# 1NC

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#### . Topical affirmatives must reduce a statutory restriction ---- this must mandate a decrease in the quantity produced

Anell 89 Chairman, WTO panel "To examine, in the light of the relevant GATT provisions, the matter referred to the

CONTRACTING PARTIES by the United States in document L/6445 and to make such findings as will assist the CONTRACTING PARTIES in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in Article XXIII:2." 3. On 3 April 1989, the Council was informed that agreement had been reached on the following composition of the Panel (C/164): Composition Chairman: Mr. Lars E.R. Anell Members: Mr. Hugh W. Bartlett Mrs. Carmen Luz Guarda CANADA - IMPORT RESTRICTIONS ON ICE CREAM AND YOGHURT Report of the Panel adopted at the Forty-fifth Session of the CONTRACTING PARTIES on 5 December 1989 (L/6568 - 36S/68)

<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/88icecrm.pdf>

The United States argued that Canada had failed to demonstrate that it effectively restricted **domestic production** of milk. The differentiation between "fluid" and "industrial" milk was an artificial one for administrative purposes; with regard to GATT obligations, the product at issue was raw milk from the cow, regardless of what further use was made of it. The use of the word "permitted" in Article XI:2(c)(i) required that there be a limitation on the total quantity of milk that domestic producers were authorized or allowed to produce or sell. The provincial controls on fluid milk **did not restrict the quantities permitted to be produced**; rather dairy farmers could produce and market as much milk as could be sold as beverage milk or table cream. There were no penalties for delivering more than a farmer's fluid milk quota, it was only if deliveries exceeded actual fluid milk usage or sales that it counted against his industrial milk quota. At least one province did not participate in this voluntary system, and another province had considered leaving it. Furthermore, Canada did not even prohibit the production or sale of milk that exceeded the Market Share Quota. The method used to calculate direct support payments on within-quota deliveries assured that most dairy farmers would completely recover all of their fixed and variable costs on their within-quota deliveries. The farmer was permitted to produce and market milk in excess of the quota, and perhaps had an economic incentive to do so. 27. The United States noted that in the past six years total industrial milk production had consistently exceeded the established Market Sharing Quota, and concluded that **the Canadian system was a regulation of production but not a restriction of production**. Proposals to amend Article XI:2(c)(i) to replace the word **"restrict" with "regulate"** had been defeated; what was required was the **reduction of production.** The results of the econometric analyses cited by Canada provided no indication of what would happen to milk production in the absence not only of the production quotas, but also of the accompanying high price guarantees which operated as incentives to produce. According to the official publication of the Canadian Dairy Commission, a key element of Canada's national dairy policy was to promote self-sufficiency in milk production. The effectiveness of the government supply controls had to be compared to what the situation would be in the absence of all government measures.

#### B. The TERA provision is a regulatory barrier which might dis-incentivize energy production but does not prevent production

#### C. Better standards

#### 1. Limits - Including regulations includes so many affs

Doub 76 Energy Regulation: A Quagmire for Energy Policy Annual Review of Energy Vol. 1: 715-725 (Volume publication date November 1976) DOI: 10.1146/annurev.eg.01.110176.003435LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae, 1757 N Street NW, Washington, DC 20036 http://0-www.annualreviews.org.library.lausys.georgetown.edu/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev.eg.01.110176.003435 Mr. Doub is a principal in the law firm of Doub and Muntzing, which he formed in 1977. Previously he was a partner in the law firm of LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby and MacRae. He was a member of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission in 1971 - 1974. He served as a member of the Executive Advisory Committee to the Federal Power Commission in 1968 - 1971 and was appointed by the President of the United States to the President's Air Quality Advisory Board in 1970. He is a member of the American Bar Association, Maryland State Bar Association, and Federal Bar Association. He is immediate past Chairman of the U.S. National Committee of the World Energy Conference and a member of the Atomic Industrial Forum. He currently serves as a member of the nuclear export policy committees of both the Atomic Industrial Forum and the American Nuclear Energy Council. Mr. Doub graduated from Washington and Jefferson College (B.A., 1953) and the University of Maryland School of Law in 1956. He is married, has two children, and resides in Potomac, Md. He was born September 3, 1931, in Cumberland, Md.

FERS began with the recognition that federal energy policy must result from concerted efforts in all areas dealing with energy, not the least of which was the manner in which energy is regulated by the federal government. Energy selfsufficiency is improbable, if not impossible, without sensible regulatory processes, and effective regulation is necessary for public confidence. Thus, the President directed that "a comprehensive study be undertaken, in full consultation with Congress, to determine the best way to organize all energy-related regulatory activities of the government." An interagency task force was formed to study this question. **With 19 different federal** departments and **agencies contributing**, the task force spent **seven months** deciphering the present organizational makeup of the federal energy regulatory system, studying the need for organizational improvement, and evaluating alternatives. **More than 40 agencies were found to be involved** with making regulatory decisions on energy. Although only a few deal exclusively with energy, **most of the 40 could significantly affect** the availability and/or cost of **energy.** For example, in the field of gas transmission, there are five federal agencies that must act on siting and land-use issues, seven on emission and effluent issues, five on public safety issues, and one on worker health and safety issues-all before an onshore gas pipeline can be built. The complexity of energy regulation is also illustrated by the case of Standard Oil Company (Indiana), which reportedly **must file about 1000 reports a year with 35 different federal agencies.** Unfortunately, this example is the rule rather than the exception.

#### 2. Predictable aff ground – affs can defend “no energy production” mechanisms, claim unpredictable advantages off of regulatory restrictions, claim modeling arguments off of regulations which hurt our debate about energy

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#### Immigration reform will pass --- it’s a top priority.

**Foley and Stein**, **1/2**/2013 (Elise and Sam, Obama’s Immigration Reform To Begin This Month, The Huffington Post, p. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/02/obama-immigration-reform\_n\_2398507.html)

Despite a bruising fiscal cliff battle that managed to set the stage for an even more heated showdown that will likely take place in a matter of months, President Barack Obama is planning to move full steam ahead with the rest of his domestic policy agenda. An Obama administration official said the president plans to push for immigration reform this January. The official, who spoke about legislative plans only on condition of anonymity, said that coming standoffs over deficit reduction are unlikely to drain momentum from other priorities. The White House plans to push forward quickly, not just on immigration reform but gun control laws as well. The timeframe is likely to be cheered by Democrats and immigration reform advocates alike, who have privately expressed fears that Obama's second term will be drowned out in seemingly unending showdowns between parties. The just-completed fiscal cliff deal is giving way to a two-month deadline to resolve delayed sequestration cuts, an expiring continuing resolution to fund the government and a debt ceiling that will soon be hit. With those bitter battles ahead, the possibility of passing other complicated legislation would seem diminished. "The negative effect of this fiscal cliff fiasco is that every time we become engaged in one of these fights, there's no oxygen for anything else," said a Senate Democratic aide, who asked for anonymity to speak candidly. "It's not like you can be multi-tasking -- with something like this, Congress just comes to a complete standstill." It remains unclear what type of immigration policies the White House plans to push in January, but turning them into law could be a long process. Aides expect it will take about two months to write a bipartisan bill, then another few months before it goes up for a vote, possibly in June. A bipartisan group of senators are already working on a deal, although they are still in the early stages. Rep. Zoe Lofgren (D-Calif.) will likely lead on the Democratic side in the House. While many Republicans have expressed interest in piecemeal reform, it's still unclear which of them plan to join the push. Lofgren expressed hope that immigration reform would be able to get past partisan gridlock, arguing that the election was seen as something of a mandate for fixing the immigration system and Republicans won't be able to forget their post-election promises to work on a bill. "In the end, immigration reform is going to depend very much on whether Speaker [John] Boehner wants to do it or not," Lofgren said.

#### Plan costs capital --- massively unpopular.

Geman, 12 (Ben, “Obama to Congress on green-energy tax-break extension: 'Do it now'”, The Hill, May 24, http://thehill.com/blogs/e2-wire/e2-wire/229457-obama-to-congress-on-green-energy-tax-break-extension-do-it-now)

The wind power industry and supply-chain companies are lobbying hard for an extension of the credits, arguing that uncertainty about the incentives is already hurting the sector and that some layoffs have begun. “Wind projects typically have an 18- to 24-month development cycle. So effectively the PTC is already expiring,” said Denise Bode, CEO of the American Wind Energy Association, a trade group, in a statement this week. “That is why an extension is urgently needed now. We can’t afford to wait until the [production tax credit] runs out.” But the fate of the credits — which have not lapsed since 2004 — remain **highly unclear** this year. The credits are tethered to wider election-year tax policy and reform debates that could drag any action past the 2012 elections, or even into next year. House Republicans have promised wide-ranging examination of expiring tax policy provisions, while Senate Democrats have pressed for an across-the-board extension of a suite of expiring provisions. Also, while the wind credits have long enjoyed bipartisan support, many Republicans are increasingly criticizing federal green energy programs. Sen. Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa), who has floated legislation to extend the credit, issued a statement ahead of Obama’s speech alleging the White House must **engage more with Congress** on various expiring tax provisions. “The provision is hung up in the lack of a way forward on dozens of expiring tax provisions. The President could exert his leadership by working with Congress on a way forward instead of calling for a provision that’s a no-brainer for many of us. He’s focusing on the easy part of a bigger task,” Grassley said Wednesday.

#### Capital is key --- it bridges support from both parties.

Dallas Morning News, **1/2**/2012 (Editorial: Actions must match Obama’s immigration pledge, p. http://www.dallasnews.com/opinion/editorials/20130102-editorial-actions-must-match-obamas-immigration-pledge.ece)

The president’s words to NBC’s David Gregory are only that — words. What will really matter is whether he puts his muscle into the task this year. We suggest that Obama start by looking at the example of former President George W. Bush. Back in 2006 and 2007, the Republican and his administration constantly worked Capitol Hill to pass a comprehensive plan. They failed, largely because Senate Republicans balked. But the opposition didn’t stop the Bush White House from fully engaging Congress, including recalcitrant Republicans. Obama may have a similar problem with his own party. The dirty little secret in the 2006 and 2007 immigration battles was that some Democrats were content to let Senate Republicans kill the effort. Labor-friendly Democrats didn’t want a bill, either. And they may not want one this year. That reluctance is a major reason the president needs to invest in this fight. He must figure out how to bring enough Democrats along, while also reaching out to Republicans. In short, the nation doesn’t need a repeat of the process through which the 2010 health care legislation was passed. Very few Republicans bought into the president’s plan, leaving the Affordable Care Act open to partisan sniping throughout last year’s election. If the nation is going to create a saner immigration system, both parties need to support substantial parts of an answer. The new system must include a guest worker program for future immigrants and a way for illegal immigrants already living here to legalize their status over time. Some House Republicans will object to one or both of those reforms, so Speaker John Boehner must be persuasive about the need for a wholesale change. But the leadership that matters most will come from the White House. The president has staked out the right position. Now he needs to present a bill and fight this year for a comprehensive solution. Nothing but action will count. HE SAID IT … “I’ve said that fixing our broken immigration system is a top priority. I will introduce legislation in the first year [of the second term] to get that done. I think we have talked about it long enough. We know how we can fix it. We can do it in a comprehensive way that the American people support. That’s something we should get done.” President Barack Obama, in an interview on Meet the Press Sunday

#### Immigration reform expands skilled labor --- spurs relations and economic growth in China and India.

Los Angeles **Times**, 11/9/**2012** (Other countries eagerly await U.S. immigration reform, p. http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/world\_now/2012/11/us-immigration-reform-eagerly-awaited-by-source-countries.html)

"Comprehensive immigration reform will see expansion of skilled labor visas," predicted B. Lindsay Lowell, director of policy studies for the Institute for the Study of International Migration at Georgetown University. A former research chief for the congressionally appointed Commission on Immigration Reform, Lowell said he expects to see at least a fivefold increase in the number of highly skilled labor visas that would provide "a significant shot in the arm for India and China." There is widespread consensus among economists and academics that skilled migration fosters new trade and business relationships between countries and enhances links to the global economy, Lowell said. "Countries like India and China weigh the opportunities of business abroad from their expats with the possibility of brain drain, and I think they still see the immigration opportunity as a bigger plus than not," he said.

#### US/India relations averts South Asian nuclear war.

**Schaffer**, Spring **2002** (Teresita – Director of the South Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Security, Washington Quarterly, p. Lexis)

Washington's increased interest in India since the late 1990s reflects India's economic expansion and position as Asia's newest rising power. New Delhi, for its part, is adjusting to the end of the Cold War. As a result, both giant democracies see that they can benefit by closer cooperation. For Washington, the advantages include a wider network of friends in Asia at a time when the region is changing rapidly, as well as a stronger position from which to help calm possible future nuclear tensions in the region. Enhanced trade and investment benefit both countries and are a prerequisite for improved U.S. relations with India. For India, the country's ambition to assume a stronger leadership role in the world and to maintain an economy that lifts its people out of poverty depends critically on good relations with the United States.

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#### Crane migration routes are prime land for wind turbines – threatening the species

WCCA 11 (Whooping Crane Conservation Association, “Wind Farms and Whooping Cranes” <http://whoopingcrane.com/vast-wind-energy-proposal-could-kill-endangered-birds/>)

The development of wind farms is occurring at a rapid pace in the Central Flyway with many of the best wind sites located in the whooping crane migration corridor. Tom Stehn, Whooping Crane Coordinator, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) advised the Whooping Crane Conservation Association (WCCA) that multiple wind farms have already been built with more planned. Stehn stated, “It is important to analyze the potential impact of literally tens of thousands of wind turbines that may be placed in the whooping crane migration corridor in the coming years.

#### Whooping Cranes are a Keystone Species and their survival is key to ours

Clemency and Duff 7 (Louise, US Fish and Wildlife Service, and Joe, Operation Migration, Whooping Crane Eastern Partnership 2007 Annual Report <http://www.bringbackthecranes.org/whatwedo/wcep07.html>)

Despite the challenges of the 2007 season, 27 birds were added to the eastern whooping crane population, almost twice the number that existed in the 1940s. The combined efforts of many agencies and the dedication of a large team of field staff and volunteers is safeguarding these birds from extinction. Each and every member of the partnership remains committed to seeing this project through to its successful completion. Once known as the white ghost of the wetlands, these magnificent birds are a keystone species and an indicator of the health of our environment. Their existence in the eastern flyway inspires an increased effort to safeguard their habitat and in doing so it is preserved for many less engaging creatures that are so important to biodiversity. Our focus is to save whooping cranes but in the end it may be the whooping crane that saves us.

#### Ecosystem breakdown via keystone species destruction is a threat to human survival

Arlington Institute 7 (Paul Alois and Victoria Cheng, July, “Keystone Species Extinction Overview” <http://www.arlingtoninstitute.org/wbp/species-extinction/443>)

Human beings have recklessly exploited the resources on this planet and continue to do so despite the obvious widespread negative consequences. Due to the severe effects of human expansion in the last 10,000 years, some scientists now believe that the Earth has entered a new “extinction phase”.[1] According to the World Resources Institute, the current rate of species extinction is between 50 and 1000 times more than the geo-historical norm.[2] The World Conservation Union’s (IUCN) Red List reports that of the 40,117 species the organization examined, 16,119 were in danger of extinction: one in eight species of birds, one in three of amphibians, and one in four of mammals.[3] Considering the convenience of modern life, it is easy for people to forget that they rely on natural ecosystems to live as much as other animals do. Advances in the production and distribution of food in the last fifty years have created the impression that humans have mastered their environment, but that is far from being the case. In recent years it has become apparent that much of the progress made in the past several decades came with a price. The ecosystems that human beings depend on for their very survival have been radically undermined, and today many of them appear to be on the verge of breaking down.

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#### Text – The United States Supreme Court should issue a narrow ruling, holding that airspace restrictions on airborne wind energy systems for the military in the United States are an unconstitutional violation of Commerce Clause. We’ll clarify

#### Competes –

#### “Restrict” means to limit by statute

Law.com 9 (http://dictionary.law.com/Default.aspx?selected=1835&bold=restrict)

**restriction**  
n. any limitation on activity, by **statute**, regulation or contract provision. In multi-unit real estate developments, condominium and cooperative housing projects managed by homeowners' associations or similar organizations, such organizations are usually required by state law to impose restrictions on use. Thus, the restrictions are part of the "covenants, conditions and restrictions" intended to enhance the use of common facilities and property which are recorded and incorporated into the title of each owner.

#### “Reduce” means to bring down in amount

Random House 6 (Unabridged Dictionary, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/reduce)

1. to bring down to a smaller extent, size, amount, number, etc.: to reduce one's weight by 10 pounds.

#### Courts can’t “reduce” – leaves the statute on the books but renders it unenforceable

Treanor and Sperling 93 (William, Associate Professor of Law – Fordham University, and Gene, Deputy Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, “Prospective Overruling And The Revival Of "Unconstitutional" Statutes”, Columbia Law Review, December, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 1902 , Lexis)

The most noted instance in which the revival issue was resolved by a court involved the District of Columbia minimum wage statute pronounced unconstitutional in Adkins. After the Court reversed Adkins in West Coast Hotel, President Roosevelt asked Attorney General Homer  [\*1913]  Cummings for an opinion on the status of the District of Columbia's statute. The Attorney General responded, The decisions are practically in accord in holding that the courts have no power to repeal or abolish a statute, and that notwithstanding a decision holding it unconstitutional a statute continues to remain on the statute books; and that if a statute be declared unconstitutional and the decision so declaring it be subsequently overruled the statute will then be held valid from the date it became effective. **[43](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=9af7ab6af69ba3c94ecf798c79154173&csvc=bl&cform=searchForm&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVtz-zSkAB&_md5=ccb0bc5c58b41caf6d0a746d4b3f2d6c" \l "n43" \t "_self)** Enforcement of the statute followed without congressional action. **[44](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=9af7ab6af69ba3c94ecf798c79154173&csvc=bl&cform=searchForm&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVtz-zSkAB&_md5=ccb0bc5c58b41caf6d0a746d4b3f2d6c" \l "n44" \t "_self)** When this enforcement was challenged, the Municipal Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Jawish v. Morlet **[45](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=9af7ab6af69ba3c94ecf798c79154173&csvc=bl&cform=searchForm&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVtz-zSkAB&_md5=ccb0bc5c58b41caf6d0a746d4b3f2d6c" \l "n45" \t "_self)** held that the decision in West Coast Hotel had had the effect of making the statute enforceable. The court observed that previous opinions addressing the revival issue proceed on the principle that a statute declared unconstitutional is **void in the sense that it is** inoperative or **unenforceable**, **but not** void **in the sense that it is repealed** or abolished; that so long as the decision stands **the statute is dormant but not dead**; and that if the decision is reversed the statute is valid from its first effective date. [46](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=9af7ab6af69ba3c94ecf798c79154173&csvc=bl&cform=searchForm&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVtz-zSkAB&_md5=ccb0bc5c58b41caf6d0a746d4b3f2d6c" \l "n46" \t "_self) The court declared this precedent sound since the cases were "in accord with the principle "that a decision of a court of appellate jurisdiction overruling a former decision is retrospective in its operation, and the effect is not that the former decision is bad law but that it never was the law.' " **[47](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=9af7ab6af69ba3c94ecf798c79154173&csvc=bl&cform=searchForm&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVtz-zSkAB&_md5=ccb0bc5c58b41caf6d0a746d4b3f2d6c" \l "n47" \t "_self)** Adkins was thus, and had always been, a nullity. The court acknowledged that, after Adkins, it had been thought that the District of Columbia's minimum wage statute was unconstitutional. As the court put it, " "Just about everybody was fooled.' " **[48](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=9af7ab6af69ba3c94ecf798c79154173&csvc=bl&cform=searchForm&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVtz-zSkAB&_md5=ccb0bc5c58b41caf6d0a746d4b3f2d6c" \l "n48" \t "_self)** Nonetheless, the court's view was that since the minimum wage law had always been valid, although for a period judicially unenforceable, there was no need to reenact it. **[49](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=9af7ab6af69ba3c94ecf798c79154173&csvc=bl&cform=searchForm&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVtz-zSkAB&_md5=ccb0bc5c58b41caf6d0a746d4b3f2d6c" \l "n49" \t "_self)** Almost all other courts that have addressed the issue of whether a statute that has been found unconstitutional can be revived have reached the same result as the Jawish court, using a similar formalistic  [\*1914]  analysis. **[50](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=9af7ab6af69ba3c94ecf798c79154173&csvc=bl&cform=searchForm&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVtz-zSkAB&_md5=ccb0bc5c58b41caf6d0a746d4b3f2d6c" \l "n50" \t "_self)** The sole decision in which a court adopted the nonrevival position is Jefferson v. Jefferson, **[51](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=9af7ab6af69ba3c94ecf798c79154173&csvc=bl&cform=searchForm&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVtz-zSkAB&_md5=ccb0bc5c58b41caf6d0a746d4b3f2d6c" \l "n51" \t "_self)** a poorly reasoned decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court. The plaintiff in Jefferson sought child support and maintenance from her husband. She prevailed at the trial level; he filed his notice of appeal one day after the end of the filing period established by the Louisiana Uniform Rules of the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals rejected his appeal as untimely, even though the Louisiana Supreme Court had previously found that the applicable section of the Uniform Rules violated the state constitution. One of Ms. Jefferson's arguments before the state Supreme Court was that that court's previous ruling had been erroneous and that the rules should therefore be revived. In rejecting this claim and in finding for the husband, the Court stated: Since we have declared the uniform court rule partially unconstitutional, it appears to be somewhat dubious that we have the right to reconsider this ruling in the instant case as counsel for the respondent judges urges us to do. For a rule of court, like a statute, has the force and effect of law and, when a law is stricken as void, it no longer has existence as law; the law cannot be resurrected thereafter by a judicial decree changing the final judgment of unconstitutionality to constitutionality as this would constitute a reenactment of the law by the Court - an assumption of legislative power not delegated to it by the Constitution. [52](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=9af7ab6af69ba3c94ecf798c79154173&csvc=bl&cform=searchForm&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVtz-zSkAB&_md5=ccb0bc5c58b41caf6d0a746d4b3f2d6c" \l "n52" \t "_self)  The Louisiana Court thus took a mechanical approach to the revival question. According to its rationale, when a statute is found unconstitutional, it is judicially determined never to have existed. Revival therefore entails judicial legislation and thereby violates constitutionally mandated separation of powers: because the initial legislative passage  [\*1915]  of the bill has no legitimacy, the bill's force is considered to be purely a creature of judicial decision-making. Jefferson has little analytic appeal. Its view of the separation of powers doctrine is too simplistic. Contrary to the Jefferson rationale, a "revived" law is not the pure product of judicial decision-making. It is, instead, a law that once gained the support of a legislature and that has never been legislatively repealed. Its legitimacy rests on its initial legislative authorization. Moreover, the view that a statute that has been found unconstitutional should be treated as if it never existed may have had some support in the early case law, but it has been clearly rejected by the Supreme Court. Instead of treating all statutes that it has found unconstitutional as if they had never existed, the Court has recognized a range of circumstances in which people who rely on an overturned decision are protected. Indeed, as will be developed, the doctrine of prospective overruling evolved to shield from harm those who relied on subsequently overruled judicial decisions. **[53](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=9af7ab6af69ba3c94ecf798c79154173&csvc=bl&cform=searchForm&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVtz-zSkAB&_md5=ccb0bc5c58b41caf6d0a746d4b3f2d6c" \l "n53" \t "_self)** In short, the one case in which there was a holding that a statute did not revive does not offer a convincing rationale for nonrevival.

#### Solves –

#### Supreme Court can use the Commerce Clause to strike down restrictions

Craig 2010 (Robin Kundis Craig, Attorneys' Title Professor and Associate Dean for Environmental Programs at Florida State University College of Law, Summer 2010, “MULTISTATE DECISION MAKING FOR RENEWABLE ENERGY AND TRANSMISSION: SPOTLIGHT ON COLORADO, NEW MEXICO, UTAH, AND WYOMING: Constitutional Contours for the Design and Implementation of Multistate Renewable Energy Programs and Projects,” University of Colorado Law Review, Lexis)

A number of dormant Commerce Clause cases have involved energy production, and they systematically conclude that states cannot create legal requirements or preferences based on the source of the fuel or energy. In Wyoming v. Oklahoma, for example, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down an Oklahoma statute that required Oklahoma coal-fired electric power plants producing power for sale in Oklahoma to burn a mixture of coal containing at least ten percent Oklahoma-mined coal. 121 Moreover, the "savings clause" of the Federal Power Act did not prevent the conclusion that the Oklahoma statute was unconstitutional. 122 Similarly, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois concluded that a Clean Air Act compliance plan that favored Illinois coalviolated the dormant Commerce Clause. 123¶ Nor can states "hoard" state-created energy within their borders. Thus, in 1982, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that New Hampshire could not constitutionally restrict interstate transportation of hydroelectric power generated in New Hampshire. 124

#### That causes full compliance

Simon 7 (Christopher A., Professor of Political Science and Director of the Master of Public Administration Program – University of Utah, *Alternative Energy: Political, Economic, and Social Feasibility*, Ed. Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Google Books, p. 201-2)

The lack of a clear linkage between energy policy and the environment is evident in the cases above. However, the courts have shown an interest in the relationship between energy policy and a very broad understanding of social and economic justice. Grossman (2003) made this point fairly well in his delineation of the "three-pronged" test the Court has established to weigh environmental justice cases related to energy policy, outlined in Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Services (TOC) 528 U.S. 167 (2000): The Court reiterated that "to satisfy Article Ill's standing requirements, a plaintiff must show (l) it has suffered an injury in fact that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision." Grossman (2003) argued that **establishing standing can be accomplished**, particularly in regions that have experienced significant negative impacts resulting from global climate change. Writing before Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, Grossman anticipated that coastal regions will most likely be able to establish that consequences of global warming have negatively impacted local social and economic conditions. In essence, with standing established, Grossman argued that the current carbon-based energy paradigm can be challenged in terms not just related to economic equity as has been the case in recent years, but on the basic of social equity in terms of the global public health and other externalities that have reduced the potential for sustainable communities of the future. In neo-institutional terms, the Court has changed and continues to change the "rules of the game" (Buchanan 1991: 20) that govern and/or constrain the decision-making processes with its own branch of government as well as that of other branches of government existing at the national, state, and local levels. In terms of members' values, a movement of the judiciary toward the political Right will likely change the "rules of the game" in a different direction. With the appointment of Chief Justice John Roberts and Associate Justice Samuel Alito Jr., the Court appears firmly dominated by conservative judicial positivists and strict constructionists, which for the moment might make Grossman's point moot. Alternatively, a Left-leaning judiciary might produce quite different results.

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#### The United States Federal Government should substantially increase investment in smart microgrid technology for its military bases in the United States via a diverse portfolio, not supplied by airborne wind energy systems and tailored to individual installation circumstances.

#### The portfolio should include, but is not limited to, on-site generation of renewable energy sources such as waste-to-energy development, increased backup generation capacity, improvements in energy efficiency and energy storage, virtual net-metering, intelligent local energy management, added security measures, and accelerated implementation of the SPIDERS project.

#### We’ll clarify.

#### It solves – smart microgrids solve DOD grid vulnerability---the combination of the CP’s mechanisms resolves the problems with each individual component

SERDP 12 – the Strategic Environmental Research and Development Program, DoD’s environmental science and technology program, executed in partnership with DOE and EPA, 7/10/12, “DoD Study Finds Microgrids Offer Improved Energy Security for DoD Installations,” http://www.serdp.org/News-and-Events/News-Announcements/Program-News/DoD-study-finds-microgrids-offer-improved-energy-security-for-DoD-installations

Advanced microgrids offer a cost-effective solution to military installations' growing vulnerability to the fragile electric grid, according to a study released today by DoD’s Office of Installations and Environment. The study performed by MIT Lincoln Laboratory looked at different microgrid architectures and characteristics and compared their relative cost-effectiveness. The report provides insight into increasing energy security and reducing energy costs through the incorporation of renewable energy resources into microgrids, as well as new market opportunities for DoD in the area of demand response and ancillary services.

The study highlights the extent of ongoing microgrid work across DoD. It identified 44 installations that either had existing microgrids, planned installation of microgrids, or conducted microgrid studies or demonstrations at their facilities. The authors interviewed more than 75 people from the military Services, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Department of Energy. The analysis categorized the ongoing microgrid efforts based on several key attributes including size, maturity, the inclusion of renewable resources, and the ability to operate in a grid-tied manner.

The analysis confirms the value of microgrids to DoD. The combination of on-site energy generation and storage, together with the microgrid’s ability to manage local energy supply and demand, allow installations to shed non-essential loads and maintain mission-critical loads if the electric grid is disrupted.

The report illustrates the largely untapped potential of moving to smarter, next generation microgrids that would accommodate far greater penetration of renewable energy sources, as well as tighter integration with the electrical grid. If solar resources that are increasingly being installed on DoD installations were available during islanded operation of a microgrid, they could significantly extend the islanding time. Moreover, a microgrid that could operate when tied to the grid would offer new opportunities for the DoD to generate cost savings by using backup generation assets during normal operation and generate financial revenue by using advanced ancillary services.

One important finding is that there will be no “one size fits all” solution. The location of a military installation influences the options available for energy generation sources, the options available for interaction with the local utility, the characteristics of the local electricity market, and the regulatory environment. The most effective microgrids will be those that take into account the needs of the local commercial electric grid and are configured so that they can earn value helping to meet those needs.

#### SPIDERS will produce effective renewable-based microgrids that guarantee communications and control survive grid outages

Robert K. Ackerman 12, SIGNAL Magazine, February 2012, “Military Energy Enters SPIDERS Web,” http://www.afcea.org/content/?q=node/2877

No man may be an island, but each U.S. military base may become an energy island if a joint project among the Department of Energy, the Department of Homeland Security and the Defense Department comes to fruition. The effort aims to develop a microgrid that would supply a base with internal power independent of any external source that might fail as a result of enemy action.

Network security would be a key element of this energy microgrid. Facing the possibility of a cyberattack on the nation’s power grid, military bases must be able to sustain internal power with a degree of immunity from the online tactics employed by cybermarauders.

This program also seeks to blend a host of conventional and alternative energy sources into a single entity that would respond seamlessly to internal base power demands. Complicating the endeavor to link these energy sources is the requirement to provide secure network control that could interoperate with the public power grid but still be immune to cyberthreats that menace the larger network.

Known as the Smart Power Infrastructure Demonstration for Energy Reliability and Security, or SPIDERS, the project is a Defense Department joint capability technology demonstration (JCTD). It already is underway at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Oahu, Hawaii, and later phases will evaluate progressively sophisticated systems at Fort Collins, Colorado, and Camp Smith, Hawaii.

Melanie Johnson, an electrical engineer with the Army Corps of Engineers Construction Engineering Research Laboratory, explains that SPIDERS is designed to develop a template for bringing microgrid technology to military installations in the United States. Its success would have implications for installations outside the United States, particularly in operational settings, she points out.

Part of the SPIDERS technical management team, Johnson explains that a key element in SPIDERS is to provide network security for the communications and control systems within that microgrid environment. That security would be vital if a base loses power because of a cyberattack on the local power grid.

What sets SPIDERS apart from other microgrid efforts is its emphasis on cybersecurity and network communications. Security is a primary SPIDERS objective, Johnson says, adding that this includes information assurance certification and implementing emerging standards from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) and Department of Energy organizations.

Adding cybersecurity to the microgrid complicates the picture and requires “a little critical thinking,” Johnson observes. However, SPIDERS is not employing the traditional approach of first developing a control system and then overlaying security. Instead, security will be integrated into the system as it is developed. The result will be a comprehensive security solution that is tailored to the system, she offers.

The microgrid control system continually will monitor power quality and conditions in the regional power grid. If it detects instability or significant quality issues, it can alert monitors who would decide to disconnect the base from the external grid. The microgrid would continue to provide power to critical missions.

Johnson shares that planners are examining the relationship between the interface with the microgrid control system and the base’s enterprise network. Of particular interest is how that relationship would open the microgrid to vulnerabilities from outside the installation. Issues include the types of communications traffic that would be allowed in and out of the microgrid control system network.

According to its guidance, SPIDERS’ primary objectives are to protect task-critical assets from power loss due to cyberattack; integrate renewable and other distributed generational electricity to power task-critical assets in times of emergency; sustain critical operations during prolonged power outages; and manage installation electrical power consumption to reduce petroleum demand and carbon footprint.

SPIDERS will exploit existing energy assets such as solar arrays, wind generators and other renewable technologies as well as diesel generators to provide electricity more efficiently than if backup diesel generators alone were used. Renewable energy generators remain online constantly, providing electricity from alternate sources during opportune conditions such as windy or sunny days. Johnson points out, however, that most renewable energy resources trip offline when the main grid crashes. The microgrid allows the renewable power to stay online while maintaining necessary safety measures.

The program might tweak the bases’ energy sources by upgrading a legacy generator that lacks the necessary capacity, for example. Otherwise, it will focus on existing assets. Johnson emphasizes that SPIDERS will be energy-source agnostic.

## Advantage 1

### 1NC Heg/War

#### Lots of factors prevent great power conflict without hegemony

Fettweis 10 (Christopher J. Professor of Political Science at Tulane, Dangerous Times-The International Politics of Great Power Peace, pg. 175-6)

If the only thing standing between the world and chaos is the US military presence, then an adjustment in grand strategy would be exceptionally counter-productive. But it is worth recalling that none of the other explanations for the decline of war – nuclear weapons, complex economic interdependence, international and domestic political institutions, evolution in ideas and norms – necessitate an activist America to maintain their validity. Were American to become more restrained, nuclear weapons would still affect the calculations of the would be aggressor; the process of globalization would continue, deepening the complexity of economic interdependence; the United Nations could still deploy peacekeepers where necessary; and democracy would not shrivel where it currently exists. More importantly,the idea that war is a worthwhile way to resolve conflict would have no reason to return. As was argued in chapter 2, normative evolution is typically unidirectional. Strategic restraint in such a world be virtually risk free.

#### Statisically unipolarity is THE most conflict prone system

Montiero 12 [Nuno P. Monteiro is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University, “Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity is Not Peaceful”, International Security, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Winter 2011/12), pp. 9–40, Chetan]

**Wohlforth claims not only that the unipole can stave off challenges and preclude major power rivalries, but also that it is able to prevent conflicts among other states** and create incentives for them to side with it. 39 The unipole’s advantage is so great that it can settle any quarrel in which it intervenes. **As Wohlforth writes, “For as long as unipolarity obtains....second-tier states are less likely to engage in conflict-prone rivalries** for security or prestige. Once the sole pole takes sides, there can be little doubt about which party will prevail.” 40 This is the core logic of Wohlforth’s argument that unipolarity is peaceful. But what specifically does his argument say about each of the six possible kinds of war I identified in the previous section? Clearly, great power war is impossible in a unipolar world. In Wohlforth’s famous formulation: “Two states measured up in 1990. One is gone. No new pole has appeared: 2 1 1.” 41 Furthermore, by arguing that unipolarity precludes hegemonic rivalries, Wohlforth makes no room for wars between the sole great power and major powers. These are, according to him, the two main reasons why a unipolar world is peaceful. Unipolarity, he writes, “means the absence of two big problems that bedeviled the statesmen of past epochs: hegemonic rivalry and balance-of-power politics among major powers.” 42 I agree with Wohlforth on these two points, but they are only part of the picture. Granted, the absence of great power wars is an important contribution toward peace, but great power competition—and the conflict it might engender—would signal the emergence of one or more peer competitors to the unipole, and thus indicate that a transition to a bipolar or multipolar system was already under way. In this sense, great power conflict should be discussed within the context of unipolar durability, not unipolar peace. Indeed, including this subject in discussions of unipolar peacefulness parallels the mistakes made in the debate about the Cold War bipolar system. Then, arguments about how the two superpowers were unlikely to fight each other were often taken to mean that the system was peaceful. This thinking ignored the possibility of wars between a superpower and a lesser state, as well as armed conflicts among two or more lesser states, often acting as great power proxies. 43 In addition, **Wohlforth claims that wars among major powers are unlikely**, because the unipole will prevent conflict from erupting among important states. He writes, “The sole pole’s power advantages matter only to the degree that it is engaged, and it is most likely to be engaged in politics among the other major powers. 44 I agree that if the unipole were to pursue a strategy of defensive dominance, major power wars would be unlikely. Yet, there is no compelling reason to expect that it will always follow such a course. Should the unipole decide to disengage, as Wohlforth implies, major power wars would be possible. At the same time, Wohlforth argues that the unipole’s power preponderance makes the expected costs of balancing prohibitive, leading minor powers to bandwagon. This is his explanation for the absence of wars between the sole great power and minor powers. But, as I show, the costs of balancing relative to bandwagoning vary among minor powers. So Wohlforth’s argument underplays the likelihood of this type of war. Finally, Wohlforth’s argument does not exclude all kinds of war. **Although power preponderance allows the unipole to manage conflicts globally, this argument is not meant to apply to relations between major and minor powers,** or among the latter. As Wohlforth explains, his argument “applies with less force to potential security competition between regional powers, or between a second-tier state and a lesser power with which the system leader lacks close ties.” 45 Despite this caveat, Wohlforth does not fully explore the consequences of potential conflict between major and minor powers or among the latter for his view that unipolarity leads to peace. **How well**, then, **does the argument that unipolar systems are peaceful account for the first two decades of unipolarity** since the end of the Cold War? Table 1 presents a list of great powers divided into three periods: 1816 to 1945, multipolarity; 1946 to 1989, bipolarity; and since 1990, unipolarity. 46 Table 2 presents summary data about the incidence of war during each of these periods. **Unipolarity is the most conflict prone of all the systems, according to** at least **two important criteria: the percentage of years that great powers spend at war and the incidence of war involving great powers**. In multipolarity, 18 percent of great power years were spent at war. In bipolarity, the ratio is 16 percent. **In unipolarity**, however, **a remarkable 59 percent of great power years** until now **were spent at war**. This is by far the highest percentage in all three systems. Furthermore, **during** periods of **multipolarity and bipolarity, the probability that war** involving a great power **would break out in any given year was, respectively, 4.2 percent and 3.4 percent. Under unipolarity, it is 18.2 percent**—or more than four times higher. 47 **These figures provide no evidence that unipolarity is peaceful**. 48 In sum, the argument that unipolarity makes for peace is heavily weighted toward interactions among the most powerful states in the system. This should come as no surprise given that Wohlforth makes a structural argument: peace flows from the unipolar structure of international politics, not from any particular characteristic of the unipole. 49 Structural **analyses of the international system are usually centered on interactions between great powers**. 50 As Waltz writes, “The theory, like the story, of international politics is written in terms of the great powers of an era.” 51 In the sections that follow, however, I show that **in the case of unipolarity, an investigation of its peacefulness must consider** potential **causes of conflict beyond interactions between the most important states in the system.**

### 1NC Heg Resilient

#### -- Heg is resilient

Wohlforth 7 (William, Professor of Government – Dartmouth College, “Unipolar Stability”, Harvard International Review, Spring, http://hir.harvard.edu/articles/1611/3/)

US military forces are stretched thin, its budget and trade deficits are high, and the country continues to finance its profligate ways by borrowing from abroad—notably from the Chinese government. These developments have prompted many analysts to warn that the United States suffers from “imperial overstretch.” And if US power is overstretched now, the argument goes, unipolarity can hardly be sustainable for long. The problem with this argument is that it fails to distinguish between actual and latent power. One must be careful to take into account both the level of resources that can be mobilized and the degree to which a government actually tries to mobilize them. And how much a government asks of its public is partly a function of the severity of the challenges that it faces. Indeed, one can never know for sure what a state is capable of until it has been seriously challenged. Yale historian Paul Kennedy coined the term “imperial overstretch” to describe the situation in which a state’s actual and latent capabilities cannot possibly match its foreign policy commitments. This situation should be contrasted with what might be termed “self-inflicted overstretch”—a situation in which a state lacks the sufficient resources to meet its current foreign policy commitments in the short term, but has untapped latent power and readily available policy choices that it can use to draw on this power. This is arguably the situation that the United States is in today. But the US government has not attempted to extract more resources from its population to meet its foreign policy commitments. Instead, it has moved strongly in the opposite direction by slashing personal and corporate tax rates. Although it is fighting wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and claims to be fighting a global “war” on terrorism, the United States is not acting like a country under intense international pressure. Aside from the volunteer servicemen and women and their families, US citizens have not been asked to make sacrifices for the sake of national prosperity and security. The country could clearly devote a greater proportion of its economy to military spending: today it spends only about 4 percent of its GDP on the military, as compared to 7 to 14 percent during the peak years of the Cold War. It could also spend its military budget more efficiently, shifting resources from expensive weapons systems to boots on the ground. Even more radically, it could reinstitute military conscription, shifting resources from pay and benefits to training and equipping more soldiers. On the economic front, it could raise taxes in a number of ways, notably on fossil fuels, to put its fiscal house back in order. No one knows for sure what would happen if a US president undertook such drastic measures, but there is nothing in economics, political science, or history to suggest that such policies would be any less likely to succeed than China is to continue to grow rapidly for decades. Most of those who study US politics would argue that the likelihood and potential success of such power-generating policies depends on public support, which is a function of the public’s perception of a threat. And as unnerving as terrorism is, there is nothing like the threat of another hostile power rising up in opposition to the United States for mobilizing public support. With **latent power** in the picture, it becomes clear that unipolarity might have more built-in **self-reinforcing mechanisms** than many analysts realize. It is often noted that the rise of a peer competitor to the United States might be thwarted by the counterbalancing actions of neighboring powers. For example, China’s rise might push India and Japan closer to the United States—indeed, this has already happened to some extent. There is also the strong possibility that a peer rival that comes to be seen as a threat would create strong incentives for the United States to end its self-inflicted overstretch and **tap** potentially **large wellsprings of** latent **power**.

### 1NC Unsustainable

#### Heg is unsustainable – rising powers, overstretch and loss of economic power

Layne 11 [Christopher Layne is the Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute. “The unipolar exit: beyond the Pax Americana”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 24:2, 149-164, Chetan]

In this article I challenge Brooks and Wohlforth. I show that the unipolar era already is visibly drawing to a close. Three main drivers explain the impending end of the Pax Americana. First, the rise of new great powers—especially China—is transforming the international system from unipolarity to multipolarity. Second, the United States is becoming the poster child for strategic over-extension, or as Paul Kennedy (1987) dubbed it, imperial overstretch. Third, the United States’ relative economic power is declining. In particular, mounting US fiscal problems and the dollar’s increasingly problematic role as the international financial system’s reserve currency are undermining US hegemony. To comprehend why the Pax Americana is ending we need to understand the linkages among these trends, and how each has feedback effects on the others. After examining how these trends undermine the Brooks and Wohlforth argument for unipolar stability and the durability of US hegemony, I conclude by arguing that over the next two decades the Pax Americana’s end presages dramatic changes in international politics—the outlines of which already are visible.

### 1NC Cyberterror

#### New developments sure up grid stability

Kemp 12 -- Reuters market analyst (John, 4/5/12, "COLUMN-Phasors and blackouts on the U.S. power grid: John Kemp," http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/05/column-smart-grid-idUSL6E8F59W120120405)

The hoped-for solution to grid instability is something called the North American SynchroPhasor Initiative (NASPI), which sounds like something out of Star Trek but is in fact a collaboration between the federal government and industry to improve grid monitoring and control by using modern communications technology. More than 500 phasor monitoring units have so far been installed across the transmission network to take precise measurements of frequency, voltage and other aspects of power quality on the grid up to 30 times per second (compared with once every four seconds using conventional technology). Units are synchronised using GPS to enable users to build up a comprehensive real-time picture of how power is flowing across the grid (www.naspi.org/Home.aspx and). It is a scaled-up version of the monitoring system developed by the University of Tennessee's Power Information Technology Laboratory using inexpensive frequency monitors that plug into ordinary wall sockets. Tennessee's FNET project provides highly aggregated data to the public via its website. The systems being developed under NASPI provide a much finer level of detail that will reveal congestion and disturbances on individual transmission lines and particular zones so that grid managers can act quickly to restore balance or isolate failures ().

#### No risk of cyberattack and no impact if it does happen

Birch, 10/1/12 – former foreign correspondent for the Associated Press and the Baltimore Sun who has written extensively on technology and public policy (Douglas, “Forget Revolution.” Foreign Policy. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/10/01/forget\_revolution?page=full)

"That's a good example of what some kind of attacks would be like," he said. "You don't want to overestimate the risks. You don't want somebody to be able to do this whenever they felt like it, which is the situation now. But this is not the end of the world." The question of how seriously to take the threat of a cyber attack on critical infrastructure surfaced recently, after Congress rejected a White House measure to require businesses to adopt stringent­ new regulations to protect their computer networks from intrusions. The bill would have required industries to report cyber security breaches, toughen criminal penalties against hacking and granted legal immunity to companies cooperating with government investigations. Critics worried about regulatory overreach. But the potential cost to industry also seems to be a major factor in the bill's rejection. A January study by Bloomberg reported that banks, utilities, and phone carriers would have to increase their spending on cyber security by a factor of nine, to $45.3 billion a year, in order to protect themselves against 95 percent of cyber intrusions. Likewise, some of the bill's advocates suspect that in the aftermath of a truly successful cyber attack, the government would have to bail the utilities out anyway. Joe Weiss, a cyber security professional and an authority on industrial control systems like those used in the electric grid, argued that a well-prepared, sophisticated cyber attack could have far more serious consequences than this summer's blackouts. "The reason we are so concerned is that cyber could take out the grid for nine to 18 months," he said. "This isn't a one to five day outage. We're prepared for that. We can handle that." But pulling off a cyber assault on that scale is no easy feat. Weiss agreed that hackers intent on inflicting this kind of long-term interruption of power would need to use a tool capable of inflicting physical damage. And so far, the world has seen only one such weapon: Stuxnet, which is believed to have been a joint military project of Israel and the United States. Ralph Langner, a German expert on industrial-control system security, was among the first to discover that Stuxnet was specifically designed to attack the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition system (SCADA) at a single site: Iran's Natanz uranium-enrichment plant. The computer worm's sophisticated programs, which infected the plant in 2009, caused about 1,000 of Natanz's 5,000 uranium-enrichment centrifuges to self-destruct by accelerating their precision rotors beyond the speeds at which they were designed to operate. Professionals like Weiss and others warned that Stuxnet was opening a Pandora's Box: Once it was unleashed on the world, they feared, it would become available to hostile states, criminals, and terrorists who could adapt the code for their own nefarious purposes. But two years after the discovery of Stuxnet, there are no reports of similar attacks against the United States. What has prevented the emergence of such copycat viruses? A 2009 paper published by the University of California, Berkeley, may offer the answer. The report, which was released a year before Stuxnet surfaced, found that in order to create a cyber weapon capable of crippling a specific control system ­­-- like the ones operating the U.S. electric grid -- six coders might have to work for up to six months to reverse engineer the targeted center's SCADA system. Even then, the report says, hackers likely would need the help of someone with inside knowledge of how the network's machines were wired together to plan an effective attack. "Every SCADA control center is configured differently, with different devices, running different software/protocols," wrote Rose Tsang, the report's author. Professional hackers are in it for the money -- and it's a lot more cost-efficient to search out vulnerabilities in widely-used computer programs like the Windows operating system, used by banks and other affluent targets, than in one-of-a-kind SCADA systems linked to generators and switches. According to Pollard, only the world's industrial nations have the means to use the Internet to attack utilities and major industries. But given the integrated global economy, there is little incentive, short of armed conflict, for them to do so. "If you're a state that has a number of U.S. T-bills in your treasury, you have an economic interest in the United States," he said. "You're not going to have an interest in mucking about with our infrastructure." There is also the threat of retaliation. Last year, the U.S. government reportedly issued a classified report on cyber strategy that said it could respond to a devastating digital assault with traditional military force. The idea was that if a cyber attack caused death and destruction on the scale of a military assault, the United States would reserve the right to respond with what the Pentagon likes to call "kinetic" weapons: missiles, bombs, and bullets. An unnamed Pentagon official, speaking to the Wall Street Journal, summed up the policy in less diplomatic terms: "If you shut down our power grid, maybe we will put a missile down one of your smokestacks." Deterrence is sometimes dismissed as a toothless strategy against cyber attacks because hackers have such an easy time hiding in the anonymity of the Web. But investigators typically come up with key suspects, if not smoking guns, following cyber intrusions and assaults -- the way suspicions quickly focused on the United States and Israel after Stuxnet was discovered. And with the U.S. military's global reach, even terror groups have to factor in potential retaliation when planning their operations.

### NO Retal

#### Public anxiety prevents retaliation

Huddy et al. 05 – Professor of political science @ Stony Brook University, Stony Brook, NY [Leonie Huddy, Stanley Feldman (Professor of political science @ Stony Brook University, Stony Brook, NY), Charles Taber (Professor of political science @ Stony Brook University, Stony Brook, NY) & Gallya Lahav (Professor of political science @ Stony Brook University, Stony Brook, NY), “Threat, Anxiety, and Support of Antiterrorism Policies,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 49, No. 3, July 2005, Pp. 593–608]

The findings from this study lend further insight into the future trajectory of support for antiterrorism measures in the United States when we consider the potential effects of anxiety. Security threats in this and other studies increase support for military action (Jentleson 1992; Jentleson and Britton 1998;Herrmann,Tetlock, and Visser 1999). But anxious respondents were less supportive of belligerent military action against terrorists, suggesting an important source of opposition to military intervention. In the aftermath of 9/11, several factors were consistently related to heightened levels of anxiety and related psychological reactions, including living close to the attack sites (Galea et al. 2002; Piotrkowski and Brannen 2002; Silver et al. 2002), and knowing someone who was hurt or killed in the attacks (in this study). It is difficult to say what might happen if the United States were attacked again in the near future. Based on our results, it is plausible that a future threat or actual attack directed at a different geographic region would broaden the number of individuals directly affected by terrorism and concomitantly raise levels of anxiety. This could, in turn, **lower support for overseas military action**. In contrast, in the absence of any additional attacks levels of anxiety are likely to decline slowly over time (we observed a slow decline in this study), weakening opposition to future overseas military action. Since our conclusions are based on analysis of reactions to a single event in a country that has rarely felt the effects of foreign terrorism, we should consider whether they can be generalized to reactions to other terrorist incidents or to reactions under conditions of sustained terrorist action. Our answer is a tentative yes, although there is no conclusive evidence on this point as yet. Some of our findings corroborate evidence from Israel, a country that has prolonged experience with terrorism. For example, Israeli researchers find that perceived risk leads to increased vilification of a threatening group and support for belligerent action (Arian 1989; Bar-Tal and Labin 2001). There is also evidence that Israelis experienced fear during the Gulf War, especially in Tel Aviv where scud missiles were aimed (Arian and Gordon 1993). What is missing, however, is any evidence that anxiety tends to undercut support for belligerent antiterrorism measures under conditions of sustained threat. For the most part, Israeli research has not examined the distinct political effects of anxiety. In conclusion, the findings from this study provide significant new evidence on the political effects of terrorism and psychological reactions to external threat more generally. Many terrorism researchers have speculated that acts of terrorist violence can arouse fear and anxiety in a targeted population, which lead to alienation and social and political dislocation.8 We have clear evidence that the September 11 attacks did induce anxiety in a sizeable minority of Americans. And these emotions were strongly associated with symptoms of depression, appeared to inhibit learning about world events, and weakened support foroverseas military action. This contrasted, however, with Americans’ dominant reaction, which was a heightened concern about future terrorist attacks in the United States that galvanized support for government antiterrorist policy. In this sense, the 9/11 terrorists failed to arouse sufficient levels of anxiety to counteract Americans’ basic desire to strike back in order to increase future national security, even if such action increased the shortterm risk of terrorism at home. Possible future acts of terrorism, or a different enemy, however, could change the fine balance between a public attuned to future risks and one dominated by anxiety.

## Advantage 2

### 1NC Iran Adventurism/Aggression

#### Iran will not be aggressive – they will back down from direct confrontation.

**Savyon**, 7/4/**2011** (Ayelet – director of the Iranian Media Project at the Middle East Media Research Institute, Iran’s Defeat in Bahrain, p. http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/5424.htm)

Despite its image as a looming superpower, which revolutionary Iran has sought for years to cultivate, its actual policy reveals a deep recognition of its weakness as a representative of the Shi'ites, who constitute a 10% minority in a Sunni Muslim region. Historically persecuted over centuries, the Shi'ites developed various means of survival, including taqiya – the Shi'ite principle of caution, as expressed in willingness to hide one's Shi'ite affiliation in order to survive under a hostile Sunni rule – and passivity, reflected in the use of diplomacy alongside indirect intimidation, terrorism, etc. The ideological change pioneered by the founder of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini – who transformed the passive perception characteristic of the of the Shi'a (which was based on the legend of the martyrdom of Hussein at the Battle of Karbala) into an active perception of martyrdom (shahada)[26] – is not being carried out by Iran. Tehran is refraining from sending Iranian nationals to carry out martyrdom operations, despite its years-long glorification of this principle. It is also not sending Iranians to Gaza, either on aid missions or to carry out suicide attacks – and this despite the fact that regime-sponsored organizations are recruiting volunteers for such efforts. Moreover, it appears that the Shi'ite regime in Iran is utilizing the legend of Hussein's martyrdom solely for propaganda purposes, in order to glorify its own might and intimidate the Sunni and Western world. Such intimidation is in keeping with Shi'ite tradition, as a way to conceal Tehran's unwillingness to take overt military action against external challenges. Conclusion Tehran's defeat in the Bahrain crisis reflects characteristic Shi'ite restraint, stemming from recognition of its own weakness in the face of the vast Sunni majority. The decade during which Iran successfully expanded its strength and power exponentially via threats and creating an image of superpower military strength has collapsed in the Bahrain crisis; Iran is now revealed as a paper tiger that will refrain from any violent conflict. When it came to the crunch, it became clear that the most that Iran could do was threaten to use terrorism or to subvert the Shi'ite citizens of other countries – in keeping with customary Shi'ite behavior – and these threats were not even implemented. It can be assumed that the Sunni camp, headed by Saudi Arabia, is fully aware of the political and military significance of Iran's weakness and its unwillingness to initiate face-to-face conflict. This will have ramifications on both the regional and the global levels.

#### Iran’s guiding principles is defined by regime survival and deterrence.

**Eisenstadt**, August **2011** (Michael - director of the Military & Security Studies Program at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, The Strategic Culture of the Islamic Republic of Iran, MES Monographs, No. 1, p. 3)

In establishing this principle, Khomeini formalized the supremacy of raison d’etat over the tenets of Islam

as the precept guiding Iranian decision-making. This principle guides decision making at the highest levels of the regime, as well as the actions of the regime’s foot-soldiers.6 The assumption underpinning this precept is that the regime’s brand of revolutionary Islam will not survive unless the IRI survives. Preserving the Islamic Republic thus becomes the ultimate religious value, and it becomes permissible to engage in torture and murder, and to violate the tenets of Islam, in order to preserve the regime. Paradoxically, then, policy in the IRI is based on the secular principle of raison d’etat, rather than the dictates of Shiite Islam. One can say, in effect, that the IRI is a secular theocracy. Similarly, despite the frequent resort to religious allusions and imagery in speeches and interviews, Iranian officials often employ the language of deterrence theory as spoken and understood in the West. Thus, shortly after the first test launch of the Shihab-3 missile in July 1998, Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani explained that to bolster Iran’s deterrent capability we have prepared ourselves to absorb the first strike so that it inflicts the least damage on us. We have, however, prepared a second strike which can decisively avenge the first one while preventing a third strike against us.7

### 1NC Middle East War

#### Middle East war doesn’t escalate

Maloney 7 (Suzanne, Senior Fellow – Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Steve Cook, Fellow – Council on Foreign Relations, and Ray Takeyh, Fellow – Council for Foreign Relations, “Why the Iraq War Won’t Engulf the Mideast”, International Herald Tribune, 6-28, http://www.brookings.edu/views/op-ed/maloney20070629.htm)

Long before the Bush administration began selling "the surge" in Iraq as a way to avert a general war in the Middle East, observers both inside and outside the government were growing concerned about the potential for armed conflict among the regional powers. Underlying this anxiety was a scenario in which Iraq's sectarian and ethnic violence spills over into neighboring countries, producing conflicts between the major Arab states and Iran as well as Turkey and the Kurdistan Regional Government. These wars then destabilize the entire region well beyond the current conflict zone, involving heavyweights like Egypt. This is scary stuff indeed, but with the exception of the conflict between Turkey and the Kurds, the scenario is far from an accurate reflection of the way Middle Eastern leaders view the situation in Iraq and calculate their interests there. It is abundantly clear that major outside powers like Saudi Arabia, Iran and Turkey are heavily involved in Iraq. These countries have so much at stake in the future of Iraq that it is natural they would seek to influence political developments in the country. Yet, the Saudis, Iranians, Jordanians, Syrians, and others are very unlikely to go to war either to protect their own sect or ethnic group or to prevent one country from gaining the upper hand in Iraq. The reasons are fairly straightforward. First, Middle Eastern leaders, like politicians everywhere, are primarily interested in one thing: self-preservation. Committing forces to Iraq is an inherently risky proposition, which, if the conflict went badly, could threaten domestic political stability. Moreover, most Arab armies are geared toward regime protection rather than projecting power and thus have little capability for sending troops to Iraq. Second, there is cause for concern about the so-called blowback scenario in which jihadis returning from Iraq destabilize their home countries, plunging the region into conflict. Middle Eastern leaders are preparing for this possibility. Unlike in the 1990s, when Arab fighters in the Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union returned to Algeria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia and became a source of instability, Arab security services are being vigilant about who is coming in and going from their countries. In the last month, the Saudi government has arrested approximately 200 people suspected of ties with militants. Riyadh is also building a 700 kilometer wall along part of its frontier with Iraq in order to keep militants out of the kingdom. Finally, there is no precedent for Arab leaders to commit forces to conflicts in which they are not directly involved. The Iraqis and the Saudis did send small contingents to fight the Israelis in 1948 and 1967, but they were either ineffective or never made it. In the 1970s and 1980s, Arab countries other than Syria, which had a compelling interest in establishing its hegemony over Lebanon, never committed forces either to protect the Lebanese from the Israelis or from other Lebanese. The civil war in Lebanon was regarded as someone else's fight. Indeed, this is the way many leaders view the current situation in Iraq. To Cairo, Amman and Riyadh, the situation in Iraq is worrisome, but in the end it is an Iraqi and American fight. As far as Iranian mullahs are concerned, they have long preferred to press their interests through proxies as opposed to direct engagement. At a time when Tehran has access and influence over powerful Shiite militias, a massive cross-border incursion is both unlikely and unnecessary. So Iraqis will remain locked in a sectarian and ethnic struggle that outside powers may abet, but will remain within the borders of Iraq. The Middle East is a region both prone and accustomed to civil wars. But given its experience with ambiguous conflicts, the region has also developed an intuitive ability to contain its civil strife and prevent local conflicts from enveloping the entire Middle East.

#### Won’t go nuclear

Dyer 2 (Gwynne, Ph.D. in War Studies – University of London and Board of Governors – Canada’s Royal Military College, The Coming War, Queen’s Quarterly, December, Lexis)

All of this indicates an extremely dangerous situation, with many variables that are impossible to assess fully. But there is one comforting reality here: this will not become World War III. Not long ago, wars in the Middle East always went to the brink very quickly, with the Americans and Soviets deeply involved on opposite sides, bristling their nuclear weapons at one another. And for quite some time we lived on the brink of oblivion. But that is over. World War III has been cancelled, and I don't think we could pump it up again no matter how hard we tried. The connections that once tied Middle Eastern confrontations to a global confrontation involving tens of thousands of nuclear weapons have all been undone. The East-West Cold War is finished. The truly dangerous powers in the world today are the industrialized countries in general. We are the ones with the resources and the technology to churn out weapons of mass destruction like sausages. But the good news is: we are out of the business.

### No Iran Influence

#### Multiple factors preclude Iran gaining influence through the Arab Spring

#### Kaye, 11

(Senior Political Scientist-RAND, Foreign Affairs, Jul-August, Lexis)

 Still, although Iran and its allies will attempt to seize on these vulnerabilities to widen the gap between ruler and ruled, they are unlikely to achieve the success of Nasser. In fact, the political upheaval in the Arab world has led to at least three fundamental shifts in the regional order that have only sharpened the preexisting limitations of Iranian influence. BRAND DAMAGE First, in a new political order shaped by calls for popular governance, the Iranian brand is losing its luster. Tehran's influence has always been greatest in places with entrenched authoritarianism, where it has exploited the illegitimacy of Arab rulers by highlighting their dependence on the United States and their impotence (or ambivalence) on pan-Arab issues, such as the conflicts in Iraq, Lebanon, and the Palestinian territories. At the same time, Iran has poured salt on these wounds, aiding a variety of Shiite and Sunni extremist groups as both a challenge to the U.S.-backed security order and as a way to demonstrate its own indispensability in the region. Although this strategy will continue, Iran will find a diminished Arab audience for it. A new type of populist force has emerged among the region's youth, who are more pragmatic and less ideological than prior revolutionaries. This movement has not turned to outside actors for support during the uprisings; the same will hold true in the aftermath, when it will look inward to address questions of economic reconstruction and institution building. Moreover, the region's pro-democracy youth see through the hypocrisy of Tehran's attempts to spin the Arab uprisings as a variation of its own Islamic revolution -- even more so after Iran's violent suppression of its own opposition Green Movement and its support for Bashar al-Assad's brutal crackdown in Syria. Of course, a failure of the Arab world's popular uprisings to bring about legitimate governments could breathe new life into Iran's regional designs. But such a failure is more likely to be the result of local dynamics than of manipulation or provocation by Iran. The most probable worst-case scenario is a return to authoritarian Arab rule, possibly by military officers, who, as they move to consolidate power internally, may be uninterested in Iran and its regional agenda. And if democratic transitions do move forward and lead to an increased number of political actors vying for power, these new political players, even Islamist ones, may be wary of jeopardizing their nationalist legitimacy by turning to Iran. Second, the "resistance bloc" that Iran leads is far less coordinated and omnipotent than Doran claims. Indeed, Iran, Hamas, Hezbollah, and Syria are less a coherent bloc than a temporary coalition in which local and short-term tactical interests have always trumped ideological or religious affinity. As the individual members of this bloc face mounting domestic pressures, their diverging agendas are only likely to intensify, making it difficult for Tehran to orchestrate a grand strategy. The weakest link for Tehran right now is Damascus, which is facing a civil war and, from the Iranian perspective, looks increasingly like a liability rather than an asset. Syria has long served as Tehran's entrée onto the Arab stage, enabling it, at least symbolically, to overcome its fundamental isolation as a Persian power. Continued turmoil in Syria will jeopardize this role, depriving Iran of a key state partner in the Levant. At the same time, Hezbollah is staying out of the limelight in the Arab Spring as it focuses on building a consensus-based government and consolidating its power in Lebanon. Hamas, for its part, has refused to offer vocal support for Assad's regime against the opposition, taking care to preserve its self-image as a populist movement. The case of Iraq offers an instructive lesson on the limits of nonstate actors in the resistance bloc: the fratricidal violence of the Iranian-backed "special groups," militias that killed Iraqi civilians and security forces in 2007-8, provoked a widespread backlash within Iraq against Iran.

### 1NC Iraq Stability

#### Zero risk of Iraqi escalation- self interest checks

Fettweis ’7(Christopher J. Fettweis, Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval War College, 2007 “'On the Consequences of Failure in Iraq”)

**No matter what the outcome in Iraq, the region is not likely to devolve into chaos. Although it might seem counter-intuitive, by most traditional measures the Middle East is very stable**. Continuous, uninterrupted governance is the norm, not the exception; most Middle East regimes have been in power for decades. Its monarchies, from Morocco to Jordan to every Gulf state, have generally been in power since these countries gained independence. In Egypt Hosni Mubarak has ruled for almost three decades, and Muammar Gadhafi in Libya for almost four. The region’s autocrats have been more likely to die quiet, natural deaths than meet the hangman or post-coup firing squads. Saddam’s rather unpredictable regime, which attacked its neighbours twice, was one of the few exceptions to this pattern of stability, and he met an end unusual for the modern Middle East. Its regimes have survived potentially destabilising shocks before, and they would be likely to do so again. The region actually experiences very little cross-border warfare, and even less since the end of the Cold War. Saddam again provided an exception, as did the Israelis, with their adventures in Lebanon. Israel fought four wars with neighbouring states in the first 25 years of its existence, but none in the 34 years since. Vicious civil wars that once engulfed Lebanon and Algeria have gone quiet, and its ethnic conflicts do not make the region particularly unique. The biggest risk of an American withdrawal is intensified civil war in Iraq rather than regional conflagration. **Iraq’s neighbours will likely not prove eager to fight each other to determine who gets to be the next country to spend itself into penury propping up an unpopular puppet regime next door**. As much as the Saudis and Iranians may threaten to intervene on behalf of their coreligionists, they have shown no eagerness to replace the counter-insurgency role that American troops play today. If the United States, with its remarkable military and unlimited resources, could not bring about its desired solutions in Iraq, why would any other country think it could do so?17 Common interest, not the presence of the US military, provides the ultimate foundation for stability. All ruling regimes in the Middle East share a common (and understandable) fear of instability. It is the interest of every actor – the Iraqis, their neighbours and the rest of the world – to see a stable, functioning government emerge in Iraq. If **the United States were to withdraw, increased regional cooperation to address that common interest is far more likely than outright warfare**. Even a Turkish invasion of the north is hardly inevitable. Withdrawal from Iraq would, after all, hardly rob the United States of all its tools with which to influence events. Washington and the rest of NATO still wield significant influence over Ankara; a cross-border invasion would almost certainly doom Turkey’s prospects of entering the European Union. It is puzzling why anyone would think that no incentive structure could be devised to convince Turkey not to attack its neighbour. Should such an assault prove undeterrable, it is not clear that intervention would be in the strategic interest of the United States. One of the worst suggestions that occasionally surfaces in the withdrawal debate is that the United States should ‘redeploy’ troops to Kurdistan in northern Iraq, in order to ‘deter’ Turkey and reward its Kurdish allies.18 Such a move would allow a continuation of what amounts to state-sponsored terrorism, and risk embroiling the United States in yet another local, intractable conflict. The removal of de facto US protection would presumably encourage the Kurds to act more responsibly toward their more powerful neighbours, and may well prove to be good for stability. Clearly, elements in Kurdistan actively support Kurdistan Workers’ Party terrorists in Turkey, but that would change if they faced the possibility of paying a price for their behaviour. A regional descent into the whirlwind following a US withdrawal cannot be ruled out; using that logic, neither can benevolent transitions to democracy. Just because a scenario is imaginable does not make it likely. In fact, most of the chaotic outcomes pessimists predict require unprecedented breaks with the past. Since the United States has historically overestimated the threats it faces, there is every reason to believe that it is doing so again.

### Dysprosium 1nc

#### Chinese Dysprosium is key to Turbines – and it’s running out

Rhodes 12 (July 30, Chris, chemistry and doctor phil, youngest professor of Physical Chemistry in UK, “The No.1 Source for Oil and Energy News,” “Peak Minerals: Shortage of Rare Earth Metals Threatens Renewable Energy” <http://oilprice.com/Alternative-Energy/Renewable-Energy/Peak-Minerals-Shortage-of-Rare-Earth-Metals-Threatens-Renewable-Energy.html>)

Of the other REEs, demands for dysprosium and terbium, which are harder elements to extract than their lighter relatives, are such that supply will be outpaced within a decade. The latter have been described as "miracle" ingredients for green energy production since small quantities of dysprosium can result in magnets with only one tenth the weight of conventional permanent magnets of similar strength, while terbium can be used to furnish lights that use as little as 20% of the power consumed by normal illumination. By alloying neodymium with dysprosium and terbium, magnets are created that more readily maintain their magnetism at the high temperatures of hybrid car engines. However, far more dysprosium relative to neodymium is required than occurs naturally in the REE ores, meaning that another source of dysprosium must be found if hybrid cars are to be manufactured at a seriously advancing rate. As noted, almost all REEs come from China whom it appears will run out of dysprosium and terbium within 15 years, or sooner if demand continues to soar, notwithstanding that Chinese hegemony for its own future energy projects may mean that the current amount of REEs being released onto the world markets will be severely curbed. Almost certainly, new sources of REEs will be sought, given their vital importance to providing future renewable energy, and Japanese geologists have reported that there may be 100 billion tonnes of REEs in the mud of the floor of the Pacific Ocean. Since the minerals were found at depths of 3,500 to 6,000 metres (11,500-20,000 ft) below the ocean surface, the undertaking required to recover them will not be trivial, however, and the practicalities of the enterprise remain to be seen.

#### Tightening REE supply causes US-China trade wars

Time 12 (Time Science & Space, “Raring to Fight: The US Tangles with China over Rare-Earth Exports,” Bryan Walsh, March 13, http://science.time.com/2012/03/13/raring-to-fight-the-u-s-tangles-with-china-over-rare-earth-exports/)

Or not. This morning Obama announced that the U.S. — along with the European Union and Japan — had filed a case with the World Trade Organization requesting talks with China over its export controls of the rare-earth minerals used in the high-tech and clean-tech manufacturing industries. The request for consultations is the first step in a process that will lead to a full legal case within two months, unless China agrees to the demands to ease its tightening export quotas on rare-earth minerals. That isn’t likely — and the fact that Obama chose to make his case publicly, from the White House Rose Garden, indicates that both sides could be gearing up for a trade war in a presidential-election year. “Being able to manufacture advanced batteries and cars is too important to sit back and do nothing,” Obama said. “We can’t let the new energy industry take root in other countries because they are allowed to break the rules.”

#### Trade Wars Empirically Go Hot

**Droke 10** (Clif, Editor – Momentum Strategies Report, “America and the Next Major War’, Green Faucet, 3-29, http://www.greenfaucet.com/technical-analysis/america-and-the-next-major-war/79314)

In the current phase of relative peace and stability we now enjoy, many are questioning when the next major war may occur and speculation is rampant as to major participants involved. Our concern here is strictly of a financial nature, however, and a discussion of the geopolitical and military variables involved in the escalation of war is beyond the scope of this commentary. But what we can divine from financial history is that "hot" wars in a military sense often emerge from trade wars. As we shall see, the elements for what could prove to be a trade war of epic proportions are already in place and the key figures are easily identifiable.

# 2NC/1NR

## Hege

### 2NC Heg/War – Fettweis Biz

#### Reject their vague assertions for conflict scenarios absent hegemony – their authors overestimate the importance of the US - *star this card*

**Fettweis 11** [Christopher J. Fettweis - Department of Political Science Tulane University and Professor of National Security Affairs at the US Naval War College, “Free Riding or Restraint Examining European Grand Strategy”, Comparative Strategy; Sep/Oct2011, Vol. 30 Issue 4, p316-332, 17p, Chetan]

**Assertions that without** the combination of **U.S. capabilities, presence and commitments instability would return** to Europe and the Pacific Rim **are usually rendered in rather vague language**. If the United States were to decrease its commitments abroad, argued Robert Art, “**the world will become a more dangerous place** and, sooner or later, that will redound to America’s detriment.”53 **From where would this danger arise? Who** precisely **would do the fighting, and over what issues?** Without the United States, **would Europe really descend into Hobbesian anarchy? Would the Japanese attack** mainland **China again**, to see if they could fare better this time around? Would the Germans and French have another go at it? In other words, **where exactly is hegemony is keeping the peace?** With one exception, **these questions are rarely addressed**. That exception is in the Pacific Rim. Some analysts fear that a de facto surrender of U.S. hegemony would lead to a rise of Chinese influence. Bradley Thayer worries that Chinese would become “the language of diplomacy, trade and commerce, transportation and navigation, the internet, world sport, and global culture,” and that Beijing would come to “dominate science and technology, in all its forms” to the extent that soon theworldwould witness a Chinese astronaut who not only travels to the Moon, but “plants the communist flag on Mars, and perhaps other planets in the future.”54 Indeed Chin a is the only other major power that has increased its military spending since the end of the Cold War, even if it still is only about 2 percent of its GDP. Such levels of effort do not suggest a desire to compete with, much less supplant, the United States. The much-ballyhooed, **decade-long military buildup has brought Chinese spending up to somewhere between one-tenth and one-fifth of the U.S. level. It is hardly clear that a restrained United States would invite Chinese** regional, must less global, political **expansion.** Fortunately one need not ponder for too long the horrible specter of a red flag on Venus, since on the planet Earth, where war is no longer the dominant form of conflict resolution, the threats posed by even a rising China would not be terribly dire. The dangers contained in the terrestrial security environment are less severe than ever before. **Believers in the pacifying power of hegemony ought to keep in mind** a rather basic tenet: When it comes to policymaking, **specific threats are more significant than vague, unnamed dangers**. Without specific risks, it is just as plausible to interpret U.S. presence as redundant, as overseeing a peace that has already arrived. **Strategy should not be based upon vague images emerging from the dark reaches of the neoconservative imagination.**  Overestimating Our Importance One of **the most basic insights of cognitive psychology provides the final reason to doubt the power of hegemonic stability: Rarely are our actions as consequential** upon their behavior **as we perceive them to be.** A great deal of **experimental evidence exists to support the notion that** people (and therefore **states) tend to overrate the degree to which** **their behavior is responsible for the actions of others.** Robert Jervis has argued that two processes account for this overestimation, both ofwhichwould seem to be especially relevant in theU.S. case. 55 First, **believing that we are responsible** **for their actions gratifies our national ego** (which is not small to begin with; the United States is exceptional in its exceptionalism). The hubris of the United States, long appreciated and noted, has only grown with the collapse of the Soviet Union.56 **U.S. policymakers famously have comparatively little knowledge of—or interest in—events that occur outside of their own borders**. **If there is any state vulnerable to the overestimation of its importance due to the fundamental misunderstanding of the motivation of others, it would have to be the United States.** Second, policymakers in the United States are far more familiar with our actions than they are with the decision-making processes of our allies. Try as we might**, it is not possible to** fully **understand the threats, challenges, and opportunities that our allies see from their perspective.** The European great powers have domestic politics as complex as ours, and they also have competent, capable strategists to chart their way forward. **They react to many international forces, of which U.S. behavior is only one**. Therefore, for any actor trying to make sense of the action of others, Jervis notes, “in the absence of strong evidence to the contrary, the most obvious and parsimonious explanation is that he was responsible.”57 **It is natural**, therefore, **for U.S**. policymakers and **strategists to believe that the behavior of our allies (and rivals) is shaped largely by what Washington does**. Presumably Americans are at least as susceptible to the overestimation of their ability as any other people, and perhaps more so. At the very least, political psychologists tell us, **we are probably not as important to them as we think**. **The importance of U.S. hegemony in contributing to international stability is therefore almost certainly overrated**. In the end, one can never be sure why our major allies have not gone to, and do not even plan for, war. Like deterrence, **the hegemonic stability theory rests on faith; it can only be falsified, never proven**. It does not seem likely, however, that hegemony could fully account for twenty years of strategic decisions made in allied capitals if the international system were not already a remarkably peaceful place. **Perhaps these states have no intention of fighting one another to begin with**, and our commitments are redundant. European great powers may well have chosen strategic restraint because they feel that their security is all but assured, **with or without the United States**.

### 2NC Unsustainable

#### More evidence - China is making the world multipolar

Layne 12 [Christopher Layne is the Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute, “This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana”, International Studies Quarterly (2012) 56, 203–213, Chetan]

American decline is part of a broader trend in international politics: the shift of economic power away from the Euro-Atlantic core to rising great and regional powers (what economists sometimes refer to as the ‘‘**emerging market’’ nations**). Among the former are China, India, and Russia. The latter category includes Indonesia, Turkey, South Korea, Brazil, and South Africa. In a May 2011 report, the World Bank predicted that six countries—China, India, Brazil, Russia, Indonesia, and South Korea—**will account for one-half of the world’s economic growth** between 2011 and 2025 (Politi 2011; Rich 2011). In some respects, of course, this emergence of new great powers is less about rise than restoration. As Figure 1 indicates, in 1700 China and India were the world’s two largest economies. From their perspective—especially Beijing’s—they are merely regaining what they view as their natural, or rightful, place in the hierarchy of great powers. The ascent of new great powers is the strongest evidence of unipolarity’s end. The two most important indicators of whether new great powers are rising are relative growth rates and shares of world GDP (Gilpin 1981; Kennedy 1987). **The evidence that the international system is** rapidly **becoming multipolar**—and that, consequently, America’s relative power is declining—**is now impossible to deny**, and **China is Exhibit A for the shift** in the world’s center of economic and geopolitical gravity. China illustrates how, since the Cold War’s end, potential great powers have been positioning themselves to challenge the United States. To spur its economic growth, for some three decades (beginning with Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms) China took a low proﬁle in international politics and avoided confrontation with the United States and its regional neighbors. To spur its modernization as well, China integrated itself in the American-led world order. China’s self-described ‘‘peaceful rise’’ followed the script written by Deng Xiaoping: ‘‘Lie low. Hide your capabilities. Bide your time.’’ The fact that China joined the international economic order did not mean its long-term intentions were benign. Beijing’s long-term goal was not simply to get rich. It was also to become wealthy enough to acquire the military capabilities it needs to compete with the United States for regional hegemony in East Asia. 2 The Great Recession caused a dramatic shift in Beijing’s perceptions of the international balance of power. China now sees the United States in decline while simultaneously viewing itself as having risen to great-power status. China’s newly gained self-conﬁdence was evident in its 2010 foreign policy muscle-ﬂexing. **Objective indicators conﬁrm the reality of China’s rise, and** the **U**nited **S**tates’ corresponding relative **decline**. In 2010, China displaced the United States as the world’s leading manufacturing nation— a crown the United States had held for a century. The International Monetary Fund forecasts that China’s share of world GDP (15%) will draw nearly even with the United States (18%) by 2014 (see Figure 2). This is especially impressive given that China’s share of world GDP was only 2% in 1980 and as recently as 1995 was only 6%. Moreover, **China is on course to overtake the United States as the world’s largest economy**. While analysts disagree on the date when this will happen, the most recent projections by leading economic forecasters have advanced the date dramatically over what was being estimated just a few years ago. For example, in 2003 Goldman Sachs predicted that China would surpass the United States as the world’s largest economy in 2041, and in 2008, it advanced the date to 2028 (Wilson and Purushothaman 2003; O’Neill 2008). However, the most recent forecasts are now that China will pass the United States much sooner than 2028. The Economist Intelligence Unit (2009) predicts China will become the world’s largest economy in 2021; PricewaterhouseCoopers (2010) says 2020, and the Economist magazine says 2019 (World’s Biggest Economy 2010) (see Figure 3). 3 More strikingly, according to a 2011 International Monetary Fund study, in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP), **China will overhaul the U**nited **S**tates **in 2016**. In fact, economist Arvin Subramanian of the Peterson Institute for International Economics has calculated, also using PPP, that China is already the world’s largest economy (Subramanian 2011). 4 What could be clearer proof of the United States’ relative decline than the fact that China will soon leapfrog the United States and become the world’s largest economy, if indeed it has not already done so? That China is poised to displace the United States as the world’s largest economy has more than economic signiﬁcance. It is signiﬁcant geopolitically. The pattern of great-power rise is well established. First, China’s claims of ‘‘peaceful rise’’ notwithstanding, the emergence of new great powers in the international system has invariably been destabilizing geopolitically. The near-simultaneous emergence of the United States, Germany, and Japan as great powers in the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries triggered two world wars (Layne 1993). Second, **as rising great powers become wealthier,** their political ambitions increase and **they convert their** newfound **economic muscle into the military clout** (Zakaria 1998). Already, China is engaged in an impressive military modernization and buildup. While **China** has not yet caught up to the United States’ sophisticated military technology, it clearly **is narrowing the US advantage**. Third, rising powers invariably seek to dominate the regions in which they are situated (Mearsheimer 1). This means that China and the United States are on a collision course in East Asia—the region where the United States has been the incumbent hegemon since 1945, and which an increasingly powerful and assertive China sees as its own backyard. Fourth, as they rise, new great powers acquire economic and political interests abroad, and they seek to acquire the power projection capabilities to defend those interests (Zakaria 1998).

#### Second – Economic decline is crumbling influence and undermining military strength

#### More evidence – dollar collapse, debt, trade deficit, there is no recovery

Layne 11 [Christopher Layne is the Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute. “The unipolar exit: beyond the Pax Americana”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 24:2, 149-164 – June2011, Chetan]

The meltdown’s real significance is that it has both unmasked, and speeded-up, the impact of these deep-seated problems: staggering trade imbalances; a burgeoning national debt; run-away budget deficits; out-of-control expenditure on entitlements programmes; and the progressive de-industrialization of the US economy. In the 1980s, these problems were acutely diagnosed by a number of socalled declinist writers—notably David Calleo (1982), Paul Kennedy (1987), Robert Gilpin (1987), Samuel Huntington (1987), and James Chace (1981)—who predicted that over time these structural economic ills would erode the economic foundations of America’s global pre-eminence. The debate about these predictions was cut short, however, when, in short order, the Soviet Union collapsed, Japan’s economic bubble burst, and the United States experienced an apparent economic revival during the Clinton administration. Now, however, the day of reckoning that was predicted nearly two decades ago is fast approaching. In other words, the ‘declinists’ were right after all. All but overlooked in the current debate about how the United States can digout of the current fiscal and economic quagmire is the ironic probability that all that a ‘recovery’ will accomplish is to put the United States back in the same economically untenable position that it was in before the meltdown began: still dependent on foreign (especially Chinese) capital inflows; still running staggering trade deficits; and saddled with crushing federal government expenditures and private and public sector indebtedness (Bergsten 2009). There will be one difference, however: the long-term economic picture for the United States will be even worse than it was before the meltdown both because of the spectre of runaway inflation looming just over the horizon, and the dollar’s increasingly shaky hold on its status as the global economy’s reserve currency—both of which are tied to the debt bomb that hangs like the sword of Damocles over the United States’ economic future. Optimists, of course, contend that once the United States recovers, fears of a fiscal crisis will fade. After all, they say, the United States faced a larger debt-to- GDP ratio after World War II, and yet embarked on a sustained era of growth. The post-war era, however, was a **golden age of US** industrial and **financial dominance**, trade surpluses, and sustained high growth rates. Those days are gone, however. Forever. The United States today lives in a world that is far different from the immediate post-World War II era. Thus, many economists believe that even in the best case, the United States will emerge from the current crisis with serious handicaps. Chief among these are the increase in the money supply (caused by the massive amount of dollars the Federal Reserve and Treasury have pumped into circulation in the hope of reviving the economy), and the $1 trillion plus budget deficits that the Brookings Institution and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) project the United States will run for at least a decade (CBO 2009; Gale and Auerbach 2009). When the projected deficits are bundled with the persistent US current account deficit, the entitlements overhang (the unfunded future liabilities of Medicare and Social Security), and the cost of two ongoing wars, the result is a ticking debt bomb that threatens the United States’ long-term fiscal stability (Bergsten 2009; Glantz 2009; Stiglitz and Bilmes 2008). As the CBO says, **Even if the recovery occurs as projected and the stimulus bill is allowed to expire, the country will face the highest debt/GDP ratio in 50 years** and an increasingly urgent and unsustainable and urgent fiscal problem’ (CBO 2009). An exclamation point to this prognosis was added in early 2010 when the CBO warned that by 2020 the federal debt-to-GDP ratio could approach 100 per cent (Calmes 2010a; 2010b; CBO 2010; Sanger 2010). Remarkably, proponents of the current Pax Americana foreign policy paradigm believe the debt bomb and the resultant looming fiscal crisis have no implications for America’s strategy of global dominance and worldwide military presence. If the CBO and (and other analysts) are correct, over the next decade the swelling US deficits could imperil the dollar. This is important because, for the foreseeable future, the United States will depend on capital inflows from abroad both to finance its deficit spending and private consumption, and to maintain the dollar’s position as the international economic system’s reserve currency. **The dollar’s reserve currency role underwrites America’s geopolitical pre-eminence,** and if it loses that status US **hegemony literally will be unaffordable**.12 As a leading expert on international economic affairs observed just before the meltdown began, **the dollar’s vulnerability ‘presents potentially significant and underappreciated restraints upon contemporary American political and military predominance’** (Kirshner 2008, 418). Concerns about the dollar’s long-term health predated the current financial and economic crisis (Bergsten 2009; Helleiner 2008, 370–371; Kirshner 2008, 419–421). The meltdown has amplified doubts about the dollar’s future in two key respects. First, the other big players in the international economy now are either military rivals (China) or ambiguous ‘allies’ (Europe) that have their own ambitions and no longer require US protection from the now-vanished Soviet threat. Second, the dollar faces an uncertain future because of concerns that its valuewill diminish over time. Indeed, China, which has vast holdings of American dollars (more than $2 trillion) is worried that America’s fiscal incontinence will leave Beijing holding the bag with huge amounts of depreciated dollars. China’s doubts about the dollar’s future are reflected in its recent calls to for creating a newreserve currency to replace the dollar, and in reports that during his November 2009 trip to Beijing, senior Chinese officials lectured President Obama on their concerns about US budget deficits (Layne 2009a; Pomfret 2010b; Wines 2010).13 In coming years the United States will be under increasing pressure to defend the dollar by preventing runaway inflation. This will require some combination of budget cuts, tax increases, and interest-rate hikes.14 Because exclusive reliance on the last two options could choke-off renewed growth, there is likely to be strong pressure to slash the federal budget in order to hold-down taxes and interest rates. It will be almost impossible to make meaningful cuts in federal spending without deep reductions in defence expenditures because discretionary non-defence—that is, domestic—spending accounts for only about 20 per cent of annual federal outlays (Economic Research Service 2008). In coming years, therefore, the United States probably will face difficult trade-offs between ‘guns or butter’. With US defence spending currently at high absolute levels, domestic political pressure to make steep cuts in defence spending is likely to increase.

#### Third – Overstretch makes it impossible for the US to maintain its security commitments – withering alliances and credibility

#### More evidence – the overstretch military can’t handle multiple future hotspots

Layne 11 [Christopher Layne is the Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute. “The unipolar exit: beyond the Pax Americana”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 24:2, 149-164 – June2011, Chetan]

Today, the United States is saddled with the responsibility for maintaining stability in Europe, East Asia and the Persian Gulf—commitments that are the legacy of the Cold War. In the last 20 years, the United States has taken on additional responsibilities in the Middle East, Central Asia, and Eastern Europe. These strategic obligations require the United States to maintain large, capable— and expensive—military forces. Yet, strategic experts increasingly realize that America’s current force structure is insufficient to meet all of the United States’ far-flung security commitments. This was evidenced in August 2008 when Russia and Georgia went to war. Many US leaders—including Republican presidential nominee John McCain— wanted the United States to come to Georgia’s aid. Quite apart from the dubious wisdomof such a policy, even if it had been the smart thing to do America’s hands were tied. Because of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States simply did not have the forces needed to defend Georgia. Similarly, there is a good deal of evidence that the George W Bush administration wanted to use the military option to squelch the nuclear programmes of Iran and North Korea but was prevented from doing so because the bulk of the US military was committed to the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is now clear that as currently structured, the American military is too small to meet the demands of those two wars alone— much less any other obligations the United States may have. Even before the current financial and economic crisis, however, many experts were raising concerns about the economic costs of America’s hegemonic military posture. For example, the Nobel Prize winning Columbia University economist Joseph Stiglitz and his co-author Linda Bilmes have estimated that the direct and indirect costs of the Iraq War will exceed $3 trillion (Stiglitz and Bilmes 2008). No similar estimate has been made for the Afghanistan conflict, but given the Obama administration’s decision to ramp-up the US effort there, it is bound to be substantial.9 In coming years, the weakening of the US economy and the nation’s ballooning budget deficits are going to make it increasingly difficult to sustain the level of military commitments that US hegemony requires. Simply put, the United States is imperially overstretched: its strategic commitments exceed the resources available to support them. In coming years economic and fiscal constraints also could have a more subtle effect on US primacy. As a hegemon, the United States is very much like a corporation enjoying a monopoly in the marketplace. Monopolists and hegemons have one thing in common: they do not like competition, and both seek to erect formidable entry barriers that discourage the emergence of rivals. For the United States, its military dominance plays the role of entry barrier. US superiority at all levels of warfare is supposed to prevent the emergence of great power challengers to its hegemony. To maintain this preponderant power in the future, the American military will have to be expanded in size, because it is too small to meet present— and likely future—commitments.10 No one can say for certain how long large numbers of US forces will be deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan, but it is safe to say that substantial numbers of troops will be there for a long time. At the same time, in addition to the waging the so-called global counter-insurgency against Islamic fundamentalist terrorist groups (and the concomitant requirements of homeland defence), the United States faces possible future conflicts with North Korea, Iran, China, and Russia. For reasons discussed in the next section, in this emerging strategic environment the cost of maintaining the hard power capabilities—both quantitative and qualitative—needed to sustain American hegemony, and of fighting the kinds of wars that hegemons invariably fight to affirm their dominance, will become ever more onerous. If the United States is unable to sustain its military dominance, the entry barrier that heretofore has kept new great powers from emerging and challenging American hegemony will begin to crumble, and rising powers will conclude that they can leap over the previously insurmountable barrier to great power status. Indeed, when that inflection point is reached, the strategic calculus for aspiring great powers changes, because the costs of great power emergence and counterbalancing decrease, and the payoffs for doing so increase.11 **Here, there is an important feedback loop at work: internal constraints on America’s hegemonic power trigger an external shift in the international distribution of power, which, in turn, exacerbates the effects of US fiscal and strategic overstretch**. This is the geopolitical reality which the United States likely will confront in the next two decades.

### AT Readiness

#### -- Readiness collapse inevitable – equipment shortfalls

Perry and Flournoy 6 (William and Michael, “The US Military: Under Strain and at Risk”, National Defense Magazine, May, http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2006/may/TheU.S.MilitaryUnder.htm)

The Army and the Army National Guard also have experienced **equipment shortfalls** that increased the level of risk to forces deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan and **reduced the readiness** of units in the United States. From the beginning of the Iraq war until as late as last year, the active Army experienced shortages of key equipment — such as radios, up-armored Humvees, trucks, machine guns, rifles, grenade launchers, and night vision equipment — for troops deploying overseas.  While many of these shortfalls havenow been addressed for deployed units, the readiness ratings of many non-deployed units have dropped. This is particularly worrisome because some of these units are slated to deploy later this year. This situation is even worse for Army National Guard units, many of which have had to leave their equipment sets in Iraq for arriving units. These readiness shortfalls are only likely to grow as the war in Iraq continues to accelerate the wear-out rate of all categories of equipment for ground forces.

### Military Backup 1NC

#### The military isn’t stupid – backup capacity solves blackouts

Aimone 9-12 (Dr. Michael, Director of Business Enterprise Integration – Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment), “Statement Before the House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection and Security Technologies,” 2012, http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/Testimony%20-%20Aimone.pdf)

DoD’s facility energy strategy is also focused heavily on grid security in the name of mission assurance. Although the Department’s fixed installations traditionally served largely as a platform for training and deployment of forces, in recent years they have begun to provide direct support for combat operations, such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) flown in Afghanistan from fixed installations here in the United States. Our fixed installations also serve as staging platforms for humanitarian and homeland defense missions. These installations are largely dependent on a commercial power grid that is vulnerable to disruption due to aging infrastructure, weather-related events, and potential kinetic, cyber attack. In 2008, the Defense Science Board warned that DoD’s reliance on a fragile power grid to deliver electricity to its bases places critical missions at risk. 1 Standby Power Generation Currently, DoD ensures that it can continue mission critical activities on base largely through its fleet of on-site power generation equipment. This equipment is connected to essential mission systems and automatically operates in the event of a commercial grid outage. In addition, each installation has standby generators in storage for repositioning as required. Facility power production specialists ensure that the generators are primed and ready to work, and that they are maintained and fueled during an emergency. With careful maintenance these generators can bridge the gap for even a lengthy outage. As further back up to this installed equipment, DoD maintains a strategic stockpile of electrical power generators and support equipment that is kept in operational readiness. For example, during Hurricane Katrina, the Air Force transported more than 2 megawatts of specialized diesel generators from Florida, where they were stored, to Keesler Air Force Base in Mississippi, to support base recovery.

### No Cyber Terror 2NC

#### Studies prove no cyberattacks. Post dates

**The Register ’11** (John Leyden, 1/17, “Cyberwar hype is obscuring real security threats.” http://www.theregister.co.uk/2011/01/17/cyberwar\_hype\_oecd\_study/)

Cyberwar hype is inhibiting government attempts to develop an appropriate response to cybersecurity threats, say computer scientists. A heavyweight study by UK computer scientists for the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) concludes that it is "highly unlikely" there will ever be a "pure cyber war”, comparable with recent conflicts in Afghanistan or the Balkans. Suggestions to the contrary are down to "heavy lobbying" by suppliers, the report's authors – Professor Peter Sommer of the London School of Economics and Dr Ian Brown of the Oxford Internet Institute, University of Oxford – conclude. It is unlikely that there will ever be a true cyberwar. The reasons are: many critical computer systems are protected against known exploits and malware so that designers of new cyberweapons have to identify new weaknesses and exploits; the effects of cyberattacks are difficult to predict – on the one hand they may be less powerful than hoped but may also have more extensive outcomes arising from the interconnectedness of systems, resulting in unwanted damage to perpetrators and their allies. More importantly, there is no strategic reason why any aggressor would limit themselves to only one class of weaponry.

### NO Retal

#### Public anxiety prevents retaliation

Huddy et al. 05 – Professor of political science @ Stony Brook University, Stony Brook, NY [Leonie Huddy, Stanley Feldman (Professor of political science @ Stony Brook University, Stony Brook, NY), Charles Taber (Professor of political science @ Stony Brook University, Stony Brook, NY) & Gallya Lahav (Professor of political science @ Stony Brook University, Stony Brook, NY), “Threat, Anxiety, and Support of Antiterrorism Policies,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 49, No. 3, July 2005, Pp. 593–608]

The findings from this study lend further insight into the future trajectory of support for antiterrorism measures in the United States when we consider the potential effects of anxiety. Security threats in this and other studies increase support for military action (Jentleson 1992; Jentleson and Britton 1998;Herrmann,Tetlock, and Visser 1999). But anxious respondents were less supportive of belligerent military action against terrorists, suggesting an important source of opposition to military intervention. In the aftermath of 9/11, several factors were consistently related to heightened levels of anxiety and related psychological reactions, including living close to the attack sites (Galea et al. 2002; Piotrkowski and Brannen 2002; Silver et al. 2002), and knowing someone who was hurt or killed in the attacks (in this study). It is difficult to say what might happen if the United States were attacked again in the near future. Based on our results, it is plausible that a future threat or actual attack directed at a different geographic region would broaden the number of individuals directly affected by terrorism and concomitantly raise levels of anxiety. This could, in turn, **lower support for overseas military action**. In contrast, in the absence of any additional attacks levels of anxiety are likely to decline slowly over time (we observed a slow decline in this study), weakening opposition to future overseas military action. Since our conclusions are based on analysis of reactions to a single event in a country that has rarely felt the effects of foreign terrorism, we should consider whether they can be generalized to reactions to other terrorist incidents or to reactions under conditions of sustained terrorist action. Our answer is a tentative yes, although there is no conclusive evidence on this point as yet. Some of our findings corroborate evidence from Israel, a country that has prolonged experience with terrorism. For example, Israeli researchers find that perceived risk leads to increased vilification of a threatening group and support for belligerent action (Arian 1989; Bar-Tal and Labin 2001). There is also evidence that Israelis experienced fear during the Gulf War, especially in Tel Aviv where scud missiles were aimed (Arian and Gordon 1993). What is missing, however, is any evidence that anxiety tends to undercut support for belligerent antiterrorism measures under conditions of sustained threat. For the most part, Israeli research has not examined the distinct political effects of anxiety. In conclusion, the findings from this study provide significant new evidence on the political effects of terrorism and psychological reactions to external threat more generally. Many terrorism researchers have speculated that acts of terrorist violence can arouse fear and anxiety in a targeted population, which lead to alienation and social and political dislocation.8 We have clear evidence that the September 11 attacks did induce anxiety in a sizeable minority of Americans. And these emotions were strongly associated with symptoms of depression, appeared to inhibit learning about world events, and weakened support foroverseas military action. This contrasted, however, with Americans’ dominant reaction, which was a heightened concern about future terrorist attacks in the United States that galvanized support for government antiterrorist policy. In this sense, the 9/11 terrorists failed to arouse sufficient levels of anxiety to counteract Americans’ basic desire to strike back in order to increase future national security, even if such action increased the shortterm risk of terrorism at home. Possible future acts of terrorism, or a different enemy, however, could change the fine balance between a public attuned to future risks and one dominated by anxiety.

## Iraq

### 2NC Middle East War

#### Stability comparatively outweighs motives to go to war

Fettweis 7 (Christopher J., Assistant Professor of National Security Affairs in the National Security Decision

Making Department – US Naval War College, “On the Consequences of Failure in Iraq,” Survival, 49(4), p. 83-98)

Without the US presence, a second argument goes, nothing would prevent Sunni–Shia violence from sweeping into every country where the religious divide exists. A Sunni bloc with centres in Riyadh and Cairo might face a Shia bloc headquartered in Tehran, both of which would face enormous pressure from their own people to fight proxy wars across the region. In addition to intraMuslim civil war, cross-border warfare could not be ruled out. Jordan might be the first to send troops into Iraq to secure its own border; once the dam breaks, Iran, Turkey, Syria and Saudi Arabia might follow suit. The Middle East has no shortage of rivalries, any of which might descend into direct conflict after a destabilising US withdrawal. In the worst case, Iran might emerge as the regional hegemon, able to bully and blackmail its neighbours with its new nuclear arsenal. Saudi Arabia and Egypt would soon demand suitable deterrents of their own, and a nuclear arms race would envelop the region. Once again, however, none of these outcomes is particularly likely. Wider war No matter what the outcome in Iraq, the region is not likely to devolve into chaos. Although it might seem counter-intuitive, by most traditional measures the Middle East is very stable. Continuous, uninterrupted governance is the norm, not the exception; most Middle East regimes have been in power for decades. Its monarchies, from Morocco to Jordan to every Gulf state, have generally been in power since these countries gained independence. In Egypt Hosni Mubarak has ruled for almost three decades, and Muammar Gadhafi in Libya for almost four. The region’s autocrats have been more likely to die quiet, natural deaths than meet the hangman or post-coup firing squads. Saddam’s rather unpredictable regime, which attacked its neighbours twice, was one of the few exceptions to this pattern of stability, and he met an end unusual for the modern Middle East. Its regimes have survived potentially destabilising shocks before, and they would be likely to do so again. The region actually experiences very little cross-border warfare, and even less since the end of the Cold War. Saddam again provided an exception, as did the Israelis, with their adventures in Lebanon. Israel fought four wars with neighbouring states in the first 25 years of its existence, but none in the 34 years since. Vicious civil wars that once engulfed Lebanon and Algeria have gone quiet, and its ethnic conflicts do not make the region particularly unique. The biggest risk of an American withdrawal is intensified civil war in Iraq rather than regional conflagration. Iraq’s neighbours will likely not prove eager to fight each other to determine who gets to be the next country to spend itself into penury propping up an unpopular puppet regime next door. As much as the Saudis and Iranians may threaten to intervene on behalf of their coreligionists, they have shown no eagerness to replace the counter-insurgency role that American troops play today. If the United States, with its remarkable military and unlimited resources, could not bring about its desired solutions in Iraq, why would any other country think it could do so?17 Common interest, not the presence of the US military, provides the ultimate foundation for stability. All ruling regimes in the Middle East share a common (and understandable) fear of instability. It is the interest of every actor – the Iraqis, their neighbours and the rest of the world – to see a stable, functioning government emerge in Iraq. If the United States were to withdraw, increased regional cooperation to address that common interest is far more likely than outright warfare.

#### Err Neg – their authors exaggerate

Luttwak 7 (Edward, Senior Associate – Center for Strategic and International Studies, “The Middle of Nowhere”, Prospect Magazine, May, http://www.prospect-magazine.co.uk/article\_details.php?id=9302)

Why are middle east experts so unfailingly wrong? The lesson of history is that men never learn from history, but middle east experts, like the rest of us, should at least learn from their past mistakes. Instead, they just keep repeating them. The first mistake is "five minutes to midnight" catastrophism. The late King Hussein of Jordan was the undisputed master of this genre. Wearing his gravest aspect, he would warn us that with patience finally exhausted the Arab-Israeli conflict was about to explode, that all past conflicts would be dwarfed by what was about to happen unless, unless… And then came the remedy—usually something rather tame when compared with the immense catastrophe predicted, such as resuming this or that stalled negotiation, or getting an American envoy to the scene to make the usual promises to the Palestinians and apply the usual pressures on Israel. We read versions of the standard King Hussein speech in countless newspaper columns, hear identical invocations in the grindingly repetitive radio and television appearances of the usual middle east experts, and are now faced with Hussein's son Abdullah periodically repeating his father's speech almost verbatim. What actually happens at each of these "moments of truth"—and we may be approaching another one—is nothing much; only the same old cyclical conflict which always restarts when peace is about to break out, and always dampens down when the violence becomes intense enough. The ease of filming and reporting out of safe and comfortable Israeli hotels inflates the media coverage of every minor affray. But humanitarians should note that the dead from Jewish-Palestinian fighting since 1921 amount to fewer than 100,000—about as many as are killed in a season of conflict in Darfur.

### 1NC Iran Strikes (US)

#### Iran strikes don’t go nuclear

**Plesch and Butcher**, September **2007** (Dan – Director of the School of Oriental and African Studies at the Centre for International Studies and Diplomacy and Martin – international consultant on security politics, Considering a war with Iran: A discussion paper on WMD in the Middle East, p. http://www.rawstory.com/images/other/IranStudy082807a.pdf)

The US has strategic forces prepared to launch massive strikes on Iran with hours of the order being given. Although there is clear evidence that nuclear weapons use is being given serious political consideration, actual use is unlikely given the lack of effectiveness of nuclear weapons against concealed and buried targets and the negative political consequences of such use. The aim of the new Triad and the Global Strike capability developed under the Bush administration is stated to be making nuclear weapons use less likely.

### 1NC Iran Strikes (Israel)

#### No risk of Israeli strike on Iran

**Rubin, 1/26**/12 – professor at the Interdisciplinary Center in Herzliya, Israel, the Director of the Global Research and International Affairs (GLORIA) Center, and a Senior Fellow at the International Policy Institute for Counterterrorism (Barry, “Israel Isn’t Going to Attack Iran and Neither Will the United States.” http://pjmedia.com/barryrubin/2012/01/26/israel-is-not-about-to-attack-iran-and-neither-is-the-united-states-get-used-to-it/)

The radio superhero The Shadow had the power to “cloud men’s minds.” But nothing clouds men’s minds like anything that has to do with Jews or Israel. This year’s variation on that theme is the idea that Israel is about to attack Iran. Such a claim repeatedly appears in the media. Some have criticized Israel for attacking Iran and turning the Middle East into a cauldron of turmoil (not as if the region needs any help in that department) despite the fact that it hasn’t even happened. On the surface, of course, there is apparent evidence for such a thesis. Israel has talked about attacking Iran and one can make a case for such an operation. Yet any serious consideration of this scenario — based on actual research and real analysis rather than what the uninformed assemble in their own heads or Israeli leaders sending a message to create a situation where an attack isn’t necessary — is this: It isn’t going to happen. Indeed, the main leak from the Israeli government, by an ex-intelligence official who hates Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, has been that the Israeli government already decided not to attack Iran. He says that he worries this might change in the future but there’s no hint that this has happened or will happen. Defense Minister Ehud Barak has publicly denied plans for an imminent attack as have other senior government officials. Of course, one might joke that the fact that Israeli leaders talk about attacking Iran is the biggest proof that they aren’t about to do it. But Israel, like other countries, should be subject to rational analysis. Articles written by others are being spun as saying Israel is going to attack when that’s not what they are saying. I stand by my analysis and before December 31 we will see who was right. I’m not at all worried about stating very clearly that Israel is not going to go to war with Iran. So why are Israelis talking about a potential attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities? Because that’s a good way – indeed, the only way Israel has — to pressure Western countries to work harder on the issue, to increase sanctions and diplomatic efforts. If one believes that somehow pushing Tehran into slowing down or stopping its nuclear weapons drive is the only alternative to war, that greatly concentrates policymakers’ minds. Personally, I don’t participate — consciously or as an instrument — in disinformation campaigns, even if they are for a good cause. Regarding Ronen Bergman’s article in the New York Times, I think the answer is simple: Israeli leaders are not announcing that they are about to attack Iran. They are sending a message that the United States and Europe should act more decisively so that Israel does not feel the need to attack Iran in the future. That is a debate that can be held but it does not deal with a different issue: Is Israel about to attack Iran? The answer is “no.”

### 2NC Iraq Stability

#### History disproves escalation --- no regional war has spread

Simon 07 – Senior Fellow in Middle Eastern Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.

[Steven Simon, “America and Iraq: The Case for Disengagement,” Survival, Volume 49, Issue 1 March 2007 , pages 61 – 84//Informaworld]

A related question is whether the disengagement of US forces in the near term would open the door to a regional war triggered by the civil wars within Iraq. Here definitions matter. Direct armed clashes between or among the armies of Iraq's neighbours do not seem to be on the cards. Although history is not always an infallible guide, mid-to-late twentieth-century civil wars in the region - in Algeria, Yemen, Afghanistan, Pakistan, even Lebanon - have not sparked bigger wars. In most cases, surrounding countries have tried to protect their interests through proxies, while avoiding the risks and costs of military intervention. Even Lebanon, whose civil war ultimately drew in both Syrian and Israeli forces, did not mushroom into a true regional war. Damascus and Jerusalem both took steps to prevent escalation. Indirect conflict, however, is probably inevitable, especially in the absence of a diplomatic process designed to stave off or at least regulate moves by neighbouring countries to protect their interests using proxies. Indeed, this low-profile competition is already underway. To the limited extent the presence of US military forces can stave off a regional war stemming from the violence in Iraq, such a presence could and should be kept in-theatre. But it should not be in Iraq.

#### -- Iraq won’t escalate

Maloney 7 (Suzanne, Senior Fellow – Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Steve Cook, Fellow – Council on Foreign Relations, and Ray Takeyh, Fellow – Council for Foreign Relations, “Why the Iraq War Won’t Engulf the Mideast”, International Herald Tribune, 6-28, http://www.brookings.edu/views/op-ed/maloney20070629.htm)

Long before the Bush administration began selling "the surge" in Iraq as a way to avert a general war in the Middle East, observers both inside and outside the government were growing concerned about the potential for armed conflict among the regional powers. Underlying this anxiety was a scenario in which Iraq's sectarian and ethnic violence spills over into neighboring countries, producing conflicts between the major Arab states and Iran as well as Turkey and the Kurdistan Regional Government. These wars then destabilize the entire region well beyond the current conflict zone, involving heavyweights like Egypt. This is scary stuff indeed, but with the exception of the conflict between Turkey and the Kurds, the scenario is far from an accurate reflection of the way Middle Eastern leaders view the situation in Iraq and calculate their interests there. It is abundantly clear that major outside powers like Saudi Arabia, Iran and Turkey are heavily involved in Iraq. These countries have so much at stake in the future of Iraq that it is natural they would seek to influence political developments in the country. Yet, the Saudis, Iranians, Jordanians, Syrians, and others are very unlikely to go to war either to protect their own sect or ethnic group or to prevent one country from gaining the upper hand in Iraq. The reasons are fairly straightforward. First, Middle Eastern leaders, like politicians everywhere, are primarily interested in one thing: self-preservation. Committing forces to Iraq is an inherently risky proposition, which, if the conflict went badly, could threaten domestic political stability. Moreover, most Arab armies are geared toward regime protection rather than projecting power and thus have little capability for sending troops to Iraq.

### AT Syria (WMD)

#### Geographic proximity, doctrine and battlefield norms prevents Syrian use of biological weapons

Diab, 97 **-** Syrian-born international security analyst living in London(Zuhair, The Nonproliferation Review, Fall, “SYRIA’S CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS: ASSESSING CAPABILITIES AND MOTIVATIONS”, <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol05/51/diab51.pdf>)

While the U.S. government may possess secret infor-mation to back up its claim of an offensive Syrian BW capability, there is no hint of its existence from open sources. Syrian armed forces are equipped with defen-sive equipment but there are no reported exercises in-volving the offensive use of biological weapons, making it unlikely that they have been integrated into Syrian mili-tary doctrine. If security concerns have encouraged Syria to acquire and retain a CW capability, these motivations may not necessarily apply BW. Both Israel and Syria presumably recognize the negative military utility of BW because of the geographical proximity of the two states. Moreover, there is no modern precedent of employing BW on the battlefield, and the moral revulsion surround-ing biological warfare is also far stronger than for nuclear or chemical weapons. Since the military utility of BW is uncertain, the functions of denial and punishment in Syria’s deterrent posture could be met more efficiently with CW. Indeed, what advantage could be gained from threaten- ing the use of a completely untested method of warfare?

#### China isn’t deterred by US presence in Taiwan – if anything, our presence will provoke a war.

**Johnson 5** (Chalomers, President of Japan Policy Research Institute, “China will emerge as Hegemon of east Asia”, Korea Times, June 9)

The Americans are playing an extremely dangerous game to get involved in Taiwan. War with China would be World War III. It would be an unmitigated disaster. The United States probably would also not win the war – it would be like Vietnam. The Chinese probably have the capacity, if the U.S. used nuclear weapons, to retaliate against the West coast U.S. cities. It would be the end of civilization as we know it.

## Microgrids CP

### Solvency – General 2NC

#### None of their answers presume the combination of mechanisms---the full CP altogether resolves deficiencies of any single plank---that solves islanding, and DOD will remedy any failures in the system

Dr. Dorothy Robyn 12, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment, 3/27/12, Testimony before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies, Congressional Documents & Publications, lexis

The first two elements of our facility energy strategy contribute indirectly to installation energy security; in addition, we are addressing the problem directly. A major focus of my office is smart microgrid technology. Smart microgrids and energy storage offer a more robust and cost effective approach to ensuring installation energy security than the current one--namely, back-up generators and (limited) supplies of on-site fuel. Although microgrid systems are in use today, they are relatively unsophisticated, with limited ability to integrate renewable and other distributed energy sources, little or no energy storage capability, uncontrolled load demands and "dumb" distribution that is subject to excessive losses. By contrast, we envision microgrids as local power networks that can utilize distributed energy, manage local energy supply and demand, and operate seamlessly both in parallel to the grid and in "island" mode.

Advanced microgrids are a "triple play" for DoD's installations. Such systems will reduce installation energy costs on a day-to-day basis by allowing for load balancing and demand response. They will also facilitate the incorporation of renewable and other on-site energy generation. Most important, the combination of on-site energy and storage, together with the microgrid's ability to manage local energy supply and demand, will allow an installation to shed non-essential loads and maintain mission-critical loads if the grid goes down.

The Installation Energy Test Bed, discussed below, has funded ten demonstrations of microgrid and storage technologies to evaluate the benefits and risks of alternative approaches and configurations. Demonstrations are underway at Twentynine Palms, CA; Fort Bliss, TX; Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, NJ; Fort Sill, OK; and several other installations.

Although microgrids will address the grid security problem over time, we are taking steps to address near-term concerns. Together with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs, I co-chair DoD's Electric Grid Security Executive Council (EGSEC), which works to improve the security, adequacy and reliability of electricity supplies and related infrastructure key to the continuity of critical defense missions. In addition to working across DoD, the EGSEC works with the Departments of Energy and Homeland Security. The three agencies recently created an Energy Surety Public Private Partnership (ES3P) to work with the private sector. As an initial focus, the ES3P is collaborating with four utilities in the National Capital Region to improve energy security at mission critical facilities.

### Solvency – Grid 2NC

#### Microgrids avoid the problem of renewables shutting down when the base loses macro-grid power

Stephanie Hobby 12, Sandia National Laboratory, 3/23/12, “SPIDERS microgrid project secures military installations,” http://www.sandia.gov/LabNews/120323.html

The goal for SPIDERS microgrid technology is to provide secure control of on-base generation.

“If there is a disruption to the commercial utility power grid, a secure microgrid can isolate from the grid and provide backup power to ensure continuity of mission-critical loads. The microgrid can allow time for the commercial utility to restore service and coordinate reconnection when service is stabilized,” says Col. Nancy Grandy, oversight executive of the SPIDERS Joint Capability Technology Demonstration (JCTD). “This capability provides much-needed energy security for our vital military missions.”

SPIDERS is addressing the challenge of tying intermittent clean energy sources such as solar and wind to a grid.

“People run single diesel generators all the time to support buildings, but they don’t run interconnected diesels with solar, hydrogen fuel cells, and so on, as a significant energy source. It’s not completely unheard of, but it’s a real integration challenge,” says Jason Stamp (6111), Sandia’s lead project engineer for SPIDERS.

Currently, when power is disrupted at a military base, individual buildings switch to backup diesel generators, but that approach has several limitations. Generators might fail to start, and if a building’s backup power system doesn’t start, there is no way to use power from another building’s generator. Most generators are oversized for the load and run at less-than-optimal capacity, and excess fuel is consumed. Furthermore, safety requirements state that all renewable energy sources on base must disconnect when off-site power is lost.

A smart, cybersecure microgrid addresses these issues by allowing renewable energy sources to stay connected and run in coordination with diesel generators, which can all be brought online as needed. Such a system would dramatically help the military increase power reliability, lessen its need for diesel fuel, and reduce its “carbon bootprint.”

“The military has indicated it wants to be protected against disruptions, to integrate renewable energy sources, and to reduce petroleum demand,” Jason says. “SPIDERS is focused on accomplishing those tasks. The end result is having better energy delivery for critical mission support, and that is important for every American.”

SPIDERS uses existing, commercially available technologies for implementation, so the individual technologies are not novel. “What’s novel is the system integration of the various technologies, and demonstrating them in an operational field environment,” says Bill Waugaman (6512), SPIDERS operational lead. “Microgrid concepts are still fairly new, and that’s where Sandia’s microgrid design expertise is coming into play.”

### Solvency – A2: Intermittency

#### Badass battery storage overwhelms the intermittency problem

Girard 12 (Dan, 25 years of technical and project management experience working with utilities, large commercial and industrial customers on various engineering solutions consisting of power issues that include design of substations, power feeders, power factor corrections, new building electrical layout, and campus layouts, “Microgrids 2.0: New Technologies Require a Second Look at an Old Concept,” Renewable Energy World, 6-29, http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/blog/post/2012/06/microgrids-2-0-new-technologies-require-a-second-look-at-an-old-concept)

Talk about the importance of microgrids has reached a fever pitch in recent years. Many have discussed the need for industrial campuses, military bases, universities, and many other critical loads to operate when isolated from the utility grid — or, in other words, as a microgrid. Is this some fancy new smart grid concept? Hardly. A microgrid is essentially any isolated electrical system that has its own generation source, and they’ve been in existence practically since we began using electricity as an energy source. The first true microrgrids were remote, built for cities or businesses that didn’t have an economical way to tie into the nearest utility system. Oil refining, mining, lumber and other business brought generators on site to provide the power they needed to operate. “Quasi” microgrids — where loads use utility generation as their primary source of electricity, but also have local back-up generation sources if there’s a disruption in their utility service — are not a new concept, either. They emerged as certain load types (think hospitals, airports, critical manufacturing processes, and more) grew very dependent on constant energy to operate. These facilities typically brought in two different utility sources of power to assure that if one failed, the other could be used as a back-up. Onsite generation was used as an emergency backup in case of a loss in both utility sources. So…if microgrids have been around for decades, why are they such a hot topic today? The difference is advancements in renewable energy generation and energy storage. Renewable energy generation has only recently have become efficient enough to provide the volume of power that facilities demand. With this increase in efficiency, it’s become practical to use renewable energy generation as a back-up, or even primary, source of generation for important loads. Renewable energy is also becoming more reliable because new battery-based stored energy systems ensure the microgrid can meet demand when production of intermittent renewable sources like wind and solar energy is low. This combination has drawn the attention of many operators of critical facilities, because the energy source holds the potential to be cheap, secure, readily available, and green. The U.S. military, for one, sees potential in these new energy technologies, as do electricity users ranging from data centers to universities. Though industry continues to advance these technologies, they are making their way into real-world microgrid applications. S&C recently worked on a microgrid project at the Santa Rita Jail in California where both renewables and battery-based storage are applied.

### Cyber-Security---2NC

#### Key corporations developing microgrids are making them cyber-secure---and the military votes for the CP

Sandra I. Erwin 11, Editor, National Defense Magazine, July 2011, “High-Tech Weapon Makers Set Sights on ‘Smart Microgrid’ Market,” http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2011/July/Pages/High-TechWeaponMakersSetSightson%E2%80%98SmartMicrogrid%E2%80%99Market.aspx

SBI suggests that most of the military microgrid business will come from U.S. military bases that seek reliable and secure energy. “The majority of U.S. military bases are powered by public electrical grids, which in some instances lead to as many as 300 power outages per year,” the study says. “These interruptions weaken military readiness and security. In the face of a terrorist attack or natural disasters, reliance on conventional energy supplies may be inefficient and may even be detrimental to military functions.”

A Pentagon advisory panel, the Defense Science Board, noted in a 2008 study that military bases’ dependence on often unreliable commercial power suppliers makes Defense Department installations vulnerable. Many defense contractors viewed that study as a cue that they needed to get into the energy business.

Lockheed Martin Corp. is one of several top defense industry firms that are jockeying for position in the microgrid market.

The company recently expanded its “microgrid development center” in Dallas to increase its load capacity from 100 kilowatts to 500 kilowatts, and energy storage from 4 kilowatt hours to 20 kilowatt hours.

Lockheed officials not only see an emerging market in constructing microgrids but also in supplying cybersecurity systems to protect them from hackers or computer viruses.

Lockheed Vice President and Chief Technology Officer Ray Johnson says the company has been pursuing new business in the energy sector for about two years. Revenues from defense-related energy programs currently are minimal, but Lockheed officials anticipate greater Pentagon investments in green programs. “DoD has recognized the strategic importance of energy, and it uses 1.5 percent of the nation’s energy,” Johnson says in an interview. “Energy activities are part of each of our four business areas, and [they] are expanding broadly.”

He predicts smart grids increasingly will become an “imperative” for the Defense Department as it searches for ways in which deployed units and military installations can “operate independently when they’re off the [local] grid.” Smart grids also make it easier to bring renewable energy into a larger grid. Under a 2007 law, the Defense Department by 2025 must generate 25 percent of its electricity from renewable sources, such as wind and solar.

Advanced microgrids have been on the military’s wish list for years, and there is now fresh momentum to begin deploying them, says Elizabeth Porter, director of corporate energy initiatives at Lockheed Martin. The military services are beginning to see the data about potential fuel savings and are interested in moving projects forward, she says.

### Solvency – A2: Multiple Inputs Fail

#### \*Microgrids can easily manage multiple inputs – none of their evidence assumes small customers like the military

Hallett 11-20 (Michael, US Strategic Engagement Staff Officer at NATO, Allied Command Transformation, “Microgrids: A Smart Defense Based NATO Contribution to Energy Security,” Journal of Energy Security, November, http://www.ensec.org/index.php?option=com\_content&view=article&id=390:microgrids-a-smart-defense-based-nato-contribution-to-energy-security&catid=130:issue-content&Itemid=405)

Enhanced power generation utilization efficiency Reliance on fossil fuel to power generators in expeditionary contexts imposes huge costs on the military, not only in fuel but much more importantly in lives lost to attacks on logistics systems. NATO militaries have therefore in many cases been enthusiastic early adopters of alternative power generation technologies based on wind and solar sources because multiple power source capability both increases resilience and reduces operating costs. Every kilowatt produced by a solar or wind system reduces the amount of fuel, and convoys or air drops to deliver that fuel, a remote forward operating base requires. Yet managing diverse power sources is extremely complicated. For example, integrating a solar array into a base power supply infrastructure requires not only knowledge of the microclimate effecting the array and the projected loads but also requires conventional power generation resources on standby to cover the possible shortfalls from the solar generation. Microgirds can help manage this challenge. The small size and focus on key customers of microgrids makes more efficient use of multiple distributed energy resources, like landfill methane, wind, solar and small scale natural gas and co-generation facilities and a variety of storage technologies easier. The microgrid operator can more efficiently manage its loads within the microgrid because the operator can quickly, and without considering possible disruption to other loads, adjust to changes in wind speed or cloud cover by shifting its standby power generation sources or (when available) simply drawing more power from the grid. Microgrids thus provide two important energy security advantages from a military perspective. First, by providing a flexible set of sockets and the intelligent control of distribution systems into which multiple energy generation sources and storage devices can plug, microgrids simplify the base power management task. Second, the use of multiple power generating technology increases the resilience of a base – when power is unavailable (no wind, the convoy of fuel trucks is late, etc.) another power source can fill the gap and preserve continuity of service. The extra costs associated with creating a microgrid able to utilize multiple power generating and storage systems pales into insignificance when compared to the costs of mission failure. Alternative generating technologies provide faster and more visible savings when the financial evaluation is taking place in a context in which the fully burdened costs of fuel (as seen in resupply by air drop or hundred mile truck convoys over hostile terrain) are brought to the forefront of decision making.

## Politics

### Impact 2NC

#### DA outweighs the case ---

#### Escalation is highly probable.

**Geller 2005** (Daniel S. – Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science at Wayne State University, The India-Pakistan Conflict: An Enduring Rivalry, Ed. T. V. Paul, p. 99)

In fact, both the May-July 1999 military engagement between India and Pakistan over Kashmir and the crisis of December 2001-June 2002 after the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament mirrored the conflict escalation pattern for nuclear-armed states. Each side initiated troop mobilization and general military alerts, coupled with the evacuation of civilians from border-area villages. However, the outcome of the future confrontations for India and Pakistan may not adhere to the pattern established by other nuclear dyads. Elements are present in this dyad that were largely absent between other nuclear-armed antagonists and that make the escalation of war more probable. Among those factors are the presence of a contiguous border between India and Pakistan, a history of multiple wars, and an ongoing territorial dispute. These factors, among others,79 increase the likelihood that an Indo-Pakistani dispute will turn violent and that the violence will escalate to war irrespective of the presence of nuclear weapons.

#### That escalation has a high probability of being nuclear.

**Raghavan**, Fall-Winter **2001** (Lieutenant General V. R. – former Director General of Military Operations for India, Limited War and Nuclear Escalation in South Asia, The Nonproliferation Review, p. 1)

The status of India and Pakistan as declared nuclear powers with growing nuclear arsenals has raised the risks of a nuclear exchange between them, if the two countries engage in a large military conflict. The political leadership in both countries does not seem to have fully grasped the implications of nuclear weapons in relation to the ongoing conflict in Jammu and Kashmir. This conflict could lead to a limited war, as it has triggered three wars in the past. The risks involved in fighting a limited war over the Kashmir issue and the potential for such a war to escalate into a nuclear exchange are at best inadequately understood, and at worst brushed aside as an unlikely possibility. Despite this official stance, however, a close examination of Indian and Pakistani military and nuclear doctrine reveals elements that could contribute to the rapid escalation of a limited war to include nuclear weapons. Strikingly, India and Pakistan have not revealed warfighting doctrines for the post-1998 condition of nuclear weapons readiness. It is not clear, for example, what threats to its security would compel India to declare a state of war with Pakistan. There is also no indication of the circumstances that would induce Pakistan to seek a larger war with India. The political objectives that a limited war might seek to achieve have also not been articulated in official and public discourse in the two countries. This article examines the possibility of limited war between India and Pakistan, and the potential of such a conflict triggering a nuclear war. It examines the considerations that could push each of the two countries to fight a limited war. It discusses how such a war might be waged and the circumstances that would likely precipitate an escalation to a nuclear exchange. The doctrinal beliefs and decisionmaking processes of the two countries are examined to trace the likely escalatory spiral towards a nuclear war. The article concludes that the probability of a nuclear war between India and Pakistan is high in the event the two countries engage in a direct military conflict.

#### Two other impacts in 1NC – we’ll impact them here –

#### Chinese economic growth prevents global nuclear war

Kaminski 7 (Antoni Z., Professor – Institute of Political Studies, “World Order: The Mechanics of Threats (Central European Perspective)”, Polish Quarterly of International Affairs, 1, p. 58)

As already argued, the economic advance of China has taken place with relatively few corresponding changes in the political system, although the operation of political and economic institutions has seen some major changes. Still, tools are missing that would allow the establishment of political and legal foundations for the modem economy, or they are too weak. The tools are efficient public administration, the rule of law, clearly defined ownership rights, efficient banking system, etc. For these reasons, many experts fear an economic crisis in China. Considering the importance of the state for the development of the global economy, the crisis would have serious global repercussions. Its political ramifications could be no less dramatic owing to the special position the military occupies in the Chinese political system, and the existence of many potential vexed issues in East Asia (disputes over islands in the China Sea and the Pacific). A potential hotbed of conflict is also Taiwan's status. Economic recession and the related destabilization of internal policies could lead to a political, or even military crisis. The likelihood of the global escalation of the conflict is high, as the interests of Russia, China, Japan, Australia and, first and foremost, the US clash in the region.

#### Indian economic growth is crucial to stabilize South Asia

Garten 95 (Jeffrey, Under Secretary of Commerce for International Trade, FDCH, 3-7, Lexis)

Paramount among those interests are the commercial opportunities that are increasingly at the heart of the Clinton Administration's foreign policy. But it is impossible to separate those commercial interests from our broader interests. Economic reforms enable our companies to take advantage of the opportunities within the Indian market and enable Indian companies to better enter the global marketplace. Economic growth in India is a powerful stabilizing force in a region of the world where stability is of Supreme importance. Stability and growth in India are of enormous importance through southern Asia, from the Middle East to Indochina. Peace and prosperity in that part of the world are essential to the peace and prosperity of the world.

#### Immigration reform will increase high-tech visas.

**Smith**, 11/7/**2012** (Gerry, Technology Industry Puts Immigration Reform As Top Hope For Obama's Second Term, p. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/07/technology-immigration-reform-obama\_n\_2087457.html)

Many startups in New York's "Silicon Alley" say they can't hire enough qualified engineers because of a shortage of temporary work visas and green cards. They have been pushing for legislation that would allow more immigrants with high-tech skills to remain in the country. The issue was not a priority during the president's first term. But on the campaign trail, Obama hinted that it would be a priority in his next term. And in his acceptance speech early Wednesday morning, he said "fixing our immigration system" would be one of the policy issues that he would address "in the coming weeks and months." But to accomplish that, Obama will need help from Congress, which after Tuesday's election, remains divided. Democrats maintained control of the Senate and Republicans kept control of the House. The issue of expanding visas for highly-skilled immigrants has faced opposition from both parties. The STEM Jobs Act, which would have granted more visas to immigrants with math and science degrees, was widely supported by the tech community. But it failed to pass this year in part because Democrats demanded more comprehensive immigration reform. And expanding visa programs are politically controversial: Critics claim they produce an influx in foreign-born workers who depress wages and make it more difficult for American-born workers to find jobs in high-tech fields. Over the past four years, Obama has received high marks from the tech community on some measures. He recently signed laws, for example, that will allow entrepreneurs to use “crowdfunding” to raise capital. But they've expressed disappointed that he hasn't accomplished more. "He hasn’t done as much on tech as we would like but he's clearly leaning toward many of our policy goals," said Andrew Rasiej, chairman of NY Tech Meetup, which hosts monthly gatherings for tech entrepreneurs. Besides immigration, those goals include increasing investment in research and development and science and math education. In a letter he sent last month to NY Tech Meetup, which has more than 27,000 members, Obama said he planned to recruit 10,000 math and science teachers over the next decade and train 2 million workers for high-tech jobs. Now that the election is over, some are optimistic that Obama will give more attention to their top policy issue. "We think the president was sincere in his talk about the need for immigriaton reform in the second term, and we think he'll have a receptive House and Senate who want to look at that issue as well," said Mark Heesen, the president of the National Venture Capital Association, an industry group. One factor may help explain the tech community's optimism that Obama will prioritize their issues in his next term: the industry made sizable contributions to his campaign. Obama raised $7.1 million from members of the tech industry, according to the Center for Responsive Politics.

#### Increasing green cards generates effective IT experts to combat cyber war

McLarty 9 (Thomas F. III, President – McLarty Associates and Former White House Chief of Staff and Task Force Co-Chair, “U.S. Immigration Policy: Report of a CFR-Sponsored Independent Task Force”, 7-8, http://www.cfr.org/ publication/19759/us\_immigration\_policy.html)

We have seen, when you look at the table of the top 20 firms that are H1-B visa requestors, at least 15 of those are IT firms. And as we're seeing across industry, much of the hardware and software that's used in this country is not only manufactured now overseas, but it's developed overseas by scientists and engineers who were educated here in the United States.

We're seeing a lot more activity around cyber-security, certainly noteworthy attacks here very recently. It's becoming an increasingly dominant set of requirements across not only to the Department of Defense, but the Department of Homeland Security and the critical infrastructure that's held in private hands. Was there any discussion or any interest from DOD or DHS as you undertook this review on the security things about what can be done to try to generate a more effective group of IT experts here in the United States, many of which are coming to the U.S. institutions, academic institutions from overseas and often returning back? This potentially puts us at a competitive disadvantage going forward.

MCLARTY: Yes. And I think your question largely is the answer as well. I mean, clearly we have less talented students here studying -- or put another way, more talented students studying in other countries that are gifted, talented, really have a tremendous ability to develop these kind of technology and scientific advances, we're going to be put at an increasingly disadvantage. Where if they come here -- and I kind of like Dr. Land's approach of the green card being handed to them or carefully put in their billfold or purse as they graduate -- then, obviously, that's going to strengthen, I think, our system, our security needs.

#### That *deters* and *solves the impact* to cyberattacks

Saydjari 8 (O. Sami, Cyber Defense Agency, LLC, “Structuring for Strategic Cyber Defense: A Cyber Manhattan Project Blueprint”, 2008 Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, http://www.acsac.org/2008/program /keynotes/saydjari.pdf)

As a step toward a security research plan that includes such capabilities, we should identify endstates— goals in terms of how we want our systems to ideally operate. This fresh perspective includes the overall strategic picture and connects clearly with strategic actions that significantly mitigate strategic vulnerabilities. If, for example, the nation has a capability to quickly recover its critical information infrastructure, then the end-state is that strategic attack damages are mitigated and critical services are restored quickly, possibly deterring adversaries from attempting a future attack. Desired End-States. The National Cyber Defense Initiative (NCDI) Opening Moves Workshop [4] identified important end-states, the outcome of a 10- year research effort to create critical capabilities. The following end-states appear in the workshop proceedings: --Continuity of Critical Information Infrastructure Operations. Create technology that would be the basis for a resilient US cyber infrastructure that would sustain critical functions in the face of attacks, including those that could be affected by determined adversaries. --Well-Defended Critical Assets. Make it economically prohibitive for an adversary to cause strategic damage to critical US infrastructures. Currently, adversaries can attack critical systems without investing substantial resources.

#### Key to leadership

Bush and McLarty 9 (Jeb, Former Governor – Florida and Thomas F. III, President – McLarty Associates, et al., “U.S. Immigration Policy”, CFR Independent Task Force Report, 63, July, http://www.cfr.org/publication/20030/ us\_immigration\_policy.html)

Immigrants are especially important in science, technology, and engineering, which are so **critical to U.S. economic competitiveness**. Foreign students and immigrants make up more than half the scientific researchers in the United States; in 2006, they received 40 percent of science and engineering PhDs and 65 percent of computer science doctorates. Among postdoctoral students doing research at the highest levels, 60 percent are foreign born. This is not a recent development; even in the 1980s, some 40 percent of engineering and computer science students in the United States came from abroad. On one significant measure of innovation, the number of patents issued each year, the United States far surpasses any country in the world; immigrants produce nearly 25 percent of those patents, or roughly twice their share of the U.S. population.30 Other studies have shown that an increase in the number of foreign graduate students in the United States results in significant increases in the number of patent applications.31 Overall, the share of all patents awarded to U.S. scientists of Chinese and Indian origin grew from just 4 percent in the late 1970s to 14 percent in the early part of this decade; at Intel, the world’s largest semiconductor maker, 40 percent of the patents are for work done by Chinese or Indian immigrants. Just as important, this increased innovation by recent immigrants actually coincided with an increase in the number of patents awarded to native-born scientists as well, indicating that American-born and immigrant scientists are **feeding off each other** to enhance the country’s **overall innovative capacity**.32 One in four engineering and technology companies established in the United States between 1995 and 2005 had an immigrant founder.33 The four countries that create the greatest number of new companies per capita—the United States, Canada, Australia, and Israel—all have large immigrant populations.34 It is not an overstatement to say that **the** **U**nited **S**tates **would not enjoy** anything close to its current **technological** and entrepreneurial **leadership if it** had **maintained** a **closed immigration policy**. Amy Chua, the Yale historian and legal scholar, argues in her recent book, *Day of Empire: How Hyperpowers Rise to Global Dominance—and Why They Fall*, that the successful great powers in history have been those able to attract and make use of the most talented people the world has to offer. “At any given historical moment,” she writes, “the most valuable human capital the world has to offer—whether in the form of intelligence, physical strength, skill, knowledge, creativity, networks, commercial innovation, or technological invention—is never to be found in any one locale or with any one ethnic or religious group. **To pull away from** its **rivals on a global scale**, a society must pull into itself and motivate the world’s best and brightest, regardless of ethnicity, religion or background.” America, she argues, has been more successful than any other country in the world in recent history in attracting and mobilizing such talents. The Task Force believes that maintaining robust levels of immigration, allowing for fluctuations based on the state of the economy, is firmly in America’s national interests. In particular, **continuing to attract highly skilled immigrants is critical to the competitiveness of the U.S. economy**, **and to America’s ability to remain the world’s leader in innovation**. The United States must open its doors more widely to such people.

#### Turns ME conflict – Pakistan/India conflict certiantly spills over

### U – AT: Thumpers (Generic)\*\*\*

#### It’s at the top of the docket.

**Weber**, **1/1**/2013 (Joseph, Guns, immigration, fiscal issues emerge as top priorities for Obama, new Congress, Fox News, p. <http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/01/01/gun-control-immigration-reform-fiscal-issues-emerge-as-top-issues-for-new/>)

But in the near term, immigration legislation appears to be high on the docket in the next Congress and second Obama administration term. Washington has tried for years to change the country's immigration policy -- to strengthen border security and stem the flow of illegal immigrants into the U.S.; to reform the visa system for the benefit of those legal immigrants following the rules; and figure out how to address the millions of illegal immigrants already here. Legislative efforts by Democrats and Republicans on comprehensive immigration reform had reached a standstill -- until the issue re-emerged during this election cycle when Obama suspended deportation for many young immigrants brought to the U.S. illegally by their parents. Republicans have since signaled their intentions to be the first to introduce and pass more comprehensive legislation to deal with the roughly 11 million illegal immigrants in the United States, especially after Obama won re-election with roughly 71 percent of the Hispanic vote. However, Obama appeared to re-stake his turf Sunday, saying he would introduce legislation next year to fix “our broken immigration system.”

### U – AT: Fiscal Cliff Thumper 1

#### Immigration reform is at the top of the docket.

**Estes**, **1/2**/2013 (Adam Clark, Obama’s Push for Immigration Reform Starts Now, p. http://www.theatlanticwire.com/politics/2013/01/obamas-push-immigration-reform-starts-now/60525/)

Everybody knew that Obama was going to tackle immigration reform in his second term. We just didn't know how soon. Well, the word is out, and it's good news for anybody eager for lawmakers to tackle an issue that's troubled the country for years. Obama will take on immigration reform this month. A fresh report from The Huffington Post's Elise Foley and Sam Stein quotes anonymous administration officials and Democratic aides in explaining that the president is going to move fast on immigration reform, as well as gun control, and advocates couldn't be happier. None of this is a tremendous surprise, though the expedited timeline is sort of curious. Obama's been talking about sweeping immigration since he took office and, at least until 2009, has left many guessing if and when that's going to happen. He made progress last year when he kept 800,000 young people who had been brought to the United States illegally as children from being deported, making a DREAM Act-like policy initiative as the DREAM Act itself floundered in Congress. Immigration remained an issue through the election, and almost as soon as Obama won his second term, whispers of a renewed push for immigration reform started, though the White House vowed to deal with the fiscal cliff first. Obama then reiterated his commitment to tackle immigration soon on his Meet the Press appearance last weekend. With a fiscal cliff deal (sort of) sealed, it would appear it's immigration time, and details about how the president will handle the challenge are trickling out. Stein and Foley say that California congresswoman Zoe Lofgren will lead the Democratic effort in the House and pushes back at the idea that House Speaker John Boehner will be able to stonewall the effort. "In the end, immigration reform is going to depend very much on whether Speaker Boehner wants to do it or not," she said. Democrats will inevitably have to navigate more than Boehner's will, but some say that the challenge of the fiscal cliff has Capitol Hill ready for some easier negotiations. Or as one pro-immigration reform executive told HuffPost, "The chance to legislate through regular order on immigration reform might have leaders in both parties working together and singing 'Kumbaya.'"

#### Immigration is before economic issues – including budget battles

**York**, **1/2**/2013 (Byron, For Obama, the Economy Never Comes First, Town Hall, p. http://townhall.com/columnists/byronyork/2013/01/02/for-obama-the-economy-never-comes-first-n1477781)

Many Republicans have accused Barack Obama of ignoring the economy. That's not true. The problem with Obama is not that he has ignored the economy, but that it was never his top priority in his first term as president, even as millions of Americans suffered the consequences of a devastating economic downturn. Now, with many still struggling, we know the economy won't be Obama's top concern in his second term, either. On “Meet the Press” on Sunday, when the president was asked to name his top priority for the next four years, he first listed immigration reform. “That's something we should get done,” Obama said. The economy came after that, as the president continued: “The second thing that we've got to do is to stabilize the economy and make sure it's growing.” Obama's third priority for his new term is to manage the explosion in U.S. energy production “in a way that also deals with some of the environmental challenges that we have.” Given that the energy revolution -- fracking and the discovery of huge new sources of gas and oil -- is a key driver of economic growth, Obama's third priority is, in effect, to put the brakes on his second priority. During Obama's first term, when economic conditions bordered on desperate, Republicans often criticized him for putting the economy behind other concerns, most notably national health care. Indeed, the president and Democrats sometimes conceded the criticism when they talked about making a “pivot” to the issue of jobs and the economy from whatever policy pursuit Obama felt was more important at the time. When the time came to run for re-election, Obama finally started talking about the economy -- a lot. He talked about it, and why his economic plan was superior to Mitt Romney's, so much that audiences might well have come away with the impression that economic recovery was the president's top second-term priority. Turns out they would have been wrong. At the same time, even though Obama has long said he wants to pursue immigration reform, he didn't talk about it much in his standard stump speech. In fact, in the speech he used in the final days of the campaign, Obama didn't talk about immigration reform at all, unless one counts his accusation that Republicans want to “turn back the clock 50 years for women, and for immigrants, and for gays.” But now, it's immigration reform first, the economy second.

#### 1NC evidence says immigration fights avoid economic battles and will come before that – Obama’s muscle is key

### A2: Thumpers – General

#### \_\_\_ comes first – it’s on the top of the agenda and Obama is pushing for it now

#### Issues only cost capital once they reach the finish line.

**Drum**, 3/10/**2010** (Kevin – political blogger for Mother Jones, Immigration coming off the back burner?, Mother Jones, p. http://motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2010/03/immigration-coming-back-burner)

Not to pick on Ezra or anything, but this attitude betrays a surprisingly common misconception about political issues in general. The fact is that political dogs never bark until an issue becomes an active one. Opposition to Social Security privatization was pretty mild until 2005, when George Bush turned it into an active issue. Opposition to healthcare reform was mild until 2009, when Barack Obama turned it into an active issue. Etc. I only bring this up because we often take a look at polls and think they tell us what the public thinks about something. But for the most part, they don't.1 That is, they don't until the issue in question is squarely on the table and both sides have spent a couple of months filling the airwaves with their best agitprop. Polling data about gays in the military, for example, hasn't changed a lot over the past year or two, but once Congress takes up the issue in earnest and the Focus on the Family newsletters go out, the push polling starts, Rush Limbaugh picks it up, and Fox News creates an incendiary graphic to go with its saturation coverage — well, that's when the polling will tell you something. And it will probably tell you something different from what it tells you now. Immigration was bubbling along as sort of a background issue during the Bush administration too until 2007, when he tried to move an actual bill. Then all hell broke loose. The same thing will happen this time, and without even a John McCain to act as a conservative point man for a moderate solution. The political environment is worse now than it was in 2007, and I'll be very surprised if it's possible to make any serious progress on immigration reform. "Love 'em or hate 'em," says Ezra, illegal immigrants "aren't at the forefront of people's minds." Maybe not. But they will be soon.

### Wind – 2NC

#### Plan requires lots of capital – Congressional engagement key to Obama’s renewable agenda

Businessweek, 9/6 (“Renewable Energy Is Obama Goal for Next Term, Aide Says”, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-09-06/renewable-energy-is-obama-goal-for-next-term-aide-says)

President Barack Obama’s effort to develop renewable power sources and persuade Congress to adopt a long-term energy policy will be priorities should he win a second term, his top climate and energy aide said. Clean-energy programs and efficiency initiatives will be a focus for the president if he’s re-elected in November, Heather Zichal, Obama’s deputy assistant for energy and climate change, told reporters today in Washington. “The big issue will remain engagement with Congress,” she said. “The president has talked continuously about the need for a long-term energy policy, and I think that will be something that he will obviously remain focused on in the second term.” As a candidate in 2008, Obama pledged to create 5 million green jobs over 10 years by investing in renewable sources such as solar and wind power. He promoted alternatives to fossil fuels as a way to cut U.S. dependence on imported fuel. The 2009 economic-stimulus plan spent a record $90 billion on clean energy, creating 225,000 green jobs after one year, according to the White House. Republicans have used U.S. support for Solyndra LLC, the solar-panel maker that collapsed two years after getting a $535 million U.S. loan guarantee, to depict Obama’s policies as a failure by meddling in the free market. Mitt Romney, the Republican presidential nominee, said federal regulation of oil and gas limit U.S. energy development.

#### Wind saps capital – it’ll get caught up in broader election-year battles – answers their bipart warrant

Geman, 12 (Ben, “Obama presses Congress to extend energy tax incentives”, The Hill, May 8, http://thehill.com/blogs/e2-wire/e2-wire/226021-obama-presses-congress-to-extend-energy-tax-incentives)

President Obama is urging Congress to extend tax breaks for wind power projects that are slated to expire at year’s end and expand stimulus-law tax incentives for manufacturing green energy components. The energy credits are among a wider jobs “to do” list — which even comes with its own logo — that Obama will call on Congress to act upon at an appearance in upstate New York later Tuesday. “Congress needs to help put America in control of its energy future by passing legislation that will extend the Production Tax Credit to support American jobs and manufacturing alongside an expansion of the 30 percent tax credit to investments in clean energy manufacturing (48C Advanced Energy Manufacturing Tax Credit),” the White House said. The wind industy is lobbying heavily for renewal of the Production Tax Credit, which is vital to helping finance new power projects. New wind installations have dropped off significantly when the credit has been allowed to lapse, which last occurred in 2004. The American Wind Energy Association, a trade group, warned in April that with the expiration looming, “the supply chain is feeling the uncertainty, and layoffs have now begun.” While wind power has bipartisan support — Midwest and Great Plains Republicans are particular fans — extension of the credit this year is uncertain amid election-season political battles over green energy and other factors.

### DOD – 1NC

#### Plan unpopular

Sorenson 12

[Lt. Gen Jeff Sorenson, 9/28/12, <http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/economy-a-budget/259163-saving-energy-saving-soldiers-lives>]

From biofuels that could propel the Navy’s Great Green Fleet to spending billions of dollars on renewable energy, the Pentagon’s green energy initiatives have emerged as a contentious topic in Washington. Recent Congressional budget proposals could curtail military efforts to produce alternative fuels because they are currently more expensive than fossil fuels. Yet Pentagon officials insist its focus on energy conservation and renewable energy is essential for national security and improved military capability. Who’s right? Is the Pentagon’s pursuit of green energy an outrageously expensive endeavor or an operational necessity? Yes, the impending concerns about a potential $259 billion budget reduction for the Defense Department over the next five years **might make one question the fiscal sense of investing billions on renewable energy projects.**

### U 2NC

#### Immigration reform will pass --- the election has given Obama a mandate and weakened GOP opposition. That’s the 1NC Foley and Stein 1/2 evidence.

#### Prefer our ev because it is predictive and post-dates their evidence.

#### Immigration reform has momentum and a compromise is likely.

**Grant**, **12/28**/2012 (David, Immigration reform: Is 'amnesty' a possibility now?, Christian Science Monitor, p. <http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2012/1228/Immigration-reform-Is-amnesty-a-possibility-now>)

The momentum of President Obama's resounding victory in November's election – with a big push from Latinos and other minority groups – has catapulted immigration policy to the top of Washington's 2013 agenda, making reform not only possible but also likely. The shift in the political conversation has been so dramatic that even a pathway to citizenship for some of the estimated 12 million undocumented immigrants in the United States – long rejected out of hand by most Republicans and some Democrats – could be part of the deal. The task is momentous. It involves weighing the wishes of industries from agriculture to high-tech, as well as the sensitivities of opening the door to immigrant workers at a time when unemployment remains high. The past only reinforces the potential difficulties ahead. In 1986, Republicans felt betrayed when Democrats stripped the enforcement provisions from a bill that offered citizenship to some 3 million illegal immigrants. By 2005, the issue had become so politically toxic to conservatives that they blocked President George W. Bush's push for a new round of immigration reform. Yet with Election 2012 highlighting the electoral consequences of America's changing demographics, the next year appears to be ripe for compromise. How reforms might take shape could be a major point of contention between the parties, but lawmakers on both sides suddenly see an opportunity for what could be their most expansive achievement of 2013.

#### It will pass --- capital is key.

Financial Times, **1/2**/2013 (Fiscal fights threaten US policy goals, p. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/8f8ef804-5501-11e2-a628-00144feab49a.html?ftcamp=published\_links%2Frss%2Fworld%2Ffeed%2F%2Fproduct#axzz2GrNoEPIS)

Of all the issues crowding Mr Obama’s agenda, immigration has the best hope of passing in some form, as the disastrous vote recorded by Republicans among minorities in 2012 gives them a huge incentive to address the issue. But on everything else, with the Republicans remaining in control of the House, Mr Obama needs all the skills of cajoling, seducing and manipulating Congress that he has so far shown no signs of developing. “I find it remarkable that the president apparently continues to believe that he will not have to deal with people that he does not agree with,” said Mr Galston. “A president who is not disdainful of the art of legislating can get things done.”

#### GOP support ensures passage.

Financial Times, **1/2**/2013 (White House builds immigration pact, p. <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/e6b2805c-4ac9-11e2-929d-00144feab49a.html#axzz2GrNoEPIS>)

As they try to avoid further alienating the US’s fastest growing demographic, Republicans are eager to deal with the issue of immigration reform and get it off the table before the 2014 midterm elections. That could help its passage through Congress and help repair relations following Mr Romney’s presidential bid. “This was a big mistake from the start of the Republican primaries, when the candidates had very ugly positions and antagonised Latinos,” said Alfonso Aguilar, executive director of the Latino Partnership for Conservative Principles and an influential Republican voice on immigration. “Now we’ve got to get back to the principles of George W. Bush and reclaim this issue,” he said, referring to the former president’s relatively open approach to immigration. In a Latino Decisions poll taken on the eve of the election, 31 per cent said they would be more likely to vote Republican if the Republican party took a leadership role in supporting comprehensive immigration reform with an eventual pathway to citizenship for undocumented immigrants.

### Capital Key 2NC

#### Capital is key --- without Obama’s support, Democrats will let CIR die. Presidential leadership is the most important factor --- that’s the 1NC DMN evidence.

#### Obama needs to spend capital to get CIR.

**Hesson**, **1/2**/2013 (Ted, Analysis: 6 Things To Do for Immigration Reform, ABC News, p. http://abcnews.go.com/ABC\_Univision/News/things-president-obama-immigration-reform/story?id=18103115#.UOSvpG88CSo)

On Sunday, President Barack Obama said that immigration reform is a "top priority" on his agenda and that he would introduce legislation in his first year. To find out what he needs to do to make reform a reality, we talked to Lynn Tramonte, the deputy director at America's Voice, a group that lobbies for immigration reform, and Muzaffar Chishti, the director of the New York office of the Migration Policy Institute, a think tank. Here's what we came up with. 1. Be a Leader During Obama's first term, bipartisan legislation never got off the ground. The president needs to do a better job leading the charge this time around, according to Chishti. "He has to make it clear that it's a high priority of his," he said. "He has to make it clear that he'll use his bully pulpit and his political muscle to make it happen, and he has to be open to using his veto power." His announcement this weekend is a step in that direction, but he needs to follow through.

#### The plan’s controversial fight spills over to immigration reform.

**O’Brien**, **12/30**/2012 (Michael, Immigration and gun violence top president's post-fiscal cliff agenda, NBC News, p. http://nbcpolitics.nbcnews.com/\_news/2012/12/30/16239613-immigration-and-gun-violence-top-presidents-post-fiscal-cliff-agenda?lite)

The president discussed efforts to address gun violence and immigration with particular urgency on Sunday. "I've said that fixing our broken immigration system is a top priority," he said. "I will introduce legislation in the first year to get that done. I think we have talked about it long enough." And in the aftermath of December's deadly elementary school shooting in Newtown, Conn., the president vowed to put his "full weight" behind the gun violence recommendations he asked Vice President Joe Biden to generate. Obama said that battle would also be fought during the first year of his second term, the success of which the president suggested would hinge upon just how searing the deadly shooting was to the public psyche. "Will there be resistance? Absolutely there will be resistance," the president told NBC's David Gregory. "And the question then becomes whether we are actually shook up enough by what happened here that it does not just become another one of these routine episodes where it gets a lot of attention for a couple of weeks and then it drifts away. It certainly won't feel like that to me. This is something that was the worst day of my presidency. And it's not something that I want to see repeated." Obama also said he was "skeptical" of the National Rifle Association's proposal to put an armed guard in every school, though he said he would not "prejudge" any proposals to address mass shooting events. Those items alone might constitute an ambitious agenda for a second-term president, who, history suggests, has a limited timetable to accomplish top goals before the waning powers of a lame-duck presidency set in. But Obama added to that list two other priorities which eluded him in his first term. He said energy and the environment would be a "third thing" on his second term agenda, for instance. "We've got a huge opportunity around energy. We are producing more energy and America can become an energy exporter," the president said. "How do we do that in a way that also deals with some of the environmental challenges that we have at the same time?" The president acknowledged, though, that his top priority is preventing automatic tax hikes on all Americans come Jan. 1 as part of the fiscal cliff. That battle has been playing out vividly in Washington during the final days of 2012, and directly involves the fourth priority as described by Obama: stabilizing and growing the economy. "Part of that is deficit reduction. Part of it is also making sure that we're investing, for example, in rebuilding our infrastructure, which is broken," he said, arguing that the combination of spending cuts elsewhere and new investments would help stabilize the economy. But Obama's ability to accomplish those four priorities — and then some — could be sapped by the protracted fiscal cliff battle, or any of the other legislative battles he might encounter along the way.