# Kentucky Aff Speeches

## 1AC (Rounds 1,3,5)

### Inherency

#### **Contention One is Inherency –**

#### The Department of Interior’s leasing plan effectively restricts offshore natural gas drilling on federal lands

New 6-30 (Bill, President – New Industires, \*Offers Steel Fabrication Services to Offshore Drilling Projects, “Letters: New Leasing Plan a Step Backward,” The Advocate, 2012, http://theadvocate.com/news/opinion/3484480-123/letters-new-leasing-plan-a)

In late June, the U.S. Department of the Interior released its long-awaited outer continental shelf leasing plan, which effectively blocks offshore oil and natural gas exploration in any new areas for the next five years. Unfortunately, the proposal is a step backward in our effort to achieve energy independence. Under the plan, 85 percent of America’s OCS would be off-limits at a time when exploring every possible energy source is critical to boosting our nation’s economy and creating jobs. Instead of finding out what might be available to us in expansive unexplored areas off our coasts, we will be left to search for oil and natural gas in the same, relatively small portion of the OCS we’ve been exploring for four decades. Not only does this plan run counter to President Barack Obama’s “all of the above” strategy for energy independence, but it shows an outright disregard for the requests of the Gulf Coast states –— including Louisiana — to increase domestic oil production when the Interior Department released a draft of the plan late last year. Interestingly, the Interior Department chose to release this latest version of the OCS plan on the day the Supreme Court announced its health care decision — a thinly veiled attempt to bury it in news coverage of the ruling. But that didn’t keep right-thinking lawmakers from taking notice and working on ways to get America’s economy going using sound energy policies. U.S. Rep. Doc Hastings, R-Wash., chairman of the House Natural Resource Committee, has written legislation that sensibly revises the plan. While the Interior Department’s plan is to hold just 12 oil and gas lease sales in the Gulf of Mexico, and three in offshore Alaska from 2012 to 2017, the Hastings plan would schedule 28 lease sales total, dramatically increasing drilling opportunities off the Alaskan coast and including a sale of offshore leases in a potentially rich area off the coast of Virginia. The United States is producing more oil and natural gas than ever thanks to increased production on state-owned or private land. However, production on federal onshore land is down 14 percent in the last two years, and down 17 percent on federal offshore areas. Imagine what could happen if we enact legislation that allows us to open new offshore areas.

#### Current legislation is insufficient – removing access restrictions allows for expanded energy production – certainty is key

Loris 8-6 (Nicolas, Fellow in the Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies – Heritage Foundation “Senate Energy Bill: Good Start, Room for Improvement,” Heritage Foundation, 2012, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/08/domestic-energy-and-jobs-act-good-start-room-for-improvement)

Senator John Hoeven (R–ND) recently introduced the Domestic Energy and Jobs Act (DEJA), which would greatly expand access to energy and simplify burdensome regulations that prevent projects from coming online in a timely manner. While the legislation could be improved by further increasing access and removing the top-down energy planning, DEJA would still spur economic growth and drive energy production. Increasing Access to Energy DEJA would accept the State Department’s environmental review of the Keystone XL pipeline as sufficient and allow the state of Nebraska to reroute the pipeline to meet the state’s environmental concerns. The State Department studied and addressed risks to soil, wetlands, water resources, vegetation, fish, wildlife, and endangered species and concluded that construction of the pipeline would pose minimal environmental risk.[1] The construction of Keystone XL would allow up to 830,000 barrels of oil per day to come from Canada to the Gulf Coast and create thousands of jobs. DEJA also directs the Department of the Interior (DOI) to conduct a lease sale off the coast of Virginia. The 2.9 million acres 50 miles off the coast has an estimated 130 million barrels of oil and 1.14 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. Opening access off Virginia’s coast is long overdue, and the legislation **only opens up a small portion of America’s territorial waters that are off limits**. The Offshore Petroleum Expansion Now (OPEN) Act of 2012, also co-sponsored by Senator Hoeven, would replace President Obama’s 2012–2017 Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Leasing Program with a much more robust plan that opens areas in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, in the Gulf of Mexico, and off Alaska.[2] Both DEJA and OPEN increase the royalties that states would receive from energy production, but both could go further to increase state involvement in offshore drilling decisions. Since onshore states already receive 50 percent of the royalties, Congress should also implement a 50/50 royalty-sharing program between federal and state governments involved in offshore drilling. Efficient Permitting and Leasing for All Energy Projects Another important component of DEJA is that it streamlines the permitting of all energy projects. Receiving a permit for any energy project, not just fossil fuels, takes entirely too long. Duplicative and unnecessary regulations slow the process and drive up costs. Furthermore, environmental activists delay new energy projects by filing endless administrative appeals and lawsuits. DEJA would create a manageable time frame for permitting for all energy sources to increase supply at lower costs and stimulate economic activity. DEJA also calls for an end to the lengthy permit process in the Natural Petroleum Reserve area of Alaska. It would require the DOI to approve drilling permits within 60 days and infrastructure permits within six months. Lease certainty is another critical issue. The act states that the DOI cannot cancel or withdraw a lease sale after the winning company pays for the lease. Ensuring that the federal government does not pull the rug out from under a company that wins the lease sale would provide the **certainty necessary to pursue energy projects**. Freeze and Study Environmental Regulations DEJA would also create transparency and accountability for Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulations by establishing an interagency committee that would report on the full economic impact of the rules implemented by the EPA that affect fuel prices. This includes any part of the production process that would be affected by greenhouse gas regulations. DEJA delays the implementation of Tier 3 fuel standards (designed to replace the Tier 2 regulations issued in 2000) that would lower the amount of sulfur in gasoline but could add 6–9 cents per gallon to the cost of manufacturing gasoline. The EPA has declared no measurable air quality benefits from these standards. DEJA delays the New Source Performance Standards for refineries, which would drive up the cost of gasoline for no measurable change in the earth’s temperature.[3] It would also delay new national ambient air quality standards for ozone, which are unnecessary because the ozone standard set by the EPA is already more than stringent enough to protect human health. Though the delays contained in DEJA underscore the problems with these regulations, the preferred approach would be to prohibit the implementation of these three standards altogether. DEJA would also prevent the DOI from issuing any rule under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 before 2014 that would adversely affect coal employment, reduce revenue from coal production, reduce coal for domestic consumption or export, designate areas as unsuitable for surface mining and reclamation, or expose the U.S. to liability by taking privately owned coal through regulation. While this temporary fix recognizes the federal overreach in coal production, a better approach would be to create a framework that restricts overregulation, empowers the states, balances economic growth and environmental well-being, and creates a timely permitting process for all aspects of coal production.[4] Energy Central Planning Unneeded DEJA would require the federal government to create production objectives for fossil fuels and renewable energy and allow the relevant agencies to make additional lands available to meet those objectives. The bill would also require the U.S. Geological Survey to establish a critical minerals list and create comprehensive policies to increase critical mineral production. A much simpler and effective solution would be to open all federal lands for energy production of all sources and allow the private sector to determine what sources of energy and what technologies meet America’s electricity and transportation fuel demand. Too often the use of critical minerals has been used as cover for subsidies and extensive government intervention in a major industry. If there are clear military needs for certain critical materials, these should be met by government action. Absent that, streamlining the bureaucracy that has expanded around mining and **opening access is the only necessary federal action surrounding critical minerals**.

### Plan

#### The United States Federal Government should substantially reduce access restrictions on federal lands in the Outer Continental Shelf for conventional gas production

### Energy Revolution

#### Contention 2 : The Energy Revolution

#### The energy transition is failing – fracking requires massive amounts of water that drives up costs and makes new natural gas uneconomical – access to new conventional natural gas makes the transition sustainable

Dorsey 12 (Gregory, Managing Editor – Leeb’s Income Performance Letter, “Fractured Logic: The Myth of Abundant Natural Gas,” Leeb’s Market Forecast, 5-9, http://leebsmarketforecast.com/content/fractured-logic-myth-abundant-natural-gas)

A popular meme these days is the idea that natural gas is America’s salvation on the road to energy independence. Production of the clean burning fuel has reached record levels in this country and stockpiles are bursting at the seams. Natural gas prices recently dipped to their lowest level since the late 1990s below $2 before clawing their way back to $2.50. The supply glut has occurred thanks to an extraction technique known as hydraulic fracturing, or “fracking,” as it’s commonly known. In contrast to the conventional method where companies merely drill into the earth to exploit natural gas and oil deposits below the surface, fracturing entails pumping a highly pressurized mixture of water, sand and chemicals into the well. The highly pressurized cocktail opens up cracks in tight rock formations, facilitating the flow of natural gas and other hydrocarbons from the source rock. Since fracking was approved for energy production through its exemption from the 2005 Safe Drinking Water Act, its popularity has grown immensely. Fracking has allowed producers to exploit resources that were otherwise considered too difficult to access. However, we would **stop short of calling fracking a true energy revolution** for a number of reasons, just one of which we want to address today. What’s typically overlooked is the huge amount of water resources required for hydraulic fracturing. While many believe fresh water to be an abundant resource, it’s actually anything but. As we’ve pointed out in the past, natural resources tend to be inter-correlated through the energy required to extract and process them. As one resource becomes scarcer, it will affect the cost or availability of other resources as well. In the long run, we see natural gas extraction from unconventional sources as no exception. And fresh water is the key connection. The mainstream political opposition to fracking comes from the environmental concern that the chemicals injected into the ground can leak into the groundwater, contaminating an important source of drinking water. We’ll leave the environmental argument to the experts in that field, but what has become increasingly clear in our research is that the amount of fresh water required for large-scale hydraulic fracturing is massive, far surpassing any estimates put forward by the oil and gas industry today. Depending on which numbers you use, unconventional shale fracking uses between six and 50 times the amount of water as conventional gas drilling. And the bulk of that water is required up front, as opposed to being used throughout the extraction process. The higher figures come from actual operational data, while the lower estimates are just that: estimates. As a result, many of the US shale plays that have been lauded as an abundant source of clean energy may produce far less natural gas than current forecasted estimates after all costs and resource inputs are accounted for. If these unconventional shale plays require much more water than conventional wisdom expects, as we suspect they will, there will be much less gas coming on line in the future than expected. And the cost of much of the gas that may eventually be extracted will be much higher than anticipated. Either way, the result is the same, causing the natural gas market to tighten and prices to rise. So if you heat and cool your home with natural gas, enjoy the current bonanza while it lasts. The takeaway for investors, meanwhile, is not simply to pile into the energy stocks most leveraged to natural gas prices, as tempting as that may be from a contrarian perspective. Unconventional gas deposits that will require fracking now make up a large portion of total natural gas assets for many E&P companies. And while higher water requirements will drive natural gas prices northward, it will also drive up costs for unconventional producers. The result for those producers will not be pretty. We would therefore stick with conventional natural gas producers who will benefit from higher gas prices. For safety sake, companies that also have a healthy exposure to crude oil earn the highest honors.

#### **Natural gas abundance is a myth – shale gas is declining and studies don’t assume increased production**

Berman 12 (Art, Former Editor – Oil and Gas Journal, Geological Consultant – American Association of Petroleum Geologists, “After the Gold Rush: A Perspective on Future U.S. Natural Gas Supply and Price,” Oil Drum, 2-8, http://www.theoildrum.com/node/8914)

For several years, we have been asked to believe that less is more, that more oil and gas can be produced from shale than was produced from better reservoirs over the past century. We have been told more recently that the U.S. has enough natural gas to last for 100 years. We have been presented with an improbable business model that has no barriers to entry except access to capital, that provides a source of cheap and abundant gas, and that somehow also allows for great profit. Despite three decades of experience with tight sandstone and coal-bed methane production that yielded low-margin returns and less supply than originally advertised, we are expected to believe that poorer-quality shale reservoirs will somehow provide superior returns and make the U.S. energy independent. Shale gas advocates point to the large volumes of produced gas and the participation of major oil companies in the plays as indications of success. But advocates rarely address details about profitability and they never mention failed wells. Shale gas plays are an important and permanent part of our energy future. We need the gas because there are fewer remaining plays in the U.S. that have the potential to meet demand. A careful review of the facts, however, casts doubt on the extent to which shale plays can meet supply expectations except at much higher prices. One Hundred Years of Natural Gas The U.S. does not have 100 years of natural gas supply. There is a difference between resources and reserves that many outside the energy industry fail to grasp. A resource refers to the gas or oil in-place that can be produced, while a reserve must be commercially producible. The Potential Gas Committee (PGC) is the standard for resource assessments because of the objectivity and credentials of its members, and its long and reliable history. In its biennial report released in April 2011, three categories of technically recoverable resources are identified: probable, possible and speculative. The President and many others have taken the PGC total of all three categories (2,170 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of gas) and divided by 2010 annual consumption of 24 Tcf. This results in 90 and not 100 years of gas. Much of this total resource is in accumulations too small to be produced at any price, is inaccessible to drilling, or is too deep to recover economically. More relevant is the Committee’s probable mean resources value of 550 (Tcf) of gas (Exhibit 4). If half of this supply becomes a reserve (225 Tcf), the U.S. has approximately 11.5 years of potential future gas supply at present consumption rates. When proved reserves of 273 Tcf are included, there is an additional 11.5 years of supply for a total of almost 23 years. It is worth noting that proved reserves include proved undeveloped reserves which may or may not be produced depending on economics, so even 23 years of supply is tenuous. If consumption increases, this supply will be exhausted in less than 23 years. Revisions to this estimate will be made and there probably is more than 23 years but based on current information, 100 years of gas is not justified. Shale Gas Plays May Not Provide Sustainable Supply Several of the more mature shale gas plays are either in decline or appear to be approaching peak production. Exhibit 5 shows that total Barnett Shale production is approximately 5.7 Bcf per day (Bcf/d) and cumulative gas production is more than 10 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of gas. It also shows that production may be approaching a peak at current gas prices despite the constant addition of new wells. Exhibit 5. Barnett Shale Total Production. Source: HPDI. The Haynesville Shale surpassed the Barnett during 2011 as the most productive gas play in North America, with present daily rates of almost 7 Bcf/d and cumulative production of 3.5 Tcf (Exhibit 6). This play is most responsible for the current over-supply of gas with the average well producing 3.3 million cubic feet per day (Mcf/d) compared to only 0.4 Mdf/d in the Barnett. It is too early to say for sure, but the Haynesville Shale may also be approaching peak production. The Marcellus Shale is presently producing 2.4 Bcf/d and has produced a total of about 0.8 Tcf (Exhibit 7). In this play, production shows no sign of leveling off, as it does in the Barnett and Haynesville, and production in the Fayetteville Shale may also be approaching a peak (Exhibit 8). The Woodford Shale is already in decline (Exhibit 9). If some existing shale gas plays are approaching peak production after only a few years since the advent of horizontal drilling and multi-stage hydraulic fracturing, what is the basis for long-term projections of abundant gas supply?

#### Claims of abundant natural gas are industry bias and use manipulated data

Hughes 11 (J. David, Fellow in Fossil Fuels – Post Carbon Institute, Geoscientist – Geological Survey of Canada, and Team Leader – Canadian Gas Potential Committee, Abstract by Richard Heinberg, Senior Fellow-in-Residence – Post Carbon Institute, “Will Natural Gas Fuel America in the 21st Century?” Post Carbon Institute, May, http://www.postcarbon.org/reports/PCI-report-nat-gas-future-plain.pdf)

As this report details, all of these assumptions and recommendations need to be re-thought. What emerges from the data is a very different assessment. But if this report is right, then how could mainstream energy analysts have gotten so much so wrong? It is not our purpose to analyze in detail the social, political, and economic process whereby public relations became public policy. Nevertheless it is fairly easy to trace the convergence of interests among major players. First, the shale gas industry was motivated to hype production prospects in order to attract large amounts of needed investment capital; it did this by drilling the best sites first and extrapolating initial robust results to apply to more problematic prospective regions. The energy policy establishment, desperate to identify a new energy source to support future economic growth, accepted the industry’s hype uncritically. This in turn led Wall Street Journal, Time Magazine, 60 Minutes, and many other media outlets to proclaim that shale gas would transform the energy world. Finally, several prominent environmental organizations, looking for a way to lobby for lower carbon emissions without calling for energy cutbacks, embraced shale gas as a necessary “bridge fuel” toward a renewable energy future. Each group saw in shale gas what it wanted and needed. The stuff seemed too good to be true—and indeed it was. The biggest losers in this misguided rush to anoint shale gas as America’s energy savior are members of the public, who need sound energy policy based on realistic expectations for future supply, as well as sound assessments of economic and environmental costs.

#### **New state and federal regulations are coming now – that makes** fracking unsustainable

Plumer 12 (Brad, “How states are regulating fracking (in maps)”, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/wp/2012/07/16/how-states-are-regulating-fracking-in-maps/)

Armed with new drilling techniques, companies are spreading out across the United States, cracking open shale rock in search of vast new stores of natural gas. It’s not an exaggeration to say that hydraulic fracturing, or “fracking,” has revolutionized the U.S. energy industry. Cheap natural gas has become America’s top source for electricity, displacing coal and bringing back jobs to once-decaying states like Ohio.But the fracking boom has also led to plenty of environmental concerns. Local communities are worried that the chemicals used to pry open the shale rock can contaminate nearby drinking water supplies. (So far, there’s scant evidence this is happening in places like Pennsylvania, but the science is still in its infancy.) Excess gas is often vented off, producing air pollution. And the disposal of fracking wastewater underground appears to be linked to earthquakes in places like Ohio. Confronted with these worries, **states have responded with** a patchwork of different regulations. But there’s a lot of variation between different states. And here’s a good way to track what’s going on: A helpful series of new maps, put together by Resources for the Future (RFF), gives an overview of how 31 states with significant shale gas reserves are treating different aspects of fracking. Here, for instance, is a look at which states require companies to disclose the chemicals they use in drilling. (Fracking is exempt from federal disclosure rules under the Safe Water Drinking Act.) Some states, like Pennsylvania — which sits above the gas-rich Marcellus shale formation — now require a full disclosure of chemicals. By contrast, Kansas, which is just beginning to see widespread fracking activity, is further behind: Meanwhile, the map below details how different states treat the “venting” or release of excess gas into the air. Just 22 of the 31 gas states have restrictions on this process, which can release both heat-trapping methane into the atmosphere as well as “volatile organic compounds” such as benzene that can produce smog and trigger health problems. Some states ban this practice entirely; others restrict it to emergencies or require that operators not harm public health: There are many more maps on RFF’s Web site, which is worth poking around on. In an introductory essay, RFF’s Nathan Richardson notes that these maps still provide just a partial picture — the details of laws matter, and more importantly, different states may enforce their rules with different levels of vigor. But it’s an invaluable resource all the same. The regulation of fracking has become a low-level campaign issue, as well. The Obama administration is gradually putting forward federal regulations. The Department of Interior **is drafting rules for fracking on publicly-owned lands** (where about 38 percent of the country’s gas reserves sit, according to the American Petroleum Institute). The Environmental Protection Agency, meanwhile, is slowly getting in on regulation and has proposed rules that will require all producers to phase out venting by 2015 and capture their waste methane instead. Mitt Romney, by contrast, has criticized the federal approach. In his “Believe in America” economic plan (pdf), he warns that the EPA should not “pursue overly aggressive interventions designed to discourage fracking altogether.” By contrast, Romney praises states for having “carefully and effectively regulated the process for decades.” Indeed, many Republicans believe that fracking regulations should be mainly left to the states, which can issue rules more speedily and can tailor regulations to the specific needs of their communities. Environmentalists, by contrast, worry that this will create a race to the bottom whereby states pare back their rules — or enforce them weakly — in order to compete for business. Both sides agree that addressing the public health and environmental aspects of fracking isn’t costless. The International Energy Agency recently estimated that addressing all of the various concerns could boost the price of natural gas by roughly 7 percent. Yet the IEA also warned that if these rules weren’t adopted, public outcry and protests could stop the shale gas boom altogether. Anti-fracking protests like those in New York state could become the norm. And that, the IEA notes, could prove even more costly to the gas industry

#### Shoring up energy primacy is the only way to sustain leadership and prevent extinction

Hagel 12 [Chuck Hagel, Professor at Georgetown University, “The Challenge of Change”, 5/15/12, <http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/challenge-change>]

A new world order is being built today by seven billion global citizens. America’s responsibilities in this new world and to future generations are as enormous as they are humbling. The challenges and choices before us demand leadership that reaches into the future without stumbling over today. They also require challenging every past frame of reference. Sensing the realities and subtleties of historic change are not always sudden or obvious. As former Secretary of State Dean Acheson recounted, “Only slowly did it dawn upon us that the whole world structure and order that we had inherited from the 19th century was gone and that the struggle to replace it would be directed from two bitterly opposed and ideologically irreconcilable power centers.” Staying a step ahead of the forces of change requires an ability to foresee and appreciate the consequences of our actions, a willingness to learn the hard lessons of history and from our own experiences, and a clear realization of the limitations of great power. Acheson and the Wise Men of that time got it right. America led the shaping of the post-Second World War world order through strong inspired leadership, a judicious (most of the time) use of its power, and working with allies through alliances and institutions. This has helped prevent a Third World War and a nuclear holocaust. The world we face in 2012 is of a different character than even a few years ago. Many developing nations are fragile states and are under enormous pressure from terrorism, endemic poverty, environmental challenges, debt, corruption, civil unrest, and regional, tribal, and religious conflicts. The result is a climate of despair, and potential breeding grounds for radical politics and extremism. A successful American foreign policy must include thinking through actions and policies, and how uncontrollable and unpredictable global forces may affect outcomes. Eleven years of invasions and occupations have put the U.S. in a deep hole and mired us down in terribly costly commitments in blood, treasure, and prestige. Our diplomatic and security flexibility has been seriously eroded by many of the decisions of the last eleven years. Too often we tend to confuse tactical action for strategic thinking. A matter of mutual understanding American foreign policy has always required a principled realism that is true to our values as we face the world as it really is in all of its complexities. We need to accept the reality that there is not a short-term solution to every problem in the world. What we must do is manage these realities and complex problems, moving them into positions of solution possibilities and resolution. American foreign policy has always dared to project a vision of a world where all things are possible. If we are to succeed, we must understand how the world sees us. Turn on our receivers more often and shut off our transmitters. This is a vital priority for a successful 21st century foreign policy. We must also avoid the traps of hubris, ideology and insularity, and know that there is little margin for error with the stakes so high in the world today. America must strengthen its global alliances. Common-interest alliances will be required in a volatile world of historic diffusions of power. The great challenges facing the world today are the responsibility of all peoples of the world. They include cyber warfare, terrorism, preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, prosperity and stability, and global poverty, disease and environmental degradation. Our allies throughout the world share these same challenges and threats and will also be just as affected by the outcomes. These will be either our common successes or our common failures. America cannot be successful with any of these challenges, without sustained partnerships and deep cooperation in the economic, intelligence, diplomatic, humanitarian, military and law enforcement fields. The centrality of alliances and multi-lateral institutions to a successful foreign policy is fundamental. Alliances and multi-lateral institutions must be understood as expansions of our influence, not as constraints on our power. Alliances are imperfect, as are all institutions. But like “process,” they help absorb shocks. Beyond military solutions Alliances must be built on solid foundations to handle both routine and sudden unforeseen challenges. Crisis-driven “coalitions of the willing” by themselves are not the building blocks for a stable world. We need to think more broadly, deeply and strategically. American military power and force structure cannot sustain its commitments without a shift to a more comprehensive strategic approach to global threats and a more flexible and agile military. Cyber warfare is a paramount example of these new threats. The perception of American power around the world must not rest solely on a military orientation or optic. There must be an underlying commitment to engagement and humanity. Engagement is not appeasement, nor is it negotiation. It is not a guarantee of anything, but rather a smart diplomatic bridge to better understanding and possible conflict resolution. American foreign policy must reflect the realities and demands of the global economy. The global economy cannot be shut out of foreign policy. There can be no higher priority for America than to remain economically competitive in a world undergoing a historic diffusion of economic power. A nation’s strength is anchored to and underpinned by its economic strength. The connections between America’s trade, economic, and energy policies must also be synthesized into a strategic vision for American foreign policy that not only meets the challenges of our time, but frames the completeness of long-term policies for strategic future outcomes. Trade is a major catalyst for economic strength and growth at home and abroad, as well as a critical stabilizer for world peace and prosperity. America must remain the global champion of free, fair and open trade. As the world’s strongest, largest and most dynamic economy, America must continue to lead world trade. Economic strength must be as high a priority as any other foreign policy priority. America’s security and growth are connected to both the American and global economies. A centerpiece of this security is energy security. Energy security and energy interdependence are interconnected parts of a broad and deep foreign policy paradigm that frames the complexity of the challenges that face America and the world. A diverse portfolio of energy that is accessible and affordable is the core of America’s energy security. Much of the world’s energy is produced in countries and regions that are consumed by civil unrest, lack of human rights, corruption, underdevelopment, and conflict. The price of oil is driven by supply and demand and the global market. We must ensure diversification of sources of supply and distribution networks to prevent undue dependence on any one country or region. Instability and violence disrupt supply and distribution and increase prices.

#### A US-led natural gas revolution solidifies international leadership

Mead 12 (Walter Russell, James Clark Chase Professor of Foreign Affairs and Humanities – Bard College and Editor-at-Large – American Interest, “Energy Revolution 2: A Post Post-American Post,” American Interest, 7-15, http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2012/07/15/energy-revolution-2-a-post-post-american-post/)

Forget peak oil; forget the Middle East. The energy revolution of the 21st century isn’t about solar energy or wind power and **the “scramble for oil” isn’t going to drive global politics**. The energy abundance that helped propel the United States to global leadership in the 19th and 2oth centuries is back; if the energy revolution now taking shape lives up to its full potential, we are headed into a new century in which the location of the world’s energy resources and the structure of the world’s energy trade **support American affluence at home and power abroad**. By some estimates, the United States has more oil than Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Iran combined, and Canada may have even more than the United States. A GAO report released last May (pdf link can be found here) estimates that up to the equivalent of 3 trillion barrels of shale oil may lie in just one of the major potential US energy production sites. If half of this oil is recoverable, US reserves in this one deposit are roughly equal to the known reserves of the rest of the world combined. Edward Luce, an FT writer usually more given to tracing America’s decline than to promoting its prospects, cites estimates that as early as 2020 the US may be producing more oil than Saudi Arabia. So dramatic are America’s finds, analysts talk of the US turning into the world’s new Saudi Arabia by 2020, with up to 15m barrels a day of liquid energy production (against the desert kingdom’s 11m b/d this year). Most of the credit goes to private sector innovators, who took their cue from the high oil prices in the last decade to devise ways of tapping previously uneconomic underground reserves of “tight oil” and shale gas. And some of it is down to plain luck. Far from reaching its final frontier, America has discovered new ones under the ground. Additionally, our natural gas reserves are so large that the US is likely to become a major exporter, and US domestic supplies for hydrocarbon fuels of all types appear to be safe and secure for the foreseeable future. North America as a whole has the potential to be a major exporter of fossil fuels for decades and even generations to come. Since the 1970s, pessimism about America’s energy future has been one of the cornerstones on which the decline theorists erected their castles of doom; we are now entering a time when energy abundance will be an argument for continued American dynamism. The energy revolution isn’t a magic wand that can make all America’s wishes come true, but it is **a powerful wind in the sails of both America’s domestic economy and of its international goals**. The United States isn’t the only big winner of the energy revolution — Canada, Israel and China among others will also make gains — but the likely consequences of the energy revolution for America’s global agenda are so large, that the chief effect of the revolution is likely to be its role in shoring up the foundations of the American-led world order.

#### And it allows us to determine how the system functions- alters the global balance of power

Gjelten 12 (Tom, Diplomatic Correspondent – NPR, “The Dash for Gas: The Golden Age of an Energy Game-Changer,” World Affairs, Jan/Feb, http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/dash-gas-golden-age-energy-game-changer)

For a fresh perspective on geopolitical trends, look at the world through the lens of the natural gas trade. One of the reasons for Israeli unease with the Arab Spring is that the democratic uprising that took down Hosni Mubarak also brought interruptions in Israel’s supply of natural gas, much of which since 2008 has come from Egypt. Wondering about China’s new interest in Australia and Qatar? It’s about their abundant gas supplies and China’s tremendous energy needs. Desperate for signs of cooperation from North Korea? Check out reports that Kim Jong-il may agree to the construction of a natural gas pipeline that would link Russia, Pyongyang, and Seoul. From Asia to the Middle East to North America, a boom in natural gas usage is rearranging international connections, with major repercussions for global politics. Energy consumers see that natural gas is relatively inexpensive, provided it can be transported efficiently, and abundant, especially if it can be harvested from shale rock and other unconventional deposits. The International Energy Agency (IEA) predicts that over the next twenty-five years gas will be the fastest-growing energy source, overtaking coal as soon as 2030. Around the world, natural gas is fast becoming the fuel of choice for electric power generation, especially with nuclear losing its appeal in the aftermath of the Fukushima disaster. Energy experts predict gas could even displace oil in the transportation sector, as car and truck engines are redesigned. The trend has so impressed IEA analysts that the agency in 2011 boldly predicted that the world is entering “a golden age of gas.” The implications are significant. Because gas is somewhat cleaner than other fossil fuels, its rise as a fuel source should have environmental benefits. Because it is cheaper than oil, its increased use would lower energy costs and bring energy to millions of people who lack access to it now. But among the most striking consequences of a dramatic growth in natural gas consumption would be its effect on international relations. The energy trade is an important determinant of the global balance of power, and the shift to natural gas will introduce **a new set of winners and losers**, bringing greater independence to many countries and reducing the energy leverage that oil producers have traditionally enjoyed. After chairing an advisory panel on the subject for the Department of Energy, former CIA director John Deutch concluded that the prospective geopolitical shifts amount to no less than “a natural gas revolution” in global affairs. A big difference between gas and oil is the trading infrastructure. While oil can be shipped in tankers, gas has moved mainly through pipelines, thus confining it largely to regional markets. Liquefied natural gas (LNG) is facilitating the development of a global market in gas, but it is still traded largely on a country-to-country basis, with negotiated prices that are specified in contracts. As gas usage has grown, these gas deals have grown more important. In Bolivia, for instance, a determination to use natural gas wealth for political ends has affected relations with its neighbors for most of the past decade. Privately financed exploration in the late 1990s revealed that the country’s proven gas reserves were six times greater than what was previously believed, but Bolivian leaders could not agree on how to exploit them. A public outcry forced President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada to resign and leave the country in 2003 after he proposed to export natural gas to Mexico and the United States through a terminal in Chile, where it was to have been liquefied. (Anti-Chilean sentiment has run deep in Bolivia ever since a war with Chile in 1879 cost the country its Pacific access.) Bolivian gas is now sold instead to Brazil and Argentina, but disputes with Brazil over the terms of the gas contract have cast a shadow over that relationship in recent years, and management of the country’s gas exports is probably Bolivia’s top foreign-policy challenge. The Bolivian case shows how the natural gas trade is more likely to be complicated by resource nationalism than the oil business would be. In a pique, Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez can say he is prepared to cut off oil sales to the United States, but because oil is a globally traded commodity managed by middlemen, the threat is largely meaningless. For every buyer, there will always be a seller. State-to-state gas deals, by contrast, are more likely to carry geopolitical overtones. In 2005, for example, Egypt took the bold step of agreeing to sell natural gas to Israel. The gas began flowing in 2008 through a pipeline that runs across the Sinai peninsula and continues undersea to the Israeli port of Ashkelon. Israel depends on natural gas for much of its power generation, and the deal with Egypt has provided the country with more than forty percent of its gas needs. The notion of exporting gas to Israel has been highly unpopular in Egypt, however, and in the months following the collapse of the Mubarak regime, the Sinai pipeline has been repeatedly blown up, forcing Israel to fire up unused coal plants and convert several gas-fueled generating stations to run on fuel oil or diesel instead, at a cost of several million dollars. But the country had a possible solution: In December 2010, a Houston-based energy exploration company announced “a significant natural gas discovery” about eighty miles off Israel’s coast. Preliminary measurements suggested it could be the world’s biggest deepwater gas discovery in ten years and could provide Israel with enough gas to become a net exporter, providing it with more clout in its regional energy relationships. South Korea also relies on imported energy sources and is keen on natural gas, which explains its interest in a Russian proposal to build a pipeline that would carry Russian gas from Siberia across the Korean peninsula. The idea has been floated for years, but North Korean leader Kim Jong-il apparently gave the proposal his firm support during a meeting in August 2011 with Russian President Dmitri Medvedev. South Korean President Lee Myung-bak subsequently agreed to work closely with the Russians to make the project a reality. The South Koreans have offered to build a natural gas power generating plant in the north as compensation for Pyongyang’s support for the pipeline. The key to the project’s success would be a design that would reassure Seoul that the North Korean authorities had no incentive to steal the gas or cut off the supply before it reaches the south. The textbook illustration of a link between geopolitics and the natural gas trade is Russia. As of 2010, the country was the world’s top gas producer (after briefly being surpassed by the United States), with one state-controlled company, Gazprom, accounting for about eighty percent of the country’s production. Originally part of the Soviet Union’s Ministry of Gas Industry, Gazprom is in effect a state monopoly, and its power and reach are without comparison in the energy world. The company has its own armed forces, with as many as twenty thousand armed security guards and a private fleet of unmanned drones, used mainly to monitor pipelines and production facilities. The company effectively operates as an arm of the Russian state, and the company’s gas deals in Europe and Asia can legitimately be seen as an extension of Russian foreign policy, exemplifying the growing importance of “gas diplomacy.” Though its relative importance as a gas provider to Europe has diminished over the past ten years, Russia still meets about a quarter of Europe’s needs, more than any other supplier, and European governments have long been uneasy about their dependence on Russian gas. About eighty percent of the Russian gas shipment to Europe goes through Ukraine, and the flow has been cut on two major occasions at least in part because of geopolitical wrangling. In January 2006, after Kiev resisted price increase demands, Gazprom reduced the flow of gas to Ukraine, causing shortages in other European countries that received gas through Ukraine. Politics seems to have played a role in the Russian move. Ukraine at the time was moving closer to the West, and Ukrainian leaders charged that Moscow, with its price increase demands, was trying to “blackmail” Ukraine into changing its political course. The gas flow was cut once again in January 2009, causing a severe midwinter gas shortage across Europe. The two episodes convinced many European leaders that Russia was ready and willing to use Gazprom’s clout in what it considered its “privileged sphere of influence,” with the goal of bringing the former Soviet republics back under Moscow’s control. Joschka Fischer, the German foreign minister and vice chancellor from 1998 to 2005, spoke for many European observers when he wrote in 2010, “The primary goal of Russian gas policy isn’t economic but political, namely to further the aim of revising the post-Soviet order in Europe.” The eagerness of European countries to reduce their dependence on Russian gas has prompted ongoing efforts to find alternative supply routes. Iraq and the former Soviet republics of Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan are promising sources, and for about a decade European authorities have been scheming to develop a gas pipeline that would bypass Russia. The Nabucco pipeline project, launched in 2002, would bring gas from the Caspian basin across Turkey to a hub in Austria. In addition, BP and two Italian companies have been promoting pipeline projects of their own along that southern corridor. The European Commission and the United States have both given strong backing to the Nabucco project, but the pipeline planners have had a difficult time lining up the supply commitments needed to make the project economically worthwhile. Moscow has put pressure on the Central Asian states to send their gas to Russia rather than Europe, and China is pursuing supply deals of its own in the region. Among the major new developments has been the construction of new facilities to liquefy natural gas. Petroleum engineers have long known how to convert gas into liquid form through extreme cooling, but only in recent years has the LNG industry expanded to the point that it has altered gas trading patterns. The construction of dozens of new liquefaction and regasification plants around the world, along with the introduction of LNG tanker ships, has made it possible for island nations like Australia to become major gas exporters, and it has given gas-consuming countries new supply sources. The United States, Japan, China, and European countries were all quick to embrace the industry. (In the US alone, twelve new terminals have been built to receive LNG, with plants to regasify the LNG for shipment through pipelines around the country.) The development has been rapid. The International Energy Agency predicts that between 2008 and 2020 total liquefaction capacity will double. Qatar, which opened its first LNG plant in 1997, by 2006 had become the world’s top LNG producer and was investing in LNG terminals around the world. For European countries with terminals, importing LNG from Qatar or Algeria or Nigeria is another way to reduce dependence on Russian supplies. By 2035, for example, LNG is expected to supply about half of the United Kingdom’s natural gas needs, with imports from Qatar leading the way. British Prime Minister David Cameron’s February 2011 visit to Qatar, culminating in a new gas deal, put Moscow on notice that Europe had alternatives to Russian gas. Qatar and other LNG exporters have an even more inviting market in Asia. The IEA foresees China’s gas consumption growing by nearly six percent annually up to 2035. Japan, having lost much of its nuclear generating capacity as a result of the March 2011 earthquake and tsunami, is now a huge gas market as well, and LNG imports from Australia, Qatar, and the other gas exporting countries will be essential to its energy mix. Such developments were not foreseen twenty years ago. The LNG industry has diversified the gas trade, introducing new producers into the picture and giving gas importers more supply choices just as their demand for gas is growing. Without a doubt, the most revolutionary recent development in the natural gas world has been an improvement in the ability to extract gas from shale rock and other unconventional sources. Geologists have known for two hundred years that shale contains combustible gas, but the tightness of the shale formation meant that the gas was generally considered unrecoverable. In the last decade, however, energy companies in the United States have found that it is economically possible to harvest shale gas through the use of hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”), by which large amounts of water mixed with sand and chemicals are injected at high pressure into the rock formations in order to free the gas trapped inside. In addition, gas producers are now employing horizontal drilling techniques, turning their drill bits in a horizontal direction after reaching a deep shale reservoir and thus reaching more deposits from a single well. These developments have proven so promising that analysts are dramatically increasing their estimates of how much shale gas can be recovered around the world. In the United States, shale accounted for almost no gas production as recently as 2000. It now provides about twenty percent of the total production, and within twenty years it could be half. The US government’s Energy Information Administration has estimated that if recoverable shale gas reserves are included, the United States may have enough natural gas to meet US needs for the next hundred years, at current consumption rates. Such estimates are imprecise and may well be adjusted downward, but the production of shale gas has already dramatically altered the US energy picture. Just a few years ago, it was assumed that the United States would be a net importer of natural gas, with much of it arriving as LNG. But the terminals and regasification facilities that were built to facilitate LNG imports are now going largely unused. The successful production of shale gas could even mean the United States will soon be a net gas exporter. Some of the existing regasification facilities, built for LNG imports, could actually be converted to liquefaction plants, so that excess domestic gas production can be exported as LNG. If the United States became self-sufficient in natural gas, there would be significant geopolitical implications. When Arab states in 1973 imposed an embargo on oil shipments to the United States as punishment for US support of Israel, American consumers learned how vulnerable their country was to the “oil weapon” when used by potentially hostile states. As the United States moves toward energy independence, **if only in gas**, that vulnerability disappears. There would also be geopolitical effects overseas. With the United States no longer importing LNG, that gas could go to European consumers instead, and Europe’s dependence on Russia for its gas supply would diminish. In 2000, Russia was supplying about forty percent of Europe’s gas; some estimates have the Russian share sliding to ten percent by 2040. Whether the United States can maintain a sharply upward trend in shale gas production **depends on whether the reserves are as promising as they now appear to be**, whether the gas price is sufficient to cover production costs, and especially whether environmental concerns associated with shale drilling are addressed. Hydraulic fracturing requires enormous amounts of water, and recycling or disposal of the waste water can be problematic. There have been cases where shale well casings have proved defective, and contamination of the surrounding soil or water has occurred. Authorities in New York, New Jersey, and Maryland have imposed temporary moratoria on fracking in order to assess the practice and determine whether it imposes any risks to drinking water or human health.

circumstances.

#### Maintaining the U.S. supported international order solves great power war

**Kagan 12** (Robert – senior fellow of foreign policy at the Center on the United States and Europe, America Has Made the World Freer, Safer and Wealthier, 3-14, p. http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2012/0314\_us\_power\_kagan.aspx)

We take a lot for granted about the way the world looks today -- the widespread freedom, the unprecedented global prosperity (even despite the current economic crisis), and the absence of war among great powers. In 1941 there were only a dozen democracies in the world. Today there are more than 100. For four centuries prior to 1950, global GDP rose by less than 1 percent a year. Since 1950 it has risen by an average of 4 percent a year, and billions of people have been lifted out of poverty. The first half of the 20th century saw the two most destructive wars in the history of mankind, and in prior centuries war among great powers was almost constant. But for the past 60 years no great powers have gone to war. This is the world America made when it assumed global leadership after World War II. Would this world order survive if America declined as a great power? Some American intellectuals insist that a "Post-American" world need not look very different from the American world and that all we need to do is "manage" American decline. But that is wishful thinking. If the balance of power shifts in the direction of other powers, the world order will inevitably change to suit their interests and preferences. Take the issue of democracy. For several decades, the balance of power in the world has favored democratic governments. In a genuinely post-American world, the balance would shift toward the great power autocracies. Both China and Russia already protect dictators like Syria's Bashar al-Assad. If they gain greater relative influence in the future, we will see fewer democratic transitions and more autocrats hanging on to power. What about the free market, free trade economic order? People assume China and other rising powers that have benefited so much from the present system would have a stake in preserving it. They wouldn't kill the goose that lays the golden eggs. But China's form of capitalism is heavily dominated by the state, with the ultimate goal being preservation of the ruling party. Although the Chinese have been beneficiaries of an open international economic order, they could end up undermining it simply because, as an autocratic society, their priority is to preserve the state's control of wealth and the power it brings. They might kill the goose because they can't figure out how to keep both it and themselves alive. Finally, what about the long peace that has held among the great powers for the better part of six decades? Many people imagine that American predominance will be replaced by some kind of multipolar harmony. But multipolar systems have historically been **neither stable nor peaceful**. War among the great powers was a common, if not constant, occurrence in the long periods of multipolarity in the 16th, 17th, and 18th centuries. The 19th century was notable for two stretches of great-power peace of roughly four decades each, punctuated, however, by major wars among great powers and culminating in World War I, the most destructive and deadly war mankind had known up to that point. The era of American predominance has shown that there is no better recipe **for great-power peace than certainty about who holds the upper hand**. Many people view the present international order as the inevitable result of human progress, a combination of advancing science and technology, an increasingly global economy, strengthening international institutions, evolving "norms" of international behavior, and the gradual but inevitable triumph of liberal democracy over other forms of government -- forces of change that transcend the actions of men and nations. But there was nothing inevitable about the world that was created after World War II. International order is not an evolution; it is an imposition. It is the domination of one vision over others -- in America's case, the domination of liberal free market principles of economics, democratic principles of politics, and a peaceful international system that supports these, over other visions that other nations and peoples may have. The present order will last only as long as those who favor it and benefit from it retain the will and capacity to defend it. If and when American power declines, the institutions and norms American power has supported will decline, too. Or they may collapse altogether as we transition into another kind of world order, or into disorder. We may discover then that the United States was essential to keeping the present world order together and that the alternative to American power was not peace and harmony but chaos and catastrophe -- which was what the world looked like right before the American order came into being.

### Exports

#### Contention 3 : LNG Exports

#### Currently, inadequate supply of natural gas causes domestic infighting over LNG exports – new, sustainable supply is key to export feasibility

Ebinger et al 12 (Charles, Senior Fellow and Director of the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, Kevin Massy, Assistant Director of the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, and Govinda Avasarala, Senior Research Assistant in the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, “Liquid Markets: Assessing the Case for U.S. Exports of Liquefied Natural Gas,” Brookings Institution, Policy Brief 12-01, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2012/5/02%20lng%20exports%20ebinger/0502\_lng\_exports\_ebinger.pdf)

For an increase in U.S. exports of LNG to be considered feasible, there has to be an adequate and sustainable domestic resource base to support it. Natural gas currently accounts for approximately 25 percent of the U.S. primary energy mix.3 While it currently provides only a minority of U.S. gas supply, shale gas production is increasing at a rapid rate: from 2000 to 2006, shale gas production increased by an average annual rate of 17 percent; from 2006 to 2010, production increased by an annual average rate of 48 percent (see Figure 2).4 According to the Energy Information Adminis- tration (EIA), shale gas production in the United States reached 4.87 trillion cubic feet (tcf) in 2010, or 23 percent of U.S. dry gas production. By 2035, it is estimated that shale gas production will account for 46 percent of total domestic natural gas production. Given the centrality of shale gas to the future of the U.S. gas sector, much of the discussion over potential exports **hinges on the prospects for its sustained availability and development**. For exports to be feasible, gas from shale and other unconventional sources needs to both offset declines in conventional production and **compete with new and incumbent domestic end uses**. There have been a number of reports and studies that attempt to identify the total amount of technically recoverable shale gas resources—the volumes of gas retrievable using current technology irrespective of cost—available in the United States. These estimates vary from just under 700 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of shale gas to over 1,800 tcf (see table 1). To put these numbers in context, the United States consumed just over 24 tcf of gas in 2010, suggesting that the estimates for the shale gas resource alone would be enough to satisfy between 25 and 80 years of U.S. domestic demand. The estimates for recoverable shale gas resources also compare with an estimate for total U.S. gas resources (onshore and offshore, including Alaska) of 2,543 tcf. Based on the range of estimates below, shale gas could therefore account for between 29 percent and 52 percent of the total technically recoverable natural gas resource in the United States. In addition to the size of the economically recoverable resources, two other major factors will have an impact on the sustainability of shale gas production: the productivity of shale gas wells; and the demand for the equipment used for shale gas production. The productivity of shale gas wells has been a subject of much recent debate, with some industry observers suggesting that undeveloped wells may prove to be less productive than those developed to date. However, a prominent view among independent experts is that sustainability of shale gas production is not a cause for serious concern, owing to the continued rapid improvement in technologies and production processes.

#### Perception is key – new supply removes uncertainty over shale gas – that makes LNG exports economical

Ebinger et al 12 (Charles, Senior Fellow and Director of the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, Kevin Massy, Assistant Director of the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, and Govinda Avasarala, Senior Research Assistant in the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, “Liquid Markets: Assessing the Case for U.S. Exports of Liquefied Natural Gas,” Brookings Institution, Policy Brief 12-01, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2012/5/02%20lng%20exports%20ebinger/0502\_lng\_exports\_ebinger.pdf)

Aside from the price impact of potential U.S. LNG exports, a major concern among opponents is that such exports would diminish U.S. “energy security”; that exports would deny the United States of a strategically important resource. The extent to which such concerns are **valid** depends on several factors, including the size of the domestic resource base, and the liquidity and functionality of global trade. As Part I of this report notes, geological evidence suggests that the volumes of LNG export under consideration would not materially affect the availability of natural gas for the domestic market. Twenty years of LNG exports at the rate of 6 bcf/day, phased in over the course of 6 years, would increase demand by approximately 38 tcf. As presented in Part I, four existing estimates of total technically recoverable shale gas resources range from 687 tcf to 1,842 tcf; therefore, exporting 6 bcf/day of LNG over the course of twenty years would consume between 2 and 5.5 percent of total shale gas resources. While the estimates for **shale gas reserves are uncertain**, in a scenario where reserves are perceived to be lower than expected, domestic natural gas prices would increase and exports would almost immediately become uneconomic. In the long-term, it is possible that U.S. prices and international prices will converge to the point at which they settle at similar levels. In that case, the United States would have more than adequate import capacity (through bi-directional import/export facilities) to import gas when economic.

#### Lifting federal restrictions diversifies US energy portfolio – natural gas firms would export any surplus supply

Hartley and Medlock 7 (Dr. Peter, Professor of Economics – Rice University, Rice Scholar – Baker Institute for Public Policy, and Dr. Kenneth B., Fellow in Energy Policy – Baker Institute for Public Policy, Adjunct Assistant Professor of Economics – Rice University, “North American Security of Natural Gas Supply in a Global Market,” James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, November, <http://www.bakerinstitute.org/programs/energy-forum/publications/energy-studies/docs/natgas/ng_security-nov07.pdf>)

Higher Lower 48 production as a result of opening access also results in lower imports of LNG. Figure 13 depicts the change in LNG imports when access restrictions are lifted and all other factors remain unchanged. Total LNG imports into the United States in 2015 fall by about 0.85 tcf (or from about 2.4 tcf to 1.55 tcf) and in 2030 by 1.6 tcf (or from 8.8 tcf to 7.3 tcf). This figure includes pipeline imports to the United States from Mexico and Canada that are being reshipped from LNG import terminals from those countries. The decline under this scenario is represents a fall in LNG market share in the United States from just over 31 percent in the Reference Case in 2030 to 22 percent. The LNG receiving terminals that are most directly affected by the opening of access for drilling are those that are closest to these newly opened areas of the Atlantic, Pacific and east Gulf of Mexico OCS. For example, the terminals at Baja, New Brunswick, Pascagoula, Cove Point, and Delaware Bay see the largest volume reductions, in some years accounting for over 80 percent of the difference in overall import flows. This, like the situation with Alaska, represents some cannibalization of market share as companies who might drill in the now restricted OCS would be the same firms whose LNG would be **pushed out of the U.S. market**. One offsetting factor to the loss of market share for LNG and Alaskan supplies is that fact that lower average prices give a slight boost to overall U.S. demand. When access restrictions are lifted, lower prices encourage a modest increase in demand of about 1.3 bcfd by 2030, of which 1.0 bcfd is added natural gas demand in the power generation sector. While the change in average annual prices under this unrestricted scenario is not large, open access also allows existing demand to be served at lower cost. Thus, the net surplus benefits (including added consumer welfare) associated with expanded use of gas at lower prices can be quite large. For example, the benefit to consumers of a $0.42 reduction in price in 2017 (the maximum decrease seen over the modeling period) results in an annual saving of $10.3 billion for natural gas consumers. Of course, the benefits are lower in other years, but cumulative benefits still range into the many billions of dollars. Open access also brings other potential benefits, such as providing a degree of diversification that **mitigates the extent to which a cartel in international natural gas markets can operate effectively to threaten U.S. energy security**. This increased diversification is evident in Figure 14, which depicts the changes in LNG imports by major regions around the world. We see that when access restrictions are removed, the resulting decline in North American LNG imports is accompanied by an increase in LNG imports in other regions around the world. This occurs as global prices are reduced and demand is encouraged. Thus, both energy security benefits as well as welfare benefits accrue to nations outside the United States **as a result of eliminating access restrictions**. 30 In addition, when access restrictions are removed, LNG exports from the more marginal producers, which tend to be OPEC countries (Iran, other Middle East exporters, Venezuela, and to a lesser extent countries in North and West Africa), decline at the margin, falling collectively by 0.27 tcf in 2015, and as much as 0.43 tcf by 2030 (see Figure 15). Even though the volumes are small, the analysis suggests that this **less constrained supply picture** for the global market can contribute to rendering the United States and its allies **less vulnerable to the will** of any one producer, or the collective will of any group of producers, by enhancing the diversification of supply options. The wider swath of alternative supplies for Europe and northeast Asia translates into significantly reduced potential for producers in Russia and the Middle East to exert market power.

#### Export infrastructure exists – we can use import terminals to export

Levi 12 (Michael, Senior Fellow for Energy and Environment – Council on Foreign Relations, “A Strategy for U.S. Natural Gas Exports,” Hamilton Project – Brookings Institute, June, Discussion Paper 2012-04, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/6/13%20exports%20levi/06\_exports\_levi)

Additional gains would be realized because natural gas exports would exploit existing LNG infrastructure (i.e. some parts of existing import terminals) that would otherwise go unused and thus be worthless. These gains should approximately equal the value of the utilized LNG terminals (not including the value of their regasification facilities, which are not useful for exports), which are typically on the order of $1 billion for each billion cubic feet a day of capacity. Spread over a notional fifteen-year use period, this would add approximately $70 million a year for each billion cubic feet a day of exports. This brings the total estimated surplus from six billion cubic feet a day of exports to $3.1 billion to $3.7 billion.

#### Global export contracts are being renegotiated – now is key to get the US in the LNG export game

Ebinger et al 12 (Charles, Senior Fellow and Director of the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, Kevin Massy, Assistant Director of the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, and Govinda Avasarala, Senior Research Assistant in the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, “Liquid Markets: Assessing the Case for U.S. Exports of Liquefied Natural Gas,” Brookings Institution, Policy Brief 12-01, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2012/5/02%20lng%20exports%20ebinger/0502\_lng\_exports\_ebinger.pdf).

LNG exports will help to sustain market liquidity in what looks to be an increasingly tight LNG market beyond 2015 (see Figure 10). Should LNG exports from the United States continue to be permitted, they will add to roughly 10 bcf/day of LNG that is expected to emerge from Australia between 2015 and 2020. Nevertheless, given the projected growth in demand for natural gas in China and India and assuming that some of Japan’s nuclear capacity remains offline, demand for natural gas will outpace the incremental supply. This makes U.S. LNG even more valuable on the international market. Although it will be important to global LNG markets, it is unlikely that the emergence of the United States as an exporter of LNG will change the existing pricing structure overnight. Not only is the market still largely dependent on long-term contracts, the overwhelming majority of new liquefaction capacity emerging in the next decade (largely from Australia) has already been contracted for at oil-indexed rates.108 The incremental LNG volumes supplied by the United States at floating Henry Hub rates will be small in comparison. But while U.S. LNG will not have a transformational impact, by establishing an alternate lower price for LNG derived through a different market mechanism, U.S. exports may be central in catalyzing future changes in LNG contract structure. As previously mentioned, this impact is already being felt in Europe. A number of German utilities have either renegotiated contracts or are seeking arbitration with natural gas suppliers in Norway and Russia. The Atlantic Basin will be a more immediate beneficiary of U.S. LNG exports than the Pacific Basin as many European contracts allow for periodic revisions to the oil-price linkage.109 In the Pacific Basin this contractual arrangement is not as common and most consumers are tied to their respective oil-linkage formulae for the duration of the contract.110 Despite the increasing demand following the Fukushima nuclear accident, however, Japanese LNG consumers are actively pursuing new arrangements for LNG contracts.111 There are other limits to the extent of the impact that U.S. LNG will have on global markets. It is unlikely that many of the LNG export facilities under consideration will reach final investment decision. Instead, it is more probable that U.S. natural gas prices will have rebounded sufficiently to the point that exports are not commercially viable beyond a certain threshold. (Figure 11 illustrates the estimated costs of delivering LNG to Japan in 2020.) This threshold, expected by many experts to be roughly 6 bcf/day by 2025, is modest in comparison to the roughly 11 bcf/day of Australian LNG export projects that have reached final investment decision and are expected to be online by 2020.

#### Scenario 1 : Trade Leadership

#### Globally, bilateral trade agreements are inevitable. However, the US is losing out – reinvigorated support for US-based FTAs solidifies our global trade leadership

Smith 11 (Rod, Editor – Feedstuffs, “US Trade Leadership Slipping,” Feedstuffs Food Link, 6-24, http://www.feedstuffsfoodlink.com/ME2/dirmod.asp?sid=&nm=&type=news&mod=News&mid=9A02E3B96F2A415ABC72CB5F516B4C10&tier=3&nid=FAA1AC2A45944313AAC3C0F446B2E2C4)

THE number of bilateral and regional free trade agreements (FTAs) being negotiated by countries around the world has increased significantly in recent years, creating new trade between parties to the agreements as consumers respond to lower-priced imports and to products and services not otherwise available domestically. This is a good result for those countries involved, but FTAs also divert trade from efficient non-members to less-efficient members that receive preferential treatment in the form of lower or no tariffs. This is happening now to the U.S., according to the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Economic Research Service (ERS). When countries agree to reduce tariffs and other trade barriers within an FTA, those trade barriers remain in place for other exporting countries, often **adversely affecting their competitiveness**, ERS researchers said in an article in the June issue of the agency's Amber Waves magazine. A recent ERS analysis of bilateral trade flows from 1975 to 2005 found empirical evidence that FTAs increase trade among agreement members and reduce trade between members and non-members, suggesting that the increasingly "large number of FTAs that do not include the U.S. may be eroding the U.S. presence in global markets," the researchers said. Another ERS study focused specifically on three FTAs: (1) the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)-Australia/New Zealand FTA, (2) the ASEAN-China FTA and (3) the Colombia-Mercosur FTA. The study found that the U.S., which is not a party to the agreements, was affected only modestly by the ASEAN pacts but was affected more negatively by the Colombia-Mercosur FTA, the researchers said. ASEAN, Australian and New Zealand tariffs on U.S. products and services, including agricultural and food products, are low to begin with, and the U.S. has an FTA with Australia that has opened Australia's markets to the U.S., they explained. However, U.S. products and services are exposed to high tariffs in Colombia and the Mercosur region, they said. The ASEAN region encompasses Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Burma. The Mercosur countries include Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. Slipping vanguard The ERS researchers, citing World Trade Organization data, noted that there were 290 FTAs in force as of Dec. 1, 2010, and more than two-thirds of them were put in place in the last decade (Figure). This trend will continue as a number of additional agreements are being negotiated, they said. Almost all countries are now party to at least one FTA, the researchers said, but the U.S., "once in the vanguard of countries creating FTAs," has decreased its emphasis on trade pacts in recent years. Between 2003 and 2007, the U.S. negotiated and implemented eight FTAs with 13 countries, they said, but for almost four years, important pacts that were negotiated with South Korea, Colombia and Panama have not been submitted to Congress for ratification. The share of the world's trade involving FTA members has been increasing in recent years, the researchers said, noting that 54% of the world's agricultural trade was between FTA partners in 2009 but that only 41% of U.S. agricultural trade was with FTA partners. Major agricultural producers such as Canada and the European Union have been "particularly active" in negotiating more FTAs than the U.S., they said. The primary purpose of an FTA is to achieve preferential access to a market, thereby securing "a competitive edge" over other exporters, but non-economic objectives also are important, including geopolitical achievements leading to peace, stability and development in a region, the researchers explained. Additionally, uncertainties associated with successfully concluding the current multilateral WTO Doha Round have likely prompted many nations to seek bilateral relationships, they noted. Damaged vanguard Returning to the ASEAN and Colombia-Mercosur FTAs, the ERS researchers reported that U.S. agricultural exports to the ASEAN nations totaled $20 billion in 2009 -- almost 50% of which was for soybeans, with cotton and oilseed products accounting for another 12%. The U.S. will lose only about 6% of its ASEAN market, they said. However, the Colombia-Mercosur pact "appears to be an example of appreciable damage" to U.S. exports to Colombia, they said, causing a loss of $305 million in sales of corn and wheat alone, or about 25% of total U.S. agricultural sales to Colombia. The difference between the two ASEAN agreements and the Colombian FTA is that Colombia has imposed higher tariffs on principal U.S. exports than ASEAN has, the researchers said. Consequently, U.S. exporters to Colombia face heavy competition from Mercosur exporters, which are major producers of corn, soybeans and wheat and are exempt from the Colombian tariffs, they said. When the U.S. is not a partner, the effect FTAs have on U.S. agricultural exports varies depending on how high the tariffs are on U.S. products, how much tariffs were decreased on partner products and the degree to which partners can provide the products that the U.S. previously supplied, the researchers said. The U.S. advantages in being a large, low-cost and reliable supplier "are not automatically canceled" by such FTAs, they said, but FTAs always provide their members with "a margin of tariff preference" over the U.S. that, in many cases, "can lead to serious declines" in U.S. agricultural exports. Here's our point: U.S. trade leadership slipping TRADE works. Trade creates economic positives, allowing producers to be profitable and sustainable and to expand; trade creates jobs and strong, vibrant economies for exporting nations. Trade also helps nations develop and promote peace. However, the U.S., once the world's vanguard in negotiating trade agreements and urging fair and free trade, is rapidly sliding into the background as other countries and regions implement trade pacts in which the U.S. is not a member. This not only affects our economic health but **our leadership in the world**.

#### LNG exports are key – gives the US leverage in trade negotiations

Levi 12 (Michael, Senior Fellow for Energy and Environment – Council on Foreign Relations, “A Strategy for U.S. Natural Gas Exports,” Hamilton Project – Brookings Institute, June, Discussion Paper 2012-04, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/6/13%20exports%20levi/06\_exports\_levi)

U.S. law distinguishes between LNG exports to countries with which the United States has relevant free trade agreements (FTAs), which are fast tracked for approval, and exports to other countries, which face more rigorous review and must be judged to be consistent with the U.S. national interest. Some have argued that this distinction should be abolished, since it interferes with free trade. The United States should maintain the distinction, which can **give it leverage in trade negotiations** without entailing any economic costs. U.S. natural gas exports can also provide a platform for more effective U.S. foreign and trade policy. To that end, the United States should use foreign access to U.S. gas exports as leverage in trade negotiations, and actively seek to steer global gas trade toward greater transparency and market-based pricing.

#### Impact is great power wars and accesses every impact

**Panitchpakdi 4** (DG Supachai, Former Director-General – World Trade Organization, “American Leadership and the World Trade Organization: What is the Alternative?”, National Press Club, 2-26, http://www.wto.org/french/ news\_f/spsp\_f/spsp22\_f.htm)

I can sum up my message today in three sentences: The United States, more than any single country, created the world trading system. The US has never had more riding on the strength of that system. And US leadership — especially in the current Doha trade talks — is indispensable to the system's success. It is true that as the WTO's importance to the world economy increases, so too does the challenge of making it work: there are more countries, more issues, trade is in the spot light as never before. But the fiction that there is an alternative to the WTO — or to US leadership — is both naïve and dangerous. Naïve because it fails to recognize that multilateralism has become more — not less — important to advancing US interests. Dangerous because it risks undermining the very objectives the US seeks — freer trade, stronger rules, a more open and secure world economy. The Doha Round is a crucial test. The core issues — services, agriculture, and industrial tariffs — are obviously directly relevant to the US. America is highly competitive in services — the fastest growing sector of the world economy, and where the scope for liberalization is greatest. In agriculture too the US is competitive across many commodities — but sky-high global barriers and subsidies impede and distort agricultural trade. Industrial tariffs also offer scope for further liberalization — especially in certain markets and sectors. But what is at stake in these talks is more than the economic benefits that would flow from a successful deal. The real issue is the relevance of the multilateral trading system. Its expanded rules, broader membership, and binding dispute mechanism means that the new WTO — created less than ten years ago — is pivotal to international economic relations. But this means that the costs of failure are also higher — with ramifications that can be felt more widely. Advancing the Doha agenda would confirm the WTO as the focal point for global trade negotiations, and as the key forum for international economic cooperation. The credibility of the institution would be greatly enhanced. But if the Doha negotiations stumble, doubts may grow, not just about the WTO's effectiveness, but about the future of multilateralism in trade. This should be a major concern to the US for two reasons: First, the US is now integrated with the world economy as never before. A quarter of US GDP is tied to international trade, up from 10 per cent in 1970 — the largest such increase of any developed economy over this period. A third of US growth since 1990 has been generated by trade. And America's trade is increasingly global in scope — 37 per cent with Canada and Mexico, 23 per cent with Europe, 27 per cent with Asia. Last year alone, exports to China rose by almost 30 per cent. The US has also grown more reliant on the rules of the multilateral system to keep world markets open. Not only has it initiated more WTO dispute proceedings than any other country — some 75 since 1995 — according to USTR it has also won or successfully settled most of the cases it has brought. The point is this: even the US cannot achieve prosperity on its own; it is increasingly dependent on international trade, and the rules-based economic order that underpins it. As the biggest economy, largest trader and one of the most open markets in the world, it is axiomatic that the US has the greatest interest in widening and deepening the multilateral system. Furthermore, expanding international trade through the WTO generates increased global prosperity, in turn creating yet more opportunities for the US economy. The second point is that strengthening the world trading system is essential to America's wider global objectives. Fighting terrorism, reducing poverty, improving health, integrating China and other countries in the global economy — all of these issues are linked, in one way or another, to world trade. This is not to say that trade is the answer to all America's economic concerns; only that meaningful solutions are inconceivable without it. The world trading system is the linchpin of today's global order — underpinning its security as well as its prosperity. A successful WTO is an example of how multilateralism can work. Conversely, if it weakens or fails, much else could fail with it. This is something which the US — at the epicentre of a more interdependent world — cannot afford to ignore. These priorities must continue to guide US policy — as they have done since the Second World War. America has been the main driving force behind eight rounds of multilateral trade negotiations, including the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round and the creation of the WTO. The US — together with the EU — was instrumental in launching the latest Doha Round two years ago. Likewise, the recent initiative, spearheaded by Ambassador Zoellick, to re-energize the negotiations and move them towards a successful conclusion is yet another example of how essential the US is to the multilateral process — signalling that the US remains committed to further liberalization, that the Round is moving, and that other countries have a tangible reason to get on board. The reality is this: when the US leads the system can move forward; when it withdraws, the system drifts. The fact that US leadership is essential, does not mean it is easy. As WTO rules have expanded, so too has as the complexity of the issues the WTO deals with — everything from agriculture and accounting, to tariffs and telecommunication. The WTO is also exerting huge gravitational pull on countries to join — and participate actively — in the system. The WTO now has 146 Members — up from just 23 in 1947 — and this could easily rise to 170 or more within a decade. Emerging powers like China, Brazil, and India rightly demand a greater say in an institution in which they have a growing stake. So too do a rising number of voices outside the system as well. More and more people recognize that the WTO matters. More non-state actors — businesses, unions, environmentalists, development NGOs — want the multilateral system to reflect their causes and concerns. A decade ago, few people had even heard of the GATT. Today the WTO is front page news. A more visible WTO has inevitably become a more politicized WTO. The sound and fury surrounding the WTO's recent Ministerial Meeting in Cancun — let alone Seattle — underline how challenging managing the WTO can be. But these challenges can be exaggerated. They exist precisely because so many countries have embraced a common vision. Countries the world over have turned to open trade — and a rules-based system — as the key to their growth and development. They agreed to the Doha Round because they believed their interests lay in freer trade, stronger rules, a more effective WTO. Even in Cancun the great debate was whether the multilateral trading system was moving fast and far enough — not whether it should be rolled back. Indeed, it is critically important that we draw the right conclusions from Cancun — which are only now becoming clearer. The disappointment was that ministers were unable to reach agreement. The achievement was that they exposed the risks of failure, highlighted the need for North-South collaboration, and — after a period of introspection — acknowledged the inescapable logic of negotiation. Cancun showed that, if the challenges have increased, it is because the stakes are higher. The bigger challenge to American leadership comes from inside — not outside — the United States. In America's current debate about trade, jobs and globalization we have heard a lot about the costs of liberalization. We need to hear more about the opportunities. We need to be reminded of the advantages of America's openness and its trade with the world — about the economic growth tied to exports; the inflation-fighting role of imports, the innovative stimulus of global competition. We need to explain that freer trade works precisely because it involves positive change — better products, better job opportunities, better ways of doing things, better standards of living. While it is true that change can be threatening for people and societies, it is equally true that the vulnerable are not helped by resisting change — by putting up barriers and shutting out competition. They are helped by training, education, new and better opportunities that — with the right support policies — can flow from a globalized economy. The fact is that for every job in the US threatened by imports there is a growing number of high-paid, high skill jobs created by exports. Exports supported 7 million workers a decade ago; that number is approaching around 12 million today. And these new jobs — in aerospace, finance, information technology — pay 10 per cent more than the average American wage. We especially need to inject some clarity — and facts — into the current debate over the outsourcing of services jobs. Over the next decade, the US is projected to create an average of more than 2 million new services jobs a year — compared to roughly 200,000 services jobs that will be outsourced. I am well aware that this issue is the source of much anxiety in America today. Many Americans worry about the potential job losses that might arise from foreign competition in services sectors. But it’s worth remembering that concerns about the impact of foreign competition are not new. Many of the reservations people are expressing today are echoes of what we heard in the 1970s and 1980s. But people at that time didn’t fully appreciate the power of American ingenuity. Remarkable advances in technology and productivity laid the foundation for unprecedented job creation in the 1990s and there is no reason to doubt that this country, which has shown time and again such remarkable potential for competing in the global economy, will not soon embark again on such a burst of job-creation. America's openness to service-sector trade — combined with the high skills of its workforce — will lead to more growth, stronger industries, and a shift towards higher value-added, higher-paying employment. Conversely, closing the door to service trade is a strategy for killing jobs, not saving them. Americans have never run from a challenge and have never been defeatist in the face of strong competition. Part of this challenge is to create the conditions for global growth and job creation here and around the world. I believe Americans realize what is at stake. The process of opening to global trade can be disruptive, but they recognize that the US economy cannot grow and prosper any other way. They recognize the importance of finding global solutions to shared global problems. Besides, what is the alternative to the WTO? Some argue that the world's only superpower need not be tied down by the constraints of the multilateral system. They claim that US sovereignty is compromised by international rules, and that multilateral institutions limit rather than expand US influence. Americans should be deeply sceptical about these claims. Almost none of the trade issues facing the US today are any easier to solve unilaterally, bilaterally or regionally. The reality is probably just the opposite. What sense does it make — for example — to negotiate e-commerce rules bilaterally? Who would be interested in disciplining agricultural subsidies in a regional agreement but not globally? How can bilateral deals — even dozens of them — come close to matching the economic impact of agreeing to global free trade among 146 countries? Bilateral and regional deals can sometimes be a complement to the multilateral system, but they can never be a substitute. There is a bigger danger. By treating some countries preferentially, bilateral and regional deals exclude others — fragmenting global trade and distorting the world economy. Instead of liberalizing trade — and widening growth — they carve it up. Worse, they have a domino effect: bilateral deals inevitably beget more bilateral deals, as countries left outside are forced to seek their own preferential arrangements, or risk further marginalization. This is precisely what we see happening today. There are already over two hundred bilateral and regional agreements in existence, and each month we hear of a new or expanded deal. There is a basic contradiction in the assumption that bilateral approaches serve to strengthen the multilateral, rules-based system. Even when intended to spur free trade, they can ultimately risk undermining it. This is in no one's interest, least of all the United States. America led in the creation of the multilateral system after 1945 precisely to avoid a return to hostile blocs — blocs that had done so much to fuel interwar instability and conflict. America's vision, in the words of Cordell Hull, was that “enduring peace and the welfare of nations was indissolubly connected with the friendliness, fairness and freedom of world trade”. Trade would bind nations together, making another war unthinkable. Non-discriminatory rules would prevent a return to preferential deals and closed alliances. A network of multilateral initiatives and organizations — the Marshal Plan, the IMF, the World Bank, and the GATT, now the WTO — would provide the institutional bedrock for the international rule of law, not power. Underpinning all this was the idea that freedom — free trade, free democracies, the free exchange of ideas — was essential to peace and prosperity, a more just world. It is a vision that has emerged pre-eminent a half century later. Trade has expanded twenty-fold since 1950. Millions in Asia, Latin America, and Africa are being lifted out of poverty, and millions more have new hope for the future. All the great powers — the US, Europe, Japan, India, China and soon Russia — are part of a rules-based multilateral trading system, greatly increasing the chances for world prosperity and peace. There is a growing realization that — in our interdependent world — sovereignty is constrained, not by multilateral rules, but by the absence of rules. All of these were America’s objectives. The US needs to be both clearer about the magnitude of what it has achieved, and more realistic about what it is trying to — and can — accomplish. Multilateralism can be slow, messy, and tortuous. But it is also indispensable to managing an increasingly integrated global economy. Multilateralism is based on the belief that all countries — even powerful countries like the United States — are made stronger and more secure through international co-operation and rules, and by working to strengthen one another from within a system, not outside of it. Multilateralism's greatest ideal is the ideal of negotiation, compromise, consensus, not coercion. As Churchill said of democracy, it is the worst possible system except for all the others. I do not believe America's long-term economic interests have changed. Nor do I believe that America's vision for a just international order has become blurred. If anything, the American vision has been sharpened since the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington; sharpened by the realization that there is now a new struggle globally between the forces of openness and modernity, and the forces of separatism and reaction. More than ever, America's interests lie in an open world economy resting on the foundation of a strong, rules-based multilateral system. More and more, America's growth and security are tied to the growth and security of the world economy as a whole. American leadership today is more — not less — important to our increasingly interconnected planet. A recent successful, and much needed, example is the multilateral agreement on intellectual property rights and access to medicines for poor countries, in which the US played a pivotal role. It would be a tragic mistake if the Doha Round, which offers the world a once-in-a-generation opportunity to eliminate trade distortions, to strengthen trade rules, and open markets across the world, were allowed to founder. We need courage and the collective political will to ensure a balanced and equitable outcome. What is the alternative? It is a fragmented world, with greater conflict and uncertainty. A world of the past, not the future — one that America turned away from after 1945, and that we should reject just as decisively today. America must lead. The multilateral trading system is too important to fail. The world depends on it. So does America.

#### Scenario 2 : Chinese Rare Earth

#### Absent LNG exports, China will win tougher restrictions on rare earth exports

Levi 12 (Michael, Senior Fellow for Energy and Environment – Council on Foreign Relations, “A Strategy for U.S. Natural Gas Exports,” Hamilton Project – Brookings Institute, June, Discussion Paper 2012-04, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/6/13%20exports%20levi/06\_exports\_levi)

Potential U.S. exports might also be exploited for wider strategic gain under the right conditions. Current U.S. law makes approval of exports to markets with which the United States has free-trade agreements essentially automatic, but requires extensive review and subsequent approval for exports to others. This ought to give the United States leverage in broader trade negotiations with would-be importers. For example, Japanese officials and market participants have noticed that the recent U.S.-South Korea free-trade agreement will give South Korea special access to U.S. natural gas exports, and have inquired as to whether Japanese participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade arrangement would give them similar privileges (Interviews 2011). Regardless of whether Japanese and other policymakers are wise in wanting direct access to U.S. exports, this sort of dynamic can only strengthen the U.S. hand in international trade negotiations, which can lead to broader gains for U.S. consumers and firms. Conversely, if the United States were to restrain LNG exports, it would almost certainly face wider trade-related problems. The consequences could be broad, affecting support for open trade in general, but they would likely have special impact on **other resource-related disputes**. Article XI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) prohibits sustained quantitative restrictions on energy exports unless they are related “to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption” (Selivanova 2007). U.S. policy would be the opposite: it would be made in conjunction with efforts to encourage both domestic production and consumption of natural gas. Indeed, the United States has recently joined Europe and Japan in challenging Chinese restrictions on exports of **rare earth metals**—which are critical to a variety of defense, electronics, and energy technologies—at the World Trade Organization (WTO) (Palmer 2011). The arguments that the United States would need to invoke in order to restrain LNG exports—particularly the prospects of environmental damage and harm to domestic industry—are precisely those that China would like to use to defend its own restrictions on rare earths exports; China could all but take the U.S. justification of curbs on LNG exports, change a few words, and use it in its own defense. It would likely be difficult for the United States to sustain limits to U.S. LNG exports while fighting Chinese limits on exports of rare earth metals.

#### Even if exports don’t get approved, the plan alone removes US hypocrisy towards rare earth

Tamny 12 (John, “China's "Rare Earths", and the Hypocrisy of the Obama Administration,” Forbes, 3-25, http://www.forbes.com/sites/johntamny/2012/03/25/chinas-rare-earths-and-the-hyprocrisy-of-the-obama-administration/)

As is well known now, the Obama administration recently joined the EU and Japan in a lawsuit filed at the World Trade Organization over China’s alleged restrictions on the export of rare earth elements. For those who’ve properly ignored what until now should have been a non-story, “rare earths” are metals essential for the production of everything from smart phones, to hybrid cars, to military equipment. At present, China produces roughly 95% of rare earths, and it’s of course assumed that the high price of these obscure metals has resulted from export restrictions. Obama et al really ought to look in the mirror on this one, and once they do, leave China alone. To see why, let’s think for a moment about what this is all about. The U.S. and others are telling China – the country – that it must sell more of what is endemic to China. The hypocrisy here is impressive, particularly considering the **myriad restrictions our own government puts on the exploration** for and mining of, nearly everything. What the Obama administration is doing here is the equivalent of China going to the WTO with a lawsuit demanding that we open up more of Alaska and other oil rich locales controlled by the U.S., not to mention reduce the various regulations controlling the mining of other commodities that the U.S. is rich in. If the Chinese were to do so, there’s no telling what the negative reaction would be from the U.S. political class, not to mention its citizenry. We’d be rightfully offended for another country nosing in on what should be a U.S. matter. It’s arguable that what makes the U.S. great is our collective lack of self-awareness that often reveals itself through some of the most disruptive entrepreneurial innovations known to mankind, but goodness, aren’t we crossing the line when we meddle in the affairs of other countries; essentially saying to them “Mine what we tell you to, and then sell to us”? A little humility is surely in order, for one.

#### **Hypocrisy is key – it’s the sole reason for Chinese protectionism**

Deas 8 (Destiny, JD – Duke University, Board of Community Disaster Relief Fund in Shrevport, “The Costs of Perceived Hypocrisy: the Impact of U.S. Treatment of Foreign Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises,” Duke Law Journal, 57 Duke L.J. 1795, Lexis)

Both the Chinese and U.S. acquisition rules may also run afoul of World Trade Organization (WTO) commitments. The United States has argued that its own acquisition n11 rules are no more restrictive than necessary to maintain national security. n12 Even if this argument is accepted, the perceived hypocrisy of the United States blocking politically unpopular acquisitions of U.S. entities by Chinese companies while simultaneously urging more openness in the global market undermines American influence and credibility. The costs of [\*1798] this perceived hypocrisy are not always clearly defined or restricted to national borders. Part I of this Note examines the relationship between the U.S. and Chinese policies regarding acquisitions of domestic enterprises by foreign investors. It describes how U.S. policies have triggered **heightened protectionism in China**. Part II analyzes the legality of U.S. and Chinese acquisition rules in light of both countries' commitments to the WTO's General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). It concludes that both countries have violated their obligations under the GATS, and it argues that these violations carry potential costs to the United States, China, and the world economy. Given U.S. commitments to free trade in services through the GATS, the United States must consider the impact of the perception of its own seemingly anti-free trade policies on the rest of the world, both in terms of developing the policies of their trading partners and in terms of the economic costs of violating treaty obligations.

**Reserves are insufficient- cutoff kills economic growth**

**Parthemore 11** - Fellow @ Center for a New American Security. Director of the Natural Security Program [Christine Parthemore (MA from Georgetown’s Security Studies Program), “Elements of Security: Mitigating the Risks of U.S. Dependence on Critical Minerals,” Center for a New American Security, June 2011, pg. <http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_Minerals_Parthemore.pdf>]

Assessing U.S. Vulnerability - Analysts vary widely in assessing the implications of U.S. dependence on critical minerals, despite broad acceptance of the physical reality that mineral resources are finite and the economic realities that requirements are ubiquitous and demand is growing. On one extreme, some analysts believe the 2010 incident between China and Japan suggests an approaching Hobbesian world in which resource demands outstrip supplies for minerals, nonrenewable energy sources and even food supplies. History indicates that conflict over absolute scarcities is unlikely. At the other end of the spectrum, many still believe that an open market and its invisible hand will continue to determine winners and losers with no serious repercussions for the United States given its purchasing power. In between these extremes, even staunch pragmatists will point to the 2010 China rare earths episode as proof of one basic tenet: The United States and other market-based economies no longer determine all the rules of global trade. Central to this narrative is a conundrum for policymakers. Reserve estimates show that global supplies of almost all minerals are adequate to meet expected global demands over the long term, and for decades into the future for most minerals. The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) indicates, for example, that world supplies of rare earths will be adequate for more than 100 years.13 These estimates, however, can be meaningless in the near term if supplies are insufficient, or if suppliers reduce exports or otherwise manipulate trade. For example, most experts project that global production of rare earths will likely be insufficient to meet the world’s demand over the next two to three years. The long-term sufficiency of supplies has no practical effect because it takes years and high capital costs to start up new mining and processing businesses for rare earths. Thus, the risks of inaction are high. A range of political, economic and geographic factors can disrupt supplies and cause price spikes that can create rifts in bilateral relations, trade disputes, accusations of economic sabotage and instability in countries that possess rare reserves of prized minerals. They can also give supplier countries extraordinary leverage that can alter geopolitical calculations, especially when single countries control most world supplies. For U.S. policymakers, the risks fall into two rough categories: **Disruptions, delivery lags and price spikes** that affect military assets and place unanticipated strains on defense procurement budgets; and lack of affordable access to minerals and raw materials preventing important national economic growth goals. The defense industrial base in the modern era differs greatly from any previous time. Often, actual scarcity is not required for problems to arise, as concerns about future scarcities often drive countries to behave as if shortages are occurring. The National Academies recently reported, “The risk of supply interruption arguably has increased or, at the very least, has become different from the more traditional threats associated with the more familiar ideas of war and conflict.”14 During World War I and World War II, for example, governments counted on domestic steel production – and even civilian willingness to contribute scrap materials for reuse and recycling – for tanks and other equipment. In contrast, modern warfare relies on globalized and privatized supply chains rather than a primarily domestic (and often government-run) network. Vulnerability to mineral supply disruptions is likewise far broader and more complicated than it was in previous eras. Policymakers should also consider minerals that play uniquely important roles in the American economy. Rare earths, for example, are important in petroleum refining, which today **enables the smooth functioning of the economy**. Looking to the longer term, much concern is turning toward minerals that may see booming demand as the economy develops a greater reliance on energy efficiency and renewable energy technologies, such as the lithium used in advanced batteries and hybrid and electric vehicles. These minerals will directly affect U.S. **economic competitiveness**, and plans for improving **economic growth** and **job development**. Pg. 11

#### Economic decline causes global war

**Royal 10** (Jedediah, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction – U.S. Department of Defense, “Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises”, Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, Ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215)

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin. 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Feaver, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner. 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases**,** as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularlyduring periods of economic downturn. They write: The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002. p. 89) Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. "Diversionary theory" suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate externalmilitary conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995). and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in theuse of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflictat systemic, dyadic and national levels.5 This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.

#### Rare earth access is key to first-strike missile guidance

**Kennedy 10** (J., President – Wings Enterprise, “Critical and Strategic Failure of Rare Earth Resources”, March, http://www.smenet.org/rareEarthsProject/TMS-NMAB-paperV-3.pdf)

The national defense issues are equally important. Rare earths are critical components for military jet engines, guided missiles and bombs, electrical countermeasures, anti-missile systems, satellite communication systems and armor, yet the U.S. has no domestic sources. Innovation Drives Industry – Industry Carries the EconomyAdvances in Materials Science are a result of tireless innovation; innovation seeking improvements in the performance and characteristics of material properties or a change in their form or function. Much of this work must eventually translate into commercial and military applications. Today many advances in material science are achieved through the application of rare earth oxides, elements and alloys. This group of elements, also known as the lanthanide series, represents the only known bridge to the next level of improved performance in the material properties for many metallurgical alloys, electrical conductivity, and instrument sensitivity and in some cases a mechanical or physical change in function. These lanthanides hold unique chemical, magnetic, electrical, luminescence and radioactive shielding characteristics. Combined with other elements they can help maintain or alter physical and structural characteristics under changing conditions. Today, these rare earth elements are essential to every computer hard drive, cell phone, energy efficient light bulb, many automotive pollution control devices and catalysts, hybrid automobiles and most, if not all, military guidance systems and advanced armor. Tomorrow, they will be used in ultra capacity wind turbines, magnetic refrigeration, zero emission automobiles, superconductors, sub-light-speed computer processors, nano-particle technologies for material and metallurgical applications, structurally amorphous metals, next generation military armor and TERFENOL-D Radar. America must lead in these developments. The entire U.S. defense system is completely interdependent upon REO enhanced technologies for our most advanced weapons guidance systems, advanced armor, secure communications, radar, advanced radar systems, weapons triggering systems and un-manned Drones. REO dependent weapons technologies are predominantly represented in our ‘first strike’ and un-manned capabilities. This national defense issue is not a case of limited exposure for first-strike capabilities. This first-strike vulnerability translates into risk exposure in every level of our national defense system, as the system is built around our presumptive technological and first-strike superiority. Yet the DoD has abandon its traditional procurement protocols for “strategic and critical” materials and components for weapons systems in favor of “the principles of free trade vii.”

#### And shortages are causing delays now- removing uncertainty key

**Richardson 10**

[Michael, 10/18, visiting senior research fellow at the Institute of South East Asian Studies in Singapore, Yale Global Online, “China’s Chokehold On Rare-Earth Minerals Raises Concerns ,” <http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/chinas-rare-earth-minerals>,]

Yet China could keep its dominant grip on the rare-earths industry for some years. It holds 35 percent of global reserves, but supplies over 95 percent of demand for rare-earth oxides, of which 60 percent is domestic, according to Industrial Minerals Company of Australia, a consultancy. Just as important, Chinese companies, many of them state-controlled, have advanced in their quest to make China the world leader in processing rare-earth metals into finished materials. Success in this quest could give China a decisive advantage not just in civilian industry, including clean energy, but also in military production if Chinese manufacturers were given preferential treatment over foreign competitors. Cerium is the most abundant of the 17 rare earths, all of which have similar chemical properties. A cerium-based coating is non-corrosive and has significant military applications. The Pentagon is due to finish a report soon on the risks of US military dependence on rare earths from China. Their use is widespread in the defense systems of the US, its allies, and other countries that buy its weapons and equipment. In a report to the US Congress in April, the Government Accountability Office said that it had been told by officials and defense industry executives that where rare-earth alloys and other materials were used in military systems, they were “responsible for the functionality of the component and would be difficult to replace without losing performance.” For example, fin actuators in precision-guided bombs are specifically designed around the capabilities of neodymium iron boron rare-earth magnets. The main US battle tank, the M1A2 Abrams, has a reference and navigation system that relies on samarium cobalt magnets from China. An official report last year on the US national defense stockpile said that shortages of four rare earths – lanthanum, cerium, europium and gadolinium – **had already caused delays in producing some weapons**. It recommended further study to determine the severity of the delays.

#### Future conflicts are inevitable and will draw-in the U.S. --- effective guidance is key to prevent escalation and nuclear war

**Lieber and Press 9** (Keir A., Associate Professor in the Security Studies Program – Georgetown University's Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and Daryl G., Associate Professor of Government – Dartmouth College, “The Nukes We Need”, Foreign Affairs, November/December, 88(6), Ebsco)

Unfortunately, deterrence in the twenty-first century may be far more difficult for the United States than it was in the past, and having the right mix of nuclear capabilities to deal with the new challenges will be crucial. The United States leads a global network of alliances, a position that commits Washington to protecting countries all over the world. Many of its potential adversaries have acquired, or appear to be seeking, nuclear weapons. Unless the world's major disputes are resolved--for example, on the Korean Peninsula, across the Taiwan Strait, and around the Persian Gulf--or the U.S. military pulls back from these regions, the United States will sooner or later find itself embroiled in conventional wars with nuclear-armed adversaries. Preventing escalation in those circumstances will be far more difficult than peacetime deterrence during the Cold War. In a conventional war, U.S. adversaries would have powerful incentives to brandish or use nuclear weapons because their lives, their families, and the survival of their regimes would be at stake. Therefore, as the United States considers the future of its nuclear arsenal, it should judge its force not against the relatively easy mission of peacetime deterrence but against the demanding mission of deterring escalation during a conventional conflict, when U.S. enemies are fighting for their lives. Debating the future of the U.S. nuclear arsenal is critical now because the Obama administration has pledged to pursue steep cuts in the force and has launched a major review of U.S. nuclear policy. (The results will be reported to Congress in February 2010.) The administration's desire to shrink the U.S. arsenal is understandable. Although the force is only one-fourth the size it was when the Cold War ended, it still includes roughly 2,200 operational strategic warheads--more than enough to retaliate against any conceivable nuclear attack. Furthermore, as we previously argued in these pages ("The Rise of U.S. Nuclear Primacy," March/April 2006), the current U.S. arsenal is vastly more capable than its Cold War predecessor, particularly in the area of "counterforce"--the ability to destroy an adversary's nuclear weapons before they can be used. Simply counting U.S. warheads or measuring Washington's counter-force capabilities will not, however, reveal what type of arsenal is needed for deterrence in the twenty-first century. The only way to determine that is to work through the grim logic of deterrence: to consider what actions will need to be deterred, what threats will need to be issued, and what capabilities will be needed to back up those threats. The Obama administration is right that the United States can safely cut its nuclear arsenal, but it must pay careful attention to the capabilities it retains. During a war, if a desperate adversary were to use its nuclear force to try to coerce the United States--for example, by threatening a U.S. ally or even by launching nuclear strikes against U.S. overseas bases--an arsenal comprised solely of high-yield weapons would leave U.S. leaders with terrible retaliatory options. Destroying Pyongyang or Tehran in response to a limited strike would be vastly disproportionate, and doing so might trigger further nuclear attacks in return. A deterrent posture based on such a dubious threat would lack credibility. Instead, a credible deterrent should give U.S. leaders a range of retaliatory options, including the ability to respond to nuclear attacks with either conventional or nuclear strikes, to retaliate with strikes against an enemy's nuclear forces rather than its cities, and to minimize casualties. The foundation for this flexible deterrent exists. The current U.S. arsenal includes a mix of accurate high- and low-yield warheads, offering a wide range of retaliatory options--including the ability to launch precise, very low-casualty nuclear counterforce strikes. The United States must preserve that mix of capabilities--especially the low-yield weapons--as it cuts the size of its nuclear force. [DETERRENCE IN DARK TIMES](http://web.ebscohost.com.proxy-remote.galib.uga.edu/ehost/detail?vid=3&hid=113&sid=4a8087ff-fe77-45d2-b2bb-70d04b414572%40sessionmgr111&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#toc)  THE PRIMARY purpose of U.S. nuclear forces is to deter nuclear attacks on the United States and its allies. During peacetime, this is not a demanding mission. The chance that leaders in Beijing, Moscow, or even Pyongyang will launch a surprise nuclear attack tomorrow is vanishingly small. But peacetime deterrence is not the proper yardstick for measuring the adequacy of U.S. nuclear forces. Rather, the United States' arsenal should be designed to provide robust deterrence in the most difficult of plausible circumstances: during a conventional war against a nuclear-armed adversary. In the coming decades, the United States may find itself facing nuclear-armed states on the battlefield. U.S. alliances span the globe, and the United States is frequently drawn into regional conflicts. Washington has launched six major military operations since the fall of the Berlin Wall: in Panama, Somalia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and twice in Iraq. Furthermore, most of the United States' potential adversaries have developed--or seem to be developing--nuclear weapons. Aside from terrorism, the threats that dominate U.S. military planning come from China, North Korea, and Iran: two members of the nuclear club, and one intent on joining it. The central problem for U.S. deterrence in the future is that even rational adversaries will have powerful incentives to introduce nuclear weapons--that is, threaten to use them, put them on alert, test them, or even use them--during a conventional war against the United States. If U.S. military forces begin to prevail on the battlefield, U.S. adversaries may use nuclear threats to compel a cease-fire or deny the United States access to allied military bases. Such threats might succeed in pressuring the United States to settle the conflict short of a decisive victory. Such escalatory strategies are rational. Losing a conventional war to the United States would be a disastrous outcome for any leader, and it would be worth taking great risks to force a cease-fire and avert total defeat. The fate of recent U.S. adversaries is revealing. The ex-dictator of Panama, Manuel Noriega, remains in a Miami prison. The former Bosnian Serb leader, Radovan Karadzic, awaits trial in The Hague, where Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic died in detention three years ago. Saddam Husseins punishment for losing the 2003 war was total: his government was toppled, his sons were killed, and he was hanged on a dimly lit gallows, surrounded by enemies. Even those leaders who have eluded the United States--such as the Somali warlord Muhammad Farah Aidid and Osama bin Laden--have done so despite intense U.S. efforts to capture or kill them. The United States' overseas conflicts are limited wars only from the U.S. perspective; to adversaries, they are existential. It should not be surprising if they use every weapon at their disposal to stave off total defeat. Coercive nuclear escalation may sound like a far-fetched strategy, but it was NATO'S policy during much of the Cold War. The Western allies felt that they were hopelessly outgunned in Europe at the conventional level by the Warsaw Pact. Even though NATO harbored little hope of prevailing in a nuclear war, it planned to initiate a series of escalating nuclear operations at the outbreak of war--alerts, tactical nuclear strikes, and wider nuclear attacks--to force the Soviets to accept a cease-fire. The United States' future adversaries face the same basic problem today: vast conventional military inferiority. They may adopt the same solution. Leaders in Beijing may choose gradual, coercive escalation if they face imminent military defeat in the Taiwan Strait--a loss that could weaken the Chinese Communist Party's grip on power. And if U.S. military forces were advancing toward Pyongyang, there is no reason to expect that North Korean leaders would keep their nuclear weapons on the sidelines. Layered on top of these challenges are two additional ones. First, U.S. conventional military doctrine is inherently escalatory. The new American way of war involves launching simultaneous air and ground attacks throughout the theater to blind, confuse, and overwhelm the enemy. Even if the United States decided to leave the adversary's leaders in power (stopping short of regime change so as to prevent the confrontation from escalating), how would Washington credibly convey the assurance that it was not seeking regime change once its adversary was blinded by attacks on its radar and communication systems and command bunkers? A central strategic puzzle of modern war is that the tactics best suited to dominating the conventional battlefield are the same ones most likely to trigger nuclear escalation. Furthermore, managing complex military operations to prevent escalation is always difficult. In 1991, in the lead-up to the Persian Gulf War, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker assured Iraq's foreign minister, Tariq Aziz, that the United States would leave Saddam's regime in power as long as Iraq did not use its chemical or biological weapons. But despite Baker's assurance, the U.S. military unleashed a major bombing campaign targeting Iraq's leaders, which on at least one occasion nearly killed Saddam. The political intent to control escalation was not reflected in the military operations, which nearly achieved a regime change. In future confrontations with nuclear-armed adversaries, the United States will undoubtedly want to prevent nuclear escalation. But the leaders of U.S. adversaries will face life-and-death incentives to use their nuclear arsenals to force a cease-fire and remain in power. [THE CASE FOR COUNTERFORCE](http://web.ebscohost.com.proxy-remote.galib.uga.edu/ehost/detail?vid=3&hid=113&sid=4a8087ff-fe77-45d2-b2bb-70d04b414572%40sessionmgr111&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#toc)  IF THE United States hopes to deter nuclear attacks during conventional wars, it must figure out how it might respond to such attacks, and it must retain the nuclear forces to do so. The most horrific retaliatory threat that the United States might issue--to destroy cities if enemy leaders brandish or use nuclear weapons--is a poor foundation for deterrence. First, this threat lacks credibility. Destroying cities would be a vastly disproportionate response if an enemy used nuclear weapons against a purely military target, such as a U.S. carrier group at sea or even a U.S. base located away from a major city (such as the U.S. airfields on Guam or Okinawa). During recent wars, the United States has labored to minimize enemy civilian casualties. It is hard to believe that Washington would reverse course and intentionally slaughter hundreds of thousands of civilians, especially if no U.S. or allied city has been destroyed. Moreover, a retaliatory strike on an enemy city would not even achieve critical military objectives, so the horrendous consequences would be inflicted for little purpose. If an enemy used nuclear weapons, the most pressing U.S. objective would be to prevent further nuclear attacks. Destroying one of the enemy's cities--even its capital--would neither eliminate its nuclear forces nor even necessarily kill its leaders. Nor could the United States respond to an enemy's limited nuclear strike simply by marching to its capital city to capture and hang its leaders; that would leave time for more strikes on allies' cities. In such a crisis, the United States would need to stop the enemy's nuclear attacks immediately. Of course, no one knows how a U.S. president would respond in such dark circumstances. It is possible that the United States would retaliate by attacking enemy cities--fear or anger might prevail over reason. But that mere possibility is a perilous foundation for deterrence. A credible deterrent must give U.S. leaders acceptable options in the event an enemy were to use nuclear weapons. An arsenal that can only destroy cities fails that test. The least bad option in the face of explicit nuclear threats or after a limited nuclear strike may be a counterforce attack to prevent further nuclear use. A counterforce strike could be conducted with either conventional or nuclear weapons, or a mix of the two. The attack could be limited to the enemy's nuclear delivery systems--for example, its bombers and missile silos--or a wider range of sites related to its nuclear program. Ideally, a U.S. counterforce strike would completely destroy the enemy's nuclear forces. But if an adversary had already launched a nuclear attack against the United States or its allies, a response that greatly reduced the adversary's nuclear force could save countless lives, and it could open the door to decisive military actions (such as conquest and regime change) to punish the enemy's leadership for using nuclear weapons. During the last decades of the Cold War, the nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union were too big to be completely destroyed in a disarming strike, and, in any case, their nuclear delivery systems were not accurate enough to destroy large numbers of hardened targets. But the world has changed. Washington's potential adversaries field much smaller arsenals. Meanwhile, U.S. delivery systems have grown vastly more accurate. [MODELING THE UNTHINKABLE](http://web.ebscohost.com.proxy-remote.galib.uga.edu/ehost/detail?vid=3&hid=113&sid=4a8087ff-fe77-45d2-b2bb-70d04b414572%40sessionmgr111&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#toc)  To ILLUSTRATE the growth in U.S. counterforce capabilities, we applied a set of simple formulas that analysts have used for decades to estimate the effectiveness of counterforce attacks. We modeled a U.S. strike on a small target set: 20 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMS) in hardened silos, the approximate size of China's current long-range, silo-based missile force. The analysis compared the capabilities of a 1985 Minuteman ICBM to those of a modern Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missile.[1] In 1985, a single U.S. ICBM warhead had less than a 60 percent chance of destroying a typical silo. Even if four or five additional warheads were used, the cumulative odds of destroying the silo would never exceed 90 percent because of the problem of "fratricide," whereby incoming warheads destroy each other. Beyond five warheads, adding more does no good. A probability of 90 percent might sound high, but it falls far short if the goal is to completely disarm an enemy: with a 90 percent chance of destroying each target, the odds of destroying all 20 are roughly 12 percent. In 1985, then, a U.S. ICBM attack had little chance of destroying even a small enemy nuclear arsenal. Today, a multiple-warhead attack on a single silo using a Trident II missile would have a roughly 99 percent chance of destroying it, and the probability that a barrage would destroy all 20 targets is well above 95 percent. Given the accuracy of the U.S. military's current delivery systems, the only question is target identification: silos that can be found can be destroyed. During the Cold War, the United States worked hard to pinpoint Soviet nuclear forces, with great success. Locating potential adversaries' small nuclear arsenals is undoubtedly a top priority for U.S. intelligence today. The revolution in accuracy is producing an even more momentous change: it is becoming possible for the United States to conduct low- yield nuclear counterforce strikes that inflict relatively few casualties. A U.S. Department of Defense computer model, called the Hazard Prediction and Assessment Capability (HPAC), estimates the dispersion of deadly radioactive fallout in a given region after a nuclear detonation. The software uses the warhead's explosive power, the height of the burst, and data about local weather and demographics to estimate how much fallout would be generated, where it would blow, and how many people it would injure or kill. HPAC results can be chilling. In 2006, a team of nuclear weapons analysts from the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) and the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) used HPAC to estimate the consequences of a U.S. nuclear attack using high-yield warheads against China's ICBM field. Even though China's silos are located in the countryside, the model predicted that the fallout would blow; over a large area, killing 3-4 million people. U.S. counterforce capabilities were useless, the study implied, because even a limited strike would kill an unconscionable number of civilians. But the United States can already conduct nuclear counterforce strikes at a tiny fraction of the human devastation that the FAS/NRDC study predicted, and small additional improvements to the U.S. force could dramatically reduce the potential collateral damage even further. The United States' nuclear weapons are now so accurate that it can conduct successful counterforce attacks using the smallest-yield warheads in the arsenal, rather than the huge warheads that the FAS/NRDC simulation modeled. And to further reduce the fallout, the weapons can be set to detonate as airbursts, which would allow most of the radiation to dissipate in the upper atmosphere. We ran multiple HPAC scenarios against the identical target set used in the FAS/NRDC study but modeled low-yield airbursts rather than high-yield groundbursts. The fatality estimates plunged from 3-4 million to less than 700--a figure comparable to the number of civilians reportedly killed since 2006 in Pakistan by U.S. drone strikes. One should be skeptical about the results of any model that depends on unpredictable factors, such as wind speed and direction. But in the scenarios we modeled, the area of lethal fallout was so small that very few civilians would have become ill or died, regardless of which way the wind blew. Critics may cringe at this analysis. Many of them, understandably, say that nuclear weapons are--and should remain--unusable. But if the United States is to retain these weapons for the purpose of deterring nuclear attacks, it needs a force that gives U.S. leaders retaliatory options they might actually employ. If the only retaliatory option entails killing millions of civilians, then the U.S. deterrent will lack credibility. Giving U.S. leaders alternatives that do not target civilians is both wise and just. A counterforce attack--whether using conventional munitions or low- or high-yield nuclear weapons--would be fraught with peril. Even a small possibility of a single enemy warhead's surviving such a strike would undoubtedly give any U.S. leader great pause. But in the midst of a conventional war, if an enemy were using nuclear threats or limited nuclear attacks to try to coerce the United States or its allies, these would be the capabilities that would give a U.S. president real options. [GOOD THINGS IN SMALL PACKAGES](http://web.ebscohost.com.proxy-remote.galib.uga.edu/ehost/detail?vid=3&hid=113&sid=4a8087ff-fe77-45d2-b2bb-70d04b414572%40sessionmgr111&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#toc)  As THE United States restructures its nuclear arsenal and overall strategic posture, it should ensure that it has three distinct capabilities. First, it still needs some high-yield nuclear weapons (such as those deployed on land-based missiles and in submarines), although fewer than it currently possesses. If the U.S. military had to destroy an enemy's nuclear force in circumstances so dire that collateral damage was not a major concern, these weapons would provide the best odds of success. They maximize the odds of getting the target, albeit at the cost of enormous collateral damage. The United States also needs conventional counterforce weapons. The U.S. military already fields precision nonnuclear weapons that can destroy nuclear targets, and the Pentagon has wisely made conventional capabilities a key element of its "global strike" mission, which seeks the capacity to hit any target anywhere in the world in less than an hour. Conventional weapons permit the United States to conduct a counterforce strike without crossing the nuclear threshold, and without killing millions. To illustrate the promise of conventional counterforce, we modeled an attack on 20 land-based silos using B-2 bombers and bombs guided by GPS. If GPS signals were not jammed, an attack would destroy most of the silos and have about a 50-50 chance of destroying them all. The problem with conventional counterforce weapons is that, lacking the destructive power of nuclear weapons, they depend on pinpoint accuracy. If an enemy can jam GPS signals near the target, the odds of destroying all 20 silos with current bombs are essentially nil. In short, conventional weapons offer the ability to destroy an enemy's nuclear forces with minimal collateral damage, although with only a fair chance of success. For the third leg of the U.S. strategic force, the United States should retain the lowest-yield warheads in its nuclear arsenal and (if it has not already done so) enhance their accuracy. If the low-yield nuclear bombs and cruise missiles, which reportedly use inertial guidance systems, were even half as accurate as their conventional, GPS-guided cousins, they could match the effectiveness of high-yield nuclear weapons while inflicting casualties more akin to those caused by conventional bombs. Improving the accuracy of the United States' low-yield nuclear bombs and cruise missiles may not be as simple as attaching GPS guidance systems. The Pentagon has been reluctant to use GPS on nuclear weapons because adversaries might conduct intense GPS jamming near their high-value targets or disrupt GPS transmissions with high-altitude nuclear detonations. But GPS may still have a role. The United States has overcome local GPS jamming in the past. More important, the enhanced accuracy gained by having GPS guidance during even half of a weapon's flight time--before the signal is lost--would be enough in many circumstances to permit a highly effective, low-casualty counterforce strike. Whether the slight accuracy improvements come from GPS, next-generation inertial guidance, or other technologies, high-accuracy delivery systems with low-yield weapons should form the backbone of the U.S. nuclear deterrent. [CONFRONTING NUCLEAR REALITIES](http://web.ebscohost.com.proxy-remote.galib.uga.edu/ehost/detail?vid=3&hid=113&sid=4a8087ff-fe77-45d2-b2bb-70d04b414572%40sessionmgr111&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#toc)  CRITICS MAY object to such calculations on the grounds that this approach evaluates the U.S. nuclear arsenal by measuring its capability to carry out nuclear strikes when the real purpose of the arsenal should be to deter wars, not fight them. According to this criticism, whether U.S. nuclear forces can destroy Chinese, North Korean, or (in the future) Iranian nuclear targets during a war is irrelevant, and planning for such contingencies is macabre. But this criticism is incoherent. Deterrence depends on the capacity to carry out threats. Retaining that capacity is not a sign that the United States has moved beyond deterrence to a war-fighting posture for its nuclear arsenal; rather, the capacity to execute threats is the very foundation of deterrence. Of course, a deterrent threat also needs to be credible--that is, an adversary needs to be convinced that a retaliatory threat will actually be executed. If not backed by the capability and the credibility to execute threats, deterrence is merely a dangerous bluff. A deterrent force should therefore provide decision-makers with options they would conceivably execute if their redlines were crossed. Otherwise, allies will question U.S. assurances, adversaries will doubt U.S. threats, and a U.S. president may confront an escalating crisis without any acceptable options. More broadly, any analyst or policymaker who proposes a nuclear posture for the United States must answer four fundamental questions: What enemy actions are to be deterred? Under what circumstances might those actions be taken? What threats would a U.S. president wish to issue? And does the proposed arsenal give the president the ability to carry out those threats? Without working through the grim realities of deterrence, the United States risks creating a force that gives the president no acceptable choices and therefore will not reliably deter U.S. enemies. A second criticism of the argument for retaining and improving certain counterforce capabilities is that the cure could be worse than the disease. Counterforce capabilities may mitigate escalation during a conflict--for example, by dissuading adversaries from nuclear saber rattling, by reassuring allies that the United States can defend them, and, if necessary, by giving the United States the ability to pursue regime change if adversaries brandish or use nuclear weapons. But they may also exacerbate the problem of controlling escalation if an adversary feels so threatened that it adopts a hair-trigger nuclear doctrine. Specifically, the United States' ability to launch a disarming strike without killing millions of civilians might increase the escalatory pressures that already exist because of the nature of the U.S. military's standard wartime strategy. Conventional air strikes on radar systems, communication links, and leadership bunkers may look even more like the precursors of a preemptive disarming strike if adversaries know that the United States possesses a well-honed nuclear counter-force capability.

#### Escalates to great power nuclear war

**Caves 10** (John P. Jr., Senior Research Fellow in the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction – National Defense University, “Avoiding a Crisis of Confidence in the U.S. Nuclear Deterrent”, Strategic Forum, No. 252, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/docUploaded/SF%20252\_John%20Caves.pdf)

Perceptions of a compromised U.S. nuclear deterrent as described above would have profound policy implications, particu­larly if they emerge at a time when a nuclear-armed great power is pursuing a more aggressive strategy toward U.S. allies and partners in its region in a bid to enhance its regional and global clout.

■ A dangerous period of vulnerability would open for the United States and those nations that depend on U.S. protection while the United States attempted to rectify the problems with its nuclear forces. As it would take more than a decade for the United States to produce new nuclear weapons, ensuing events could preclude a return to anything like the status quo ante.

■ The assertive, nuclear-armed great power, and other major adversaries, could be willing to challenge U.S. interests more directly in the expectation that the United States would be less prepared to threaten or deliver a military response that could lead to direct conflict. They will want to keep the United States from reclaiming its earlier power position.

■ Allies and partners who have relied upon explicit or implicit assurances of U.S. nuclear protection as a foundation of their security could lose faith in those assur­ances. They could compensate by accom­modating U.S. rivals, especially in the short term, or acquiring their own nuclear deter­rents, which in most cases could be accom­plished only over the mid- to long term. A more nuclear world would likely ensue over a period of years.

■ Important U.S. interests could be com­promised or abandoned, or a major war could occur as adversaries and/or the United States miscalculate new boundaries of deterrence and provocation. At worst, war could lead to state-on-state employment of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) on a scale far more catastrophic than what nuclear-armed terror­ists alone could inflict.

### Solvency

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#### Lifting access restrictions on federal lands provides 60 years of natural gas – clear, federal authority provides certainty that’s key to private sector. And – new drilling tech solves your environment turns.

Griles 3 (Lisa, Deputy Secretary – Department of the Interior, “Energy Production on Federal Lands,” Hearing before the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, United States Senate, 4-30)

Mr. GRILES. America’s public lands have an abundant opportunity for exploration and development of renewable and nonrenewable energy resources. Energy reserves contained on the Department of the Interior’s onshore and offshore Federal lands are very important to meeting our current and future estimates of what it is going to take to continue to supply America’s energy demand. Estimates suggest that these lands contain approximately 68 percent of the undiscovered U.S. oil resources and 74 percent of the undiscovered natural gas resources. President Bush has developed a national energy policy that laid out a comprehensive, long-term energy strategy for America’s future. That strategy recognizes we need to raise domestic production of energy, both renewable and nonrenewable, to meet our dependence for energy. For oil and gas, the United States uses about 7 billion barrels a year, of which about 4 billion are currently imported and 3 billion are domestically produced. The President proposed to open a small portion of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge to environmentally responsible oil and gas exploration. Now there is a new and environmentally friendly technology, similar to directional drilling, with mobile platforms, self-containing drilling units. These things will allow producers to access large energy reserves with almost no footprint on the tundra. Each day, even since I have assumed this job, our ability to minimize our effect on the environment continues to improve to where it is almost nonexistent in such areas as even in Alaska. According to the latest oil and gas assessment, ANWR is the largest untapped source of domestic production available to us. The production for ANWR would equal about 60 years of imports from Iraq. The National Energy Policy also encourages development of cleaner, more diverse portfolios of domestic renewable energy sources. The renewable policy in areas cover geothermal, wind, solar, and biomass. And it urges research on hydrogen as an alternate energy source. To advance the National Energy Policy, the Bureau of Land Management and the DOE’s National Renewable Energy Lab last week announced the release of a renewable energy report. It identifies and evaluates renewable energy resources on public lands. Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit this for the record.\* This report, which has just come out, assess the potential for renewable energy on public lands. It is a very good report that we hope will allow for the private sector, after working with the various other agencies, to where can we best use renewable resource, and how do we take this assessment and put it into the land use planning that we are currently going, so that right-of-ways and understanding of what renewable resources can be done in the West can, in fact, have a better opportunity. The Department completed the first of an energy inventory this year. Now the EPCA report, which is laying here, also, Mr. Chairman, is an estimate of the undiscovered, technically recoverable oil and gas. Part one of that report covers five oil and gas basins. The second part of the report will be out later this year. Now this report, it is not—there are people who have different opinions of it. But the fact is we believe it will be a good guidance tool, as we look at where the oil and gas potential is and where we need to do land use planning. And as we update these land use plannings and do our EISs, that will help guide further the private sector, the public sector, and all stakeholders on how we can better do land use planning and develop oil and gas in a sound fashion. Also, I have laying here in front of me the two EISs that have been done on the two major coal methane basins in the United States, San Juan Basis and the Powder River Basin. Completing these reports, which are in draft, will increase and offer the opportunity for production of natural gas with coal bed methane. Now these reports are in draft and, once completed, will authorize and allow for additional exploration and development. It has taken 2 years to get these in place. It has taken 2 years to get some of these in place. This planning process that Congress has initiated under FLPMA and other statutes allows for a deliberative, conscious understanding of what the impacts are. We believe that when these are finalized, that is in fact what will occur. One of the areas which we believe that the Department of the Interior and the Bureau of Land Management is and is going to engage in is coordination with landowners. Mr. Chairman, the private sector in the oil and gas industry must be good neighbors with the ranchers in the West. The BLM is going to be addressing the issues of bonding requirements that will assure that landowners have their surface rights and their values protected. BLM is working to make the consultation process with the landowners, with the States and local governments and other Federal agencies more efficient and meaningful. But we must assure that the surface owners are protected and the values of their ranches are in fact assured. And by being good neighbors, we can do that. In the BLM land use planning process, we have priorities, ten current resource management planning areas that contain the major oil and gas reserves that are reported out in the EPCA study. Once this process is completed, then we can move forward with consideration of development of the natural gas. We are also working with the Western Governors’ Association and the Western Utilities Group. The purpose is to identify and designate right-of-way corridors on public lands. We would like to do it now as to where right-of-way corridors make sense and put those in our land use planning processes, so that when the need is truly identified, utilities, energy companies, and the public will know where they are Instead of taking two years to amend a land use plan, hopefully this will expedite and have future opportunity so that when the need is there, we can go ahead and make that investment through the private sector. It should speed up the process of right-of-way permits for both pipelines and electric transmission. Now let me switch to the offshore, the Outer Continental Shelf. It is a huge contributor to our Nation’s energy and economic security. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, everything you have talked about so far is onshore. Mr. GRILES. That is correct. The CHAIRMAN. You now will speak to offshore. Mr. GRILES. Yes, sir, I will. Now we are keeping on schedule the holding lease sales in the areas that are available for leasing. In the past year, scheduled sales in several areas were either delayed, canceled, or **put under moratoria**, even though they were in the 5-year plan. It undermined certainty. It made investing, particularly in the Gulf, more risky. We have approved a 5-year oil and gas leasing program in July 2002 that calls for 20 new lease sales in the Gulf of Mexico and several other areas of the offshore, specifically in Alaska by 2007. Now our estimates indicate that these areas contain resources up to 22 billion barrels of oil and 61 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. We are also acting to raise energy production from these offshore areas by providing royalty relief on the OCS leases for new deep wells that are drilled in shallow water. These are at depths that heretofore were very and are very costly to produce from and costly to drill to. We need to encourage that exploration. These deep wells, which are greater than 15,000 feet in depth, are expected to access between 5 to 20 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and can be developed quickly due to existing infrastructure and the shallow water. We have also issued a final rule in July 2002 that allows companies to apply for a lease extension, giving them more time to analyze complex geological data that underlies salt domes. That is, where geologically salt overlays the geologically clay. And you try to do seismic, and the seismic just gets distorted. So we have extended the lease terms, so that hopefully those companies can figure out where and where to best drill. Vast resources of oil and natural gas lie, we hope, beneath these sheets of salt in the OCS in the Gulf of Mexico. But it is very difficult to get clear seismic images. We are also working to create a process of reviewing and permitting alternative energy sources on the OCS lands. We have sent legislation to Congress that would give the Minerals Management Service of the Department of the Interior clear authority to lease parts of the OCS for renewable energy. The renewables could be wind, wave, or solar energy, and related projects that are auxiliary to oil and gas development, such as offshore staging facilities and emergency medical facilities. We need this authority in order to be able to **truly give the private sector what are the rules to play from and buy**, so they can have certainty about where to go.

## 2AC vs. George Washington RS

### T – Energy Production

#### We meet – natural gas drilling is energy production

CMP No Date (Conservation Measures Partnership, “3 Energy Production & Mining,” *Threats & Actions Taxonomies*, http://www.conservationmeasures.org/initiatives/threats-actions-taxonomies/threats-taxonomy/3-energy-production-mining)

3 Energy Production & Mining

Definition: Threats from production of non-biological resources

Exposition: Various forms of water use (for example, dams for hydro power) could also be put in this class, but these threats seemed more related to other threats that involve alterations to hydrologic regimes. As a result, they should go in 7.2 Dams & Water Management/Use.

3.1 Oil & Gas Drilling

Definition: Exploring for, developing, and producing petroleum and other liquid hydrocarbons

Exposition: Oil and gas pipelines go into 4.2 Utility & Service Lines. Oil spills that occur at the drill site should be placed here; those that come from oil tankers or pipelines should go in 4. Transportation & Service Corridors or in 9.2 Industrial & Military Effluents, depending on your perspective.

Examples:

oil wells

deep sea natural gas drilling

3.2 Mining & Quarrying

Definition: Exploring for, developing, and producing minerals and rocks

Exposition: It is a judgment call whether deforestation caused by strip mining should be in this category or in 5.3 Logging & Wood Harvesting – it depends on whether the primary motivation for the deforestation is access to the trees or to the minerals. Sediment or toxic chemical runoff from mining should be placed in 9.2 Industrial & Military Effluents if it is the major threat from a mining operation.

Examples:

coal strip mines

alluvial gold panning

gold mines

rock quarries

sand/salt mines

coral mining

deep sea nodules

guano harvesting

dredging outside of shipping lanes

3.3 Renewable Energy

Definition: Exploring, developing, and producing renewable energy

Exposition: Hydropower should be put in 7.2 Dams & Water Management/Use.

Examples:

geothermal power production

solar farms

wind farms (including birds flying into windmills)

tidal farms

#### Counter-interpretation – Energy production is the extraction or capture of energy from natural sources

DOCC 8 (Australian Government’s Department of Climate Change, “National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Guidelines,” http://www.climatechange.gov.au/government/initiatives/~/media/publications/greenhouse-report/nger-reporting-guidelines.ashx)

Energy Production

‘Energy production’ is defined in r. 2.23:

Production of energy, in relation to a facility, means any one of the following:

a. the extraction or capture of energy from natural sources for **final consumption** by or from the operation of the facility or for use other than in operation of the facility; 11

b. the manufacture of energy by the conversion of energy from one form to another form for final consumption by

or from the operation of the facility or for use other than in the operation of the facility.

Energy consumption

‘Energy consumption’ is defined in r. 2.23:

Consumption of energy, in relation to a facility, means the use or disposal of energy from the operation of the

facility including own-use and losses in extraction, production and transmission.

### Case

#### OCS areas are key

Mason 9 (Joseph R. – Louisiana State University Endowed Chair of Banking and nationally-renowned economist , “The Economic Contribution of Increased Offshore Oil Exploration and Production to Regional and National Economies”, February, <http://www.americanenergyalliance.org/images/aea_offshore_updated_final.pdf>)

Even without those remaining sixteen states, plus California and Alaska, the OCS is already the most important source of U.S. energy supplies. According to the MMS, “the Federal OCS is a major supplier of oil and natural gas for the domestic market, **contributing more energy** (oil and natural gas) for U.S. consumption than any single U.S. state or country in the world.”8 That is, OCS production currently meets more U.S. energy demand than any other single source, including Saudi Arabia.

#### Price spike is small – benefits the petrochemical industry

Ebinger et al 12 (Charles, Senior Fellow and Director of the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, Kevin Massy, Assistant Director of the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, and Govinda Avasarala, Senior Research Assistant in the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, “Liquid Markets: Assessing the Case for U.S. Exports of Liquefied Natural Gas,” Brookings Institution, Policy Brief 12-01, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2012/5/02%20lng%20exports%20ebinger/0502\_lng\_exports\_ebinger.pdf)

Opponents of LNG exports contend that such investments would be deterred in the future as a result of increases in the price of natural gas. However, the evidence suggests that the competitive advantage of U.S. industrial producers relative to its competitors in Western Europe and Asia is not likely to be affected significantly by the projected increase in natural gas prices resulting from LNG exports. As European and many Asian petrochemical producers use oil-based products such as naphtha and fuel oil as feedstock, U.S. companies are more likely to enjoy a significant cost advantage over their overseas competitors. Even a one-third decline in the estimated price of crude oil in 2035 would result in an oil-to-gas ratio of 14:1.101 There is also the potential for increased exports to help industrial consumers. Ethane, a liquid byproduct of natural gas production at several U.S. gas plays, is the primary feedstock of ethylene, a petrochemical product used to create a wide variety of products. According to a study by the American Chemistry Council, an industry trade body, a 25 percent increase in ethane production would yield a $32.8 billion increase in U.S. chemical production. By providing another market for cheap dry gas, LNG exports will encourage additional production of natural gas liquids (NGL) that are produced in association with dry gas. According to the EIA, ethane production increased by nearly 30 percent between 2009 and 2011 as natural gas production from shale started to grow substantially. Ethane production is now at an alltime high, with more than one million barrels per day of ethane being produced.102 Increased gas production for exports results in increased production of such natural gas liquids, in which case exports can be seen as providing a benefit to the petrochemical industry.

#### American hegemony defeats the worst forms of imperialism

Kaufman 7

(Robert, professor of public policy at the Pepperdine School of Public Policy. In Defense Of The Bush Doctrine. Pg. 66)

The issue is not whether a broad coalition is desirable, but when in what circumstances its maintenance should take precedence over the need for decisive action. Nor is the issue whether legitimacy is an important criterion for American foreign policy. Benign is the key word in Josef Joffe’s apt description of American hegemony. Niall Ferguson and others have wrongly branded the United States as an imperial power. Richard Cooper knows better. As he observes perceptively, the United States has been consciously anti –imperial for most of American history: True, it has interfered relentlessly in Central America, acquired territory by force (as well as by purchase), and it was caught up in the imperial frenzy at the end of the nineteenth century; but it was also one of the first to give up its colonies. It then did its best to ensure that the British and French Empires were dismantled. The United States is founded on ideals and its vocation is the spread of those ideals. Although the United States has more troops deployed abroad than Britain at the height of its imperial glory, they are not used for the same purpose. Typically, they are used to defend America’s allies….Usually, they **arrive at a time of conflict, but stay on to ensure security** and perhaps to strengthen the forces of good government – the two are sometimes related – thereafter. This often turns out to be a long business.

### Condition TPP CP – 2AC

#### Perm do both – genuine not key – it crushes hegemony

Carroll 9 (Jamie FF, Notes & Comments Editor – Emory International Law Review, J.D. with Honors – Emory University School of Law, “Back to the Future: Redefining the Foreign Investment and National Security Act's Conception of National Security”, Emory International Law Review, 23 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 167, Lexis)

n221. See Thomas Friedman, Op-Ed., 9/11 is Over, N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 2007, § 4, at 12. This does not mean, however, that foreign countries should hold a veto over U.S. foreign or domestic policies, particularly policies that are not directly related to their national survival. Allowing foreign countries or international institutions to veto or modify unrelated U.S. policies would make a mockery of our foreign policy and destroy the credibility of American leadership. International cooperation does not require making our policy subservient to the whims of other nations. See generally The Allies and Arms Control (F.O. Hampson et al. eds., 1992). See also Khalilzad, supra note 177.

#### It’s acceptable within the range of “should”

GAO 8 (Government Accounting Office, Exposure Draft of Proposed Changes to the International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing, http://www.gao.gov/govaud/cl\_iia080331.pdf)

The second sentence of the “must” definition used in the exposure draft instructions is more aligned with the definition of “should” as used by other standards setters, including GAO. The definition of “should” as used by GAO, which is intended to be consistent with the definition used by the AICPA and the PCAOB, indicates a presumptively mandatory requirement and contains the following language: “…in rare circumstances, auditors and audit organizations may depart from a presumptively mandatory requirement provided they document their justification for the departure and how the alternative procedures performed in the circumstances were sufficient to achieve the objectives of the presumptively mandatory requirement.” We suggest that the IIA move the second sentence of the “must” definition to the “should” definition. The definition of “must” needs to be clear that “must” indicates an unconditional requirement and that another procedure cannot substitute for a “must.” Also, we suggest adding language to the definition of “should” to indicate that substituting another procedure for a “should” requirement is allowed only if the auditors document their justification for the departure from the “should” and how the alternative procedures performed in the circumstances were sufficient to achieve the objectives of the “should” requirement. The IIA should review every “must” requirement in the Standards to determine whether there are acceptable alternatives to the procedure; if so, “should” is the appropriate word.

#### “Resolved” means law

Words and Phrases 64 (Permanent Edition)

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

#### No net benefit – Congress is key to TPP

Bloomberg 9/2 (“Obama Envoy Kirk Says 2013 Key for Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement,” http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-09-02/obama-envoy-kirk-says-2013-key-for-asia-pacific-trade-agreement, accessed 9-17-12)

Besides Canada and Mexico, which have yet to formally join, the agreement includes Australia, Brunei, Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the U.S. and Vietnam. The U.S.’s ability to compromise on sensitive areas is limited because the deal must be approved by Congress, Kirk said. “We are willing to show some flexibility, but for the United States it would be difficult for me to go back and sell to Congress and the American public a Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement that wasn’t at least as forward-leaning as some of the agreements we have recently concluded,” he said, referring to deals with Panama, Colombia and South Korea that were completed under President George W. Bush and only approved by U.S. lawmakers last year.

#### they allow for future rollback of the plan – guts investor confidence

Loris 8-6 (Nicolas, Fellow in the Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies – Heritage Foundation “Senate Energy Bill: Good Start, Room for Improvement,” Heritage Foundation, 2012, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/08/domestic-energy-and-jobs-act-good-start-room-for-improvement)

Lease certainty is another critical issue. The act states that the DOI cannot cancel or withdraw a lease sale after the winning company pays for the lease. Ensuring that the federal government does not pull the rug out from under a company that wins the lease sale would provide the **certainty necessary to pursue energy projects**.

#### That’s key to nat gas development

Kabelitz 6 (Dr. Klaus-Robert, Chief Economist – E.on Ruhrgas, one of the leading European players in natural gas, “Strategy, Economy, and Regulation,” International Gas Union, June, http://www.igu.org/html/wgc2006/pdf/com/PGC%20B%20final%20report.pdf)

It goes without saying that abundant gas reserves and favourable pre-tax economics may not deliver investment and production growth if the fiscal terms are so onerous as to make post-tax economics uncompetitive. Investors’ political risk perceptions are critical to gas developments. Political risk includes the risk of social and political disturbances, and the risk of unforeseen changes in legal and regulatory conditions. Political risk is a key component of total project risk for long term, large, capital intensive, complex projects involving installations that may easily be targeted or accidentally damaged in times of war or civil strife. Gas projects typically meet all these criteria. Concerning the regulatory aspect of political risk, an uneven playing field, an unstable fiscal framework and/or suspicions of a lack of commitment across the board to the sanctity of contracts can make otherwise low risk areas high risk from the point of view of investors.

### Climate Leadership – 2AC

#### Natural gas cements climate leadership

Casten 9 (Sean Casten, president of Recycled Energy Development, December 16, 2009, “Natural gas as a near-term CO2 mitigation strategy,” Grist, http://goo.gl/b8z08)

Discussions of CO2 reduction tend to start from a presumption of near-term economic disruption coupled to long-term investment in green technology. The presumption isn’t right. The U.S. could reduce its total CO2 footprint by 14-20 percent tomorrow with no disruption in our access to energy services, without investing in any new infrastructure. The Waxman-Markey proposal to reduce CO2 emissions by 17 percent over 10 years is constrained only by its ambition. This near-term opportunity would be realized by ramping up our nation’s generation of electricity from gas and ramping down our generation from coal, taking advantage only of existing assets. Its scale and potential for immediate impact deserves consideration; even partial action towards this goal would have dramatic political and environmental consequences, establishing U.S. leadership and credibility in global climate negotiations.

#### Climate leadership is key to prevent extinction

Khosla 9 (Ashok Khosla, president of the International Union for Conservation of Nature, January 27, 2009, “A new President for the United States: We have a dream,” http://goo.gl/RQsL8)

A rejuvenated America, with a renewed purpose, commitment and energy to make its contribution once again towards a better world could well be the turning point that can reverse the current decline in the state of the global economy, the health of its life support systems and the morale of people everywhere. This extraordinary change in regime brings with it the promise of a deep change in attitudes and aspirations of Americans, a change that will lead, hopefully, to new directions in their nation’s policies and action. In particular, we can hope that from being a very reluctant partner in global discussions, especially on issues relating to environment and sustainable development, the United States will become an active leader in international efforts to address the Millennial threats now confronting civilization and even the survival of the human species. For the conservation of biodiversity, so essential to maintaining life on Earth, this promise of change has come not a moment too soon. It would be a mistake to put all of our hopes on the shoulder of one young man, however capable he might be. The environmental challenges the world is facing cannot be addressed by one country, let alone by one man. At the same time, an inspired US President guided by competent people, who does not shy away from exercising the true responsibilities and leadership his country is capable of, could do a lot to spur the international community into action. To paraphrase one of his illustrious predecessors, “the world asks for action and action now.” What was true in President Roosevelt’s America 77 years ago is even more appropriate today. From IUCN’s perspective, the first signals are encouraging. The US has seriously begun to discuss constructive engagement in climate change debates. With Copenhagen a mere 11 months away, this commitment is long overdue and certainly very welcome. Many governments still worry that if they set tough standards to control carbon emissions, their industry and agriculture will become uncompetitive, a fear that leads to a foot-dragging “you go first” attitude that is blocking progress. A positive intervention by the United States could provide the vital catalyst that moves the basis of the present negotiations beyond the narrowly defined national interests that lie at the heart of the current impasse. The logjam in international negotiations on climate change should not be difficult to break if the US were to lead the industrialized countries to agree that much of their wealth has been acquired at the expense of the environment (in this case greenhouse gases emitted over the past two hundred years) and that with the some of the benefits that this wealth has brought, comes the obligation to deal with the problems that have resulted as side-effects. With equitable entitlement to the common resources of the planet, an agreement that is fair and acceptable to all nations should be easy enough to achieve. Caps on emissions and sharing of energy efficient technologies are simply in the interest of everyone, rich or poor. And both rich and poor must now be ready to adopt less destructive technologies – based on renewables, efficiency and sustainability – both as a goal with intrinsic merit and also as an example to others. But climate is not the only critical global environmental issue that this new administration will have to deal with. Conservation of biodiversity, a crucial prerequisite for the wellbeing of all humanity, no less America, needs as much attention, and just as urgently. The United States’ self-interest in conserving living natural resources strongly converges with the global common good in every sphere: in the oceans, by arresting the precipitate decline of fish stocks and the alarming rise of acidification; on land, by regenerating the health of our soils, forests and rivers; and in the atmosphere by reducing the massive emission of pollutants from our wasteful industries, construction, agriculture and transport systems.

### Neoliberalism K – 2AC

#### No collective suicide.

**Bostrom 2** (Nick, PhD Philosophy – Oxford University, “Existential Risks: Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios”, Journal of Evolution and Technology, 9, March, http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html)

Some foreseen hazards (hence not members of the current category) which have been excluded from the list of bangs on grounds that they seem too unlikely to cause a global terminal disaster are: solar flares, supernovae, black hole explosions or mergers, gamma-ray bursts, galactic center outbursts, supervolcanos, loss of biodiversity, buildup of air pollution, gradual loss of human fertility, and various religious doomsday scenarios. The hypothesis that we will one day become “illuminated” and **commit collective suicide** or stop reproducing, as supporters of VHEMT (The Voluntary Human Extinction Movement) hope [43], appears unlikely. If it really were better not to exist (as Silenus told king Midas in the Greek myth, and as Arthur Schopenhauer argued [44] although for reasons specific to his philosophical system he didn’t advocate suicide), then we should not count this scenario as an existential disaster. The assumption that it is not worse to be alive should be regarded as an implicit assumption in the definition of Bangs. Erroneous collective suicide is an existential risk albeit one whose **probability seems extremely slight**. (For more on the ethics of human extinction, see chapter 4 of [9].)

#### Turn – Collapsing neoliberalism results in increased corporate power

Legrain 00 (Phillipe Legrain, special adviser to the WTO director general Mike Moore, 2000, The WTO: Boon or Bane for the Developing World, p. http://www.focusweb.org/publications/2000/The%20WTOThe%20WTO-Boon%20or%20Bane%20for%20the%20Developing%20World.htm)

A convincing case for the WTO’s abolition must show two things. First, that the world would be **better off** without the WTO. Second, that the WTO's abolition is preferable to **any politically feasible reform**. You fail to show either. Abolishing the WTO would not **destroy globalisation, capitalism, or US corporate power**. But it would **wipe out** a forum for governments to negotiate multilateral trade rules and a mechanism for holding them to those rules. That would make **every country worse off**, but **the biggest losers would be the poor and the weak**. One benefit of rules is that they apply to big, rich countries as well as small, poor ones. When America blocked imports of Costa Rican underwear, Costa Rica appealed to the WTO. It won, and America lifted its restrictions. Do you honestly think Costa Rica would have such clout in Washington **without the WTO?** Granted, the dispute-settlement mechanism is not perfect: America has a battery of lawyers to fight its corner, whereas small countries scrimp. It should be improved. But it is already much better than the alternative: the law of the jungle, where might makes right. Another merit of WTO rules is that they tie governments’ hands. Once countries open their markets to foreign trade and investment, they cannot close them again at whim. Without this stability, companies would be reluctant to invest abroad, particularly in developing countries with a protectionist or politically unstable record. Abolishing the WTO would further **marginalise developing countries**. If there were no prospect of further multilateral liberalisation and no body to enforce existing rules, trade barriers would creep up as protectionists gain the upper hand. The world might split into hostile regional blocks, with rich-country exporters **seeking captive markets in developing countries**. Developing countries, which need access to rich-country markets more than rich countries need access to theirs, would have to join on **unfavourable terms** or be left out in the cold. In any case, there would be less trade. And less trade means slower economic growth, stagnating living standards and more people trapped in poverty – like in the Great Depression. Over the past 50 years, the 15-fold rise in world trade has driven a seven-fold rise in world output. Thanks to trade, Japan and South Korea are no longer developing countries. Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner of Harvard University found that developing countries with open economies grew by 4.5 per cent a year in the 1970s and 1980s, while those with closed economies grew by 0.7 per cent a year. At that rate, open economies double in size every 16 years, while closed ones must wait a hundred. Of course, in the short term, some people lose from trade liberalisation. But in the long run, everyone gains: even the poorest South Koreans today are much richer than their counterparts 30 years ago.

#### Solves better – using capitalism to fight itself is more effective

Rothkrug 90 (Paul, Founder – Environmental Rescue Fund, Monthly Review, March, 41(10), p. 38)

No institution is or ever has been a seamless monolith. Although the inherent mechanism of American capitalism is as you describe it, oriented solely to profit without regard to social consequences, this does not preclude significant portions of that very system from joining forces with the worldwide effort for the salvation of civilization, perhaps even to the extent of furnishing the margin of success for that very effort.

#### Capitalism is resilient – it’ll bounce back

Foster 9 (JD, Norman B. Ture Senior Fellow in the Economics of fiscal policy – Heritage Foundation, "Is Capitalism Dead? Maybe," 3-11, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=101694302)

Capitalism is down. It may even be out. But it's **far from dead**. Capitalism is **extremely resilient**. Why? Because here, as in every democratic-industrial country around the world, it has always had to struggle to survive against encroachments — both benign and malevolent — of the state. At the moment, capitalism is losing ground most everywhere. But when the economic crisis passes, capitalism and the freedoms it engenders will **recover again**, if only because freedom beats its lack. It is said that the trouble with socialism is socialism; the trouble with capitalism is capitalists. The socialist economic system, inherently contrary to individual liberties, tends to minimize prosperity because it inevitably allocates national resources inefficiently. On the other hand, a truly capitalist system engaged in an unfettered pursuit of prosperity is prone to occasional and often painful excesses, bubbles and downturns like the one we are now experiencing globally. When capitalism slips, governments step in with regulations and buffers to try to moderate the excesses and minimize the broader consequences of individual errors. Sometimes these policies are enduringly helpful. Severe economic downturns inflict collateral damage on families and businesses otherwise innocent of material foolishness. Not only are the sufferings of these innocents harmful to society, but they are also downright expensive. A little wise government buffering can go a long way. The trick, of course, is the wisdom part. A good example of a wise government buffer is deposit insurance at commercial banks. Without it, depositors would have withdrawn their funds en masse, leading to a rapid collapse of the banking system. It happened in years gone by. But today, deposits have flowed into the banking system in search of safety, helping banks staunch their many severe wounds. Yet for every example of helpful government intervention, there are many more that do more harm than good. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac leap to mind. These congressional creatures helped create, then inflate the subprime market. When that balloon popped, it triggered a global economic meltdown. The current financial crisis clearly has capitalism on its back foot. Government ownership of the largest insurance company, the major banks, and Fan and Fred are awesome incursions into private markets. But, as President Obama has underscored, these incursions are only temporary. In time, these institutions — even Fan and Fred — will be broken up and sold in parts. It will leave government agents with stories to tell their grandkids, and taxpayers stuck with the losses. But the power of the state will again recede, and **another new age of** freedom and **capitalism will arrive and thrive**… until we repeat the cycle again sometime down the road.

#### Rejection won’t dislodge capitalism – no critical mass exists

Grossberg 92 (Lawrence, Professor of Communication Studies – UNC-Chapel Hill and Chair of the Executive Committee of the University Program in Cultural Studies, We Gotta Get Out of This Place: Popular Conservatism and Postmodern Culture, p. 388-389)

If it is capitalism that is at stake, our moral opposition to it has to be **tempered by** the **realities** of the world and the possibilities of political change. Taking a simple negative relation to it, as if the moral condemnation of the evil of capitalism were sufficient (granting that it does establish grotesque systems of inequality and oppression), is not likely to establish a viable political agenda. First, it is not at all clear what it would mean to overthrow capitalism in the current situation. Unfortunately, despite our desires, "the masses" are not waiting to be led into revolution, and it is not simply a case of their failure to recognize their own best interests, as if we did. Are we to decide-rather undemocratically, I might add-to overthrow capitalism in spite of their legitimate desires? Second, as much as capitalism is the cause of many of the major threats facing the world, at the moment it may also be one of the few forces of stability, unity and even, within limits, a certain "civility" in the world. The world system is, unfortunately, simply too precarious and the alternative options not all that promising. Finally, the appeal of an as yet unarticulated and even unimagined future, while perhaps powerful as a moral imperative, is **simply too weak** in the current context to effectively organize people, and **too vague** to provide any direction.

#### Alternatives to capitalism will inevitably collapse

Taylor 94 (Jerry, Director of Natural Resource Studies – Cato Institute, “The Challenge of Sustainable Development”, Regulation, http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/reg17n1-taylor.html)

The free, competitive marketplace creates not only human capital but natural capital as well. That is because capitalism is the most productive engine of intellectual and technological advance, and it is that stock of human knowledge and technology that turns the earth's material into useful commodities. "Humans are the active agent, having ideas that they use to transform the environment for human purposes, observes economist Thomas De Gregori. "Resources are not fixed and finite because they are not natural. They are a product of human ingenuity resulting from the creation of technology and science." David Osterfeld adds that "since resources are a function of human knowledge, and since our stock of knowledge has increased over time, it should come as no surprise that the stock of physical resources has also been expanding." Closed societies and economies under the heavy hand of state planning are doomed to live within the **confines of dwindling resource bases** and **eventually experience the** very collapse feared by the proponents of sustainable development.

**Vague alts are a voter – rejecting the aff can be anything – kills 2AC strat, makes it impossible to generate offense – justifies perm do the alt, we’ll defend it.**

#### Alt causes transition wars

Harris 3 (Lee, Analyst – Hoover Institution and Author of The Suicide of Reason, “The Intellectual Origins of America-Bashing”, Policy Review, January, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/3458371.html)

This is the immiserization thesis of Marx. And it is central to revolutionary Marxism, since if capitalism produces no widespread misery, then it also produces no fatal internal contradiction: If everyone is getting better off through capitalism, who will dream of struggling to overthrow it? Only genuine misery on the part of the workers would be sufficient to overturn the whole apparatus of the capitalist state, simply because, as Marx insisted, the capitalist class could not be realistically expected to relinquish control of the state apparatus and, with it, the monopoly of force. In this, Marx was absolutely correct. No capitalist society has ever willingly liquidated itself, and it is utopian to think that any ever will. Therefore, in order to achieve the goal of socialism, nothing short of a complete revolution would do; and this means, in point of fact, **a full-fledged** civil **war** not just within one society, but **across the globe**. Without this **catastrophic upheaval**, capitalism would remain completely in control of the social order and all socialist schemes would be reduced to pipe dreams.

**Extinction**

Kothari 82 (Rajni, Professor of Political Science – University of Delhi, Toward a Just Social Order, p. 571)

Attempts at global economic reform could also lead to a world racked by increasing turbulence, a greater sense of insecurity among the major centres of power -- and hence to a further tightening of the structures of domination and domestic repression – producing in their wake an intensification of the old arms race and militarization of regimes, encouraging regional conflagrations and setting the stage for **eventual global holocaust**.

#### Retreat solidifies capitalism – the void allows corporate power to go unchallenged

Boggs 97 (Carl, Professor of Political Science – National University, Theory & Society 26, December, p. 750-751)

Both mall culture and mass media symbolize the prevailing mood of anti-politics: they reproduce to a deeply-atomized, commodified social life-world which corresponds to the mode of consciousness described by Richard Sennett in The Fall of Public Man, where citizen involvement in a res publica is effaced ``by the belief that social meanings are generated by the feelings of individual human beings,'' so that the common terrain of power relations and social space is obliterated.15 Sheldon Wolin refers to this development as a ``crisis of citizenship,'' reflected in the carving up of the public sphere by local, privatized interests.16 The point has been reached where most Americans can no longer imagine a system truly open to citizen participation, where the ordinary person might have influence. Viewed in this way, modernity is two-sided: it coincides with the spread of technology, knowledge, and expertise but also reinforces widespread feelings of alienation and powerlessness. Individuals feel engulfed by forces beyond their control – bureaucracy, government, huge corporations, the global economy. Under these conditions psychological retreat from the public sphere may seem normal enough. The problem, however, is that such firmly entrenched bastions of power will not vanish simply because they are denigrated or ignored; on the contrary, their hegemony will simply go unchallenged.

#### Extinction results

Boggs 97 (Carl, Professor of Political Science – National University, Theory & Society 26, December, p. 773-774)

The decline of the public sphere in late twentieth-century America poses a series of great dilemmas and challenges. Many ideological currents scrutinized here ^ localism, metaphysics, spontaneism, post- modernism, Deep Ecology – intersect with and reinforce each other. While these currents have deep origins in popular movements of the 1960s and 1970s, they remain very much alive in the 1990s. Despite their different outlooks and trajectories, they all share one thing in common: a depoliticized expression of struggles to combat and overcome alienation. The false sense of empowerment that comes with such mesmerizing impulses is accompanied by a loss of public engagement, an erosion of citizenship and a depleted capacity of individuals in large groups to work for social change. As this ideological quagmire worsens, urgent problems that are destroying the fabric of American society will go unsolved – perhaps even unrecognized – only to fester more ominously into the future. And such problems (ecological crisis, poverty, urban decay, spread of infectious diseases, technological displacement of workers) cannot be understood outside the larger social and global context of internationalized markets, finance, and communications. Paradoxically, the widespread retreat from politics, often inspired by localist sentiment, comes at a time when agendas that ignore or side-step these global realities will, more than ever, be reduced to impotence. In his commentary on the state of citizenship today, Wolin refers to the increasing sublimation and dilution of politics, as larger numbers of people turn away from public concerns toward private ones. By diluting the life of common involvements, we negate the very idea of politics as a source of public ideals and visions.74 In the meantime, the fate of the world hangs in the balance. The unyielding truth is that, even as the ethos of anti-politics becomes more compelling and even fashionable in the United States, it is the vagaries of political power that will continue to decide the fate of human societies. This last point demands further elaboration. The shrinkage of politics hardly means that corporate colonization will be less of a reality, that social hierarchies will somehow disappear, or that gigantic state and military structures will lose their hold over people's lives. Far from it: the space abdicated by a broad citizenry, well-informed and ready to participate at many levels, can in fact be filled by authoritarian and reactionary elites – an already familiar dynamic in many lesser- developed countries. The fragmentation and chaos of a Hobbesian world, not very far removed from the rampant individualism, social Darwinism, and civic violence that have been so much a part of the American landscape, could be the prelude to a powerful Leviathan designed to impose order in the face of disunity and atomized retreat. In this way the eclipse of politics might set the stage for a reassertion of politics in more virulent guise – or it might help further rationalize the existing power structure. In either case, the state would likely become what Hobbes anticipated: the embodiment of those universal, collective interests that had vanished from civil society.75

### Fiscal Cliff DA – 2AC

#### No fiscal cliff compromise - Senate efforts will die in the House

**Lemire 10/3/12** (Jonathan, NY Daily News, "Bipartisan Senate ‘Gang of Eight’ works to avoid year-end fiscal crisis as Bush tax cuts end," http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/senate-gang-8-works-stem-tax-crisis-article-1.1173739#ixzz28TfWj3OS)

The Gang of Six has grown to eight — and their mission is to save the American economy.¶ Eight senators — four Democrats, four Republicans — will meet this month to prevent the federal government from plunging over a looming fiscal cliff.¶ While their summits will be eclipsed by the final month of the presidential campaign, the eight men are tasked with finding a solution to problems posed by the expiration of Bush-era tax cuts and automatic massive cuts to federal spending.¶ Their meetings are shrouded in secrecy, and aides have provided no details.¶ “This group continues to meet and work toward a bipartisan solution,” is all a spokesman for Sen. Mark Warner (D-Va.) would tell Politico on Wednesday.¶ Warner, along with Sen. Dick Durbin of Illinois and Kent Conrad of North Dakota, was one of three Democrats in the original Gang of Six, which was formed last summer to solve the nation’s debt ceiling crisis.¶ The group — joined by Republicans Saxby Chambliss of Georgia, Mike Crapo of Idaho and Tom Coburn of Oklahoma — failed to reach a deal.¶ But they have reconvened to tackle a new crisis and have been joined by Sen. Lamar Alexander (R-Tenn.) and Sen. Michael Bennet (D-Colo.), according to Politico.¶ The group has little power but widespread appeal, as bipartisan meetings are considered a refreshing alternative for gridlocked Washington.¶ But even if the Gang of Eight senators reach a deal, it may very well fall apart in the House of Representatives.¶ The latest polling suggests that the Republicans will retain control of the House and their leadership there has already voted to extend the Bush tax cuts and stop the cuts to defense spending.

#### Election year

Madison 12 (Lucy, “Congress back to work, but little action expected”, 9/10, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544\_162-57509835-503544/congress-back-to-work-but-little-action-expected/)

(CBS News) With just 13 days left in the final legislative session before the presidential elections, Congress returns this week with a number of crucial legislative measures on the to-do list. But **there's little evidence that the perpetually deadlocked body will do much more** in the next two weeks than is necessary to keep the government functional. Facing the threat of the so-called "fiscal cliff," a combination of tax increases and spending cuts scheduled to go into effect January 2013, the House and Senate must soon take up a series of contentious debates over taxes, defense and spending cuts. The Bush-era tax cuts are set to expire at the end of the year, and January 1, 2013 also marks the day when $1.2 trillion worth of budget cuts, which cut across domestic programs and the Pentagon, begin to go into effect unless Congress can reach a deal to offset them. On the same day, a payroll tax cut will expire, as will a deferment of payment cuts to Medicare physicians. Despite across-the-board urgings to address the looming fiscal cliff swiftly, most observers expect many of the relevant conversations to go up to the 11th hour, during the post-election lame duck session, when both parties are able to calibrate their actions based on how they fared in the presidential, and congressional, elections. "The fact is, whether it's the leadership or the members, all they want to do **is get out of there as quickly as possible and** get back there on the campaign trail," said Jim Manley, former spokesman for Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid and now senior director at the public affairs firm Quinn Gillespie & Associates. "There's not going to be a lot of appetite for doing much more than a handful of items."

#### Not in session

Lightman and Douglas 9/21 (David and William, “Unproductive Congress breaks until after November election”, 2012, <http://www.adn.com/2012/09/20/2633147/unproductive-congress-breaks-until.html>\_

Lawmakers spent Thursday pointing fingers and charging opponents with cynical political posturing. Among Congress' last decisions was a characteristic 2012 judgment: Punt action until later. It will let the farm bill, a broad measure that sets the nation's agriculture and food and nutrition assistance policies, expire Sept. 30. Congress also exits without any serious effort to edge away from the "fiscal cliff," the prospect of economy-damaging budget chaos if it doesn't act by year's end. Bush-era tax cuts are due to expire, and automatic spending cuts will take effect unless alternatives are passed. The public is noticing, as the legislative failures stir uncertainty and further roil an already-weak economy. This Congress' approval ratings were stuck at 13 percent in a Gallup survey Sept. 6-9, the lowest the pollster has ever logged this late in an election year since such measurements began in 1974. Yet **lawmakers are slinking out of town**, after a September session that was on and off for less than two weeks, following a summer recess that ran from Aug. 3 to Sept. 10. Congress is expected to return Nov. 13.

#### No link – doesn’t require congressional approval

Janofsky 6 (Michael, Veteran Journalist, “Offshore Drilling Plan Widens Rifts Over Energy Policy,” New York Times, 4-9, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/09/washington/09drill.html)

A Bush administration proposal to open an energy-rich tract of the Gulf of Mexico to oil and gas drilling has touched off a tough fight in Congress, the latest demonstration of the political barriers to providing new energy supplies even at a time of high demand and record prices. The two-million-acre area, in deep waters 100 miles south of Pensacola, Fla., is estimated to contain nearly half a billion barrels of oil and three trillion cubic feet of natural gas, enough to run roughly a million vehicles and heat more than half a million homes for about 15 years. The site, Area 181, is the only major offshore leasing zone that the administration is offering for development. But lawmakers are divided over competing proposals to expand or to limit the drilling. The Senate Energy Committee and its chairman, Pete V. Domenici, Republican of New Mexico, are pushing for a wider drilling zone, while the two Florida senators and many from the state's delegation in the House are arguing for a smaller tract. Other lawmakers oppose any new drilling at all. The debate could go a long way toward defining how the nation satisfies its need for new energy and whether longstanding prohibitions against drilling in the Outer Continental Shelf, the deep waters well beyond state coastlines, will end. The fight, meanwhile, threatens to hold up the confirmation of President Bush's choice to lead the Interior Department, Gov. Dirk Kempthorne of Idaho. Mr. Kempthorne was nominated last month to replace Gale A. Norton, a proponent of the plan, who stepped down March 31. Like Ms. Norton, Mr. Kempthorne, a former senator, is a determined advocate of developing new supplies of energy through drilling. While environmental groups say that discouraging new drilling would spur development of alternative fuels, administration officials say that timely action in Area 181 and beyond could bring short-term relief to the nation's energy needs and, perhaps, lower fuel costs for consumers. "It's important to have expansions of available acres in the Gulf of Mexico as other areas are being tapped out," Ms. Norton said recently. She predicted that drilling in the offshore zone would lead to further development in parts of the Outer Continental Shelf that have been off-limits since the 1980's under a federal moratorium that Congress has renewed each year and that every president since then has supported. States are beginning to challenge the prohibitions. Legislatures in Georgia and Kansas recently passed resolutions urging the government to lift the bans. On Friday, Gov. Tim Kaine of Virginia, a Democrat, rejected language in a state energy bill that asked Congress to lift the drilling ban off Virginia's coast. But he did not close the door to a federal survey of natural gas deposits. Meanwhile, Representative Richard W. Pombo, Republican of California, the pro-development chairman of the House Resources Committee, plans to introduce a bill in June that would allow states to seek control of any energy exploration within 125 miles of their shorelines. Senators John W. Warner of Virginia, a Republican, and Mark Pryor of Arkansas, a Democrat, introduced a similar bill in the Senate last month. Currently, coastal states can offer drilling rights only in waters within a few miles of their own shores. Mr. Pombo and other lawmakers would also change the royalty distribution formula for drilling in Outer Continental Shelf waters so states would get a share of the royalties that now go entirely to the federal government. Senators from Alabama, Louisiana and Mississippi are co-sponsoring a bill that would create a 50-50 split. As exceptions to the federal ban, the western and central waters of the Gulf of Mexico produce nearly a third of the nation's oil and more than a fifth of its natural gas. But Area 181 has been protected because of its proximity to Florida and the opposition of Mr. Bush's brother, Gov. Jeb Bush. By its current boundaries, the pending lease area is a much smaller tract than the 5.9 million acres the Interior Department first considered leasing more than 20 years ago and the 3.6 million acres that the department proposed to lease in 2001. This year, two million acres of the original tract are proposed for lease as the only waters of the Outer Continental Shelf that the administration is making available for 2007-12. The proposal is an administrative action that does not require Congressional approval, but it is still subject to public comment before being made final. Unless Congress directs the administration to change course, the administration's final plan would lead to bidding on new leases in 2007.

#### Natural gas production is popular

Strahan 12 (David, Energy Reporter – New Scientist, “The Great Gas Showdown,” New Scientist, 2-25, 213(2835), Academic Search Complete)

I FIRST heard the idea on a private jet flying from New York to London. The US oil billionaire Robert Hefner III, known as the "father of deep natural gas", had offered me a lift to discuss a book he was planning. The idea was, perhaps unsurprisingly, that natural gas will solve the supply problem of "peak oil" -- when global oil production starts to decline -- and dramatically cut US emissions of greenhouse gases, making it a perfect bridging fuel to a low-carbon future. With gas prices approaching record highs at the time, I was sceptical to say the least. But things have changed. Today the US is awash with cheap gas, thanks in part to the newfound ability to extract large amounts of shale gas. So could it be that Hefner, despite his obvious commercial interest, was right all along? Fellow tycoon T. Boone Pickens has also been pushing the gas agenda and their ideas have found enthusiastic support among the US public and in Congress. Replacing oil imports with domestically produced gas may promise better energy security and economic benefits. Is it the best route for cutting carbon emissions, though? Natural gas, which is mainly methane, may generate less carbon dioxide than oil and coal when burned, but as recent research has found, there's more to greenhouse gas emissions than just combustion.

#### Winners win.

Halloran 10 (Liz, Reporter – NPR, “For Obama, What A Difference A Week Made”, National Public Radio, 4-6, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=125594396)

Amazing what a win in a major legislative battle will do for a president's spirit. (Turmoil over spending and leadership at the Republican National Committee over the past week, and the release Tuesday of a major new and largely sympathetic book about the president by New Yorker editor David Remnick, also haven't hurt White House efforts to drive its own, new narrative.) Obama's Story Though the president's national job approval ratings failed to get a boost by the passage of the health care overhaul — his numbers have remained steady this year at just under 50 percent — he has earned grudging respect even from those who don't agree with his policies. "He's achieved something that virtually everyone in Washington thought he couldn't," says Henry Olsen, vice president and director of the business-oriented American Enterprise Institute's National Research Initiative. "And that's given him confidence." The protracted health care battle looks to have taught the White House something about power, says presidential historian Gil Troy — a lesson that will inform Obama's pursuit of his initiatives going forward. "I think that Obama realizes that presidential power is a muscle, and the more you exercise it, the stronger it gets," Troy says. "He exercised that power and had a success with health care passage, and now he wants to make sure people realize it's not just a blip on the map." The White House now has an opportunity, he says, to change the narrative that had been looming — that the Democrats would lose big in the fall midterm elections, and that Obama was looking more like one-term President Jimmy Carter than two-termer Ronald Reagan, who also managed a difficult first-term legislative win and survived his party's bad showing in the midterms. Approval Ratings Obama is exuding confidence since the health care bill passed, but his approval ratings as of April 1 remain unchanged from the beginning of the year, according to [Pollster.com](http://www.pollster.com/polls/us/jobapproval-obama.php). What's more, just as many people disapprove of Obama's health care policy now as did so at the beginning of the year. According to the most recent numbers: Forty-eight percent of all Americans approve of Obama, and 47 disapprove. Fifty-two percent disapprove of Obama's health care policy, compared with 43 percent who approve. Stepping Back From A Precipice Those watching the re-emergent president in recent days say it's difficult to imagine that it was only weeks ago that Obama's domestic agenda had been given last rites, and pundits were preparing their pieces on a failed presidency. Obama himself had framed the health care debate as a referendum on his presidency. A loss would have "ruined the rest of his presidential term," says Darrell West, director of governance studies at the liberal-leaning Brookings Institution. "It would have made it difficult to address other issues and emboldened his critics to claim he was a failed president." The conventional wisdom in Washington after the Democrats lost their supermajority in the U.S. Senate when Republican Scott Brown won the Massachusetts seat long held by the late Sen. Edward Kennedy was that Obama would scale back his health care ambitions to get something passed. "I thought he was going to do what most presidents would have done — take two-thirds of a loaf and declare victory," says the AEI's Olsen. "But he doubled down and made it a vote of confidence on his presidency, parliamentary-style." "You've got to be impressed with an achievement like that," Olsen says. But Olsen is among those who argue that, long-term, Obama and his party would have been better served politically by an incremental approach to reworking the nation's health care system, something that may have been more palatable to independent voters Democrats will need in the fall. "He would have been able to show he was listening more, that he heard their concerns about the size and scope of this," Olsen says. Muscling out a win on a sweeping health care package may have invigorated the president and provided evidence of leadership, but, his critics say, it remains to be seen whether Obama and his party can reverse what the polls now suggest is a losing issue for them.

#### Capital does not affect the agenda

**Dickinson 9** (Matthew, Professor of political science at Middlebury College, Sotomayer, Obama and Presidential Power, Presidential Power, http://blogs.middlebury.edu/presidentialpower/2009/05/26/sotamayor-obama-and-presidential-power/)

What is of more interest to me, however, is what her selection reveals about the basis of presidential power. Political scientists, like baseball writers evaluating hitters, have devised numerous means of measuring a president’s influence in Congress. I will devote a separate post to discussing these, but in brief, they often center on the creation of legislative “box scores” designed to measure how many times a president’s preferred piece of legislation, or nominee to the executive branch or the courts, is approved by Congress. That is, how many pieces of legislation that the president supports actually pass Congress? How often do members of Congress vote with the president’s preferences? How often is a president’s policy position supported by roll call outcomes? These measures, however, are a misleading gauge of presidential power – they are a better indicator of congressional power. This is because how members of Congress vote on a nominee or legislative item is rarely influenced by anything a president does. Although journalists (and political scientists) often focus on the legislative “endgame” to gauge presidential influence – will the President swing enough votes to get his preferred legislation enacted? – this mistakes an outcome with actual evidence of presidential influence. Once we control for other factors – a member of Congress’ ideological and partisan leanings, the political leanings of her constituency, whether she’s up for reelection or not – we can usually predict how she will vote without needing to know much of anything about what the president wants. (I am ignoring the importance of a president’s veto power for the moment.) Despite the much publicized and celebrated instances of presidential arm-twisting during the legislative endgame, then, most legislative outcomes don’t depend on presidential lobbying. But this is not to say that presidents lack influence. Instead, the primary means by which presidents influence what Congress does is through their ability to determine the alternatives from which Congress must choose. That is, presidential power is largely an exercise in agenda-setting – not arm-twisting. And we see this in the Sotomayer nomination. Barring a major scandal, she will almost certainly be confirmed to the Supreme Court whether Obama spends the confirmation hearings calling every Senator or instead spends the next few weeks ignoring the Senate debate in order to play Halo III on his Xbox. That is, how senators decide to vote on Sotomayor will have almost nothing to do with Obama’s lobbying from here on in (or lack thereof). His real influence has already occurred, in the decision to present Sotomayor as his nominee. If we want to measure Obama’s “power”, then, we need to know what his real preference was and why he chose Sotomayor. My guess – and it is only a guess – is that after conferring with leading Democrats and Republicans, he recognized the overriding practical political advantages accruing from choosing an Hispanic woman, with left-leaning credentials. We cannot know if this would have been his ideal choice based on judicial philosophy alone, but presidents are never free to act on their ideal preferences. Politics is the art of the possible. Whether Sotomayer is his first choice or not, however, her nomination is a reminder that the power of the presidency often resides in the president’s ability to dictate the alternatives from which Congress (or in this case the Senate) must choose. Although Republicans will undoubtedly attack Sotomayor for her judicial “activism” (citing in particular her decisions regarding promotion and affirmative action), her comments regarding the importance of gender and ethnicity in influencing her decisions, and her views regarding whether appellate courts “make” policy, they run the risk of alienating Hispanic voters – an increasingly influential voting bloc (to the extent that one can view Hispanics as a voting bloc!) I find it very hard to believe she will not be easily confirmed. In structuring the alternative before the Senate in this manner, then, Obama reveals an important aspect of presidential power that cannot be measured through legislative boxscores.

#### No deal coming on averting the fiscal cliff AND any tax increases/spending cuts won't immediately hurt the economy

Drum 10/3/12 (Kevin, Mother Jones, "Who's Afraid of the Fiscal Cliff," http://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2012/10/whos-afraid-fiscal-cliff)

Sarah Binder writes today that she doesn't expect this year's lame duck session of Congress to conclude a deal that will avert the "fiscal cliff" our legi-lemmings are set to march over on December 31. She has three reasons, and the first two boil down to the fact that Republicans aren't likely to suddenly stop being crazy just because we had an election, even if Obama wins.1 I can buy that. But here's reason #3:¶ Third, I’m somewhat skeptical that Democrats would have the political fortitude to go over the cliff. Democrats could have stuck to their guns in the lame duck of 2010, forcing Republicans (still in the minority) to swallow an increase in upper income tax rates as the price for extending the middle class tax cuts. That’s not the strategy Democrats chose then, and it strikes me as equally unlikely in 2012 with a GOP House majority. Going over the cliff requires Democrats to take ownership of raising taxes on the middle class at Christmas. That might be the strategically wise move for bolstering Democrats’ leverage come January. But it also strikes me as an electorally doubtful holiday gift to voters.¶ I'm not so sure about that. In this case, I think I'm with the folks who like to refer to this event as a fiscal slope rather than a fiscal cliff. Their general point is that we don't all suddenly pay thousands of dollars in taxes and cut billions of dollars in spending at the stroke of midnight on January 1st. This stuff all phases in over time.¶ That's true, and I doubt very much that there would be any serious consequences to doing a deal in February or March instead of December. In the particular case of taxes, the only thing that happens on January 1st is that withholding rates would go up slightly — and maybe not even that. The IRS has a fair amount of latitude to leave withholding rates alone for a few months if it wants to. Either way, this means that Democrats don't really have to worry about "owning" the expiration of the Bush tax cuts for quite a while. (The payroll tax holiday also expires on December 31, but that was always unlikely to be extended anyway. It doesn't have much to do with the fiscal cliff.)¶ For a few months, then, taxpayers won't see much impact. Maybe none at all. As a result, I think Democrats could pretty safely stick to their guns and extend negotiations into 2013 without much risk. At that point, with the Bush tax cuts gone and rates back up to their Clinton-era levels, they'll still have to convince Republicans to introduce a bill that cuts only the middle-income rates, not the top marginal rates, and that won't be easy. But Republicans will be under as much pressure as Democrats by that point, and they might very well be willing to do a deal.¶ In short, as long as the composition of Congress doesn't change dramatically, I don't think the calculus is much different before and after January 1st. The cliff doesn't really start to get scary until later in the year.

#### Middle East war doesn’t escalate

Maloney 7 (Suzanne, Senior Fellow – Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Steve Cook, Fellow – Council on Foreign Relations, and Ray Takeyh, Fellow – Council for Foreign Relations, “Why the Iraq War Won’t Engulf the Mideast”, International Herald Tribune, 6-28, http://www.brookings.edu/views/op-ed/maloney20070629.htm)

Long before the Bush administration began selling "the surge" in Iraq as a way to avert a general war in the Middle East, observers both inside and outside the government were growing concerned about the potential for armed conflict among the regional powers. Underlying this anxiety was a scenario in which Iraq's sectarian and ethnic violence spills over into neighboring countries, producing conflicts between the major Arab states and Iran as well as Turkey and the Kurdistan Regional Government. These wars then destabilize the entire region well beyond the current conflict zone, involving heavyweights like Egypt. This is scary stuff indeed, but with the exception of the conflict between Turkey and the Kurds, the scenario is far from an accurate reflection of the way Middle Eastern leaders view the situation in Iraq and calculate their interests there. It is abundantly clear that major outside powers like Saudi Arabia, Iran and Turkey are heavily involved in Iraq. These countries have so much at stake in the future of Iraq that it is natural they would seek to influence political developments in the country. Yet, the Saudis, Iranians, Jordanians, Syrians, and others are very unlikely to go to war either to protect their own sect or ethnic group or to prevent one country from gaining the upper hand in Iraq. The reasons are fairly straightforward. First, Middle Eastern leaders, like politicians everywhere, are primarily interested in one thing: self-preservation. Committing forces to Iraq is an inherently risky proposition, which, if the conflict went badly, could threaten domestic political stability. Moreover, most Arab armies are geared toward regime protection rather than projecting power and thus have little capability for sending troops to Iraq. Second, there is cause for concern about the so-called blowback scenario in which jihadis returning from Iraq destabilize their home countries, plunging the region into conflict. Middle Eastern leaders are preparing for this possibility. Unlike in the 1990s, when Arab fighters in the Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union returned to Algeria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia and became a source of instability, Arab security services are being vigilant about who is coming in and going from their countries. In the last month, the Saudi government has arrested approximately 200 people suspected of ties with militants. Riyadh is also building a 700 kilometer wall along part of its frontier with Iraq in order to keep militants out of the kingdom. Finally, there is no precedent for Arab leaders to commit forces to conflicts in which they are not directly involved. The Iraqis and the Saudis did send small contingents to fight the Israelis in 1948 and 1967, but they were either ineffective or never made it. In the 1970s and 1980s, Arab countries other than Syria, which had a compelling interest in establishing its hegemony over Lebanon, never committed forces either to protect the Lebanese from the Israelis or from other Lebanese. The civil war in Lebanon was regarded as someone else's fight. Indeed, this is the way many leaders view the current situation in Iraq. To Cairo, Amman and Riyadh, the situation in Iraq is worrisome, but in the end it is an Iraqi and American fight. As far as Iranian mullahs are concerned, they have long preferred to press their interests through proxies as opposed to direct engagement. At a time when Tehran has access and influence over powerful Shiite militias, a massive cross-border incursion is both unlikely and unnecessary. So Iraqis will remain locked in a sectarian and ethnic struggle that outside powers may abet, but will remain within the borders of Iraq. The Middle East is a region both prone and accustomed to civil wars. But given its experience with ambiguous conflicts, the region has also developed an intuitive ability to contain its civil strife and prevent local conflicts from enveloping the entire Middle East.

### Helium – 2AC

#### US natural gas production is key global helium production

EIA 6 (Energy Information Administration, the official energy statistics agency of U.S. Government , “Natural Gas Processing: The Crucial Link Between Natural Gas Production and Its Transportation to Market” http://www.eia.gov/pub/oil\_gas/natural\_gas/feature\_articles/2006/ngprocess/ngprocess.pdf)

**The world’s supply of helium** comes exclusively **from natural gas production**. The single largest source of helium is the United States, which produces about 80 percent of the annual world production of 3.0 billion cubic feet (Bcf). In 2003, U.S. production of helium was 2.4 Bcf, about two-thirds of which came from the Hugoton Basin in north Texas, Oklahoma, and Kansas (Figure 2). The rest mostly comes from the LaBarge field located in the Green River Basin in western Wyoming, with small amounts also produced in Utah and Colorado. According to the National Research Council, the consumption of helium in the United States doubled between 1985 and 1996, although its use has leveled off in recent years. It is used in such applications as magnetic resonance imaging, semiconductor processing, and in the pressurizing and purging of rocket engines by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Twenty-two natural gas treatment plants in the United States currently produce helium as a major byproduct of natural gas processing. Twenty of these plants, located in the Hugoton-Panhandle Basin, produce marketable helium which is sold in the open market when profitable, while transporting the remaining unrefined helium to the Federal Helium Reserve (FHR). The FHR was created in the 1950s in the Bush salt dome, underlying the Cliffside field, located near Amarillo, Texas. Sales of unrefined helium in the United Statesfor the most part, come from the FHR.

#### This collapses US space exploration

CN 12 – Citation News, “Scientists' High-Pitched Response to Helium Shortage”, 3-22, http://www.cyberregs.com/webapps/Blog/post/Scientists-High-Pitched-Response-to-Helium-Shortage.aspx

Helium - the second lightest element in the universe with an atomic weight of 4.002602 - is an inert gas that can be cooled to temperatures of -270 Celsius without becoming a solid, **making it indispensible** in the operation of, among many things, superconducting magnets used in MRI scanners, telescopes and particle accelerators like the Large Hadron Collider. Helium also holds an important place in the defense industry. It also has some far less profound applications, which consume great quantities of the gas annually - applications such as party balloons and squeak-voice huffing. These latter applications have drawn the ire of researchers. This month, the Guardian reported that the UK's Rutherford Appleton Laboratory wasted three days and £90,000 (US$ 143,091), when, during an important experiment exploring the structure of matter, they could not obtain a supply of helium. Needless to say, the scientists were in a less-than-celebratory mood. "We put the stuff into party balloons and let them float off into the upper atmosphere, or we use it to make our voices go squeaky for a laugh. It is very, very stupid. It makes me really angry,” said Oleg Kiricheck, the research team leader. Cornell University Professor Robert Richardson is also concerned. He believes that, with our current reserves of helium, the price of the element severely discounts its real value. By his estimation, the price of a single party balloon should cost as much as $100. Richardson suggests increasing the price of helium by 20-50% to eliminate excessive waste. Although helium ranks next to hydrogen as the most abundant element in the universe, here on earth it is a finite commodity. The helium that is here is all we have! Helium is **collected during natural gas** and oil drilling. If the gas is not captured, it dissipates into earth's upper atmosphere and is lost forever. The same happens when a party balloon is released into the air, or when it self-deflates, because helium atoms are so small that they can easily move through the balloon's latex shell. Party balloons do not represent the only wasteful expenditures of helium. Macy's Thanksgiving Day parade typically uses 400 Mcf a year, although there have been recent attempts to recycle some of the helium used in the floats. NASA uses up to 75 MMcf annually to pressurize rocket tanks. The agency has made no attempt to recycle this huge amount of gas. Weather balloons also consume about 140 MMcf of helium per year. At the present rate of supply depletion, the United States will become an importer of helium from the Middle East and Russia within 10 years, and the world will run out of helium within 30 years. This would have major implications for space travel and exploration, scientific and nuclear research, medical advances and early detection of diseases. Possible solutions for this problem **should address supply**, not pricing. A drastic increase in the price of helium as a preservative measure would cause a huge spike in billing for medical procedures, such as MRIs, scientific research, and defense expenditures, as well as party balloons.

#### Extinction is inevitable without space exploration

Carreau 2 (Mark, Winner – 2006 Space Communicator Award, MA in Journalism – Kansas State University, “Top Experts See Space Study As Key to Human Survival”, The Houston Chronicle, 10-19, Lexis)

With Apollo astronaut John Young leading the charge, top aerospace experts warned Friday that humanity's survival may depend on how boldly the world's space agencies venture into the final frontier. Only a spacefaring culture with the skills to travel among and settle planets can be assured of escaping a collision between Earth and a large asteroid or devastation from the eruption of a super volcano, they told the World Space Congress. "Space exploration is the key to the future of the human race," said Young, who strolled on the moon more than 30 years ago and now serves as the associate director of NASA's Johnson Space Center. "We should be running scared to go out into the solar system. We should be running fast." Scientists believe that an asteroid wiped out the dinosaurs more than 60 million years ago, and are gathering evidence of previously large collisions. "The civilization of Earth does not have quite as much protection as we would like to believe," said Leonid Gorshkov, an exploration strategist with RSC Energia, one of Russia's largest aerospace companies. "We should not place all of our eggs in one basket."

## 1AR vs. George Washington RS

### T

#### Natural gas production means making natural gas marketable – that exclude **Reinjected, Venting, and Natural Gas Liquids**

Eurostat 5 (Statistical Office of the European Communities, “Energy Statistics Manual,” International Energy Agency, http://www.iea.org/stats/docs/statistics\_manual.pdf)

Production

Fuels

Fuels can be produced in a large diversity of ways: deep mine for coal, offshore platform for oil, forest for fuelwood, etc.

The production of primary fossil fuels is usually measured **close to the point of extraction** from the reserves. The quantities produced should be those measured when the fuels are in a marketable state. Any quantities which are not saved for use or sale should be excluded from the production figure. For example, some of the gases extracted from a gas or oil field may be returned to the field to maintain pressure (reinjected gas), flared or released into the atmosphere (vented gas). The remaining gases may then be processed to remove some of the heavier gases (natural gas liquids). The **production of marketable natural gas should be measured or calculated only after the reinjected gas, waste gas and the natural gas liquids have been removed** (see chapter on natural gas).

### CP

#### Japan says no

Fesharaki 12 (Dr. Fereidun, Chairman – Facts Global Energy, “Japanese Government Energy Policy: The Role of US LNG Exports,” Hydrocarbon Asia, Jan-Mar, http://www.hcasia.safan.com/mag/hca0112/r20.pdf)

The Japanese government, in the form of MITI, now METI, the Ministry of Environment, and the Ministry of Finance, have long been important players in Japan’s energy industry. The long-term energy policy targets of METI are well recognized and much anticipated in the energy business. For many, it **sets the parameters of not just energy policies, but also energy security, energy diplomacy, and environmental standards**, especially on carbon issues. The crisis in Fukushima has had two opposing impacts on government policies. On the one hand, it exposed the backroom dealings and lack of proper monitoring. On the other hand, it created a greater need for a **bolder more assertive policy stance**. The stronger policy stance is also a reaction to the renewed vigor and even more aggressive local government position in trying to wrest control of energy policy away from the central government and consolidate it in local hands. The radical positions of the Mayor of Osaka and the Governor of Tokyo are good examples. Frankly, the central government needs to be more assertive as local politics and populism can have serious negative consequences for the economy and energy security of Japan. Among the new issues now flagged by the central government is an increasing role for natural gas. Currently, there are serious infrastructural limitations on the ability to import more LNG via existing receiving facilities and the generation capacity of gas. In Tokyo Bay, for example, 24 million tonnes of LNG imports is the absolute maximum that can be imported by TEPCO. At around 80\_81 million tonnes of LNG imports, we have reached the limits of import capacity in Japan. METI will announce a new energy policy by the second half of 2012, giving some 30-35 percent share to natural gas and reducing the share of nuclear to 15-20 percent. This will also trigger the building of additional gas-fired generation capacity and conversion of older oil- and coal-fired capacity to gas fired. New, more efficient coal\_fired power plants—IGCC are also likely be permitted and built. Meanwhile, the carbon issues take a back seat in the interim period. By late this decade, the LNG imports could be 90 million tonnes or higher, keeping Japan as the number one LNG importer in the world well into the next decade. Among the new policies being adopted, but still not heavily publicized or articulated, is for Japan to import LNG from North America, namely the United States, on a large scale. The Japanese government feels that there is too much dependence on Asia and too much dependence on conventional non-flexible LNG with higher price slopes. They would like to see a major push by the utilities to import less expensive LNG with flexible volumes both for energy security and economic reasons. The government was somewhat surprised that the Japanese companies were not active in the Sabine Pass sales, and that the Indian and Korean entities grabbed half of the volume. The Japanese LNG importers have certain discomforts with importing LNG from the US. First, there is a general fear that somehow, the impact of the fracking issues and water table contamination may stop the whole shale gas movement. They fear that the US government may intervene to stop the exports.

### K

#### -- Environment is resilient

Easterbrook 95 (Gregg, Distinguished Fellow – Fullbright Foundation, A Moment on Earth, p. 25)

In the aftermath of events such as Love Canal or the Exxon Valdez oil spill, every reference to the environment is prefaced with the adjective "fragile." "Fragile environment" has become a welded phrase of the modern lexicon, like "aging hippie" or "fugitive financier." But the notion of a fragile environment is profoundly wrong. Individual animals, plants, and people are distressingly fragile. The environment that contains them is close to indestructible. The living environment of Earth has survived ice ages; bombardments of cosmic radiation more deadly than atomic fallout; solar radiation more powerful than the worst-case projection for ozone depletion; thousand-year periods of intense volcanism releasing global air pollution far worse than that made by any factory; reversals of the planet's magnetic poles; the rearrangement of continents; transformation of plains into mountain ranges and of seas into plains; fluctuations of ocean currents and the jet stream; 300-foot vacillations in sea levels; shortening and lengthening of the seasons caused by shifts in the planetary axis; collisions of asteroids and comets bearing far more force than man's nuclear arsenals; and the years without summer that followed these impacts. Yet hearts beat on, and petals unfold still. Were the environment fragile it would have expired many eons before the advent of the industrial affronts of the dreaming ape. Human assaults on the environment, though mischievous, are pinpricks compared to forces of the magnitude nature is accustomed to resisting.

#### -- Long time-frame

Kay 1 (Jane, “Study Takes Historical Peek at Plight of Ocean Ecosystems”, San Francisco Chronicle, 7-26, Lexis)

The collapse of ecosystems often occur over a long period. In one example, when Aleut hunters killed the Alaskan sea otter about 2,500 years ago, the population of their natural prey, the sea urchin, grew larger than its normal size. In turn, the urchins grazed down the kelp forests, important habitat for a whole host of ocean life. Then, when fur traders in the 1800s hunted the otters and sea cows almost to extinction, the kelp forests disappeared and didn't start to regenerate until the federal government protected the sea otters in the 20th century. In California, the diversity of spiny lobsters, sheephead fish and abalone kept down the urchin numbers. At present in Alaska, the kelp beds are declining again in areas where killer whales are preying on sea otters. Biologists think the killer whales switched to otters for food because there are fewer seals and sea lions to eat.

#### Life has intrinsic value that is unattached to instrumental capacity

**Penner 5** (Melinda, Director of Operations – STR, “End of Life Ethics: A Primer”, Stand to Reason, http://www.str.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=5223)

Intrinsic value is very different. Things with intrinsic value are valued for their own sake. They don’t have to achieve any other goal to be valuable. They are goods in themselves. Beauty, pleasure, and virtue are likely examples. Family and friendship are examples. Something that’s intrinsically valuable might also be instrumentally valuable, but **even if it loses its instrumental value**, its intrinsic value remains. Intrinsic value is what people mean when they use the phrase "the sanctity of life." Now when someone argues that someone doesn’t have "quality of life" they are arguing that life is only valuable as long as it obtains something else with quality, and when it can’t accomplish this, it’s not worth anything anymore. It's only instrumentally valuable. The problem with this view is that it is entirely subjective and changeable with regards to what might give value to life. Value becomes a completely personal matter, and, as we all know, our personal interests change over time. There is no grounding for objective human value and human rights if it’s not intrinsic value. Our legal system is built on the notion that humans have intrinsic value. The Declaration of Independence: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that each person is endowed by his Creator with certain unalienable rights...." If human beings only have instrumental value, then slavery can be justified because there is nothing objectively valuable that requires our respect. There is nothing other than intrinsic value that can ground the unalienable equal rights we recognize because there is nothing about all human beings that is universal and equal. Intrinsic human value is what binds our social contract of rights. So if human life is intrinsically valuable, then it remains valuable even when our capacities are limited. Human life is valuable even with tremendous limitations. Human life remains valuable because its value is not derived from being able to talk, or walk, or feed yourself, or even reason at a certain level. Human beings don’t have value only in virtue of states of being (e.g., happiness) they can experience.

#### Value to life can’t be calculated

**Schwartz 2** (Lisa, M.D., Associate Professor of Medicine – Dartmouth College Medical School, et al., Medical Ethics: A Case Based Approach, www.fleshandbones.com/readingroom/pdf/399.pdf)

The first criterion that springs to mind regarding the value of life is usually the quality of the life or lives in question: The quality of life ethic puts the emphasis on the type of life being lived, not upon the **fact of life**. Lives are not all of one kind; some lives are of great value to the person himself and to others while others are not. What the life means to someone is what is important. Keeping this in mind it is not inappropriate to say that some lives are of greater value than others, that the condition or meaning of life does have much to do with the justification for terminating that life.1 Those who choose to reason on this basis hope that if the quality of a life can be measured then the answer to whether that life has value to the individual can be determined easily. This raises special problems, however, because the idea of quality involves a value judgment, and value judgments are, by their essence, subject to indeterminate relative factors such as preferences and dislikes. Hence, quality of life is difficult to measure and will vary according to individual tastes, preferences and aspirations. As a result, **no general rules** or principles **can be asserted that would simplify decisions about the value of a life based on its quality.**

## 2AC vs. Dartmouth ER

### Heg

#### Heg is completely sustainable- their authors are incorrect

**Beckley 12** [Michael Beckley, research fellow in the International Security Program at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, “China’s Century?”, Winter 2012]

Hegemony is indeed expensive and provocative, but these declinist arguments tell only part of the story. The United States is both “system-maker and privilege-taker”—it pays a large share of system-maintenance costs but takes a disproportionate share of the benefiªts.36 The basic claim of the alternative perspective is that these benefiªts outweigh the costs. Most obvious, the United States, as hegemon, possesses an array of tools with which to reward and punish. It can provide, restrict, or deny access to the U.S. market, technology, foreign aid, support for membership in international organizations, bribes, and White House visits. These tit-for-tat bargains with individual states, however, are not as consequential as the United States’ power over aspects of the international system itself. In the alternative perspective, hegemony is not just preponderant power, it is “structural power.”37 It is the power to set agendas, to shape the normative frameworks within which states relate to one another, and to change the range of choices open to others without putting pressure directly on them. It is, at once, less visible and more profound than brute force. Seen in this light, the United States is neither benevolent nor feeble, but coercive and capable, and the goods it produces “are less collective goods than private ones, accruing primarily to the hegemon and thus helping maintain its hegemony.”38 Military superiority, for example, allows the United States to employ “force without war,” pressuring other countries into making concessions by shifting military units around or putting them on alert.39 It also allows the United States to run a protection racket, garnering inºfluence through the provision of security. As Joseph Nye explains, “Even if the direct use of force were banned among a group of countries, military force would still play an important political role. For example, the American military role in deterring threats to allies, or of assuring access to a crucial resource such as oil in the Persian Gulf, means that the provision of protective force can be used in bargaining situations. Sometimes the linkage may be direct; more often it is a factor not mentioned openly but present in the back of statesmen’s minds.”40 To be sure, the costs of maintaining U.S. military superiority are substantial. By historical standards, however, they are exceptionally small.41 Past hegemons succumbed to imperial overstretch after ªfighting multifront wars against major powers and spending more than 10 percent (and often 100 or 200 percent) of their GDPs on defense.42 The United States, by contrast, spends 4 percent of its GDP on defense and concentrates its enmity on rogue nations and failed states. Past bids for global mastery were strangled before hegemony could be fully consolidated. The United States, on the other hand, has the advantage of being an extant hegemon—it did not overturn an existing international order; rather, the existing order collapsed around it. As a result, its dominant position is entrenched to the point that “any effort to compete directly with the United States is futile, so no one tries.”43 The dollar’s global role may handicap American exports, but it also comes with perks including seigniorage,44 reduced exchange rate risks for U.S. ªfirms involved in international commerce, competitive advantages for American banks in dollarized ªfinancial markets, and the ability to delay and deºflect current account adjustments onto other countries.45 More important, foreign governments that hold dollar reserves depend on U.S. prosperity for their continued economic growth and are thus “entrapped,” unable to disentangle their interests from those of the United States.46 Rather than seeking to undermine the American economy, they invest in its continued expansion.47 Finally, given its position at the top of the world trade regime, the United States can distort international markets in its favor.48 Declinists expect the hegemon to use its power magnanimously. According to the alternative perspective, however, American foreign economic policy involves the routine use of diplomatic leverage at the highest levels to create opportunities for U.S. ªfirms.49 U.S. trade offiªcials, “acting as self-appointed enforcers of the free trade regime, asserted the right with their own national law to single out and punish countries they judged to be unfair traders.”50 Globalization, therefore, may not be a neutral process that diffuses wealth evenly throughout the international system, but a political process shaped by the United States in ways that serve its interests.

**Decline causes aggression- triggers the impact**

**Snyder 07**

Robert and Renee Belfer Professor of International Relations at Columbia University

[Jack “FREE HAND ABROAD, DIVIDE AND RULE AT HOME: THE DOMESTIC POLITICS OF UNIPOLARITY” (http://www.henryfarrell.net/unipolarity.pdf)]

Plausible as these arguments may be, the opposite case may be equally plausible. States that are under intense international pressure may be especially vulnerable to myth-ridden foreign policies. Hostile encirclements heighten the enemy images, bunker mentalities, and double standards in perception that are common in competitive relationships of all kinds, especially in international relations. 9 Nationalist and garrison-state ideologies are reinforced. Likewise, Charles Kupchan argues that declining empires typically adopt strategic ideologies of aggressive forward defense out of fear that their opponents will discover the truth about their growing weakness. 10 In contrast, diplomatic historians commonly applaud the pragmatism of powerful “off-shore balancers,” whose privileged position grants them the freedom to be selective and fact-driven, waiting upon developments before committing troops. Whether powerful, unconstrained states are more ideological than weaker or highly constrained states depends greatly on their domestic politics, not simply their position in the international system. 11 Krasner’s corollary hypothesis—that powerful or unconstrained states are likely to succumb to an ideology of expansionism—is also an oversimplification. Powerful, secure states have the option to express their ideological values in the world through coercion, but they also have other options. They might choose to engage with the world pragmatically, taking what they need and ignoring the global problems that good fortune insulates them from. Or they might adopt a highly principled foreign policy that increases humanitarian assistance abroad, but eschews empire and declines to meddle in the internal politics of foreign peoples. Finally, they might be tempted by policies of limited liability, embarking on good works and moralistic hectoring abroad, but then heading for the exits when backlash makes costs rise. 12 Simply being powerful says little about whether or how ideology will express itself.

They don’t assume the transition – that goes nuclear

Posen and Ross 97 [Barry Posen, Professor of Political Science in the Defense and Arms Control Studies Program at MIT, Andrew Ross, Professor of National Security Studies at the Naval War College, International Security, Winter 1997]

The United States can, more easily than most, go it alone. Yet we do not find the arguments of the neo-isolationists compelling. Their strategy serves U.S. interests only if they are narrowly construed. First, though the neo-isolationists have a strong case in their argument that the United States is currently quite secure, disengagement is unlikely to make the United States more secure, and would probably make it less secure. The disappearance of the United States from the world stage would likely precipitate a good deal of competition abroad for security. Without a U.S. presence, aspiring regional hegemons would see more opportunities. States formerly defended by the United States would have to look to their own military power; local arms competitions are to be expected. Proliferation of nuclear weapons would intensify if the U.S. nuclear guarantee were withdrawn. Some states would seek weapons of mass destruction because they were simply unable to compete conventionally with their neighbors. This new flurry of competitive behavior would probably energize many hypothesized immediate causes of war, including preemptive motives, preventive motives, economic motives, and the propensity for miscalculation**. There would** like **be more war. W**eapons of **m**ass **d**estruction **might be used in** some of **the wars**, with unpleasant effects even for those not directly involved.

Their offense is inevitable – we’ll always pursue heg

Shalmon and Horowitz 09

(Dan, Mike, Total B.A.’s, Orbis, Spring)

It is important to recognize at the outset two key points about United States strategy and the potential costs and benefits for the United States in a changing security environment. First, the United States is very likely to remain fully engaged in global affairs. Advocates of restraint or global withdrawal, while popular in some segments of academia, remain on the margins of policy debates in Washington D.C. This could always change, of course. However, at present, it is a given that the United States will define its interests globally and pursue a strategy that requires capable military forces able to project power around the world. Because ‘‘indirect’’ counter-strategies are the rational choice for actors facing a strong state’s power projection, irregular/asymmetric threats are inevitable given America’s role in the global order.24

Offshore balancing causes aggression, triggers a power vacuum and causes global war

Poffenbarger and Schaefer 9

[John G., Dept Social Sciences @ Wheeling Jesuit U, and Mark E., Dept History, Philosophy, Poli. Sci. and Religion @ Marietta College, "Searching for Acceptance: The United States and South America," for presentation at the 2009 International Studies Assoc. Annual Conference, February 17, AllAcademic | VP]

It is our contention that a strategy of hegemony is preferable to one of offshore balancing for several reasons. First, we believe that the depth and breadth of United States’ interests may not be best served by the use of regional proxies. The utilization of regional partners is certainly a possibility for an actor such as the United States, however off-shore balancing seems to call for an over reliance on such partners that could weaken United States power and interests. Second, the realities of the recent Bush administration’s policies may not allow for such a strategic adjustment to offshore balancing. That is not to say that the United States might not seek to reduce its exposure abroad in some areas, but a move to an off-shore balancing strategy at this time may send the wrong message to allies and potential rivals. Next, a move away from a strategy of hegemony would likely trigger a power vacuum in some areas. The European Union faces problems of unity, cohesion, willingness, and a lack of structure to deal with most of the situations currently faced by the United States. Russia, while seeing a resurgence of power in recent years, does not appear to currently have global ambitions, but more likely wishes to focus on its “near-abroad”. (This “near abroad” also seems to lie within United States’ security and economic purview.) China also appears to currently have limited global interests, as it seeks to finalize its development and gain global energy access, but it also may be searching for ways to alter its relative power in relation to the United States. Finally, it is our belief that such a dramatic change in strategy may actually trigger more balancing; as such a withdrawal may send a signal of vulnerability and a lack of willingness to latent balancers. We contend that the United States would be best served by maintaining its current position in the international system, and by simply taking steps to mitigate the motivations for balancing while seeking to attract bandwagoners.

#### Perception of American strength prevents prolif and first strikes

Talent and Hall ‘10,

March (Jim - distinguished fellow in government relations at the Heritage Foundation, and Heath, Sowing the Wind, p. http://www.freedomsolutions.org/2010/03/sowing-the-wind-the-decay-of-american-power-and-its-consequences/)

There is a reason that regimes like Iran and North Korea go to the time and expense, and assume the risks of developing nuclear weapons programs; nuclear capability empowers them to achieve their ends, and thereby poses challenges to the United States, for several reasons. First, there is a danger that rogue regimes with nuclear material may assist terrorists in developing weapons of mass destruction.[36] Even the possibility that such regimes may do so gives them leverage internationally. Second, these regimes have ambitions in their regions and around the world.[37] Some of their leaders are fanatical enough to actually consider a first strike using nuclear weapons; for example, high-ranking officials of the Iranian government have openly discussed using a nuclear weapon against Israel.[38] Whether a first strike occurs or not, the possession of nuclear capability frees aggressive regimes to pursue their other goals violently with less fear of retaliation. For example, North Korea’s nuclear capability means that it could attack South Korea conventionally with a measure of impunity; even if the attack failed, the United States and its allies would be less likely to remove the North Korean regime in retaliation. In other words, nuclear capability lessens the penalties which could be exacted on North Korea if it engages in aggression, which makes the aggression more likely. The same logic applies to Iran, which is why the other nations in the Middle East are so concerned about Iran’s nuclear program. A nuclear attack by Iran is possible, but the real danger of Iranian nuclear capability is that it would make conventional aggression in the region more likely.[39] Finally, the more nations that get nuclear weapons, the greater the pressure on other nations to acquire them as a deterrent, and this is particularly true when a government acquiring the capability is seen as unstable or aggressive. North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons has tended, for obvious reasons, to make the South Koreans and Japanese uncomfortable about having no deterrent themselves. The possibility of uncontrolled proliferation—what experts call a “nuclear cascade”[40]—is tremendously dangerous; it increases the possibility that terrorists can get nuclear material from a national program, and it raises the prospect of a multilateral nuclear confrontation between nations.[41] Many of the smaller nuclear nations do not have well-established first strike doctrine or launch protocols; the chance of a nuclear exchange, accidental or intentional, increases geometrically when a confrontation is multilateral. The antidote to proliferation is American leadership and power. The reality and perception of American strength not only deters aggressive regimes from acquiring weapons of mass destruction; it reassures other countries that they can exist safely under the umbrella of American power without having to develop their own deterrent capability.[42]

### K – 2AC

#### K doesn’t come first

**Owens 2002** (David – professor of social and political philosophy at the University of Southampton, Re-orienting International Relations: On Pragmatism, Pluralism and Practical Reasoning, Millenium, p. 655-657)

Commenting on the ‘philosophical turn’ in IR, Wæver remarks that ‘[a] frenzy for words like “epistemology” and “ontology” often signals this philosophical turn’, although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn. The first danger with the philosophical turn is that it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology **over explanatory** and/or interpretive **power** as if the latter two were merely a **simple function** of the former. But while the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is not wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), **it is by no means clear that it is**, in contrast, wholly dependent **on these philosophical commitments**. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness—but **this does not undermine** the point that, for a certain class of problems, rational choice theory may provide the best account available to us. In other words, while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, **it is not the only or even necessarily the** most important kind. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that because prioritisation of ontology and epistemology promotes theory-construction from philosophical first principles, it cultivates a theory-driven rather than problem-driven approach to IR. Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action, event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, ‘theory-driven work is part of a reductionist program’ in that it ‘dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory’.5 The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since ‘whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is a **question for social-scientific inquiry**, not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry’.6 Moreover, this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of empirical validity. The third danger is that the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR—what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) ‘the Highlander view’—namely, an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because the turn to, and prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one **theoretical approach which gets things right**, namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so a potentially vicious circle arises.

#### No single cause of violence

Muro-Ruiz 2 (Diego, London School of Economics, “The Logic of Violence”, Politics, 22(2), p. 116)

Violence is, most of the time, a wilful choice, especially if it is made by an organisation. Individuals present the scholar with a more difficult case to argue for. Scholars of violence have now a wide variety of perspectives they can use – from sociology and political science, to psychology, psychiatry and even biology – and should escape easy judgements. However, **the fundamental difficulty** for all of us is the absence of a synthetic, general theory able of integrating less complete theories of violent behaviour. In the absence of such a general theory, researchers should bear in mind that violence is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon that resists mono-causal explanations. Future research on violence will have to take in account the variety of approaches, since they each offer some understanding of the logic of violence.

#### -- Some threats are real – “security politics” does not motivate all violence

**Kydd 97** (Professor of Political Science – California, Riverside, Security Studies, Autumn, p. 154)

As for the Second World War, few structural realists will make a sustained case the Hitler was genuinely motivated by a rational pursuit of security for Germany and the other German statesmen would have responded in the same way to Germany’s international situation. Even Germen generals opposed Hitler’s military adventurism until 1939; it is difficult to imagine a less forceful civilian leader overruling them and leading Germany in an oath of conquest. In the case of the cold war, it is again difficult to escape the conclusion that the Soviet Union was indeed expansionist before Gorbachev and not solely motivated by security concerns. The increased emphasis within international relations scholarship on explaining the nature and origins of aggressive expansionists states reflects a growing consensus that aggressive states are at the root of conflict, not security concerns.

#### Alt causes right to fill in – turns the K

Olav. F. **Knudsen**, Prof @ Södertörn Univ College, **‘1** [*Security Dialogue* 32.3, “Post-Copenhagen Security Studies: Desecuritizing Securitization,” p. 366]

A final danger in focusing on the state is that of building the illusion that states have impenetrable walls, that they have an inside and an outside, and that nothing ever passes through. Wolfers’s billiard balls have contributed to this misconception. But the state concepts we should use **are in no need of** such an illusion. Whoever criticizes the field for such sins in the past needs to **go back to the literature**. Of course, we must continue to be open to a frank and unbiased assessment of the transnational politics which significantly in- fluence almost every issue on the domestic political agenda. The first decade of my own research was spent studying these phenomena – and I disavow none of my conclusions about the state’s limitations. Yet I am not ashamed to talk of a domestic political agenda. Anyone with a little knowledge of Euro- pean politics knows that Danish politics is not Swedish politics is not German politics is not British politics. Nor would I hesitate for a moment to talk of the role of the state in transnational politics, where it is an important actor, though only one among many other competing ones. In the world of transnational relations, the exploitation of states by interest groups – by their assumption of roles as representatives of states or by convincing state representatives to argue their case and defend their narrow interests – is a significant class of phenomena, today as much as yesterday. Towards a Renewal of the Empirical Foundation for Security Studies Fundamentally, the sum of the foregoing list of sins blamed on the Copen- hagen school amounts to a lack of attention paid to just that ‘reality’ of security which Ole Wæver consciously chose to leave aside a decade ago in order to pursue the politics of securitization instead. I cannot claim that he is void of interest in the empirical aspects of security because much of the 1997 book is devoted to empirical concerns. However, the attention to agenda-setting – confirmed in his most recent work – draws attention away from the important issues we need to work on more closely if we want to contribute to a better understanding of European **security as it is** currently developing**.** That inevitably requires a more **consistent** interest in security policy in the making – not just in the development of alternative security policies. The dan- ger here is that, as alternative policies are likely to fail grandly on the political arena, crucial decisions may be made in the ‘**traditional’ sector of security** policymaking, **unheeded by any but the most uncritical minds.**

#### Alternative fails – critical theory has no mechanism to translate theory into practice

**Jones 99** (Richard Wyn, Lecturer in the Department of International Politics – University of Wales, Security, Strategy, and Critical Theory, CIAO, http://www.ciaonet.org/book/wynjones/wynjones06.html)

Because emancipatory political practice is central to the claims of critical theory, one might expect that proponents of a critical approach to the study of international relations would be reflexive about the relationship between theory and practice. Yet their thinking on this issue thus far does not seem to have progressed much beyond **grandiose statements of intent**. There have been no systematic considerations of how critical international theory can help generate, support, or sustain emancipatory politics beyond the seminar room or conference hotel. Robert Cox, for example, has described the task of critical theorists as providing “a guide to strategic action for bringing about an alternative order” (R. Cox 1981: 130). Although he has also gone on to identify possible agents for change and has outlined the nature and structure of some feasible alternative orders, he has not explicitly indicated whom he regards as the addressee of critical theory (i.e., who is being guided) and thus how the theory can hope to become a part of the political process (see R. Cox 1981, 1983, 1996). Similarly, Andrew Linklater has argued that “a critical theory of international relations must regard the practical project of extending community beyond the nation–state as its most important problem” (Linklater 1990b: 171). However, he has little to say about the role of theory in the realization of this “practical project.” Indeed, his main point is to suggest that the role of critical theory “is not to offer instructions on how to act but to reveal the existence of unrealised possibilities” (Linklater 1990b: 172). But the question still remains, reveal to whom? Is the audience enlightened politicians? Particular social classes? Particular social movements? Or particular (and presumably particularized) communities? In light of Linklater’s primary concern with emancipation, one might expect more guidance as to whom he believes might do the emancipating and how critical theory can impinge upon the emancipatory process. There is, likewise, little enlightenment to be gleaned from Mark Hoffman’s otherwise important contribution. He argues that critical international theory seeks not simply to reproduce society via description, but to understand society and change it. It is both descriptive and constructive in its theoretical intent: it is both an intellectual and a social act. It is not merely an expression of the concrete realities of the historical situation, but also a force for change within those conditions. (M. Hoffman 1987: 233) Despite this very ambitious declaration, once again, Hoffman gives no suggestion as to how this “force for change” should be operationalized and what concrete role critical theorizing might play in changing society. Thus, although the critical international theorists’ critique of the role that more conventional approaches to the study of world politics play in reproducing the contemporary world order may be persuasive, their account of the relationship between their own work and emancipatory political practice is unconvincing. Given the centrality of practice to the claims of critical theory, this is a very significant weakness. Without some plausible account of the **mechanisms** by which they hope to aid in the achievement of their emancipatory goals, proponents of critical international theory are hardly in a position to justify the assertion that “it represents the next stage in the development of International Relations theory” (M. Hoffman 1987: 244). Indeed, without a more convincing conceptualization of the theory–practice nexus, one can argue that critical international theory, by its own terms, has no way of redeeming some of its central epistemological and methodological claims and thus that it is a **fatally flawed** enterprise.

#### Rigid rejection of “China threat” gets warped into a new orthodoxy and fuels extremism. Recognizing plural interpretations and linkages is more productive.

Callahan 5 (William A., Professor of Politics – University of Manchester, “How to Understand China: The Dangers and Opportunities of Being a Rising Power”, Review of International Studies, 31)

Although ‘China threat theory’ is ascribed to the Cold War thinking of foreigners who suffer from an enemy deprivation syndrome, the use of containment as a response to threats in Chinese texts suggests that Chinese strategists are also seeking to fill the symbolic gap left by the collapse of the Soviet Union, which was the key threat to the PRC after 1960. Refutations of ‘China threat theory’ do not seek to deconstruct the discourse of ‘threat’ as part of critical security studies. Rather they are expressions of a geopolitical identity politics because they refute ‘Chinese’ threats as a way of facilitating the production of an America threat, a Japan threat, an India threat, and so on. Uniting to fight these foreign threats affirms China’s national identity. Unfortunately, by refuting China threat in this bellicose way – that is by generating a new series of threats – the China threat theory texts end up confirming the threat that they seek to deny: Japan, India and Southeast Asia are increasingly threatened by China’s protests of peace.43 Moreover, the estrangement produced and circulated in China threat theory is not just among nation-states. The recent shift in the focus of the discourse from security issues to more economic and cultural issues suggests that China is estranged from the ‘international standards’ of the ‘international community’. After a long process of difficult negotiations, China entered the WTO in December 2001. Joining the WTO was not just an economic or a political event; it was an issue of Chinese identity.44 As Breslin, Shih and Zha describe in their articles in this Forum, this process was painful for China as WTO membership subjects the PRC to binding rules that are not the product of Chinese diplomacy or culture. Thus although China enters international organisations like the WTO based on shared values and rules, China also needs to distinguish itself from the undifferentiated mass of the globalised world. Since 2002, a large proportion of the China threat theory articles have been published in economics, trade, investment, and general business journals – rather than in international politics, area studies and ideological journals as in the 1990s. Hence China threat theory is one way to differentiate China from these international standards, which critics see as neo-colonial.45 Another way is for China to assert ownership over international standards to affirm its national identity through participation in globalisation.46 Lastly, some China threat theory articles go beyond criticising the ignorance and bad intentions of the offending texts to conclude that those who promote China threat must be crazy: ‘There is a consensus within mainland academic circles that there is hardly any reasonable logic to explain the views and practices of the United States toward China in the past few years. It can only be summed up in a word: ‘‘Madness’’ ’.47 Indians likewise are said to suffer from a ‘China threat theory syndrome’.48 This brings us back to Foucault’s logic of ‘rationality’ being constructed through the exclusion of a range of activities that are labelled as ‘madness’. The rationality of the rise of China depends upon distinguishing it from the madness of those who question it. Like Joseph Nye’s concern that warnings of a China threat could become a self-fulfilling prophesy, China threat theory texts vigorously reproduce the dangers of the very threat they seek to deny. Rather than adding to the debate, they end up policing what Chinese and foreigners can rationally say. Conclusion The argument of this essay is not that China is a threat. Rather, it has examined the productive linkages that knit together the image of China as a peacefully rising power and the discourse of China as a threat to the economic and military stability of East Asia. It would be easy to join the chorus of those who denounce ‘China threat theory’ as the misguided product of the Blue Team, as do many in China and the West. But that would be a mistake, because depending on circumstances anything – from rising powers to civilian aircraft – can be interpreted as a threat. The purpose is not to argue that interpretations are false in relation to some reality (such as that China is fundamentally peaceful rather than war-like), but that it is necessary to unpack the political and historical context of each perception of threat. Indeed, ‘China threat’ has never described a unified American understanding of the PRC: it has always been one position among many in debates among academics, public intellectuals and policymakers. Rather than inflate extremist positions (in both the West and China) into irrefutable truth, it is more interesting to examine the debates that produced the threat/opportunity dynamic.

### Nuke Power Tradeoff DA – 2AC

#### Nuclear power’s not cost competitive with gas

Levi 12 (Michael, Senior Fellow for Energy and Environment – Council on Foreign Relations, “Splitting Rock vs. Splitting Atoms: What Shale Gas Means For Nuclear Power,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 68(4), July/August, p. 52-60)

For most of the past decade, energy analysts produced increasingly bold predictions of a coming energy revolution that would deliver cheap, secure, and environmentally friendly power. Skeptics pointed out problems: Costs would turn out to be too high; advocates were overlooking important environmental risks; the promised security benefits were a chimera. Those criticisms, though, largely failed to blunt an infectious enthusiasm that seemed destined to prevail. The prophets were right to predict seismic shifts in the energy landscape. They were just looking in the wrong place. The flavor of the decade, of course, was nuclear energy, and talk of a “nuclear renaissance” was on everyone’s lips. Yet by 2009, it was shale gas, not atomic power, that was roiling the energy landscape. John Deutch, US undersecretary of energy in the late 1970s, recently said, ÒWhatÕs happening biggest energy story thatÕs happened in the 40-plus years that IÕve been watching energy development in this countryÓ (Ekstrom, 2012). And booming gas production is causing **casualties**. Speaking to an audience at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania last fall, then-Exelon CEO John Rowe put it bluntly: ‘I cannot build a new nuclear plant to compete with gas’ (Maykuth, 2011). In case his message wasnÕt clear, he followed up a few months later, predicting that the combination of low natural gas prices and Fukushima will set a real nuclear renaissance back by several decades (Silvestein, 2012). Deutch and Rowe are far from alone in the energy world. There is increasingly widespread agreement among energy experts that the United States will enjoy moderate natural gas prices for decades and that **nuclear power will be unable to compete**. If substantial shale gas supplies are developed in other countries, or increasingly robust global markets for natural gas push overseas prices down, the cost differential between natural gas and nuclear power could replicate itself elsewhere. It has become impossible to speculate intelligently about the future of nuclear power without first understanding the ongoing revolution in natural gas.

#### No impact – prolif will be limited and slow

Yusuf 9 (Moeed, Fellow and Ph.D. Candidate in the Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range

Future – Boston University, “Predicting Proliferation: The History of the Future of Nuclear Weapons”, Brookings Policy Paper 11, January, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2009/01\_nuclear\_proliferation\_ yusuf/01\_nuclear\_proliferation\_yusuf.pdf)

It is a paradox that few aspects of international security have been as closely scrutinized, but as incorrectly forecast, as the future nuclear landscape. Since the advent of nuclear weapons in 1945, there have been dozens, if not hundreds of projections by government and independent analysts trying to predict horizontal and vertical proliferation across the world. Various studies examined which countries would acquire nuclear weapons, when this would happen, how many weapons the two superpowers as well as other countries would assemble, and the impact these developments might have on world peace. The results have oscillated between gross underestimations and terrifying overestimations. Following the September 11, 2001 attacks, the fear that nuclear weapons might be acquired by so-called “rogues states” or terrorist groups brought added urgency – and increased difficulty – to the task of accurately assessing the future of nuclear weapons. A survey of past public and private projections provides a timely reminder of the flaws in both the methodologies and theories they employed. Many of these errors were subsequently corrected, but not before, they made lasting impressions on U.S. nuclear (and non-nuclear) policies. This was evident from the time the ‘Atoms for Peace’ program was first promulgated in 1953 to the 1970 establishment of the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and more recently during the post-Cold War disarmament efforts and debates surrounding U.S. stance towards emerging nuclear threats. This study offers a brief survey of attempts to predict the future of nuclear weapons since the beginning of the Cold War.1 The aim of this analysis is not merely to review the record, but to provide an overall sense of how the nuclear future was perceived over the past six decades, and where and why errors were made in prediction, so that contemporary and future predictive efforts have the benefit of a clearer historical record. The survey is based on U.S. intelligence estimates as well as the voluminous scholarly work of American and foreign experts on the subject. Six broad lessons can be gleaned from this history. First, it reveals consistent misjudgments regarding the extent of nuclear proliferation. Overall, projections were far more pessimistic than actual developments; those emanating from independent experts more so than intelligence estimates. In the early years of the Cold War, the overly pessimistic projections stemmed, in part, from an incorrect emphasis on technology as the driving factor in horizontal proliferation, rather than intent, a misjudgment, which came to light with the advent of a Chinese bomb in 1964. The parallel shift from developed-world proliferation to developing-world proliferation was accompanied by greater alarm regarding the impact of proliferation. It was felt that developing countries were more dangerous and irresponsible nuclear states than developed countries. Second, while all the countries that did eventually develop nuclear weapons were on the lists of suspect states, the estimations misjudged when these countries would go nuclear. The Soviet Union went nuclear much earlier than had been initially predicted, intelligence estimates completely missed China’s nuclear progress, and India initially tested much later than U.S. intelligence projections had anticipated and subsequently declared nuclear weapon status in 1998 when virtually no one expected it to do so. Third, the pace of proliferation has been consistently slower than has been anticipated by most experts due to a combination of overwhelming alarmism, the intent of threshold states, and many incentives to abstain from weapons development. In the post-Cold War period, the number of suspected threshold states has gradually decreased and the geographical focus has shifted solely to North-East Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East. There is also much greater concern that a nuclear chain reaction will break out than was the case during the Cold War.

#### Nuke leadership fails – it’s an ineffective tool and outdated

Weiss 9 (Leonard, Affiliated Scholar – Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation, “Reliable Energy Supply and Nonproliferation,” Nonproliferation Review, 16(2), July, http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/npr\_16-2\_weiss.pdf)

Part of the problem is that its value as a nonproliferation tool was at its height at the beginning of the nuclear age**,** when few countries were in a position to achieve nuclear autarky. The probability of consensus on establishing a worldwide regime in which there are fuel guarantees and no nationally owned fuel cycle facilities has been on a decreasing slope. Technology denial has become a less effective tool, thanks especially to A.Q. Khan and others. The spread of fuel cycle technologies has perhaps reached a tipping point in which the technology is**,** if not widely available, then sufficiently available to any determined party**.** Hence, the argument made by proponents of internationalization that giving up national nuclear development in favor of more restrictive international efforts will result in much greater security for all does not have the power it may once have had.

### A2: LNG Exports Bad – Russian Economy – 2AC

#### **Qatar takes out the link – already out competing Russia**

Satanovsky 12 (E. , “Small, but very dangerous. Qatar could oust Russia from the global gas market”, 9/4, <http://therearenosunglasses.wordpress.com/2012/04/09/small-but-very-dangerous-qatar-could-oust-russia-from-the-global-gas-market/>, originally from http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1333724880)

Ironically, the tiny but ambitious and dynamic, Qatar is the main competitor of Russia in world energy markets.While Moscow, sinking into the international political and technical problems, build pipelines, which were to allow it to solve the problems with transit countries, Doha has created sweeping the entire world network of terminals for liquefied natural gas (LNG) and formed the largest specialized fleet of 54 vessels. About stuck at the stage of negotiations, “South Stream” keep silent, but the Russian gas that goes to Europe on the “Nord Stream”, and in China and other Asian countries on the ESPO under construction, will meet in those markets most serious competition from Qatar. In 2010, the emirate has put 55.7 million tons of LNG to 23 countries. In 2011 – 77 million tons by the end of 2012 plans to sell 120 million tons. 23% of EU gas consumption has Qatari origin. During the eight years of production and export of LNG in **Qatar grew by six times**, and five-year plan involves the development of its economy to invest more than $ 96 billion in deposits and the expansion of processing facilities, while maintaining a caretaker as a series of major gas fields. Isolated from the land of Saudi Arabia, which at one time cut off from his UAE, Qatar was forced to concentrate on the manufacture and export of LNG and is now independent of the neighbor-rival. And its partners Exxon Mobil and British Petroleum have the most advanced technology liquefaction. Growing market Qatari gas is Europe. In Asia, the number of his clients are India, China, Malaysia, Pakistan, South Korea and Japan. In North America – USA and Canada. In South America, from 2011 – Argentina and Brazil (Petrobras). Competing in the EU with the Algerian and Egyptian gas, the main pressure on the emirate has a Russian “Gazprom”, pushing it even on the traditional markets such as Italy and Poland, where the LNG will begin in 2013. Active negotiations on the export of Qatari gas to the Baltic countries, Ukraine and Belarus. In Asia Qatari liquefied natural gas – **a competitor of Russian LNG** produced on Sakhalin and the Far East. Russian politicians have believed in vain that the creation of the so-called ”Gas OPEC” (Forum countries – exporters of natural gas) will be the basis of alliance of gas producers, who will be able to dictate its conditions to consumers the benefit of all market players. For Qatar, the whole point of this organization limited to the location of its headquarters in Doha, and the possibility of imitation in its framework for collective action, which allows competitors to divert attention from its offensive against their interests. At a red herring like and discussion about the emirate’s investment in the project “Yamal LNG.” While the economic cooperation of Qatar and Russia costavlyaet less than $ 20 million per year. And if Russia is open for cooperation, the presence of Russian business in Qatar is extremely complicated. The rapid expansion of Qatar’s terminal network, dumping, and the transition from the spot to supply medium-and long-term contracts do not give a reason for the optimistic estimates of the possibilities for harmonizing Russian and Qatari gas strategy. Geography of Qatar LNG terminals covers the UK, continental Europe, the U.S. (only one Golden Pass terminal on the Gulf Coast has a capacity of 15.6 million tonnes of LNG per year), Latin America, the Middle East. Requirements of European companies that rely on the Qatari dumping, the decline in prices for Russian gas complicate the situation of “Gazprom”, especially since the transition to long-term transactions Qatar **neutralized the main traditional advantage of Russia**. A precedent was a three-year contract for $ 3.25 billion signed in 2011 between Qatargas and the British company Centrica, to supply the last 2.4 million tons of LNG annually.

#### No link and non-unique – most nat gas is domestically used and Russia’s industry is screwed

Stratfor 12 (“Russia's Natural Gas Dilemma”, 4/9, http://www.stratfor.com/sample/analysis/russias-natural-gas-dilemma)

Russia produced approximately 510 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas in 2011, and approximately 60% of it was sold on the domestic Russian market. **Russia has one of the highest domestic consumption rates per capita of natural gas** - understandably so, since Russia is one of the world's coldest countries, and heating and electricity use is high. Russian industry also depends heavily on natural gas. Russia uses a four-tier pricing system for natural gas: two tiers for domestic prices, one for the former Soviet states and one for its European customers. Russia has long capped domestic natural gas prices, a practise left over from the Soviet era. Currently, Russia charges between $75 and $97 per thousand cubic metres (tcm) on the domestic market, with households and municipal entities, such as schools and hospitals, paying the lower price and industrial entities paying more. Most of the former Soviet states pay in the mid-$200s and Europe pays $350 to $450 per tcm. Russia's natural gas firms - primarily Gazprom - **are suffering financially** because of measures that let domestic users pay a fraction of the price Russia's foreign customers pay. In the past decade, the Kremlin has permitted Gazprom to increase its price by 14 to 25% a year. This gradual increase has prevented a massive backlash from natural gas consumers in Russia because it has been accompanied by improving economic standards in the country. However, Gazprom says this increase is insufficient. Gazprom sees four primary problems with Russia's current natural gas prices. First, **Gazprom is losing money on its domestic sales**. According to current Gazprom data, it costs Gazprom approximately $132 to produce or acquire and then distribute 1 tcm of natural gas, but its revenue from the domestic market is only $80 per tcm, which means Gazprom loses more than $50 per tcm sold domestically. Considering that the domestic market makes up 60% of sales, the loss is monumental. Gazprom has continued to stay afloat and remain strong because of its sales abroad, where its revenue is approximately $279 per tcm (double the cost of production). However, Russia's domestic natural gas consumption has grown more than 15% in the past decade (but declined during the economic crisis of 2008-2009). Gazprom is thus producing more natural gas at a loss than it would if it charged its domestic customers what it charged its foreign customers. Second, Gazprom is concerned that **its revenues from sales to Europe will decrease** amid negotiations over new natural gas prices with many of its European customers. Coupled with Europe's diversification of natural gas supplies away from Russia, this means Gazprom could soon be unable to continue offsetting its domestic losses with high profit margins from sales on the European market. Third, when winters are particularly cold, Russia curbs what it exports (mainly to Europe) to keep more supplies at home. This happened this past winter and shortages of up to 30% were seen in Austria, Romania, Germany, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Greece and Italy, all of which also experienced an extraordinarily cold winter. Although this practice might keep the population at home warm, it meant that Gazprom lost a great deal of money it could have made if more supplies had gone to Europe. Finally, Gazprom is trying to offset a recent 61% increase in mineral extraction taxes, which cost Gazprom $2.2 billion more in 2011 and could cost an estimated $5.2 billion more in 2012. The tax issue is highly controversial and interwoven with the ongoing internal political struggle in the Kremlin. The idea of restructuring the country's energy tax system has drawn both robust opposition and staunch support within the Kremlin. The increased tax came from a faction in the Kremlin that believes the government needs more funds to offset its budget deficit and that the government needed to stop coddling Russia's energy firms with low taxes. Citing these concerns, Gazprom is arguing that it **cannot continue funding future projects without more revenue** from domestic natural gas consumers. It is not that Gazprom would be unable to continue the de facto subsidisation overall; the company generates a great deal of revenue. Gazprom has some large and expensive projects planned that it does not believe it can fund without making more money. These projects include the Shtokman Arctic project, estimated to cost $15 billion to $20 billion; the South Stream pipeline, with an estimated cost of $24 billion to $31 billion; the Yamal fields project, which will cost tens of billions of dollars; and an expansion of Sakhalin, which will also cost tens of billions of dollars.

#### Russia’s natural gas sector is failing now

BR 9/7 (Business Recorder, “Gazprom profit plunges as it repays Europe”, 2012, http://www.brecorder.com/fuel-a-energy/193/1234841/)

Gazprom said Thursday its profit plunged by a quarter due top falling gas exports and billions in back payments to EU nations now probing the Russian giant for price fixing and intimidation tactics. The world's largest natural gas company attributed its 23.5 percent drop in first-quarter net income to a sharp decline in sales to both Europe and the ex-Soviet states - two of the slowest-growing regions in the world. It also reported a one-off $2.4 billion (78.5 billion ruble) payment to European clients who managed to negotiate a lower price after threatening to take the Russian state firm to court. The profit was still a strong $11.1 billion (357.8 billion rubles) and debt was down heavily. Brussels is formally probing Gazprom for effectively trying to bully eastern and central European nations into buying its pipeline gas at elevated prices and then preventing them from trading any excess supply. The probe comes a year after official raids on the offices of Gazprom's European partners and amid widening EU efforts to diversify its sources of energy supplies. Gazprom on Wednesday suggested that Russia's broader national interests were being threatened by the investigation and demanded respect for its "status as a strategic organisation" under federal law. The politics of the probe quickly resonated through the Kremlin-controlled parliament and saw some officials accuse Brussels bureaucrats of trying to gain an unfair advantage over a powerful Russian firm. "This could be just a form - and a fairly improper one at that - of (economic) competition," Russia's EU envoy Vladimir Chizhov told the Interfax news agency in Brussels. "I think that the European Commission is simply trying to lower the gas price," added ruling party energy committee member Pavel Zavalny. Gazprom - owner of both gas supplies and distribution at home - last year began renegotiating some of its long-term contracts at lower prices while adamantly resisting rules to cede control of its European pipelines. Alfa Bank analyst Maria Yegikyan said she expected the back payment to Europe to reach $4.5 billion between April and June. But the EU probe is broader and focused on whether past and current Russian company policies "prevented the diversification of supply of gas" in Europe. The investigation is expected to last as many as three years. But Gazprom's stock lost nearly two percent on Wednesday on speculation about possible fines that could be retroactive and apply to this and previous years. Gazprom reported an eight-percent decrease in European delivery volumes and 32-percent less gas to ex-Soviet states that almost exclusively rely on Gazprom shipments.

#### Give Russia war zero probability – politics, military superiority, and nuclear security

Graham 7 (Thomas, Russia in Global Affairs, "The dialectics of strength and weakness", http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/numbers/20/1129.html)

An astute historian of Russia, Martin Malia, wrote several years ago that “Russia has at different times been demonized or divinized by Western opinion less because of her real role in Europe than because of the fears and frustrations, or hopes and aspirations, generated within European society by its own domestic problems.” Such is the case today. To be sure, mounting Western concerns about Russia are a consequence of Russian policies that appear to undermine Western interests, but they are also a reflection of declining confidence in our own abilities and the efficacy of our own policies. Ironically, this growing fear and distrust of Russia come at a time when Russia is arguably less threatening to the West, and the United States in particular, than it has been at any time since the end of the Second World War. Russia does not champion a totalitarian ideology intent on our destruction, its **military poses no threat** to sweep across Europe, its economic growth depends on constructive commercial relations with Europe, and its strategic arsenal – while still capable of annihilating the United States – is under more reliable control than it has been in the past fifteen years and the threat of a strategic strike **approaches zero probability.** Political gridlock in key Western countries, however, precludes the creativity, risk-taking, and subtlety needed to advance our interests on issues over which we are at odds with Russia while laying the basis for more constructive long-term relations with Russia.

### Elections DA – Obama Good – 2AC

#### Energy is not a key election issues --- other issues outweigh.

**The Washington Post**, 6/27/**2012** (Energy ads flood TV in swing states, p. http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/energy-ads/2012/06/27/gJQAD5MR7V\_story.html)

Energy issues don’t spark much excitement among voters, ranking below health care, education and the federal budget deficit — not to mention jobs and the economy. And yet those same voters are being flooded this year with campaign ads on energy policy. Particularly in presidential swing states, the airwaves are laden with messages boosting oil drilling and natural gas and hammering President Obama for his support of green energy. The Cleveland area alone has heard $2.7 million in energy-related ads. The disconnect between what voters say they care about and what they’re seeing on TV lies in the money behind the ads, much of it coming from oil and gas interests. Those funders get the double benefit of attacking Obama at the same time they are promoting their industry. Democrats also have spent millions on the subject, defending the president’s record and tying Republican candidate Mitt Romney to “Big Oil.” Overall, more than $41 million, about one in four of the dollars spent on broadcast advertising in the presidential campaign, has gone to ads mentioning energy, more than a host of other subjects and just as much as health care, according to ad-tracking firm Kantar Media/Cmag. In an election focused heavily on jobs and the economy, all of this attention to energy seems a bit off topic. But the stakes are high for energy producers and environmentalists, who are squared off over how much the government should regulate the industry. And attention has been heightened by a recent boom in production using new technologies such as fracking and horizontal drilling, as well as a spike in gas prices this spring just as the general election got underway. When asked whether energy is important, more than half of voters say yes, according to recent polls. But asked to rank their top issues, fewer than 1 percent mention energy.

#### Plan cuts against Romney’s “dirty fuel” narrative – helps Obama win swing states

LeVine 12 (Steve, “How Dirty is Romney Prepared to Get to Win Election?” Foreign Policy, 6-13, http://oilandglory.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/06/12/how\_dirty\_is\_romney\_prepared\_to\_get\_to\_win\_election)

Is Barack Obama sufficiently dirty to win re-election? Not according to presumptive Republican nominee Mitt Romney, who says the president is too spic and span. Calculating that clean energy is passé among Americans more concerned about jobs and their own pocketbooks, Romney is gambling that he can tip swing voters his way by embracing dirtier air and water if the tradeoff is more employment and economic growth. Romney's gamble is essentially a bet on the demonstrated disruptive potency of shale gas and shale oil, which over the last year or so have shaken up geopolitics from Russia to the Middle East and China. Now, Romney and the GOP leadership hope they will have the same impact on U.S. domestic politics, and sweep the former Massachusetts governor into the White House with a strong Republican majority in Congress. A flood of new oil and natural gas production in states such as North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Texas is changing the national and global economies. U.S. oil production is projected to reach 6.3 million barrels a day this year, the highest volume since 1997, the Energy Information Agency reported Tuesday. In a decade or so, U.S. oil supplies could help to shrink OPEC's influence as a global economic force. Meanwhile, a glut of cheap U.S. shale gas has challenged Russia's economic power in Europe and is contributing to a revolution in how the world powers itself. But Romney and the GOP assert that Obama is slowing the larger potential of the deluge, and is not up to the task of turning it into what they say ought to be a gigantic jobs machine. The president's critics say an unfettered fossil fuels industry could produce 1.4 million new jobs by 2030. They believe that American voters won't be too impressed with Obama's argument that he is leading a balanced energy-and-jobs approach that includes renewable fuels and electric cars. The GOP's oil-and-jobs campaign -- in April alone, 81 percent of U.S. political ads attacking Obama were on the subject of energy, according to Kantar Media, a firm that tracks political advertising -- is a risk that could backfire. Americans could decide that they prefer clean energy after all. Or, as half a dozen election analysts and political science professors told me, energy -- even if it seems crucial at this moment in time -- may not be a central election issue by November. Yet if the election is as close as the polls suggest, the energy ads could prove a pivotal factor. "Advertising is generally not decisive. **Advertising matters at the margins**. ... But ask Al Gore if the margin matters," said Ken Goldstein, president of the Campaign Media Analysis Group at Kantar Media. "This is looking like an election where the margin may matter." Romney is hardly the first major U.S. presidential candidate to embrace Big Oil. The politics of clean go back to Lady Bird Johnson's war on litter and Richard Nixon's embrace of environmentalism. But both presidents Bush came from the oil industry, and former Alaska Gov. Sarah Palin, the last GOP vice presidential nominee, gleefully led chants of "Drill, baby, drill" in 2008. Yet President George W. Bush also famously declared that "America is addicted to oil" in his 2006 State of the Union address, and initiated most of the energy programs for which Obama is currently under fire. And Palin's drumbeat in the end seemed to fall flat. The Republican efforts appear to go beyond any modern campaign in their brash embrace of what is dirty, and their scorn of what is not. And the times seem to favor them. In 2009, the GOP, backed by heavy industry lobbying, knocked back environmentalists on their heels by crushing global warming legislation. Other previously central issues -- Afghanistan, Iraq, health care -- are still debated in the campaign, but **not as centrally nor as viscerally as energy**, said Frank Maisano, an energy and political analyst at Bracewell & Giuliani, a Houston-based law firm. Obama advisors have said rightly that energy is only one component of a much broader American and global economy, but the GOP appears to have at least partially successfully injected the oil and gas boom as a defining feature of the economic discourse. In a Sunday op-ed in the New York Times entitled "America's New Energy Reality," industry consultant Daniel Yergin remarked that while Obama's 2010 State of the Union address focused on clean-energy jobs, the president pivoted this year to talk as much about oil and natural gas. "His announcement that ‘American oil production is the highest it has been in eight years' turned out to be an applause line," Yergin noted. Romney grants that Obama is not precisely Mr. Clean -- while the president has championed clean energy technologies, he has also stewarded over the greatest buildup in U.S. fossil fuel production since the 1990s. But Romney insists he will be dirtier: He vows to **open more land to oil and gas drilling**, approve the import of more Canadian oil sands to Gulf Coast refineries, and allow more coal mining. As for Obama, Romney recently told a Colorado coal community, he isn't dirty enough to deserve a second presidential term. The president has "made it harder to get coal out of the ground; he's made it harder to get natural gas out of the ground; he's made it harder to get oil out of the ground," Romney said. The approach aligns with a campaign by the American Petroleum Institute, the U.S. oil industry's main lobbying arm, called "Vote4Energy." The API campaign, which consists of big political events and advertisements, targets 15 or so mostly swing states, those that both Obama and Romney will most need to muster the 270 electoral votes required to win. Marty Durbin, executive vice president at API, told me that the Vote4energy campaign is deliberately not backing any specific candidate or party, but attempting to centrally fix the subject of greater fossil-fuel drilling in voters' minds. "We're using this to highlight the importance of energy to the broader policy, that with the right energy policies we can have job creation, economic growth, energy security, government revenue. If voters have these realities in their mind when they go to the ballot box, that's what is going to move us forward in having a more rational national energy policy," he said. Already, he said, "the energy conversation is no longer just production and energy security. This is about job creation on a state-by-state level." Notwithstanding Durbin's disclaimer, the API campaign seems to weave seamlessly into the GOP strategy. And Maisano told me that he sees grist for GOP success in the targeted states. "Energy plays a huge role in those states, and I see it as a huge problem for Obama," he said. "It's going to be hard for him to win these states that he has to win, like North Carolina, like Florida and Michigan and Ohio and Missouri and Wisconsin. Energy undercuts him in those economies." Some analysts think the dirty campaign will ultimately fizzle. "The Romney campaign has positioned itself to beat the job-creation drum better than the Obama campaign has," said Kyle Saunders, a professor at Colorado State University, but an improvement in job numbers could undermine the GOP narrative. In addition, said John Sides, a professor at George Washington University, **Obama's incorporation of fossil fuels in his energy policy may muddle the picture for voters**. "I'm not sure that there is a lot of daylight between Obama and Romney," Sides told me. Yet my own impression is that the Republican strategy may be working, at least partly and at least for now. Given the stakes, Obama and the main environmental lobby seem more lethargic than they might be. When I sought comment for this story, API responded almost immediately with an offer to speak with Durbin. Not so much the Sierra Club, the principal bulwark of U.S. environmentalists. A spokeswoman missed a couple of emails sent over a couple of days, then by phone said she would try to scare up someone to speak. Finally, I finally received a message: "I haven't been able to track down our political team today." **In an election that may be decided on the margins,** advantage: fossil fuels.

#### Offshore drilling has massive support – outweighs all other energies

**Dixon**, 3/19/**2012** (Darius – energy reporter at Politico, Poll: Support rises for offshore drilling, Politico, p. http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0312/74185.html)

Interest in alternative energy sources like wind and solar over has waned among Americans the last year, while support for offshore oil and gas drilling has climbed back up to pre-BP oil spill levels, according to a poll released Monday. Fifty-two percent of those surveyed by the Pew Research Center support alternative energy, down 11 percent compared with March 2011. However, interest in developing oil, coal and natural gas resources rose by 10 percent, while the remainder to those who said they supported both or didn’t know. Support for offshore oil and gas drilling in U.S. waters has also recovered to its levels prior to the 2010 BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. Nearly two-thirds of those surveyed now favor allowing increased offshore drilling, up from 57 percent a year ago and 44 percent in June 2010, during the spill. The partisan divide on renewable energy versus oil, coal and natural gas development has also become more pronounced over the last year. Eighty-nine percent of Republicans favor allowing more offshore oil and gas drilling while only half of Democrats agree, according the survey. However, a 64 percent of independents support increased drilling off the U.S. coast.

#### No link – plan doesn’t happen till after the election

Lightman and Douglas 9/21 (David and William, “Unproductive Congress breaks until after November election”, 2012, <http://www.adn.com/2012/09/20/2633147/unproductive-congress-breaks-until.html>\_

Lawmakers spent Thursday pointing fingers and charging opponents with cynical political posturing. Among Congress' last decisions was a characteristic 2012 judgment: Punt action until later. It will let the farm bill, a broad measure that sets the nation's agriculture and food and nutrition assistance policies, expire Sept. 30. Congress also exits without any serious effort to edge away from the "fiscal cliff," the prospect of economy-damaging budget chaos if it doesn't act by year's end. Bush-era tax cuts are due to expire, and automatic spending cuts will take effect unless alternatives are passed. The public is noticing, as the legislative failures stir uncertainty and further roil an already-weak economy. This Congress' approval ratings were stuck at 13 percent in a Gallup survey Sept. 6-9, the lowest the pollster has ever logged this late in an election year since such measurements began in 1974. Yet **lawmakers are slinking out of town**, after a September session that was on and off for less than two weeks, following a summer recess that ran from Aug. 3 to Sept. 10. Congress is expected to return Nov. 13.

#### Romney is a pragmatist --- he won’t strike Iran.

**Foster**, 7/25/**2012** (Peter – Telegraph’s US Editor, Mitt Romney wants to put the spine back into US foreign policy, but he's not a warrior. He’s a pragmatist, The Telegraph, p. <http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/peterfoster/100172414/mitt-romney-wants-to-put-the-spine-back-into-us-foreign-policy-but-hes-not-a-warrior-hes-a-pragmatist/>)

The Obama campaign will try and cast this as a return to the ‘dark days of Dubya’ when crusading neo-cons waged righteous war after 9/11, leading the free world into a financially ruinous quagmire from which only now, Obama is finally managing to extract us. But we this doesn't ring true for two reasons: first, America is war-weary, and Romney knows it; there is no appetite for adventure right now and second, because ‘Dubya’ himself is nowhere to be seen during this campaign. He is conspicuously and deliberately absent. Romney isn’t a neo-con. He’s a data-drive politician who privately knows the limits of US hard power and, in a time of recession, the public will-power to sustain further conflict – but critically he also knows that in a world in such economic and geopolitical flux, US backbone has never been more important. That is why Romney, for all his huffing and puffing about Obama and Afghanistan, is still planning to have the troops out by 2014. It is why when he talks about Iran, he talks about the iron application of sanctions and not unleashing the bunker-buster at first light. And also why there's no mention of designating China as a currency manipulator on day one of his presidency. Romney is not saying he plans to take up where Bush left off, but that he wants America to re-discover its spine and end the Obama administration’s policy of giving “trust where it is not earned, insult where it is not deserved, and apology where it is not due.” Romney recognizes the truth that Russia under Putin and China under the mandarins, are fundamentally transactional and Cold War in their approach to the world. Playing nice has yielded nothing over Syria, just as it didn’t when Obama came to Beijing shortly after being elected and was made a laughing stock by the Chinese. And the result of the Obama doctrine is plain for all to see right now in Syria, a conflict that is crying out for US presidential leadership – not military intervention, note, but leadership.

#### Strikes don’t escalate. It is not in the interest of great powers.

**Schuler** **2007** (Dave, Restating the U.S. Policy of Nuclear Deterrence, p. http://theglitteringeye.com/?p=459)

\* A nuclear retaliation Iran in response to a terrorist nuclear attack would inevitably draw France, Russia, and China to enter the conflict. To believe this you must believe that France, Russia, and China will act irrationally. There is absolutely no reason to believe that this is the case. All three nations know that their intervention against the U. S. would result in total annihilation. There are other issues as well and let’s examine the two distinct cases: Russia on the one hand and France and China on the other. As a major non-Gulf producer of oil Russia would be in a position to benefit enormously in case of a disruption of Gulf oil production or shipment. That being the case they would publicly deplore a retaliation against Iran but **privately rejoice**. Both France and China are in an extremely delicate position. A nuclear response by either would result in **total annihilation** and, equally importantly, wouldn’t keep the oil flowing. Lack of a blue water navy means that both nations are completely at the mercy of the United States’s (or more specifically the U. S. Navy’s) willingness to keep shipments of oil moving out of the Gulf. China is particularly vulnerable since it has only about two weeks’ worth of strategic oil reserves. Neither France nor China has any real ability to project military force other than nuclear force beyond their borders. They’d be upset. But they’re in no position to do anything about it.

## 1AR vs. Dartmouth ER

### Heg

#### And their authors measurements should be discounted- the system is sustainable

**Brooks and Wohlforth 09**

Steven G. Brooks --AND-- William C. Wohlforth, Associate Professors of Government at Dartmouth College, 09

[“Reshaping the World Order,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2009, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64652/stephen-g-brooks-and-william-c-wohlforth/reshaping-the-world-order]



Now, the conventional wisdom is that the world is rapidly approaching the end of the unipolar system with the United States as the sole superpower. A dispassionate look at the facts shows that this view understates U.S. power as much as recent talk of empire exaggerated it. That the United States weighs more on the traditional scales of world power than has any other state in modern history is as true now as it was when the commentator Charles Krauthammer proclaimed the advent of a "unipolar moment" in these pages nearly two decades ago. The United States continues to account for about half the world's defense spending and one-quarter of its economic output. Some of the reasons for bearishness concern public policy problems that can be fixed (expensive health care in the United States, for example), whereas many of the reasons for bullishness are more fundamental (such as the greater demographic challenges faced by the United States' potential rivals). So why has opinion shifted so quickly from visions of empire to gloomy declinism? One reason is that the United States' successes at the turn of the century led to irrational exuberance, thereby setting unreasonably high standards for measuring the superpower's performance. From 1999 to 2003, seemingly easy U.S. victories in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq led some to conclude that the United States could do what no great power in history had managed before: effortlessly defeat its adversaries. It was only a matter of time before such pie-in-the-sky benchmarks proved unattainable. Subsequent difficulties in Afghanistan and Iraq dashed illusions of omnipotence, but these upsets hardly displaced the United States as the world's leading state, and there is no reason to believe that the militaries of its putative rivals would have performed any better. The United States did not cease to be a superpower when its policies in Cuba and Vietnam failed in the 1960s; bipolarity lived on for three decades. Likewise, the United States remains the sole superpower today. Another key reason for the multipolar mania is "the rise of the rest." Impressed by the rapid economic growth of China and India, many write as if multipolarity has already returned. But such pronouncements mistake current trajectories for final outcomes -- a common strategic error with deep psychological roots. The greatest concern in the Cold War, for example, came not from the Soviet Union's actually attaining parity with the United States but from the expectation that it would do so in the future. Veterans of that era recall how the launch of Sputnik in 1957 fed the perception that Soviet power was growing rapidly, leading some policymakers and analysts to start acting as if the Soviet Union were already as powerful as the United States. A state that is rising should not be confused with one that has risen, just as a state that is declining should not be written off as having already declined. China is generally seen as the country best positioned to emerge as a superpower challenger to the United States. Yet depending on how one measures GDP, China's economy is between 20 percent and 43 percent the size of the United States'. More dramatic is the difference in GDP per capita, for which all measures show China's as being less than 10 percent of the United States'. Absent a 1930s-style depression that spares potential U.S. rivals, the United States will not be replaced as the sole superpower for a very long time. Real multipolarity -- an international system of three or more evenly matched powers -- is nowhere on the horizon. Relative power between states shifts slowly. This tendency to conflate trends with outcomes is often driven by the examination in isolation of certain components of state power. If the habit during the Cold War was to focus on military power, the recent trend has been to single out economic output. No declinist tract is complete without a passage noting that although the United States may remain a military superpower, economic multipolarity is, or soon will be, the order of the day. Much as highlighting the Soviet Union's military power meant overlooking the country's economic and technological feet of clay, examining only economic output means putting on blinders. In 1991, Japan's economy was two-thirds the size of the United States', which, according to the current popular metric, would mean that with the Soviet Union's demise, the world shifted from bipolarity to, well, bipolarity. Such a partial assessment of power will produce no more accurate an analysis today. Nor will giving in to apprehension about the growing importance of nonstate actors. The National Intelligence Council's report Global Trends 2025 grabbed headlines by forecasting the coming multipolarity, anticipating a power shift as much to nonstate actors as to fast-growing countries. But nonstate actors are nothing new -- compare the scale and scope of today's pirates off the Somali coast with those of their eighteenth-century predecessors or the political power of today's multinational corporations with that of such behemoths as the British East India Company -- and projections of their rise may well be as much hype as reflections of reality. And even if the power of nonstate actors is rising, this should only increase the incentives for interstate cooperation; nonstate threats do not affect just the United States. Most nonstate actors' behavior, moreover, still revolves around influencing the decisions of states. Nongovernmental organizations typically focus on trying to get states to change their policies, and the same is true of most terrorists. When it comes to making, managing, and remaking international institutions, states remain the most important actors -- and the United States is the most important of them. No other country will match the United States' combination of wealth, size, technological capacity, and productivity in the foreseeable future. The world is and will long remain a 1 + x world, with one superpower and x number of major powers. A shift from 1 + 3 to 1 + 4 or 5 or 6 would have many important consequences, but it would not change the fact that the United States will long be in a far stronger position to lead the world than any other state.

#### Maintaining hegemony brings comparatively more stability than retrenchment – we’ll inevitably be involved, it’s a question of effectiveness

**Goure 11**

(Daniel, Vice President with the Lexington Institute, “Unsettled World Won’t Let US Reduce Its Military,” <http://www.defpro.com/news/details/20969/?SID=3f7de7dc9a8343394bd7e1cfb97fd429>, dml)   
  
The conventional wisdom in the national security community is that the United States must and will reduce its expenditure on defense and hence the size and capability of its military forces. Defense analysts are trying to put a good face on this situation in speaking of frugal superpowers and leaner and meaner defense establishments. A few have argued that the United States must alter its foreign and defense policies so that there will be fewer, less stressing missions for a reduced military to perform. The last time the U.S. military contracted and the defense budget shrank was at the end of the Cold War. Over the next five or six years, the U.S. military shrank by almost half, from eighteen Army divisions to ten, almost 600 ships to around 300, and from 28 fighter wings to 20. That legendary stalwart of a strong defense Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense in the First Bush Administration, was responsible for canceling more than 100 weapons programs. The defense decline of the early 1990s was based on two premises. The first was the need for a peace dividend in the wake of the recession of the late 1980s. The second was that with the fall of the Soviet Union there was less of a need for a large and capable U.S. military. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, opined that the United States was running out of enemies. Many expected that the world after the end of the East-West ideological conflict was going to be less conflict ridden. Remember such phrases as “new world order” or the “end of history?” The reality was **quite different** from the optimistic vision. The decade of the 1990s was bookmarked by the first Gulf War and September 11. In between, the U.S. military, freed from the responsibility to ~~man~~ [staff] the ramparts against the Soviet threat, found itself undertaking **a wide variety** of other missions from humanitarian relief and nation building in Somalia to maintaining no fly zones over Iraq and supporting the expansion of NATO. Measured in terms of the number of unit deployments that took place, the U.S. military experienced a four-fold increase in its utilization rate even as it shrank by almost half in terms of deployable forces. The result of the two trends mentioned above was a **hollowing out** of the military. In order to support force deployments, the procurement and military construction accounts were particularly hard hit. One former Army Chief of Staff estimated that his service had deferred some $56 billion in expenditures on maintenance, procurement and construction in the 1990s. Hundreds of billions of dollars of the rising defense budget post-2001 was spent to make up for inadequate investments of the preceding decade. Even with the increases in defense spending under Presidents Bush and Obama the age of the force overall has increased due to insufficient procurement for such weapons systems as tankers, strategic bombers, fighters, armored fighting vehicles and Navy surface combatants. Even in the relatively quiescent 1990s, the U.S. military found itself extremely active. If anything, the new decade will be **even less quiet and stable**. One only has to point to the rise of China, belligerent regional powers such as North Korea, Iran, Venezuela and Russia, failing states like Pakistan, Sudan and Ivory Coast and rising non-state actors. At the same time, the U.S. is becoming more engaged in the world economically. The belief that the United States can withdraw even **part way from the world**, engage in so-called offshore balancing or selective engagement **flies in the face of** the recent historical evidence, ongoing national interests and the structure of **the extant international order**. In fact, the role of the U.S. military in protecting U.S. national interests is likely to increase as erstwhile allies such as Britain, France and Germany spend less on defense. We may be well advised to engage less in certain missions such as nation building. But this only means the U.S. military will spend more time on others such as counter-terrorism. Nor can the U.S. military avoid the twin challenges of nuclear attack and large-scale conventional conflict so long as potential adversaries are acquiring both kinds of forces. The United States will have to go through the obligatory period of trying to decrease its spending in defense and its international military presence. We will also see a short-term decline in defense stocks. But smart investors – and smart strategists – would be wise to bet on U.S. defense for the long run. The world has **no one else** to whom it can turn.

#### Heg key to solve China war

#### Multipolarity exacerbates current tensions with Russia – causing nuke war

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(*Alexei,* [© "Russia in Global Affairs". № 2, July - September 2007](http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/numbers/20/), Is a New Cold War Imminent? 08-08)

However, the low probability of a new Cold War and the collapse of American unipolarity (as a political doctrine, if not in reality) cannot be a cause for complacency. Multipolarity, existing objectively at various levels and interdependently, holds many difficulties and threats. For example, if the Russia-NATO confrontation persists, it can do much damage to both parties and international security. Or, alternatively, if Kosovo secedes from Serbia, this may provoke similar processes in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transdniestria, and involve Russia in armed conflicts with Georgia and Moldova, two countries that are supported by NATO. Another flash point involves Ukraine. In the event of Kiev’s sudden admission into the North Atlantic Alliance (recently sanctioned by the U.S. Congress), such a move may divide Ukraine and provoke mass disorders there, thus making it difficult for Russia and the West to refrain from interfering. Meanwhile, U.S. plans to build a missile defense system in Central and Eastern Europe may cause Russia to withdraw from the INF Treaty and resume programs for producing intermediate-range missiles. Washington may respond by deploying similar missiles in Europe, which would dramatically increase the vulnerability of Russia’s strategic forces and their control and warning systems. This could make the stage for nuclear confrontation even tenser.

#### Second- Decline causes selfishness – makes multipolar transitions impossible and wrecks climate negotiations

**Roberts 11**

(J. Timmons, Director – Center for Environmental Studies and Professor of Sociology and Environmental Studies – College of William and Mary, “Multipolarity and the New World (Dis)Order: US Hegemonic Decline and the Fragmentation of the Global Climate Regime,” Global Environment Change 21, p. 776-784, Online)

4. US hegemonic decline: applying the lens of Arrighi and Silver So we have seen over the past few years a sharply increasing fragmentation of international alignments in response to climate change. Looking longer term, we see an even more extreme increase in defined positions. First, there was the UNFCCC's vague but solidaristic statements in 1992, based on per capita justice and preventing dangerous climate change. Then the incrementalist and realist 1997 Kyoto regime reflected hegemonic struggle between the US and the EU (Paterson, 2009), and ended up being based on the grandfathering of past emissions, emissions trading, and the eventual withdrawal of the world's most powerful nation – its hegemon, the US.8 Then in the 2009/2010 Copenhagen-Cancun Round world we see a weakening in European leadership (as that bloc expanded from 17 relatively wealthy to 27 much more diverse nations), and the fragmentation of the G-77 into an even more fractious set of ad hoc negotiating groups just described. The US was something of a foot-dragger in the 1992 Earth Summit, with President George H.W. Bush traveling to Rio and signing the UNFCCC only hesitatingly and under pressure, and agreeing to the treaty because there were no binding limits placed on the US. In the negotiations leading up to the 1997 Kyoto pact, the Clinton/Gore administration played a role of demanding binding limits also on China, India and some other developing nations, a move resisted by the G77, EU, and most environmentalists ( [Masood, 1997a] and [Masood, 1997b]). The US played a role of resisting efforts to include it in Kyoto, to the point that the country was nearly completely marginalized during George W. Bush's administration. Then President Barack Obama negotiated the 2009 Copenhagen Accord with the BASIC countries on the last negotiation day, but as we briefly reviewed in Section 2, the Accord was not a step in the direction of climate justice. A framework I find useful to understand the shift in the dynamics of climate negotiations is to consider the massive upheaval in the global political economic system over these twenty years. Giovanni Arrighi and Beverly Silver have written a series of pieces, including their 2001 article, “Capitalism and World (dis)Order”, in the Review of International Studies.9 The piece describes transitions over five centuries in global hegemony: from Genoese, Dutch, British and now American cycles of rise and decline. In each cycle, the rise of financial capital plays a key role, creating flexibility of accumulation for the hegemonic power's elites, and diversifying income of these elites as different types of activities in certain locations become more and then less profitable. In the US hegemonic cycle, the profitability of manufacturing in the core nations dropped sharply in the late 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, as job-heavy production shifted to cheap labor zones such as Mexico and China. The fiscal crisis was deferred as it was in previous hegemonic cycles, as financial power sustained each hegemon beyond its time. Each hegemon, at the end of its cycle of dominance, experienced a final boom and “pursues their national interest without regard for system-level problems that require system-level solutions” (p. 271). Arrighi and Silver argue that such global orders are very unstable. “[T]he power of the hegemonic state experiences a deflation, and a hegemonic crisis sets in…. Hegemonic crises have been characterized by three distinct but closely related processes: the intensification of interstate and inter-enterprise competition; the escalation of social conflicts; and the interstitial emergence of new configurations of power.“(270–271). They argue that the final stages are complete hegemonic breakdown and ‘systemic chaos’… a situation of severe and seemingly irremediable systemic disorganization. As competition and conflicts escalate beyond the regulatory capacity of existing structures, new structures emerge interstitially and destabilize further the dominant configuration of power. Disorder tends to become self-reinforcing, threatening to provoke or actually provoking the complete breakdown in the system's organization. (Arrighi and Silver, 2001, p. 271) To bring this back to interstate climate politics, in his landmark book, The Long Twentieth Century, Arrighi describes how, in the face of military and financial crisis in 1973, the US retreated from the world stage and “US strategies of power came to be characterized by a basic neglect of world governmental functions.10 It was as if the ruling groups within the US had decided that, since the world could no longer be governed by them, it should be left to govern itself”(301). Arrighi argues that, in this vacuum, oil-producing states organized an effective way to gain huge rents from petroleum (the 1973 and 1978 OPEC embargos, and carefully attempting to modulate production at other times to keep prices up) (Arrighi, 1994: 322). Two things happened with that money. First, Arab oil producers gave foreign assistance of at least $100 billion accumulated since that period (Shuhan et al., 2010).11 We do not know whether one of the goals of Arab aid has been to secure support for their position in other negotiations, such as to keep key recipients from dissenting from OPEC views in G-77 negotiations during climate change negotiations. If Arab donors did use aid that way they would not be alone: anecdotal information suggests Japan has secretly used aid in this way for votes on the International Whaling Commission, and (among other cases), and the US in 2010 publically made payments from the Copenhagen funding (most publicly, to Ecuador) provisional on the signing of the Copenhagen Accord. Second, the oil boom money from OPEC governments was often loaned (through Western banks) to other developing countries with adjustable rates, and these rates skyrocketed when the Reagan administration in the US adopted a tight fiscal policy to regain control (Arrighi, 2001). This created a debt crisis that set back many developing countries for a decade. This failure of development to measure up to expectations has certainly strengthened the G-77's cohesiveness in the climate negotiations, even as their interests diverged (see Roberts and Parks, 2007). Meanwhile, China's economy (and energy use/carbon emissions) has risen exponentially since 2001, threatening US global hegemony, at least in some market segments. India also has the ability to undermine US labor competitiveness in a large number of job categories long thought to be securely unexportable. Arrighi and Silver argue that the rich countries cannot compete with the ascendant nations in East Asia because of profoundly different developmental paths (especially wage rates), and they cannot be restructured “without causing social strains so unbearable that they would result in chaos rather than ‘competitiveness”’ (2001, p. 278). Arrighi and Silver end with the ominous warning that “If the system eventually breaks down, it will be primarily because of US resistance to adjustment and accommodation. And conversely, US adjustment and accommodation to the rising economic power of the East Asian region is an essential condition for a non-catastrophic transition to a new world order.” (p. 279). In his 2009 “Post-Hegemonic Climate Politics?” piece, Matthew Paterson argues that Europe has taken the lead in the area of global climate policy, surpassing the US. However in Copenhagen, we saw the rise of BASIC, especially China, as the real challenger to US hegemonic power.12 As Arrighi and Silver say, the hegemon is typically the only power with the ability to lead the world in protecting “global public goods.” This suggests that the US, as declining hegemon, is leaving its climate mess for the rising economic hegemon (seemingly China) to clean up. As Arrighi and Silver put it about economic issues: “An equally essential condition is the emergence of a new global leadership from the main centres of the East Asian economic expansion. This leadership must be willing and able to rise up to the task of providing system-level solutions to the system-level problems left behind by US hegemony”(p. 279). Whether China will be the next global hegemonic power is uncertain. And though China has the ability to mobilize extraordinary economic resources and it has invested heavily in renewable energy sources, its leadership's overall emphasis on addressing climate change remains uncertain because it has economic growth as its top priority (see also Mol, 2011). Whether China, another nation, or a regional bloc becomes the next global hegemon, Arrighi and Silver's work supports the idea that they will inherit a climate mess requiring someone to take the lead in cleaning up. 5. Discussion and conclusion Observing many years of turmoil in negotiations over global nations’ response to climate change, leading ever further away from principles and practice of climate justice, one is tempted to chalk it up to stubbornness on the part of a few selfish nations: the US and Saudi Arabia most obviously and for the longest time, but Canada might be put in this group, and also one could say China and India, for different reasons. Poor leadership by the Danish Presidency at Copenhagen was clearly a factor, as deft leadership by Mexico in Cancun confirmed. The list could go on. Certainly short-sighted selfishness has been a major factor in creating our current dire situation on climate change, but I argue here that the roots of failure to reach consensus on a global response to climate change lie in the global economic structure and its current phase of restructuring. Many nations in the global South remain frustrated that in spite of many decades of promises and striving that they face persistent inequality and stalled economic development. In the case of the US, its pigheadedness in negotiations might be seen as having been driven by insecurity in a shifting global political economy about its ability to provide jobs for its workers in the future where all sorts of work is moving to China and India. Giovanni Arrighi and Beverly Silver point us to two central parts of that dynamic. First, while developing nations may be industrializing, the majority of citizens in those nations are not getting rich (or even getting to global middle class status in GDP/capita terms) in the process ( [Arrighi and Silver, 2001], [Arrighi et al., 2003] and [Arrighi et al., 2005]). This happens because lower-profit parts of the product cycle are offshored to those countries, with owners looking for cheap labor havens.13 This persistent and growing inequality between and within nations exacerbates the frustration of many in the developing world about their stalled prosperity, which also dampens their enthusiasm about limiting their future growth – an issue we’ve discussed at length elsewhere ( [Roberts and Parks, 2007] and [Parks and Roberts, 2010]). The current article therefore begins to address two major gaps in our previous work, which was more focused on explaining non-cooperation by developing countries. Those gaps are (1) explaining fragmentation in the global South, and (2) the roots of resistance by the US Senate and executive branch to a meaningful and binding climate treaty. For two decades now, the US has been the bull in the china shop of climate negotiations – repeatedly smashing any small progress that was being delicately arranged. It has not been alone in wrecking the negotiations, but its intransigence has provided a shield behind which many other nations can conveniently hide. The US government's unwillingness to take active steps to address this looming global crisis is exactly the kind of failure of leadership that Arrighi and Silver describe among hegemons in the “autumns” of their decline. This has been true since the Genoese, Dutch, and British rode waves of boom and bust over the past centuries. In the current case it's fairly simple: US fear of job loss to China lay behind the July 1997 Byrd-Hagel Resolution that arguably sunk the Kyoto Protocol, tying the Clinton administration's hands the summer before the COP 3 in that Japanese city. That resolution read that the United States should not be a signatory to any protocol … which would mandate new commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions … unless the protocol or other agreement also mandates new specific scheduled commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for Developing Country Parties within the same compliance period, or would result in serious harm to the economy of the United States (US Senate, July 25, 1997) US stubbornness in the climate negotiations is driven by fear of job loss and competitiveness to China, India, and elsewhere, while China and other rapidly developing nations in turn fear the treaty being used by the US and others to dampen their growth and defer their dreams.142

#### Extinction

**Tickell 8** (Oliver, Climate Researcher and Author – Kyoto2, “On a Planet 4C Hotter, All We Can Prepare For is Extinction”, The Guardian, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/aug/11/climatechange)

We need to get prepared for four degrees of global warming, Bob Watson told the Guardian last week. At first sight this looks like wise counsel from the climate science adviser to Defra. But the idea that we could adapt to a [4C rise](http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/aug/07/carbonemissions.climatechange) is absurd and dangerous. [Global warming](http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/climatechange) on this scale would be a catastrophe that would mean, in the immortal words that Chief Seattle probably never spoke, "the end of living and the beginning of survival" for humankind. Or perhaps the beginning of our extinction. The collapse of the polar ice caps would become inevitable, bringing long-term [sea level rises](http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/gallery/2007/dec/05/climatechange.flooding?picture=331454811) of 70-80 metres. All the world's coastal plains would be lost, complete with ports, cities, transport and industrial infrastructure, and much of the world's most productive farmland. The world's geography would be transformed much as it was at the end of the last ice age, when sea levels rose by about 120 metres to create the Channel, the North Sea and Cardigan Bay out of dry land. Weather would become extreme and unpredictable, with more frequent and severe droughts, [floods](http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2008/aug/08/climatechange.flooding) and hurricanes. The Earth's carrying capacity would be hugely reduced. Billions would undoubtedly die. Watson's call was supported by the government's former chief scientific adviser, Sir David King, who warned that "if we get to a four-degree rise it is quite possible that we would begin to see a runaway increase". This is a remarkable understatement. The climate system is already experiencing significant feedbacks, notably the summer [melting of the Arctic sea ice](http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2008/aug/10/climatechange.arctic). The more the ice melts, the more sunshine is absorbed by the sea, and the more the Arctic warms. And as the Arctic warms, the release of billions of tonnes of methane – a greenhouse gas 70 times stronger than carbon dioxide over 20 years – captured under melting permafrost is already under way. To see how far this process could go, look 55.5m years to the Palaeocene-Eocene Thermal Maximum, when a global temperature increase of 6C coincided with the release of about 5,000 gigatonnes of carbon into the atmosphere, both as CO2 and as methane from bogs and seabed sediments. Lush subtropical forests grew in polar regions, and sea levels rose to 100m higher than today. It appears that an initial warming pulse triggered other warming processes. Many scientists warn that this historical event may be analogous to the present: the warming caused by human emissions could propel us towards a similar hothouse Earth. But what are we to do? All our policies to date to tackle global warming have been miserable failures. The Kyoto protocol has created a vast carbon market but done little to reduce emissions. The main effect of the EU's emissions trading scheme has been to transfer about €30bn or more from consumers to Europe's biggest polluters, the power companies. The EU and US foray into [biofuels](http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/biofuels) has, at huge cost, increased greenhouse gas [emissions](http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/carbonemissions) and created a world [food crisis](http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/food), causing starvation in many poor countries. So are all our efforts doomed to failure? Yes, so long as our governments remain craven to special interests, whether [carbon traders](http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2008/aug/10/emissionstrading.utilities) or fossil fuel companies. The carbon market is a valuable tool, but must be subordinate to climatic imperatives. The truth is that to prevent runaway greenhouse warming, we will have to leave most of the world's fossil fuels in the ground, especially carbon-heavy coal, oil shales and tar sands. The fossil fuel and power companies must be faced down. Global problems need global solutions, and we also need an effective replacement for the failed Kyoto protocol. The entire Kyoto system of national allocations is obsolete because of the huge volumes of [energy](http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/energy) embodied in products traded across national boundaries. It also presents a major obstacle to any new agreement – as demonstrated by the 2008 [G8 meeting](http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/jul/08/g8) in Japan that degenerated into a squabble over national emission rights.

### Elections

#### Romney won’t strike Iran --- too many constraining factors.

**Smith**, 8/22/**2012** (Lee – senior editor at the Weekly Standard, fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Why Romney Won’t Strike Iran, Tablet Magazine, p. <http://www.tabletmag.com/jewish-news-and-politics/109873/why-romney-wont-strike-iran>)

During Romney’s trip to Israel last month, campaign adviser Dan Senor said: “If Israel has to take action on its own, in order to stop Iran from developing that capability, the governor would respect that decision.” But that’s an important hedge, and it throws into sharp relief the real truth: A Republican president is no more likely than a Democrat to stage a pre-emptive attack on Iran, and American support for an Israeli attack is the very best that Israeli leaders can hope to expect from the White House, regardless of which party inhabits it. The explanation is based on three interrelated factors: domestic American politics, Washington’s history with the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the U.S. record of containing and deterring nuclear powers. Domestic politics. Bush did not attack Iran because he was already waging war in two Middle Eastern theaters and did not want to go down in the history books as the president who only waged wars on Muslims. Barack Obama has not attacked Iran in his first term and is highly unlikely to do so in his second term because his Middle East policy is one of extrication from the region, not further military involvement. Correctly or not, the Obama White House suspects that an attack on Iran will not only eventually entail landing ground troops but will also further inflame the Muslim world against America, and Obama is the president of outreach to the Muslim world. Romney’s internal conversation with himself will look something like a combination of his two predecessors’: He doesn’t want to further burden the economy by destabilizing the Middle East and sending oil prices skyrocketing, and he doesn’t want to be tagged as a war-mongering Republican who bombed Iran only a few months after moving into his new digs. Like every other man who takes the job, Romney wants a second term, and if he gets it, then there’s going to be another reason not to do it. History’s lessons. The record shows that there is always a reason for American presidents of both parties to look the other way when Iran is up to no good. No American president has ever drawn red lines for Tehran and enforced them by showing that transgressions are swiftly and severely punished. It’s true that it was a Democrat, Jimmy Carter, who sat by idly when Ayatollah Khomeini and the founders of the Islamic Republic stormed the U.S. embassy and held Americans hostage for 444 days. But GOP hero Ronald Reagan provided the Iranians with arms—after the Islamic Republic’s Lebanese asset, Hezbollah, killed 241 U.S. Marines in the 1983 bombing of their barracks at the Beirut airport. When the FBI said Tehran was responsible for the 1996 bombing of Khobar Towers, Bill Clinton failed to respond or even name Iran, lest it derail the “dialogue of civilizations” promised by the newly elected reform-minded president Muhammad Khatami. And the last Republican in the White House was no more proactive in countering Iran’s actual attacks on Americans: The more than 100,000 American servicemen and -women that Bush had dispatched to Iraq were targeted by the IRGC and their local allies, a fact that U.S. officials tended to obscure and did little to change when they did acknowledge it. The current administration, unsurprisingly, hardly broke this mold. After the Obama White House revealed the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps plot against the Saudi ambassador in Washington, it exacted no price from Iran for planning an operation in the American capital that might have cost the lives of hundreds of American citizens. General nuclear deterrence. If you can kill Americans without any consequences and the Americans will in fact collaborate in covering up your malfeasance, you can certainly build a nuclear weapons facility without too much concern that the Americans are really keeping “all options on the table”; the White House is not and almost surely never will—no matter who’s calling the shots. Short of an American city suffering thousands of casualties in a nuclear attack that the Iranians boast of publicly, it is difficult to know what would compel a U.S. president to take military action against Iran.

#### Obama supports shale gas – he gets the blame

WSJ 12 (Wall Street Journal, “Obama Discovers Natural Gas,” 1-18, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204542404577159451962332684.html)

A re-election campaign is a terrible thing to waste, and this year's race is **already producing miraculous changes** at the Obama White House: The latest example of a bear walking on its hind legs is the President's new embrace of . . . natural gas from shale. Last week the White House issued its latest report on jobs and it includes a section on "America's Natural Resource Boom." The report avers that a few years ago there were widespread "fears of a looming natural gas shortage," but that "the discovery of new natural gas reserves, such as the Marcellus Shale, and the development of hydraulic fracturing techniques to extract natural gas from these reserves has led to rapidly growing domestic production and relatively low domestic prices for households and downstream industrial users." Please pass the smelling salts to Interior Secretary Ken Salazar and Lisa Jackson at the Environmental Protection Agency. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time the White House **has favorably mentioned the** Marcellus Shale, the **natural gas reservoir** below Pennsylvania, West Virginia and other Northeastern states. And **now** he's taking credit for this soaring production. As the White House report puts it: "Of the major fossil fuels, natural gas is the cleanest and least carbon‐intensive for electric power generation. By keeping domestic energy costs relatively low, this resource also supports energy intensive manufacturing in the United States. In fact, companies like Dow Chemical and Westlake Chemical have announced intentions to make major investments in new facilities over the next several years." And that's not all: "In addition, firms that provide equipment for shale gas production have announced major investments in the U.S., including Vallourec's $650 million plant for steel pipes in Ohio. An abundant local supply will translate into relatively low costs for the industries that use natural gas as an input. Expansion in these industries, including industrial chemicals and fertilizers, will boost investment and exports in the coming years, generating new jobs." We checked to see if someone slipped a press release from the Natural Gas Council into the White House report by mistake, but apparently not. The report does add the obligatory disclaimer about hydraulic fracturing that "appropriate care must to be taken to ensure that America's natural resources are extracted in a safe and environmentally responsible manner" with safeguards "to protect public health and safety." But no one disagrees with that. The catch is that this endorsement runs against every energy policy pursued by the Obama Administration for three years. The Institute for Energy Research reports that royalties from oil and gas drilling have fallen more than 90% since 2008 because of Interior Department permitting delays and rejections. The EPA recently issued a flawed report on groundwater contamination that could shut down the fracking process the President is now touting as a jobs producer. EPA's political goal is to grab power to supercede state drilling regulation. The industry regards new EPA authority as a real threat to its future. Each year Mr. Obama has also supported a $40 billion tax hike on the oil and gas industry because, as he put it in 2009, the tax code "encourages overproduction of oil and gas" and "is detrimental to long-term energy security." Even the Securities and Exchange Commission has imposed extensive new reporting requirements on oil and gas fracking companies. **It's certainly smart politics for Mr. Obama** to distance himself from the anti-fossil fuels obsessives, and no doubt **his political advisers are hoping it helps this fall in the likes of Ohio and Pennsylvania**. On the other hand, this could be a one-year wonder, and if he wins Mr. Obama might revert to form in 2013. A good test of his sincerity would be to replace Ms. Jackson and Mr. Salazar.

## 2AC vs. Emory HD

### Exports

#### Warming irreversible

ANI 10 (“IPCC has underestimated climate-change impacts, say scientists”, 3-20, One India, http://news.oneindia.in/2010/03/20/ipcchas-underestimated-climate-change-impacts-sayscientis.html)

According to Charles H. Greene, Cornell professor of Earth and atmospheric science, "Even if all man-made greenhouse gas emissions were stopped tomorrow and carbon-dioxide levels stabilized at today's concentration, by the end of this century, the global average temperature would increase by about 4.3 degrees Fahrenheit, or about 2.4 degrees centigrade above pre-industrial levels, which is significantly above the level which scientists and policy makers agree is a threshold for dangerous climate change." "Of course, greenhouse gas emissions will not stop tomorrow, so the actual temperature increase will likely be significantly larger, resulting in potentially catastrophic impacts to society unless other steps are taken to reduce the Earth's temperature," he added. "Furthermore, while the oceans have slowed the amount of warming we would otherwise have seen for the level of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, the ocean's thermal inertia will also slow the cooling we experience once we finally reduce our greenhouse gas emissions," he said. This means that the temperature rise we see this century will be largely irreversible for the next thousand years. "Reducing greenhouse gas emissions alone is unlikely to mitigate the risks of dangerous climate change," said Green.

#### Turn – conventional gas reduces emissions

Howarth et al 11 (Robert W. Professor of Ecology & Environmental Biology – Cornell, Renee Santoro, Research Aide for Howarth – Cornell, Anthony Ingraffea, Professor of Engineering – Cornell, “Methane and the Greenhouse-Gas Footprint of Natural Gas from Shale Formations,” Climatic Change, 106(4), p.679-690, Springer Link, <http://www.springerlink.com/content/e384226wr4160653/?MUD=MP>)

We evaluate the greenhouse gas footprint of natural gas obtained by highvolume hydraulic fracturing from shale formations, focusing on methane emissions. Natural gas is composed largely of methane, and 3.6% to 7.9% of the methane from shale-gas production escapes to the atmosphere in venting and leaks over the lifetime of a well. These methane emissions are at least 30% more than and perhaps more than twice as great as those from conventional gas. The higher emissions from shale gas occur at the time wells are hydraulically fractured—as methane escapes from flow-back return fluids—and during drill out following the fracturing. Methane is a powerful greenhouse gas, with a global warming potential that is far greater than that of carbon dioxide, particularly over the time horizon of the first few decades following emission. Methane contributes substantially to the greenhouse gas footprint of shale gas on shorter time scales, dominating it on a 20-year time horizon. The footprint for shale gas is greater than that for conventional gas or oil when viewed on any time horizon, but particularly so over 20 years. Compared to coal, the footprint of shale gas is at least 20% greater and perhaps more than twice as great on the 20-year horizon and is comparable when compared over 100 years.

#### Warming doesn’t cause extinction – past temperature fluctuations prove

**Stampf 7** (Olaf, staff writer for Spiegel Online, 5/5. “Not the End of the World as we Know it,” <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,481684,00.html>)

But even this moderate warming would likely have far fewer apocalyptic consequences than many a prophet of doom would have us believe. For one thing, the more paleontologists and geologists study the history of the earth's climate, the more clearly do they recognize just how much temperatures have fluctuated in both directions in the past. Even major fluctuations appear to be completely natural phenomena. Additionally, some environmentalists doubt that the large-scale extinction of animals and plants some have predicted will in fact come about. "A warmer climate helps promote species diversity," says Munich zoologist Josef Reichholf. Also, more detailed simulations have allowed climate researchers to paint a considerably less dire picture than in the past -- gone is the talk of giant storms, the melting of the Antarctic ice shield and flooding of major cities. Improved regionalized models also show that climate change can bring not only drawbacks, but also significant benefits, especially in northern regions of the world where it has been too cold and uncomfortable for human activity to flourish in the past. However it is still a taboo to express this idea in public. For example, countries like Canada and Russia can look forward to better harvests and a blossoming tourism industry, and the only distress the Scandinavians will face is the guilty conscience that could come with benefiting from global warming.

#### Energy abundance solves US-China conflict over the Middle East

Mead 12 (Walter Russell, James Clark Chase Professor of Foreign Affairs and Humanities – Bard College and Editor-at-Large – American Interest, “Energy Revolution 3: The New American Century,” American Interest, 7-18, http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2012/07/18/energy-revolution-3-the-new-american-century/)

On the whole, a world of energy abundance should be particularly good for U.S.-China relations. If both China and the United States have large energy reserves at home, and if new discoveries globally are making energy more abundant, there is less chance that China and the U.S. will compete for political influence in places like the Middle East. More energy security at home may also lessen the political pressure inside China to build up its naval forces. Oil may calm the troubled waters around China’s shores. The maritime disputes now causing trouble from Korea and Japan to Malaysia and the Philippines will be easier to manage if the potential undersea energy resources are seen as less vital to national economic security. Nationalist passion will still drive tough stands on the maritime issues, but nationalism is a much stronger force when powerful economic arguments share the agenda of radical nationalist groups. If the South China Sea issue is seen as both a question of national pride and, because of perceived energy supply issues, a vital national interest, Chinese policy will be much tougher than if it is simply a question of pride. Depending on the size of China’s unconventional domestic reserves (and some analysts think the country could have something like the equivalent of double Saudi Arabia’s oil reserves), China will feel marginally less constrained by Washington’s global naval supremacy. As it now stands, in any serious clash with China, the U.S. could bring Beijing to its knees with a naval blockade. With much larger domestic energy production, China would be less vulnerable to this threat. This could translate into a greater willingness to take a hard line on international issues.

#### US LNG exports solve Russia-Ukraine war

Ebinger et al 12 (Charles, Senior Fellow and Director of the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, Kevin Massy, Assistant Director of the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, and Govinda Avasarala, Senior Research Assistant in the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, “Liquid Markets: Assessing the Case for U.S. Exports of Liquefied Natural Gas,” Brookings Institution, Policy Brief 12-01, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2012/5/02%20lng%20exports%20ebinger/0502\_lng\_exports\_ebinger.pdf).

A large increase in U.S. LNG exports would have the potential to increase U.S. foreign policy interests in both the Atlantic and Pacific basins. Unlike oil, natural gas has traditionally been an infrastructure-constrained business, giving geographical proximity and political relations between producers and consumers a high level of importance. Issues of “pipeline politics” have been most directly visible in Europe, which relies on Russia for around a third of its gas. Previous disputes between Moscow and Ukraine over pricing have led to major gas shortages in several E.U. countries in the winters (when demand is highest) of both 2006 and 2009. Further disagreements between Moscow and Kiev over the terms of the existing bilateral gas deal have the potential to escalate again, with negative consequences for E.U. consumers. The risk of high reliance on Russian gas has been a principal driver of European energy policy in recent decades. Among central and eastern European states, particularly those formerly aligned with the Soviet Union such as Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, the issue of reliance on imports of Russian gas is a primary energy security concern and has inspired energy policies aimed at diversification of fuel sources for power generation. From the U.S. perspective such Russian influence in the affairs of these democratic nations is an impediment to efforts at political and economic reform. The market power of Gazprom, Russia’s state-owned gas monopoly, is evident in these countries. Although they are closer to Russia than other consumers of Russian gas in Western Europe, many countries in Eastern and Central Europe pay higher contract prices for their imports, as they are more reliant on Russian gas as a proportion of their energy mixes. In the larger economies of Western Europe, which consume most of Russia’s exports, there are efforts to diversify their supply of natural gas. The E.U. has formally acknowledged the need to put in place mechanisms to increase supply diversity. These include market liberalization approaches such as rules mandating third-party access to pipeline infrastructure (from which Gazprom is demanding exemption), and commitments to complete a single market for electricity and gas by 2014, and to ensure that no member country is isolated from electricity and gas grids by 2015.112 Despite these formal efforts, there are several factors retarding the E.U.’s push for a unified effort to reduce dependence on Russian gas. National interest has been given a higher priority than collective, coordinated E.U. energy policy: the gas cutoffs in 2006 and 2009 probably contributed to the acceptance of the Nord Stream project, which carries gas from Russia into Germany. Germany’s decision to phase out its fleet of nuclear reactors by 2022 will result in far higher reliance on natural gas for the E.U.’s biggest economy. The environmental imperative to reduce carbon emissions— codified in the E.U.’s goal of essentially decarbonizing its power sector by the middle of century—mean that natural gas is being viewed by many as the short-to medium fuel of choice in power generation. Finally, the prospects for European countries to replicate the unconventional gas “revolution” that has resulted in a glut of natural gas in the United States look uncertain. Several countries, including France and the U.K., have encountered stiff public opposition to the techniques used in unconventional gas production, while those countries, such as Poland and Hungary, that have moved ahead with unconventional- gas exploration have generally seen disappointing early results. Collectively, these factors suggest that the prospects for reduced European reliance on Russian gas appear dim. The one factor that has been working to the advantage of advocates of greater European gas diversity has been the increased liquidity of the global LNG market, discussed above. Russia’s dominant position in the European gas market is being eroded by the increased availability of LNG. Qatar’s massive expansion in LNG production in 2008, coupled with the rise in unconventional gas production in the United States as well as a drop in global energy demand due to the global recession, produced a global LNG glut that saw many cargoes intended for the U.S. market diverted into Europe. As mentioned previously, with an abundant source of alternative supply, some European consumers, mainly Gazprom’s closest partners, were able to renegotiate their oil-linked, takeor- pay contracts with Gazprom. As Figure 10 illustrates, however, in the wake of the Fukushima natural disaster and nuclear accident in Japan and a return to growth in most industrialized economies, the LNG market is projected to tighten considerably in the short-term, potentially returning market power to Russia. However, there is a second, structural change to the global gas market that may have more lasting effects to Russia’s market power in the European gas market. LNG is one of the fastest growing segments of the energy sector. The growth of the LNG market, both through long-term contract and spot-market sales, is likely to put increasing pressure on incumbent pipeline gas suppliers. A significant addition of U.S. LNG exports will **accelerate this trend**. In addition to adding to the size of the market, U.S. LNG contracts are likely to be determined on a “floating” basis, with sales terms tied to the price of a U.S. benchmark such as Henry Hub, **eroding the power of providers of long-term oil linked contract suppliers such as Russia**. While U.S. LNG will not be a direct tool of U.S. foreign policy—the destination of U.S. LNG will be determined according to the terms of individual contracts, the spot-price-determined demand, and the LNG traders that purchase such contracts—the addition of a large, market-based producer will **indirectly** serve to increase gas supply diversity in Europe, thereby providing European consumers with increased flexibility and market power.

#### Russia-Ukraine war goes nuclear – draws in the US

**Kingston 9** (Brian, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs – CIFP, “Ukraine: A Risk Assessment Report”, February, http://www.carleton.ca/cifp/app/serve.php/1214.pdf)

Russia: Russia seeks to influence the weakened Ukraine, inflaming ethnic-Russian separatism; Crimea declares independence; Ukraine resists, perhaps seeing an external war as a distraction from internal strife; Russia comes to the aid of Crimea/ethnic-Russians resulting in open warfare between Russia and Ukraine. The West: The West also suffers from the global recession, but (perhaps following a period of inward looking protectionism) realizes that it cannot allow Russian success in Ukraine; open hostilities erupt between Russian and NATO forces **triggering World War III** and the strong possibility of **nuclear war**, or at least the drawing in of many other countries.

### Heg

**Decline causes aggression- triggers the impact**

**Snyder 07**

Robert and Renee Belfer Professor of International Relations at Columbia University

[Jack “FREE HAND ABROAD, DIVIDE AND RULE AT HOME: THE DOMESTIC POLITICS OF UNIPOLARITY” (http://www.henryfarrell.net/unipolarity.pdf)]

Plausible as these arguments may be, the opposite case may be equally plausible. States that are under intense international pressure may be especially vulnerable to myth-ridden foreign policies. Hostile encirclements heighten the enemy images, bunker mentalities, and double standards in perception that are common in competitive relationships of all kinds, especially in international relations. 9 Nationalist and garrison-state ideologies are reinforced. Likewise, Charles Kupchan argues that declining empires typically adopt strategic ideologies of aggressive forward defense out of fear that their opponents will discover the truth about their growing weakness. 10 In contrast, diplomatic historians commonly applaud the pragmatism of powerful “off-shore balancers,” whose privileged position grants them the freedom to be selective and fact-driven, waiting upon developments before committing troops. Whether powerful, unconstrained states are more ideological than weaker or highly constrained states depends greatly on their domestic politics, not simply their position in the international system. 11 Krasner’s corollary hypothesis—that powerful or unconstrained states are likely to succumb to an ideology of expansionism—is also an oversimplification. Powerful, secure states have the option to express their ideological values in the world through coercion, but they also have other options. They might choose to engage with the world pragmatically, taking what they need and ignoring the global problems that good fortune insulates them from. Or they might adopt a highly principled foreign policy that increases humanitarian assistance abroad, but eschews empire and declines to meddle in the internal politics of foreign peoples. Finally, they might be tempted by policies of limited liability, embarking on good works and moralistic hectoring abroad, but then heading for the exits when backlash makes costs rise. 12 Simply being powerful says little about whether or how ideology will express itself.

They don’t assume the transition – that goes nuclear

Posen and Ross 97 [Barry Posen, Professor of Political Science in the Defense and Arms Control Studies Program at MIT, Andrew Ross, Professor of National Security Studies at the Naval War College, International Security, Winter 1997]

The United States can, more easily than most, go it alone. Yet we do not find the arguments of the neo-isolationists compelling. Their strategy serves U.S. interests only if they are narrowly construed. First, though the neo-isolationists have a strong case in their argument that the United States is currently quite secure, disengagement is unlikely to make the United States more secure, and would probably make it less secure. The disappearance of the United States from the world stage would likely precipitate a good deal of competition abroad for security. Without a U.S. presence, aspiring regional hegemons would see more opportunities. States formerly defended by the United States would have to look to their own military power; local arms competitions are to be expected. Proliferation of nuclear weapons would intensify if the U.S. nuclear guarantee were withdrawn. Some states would seek weapons of mass destruction because they were simply unable to compete conventionally with their neighbors. This new flurry of competitive behavior would probably energize many hypothesized immediate causes of war, including preemptive motives, preventive motives, economic motives, and the propensity for miscalculation**. There would** like **be more war. W**eapons of **m**ass **d**estruction **might be used in** some of **the wars**, with unpleasant effects even for those not directly involved.

Their offense is inevitable – we’ll always pursue heg

Shalmon and Horowitz 09

(Dan, Mike, Total B.A.’s, Orbis, Spring)

It is important to recognize at the outset two key points about United States strategy and the potential costs and benefits for the United States in a changing security environment. First, the United States is very likely to remain fully engaged in global affairs. Advocates of restraint or global withdrawal, while popular in some segments of academia, remain on the margins of policy debates in Washington D.C. This could always change, of course. However, at present, it is a given that the United States will define its interests globally and pursue a strategy that requires capable military forces able to project power around the world. Because ‘‘indirect’’ counter-strategies are the rational choice for actors facing a strong state’s power projection, irregular/asymmetric threats are inevitable given America’s role in the global order.24

#### Decline causes selfishness – makes multipolar transitions impossible and wrecks climate negotiations

**Roberts 11**

(J. Timmons, Director – Center for Environmental Studies and Professor of Sociology and Environmental Studies – College of William and Mary, “Multipolarity and the New World (Dis)Order: US Hegemonic Decline and the Fragmentation of the Global Climate Regime,” Global Environment Change 21, p. 776-784, Online)

4. US hegemonic decline: applying the lens of Arrighi and Silver So we have seen over the past few years a sharply increasing fragmentation of international alignments in response to climate change. Looking longer term, we see an even more extreme increase in defined positions. First, there was the UNFCCC's vague but solidaristic statements in 1992, based on per capita justice and preventing dangerous climate change. Then the incrementalist and realist 1997 Kyoto regime reflected hegemonic struggle between the US and the EU (Paterson, 2009), and ended up being based on the grandfathering of past emissions, emissions trading, and the eventual withdrawal of the world's most powerful nation – its hegemon, the US.8 Then in the 2009/2010 Copenhagen-Cancun Round world we see a weakening in European leadership (as that bloc expanded from 17 relatively wealthy to 27 much more diverse nations), and the fragmentation of the G-77 into an even more fractious set of ad hoc negotiating groups just described. The US was something of a foot-dragger in the 1992 Earth Summit, with President George H.W. Bush traveling to Rio and signing the UNFCCC only hesitatingly and under pressure, and agreeing to the treaty because there were no binding limits placed on the US. In the negotiations leading up to the 1997 Kyoto pact, the Clinton/Gore administration played a role of demanding binding limits also on China, India and some other developing nations, a move resisted by the G77, EU, and most environmentalists ( [Masood, 1997a] and [Masood, 1997b]). The US played a role of resisting efforts to include it in Kyoto, to the point that the country was nearly completely marginalized during George W. Bush's administration. Then President Barack Obama negotiated the 2009 Copenhagen Accord with the BASIC countries on the last negotiation day, but as we briefly reviewed in Section 2, the Accord was not a step in the direction of climate justice. A framework I find useful to understand the shift in the dynamics of climate negotiations is to consider the massive upheaval in the global political economic system over these twenty years. Giovanni Arrighi and Beverly Silver have written a series of pieces, including their 2001 article, “Capitalism and World (dis)Order”, in the Review of International Studies.9 The piece describes transitions over five centuries in global hegemony: from Genoese, Dutch, British and now American cycles of rise and decline. In each cycle, the rise of financial capital plays a key role, creating flexibility of accumulation for the hegemonic power's elites, and diversifying income of these elites as different types of activities in certain locations become more and then less profitable. In the US hegemonic cycle, the profitability of manufacturing in the core nations dropped sharply in the late 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, as job-heavy production shifted to cheap labor zones such as Mexico and China. The fiscal crisis was deferred as it was in previous hegemonic cycles, as financial power sustained each hegemon beyond its time. Each hegemon, at the end of its cycle of dominance, experienced a final boom and “pursues their national interest without regard for system-level problems that require system-level solutions” (p. 271). Arrighi and Silver argue that such global orders are very unstable. “[T]he power of the hegemonic state experiences a deflation, and a hegemonic crisis sets in…. Hegemonic crises have been characterized by three distinct but closely related processes: the intensification of interstate and inter-enterprise competition; the escalation of social conflicts; and the interstitial emergence of new configurations of power.“(270–271). They argue that the final stages are complete hegemonic breakdown and ‘systemic chaos’… a situation of severe and seemingly irremediable systemic disorganization. As competition and conflicts escalate beyond the regulatory capacity of existing structures, new structures emerge interstitially and destabilize further the dominant configuration of power. Disorder tends to become self-reinforcing, threatening to provoke or actually provoking the complete breakdown in the system's organization. (Arrighi and Silver, 2001, p. 271) To bring this back to interstate climate politics, in his landmark book, The Long Twentieth Century, Arrighi describes how, in the face of military and financial crisis in 1973, the US retreated from the world stage and “US strategies of power came to be characterized by a basic neglect of world governmental functions.10 It was as if the ruling groups within the US had decided that, since the world could no longer be governed by them, it should be left to govern itself”(301). Arrighi argues that, in this vacuum, oil-producing states organized an effective way to gain huge rents from petroleum (the 1973 and 1978 OPEC embargos, and carefully attempting to modulate production at other times to keep prices up) (Arrighi, 1994: 322). Two things happened with that money. First, Arab oil producers gave foreign assistance of at least $100 billion accumulated since that period (Shuhan et al., 2010).11 We do not know whether one of the goals of Arab aid has been to secure support for their position in other negotiations, such as to keep key recipients from dissenting from OPEC views in G-77 negotiations during climate change negotiations. If Arab donors did use aid that way they would not be alone: anecdotal information suggests Japan has secretly used aid in this way for votes on the International Whaling Commission, and (among other cases), and the US in 2010 publically made payments from the Copenhagen funding (most publicly, to Ecuador) provisional on the signing of the Copenhagen Accord. Second, the oil boom money from OPEC governments was often loaned (through Western banks) to other developing countries with adjustable rates, and these rates skyrocketed when the Reagan administration in the US adopted a tight fiscal policy to regain control (Arrighi, 2001). This created a debt crisis that set back many developing countries for a decade. This failure of development to measure up to expectations has certainly strengthened the G-77's cohesiveness in the climate negotiations, even as their interests diverged (see Roberts and Parks, 2007). Meanwhile, China's economy (and energy use/carbon emissions) has risen exponentially since 2001, threatening US global hegemony, at least in some market segments. India also has the ability to undermine US labor competitiveness in a large number of job categories long thought to be securely unexportable. Arrighi and Silver argue that the rich countries cannot compete with the ascendant nations in East Asia because of profoundly different developmental paths (especially wage rates), and they cannot be restructured “without causing social strains so unbearable that they would result in chaos rather than ‘competitiveness”’ (2001, p. 278). Arrighi and Silver end with the ominous warning that “If the system eventually breaks down, it will be primarily because of US resistance to adjustment and accommodation. And conversely, US adjustment and accommodation to the rising economic power of the East Asian region is an essential condition for a non-catastrophic transition to a new world order.” (p. 279). In his 2009 “Post-Hegemonic Climate Politics?” piece, Matthew Paterson argues that Europe has taken the lead in the area of global climate policy, surpassing the US. However in Copenhagen, we saw the rise of BASIC, especially China, as the real challenger to US hegemonic power.12 As Arrighi and Silver say, the hegemon is typically the only power with the ability to lead the world in protecting “global public goods.” This suggests that the US, as declining hegemon, is leaving its climate mess for the rising economic hegemon (seemingly China) to clean up. As Arrighi and Silver put it about economic issues: “An equally essential condition is the emergence of a new global leadership from the main centres of the East Asian economic expansion. This leadership must be willing and able to rise up to the task of providing system-level solutions to the system-level problems left behind by US hegemony”(p. 279). Whether China will be the next global hegemonic power is uncertain. And though China has the ability to mobilize extraordinary economic resources and it has invested heavily in renewable energy sources, its leadership's overall emphasis on addressing climate change remains uncertain because it has economic growth as its top priority (see also Mol, 2011). Whether China, another nation, or a regional bloc becomes the next global hegemon, Arrighi and Silver's work supports the idea that they will inherit a climate mess requiring someone to take the lead in cleaning up. 5. Discussion and conclusion Observing many years of turmoil in negotiations over global nations’ response to climate change, leading ever further away from principles and practice of climate justice, one is tempted to chalk it up to stubbornness on the part of a few selfish nations: the US and Saudi Arabia most obviously and for the longest time, but Canada might be put in this group, and also one could say China and India, for different reasons. Poor leadership by the Danish Presidency at Copenhagen was clearly a factor, as deft leadership by Mexico in Cancun confirmed. The list could go on. Certainly short-sighted selfishness has been a major factor in creating our current dire situation on climate change, but I argue here that the roots of failure to reach consensus on a global response to climate change lie in the global economic structure and its current phase of restructuring. Many nations in the global South remain frustrated that in spite of many decades of promises and striving that they face persistent inequality and stalled economic development. In the case of the US, its pigheadedness in negotiations might be seen as having been driven by insecurity in a shifting global political economy about its ability to provide jobs for its workers in the future where all sorts of work is moving to China and India. Giovanni Arrighi and Beverly Silver point us to two central parts of that dynamic. First, while developing nations may be industrializing, the majority of citizens in those nations are not getting rich (or even getting to global middle class status in GDP/capita terms) in the process ( [Arrighi and Silver, 2001], [Arrighi et al., 2003] and [Arrighi et al., 2005]). This happens because lower-profit parts of the product cycle are offshored to those countries, with owners looking for cheap labor havens.13 This persistent and growing inequality between and within nations exacerbates the frustration of many in the developing world about their stalled prosperity, which also dampens their enthusiasm about limiting their future growth – an issue we’ve discussed at length elsewhere ( [Roberts and Parks, 2007] and [Parks and Roberts, 2010]). The current article therefore begins to address two major gaps in our previous work, which was more focused on explaining non-cooperation by developing countries. Those gaps are (1) explaining fragmentation in the global South, and (2) the roots of resistance by the US Senate and executive branch to a meaningful and binding climate treaty. For two decades now, the US has been the bull in the china shop of climate negotiations – repeatedly smashing any small progress that was being delicately arranged. It has not been alone in wrecking the negotiations, but its intransigence has provided a shield behind which many other nations can conveniently hide. The US government's unwillingness to take active steps to address this looming global crisis is exactly the kind of failure of leadership that Arrighi and Silver describe among hegemons in the “autumns” of their decline. This has been true since the Genoese, Dutch, and British rode waves of boom and bust over the past centuries. In the current case it's fairly simple: US fear of job loss to China lay behind the July 1997 Byrd-Hagel Resolution that arguably sunk the Kyoto Protocol, tying the Clinton administration's hands the summer before the COP 3 in that Japanese city. That resolution read that the United States should not be a signatory to any protocol … which would mandate new commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions … unless the protocol or other agreement also mandates new specific scheduled commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for Developing Country Parties within the same compliance period, or would result in serious harm to the economy of the United States (US Senate, July 25, 1997) US stubbornness in the climate negotiations is driven by fear of job loss and competitiveness to China, India, and elsewhere, while China and other rapidly developing nations in turn fear the treaty being used by the US and others to dampen their growth and defer their dreams.142

#### Hegemony solves multiple scenarios for Asian conflict

Wortzel 3

[[Larry M., Ph.D.](http://www.heritage.org/About/Staff/LarryWortzel.cfm) VP of Foreign Policy and Defense Studies at The Heritage Foundation, “United States Military Forces in Asia Maintain the Peace and Advance Democracy” 1-10, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/wm185.cfm>]

America’s primary regional security interests are best served by preserving the stability of Northeast Asia, an area plagued by war for most of the past century. Without an American military presence, deep historical animosities and territorial disputes among Russia, China, Japan, and the two Koreas would lead to a major race for military dominance. A delicate balance has existed since the end of World War Two, when Japan renounced offensive military force and rejected nuclear weapons. Pulling out US troops would destroy that balance. **America’s military presence** in Northeast Asia **has provided the glue for security arrangements that** offered protection to its allies and reassurances that **helped avert an arms race** among enemies that have fought each other for centuries. America’s bilateral security treaties with Japan and South Korea, respectively, ensure that United States military, political, and economic interests in the region are protected. The forward presence of U.S. troops also serves to protect the democracies of South Korea and Taiwan from hostile threats by Leninist dictatorships in North Korea and China. Japan depends on the presence of U.S. military forces. It maintains its peace constitution, eschews the development of an offensive military force, and feels secure in a nuclear age without a nuclear arsenal because of American security guarantees. For South Korea, the presence of U.S. combat forces has created the conditions that permitted democracy and a market economy to flourish. In South Korea, the voters elected a candidate that wants to pursue dialogue with North Korea. They elected a candidate who emphasized engaging North Korea regardless of North Korea’s reactions or reciprocity. Even though there have been protests, both South Korean presidential candidates, and the majority of the citizens of South Korea, continue to recognize the stability and security that the U.S. presence in Korea provides. **It is imperative for Americans to remember that** in the final analysis, the **forward deployment** of U.S. troops **serves American interests** even as it advances our values.

#### The impact is extinction

Ogura and Oh 97

[Toshimaru, Professor of Political Economy @ Toyama University + Ingyu, Professor of Organizational Behaviour and Innovation at the Graduate School of Management, Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University (Japan), “Nuclear Clouds over the Korean Peninsula and Japan” Monthly Review, April]

North Korea, South Korea, and Japan have achieved quasi- or virtual nuclear armament. Although these countries do not produce or possess actual bombs, they possess sufficient technological know-how to possess one or several nuclear arsenals. Thus, virtual armament creates a new nightmare in this region - **nuclear annihilation**. Given the concentration of economic affluence and military power in this region and its growing importance to the world system, any hot conflict among these countries would threaten to **escalate into a global conflagration**.

### Combo CP – 2AC

#### Shale doesn’t solve exports regardless of supply – Industry inexperience

Lundgren 12 (Kari, “U.S. Shale Gas Exports Face Hurdles, Former Exxon CEO Says,” 2-10-12,

<http://mb50.wordpress.com/category/geopolitics/energy-geopolitics/lng/page/6/>

Politicians including Democrats Senator Ron Wyden of Oregon and Representative Edward Markey of Massachusetts have said exports may raise domestic gas prices. In allowing exports, the U.S. may be “trading away the enormous economic advantage of having large, low-cost domestic natural gas supply,” Wyden said in an e-mailed statement on Jan. 6. “It’s going to be a little while before people are really confident that there is going to be a sufficient amount of gas for 30 years to support the construction of an LNG plant,” said Raymond, who stepped down in 2005. “I’m frankly not sure that we have enough experience with shale gas to make the kind of judgment you’d have to make.” Global Supply Some gas-industry players are confident the U.S. will become a major exporter. BG Group Plc (BG/) said yesterday that the U.S. will be able to supply about 9 percent of global liquefied natural-gas output by the end of the decade. The U.K.’s third- largest gas producer said the U.S. will have the capacity to export about 45 metric million tons of LNG a year from 2020. Rising production of natural gas has driven down prices and is leading owners of import terminals to explore exports. Cheniere Energy Inc. has proposed a liquefaction facility at its Sabine Pass terminal, which would be the first new North American export project since 1969. BG has a preliminary agreement to take gas from Sabine Pass. The cost of building an LNG (LNG) terminal runs to billions of dollars. Cheniere’s Sabine Pass terminal will have a capacity of 9 million tons a year. Construction costs at projects underway in Australia, have reached $4,000 a ton of capacity, according to analysts at Sanford C. Bernstein & Co. ‘Huge Investments’ “If you build any LNG, from a producer’s point of view, you can only do that from an economic point of view if you’re assured that you have a long-term competitive supply because these are huge investments,” Raymond said. Exxon, the world’s largest energy company by market value, is pursuing shale exploration in Argentina, Poland and the U.S. The company said earlier this month that two exploratory wells drilled in a Polish shale formation last year weren’t commercially viable. The gas discovered failed to flow in sufficient quantities Texas-based Exxon said Feb. 1.

#### Shale has higher CO2 content

Roy 10 (Diane, Director, Regulatory Affairs Terasen Gas, “Commercial Energy Consumers Association of British Columbia,” 10-8-10, <http://www.fortisbc.com/About/RegulatoryAffairs/GasUtility/NatGasBCUCSubmissions/Documents/101108_TUtilities_2010_LTRP_CEC_IR2_Response_FF.pdf>

Using gas is an advantage for companies that are investing in greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reductions; as conventional gas has about 27% lower GHG emissions on an energy equivalent basis compared to diesel or fuel oil for example. 1 However, unconventional gas production and processing can result in the release of CO2 that occurs naturally with the gas. The CO2 content of shale gas varies considerably by deposit. In Canada, the approximate range of CO2 content of shale gas is anywhere from 1 percent or less to 12 percent. Since some shale gas contains more CO2 than conventional gas, mitigation methods will need to be developed for high CO2 shales.

#### Increases costs – makes the liquefaction process uneconomical

Ebenezer 5 (Salako Abiodun, Institute of Petroleum Technology, “Removal Of Carbon Dioxide From Natural Gas For LNG Production,” December 2005, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim,

<http://www.ipt.ntnu.no/~jsg/studenter/prosjekt/Salako2005.pdf>

Liquefaction process which is the transformation of natural gas to liquid form involve operation at a very low Temperature (-161 o C) and as low as atmospheric pressure. At these conditions CO2 can freeze out on exchanger surface, plugging lines and reduce plant efficiency. Therefore there is need for removal of CO2 before liquefaction process, this is done not to overcome the process bottle necks but also to meet the LNG product specifications, prevent corrosion of process equipment and environmental performance. There are many acid gas treating processes available for removal of CO2 from natural gas. These processes include Chemical solvents, Physical solvents, Adsorption Processes Hybrid solvents and Physical separation (Membrane) (Kohl and Nielsen, 1997); The chemical solvents and physical solvents or combination of these two have been used extensively in existing base load LNG facilities (David Coyle et. al 2003). Today, computer-aided process simulation is nearly universally recognized as an essential tool in the process industries. Indeed, simulation software play a key role in: process development – to study process alternatives, assess feasibility and preliminary economics, and interpret pilot-plant data; process design to optimize hardware and flowsheets, estimate equipment and operating cost and investigate feedstock flexibility; and plant operation to reduce energy use, increase yield and improve pollution control. The ability of the LNG option to continue to compete with existing and emerging gas monetization, option will depend on the industry’s success in reducing cost throughout the LNG value chain and maintaining exceptional safety, reliable and less environmental impact operations. This project therefore summarizes the various processes available and suitable for removal of CO2 from natural gas to meet the LNG stringent specification of about 50-100 ppmv or 2-3% CO2 concentration in the product stream. Different processes scalability, advantages and disadvantages will be highlighted. Simulation of a typical amine solvent based CO2 removal plant using HYSYS process simulator to establish optimum operating conditions that will improve process environmental performance will be considered in detail.

### Hydrates DA

#### Oil drilling should trigger the link

Klimasinska 12(Katarzyna Klimasinska “Republicans Fault Obama’s Five-Year Oil Plan As Too Restrictive” 6/28/12 http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-06-28/republicans-fault-obama-s-five-year-oil-plan-as-too-restrictive.html accessed on 6/28/12)

Republicans criticized the Obama administration’s latest five-year offshore oil-leasing plan for failing to open new areas for drilling, while environmentalists said the U.S. has put too many areas at risk. The Interior Department today scheduled 15 lease sales through 2017 in the Gulf of Mexico and Arctic waters, while keeping areas along the Atlantic and Pacific coasts off-limits. The agency also pushed back by two years a sale in Alaska’s Beaufort Sea to collect additional scientific information. “There is far too great of potential to put people back to work, improve the economy and make American more energy independent for President Obama to ignore America’s vast offshore energy resources,” House Natural Resources Committee Chairman Doc Hastings, a Washington Republican, said in a statement. “It’s extremely disappointing that the Obama administration continues to have such a narrow vision for American energy production.” President Barack Obama has set a target of reducing U.S. oil imports by a third by 2025 through more domestic oil production and increased use of natural gas and renewable resources. Republican challenger Mitt Romney has called for more extensive drilling. The five-year plan includes 12 sales in the Gulf of Mexico, an auction in Alaska’s Cook Inlet in 2016, in Chukchi Sea in 2016 and in the Beaufort Sea in 2017. The regions hold more than 75 percent of total undiscovered, recoverable oil, according to the agency

#### Gas industry tech solves

Sassoon 10 (David – Writer for SolveClimate, “Did Deepwater methane hydrates cause the BP Gulf explosion?”, 5/10, http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2010/may/20/deepwater-methane-hydrates-bp-gulf)

She explained that the oil and gas industry has a lot of experience with methane hydrates, because they have to be kept from forming in pipes or they will clog the lines, stop the flow of oil, and pose a danger. Drillers use inhibitors such as methanol to keep the hydrates from crystallizing inside drill rigs operating at great depth, where conditions for methane hydrate formation are ideal. This film clip of an experiment conducted on the ocean floor near the Deepwater Horizon drilling site demonstrates how quickly and easily methane hydrates can form. It was conducted by the Gulf of Mexico Hydrates Research Consortium aboard the Seward Johnson in September 2006. The voices of the scientists conducting the experiment are clearly audible. The clip shows with remarkable clarity a robotic arm maneuvering a clear tube over a stream of hydrate bubbles emanating from a crater on the sea floor. Within minutes, gas trapped in the tube begins to form a visible solid — a white ice matrix — thanks to the extreme cold and pressure of the ocean depth. When the tube is inverted, the hydrate, less dense than seawater, floats out of the tube, dissociating into its components, gas and water.

#### Methane hydrates don’t reach the atmosphere – no impact

Kvenolden 99 (Keith A. – USGS, “Potential Effects of Gas Hydrate on Human Welfare”, 1999, JSTOR)

For almost 30 years. serious interest has been directed toward natural gas hydrate, a crystalline solid composed of water and methane, as a potential (i) energy resource, (ii) factor in global climate change, and (Wi) submarine geohazard. Although each of these issues can affect human welfare, only (iii) is considered to be of immediate importance. Assessments of gas hydrate as an energy resource have often been overly optimistic, based in part on its very high methane content and on its worldwide occurrence in continental margins. Although these attributes are attractive, geologic settings, reservoir properties, and phase-equilibria considerations diminish the energy resource potential of natural gas hydrate. The possible role of gas hydrate in global climate change has been often overstated. Although methane is a "greenhouse" gas in the atmosphere, much methane from dissociated gas hydrate may never reach the atmosphere, but rather may be converted to carbon dioxide and sequestered by the hydrosphere/biosphere before reaching the atmosphere. Thus, methane from gas hydrate may have little opportunity to affect global climate change. However, submarine geohazards (such as sediment instabilities and slope failures on local and regional scales, leading to debris flows, slumps, slides, and possible tsunamis) caused by gas-hydrate dissociation are of immediate and increasing importance as humankind moves to exploit seabed resources in ever-deepening waters of coastal oceans. The vulnerability of gas hydrate to temperature and sea level changes enhances the instability of deep-water oceanic sediments, and thus human activities and installations in this setting can be affected.

#### Inevitable – other countries are attempting to drill for R&D purposes

Fitzpatrick 10 (Michael – The Guardian, “Japan to drill for frozen methane”, 9/27, lexis)

In a bid to shore up its precarious energy security Japan is to start commercial test drilling for controversial frozen methane gas along its coast next year. The gas is methane hydrate, a sherbet-like substance consisting of methane trapped in water ice - sometimes called fire ice or MH - that is locked deep underwater or under permafrost by the cold and under pressure 23 times that of normal atmosphere. A consortium led by the Japanese government and the Japan Oil, Gas and Metals National Corporation (Jogmec) will be sinking several wells off the south-eastern coast of Japan to assess the commercial viability of extracting gas from frozen methane deep beneath local waters. Surveys suggest Japan has enough methane hydrate for 100 years at the current rate of usage. Lying hundreds of metres below the sea and deeper still below sediments, fire ice is exceedingly difficult to mine. Japan is claiming successful tests using a method that gently depressurises the frozen gas. Tokyo plans to start commercial output of methane hydrates by 2018. At present Japan imports nearly all its gas and is heavily dependent on oil imports. In a desperate attempt to secure more oil, for example, Japan recently did a deal with the United Arab Emirates. In exchange for using Japan as a base for Asian oil trading Japan now has priority to purchase rights to up to 4 million barrels of immediately accessible crude. Methane hydrates could make Japan energy independent. "Japan put a lot of R&D into this project because of course the less energy it imports the better. Whether they can commercialise methane hydrates remains to be seen," said Lucia van Geuns, an energy analyst at the international energy programme of the Clingendael Institute. "If it does succeed, and that's very much a long shot, it will have a huge impact - equivalent to the use of gas shales in the US." Japan's ministry of trade, which is behind the scheme, has requested a budget of ¥8.9bn (£667m) for the drilling to start next spring. The huge budget reflects the difficulties of drilling deep offshore. In Japan, hydrates in the Sea of Kumano are found about 30km offshore in about 100 metres of water and at a depth below the seabed of 200 metres , making it difficult to mine the unstable hydrates. Concerns had been raised that digging for frozen methane would destabilise the methane beds which contain enough gas worldwide to snuff out most complex life on earth. Methane itself is a greenhouse gas with 21 times the potency of carbon dioxide and any leakage from wells could be an environmental problem . Professor Gerald Dickens, of Rice University in Texas, thinks accidental releases can be avoided."The only potential issue in regards to drilling would be if there is greatly over-pressured gas immediately beneath the gas hydrate. However, there is growing belief and rationale to suggest that this cannot occur in nature. So, as far as drilling there should be no issue." Environmentalists , however, are concernedabout the burning of more earth-locked hydrocarbons. Methane may be cleaner-burning fossil fuel than coal or oil but will still release many tons of CO2. Jogmec acknowledges the problems, admitting mining of methane ice could lead to landslides and the devastation of marine life in the mining areas. "There are many other technological problems to overcome," says the Jogmec website. "Not least that when you drill you create heat which turns the frozen methane into gas, which could then leak uncontrollably through the sea to our atmosphere." The US, China, Canada and South Korea are among other countries seeking to develop commercially viable extraction technology and each is now exploring the mining of methane hydrates from their own sea beds. "Some commercial production of methane from methane hydrate could be achieved in the United States before 2025," says a US government report on the subject.

#### That excludes shale and methane hydrates

Energy Insider 7 (Energy Insider, “The Rise of Unconventional Gas”, 2007, http://www.enerdynamics.com/documents/Insider91807\_000.pdf)

What is Unconventional Gas? Natural gas is formed over thousands of years by the combination of pressure and heat on organic material trapped in rock. After natural gas is formed, the earth’s pressure often pushes the gas upward through small holes and cracks in rock until it reaches a layer of impermeable rock where the gas becomes trapped. It sits there in a “pool” until it is released from the ground by a drill bit providing a path to the surface. This is what we call conventional gas, the resource upon which our gas industry was built. But not all gas is found in these formations. In fact, there are a number of forms of unconventional gas that were created in formations without the permeability necessary to allow migration. These include: • Tight Sands Gas – formed in sandstone or carbonate (called tight gas sands) with low permeability which prevents the gas from flowing naturally. • Coalbed Methane (CBM) – formed in coal deposits and adsorbed4 by coal particles. • Shale Gas – formed in fine-grained shale rock (called gas shales) with low permeability in which gas has been adsorbed by clay particles or is held within minute pores and microfractures. • Methane Hydrates – a crystalline combination of natural gas and water, formed at low temperature and high pressure in places such as under the oceans and permafrost.

#### Environment is resilient

Easterbrook 95 (Gregg, Distinguished Fellow – Fullbright Foundation, A Moment on Earth, p. 25)

In the aftermath of events such as Love Canal or the Exxon Valdez oil spill, every reference to the environment is prefaced with the adjective "fragile." "Fragile environment" has become a welded phrase of the modern lexicon, like "aging hippie" or "fugitive financier." But the notion of a fragile environment is profoundly wrong. Individual animals, plants, and people are distressingly fragile. The environment that contains them is close to indestructible. The living environment of Earth has survived ice ages; bombardments of cosmic radiation more deadly than atomic fallout; solar radiation more powerful than the worst-case projection for ozone depletion; thousand-year periods of intense volcanism releasing global air pollution far worse than that made by any factory; reversals of the planet's magnetic poles; the rearrangement of continents; transformation of plains into mountain ranges and of seas into plains; fluctuations of ocean currents and the jet stream; 300-foot vacillations in sea levels; shortening and lengthening of the seasons caused by shifts in the planetary axis; collisions of asteroids and comets bearing far more force than man's nuclear arsenals; and the years without summer that followed these impacts. Yet hearts beat on, and petals unfold still. Were the environment fragile it would have expired many eons before the advent of the industrial affronts of the dreaming ape. Human assaults on the environment, though mischievous, are pinpricks compared to forces of the magnitude nature is accustomed to resisting.

### Elections DA

#### Romney will maintain a working relationship with Russia.

Business Insider, 9/1/**2012** (Romney Could Screw Up US Relations With Russia, p. <http://www.businessinsider.com/mitt-romneys-foreign-policy-chops-come-into-light-2012-9>)

At the same time, the potential impact of a Romney presidency should not be exaggerated. Mr Romney is not an ideological politician, and he will have solid reasons to maintain a working relationship with Russia. These include reliance on Russian transit corridors to support US forces in Afghanistan to 2015 and beyond, Russia's veto in the UN Security Council, and its potential to act as interlocutor between the US and rogue states. Finally, there is a significant element of uncertainty that stems from the lack of clarity about what Mr Romney, who has often changed his position, actually stands for. In particular, the extent of the influence on him of several competing Republican foreign policy schools (neo-conservativism, populist isolationism, realism, liberal internationalism) is unclear.

#### Give Russia war zero probability – politics, military superiority, and nuclear security

Graham 7 (Thomas, Russia in Global Affairs, "The dialectics of strength and weakness", http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/numbers/20/1129.html)

An astute historian of Russia, Martin Malia, wrote several years ago that “Russia has at different times been demonized or divinized by Western opinion less because of her real role in Europe than because of the fears and frustrations, or hopes and aspirations, generated within European society by its own domestic problems.” Such is the case today. To be sure, mounting Western concerns about Russia are a consequence of Russian policies that appear to undermine Western interests, but they are also a reflection of declining confidence in our own abilities and the efficacy of our own policies. Ironically, this growing fear and distrust of Russia come at a time when Russia is arguably less threatening to the West, and the United States in particular, than it has been at any time since the end of the Second World War. Russia does not champion a totalitarian ideology intent on our destruction, its military poses no threat to sweep across Europe, its economic growth depends on constructive commercial relations with Europe, and its strategic arsenal – while still capable of annihilating the United States – is under more reliable control than it has been in the past fifteen years and the threat of a strategic strike approaches zero probability. Political gridlock in key Western countries, however, precludes the creativity, risk-taking, and subtlety needed to advance our interests on issues over which we are at odds with Russia while laying the basis for more constructive long-term relations with Russia.

#### Energy is not a key election issues --- other issues outweigh.

**The Washington Post**, 6/27/**2012** (Energy ads flood TV in swing states, p. http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/energy-ads/2012/06/27/gJQAD5MR7V\_story.html)

Energy issues don’t spark much excitement among voters, ranking below health care, education and the federal budget deficit — not to mention jobs and the economy. And yet those same voters are being flooded this year with campaign ads on energy policy. Particularly in presidential swing states, the airwaves are laden with messages boosting oil drilling and natural gas and hammering President Obama for his support of green energy. The Cleveland area alone has heard $2.7 million in energy-related ads. The disconnect between what voters say they care about and what they’re seeing on TV lies in the money behind the ads, much of it coming from oil and gas interests. Those funders get the double benefit of attacking Obama at the same time they are promoting their industry. Democrats also have spent millions on the subject, defending the president’s record and tying Republican candidate Mitt Romney to “Big Oil.” Overall, more than $41 million, about one in four of the dollars spent on broadcast advertising in the presidential campaign, has gone to ads mentioning energy, more than a host of other subjects and just as much as health care, according to ad-tracking firm Kantar Media/Cmag. In an election focused heavily on jobs and the economy, all of this attention to energy seems a bit off topic. But the stakes are high for energy producers and environmentalists, who are squared off over how much the government should regulate the industry. And attention has been heightened by a recent boom in production using new technologies such as fracking and horizontal drilling, as well as a spike in gas prices this spring just as the general election got underway. When asked whether energy is important, more than half of voters say yes, according to recent polls. But asked to rank their top issues, fewer than 1 percent mention energy.

#### No link – plan doesn’t happen till after the election

Lightman and Douglas 9/21 (David and William, “Unproductive Congress breaks until after November election”, 2012, <http://www.adn.com/2012/09/20/2633147/unproductive-congress-breaks-until.html>\_

Lawmakers spent Thursday pointing fingers and charging opponents with cynical political posturing. Among Congress' last decisions was a characteristic 2012 judgment: Punt action until later. It will let the farm bill, a broad measure that sets the nation's agriculture and food and nutrition assistance policies, expire Sept. 30. Congress also exits without any serious effort to edge away from the "fiscal cliff," the prospect of economy-damaging budget chaos if it doesn't act by year's end. Bush-era tax cuts are due to expire, and automatic spending cuts will take effect unless alternatives are passed. The public is noticing, as the legislative failures stir uncertainty and further roil an already-weak economy. This Congress' approval ratings were stuck at 13 percent in a Gallup survey Sept. 6-9, the lowest the pollster has ever logged this late in an election year since such measurements began in 1974. Yet lawmakers are slinking out of town, after a September session that was on and off for less than two weeks, following a summer recess that ran from Aug. 3 to Sept. 10. Congress is expected to return Nov. 13.

#### Link is self-correcting --- Obama will October Surprise if he is behind.

**Whittington**, **6/14**/2012 (Mark, Obama’s October Surprise Could Be Legalizing Pot, Yahoo! News, p. http://news.yahoo.com/obamas-october-surprise-could-legalizing-pot-191100768.html

The Atlantic Wire believes that it has hit upon President Obama's surefire October Surprise to change his political fortunes and get him re-elected for a second term. That October surprise would be for him to support the legalization of pot. This last-minute gambit has an advantage to starting a war, being that no one would get killed. The theory is that young voters, disenchanted with Obama because of the fact they are still living in their parents' garage three years after graduation and can't get a job, will be motivated to turn out for him because he supports legalized dope smoking. The Washington Post related David Maraniss' claims of Barack Obama being a pothead during his high school days. The gambit would also answer Penn Jillette's recent rant on the hypocrisy of Obama, a self-admitted former doper, enforcing drug laws that put people like he used to be in jail. The idea that Obama can get potheads motivated enough to turn off "The Daily Show," get off the couch, and go to the polls is a very charming one. To be sure, people voting while stoned could explain a lot of election results -- the re-election of Jerry Brown as governor of California comes to mind. But the legalized pot gambit has some pitfalls. Millions of people, likely more than who toke while laughing hysterically at Bill Maher, are against legalized drug use. Rasmussen suggested that a plurality of 47 percent of Americans favor legalizing marijuana and taxing it, which makes the say yes to drugs gambit just a little tempting to a president facing defeat in November. But such a move could be turned back on Obama fairly quickly. Mitt Romney, whose skill at the political riposte has become well known, would have lots of fun with an Obama legalize dope initiative. What next, he will ask. Selling crystal meth to school kids from vending machines? And if Obama proposed taxing pot at the same time, Romney would think that the good lord really does want him to be president. The conservative base likes few things less, besides gays getting married, than legalized dope and raising taxes, even on legalized dope. What, Obama would ask, does this have to do with a bad economy? One hope would be left for Obama: a stimulus package for pot growers. It may be his only hope.

#### Voters will forget events in a month.

**Carlson**, 9/18/**2012** (Margaret, Why Romney can still win, Star Tribune, p. http://www.startribune.com/opinion/commentaries/170184556.html?refer=y)

Besides, we live in the United States of Amnesia, where no one (except maybe the press) remembers Romney's mistakes if they happened more than a month ago. Who can forget when he criticized the British, our closest ally, for not being as good at running the Olympics as he was (turned out it was)? Or his $10,000 bet with Texas Gov. Rick Perry over his health-care plan? Or his comment that "corporations are people, my friend"? Or his failure to release years of tax returns? Soon everyone may even forget the video in which he says of the poor, "My job is not to worry about those people."

#### Romney will win --- Electoral College models prove.

**Hoover**, **10/5**/2012 (Tim – staff writer for the Denver Post, CU professors double-down on prediction of Romney win due to economic factors, The Denver Post, p. http://blogs.denverpost.com/thespot/2012/10/05/cu-professors-doubledown-prediction-romney-win-due-economic-factors/83220/)

Remember the University of Colorado professors who predicted Mitt Romney would win the election because of economic factors – despite national pollsters predicting President Barack Obama well ahead? Well, political science professors Kenneth Bickers of CU-Boulder and Michael Berry of CU Denver have updated their model and say the new data still shows a Romney win. According to the updated analysis, Romney would get 330 Electoral College votes to Obama’s 208 votes, even less than the 218 the pair predicted during the summer and still well short of the 270 needed to win. Again, it’s a huge disconnect from national punditry which still shows an easy Obama victory (though experts say new polling will have to gauge the effect of Romney’s success during Wednesday’s debate). “We continue to show that the economic conditions favor Romney even though many polls show the president in the lead,” Bickers said. “Other published models point to the same result, but they looked at the national popular vote, while we stress state-level economic data.” The pair’s analysis relies on state and national unemployment figures and changes in real per capita income, among other factors. Their updated analysis includes unemployment rates from August instead of May, and has changes in per capita income from the end of June rather than March. The duo predicts Romney winning all but three of 13 battleground states.

#### Plan cuts against Romney’s “dirty fuel” narrative – helps Obama win swing states

LeVine 12 (Steve, “How Dirty is Romney Prepared to Get to Win Election?” Foreign Policy, 6-13, http://oilandglory.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/06/12/how\_dirty\_is\_romney\_prepared\_to\_get\_to\_win\_election)

Is Barack Obama sufficiently dirty to win re-election? Not according to presumptive Republican nominee Mitt Romney, who says the president is too spic and span. Calculating that clean energy is passé among Americans more concerned about jobs and their own pocketbooks, Romney is gambling that he can tip swing voters his way by embracing dirtier air and water if the tradeoff is more employment and economic growth. Romney's gamble is essentially a bet on the demonstrated disruptive potency of shale gas and shale oil, which over the last year or so have shaken up geopolitics from Russia to the Middle East and China. Now, Romney and the GOP leadership hope they will have the same impact on U.S. domestic politics, and sweep the former Massachusetts governor into the White House with a strong Republican majority in Congress. A flood of new oil and natural gas production in states such as North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Texas is changing the national and global economies. U.S. oil production is projected to reach 6.3 million barrels a day this year, the highest volume since 1997, the Energy Information Agency reported Tuesday. In a decade or so, U.S. oil supplies could help to shrink OPEC's influence as a global economic force. Meanwhile, a glut of cheap U.S. shale gas has challenged Russia's economic power in Europe and is contributing to a revolution in how the world powers itself. But Romney and the GOP assert that Obama is slowing the larger potential of the deluge, and is not up to the task of turning it into what they say ought to be a gigantic jobs machine. The president's critics say an unfettered fossil fuels industry could produce 1.4 million new jobs by 2030. They believe that American voters won't be too impressed with Obama's argument that he is leading a balanced energy-and-jobs approach that includes renewable fuels and electric cars. The GOP's oil-and-jobs campaign -- in April alone, 81 percent of U.S. political ads attacking Obama were on the subject of energy, according to Kantar Media, a firm that tracks political advertising -- is a risk that could backfire. Americans could decide that they prefer clean energy after all. Or, as half a dozen election analysts and political science professors told me, energy -- even if it seems crucial at this moment in time -- may not be a central election issue by November. Yet if the election is as close as the polls suggest, the energy ads could prove a pivotal factor. "Advertising is generally not decisive. **Advertising matters at the margins**. ... But ask Al Gore if the margin matters," said Ken Goldstein, president of the Campaign Media Analysis Group at Kantar Media. "This is looking like an election where the margin may matter." Romney is hardly the first major U.S. presidential candidate to embrace Big Oil. The politics of clean go back to Lady Bird Johnson's war on litter and Richard Nixon's embrace of environmentalism. But both presidents Bush came from the oil industry, and former Alaska Gov. Sarah Palin, the last GOP vice presidential nominee, gleefully led chants of "Drill, baby, drill" in 2008. Yet President George W. Bush also famously declared that "America is addicted to oil" in his 2006 State of the Union address, and initiated most of the energy programs for which Obama is currently under fire. And Palin's drumbeat in the end seemed to fall flat. The Republican efforts appear to go beyond any modern campaign in their brash embrace of what is dirty, and their scorn of what is not. And the times seem to favor them. In 2009, the GOP, backed by heavy industry lobbying, knocked back environmentalists on their heels by crushing global warming legislation. Other previously central issues -- Afghanistan, Iraq, health care -- are still debated in the campaign, but **not as centrally nor as viscerally as energy**, said Frank Maisano, an energy and political analyst at Bracewell & Giuliani, a Houston-based law firm. Obama advisors have said rightly that energy is only one component of a much broader American and global economy, but the GOP appears to have at least partially successfully injected the oil and gas boom as a defining feature of the economic discourse. In a Sunday op-ed in the New York Times entitled "America's New Energy Reality," industry consultant Daniel Yergin remarked that while Obama's 2010 State of the Union address focused on clean-energy jobs, the president pivoted this year to talk as much about oil and natural gas. "His announcement that ‘American oil production is the highest it has been in eight years' turned out to be an applause line," Yergin noted. Romney grants that Obama is not precisely Mr. Clean -- while the president has championed clean energy technologies, he has also stewarded over the greatest buildup in U.S. fossil fuel production since the 1990s. But Romney insists he will be dirtier: He vows to **open more land to oil and gas drilling**, approve the import of more Canadian oil sands to Gulf Coast refineries, and allow more coal mining. As for Obama, Romney recently told a Colorado coal community, he isn't dirty enough to deserve a second presidential term. The president has "made it harder to get coal out of the ground; he's made it harder to get natural gas out of the ground; he's made it harder to get oil out of the ground," Romney said. The approach aligns with a campaign by the American Petroleum Institute, the U.S. oil industry's main lobbying arm, called "Vote4Energy." The API campaign, which consists of big political events and advertisements, targets 15 or so mostly swing states, those that both Obama and Romney will most need to muster the 270 electoral votes required to win. Marty Durbin, executive vice president at API, told me that the Vote4energy campaign is deliberately not backing any specific candidate or party, but attempting to centrally fix the subject of greater fossil-fuel drilling in voters' minds. "We're using this to highlight the importance of energy to the broader policy, that with the right energy policies we can have job creation, economic growth, energy security, government revenue. If voters have these realities in their mind when they go to the ballot box, that's what is going to move us forward in having a more rational national energy policy," he said. Already, he said, "the energy conversation is no longer just production and energy security. This is about job creation on a state-by-state level." Notwithstanding Durbin's disclaimer, the API campaign seems to weave seamlessly into the GOP strategy. And Maisano told me that he sees grist for GOP success in the targeted states. "Energy plays a huge role in those states, and I see it as a huge problem for Obama," he said. "It's going to be hard for him to win these states that he has to win, like North Carolina, like Florida and Michigan and Ohio and Missouri and Wisconsin. Energy undercuts him in those economies." Some analysts think the dirty campaign will ultimately fizzle. "The Romney campaign has positioned itself to beat the job-creation drum better than the Obama campaign has," said Kyle Saunders, a professor at Colorado State University, but an improvement in job numbers could undermine the GOP narrative. In addition, said John Sides, a professor at George Washington University, **Obama's incorporation of fossil fuels in his energy policy may muddle the picture for voters**. "I'm not sure that there is a lot of daylight between Obama and Romney," Sides told me. Yet my own impression is that the Republican strategy may be working, at least partly and at least for now. Given the stakes, Obama and the main environmental lobby seem more lethargic than they might be. When I sought comment for this story, API responded almost immediately with an offer to speak with Durbin. Not so much the Sierra Club, the principal bulwark of U.S. environmentalists. A spokeswoman missed a couple of emails sent over a couple of days, then by phone said she would try to scare up someone to speak. Finally, I finally received a message: "I haven't been able to track down our political team today." **In an election that may be decided on the margins,** advantage: fossil fuels.

#### Offshore drilling has massive support – outweighs all other energies

**Dixon**, 3/19/**2012** (Darius – energy reporter at Politico, Poll: Support rises for offshore drilling, Politico, p. http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0312/74185.html)

Interest in alternative energy sources like wind and solar over has waned among Americans the last year, while support for offshore oil and gas drilling has climbed back up to pre-BP oil spill levels, according to a poll released Monday. Fifty-two percent of those surveyed by the Pew Research Center support alternative energy, down 11 percent compared with March 2011. However, interest in developing oil, coal and natural gas resources rose by 10 percent, while the remainder to those who said they supported both or didn’t know. Support for offshore oil and gas drilling in U.S. waters has also recovered to its levels prior to the 2010 BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. Nearly two-thirds of those surveyed now favor allowing increased offshore drilling, up from 57 percent a year ago and 44 percent in June 2010, during the spill. The partisan divide on renewable energy versus oil, coal and natural gas development has also become more pronounced over the last year. Eighty-nine percent of Republicans favor allowing more offshore oil and gas drilling while only half of Democrats agree, according the survey. However, a 64 percent of independents support increased drilling off the U.S. coast.

## 1AR vs. Emory HD

### Heg

#### Unipolarity is the most explanatory method of preventing conflict

**Wohlforth 9**

William Wohlforth (professor of government at Dartmouth College) 2009 “ Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War”Project Muse

The evidence suggests that narrow and asymmetrical capabilities gaps foster status competition even among states relatively confident of their basic territorial security for the reasons identified in social identity theory and theories of status competition. Broad patterns of evidence are consistent with this expectation, suggesting that unipolarity shapes strategies of identity maintenance in ways that dampen status conflict. The implication is that unipolarity helps explain low levels of military competition and conflict among major powers after 1991 and that a return to bipolarity or multipolarity would increase the likelihood of such conflict. This has been a preliminary exercise. The evidence for the hypotheses explored here is hardly conclusive, but it is sufficiently suggestive to warrant further refinement and testing, all the more so given [End Page 56] the importance of the question at stake. If status matters in the way the theory discussed here suggests, then the widespread view that the rise of a peer competitor and the shift back to a bipolar or multipolar structure present readily surmountable policy challenges is suspect. Most scholars agree with Jacek Kugler and Douglas Lemke’s argument: “[S]hould a satisfied state undergo a power transition and catch up with dominant power, there is little or no expectation of war.” 81 Given that today’s rising powers have every material reason to like the status quo, many observers are optimistic that the rise of peer competitors can be readily managed by fashioning an order that accommodates their material interests. Yet it is far harder to manage competition for status than for most material things. While diplomatic efforts to manage status competition seem easy under unipolarity, theory and evidence suggest that it could present much greater challenges as the system moves back to bipolarity or multipolarity. When status is seen as a positional good, efforts to craft negotiated bargains about status contests face long odds. And this positionality problem is particularly acute concerning the very issue unipolarity solves: primacy. The route back to bipolarity or multipolarity is thus fraught with danger. With two or more plausible claimants to primacy, positional competition and the potential for major power war could once again form the backdrop of world politics. [End Page 57]

#### Hegemony key to solve global warming

Cascio ‘8

(Jamais,Writer for the Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies, *The Big Picture: Climate Chaos*)

The relationship between climate chaos and the rise of the post-hegemonic world is tricky. Climate disruption isn’t causing the decline of US hegemony, nor is it caused by that decline. However, global warming underscores the weakness of the American hegemony, and that the decline of American hegemony weakens the potential for a near-term coordinated response to global warming. Moreover, this decline has the potential to make dealing with climate chaos more difficult. The best example of this situation occurred at the Bali global warming conference in December. The US delegation refused to sign an agreement accepted by essentially the rest of the participants, instead arguing for its own alternative. Kevin Conrad, the delegate from Papua New Guinea, then stepped to the microphone and said this: There’s an old saying: If you are not willing to lead, then get out of the way. I ask the United States: We asked for your leadership; we seek your leadership. But if for some reason you are not willing to lead, leave it to the rest of us; please get out of the way. A weakened American hegemon is one that is most likely to either try a costly attempt to shore up its power, or lash out at rising competitors, distracting national and world leadership at a time when distraction is most problematic. Of all of the risks to our global capacity to deal with global warming, this is the most dangerous.

#### Many countries empirically deny the impact

**Impact Lab 10** (6/21, “The 2010 Failed States Index.” http://www.impactlab.com/2010/06/21/the-2010-failed-states-index/)

Given time and the right circumstances, countries do recover. Sierra Leone and Liberia, for instance, no longer rank among the top 20 failing states, and Colombia has become a stunning success story. Few remember today that the Dominican Republic once vied with its neighbor Haiti for the title of “worst [Caribbean](http://www.impactlab.com/2010/06/21/the-2010-failed-states-index/) basket case.” But the overall story of the Failed States Index is one of wearying constancy, and 2010 is proving to be no different: Crises in Guatemala, [Honduras](http://www.impactlab.com/2010/06/21/the-2010-failed-states-index/), Iran, and Nigeria — among others — threaten to push those unstable countries to the breaking point.

#### -- No Russia/China war – deterrence and economics

Garnett 1 (Sherman, Dean of James Madison College – Michigan State University, Washington Quarterly, Autumn, Lexis)

Perceiving this partnership as a reversal of the balance in the old strategic triangle is also a mistake. Such a view overestimates Sino-Russian leverage, especially given Russia's **economic weakness** and the current **military** **balance**. Most critically, it misdiagnoses an emerging security environment that cannot be reduced to a triangle. Japan, the two Koreas, key Central Asian states, India and many other countries have a direct say in many of the core issues of interest to Russia, China, and the United States. All three powers must adjust to these new actors and to the new patterns their actions will engender on important trade, energy, environmental and security questions. Such a view underestimates the continued leverage Washington has in its bilateral ties over both Moscow and Beijing, even in the aftermath of the Friendship Treaty and the crisis in Sino-U.S. relations over the downed spy plane earlier this year. Russia and China need trade and investment far in excess of what the other can provide.

#### Collapse of hegemony increases terrorism

Brooks and Wohlforth 2 [Stephen Brooks, Assistant Professor, William Wohlforth, Associate Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth, Foreign Affairs, July / August 2002]

Some might question the worth of being at the top of a unipolar system if that means serving as a lightning rod for the world's malcontents. When there was a Soviet Union, after all, it bore the brunt of Osama bin Laden's anger, and only after its collapse did he shift his focus to the United States (an indicator of the demise of bipolarity that was ignored at the time but looms larger in retrospect). But terrorism has been a perennial problem in history, and multipolarity did not save the leaders of several great powers from assassination by anarchists around the turn of the twentieth century. In fact, a slide back toward multipolarity would actually **be the worst of all worlds for the U**nited **S**tates. In such a scenario it would continue to lead the pack and serve as a focal point for resentment and hatred by both state and nonstate actors, but it would have fewer carrots and sticks to use in dealing with the situation. The **threats would remain, but** the possibility of **effective and coordinated action against them would be reduced**.

#### Hegemony is key to democracy promotion – the impact is failed states

Lane 2K [Charles, The Weekly Standard, January 17, <http://www.ceip.org/programs/democr/aidingreviews.htm>]

Thanks to American power, then, fascism and communism have been mostly vanquished. The remaining task is to remove them where they linger (China, North Korea, Cuba, Iraq, Serbia), and to cope with or overcome other ideologically based obstacles to democracy-like Islamic fundamentalism, the "Asian values" canard, and the tribal and ethnic strife that bedevil the Arab world, sub-Saharan Africa, the Caucasus, and the Balkans. It may take more than a century to handle all of this unfinished business. But, if the United States is serious about defending and consolidating democracy, it will have to identify democracy's enemies and oppose them, both with the force of our ideas and, where necessary, with just plain force. In short, what Joseph Nye has called "soft power"-foreign aid, trade, and the other persuasive tools which Carothers and Diamond emphasize-may not be enough. "Hard power," the maintenance of a strong U.S. military and a network of global security commitments and alliances capable of protecting democracies and resisting aggressive dictatorships, will surely continue to play an **indispensable role**. Doubters need only ask themselves whether democracy in Taiwan, South Korea, or even Japan would be stabilized or destabilized by a U.S. pullout from East Asia-where China increasingly flexes its military muscles.

### Elections

#### Historical analysis

**Idaho Statesman**, **10/5**/2012 (Dan Popkey: Scholar foresees Romney win, but not in popular vote, p. <http://www.idahostatesman.com/2012/10/05/2299086/scholar-foresees-romney-win-but.html>)

Lara Brown predicts, based on a historical analysis, that Mitt Romney will win 275 electoral votes to Barack Obama’s 263, while trailing by about 2 million popular votes. She also says a “nightmare” scenario — a 269-269 tie — is possible. Were that to happen, Brown said it could bring about abolition of the Electoral College — a move she said would upset the Constitution’s careful balance that guarantees regional as well as popular support. “The presidency represents a broad constituency, not just a narrow and deep one,” said Brown, a professor at Villanova University in Philadelphia. Brown keynoted Thursday’s history conference at Boise High, sponsored by the Andrus Center for Public Policy and the Idaho Council for History Education. When Brown graduated from UCLA with her doctorate in political science, she was among the vast majority of Americans who have “no idea” how the Electoral College works. She decided to make it her mission to defend a misunderstood institution. Brown rejects the view — held by about two-thirds of Americans in polls — that the Electoral College is un-democratic and archaic. “If that were true, we should probably get rid of the Senate and the Supreme Court, too.” The House of Representatives is the national chamber and a popular instrument based on one-person, one-vote. The Senate — where every state, regardless of size, gets two seats — bolsters states’ power and federalism. Add the “compound office” of a president chosen by the Electoral College and we have a government of “mixed character” best suited to protect liberty, she said. Brown likened the Electoral College to the seven-game World Series. “I have yet to hear the argument that the team with the most runs should win the World Series. The team that wins four games wins.” In very close elections, such as 2000 when George W. Bush lost the popular vote by 544,000 but won the electoral vote 271-266, no system can be perfect, she argued. She cites Alexander Hamilton on the Electoral College: “If not perfect, it is at least excellent.” Brown’s analysis of the past three presidential elections gives Romney the edge in 10 battleground states. She predicts Obama wins Iowa, Nevada, New Hampshire and New Mexico; Romney takes Colorado, Florida, Indiana, North Carolina, Ohio and Virginia.

#### Swing States

**Chambers**, **10/4**/2012 (Dean, Mitt Romney likely victory indicated by QStarNews, swing state poll, Examiner, p. <http://www.examiner.com/article/mitt-romney-likely-victory-indicated-by-qstarnews-swing-state-poll>)

The QStarNews poll of swing states released today shows President Obama leading 49.61 percent to 47.99 percent in the popular vote collectively in the 11 key swing states surveyed while Mitt Romney leads in seven of the 11 swing states. The QStarNews poll surveyed likely voters from Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Michigan, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia and Wisconsin. The poll included 2737 likely voters from those 11 states and had a margin of error of 1.87 percent. The president has a slightly higher disapproval rating than his approval rating among the likely voters in the 11 states in the QStarNews poll. Those who somewhat approve of Obama's performance as president were 25.27 percent while 23.65 strongly approve of the president for a total approval rating of 48.92 percent. Those who disapprove were divided between 4.61 percent who somewhat disapprove and 45.38 percent who strongly disapprove for a total disapproval rate of 49.99 percent. All responses in this survey were obtained before the first debate between Barack Obama and Mitt Romney. Romney is winning in seven of the 11 states, and as shown by the map above, would win the presidency if he wins those seven states. The other 39 states and the District of Columbia are shaded dark blue for Obama and dark red for Romney and those projections are nearly universal among all the maps of the race published on the web. The 11 key swing states covered in this poll as also the very states on which most analysts and prognosticators disagree about which candidate will win those states. Below is the data form the QStarNews poll from the surveys of the 11 states. In some of these states the samples are fairly small, and have fairly high margins of error.

#### Their polls are skewed --- Romney is ahead.

**Chambers**, **10/5**/2012 (Dean, Skewed Gallup poll turns tied race into five point Barack Obama lead, Examiner, p. http://www.examiner.com/article/skewed-gallup-poll-turns-tied-race-into-five-point-barack-obama-lead)

The Gallup seven day tracking poll of the presidential race released today shows Mitt Romney behind President Obama by a 50 percent to 45 margin. The seven day tracking poll of 3050 registered voters, that has a margin of error of 2.0 percent, over samples Democrats by about a five percent margin based on calculations from the reported data. If the data is properly weighted for the partisan makeup of the electorate, the data from this poll unskewed would show a tie in the race at 47 percent for each candidate. By skewing the poll, it gives Obama a five point lead. The sampling used by Gallup differs with the data from the latest QStarNews poll, the expected partisan make up of the electorate expected for this year's election is 34.8 percent Republicans, 35.2 percent Democrats and 30.0 independents. This indicates a degree of over-sampling of Democrats by eight percent, a plus four margin for Democrats as opposed to the plus four margin of Republicans among the likely voting electorate. The Gallup tracking poll has Democrats favoring Obama by a 93 percent to four percent margin while Republicans surveyed in the poll favor Romney by a 92 percent to five percent margin. Gallup found independent voters to support Obama by a 44 percent to 43 percent edge. If this data is weighted for the appropriate percentage of Republicans, Democrats and independents as shown by the Rasmussen data, the survey indicates a far larger and growing lead for Mitt Romney. Analysis of the data by those criteria would lead to a result showing the candidate tied at 47 percent. The significance of this is, somewhere along the way the weighting and sampling used by Gallup appears to have changed. The polling output resulting from this change demonstrates an apparent change that may not have happened at all, resulting in the showing of a Barack Obama post-convention “bounce” much larger than what might have actually occurred. The latest Rasmussen Reports Daily Tracking poll of the presidential race released today shows Obama at 49 percent to Romney at 47 percent. The Gallup poll is not the only such poll recently to be skewed by over-sampling Democrats to skew the results in favor of Barack Obama. Last month, the Sept. 10 CNN/ORC poll was similarly skewed. Last month on the Fox News segment “Campaign Insiders” today, Democratic pollsters Pat Caddell and Doug Schoen both confirmed their belief that major polls are skewed in favor of the Democrats by over-sampling of Democratic voters when the surveys are conducted. So many of these skewed polls have been unskewed here in this column they are now averaged, in unskewed form, in the new UnskewedPolls.com UnSkewed Average of Polls that today shows Romney leading by 3.0 percent.

#### Romney’s ahead with independents and the economy

Central Illinois Proud 10/5/12 ("Post Debate Bounce for Romney?" http://centralillinoisproud.com/fulltext?nxd\_id=277822)

Several new polls released Friday have Republican presidential nominee Mitt Romney cheering as he has pulled ahead of President Obama in three key states, Virginia, Ohio and Florida. Those polls, conducted by Rasmussen, come just a few days after the first presidential debate in which political analysts say Romney easily won that debate in front of a TV audience of over 65 million people. Still reeling from his weak performance, Obama now finds himself behind Romney in three battleground states. Romney also continues to lead among independent voters. In Ohio, among those certain to vote, Romney commands a 51 to 48 lead and the GOP has now closed the gap Democrats held in requests for absentee ballots for early voting in Ohio, a sign Romney is doing much better in that state. Romney is also ahead of Obama in whose best to handle the economy and national security. More importantly, 50 percent feel the economy will improve if Romney wins but only 34 percent feel the same way about Obama.

#### The debate changes everything

O'Connor and Nelson 10/5/12 (Patrick and Colleen, WSJ, "Romney Gets a Post-Debate Jolt," http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390443768804578038132315613600.html?mod=WSJ\_hppMIDDLENexttoWhatsNewsSecond)

ABINGDON, Va.—Mitt Romney's strong debate performance Wednesday night has generated $12 million in online contributions, his campaign said, as well as a surge in volunteers and bigger crowds at his events.¶ The challenge for Mr. Romney in the weeks ahead will be translating this jolt of energy into votes in a race that saw the Republican nominee enter the first debate trailing President Barack Obama in most of the states that will decide the election.¶ Republicans and Democrats say Mr. Romney's performance before a television audience of some 67 million people bought the GOP nominee a second look from swing voters and may help him improve an image battered by negative ads and his own missteps. The debate also gave Mr. Romney a chance to do something he couldn't in the primary: trumpet his record of working with Democrats and present himself as a practical deal maker who favors results over ideology.¶ One former Obama White House official said the debate "has caused people to take a second look at Romney."

#### More evidence – plan helps Obama win Ohio and Pennsylvania

Snyder 12 (Jim, “Ohio’s Gas-Fracking Boom Seen Aiding Obama in Swing State”, 9/4, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-04/ohio-s-gas-fracking-boom-seen-aiding-obama-in-swing-state.html)

Four years ago, Barack Obama pledged to promote a green revolution, saying the government would back alternative-energy technologies that could create 5 million jobs and free the U.S. from a dependence on overseas oil tyrants. Today, the energy industry is one of the main engines of job growth and the U.S. is the closest it has been in almost 20 years to meeting its own needs. Yet the transformation -- driven by a surge in oil and natural gas production -- isn’t primarily green and has little connection to the president’s plans. “We’re moving to energy independence by accident,” said Philip Verleger, who directed the U.S. Treasury office of energy policy under President Jimmy Carter and is now an industry consultant. “Energy policy had nothing to do with it.” The boom in oil and natural gas is setting up an election- year irony: a green-energy president who is getting a boost from fossil fuels. Oil and natural gas output is on the rise largely because of hydraulic fracturing, which has given drillers access to reserves in shale rock formations once too costly to produce. The so-called fracking injects millions of gallons of water, sand and chemicals thousands of feet below the surface to free fossil fuels trapped there, a process that Obama’s environmentalist allies say increases air and water pollution. Fracking is unlocking oil in North Dakota and Texas. More important to Obama’s re-election chances, it’s aiding natural gas production -- and Obama’s poll ratings -- in Ohio and Pennsylvania, swing states with 38 electoral votes combined. Job Growth Ohio’s unemployment rate was 7.2 percent in July, the lowest since September 2008 and below the nationwide 8.3 percent. Job growth there is the fourth-fastest in the U.S., federal data show. Pennsylvania’s jobless rate is 7.9 percent, down from a high of 8.7 percent in March 2010. The president has done little to stall the expansion of fracking, even with pressure from within his Democratic Party. “There’s so many different ways in which this is feeding into various sectors of the economy,” said Philip Sharp, a former Democratic House member from Indiana who heads Resources for the Future, a Washington-based environmental research group. “The administration looks to me like they’ve come to recognize its importance and they have not jumped on the anti-fracking bandwagon.” Different Vision When he entered the White House, Obama offered a different vision for the U.S.’s energy future, vowing to revive an economy battered by a recession and mend the environment with an export- heavy, green-technology push. As a candidate in 2008, Obama had promised to create 5 million green jobs over 10 years by investing in solar, wind and other renewable energy sources. His 2009 economic-stimulus plan spent a record $90 billion on clean energy. Among the successes the administration can tout are a doubling of solar and wind-energy generation and the retrofitting of more than 1 million homes to lower heating and cooling costs. An agreement with automakers to raise fleet-wide fuel economy will cut carbon emissions and oil imports. Still, only 225,000 green jobs had materialized through the stimulus program by 2010, according to the White House. Green energy “is a big area of unfulfilled promise,” said Julian Zelizer, a history and public affairs professor at Princeton University in New Jersey. Republicans have used the example of Solyndra LLC, the Fremont, California, solar-panel maker that closed two years after getting a $535 million U.S. loan guarantee, to depict Obama as a failed, big-government meddler in the free market. Keystone Rejection The president’s rejection of the Keystone XL (TRP) pipeline that would carry tar sands crude from Alberta, Canada, to refineries along the Gulf Coast, and a deepwater drilling ban imposed after BP Plc’s 2010 spill, sparked criticism that Obama was too focused on alternative energy sources. “We need an energy policy for today, tomorrow, and 50 years from now,” said Karen Harbert, chief executive officer of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s Institute for 21st Century Energy. “We don’t need an energy policy just for 50 years from now.” Standing in front of a coal facility in Ohio on Aug. 14, Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney criticized Obama for regulations such as Environmental Protection Agency greenhouse gas curbs. His own plan calls for ending clean-energy subsidies and aggressively expanding fossil fuel development. Not the Quarterback Representative Bill Johnson, an Ohio Republican whose district is home to many of the new wells being drilled, said Obama doesn’t deserve praise for the energy boom. “You go to a football game, you don’t get credit for throwing a touchdown pass,” Johnson said. “The quarterback does.” Domestic production of natural gas can help Obama undercut the line of attack that his environmental policies are hurting the economy, said Paul Allen Beck, a political science professor at Ohio State University in Columbus. “There’s a natural opening for Obama to say, ‘We’re not just regulators,’” Beck said. And while the administration is considering federal safeguards on fracking, so far it hasn’t stood in the way of its growth. The EPA delayed new air emissions standards for natural gas operations by two years, drawing rare applause from the American Petroleum Institute, a Washington-based industry group whose members include Irving, Texas-based Exxon Mobil Corp. (XOM) and ConocoPhillips (COP) in Houston. ‘Central Role’ In January, the president promoted natural-gas development in his State of the Union address, saying it could support 600,000 jobs by the end of the decade. Obama believes natural gas “has a central role to play in our energy future,” White House spokesman Clark Stevens said in an e-mail. Stevens also cited rising oil production as evidence the president supports what he calls an “all-of-the-above” energy strategy that includes oil and natural gas development as well as tax breaks for renewable energy sources. The energy picture has shifted in ways few would have predicted four years ago. Natural gas production increased to 24.2 trillion cubic feet in 2011 from 21.1 trillion in 2008. The increase pushed prices down to their lowest level in a decade. While lower prices could slow its growth, fracking also helped create an industrial renaissance, boosting the steelmakers that supply the well parts, chemical companies that use ethane, a liquid found with gas, and other energy-intensive manufacturers. Halving Emissions Even though Obama was unable to get Congress to pass legislation to combat climate change, the new trend is driving down greenhouse gases anyway because natural gas releases only about half the carbon emissions as coal when burned. The Energy Information Administration, which tracks and analyzes data for the U.S., projected for the first time earlier this year a long- term decline in the nation’s greenhouse-gas emissions. Companies that once planned to build facilities to import liquefied natural gas to meet domestic demand are now applying for export permits, thanks to the growing reserves. Oil production is also rising from under 5 million barrels per day in 2008 to almost 6.2 million barrels this year, helping reduce imports to 42 percent of U.S. consumption. Falling demand, greater biofuels production and higher domestic output combined to reduce oil imports to their lowest level since 1998, according to the EIA. The benefits of the fracking boom can be seen in Ohio’s Mahoning Valley, an industrial corridor in the northeastern part of the state. ‘More Optimism’ “You’re seeing more optimism than we’ve seen here in a long, long time,” said Representative Tim Ryan, a Democrat who represents the Youngstown area. “Right now there is a tidal wave of support behind the natural gas industry.” As many as 40 percent of Local 396 of Ohio’s pipe-fitters’ union members were out of work in the depths of the recession three years ago. Roland “Butch” Taylor, business manager of the union, said factory expansions and new construction now have all 700 of its members working. “We don’t see any types of layoffs for the future,” Taylor, 54, said at the Boardman headquarters of the United Association of Union Plumbers, Fitters, Welders and HVAC Service Technicians local. Further south in Ohio’s Appalachian region, farmers are getting signing bonuses from drillers of as high as $5,000 an acre, allowing a few to pay cash for $250,000 combines, said Amy Rutledge, the director of the Carroll County Convention & Visitors Bureau in Carrollton. “This has been a farming, rural community forever,” Rutledge said. “They’ve been scratching their dirt forever, and now they’re actually getting something out of the dirt.”

#### Ohio is a must-win for Romney.

**Anderson**, 8/9/**2012** (Theo, Obama’s Trump Card: Ohio, In These Times, p. <http://www.inthesetimes.com/article/13609/obamas_ohio_trump_card/>)

Can Mitt Romney lose Ohio and win the election? Not likely. Assuming that President Obama takes Ohio and that Romney wins Florida, Romney would need to win 50 of the remaining swing state's 53 electoral college votes. If Romney loses both Ohio and Florida, where he now trails by about a point, he has essentially no chance of winning. (This analysis is based on the Real Clear Politics electoral map.) The critical question, then, is whether Romney can win Ohio. With the standard caveat that anything could happen between now and November, it looks increasingly doubtful.

#### Offshore oil drilling has lost its voting power in Florida.

**Schor**, 12/5/**2011** (Elana – E&E reporter, Campaign 2012: Intensity of debate over offshore drilling hard to calculate in Fla. Senate race, E & E News, p. <http://www.eenews.net/public/EEDaily/2011/12/05/1>)

Has one of Florida's longest-running political lightning rods lost its charge?Sunshine State voters are about to find out as the second hotly contested Senate race in two cycles opens a door for rhetorical combat over offshore oil drilling. Despite a fast-starting GOP challenger with a nuanced record on coastal drilling in Rep. Connie Mack, the ailing economy and a mercurial public stance on the issue could deter Sen. Bill Nelson (D) from heavily promoting his fight to keep rigs off the state's shores. "Frankly, it's not the third rail of Florida politics like it used to be," Mark Ferrulo, executive director of the liberal group Progress Florida, said of the rigs now kept off state-controlled near-shore waters and at least 125 miles from the coast in federal waters. Even as he quipped that "figuring out where Congressman Mack stands on drilling is harder than cleaning up an oil spill" and predicted that Nelson would tout his case against easing the limits on Floridian coastal oil production, Ferrulo acknowledged that the debate would not be top-of-mind for swing voters most concerned by unemployment and the state's housing crisis. As recently as last year, the fate of state and federal bans on exploring for oil was among the most contentious topics on Florida's campaign trail. The three-way Senate clash that peaked as the Gulf of Mexico oil spill aimed a harsh spotlight on the risks of drilling -- moving GOP-turned-independent Gov. Charlie Crist to push a state constitutional amendment against near-shore rigs -- but ended with pro-drilling Sen. Marco Rubio (R) notching the victory.

## 1AC (Round 8) V. Emporia

### Inherency

#### **Contention One is Inherency –**

#### The Department of Interior’s leasing plan effectively restricts offshore natural gas drilling on federal lands

New 6-30 (Bill, President – New Industires, \*Offers Steel Fabrication Services to Offshore Drilling Projects, “Letters: New Leasing Plan a Step Backward,” The Advocate, 2012, http://theadvocate.com/news/opinion/3484480-123/letters-new-leasing-plan-a)

In late June, the U.S. Department of the Interior released its long-awaited outer continental shelf leasing plan, which effectively blocks offshore oil and natural gas exploration in any new areas for the next five years. Unfortunately, the proposal is a step backward in our effort to achieve energy independence. Under the plan, 85 percent of America’s OCS would be off-limits at a time when exploring every possible energy source is critical to boosting our nation’s economy and creating jobs. Instead of finding out what might be available to us in expansive unexplored areas off our coasts, we will be left to search for oil and natural gas in the same, relatively small portion of the OCS we’ve been exploring for four decades. Not only does this plan run counter to President Barack Obama’s “all of the above” strategy for energy independence, but it shows an outright disregard for the requests of the Gulf Coast states –— including Louisiana — to increase domestic oil production when the Interior Department released a draft of the plan late last year. Interestingly, the Interior Department chose to release this latest version of the OCS plan on the day the Supreme Court announced its health care decision — a thinly veiled attempt to bury it in news coverage of the ruling. But that didn’t keep right-thinking lawmakers from taking notice and working on ways to get America’s economy going using sound energy policies. U.S. Rep. Doc Hastings, R-Wash., chairman of the House Natural Resource Committee, has written legislation that sensibly revises the plan. While the Interior Department’s plan is to hold just 12 oil and gas lease sales in the Gulf of Mexico, and three in offshore Alaska from 2012 to 2017, the Hastings plan would schedule 28 lease sales total, dramatically increasing drilling opportunities off the Alaskan coast and including a sale of offshore leases in a potentially rich area off the coast of Virginia. The United States is producing more oil and natural gas than ever thanks to increased production on state-owned or private land. However, production on federal onshore land is down 14 percent in the last two years, and down 17 percent on federal offshore areas. Imagine what could happen if we enact legislation that allows us to open new offshore areas.

#### Current legislation is insufficient – removing access restrictions allows for expanded energy production – certainty is key

Loris 8-6 (Nicolas, Fellow in the Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies – Heritage Foundation “Senate Energy Bill: Good Start, Room for Improvement,” Heritage Foundation, 2012, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/08/domestic-energy-and-jobs-act-good-start-room-for-improvement)

Senator John Hoeven (R–ND) recently introduced the Domestic Energy and Jobs Act (DEJA), which would greatly expand access to energy and simplify burdensome regulations that prevent projects from coming online in a timely manner. While the legislation could be improved by further increasing access and removing the top-down energy planning, DEJA would still spur economic growth and drive energy production. Increasing Access to Energy DEJA would accept the State Department’s environmental review of the Keystone XL pipeline as sufficient and allow the state of Nebraska to reroute the pipeline to meet the state’s environmental concerns. The State Department studied and addressed risks to soil, wetlands, water resources, vegetation, fish, wildlife, and endangered species and concluded that construction of the pipeline would pose minimal environmental risk.[1] The construction of Keystone XL would allow up to 830,000 barrels of oil per day to come from Canada to the Gulf Coast and create thousands of jobs. DEJA also directs the Department of the Interior (DOI) to conduct a lease sale off the coast of Virginia. The 2.9 million acres 50 miles off the coast has an estimated 130 million barrels of oil and 1.14 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. Opening access off Virginia’s coast is long overdue, and the legislation **only opens up a small portion of America’s territorial waters that are off limits**. The Offshore Petroleum Expansion Now (OPEN) Act of 2012, also co-sponsored by Senator Hoeven, would replace President Obama’s 2012–2017 Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Leasing Program with a much more robust plan that opens areas in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, in the Gulf of Mexico, and off Alaska.[2] Both DEJA and OPEN increase the royalties that states would receive from energy production, but both could go further to increase state involvement in offshore drilling decisions. Since onshore states already receive 50 percent of the royalties, Congress should also implement a 50/50 royalty-sharing program between federal and state governments involved in offshore drilling. Efficient Permitting and Leasing for All Energy Projects Another important component of DEJA is that it streamlines the permitting of all energy projects. Receiving a permit for any energy project, not just fossil fuels, takes entirely too long. Duplicative and unnecessary regulations slow the process and drive up costs. Furthermore, environmental activists delay new energy projects by filing endless administrative appeals and lawsuits. DEJA would create a manageable time frame for permitting for all energy sources to increase supply at lower costs and stimulate economic activity. DEJA also calls for an end to the lengthy permit process in the Natural Petroleum Reserve area of Alaska. It would require the DOI to approve drilling permits within 60 days and infrastructure permits within six months. Lease certainty is another critical issue. The act states that the DOI cannot cancel or withdraw a lease sale after the winning company pays for the lease. Ensuring that the federal government does not pull the rug out from under a company that wins the lease sale would provide the **certainty necessary to pursue energy projects**. Freeze and Study Environmental Regulations DEJA would also create transparency and accountability for Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulations by establishing an interagency committee that would report on the full economic impact of the rules implemented by the EPA that affect fuel prices. This includes any part of the production process that would be affected by greenhouse gas regulations. DEJA delays the implementation of Tier 3 fuel standards (designed to replace the Tier 2 regulations issued in 2000) that would lower the amount of sulfur in gasoline but could add 6–9 cents per gallon to the cost of manufacturing gasoline. The EPA has declared no measurable air quality benefits from these standards. DEJA delays the New Source Performance Standards for refineries, which would drive up the cost of gasoline for no measurable change in the earth’s temperature.[3] It would also delay new national ambient air quality standards for ozone, which are unnecessary because the ozone standard set by the EPA is already more than stringent enough to protect human health. Though the delays contained in DEJA underscore the problems with these regulations, the preferred approach would be to prohibit the implementation of these three standards altogether. DEJA would also prevent the DOI from issuing any rule under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 before 2014 that would adversely affect coal employment, reduce revenue from coal production, reduce coal for domestic consumption or export, designate areas as unsuitable for surface mining and reclamation, or expose the U.S. to liability by taking privately owned coal through regulation. While this temporary fix recognizes the federal overreach in coal production, a better approach would be to create a framework that restricts overregulation, empowers the states, balances economic growth and environmental well-being, and creates a timely permitting process for all aspects of coal production.[4] Energy Central Planning Unneeded DEJA would require the federal government to create production objectives for fossil fuels and renewable energy and allow the relevant agencies to make additional lands available to meet those objectives. The bill would also require the U.S. Geological Survey to establish a critical minerals list and create comprehensive policies to increase critical mineral production. A much simpler and effective solution would be to open all federal lands for energy production of all sources and allow the private sector to determine what sources of energy and what technologies meet America’s electricity and transportation fuel demand. Too often the use of critical minerals has been used as cover for subsidies and extensive government intervention in a major industry. If there are clear military needs for certain critical materials, these should be met by government action. Absent that, streamlining the bureaucracy that has expanded around mining and **opening access is the only necessary federal action surrounding critical minerals**.

### Plan

#### The United States Federal Government should substantially reduce access restrictions on federal lands in the Outer Continental Shelf for conventional gas production

### Cult of Wilderness

#### Contention \_\_: Cult of Wilderness

**Offshore energy development is necessary to challenge the cult of wilderness – that which is sacred should be free from all forms of human intervention and that which has fallen no longer deserves human involvement**

**Wickersham 4** (Jay, Partner, Noble & Wickersham LLP, Cambridge, MA; Lecturer in Planning and Environmental Law, Harvard Graduate School of Design and Kennedy School of Government, “Sacred Landscapes and Profane Structures: How Offshore Wind Power Challenges the Environmental Impact Review Process,” 2004, 31 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 325)

In closing, I would like to explore an unstated assumption that helps explain the opposition to the project: the cult of wilderness, which presumes that all human impacts on the natural environment are necessarily harmful. n119 To understand what I mean by the cult of wilderness, let's look at the rhetoric of opponents to the Cape Wind project. Attorney General Reilly and others have described Nantucket Sound as akin to the "Grand Canyon." n120 Robert F. Kennedy, Jr. has compared Nantucket Sound to "Yosemite," and said that for many people, "it's their only access to wilderness." n121 Historian David McCullough has said that the wind farm would ruin "one of the most beautiful unspoiled places in all America." n122 The Grand Canyon, Yosemite: these are the sacred places of the American cult of wilderness, consecrated in the scriptures of writers beginning with John Muir. n123 The legal designation that opponents favor is actually a religious term: "sanctuary." n124 One reason the wind farm turbines are proposed to be located more than three miles offshore, outside of Massachusetts territorial waters, is that Massachusetts has designated virtually all its coastal areas, with the exception of Boston Harbor, as "ocean sanctuaries," within which the construction or operation of an electrical generating station is prohibited. n125 Now there is a proposal that the federal waters of Nantucket Sound receive a comparable federal designation as a "marine sanctuary." n126 [\*342] The quasi-religious value we ascribe to wilderness is America's most original contribution to environmentalism. n127 But as historian William Cronon writes in his essay, The Trouble with Wilderness, the cult of wilderness as a sacred place may also be the greatest impediment to our development of a sound attitude toward the natural environment. n128 The cult of wilderness distorts our perceptions and our actions. n129 Because designation of a place as a wilderness, an untouched place, may be required for it to receive legal protection, **it encourages us to misrepresent the nature of places that we care about, to give them a** spurious history free of any human intervention. n130 Second, the cult of wilderness encourages us to disregard places that do not qualify. **Places that have received a visible human imprint are fallen, no longer sacred**--and so they are no longer worthy of our protection and love. n131 As Michael Pollan has written: "Americans have done an admirable job of drawing lines around certain sacred areas . . . and a terrible job of managing the rest of our land." n132 I would like to draw particular attention to the visual aspect of the cult of wilderness because of its importance in the offshore wind power debate. The Grand Canyon and Yosemite are visual icons. In addition to making pilgrimages to these sacred places, we worship their images: from the paintings of Albert Bierstadt, to the photographs of Ansel Adams, to today's postcards and television travelogues and nature shows. Much of the opposition to the Cape Wind project derives from what we must presume is a sincere and deeply-held belief that the turbine towers are ugly to look at and that introducing these elements into Nantucket Sound will irretrievably damage the visual experience of that place. n133 I am not going to argue that aesthetics have no place in environmental impact review because of their inherent subjectivity. As Dorothy Bisbee's article discusses, the regulation of visual appearance is well founded in the law, and it should not necessarily be excluded [\*343] by the NEPA/MEPA process. n134 But our analysis should acknowledge that our perceptions of beauty and visual impacts are cultural constructs, in a way that physical impacts on birds, or fish, or wave patterns, are not. As John Costonis has written in Icons and Aliens, the demand to regulate aesthetics is rooted in a sense of social dissonance. n135 Either a sacred structure or landscape (an "icon") is threatened with change or destruction, or there is a proposal to introduce a jarring element (an "alien") into a well-defined context. n136 Often the two concepts go together and project opponents claim that it is the intrusion of an alien structure that threatens to destroy an iconic landscape. n137 Yet as Costonis also points out, our notions of what is an icon and what is an alien are highly malleable: "one generation's alien is the next generation's icon." n138 In the late nineteenth century, a committee of three hundred concerned citizens organized themselves to try to protect a particularly well-beloved landscape from a large-scale industrial intrusion. n139 A landscape "without rival in the world" would be "profaned" and subject to "dishonor" due to the construction of a "ridiculously tall tower," which they characterized as "the grotesque, mercantile imaginings of a constructor of machines." n140 The iconic landscape was the city of Paris; the alien was the Eiffel Tower. In a sense, the opponents were right. The Eiffel Tower was wildly out of scale with a predominantly low-rise city; its exposed steel construction jarred with the predominant aesthetic of classical buildings rendered [\*344] in stone. n141 And yet the alien has become an icon: today the Eiffel Tower is the most recognizable and best loved symbol of Paris. n142

**Challenging the sacredness of wilderness is essential to break down cultural imperialism and solve environmental problems – dualistic notions of humanity and the environment reinforce the notion that we are separate from our surroundings.**

**Cronon 95** (William Cronon, “The Trouble with Wilderness; or, Getting Back to the Wrong Nature,”

ed., Uncommon Ground: Rethinking the Human Place in Nature, New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1995, 69-90;

http://www.williamcronon.net/writing/Trouble\_with\_Wilderness\_Main.html)

The removal of Indians to create an “uninhabited wilderness”—uninhabited as never before in the human history of the place—reminds us just how invented, just how constructed, the American wilderness really is. To return to my opening argument: there is nothing natural about the concept of wilderness. It is entirely a creation of the culture that holds it dear, a product of the very history it seeks to deny. Indeed, one of the most striking proofs of the cultural invention of wilderness is its thoroughgoing erasure of the history from which it sprang. In virtually all of its manifestations, wilderness represents a flight from history. Seen as the original garden, it is a place outside of time, from which human beings had to be ejected before the fallen world of history could properly begin. Seen as the frontier, it is a savage world at the dawn of civilization, whose transformation represents the very beginning of the national historical epic. Seen as the bold landscape of frontier heroism, it is the place of youth and childhood, into which men escape by abandoning their pasts and entering a world of freedom where the constraints of civilization fade into memory. Seen as the sacred sublime, it is the home of a God who transcends history by standing as the One who remains untouched and unchanged by time’s arrow. No matter what the angle from which we regard it, wilderness offers us the illusion that we can escape the cares and troubles of the world in which our past has ensnared us. (25) This escape from history is one reason why the language we use to talk about wilderness is often permeated with spiritual and religious values that reflect human ideals far more than the material world of physical nature. Wilderness fulfills the old romantic project of secularizing Judeo-Christian values so as to make a new cathedral not in some petty human building but in God’s own creation, Nature itself. Many environmentalists who reject traditional notions of the Godhead and who regard themselves as agnostics or even atheists nonetheless express feelings tantamount to religious awe when in the presence of wilderness—a fact that testifies to the success of the romantic project. Those who have no difficulty seeing God as the expression of our human dreams and desires nonetheless have trouble recognizing that in a secular age Nature can offer precisely the same sort of mirror. Thus it is that wilderness serves as the unexamined foundation on which so many of the quasi-religious values of modern environmentalism rest. The critique of modernity that is one of environmentalism’s most important contributions to the moral and political discourse of our time more often than not appeals, explicitly or implicitly, to wilderness as the standard against which to measure the failings of our human world. Wilderness **is the natural, unfallen antithesis of an unnatural civilization** that has lost its soul. It is a place of freedom in which we can recover the true selves we have lost to the corrupting influences of our artificial lives. Most of all, it is the ultimate landscape of authenticity. Combining the sacred grandeur of the sublime with the primitive simplicity of the frontier, it is the place where we can see the world as it really is, and so know ourselves as we really are—or ought to be. But the trouble with wilderness is that it quietly expresses and reproduces the very values its devotees seek to reject. The flight from history that is very nearly the core of wilderness represents the false hope of an escape from responsibility, the illusion that we can somehow wipe clean the slate of our past and return to the tabula rasa that supposedly existed before we began to leave our marks on the world. The dream of an unworked natural landscape is very much the fantasy of people who have never themselves had to work the land to make a living—urban folk for whom food comes from a supermarket or a restaurant instead of a field, and for whom the wooden houses in which they live and work apparently have no meaningful connection to the forests in which trees grow and die. Only people whose relation to the land was already alienated could hold up wilderness as a model for human life in nature, for the romantic ideology of wilderness leaves precisely nowhere for human beings actually to make their living from the land. This, then, is the central paradox: wilderness embodies a dualistic vision **in which the human is entirely outside the natural**. If we allow ourselves to believe that nature, to be true, must also be wild, then our very presence in nature represents its fall. The place where we are is the place where nature is not. If this is so—if by definition wilderness leaves no place for human beings, save perhaps as contemplative sojourners enjoying their leisurely reverie in God’s natural cathedral—then also by **definition it can offer no solution to the environmental** and other **problems that confront us**. To the extent that we celebrate wilderness as the measure with which we judge civilization, we reproduce the dualism that sets humanity and nature at opposite poles. We thereby leave ourselves little hope of discovering what an ethical, sustainable, honorable human place in nature might actually look like. Worse: to the extent that we live in **an urban-industrial civilization but at the same time pretend to ourselves that our real home is in the wilderness,** to just that extent **we give ourselves permission to** evade responsibility for the lives we actually lead. We inhabit civilization while holding some part of ourselves—what we imagine to be the most precious part—aloof from its entanglements. We work our nine-to-five jobs in its institutions, we eat its food, we drive its cars (not least to reach the wilderness), we benefit from the intricate and all too invisible networks with which it shelters us, all the while pretending that these things are not an essential part of who we are. By imagining that our true home is in the wilderness, we forgive ourselves the homes we actually inhabit. In its flight from history, in its siren song of escape, in its reproduction of the dangerous dualism that sets human beings outside of nature—in all of these ways, wilderness poses a serious threat to responsible environmentalism at the end of the twentieth century. By now I hope it is clear that my criticism in this essay is not directed at wild nature per se, or even at efforts to set aside large tracts of wild land, but rather at the specific habits of thinking that flow from this complex cultural construction called wilderness. It is not the things we label as wilderness that are the problem—for nonhuman nature and large tracts of the natural world do deserve protection—but rather what we ourselves mean when we use the label. Lest one doubt how pervasive these habits of thought actually are in contemporary environmentalism, let me list some of the places where wilderness serves as the ideological underpinning for environmental concerns that might otherwise seem quite remote from it. Defenders of biological diversity, for instance, although sometimes appealing to more utilitarian concerns, often point to “untouched” ecosystems as the best and richest repositories of the undiscovered species we must certainly try to protect. Although at first blush an apparently more “scientific” concept than wilderness, biological diversity in fact invokes many of the same sacred values, which is why organizations like the Nature Conservancy have been so quick to employ it as an alternative to the seemingly fuzzier and more problematic concept of wilderness. There is a paradox here, of course. To the extent that biological diversity (indeed, even wilderness itself) is likely to survive in the future only by the most vigilant and self-conscious management of the ecosystems that sustain it, the ideology of wilderness is potentially in direct conflict with the very thing it encourages us to protect. (26) The most striking instances of this have revolved around “endangered species,” which serve as vulnerable symbols of biological diversity while at the same time standing as surrogates for wilderness itself. The terms of the Endangered Species Act in the United States have often meant that those hoping to defend pristine wilderness have had to rely on a single endangered species like the spotted owl to gain legal standing for their case—thereby making the full power of the sacred land inhere in a single numinous organism whose habitat then becomes the object of intense debate about appropriate management and use. (27) The ease with which anti-environmental forces like the wise-use movement have attacked such single-species preservation efforts suggests the vulnerability of strategies like these. Perhaps partly because our own conflicts over such places and organisms have become so messy, the convergence of wilderness values with concerns about biological diversity and endangered species has helped produce a deep fascination for remote ecosystems, where it is easier to imagine that nature might somehow be “left alone” to flourish by its own pristine devices. The classic example is the tropical rain forest, which since the 1970s has become the **most powerful modern icon of unfallen**, sacred land—a veritable Garden of Eden—for many Americans and Europeans. And yet protecting the rain forest in the eyes of First World environmentalists all too often means protecting it from the people who live there. Those who seek to preserve such “wilderness” from the activities of native peoples run the risk of reproducing the same tragedy—**being forceably removed from an ancient home**—that befell American Indians. Third World countries face massive environmental problems and deep social conflicts, but these are not likely to be solved by a cultural myth that encourages us to “preserve” peopleless landscapes that have not existed in such places for millennia. At its worst, as environmentalists are beginning to realize, exporting American notions of wilderness in this way **can become an unthinking and self-defeating form of** cultural imperialism. (28)

#### We must recognize that everything is wilderness – there is no such thing as a pristine ecosystem. Only by doing this can we truly hope to view ourselves as part of our surroundings

Bailey 11 (Ronald – award-winning science correspondent for Reason, Emma Marris is a writer for Nature,

“The Myth of Pristine Nature A review of Rambunctious Garden: Saving Nature in a Post-Wild World”, 8/16, http://reason.com/archives/2011/08/16/the-myth-of-pristine)

“Nature is almost everywhere. But wherever it is, there is one thing nature is not: pristine,” writes science journalist Emma Marris in her engaging new book Rambunctious Garden: Saving Nature in a Post-Wild World. She adds, “We **must temper our romantic notion of untrammeled wilderness** and find room next to it for the more nuanced notion of a global, half-wild rambunctious garden, tended by us.” Marris’ message will discomfort both environmental activists and most ecologists who are in thrall to the damaging cult of pristine wilderness and the false ideology of the balance of nature. But it should encourage and inspire the rest of us. Marris begins by exposing the vacuity of the notion of the ecological baseline. “For many conservationists, restoration to a pre-human or a pre-European baseline **is seen as healing a wounded or sick nature**,” explains Marris. “For others, it is an ethical duty. We broke it; therefore we must fix it. Baselines thus typically don’t act as a scientific before to compare with an after. They become the good, the goal, the one correct state.” What is so good about historical ecosystems? I too have noted that ecologists when asked this same question become almost inarticulate. They just know that historical ecosystems are better. So many ecologists set the historical baseline as the condition of ecosystems before Europeans arrived. Why? The fact is that primitive peoples killed off the largest species in North and South America, Australia and Pacific Islands thousands of years ago. For example, after people showed up about 14,000 years ago, North America lost 60 or so species of tasty mammals that weighed over 100 pounds, including giant ground sloths, mammoths, mastodons, cheetahs, camels, and glyptodonts. Marris argues that the cult of pristine wilderness was created by nature romantics like John Muir. Muir is famous for advocating that the Yosemite Valley be turned into a national park. As Marris notes, wild nature for Muir was a necessity for “tired, nerve-shaken, over-civilized people” suffering from “the vice of over-industry and the deadly apathy of luxury.” And for some people it might be—but that is not a scientific claim about ecosystems and their “integrity.” In fact, Marris reports that there is precious little scientific support for the ideology that pristine nature is somehow “better” than the mélange that humanity has created by moving species around the globe. For example, she visits Hawaii where half of the plant species now living on the islands are non-native. One brave younger ecologist, Joe Mascaro, studies novel ecosystems that are developing on Hawaii that incorporate both native and non-native species. Among other things, Mascaro “found that the novel forests, on average, had just as many species as native forests” and “that in many measures of forest productivity, such as nutrient cycling and biomass, novel forests matched or outproduced the native forests.” Marris contrasts Mascaro with another ecologist, Christian Giardina, who helps manage the Laupahoehoe Natural Area Reserve in Hawaii from which he wants to extirpate non-natives. Yet even Giardina muses over dinner, “Are we so religious about this biodiversity ethic that we need to be called on it?” He answers his own question: “If you really dig down to why we should care, **you end up with nothing**. You are running on faith that we should care.” Although Marris doesn’t cite him, she is plowing much the same intellectual ground as University of Maryland philosopher Marc Sagoff. Sagoff has challenged ecologists to name any specifically ecological criterion by which scientists can objectively determine whether an ecosystem whose history they don't know has been invaded or not. Are invaded ecosystems less productive? No. Are they less species-rich? No. And so on. In fact, Sagoff points out that there is no objective criterion for distinguishing between "disturbed" ecosystems and allegedly pristine ones. Marris also cites research that shows that the notion of the “balance of nature” is scientifically specious. Early in the 20th century influential ecologist Frederic Clements developed the theory that each ecosystem tended toward a stable climax that, once achieved, was perfectly balanced unless disturbed by people. Each participant in the climax ecosystem fitted tightly into niches as a result of coevolving together. However, ecologist Henry Gleason, a contemporary of Clements, countered that ecosystems were assembled by chance just depending on what species got there first and were successful in competing with other species as they arrived. For the most part, 20th century ecologists fell into the Clements’ camp. Now we know now that Gleason was far more right than Clements—ecosystems are largely assembled by chance. For example, northern temperate forests are composed of an assemblage of species that mixed together as they raced northward out of various refugia as the glaciers retreated. Although Marris mentions it briefly, one of the more fascinating novel ecosystems is the accidental rainforest created on Ascension Island in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean. A little over 150 years ago, the British navy began receiving shipments of trees and shrubs from all over the world from the collections at Kew Gardens in London. Once planted, they took hold and have transformed the bare peak once known as White Mountain into Green Mountain today. Species don’t need to coevolve to create fully functioning ecosystems [PDF]; they make the best of what they have. Only when the ecologically-correct ideologies that blind us are upended can we can see the real nature that is all around us. Baselines are properly transformed into aesthetic choices rather than “scientific” mandates. For example, Marris discusses the ambitious Pleistocene Rewilding proposal in which proxy wild species from Africa might be used to replace those North American species killed off by early peoples. African cheetahs might chase after pronghorns, and elephants graze where mastodons once did. A small version of rewilding is the fascinating Oostvaardersplassen [PDF] experiment where researchers are designing an ecosystem that aims to mimic what Northern Europe might have looked like 10,000 years ago. It is stocked with herds of Konik horses and Heck cattle, thought to be respectively similar to the tarpan horses and the aurochs that once roamed Europe. The newly constructed ecosystem has attracted many wild species that have long been absent from the Netherlands. It is still missing predators, but wolves are apparently moving westward from Eastern Europe. Marris argues that **the conservation and appreciation of nature can take place at far less exotic locations**, **such as backyards, city parks, farms, and even parking lots**. If biodiversity is what is of interest, she notes that the Los Angeles area is home to 60 native tree species, but now hosts 145 species. “With eight to eleven tree species per hectare, L.A. is more diverse than many ecosystem types,” she writes. Another researcher has identified 227 species of bee living in New York City. And if some of us choose to conserve some areas as “pristine” with regard to some preferred aesthetic baseline, that’s O.K. Certainly science can be used to help achieve that goal, but such areas become essentially wilderness gardens maintained by “perpetual weeding and perpetual watching.” This gracefully written and well-argued book deserves a wide readership. One hopes that readers will take to heart Marris’ chief insight about conservation: “There is no one best goal.” She bravely and correctly concludes, “We’ve forever altered the Earth, and so now we cannot abandon it to a random fate. It is our duty to manage it. Luckily, it can be a pleasant, even joyful task if we embrace it in the right spirit. Let the rambunctious gardening begin.”

#### This dualistic relationship with nature is the root cause of our anthropocentric mindset. Starting from any other point prevents an effective understanding of oppression and humanity

Plumwood 4 (Val – Famous Australian Philosopher, “Environmental Justice”, 2004, http://www.eolss.net/Sample-Chapters/C14/E1-37-03-04.pdf)

4. Interspecies Justice The dominant position in the West has insisted that concepts of **justice are confined to the human sphere and to intra-human relationships**. I will argue, to the contrary, that **we can map a range of ethical stances and components of justice** onto interspecies relationships and human treatment of non-human nature, and that there are important insights **to be gained from doing so and** to be lost from refusing to do **so**. There are some important choices between different ways to make such mappings, some of which I discuss below. I will argue against closed, extensionist mappings of justice that try to confine interspecies ethics to sentient or conscious beings, recognizing only those nonhumans who are believed most closely to resemble humans. These positions may avoid the most extreme and blatant forms of species injustice, but they retain most **of the problems of moral dualism** and do little to help us change our perceptions or behavior in ways relevant to the environmental crisis. But **primary concepts of justice** as giving others their due, and as distributional and proportional justice, **are not confined to intrahuman relationships, and have an application to the non-human sphere** and interspecies relationships. An important concept of injustice as “prejudice” is concerned with the impediments to justice presented by prior reductive or oppressive conceptions of the other, as in colonialism, racism, and sexism, and this concept of justice has, I shall argue, **a clear application to the non-human sphere**. The denial of concepts of justice to the non-human sphere, which is thus treated ethically as “other,” is itself a form of injustice. 4.1. Prejudice and Injustice There is injustice in the traditional stances of the dominant culture that would deny any application of ethics to non-humans, treating humans, and only humans, as ethically significant in the universe, and derive those limited ethical constraints they admit on the way we can use nature and animals entirely indirectly, from harms to other humans. These extreme positions are fairly obvious and easy to recognize as forms of anthropocentrism. But just as other forms of supremacism and centrism, for example those based on race and gender, appear in various forms and guises, so there are weaker and stronger, more upfront and more subtle forms of human centeredness. Despite our contemporary context of accelerating human destruction of the non-human world, traditions of general and direct ethical exclusion for non-humans are strongly defended by many philosophers and some environmentalists. Some philosophers, most notably Kant, have advocated admitting the others of the earth indirectly to ethical status, because we can learn from cruelty to animals “bad habits” that affect our behavior towards those who really count, human beings. Such indirect positions are heavily human centered because non-humans are admitted to value only in a secondary way, entirely as a function of their relationship to humans. Other philosophers are critical of these strong forms of human centeredness, but nevertheless cling to subtler forms that remain anthropocentric and are overly restrictive in their ethical recognition of non-humans. Recent environmental ethics has produced many examples of more subtle anthropocentric forms, for example assimilationist positions that allocate moral consideration or value to non-human beings entirely on the basis of their similarity to the human. Such claims are unjust for non-humans in the same way that assimilationist frameworks that allocate worth to individuals of another culture, for example an aboriginal culture, just on the basis of their similarity to the dominant (white) colonizing culture are unjust. **We should not begin** this inquiry into justice for non-humans with **the assumption that we start from a condition of tabula rasa**, that we have no conceptual mappings already, or that they are neutral. On the contrary, those of us from Western backgrounds start out from a tradition **that has consistently mapped non-humans onto human others**, and accorded both less than justice. Dominant traditions over at least 25 centuries have identified the human normatively with the rational, and **both the non-human and the human other with relative absence of reason and corresponding proximity to nature and the earth**. Women have been consistently identified with lack of reason and with animals and, by Hegel, with a plant-like form of existence. The humanistic revolution of the Enlightenment replaced the rational hierarchy built on a complex set of reason/nature dualisms with a simpler and starker mental and moral dualism between humans and non-humans. In the Cartesian mind/body dualism, for example, non-humans are hyper-separated from humans by their alleged lack of “thought,” and are subject to an extreme form of homogenization that consigns them uniformly to the same inconsiderable category as the least considerable and most instrumentalized among them, which for Descartes was the machine. Modern conceptions of nature, even those of supposedly liberatory versions of environmental ethics, **have not fully broken with these traditions of human** and rational supremacy, although they minimize our ability to render justice and our sensitivity to the other, human and non-human. Questions of justice for non-human nature—including the question of ethical recognition and the critique of human-supremacist or anthropocentric values and ethical standards—were intensely debated over the three decades of environmental philosophy at the end of the twentieth century. I am among those environmental philosophers who say that Western culture is locked into an ecologically destructive form of rationality that is human centered, or “anthropocentric,” treating non-human nature as a sphere of inferior and replaceable “others.” Human supremacism and anthropocentrism are incompatible with justice to other species. Human supremacism in its strongest forms refuses ethical recognition to non-humans, treating nature as just a resource we can make use of however we wish. It sees humans, and only humans, as ethically significant in the universe, and derives those limited ethical constraints it admits on the way we can use nature and animals entirely indirectly, from harms to other humans. But just as other forms of supremacism and centrism, for example those based on race and gender, appear in various guises, **so there are** weaker and stronger, more obvious and more subtle forms of human supremacism and human centeredness. Despite our contemporary context of accelerating human destruction of the non-human world, some philosophers and traditionalists have been reluctant to censure even strong forms of human supremacism. Others are critical of these strong forms, but nevertheless cling to subtler forms that remain anthropocentric and are overly restrictive in their ethical recognition of non-humans. The most human-like “higher animals,” who are claimed to be the only possessors among the non-humans of the supposedly defining human characteristic of awareness, says Peter Singer, may be admitted to the ethical sphere, but the door is firmly closed against all others. This strategy is aptly termed “neo-Cartesianism” or “minimalism.” It aims to enlarge the human sphere of justice rather than ethically to integrate human and non-human spheres, a strategy that results in minimal further admissions to the privileged class. It minimally challenges anthropocentric ranking regimes that base the worth of beings on their degree of conformity to human norms or resemblance to an idealized “rational” or “conscious” humanity; and it often aims explicitly at minimal deviations from the prevailing political assumptions and dominant human-centered ethic they are tied into. It tends to minimize recognition of diversity, focusing on ethically relevant qualities like mind, consciousness, and communication only in forms resembling the human and failing to recognize that they can be expressed in many different, often incommensurable, forms in an ethically and ecologically rich and diverse world. I contrast below this minimalist ethical stance of closure with a more generous eco-justice stance of openness and recognition towards non-humans that acknowledges ethical diversity and critiques anthropocentric moral dualism as the “othering” of the non-human world, a form of injustice that closely parallels racial and gender injustice in both conceiving and making the other radically less than they are or can become. Moral dualism makes an emphatic division of the world into two starkly contrasting orders, consisting of those privileged beings considered subject to full-blown ethical concern as “humans” or “persons,” and the remainder, considered beneath ethical concern and as belonging to an instrumental realm of resources (or, in the prevailing political context, of “property”), available to the first group. Both the traditional humansupremacist position that refuses any extension of ethics beyond the class of humans and the minimalist animal rights variation that refuses any extension of ethics beyond the class it considers conscious (persons) are moral dualisms. Typically, moral dualism organizes moral concepts so that they apply in an all-or-nothing way: for example, a being either has a full-blown “right” to equal treatment with humans, or it is not subject to any form of ethical consideration at all. As I will show below, there are good reasons to reject moral dualism. We have many opportunities to organize the ethical field differently; some ethical concepts and practices of recognition and justice, for example, can be applied to humans and also to non-human animals and nature more generally. And ethically relevant qualities such as mind, communication, consciousness, and sensitivity to others are organized in multiple and diverse ways across life forms that do not correspond to the all-or-nothing scenarios assumed by moral dualism. In both the human and the non-human case, a politics of conflict can be played out around these moral dualisms, in which the moral exclusion of the class defined as “resource” is represented as a benefit or even a moral duty to less fortunate members of the human or person class, and the rejection of moral dualism is represented as depriving underprivileged humans of resources that are rightfully theirs. Much humanist rhetoric has involved policing exaggerated boundaries of moral considerability and forming a pan-human identity in the same way as racist and macho (male-bonding) identities, **building solidarity within the human group through** creating an inferiorized non-human out-group of others that the pan-human identity is defined against. The exclamation “What are we—animals?—to be treated like this!” both implicitly appeals to such an identity, and implies that ill treatment is appropriate for animals. Moral dualism helps to construct concern for non-human nature in this conflictual way, as a deficit of attention or concern for some less privileged human group, although the remorseless conflict scenario this assumes can usually be reconceived in complementary rather than competitive ways. As in the case of conflicts within the sphere of human justice, we have, I believe, an overriding, higher-order obligation to try to circumvent and reduce or eliminate such justice conflicts where possible, and to avoid multiplying and reinforcing them. This translates into an obligation to favor, where they are available, complementary over competitive constructions of justice spheres, other things being equal. We need then to attend to the ways in which both human and non-human spheres of justice, although not free of some limited and sometimes manufactured conflicts of this kind, can be constructed not as competitive but as complementary approaches that need and strengthen each other. Thus we should note that moral dualism is also a moral boomerang that too often returns to strike down humanity itself when allegedly “lower” orders of humans are assimilated to nature and to animals, as they have been systematically throughout Western history. Conversely, many forms of ethical practice and sensitivity to others are not only not especially sensitive to whether these others are human or non-human, but can actually be strengthened and deepened generally when we refuse the arbitrary exclusion of non-human others and the self-impoverishment and blunting of sensibilities exclusion involves. One reason for rejecting moral dualism is that its stance of closure unnecessarily blunts our sensitivity to the excluded class and those assimilated to them, and this can involve prudential hazards as well as injustices. It is in our interests as well as the interests of the other to adopt a less impoverished ethical stance and view of the other. Thus, by refusing recognition to nature we lose not only an ethically but **also a** prudentially crucial set of connections **that link human and non-human movements for liberation and justice.** By blunting our sensitivity to nature and animals we lose a prudentially important set of insights that can help us to reflect on our limitations as human actors and observers and correct crucial blind spots in our relationships with the more-than-human world. Further, the attempt to articulate various forms of recognition for nature, and to counter anthropocentrism, **is important for practical activism in a number of ways**, and also affects the way political alliances between groups can be formed. Such a recognition **is crucial for the birth of the new communicative and care paradigm for the human–nature relationship** that must now, in an age of ecological limits, take the place of the mechanistic paradigm associated with the past centuries of human expansion and conquest.

#### This is the root cause of every human injustice. Until we confront this dualistic relationship with nature, human injustice will never cease. Separating the non-human from human is the rhetorical strategy that justifies racism. Rossini 6 – Manuela, Postdoctoral Fellow at Amsterdam School for Cultural Analysis [“To the Dogs: Companion speciesism and the new feminist materialism,” Kritikos, Volume 3, September 2006, ISSN 1552-5112,<http://intertheory.org/Rossini>]

What is equally sobering, however, is the fact that the most radical metaposthumanists (and the humanities more broadly) do not quite manage to make an epistemological break with liberal humanism, insofar as their writing is also marked by an unquestioned “speciesism”; i.e., in the definition of ethicist Peter Singer who popularised the term three decades ago in his book Animal Liberation, “a prejudice or attitude of bias in favour of the interests of members of one’s own species and against those of members of other species.”[17] Both postcolonial, feminist and queer theories and discussion of subjectivity, identity, and difference as well as the claims on the right to freedom by new social movements have recourse to an Enlightenment concept of the subject whose conditio sine qua non is the absolute control of that subject over the life of nonhuman others/objects**. The rhetorical strategy of radically separating** non-white, non-male and non-heterosexual human beings from animals in order to have the subject status of these members of the human species recognised was and is successful and also legitimate – given that the racist, sexist and homophobic discourse of animality or an animalistic „nature“ has hitherto served to exclude most individuals of those groups of people from many privileges – but the speciesist logic of the dominance of human animals over nonhuman animals has remained in place. If we fight racism and (hetero)sexism because we declare discrimination on the basis of specific and identifiable characteristics – such as “black“, “woman” or “lesbian“ to be wrong and unjust, then we should also vehemently oppose the exploitation, imprisoning, killing and eating of nonhuman animals on the basis of their species identity. Moreover, if our research and teaching as cultural critics endeavours to do justice to the diversity of human experience and life styles and feel responsible towards marginalised others, should we then not seriously think about Cary Wolfe’s question „how must our work itself change when the other to which it tries to do justice is no longer human?“[18] Wolfe is not making a claim for animal rights here – at least not primarily. This is also why his book puns on “rites/rights“: Animal Rites is the intervention of the anti-speciesist cultural critic who scrutinizes the rituals that human beings form around the figures of animals, including the literary and cinematic enactments of cannibalism, monstrosity and normativity. Wolfe subsumes all of these stagings under the heading the discourse of species, with “discourse“ understood in the sense of Michel Foucault as not only a rhetoric but above all as the condition for the production and ordering of meaning and knowledge in institutions like medicine, the law, the church, the family or universities. In addition, Wolfe wants to sharpen our awareness that a speciesist metaphysics has also a deadly impact on human animals, especially because speciesism is grounded in the juridical state apparatus: “the full transcendence of the ‘human‘ requires the sacrifice of the ‘animal‘ and the animalistic, which in turn makes possible a symbolic economy in which we engage in what Derrida [calls] a ‚non-criminal putting to death‘ of other humans **as well by marking them as animal**.“[19]

#### This independently divorces our relationship with the natural world and makes ecocide inevitable

Gottlieb 94 (Roger S. Gottlieb – Professor of Humanities at Worcester Polytechnic Institute, holds a Ph.D. in Philosophy from Brandeis University, “Ethics and Trauma: Levinas, Feminism, and Deep Ecology,” Crosscurrents: A Journal of Religion and Intellectual Life, 1994, Summer, http://www.crosscurrents.org/feministecology.htm)

Here I will at least begin in agreement with Levinas. As he rejects an ethics proceeding on the basis of self-interest, so I believe the anthropocentric perspectives of conservation or liberal environmentalism cannot take us far enough. Our relations with nonhuman nature are poisoned and not just because we have set up feedback loops that already lead to mass starvations, skyrocketing environmental disease rates, and devastation of natural resources. The problem with ecocide is not just that it hurts human beings. Our uncaring violence also violates the very ground of our being, our natural body, our home. Such violence is done not simply to the other – as if the rainforest, the river, the atmosphere, the species made extinct are totally different from ourselves. Rather, we have crucified ourselves**-in-relation-to-the-other, fracturing a mode of being** in which self and other can no more be conceived as fully in isolation from each other than can a mother and a nursing child. We are that child, and nonhuman nature is that mother. If this image seems too maudlin, let us remember that other lactating women can feed an infant, but we have only one earth mother. What moral stance will be shaped by our personal sense that we are poisoning ourselves, our environment, and so many kindred spirits of the air, water, and forests? To begin, we may see this tragic situation as setting the limits to Levinas's perspective. The other which is nonhuman nature is not simply known by a "trace," nor is it something of which all knowledge is necessarily instrumental. This other is inside us as well as outside us. We prove it with every breath we take, every bit of food we eat, every glass of water we drink. We do not have to find shadowy traces on or in the faces of trees or lakes, topsoil or air: we are made from them. Levinas denies this sense of connection with nature. Our "natural" side represents for him a threat of simple consumption or use of the other, a spontaneous response which must be obliterated by the power of ethics in general (and, for him in particular, Jewish religious law(23) ). A "natural" response lacks discipline; without the capacity to heed the call of the other, unable to sublate the self's egoism. Worship of nature would ultimately result in an "everything-is-permitted" mentality, a close relative of Nazism itself. For Levinas, to think of people as "natural" beings is to assimilate them to a totality, a category or species which makes no room for the kind of individuality required by ethics.(24) He refers to the "elemental" or the "there is" as unmanaged, unaltered, "natural" conditions or forces that are essentially alien to the categories and conditions of moral life.(25) One can only lament that Levinas has read nature -- as to some extent (despite his intentions) he has read selfhood -- through the lens of masculine culture. It is precisely our sense of belonging to nature as system, as interaction, as interdependence, which can provide the basis for an ethics appropriate to the trauma of ecocide. As cultural feminism sought to expand our sense of personal identity to a sense of inter-identification with the human other, so this ecological ethics would expand our personal and species sense of identity into an inter-identification with the natural world. Such a realization can lead us to an ethics appropriate to our time, a dimension of which has come to be known as "deep ecology."(26) For this ethics, we do not begin from the uniqueness of our human selfhood, existing against a taken-for-granted background of earth and sky. Nor is our body somehow irrelevant to ethical relations, with knowledge of it reduced always to tactics of domination. Our knowledge does not assimilate the other to the same, but reveals and furthers the continuing dance of interdependence. And our ethical motivation is neither rationalist system nor individualistic self-interest, but a sense of connection to all of life. The deep ecology sense of self-realization goes beyond the modern Western sense of "self" as an isolated ego striving for hedonistic gratification. . . . . Self, in this sense, is experienced as integrated with the whole of nature.(27) Having gained distance and sophistication of perception [from the development of science and political freedoms] we can turn and recognize who we have been all along. . . . we are our world knowing itself. We can relinquish our separateness. We can come home again -- and participate in our world in a richer, more responsible and poignantly beautiful way.(28) Ecological ways of knowing nature are necessarily participatory. [This] knowledge is ecological and plural, reflecting both the diversity of natural ecosystems and the diversity in cultures that nature-based living gives rise to. The recovery of the feminine principle is based on inclusiveness. It is a recovery in nature, woman and man of creative forms of being and perceiving. In nature it implies seeing nature as a live organism. In woman it implies seeing women as productive and active. Finally, in men the recovery of the feminine principle implies a relocation of action and activity to create life-enhancing, not life-reducing and life-threatening societies.(29) In this context, the knowing ego is not set against a world it seeks to control, but one of which it is a part. To continue the feminist perspective, the mother knows or seeks to know the child's needs. Does it make sense to think of her answering the call of the child in abstraction from such knowledge? Is such knowledge necessarily domination? Or is it essential to a project of care, respect and love, precisely because the knower has an intimate, emotional connection with the known?(30) Our ecological vision locates us in such close relation with our natural home that knowledge of it is knowledge of ourselves. And this is not, contrary to Levinas's fear, reducing the other to the same, but a celebration of a larger, more inclusive, and still complex and articulated self.(31) The noble and terrible burden of Levinas's individuated responsibility for sheer existence gives way to a different dream, a different prayer: Being rock, being gas, being mist, being Mind, Being the mesons traveling among the galaxies with the speed of light, You have come here, my beloved one. . . . You have manifested yourself as trees, as grass, as butterflies, as single-celled beings, and as chrysanthemums; but the eyes with which you looked at me this morning tell me you have never died.(32) In this prayer, we are, quite simply, all in it together. And, although this new ecological Holocaust -- this creation of planet Auschwitz – is under way, it is not yet final. We have time to step back from the brink, to repair our world. But **only if we see that world not as an other** across an irreducible gap of loneliness and unchosen obligation, but as a part of ourselves as we are part of it, to be redeemed not out of duty, but out of love**; neither for our selves nor for the other, but for us all**.

#### This is the most important discussion to have this round – it can allow us to identify what it means to be human, breaking down notions of human exceptionalism McKnight 6 (Peter – Vancouver Sun, “A subject that teaches us a lot about ourselves: Speciesism,” Vancouver Sun, March 15, 2006, lexis)

Despite the skepticism, though, a discussion of speciesism is among the most important discussions that could take place in school. And **this is not primarily** because it might lead future generations to treat animals better than we do, although that would be an unqualified good. No, the reason schools, and society in general, ought to grapple with the concept of speciesism, rather than dismissing it out of hand, is because it **tells us a lot more about ourselves** than about non-human animals. Indeed, a discussion of speciesism is ultimately a discussion about what it means to be human. Humans have always thought of ourselves as exceptional, but in recent centuries **we've been knocked from our pedestal**. In the early 16th century, Polish astronomer Nicolas Copernicus made short work of our belief that the physical universe revolved us, but we nevertheless continued to believe that we're at the centre of the moral universe. In more religious times, this was easy enough to accept, since all and only human beings possessed an immortal soul, thereby establishing a qualitative difference between humans and non-human animals. Even philosophers who didn't rely on explicitly theological premises were able to separate man from other animals because man is the "rational animal." So Immanuel Kant, in explaining his famous "categorical imperative," argued that thanks to self-consciousness, we must treat humans as ends in themselves. Animals, on the other hand, lack self-consciousness and so can be treated as means to an end. But as science, and particularly biology progressed, it became **more and more difficult to hold to the notion of human exceptionalism**. Other animals were discovered capable of engaging in what were previously thought to be uniquely human, rational behaviours, such as tool-using and even rudimentary language. The difference between humans and other animals therefore seemed quantitative rather than qualitative, a difference in degree rather than a difference in kind. Indeed, the theory of evolution told us that all living things share a common ancestor, and that humans are apes -- great apes to be sure, but apes nonetheless. And more recent evidence further shatters our notion of human exceptionalism, as it confirms that we share more than 98 per cent of our DNA with chimpanzees. Against this backdrop it's unsurprising that the spectre of speciesism **has gained currency in our culture.** Coined by British psychologist and former animal researcher Richard Ryder in 1970, speciesism received its most extensive formulation in Australian philosopher Peter Singer's seminal work, Animal Liberation, in 1975.

### Fracking

#### Contention \_\_: Fracking

#### The shale gas revolution is a result of the lack of access to conventional gas reserves – it is being used to meet growing natural gas demand

Berman 12 (Art, Former Editor – Oil and Gas Journal, Geological Consultant – American Association of Petroleum Geologists, “After the Gold Rush: A Perspective on Future U.S. Natural Gas Supply and Price,” Oil Drum, 2-8, http://www.theoildrum.com/node/8914)

All of these major gas-producing areas except Louisiana are in decline. This is largely because non-shale production is declining rapidly since little new drilling in these reservoirs in recent years has occurred. While shale production volumes and initial rates are impressive (Exhibit 18), much of this new production is merely substituting for depleting conventional gas reserves. With the shift to more oil-prone or "liquids-rich" shale plays, many observers have suggested that associated gas production from these plays is or will be a major contributor to the present over-supply of gas. Approximately 3% of total U.S. gas supply is from shale associated gas so, while this is a factor, it is not the cause of over-supply. Details of this analysis may be found in an earlier post. Overall, U.S. natural gas production using state-level data appears to have reached an undulating plateau (Exhibit 19). Conclusions A secular shift has occurred in the U.S. domestic gas supply by drilling mostly shale formations, formerly considered source rocks too costly to develop. The tremendous number of wells drilled in the last several years has contributed to an over-supply of gas. The shale revolution did not begin because producing oil and gas from shale was a good idea but because more attractive opportunities were largely exhausted. Initial production rates from shale are high but expensive drilling and completion costs make economics challenging. The gold rush mentality taken by companies to enter shale plays has added expensive leases and new pipelines to those costs, further complicating shale gas economics. In the decades before shale plays, the exploration and production emphasis was on discipline. Science was used to identify the most prospective areas in order to limit the amount of acreage to be acquired and its cost. Shale plays have produced a land grab business model in which hundreds of thousands of acres are acquired by each company. Unprecedented lease costs have become the norm often based on limited information and science. Operators have indulged in over-drilling these plays for many reasons but adding reserves, holding leases and company growth are among the main factors particularly with the low cost of capital. The inevitable result has been the collapse of prices as supply exceeded demand. Most analysts forecast that the future will be much like the present, and that natural gas will be abundant and cheap for decades to come. There are, however, strong and consistent indicators that natural gas supply may be less certain than most observers believe and require a higher price to be developed economically. Natural gas demand is growing as fuel switching for electric power generation continues, and will be increased by environmental regulation in the coming years. The U.S. will shift more of its future energy needs to natural gas in many sectors of the economy. The best justification, in fact, for the land grab and over-drilling spree is expectation of higher prices. Those companies that grabbed the land and held it by production will profit greatly once the true supply and cost of shale gas is recognized.

#### The OCS contains massive amounts of conventional gas – the plan makes it available to the market

Robertson 12 (Jessica – USGS, “World’s Oil and Gas Endowment “, 4/18, http://www.usgs.gov/blogs/features/usgs\_top\_story/worlds-oil-and-gas-endowment/)

The U.S. Geological Survey released in April a new global estimate for conventional oil and gas resources. The USGS estimates that the undiscovered, conventional resources in the world total 565 billion barrels of oil (bbo), 5,606 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of natural gas, and 167 billion barrels of natural gas liquids. All of these numbers represent technically recoverable resources, which are those quantities of oil and gas producible using currently available technology and industry practices, regardless of economic or accessibility considerations. “In the twelve years since the last assessment, the steady progress in technology now allows additional resources to be regarded as technically recoverable,” said USGS Director Marcia McNutt. “By placing this information in the public domain, government leaders**, investors**, public and private corporations, and citizens **have a common information base for planning and decision**s that affect the global environment and market place.” Vertical limestone beds forming cliffs along Three Pagodas-Fault Zone near Hua Hin, Thailand. This area was included in the USGS report, “An Estimate of Undiscovered Conventional Oil and Gas Resources of the World, 2012.” This new assessment is complete reassessment of the world since the last World Petroleum Assessment in 2000 by the USGS. The report includes mean estimates of resources in 171 geologic provinces of the world. These estimates include resources beneath both onshore and offshore areas. Resources in the United States This assessment does not include undiscovered, **conventional resources in the U**nited **S**tates, which the USGS currently estimates holds 27 bbo and 388 tcf of natural gas onshore and in State waters. Additionally, there are an estimated 81 bbo and 398 tcf of natural gas in the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf (OCS), according to the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management.

#### Global natural gas extraction is inevitable – the US needs to take the lead to ensure the best practices are used so other countries follow

Schneider 12 (Michael, Advocacy Director – Clean Air Task Force, “Curb Methane Emissions,” National Journal, 7-25, http://energy.nationaljournal.com/2012/07/is-arctic-oil-drilling-ready-f.php?comments=expandall#comments)

For several weeks now the public and the media have cast increasing attention on Arctic oil and gas drilling, specifically regarding the plans of Shell to explore in the Arctic waters off the coast of Alaska. This is, pardon the pun, only the tip of the iceberg when it comes to Arctic oil and gas development. Around the Arctic, efforts are ramping up in Russia, Norway, Greenland and Canada to stake a claim to one of the last great reserves of undiscovered oil and gas. According to the United States Geological Survey, the Arctic holds one-fifth of the world’s undiscovered, recoverable oil and natural gas; 90 billion barrels of oil and 1,669 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. With Shell’s imminent entrance into Arctic waters, **the debate is turning from “if we drill in the Arctic,” to “how and where we drill in the Arctic**.” The discussion to date has primarily revolved around the key questions of oil spills and impacts to marine ecosystems. However, it is also critically important to remember that this debate starts and ends with climate change. The melting of the Arctic due to global warming is what set off the race for Arctic oil and gas. Now, it is incumbent upon the countries and the companies that intend to develop the Arctic to make sure that it is done in the least damaging way possible, and this includes paying very close attention to the global warming pollutants coming from the production: methane, black carbon and carbon dioxide. Pointing the way forward in a new report: (www.catf.us/resources/publications/view/170), Clean Air Task Force has laid out the primary climate risks and mitigation strategies of drilling in the Arctic. Here is a summary of some of the key findings of that report: While oil production is the primary focus of current exploration and production activities due to high oil prices, natural gas is almost always produced along with oil, posing the problem of what to do with it. Crude oil usually contains some amount of “associated” natural gas that is dissolved in the oil or exists as a cap of free gas above the oil in the geological formation. In some cases, this represents a large volume of gas. For example, nearly 3 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) per year of gas is produced in association with oil in Alaska. The largest (but by no means only) potential source of methane pollution is from the leaks or outright venting of this “associated” natural gas. Flaring, the typical way to dispose of this “stranded” gas, is much better than venting, but it releases a tremendous amount of CO2. Worldwide, about 5 trillion cubic feet of gas is flared each year. That’s about 25 percent of the US’s annual natural gas consumption. This leads to the release of about 400 million tons of CO2 per year globally, the equivalent to the annual emissions from over 70 million cars. Black carbon is also emitted from flares, although measurements are lacking to fully understand the potential burden from flaring. What we do know is that the black carbon that flaring will release in the Arctic is particularly harmful, since it is so likely to settle out on snow or ice, where the dark pollutant rapidly warms the white frozen surface. Many technologies and best practices exist to reduce the impact of oil and gas production both to the Arctic and the global climate. If we are going to extract the oil from the Arctic, we need to do it in a way that does not exacerbate the very real problem that climate change is already posing there. In order to do so, the US must take the lead in ensuring that only the best practices are acceptable when it comes to Arctic exploration and drilling. The technologies and practices below can dramatically reduce the emissions associated with oil and natural gas, in some cases by almost 100%.

#### Switching away from shale gas is good – it contaminates and over consumes water

Hughes 11 (J. David, Fellow in Fossil Fuels – Post Carbon Institute, Geoscientist – Geological Survey of Canada, and Team Leader – Canadian Gas Potential Committee, “Will Natural Gas Fuel America in the 21st Century?” Post Carbon Institute, May, http://www.postcarbon.org/reports/PCI-report-nat-gas-future-plain.pdf)

ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES

Hundreds of articles have been published over the past couple of years on the environmental impacts of shale gas production.

In 2010, the documentary movie Gasland46 brought many of the issues involved with hydraulic fracturing and shale gas production to the forefront. The gas lobby launched a major offensive against Gasland47 and started a website dedicated to countering articles providing information contrary to its interests.48 What is clear is that the production of shale gas involves extraordinary environmental impacts compared with conventional gas drilling. These include:

- Contamination of groundwater directly through hydraulic fracturing and as a result of compromised cementing jobs in near-surface casing.49 This is a critical and controversial issue, and has resulted in the initiation of a major U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) study with preliminary results to be released in 2012 and a final report in 2014.50 New York State has recently imposed a temporary moratorium on new drilling permits involving hydraulic fracturing.51

- Contamination of surface water, and potentially drinking water, through improper disposal of toxic produced drilling fluids containing salts, radioactive elements, and other toxins. Toxic produced drilling fluids, which amount to 15% to 80% of the 2 million to 8 million gallons of water injected during hydraulic fracturing for each well,52 are disposed of through either reinjection, surface disposal and treatment at wastewater treatment facilities, or, less commonly, recycling. Recycling involves distilling purified water from the drilling waste, which still leaves a residue of toxins53 and is very energy intensive. The surface disposal of toxic drilling fluids and the fluids’ potential to contaminate drinking water with radionuclides and other contaminants has recently been documented by the New York Times.54 Indeed, efforts by shale gas producers to remain exempt from the Safe Drinking Water Act are surely counterproductive and counterintuitive if the production of shale gas is really as benign as the industry contends.55

- Very high water consumption, between 2 million and 8 million gallons per well, which is potentially problematic, particularly in arid areas. Container Trucks with Hydraulic Fracturing Liquids at a Drilling Site, Dimock, Pennsylvania.56

- The surface impacts of road and drill pad construction and the requirement for hundreds of truck trips for each well to move the drilling rig, storage tanks, water, proppant, chemicals, compressors, and other equipment.

- Higher full-cycle greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Full-cycle GHG emissions from shale gas are far larger than the burner-tip emissions of the gas itself. This potentially defuses a major argument of the natural gas lobby that natural gas is a significantly lower source of GHG emissions than coal or oil. A comparison of the life-cycle analyses of GHG emissions from shale gas and coal is given in the following section.

- Induced earthquakes through fluid injection both during the hydraulic fracturing process and during the disposal of waste fluid through injection wells. To date, seismic activity related to the injection of waste flowback fluids from hydraulic fracturing seems to be the largest source of induced seismic activity.57

#### That kills millions and is the worst form of destruction

Bera 10 (Ronald – AP, “UN: Polluted Water Killing, Sickening Millions”, 3/22, http://www.usnews.com/science/articles/2010/03/22/un-polluted-water-killing-sickening-millions)

NAIROBI, Kenya—**More people die from polluted water every year** than from all forms of violence, including war, the U.N. said in a report Monday that highlights the need for clean drinking water. The report, launched Monday to coincide with World Water Day, said an estimated **2 billion tons of waste water** — including fertilizer run-off, sewage and industrial waste — is being discharged daily. That waste fuels the spread of disease and damages ecosystems. "Sick Water" — the report from the U.N. Environment Program — said that 3.7 percent of all deaths are attributed to water-related diseases, translating into millions of deaths. More than half of the world's hospital beds are filled by people suffering from water-related illnesses, it said. "If we are not able to manage our waste, then that means more people dying from waterborne diseases," said Achim Steiner, the U.N. Undersecretary General and executive director of UNEP. The report says that it takes 3 liters of water to produce one liter of bottled water, and that bottled water in the U.S. requires the consumption of some 17 million barrels of oil yearly. Improved wastewater management in Europe has resulted in significant environmental improvements there, the UNEP said, but that dead zones in oceans are still spreading worldwide. Dead zones are oxygen-deprived areas caused by pollution. "If the world is to thrive, let alone to survive on a planet of 6 billion people heading to over 9 billion by 2050, we need to get collectively smarter and more intelligent about how we manage waste, including wastewaters," Steiner said.

#### **Independently, fracking protects white, wealthy elites – the plan creates discussion to break down the racialized fracking of America.**

Starkey 9-18 (James, Professor Emeritus of Economics – University of Rhode Island, “The Fracking of America,” Vermont Commons, http://www.vtcommons.org/blog/fracking-america)

Fracking is a process that injects a toxic brew of silica and chemicals into shale formations under great pressure in order to produce fissures through which oil and natural gas are released. Unfortunately this single-minded pursuit of oil and gas profits produces many serious environmental problems. The industry chooses to cover-up these problems using misleading public relations based on rigged studies done by the “Frackademia.” In this essay, I argue that America is being politically “fracked” by the Republican Party with the intent of restoring yet another aristocrat to the Presidency. The not so hidden agenda is the protection of the privileges and the wealth elites have garnered since the Administration of Ronald Reagan and to destroy the New Deal programs that constitute the safety net. They are doing this at a time when the safety net has become more necessary than ever. The tactic is a ruthless, scorched-earth policy of obstruction, with racial divisiveness as the fracking agent that is “spun” as an honorable campaign to protect America from the “devil” - its immigrant, socialist, Muslim black President. The United States is coming apart at the seams. The obstreperous and nihilistic behavior of the new radical-controlled Republican Party has managed to paralyze the nation’s political system at a time when collective action on many fronts is vitally necessary. Thomas Friedman wrote recently, there is now “a different kind of American political scene that makes me wonder whether we can seriously discuss serious issues any longer and make decisions on the basis of the national interest. Our leaders, even the President, can no longer utter the word ‘we’ with a straight face. There is no more ‘we’ in American politics.” Two highly respected experts on the Congress recently lamented that “we have been studying Washington politics and Congress for more than 40 years, and never have we seen them this dysfunctional,” moreover “we have no choice but to acknowledge that the core of the problem lies with the Republican Party.” The Color Line A century ago, the great W.E.B. DuBois declared that the “the problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color line.” DuBois was of African and mixed European ancestry (except not a single drop of Anglo-Saxon) so, as a consequence of the color line, he felt within him two souls, two “warring ideals” as he put it. Now, as then, our society has two ideals regarding race. One of these ideals was forged in the apologetics of an immoral, decadent, 19th century slave-owning society on the wrong side of history. The other was conceived in a dream of “a nation where a person is judged not by the color of their skin, but by the content of their character.” True to this ideal, this nation actually elected a bi-racial man as its president, and erected a monument on the National Mall honoring the African-American man who had that dream suggesting, hopefully, that perhaps the dream had actually been realized. Sadly, the malicious politics of America’s class war have killed the dream Dr. King dreamed.

### Solvency

#### Contention 4 is Solvency –

#### Lifting access restrictions on federal lands provides 60 years of natural gas – clear, federal authority provides certainty that’s key to private sector. And – new drilling tech solves your environment turns.

Griles 3 (Lisa, Deputy Secretary – Department of the Interior, “Energy Production on Federal Lands,” Hearing before the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, United States Senate, 4-30)

Mr. GRILES. America’s public lands have an abundant opportunity for exploration and development of renewable and nonrenewable energy resources. Energy reserves contained on the Department of the Interior’s onshore and offshore Federal lands are very important to meeting our current and future estimates of what it is going to take to continue to supply America’s energy demand. Estimates suggest that these lands contain approximately 68 percent of the undiscovered U.S. oil resources and 74 percent of the undiscovered natural gas resources. President Bush has developed a national energy policy that laid out a comprehensive, long-term energy strategy for America’s future. That strategy recognizes we need to raise domestic production of energy, both renewable and nonrenewable, to meet our dependence for energy. For oil and gas, the United States uses about 7 billion barrels a year, of which about 4 billion are currently imported and 3 billion are domestically produced. The President proposed to open a small portion of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge to environmentally responsible oil and gas exploration. Now there is a new and environmentally friendly technology, similar to directional drilling, with mobile platforms, self-containing drilling units. These things will allow producers to access large energy reserves with almost no footprint on the tundra. Each day, even since I have assumed this job, our ability to minimize our effect on the environment continues to improve to where it is almost nonexistent in such areas as even in Alaska. According to the latest oil and gas assessment, ANWR is the largest untapped source of domestic production available to us. The production for ANWR would equal about 60 years of imports from Iraq. The National Energy Policy also encourages development of cleaner, more diverse portfolios of domestic renewable energy sources. The renewable policy in areas cover geothermal, wind, solar, and biomass. And it urges research on hydrogen as an alternate energy source. To advance the National Energy Policy, the Bureau of Land Management and the DOE’s National Renewable Energy Lab last week announced the release of a renewable energy report. It identifies and evaluates renewable energy resources on public lands. Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit this for the record.\* This report, which has just come out, assess the potential for renewable energy on public lands. It is a very good report that we hope will allow for the private sector, after working with the various other agencies, to where can we best use renewable resource, and how do we take this assessment and put it into the land use planning that we are currently going, so that right-of-ways and understanding of what renewable resources can be done in the West can, in fact, have a better opportunity. The Department completed the first of an energy inventory this year. Now the EPCA report, which is laying here, also, Mr. Chairman, is an estimate of the undiscovered, technically recoverable oil and gas. Part one of that report covers five oil and gas basins. The second part of the report will be out later this year. Now this report, it is not—there are people who have different opinions of it. But the fact is we believe it will be a good guidance tool, as we look at where the oil and gas potential is and where we need to do land use planning. And as we update these land use plannings and do our EISs, that will help guide further the private sector, the public sector, and all stakeholders on how we can better do land use planning and develop oil and gas in a sound fashion. Also, I have laying here in front of me the two EISs that have been done on the two major coal methane basins in the United States, San Juan Basis and the Powder River Basin. Completing these reports, which are in draft, will increase and offer the opportunity for production of natural gas with coal bed methane. Now these reports are in draft and, once completed, will authorize and allow for additional exploration and development. It has taken 2 years to get these in place. It has taken 2 years to get some of these in place. This planning process that Congress has initiated under FLPMA and other statutes allows for a deliberative, conscious understanding of what the impacts are. We believe that when these are finalized, that is in fact what will occur. One of the areas which we believe that the Department of the Interior and the Bureau of Land Management is and is going to engage in is coordination with landowners. Mr. Chairman, the private sector in the oil and gas industry must be good neighbors with the ranchers in the West. The BLM is going to be addressing the issues of bonding requirements that will assure that landowners have their surface rights and their values protected. BLM is working to make the consultation process with the landowners, with the States and local governments and other Federal agencies more efficient and meaningful. But we must assure that the surface owners are protected and the values of their ranches are in fact assured. And by being good neighbors, we can do that. In the BLM land use planning process, we have priorities, ten current resource management planning areas that contain the major oil and gas reserves that are reported out in the EPCA study. Once this process is completed, then we can move forward with consideration of development of the natural gas. We are also working with the Western Governors’ Association and the Western Utilities Group. The purpose is to identify and designate right-of-way corridors on public lands. We would like to do it now as to where right-of-way corridors make sense and put those in our land use planning processes, so that when the need is truly identified, utilities, energy companies, and the public will know where they are Instead of taking two years to amend a land use plan, hopefully this will expedite and have future opportunity so that when the need is there, we can go ahead and make that investment through the private sector. It should speed up the process of right-of-way permits for both pipelines and electric transmission. Now let me switch to the offshore, the Outer Continental Shelf. It is a huge contributor to our Nation’s energy and economic security. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, everything you have talked about so far is onshore. Mr. GRILES. That is correct. The CHAIRMAN. You now will speak to offshore. Mr. GRILES. Yes, sir, I will. Now we are keeping on schedule the holding lease sales in the areas that are available for leasing. In the past year, scheduled sales in several areas were either delayed, canceled, or **put under moratoria**, even though they were in the 5-year plan. It undermined certainty. It made investing, particularly in the Gulf, more risky. We have approved a 5-year oil and gas leasing program in July 2002 that calls for 20 new lease sales in the Gulf of Mexico and several other areas of the offshore, specifically in Alaska by 2007. Now our estimates indicate that these areas contain resources up to 22 billion barrels of oil and 61 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. We are also acting to raise energy production from these offshore areas by providing royalty relief on the OCS leases for new deep wells that are drilled in shallow water. These are at depths that heretofore were very and are very costly to produce from and costly to drill to. We need to encourage that exploration. These deep wells, which are greater than 15,000 feet in depth, are expected to access between 5 to 20 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and can be developed quickly due to existing infrastructure and the shallow water. We have also issued a final rule in July 2002 that allows companies to apply for a lease extension, giving them more time to analyze complex geological data that underlies salt domes. That is, where geologically salt overlays the geologically clay. And you try to do seismic, and the seismic just gets distorted. So we have extended the lease terms, so that hopefully those companies can figure out where and where to best drill. Vast resources of oil and natural gas lie, we hope, beneath these sheets of salt in the OCS in the Gulf of Mexico. But it is very difficult to get clear seismic images. We are also working to create a process of reviewing and permitting alternative energy sources on the OCS lands. We have sent legislation to Congress that would give the Minerals Management Service of the Department of the Interior clear authority to lease parts of the OCS for renewable energy. The renewables could be wind, wave, or solar energy, and related projects that are auxiliary to oil and gas development, such as offshore staging facilities and emergency medical facilities. We need this authority in order to be able to **truly give the private sector what are the rules to play from and buy**, so they can have certainty about where to go.

## 2AC vs. Emporia

### Counter-Methodology – 2AC

#### The alt creates a political void filled by elites – locking in oppression

Cook 92 (Anthony, Associate Professor – Georgetown Law, New England Law Review, Spring, 26 New Eng.L. Rev. 751, Lexis)

The effect of deconstructing the power of the author to impose a fixed meaning on the text or offer a continuous narrative is both debilitating and liberating. It is debilitating in that any attempt to say what should be done within even our insular Foucaultian preoccupations may be oppositionalized and deconstructed as an illegitimate privileging of one term, value, perspective or narrative over another. The struggle over meaning might continue ad infinitum. That is, if a deconstructionist is theoretically consistent and sees deconstruction not as a political tool but as a philosophical orientation, political action is impossible, because such action requires a degree of closure that deconstruction, as a theoretical matter, does not permit. Moreover, the approach is debilitating because deconstruction without material rootedness, without goals and vision, **creates a political** and spiritual **void** into which the socially real power we theoretically deconstruct steps and **steps on** the disempowered and dispossessed.  [\*762]  To those dying from AIDS, stifled by poverty, dehumanized by sexism and racism, crippled by drugs and brutalized by the many forms of physical, political and economic violence that characterizes our narcissistic culture, power hardly seems a matter of illegitimate theoretical privileging. When vision, social theory and political struggle do not accompany critique, the **void will be filled** by the rich, the powerful and the charismatic, those who influence us through their eloquence, prestige, wealth and power.

#### Only combining the two can solve – the alt alone fails

Bell and Russell 00 (Anne C. and Constane L., “Beyond Human, Beyond Words: Anthropocentrism, Critical Pedagogy, and the Poststructuralist Turn”, 2000, CANADIAN JOURNAL OF EDUCATION, http://www.csse-scee.ca/CJE/Articles/FullText/CJE25-3/CJE25-3-bell.pdf)

For this reason, the various movements against oppression need to be aware of and supportive of each other. In critical pedagogy, however, the exploration of questions of race, gender, class, and sexuality has proceeded so far with little acknowledgement of the systemic links between human oppressions and the domination of nature. The more-than-human world and human relationships to it have been ignored, as if the suffering and exploitation of other beings and the global ecological crisis were somehow irrelevant. Despite the call for attention to voices historically absent from traditional canons and narratives (Sadovnik, 1995, p. 316), nonhuman beings are shrouded in silence. This silence characterizes even the work of writers who call for a rethinking of all culturally positioned essentialisms. Like other educators influenced by poststructuralism, we agree that there is a need to scrutinize the language we use, the meanings we deploy, and the epistemological frameworks of past eras (Luke & Luke, 1995, p. 378). To treat social categories as stable and unchanging is to reproduce the prevailing relations of power (Britzman et al., 1991, p. 89). What would it mean, then, for critical pedagogy to extend this investigation and critique to include taken-for-granted understandings of “human,” “animal,” and “nature”? This question is difficult to raise precisely because these understandings are taken for granted. The anthropocentric bias in critical pedagogy manifests itself in silence and in the asides of texts. Since it is not a topic of discussion, it can be difficult to situate a critique of it. Following feminist analyses, we find that examples of anthropocentrism, like examples of gender symbolization, occur “in those places where speakers reveal the assumptions they think they do not need to defend, beliefs they expect to share with their audiences” (Harding, 1986, p. 112).

#### Only the perm solves – theory must be combined with pratical political action. Failure to engage undermines social progress and allows conservatives to win out.

**Wing 2003** (Adrien Katherine Wing, Bessie Dutton Murray Distinguished Professor of Law at the University of Iowa College of Law, Louisiana Law Review, Spring, 2003, 63 La. L. Rev. 717)

Another tenet that Critical Race Theorists espouse involves the necessity to engage in praxis, the combining of the-ory and practice. n153 According to Eric Yamamoto, "critical race praxis focuses on developing and then translating critical theoretical insights about race, culture, and law into operational ideas and language for antisubordination prac-tice and, in turn, rethinking theory in light of new practice experience." n154 Sumi Cho and Robert Westley have [\*736] called for synergism, an "interaction of agents or conditions that produces a combined effect that is greater than the sum of the individual effects. We envision a mode of synergistic movement theorizing that contains both sub-stantive and methodological commitments . . . Such a project is necessarily collaborative, requiring information and insights gleaned from movements in order to formulate discursive strategies that must ultimately be tested in the context of actual struggle." n155 My own explanation for the need for praxis is based upon the historical realities of many minorities. "Since many of us come from disenfranchised communities of color, we feel compelled to 'look to the bottom,' n156 to involve our-selves in the development of solutions to our people's problems. We can not afford to adopt the classic, detached, ivory tower model of scholarship when so many are suffering, sometimes in our own extended families. We do not believe in praxis instead of theory, but that both are essential to our people's literal and figurative future." n157 Praxis can take many forms ranging from counseling a client, filing a brief, making a speech, doing op-ed pieces, writing popular press books, appearing on talk shows, serving on boards, testifying before Congress, support-ing/attacking federal judicial nominees, or working officially or pro bono with various public interest, governmental, or international organizations. Some CRT adherents do engage in praxis. For example, RobertWilliams represents Indian tribes around the world. n158 Gerald Lopez calls for community centered rebellious lawyering, n159 and Luke Cole places legal tactics within a broader political strategy. n160 Acknowledging the difficulties academics naturally face into linking theory with prac-tice, John Calmore states that CRT's primary impact on practice is seed planting among students. n161 Yamamoto has developed four guideposts for critical race praxis inquiry: conceptual, performative, material, and reflexive. n162 After [\*737] framing and exploring the conceptual issues involved, he asserts that one can design or perform appropriate actions. You can then assess if there was any material change, and then reintegrate that experience back into the theory of practice. n163 In my own career, I have unknowingly used Yamamoto's framework. Because I am the mother of five African American sons, I am critically interested in the treatment of Black men in the criminal justice system. In the early 90s, my interest manifested itself in exploring issues related to gangs. I studied conceptual issues related to gang theory, particularly as affecting ethnic minority males. I determined that I needed to get beyond theories developed predominantly by white male social science academics in ivory towers to understand the reality of Black gang life, and then design culturally appropriate strategies. My research led me to Los Angeles former gang members, who were dealing directly with preventive and rehabili-tative solutions to the gang problem. Through them, I discovered Amer-I-Can, a self-esteem curriculum started by Hall of Fame former football player, actor, and activist Jim Brown. After studying the program's effectiveness, I became involved as a national consultant. I went through facilitator training to teach the curriculum; brought former gang members to interact with law students in Iowa; took law students from Iowa to Los Angeles to meet with gang members there; arranged for Jim Brown to visit Iowa and other states; sold the curriculum for use and supervised programs in Des Moines, Iowa and New Orleans; wrote Congressional testimony on preventive and rehabilitative approaches to the gang problem; drafted a former gang member's autobiography; made numerous speeches; and served on the Iowa gubernato-rial commission on African Americans in the prison population. I ended up engaging with various other actors on the gang issue, including scholars, gang members, ex-convicts, Congresspersons, state representatives and staffers, execu-tive branch policy makers, cultural and religious community activists, federal and state law enforcement, including then Attorney General Janet Reno and then FBI director Louis Freeh, not-for-profit service providers like the YMCA, poten-tial corporate contributors, professional athletes, entertainers, etc. Assessing my several years of experiences, I realized that I had not sufficiently explored the roles of women with respect to gangs, whereas my other scholarly interests were examined culturally relevant feminisms. n164 So I did additional research into gang theories related to women, pre-sented some speeches and panel [\*738] presentations, and wrote a scholarly article. n165 Needless to say, these ac-tivities were highly educational for my students, personally and professionally transformative for me and even my entire family, but also very time consuming, and with relatively little scholarly output to show for it. My plans to publish an entire book on gangs have been sidetracked by other matters, including the passe nature of the gang subject in the na-tional spotlight. I remain interested, but not as actively involved personally or on a scholarly level in the area. In my view, unfortunately, praxis remains an aspirational element for many CRT theorists, who may limit their discussions about solutions to racism to ivory tower academic conferences and highly footnoted law review articles that are not even physically or pedagogically accessible to other social science academics, much less the adult college edu-cated public. Many if not most tenure track professors are hired for their potential scholarly abilities and must devote several intense years to demonstrating those abilities sufficiently to get tenure through the writing of law review articles. It would not be surprising that most of them would not be suited to engage in praxis, especially pre-tenure. Many schol-ars may have never had any interest in praxis, pre- or post tenure, and openly welcomed the retreat from practice that professing represented. Some teachers who initially had an interest in praxis, may have lost that interest in the grueling process to get tenure. Some realize that post tenure raises are based on scholarly productivity, i.e. more articles and books, and not on other activities. Many lawyers primarily interested in practice would not want to deflect their focus by "wasting" many years writing theoretical articles, so they would not even be attracted to teaching. My comments here do not relate to clinical faculty who may be more likely to engage in praxis as they remain practitioners, training students to handle real world lawyering, and even social justice issues. Ironically, it is evident that too many progressive theoreticians of all colors have remained unconnected to praxis, while the political right has been able to marry its neoconservative race theory with its political lawyering. n166 Groups like the Federalist Society in law [\*739] schools are integrally linked with conservative professors, lawyers, judges, think tanks, and ascendant Republican party policy. Most critical race theorists have not been able to effectively connect to similarly embattled progressive groups. As one commentator stated, "it's nice to know racism is socially constructed, but it doesn't help hail a cab at night."

#### Just changing consciousness isn’t enough to solve racism – we must include practical debate about how to proceed with legal, legislative, and doctrinal change

**Litowitz 97** (Douglas E. Litowitz, Prof. of Law @ Loyola, Notre Dame Law Review, 1997 72 Notre Dame L. Rev. 503)

I think we can put CRT in its best light by seeing it as a form of what Marxists and feminists refer to as consciousness raising. That is, CRT elevates our sensitivity to racial issues and gives us a heightened awareness of what it is like to experience the sting of racism. And there is no question that it accomplishes this goal. One emerges from reading this anthology (and from reading other CRT articles) with a new sensibility, as if one is seeing the world through a new set of eyes. This alone is worthwhile for at least three reasons: it clarifies and brings to the fore the racist stereotypes and assumptions which pervade our psyches; it reminds us of our brutal history of racial prejudice and exclusion; and it hu-manizes people of color so they do not seem so Other, and instead appear as living, breathing people who deserve equal treatment. But there is a problematic assumption running through much CRT scholarship to the effect that once our con-sciousness has been raised through narratives and stories, the correct legal decision will immediately become clear to us. That is, judges and lawyers who genuinely understand the experiences of people of color will start making decisions that will benefit these "out-groups." But is this a correct assumption? I think not, for the simple reason that a raised consciousness is no guarantee that a particular decision will be chosen. This can be seen by the rise of Afri-can-American intellectuals who have experienced stinging acts of racism yet remain staunchly opposed to affirmative action and set-asides, on doctrinal grounds. The very existence of neoconservative black intellectuals like Stephen Carter and Shelby Steele (not to mention Justice Clarence Thomas and law professor Randall Kennedy) militates against the idea that the subjective experience of racism will automatically lead to some sort of psychological conver-sion in which judges and lawyers will know how to "do the right thing." CRT acts as a sort of disinfectant which dispels some widely-held misconceptions about people of color, assump-tions which are often held unconsciously by judges and lawyers. A judge who has read the works of Patricia Williams and Derrick Bell may be less likely to hold stereotypical, denigrating views of black people, and while this may not af-fect every decision that she makes, it can have a certain salutary effect. And the importance of this gestalt switch, this psychological conversion in how one sees minorities, should not be minimized, be- [\*529] cause many judges and lawyers carry around distorted beliefs on racial matters. But even when CRT has raised our consciousness to the point where it is clear of racism (or at least relatively clear of it), there remains a separate debate which must take place at the level of legal doctrine, where we discuss theo-retical questions of equality, fairness, due process, and desert. Assuming that CRT wants to contribute something more than consciousness raising, it needs to address this doctrinal, theoretical level, and to make the constitutional arguments that appeal to all of us (black, white, Asian), because we are splintered enough as it is.

#### Perm is a necessary condition for effective action in policy.

**McCoy and Scully**, Summer **2002** (Martha – executive director of Everyday Democracy, and Patrick – senior associate at Everyday Democracy, National Civic Review, Vol. 91, No. 2, p. 124)

6. Encourage analysis and reasoned argument. The powerful work that occurs in dialogue—identifying the connections between personal and public concerns, creating mutual understanding, and building relationships based on trust—is necessary for solving complex public problems. But it is not enough. People also need structured opportunities to engage in “judicious argument, critical listening, and earnest decision making.” 21 Most political theorists who focus on the importance of public deliberation emphasize the importance of critical thinking and reasoned argument to the creation of sound public policy. David Mathews, president of the Kettering Foundation, has been one of the most vocal and persistent promoters of this concept of public deliberation: “deliberations aren’t just discussions to promote better understanding. They are the way we make the decisions that allow us to act together. People are challenged to face the unpleasant costs and consequences of various options and to ‘work through’ the often volatile emotions that are a part of making public decisions.” 22 The need for reasoned argument raises the question of how much information people need in order to deliberate effectively. Some civic engagement processes stress the importance of exposing participants to large amounts of technical information and other relevant facts. While many theorists and promoters of public deliberation agree that civic engagement processes should provide a baseline of information about issues, they also warn against overwhelming people with too many facts. 23 Richard Harwood emphasizes that civic engagement processes should provide “a sense of coherence about how different pieces of information ﬁt together . . . and not necessarily all available information.” 24 While critical thinking is an essential part of effective engagement on issues, too many civic reformers tend to make this approach the element of political talk that trumps all others. Benjamin Barber notes, “Philosophers and legal theorists have been particularly guilty of overrationalizing talk in their futile quest for a perfectly rational world mediated by perfectly rational forms of speech.” 25 Many people are intimidated by processes that place heavy emphasis on absorbing large amounts of facts or on making closely reasoned arguments. 26 Such an approach can make it difﬁcult to bring large and diverse numbers of people into a civic engagement process. This is one of the most important reasons for combining the best aspects of dialogue and deliberation in a single process. A more comprehensive deliberative dialogue approach provides a place in the process for people who engage public issues in all kinds of ways. As noted above, the ﬁrst few sessions of a study circle emphasize the dialogue aspects of deliberative dialogue. In most cases, it is not until the penultimate session that a study circle addresses the pros and cons of different proposals for action. By this time, people have become more comfortable with each other and with the issue, making it easier for everyone to have a voice. 27

#### Alternative alone is not enough to prompt policy action – we need practical debate on policy change.

**Litowitz** **1997** (Douglas – professor of law at Loyola University, Notre Dame Law Review, 72 Notre Dame L. Rev. 503, p. lexis)

I think we can put CRT in its best light by seeing it as a form of what Marxists and feminists refer to as consciousness raising. That is, CRT elevates our sensitivity to racial issues and gives us a heightened awareness of what it is like to experience the sting of racism. And there is no question that it accomplishes this goal. One emerges from reading this anthology (and from reading other CRT articles) with a new sensibility, as if one is seeing the world through a new set of eyes. This alone is worthwhile for at least three reasons: it clarifies and brings to the fore the racist stereotypes and assumptions which pervade our psyches; it reminds us of our brutal history of racial prejudice and exclusion; and it hu-manizes people of color so they do not seem so Other, and instead appear as living, breathing people who deserve equal treatment. But there is a problematic assumption running through much CRT scholarship to the effect that once our con-sciousness has been raised through narratives and stories, the correct legal decision will immediately become clear to us. That is, judges and lawyers who genuinely understand the experiences of people of color will start making decisions that will benefit these "out-groups." But is this a correct assumption? I think not, for the simple reason that a raised consciousness is no guarantee that a particular decision will be chosen. This can be seen by the rise of Afri-can-American intellectuals who have experienced stinging acts of racism yet remain staunchly opposed to affirmative action and set-asides, on doctrinal grounds. The very existence of neoconservative black intellectuals like Stephen Carter and Shelby Steele (not to mention Justice Clarence Thomas and law professor Randall Kennedy) militates against the idea that the subjective experience of racism will automatically lead to some sort of psychological conver-sion in which judges and lawyers will know how to "do the right thing." CRT acts as a sort of disinfectant which dispels some widely-held misconceptions about people of color, assump-tions which are often held unconsciously by judges and lawyers. A judge who has read the works of Patricia Williams and Derrick Bell may be less likely to hold stereotypical, denigrating views of black people, and while this may not af-fect every decision that she makes, it can have a certain salutary effect. And the importance of this gestalt switch, this psychological conversion in how one sees minorities, should not be minimized, be- [\*529] cause many judges and lawyers carry around distorted beliefs on racial matters. But even when CRT has raised our consciousness to the point where it is clear of racism (or at least relatively clear of it), there remains a separate debate which must take place at the level of legal doctrine, where we discuss theo-retical questions of equality, fairness, due process, and desert. Assuming that CRT wants to contribute something more than consciousness raising, it needs to address this doctrinal, theoretical level, and to make the constitutional arguments that appeal to all of us (black, white, Asian), because we are splintered enough as it is.

#### --‘resolved’ means to enact a policy by law.

Words and Phrases 64 (Permanent Edition)

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

#### --“United States Federal Government should” means the debate is solely about the outcome of a policy established by governmental means

Ericson 3 (Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow *should* in the *should*-verb combination. For example, should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action though governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase *free trade*, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the *affirmative side* in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

#### Dialogue – debate games open up dialogue which fosters information processing and decision-making – they open up infinite frameworks making the game impossible

Haghoj 8 – PhD, affiliated with Danish Research Centre on Education and Advanced Media Materials, asst prof @ the Institute of Education at the University of Bristol (Thorkild, 2008, "PLAYFUL KNOWLEDGE: An Explorative Study of Educational Gaming," PhD dissertation @ Institute of Literature, Media and Cultural Studies, University of Southern Denmark, http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information\_til/Studerende\_ved\_SDU/Din\_uddannelse/phd\_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf)

Debate games are often based on pre-designed scenarios that include descriptions of issues to be debated, educational goals, game goals, roles, rules, time frames etc. In this way, debate games differ from textbooks and everyday classroom instruction as debate scenarios allow teachers and students to actively imagine, interact and communicate within a domain-specific game space. However, instead of mystifying debate games as a “magic circle” (Huizinga, 1950), I will try to overcome the epistemological dichotomy between “gaming” and “teaching” that tends to dominate discussions of educational games. In short, educational gaming is a form of teaching. As mentioned, education and games represent two different semiotic domains that both embody the three faces of knowledge: assertions, modes of representation and social forms of organisation (Gee, 2003; Barth, 2002; cf. chapter 2). In order to understand the interplay between these different domains and their interrelated knowledge forms, I will draw attention to a central assumption in Bakhtin’s dialogical philosophy. According to Bakhtin, all forms of communication and culture are subject to centripetal and centrifugal forces (Bakhtin, 1981). A centripetal force is the drive to impose one version of the truth, while a centrifugal force involves a range of possible truths and interpretations. This means that any form of expression involves a duality of centripetal and centrifugal forces: “Every concrete utterance of a speaking subject serves as a point where centrifugal as well as centripetal forces are brought to bear” (Bakhtin, 1981: 272). If we take teaching as an example, it is always affected by centripetal and centrifugal forces in the on-going negotiation of “truths” between teachers and students. In the words of Bakhtin: “Truth is not born nor is it to be found inside the head of an individual person, it is born between people collectively searching for truth, in the process of their dialogic interaction” (Bakhtin, 1984a: 110). Similarly, the dialogical space of debate games also embodies centrifugal and centripetal forces. Thus, the election scenario of The Power Game involves centripetal elements that are mainly determined by the rules and outcomes of the game, i.e. the election is based on a limited time frame and a fixed voting procedure. Similarly, the open-ended goals, roles and resources represent centrifugal elements and create virtually endless possibilities for researching, preparing, 51 presenting, debating and evaluating a variety of key political issues. Consequently, the actual process of enacting a game scenario involves a complex negotiation between these centrifugal/centripetal forces that are inextricably linked with the teachers and students’ game activities. In this way, the enactment of The Power Game is a form of teaching that combines different pedagogical practices (i.e. group work, web quests, student presentations) and learning resources (i.e. websites, handouts, spoken language) within the interpretive frame of the election scenario. Obviously, tensions may arise if there is too much divergence between educational goals and game goals. This means that game facilitation requires a balance between focusing too narrowly on the rules or “facts” of a game (centripetal orientation) and a focusing too broadly on the contingent possibilities and interpretations of the game scenario (centrifugal orientation). For Bakhtin, the duality of centripetal/centrifugal forces often manifests itself as a dynamic between “monological” and “dialogical” forms of discourse. Bakhtin illustrates this point with the monological discourse of the Socrates/Plato dialogues in which the teacher never learns anything new from the students, despite Socrates’ ideological claims to the contrary (Bakhtin, 1984a). Thus, discourse becomes monologised when “someone who knows and possesses the truth instructs someone who is ignorant of it and in error”, where “a thought is either affirmed or repudiated” by the authority of the teacher (Bakhtin, 1984a: 81). In contrast to this, dialogical pedagogy fosters inclusive learning environments that are able to expand upon students’ existing knowledge and collaborative construction of “truths” (Dysthe, 1996). At this point, I should clarify that Bakhtin’s term “dialogic” is both a descriptive term (all utterances are per definition dialogic as they address other utterances as parts of a chain of communication) and a normative term as dialogue is an ideal to be worked for against the forces of “monologism” (Lillis, 2003: 197-8). In this project, I am mainly interested in describing the dialogical space of debate games. At the same time, I agree with Wegerif that “one of the goals of education, perhaps the most important goal, should be dialogue as an end in itself” (Wegerif, 2006: 61).

#### 3. Politics – debate as a competitive political game is the best framework to solve dogmatism and human brutality – only we can solve

Carter 8 – prof @ The Colorado College, research support from the Rockefeller Foundation and the staff of the Villa Serbelloni, Bellagio, Italy, the Institute of Governmental Studies at the University of California, Berkeley, and the Benezet Foundation at The Colorado College (Lief H, 2008, "LAW AND POLITICS AS PLAY," Chicago-Kent Law Review, 83(3), http://www.cklawreview.com/wp-content/uploads/vol83no3/Carter.pdf)

Vico asked his audience at the University of Naples in 1708 to debate two competing ways of knowing: Cartesian rationality versus the poetic world of the ancients. Vico, the “pre-law advisor” of his day, saw law as a rhetorical game. That is, he understood the civic (ethical) value of competi-tion itself.12 He understood that Cartesian rationality, like religious and ideological fundamentalism, generates a kind of certainty that shuts down robust debate. Vico’s comprehensive vision suggests, in effect, that people should practice law and politics not as the search for the most rational or logically correct outcomes but rather as passionate and embodied yet peaceful competitive play. Vico inspires this vision of law and politics as play because he sees that all things in the human mind, including law and politics, are at one with the human body. As Vico put it as he concluded his 1708 address, “[T]he soul should be drawn to love by means of bodily images; for once it loves it is easily taught to believe; and when it believes and loves it should be inflamed so that it wills things by means of its normal intemperance.”13 Vico had no hope that such abstract moral principles as liberty, equality, justice, and tolerance could effectively offset the “crude and rough” nature of men.14 The Holy Bible and the Qur’an contain normative principles of love, tolerance, equal respect, and peace, but these commands have not forestalled ancient and modern religious warfare. This essay proposes that humans learn how to keep the peace not by obeying the norms, rules, and principles of civil conduct but by learning how to play, and thereby reintegrating the mind and the body. People do law, politics, and economic life well when they do them in the same ways and by the same standards that structure and govern good competitive sports and games. The word “sport” derives from “port” and “portal” and relates to the words “disport” and “transport.” The word at least hints that the primitive and universal joy of play carries those who join the game across space to a better, and ideally safer, place—a harbor that Vico him-self imagined. This essay’s bold proposition honors Vico in many ways. Its “grand theory” matches the scope of Vico’s comprehensive and integrated vision of the human condition. It plausibly confirms Vico’s hope for a “concep-tion of a natural law for all of humanity” that is rooted in human historical practice.15 Seeing these core social processes as play helps us to escape from arid academic habits and to “learn to think like children,” just as Vico urged.16 Imagining law and politics as play honors Vico above all because, if we attain Ruskin’s epigraphic ideal,17 we will see that the peace-tending qualities of sports and games already operate under our noses. Seeing law and politics as play enables us “to reach out past our inclination to make experience familiar through the power of the concept and to engage the power of the image. We must reconstruct the human world not through concepts and criteria but as something we can practically see.”18 If at its end readers realize that they could have seen, under their noses, the world as this essay sees it without ever having read it, this essay will successfully honor Vico. As Vico would have predicted, formal academic theory has played at best a marginal role in the construction of competitive games. Ordinary people have created cricket and football, and common law and electoral politics and fair market games, more from the experience of doing them than from formal theories of competitive games. When they play interna-tional football today, ordinary people in virtually every culture in the world recreate the experience of competitive games. Playing competitive games unites people across cultures in a common normative world.19 Within Vico’s social anthropological and proto-scientific framework, the claim that competitive play can generate peaceful civic life is purely empirical: law and politics in progressively peaceful political systems already are nothing more or less than competitive games. All empirical description operates within some, though too often ob-scured, normative frame. This essay’s normative frame is clear. It holds, with Shaw’s epigraph, above: Human brutalities waged against other hu-mans—suicide bombings, genocides, tribal and religious wars that provoke the indiscriminate rape, murder, torture, and enslavement of men, women, and children, often because they are labeled “evil”—are the worst things that we humans do. We should learn not to do them. In Vico’s anti-Cartesian, non-foundational world, no method exists to demonstrate that this essay’s normative core is “correct,” or even “better than,” say, the core norm holding that the worst thing humans do is dishonor God. Readers who reject Shaw’s and this essay’s normative frame may have every reason to reject the essay’s entire argument. However, this essay does describe empirically how those whose core norm requires honoring any absolute, including God, above all else regu-larly brutalize other human beings, and why those who live by the norms of good competitive play do not. People brutalize people, as Shaw’s Caesar observed, in the name of right and honor and peace. Evaluated by the norm that human brutality is the worst thing humans do, the essay shows why and how the human invention of competitive play short circuits the psy-chology of a righteousness-humiliation-brutality cycle. We cannot help but see and experience on fields of contested play testosterone-charged males striving mightily to defeat one another. Yet at the end of play, losers and winners routinely shake hands and often hug; adult competitors may dine and raise a glass together.20 Whether collectively invented as a species-wide survival adaptation or not, institutionalized competitive play under-cuts the brutality cycle by displacing religious and other forms of funda-mentalist righteousness with something contingent, amoral, and thus less lethal. Play thereby helps humans become Shaw’s “race that can under-stand.”

Narratives are entirely subjective and has no external criteria for evaluation

Chartier 1 (Gary, Lecturer in Business Ethics – La Sierra University, 7 UCLA Asian Pac. Am. L.J. 105, Spring)

Chang maintains that poststructuralism is "anti-foundational," implying that this is so because it offers us "a conception of language and knowledge that is not based on any universalist theoretical ground. ..." [35](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=d4ff9c09a0b1bcca46091e75e448605b&docnum=9&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlb-zSkAA&_md5=609651beecc28c621ac9287fd9302116&focBudTerms=&focBudSel=all" \l "n35" \t "_self) Chang thus enthusiastically joins in the wholesale contemporary rejection of foundationalism. Our knowledge, he argues, is local knowledge. Anti-foundationalism "provides for certainty, but only within the local, partisan point of view, which is posited as the only available point of view." [36](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=d4ff9c09a0b1bcca46091e75e448605b&docnum=9&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlb-zSkAA&_md5=609651beecc28c621ac9287fd9302116&focBudTerms=&focBudSel=all" \l "n36" \t "_self) Poststructuralism's emphasis on the limits of human speech and knowledge rules out criticisms of narrative as subjective and partial. According to Chang, "since all standpoints are equally validated (or invalidated), there is no longer any compelling reason to privilege any viewpoint. To state it differently, my personal narrative is as relevant as your personal narrative, and since both of them are equally relevant, they are equally irrelevant." [37](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=d4ff9c09a0b1bcca46091e75e448605b&docnum=9&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlb-zSkAA&_md5=609651beecc28c621ac9287fd9302116&focBudTerms=&focBudSel=all" \l "n37" \t "_self) Chang recognizes that this conclusion entails what might seem to be unpalatable consequences. Some people, he observes, "want to be able to say ... that all Nazis are bad, all of the time." Apparently, however, on his version of poststructuralism one cannot do this: "To try to make a universal, ahistorical claim about all Nazis being bad is meaningless because the phrase 'all Nazis are bad' has meaning only in certain contexts." Anti-foundationalism cannot, he concedes, "provide a compelling 'ought' in the rigorous sense of the word." But we need not be troubled by this; after all "ought" has been on shaky ground ever since David Hume said, "'Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger. ..." [38](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=d4ff9c09a0b1bcca46091e75e448605b&docnum=9&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlb-zSkAA&_md5=609651beecc28c621ac9287fd9302116&focBudTerms=&focBudSel=all" \l "n38" \t "_self) Does characterizing all stories as "equally irrelevant" cut the nerve of social critique? Chang relates the horrifying story of Nguyen Hen Van, jailed on a theft charge but inadvertently brought to court as the defendant in a murder case in place of another Vietnamese man housed in the same jail. Witnesses and even the real murder defendant's lawyer failed to realize that the wrong defendant was in court. Nguyen Hen Van's cries of "Not me, not me" went unheard until the end of the  [\*115]  trial. [39](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=d4ff9c09a0b1bcca46091e75e448605b&docnum=9&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlb-zSkAA&_md5=609651beecc28c621ac9287fd9302116&focBudTerms=&focBudSel=all" \l "n39" \t "_self) Is it obvious that the narratives of the witnesses and the attorney - narratives in which he purportedly plays a part - should be regarded as just as relevant as those of Nguyen Hen Van, confused with another member of southern California's still relatively small and marginal Vietnamese minority? Chang obviously - and rightly - does not think so. But he is not altogether persuasive when he explains why critique remains possible on his view, when he describes how we should think about contests among alternative personal and group narratives. His poststructuralist understanding of epistemology and ethics does not render political action impossible; if anything, it does the opposite, in the sense that political action is all that will be left. The poststructuralist critique changes the present game, which involves the search for legitimation, by eliminating the possibility of any appeal to an external standard for legitimation. It becomes, as if it were ever anything but, a question of power, where no one can claim a superior legitimacy or deny the legitimacy of another's viewpoint or story. ... Narratives, then, cannot be discounted because in this game of power there is no "objective" standard for disqualification. One "wins" by being more persuasive. Narratives, especially those about personal oppression, are particularly well-suited for persuasive purposes because they can provide compelling accounts of how things are in society. These stories will carry considerable persuasive power because in our present political-legal climate, which is dominated by liberal political philosophy, oppression is bad. Oppression, when recognized, requires redress. [40](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=d4ff9c09a0b1bcca46091e75e448605b&docnum=9&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlb-zSkAA&_md5=609651beecc28c621ac9287fd9302116&focBudTerms=&focBudSel=all" \l "n40" \t "_self)

#### There must be a sense of agency to generate true change – only the aff can do that

**McCoy and Scully**, Summer **2002** (Martha – executive director of Everyday Democracy, and Patrick – senior associate at Everyday Democracy, National Civic Review, Vol. 91, No. 2, p. 125-126)

8. Provide a way for people to see themselves as actors and to be actors. Our everyday public discourse reinforces the idea that real change happens “out there,” beyond most people’s reach or inﬂuence. In part, this reﬂects the all too-common disconnects between citizens and elected ofﬁcials and between community members and the institutions and resources of the community. It also reﬂects the difﬁculty in seeing how individuals’ efforts to create change connect to the larger issues or the larger community. Effective deliberative dialogue processes address this in two ways. First, whole-community organizing creates opportunities for people from various neighborhoods, institutions, and agencies to work through problems, consider solutions, and share a variety of resources to solve them. 32 In essence, the process should bring “us” and “them” together in the conversation, so that the conversation is about “all of us” making a difference in the community. This takes the focus away from “this is what we hope they will do.” Second, the content of the deliberative dialogue process is also critical. It helps create a sense of agency for each person by leading participants in a natural progression from analysis of the issue to an exploration of speciﬁc action steps. When participants have the chance to consider a range of actions that different actors (such as individuals, small groups, nonproﬁts, businesses, schools, and government) can take, they are more likely to see that solutions to public problems can come in many and varied ways. They are also more likely to see themselves as actors. When a public conversation ends with analysis of the issue and does not progress to an intentional conversation about action steps, it reinforces the idea that the possibilities for addressing the issue are entirely outside the room.

#### -- No trade-off – global visions spur local activism

**Grossberg 92** (Lawrence, Professor of Communication Studies – UNC-Chapel Hill and Chair – Executive Committee of the University Program in Cultural Studies, We Gotta Get Out of This Place: Popular Conservatism and Postmodern Culture, p. 391-393)

Such a politics will not begin by **distinguishing between the local and the global** (and certainly not by valorizing one over the other) for the ways in which the former are incorporated into the latter preclude the luxury of such choices. Resistance is always a local struggle, even when (as in parts of the ecology movement) it is imagined to connect into **its global structures of articulation**: Think globally, act locally. Opposition is predicated precisely on locating the points of articulation between them, the points at which the global becomes local, and the local opens up onto the global. Since the meaning of these terms has to be understood in the context of any particular struggle, **one is always acting both globally and locally**: Think globally, act appropriately! Fight locally because that is the scene of action, but aim for the global because that is the scene of agency. "Local struggles directly target national and international axioms, at the precise point of their insertion into the field of immanence. This requires the imagination and construction of forms of unity, commonality and social agency which do not deny differences. Without such commonality, politics is too easily reduced to a question of individual rights (i, e., in the terms of classical utility theory); difference ends up "trumping" politics, bringing it to an end." The struggle against the disciplined mobilization of everyday life can only be built on affective commonalities, a shared "responsible yearning: a yearning out towards something more and something better than this and this place now. "The Left, after all, is defined by its common commitment to principles of justice, equality and democracy (although these might conflict) in economic, political and cultural life. It is based on the hope, perhaps even the illusion, that such things are possible. The construction of an affective commonality attempts to mobilize people in a common struggle, despite the fact that they have no common identity or character, recognizing that they are the only force capable of providing a new historical and oppositional agency. It strives to organize minorities into a new majority. This requires finding ways of getting people to care again: to care about the potential ecological, political and economic **disasters facing the world**; to care about the structures of inequality which maintain some people in luxury and condemn others to poverty, starvation and death; to care about the attacks on people's freedom and equality, especially within a nation which claims to cherish these values; and to care about the feeling that any viable relationship between affect, desire and ideology in our lives has collapsed (even if we admit that the existence of such a relationship was only imagined). This does not require a spiritual transcendence or selflessness. "Others need the immortality of the soul, need gods and angels. We need to feel ourselves possessed by the demons that make us leave ourselves a little in order to try to love, to understand and to act on human history."" **It does require strategic campaigns, aimed at creating something beyond a local commitment.** It requires using the cultural logics and media that already connect to people's lives to articulate interconnected antagonisms to the present and a common commitment to the future. (Is this what we want to leave our children? Is this how we want to be remembered? Could this happen to us?) If people want to feel good, then such desires can be inflected into a progressive agenda.

#### -- Turn – political vacuum –

#### Localism siphons off and deflects activist energies from centers of power – the result is rule by elites

**Boggs 97** (Carl, Professor of Political Science – National University, Theory & Society, 26, December, p. 760-761)

Grassroots politics, of course, remains a significant part of any transformative agenda; clearly there is no iron law favoring an enclave outcome, but in a depoliticized culture it will be difficult to avoid. In many ways the dilemmas of local activism go back to the origins of the American political system, which was set up to allow space for local participation apart from federal structures so that no amount of grass- roots mayhem would disturb the national political system. Thus, even where oppositional groups were able to carve out a local presence, their influence on the national state was likely to be minimal owing to the complex maze of checks and balances, overlapping forms of representation, legislative intricacies, and a cumbersome winner-take-all electoral system that pushes the two main parties toward moderation. Over time, too, the national government became stronger and more bureaucratized, further reducing the scope of local decision-making and rendering much local empowerment illusory. Meanwhile, the federal state, with its expanded role in the military, foreign policy, and global economy, assumed ever greater control over people's lives. Such realities, along with constitutional and legal obstacles to securing a national foothold, often compelled progressive movements to stress local organizing. At the same time, as Mark Kann observes, community radicalism could actually **serve elite interests** by **siphoning off discontent** and **deflecting it away from the real centers of power**.40 Like spiritual politics, enclave activism can be understood as a reaction against the chaos of urban life and the eclipse of public space, along with a rejection of normal politics itself. The globalizing pressures exerted on the economy and political system reinforce this trend. Collective action within the enclave has less to do with rejuvenating public discourse, making policy, and gaining levers of institutional power than with erecting barriers against outside intrusions, just as city-dwellers may look to gated communities as a way of protecting themselves against the Hobbesian features of civil society. The end result of this type of populism is a widespread turning-away from the concerns of power, governance, and citizen participation within the general community – one of the **hallmarks of a depoliticized society**.