special Report, Senior Correspondent Lois R. Ember examines the challenge of developing methods to counter the threat of such biological weapons. "Science and technology will eventually produce sensors able to detect the presence or release of biological agents, or devices that aid in forecasting, remediating, and ameliorating bioattacks," Ember writes. Finally, Contributing Editor Wil Lepkowski discusses the most mundane, the most marvelous, and the most essential molecule on [Earth, H2O.](http://pubs.acs.org/hotartcl/cenear/991206/7749water.html) Providing clean water to Earth's population is already difficult—and tragically, not always accomplished. Lepkowski looks in depth at the situation in Bangladesh—where a well-meaning UN program to deliver clean water from wells has poisoned millions with arsenic. Chemists are working to develop better ways to detect arsenic in drinking water at meaningful concentrations and ways to remove it that will work in a poor, developing country. And he explores the evolving water management philosophy, and the science that underpins it, that will be needed to provide adequate water for all its vital uses. In the past two centuries, our science has transformed the world. Chemistry is a wondrous tool that has allowed us to understand the structure of matter and gives us the ability to manipulate that structure to suit our own purposes. It allows us to dissect the molecules of life to see what makes them, and us, tick. It is providing a glimpse into workings of what may be the most complex structure in the universe, the human brain, and with it hints about what constitutes consciousness. In the coming decades, we will use chemistry to delve ever deeper into these mysteries and provide for humanity's basic and not-so-basic needs.

### Risk

#### No link –

#### A strong internal link and uniqueness story solves --- their author.

**Berube 2000** (David – Associate Professor of Speech Communication and Director of Debate at the University of South Carolina, Debunking Mini-Max Reasoning, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, p. 64-65)

If extended arguments using mini-max reasoning is so indefensible, what can we do? Surprisingly, the answer is quite a lot. As a starting point, we need to reject the notion that contest debating would be impossible without them. We could demand a greater responsibility on the part of arguers making mini-max claims (a subject approached below). Debaters could use their plans and counterplans to stipulate the internal link and uniqueness stories for their extended arguments, consequently focusing the debate on probability assessment and away from exaggerated impacts. Alternatively, debaters may select to discuss ideas as we have seen in the recent trend toward kritik debating.

#### No alternative – even if it’s complex and uncertainty, our form of social science is the only game in town.

**Miller 2002** (Katherine Miller – Professor of Communication at Texas A & M, Communication theories: Perspectives, processes, and contexts, p. 35-36)

Epistemology and Axiology Post-positivist assumptions about the grounds of social knowledge and the role of values in the production of social knowledge are also based largely on the objectivist tenets we discussed in Chapter 2. These assumptions include the three interlinked notions that (a) knowledge can best be gained through a search for regularities and causal relationships among components of the social world, (b) regularities and causal relationships can best be discovered if there is a complete separation between the investigator and the subject of the investigation, and (c) this separation can be guaranteed through the use of the scientific method. As they have done with ontological assumptions of realism, however, most post-positivist scholars in communication today have tempered these epistemological and axiological bases to what Guba (1990a) has termed modified objectivist. Post-positivist theorists generally hold to the first assumption mentioned in the preceding paragraph. That is, the search for knowledge remains centered on causal explanations for regularities observed in the physical and social world. This is clearly consistent with the ontological position outlined previously. It should be noted, though, that the regularities and causal relationships studied by post-positivist scholars today are rarely simplistic and often involve a multiplicity of factors and over-time relationships (see K. I. Miller, 2001, for examples in organizational communication). Beyond this first assumption, however, post-positivists have largely rejected the second assumption, regarding the necessary distinction between knower and known. Instead, many post-positivists have concluded that "the hope for a formal method, capable of being isolated from actual human judgment about the content of science (that is, about the nature of the world), and from human values seems to have evaporated" (H. Putnam, 1981, p. 192). Because this assumption of value-free inquiry is rejected, post-positivists have similarly rejected blind obedience to the scientific method. Instead, objectivity is seen as a regulatory ideal. In other words, a post-positivist will use methods that strive to be as unbiased as possible and will attempt to be aware of any values that might compromise neutrality However, because the possible fallabilities of the scientific method are recognized, the post-positivist will also rely on the critical scrutiny of a community of scholars in order to safeguard objectivity and maximize the growth of social scientific knowledge. Thus, though no claims to absolute truth and value-free inquiry are made, the belief exists that progress can be made if researchers exercise care in their theorizing and research and are critical of theoretical assertions and empirical justifications. As Phillips (1990) summarizes, The ideal that is embraced seems to be this: Seekers after enlightenment in any field do the best that they can; they honestly seek evidence, they critically scrutinize it, they are (relatively) open to alternative viewpoints, they take criticism (fairly) seriously and try to profit from it, they play their hunches, they stick to their guns, but they also have a sense of when it is time to quit. It may be a dirty and hard and uncertain game, but with no fixed algorithms to determine progress, it is the only game in town. .

#### Primacy results in the structural decline of conflict --- history and studies prove.

**Drezner** 5/25/**2005** (Daniel – professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law, Gregg Easterbrook, War, and the Dangers of Extrapolation, p. http://www.danieldrezner.com/archives/002087.html)

Daily explosions in Iraq, massacres in Sudan, the Koreas staring at each other through artillery barrels, a Hobbesian war of all against all in eastern Congo--combat plagues human society as it has, perhaps, since our distant forebears realized that a tree limb could be used as a club. But here is something you would never guess from watching the news: War has entered a cycle of decline. Combat in Iraq and in a few other places is an exception to a significant global trend that has gone nearly unnoticed--namely that, for about 15 years, there have been steadily fewer armed conflicts worldwide. In fact, it is possible that a person's chance of dying because of war has, in the last decade or more, become the lowest in human history. Is Easterbrook right? He has a few more paragraphs on the numbers: The University of Maryland studies find the number of wars and armed conflicts worldwide peaked in 1991 at 51, which may represent the most wars happening simultaneously at any point in history. Since 1991, the number has fallen steadily. There were 26 armed conflicts in 2000 and 25 in 2002, even after the Al Qaeda attack on the United States and the U.S. counterattack against Afghanistan. By 2004, Marshall and Gurr's latest study shows, the number of armed conflicts in the world had declined to 20, even after the invasion of Iraq. All told, there were less than half as many wars in 2004 as there were in 1991. Marshall and Gurr also have a second ranking, gauging the magnitude of fighting. This section of the report is more subjective. Everyone agrees that the worst moment for human conflict was World War II; but how to rank, say, the current separatist fighting in Indonesia versus, say, the Algerian war of independence is more speculative. Nevertheless, the Peace and Conflict studies name 1991 as the peak post-World War II year for totality of global fighting, giving that year a ranking of 179 on a scale that rates the extent and destructiveness of combat. By 2000, in spite of war in the Balkans and genocide in Rwanda, the number had fallen to 97; by 2002 to 81; and, at the end of 2004, it stood at 65. This suggests the extent and intensity of global combat is now less than halfwhat it was 15 years ago. Easterbrook spends the rest of the essay postulating the causes of this -- the decline in great power war, the spread of democracies, the growth of economic interdependence, and even the peacekeeping capabilities of the United Nations. Easterbrook makes a lot of good points -- most people are genuinely shocked when they are told that even in a post-9/11 climate, there has been a steady and persistent decline in wars and deaths from wars. That said, what bothers me in the piece is what Easterbrook leaves out. First, he neglects to mention the biggest reason for why war is on the decline -- there's a global hegemon called the United States right now. Easterbrook acknowledges that "the most powerful factor must be the end of the cold war" but he doesn't understand why it's the most powerful factor. Elsewhere in the piece he talks about the growing comity among the great powers, without discussing the elephant in the room: the reason the "great powers" get along is that the United States is much, much more powerful than anyone else. If you quantify power only by relative military capabilities, the U.S. is a great power, there are maybe ten or so middle powers, and then there are a lot of mosquitoes. [If the U.S. is so powerful, why can't it subdue the Iraqi insurgency?--ed. Power is a relative measure -- the U.S. might be having difficulties, but no other country in the world would have fewer problems.] Joshua Goldstein, who knows a thing or two about this phenomenon, made this clear in a Christian Science Monitor op-ed three years ago: We probably owe this lull to the end of the cold war, and to a unipolar world order with a single superpower to impose its will in places like Kuwait, Serbia, and Afghanistan. The emerging world order is not exactly benign – Sept. 11 comes to mind – and Pax Americana delivers neither justice nor harmony to the corners of the earth. But a unipolar world is inherently more peaceful than the bipolar one where two superpowers fueled rival armies around the world. The long-delayed "peace dividend" has arrived, like a tax refund check long lost in the mail. The difference in language between Goldstein and Easterbrook highlights my second problem with "The End of War?" Goldstein rightly refers to the past fifteen years as a "lull" -- a temporary reduction in war and war-related death. The flip side of U.S. hegemony being responsible for the reduction of armed conflict is what would happen if U.S. hegemony were to ever fade away. Easterbrook focuses on the trends that suggest an ever-decreasing amount of armed conflict -- and I hope he's right. But I'm enough of a realist to know that if the U.S. should find its primacy challenged by, say, a really populous non-democratic country on the other side of the Pacific Ocean, all best about the utility of economic interdependence, U.N. peacekeeping, and the spread of democracy are right out the window. UPDATE: To respond to a few thoughts posted by the commenters: 1) To spell things out a bit more clearly -- U.S. hegemony important to the reduction of conflict in two ways. First, U.S. power can act as a powerful if imperfect constraint on pairs of enduring rivals (Greece-Turkey, India-Pakistan) that contemplate war on a regular basis. It can't stop every conflict, but it can blunt a lot ofthem. Second, and more important to Easterbrook's thesis, U.S. supremacy in conventional military affairs prevents other middle-range states -- China, Russia, India, Great Britain, France, etc. -- from challenging the U.S. or each other in a war. It would be suicide for anyone to fight a war with the U.S., and if any of these countries waged a war with each other, the prospect of U.S. intervention would be equally daunting.

Complexity theory leads to paralysis  
Hendrick 9 (Diane; Department of Peace Studies – University of Bradford, “Complexity Theory and Conflict Transformation: An Exploration of Potential and Implications,” June, [http://143.53.238.22/acad/confres/papers/pdfs/CCR17.pdf)](http://143.53.238.22/acad/confres/papers/pdfs/CCR17.pdf%29)  
It is still relatively early days in the application of complexity theory to social sciences and there are doubts and criticisms, either about the applicability of the ideas or about the expectations generated for them. It is true that the translation of terms from natural science to social science is sometimes contested due to the significant differences in these domains, and that there are concerns that the meanings of terms may be distorted, thus making their use arbitrary or even misleading. Developing new, relevant definitions for the new domain applications, where the terms indicate a new idea or a new synthesis that takes our understanding forward, are required. In some cases, particular aspects of complexity theory are seen as of only limited applicability, for example, self-organisation (see Rosenau‘s argument above that it is only relevant in systems in which authority does not play a role). There are those who argue that much that is being touted as new is actually already known, whether from systems theory or from experience, and so complexity theory cannot be seen as adding value in that way. There are also concerns that the theory has not been worked out in sufficient detail,or with sufficient rigour, to make itself useful yet. Even that it encourages woolly thinking and imprecision. In terms of application in the field, it could be argued that it may lead to paralysis, in fear of all the unexpected things that could happen, and all the unintended consequences that could result, from a particular intervention. The proposed adaptability and sensitivity to emerging new situations may lead to difficulties in planning or, better expressed, must lead to a different conception of what constitutes planning, which is, in itself, challenging (or even threatening) for many fields. The criteria for funding projects or research may not fit comfortably with a complexity approach, and evaluation, already difficult especially in the field of conflict transformation, would require a re-conceptualisation. Pressure for results could act as a disincentive to change project design in the light of emergent processes. There may be the desire to maintain the illusion of control in order to retain the confidence of funders. On the other hand, there are fears that complexity may be used as an excuse for poor planning, and implementation, which is a valid concern for funders. In addition, there may be scepticism that the co-operation and co-ordination between different researchers or interveners, (let alone transdisciplinary undertakings) appropriate to working on complex problem domains, will not work due to differing mental models, competing interests and aims, competition for funding, prestige, etc. Such attempts appear, therefore, unrealistic or unfeasible.

Scenario planning is possible and key to making effective decisions

Kurasawa 4 (Fuyuki, Professor of Sociology – York University of Toronto, “Cautionary Tales: The Global Culture of Prevention and the Work of Foresight”, Constellations, 11(4))

A radically postmodern line of thinking, for instance, would lead us to believe that it is pointless, perhaps even harmful, to strive for farsightedness in light of the aforementioned crisis of conventional paradigms of historical analysis. If, contra teleological models, history has no intrinsic meaning, direction, or endpoint to be discovered through human reason, and if, contra scientistic futurism, prospective trends cannot be predicted without error, then the abyss of chronological inscrutability supposedly opens up at our feet. The future appears to be unknowable, an outcome of chance. Therefore, rather than embarking upon grandiose speculation about what may occur, we should adopt a pragmatism that abandons itself to the twists and turns of history; let us be content to formulate ad hoc responses to emergencies as they arise. While this argument has the merit of underscoring the fallibilistic nature of all predictive schemes, it conflates the necessary recognition of the contingency of history with unwarranted assertions about the latter’s total opacity and indeterminacy. Acknowledging the fact that the future cannot be known with absolute certainty **does not imply abandoning the task** of trying to understand what is brewing on the horizon and to prepare for crises already coming into their own. In fact, the incorporation of the principle of fallibility into the work of prevention means that we must be ever more vigilant for warning signs of disaster and for responses that provoke unintended or unexpected consequences (a point to which I will return in the final section of this paper). In addition, from a normative point of view, the acceptance of historical contingency and of the self-limiting character of farsightedness places the duty of preventing catastrophe squarely on the shoulders of present generations. The future no longer appears to be a metaphysical creature of destiny or of the cunning of reason, nor can it be sloughed off to pure randomness. It becomes, instead, a result of human action shaped by decisions in the present – including, of course, trying to anticipate and prepare for possible and avoidable sources of harm to our successors. Combining a sense of analytical contingency toward the future and ethical responsibility for it, the idea of early warning is making its way into preventive action on the global stage.

Our advantage isn’t based on myopic security discourse- multiple independent fields support our hegemony advantage, prefer our advantage because it is interdisciplinary  
**Wohlforth 09**

– Professor of government @ Dartmouth College [[William C. Wohlforth](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html#back), “Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War,” World Politics, Volume 61, Number 1, January 2009]

Second, I question the dominant view that status quo evaluations are relatively independent of the distribution of capabilities. If the status of states depends in some measure on their relative capabilities, and if states derive utility from status, then different distributions of capabilities may affect levels of satisfaction, just as different income distributions may affect levels of status competition in domestic settings. [6](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html" \l "f6) Building on research in psychology and sociology, I argue that even capabilities distributions among major powers foster ambiguous status hierarchies, which generate more **dissatisfaction and clashes** over the status quo. And the more stratified the distribution of capabilities, the less likely such status competition is. Unipolarity thus generates far fewer incentives than either bipolarity or multipolarity for direct great power positional competition over status. Elites in the other major powers continue to prefer higher status, but in a unipolar system they face comparatively weak incentives to translate that preference into costly action. And the absence of such incentives matters because social status is a positional good—something whose value depends on how much one has in relation to others.[7](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html" \l "f7) “If everyone has high status,” Randall Schweller notes, “no one does.”[8](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html" \l "f8) While one actor might increase its status, all cannot simultaneously do so. High status is thus inherently scarce, and competitions for **status tend to be zero sum**.[9](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html" \l "f9) I begin by describing the puzzles facing predominant theories that status competition might solve. Building on recent research on social identity and status seeking, I then show that under certain conditions the ways decision makers identify with the states they represent may prompt them to frame issues as positional disputes over status in a social hierarchy. I develop hypotheses that tailor this scholarship to the domain of great power politics, showing how the probability of status competition is likely to be linked to polarity. The rest of the article investigates whether there is sufficient evidence for these hypotheses to warrant further refinement and testing. I pursue this in three ways: by showing that the theory advanced here is **consistent** with what we know about large-scale patterns of **great power conflict** through **history**; by [End Page 30] demonstrating that the causal mechanisms it identifies did drive relatively secure major powers to military conflict in the past (and therefore that they might do so again if the world were bipolar or multipolar); and by showing that observable evidence concerning the major powers’ identity politics and grand strategies under unipolarity are consistent with the theory’s expectations. Puzzles of Power and War Recent research on the connection between the distribution of capabilities and war has concentrated on a hypothesis long central to systemic theories of power transition or hegemonic stability: that **major war** arises out of a **power shift** in favor of a rising state dissatisfied with a status quo defended by a declining satisfied state.[10](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html" \l "f10) Though they have garnered substantial empirical support, these theories have yet to solve two intertwined empirical and theoretical puzzles—each of which might be explained by positional concerns for status. First, if the material costs and benefits of a given status quo are what matters, why would a state be dissatisfied with the very status quo that had abetted its rise? The rise of China today naturally prompts this question, but it is hardly a novel situation. Most of the best known and most consequential power transitions in history featured rising challengers that were prospering mightily under the status quo. In case after case, historians argue that these revisionist powers sought recognition and standing rather than specific alterations to the existing rules and practices that constituted the order of the day. In each paradigmatic case of hegemonic war, the claims of the rising power are hard to reduce to instrumental adjustment of the status quo. In R. Ned Lebow’s reading, for example, Thucydides’ account tells us that the rise of Athens posed unacceptable threats not to the security or welfare of Sparta but rather to its identity as leader of the Greek world, which was an important cause of the Spartan assembly’s vote for war.[11](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html" \l "f11) The issues that inspired Louis XIV’s and Napoleon’s dissatisfaction with the status quo were many and varied, but most accounts accord [End Page 31] independent importance to the drive for a position of unparalleled primacy. In these and other hegemonic struggles among leading states in post-Westphalian Europe, the rising challenger’s dissatisfaction is often difficult to connect to the material costs and benefits of the status quo, and much contemporary evidence revolves around issues of recognition and status.[12](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html" \l "f12) Wilhemine Germany is a fateful case in point. As Paul Kennedy has argued, underlying material trends as of 1914 were set to propel Germany’s continued rise indefinitely, so long as Europe remained at peace.[13](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html" \l "f13) Yet Germany chafed under the very status quo that abetted this rise and its elite focused resentment on its chief trading partner—the great power that presented the least plausible threat to its security: Great Britain. At fantastic cost, it built a battleship fleet with no plausible strategic purpose other than to stake a claim on global power status.[14](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html" \l "f14) Recent historical studies present strong evidence that, far from fearing attacks from Russia and France, German leaders sought to provoke them, knowing that this would lead to a long, expensive, and sanguinary war that Britain was certain to join.[15](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html" \l "f15) And of all the motivations swirling round these momentous decisions, no serious historical account fails to register German leaders’ oft-expressed yearning for “a place in the sun.” The second puzzle is bargaining failure. Hegemonic theories tend to model war as a conflict over the status quo without specifying precisely what the status quo is and what flows of benefits it provides to states.[16](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html" \l "f16) Scholars generally follow Robert Gilpin in positing that the underlying issue concerns a “desire to redraft the rules by which relations among nations work,” “the nature and governance of the system,” and “the distribution of territory among the states in the system.”[17](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html" \l "f17) If these are the [End Page 32] issues at stake, then systemic theories of hegemonic war and power transition confront the puzzle brought to the fore in a seminal article by James Fearon: what prevents states from striking a bargain that avoids the costs of war? [18](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html" \l "f18) Why can’t states renegotiate the international order as underlying capabilities distributions shift their relative bargaining power? Fearon proposed that one answer consistent with strict rational choice assumptions is that such bargains are infeasible when the issue at stake is indivisible and cannot readily be portioned out to each side. Most aspects of a given international order are readily divisible, however, and, as Fearon stressed, “both the intrinsic complexity and richness of most matters over which states negotiate and the availability of linkages and side-payments suggest that intermediate bargains typically will exist.”[19](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html" \l "f19) Thus, most scholars have assumed that the indivisibility problem is trivial, focusing on two other rational choice explanations for bargaining failure: uncertainty and the commitment problem.[20](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html" \l "f20) In the view of many scholars, it is these problems, rather than indivisibility, that likely explain leaders’ inability to avail themselves of such intermediate bargains. Yet recent research inspired by constructivism shows how issues that are physically divisible can become socially indivisible, depending on how they relate to the identities of decision makers.[21](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html" \l "f21) Once issues surrounding the status quo are framed in positional terms as bearing on the disputants’ relative standing, then, to the extent that they value their standing itself, they may be unwilling to pursue intermediate bargaining solutions. Once linked to status, easily divisible issues that theoretically provide opportunities for linkages and side payments of various sorts may themselves be seen as indivisible and thus unavailable as avenues for possible intermediate bargains. The **historical record** surrounding **major wars** is **rich with evidence** suggesting that positional **concerns over status frustrate bargaining**: expensive, protracted conflict over what appear to be minor issues; a propensity on the part of decision makers to frame issues in terms of relative rank even when doing so makes bargaining harder; decision-makers’ [End Page 33] inability to accept feasible divisions of the matter in dispute even when failing to do so imposes high costs; demands on the part of states for observable evidence to confirm their estimate of an improved position in the hierarchy; the inability of private bargains to resolve issues; a frequently observed compulsion for the public attainment of concessions from a higher ranked state; and stubborn resistance on the part of states to which such demands are addressed even when acquiescence entails limited material cost. The literature on bargaining failure in the context of power shifts remains inconclusive, and it is premature to take any empirical pattern as necessarily probative. Indeed, Robert Powell has recently proposed that indivisibility is not a rationalistic explanation for war after all: fully rational leaders with perfect information should prefer to settle a dispute over an indivisible issue by resorting to a lottery rather than a war certain to destroy some of the goods in dispute. What might prevent such bargaining solutions is not indivisibility itself, he argues, but rather the parties’ inability to commit to abide by any agreement in the future if they expect their relative capabilities to continue to shift.[22](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html" \l "f22) This is the credible commitment problem to which many theorists are now turning their attention. But how it relates to the information problem that until recently dominated the formal literature remains to be seen.[23](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html" \l "f23) The larger point is that positional concerns for status may help account for the puzzle of bargaining failure. In the rational choice bargaining literature, war is puzzling because it destroys some of the benefits or flows of benefits in dispute between the bargainers, who would be better off dividing the spoils without war. Yet what happens to these models if what matters for states is less the flows of material benefits themselves than their implications for relative status? The salience of this question depends on the relative importance of positional concern for status among states. Do Great Powers Care about Status? Mainstream theories generally posit that states come to blows over an international status quo only when it has implications for their security or material well-being. The guiding assumption is that a state’s satisfaction [End Page 34] with its place in the existing order is a function of the material costs and benefits implied by that status.[24](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html" \l "f24) By that assumption, once a state’s status in an international order ceases to affect its material wellbeing, its relative standing will have no bearing on decisions for war or peace. But the assumption is undermined by **cumulative research** **in disciplines ranging from neuroscience** and **evolutionary biology** to **economics, anthropology, sociology, and psychology** that human beings are powerfully motivated by the desire for favorable social status comparisons. This research suggests that the preference for status is a basic disposition rather than merely a strategy for attaining other goals.[25](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html" \l "f25) People often seek tangibles not so much because of the welfare or security they bring but because of the social status they confer. Under certain conditions, the search for status will cause people to behave in ways that directly contradict their material interest in security and/or prosperity. Pg. 33-35

#### **Complexity theory is wrong - linear solutions empirically are effective - the alternative dooms the world**

Kurasawa 4 (Professor of Sociology, York University of Toronto, Fuyuki, Constellations Volume 11, No 4, 2004).

Moreover, keeping in mind the sobering lessons of the past century cannot but make us wary about humankind’s supposedly unlimited ability for problemsolving or discovering solutions in time to avert calamities. In fact, the historical track-record of last-minute, technical ‘quick-fixes’ is hardly reassuring. What’s more, most of the serious perils that we face today (e.g., nuclear waste, climate change, global terrorism, genocide and civil war) demand complex, sustained, long-term strategies of planning, coordination, and execution. On the other hand, an examination of fatalism makes it readily apparent that the idea that humankind is doomed from the outset puts off any attempt to minimize risks for our successors, essentially condemning them to face cataclysms unprepared. An a priori pessimism is also unsustainable given the fact that long-term preventive action has had (and will continue to have) appreciable beneficial effects; the examples of medical research, the welfare state, international humanitarian law, as well as strict environmental regulations in some countries stand out among many others. The evaluative framework proposed above should not be restricted to the critique of misappropriations of farsightedness, since it can equally support public deliberation with a reconstructive intent, that is, democratic discussion and debate about a future that human beings would freely self-determine. Inverting Foucault’s Nietzschean metaphor, we can think of genealogies of the future that could perform a farsighted mapping out of the possible ways of organizing social life. They are, in other words, interventions into the present intended to facilitate global civil society’s participation in shaping the field of possibilities of what is to come. Once competing dystopian visions are filtered out on the basis of their analytical credibility, ethical commitments, and political underpinnings and consequences, groups and individuals can assess the remaining legitimate catastrophic scenarios through the lens of genealogical mappings of the future. Hence, our first duty consists in addressing the present-day causes of eventual perils, ensuring that the paths we decide upon do not contract the range of options available for our posterity.42 Just as importantly, the practice of genealogically inspired farsightedness nurtures the project of an autonomous future, one that is socially self-instituting. In so doing, we can acknowledge that the future is a human creation instead of the product of metaphysical and extra-social forces (god, nature, destiny, etc.), and begin to reflect upon and deliberate about the kind of legacy we want to leave for those who will follow us. Participants in global civil society can then take – and in many instances have already taken – a further step by committing themselves to socio-political struggles forging a world order that, aside from not jeopardizing human and environmental survival, is designed to rectify the sources of transnational injustice that will continue to inflict needless suffering upon future generations if left unchallenged.

### Helium – 2AC

#### US natural gas production is key global helium production

EIA 6 (Energy Information Administration, the official energy statistics agency of U.S. Government , “Natural Gas Processing: The Crucial Link Between Natural Gas Production and Its Transportation to Market” http://www.eia.gov/pub/oil\_gas/natural\_gas/feature\_articles/2006/ngprocess/ngprocess.pdf)

The world’s supply of helium comes exclusively from natural gas production. The single largest source of helium is the United States, which produces about 80 percent of the annual world production of 3.0 billion cubic feet (Bcf). In 2003, U.S. production of helium was 2.4 Bcf, about two-thirds of which came from the Hugoton Basin in north Texas, Oklahoma, and Kansas (Figure 2). The rest mostly comes from the LaBarge field located in the Green River Basin in western Wyoming, with small amounts also produced in Utah and Colorado. According to the National Research Council, the consumption of helium in the United States doubled between 1985 and 1996, although its use has leveled off in recent years. It is used in such applications as magnetic resonance imaging, semiconductor processing, and in the pressurizing and purging of rocket engines by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Twenty-two natural gas treatment plants in the United States currently produce helium as a major byproduct of natural gas processing. Twenty of these plants, located in the Hugoton-Panhandle Basin, produce marketable helium which is sold in the open market when profitable, while transporting the remaining unrefined helium to the Federal Helium Reserve (FHR). The FHR was created in the 1950s in the Bush salt dome, underlying the Cliffside field, located near Amarillo, Texas. Sales of unrefined helium in the United Statesfor the most part, come from the FHR.

#### This collapses US space exploration

CN 12 – Citation News, “Scientists' High-Pitched Response to Helium Shortage”, 3-22, http://www.cyberregs.com/webapps/Blog/post/Scientists-High-Pitched-Response-to-Helium-Shortage.aspx

Helium - the second lightest element in the universe with an atomic weight of 4.002602 - is an inert gas that can be cooled to temperatures of -270 Celsius without becoming a solid, making it indispensible in the operation of, among many things, superconducting magnets used in MRI scanners, telescopes and particle accelerators like the Large Hadron Collider. Helium also holds an important place in the defense industry. It also has some far less profound applications, which consume great quantities of the gas annually - applications such as party balloons and squeak-voice huffing. These latter applications have drawn the ire of researchers. This month, the Guardian reported that the UK's Rutherford Appleton Laboratory wasted three days and £90,000 (US$ 143,091), when, during an important experiment exploring the structure of matter, they could not obtain a supply of helium. Needless to say, the scientists were in a less-than-celebratory mood. "We put the stuff into party balloons and let them float off into the upper atmosphere, or we use it to make our voices go squeaky for a laugh. It is very, very stupid. It makes me really angry,” said Oleg Kiricheck, the research team leader. Cornell University Professor Robert Richardson is also concerned. He believes that, with our current reserves of helium, the price of the element severely discounts its real value. By his estimation, the price of a single party balloon should cost as much as $100. Richardson suggests increasing the price of helium by 20-50% to eliminate excessive waste. Although helium ranks next to hydrogen as the most abundant element in the universe, here on earth it is a finite commodity. The helium that is here is all we have! Helium is collected during natural gas and oil drilling. If the gas is not captured, it dissipates into earth's upper atmosphere and is lost forever. The same happens when a party balloon is released into the air, or when it self-deflates, because helium atoms are so small that they can easily move through the balloon's latex shell. Party balloons do not represent the only wasteful expenditures of helium. Macy's Thanksgiving Day parade typically uses 400 Mcf a year, although there have been recent attempts to recycle some of the helium used in the floats. NASA uses up to 75 MMcf annually to pressurize rocket tanks. The agency has made no attempt to recycle this huge amount of gas. Weather balloons also consume about 140 MMcf of helium per year. At the present rate of supply depletion, the United States will become an importer of helium from the Middle East and Russia within 10 years, and the world will run out of helium within 30 years. This would have major implications for space travel and exploration, scientific and nuclear research, medical advances and early detection of diseases. Possible solutions for this problem should address supply, not pricing. A drastic increase in the price of helium as a preservative measure would cause a huge spike in billing for medical procedures, such as MRIs, scientific research, and defense expenditures, as well as party balloons.

#### Extinction is inevitable without space exploration

Carreau 2 (Mark, Winner – 2006 Space Communicator Award, MA in Journalism – Kansas State University, “Top Experts See Space Study As Key to Human Survival”, The Houston Chronicle, 10-19, Lexis)

With Apollo astronaut John Young leading the charge, top aerospace experts warned Friday that humanity's survival may depend on how boldly the world's space agencies venture into the final frontier. Only a spacefaring culture with the skills to travel among and settle planets can be assured of escaping a collision between Earth and a large asteroid or devastation from the eruption of a super volcano, they told the World Space Congress. "Space exploration is the key to the future of the human race," said Young, who strolled on the moon more than 30 years ago and now serves as the associate director of NASA's Johnson Space Center. "We should be running scared to go out into the solar system. We should be running fast." Scientists believe that an asteroid wiped out the dinosaurs more than 60 million years ago, and are gathering evidence of previously large collisions. "The civilization of Earth does not have quite as much protection as we would like to believe," said Leonid Gorshkov, an exploration strategist with RSC Energia, one of Russia's largest aerospace companies. "We should not place all of our eggs in one basket."

### ROB

#### A constant focus on epistemological and ontological questions undermines theory and the ability to develop real-world policy solutions.

**Owens 2002** (David – professor of social and political philosophy at the University of Southampton, Re-orienting International Relations: On Pragmatism, Pluralism and Practical Reasoning, Millenium, p. 655-657)

Commenting on the ‘philosophical turn’ in IR, Wæver remarks that ‘[a] frenzy for words like “epistemology” and “ontology” often signals this philosophical turn’, although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn. The first danger with the philosophical turn is that it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology over explanatory and/or interpretive power as if the latter two were merely a simple function of the former. But while the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is not wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, wholly dependent on these philosophical commitments. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness—but this does not undermine the point that, for a certain class of problems, rational choice theory may provide the best account available to us. In other words, while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it is not the only or even necessarily the most important kind. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that because prioritisation of ontology and epistemology promotes theory-construction from philosophical first principles, it cultivates a theory-driven rather than problem-driven approach to IR. Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action, event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, ‘theory-driven work is part of a reductionist program’ in that it ‘dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory’.5 The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since ‘whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for social-scientific inquiry, not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry’.6 Moreover, this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of empirical validity. The third danger is that the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR—what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) ‘the Highlander view’—namely, an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because the turn to, and prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things right, namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so a potentially vicious circle arises.

A. Interpretation – debate is a game that requires the aff to defend USFG action on energy policy vs. the status quo or competitive policy option

#### --‘resolved’ means to enact a policy by law.

Words and Phrases 64 (Permanent Edition)

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

#### --“United States Federal Government should” means the debate is solely about the outcome of a policy established by governmental means

Ericson 3 (Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow *should* in the *should*-verb combination. For example, should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action though governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase *free trade*, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the *affirmative side* in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

B. Violation – they claim to win for reasons other than the desirability of that action

C. Reasons to prefer:

#### 1. Predictability – debate games open up dialogue which fosters information processing – they open up infinite frameworks making the game impossible

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Debate games are often based on pre-designed scenarios that include descriptions of issues to be debated, educational goals, game goals, roles, rules, time frames etc. In this way, debate games differ from textbooks and everyday classroom instruction as debate scenarios allow teachers and students to actively imagine, interact and communicate within a domain-specific game space. However, instead of mystifying debate games as a “magic circle” (Huizinga, 1950), I will try to overcome the epistemological dichotomy between “gaming” and “teaching” that tends to dominate discussions of educational games. In short, educational gaming is a form of teaching. As mentioned, education and games represent two different semiotic domains that both embody the three faces of knowledge: assertions, modes of representation and social forms of organisation (Gee, 2003; Barth, 2002; cf. chapter 2). In order to understand the interplay between these different domains and their interrelated knowledge forms, I will draw attention to a central assumption in Bakhtin’s dialogical philosophy. According to Bakhtin, all forms of communication and culture are subject to centripetal and centrifugal forces (Bakhtin, 1981). A centripetal force is the drive to impose one version of the truth, while a centrifugal force involves a range of possible truths and interpretations. This means that any form of expression involves a duality of centripetal and centrifugal forces: “Every concrete utterance of a speaking subject serves as a point where centrifugal as well as centripetal forces are brought to bear” (Bakhtin, 1981: 272). If we take teaching as an example, it is always affected by centripetal and centrifugal forces in the on-going negotiation of “truths” between teachers and students. In the words of Bakhtin: “Truth is not born nor is it to be found inside the head of an individual person, it is born between people collectively searching for truth, in the process of their dialogic interaction” (Bakhtin, 1984a: 110). Similarly, the dialogical space of debate games also embodies centrifugal and centripetal forces. Thus, the election scenario of The Power Game involves centripetal elements that are mainly determined by the rules and outcomes of the game, i.e. the election is based on a limited time frame and a fixed voting procedure. Similarly, the open-ended goals, roles and resources represent centrifugal elements and create virtually endless possibilities for researching, preparing, 51 presenting, debating and evaluating a variety of key political issues. Consequently, the actual process of enacting a game scenario involves a complex negotiation between these centrifugal/centripetal forces that are inextricably linked with the teachers and students’ game activities. In this way, the enactment of The Power Game is a form of teaching that combines different pedagogical practices (i.e. group work, web quests, student presentations) and learning resources (i.e. websites, handouts, spoken language) within the interpretive frame of the election scenario. Obviously, tensions may arise if there is too much divergence between educational goals and game goals. This means that game facilitation requires a balance between focusing too narrowly on the rules or “facts” of a game (centripetal orientation) and a focusing too broadly on the contingent possibilities and interpretations of the game scenario (centrifugal orientation). For Bakhtin, the duality of centripetal/centrifugal forces often manifests itself as a dynamic between “monological” and “dialogical” forms of discourse. Bakhtin illustrates this point with the monological discourse of the Socrates/Plato dialogues in which the teacher never learns anything new from the students, despite Socrates’ ideological claims to the contrary (Bakhtin, 1984a). Thus, discourse becomes monologised when “someone who knows and possesses the truth instructs someone who is ignorant of it and in error”, where “a thought is either affirmed or repudiated” by the authority of the teacher (Bakhtin, 1984a: 81). In contrast to this, dialogical pedagogy fosters inclusive learning environments that are able to expand upon students’ existing knowledge and collaborative construction of “truths” (Dysthe, 1996). At this point, I should clarify that Bakhtin’s term “dialogic” is both a descriptive term (all utterances are per definition dialogic as they address other utterances as parts of a chain of communication) and a normative term as dialogue is an ideal to be worked for against the forces of “monologism” (Lillis, 2003: 197-8). In this project, I am mainly interested in describing the dialogical space of debate games. At the same time, I agree with Wegerif that “one of the goals of education, perhaps the most important goal, should be dialogue as an end in itself” (Wegerif, 2006: 61).

#### 2. Ground – the resolution exists to create balanced difficulty, creating a topic that is supposed to be moral and controversial – games requires acceptance of rules whose purpose is to forbid the easiest means to a goal – this makes the game meaningful

Hurka 6 – philosopher who serves as the Jackman Distinguished Chair in Philosophical Studies at the University of Toronto (Thomas, 2006, "Games and the Good," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 80, http://homes.chass.utoronto.ca/~thurka/docs/pass\_games.pdf)

I take this admiration to rest on the judgement that excellence in games is good in itself, apart from any pleasure it may give the player or other people but just for the properties that make it excellent. The admiration, in other words, rests on the perfectionist judgement that skill in games is worth pursuing for its own sake and can add value to one’s life. This skill is not the only thing we value in this way; we give similar honours to achievements in the arts, science, and business. But one thing we admire, and to a significant degree, is excellence in athletic and nonathletic games. Unless we dismiss this view, one task for philosophy is to explain why such excellence is good. But few philosophers have attempted this, for a well-known reason. A unified explanation of why excellence in games is good requires a unified account of what games are, and many doubt that this is possible. After all, Wittgenstein famously gave the concept of a game as his primary example of one for which necessary and sufficient conditions cannot be given but whose instances are linked only by looser “family resemblances.”2 If Wittgenstein was right about this, 2 there can be no single explanation of why skill in games is good, just a series of distinct explanations of the value of skill in hockey, skill in chess, and so on. But Wittgenstein was not right, as is shown in a little-known book that is nonetheless a classic of twentieth-century philosophy, Bernard Suits’s The Grasshopper: Games, Life and Utopia. Suits gives a perfectly persuasive analysis of playing a game as, to quote his summary statement, “the voluntary attempt to overcome unnecessary obstacles.”3 And in this paper I will use his analysis to explain the value of playing games. More specifically, I will argue that the different elements of Suits’s analysis give game-playing two distinct but related grounds of value, so it instantiates two related intrinsic goods. I will also argue that game-playing is an important intrinsic good, which gives the clearest possible expression of what can be called a modern as against a classical, or more specifically Aristotelian, view of value. But first Suits’s analysis. It says that a game has three main elements, which he calls the prelusory goal, the constitutive rules, and the lusory attitude. To begin with the first, in playing a game one always aims at a goal that can be described independently of the game. In golf, this is that a ball enter a hole in the ground; in mountain-climbing, that one stand on top of a mountain; in Olympic sprinting, that one cross a line on the track before one’s competitors. Suits calls this goal “prelusory” because it can be understood and achieved apart from the game, and he argues that every game has such a goal. Of course, in playing a game one also aims at a goal internal to it, such as winning the race, climbing the mountain, or breaking par on the golf course. But on Suits’s view this “lusory” goal is derivative, since achieving it involves achieving the prior prelusory goal in a specified way. This way is identified by the second element, the game’s constitutive rules. According to 3 Suits, the function of these rules is to forbid the most efficient means to the prelusory goal. Thus, in golf one may not carry the ball down the fairway and drop it in the hole by hand; one must advance it using clubs, play it where it lies, and so on. In mountain-climbing one may not ride a gondola to the top of the mountain or charter a helicopter; in 200-metre sprinting, one may not cut across the infield. Once these rules are in place, success in the game typically requires achieving the prelusory goal as efficiently as they allow, such as getting the ball into the hole in the fewest possible strokes or choosing the best way up the mountain. But this is efficiency within the rules, whose larger function is to forbid the easiest means to the game’s initial goal. These first two elements involve pursuing a goal by less than the most efficient means, but they are not sufficient for playing a game. This is because someone can be forced to use these means by circumstances he regrets and wishes were different. If this is the case – if, for example, a farmer harvests his field by hand because he cannot afford the mechanical harvester he would much rather use – he is not playing a game. Hence the need for the third element in Suits’s analysis, the lusory attitude, which involves a person’s willingly accepting the constitutive rules, or accepting them because they make the game possible. Thus, a golfer accepts that he may not carry the ball by hand or improve his lie because he wants to play golf, and obeying those rules is necessary for him to do so; the mountaineer accepts that he may not take a helicopter to the summit because he wants to climb. The restrictions the rules impose are adhered to not reluctantly but willingly, because they are essential to the game. Adding this third element gives Suits’s full definition: “To play a game is to attempt to achieve a specific state of affairs [prelusory goal], using only means permitted by the rules ..., where the rules prohibit the use of more efficient in favour of less efficient means [constitutive rules], and where the rules are 4 accepted just because they make possible such activity [lusory attitude].” Or, in the summary statement quoted above, “playing a game is the voluntary attempt to overcome unnecessary obstacles.”4 This analysis will doubtless meet with objections, in the form of attempted counterexamples. But Suits considers a whole series of these in his book, showing repeatedly that his analysis handles them correctly, and not by some ad hoc addition but once its elements are properly understood. Nor would it matter terribly if there were a few counterexamples. Some minor lack of fit between his analysis and the English use of “game” would not be important if the analysis picks out a phenomenon that is unified, close to what is meant by “game,” and philosophically interesting. But the analysis is interesting if, as I will now argue, it allows a persuasive explanation of the value of excellence in games. Suits himself addresses this issue of value. In fact, a central aim of his book is to give a defence of the grasshopper in Aesop’s fable, who played all summer, against the ant, who worked. But in doing so he argues for the strong thesis that playing games is not just an intrinsic good but the supreme such good, since in the ideal conditions of utopia, where all instrumental goods are provided, it would be everyone’s primary pursuit. The grasshopper’s game-playing, therefore, while it had the unfortunate effect of leaving him without food for the winter, involved him in the intrinsically finest actvity. Now, I do not accept Suits’s strong thesis that gameplaying is the supreme good – I think many other states and activities have comparable value – and I do not find his arguments for it persuasive. But I will connect the weaker thesis that playing games is one intrinsic good to the details of his analysis more explicitly than he ever does.

#### 3. Education – debate as a competitive political game is the best framework to solve dogmatism and human brutality

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Vico asked his audience at the University of Naples in 1708 to debate two competing ways of knowing: Cartesian rationality versus the poetic world of the ancients. Vico, the “pre-law advisor” of his day, saw law as a rhetorical game. That is, he understood the civic (ethical) value of competi-tion itself.12 He understood that Cartesian rationality, like religious and ideological fundamentalism, generates a kind of certainty that shuts down robust debate. Vico’s comprehensive vision suggests, in effect, that people should practice law and politics not as the search for the most rational or logically correct outcomes but rather as passionate and embodied yet peaceful competitive play. Vico inspires this vision of law and politics as play because he sees that all things in the human mind, including law and politics, are at one with the human body. As Vico put it as he concluded his 1708 address, “[T]he soul should be drawn to love by means of bodily images; for once it loves it is easily taught to believe; and when it believes and loves it should be inflamed so that it wills things by means of its normal intemperance.”13 Vico had no hope that such abstract moral principles as liberty, equality, justice, and tolerance could effectively offset the “crude and rough” nature of men.14 The Holy Bible and the Qur’an contain normative principles of love, tolerance, equal respect, and peace, but these commands have not forestalled ancient and modern religious warfare. This essay proposes that humans learn how to keep the peace not by obeying the norms, rules, and principles of civil conduct but by learning how to play, and thereby reintegrating the mind and the body. People do law, politics, and economic life well when they do them in the same ways and by the same standards that structure and govern good competitive sports and games. The word “sport” derives from “port” and “portal” and relates to the words “disport” and “transport.” The word at least hints that the primitive and universal joy of play carries those who join the game across space to a better, and ideally safer, place—a harbor that Vico him-self imagined. This essay’s bold proposition honors Vico in many ways. Its “grand theory” matches the scope of Vico’s comprehensive and integrated vision of the human condition. It plausibly confirms Vico’s hope for a “concep-tion of a natural law for all of humanity” that is rooted in human historical practice.15 Seeing these core social processes as play helps us to escape from arid academic habits and to “learn to think like children,” just as Vico urged.16 Imagining law and politics as play honors Vico above all because, if we attain Ruskin’s epigraphic ideal,17 we will see that the peace-tending qualities of sports and games already operate under our noses. Seeing law and politics as play enables us “to reach out past our inclination to make experience familiar through the power of the concept and to engage the power of the image. We must reconstruct the human world not through concepts and criteria but as something we can practically see.”18 If at its end readers realize that they could have seen, under their noses, the world as this essay sees it without ever having read it, this essay will successfully honor Vico. As Vico would have predicted, formal academic theory has played at best a marginal role in the construction of competitive games. Ordinary people have created cricket and football, and common law and electoral politics and fair market games, more from the experience of doing them than from formal theories of competitive games. When they play interna-tional football today, ordinary people in virtually every culture in the world recreate the experience of competitive games. Playing competitive games unites people across cultures in a common normative world.19 Within Vico’s social anthropological and proto-scientific framework, the claim that competitive play can generate peaceful civic life is purely empirical: law and politics in progressively peaceful political systems already are nothing more or less than competitive games. All empirical description operates within some, though too often ob-scured, normative frame. This essay’s normative frame is clear. It holds, with Shaw’s epigraph, above: Human brutalities waged against other hu-mans—suicide bombings, genocides, tribal and religious wars that provoke the indiscriminate rape, murder, torture, and enslavement of men, women, and children, often because they are labeled “evil”—are the worst things that we humans do. We should learn not to do them. In Vico’s anti-Cartesian, non-foundational world, no method exists to demonstrate that this essay’s normative core is “correct,” or even “better than,” say, the core norm holding that the worst thing humans do is dishonor God. Readers who reject Shaw’s and this essay’s normative frame may have every reason to reject the essay’s entire argument. However, this essay does describe empirically how those whose core norm requires honoring any absolute, including God, above all else regu-larly brutalize other human beings, and why those who live by the norms of good competitive play do not. People brutalize people, as Shaw’s Caesar observed, in the name of right and honor and peace. Evaluated by the norm that human brutality is the worst thing humans do, the essay shows why and how the human invention of competitive play short circuits the psy-chology of a righteousness-humiliation-brutality cycle. We cannot help but see and experience on fields of contested play testosterone-charged males striving mightily to defeat one another. Yet at the end of play, losers and winners routinely shake hands and often hug; adult competitors may dine and raise a glass together.20 Whether collectively invented as a species-wide survival adaptation or not, institutionalized competitive play under-cuts the brutality cycle by displacing religious and other forms of funda-mentalist righteousness with something contingent, amoral, and thus less lethal. Play thereby helps humans become Shaw’s “race that can under-stand.”

#### 4. Decision-making – debate gaming through dramatic rehearsal strengthens decision-making – only maintained by a confined educational space

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Joas’ re-interpretation of Dewey’s pragmatism as a “theory of situated creativity” raises a critique of humans as purely rational agents that navigate instrumentally through meansendsschemes (Joas, 1996: 133f). This critique is particularly important when trying to understand how games are enacted and validated within the realm of educational institutions that by definition are inscribed in the great modernistic narrative of “progress” where nation states, teachers and parents expect students to acquire specific skills and competencies (Popkewitz, 1998; cf. chapter 3). However, as Dewey argues, the actual doings of educational gaming cannot be reduced to rational means-ends schemes. Instead, the situated interaction between teachers, students, and learning resources are played out as contingent re-distributions of means, ends and ends in view, which often make classroom contexts seem “messy” from an outsider’s perspective (Barab & Squire, 2004). 4.2.3. Dramatic rehearsal The two preceding sections discussed how Dewey views play as an imaginative activity of educational value, and how his assumptions on creativity and playful actions represent a critique of rational means-end schemes. For now, I will turn to Dewey’s concept of dramatic rehearsal, which assumes that social actors deliberate by projecting and choosing between various scenarios for future action. Dewey uses the concept dramatic rehearsal several times in his work but presents the most extensive elaboration in Human Nature and Conduct: Deliberation is a dramatic rehearsal (in imagination) of various competing possible lines of action… [It] is an experiment in finding out what the various lines of possible action are really like (...) Thought runs ahead and foresees outcomes, and thereby avoids having to await the instruction of actual failure and disaster. An act overtly tried out is irrevocable, its consequences cannot be blotted out. An act tried out in imagination is not final or fatal. It is retrievable (Dewey, 1922: 132-3). 86 This excerpt illustrates how Dewey views the process of decision making (deliberation) through the lens of an imaginative drama metaphor. Thus, decisions are made through the imaginative projection of outcomes, where the “possible competing lines of action” are resolved through a thought experiment. Moreover, Dewey’s compelling use of the drama metaphor also implies that decisions cannot be reduced to utilitarian, rational or mechanical exercises, but that they have emotional, creative and personal qualities as well. Interestingly, there are relatively few discussions within the vast research literature on Dewey of his concept of dramatic rehearsal. A notable exception is the phenomenologist Alfred Schütz, who praises Dewey’s concept as a “fortunate image” for understanding everyday rationality (Schütz, 1943: 140). Other attempts are primarily related to overall discussions on moral or ethical deliberation (Caspary, 1991, 2000, 2006; Fesmire, 1995, 2003; Rönssön, 2003; McVea, 2006). As Fesmire points out, dramatic rehearsal is intended to describe an important phase of deliberation that does not characterise the whole process of making moral decisions, which includes “duties and contractual obligations, short and long-term consequences, traits of character to be affected, and rights” (Fesmire, 2003: 70). Instead, dramatic rehearsal should be seen as the process of “crystallizing possibilities and transforming them into directive hypotheses” (Fesmire, 2003: 70). Thus, deliberation can in no way guarantee that the response of a “thought experiment” will be successful. But what it can do is make the process of choosing more intelligent than would be the case with “blind” trial-and-error (Biesta, 2006: 8). The notion of dramatic rehearsal provides a valuable perspective for understanding educational gaming as a simultaneously real and imagined inquiry into domain-specific scenarios. Dewey defines dramatic rehearsal as the capacity to stage and evaluate “acts”, which implies an “irrevocable” difference between acts that are “tried out in imagination” and acts that are “overtly tried out” with real-life consequences (Dewey, 1922: 132-3). This description shares obvious similarities with games as they require participants to inquire into and resolve scenario-specific problems (cf. chapter 2). On the other hand, there is also a striking difference between moral deliberation and educational game activities in terms of the actual consequences that follow particular actions. Thus, when it comes to educational games, acts are both imagined and tried out, but without all the real-life consequences of the practices, knowledge forms and outcomes that are being simulated in the game world. Simply put, there is a difference in realism between the dramatic rehearsals of everyday life and in games, which only “play at” or simulate the stakes and 87 risks that characterise the “serious” nature of moral deliberation, i.e. a real-life politician trying to win a parliamentary election experiences more personal and emotional risk than students trying to win the election scenario of The Power Game. At the same time, the lack of real-life consequences in educational games makes it possible to design a relatively safe learning environment, where teachers can stage particular game scenarios to be enacted and validated for educational purposes. In this sense, educational games are able to provide a safe but meaningful way of letting teachers and students make mistakes (e.g. by giving a poor political presentation) and dramatically rehearse particular “competing possible lines of action” that are relevant to particular educational goals (Dewey, 1922: 132). Seen from this pragmatist perspective, the educational value of games is not so much a question of learning facts or giving the “right” answers, but more a question of exploring the contingent outcomes and domain-specific processes of problem-based scenarios.

#### Decisionmaking is a trump impact—it improves all aspects of life regardless of its specific goals

Shulman 9, president emeritus – Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, (Lee S, Education and a Civil Society: Teaching Evidence-Based Decision Making, p. ix-x)

These are the kinds of **questions** that **call for** the exercise of practical reason, **a form of thought that draws concurrently from theory and practice**, from **values and experience, and from** critical thinking and human empathy. **None of these attributes is likely to be thought of no value and thus able to be ignored.** Our schools, however, are unlikely to take on all of them as goals of the educational process. The goal of education is not to render practical arguments more theoretical; nor is it to diminish the role of values in practical reason. Indeed, all three sources—**theoretical knowledge**, practical knowhow and **experience, and** deeply held **values and identity**—**have legitimate places** in practical arguments. **An educated person**, argue philosophers Thomas Green (1971) and Gary Fenstermacher (1986), **is someone who has transformed the premises of her or his** practical **arguments** from being less objectively reasonable to being more objectively reasonable. That is, **to the extent that** they employ probabilistic reasoning or interpret data from various sources, **those judgments and interpretations** conform more accurately to well-understood principles and are less susceptible to biases and distortions. To the extent that **values**, cultural or religious **norms**, or **matters of personal preference** or taste are at work, they **have been rendered more explicit, conscious, intentional, and reflective.** In his essay for this volume, Jerome Kagan reflects the interactions among these positions by arguing: We are more likely to solve our current problem, however, if teachers accept the responsibility of guaranteeing that all adolescents, regardless of class or ethnicity, can read and comprehend the science section of newspapers, solve basic mathematical problems, detect the logical coherence in non-technical verbal arguments or narratives, and insist that all acts of maliciousness, deception, and unregulated self-aggrandizement are morally unacceptable. **Whether choosing** between **a Prius and a Hummer**, an **Obama or** a **McCain**, installing **solar panels or** planting taller **trees**, **a well-educated person has learned to combine** their **values, experience, understandings, and evidence in a thoughtful and responsible manner.** Thus do habits of mind, practice, and heart all play a significant role in the lives of citizens.

## 1AC v. Texas CM

### 1AC

#### Contention 1 is Inherency –

#### The Department of Interior’s leasing plan effectively restricts offshore natural gas drilling on federal lands

New 6-30 (Bill, President – New Industires, \*Offers Steel Fabrication Services to Offshore Drilling Projects, “Letters: New Leasing Plan a Step Backward,” The Advocate, 2012, http://theadvocate.com/news/opinion/3484480-123/letters-new-leasing-plan-a)

In late June, the U.S. Department of the Interior released its long-awaited outer continental shelf leasing plan, which effectively blocks offshore oil and natural gas exploration in any new areas for the next five years. Unfortunately, the proposal is a step backward in our effort to achieve energy independence. Under the plan, 85 percent of America’s OCS would be off-limits at a time when exploring every possible energy source is critical to boosting our nation’s economy and creating jobs. Instead of finding out what might be available to us in expansive unexplored areas off our coasts, we will be left to search for oil and natural gas in the same, relatively small portion of the OCS we’ve been exploring for four decades. Not only does this plan run counter to President Barack Obama’s “all of the above” strategy for energy independence, but it shows an outright disregard for the requests of the Gulf Coast states –— including Louisiana — to increase domestic oil production when the Interior Department released a draft of the plan late last year. Interestingly, the Interior Department chose to release this latest version of the OCS plan on the day the Supreme Court announced its health care decision — a thinly veiled attempt to bury it in news coverage of the ruling. But that didn’t keep right-thinking lawmakers from taking notice and working on ways to get America’s economy going using sound energy policies. U.S. Rep. Doc Hastings, R-Wash., chairman of the House Natural Resource Committee, has written legislation that sensibly revises the plan. While the Interior Department’s plan is to hold just 12 oil and gas lease sales in the Gulf of Mexico, and three in offshore Alaska from 2012 to 2017, the Hastings plan would schedule 28 lease sales total, dramatically increasing drilling opportunities off the Alaskan coast and including a sale of offshore leases in a potentially rich area off the coast of Virginia. The United States is producing more oil and natural gas than ever thanks to increased production on state-owned or private land. However, production on federal onshore land is down 14 percent in the last two years, and down 17 percent on federal offshore areas. Imagine what could happen if we enact legislation that allows us to open new offshore areas.

#### Current legislation is insufficient – removing access restrictions allows for expanded energy production – certainty is key

Loris 8-6 (Nicolas, Fellow in the Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies – Heritage Foundation “Senate Energy Bill: Good Start, Room for Improvement,” Heritage Foundation, 2012, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/08/domestic-energy-and-jobs-act-good-start-room-for-improvement)

Senator John Hoeven (R–ND) recently introduced the Domestic Energy and Jobs Act (DEJA), which would greatly expand access to energy and simplify burdensome regulations that prevent projects from coming online in a timely manner. While the legislation could be improved by further increasing access and removing the top-down energy planning, DEJA would still spur economic growth and drive energy production. Increasing Access to Energy DEJA would accept the State Department’s environmental review of the Keystone XL pipeline as sufficient and allow the state of Nebraska to reroute the pipeline to meet the state’s environmental concerns. The State Department studied and addressed risks to soil, wetlands, water resources, vegetation, fish, wildlife, and endangered species and concluded that construction of the pipeline would pose minimal environmental risk.[1] The construction of Keystone XL would allow up to 830,000 barrels of oil per day to come from Canada to the Gulf Coast and create thousands of jobs. DEJA also directs the Department of the Interior (DOI) to conduct a lease sale off the coast of Virginia. The 2.9 million acres 50 miles off the coast has an estimated 130 million barrels of oil and 1.14 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. Opening access off Virginia’s coast is long overdue, and the legislation **only opens up a small portion of America’s territorial waters that are off limits**. The Offshore Petroleum Expansion Now (OPEN) Act of 2012, also co-sponsored by Senator Hoeven, would replace President Obama’s 2012–2017 Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Leasing Program with a much more robust plan that opens areas in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, in the Gulf of Mexico, and off Alaska.[2] Both DEJA and OPEN increase the royalties that states would receive from energy production, but both could go further to increase state involvement in offshore drilling decisions. Since onshore states already receive 50 percent of the royalties, Congress should also implement a 50/50 royalty-sharing program between federal and state governments involved in offshore drilling. Efficient Permitting and Leasing for All Energy Projects Another important component of DEJA is that it streamlines the permitting of all energy projects. Receiving a permit for any energy project, not just fossil fuels, takes entirely too long. Duplicative and unnecessary regulations slow the process and drive up costs. Furthermore, environmental activists delay new energy projects by filing endless administrative appeals and lawsuits. DEJA would create a manageable time frame for permitting for all energy sources to increase supply at lower costs and stimulate economic activity. DEJA also calls for an end to the lengthy permit process in the Natural Petroleum Reserve area of Alaska. It would require the DOI to approve drilling permits within 60 days and infrastructure permits within six months. Lease certainty is another critical issue. The act states that the DOI cannot cancel or withdraw a lease sale after the winning company pays for the lease. Ensuring that the federal government does not pull the rug out from under a company that wins the lease sale would provide the **certainty necessary to pursue energy projects**. Freeze and Study Environmental Regulations DEJA would also create transparency and accountability for Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulations by establishing an interagency committee that would report on the full economic impact of the rules implemented by the EPA that affect fuel prices. This includes any part of the production process that would be affected by greenhouse gas regulations. DEJA delays the implementation of Tier 3 fuel standards (designed to replace the Tier 2 regulations issued in 2000) that would lower the amount of sulfur in gasoline but could add 6–9 cents per gallon to the cost of manufacturing gasoline. The EPA has declared no measurable air quality benefits from these standards. DEJA delays the New Source Performance Standards for refineries, which would drive up the cost of gasoline for no measurable change in the earth’s temperature.[3] It would also delay new national ambient air quality standards for ozone, which are unnecessary because the ozone standard set by the EPA is already more than stringent enough to protect human health. Though the delays contained in DEJA underscore the problems with these regulations, the preferred approach would be to prohibit the implementation of these three standards altogether. DEJA would also prevent the DOI from issuing any rule under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 before 2014 that would adversely affect coal employment, reduce revenue from coal production, reduce coal for domestic consumption or export, designate areas as unsuitable for surface mining and reclamation, or expose the U.S. to liability by taking privately owned coal through regulation. While this temporary fix recognizes the federal overreach in coal production, a better approach would be to create a framework that restricts overregulation, empowers the states, balances economic growth and environmental well-being, and creates a timely permitting process for all aspects of coal production.[4] Energy Central Planning Unneeded DEJA would require the federal government to create production objectives for fossil fuels and renewable energy and allow the relevant agencies to make additional lands available to meet those objectives. The bill would also require the U.S. Geological Survey to establish a critical minerals list and create comprehensive policies to increase critical mineral production. A much simpler and effective solution would be to open all federal lands for energy production of all sources and allow the private sector to determine what sources of energy and what technologies meet America’s electricity and transportation fuel demand. Too often the use of critical minerals has been used as cover for subsidies and extensive government intervention in a major industry. If there are clear military needs for certain critical materials, these should be met by government action. Absent that, streamlining the bureaucracy that has expanded around mining and **opening access is the only necessary federal action surrounding critical minerals**.

### Plan

#### The United States Federal Government should substantially reduce access restrictions on federal lands in the Outer Continental Shelf for conventional gas production

### Exports

#### Contention 2: LNG Exports

#### Currently, inadequate supply of natural gas causes domestic infighting over LNG exports – new, sustainable supply is key to export feasibility

Ebinger et al 12 (Charles, Senior Fellow and Director of the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, Kevin Massy, Assistant Director of the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, and Govinda Avasarala, Senior Research Assistant in the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, “Liquid Markets: Assessing the Case for U.S. Exports of Liquefied Natural Gas,” Brookings Institution, Policy Brief 12-01, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2012/5/02%20lng%20exports%20ebinger/0502\_lng\_exports\_ebinger.pdf)

For an increase in U.S. exports of LNG to be considered feasible, there has to be an adequate and sustainable domestic resource base to support it. Natural gas currently accounts for approximately 25 percent of the U.S. primary energy mix.3 While it currently provides only a minority of U.S. gas supply, shale gas production is increasing at a rapid rate: from 2000 to 2006, shale gas production increased by an average annual rate of 17 percent; from 2006 to 2010, production increased by an annual average rate of 48 percent (see Figure 2).4 According to the Energy Information Adminis- tration (EIA), shale gas production in the United States reached 4.87 trillion cubic feet (tcf) in 2010, or 23 percent of U.S. dry gas production. By 2035, it is estimated that shale gas production will account for 46 percent of total domestic natural gas production. Given the centrality of shale gas to the future of the U.S. gas sector, much of the discussion over potential exports **hinges on the prospects for its sustained availability and development**. For exports to be feasible, gas from shale and other unconventional sources needs to both offset declines in conventional production and **compete with new and incumbent domestic end uses**. There have been a number of reports and studies that attempt to identify the total amount of technically recoverable shale gas resources—the volumes of gas retrievable using current technology irrespective of cost—available in the United States. These estimates vary from just under 700 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of shale gas to over 1,800 tcf (see table 1). To put these numbers in context, the United States consumed just over 24 tcf of gas in 2010, suggesting that the estimates for the shale gas resource alone would be enough to satisfy between 25 and 80 years of U.S. domestic demand. The estimates for recoverable shale gas resources also compare with an estimate for total U.S. gas resources (onshore and offshore, including Alaska) of 2,543 tcf. Based on the range of estimates below, shale gas could therefore account for between 29 percent and 52 percent of the total technically recoverable natural gas resource in the United States. In addition to the size of the economically recoverable resources, two other major factors will have an impact on the sustainability of shale gas production: the productivity of shale gas wells; and the demand for the equipment used for shale gas production. The productivity of shale gas wells has been a subject of much recent debate, with some industry observers suggesting that undeveloped wells may prove to be less productive than those developed to date. However, a prominent view among independent experts is that sustainability of shale gas production is not a cause for serious concern, owing to the continued rapid improvement in technologies and production processes.

#### Perception is key – new supply removes uncertainty over shale gas – that makes LNG exports economical

Ebinger et al 12 (Charles, Senior Fellow and Director of the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, Kevin Massy, Assistant Director of the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, and Govinda Avasarala, Senior Research Assistant in the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, “Liquid Markets: Assessing the Case for U.S. Exports of Liquefied Natural Gas,” Brookings Institution, Policy Brief 12-01, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2012/5/02%20lng%20exports%20ebinger/0502\_lng\_exports\_ebinger.pdf)

Aside from the price impact of potential U.S. LNG exports, a major concern among opponents is that such exports would diminish U.S. “energy security”; that exports would deny the United States of a strategically important resource. The extent to which such concerns are **valid** depends on several factors, including the size of the domestic resource base, and the liquidity and functionality of global trade. As Part I of this report notes, geological evidence suggests that the volumes of LNG export under consideration would not materially affect the availability of natural gas for the domestic market. Twenty years of LNG exports at the rate of 6 bcf/day, phased in over the course of 6 years, would increase demand by approximately 38 tcf. As presented in Part I, four existing estimates of total technically recoverable shale gas resources range from 687 tcf to 1,842 tcf; therefore, exporting 6 bcf/day of LNG over the course of twenty years would consume between 2 and 5.5 percent of total shale gas resources. While the estimates for **shale gas reserves are uncertain**, in a scenario where reserves are perceived to be lower than expected, domestic natural gas prices would increase and exports would almost immediately become uneconomic. In the long-term, it is possible that U.S. prices and international prices will converge to the point at which they settle at similar levels. In that case, the United States would have more than adequate import capacity (through bi-directional import/export facilities) to import gas when economic.

#### Lifting federal restrictions diversifies US energy portfolio – natural gas firms would export any surplus supply

Hartley and Medlock 7 (Dr. Peter, Professor of Economics – Rice University, Rice Scholar – Baker Institute for Public Policy, and Dr. Kenneth B., Fellow in Energy Policy – Baker Institute for Public Policy, Adjunct Assistant Professor of Economics – Rice University, “North American Security of Natural Gas Supply in a Global Market,” James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, November, <http://www.bakerinstitute.org/programs/energy-forum/publications/energy-studies/docs/natgas/ng_security-nov07.pdf>)

Higher Lower 48 production as a result of opening access also results in lower imports of LNG. Figure 13 depicts the change in LNG imports when access restrictions are lifted and all other factors remain unchanged. Total LNG imports into the United States in 2015 fall by about 0.85 tcf (or from about 2.4 tcf to 1.55 tcf) and in 2030 by 1.6 tcf (or from 8.8 tcf to 7.3 tcf). This figure includes pipeline imports to the United States from Mexico and Canada that are being reshipped from LNG import terminals from those countries. The decline under this scenario is represents a fall in LNG market share in the United States from just over 31 percent in the Reference Case in 2030 to 22 percent. The LNG receiving terminals that are most directly affected by the opening of access for drilling are those that are closest to these newly opened areas of the Atlantic, Pacific and east Gulf of Mexico OCS. For example, the terminals at Baja, New Brunswick, Pascagoula, Cove Point, and Delaware Bay see the largest volume reductions, in some years accounting for over 80 percent of the difference in overall import flows. This, like the situation with Alaska, represents some cannibalization of market share as companies who might drill in the now restricted OCS would be the same firms whose LNG would be **pushed out of the U.S. market**. One offsetting factor to the loss of market share for LNG and Alaskan supplies is that fact that lower average prices give a slight boost to overall U.S. demand. When access restrictions are lifted, lower prices encourage a modest increase in demand of about 1.3 bcfd by 2030, of which 1.0 bcfd is added natural gas demand in the power generation sector. While the change in average annual prices under this unrestricted scenario is not large, open access also allows existing demand to be served at lower cost. Thus, the net surplus benefits (including added consumer welfare) associated with expanded use of gas at lower prices can be quite large. For example, the benefit to consumers of a $0.42 reduction in price in 2017 (the maximum decrease seen over the modeling period) results in an annual saving of $10.3 billion for natural gas consumers. Of course, the benefits are lower in other years, but cumulative benefits still range into the many billions of dollars. Open access also brings other potential benefits, such as providing a degree of diversification that **mitigates the extent to which a cartel in international natural gas markets can operate effectively to threaten U.S. energy security**. This increased diversification is evident in Figure 14, which depicts the changes in LNG imports by major regions around the world. We see that when access restrictions are removed, the resulting decline in North American LNG imports is accompanied by an increase in LNG imports in other regions around the world. This occurs as global prices are reduced and demand is encouraged. Thus, both energy security benefits as well as welfare benefits accrue to nations outside the United States **as a result of eliminating access restrictions**. 30 In addition, when access restrictions are removed, LNG exports from the more marginal producers, which tend to be OPEC countries (Iran, other Middle East exporters, Venezuela, and to a lesser extent countries in North and West Africa), decline at the margin, falling collectively by 0.27 tcf in 2015, and as much as 0.43 tcf by 2030 (see Figure 15). Even though the volumes are small, the analysis suggests that this **less constrained supply picture** for the global market can contribute to rendering the United States and its allies **less vulnerable to the will** of any one producer, or the collective will of any group of producers, by enhancing the diversification of supply options. The wider swath of alternative supplies for Europe and northeast Asia translates into significantly reduced potential for producers in Russia and the Middle East to exert market power.

#### Export infrastructure exists – we can use import terminals to export

Levi 12 (Michael, Senior Fellow for Energy and Environment – Council on Foreign Relations, “A Strategy for U.S. Natural Gas Exports,” Hamilton Project – Brookings Institute, June, Discussion Paper 2012-04, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/6/13%20exports%20levi/06\_exports\_levi)

Additional gains would be realized because natural gas exports would exploit existing LNG infrastructure (i.e. some parts of existing import terminals) that would otherwise go unused and thus be worthless. These gains should approximately equal the value of the utilized LNG terminals (not including the value of their regasification facilities, which are not useful for exports), which are typically on the order of $1 billion for each billion cubic feet a day of capacity. Spread over a notional fifteen-year use period, this would add approximately $70 million a year for each billion cubic feet a day of exports. This brings the total estimated surplus from six billion cubic feet a day of exports to $3.1 billion to $3.7 billion.

#### Global export contracts are being renegotiated – now is key to get the US in the LNG export game

Ebinger et al 12 (Charles, Senior Fellow and Director of the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, Kevin Massy, Assistant Director of the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, and Govinda Avasarala, Senior Research Assistant in the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, “Liquid Markets: Assessing the Case for U.S. Exports of Liquefied Natural Gas,” Brookings Institution, Policy Brief 12-01, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2012/5/02%20lng%20exports%20ebinger/0502\_lng\_exports\_ebinger.pdf).

LNG exports will help to sustain market liquidity in what looks to be an increasingly tight LNG market beyond 2015 (see Figure 10). Should LNG exports from the United States continue to be permitted, they will add to roughly 10 bcf/day of LNG that is expected to emerge from Australia between 2015 and 2020. Nevertheless, given the projected growth in demand for natural gas in China and India and assuming that some of Japan’s nuclear capacity remains offline, demand for natural gas will outpace the incremental supply. This makes U.S. LNG even more valuable on the international market. Although it will be important to global LNG markets, it is unlikely that the emergence of the United States as an exporter of LNG will change the existing pricing structure overnight. Not only is the market still largely dependent on long-term contracts, the overwhelming majority of new liquefaction capacity emerging in the next decade (largely from Australia) has already been contracted for at oil-indexed rates.108 The incremental LNG volumes supplied by the United States at floating Henry Hub rates will be small in comparison. But while U.S. LNG will not have a transformational impact, by establishing an alternate lower price for LNG derived through a different market mechanism, U.S. exports may be central in catalyzing future changes in LNG contract structure. As previously mentioned, this impact is already being felt in Europe. A number of German utilities have either renegotiated contracts or are seeking arbitration with natural gas suppliers in Norway and Russia. The Atlantic Basin will be a more immediate beneficiary of U.S. LNG exports than the Pacific Basin as many European contracts allow for periodic revisions to the oil-price linkage.109 In the Pacific Basin this contractual arrangement is not as common and most consumers are tied to their respective oil-linkage formulae for the duration of the contract.110 Despite the increasing demand following the Fukushima nuclear accident, however, Japanese LNG consumers are actively pursuing new arrangements for LNG contracts.111 There are other limits to the extent of the impact that U.S. LNG will have on global markets. It is unlikely that many of the LNG export facilities under consideration will reach final investment decision. Instead, it is more probable that U.S. natural gas prices will have rebounded sufficiently to the point that exports are not commercially viable beyond a certain threshold. (Figure 11 illustrates the estimated costs of delivering LNG to Japan in 2020.) This threshold, expected by many experts to be roughly 6 bcf/day by 2025, is modest in comparison to the roughly 11 bcf/day of Australian LNG export projects that have reached final investment decision and are expected to be online by 2020.

#### Scenario 1 : Japan

#### LNG exports will go to East Asia – it’s economical and helps meet growing demand

Ebinger et al 12 (Charles, Senior Fellow and Director of the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, Kevin Massy, Assistant Director of the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, and Govinda Avasarala, Senior Research Assistant in the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, “Liquid Markets: Assessing the Case for U.S. Exports of Liquefied Natural Gas,” Brookings Institution, Policy Brief 12-01, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2012/5/02%20lng%20exports%20ebinger/0502\_lng\_exports\_ebinger.pdf)

Owing to growing gas demand, limited domestic supply, and a more rigid and expensive pricing structure, Asia represents a near-to-medium term opportunity for natural gas exports from the United States. The expansion of the Panama Canal by 2014 will allow for LNG tankers to traverse the isthmus, thereby improving the economics of U.S. Gulf Coast LNG shipments to East and South Asian markets. This would make U.S. exports competitive with future Middle Eastern and Australian LNG exports to the region. However, challenges and uncertainties remain on both the demand and supply side. The development of indigenous unconventional gas in China or India may occur at a faster rate than currently forecast, dampening demand for LNG imports to the region. A change in sentiment in Japan may see nuclear power restarted at a greater rate than currently anticipated; alternately, a greater-than-expected penetration of coal in the Japanese electricity sector would suppress gas demand. A change in the cost of Australian LNG production or a reversal of the Qatari moratorium on gas development could disrupt the current supply projections, as could the discovery of new conventional or unconventional resources. For instance, on December 29, 2010, Noble Energy, a U.S. oil and gas exploration company, discovered between 14 and 20 tcf of gas in Israel’s offshore Leviathan gas field. Since then, other nations on the Eastern Mediterranean are exploring for potentially similarly large gas fields. A number of large natural gas discoveries in Mozambique have also prompted early interest in building significant liquefaction capacity in the Southeastern African nation. The high quality (low sulfur and carbon-dioxide content) and liquid-rich nature of Mozambican gas may make this resource a significant competitor in global LNG markets in the medium term. Finally, the expansion of LNG export capacity from Alaska and the development of LNG export capacity in Western Canada may provide a source of strong competition for U.S. Gulf-coast origin LNG. Although Alaska’s Kenai LNG export facility, which has been exporting small quantities of LNG to Northeast Asia for over 40 years, has been idled temporarily, some companies have demonstrated interest in large-scale exports of LNG from Alaska to East Asia. On March 30, 2012, ExxonMobil, along with its project partners BP and ConocoPhillips, settled a dispute with the Government of Alaska to develop its gas re- sources at Prudhoe Bay. The gas from this field is expected to travel from Alaska’s North Slope to Valdez on Alaska’s southern coast, where it will be liquefied and exported.67 According to FERC, there are currently three Canadian export facilities under consideration in British Columbia: a proposed 1.4 bcf/day terminal at Kitimat (initial production would start at 0.7 bcf/day), which received a 20-year export license in October 2011; a proposed 0.25 bcf/day facility at Douglas Island; and a potential 1 bcf/day facility at Prince Rupert Island. Given the lower transportation costs (as a result of the shorter distance), Alaskan and West Canadian exports may prove to be a source of strong competition at the margin for U.S. LNG in the Pacific Basin.

#### LNG exports solidify America’s reliability as a partner on energy issues – that’s key to US-Japan relations

Cronin et al 12 (Dr. Patrick, Senior Advisor and Senior Director of the Asia-Pacific Security Program – Center for a New American Security, Paul S. Giarra, President of Global Strategies & Transformation, Zachary M. Hosford, Research Associate – Center for a New American Security, Daniel Katz, Researcher – Center for a New American Security, “The China Challenge: Military, Economic and Energy Choices Facing the US-Japan Alliance,” April, CNAS, http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS\_TheChinaChallenge\_Cronin\_0.pdf)

Although energy security has long been an issue for the alliance, a new combination of global energy trends and geopolitical realities will raise the issue to unprecedented levels of importance in coming decades. Whereas an abundant supply of cheap energy underpinned tremendous post- World War II economic growth, future energy supplies are unlikely to be as affordable. Acquiring the right mix of energy sources to maintain sufficient economic productivity – while ensuring a gradual transition away from fossil fuels to renewable sources of energy – will be one of the most complex challenges for the alliance in this century. Indeed, the means by which the United States and Japan seek to secure their own energy supplies in a complicated geopolitical environment, respond to the enormous and increasing energy demands of a re-emerging China, and address the future of the development and implementation of civilian nuclear power at home and abroad will have huge implications for the alliance. In the midst of U.S. and Japanese efforts to address their own energy security issues, global demand for energy is increasing at a rapid rate. Total world energy use during the 2010 to 2025 time frame is projected to increase by nearly 30 percent, with China and India accounting for 50 percent of that growth.63 Meanwhile, many countries around the globe depend increasingly on Middle Eastern oil, despite its susceptibility to disruption. Further instability in the Middle East would likely pose a “major geo-strategic stability threat” to the United States, with the potential for cascading economic effects.64 Global natural gas production is increasing, however, shifting currency and power flows to new areas. At the same time, demand for nuclear power has bifurcated – growing strongly throughout the developing world, while reaching an inflection point in both the United States and Japan – with as-yet unknown consequences. Both the United States and Japan are undergoing internal debates on energy strategy, and there is no consensus among leaders in either country. To increase economic productivity, Japan will have to craft a new energy policy. Following the March 11, 2011, partial meltdowns of three nuclear reactors at the Fukushima Dai-ichi power plant and the subsequent release of radiation, the Japanese people and government have indicated that civilian nuclear power might play a reduced role in the country’s future energy mix. However, any increased reliance on fossil fuels that might result from that decision will make Japan more vulnerable to supply disruptions and price spikes. Previous disturbances in the global energy market have prompted many countries – including Japan – to seek some guarantee of energy supplies outside traditional market mechanisms, including investing in upstream oil production overseas, even if financial logic would dictate otherwise. Meanwhile, the Japanese population favors increased investment in renewable energy sources, which are not yet sufficiently affordable to be a viable alternative. Japan: Running Out of Power and Time Japan suffered from its reliance on foreign energy following the oil crises of 1973 and 1979. Although these supply disruptions led to massive growth of the domestic nuclear power industry, Japan continues to be the world’s largest importer of liquefied natural gas (LNG), with 90 percent of its supply originating overseas. In addition, Japan is the world’s second-largest importer of coal – all of which comes from abroad – and the third-largest importer of oil.65 Reliance on energy imports results in extremely low energy self-sufficiency (18 percent) compared with either the United States (75 percent) or China (94 percent).66 Although the nature of the global energy market offers some insulation because of supply-and-demand dynamics, Japanese reliance on imported energy also leaves the country more vulnerable to shocks. In a nation that already relies heavily on imported energy, the Fukushima nuclear disaster complicated the country’s long-term strategy of cultivating domestic energy sources. With much of the population wary of nuclear power following the radiation leaks and inaccurate government statements during the disaster, Japan’s efforts to diversify and secure its energy sources have lost public support. The United States also finds itself in the midst of a heated debate over energy security. The nation consumes large amounts of energy, and Americans are showing frustration with rising gas prices. There continues to be support for a shift to renewable energy sources, but these sources – including solar, wind, biomass and geothermal power– remain costly and have not yet reached the level of economic competitiveness. Meanwhile, technological advances have increased the projected amounts of recoverable oil and natural gas on U.S. land and in its surrounding waters. However, the widely publicized 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico and reports of contaminated water sources as a result of the natural gas extraction method known as hydraulic fracturing have mobilized opponents against increases in domestic drilling. Nonetheless, the picture is somewhat rosier for the United States than for Japan. Although the United States, like many industrialized countries, is witnessing a relative plateau in its overall energy demand, its energy consumption from primary fuel is expected to rise from 98.2 quadrillion Btu (British thermal units) in 2010 to 108.0 quadrillion Btu in 2035.67 Largely as a result of advances in recovering shale gas – natural gas trapped in shale formations, only recently made cost-effective to extract – the United States is projected to become a net LNG exporter by 2016, a net pipeline exporter by 2025 and an overall net natural gas exporter by 2021.68 The United States is also poised to increase its crude oil production from 5.5 million barrels per day in 2010 to 6.7 million barrels per day in 2020.69 The apparent move away from nuclear power in Japan following the Fukushima reactor meltdowns, together with the shale gas revolution in the United States, is shifting the energy security environment. Currently, Japan harbors concerns about the reliability of future U.S. energy supplies, which may be influenced by “shifting political winds in American energy policy.”70 Thus, the United States could help reduce the volatility of Japanese fossil fuel imports – which appear set to remain high – by providing a stable source of natural gas. However, if the allies fail to consult on this issue, they could drift apart, thereby missing an opportunity to strengthen the alliance.

#### Alliance solves multiple threats --- escalates to global nuclear war.

**Gates 11** (Robert, U.S. Secretary of Defense, “[U.S.-Japan Alliance a Cornerstone of Asian Security](http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1529)”, Speech to Keio University, 1-14, http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1529)

Over the course of its history, the U.S.-Japan alliance has succeeded at its original core purpose – to deter military aggression and provide an umbrella of security under which Japan – and the region – can prosper. Today, our alliance is growing deeper and broader as we address a range of security challenges in Asia. Some, like North Korea, piracy or natural disasters, have been around for decades, centuries, or since the beginning of time. Others, such as global terrorist networks, cyber attacks, and nuclear proliferation are of a more recent vintage. What these issues have in common is that they all require multiple nations working together – and they also almost always require leadership and involvement by key regional players such as the U.S. and Japan. In turn, we express our shared values by increasing our alliance’s capacity to provide humanitarian aid and disaster relief, take part in peace-keeping operations, protect the global commons, and promote cooperation and build trust through strengthening regional institutions. Everyone gathered here knows the crippling devastation that can be caused by natural disasters – and the U.S. and Japan, along with our partners in the region, recognize that responding to these crises is a security imperative. In recent years, U.S. and Japanese forces delivered aid to remote earthquake-stricken regions on Indonesia, and U.S. aircraft based in Japan helped deliver assistance to typhoon victims in Burma. We worked together in response to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, earthquakes in Java, Sumatra, and Haiti, and most recently following the floods in Pakistan. These efforts have demonstrated the forward deployment of U.S. forces in Japan is of real and life-saving value. They also provide new opportunities for the U.S. and Japanese forces to operate together by conducting joint exercises and missions. Furthermore, U.S. and Japanese troops have been working on the global stage to confront the threat of failed or failing states. Japanese peacekeepers have operated around the world, including the Golan Heights and East Timor and assisted with the reconstruction of Iraq. In Afghanistan, Japan represents the second largest financial donor, making substantive contributions to the international effort by funding the salaries of the Afghan National Police and helping the Afghan government integrate former insurgents. Japan and the United States also continue to cooperate closely to ensure the maritime commons are safe and secure for commercial traffic. Our maritime forces work hand-in-glove in the Western Pacific as well as in other sea passages such as the Strait of Malacca between Malaysia and Indonesia, where more than a third of the world’s oil and trade shipments pass through every year. Around the Horn of Africa, Japan has deployed surface ships and patrol aircraft that operate alongside those from all over the world drawn by the common goal to counter piracy in vital sea lanes. Participating in these activities thrusts Japan’s military into a relatively new, and at times sensitive role, as an exporter of security. This is a far cry from the situation of even two decades ago when, as I remember well as a senior national security official, Japan was criticized for so-called “checkbook diplomacy” – sending money but not troops – to help the anti-Saddam coalition during the First Gulf War. By showing more willingness to send self-defense forces abroad under international auspices – consistent with your constitution – Japan is taking its rightful place alongside the world’s other great democracies. That is part of the rationale for Japan’s becoming a permanent member of a reformed United Nations Security Council. And since these challenges cannot be tackled through bilateral action alone, we must use the strong U.S.-Japanese partnership as a platform to do more to strengthen multilateral institutions – regional arrangements that must be inclusive, transparent, and focused on results. Just a few months ago, I attended the historic first meeting of the ASEAN Plus Eight Defense Ministers Meeting in Hanoi, and am encouraged by Japan’s decision to co-chair the Military Medicine Working Group. And as a proud Pacific nation, the United States will take over the chairmanship of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum this year, following Japan’s successful tenure. Working through regional and international forums puts our alliance in the best position to confront some of Asia’s toughest security challenges. As we have been reminded once again in recent weeks, none has proved to be more vexing and enduring than North Korea. Despite the hopes and best efforts of the South Korean government, the U.S. and our allies, and the international community, the character and priorities of the North Korean regime sadly have not changed. North Korea’s ability to launch another conventional ground invasion is much degraded from even a decade or so ago, but in other respects it has grown more lethal and destabilizing. Today, it is North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons and proliferation of nuclear know-how and ballistic missile equipment that have focused our attention – developments that threaten not just the peninsula, but the Pacific Rim and international stability as well. In response to a series of provocations – the most recent being the sinking of the Cheonan and North Korea’s lethal shelling of a South Korean island – Japan has stood shoulder to shoulder with the Republic of Korea and the United States. Our three countries continue to deepen our ties through the Defense Trilateral Talks – the kind of multilateral engagement among America’s long-standing allies that the U.S. would like to see strengthened and expanded over time. When and if North Korea’s behavior gives us any reasons to believe that negotiations can be conducted productively and in good faith, we will work with Japan, South Korea, Russia, and China to resume engagement with North Korea through the six party talks. The first step in the process should be a North-South engagement. But, to be clear, the North must also take concrete steps to honor its international obligations and comply with U.N. Security Council Resolutions. Any progress towards diffusing the crisis on the Korean Peninsula must include the active support of the People’s Republic of China – where, as you probably know, I just finished an official visit. China has been another important player whose economic growth has fueled the prosperity of this part of the world, but questions about its intentions and opaque military modernization program have been a source of concern to its neighbors. Questions about China’s growing role in the region manifest themselves in territorial disputes – most recently in the incident in September near the Senkaku Islands, an incident that served as a reminder of the important of America’s and Japan’s treaty obligations to one another. The U.S. position on maritime security remains clear: we have a national interest in freedom of navigation; in unimpeded economic development and commerce; and in respect for international law. We also believe that customary international law, as reflected in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, provides clear guidance on the appropriate use of the maritime domain, and rights of access to it. Nonetheless, I disagree with those who portray China as an inevitable strategic adversary of the United States. We welcome a China that plays a constructive role on the world stage. In fact, the goal of my visit was to improve our military-to-military relationship and outline areas of common interest. It is precisely because we have questions about China’s military – just as they might have similar questions about the United States – that I believe a healthy dialogue is needed. Last fall, President Obama and President Hu Jin Tao made a commitment to advance sustained and reliable defense ties, not a relationship repeatedly interrupted by and subject to the vagaries of political weather. On a personal note, one of the things I learned from my experience dealing with the Soviet Union during my earlier time in government was the importance of maintaining a strategic dialogue and open lines of communication. Even if specific agreements did not result – on nuclear weapons or anything else – this dialogue helped us understand each other better and lessen the odds of misunderstanding and miscalculation. The Cold War is mercifully long over and the circumstances with China today are vastly different – but the importance of maintaining dialogue is as important today. For the last few minutes I’ve discussed some of the most pressing security challenges – along with the most fruitful areas of regional cooperation – facing the U.S. and Japan in Asia. This environment – in terms of threats and opportunities – is markedly different than the conditions that led to the forging of the U.S-Japan defense partnership in the context of a rivalry between two global superpowers. But on account of the scope, complexity and lethality of these challenges, I would argue that our alliance is more necessary, more relevant, and more important than ever. And maintaining the vitality and credibility of the alliance requires modernizing our force posture and other defense arrangements to better reflect the threats and military requirements of this century. For example, North Korea’s ballistic missiles – along with the proliferation of these weapons to other countries – require a more effective alliance missile defense capability. The U.S.-Japan partnership in missile defense is already one of the most advanced of its kind in the world. It was American and Japanese AEGIS ships that together monitored the North Korean missile launches of 2006 and 2008. This partnership –which relies on mutual support, cutting edge technology, and information sharing – in many ways reflect our alliance at its best. The U.S. and Japan have nearly completed the joint development of a new advanced interceptor, a system that represents a qualitative improvement in our ability to thwart any North Korean missile attack. The co-location of our air- and missile-defense commands at Yokota – and the associated opportunities for information sharing, joint training, and coordination in this area – provide enormous value to both countries. As I alluded to earlier, advances by the Chinese military in cyber and anti-satellite warfare pose a potential challenge to the ability of our forces to operate and communicate in this part of the Pacific. Cyber attacks can also come from any direction and from a variety of sources – state, non-state, or a combination thereof – in ways that could inflict enormous damage to advanced, networked militaries and societies. Fortunately, the U.S. and Japan maintain a qualitative edge in satellite and computer technology – an advantage we are putting to good use in developing ways to counter threats to the cyber and space domains. Just last month, the Government of Japan took another step forward in the evolution of the alliance by releasing its National Defense Program Guidelines – a document that lays out a vision for Japan’s defense posture. These guidelines envision: A more mobile and deployable force structure; Enhanced Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance capabilities; and A shift in focus to Japan’s southwest islands. These new guidelines provide an opportunity for even deeper cooperation between our two countries – and the emphasis on your southwestern islands underscores the importance of our alliance’s force posture. And this is a key point. Because even as the alliance continues to evolve – in strategy, posture, and military capabilities – to deal with this century’s security challenges, a critical component will remain the forward presence of U.S. military forces in Japan. Without such a presence: North Korea’s military provocations could be even more outrageous -- or worse; China might behave more assertively towards its neighbors; It would take longer to evacuate civilians affected by conflict or natural disasters in the region; It would be more difficult and costly to conduct robust joint exercises – such as the recent Keen Sword exercise – that hone the U.S. and Japanese militaries ability to operate and, if necessary, fight together; and Without the forward presence of U.S. forces in Japan, there would be less information sharing and coordination, and we would know less about regional threats and the military capabilities of our potential adversaries.

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#### Contention 3: The Energy Revolution

#### The energy transition is failing – fracking requires massive amounts of water that drives up costs and makes new natural gas uneconomical – access to new conventional natural gas makes the transition sustainable

Dorsey 12 (Gregory, Managing Editor – Leeb’s Income Performance Letter, “Fractured Logic: The Myth of Abundant Natural Gas,” Leeb’s Market Forecast, 5-9, http://leebsmarketforecast.com/content/fractured-logic-myth-abundant-natural-gas)

A popular meme these days is the idea that natural gas is America’s salvation on the road to energy independence. Production of the clean burning fuel has reached record levels in this country and stockpiles are bursting at the seams. Natural gas prices recently dipped to their lowest level since the late 1990s below $2 before clawing their way back to $2.50. The supply glut has occurred thanks to an extraction technique known as hydraulic fracturing, or “fracking,” as it’s commonly known. In contrast to the conventional method where companies merely drill into the earth to exploit natural gas and oil deposits below the surface, fracturing entails pumping a highly pressurized mixture of water, sand and chemicals into the well. The highly pressurized cocktail opens up cracks in tight rock formations, facilitating the flow of natural gas and other hydrocarbons from the source rock. Since fracking was approved for energy production through its exemption from the 2005 Safe Drinking Water Act, its popularity has grown immensely. Fracking has allowed producers to exploit resources that were otherwise considered too difficult to access. However, we would **stop short of calling fracking a true energy revolution** for a number of reasons, just one of which we want to address today. What’s typically overlooked is the huge amount of water resources required for hydraulic fracturing. While many believe fresh water to be an abundant resource, it’s actually anything but. As we’ve pointed out in the past, natural resources tend to be inter-correlated through the energy required to extract and process them. As one resource becomes scarcer, it will affect the cost or availability of other resources as well. In the long run, we see natural gas extraction from unconventional sources as no exception. And fresh water is the key connection. The mainstream political opposition to fracking comes from the environmental concern that the chemicals injected into the ground can leak into the groundwater, contaminating an important source of drinking water. We’ll leave the environmental argument to the experts in that field, but what has become increasingly clear in our research is that the amount of fresh water required for large-scale hydraulic fracturing is massive, far surpassing any estimates put forward by the oil and gas industry today. Depending on which numbers you use, unconventional shale fracking uses between six and 50 times the amount of water as conventional gas drilling. And the bulk of that water is required up front, as opposed to being used throughout the extraction process. The higher figures come from actual operational data, while the lower estimates are just that: estimates. As a result, many of the US shale plays that have been lauded as an abundant source of clean energy may produce far less natural gas than current forecasted estimates after all costs and resource inputs are accounted for. If these unconventional shale plays require much more water than conventional wisdom expects, as we suspect they will, there will be much less gas coming on line in the future than expected. And the cost of much of the gas that may eventually be extracted will be much higher than anticipated. Either way, the result is the same, causing the natural gas market to tighten and prices to rise. So if you heat and cool your home with natural gas, enjoy the current bonanza while it lasts. The takeaway for investors, meanwhile, is not simply to pile into the energy stocks most leveraged to natural gas prices, as tempting as that may be from a contrarian perspective. Unconventional gas deposits that will require fracking now make up a large portion of total natural gas assets for many E&P companies. And while higher water requirements will drive natural gas prices northward, it will also drive up costs for unconventional producers. The result for those producers will not be pretty. We would therefore stick with conventional natural gas producers who will benefit from higher gas prices. For safety sake, companies that also have a healthy exposure to crude oil earn the highest honors.

#### Natural gas abundance is a myth – shale gas is declining and studies don’t assume increased production

Berman 12 (Art, Former Editor – Oil and Gas Journal, Geological Consultant – American Association of Petroleum Geologists, “After the Gold Rush: A Perspective on Future U.S. Natural Gas Supply and Price,” Oil Drum, 2-8, http://www.theoildrum.com/node/8914)

For several years, we have been asked to believe that less is more, that more oil and gas can be produced from shale than was produced from better reservoirs over the past century. We have been told more recently that the U.S. has enough natural gas to last for 100 years. We have been presented with an improbable business model that has no barriers to entry except access to capital, that provides a source of cheap and abundant gas, and that somehow also allows for great profit. Despite three decades of experience with tight sandstone and coal-bed methane production that yielded low-margin returns and less supply than originally advertised, we are expected to believe that poorer-quality shale reservoirs will somehow provide superior returns and make the U.S. energy independent. Shale gas advocates point to the large volumes of produced gas and the participation of major oil companies in the plays as indications of success. But advocates rarely address details about profitability and they never mention failed wells. Shale gas plays are an important and permanent part of our energy future. We need the gas because there are fewer remaining plays in the U.S. that have the potential to meet demand. A careful review of the facts, however, casts doubt on the extent to which shale plays can meet supply expectations except at much higher prices. One Hundred Years of Natural Gas The U.S. does not have 100 years of natural gas supply. There is a difference between resources and reserves that many outside the energy industry fail to grasp. A resource refers to the gas or oil in-place that can be produced, while a reserve must be commercially producible. The Potential Gas Committee (PGC) is the standard for resource assessments because of the objectivity and credentials of its members, and its long and reliable history. In its biennial report released in April 2011, three categories of technically recoverable resources are identified: probable, possible and speculative. The President and many others have taken the PGC total of all three categories (2,170 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of gas) and divided by 2010 annual consumption of 24 Tcf. This results in 90 and not 100 years of gas. Much of this total resource is in accumulations too small to be produced at any price, is inaccessible to drilling, or is too deep to recover economically. More relevant is the Committee’s probable mean resources value of 550 (Tcf) of gas (Exhibit 4). If half of this supply becomes a reserve (225 Tcf), the U.S. has approximately 11.5 years of potential future gas supply at present consumption rates. When proved reserves of 273 Tcf are included, there is an additional 11.5 years of supply for a total of almost 23 years. It is worth noting that proved reserves include proved undeveloped reserves which may or may not be produced depending on economics, so even 23 years of supply is tenuous. If consumption increases, this supply will be exhausted in less than 23 years. Revisions to this estimate will be made and there probably is more than 23 years but based on current information, 100 years of gas is not justified. Shale Gas Plays May Not Provide Sustainable Supply Several of the more mature shale gas plays are either in decline or appear to be approaching peak production. Exhibit 5 shows that total Barnett Shale production is approximately 5.7 Bcf per day (Bcf/d) and cumulative gas production is more than 10 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of gas. It also shows that production may be approaching a peak at current gas prices despite the constant addition of new wells. Exhibit 5. Barnett Shale Total Production. Source: HPDI. The Haynesville Shale surpassed the Barnett during 2011 as the most productive gas play in North America, with present daily rates of almost 7 Bcf/d and cumulative production of 3.5 Tcf (Exhibit 6). This play is most responsible for the current over-supply of gas with the average well producing 3.3 million cubic feet per day (Mcf/d) compared to only 0.4 Mdf/d in the Barnett. It is too early to say for sure, but the Haynesville Shale may also be approaching peak production. The Marcellus Shale is presently producing 2.4 Bcf/d and has produced a total of about 0.8 Tcf (Exhibit 7). In this play, production shows no sign of leveling off, as it does in the Barnett and Haynesville, and production in the Fayetteville Shale may also be approaching a peak (Exhibit 8). The Woodford Shale is already in decline (Exhibit 9). If some existing shale gas plays are approaching peak production after only a few years since the advent of horizontal drilling and multi-stage hydraulic fracturing, what is the basis for long-term projections of abundant gas supply?

#### Claims of abundant natural gas are industry bias and use manipulated data

Hughes 11 (J. David, Fellow in Fossil Fuels – Post Carbon Institute, Geoscientist – Geological Survey of Canada, and Team Leader – Canadian Gas Potential Committee, Abstract by Richard Heinberg, Senior Fellow-in-Residence – Post Carbon Institute, “Will Natural Gas Fuel America in the 21st Century?” Post Carbon Institute, May, http://www.postcarbon.org/reports/PCI-report-nat-gas-future-plain.pdf)

As this report details, all of these assumptions and recommendations need to be re-thought. What emerges from the data is a very different assessment. But if this report is right, then how could mainstream energy analysts have gotten so much so wrong? It is not our purpose to analyze in detail the social, political, and economic process whereby public relations became public policy. Nevertheless it is fairly easy to trace the convergence of interests among major players. First, the shale gas industry was motivated to hype production prospects in order to attract large amounts of needed investment capital; it did this by drilling the best sites first and extrapolating initial robust results to apply to more problematic prospective regions. The energy policy establishment, desperate to identify a new energy source to support future economic growth, accepted the industry’s hype uncritically. This in turn led Wall Street Journal, Time Magazine, 60 Minutes, and many other media outlets to proclaim that shale gas would transform the energy world. Finally, several prominent environmental organizations, looking for a way to lobby for lower carbon emissions without calling for energy cutbacks, embraced shale gas as a necessary “bridge fuel” toward a renewable energy future. Each group saw in shale gas what it wanted and needed. The stuff seemed too good to be true—and indeed it was. The biggest losers in this misguided rush to anoint shale gas as America’s energy savior are members of the public, who need sound energy policy based on realistic expectations for future supply, as well as sound assessments of economic and environmental costs.

#### New state and federal regulations are coming now – that makes fracking unsustainable

Plumer 12 (Brad, “How states are regulating fracking (in maps)”, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/wp/2012/07/16/how-states-are-regulating-fracking-in-maps/)

Armed with new drilling techniques, companies are spreading out across the United States, cracking open shale rock in search of vast new stores of natural gas. It’s not an exaggeration to say that hydraulic fracturing, or “fracking,” has revolutionized the U.S. energy industry. Cheap natural gas has become America’s top source for electricity, displacing coal and bringing back jobs to once-decaying states like Ohio.But the fracking boom has also led to plenty of environmental concerns. Local communities are worried that the chemicals used to pry open the shale rock can contaminate nearby drinking water supplies. (So far, there’s scant evidence this is happening in places like Pennsylvania, but the science is still in its infancy.) Excess gas is often vented off, producing air pollution. And the disposal of fracking wastewater underground appears to be linked to earthquakes in places like Ohio. Confronted with these worries, states have responded with a patchwork of different regulations. But there’s a lot of variation between different states. And here’s a good way to track what’s going on: A helpful series of new maps, put together by Resources for the Future (RFF), gives an overview of how 31 states with significant shale gas reserves are treating different aspects of fracking. Here, for instance, is a look at which states require companies to disclose the chemicals they use in drilling. (Fracking is exempt from federal disclosure rules under the Safe Water Drinking Act.) Some states, like Pennsylvania — which sits above the gas-rich Marcellus shale formation — now require a full disclosure of chemicals. By contrast, Kansas, which is just beginning to see widespread fracking activity, is further behind: Meanwhile, the map below details how different states treat the “venting” or release of excess gas into the air. Just 22 of the 31 gas states have restrictions on this process, which can release both heat-trapping methane into the atmosphere as well as “volatile organic compounds” such as benzene that can produce smog and trigger health problems. Some states ban this practice entirely; others restrict it to emergencies or require that operators not harm public health: There are many more maps on RFF’s Web site, which is worth poking around on. In an introductory essay, RFF’s Nathan Richardson notes that these maps still provide just a partial picture — the details of laws matter, and more importantly, different states may enforce their rules with different levels of vigor. But it’s an invaluable resource all the same. The regulation of fracking has become a low-level campaign issue, as well. The Obama administration is gradually putting forward federal regulations. The Department of Interior is drafting rules for fracking on publicly-owned lands (where about 38 percent of the country’s gas reserves sit, according to the American Petroleum Institute). The Environmental Protection Agency, meanwhile, is slowly getting in on regulation and has proposed rules that will require all producers to phase out venting by 2015 and capture their waste methane instead. Mitt Romney, by contrast, has criticized the federal approach. In his “Believe in America” economic plan (pdf), he warns that the EPA should not “pursue overly aggressive interventions designed to discourage fracking altogether.” By contrast, Romney praises states for having “carefully and effectively regulated the process for decades.” Indeed, many Republicans believe that fracking regulations should be mainly left to the states, which can issue rules more speedily and can tailor regulations to the specific needs of their communities. Environmentalists, by contrast, worry that this will create a race to the bottom whereby states pare back their rules — or enforce them weakly — in order to compete for business. Both sides agree that addressing the public health and environmental aspects of fracking isn’t costless. The International Energy Agency recently estimated that addressing all of the various concerns could boost the price of natural gas by roughly 7 percent. Yet the IEA also warned that if these rules weren’t adopted, public outcry and protests could stop the shale gas boom altogether. Anti-fracking protests like those in New York state could become the norm. And that, the IEA notes, could prove even more costly to the gas industry

#### Shoring up energy primacy is the only way to sustain leadership and prevent extinction

Hagel 12 [Chuck Hagel, Professor at Georgetown University, “The Challenge of Change”, 5/15/12, <http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/challenge-change>]

A new world order is being built today by seven billion global citizens. America’s responsibilities in this new world and to future generations are as enormous as they are humbling. The challenges and choices before us demand leadership that reaches into the future without stumbling over today. They also require challenging every past frame of reference. Sensing the realities and subtleties of historic change are not always sudden or obvious. As former Secretary of State Dean Acheson recounted, “Only slowly did it dawn upon us that the whole world structure and order that we had inherited from the 19th century was gone and that the struggle to replace it would be directed from two bitterly opposed and ideologically irreconcilable power centers.” Staying a step ahead of the forces of change requires an ability to foresee and appreciate the consequences of our actions, a willingness to learn the hard lessons of history and from our own experiences, and a clear realization of the limitations of great power. Acheson and the Wise Men of that time got it right. America led the shaping of the post-Second World War world order through strong inspired leadership, a judicious (most of the time) use of its power, and working with allies through alliances and institutions. This has helped prevent a Third World War and a nuclear holocaust. The world we face in 2012 is of a different character than even a few years ago. Many developing nations are fragile states and are under enormous pressure from terrorism, endemic poverty, environmental challenges, debt, corruption, civil unrest, and regional, tribal, and religious conflicts. The result is a climate of despair, and potential breeding grounds for radical politics and extremism. A successful American foreign policy must include thinking through actions and policies, and how uncontrollable and unpredictable global forces may affect outcomes. Eleven years of invasions and occupations have put the U.S. in a deep hole and mired us down in terribly costly commitments in blood, treasure, and prestige. Our diplomatic and security flexibility has been seriously eroded by many of the decisions of the last eleven years. Too often we tend to confuse tactical action for strategic thinking. A matter of mutual understanding American foreign policy has always required a principled realism that is true to our values as we face the world as it really is in all of its complexities. We need to accept the reality that there is not a short-term solution to every problem in the world. What we must do is manage these realities and complex problems, moving them into positions of solution possibilities and resolution. American foreign policy has always dared to project a vision of a world where all things are possible. If we are to succeed, we must understand how the world sees us. Turn on our receivers more often and shut off our transmitters. This is a vital priority for a successful 21st century foreign policy. We must also avoid the traps of hubris, ideology and insularity, and know that there is little margin for error with the stakes so high in the world today. America must strengthen its global alliances. Common-interest alliances will be required in a volatile world of historic diffusions of power. The great challenges facing the world today are the responsibility of all peoples of the world. They include cyber warfare, terrorism, preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, prosperity and stability, and global poverty, disease and environmental degradation. Our allies throughout the world share these same challenges and threats and will also be just as affected by the outcomes. These will be either our common successes or our common failures. America cannot be successful with any of these challenges, without sustained partnerships and deep cooperation in the economic, intelligence, diplomatic, humanitarian, military and law enforcement fields. The centrality of alliances and multi-lateral institutions to a successful foreign policy is fundamental. Alliances and multi-lateral institutions must be understood as expansions of our influence, not as constraints on our power. Alliances are imperfect, as are all institutions. But like “process,” they help absorb shocks. Beyond military solutions Alliances must be built on solid foundations to handle both routine and sudden unforeseen challenges. Crisis-driven “coalitions of the willing” by themselves are not the building blocks for a stable world. We need to think more broadly, deeply and strategically. American military power and force structure cannot sustain its commitments without a shift to a more comprehensive strategic approach to global threats and a more flexible and agile military. Cyber warfare is a paramount example of these new threats. The perception of American power around the world must not rest solely on a military orientation or optic. There must be an underlying commitment to engagement and humanity. Engagement is not appeasement, nor is it negotiation. It is not a guarantee of anything, but rather a smart diplomatic bridge to better understanding and possible conflict resolution. American foreign policy must reflect the realities and demands of the global economy. The global economy cannot be shut out of foreign policy. There can be no higher priority for America than to remain economically competitive in a world undergoing a historic diffusion of economic power. A nation’s strength is anchored to and underpinned by its economic strength. The connections between America’s trade, economic, and energy policies must also be synthesized into a strategic vision for American foreign policy that not only meets the challenges of our time, but frames the completeness of long-term policies for strategic future outcomes. Trade is a major catalyst for economic strength and growth at home and abroad, as well as a critical stabilizer for world peace and prosperity. America must remain the global champion of free, fair and open trade. As the world’s strongest, largest and most dynamic economy, America must continue to lead world trade. Economic strength must be as high a priority as any other foreign policy priority. America’s security and growth are connected to both the American and global economies. A centerpiece of this security is energy security. Energy security and energy interdependence are interconnected parts of a broad and deep foreign policy paradigm that frames the complexity of the challenges that face America and the world. A diverse portfolio of energy that is accessible and affordable is the core of America’s energy security. Much of the world’s energy is produced in countries and regions that are consumed by civil unrest, lack of human rights, corruption, underdevelopment, and conflict. The price of oil is driven by supply and demand and the global market. We must ensure diversification of sources of supply and distribution networks to prevent undue dependence on any one country or region. Instability and violence disrupt supply and distribution and increase prices.

#### A US-led natural gas revolution solidifies international leadership

Mead 12 (Walter Russell, James Clark Chase Professor of Foreign Affairs and Humanities – Bard College and Editor-at-Large – American Interest, “Energy Revolution 2: A Post Post-American Post,” American Interest, 7-15, http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2012/07/15/energy-revolution-2-a-post-post-american-post/)

Forget peak oil; forget the Middle East. The energy revolution of the 21st century isn’t about solar energy or wind power and **the “scramble for oil” isn’t going to drive global politics**. The energy abundance that helped propel the United States to global leadership in the 19th and 2oth centuries is back; if the energy revolution now taking shape lives up to its full potential, we are headed into a new century in which the location of the world’s energy resources and the structure of the world’s energy trade **support American affluence at home and power abroad**. By some estimates, the United States has more oil than Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Iran combined, and Canada may have even more than the United States. A GAO report released last May (pdf link can be found here) estimates that up to the equivalent of 3 trillion barrels of shale oil may lie in just one of the major potential US energy production sites. If half of this oil is recoverable, US reserves in this one deposit are roughly equal to the known reserves of the rest of the world combined. Edward Luce, an FT writer usually more given to tracing America’s decline than to promoting its prospects, cites estimates that as early as 2020 the US may be producing more oil than Saudi Arabia. So dramatic are America’s finds, analysts talk of the US turning into the world’s new Saudi Arabia by 2020, with up to 15m barrels a day of liquid energy production (against the desert kingdom’s 11m b/d this year). Most of the credit goes to private sector innovators, who took their cue from the high oil prices in the last decade to devise ways of tapping previously uneconomic underground reserves of “tight oil” and shale gas. And some of it is down to plain luck. Far from reaching its final frontier, America has discovered new ones under the ground. Additionally, our natural gas reserves are so large that the US is likely to become a major exporter, and US domestic supplies for hydrocarbon fuels of all types appear to be safe and secure for the foreseeable future. North America as a whole has the potential to be a major exporter of fossil fuels for decades and even generations to come. Since the 1970s, pessimism about America’s energy future has been one of the cornerstones on which the decline theorists erected their castles of doom; we are now entering a time when energy abundance will be an argument for continued American dynamism. The energy revolution isn’t a magic wand that can make all America’s wishes come true, but it is **a powerful wind in the sails of both America’s domestic economy and of its international goals**. The United States isn’t the only big winner of the energy revolution — Canada, Israel and China among others will also make gains — but the likely consequences of the energy revolution for America’s global agenda are so large, that the chief effect of the revolution is likely to be its role in shoring up the foundations of the American-led world order.

#### And it allows us to determine how the system functions- alters the global balance of power

Gjelten 12 (Tom, Diplomatic Correspondent – NPR, “The Dash for Gas: The Golden Age of an Energy Game-Changer,” World Affairs, Jan/Feb, http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/dash-gas-golden-age-energy-game-changer)

For a fresh perspective on geopolitical trends, look at the world through the lens of the natural gas trade. One of the reasons for Israeli unease with the Arab Spring is that the democratic uprising that took down Hosni Mubarak also brought interruptions in Israel’s supply of natural gas, much of which since 2008 has come from Egypt. Wondering about China’s new interest in Australia and Qatar? It’s about their abundant gas supplies and China’s tremendous energy needs. Desperate for signs of cooperation from North Korea? Check out reports that Kim Jong-il may agree to the construction of a natural gas pipeline that would link Russia, Pyongyang, and Seoul. From Asia to the Middle East to North America, a boom in natural gas usage is rearranging international connections, with major repercussions for global politics. Energy consumers see that natural gas is relatively inexpensive, provided it can be transported efficiently, and abundant, especially if it can be harvested from shale rock and other unconventional deposits. The International Energy Agency (IEA) predicts that over the next twenty-five years gas will be the fastest-growing energy source, overtaking coal as soon as 2030. Around the world, natural gas is fast becoming the fuel of choice for electric power generation, especially with nuclear losing its appeal in the aftermath of the Fukushima disaster. Energy experts predict gas could even displace oil in the transportation sector, as car and truck engines are redesigned. The trend has so impressed IEA analysts that the agency in 2011 boldly predicted that the world is entering “a golden age of gas.” The implications are significant. Because gas is somewhat cleaner than other fossil fuels, its rise as a fuel source should have environmental benefits. Because it is cheaper than oil, its increased use would lower energy costs and bring energy to millions of people who lack access to it now. But among the most striking consequences of a dramatic growth in natural gas consumption would be its effect on international relations. The energy trade is an important determinant of the global balance of power, and the shift to natural gas will introduce **a new set of winners and losers**, bringing greater independence to many countries and reducing the energy leverage that oil producers have traditionally enjoyed. After chairing an advisory panel on the subject for the Department of Energy, former CIA director John Deutch concluded that the prospective geopolitical shifts amount to no less than “a natural gas revolution” in global affairs. A big difference between gas and oil is the trading infrastructure. While oil can be shipped in tankers, gas has moved mainly through pipelines, thus confining it largely to regional markets. Liquefied natural gas (LNG) is facilitating the development of a global market in gas, but it is still traded largely on a country-to-country basis, with negotiated prices that are specified in contracts. As gas usage has grown, these gas deals have grown more important. In Bolivia, for instance, a determination to use natural gas wealth for political ends has affected relations with its neighbors for most of the past decade. Privately financed exploration in the late 1990s revealed that the country’s proven gas reserves were six times greater than what was previously believed, but Bolivian leaders could not agree on how to exploit them. A public outcry forced President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada to resign and leave the country in 2003 after he proposed to export natural gas to Mexico and the United States through a terminal in Chile, where it was to have been liquefied. (Anti-Chilean sentiment has run deep in Bolivia ever since a war with Chile in 1879 cost the country its Pacific access.) Bolivian gas is now sold instead to Brazil and Argentina, but disputes with Brazil over the terms of the gas contract have cast a shadow over that relationship in recent years, and management of the country’s gas exports is probably Bolivia’s top foreign-policy challenge. The Bolivian case shows how the natural gas trade is more likely to be complicated by resource nationalism than the oil business would be. In a pique, Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez can say he is prepared to cut off oil sales to the United States, but because oil is a globally traded commodity managed by middlemen, the threat is largely meaningless. For every buyer, there will always be a seller. State-to-state gas deals, by contrast, are more likely to carry geopolitical overtones. In 2005, for example, Egypt took the bold step of agreeing to sell natural gas to Israel. The gas began flowing in 2008 through a pipeline that runs across the Sinai peninsula and continues undersea to the Israeli port of Ashkelon. Israel depends on natural gas for much of its power generation, and the deal with Egypt has provided the country with more than forty percent of its gas needs. The notion of exporting gas to Israel has been highly unpopular in Egypt, however, and in the months following the collapse of the Mubarak regime, the Sinai pipeline has been repeatedly blown up, forcing Israel to fire up unused coal plants and convert several gas-fueled generating stations to run on fuel oil or diesel instead, at a cost of several million dollars. But the country had a possible solution: In December 2010, a Houston-based energy exploration company announced “a significant natural gas discovery” about eighty miles off Israel’s coast. Preliminary measurements suggested it could be the world’s biggest deepwater gas discovery in ten years and could provide Israel with enough gas to become a net exporter, providing it with more clout in its regional energy relationships. South Korea also relies on imported energy sources and is keen on natural gas, which explains its interest in a Russian proposal to build a pipeline that would carry Russian gas from Siberia across the Korean peninsula. The idea has been floated for years, but North Korean leader Kim Jong-il apparently gave the proposal his firm support during a meeting in August 2011 with Russian President Dmitri Medvedev. South Korean President Lee Myung-bak subsequently agreed to work closely with the Russians to make the project a reality. The South Koreans have offered to build a natural gas power generating plant in the north as compensation for Pyongyang’s support for the pipeline. The key to the project’s success would be a design that would reassure Seoul that the North Korean authorities had no incentive to steal the gas or cut off the supply before it reaches the south. The textbook illustration of a link between geopolitics and the natural gas trade is Russia. As of 2010, the country was the world’s top gas producer (after briefly being surpassed by the United States), with one state-controlled company, Gazprom, accounting for about eighty percent of the country’s production. Originally part of the Soviet Union’s Ministry of Gas Industry, Gazprom is in effect a state monopoly, and its power and reach are without comparison in the energy world. The company has its own armed forces, with as many as twenty thousand armed security guards and a private fleet of unmanned drones, used mainly to monitor pipelines and production facilities. The company effectively operates as an arm of the Russian state, and the company’s gas deals in Europe and Asia can legitimately be seen as an extension of Russian foreign policy, exemplifying the growing importance of “gas diplomacy.” Though its relative importance as a gas provider to Europe has diminished over the past ten years, Russia still meets about a quarter of Europe’s needs, more than any other supplier, and European governments have long been uneasy about their dependence on Russian gas. About eighty percent of the Russian gas shipment to Europe goes through Ukraine, and the flow has been cut on two major occasions at least in part because of geopolitical wrangling. In January 2006, after Kiev resisted price increase demands, Gazprom reduced the flow of gas to Ukraine, causing shortages in other European countries that received gas through Ukraine. Politics seems to have played a role in the Russian move. Ukraine at the time was moving closer to the West, and Ukrainian leaders charged that Moscow, with its price increase demands, was trying to “blackmail” Ukraine into changing its political course. The gas flow was cut once again in January 2009, causing a severe midwinter gas shortage across Europe. The two episodes convinced many European leaders that Russia was ready and willing to use Gazprom’s clout in what it considered its “privileged sphere of influence,” with the goal of bringing the former Soviet republics back under Moscow’s control. Joschka Fischer, the German foreign minister and vice chancellor from 1998 to 2005, spoke for many European observers when he wrote in 2010, “The primary goal of Russian gas policy isn’t economic but political, namely to further the aim of revising the post-Soviet order in Europe.” The eagerness of European countries to reduce their dependence on Russian gas has prompted ongoing efforts to find alternative supply routes. Iraq and the former Soviet republics of Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan are promising sources, and for about a decade European authorities have been scheming to develop a gas pipeline that would bypass Russia. The Nabucco pipeline project, launched in 2002, would bring gas from the Caspian basin across Turkey to a hub in Austria. In addition, BP and two Italian companies have been promoting pipeline projects of their own along that southern corridor. The European Commission and the United States have both given strong backing to the Nabucco project, but the pipeline planners have had a difficult time lining up the supply commitments needed to make the project economically worthwhile. Moscow has put pressure on the Central Asian states to send their gas to Russia rather than Europe, and China is pursuing supply deals of its own in the region. Among the major new developments has been the construction of new facilities to liquefy natural gas. Petroleum engineers have long known how to convert gas into liquid form through extreme cooling, but only in recent years has the LNG industry expanded to the point that it has altered gas trading patterns. The construction of dozens of new liquefaction and regasification plants around the world, along with the introduction of LNG tanker ships, has made it possible for island nations like Australia to become major gas exporters, and it has given gas-consuming countries new supply sources. The United States, Japan, China, and European countries were all quick to embrace the industry. (In the US alone, twelve new terminals have been built to receive LNG, with plants to regasify the LNG for shipment through pipelines around the country.) The development has been rapid. The International Energy Agency predicts that between 2008 and 2020 total liquefaction capacity will double. Qatar, which opened its first LNG plant in 1997, by 2006 had become the world’s top LNG producer and was investing in LNG terminals around the world. For European countries with terminals, importing LNG from Qatar or Algeria or Nigeria is another way to reduce dependence on Russian supplies. By 2035, for example, LNG is expected to supply about half of the United Kingdom’s natural gas needs, with imports from Qatar leading the way. British Prime Minister David Cameron’s February 2011 visit to Qatar, culminating in a new gas deal, put Moscow on notice that Europe had alternatives to Russian gas. Qatar and other LNG exporters have an even more inviting market in Asia. The IEA foresees China’s gas consumption growing by nearly six percent annually up to 2035. Japan, having lost much of its nuclear generating capacity as a result of the March 2011 earthquake and tsunami, is now a huge gas market as well, and LNG imports from Australia, Qatar, and the other gas exporting countries will be essential to its energy mix. Such developments were not foreseen twenty years ago. The LNG industry has diversified the gas trade, introducing new producers into the picture and giving gas importers more supply choices just as their demand for gas is growing. Without a doubt, the most revolutionary recent development in the natural gas world has been an improvement in the ability to extract gas from shale rock and other unconventional sources. Geologists have known for two hundred years that shale contains combustible gas, but the tightness of the shale formation meant that the gas was generally considered unrecoverable. In the last decade, however, energy companies in the United States have found that it is economically possible to harvest shale gas through the use of hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”), by which large amounts of water mixed with sand and chemicals are injected at high pressure into the rock formations in order to free the gas trapped inside. In addition, gas producers are now employing horizontal drilling techniques, turning their drill bits in a horizontal direction after reaching a deep shale reservoir and thus reaching more deposits from a single well. These developments have proven so promising that analysts are dramatically increasing their estimates of how much shale gas can be recovered around the world. In the United States, shale accounted for almost no gas production as recently as 2000. It now provides about twenty percent of the total production, and within twenty years it could be half. The US government’s Energy Information Administration has estimated that if recoverable shale gas reserves are included, the United States may have enough natural gas to meet US needs for the next hundred years, at current consumption rates. Such estimates are imprecise and may well be adjusted downward, but the production of shale gas has already dramatically altered the US energy picture. Just a few years ago, it was assumed that the United States would be a net importer of natural gas, with much of it arriving as LNG. But the terminals and regasification facilities that were built to facilitate LNG imports are now going largely unused. The successful production of shale gas could even mean the United States will soon be a net gas exporter. Some of the existing regasification facilities, built for LNG imports, could actually be converted to liquefaction plants, so that excess domestic gas production can be exported as LNG. If the United States became self-sufficient in natural gas, there would be significant geopolitical implications. When Arab states in 1973 imposed an embargo on oil shipments to the United States as punishment for US support of Israel, American consumers learned how vulnerable their country was to the “oil weapon” when used by potentially hostile states. As the United States moves toward energy independence, **if only in gas**, that vulnerability disappears. There would also be geopolitical effects overseas. With the United States no longer importing LNG, that gas could go to European consumers instead, and Europe’s dependence on Russia for its gas supply would diminish. In 2000, Russia was supplying about forty percent of Europe’s gas; some estimates have the Russian share sliding to ten percent by 2040. Whether the United States can maintain a sharply upward trend in shale gas production **depends on whether the reserves are as promising as they now appear to be**, whether the gas price is sufficient to cover production costs, and especially whether environmental concerns associated with shale drilling are addressed. Hydraulic fracturing requires enormous amounts of water, and recycling or disposal of the waste water can be problematic. There have been cases where shale well casings have proved defective, and contamination of the surrounding soil or water has occurred. Authorities in New York, New Jersey, and Maryland have imposed temporary moratoria on fracking in order to assess the practice and determine whether it imposes any risks to drinking water or human health.

circumstances.

#### Maintaining the U.S. supported international order solves great power war

**Kagan 12** (Robert – senior fellow of foreign policy at the Center on the United States and Europe, America Has Made the World Freer, Safer and Wealthier, 3-14, p. http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2012/0314\_us\_power\_kagan.aspx)

We take a lot for granted about the way the world looks today -- the widespread freedom, the unprecedented global prosperity (even despite the current economic crisis), and the absence of war among great powers. In 1941 there were only a dozen democracies in the world. Today there are more than 100. For four centuries prior to 1950, global GDP rose by less than 1 percent a year. Since 1950 it has risen by an average of 4 percent a year, and billions of people have been lifted out of poverty. The first half of the 20th century saw the two most destructive wars in the history of mankind, and in prior centuries war among great powers was almost constant. But for the past 60 years no great powers have gone to war. This is the world America made when it assumed global leadership after World War II. Would this world order survive if America declined as a great power? Some American intellectuals insist that a "Post-American" world need not look very different from the American world and that all we need to do is "manage" American decline. But that is wishful thinking. If the balance of power shifts in the direction of other powers, the world order will inevitably change to suit their interests and preferences. Take the issue of democracy. For several decades, the balance of power in the world has favored democratic governments. In a genuinely post-American world, the balance would shift toward the great power autocracies. Both China and Russia already protect dictators like Syria's Bashar al-Assad. If they gain greater relative influence in the future, we will see fewer democratic transitions and more autocrats hanging on to power. What about the free market, free trade economic order? People assume China and other rising powers that have benefited so much from the present system would have a stake in preserving it. They wouldn't kill the goose that lays the golden eggs. But China's form of capitalism is heavily dominated by the state, with the ultimate goal being preservation of the ruling party. Although the Chinese have been beneficiaries of an open international economic order, they could end up undermining it simply because, as an autocratic society, their priority is to preserve the state's control of wealth and the power it brings. They might kill the goose because they can't figure out how to keep both it and themselves alive. Finally, what about the long peace that has held among the great powers for the better part of six decades? Many people imagine that American predominance will be replaced by some kind of multipolar harmony. But multipolar systems have historically been **neither stable nor peaceful**. War among the great powers was a common, if not constant, occurrence in the long periods of multipolarity in the 16th, 17th, and 18th centuries. The 19th century was notable for two stretches of great-power peace of roughly four decades each, punctuated, however, by major wars among great powers and culminating in World War I, the most destructive and deadly war mankind had known up to that point. The era of American predominance has shown that there is no better recipe **for great-power peace than certainty about who holds the upper hand**. Many people view the present international order as the inevitable result of human progress, a combination of advancing science and technology, an increasingly global economy, strengthening international institutions, evolving "norms" of international behavior, and the gradual but inevitable triumph of liberal democracy over other forms of government -- forces of change that transcend the actions of men and nations. But there was nothing inevitable about the world that was created after World War II. International order is not an evolution; it is an imposition. It is the domination of one vision over others -- in America's case, the domination of liberal free market principles of economics, democratic principles of politics, and a peaceful international system that supports these, over other visions that other nations and peoples may have. The present order will last only as long as those who favor it and benefit from it retain the will and capacity to defend it. If and when American power declines, the institutions and norms American power has supported will decline, too. Or they may collapse altogether as we transition into another kind of world order, or into disorder. We may discover then that the United States was essential to keeping the present world order together and that the alternative to American power was not peace and harmony but chaos and catastrophe -- which was what the world looked like right before the American order came into being.

#### Primacy has resulted in the lowest level of war in history – best stats prove

**Owen 2011** (John – professor of politics at the University of Virginia, Don’t Discount Hegemony, p. www.cato-unbound.org/2011/02/11/john-owen/dont-discount-hegemony/)

Andrew Mack and his colleagues at the Human Security Report Project are to be congratulated. Not only do they present a study with a striking conclusion, driven by data, free of theoretical or ideological bias, but they also do something quite unfashionable: they bear good news. Social scientists really are not supposed to do that. Our job is, if not to be Malthusians, then at least to point out disturbing trends, looming catastrophes, and the imbecility and mendacity of policy makers. And then it is to say why, if people listen to us, things will get better. We do this as if our careers depended upon it, and perhaps they do; for if all is going to be well, what need then for us? Our colleagues at Simon Fraser University are brave indeed. That may sound like a setup, but it is not. I shall challenge neither the data nor the general conclusion that violent conflict around the world has been decreasing in fits and starts since the Second World War. When it comes to violent conflict among and within countries, **things have been getting better**. (The trends have not been linear—Figure 1.1 actually shows that the frequency of interstate wars peaked in the 1980s—but the 65-year movement is clear.) Instead I shall accept that Mack et al. are correct on the macro-trends, and focus on their explanations they advance for these remarkable trends. With apologies to any readers of this forum who recoil from academic debates, this might get mildly theoretical and even more mildly methodological. Concerning international wars, one version of the “nuclear-peace” theory is not in fact laid to rest by the data. It is certainly true that nuclear-armed states have been involved in many wars. They have even been attacked (think of Israel), which falsifies the simple claim of “assured destruction”—that any nuclear country A will deter any kind of attack by any country B because B fears a retaliatory nuclear strike from A. But the most important “nuclear-peace” claim has been about mutually assured destruction, which obtains between two robustly nuclear-armed states. The claim is that (1) rational states having second-strike capabilities—enough deliverable nuclear weaponry to survive a nuclear first strike by an enemy—will have an overwhelming incentive not to attack one another; and (2) we can safely assume that nuclear-armed states are rational. It follows that states with a second-strike capability will not fight one another. Their colossal atomic arsenals neither kept the United States at peace with North Vietnam during the Cold War nor the Soviet Union at peace with Afghanistan. But the argument remains strong that those arsenals did help keep the United States and Soviet Union at peace with each other. Why non-nuclear states are not deterred from fighting nuclear states is an important and open question. But in a time when calls to ban the Bomb are being heard from more and more quarters, we must be clear about precisely what the broad trends toward peace can and cannot tell us. They may tell us nothing about why we have had no World War III, and little about the wisdom of banning the Bomb now. Regarding the **downward trend in international war**, Professor Mack is friendlier to more palatable theories such as the “**democratic peace**” (democracies do not fight one another, and the proportion of democracies has increased, hence less war); the interdependence or “**commercial peace**” (states with extensive economic ties find it irrational to fight one another, and interdependence has increased, hence less war); and the notion that people around the world are more anti-war than their forebears were. Concerning the downward trend in civil wars, he favors theories of economic growth (where commerce is enriching enough people, violence is less appealing—a logic similar to that of the “commercial peace” thesis that applies among nations) and the end of the Cold War (which end reduced superpower support for rival rebel factions in so many Third-World countries). These are all **plausible mechanisms for peace**. What is more, none of them excludes any other; all could be working toward the same end. That would be somewhat puzzling, however. Is the world just lucky these days? How is it that an array of peace-inducing factors happens to be working coincidentally in our time, when such a magical array was absent in the past? The answer may be that one or more of these mechanisms reinforces some of the others, or perhaps some of them are mutually reinforcing. Some scholars, for example, have been focusing on whether economic growth might support democracy and vice versa, and whether both might support international cooperation, including to end civil wars. We would still need to explain how this charmed circle of causes got started, however. And here let me raise another factor, perhaps even less appealing than the “nuclear peace” thesis, at least outside of the United States. That factor is what international relations scholars call hegemony—specifically **American hegemony**. A theory that many regard as discredited, but that refuses to go away, is called hegemonic stability theory. The theory emerged in the 1970s in the realm of international political economy. It asserts that **for the global economy to remain open**—for countries to keep barriers to trade and investment low—**one powerful country must take the lead**. Depending on the theorist we consult, “taking the lead” entails paying for global public goods (keeping the sea lanes open, providing liquidity to the international economy), coercion (threatening to raise trade barriers or withdraw military protection from countries that cheat on the rules), or both. The theory is skeptical that international cooperation in economic matters can emerge or endure absent a hegemon. The distastefulness of such claims is self-evident: they imply that it is good for everyone the world over if one country has more wealth and power than others. More precisely, they imply that it has been good for the world that the United States has been so predominant. There is no obvious reason why hegemonic stability theory could not apply to other areas of international cooperation, including in security affairs, human rights, international law, peacekeeping (UN or otherwise), and so on. What I want to suggest here—suggest, not test—is that **American hegemony might just be a deep cause of the steady decline of political deaths in the world**. How could that be? After all, the report states that United States is the third most war-prone country since 1945. Many of the deaths depicted in Figure 10.4 were in wars that involved the United States (the Vietnam War being the leading one). Notwithstanding politicians’ claims to the contrary, a candid look at U.S. foreign policy reveals that the country is as ruthlessly self-interested as any other great power in history. The answer is that U.S. hegemony might just be a **deeper cause of the proximate causes** outlined by Professor Mack. Consider economic growth and openness to foreign trade and investment, which (so say some theories) **render violence irrational**. American power and policies may be responsible for these in two related ways. First, at least since the 1940s Washington has **prodded other countries to embrace the market capitalism** that entails economic openness and produces **sustainable economic growth**. The United States promotes capitalism for selfish reasons, of course: its own domestic system depends upon growth, which in turn depends upon the efficiency gains from economic interaction with foreign countries, and the more the better. During the Cold War most of its allies accepted some degree of market-driven growth. Second, the U.S.-led western victory in the Cold War damaged the credibility of alternative paths to development—communism and import-substituting industrialization being the two leading ones—and **left market capitalism the best model**. The end of the Cold War also involved an end to the billions of rubles in Soviet material support for regimes that tried to make these alternative models work. (It also, as Professor Mack notes, **eliminated the superpowers’ incentives to feed civil violence** in the Third World.) What we call **globalization** is **caused in part by the emergence of the United States as the global hegemon**. The same case can be made, with somewhat more difficulty, concerning the **spread of democracy**. Washington has supported democracy only under certain conditions—the chief one being the absence of a popular anti-American movement in the target state—but those conditions have become much more widespread following the collapse of communism. Thus in the 1980s the Reagan administration—the most anti-communist government America ever had—began to dump America’s old dictator friends, starting in the Philippines. Today Islamists tend to be anti-American, and so the Obama administration is skittish about democracy in Egypt and other authoritarian Muslim countries. But general U.S. material and moral support for liberal democracy remains strong.

#### Post-positivism tempers the difference between social constructions and realism. Even if we cannot perfectly understand or describe the world, we can investigate it by using social interactions that are patterned and predictable.

**Miller 2002** (Katherine Miller – Professor of Communication at Texas A & M, Communication theories: Perspectives, processes, and contexts, p. 35-36)

If positivism, in its classical and logical forms, is largely rejected, what philosophical foundation should take its place as a framework for social research? Very different answers to this question have been proposed. Some social researchers argue that flaws in the positivist foundation require a radically different philosophy of sci- ence, one in which the realist ontology, objective epistemology, and value-free axiology of positivism are vehemently rejected and replaced with forms of inquiry that honor nominalism, subjectivism, and omnipresent values. The posi- tions of these scholars are discussed in great detail in Chapters 4 and 5 as we consider interpretive and critical petspectives on communication theory. However, some scholars believe that a rejection of positivism does not require a total rejection of realism, objectivity, and the scientific goal of value-free inquiry. However, these scholars reject the notion of absolute truth, reject the unassailable foundation of observation, and reject the assumption of an always steady and upward accumulation of knowledge. In these rejections, scholars have forged a new philosophy of science that D. C. Phillips (1987, 1990, 1992) has called post-positivism. The metatheoretical tenets of this position are discussed in the next section. Metatheoretical Commitments Ontology In Chapter 2, we discussed three ontological positions: the realist, the nominalist, and the social constructionist. To summarize, a realist believes in a hard and solid reality of physical and social objects, a nominalist proposes that the reality of social entities exists only in the names and labels we provide for them, and a social constructionist emphasizes the ways in which social meanings are created through historical and contemporary interaction. Both the realist and the social constructionist positions make contributions to the ontology of post-positivist researchers in the communication discipline. Researchers in the post-positivist tradition can be seen as realists in that they support the position that phenomena exist independent of our perceptions and theories about them (Phillips, 1987). However, this realism is tempered by the argument that humans cannot fully apprehend that reality and that the driving mechanisms in the social and physical world cannot be fully understood. As J. D. Smith (1990, p. 171) states, "Realism is essential . . . because it poses 'at least in principle, a standard by which all human societies and their beliefs can be judged: they can all have beliefs about the world which turn out to be mistaken'" (Trigg, 1985, p. 22). Phillips argues, however, that a post-positivist ontology does not deny the notions inherent in approaches advocating a "social construction of reality" (Berger & Luckmann, 1967). Rather, Phillips (1990) draws the distinction between beliefs about the reality and the objective reality (pp. 42-43). Making this distinction allows a post-positivist scholar to appreciate (and investigate) multiple realities that are constructed by social collectives through communicative inter-action. For example, a post-positivist scholar could study the ways that beliefs about the imminent end of the world influence the behaviors of mountain survivalists, members of cults, and fundamental religious groups. However, the fact that a social group has arrived at certain beliefs about the world does not make those beliefs about the social or physical world necessarily true. As Phillips (1990) notes, "It is clear that Freudians believe in the reality of the id and superego and the rest, and they act as if these are realities; but their believing in these things does not make them real" (p. 43). It could be further argued that post-positivism is consistent with social constructionist views in two important ways. First, many post-positivists would argue that the process of social construction occurs in relatively patterned ways that are amenable to the type of social scientific investigation undertaken by post-positivists. Individuals have free will and creativity but they exercise that creativity in ways that are often (though not always, certainly) patterned and predictable. In the field of mass communication, Barbara Wilson (1994) argues convincingly for this point regarding her own study of children's responses to the mass media: I believe that children's interpretations and responses are as richly individualistic as snow-flakes. However, I also believe that there are common patterns that characterize a majority of young viewers and that those patterns are as predictable and explainable as the basic process by which all those unique snowflakes are formed from water, (p. 25) Second, many post-positivists would argue that social constructions are regularly reified and treated as objective by actors in the social world. Thus, it is reasonable to study the impact of these reified constructions on our communicative lives. Tompkins (1997) has made this argument with regard to his organizational communication research with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA): The engineers, scientists, managers, bureau-crats, and other kinds of members did not believe in a socially constructed world. They believed the rockets they made did in fact go to the moon. Moreover, they believed that NASA and the contractor firms who worked for them were real. They believed that these organizations could succeed or fail by objective criteria and that their bosses could hire or fire, reward or penalize individuals—actions with real consequences, (p. 369) Thus, a social constructionist ontology is consistent with a post-positivist position that emphasizes both the patterned nature of the social construction process and the regular and predictable effects that reified social constructions have on social actors. Thus, the ontology of post-positivism is not necessarily the belief in a hard, immutable, and unchanging social world implied in a strict realist stance. Rather, a post-positivist ontology entails a belief in regularity and pattern in our interactions with others. The ways in which these regularities and patterns are studied within post-positivist theory are considered in the next section.

#### The burden of “truth claims” is to disprove the factual claims of the 1AC --- no amount of theory can replace well-warranted evidence and analysis.

**Yudkowsky 2008** (Eliezer – research fellow at Singularity Institute for Artificial Intelligence, Cognitive Biases Potentially Affecting Judgment of Global Risks, Global Catastrophic Risks, p. 111-112)

Every true idea which discomforts you will seem to match the pattern of at least one psychological error. Robert Pirsig said: "The world's biggest fool can say the sun is shining, but that doesn't make it dark out." If you believe someone is guilty of a psychological error, then demonstrate your competence by first demolishing their consequential factual errors. If there are no factual errors, then what matters the psychology? The temptation of psychology is that, knowing a little psychology, we can meddle in arguments where we have no technical expertise - instead sagely analyzing the psychology of the disputants. If someone wrote a novel about an asteroid strike destroying modern civilization, then someone might criticize that novel as extreme, dystopian, apocalyptic; symptomatic of the author's naive inability to deal with a complex technological society. We should recognize this as a literary criticism, not a scientific one; it is about good or bad novels, not good or bad hypotheses. To quantify the annual probability of an asteroid strike in real life, one must study astronomy and the historical record: no amount of literary criticism can put a number on it. Garreau (2005) seems to hold that a scenario of a mind slowly increasing in capability, is more mature and sophisticated than a scenario of extremely rapid intelligence increase. But that's a technical question, not a matter of taste; no amount of psychologizing can tell you the exact slope of that curve. It's harder to abuse heuristics and biases than psychoanalysis. Accusing someone of conjunction fallacy leads naturally into listing the specific details that you think are burdensome and drive down the joint probability. Even so, do not lose track of the realworld facts of primary interest; do not let the argument become about psychology. Despite all dangers and temptations, it is better to know about psychological biases than to not know. Otherwise we will walk directly into the whirling helicopter blades of life. But be very careful not to have too much fun accusing others of biases. That is the road that leads to becoming a sophisticated arguer - someone who, faced with any discomforting argument, finds at once a bias in it. The one whom you must watch above all is yourself. Jerry Cleaver said: "What does you in is not failure to apply some high-level, intricate, complicated technique. It's overlooking the basics. Not keeping your eye on the ball." Analyses should finally center on testable real-world assertions. Do not take your eye off the ball.

#### A constant focus on epistemological and ontological questions undermines theory and the ability to develop real-world policy solutions.

**Owens 2002** (David – professor of social and political philosophy at the University of Southampton, Re-orienting International Relations: On Pragmatism, Pluralism and Practical Reasoning, Millenium, p. 655-657)

Commenting on the ‘philosophical turn’ in IR, Wæver remarks that ‘[a] frenzy for words like “epistemology” and “ontology” often signals this philosophical turn’, although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn. The first danger with the philosophical turn is that it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology over explanatory and/or interpretive power as if the latter two were merely a simple function of the former. But while the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is not wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, wholly dependent on these philosophical commitments. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness—but this does not undermine the point that, for a certain class of problems, rational choice theory may provide the best account available to us. In other words, while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it is not the only or even necessarily the most important kind. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that because prioritisation of ontology and epistemology promotes theory-construction from philosophical first principles, it cultivates a theory-driven rather than problem-driven approach to IR. Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action, event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, ‘theory-driven work is part of a reductionist program’ in that it ‘dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory’.5 The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since ‘whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for social-scientific inquiry, not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry’.6 Moreover, this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of empirical validity. The third danger is that the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR—what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) ‘the Highlander view’—namely, an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because the turn to, and prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things right, namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so a potentially vicious circle arises.

### Solvency

#### The claim that suffering is inevitable and that intervention to suffering is life-negating is nothing more than a thinly-veiled cover for mass rape and genocide – accepting their argument necessitates an unconditional acceptance of brutal atrocities in all their forms

Kelley L. **Ross**, professor of philosophy at Los Angeles Valley College, **2003**, “Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900),” http://www.friesian.com/NIETZSCH.HTM

While the discussion of Existentialism treated Nietzsche as an Existentialist before his time, with the death of God producing the kind of nihilism characteristic of that movement, Nietzsche, for all his warnings about nihilism, does not in the end seem to be an actual nihilist. He is a kind of positivist instead -- that certain actual events and practices are the root of genuine value. The events and practices used by Nietzsche happen to be those of the most extreme 19th century Darwinian conception of nature. This very often sounds good, since Nietzsche sees himself, and can easily impress others, as simply making a healthy affirmation of life. Life for Nietzsche, however, is red in tooth and claw, and the most admirable and interesting form of life is the triumphant Darwinian predator, who in general is paradigmatic of beauty, grace, strength, intelligence, and activity, while living off of the less intelligent herds of herbivores, i.e. the dull and the bovine. In The Genealogy of Morals, one of Nietzsche's latest works (1887), he lays this all out with great clarity and eloquence. It is a performance that is also appalling -- and horrifying in relation to the uses to which Nietzsche's ideas were later put, for which he cannot, and would not care to, escape blame. First of all, Nietzsche's racism is unmistakable. The best way to approach this is to let Nietzsche speak for himself. In the quotes that follow, I will simply offer examples from The Genealogy of Morals alone, as translated by Francis Golffing (in the footnotes I have been adding some passages from Beyond Good and Evil for comparison). The Latin malus ["bad"] (beside which I place melas [Greek for "black"]) might designate the common man as dark, especially black-haired ("hic niger est"), as the pre-Aryan settler of the Italian soil, notably distiguished from the new blond conqueror race by his color. At any rate, the Gaelic presented me with an exactly analogous case: fin, as in the name Fingal, the characteristic term for nobility, eventually the good, noble, pure, originally the fair-haired as opposed to the dark, black-haired native population. The Celts, by the way, were definitely a fair-haired race; and it is a mistake to try to relate the area of dark-haired people found on ethnographic maps of Germany to Celtic bloodlines, as Virchow does. These are the last vestiges of the pre-Aryan population of Germany. (The subject races are seen to prevail once more, throughout almost all of Europe; in color, shortness of skull, perhaps also in intellectual and social instincts. Who knows whether modern democracy, the even more fashionable anarchism, and especially that preference for the commune, the most primitive of all social forms, which is now shared by all European socialists -- whether all these do not represent a throwback, and whether, even physiologically, the Aryan race of conquerors is not doomed?) [The Birth of Tragedy and The Genealogy of Morals, Doubleday Anchor Books, 1956, p.164, boldface added, note] Here we have an unmistakable racism: the good, noble, and blond Aryans, contrasted with the dark and primitive indigenes of Europe. While Nietzsche's thought is often defended as unrelated to the racism of the Nazis, there does not seem to be much difference from the evidence of this passage. One difference might be Nietzsche's characterization of the "commune" as "the most primitive of all social forms." Nazi ideology was totalitarian and "social," denigrating individualism. Nietzsche would not have gone for this -- and the small, dark Hitler is certainly no Aryan -- but then many defenders of Nietzsche these days also tend to prefer a communitarian democracy, which means they might have more in common with the Nazis, despite their usual anti-racism, than Nietzsche himself. This is characteristic of the confusion of contemporary politics, let alone Nietzsche apologetics. The passage above, at least, provides as much aid and comfort for the Nazis as for any other interpretation or appropriation of Nietzsche. Nietzsche's racism might be excused as typical of its age, and criticism of it anachronistic. However, the racism of Thomas Jefferson, a century earlier, involved an explicit denial that physical or intellectual differences between the races (about which Jefferson expressed no certainty) compromised the rights of the inferior races. To Nietzsche, however, the "subject races" have no "rights"; and domination, not to mention all the forms of "oppression" excoriated by the trendy Left, are positive and desirable goods. This anxiety or distemper may be due to a variety of causes. It may result from a crossing of races too dissimilar (or of classes too dissimilar. Class distinctions are always indicative of genetic and racial differences: the European Weltschmerz and the pessimism of the nineteenth century were both essentially the results of an abrupt and senseless mixing of classes)... [p.267, boldface added, note] In the litany of political sins identified by the Left, "racism, classism, and homophobia" are the holy trinity -- with "classism," of course, as a codeword for the hated capitalism. Here we see that for Nietzsche racism and "classism" are identical: the "subject races" form the subject classes. This is good and noble. We also get another aspect of the matter, the "mixing" of races and classes is "senseless" and productive of the pessimism and social problems of modern society. In these terms, Nietzsche can only have approved of the Nazis laws against marriage or even sex between Aryans and Untermenschen. The lack of rights for the dark underclasses brings us to the principal theme of The Genealogy of Morals: The morality of "good and evil" has been invented out of hatred and resentment by the defeated and subjugated races, especially the Jews. People who love Nietzsche for his celebration of creativity and his dismissal of the moralism of traditional religion, mainly meaning Christianity, usually seem to think of going "beyond good and evil" as merely legitimizing homosexuality, drugs, abortion, prostitution, pornography, and the other desiderata of progressive thinking. They don't seem to understand that Nietzsche wasn't particularly interested in things like that, but, more to the point, legitimizing rape, murder, torture, pillage, domination, and political oppression by the strong. The only honest Nietzschean graduate student I ever met frankly stated, "To be creative, you must be evil." We get something similar in the recent Sandra Bullock movie, Murder by Numbers [2002], where the young Nietzschean student simply says, "Freedom is crime." The story of the movie is more or less that of Leopold and Loeb, the Chicago teenagers who in 1924 murdered a young boy (Bobby Franks) to prove that they were "beyond good and evil." Leopold and Loeb understood their Nietzsche far better than most of his academic apologists. And we are the first to admit that anyone who knew these "good" ones [nobility] only as enemies would find them evil enemies indeed. For these same men who, amongst themselves, are so strictly constrained by custom, worship, ritual, gratitude, and by mutual surveillance and jealousy, who are so resourceful in consideration, tenderness, loyality, pride and friendship, when once they step outside their circle become little better than uncaged beasts of prey.

He continues…

Once abroad in the wilderness, they revel in the freedom from social constraint and compensate for their long confinement in the quietude of their own community. They revert to the innocence of wild animals: we can imagine them returning from an orgy of murder, arson, rape, and torture, jubilant and at peace with themselves as though they had committed a fraternity prank -- convinced, moreover, that the poets for a long time to come will have something to sing about and to praise. Deep within all the noble races there lurks the beast of prey, bent on spoil and conquest. This hidden urge has to be satisfied from time to time, the beast let loose in the wilderness. This goes as well for the Roman, Arabian, German, Japanese nobility as for the Homeric heroes and the Sandinavian vikings. The noble races have everywhere left in their wake the catchword "barbarian." .....their utter indifference to safety and comfort, their terrible pleasure in destruction, their taste for cruelty -- all these traits are embodied by their victims in the image of the "barbarian," and "evil enemy," the Goth or the Vandal. The profound and icy suspicion which the German arouses as soon as he assumes power (we see it happening again today [i.e. 1887]) harks back to the persistent horror with which Europe for many centuries witnessed the raging of the blond

Teutonic beast (although all racial connection between the old Teutonic tribes and ourselves has been lost). [pp.174-175, boldface added] The "noble races" are thus ennobled by no restraint or consideration shown for the persons or possessions, let alone feelings, of those helpless strangers who come within their power. "Spoil and conquest," rape and torture, are fun. Kaiser Wilhelm got in the spirit of things by telling German troups to act like the "Huns of Attila" on their mission to Peking in 1900. No Nietzschean has any business, for example, damning Christopher Columbus for enslaving the Caribs. While Nietzsche actually seems to think that the "blond Teutonic beast" was gone from Germany, and Hitler, as noted, hardly fills the bill, there is actually no lack of blonds in the "Nordic" nations, and Nietzsche himself here seems to have a relatively expansive notion of racial superiority. While he apparently thought of the Roman nobility as themselves of Aryan extraction, he can hardly have thought the same of the Arabians or Japanese. This acknowledgment would have been of material advantage in World War II, when many Arabs preferred the Germans to the British (or to the Zionist Jews of Palestine) -- while the Japanese, even today, often think of themselves as a pure and superior race. As actual German Allies in World War II, the Japanese where in close competition with Germany for atrocities against civilians and prisoners-of-war (though the Germans were relatively considerate of American and British prisoners, while brutal to Russians and others, as the Japanese were to all). But, one might think, violence and oppression are unjust! How could any progressive person not see that expoitation and abuse are wrong! We have Nietzsche's answer: No act of violence, rape, exploitation, destruction, is intrinsically "unjust," since life itself is violent, rapacious, exploitative, and destructive and cannot be conceived otherwise. Even more disturbingly, we have to admit that from the biological [i.e. Darwinian] point of view legal conditions are necessarily exceptional conditions, since they limit the radical life-will bent on power and must finally subserve, as means, life's collective purpose, which is to create greater power constellations. To accept any legal system as sovereign and universal -- to accept it, not merely as an instrument in the struggle of power complexes, but as a weapon against struggle (in the sense of Dühring's communist cliché that every will must regard every other will as its equal) -- is an anti-vital principle which can only bring about man's utter demoralization and, indirectly, a reign of nothingness. [p.208, boldface added] Nietzsche is certainly life affirming, but then violence, rape, exploitation, and destruction are intrinsic to his view of life. Attempts to protect the weak, see that justice is done, and mitigate suffering are "anti-vital" projects that, being adverse to life itself, actually tend towards "a reign of nothingness." Thus, if we actually care about others and are not just interested in asserting power over them and using them for our own pleasure, then we can look forward to extinction. The delicacy -- even more, the tartufferie -- of domestic animals like ourselves shrinks from imagining clearly to what extent cruelty constituted the collective delight of older mankind, how much it was an ingredient of all their joys, or how naïvely they manifested their cruelty, how they considered disinterested malevolence (Spinoza's sympathia malevolens) a normal trait, something to which one's conscience could assent heartily.... To behold suffering gives pleasure, but to cause another to suffer affords an even greater pleasure. [pp.197-198, boldface added] A great part of the pleasure that we get, according to Nietzsche, from injustice to others is simply the pleasure of inflicting suffering. In this it is worth recollecting the feminist shibboleth that rape is not about sex, it is about power. Nietzsche would heartily concur. So much the better! And what is more, the value of rape is not just power, it is the chance to cruelly inflict suffering. The rapist who beats and mutilates, perhaps even kills, his victim, has done no evil, he is instead one of the heroes of true historic nobility. And people think that the droit de seigneur represents some "abuse" of power! No! It is the truly noble man as heroic rapist! Nietzsche would turn around Susan Brownmiller, who said that all men are rapists. No, it is just the problem that they are not. Nietzsche would regard most men as virtual castrati (domestic oxen, geldings) for not being rapists.

#### Lifting access restrictions on federal lands provides 60 years of natural gas – clear, federal authority provides certainty that’s key to private sector. And – new drilling tech solves your environment turns.

Griles 3 (Lisa, Deputy Secretary – Department of the Interior, “Energy Production on Federal Lands,” Hearing before the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, United States Senate, 4-30)

Mr. GRILES. America’s public lands have an abundant opportunity for exploration and development of renewable and nonrenewable energy resources. Energy reserves contained on the Department of the Interior’s onshore and offshore Federal lands are very important to meeting our current and future estimates of what it is going to take to continue to supply America’s energy demand. Estimates suggest that these lands contain approximately 68 percent of the undiscovered U.S. oil resources and 74 percent of the undiscovered natural gas resources. President Bush has developed a national energy policy that laid out a comprehensive, long-term energy strategy for America’s future. That strategy recognizes we need to raise domestic production of energy, both renewable and nonrenewable, to meet our dependence for energy. For oil and gas, the United States uses about 7 billion barrels a year, of which about 4 billion are currently imported and 3 billion are domestically produced. The President proposed to open a small portion of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge to environmentally responsible oil and gas exploration. Now there is a new and environmentally friendly technology, similar to directional drilling, with mobile platforms, self-containing drilling units. These things will allow producers to access large energy reserves with almost no footprint on the tundra. Each day, even since I have assumed this job, our ability to minimize our effect on the environment continues to improve to where it is almost nonexistent in such areas as even in Alaska. According to the latest oil and gas assessment, ANWR is the largest untapped source of domestic production available to us. The production for ANWR would equal about 60 years of imports from Iraq. The National Energy Policy also encourages development of cleaner, more diverse portfolios of domestic renewable energy sources. The renewable policy in areas cover geothermal, wind, solar, and biomass. And it urges research on hydrogen as an alternate energy source. To advance the National Energy Policy, the Bureau of Land Management and the DOE’s National Renewable Energy Lab last week announced the release of a renewable energy report. It identifies and evaluates renewable energy resources on public lands. Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit this for the record.\* This report, which has just come out, assess the potential for renewable energy on public lands. It is a very good report that we hope will allow for the private sector, after working with the various other agencies, to where can we best use renewable resource, and how do we take this assessment and put it into the land use planning that we are currently going, so that right-of-ways and understanding of what renewable resources can be done in the West can, in fact, have a better opportunity. The Department completed the first of an energy inventory this year. Now the EPCA report, which is laying here, also, Mr. Chairman, is an estimate of the undiscovered, technically recoverable oil and gas. Part one of that report covers five oil and gas basins. The second part of the report will be out later this year. Now this report, it is not—there are people who have different opinions of it. But the fact is we believe it will be a good guidance tool, as we look at where the oil and gas potential is and where we need to do land use planning. And as we update these land use plannings and do our EISs, that will help guide further the private sector, the public sector, and all stakeholders on how we can better do land use planning and develop oil and gas in a sound fashion. Also, I have laying here in front of me the two EISs that have been done on the two major coal methane basins in the United States, San Juan Basis and the Powder River Basin. Completing these reports, which are in draft, will increase and offer the opportunity for production of natural gas with coal bed methane. Now these reports are in draft and, once completed, will authorize and allow for additional exploration and development. It has taken 2 years to get these in place. It has taken 2 years to get some of these in place. This planning process that Congress has initiated under FLPMA and other statutes allows for a deliberative, conscious understanding of what the impacts are. We believe that when these are finalized, that is in fact what will occur. One of the areas which we believe that the Department of the Interior and the Bureau of Land Management is and is going to engage in is coordination with landowners. Mr. Chairman, the private sector in the oil and gas industry must be good neighbors with the ranchers in the West. The BLM is going to be addressing the issues of bonding requirements that will assure that landowners have their surface rights and their values protected. BLM is working to make the consultation process with the landowners, with the States and local governments and other Federal agencies more efficient and meaningful. But we must assure that the surface owners are protected and the values of their ranches are in fact assured. And by being good neighbors, we can do that. In the BLM land use planning process, we have priorities, ten current resource management planning areas that contain the major oil and gas reserves that are reported out in the EPCA study. Once this process is completed, then we can move forward with consideration of development of the natural gas. We are also working with the Western Governors’ Association and the Western Utilities Group. The purpose is to identify and designate right-of-way corridors on public lands. We would like to do it now as to where right-of-way corridors make sense and put those in our land use planning processes, so that when the need is truly identified, utilities, energy companies, and the public will know where they are Instead of taking two years to amend a land use plan, hopefully this will expedite and have future opportunity so that when the need is there, we can go ahead and make that investment through the private sector. It should speed up the process of right-of-way permits for both pipelines and electric transmission. Now let me switch to the offshore, the Outer Continental Shelf. It is a huge contributor to our Nation’s energy and economic security. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, everything you have talked about so far is onshore. Mr. GRILES. That is correct. The CHAIRMAN. You now will speak to offshore. Mr. GRILES. Yes, sir, I will. Now we are keeping on schedule the holding lease sales in the areas that are available for leasing. In the past year, scheduled sales in several areas were either delayed, canceled, or put under moratoria, even though they were in the 5-year plan. It undermined certainty. It made investing, particularly in the Gulf, more risky. We have approved a 5-year oil and gas leasing program in July 2002 that calls for 20 new lease sales in the Gulf of Mexico and several other areas of the offshore, specifically in Alaska by 2007. Now our estimates indicate that these areas contain resources up to 22 billion barrels of oil and 61 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. We are also acting to raise energy production from these offshore areas by providing royalty relief on the OCS leases for new deep wells that are drilled in shallow water. These are at depths that heretofore were very and are very costly to produce from and costly to drill to. We need to encourage that exploration. These deep wells, which are greater than 15,000 feet in depth, are expected to access between 5 to 20 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and can be developed quickly due to existing infrastructure and the shallow water. We have also issued a final rule in July 2002 that allows companies to apply for a lease extension, giving them more time to analyze complex geological data that underlies salt domes. That is, where geologically salt overlays the geologically clay. And you try to do seismic, and the seismic just gets distorted. So we have extended the lease terms, so that hopefully those companies can figure out where and where to best drill. Vast resources of oil and natural gas lie, we hope, beneath these sheets of salt in the OCS in the Gulf of Mexico. But it is very difficult to get clear seismic images. We are also working to create a process of reviewing and permitting alternative energy sources on the OCS lands. We have sent legislation to Congress that would give the Minerals Management Service of the Department of the Interior clear authority to lease parts of the OCS for renewable energy. The renewables could be wind, wave, or solar energy, and related projects that are auxiliary to oil and gas development, such as offshore staging facilities and emergency medical facilities. We need this authority in order to be able to truly give the private sector what are the rules to play from and buy, so they can have certainty about where to go.

#### Within a framework of rules is where imagination is most powerful- our normative constraint in this debate is to center the debate around the institution, not the self

**Hatab**, professor @ ODU, **2002** p. MUSE

(Lawrence, “Prospects for a Democratic Agon” Journal of Nietzsche Studies 24)

Before **exploring these questions and confronting Nietzsche's attitude toward democracy, it is important to set the stage by considering the matter of institutions, without which political philosophy could very likely not get off the ground. Modern societies**, at least, **cannot function without institutions and the coercive force of law**. Appel, like **many interpreters, construes Nietzsche's "political" thought as advancing more an "aesthetic" activity than institutional governance** (NCD, p.160ff). Supposedly Nietzsche envisions an elite who compete with each other for creative results in isolation from the mass public; indeed the elite simply use the masses as material for their creative work, without regard for the fate or welfare of the general citizenry. Appel maintains that such a political aesthetics is problematic because it is incompatible with the maintenance of stable institutions. And Nietzsche is also supposed to eschew the rule of law in favor of the hubris of self-policing (NCD, p.165). **If this were true, one would be hard pressed to find Nietzsche relevant for any political philosophy, much less a democratic one.**

**It is a mistake, however, to read Nietzsche in simple terms as being against institutions and the rule of law on behalf of self-creation**. First of all, even Nietzsche's early celebration of the Dionysian should not be taken as an anti- or extra-political gesture. In BT 21, Nietzsche insists that the Apollonian has coequal status with the Dionysian, and the former is specifically connected with the political order, which is needed to temper the Dionysian impulse toward "ecstatic brooding" and "orgiastic self-annihilation."

T**hose who read Nietzsche as resisting "normalization" and "discipline"** (this includes most postmodern readings and Appel's as well 12 )**, are not on very firm ground either. For one thing, Nietzschean creative freedom is selective and most people should be ruled by normative orders, because universal unrestricted freedom would cause havoc. 14 Moreover, even selective creative freedom is not an abandonment of order and constraint. Creativity breaks free of existing structures, but only to establish new ones. Shaping new forms requires formative powers prepared by disciplined skills and activated by refined instruments of production. Accordingly, creativity is a kind of "dancing in chains" (WS 140). 15 Creative freedom, then, is not an abandonment of constraint, but a disruption of structure that still needs structure to prepare and execute departures from the norm**.

## 2AC v. Texas CM

### A2: Nano

#### Laws of physics prevent nanotech runaway or gray goo

Easterbrook 4 (Gregg, Editor – New Republic, “We’re All Going to Die!” Wired, 11-7, http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/11.07/doomsday.html?pg=2&topic=&topic\_set=)

5. Runaway nanobots! Eric Drexler, the father of nanotechnology, calls it "gray goo": the state of things in the wake of microscopic machines capable of breaking down matter and reassembling it into copies of themselves. Nanobots could swarm over Earth like intelligent locusts, Drexler fears, then buzz out into the cosmos devouring everything they encountered. Michael Crichton's latest novel, Prey, describes a last-ditch attempt by scientists to destroy such contraptions before they take over the world. Set aside the fact that, for all the nanobot speculation you've seen (including in Wired), these creatures do not, technically speaking, exist. Suppose they did. As the visionary scientist Freeman Dyson pointed out in his New York Review of Books critique of Prey, not only wouldn't nanobots be able to swarm after helpless victims as they do in the novel, they'd barely be able to move at all. Laws of physics dictate that the smaller something is, the greater its drag when moving through water or air. "The top speed of a swimmer or flyer is proportional to its length," Dyson notes. "A generous upper limit to the speed of a nanorobot flying through air or swimming through water would be a tenth of an inch per second, barely fast enough to chase a snail."

#### Nano impossible – just science fiction

Shachtman 3 (Noah, Wired News, “Support for Nanobots Shrinking”, 6-17, http://www.wired.com/news/technology/0,1282,59268,00.html)

That is if the little buggers ever can be built. A lot of scientists aren't so sure. "(Nanorobotics) isn't a serious issue on the science side. It's really science fiction," Stephen Quake, a California Institute of Technology physicist, said. Critics contend that the constant motion of atoms and molecules makes molecular machines nearly impossible to construct. Heisenberg's uncertainty principle -- the theory that the more you know about a subatomic particle's position, the less you know about its momentum, and vice versa -- also argues against nanobots. How can you manipulate atoms if their component pieces are so hard to find? The most potent attack came from Richard Smalley, Rice University's Nobel laureate in chemistry. In 1999, Smalley was extolling the benefits of a world where "we learn to build things at the ultimate level of control, one atom at a time." By 2001, he said, such control wouldn't really be possible. The "fingers" we'd need to handle such a delicate task are too big, Smalley asserted in a [Scientific American](http://www.ruf.rice.edu/%7Esmalleyg/rick%27s%20publications/SA285-76.pdf) article (PDF).

#### Chemistry needed to make replicating assemblers doesn’t exist

Smalley 3 (Dr. Richard E., Chemistry and Physics Prof – Rice U., Winner of the Nobel Prize, “Nanotech”, Chemical and Engineering News, 12-1, v. 81, No. 48, http://pubs.acs.org/cen/controversy/8148/8148counterpoint.html)

You still do not appear to understand the impact of my short piece in *Scientific American*. Much like you can't make a boy and a girl fall in love with each other simply by pushing them together, you cannot make precise chemistry occur as desired between two molecular objects with simple mechanical motion along a few degrees of freedom in the assembler-fixed frame of reference. Chemistry, like love, is more subtle than that. You need to guide the reactants down a particular reaction coordinate, and this coordinate treads through a many-dimensional hyperspace. I agree you will get a reaction when a robot arm pushes the molecules together, but most of the time it won't be the reaction you want. You argue that "if particular conditions will yield the wrong product, one must either choose different conditions (different positions, reactants, adjacent groups) or choose another synthetic target." But in all of your writings, I have never seen a convincing argument that this list of conditions and synthetic targets that will actually work reliably with mechanosynthesis can be anything but a very, very short list. Chemistry of the complexity, richness, and precision needed to come anywhere close to making a molecular assembler--let alone a self-replicating assembler--cannot be done simply by mushing two molecular objects together. You need more control. There are too many atoms involved to handle in such a clumsy way. To control these atoms you need some sort of molecular chaperone that can also serve as a catalyst. You need a fairly large group of other atoms arranged in a complex, articulated, three-dimensional way to activate the substrate and bring in the reactant, and massage the two until they react in just the desired way. You need something very much like an enzyme.

#### There’s no incentive for nano to be built in a manner that causes their impact

Phoenix and Drexler 4 (Chris, Dir Research – Center for Responsible Nanotech and Eric, “Safe Exponential Manufacturing, Nanotechnology, June, p. 15)

The above considerations indicate that a molecular manufacturing system, even if autoproductive, would have little resemblance to a machine capable of runaway replication. The earliestMNTfabrication systems will bemicroscopic, but simplicity and efficiency will favour devices that use specialized feedstocks and are directed by a stream of instructions supplied by an external computer. These systems will not even be self-replicators, because they will lack self-descriptions. As manufacturing systems are scaled up, these same engineering considerations will favour immobile, macroscopic systems of fabricators that again use specialized feedstocks. An autoproductive manufacturing system would not have to gather or process random chemicals. A device capable of runaway replication would have to contain far more functionality in a very small package. Although the possibility of building such a device does not appear to contradict any physical law, a nanofactory simply would not have the functionality required. Thus, there appears to be no technological or economic motive for producing a self-contained manufacturing system with mobility, or a built-in self-description, or the chemical processing system that would be required to convert naturally occurring materials into feedstocks suitable for molecular manufacturing systems. In developing and using molecular manufacturing, avoiding runaway replication will not be a matter of avoiding accidents or mutations, but of avoiding the deliberate construction of something dangerous. Suggestions in fiction (Crichton 2002) and the popular science press (Smalley 2001) that autoproductive nanosystems would necessarily be microscopic, uncontrollable things are contradicted by this analysis. And a machine like a desktop printer is, to say the least, unlikely to go wild, replicate, selforganize into intelligent systems, and eat people.

#### Superswarms check runaway nano

Marlow 4 (John Robert, Nanotech Expert, “Nanosecurity and the Future”, http://johnrobertmarlow.com)

The most dangerous thing about a rogue nanoswarm—a group of out-of-control, microscopic nanodevices which destroy everything in their path (using the debris to make more copies of themselves, in the "gray goo" scenario)—is that, once the swarm reaches a critical threshold, it has the capability to expand faster than anything subsequently deployed to stop it. Once the swarm's expansion rate passes point x, it cannot be stopped by any means. Logically, since no countermeasure can be reliably delivered to the site of any given nanoevent after that event has begun, the countermeasure—to be effective—must already be there before the event takes place. This is possible in only one way. The superswarm option proposes the creation of a benevolent, globe-spanning swarm of nanites programmed to detect, target, and destroy by disassembly any unauthorized or dangerous (including dangerously-replicating) nanodevices. A rogue swarm attacked by a properly-implemented superswarm will be quickly defeated; no other outcome is possible.

### A2: Particle Accelerators

-- HAARP is already operative – nuclear war can’t check it

Bertell 96 (Rosalie, Canadian Woman Studies, June, President International Institute)

The prototype HAARP facility is now operating, and construction on the second and larger antenna array was begun early in 1995. It is expected to be operative in late 1997.

#### -- HAARP isn’t powerful enough to cause extinction

The Observer 2 (9-15, Lexis)

Others are not so sanguine. As one Alaskan protester put it: They just want to give the ionosphere a great big kick to see what happens.' Haarp scientists claim the machine cannot give bursts powerful enough to have a sustained effect on conditions up there. We would need a million Haarps and all the energy from the world's electricity for a year to affect a thunderstorm this way,' said one.

#### -- No impact – empirically proven

Busch 97 (Linda, Writer – American Association for the Advancement of Science, “Ionosphere Research Lab Sparks Fears in Alaska”, Science Magazine, 2-21, http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/275/5303/1060? maxtoshow=&HITS=10&hits=10&RESULTFORMAT=&fulltext=weather+manipulation&searchid=1&FIRSTINDEX=20&resourcetype=HWCIT)

But anti-HAARP skeptics claim that the military has even bigger plans for the project. HAARP's somewhat menacing appearance surely hasn't helped resolve its public-relations problem: 48 21-meter radio antennas now loom behind the Gakona facility's barbed-wire fence, and, when completed, the 9-hectare antenna farm will be stuffed with 180 towers. In his book, Begich, who is the informal spokesperson for the loosely knit anti-HAARP coalition, writes that all this technology is part of a DOD plan to raise a Star Wars-type missile shield and devise technologies for jamming global communications worldwide. Physical chemist Richard Williams, a consultant for the David Sarnoff Institute in Princeton, New Jersey, further argues that HAARP could irreparably damage the ionosphere: "This is basically atmospheric physicists playing with the ionosphere, which is vital to the life of this planet." Also, he asserts that "this whole concept of electromagnetic warfare" needs to be "publicly debated." The HAARP critics have asked for a public conference to discuss their concerns and hear more details about the science from the military. They have written hundreds of letters to Alaska's congressional delegation and have succeeded in getting the attention of several state legislators, who held legislative hearings on the subject last year. Many scientists who work on HAARP are dumbfounded by the charges. "We are just improving on technology that already exists," says Heckscher. He points out that the Max Planck Institute has been running a big ionospheric "heater" in Tromsø, Norway, since the late 1970s with no lasting effects. U.S. scientists don't have good access because the United States did not join the Norwegian consortium. Also, the United States already operates two other small ionospheric heaters, at the Arecibo Observatory in Puerto Rico and at HIPAS, operated by the University of California, Los Angeles, 325 kilometers down the road from HAARP in Chena Hot Springs, Alaska. The HAARP facility, with three times the power of current facilities and a vastly more flexible radio beam, will be the world's largest ionospheric heater. Still, it will not be nearly powerful enough to change Earth's climate, say scientists. "They are talking science fiction," says Syun-Ichi Akasofu, who heads the University of Alaska's Geophysical Institute in Fairbanks, the lead institution in a university consortium that made recommendations to the military about how HAARP could be used for basic research. HAARP won't be doing anything to the ionosphere that doesn't happen naturally as a result of solar radiation, says Akasofu. Indeed, the beam's effect on the ionosphere is minuscule compared to normal day-night variations. "To do what [the critics] are talking about, we would have to flatten the entire state of Alaska and put up millions of antennas, and even then, I am not sure it would work." Weather is generated, not in the ionosphere, but in the dense atmosphere close to Earth, points out University of Tulsa provost and plasma physicist Lewis Duncan, former chair of the U.S. Ionospheric Steering Committee. Because HAARP's radio beam only excites and heats ionized particles, it will slip right through the lower atmosphere, which is composed primarily of neutral gases. "If climate modifications were even conceivable using this technology, you can bet there would be a lot more funding available for it," he jokes.

#### -- Their authors are crazy

Cole 95 (9-17, Writer for Fairbanks News-Miner and 5-time Published Nonfiction Author, “HAARP Controversy” http://www.haarp.alaska.edu/haarp/news/fnm995.html)

Alaskan Nick Begich Jr., who recently got a doctorate in the study of alternative medicine from a school based in Sri Lanka, has written and published a new book in which he alleges that HAARP could lead to "global vandalism" and affect people's "mental functions." Syun Akasofu, director of the Geophysical Institute, said the electric power in the aurora is hundreds of thousands of times stronger than that produced by HAARP.The most outlandish charges about HAARP are that it is designed to disrupt the human brain, jam all communications systems, change weather patterns over a large area, interfere with wildlife migration, harm people's health and unnaturally impact the Earth's upper atmosphere. These and other claims appear to be based on speculation about what might happen if a project 1,000 times more powerful than HAARP is ever built. That seems to be in the realm of science fiction.

#### -- Incredibly small risk of extinction from colliders

Coates 9 (Joseph F., Consulting Futurist, Inc., “Risks and Threats to Civilization, Humankind, and the Earth”, Futures, 41(1), p. 703)

At the development of the A bomb in World War II, a question came up as to whether it might ignite the oceans. The director of the lab assigned a young physicist to look at that and he came up with the confidence-inspiring response, no. We may still face that issue in a different form now in high energy physics, which is the leading edge of advanced physics today in the US and Europe. Most of the work involves colliders, which sets the particles under study to extremely high velocity and bangs them into each other or into a different type of target. The one calculation done on whether such collider could trigger the Earth’s destruction, said the likelihood was ten to the minus twelfth per year, that is, one chance in a trillion. Let us hope he has not slipped the exponent [13].

#### Particle accelerators are extremely unlikely to cause extinction

Easterbrook 4 (Gregg, Editor – New Republic, “We’re All Going to Die!” Wired, 11-7, http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/11.07/doomsday.html?pg=2&topic=&topic\_set=)

"The present vacuum could be fragile and unstable," Rees frets in his book. A particle accelerator might cause a tiny bit of space to undergo a "phase transition" back to the primordial not-anything condition that preceded the big bang. Nothingness would expand at the speed of light, deleting everything in its path. Owing to light speed, not even advanced aliens would see the mega-destructo wave front coming. In other words, a careless Brookhaven postdoc chopsticking Chinese takeout might inadvertently destroy the cosmos. Can ordinary people evaluate the likelihood of such an event? Not without years of graduate-level study. The only options are to believe the doomsayers or regard them in light of the fact that, in the 15 billion years since the big bang, in a universe full of starry infernos and cosmic cataclysms, their nightmares haven't come to pass so far.

#### No risk of particle acceleration creating a black hole – and even if, no impact

New Scientist 99 (8-28, Lexis)

Within 24 hours, the laboratory issued a rebuttal: the risk of such a catastrophe was essentially zero. The Brookhaven National Laboratory that runs the collider had set up an international committee of experts to check out this terrifying possibility. But BNL director John Marburger, insisted that the risks had already been worked out. He formed the committee simply to say why they are so confident the Earth is safe, and put their arguments on the Web to be read by a relieved public .Magazine Even so, many people will be stunned to learn that physicists felt worried enough even to mull over the possibility that a new machine might destroy us all. In fact, they’ve been fretting about it for over 50 years. The first physicist to get the collywobbles was Edward Teller, the father of the hydrogen bomb. In July 1942, he was one of a small group of theorists invited to a secret meeting at the University of California, Berkeley, to sketch out the design of a practical atomic bomb. Teller, who was studying the reactions that take place in a nuclear explosion, stunned his colleagues by suggesting that the colossal temperatures generated might ignite the Earth’s atmosphere. While some of his colleagues immediately dismissed the threat as nonsense. I. Robert Oppenheimer, director of the Manhattan Project, set up to build the atom bomb, took it seriously enough to demand a study. The report, codenamed LA-602, was made public only in February 1973. It concentrated on the only plausible reaction for destroying the Earth, fusion between nuclei of nitrogen-14. The report contirmed what the sceptics had insisted all along: the nuclear fireball cools down too far quickly to trigger a self-sustaining fire in the atmosphere. Yet in November 1975, “The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists” claimed that Arthur Compton, a leading member of the Manhattan Project, had said that there really was a risk of igniting the atmosphere. It turned out to be a case of Chinese whispers: Compton had mentioned the calculation during an interview with the American writer Pearl Buck, who had got the wrong end of the stick. Even so, the Los Alainos study is a watershed in the history of science, for it marks the first time scientists took seriously the risk that they might accidentally blow us all up. Th~ issue keeps raising its ugly head. In recent years the main focus of fear has been the giant machines used by particle physicists. Could the violent collisions inside such a machine create something nasty ? “Every time a new machine has been built at CERN,” says physicist Alvaro de Rujula, “the question has been posed and faced.” One of the most nightmarish scenarios is destruction by black hole. Black holes are bottomless pits with an insatiable appetite for anything and everything. If a tiny black hole popped into existence in RHIC, the story goes, it would burrow down from Long Island to the centre of the Earth and eat our planet - or blow it apart with all the energy released. So why are physicists convinced that there’s no chance of this happening? Well, the smallest possible black hole is around 10-35 metres across (the so-called Planck Length). Anything smaller iust gets wiped out by the quantum fluctuations in space-time around it. But even such a tiny black hole would weigh around 10 micrograms - about the same as a speck of dust. To create obiects with so much mass by collisions in a particle accelerator demands energies of 1019 giga-electronvolts, so the most powerful existing collider is ten million billion times too feeble to make a black hole. Scaling up today’s technology, we would need an accelerator as big as the Galaxy to do it. And even then, the resulting black hole wouldn’t be big enough to swallow the Earth. Such a tiny black hole would evaporate in 10-42 seconds in a blast of Hawking radiation, a process discovered by Stephen Hawking in the 1970s. To last long enough even to begin sucking in matter rather than going off pop, a black hole would have to be many orders of magnitude bigger. According to Cliff Pickover, author of “Black Holes: A Traveler’s Guide”, “Even a black hole with the mass of Mount Everest would have a radius of only about 10-15 metres, roughly the size of an atomic nucleus. Current thinking is that it would be hard for such a black hole to swallow anything at all - even consuming a proton or neutron would be difficult.”

#### Billions of natural particle collisions disprove

Bearman 00 (Joshuah, McSweeney’s, June 9, http://www.mcsweeneys.net/2000/06/09rhic2.html)

In the lower vacuum state, we would disappear. Matter as we know it could not exist; there would be no electrons, protons or neutrons—none of the particles that we are made of. Coleman and De Luccia wrote that this would be the "ultimate ecological catastrophe." When asked, Piet Hut said, "words fail me to describe what this would mean. It would be incredible." In 1982, Piet Hut and Martin Rees published a paper in which they studied the problem of whether a lower vacuum state could be triggered by a new generation of particle accelerators. They concluded that it was unlikely, because many billions of naturally occurring cosmic ray collisions in inter-stellar space produce similar or greater energy collisions than those in accelerators, and none of them have yet triggered a vacuum instability. The fact that we are still here, they argued, is proof that these experiments will be safe. And the evidence keeps mounting: Since Hut and Rees's study, new particle accelerators like the Tevatron at the Fermilab complex in Illinois have operated for years, yielding important new scientific discoveries without any apocalyptic mishaps.

#### There’s no such thing as Quantum Vacuum Mining – all legitimate scientists think your authors are crackpots

Yam 97 (Philip, Scientific American, December, “Exploiting Zero-Point Energy,” http://www.padrak.com/ine/ZPESCIAM.html)

That conceit is not shared by the **majority** of physicists; some even regard such optimism as **pseudoscience** that could leech funds from legitimate research. The conventional view is that the energy in the vacuum is **minuscule**. in fact, were it infinite, the nature of the universe would be vastly different: you would not be able to see in a straight line beyond a few kilometers. "The vacuum has some mystique about it," remarks Peter W. Milonni, a physicist at Los Alamos National Laboratory who wrote a text on the subject in 1994 called The Quantum Vacuum. "One has to be really careful about taking the concept too naively." Steve K. Lamoreaux, also at Los Alamos, is harsher: "The zero-point-energy community is more successful at advertising and selfpromotion than they are at carrying out bona fide scientific research."

#### No legit scientists believe in zero point energy

Yam 97 (Philip, Scientific American, December, “Exploiting Zero-Point Energy,” http://www.padrak.com/ine/ZPESCIAM.html)

Such disagreements in science are not unusual, especially considering how little is really known about zero-point energy. But those would-be utility moguls who think tapping zero-point energy is a worthwhile pursuit irritate some mainstream scientists. "I was rather dismayed at the attention from what I consider a **kook community**," Lamoreaux says of his celebrity status among zero-point aficionados after publishing his Casimir effect result. "It **trivializes** and abuses my work." More galling, though, is that these "**pseudoscientists** secure funding, perhaps governmental, to carry on with their research," he charges. Puthoff's institute receives a little government money but gets most of its funds from contracts with private firms. Others are backed more explicitly by public money. This past August the National Aeronautics and Space Administration sponsored a meeting called the "Breakthrough Propulsion Physics Workshop." According to participants, zero-point energy became a high priority among those trying to figure out which "breakthroughs" should be pursued. The propulsion application depends on a speculation put forth in 1994 by Puthoff, Bernhard Haisch of Lockheed Pale Alto Research Laboratory and Alfonso Rueda of California State University at Long Beach. They suggested that inertia--the resistance that objects put up when they are accelerated--stems from the drag effects of moving through the zero-point field. Because the zeropoint field can be manipulated in quantum experiments, Puthoff reasons, it should be possible to lessen an object's inertia and hence, for a rocket, reduce the fuel burden. Puthoff and his colleagues have been trying to prove this inertia-origin hypothesis--a sensitive pendulum should be able to detect a zero-point-energy "wake" left by a moving object--but Puthoff says they have not managed to isolate their system well enough to do so. More conventional scientists decried the channeling of NASA funds to a meeting where real science was lacking. "We hardly talked about the physics" of the proposals, complained Milonni, adding that during one of the breakout sessions "there was a guy talking about astral projection." Certainly, there should be room for far-out, potentially revolutionary ideas, but not at the expense of solid science. "One has to keep an open mind, but the concepts I've seen so far would violate energy conservation," Milonni concludes. In sizing up zero-point-energy schemes, it may be best to keep in mind the old caveat emptor: **if it sounds too good to be true, it probably is**.

#### ZPE can’t be extracted – no risk of a chain reaction

Yam 97 (Philip, Scientific American, December, “Exploiting Zero-Point Energy,” http://www.padrak.com/ine/ZPESCIAM.html)

Demonstrating the existence of zero-point energy is one thing; extracting useful amounts is another. Puthoff's institute, which he likens to a mini Bureau of Standards, has examined about 10 devices over the past 10 years and found **nothing workable**.

### No Aliens – Frontline

#### -- Aliens don’t exist –

#### A) Modeling proves

Klotz 8 (Irene, Discovery News, “ET Likely Doesn’t Exist, Finds Math Model”, 4-21, Discovery News, http://dsc.discovery.com/news/2008/04/21/extra-terrestrial-life.html)

Earth-like planets have relatively short windows of opportunity for life to evolve, making it highly doubtful intelligent beings exist elsewhere in the universe, according to newly published research based on a mathematical probability model. Given the amount of time it has taken for human beings to evolve on Earth and the fact that the planet will no longer be habitable in a billion years or so when the sun brightens, Andrew Watson, with the United Kingdom's University of East Anglia in Norwich, says we are probably alone. Earthlings overcame horrendous odds -- Watson pegs it at less than 0.01 percent over 4 billion years -- to achieve life. The harsh reality is that we don't have much time left. No need to cash out your 401K or anything like that, but intelligent life appeared relatively late on the scene. Scientists believe the first life forms emerged four billion years ago. Humans have walked the planet for only the last 100,000 years or so. "If we had evolved early … then even with a sample of one, we'd suspect that evolution from simple to complex and intelligent life was quite likely to occur. By contrast, we now believe that we evolved late in the habitable period," Watson said. Earth's days are numbered. In another billion years or so, the sun will grow hotter and brighter, toasting our blue world beyond recognition. "Earth's biosphere is now in its old age," Watson said. "This has implications for our understanding of the likelihood of complex life and intelligence arising on any given planet," he added. "It suggests that our evolution is rather unlikely -- in fact, the timing of events is consistent with it being very rare indeed." Watson pieced together his mathematical model by examining four critical stages that needed to occur in a particular order for intelligent life to arise on Earth. He then factored in how long a planet like Earth is suitable for habitation. The steps include the emergence of single-celled bacteria, complex cells, specialized cells allowing for complex life forms and finally intelligent life with an established language. "Complex life is separated from the simplest life forms by several very unlikely steps and therefore will be much less common. Intelligence is one step further, so it is much less common still," Watson said.

#### B) Fermi Paradox

Dvorsky 7 (George, Co-Founder and President – Toronto Transhumanist Association and Board of Directors – Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies, “The Fermi Paradox: Back with a Vengeance”, Sentient Developments, 8-4, http://www.sentientdevelopments.com/2007/08/fermi-paradox-back-with-vengeance.html)

As our sciences mature, and as the search for extraterrestrial intelligence continues to fail, the Great Silence becomes louder than ever. The seemingly empty cosmos is screaming out to us that something is askew. Our isolation in the Universe has in no small way shaped and defined the human condition. It is such an indelible part of our reality that it is often taken for granted or rationalized to extremes. To deal with the cognitive dissonance created by the Great Silence, we have resorted to good old fashioned human arrogance, anthropocentrism, and worse, an inter-galactic inferiority complex. We make excuses and rationalizations like, ‘we are the first,’ ‘we are all alone,’ or, ‘why would any advanced civilization want to bother with us backward humans?’ Under closer scrutiny, however, these excuses don’t hold. Our sciences are steadily maturing and we are discovering more and more that our isolation in the cosmos and the dearth of observable artificial phenomenon is in direct violation of our expectations, and by consequence, our own anticipated future as a space-faring species. Indeed, one of the greatest philosophical and scientific challenges that currently confronts humanity is the unsolved question of the existence of extraterrestrial intelligences (ETI's). We have yet to see any evidence for their existence. It does not appear that ETI’s have come through our solar system; we see no signs of their activities in space; we have yet to receive any kind of communication from them. Adding to the Great Silence is the realization that they should have been here by now -- the problem known as the Fermi Paradox. The Fermi Paradox The Fermi Paradox is the contradictory and counter-intuitive observation that we have yet to see any evidence for the existence of ETI’s. The size and age of the Universe suggests that many technologically advanced ETI’s ought to exist. However, this hypothesis seems inconsistent with the lack of observational evidence to support it. Largely ignored in 1950 when physicist Enrico Fermi famously asked, “Where is everybody,” and virtually dismissed at the seminal SETI conference in 1971, the conundrum was given new momentum by Michael Hart in 1975[1] (which is why it is sometimes referred to as the Fermi-Hart Paradox). Today, 35 years after it was reinvigorated by Hart, it is a hotly contested and relevant topic -- a trend that will undoubtedly continue as our sciences, technologies and future visions develop. Back with a vengeanceA number of inter-disciplinal breakthroughs and insights have contributed to the Fermi Paradox gaining credence as an unsolved scientific problem. Here are some reasons why[2]: Improved quantification and conceptualization of our cosmological environment The scale of our cosmological environment is coming into focus. Our Universe contains about 10^11 to 10^12 galaxies, giving rise to a total of 10^22 to 10^24 stars[3]. And this is what exists right now; there have been a billion trillion stars in our past Universe. [4] The Milky Way itself, which is considered a giant as far as galaxies go, contains as many as 400 billion stars and has a diameter of 100,000 light years.[5] Improved understanding of planet formation, composition and the presence of habitable zones The Universe formed 13.7 billion years ago. The Milky Way Galaxy formed a mere 200 million years later, making our Galaxy nearly as old as the Universe itself. Work by Charles Lineweaver has shown that planets also began forming a very long time ago; he places estimates of Earth-like planets forming 9 billion years ago (Gyr). According to Lineweaver, the median age of planets in the Galaxy is 6.4+/0.7 Gyr which is significantly more than the Earth’s age. An average terrestrial planet in the Galaxy is 1.6 Gyr older than the Earth. It is estimated that three quarters of earth-like planets in the Galactic habitable zone are older than the Earth. We have a growing conception of where habitation could be sustained in the Galaxy. The requirements are a host star that formed between 4 to 8 Gyr ago, enough heavy elements to form terrestrial planets, sufficient time for biological evolution, an environment free of sterilization events (namely super novae), and an annular region between 7 and 9 kiloparsecs from the galactic center that widens with time. [6] The discovery of extrasolar planets Over 240 extrasolar planets have been discovered as of May 1, 2007[7]. Most of these are so-called “hot Jupiters,” but the possibility that their satellites could be habitable cannot be ruled out. Many of these systems have stable circumstellar habitable zones. Somewhat shockingly, the first Earth-like planet was discovered earlier this year orbiting the red star Gilese 581; it is 20 light years away, 1.5 times the diameter of Earth, is suspected to have water and an atmosphere, and its temperature fluctuates between 0 and 40 degrees Celsius.[8] Confirmation of the rapid origination of life on Earth The Earth formed 4.6 Gyr ago and rocks began to appear 3.9 Gyr ago. Life emerged quickly thereafter 3 Gyr ago. Some estimates show that life emerged in as little as 600 million years after the formation of rocks.[9] Growing legitimacy of panspermia theories There is a very good chance that we inhabit a highly compromised and fertile Galaxy in which ‘life seeds’ are strewn about. The Earth itself has been a potentially infectious agent for nearly 3 billion years. Evidence has emerged that some grains of material in our solar system came from beyond our solar system. Recent experiments show that microorganisms can survive dormancy for long periods of time and under space conditions. We also now know that rocks can travel from Mars to Earth.[10] Discovery of extremophiles Simple life is much more resilient to environmental stress than previously imagined. Biological diversity is probably much larger than conventionally assumed. Developing conception of a biophilic Universe in which the cosmological parameters for the existence of life appear finely tunedAs scientists delve deeper and deeper into the unsolved mysteries of the Universe, they are discovering that a number of cosmological parameters are excruciatingly specific. So specific, in fact, that any minor alteration to key parameters would throw the entire Universe off kilter and result in a system completely unfriendly to life. The parameters of the Universe that are in place are so specific as to almost suggest that spawning life is in fact what the Universe is supposed to do. [11] Cosmological uniformitarianism implies that that anthropic observation need not be and cannot be specific to human observers, but rather to any observer in general; in other words, the Universe can support the presence of any kind of observer, whether they be here on Earth or on the other side of the cosmos. Confirmation of the early potential for intelligent life My own calculations have shown that intelligence could have first emerged in the Universe as long as 4.5 Gyr ago -- a finding that is consistent with other estimates, including those of Lineweaver and David Grinspoon.[12] Refinement of evolutionary biology, computer science and systems theories Evolution shows progressive trends towards increasing complexity and in the direction of increasing fitness. There has also been the growing acceptance of Neo-Darwinism. Advances in computer science have reshaped our conception of what is possible from an informational and digital perspective. There is the growing acceptance of systems theories which take emergent properties and complexity into account. Game theory and the rise of rational intelligence add another level to this dynamic mix. Development of sociobiological observations as they pertain to the rapid evolution of intelligent life and the apparent radical potential for advanced intelligenceExponential change. Moore’s Law. Kurzweil’s Law of Accelerating Returns. Steady advances in information technologies. Artificial intelligence. Neuroscience. Cybernetics, and so on. And then there is the theoretic potential for a technological Singularity, digital minds, artificial superintelligence, molecular nanotechnology, and other radical possibilities. There is also emerging speculation about the feasibility of interstellar travel, colonization and communication. In other words….There are more stars in the Universe than we can possibly fathom. Any conception of ‘rare,’ ‘not enough time’ or ‘far away’ has to be set against the inability of human psychology to grasp such vast cosmological scales and quantities. The Universe and the Milky Way are extremely old, our galaxy has been able to produce rocky planets for quite some time now, and our earth is a relative new-comer to the galaxy. The composition of our solar system and the Earth itself may not be as rare as some astronomers and astrobiologists believe. These discoveries are a serious blow to the Rare Earth Hypothesis – the idea that the genesis, development and proliferation of life is an extremely special event[13]. It’s also a blow to Brandon Carter’s anthropic argument which takes a very human-centric approach to understanding cosmology, suggesting that our existence as observers imposes the sort of Universe that only we can observe. Finally, the Universe appears capable of spawning radically advanced intelligence – the kind of advanced intelligence that transhumanists speculate about, namely post-Singularity, post-biological machine minds. Given intelligent life's ability to overcome scarcity, and its tendency to colonize new habitats, it seems likely that any advanced civilization would seek out new resources and colonize first their star system, and then surrounding star systems. Indeed, estimates place the time to colonize the Galaxy anywhere from one million to 100 million years.[14] The fact that our Galaxy appears unperturbed is hard to explain. We should be living in a Galaxy that is saturated with intelligence and highly organized. Thus, it may be assumed that intelligent life is rare, or, given our seemingly biophilic Universe, our assumptions about the general behaviour of intelligent civilizations are flawed.

#### C) Improbability of evolution

Savage 94 (Marshall, Founder – Living Universe Foundation, The Millenial Project, p. 350-351, 353-355)

There are 200 billion stars in the Milky Way Galaxy. How could it be possible that ours is the only one harboring intelligent life? Actually, it goes far beyond that. Not only is our solar system the only source of intelligent life, it is probably the only source of any kind of life. Not only is our planet the only source of life in this galaxy, it is probably the only source of life in any galaxy. Hard as it may be to believe or accept, it is likely that our little world is the only speck of Living matter in the entire universe. Those who tend to reflect on these issues, especially those who believe that life must be a common phenomenon, derive long elaborate formulae to prove their case. They point out there are hundreds of billions of stars in the Milky Way; of these, some 200 million are similar to the sun; around these other suns orbit 10 million earth-like worlds; life must have evolved on millions of these worlds; intelligent tool-users must then have developed hundreds of thousands of times; so there must be thousands of civilizations capable of star travel. Carl Sagan, the leading proponent of this viewpoint, calculates that the Milky Way has been home to no fewer than a billion technical civilizations! When this argument is extrapolated to the universe at large, the existence of ETs, at least somewhere, seems a virtual certainty. The odds of the Earth being the only living world in the universe are on the order of one in 1018. With such an overwhelming number of chances, a billion billion Earth-like worlds, Life must have sprung up innumerable times— mustn’t it? This argument is reasonable enough on its face, but as soon as speculators leave the realm of astronomy they enter terra incognita, where dwells an inscrutable mystery. No one knows what the odds are that life will evolve given an earth-like planet around a sun-like star. Sagan rates the chances at one in three. A close examination of the issue indicates that he may be off in his estimate by billions and billions. The evolution of life is **overwhelmingly improbable**. The odds against life are **so extreme** that it is **virtually impossible** for it to occur twice in the same universe. That life ever evolved anywhere at all is a miracle of Biblical proportions. If it wasn’t for our manifest presence, the creation of life could be dismissed as a wild fantasy. Generating animate matter through random chemistry is so unlikely as to be indistinguishable from impossible. Yet, here we are. Obviously, miracles do happen. But the question is: do they happen twice?

To generate a strand of “Genesis DNA” would take 10x360 chemical reactions. That is a completely ridiculous number. Writing out such a number is an exercise in futility; it requires hundreds of zeroes. Describing it with words is just about as hopeless; a million billion trillion quadrillion quintillion sextillion septillion octillion nonillion decillion doesn’t even touch it. The only way to describe it is as ten nonillion nonillion googol googol googol. You can’t even talk about such numbers without sounding like your brain has been fused into molten goo. If you persist in thinking about them it certainly will be. Surely, there must be numbers of equal magnitude available to rescue us from such overwhelming odds. After all, DNA is just a large molecule. So we must be dealing with atomic numbers, and those are always mind boggling—right? When Life arose, the Earth’s ocean’s were, as Carl Sagan suggests, one giant bowl of primordial soup. The number of chemical reactions going on in that stew must have been incredible. Over billions of years, any possible combination of DNA could have been cooked up—couldn’t it? Well, let’s take a look; the bottom line is always in the numbers. The oceans of the early Earth contained, at most, i044 carbon atoms.665 This sets the upper limit on the possible number of nucleic acid molecules at ~ (Assuming every atom of carbon in the ocean was locked up in a nucleic acid molecule—an unlikely state of affairs.) The oceans could therefor contain no more than about 1042 nucleotide chains, with an average length of ten base pairs. If all these nucleotides interacted with each other 100 times per second for ten billion years, they would undergo 3 X 106 1 reactions. This would still leave them woefully short of the sample needed to generate a strand of Genesis DNA. To get a self-replicating strand of DNA out of the global ocean, even if it was thick with a broth of nucleotides, would take ten billion googol googol googol years. Makes yours eyes spin counter-clockwise doesn’t it? But there are billions of stars in the galaxy and billions of galaxies in the universe. Over time, the right combination would come up somewhere—wouldn’t it? Assume every star in every galaxy in the entire universe has an Earth-like planet in orbit around it; and assume every one of those planets is endowed with a global ocean thick with organic gumbo. This would give us 40,000 billion billion oceanic cauldrons in which to brew up the elixir of life. Now we’re getting somewhere—aren’t we? In such a universe, where the conditions for the creation of life are absolutely ideal, it will still take a hundred quadrillion nonillion nonillion googol googol years for the magic strand to appear. Sheesh! Assuming some radically different form of life, independent of DNA, doesn’t really help. By definition, life forms will always be complex arrangements of matter and/or energy. This complexity has to arise out of chaos. Therefore, some initial degree of order must first just happen. Whatever the form of life, its creation is dependent on the **same** sort of **chance event** that created our first strand of Genesis DNA. It doesn’t matter what sort of coincidence is involved: the matching of base pairs, alignment of liquid crystals, or nesting of ammonia vortices; whatever the form of order, it will be subject to the same laws of probability. Consequently, any form of highly complex, self-replicating material is just as unlikely to occur as our form. Simply put, living is an unlikely state of affairs. When all of the fundamental constants underlying the bare existence of the universe are also taken into account, it becomes all too obvious that life is a sheer impossibility.666 How can a glop of mud like me possibly be walking around wondering why it exists?

#### D) Scientific consensus

Financial Times 00 (Clive Cookson and Victoria Griffith, “Our Odyssey ends here: Man’s quest for self-discovery is at a dead-end with the acceptance that we are alone in space”, 12-30, Lexis)

Yet, since the film was first shown in 1968, scientific opinion has gradually **shifted away** from the belief in smart aliens. Where science moves, the public usually follows. This may seem an odd statement, considering the number of recent media reports about extraterrestrial life. Signs of water on Mars and Europa, a moon of Jupiter, have encouraged speculation about alien creatures. Yet the type of life astronomers talk about these days is "dumb", not intelligent. The great hope of Nasa's Mars missions is to find evidence of microbes, living or dead. Martian bacteria would certainly be an important find, but they are a big step down from the little green men of earthlings' imagination. Even veterans of SETI, as the Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence is known, are beginning to sound more sceptical. Frank Drake, chairman of the SETI Institute in California, has dreamt of discovering life on other planets for 40 years. Every day, he and his colleagues attempt to pick up radio signals from other planets. Every day, they go home empty-handed. "There may be no complex organisms out there," says Drake. "The chances of tool-bearing organisms who could send out a signal are even more remote. There is intelligent life in the oceans, for example, but the whales and dolphins wouldn't be able to communicate with another planet." Astronomers' growing scepticism about intelligent life on other planets is fuelled partly by changes in thinking about Darwin's theory of evolution. Kubrick dedicates the first quarter of 2001 to a segment called "The Dawn of Man". The movie explores the notion that alien intervention 4m years ago transformed apes from vegetarian victims into tool-bearing carnivores, kick-starting their evolution into human beings. While the film's notion of evolutionary "progress" is vague, Kubrick's Dawn of Man sequence reflects the famous Darwinian idea that apes gradually became more upright and more intelligent until they turned into modern homo sapiens. This view allows humans to see themselves at the pinnacle of the evolutionary tree - so far. Who knows what kind of superior beings may lie on the evolutionary path ahead? Just a few years after the movie's debut, however, a new twist on Darwinism radically altered this view. In 1972 palaeontologist Stephen Jay Gould and his colleague Niles Eldredge developed the theory of "punctuated equilibria", according to which the most important evolutionary changes are not a gradual progression but radical and swift. Research in geology and palaeontology since then has emphasised the random nature of such biological shifts. Species are formed not by the movement to greatness but by a series of "accidents". If the evolutionary tape were to be rewound a thousand times, nothing like human beings would appear again. Had the dinosaurs not been wiped out by a cataclysmic event, mammals would have been a mere footnote in the evolutionary bible. And if human beings are merely an "accident" - a small twig on the evolutionary tree, as Gould likes to say - then the likelihood that creatures like ourselves would exist on other planets seems very remote indeed. At the same time, some astronomers say the conditions in which intelligent life evolved on Earth are extra-ordinary enough to make it likely that we are alone in our galaxy, if not in the universe. In their influential book Rare Earth (Springer, Pounds 17), Peter Ward and Donald Brownlee of the University of Washington list the factors that make Earth so special: Its distance from the sun has ensured the existence of liquid water for 3.5bn years. It has the right mass to retain atmosphere and oceans. Plate tectonics built land masses. Jupiter, its giant neighbour, has protected Earth from too many life-extinguishing collisions with asteroids and comets, while allowing a few to punctuate the evolutionary equili-brium. Its orbit around the sun is stable. There is enough carbon to support life but not to allow runaway greenhouse heating. Radiation levels promote genetic change without causing lethal damage.

### Helium – 2AC

#### US natural gas production is key global helium production

EIA 6 (Energy Information Administration, the official energy statistics agency of U.S. Government , “Natural Gas Processing: The Crucial Link Between Natural Gas Production and Its Transportation to Market” http://www.eia.gov/pub/oil\_gas/natural\_gas/feature\_articles/2006/ngprocess/ngprocess.pdf)

The world’s supply of helium comes exclusively from natural gas production. The single largest source of helium is the United States, which produces about 80 percent of the annual world production of 3.0 billion cubic feet (Bcf). In 2003, U.S. production of helium was 2.4 Bcf, about two-thirds of which came from the Hugoton Basin in north Texas, Oklahoma, and Kansas (Figure 2). The rest mostly comes from the LaBarge field located in the Green River Basin in western Wyoming, with small amounts also produced in Utah and Colorado. According to the National Research Council, the consumption of helium in the United States doubled between 1985 and 1996, although its use has leveled off in recent years. It is used in such applications as magnetic resonance imaging, semiconductor processing, and in the pressurizing and purging of rocket engines by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Twenty-two natural gas treatment plants in the United States currently produce helium as a major byproduct of natural gas processing. Twenty of these plants, located in the Hugoton-Panhandle Basin, produce marketable helium which is sold in the open market when profitable, while transporting the remaining unrefined helium to the Federal Helium Reserve (FHR). The FHR was created in the 1950s in the Bush salt dome, underlying the Cliffside field, located near Amarillo, Texas. Sales of unrefined helium in the United Statesfor the most part, come from the FHR.

#### This collapses US space exploration

CN 12 – Citation News, “Scientists' High-Pitched Response to Helium Shortage”, 3-22, http://www.cyberregs.com/webapps/Blog/post/Scientists-High-Pitched-Response-to-Helium-Shortage.aspx

Helium - the second lightest element in the universe with an atomic weight of 4.002602 - is an inert gas that can be cooled to temperatures of -270 Celsius without becoming a solid, making it indispensible in the operation of, among many things, superconducting magnets used in MRI scanners, telescopes and particle accelerators like the Large Hadron Collider. Helium also holds an important place in the defense industry. It also has some far less profound applications, which consume great quantities of the gas annually - applications such as party balloons and squeak-voice huffing. These latter applications have drawn the ire of researchers. This month, the Guardian reported that the UK's Rutherford Appleton Laboratory wasted three days and £90,000 (US$ 143,091), when, during an important experiment exploring the structure of matter, they could not obtain a supply of helium. Needless to say, the scientists were in a less-than-celebratory mood. "We put the stuff into party balloons and let them float off into the upper atmosphere, or we use it to make our voices go squeaky for a laugh. It is very, very stupid. It makes me really angry,” said Oleg Kiricheck, the research team leader. Cornell University Professor Robert Richardson is also concerned. He believes that, with our current reserves of helium, the price of the element severely discounts its real value. By his estimation, the price of a single party balloon should cost as much as $100. Richardson suggests increasing the price of helium by 20-50% to eliminate excessive waste. Although helium ranks next to hydrogen as the most abundant element in the universe, here on earth it is a finite commodity. The helium that is here is all we have! Helium is collected during natural gas and oil drilling. If the gas is not captured, it dissipates into earth's upper atmosphere and is lost forever. The same happens when a party balloon is released into the air, or when it self-deflates, because helium atoms are so small that they can easily move through the balloon's latex shell. Party balloons do not represent the only wasteful expenditures of helium. Macy's Thanksgiving Day parade typically uses 400 Mcf a year, although there have been recent attempts to recycle some of the helium used in the floats. NASA uses up to 75 MMcf annually to pressurize rocket tanks. The agency has made no attempt to recycle this huge amount of gas. Weather balloons also consume about 140 MMcf of helium per year. At the present rate of supply depletion, the United States will become an importer of helium from the Middle East and Russia within 10 years, and the world will run out of helium within 30 years. This would have major implications for space travel and exploration, scientific and nuclear research, medical advances and early detection of diseases. Possible solutions for this problem should address supply, not pricing. A drastic increase in the price of helium as a preservative measure would cause a huge spike in billing for medical procedures, such as MRIs, scientific research, and defense expenditures, as well as party balloons.

#### Extinction is inevitable without space exploration

Carreau 2 (Mark, Winner – 2006 Space Communicator Award, MA in Journalism – Kansas State University, “Top Experts See Space Study As Key to Human Survival”, The Houston Chronicle, 10-19, Lexis)

With Apollo astronaut John Young leading the charge, top aerospace experts warned Friday that humanity's survival may depend on how boldly the world's space agencies venture into the final frontier. Only a spacefaring culture with the skills to travel among and settle planets can be assured of escaping a collision between Earth and a large asteroid or devastation from the eruption of a super volcano, they told the World Space Congress. "Space exploration is the key to the future of the human race," said Young, who strolled on the moon more than 30 years ago and now serves as the associate director of NASA's Johnson Space Center. "We should be running scared to go out into the solar system. We should be running fast." Scientists believe that an asteroid wiped out the dinosaurs more than 60 million years ago, and are gathering evidence of previously large collisions. "The civilization of Earth does not have quite as much protection as we would like to believe," said Leonid Gorshkov, an exploration strategist with RSC Energia, one of Russia's largest aerospace companies. "We should not place all of our eggs in one basket."

### Nietzsche – 2AC

#### Framework – evaluate the aff vs. status quo or a competitive policy option. That’s best for fairness and predictability – there are too many frameworks to predict and they moot all of the 1ac – makes it impossible to be aff. Only our framework solves activism.

#### No link – kritik of science – the aff does not question science or advocate for science. The aff does not take the position that we are never going to die, just that great power wars prevents individuals from experiencing life for all it can be. That is intrinsically valuable.

**-- Schopenhauer is wrong – the act of progressing towards a goal gives some joy to life and pleasure is not the only thing that gives life value.**

**Schroeder 6 (William R.,** Associate Professor of Philosophy – University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Review of Julian Young’s Schopenhauer, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 9-7, http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=7583)

Young suggests that Schopenhauer’s pessimism consists of a descriptive claim (that all life is suffering) and an consequent evaluative claim (that life ought not to be) (206). The main support for the descriptive claim is that life oscillates between the suffering that follows from the inability to satisfy incessant desires and the boredom that follows from temporary satisfactions. Though suffering is burdensome, Young believes that Schopenhauer’s major contribution is the analysis of boredom, which typically produces dissociation, indifference, and even cruelty. The desperate inability to will that boredom produces is nothing like the disinterestedness and openness of aesthetic contemplation. Thus, boredom offers no release from the suffering endemic to willing. Everyday life is merely a pendulum that swings between dissatisfaction and boredom, neither of which yield genuine happiness (209-14). To this descriptive claim Young objects that even if striving produces only rare satisfactions, this does not mean it always produces dissatisfaction. There is a distinctive joy in progressing toward a goal, even if its achievement remains distant. The experience of challenge can be stimulating even if the goal is never fully reached (217-18). The evaluative claim supporting Schopenhauer’s pessimism is also flawed because, oddly, it presupposes that only pleasure can give life any value. In fact, many other values that are not reducible to pleasure are equally compelling--vitality, self-development, and spiritual strength (218-19).

(NOTE – Young is Julian Young, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Auckland)

#### -- Schopenhauer ignores the personal value of life – his view is focused on himself – turns the alternative.

**Schroeder 6 (William R.,** Associate Professor of Philosophy – University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Review of Julian Young’s Schopenhauer, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 9-7, http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=7583)

Finally, Young argues that Schopenhauer’s ethics fails to transcend egoism because one’s care for others is only an extension of one’s care for oneself. At the deepest level, self and others are not distinct; thus, Schopenhauer’s view provides no respect for others as such (182-4). Schopenhauer might reply that standard conceptions of ethics presuppose the principle of individuation that he rejects. Schopenhauer is trying to show how ethical responsiveness is possible given his metaphysics, even if he rejects the classical presuppositions of ethics. To Young’s core objection that Schopenhauer never succeeds in showing how the atemporal thing-in-itself becomes temporal, some interpreters might reply by emphasizing his “double-aspect” theory of the Will. (The universal atemporal Will is one aspect while the individual temporal instantiations of the Will is its other aspect.) Though Young acknowledges the double-aspect theory (60-1; 78-9), he notes that this does not render any more intelligible how an atemporal entity and temporal ones can be mirror-aspects of each other. Elaborating several of Young’s criticisms, I would argue that Schopenhauer never did render his empiricist aspirations coherent with his metaphysical goals. Also, I would suggest that a single fundamental choice that would bind persons to their characters is insufficient to explain the continued experience of responsibility most people feel for their specific faults or failures. Would they even have any consciousness of such a basic choice? I agree with Young that Schopenhauer simply failed to see the potentially stimulating effects of suffering; it can certainly be taken as a challenge to greater efforts and more intense self-development. This is one of Nietzsche’s many departures from Schopenhauer, and it allows Nietzsche to adopt a life-affirming orientation toward life that sharply contrasts with Schopenhauer’s life-negation. Nietzsche retained Schopenhauer’s goal of a kind of Dionysian, mystical merging with ultimate reality, but he believed that the this-worldly life-process constituted that ultimate reality. Schopenhauer’s salvation allegedly helps individuals transcend death, but all that “survives” is the atemporal Will (or the more basic thing-in-itself); nothing of individuality survives. Nietzsche took similar solace in the eternity of the this-worldly life-process, but at least individuals might contribute to--and even reshape--that process, and its existence is far more certain. Schopenhauer is an extreme example of one path within philosophy--accepting a transcendent reality and construing freedom or salvation as dissociation from the perceived world and any interest in it. A quite different path takes the perceived world to be primary, rejecting any escape to some alternate, hidden reality; it also insists that freedom requires a sense of being expressed by this-worldly actions. Withdrawal from and indifference to the world of human affairs, from this perspective, seems like a desperate form of egoism. Moreover, it fails to achieve the peace Schopenhauer valued because denying the will to live can only lead to endless internal conflict and strif**e**. Suffering and strife thus penetrate the most refined efforts to achieve salvation[3]. Schopenhauer’s metaphysics seems to undermine, rather than reinforce, his aim of achieving peace. Young’s book acknowledges the grandeur of Schopenhauer’s effort, but it also demonstrates the many ways it remains inadequate.

(NOTE – Young is Julian Young, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Auckland)

#### At worst we’re only local ethics- this solve the link

Alan **White**, professor of philosophy at Williams College, 19**90**, Within Nietzsche’s Labyrinth, p. 117

Nietzsche rejects the notion that there are human obliga­tions deriving from a different world; yet he is not one of Marcel's fools. Nehamas stresses, and I stress, that Nietzsche does not want to take the position of encouraging sadists and egotists. Unbridled egotism, he insists, would lead only to "universal wars of annihilation" (BT:15). His position is made yet more explicit in a passage quoted above, but worth repeating: I deny morality as I deny alchemy, that is, I deny their premises: but I do not deny that there have been alchemists who believed in these premises and acted in accordance with them. -- I also deny immorality: not that countless people feel themselves to be immoral, but that there is any true reason so to feel. It goes without saying that I do not deny -- unless I am a fool -- that many actions called immoral ought to be avoided and resisted, or that many called moral ought to be done and encouraged -- but I think the one should be encouraged and the other avoided for other reasons than hitherto. (D:103) Nietzsche does not want to deny "that many actions called immoral ought to be avoided and resisted, and that many called moral ought to be done and encouraged"; he agrees with Marcel that only fools could think otherwise. Yet he rejects other-worldly sources of obligation; how then can he answer Marcel's questions? What is to be said, or done, to the mass murderer and the child molester, or to the couch potato? Nehamas responds to this question on Nietzsche's behalf, but his response strikes me as in part inaccurate and in part dan­gerous, and thus, on the whole, unacceptable. In responding, Nehamas first suggests that Nietzsche severely restricts the audience to whom he addresses his transvaluative teachings: Exemplifying the very attitude that prompts him to reject uncondi­tional codes, Nietzsche does not reject them unconditionally. His demand is only that philos­ophers, and not all people, "take their stand beyond good and evil and leave the illusion of moral judgment beneath them" (TIVII:1) Here, Nehamas suggests that only philosophers -- who, he seems to assume, are not "fools" of the sort Marcel and Nietzsche are worried about -- are to recognize that moral judgment is il­lusory. In this central respect, Nehamas's Nietzsche seems to remain a Platonist: he tells noble lies to the masses in order to keep them in line, reserving the truth for the intellectually privileged few.

#### Commitment solves the institutional reliance; we don’t abdicate responsibility, we ARE responsible in the best way

**Hatab**, professor @ ODU, **2002** p. MUSE

(Lawrence, “Prospects for a Democratic Agon” Journal of Nietzsche Studies 24)

Those who take Nietzsche to be diagnosing social institutions as descendants of slave morality should take note of GM II,11, where **Nietzsche offers some interesting reflections on justice and law. He indicates that the global economy of nature is surely not a function of justice; yet workable conceptions of justice and injustice are established by the historical force of human law. Nietzsche does not indict such forces as slavish infirmities. Legal arrangements are "exceptional conditions" that modulate natural forces of power** in [End Page 126] social directions, **and that are not an elimination of conflict but an instrument in channeling the continuing conflict of different power complexes. Surprisingly, Nietzsche attributes the historical emergence of law not to reactive resentment but to active, worldly forces that check and redirect the "senseless raging of revenge," and that are able to reconfigure offenses as more "impersonal" violations of legal provisions rather than sheer personal injuries**. Here Nietzsche analyzes the law in a way analogous to his account of the Greek agon and its healthy sublimation of natural impulses for destruction. **A legal system is a life-promoting cultural force that refashions natural energies in less savage and more productive directions.**

**Finally, those who read Nietzsche as an anti-institutional transgressor and creator should heed** TI ("Skirmishes of an Untimely Man," 39), **where Nietzsche clearly diagnoses a repudiation of institutions as a form of decadence. Because of our modern faith in a foundational individual freedom, we no longer have the instincts for forming and sustaining the traditions and modes of authority that healthy institutions require**.

The whole of the West no longer possesses the instincts out of which institutions grow, out of which a future grows: perhaps nothing antagonizes its "modern spirit" so much. One lives for the day, one lives very fast, one lives very irresponsibly: precisely this is called "freedom." That which makes an institution an institution is despised, hated, repudiated: one fears the danger of a new slavery the moment the word "authority" is even spoken out loud. That is how far decadence has advanced in the value-instincts of our politicians, of our political parties: instinctively they prefer what disintegrates, what hastens the end.

#### Security is not an ideology of survival --- it is survival-plus --- that allows individuals the choice to act and become

**Booth 2005** (Ken – visiting researcher – US Naval War College, Critical Security Studies and World Politics, p. 22)

The best starting point for conceptualizing security lies in the real conditions of insecurity suffered by people and collectivities. Look around. What is immediately striking is that **some degree of insecurity**, as a life-determining condition, **is universal**. To the extent an individual or group is insecure, to the extent their life choices and changes are **taken away**; this is because of the resources and energy they need to invest in seeking safety from domineering threats–whether these are the lack of food for one’s children, or organizing to resist a foreign aggressor. The corollary of the relationship between insecurity and a determined life is that a degree of security **creates life possibilities**. Security might therefore be conceived as synonymous with **opening up space in people’s lives**. This allows for individual and collective human becoming–the capacity to have some choice about living differently–consistent with the same but different search by others. Two interrelated conclusion follow from this. First, security can be understood as an instrumental value; it frees its possessors to a greater or lesser extent from life-determining constraints and so allows different life possibilities to be explored. Second, security is not synonymous simply with survival. One can survive without being secure (the experience of refugees in long-term camps in war-torn parts of the world, for example). Security is therefore more than mere animal survival (basic animal existence). It is survival-plus, the plus being the **possibility to explore human becoming**. As an instrumental value, security is sought because it free people(s) to some degree to do other than deal with threats to their human being. The achievement of a level of security–and security is always relative – gives to individuals and groups some time, energy, and scope to choose to be or become, other than merely surviving as human biological organisms. Security is an important dimension of the process by which the human species can **reinvent itself** beyond the merely biological.

#### The idea that we should just live our life is the worst possible viewpoint for the oppressed; no such eternal recurrence is desired

**Berger**, doctoral candidate in Philosophy at Temple University, **1999** p. <http://www.ocis.temple.edu/gradmag/summer99/berger.htm>

**Nietzsche believed he had created the greatest model of life-affirmation with the eternal recurrence**, and this should make us aware that he is fighting a completely Schopenhaurian battle with it. And some of the doctrine’s critiques of Schopenhauer are profound. His criticism of Schopenhauer prioritizing ethics over metaphysics, supposing the later to be governed by the former, seems on the mark. He also exposed Schopenhauer’s pessimism, which held that no evil or pain could be seen as at all justifiable or as having a redemptive character in the world in which we live. Nietzsche wished, as Clark points out, to accord the utmost value to the process of life itself, and in this sense, his formula of recurrence was an experiment with unqualified affirmation But Nietzsche saw Schopenhauer as making resignation a categorical imperative (which was in no way the case, as I have mentioned), and, therefore, he believed he had to compel an affirmation which was equally as fatalistic and necessary as Schopenhauer’s denial of the Will. But **it is perfectly easy to imagine persons who would in no way be able to will the recurrence of their lives eternally, victims of natural and social cruelty, oppression, poverty, disease; indeed it would be quite preposterous to "diagnose" human beings who endure much lesser degrees of suffering as "decadent" merely because they would be unwilling to eternally recur. In fact, asking that these people affirm these conditions eternally as their only hope of redemption might seem more the demand of a sadistic elitist** than an Übermensch. It is thus apparent that **the eternal recurrence fails as a redemptive formula for life, for all living beings; it only works for those lucky few** who can answer the daemon affirmatively in the first place, and thus pass the test.

#### -- “Value to life” impact is trash –

#### A) Always exists – many things make living valuable – people can enjoy life even if slaves

#### B) “Denying” value isn’t the same as no value – incremental reduction isn’t total

#### C) Existence is a pre-requisite – have to be alive to value it – so the case impact of extinction turns this

#### Life always has value – even if its reduced, people have some worth – they have families and relationships and hobbies and fun – which should be preserved

Coontz 1 (Phyllis D., School of Public and International Affairs – University of Pittburgh, “Transcending the Suffering of AIDS”, Journal of Community Health Nursing, 18(4), December)

In the 1950s, psychiatrist and theorist Viktor Frankl (1963) described an existentia l theory of purpose and meaning in life. Frankl, a long-time prisoner in a concentration camp, related several instances of transcendent states that he experienced in the midst of that terrible suffering using his own experiences and observations. He believed that these experiences allowed him and others to maintain their sense of dignity and self-worth. Frankl (1969) claimed that transcendence occurs by giving to others, being open to others and the environment, and coming to accept the reality that some situations are unchangeable. He hypothesized that life always has meaning for the individual; a person can always decide how to face adversity. Therefore, self-transcendence provides meaning and enables the discovery of meaning for a person (Frankl, 1963). Expanding Frankl’s work, Reed (1991b) linked self-transcendence with mental health. Through a developmental process individuals gain an increasing understanding of who they are and are able to move out beyond themselves despite the fact that they are experiencing physical and mental pain. This expansion beyond the self occurs through introspection, concern about others and their well-being, and integration of the past and future to strengthen one’s present life (Reed, 1991b).

#### Life has intrinsic value that is unattached to instrumental capacity

Penner 5 (Melinda, Director of Operations – STR, “End of Life Ethics: A Primer”, Stand to Reason, http://www.str.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=5223)

Intrinsic value is very different. Things with intrinsic value are valued for their own sake. They don’t have to achieve any other goal to be valuable. They are goods in themselves. Beauty, pleasure, and virtue are likely examples. Family and friendship are examples. Something that’s intrinsically valuable might also be instrumentally valuable, but **even if it loses its instrumental value**, its intrinsic value remains. Intrinsic value is what people mean when they use the phrase "the sanctity of life." Now when someone argues that someone doesn’t have "quality of life" they are arguing that life is only valuable as long as it obtains something else with quality, and when it can’t accomplish this, it’s not worth anything anymore. It's only instrumentally valuable. The problem with this view is that it is entirely subjective and changeable with regards to what might give value to life. Value becomes a completely personal matter, and, as we all know, our personal interests change over time. There is no grounding for objective human value and human rights if it’s not intrinsic value. Our legal system is built on the notion that humans have intrinsic value. The Declaration of Independence: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that each person is endowed by his Creator with certain unalienable rights...." If human beings only have instrumental value, then slavery can be justified because there is nothing objectively valuable that requires our respect. There is nothing other than intrinsic value that can ground the unalienable equal rights we recognize because there is nothing about all human beings that is universal and equal. Intrinsic human value is what binds our social contract of rights. So if human life is intrinsically valuable, then it remains valuable even when our capacities are limited. Human life is valuable even with tremendous limitations. Human life remains valuable because its value is not derived from being able to talk, or walk, or feed yourself, or even reason at a certain level. Human beings don’t have value only in virtue of states of being (e.g., happiness) they can experience.

#### Value to life can’t be calculated

Schwartz 2 (Lisa, M.D., Associate Professor of Medicine – Dartmouth College Medical School, et al., Medical Ethics: A Case Based Approach, www.fleshandbones.com/readingroom/pdf/399.pdf)

The first criterion that springs to mind regarding the value of life is usually the quality of the life or lives in question: The quality of life ethic puts the emphasis on the type of life being lived, not upon the fact of life. Lives are not all of one kind; some lives are of great value to the person himself and to others while others are not. What the life means to someone is what is important. Keeping this in mind it is not inappropriate to say that some lives are of greater value than others, that the condition or meaning of life does have much to do with the justification for terminating that life.1 Those who choose to reason on this basis hope that if the quality of a life can be measured then the answer to whether that life has value to the individual can be determined easily. This raises special problems, however, because the idea of quality involves a value judgment, and value judgments are, by their essence, subject to indeterminate relative factors such as preferences and dislikes. Hence, quality of life is difficult to measure and will vary according to individual tastes, preferences and aspirations. As a result, no general rules or principles can be asserted that would simplify decisions about the value of a life based on its quality.

#### -- Turn – genocide – alt’s lack of objective moral criteria licenses atrocity

May 99 (Simon, College Research Fellow – Philosophy, Birkbeck College, Nietzsche’s Ethic Versus ‘Morality’: The New Ideal, p. 132-3)

An apologist for Nietzsche might suggest that his ethic is not alone in effectively legitimizing inhumanity. He might argue, for example, that some forms of utilitarianism could not prevent millions being sacrificed if greater numbers could thereby be saved; or that heinous maxims could be consistently universalized by Kant's Categorical Imperative-maxims against which Kant's injunction to treat all human beings as ends in themselves would afford no reliable protection, both because its conception of 'humanity' is vague and because it would be overridden by our duty, as rational agents, to respect just such universalized maxims. To this apologist one would reply that with Nietzsche there is not even an attempt to produce a systematic **safety net against cruelty**, especially if one judges oneself to be a 'higher' type of person with life-enhancing pursuits-and, to this extent, his philosophy **licenses the atrocities of a Hitler**, even though, by his personal table of values, he execrates anti-Semitism and virulent nationalism. Indeed to the extent it is irrelevant whether or not Nietzsche himself advocates violence and bloodshed or whether he is the gentle person described by his contemporaries. The reality is that the supreme value he places on individual life enhancement and self-legislation leaves room for, and in some causes **explicitly justifies**, **unfettered** **brutality**. In sum: the point here is not to rebut Nietzsche’s claim that “everything is evil, terrible, and tyrannical in man’s serves his enhancement “as much as its opposite does” – for such a rebuttal would be a major ethical undertaking in its own right. It is rather to suggest that the necessary balance between danger and safety which Nietzsche himself regards as a condition for flourishing is not vouchsafed by his extreme individualism**.**  Indeed, such individualism seems not only self-defeating, butalso quite unnecessary: for safeguards against those who have pretensions to sovereignty but lack nobility could be accepted on Nietzsche's theory of value as lust another 'condition for the preservation' of 'higher' types. Since the overriding aim of his attack on morality is to **liberate people** from the repressiveness of the 'herd' instinct, this unrelieved potential danger to the 'higher' individual must **count decisively against the success**-and the possibility of the success-**of his project**.

#### History proves – Nietzsche radicalized the Nazis toward genocide

Aschheim 96 (Steven E., Culture and Catastrophe: German and Jewish Confrontations with National Socialism and Other Crises, p. 75)

Historical transmission belts - the ways in which thought, ideas, moods and sensibility become translated into policy - are complex indeed and all thisis not meant to draw a causally straight line between Nietzsche, his epigones and the destruction of European Jewry. As we have already point­ed out, Nietzsche's influence was like his writings, always multivalent and never simplistically reducible to any single political or cultural current or direction." Nevertheless, I would argue that these texts and the mediated sen­sibility they could embody possess a relevance to the problem at hand. They formed an **explicit ingredient of** - and a particularly radical way of canaliz­ing- this kind of **anti-Semitic consciousness**, an influence that (for many, though obviously not for all) was openly acknowledged, and which constituted a **crucial element** of a radicalized mind-set that was a kind of precon­dition for what was to come. This, at any rate, is how some recent historians have viewed the matter. Thus, as Conor Cruise O'Brien has argued, it was Nietzsche who was the **decisive force** in the fateful switch from a `limited' Christian theological Jew -hatred to an unlimited, secular brand and who thus **concretely paved the way to the Holocaust**. Hitler, he writes, learned from Nietzsche that the tra­ditional Christian *limit* on anti-Semitism was itself part of a Jewish trick. When the values that the Jews had reversed were restored, there would be no limits and no Jews."' (We do not know if Hitler knew of the following Nietzschean passage but his utterances certainly echoed such sentiments: Decadence is only a *means* for the type of man who demands power in Judaism and Christianity, the *priestly* type: this type of man has a life inter­est in making mankind sick and in so twisting the concepts of good and evil, true and false, as to imperil life and slander the world."') And, as George Lichtheim would have it, only when Nietzschean ideas antithetical to the Judeo-Christian inheritance and its humanist offshoots had slowly perco­latedThrough and successfully gripped certain German minds did **Auschwitz become possible**: `It is not too much to say that **but for Nietzsche** the SS - **Hitler's shock troops** and the core of the whole movement - **would have lacked the inspiration** which enabled them **to carry out** their program of **mass murder** in Eastern Europe." Before going on with the argument and trying to clarify some particular his­torical distinctions a few general remarks would be in order. While here, and elsewhere, I insist that for the cultural historian interested in grasping the role, dynamics and effects of ideas within a political culture, the question of `valid' 'in valid' interpretations and applications must be set aside, this does not, of course, render irrelevant the role of the text - and here the Nietzschean text within this process.

#### -- Not all suffering is the same.

#### Some degree of pain is good – but some degrees are not.

#### Condoning death is stupid – Nietzsche was an ivory tower elitist who has no understanding of basic vulnerability.

Nussbaum 94 (Martha, David Benedict Professor, Professor of Philosophy and Classics, and Adjunct Professor of Comparative Literature at Brown University, Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality: Essays on Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morals, ed. Richard Schacht, p. 158-59)

We now turn to the heart of the matter, the role of “external goods” in the good human life. And here we encounter a rather large surprise. There is no philosopher in the modern Western tradition who is more emphatic than Nietzsche is about the central importance of the body, and about the fact that we are bodily creatures. Again and again he charges Christian and Platonist moralities with making a false separation between our spiritual and our physical nature; against them, he insists that we are physical through and through. The surprise is that, having said so much and with such urgency, he really is very loathe to draw the conclusion that is naturally suggested by his position: that human beings need worldly goods in order to function. In all of Nietzsche’s rather abstract and romantic praise of solitude and asceticism, we find no grasp of the simple truth that a hungry person cannot think well; that a person who lacks shelter, basic health care, and the basic necessities of life, is not likely to become a great philosopher or artist, no matter what her innate equipment. The solitude Nietzsche describes is **comfortable bourgeois solitude**, whatever its pains and loneli­ness. Who are his ascetic philosophers? “Heraclitus, Plato, Descartes, Spi­noza, Leibniz, Kant, Schopenhauer”—none a poor person, none a person who had to perform menial labor in order to survive. And because Nietzsche does not grasp the simple fact that if our abilities are physical abilities they have physical necessary conditions, he does not understand what the democratic and socialist movements of his day were all about. The pro-pity tradition, from Homer on, understood that one functions badly if one is hungry, that one thinks badly if one has to labor all day in work that does not involve the fully human use of one’s faculties. I have suggested that such thoughts were made by Rousseau the basis for the modern development of democratic-socialist thinking. Since Nietzsche does not get the basic idea, he does not see what socialism is trying to do. Since he probably never saw or knew an acutely hungry person, or a person performing hard physical labor, he never asked how human self-command is affected by such forms of life. And thus he can proceed as if it does not matter how people live from day to day, how they get their food. Who provides basic welfare support for Zarathustra? What are the “higher men” doing all the day long? The reader does not know and the author does not seem to care. Now Nietzsche himself obviously was not a happy man. He was lonely, in bad health, scorned by many of his contemporaries. And yet, there still is a distinction to be drawn between the sort of vulnerability that Nietzsche’s life contained and the sort we find if we examine the lives of truly impov­erished and hungry people. We might say, simplifying things a bit, that there are two sorts of vulnerability: what we might call bourgeois vulnerabil­ity—for example, the pains of solitude, loneliness, bad reputation, some ill health, pains that are painful enough but still compatible with thinking and doing philosophy—and what we might call **basic vulnerability**, which is a deprivation of resources so central to human functioning that thought and character are themselves impaired or not developed. Nietzsche, focus­ing on the first sort of vulnerability, holds that it is not so bad; it may even be good for the philosopher.49 **The second sort**, I claim, **he simply ne­glects**—**believing**, apparently, that **even a beggar can be a Stoic hero**, if only socialism does not inspire him with weakness.

#### -- Perm – endorse the plan and non-exclusive parts of the Alt – it informs how we value impacts – but still accomplishes the advantage

#### -- Turn – disengagement – reducing suffering doesn’t consume all existence – it can be balanced and is an extension of life and human will – only the alt enables complete self-denial

Conway 99 (David, Middlesex University, “Nietzsche's Revaluation of Schopenhauer as Educator”, http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/MPsy/MPsyConw.htm)

Nonetheless, Nietzsche was mistaken in supposing that it was contrary to the interests of an individual who is otherwise free from suffering to feel sympathy and pity for those who do suffer (through no fault of their own). Pity is not the baneful emotion which Nietzsche claims it to be. This verdict leaves unresolved the ultimate issue. In a world which does as a matter of fact contain the enormous amount of suffering that ours contains, is not an individual who is open through sympathetic identification to this suffering bound like Schopenhauer says to be revolted by the world to the point of revulsion with it? Nietzsche, of course, thought the strong can and should disengage their sympathies from the suffering of the weak. I think this is a mistake. One's world is impoverished by such disengagement of sympathies. Yet how can one continue to affirm the will when one feels with all the suffering there is? Nietzsche is correct that existence could only be tolerable if we were able to live without being constantly affected by the suffering of others. However, it was wrong to think that in order to achieve this enviable state, pity should be condemned and avoided. No, on this matter I think we are entitled to place more trust in life itself than did Nietzsche. The fact is that there are strict psychological limits on our susceptibility to feel pity. Pity is in part a function of our attention. To what we attend is a function of our will. Our sentiments very largely determine to what we attend. Consequently, it is only where people have disengaged themselves from pursuit of personal projects, like appreciating and producing art or caring for loved ones, and so on , that there can be scope for a degree of pity of the sort that alone can give rise to denial of will. Where denial of will becomes psychologically possible, therefore, it can hardly be thought of as unwarranted. Nietzsche himself spoke approvingly of taking leave of life at the time before one became a burden and life lost its point. Surely, he would not have wished to frown on Sannyasis who give up all attachments at that stage in life after they have made their way through it. In conclusion, therefore, I wish to say that their are elements of truth and error in both Schopenhauer and Nietzsche on the matter of greatest divide between them. Schopenhauer is right to see denial of will where it occurs in such figures as religious recluses as a legitimate response to the suffering of the world. Nietzsche is right to see denial of the will as not always a legitimate response to the world's suffering. Nietzsche is right that life need not contain suffering of the magnitude Schopenhauer claims is integral to it. Schopenhauer is right that an attitude of sympathy for all suffering creatures is a benefit and not a bane to the person who has the attitude.

#### -- Perm – do the alt – any theory objection links to the K

#### -- No link: the Aff is compassion, not pity – none of their evidence applies

Tevenar 5 (Gudrun Von, Birkbeck College (London), “Nietzsche’s Objections to Pity and Compassion”, www.bbk.ac.uk/phil/staff/academics/gemes-work/GurdrenvonTevenar18Oct05)

I take it as given that there is a difference between pity and compassion and that we can describe this difference as follows: both pitying and compassionate agents are distressed by the suffering of others, but compassionate agents show, in addition to this distress, also attentive concern for the way suffering persons endure their suffering. Thus compassion focuses on and is attentive to suffering persons while pity tends to focus just on the suffered condition, say, homelessness or disease. However, focusing just on the suffered condition allows a gap of distance, of separation, of otherness to develop between pitying agents and the pitied and this, in turn, can lead to feelings of superiority and contempt on the part of pitying agents and to feelings of alienation, shame, and inferiority on the part of the pitied. Compassion, by contrast, with its attentive concern for the suffering person, is based on awareness of our common humanity and thus, at its best, is able to bridge the damaging gap of separation and otherness with its associated negative feelings. Hence it follows that only pity, and not also compassion, is open to the much voiced objection of allowing, perhaps even fostering, feelings of superiority and contempt and thus of shaming and humiliating its recipients. [2] Due to the fact that there is only one German word, namely Mitleid, for pity and compassion, it is frequently not immediately obvious from an original text whether the author is talking about pity or compassion without careful consideration of context. Yet in the case of Nietzsche context alone is often not conclusive – hence the variations in translation – and I recommend therefore the additional device of close scrutiny of the kinds of objection against Mitleid Nietzsche is actually engaged in. And here we can distinguish three different kinds of objection. These are [1] psychological objections; [2] detrimental-to-recipients objections; and [3] detrimental-to-givers objections. In what follows I will give examples of all three kinds. [3] Schopenhauer, famously, celebrated Mitleid as the greatest of all virtues and as the sole basis of genuine morality. He argued that Mitleid alone is able to overcome our naturally selfish inclinations and thus to motivate agents to act solely for the well-being of others, this being the characteristic of morally worthy actions. Nietzsche vehemently rejected this elevation of what he considered to be one of the more regrettable outcomes of slave morality. And while objections against Mitleid are voiced throughout Nietzsche’s work, Daybreak 133 is notable for its strong polemic against Schopenhauer’s psychological explanations of Mitleid. In Daybreak 133 Nietzsche alleges that Schopenhauer could not possibly have had much relevant experience of Mitleid ‘because he observed and described it so badly’. In particular, Nietzsche utterly dismisses as ‘mere inventions’ Schopenhauer’s psychological foundations of Mitleid such as its supposed motivational purity of selflessness. Nietzsche derides the superficial evidence of selflessness and claims, in opposition, that subconsciously we are always and throughout concerned with our own selves. We therefore never act solely for the sake of others but usually harbour a variety of motives which include, in the case of Mitleid, the co-motivations of ‘subtle self-defence or even a piece of revenge’. Two sections on, in Daybreak 135, Nietzsche provides us with a particularly vivid detrimental-to-recipient objection. He states that the mere idea of being pitied ‘evokes a moral shudder’ in savages, because to savages, being still, we are meant to assume, uncorrupted by conventional morality, ‘to offer pity is as good as to offer contempt’. Indeed, should a defeated enemy weep and plead then savages will, out of Mitleid and contempt, let him live, humiliated like a dog, while those who endure suffering with defiant pride repulse Mitleid and thus earn their admiration and praise. Regarding the detrimental-to-givers objection, Nietzsche has Zarathustra declare, in the by now familiar detrimental-to-recipients tone, that he badly wronged a sufferer’s pride when he helped him. But, importantly, Zarathustra also declares that he washes his hand and also wipes clean his soul because he has helped a sufferer, and he admits, furthermore, that he feels ashamed because of the sufferer’s shame. These latter statements show quite conclusively that Nietzsche believed agents pollute and degrade themselves when they show Mitleid and that Mitleid is therefore detrimental to its givers. Variations of the psychological and detrimental-to-recipients objections described above are widely known and much used even in our ordinary, everyday reactions to instances of pity. But the detrimental-to-givers objection is, I believe, distinctly Nietzschean and we will see later on how this kind of objection is informed by distinctly Nietzschean views of the role and significance of suffering. [4] When we examine these objections with the pity/compassion distinction as briefly outlined at the beginning in mind, then we find that Nietzsche’s objections are almost exclusively concerned with Mitleid understood as pity and not as compassion. Notice that Mitleid is either contaminated from the beginning with contempt and shame as in the examples of the savages and Zarathustra, or Mitleid seems preoccupied mainly with the mental state of the agent and not with the sufferer. Understanding Mitleid merely as pity seems to me the main reason why Nietzsche’s objections, though very sophisticated and eminently plausible, somehow miss their target as far as Schopenhauer is concerned. Because Schopenhauer, when elevating Mitleid as the highest virtue, speaks throughout of Mitleid as compassion. Thus Schopenhauer claims that compassionate agents can act selflessly and solely for the weal of sufferers precisely because they see in sufferers someone like themselves. In other words, in the eyes of compassionate agents there is, according to Schopenhauer, no gap of distance and otherness between agents and sufferers and hence no associated negative feelings of alienation and shame. Indeed, Schopenhauer takes great pains to distinguish his kind of Mitleid, i.e. compassion, from various deviations and aberrations such as those that Nietzsche concentrates on and grants them no moral value whatsoever. We can conclude therefore that Schopenhauer could, in a way, willingly agree with most of Nietzsche’s objections and yet keep his own theory intact, since he elevates compassion while Nietzsche denigrates pity.

#### -- Doesn’t solve the case – impact is short-term extinction – and, it turns their impact – domination and violence creates rigid boundaries and undermines individual joy and pride – shatters the ability to affirm life

Schutte 84 (Ofelia, Professor of Philosophy – University of South Florida, Beyond Nihilism: Nietzsche Without Masks, p. 159-160)

Nietzche’s fascination with domination—itself a project of Western values—ruptured the intent of his project and brought the transvaluation of all values to a halt. The concrete result of Nietzsche’s alienation can be seen in the way he handles the relationship of the elite to the masses as well as that of men to women in his mature and late works. Some of the psychological and political aspects of this problem will be discussed in Chapter 7. It should be clear so far, however, that the psychology of domination calls for the war of all against all. Out of distrust for the people, out of distrust for women, out of distrust for one’s own body, the authoritarian conscience establishes the need for obedience regardless of the absurdity of the rule. Under the psychology of domination, the contribution to personal well-being that grows out of a healthy and life-affirming morality is replaced by the commanding voice of a despot who would very much like to rule the world. This reversion to repression undermines all the liberating aspects of Nietzsche’s philosophy. The Dionysian affirmation of self-transcendence is contradicted by the implementation of rigid boundaries in human life (“leader” and “herd”). The joy and pride in one’s own values (“it is… our work—let us be proud of it”) is undermined by the defense of breeding and slavery. Above all, the union of truth and life which was the aim of the Dionysian transvaluation of values is completely shattered when the doctrine of the overcoming of morality is used to sever truth from life.

#### -- Alt fails – individual affirmation makes truth and practice subjective --- causes total rejection of life

Lang 3 (Shian, “Pitfalls in Genealogical Method+Possible Repercussions of Overthrowing Slave Morality: Frederich Nietzsche Discussion Desk”, 12-8, http://westerncanon.com/cgibin/lecture/FrederichNietzschehall/cas/55.html)

Despite the positive lesson we can learn from Nietzsche’s account on slave morality, we should understand certain pitfalls of his genealogical methods of interpreting slave morality. In his Feb 5th review essay, Jason summarized the value of genealogy as follows: "Nietzsche's genealogy serves, first, to separate the content of morality from the subject itself, by showing the actual, historical development of different and indeed opposite conceptions of morality in history. The second purpose is to show the historical contingency of "moral" valuations altogether; that, is, Nietzsche hopes to dispel the aura of morality "in itself" and any intuitive morality of altruism by showing the purposes for which morality has been used, and by showing that morality originated in pursuit on values." The method of genealogy, however, does not seem like the best tool with which to accomplish these two goals. Separating the content of morality from the subject largely requires avoiding the most common method of moral theorizing: starting from presumptions about what constitutes moral behavior and then building a theory around those presumptions. As for what positive method should be used, we ought to start with fundamental questions, ones that do not presuppose moral content, namely "What are values? Why does man need them?" (Rand, VOS 15). Hoping to separate subject from content by historical investigation is much less likely to be fruitful. For example, just about every moral theory has presupposed fundamental conflicts of interests between individuals. A historical investigation will fail to reveal that this premise is questionable. The fact that Nietzsche's own moral theorizing fails to uproot or even question this basic presupposition indicates a failure of the genealogical method. Without a successful questioning on the presupposition of moral content, **it becomes potentially dangerous** to live with Nietzsche’s hope of overthrowing the dominant culture of slave morality. Nietzsche's historical perspective suggests that we should interpret the past subjectively, and take lessons so that we will not be trapped by the traditional framework of values the past has created. However, a subjective view of the past, while an exciting prospect, is potentially dangerous. **Personal interpretation makes truth subjective; we each extract different lessons from the past**. If there is a multitude of narratives, it is likely that we are manipulating the truth to serve our purposes. While many of us formulate healthy, life-serving interpretations of the past, others select the negative aspects to exalt and admire. Nietzsche envisions a society in which human being is able to overcome oneself, to be the superman who is capable to recreate one’s values. However, **not every individual is able to develop** the kind of **positive self-overcoming**. For such individuals, the overthrow of traditional moral framework, compounded by the lack of examination of why human beings need values, will likely to result in two **negative extremes: arbitrary use of will to power or complete rejection of life** because of the incapability to achieve personal goals. Without a discipline in controlling individual’s will to power, society will end up in constant chaos.