# 1AC

### Plan

#### The Tennessee Valley Authority should increase procurement contracts for mixed oxide fuel for its electricity generation in the United States.

### Nuclear Cooperation

#### Advantage one – nuclear cooperation

#### The groundwork exists for US-Russian plutonium cooperation – *however*, electricity produced from MOX is key to fulfill the PMDA

DTRIP ’12

Defense Treaty Inspection Readiness Program, “Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement”, 2012, http://dtirp.dtra.mil/tic/synopses/pmda.aspx

The Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA), [long title: Agreement Between the Government of The United States Of America and the Government of The Russian Federation Concerning the Management and Disposition of Plutonium Designated as no Longer Required for Defense Purposes and Related Cooperation] is designed to make arms reductions irreversible by ensuring that the United States and Russia transparently dispose of weapons-grade plutonium from their respective defense programs and, thereby, prevent the plutonium from ever being reused for weapons or any other military purpose. Under the PMDA the United States and Russia each agreed to dispose of no less than 34 metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium by converting it into fuel for use in civil reactors that produce electricity. Combined, this represents enough material for approximately 17,000 nuclear weapons. The PMDA also provides that additional weapons-grade plutonium declared in excess as arms reductions go forward should be disposed of under the same or comparable transparency terms. In 2006, Russia announced its nuclear energy strategy. This strategy was incompatible with the 2000 PMDA. In 2007, Russia provided clarification of its preferred approach to the disposition of weapons-grade plutonium. This clarification served as the basis for updating the PMDA via the protocol signed on April 13, 2010 by U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. The 2010 protocol enables each party to proceed with completing and operating the facilities needed to depose of weapons-grade plutonium. These facilities will use the plutonium to produce electricity for civilian purposes. In December 2010, the U.S. Deputy Secretary of Energy and the Russian Director General for the State Corporation "Rosatom” issued the Joint Statement on the Results of the Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Security Working Group Meeting, including the intent to create milestones by February 2011 for bringing the PMDA into force. On May 20, 2011, Russia's State Duma ratified the PMDA and its Protocols. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev approved the amendments to the PMDA on June 7, 2011. On July 13, 2011, Secretary Clinton and Foreign Minister Lavrov exchanged diplomatic notes in Washington, D.C., bringing the PMDA and its Protocols into force. Weapons-grade plutonium, unlike weapons-grade uranium, cannot be blended with other materials to make it unusable in weapons. However, weapons-grade plutonium can be fabricated into mixed oxide uranium-plutonium (MOX) fuel and irradiated in civil nuclear power reactors to produce electricity. This irradiation results in spent fuel – a form that is not usable for weapons or other military purposes. The protocol also prohibits spent fuel from being changed in the future unless it is subject to agreed international monitoring measures and is used only for civilian purposes. Both Russia and the United States plan to begin disposition activities by 2018. Potential Facility Impacts Key Verification Measures To provide confidence that the Parties are disposing of weapons-grade plutonium in accordance with the terms and conditions of the amended PMDA, disposition activities on both sides will be subject to monitoring and on-site inspection. The Parties met in the PMDA Joint Consultative Commission to clarify key elements of the PMDA’s compliance verification regime. Next steps include consulting with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and negotiating an agreement whereby the IAEA will monitor the Party’s disposition activities and conduct on-site inspections to verify compliance with the PMDA. In August 2010, Secretary Clinton and Foreign Minister Lavrov submitted a joint request to IAEA Director General Amano for consultation regarding an agreement whereby the IAEA will monitor the Party’s disposition activities and conduct on-site inspections to verify compliance with the PMDA. As of July 2012, the two countries and the IAEA were making progress on appropriate IAEA verification measures for each country’s disposition program. back to top Current Activities Recent Developments The United States is expected to provide $400 million in assistance for the disposal of surplus Russian plutonium, according to the Russian Foreign Ministry. Moscow will fund the remaining balance, setting aside an estimated $3.5 billion for the effort. Next, the United States and Russia must reach an agreement on milestones for allocation of the U.S. contribution. To implement the PMDA in the United States, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is building a Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility at the Savannah River Site (SRS) near Aiken, South Carolina. The facility will provide a capability to disassemble nuclear weapons pits and convert the resulting plutonium into a form suitable to be made into MOX fuel. A Waste Solidification Building will handle the waste resulting from pit disassembly and MOX operations. When operational, the facility will be capable of turning 3.5 metric tons of weapon-grade plutonium into MOX fuel assemblies annually. The facility will be licensed for 20 years, with operations to continue into the 2030s. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission is overseeing construction of the facility. It will be a hardened facility, similar to a nuclear reactor. As of June 2012, the MOX facility is scheduled to begin operation in 2016 and is more than 60 percent complete. Since construction began in 2007, more than 19,000 tons of rebar have been installed and over 118,000 cubic yards of concrete have been placed. More than 400,000 feet of process piping and nearly six million feet of electrical cable are currently being installed, while installation of the process tanks is 90 percent complete. Eleven of the sixteen auxiliary buildings needed to support construction and operation of the MOX facility have been finished, including a new electrical substation which was completed in September 2010.

#### MOX is key – any alternative *explicitly violates* the terms of the treaty

Wolfe '12

Clinton R., PhD in Chemistry, executive director of Citizens for Nuclear Technology Awareness in Aiken, S.C. He formerly chaired the Technical Advisory Panel to the U.S. Department of Energy's Plutonium Focus Area, "Guest Column" The Augustana Chronicles, Augustana GA, 11/18/12 www.c-n-t-a.com/letters.htm#GN1208

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Clinton administration made treaty obligations with the Russians in 1993 to convert weapons of mass destruction into energy for peaceful purposes - an initiative dubbed "Megatons to Megawatts." As a result of that initiative, high-enriched uranium, which had been in Soviet weapons targeting the United States and our allies, was sold to the United States and blended down to make low-enriched uranium for fuel for U.S. nuclear reactors.¶ FULLY 50 PERCENT of our nuclear-generated electricity in recent years, or 10 percent of our total electricity generation in the United States, derives from former Soviet weapons. Negotiations between the United States and Russia as to the fate of plutonium-based weapons material resulted in 2000 in a plutonium management and disposition agreement, in which each country committed to dispose of 34 metric tons of plutonium.¶ The Russians were aware that many approaches that might environmentally immobilize the plutonium in some relatively intractable matrix, such as a ceramic puck, still left the plutonium in a form that could be processed and recovered for use in weapons if we ever changed our minds. All options for disposition of plutonium were multibillion-dollar projects, and in the end all options but one led to very expensive nonproliferation safeguards and security measures ad infinitum.¶ That one option was MOX. Exposure of the plutonium in a nuclear reactor fuel cycle changes the nature of the plutonium in such a way as to render it unattractive for use in a nuclear weapon.¶ In addition to the obvious benefit of reducing the attractiveness of the plutonium for weapons, thereby reducing concerns over proliferation and many of the costs associated with safeguards and accountability, MOX provides additional benefits. Thirty-four metric tons of plutonium can provide electricity for a million homes for 50 years, a product worth tens of billions of dollars.¶ NO OTHER OPTION has any cost recovery component, so MOX embodies the benefits of disposing of the weapons threat, creating clean electricity for 50 million homes, recovering at least partial cost of the program, eliminating the permanent costs of safeguarding the material, and representing an accomplishment achieved by two nations who were near nuclear war - allowing them to step back from the brink of unthinkable destruction and to instead use those instruments of war for peaceful purposes.¶ We made the right choice. We are more than halfway to completion of the MOX facility, and changing course would be much more expensive than staying the course. We need to demonstrate our commitment to our treaty obligations and bask in the comfort of knowing that mankind can make decisions of this importance and actually pull them off.

#### Any waste alternative devastates all nuclear cooperation – violates reciprocity and forces the treaty open for future changes

Wolfe '11

Clinton R., PhD in Chemistry, executive director of Citizens for Nuclear Technology Awareness in Aiken, S.C. He formerly chaired the Technical Advisory Panel to the U.S. Department of Energy's Plutonium Focus Area, " “July 6, 2011¶ Letter/column in¶ The Augusta Chronicle - Augusta GA¶ Examine big picture of MOX mission “ www.c-n-t-a.com/letters.htm#GN1208

I would like to first consider his reference to cost vs. the alternative. The decision to make MOX fuel out of weapons-grade plutonium was reached after considering numerous disposition paths. Each of the alternatives had financial, technical or political shortcomings. Discussions with the Russians over how to dispose of plutonium became necessary after agreements between our countries in 1993 that provided for the dismantling of U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons.¶ Reciprocity was a given as a matter of trust, and the Russians would not consider treating highly enriched uranium and plutonium as wastes. They maintained, and correctly so, that these materials were valuable sources of energy. As a consequence, blend-down of highly enriched uranium from former Soviet nuclear weapons that were aimed at us and our allies now provides 50 percent of our nuclear generated electricity in the United States today.¶ This agreement already has netted a huge economic benefit to the United States and to any country with nuclear-generating capacity, as the cost of uranium for fuel has been moderated by this huge supply from the Russian and U.S. arsenals.¶ The plutonium portion of the weapons agreements was slower in coming to fruition, but each country committed to an initial disposition of 34 metric tons with more possibly to follow. This represents about 50 percent of all the weapons-grade plutonium ever produced in the United States. Conversion of this material into mixed-oxide fuel will power a million homes for more than 50 years, and that energy is worth tens of billions of dollars.¶ Choosing to delay or cancel the MOX project would require revisiting all the old alternatives, including surveillance, and all of them cost a lot of money. Add to that the potential for our treaty partners to take exception to our reneging, and we introduce the possibility of the loss of credibility in a crucial area of our foreign policy. The Russians were suspicious of proposed disposition paths that left the plutonium in a recoverable state.¶ So a big-picture look at the MOX project reveals advantages that can't be measured in mere dollars and cents. The project has helped kick-start a dormant nuclear manufacturing supply chain whose rebirth is a must if we are to build the next generation of nuclear power plants.¶ MOX represents the culmination of two superpowers stepping back from the unthinkable and converting an awesome amount of potential destruction into energy, while rendering the plutonium unusable for weapons for all time.¶ This modern example of "swords to plowshares" is an amazing achievement in our foreign policy and how we interact with our former adversary. Trashing that accomplishment in the name of tight budgets would be penny-wise and pound-foolish.

#### MOX facility key – programs must proceed in parallel to solve the agreement

Wolfe 2/17

Clinton R., PhD in Chemistry, executive director of Citizens for Nuclear Technology Awareness in Aiken, S.C. He formerly chaired the Technical Advisory Panel to the U.S. Department of Energy's Plutonium Focus Area, "Too much is at stake to throw MOX nuclear project into jeopardy," 2/17/13 m.chronicle.augusta.com/opinion/opinion-columns/2013-02-17/too-much-stake-throw-mox-nuclear-project-jeopardy

In any event, it is reckless and foolish to talk about terminating the program because of costs since the facility is more that 60 percent complete. It will cost a lot less to finish than to start over on another multibillion-dollar program that can’t really eliminate the plutonium threat the way that MOX can. Russia currently is ahead of us in progress toward eliminating their plutonium, but it has made it clear that it will not eliminate its stockpile until America is ready to do likewise. The programs are, therefore, inextricably linked.¶ ¶ ON DEC, 3, 2012, barely two months ago, President Obama gave a talk at the National War College in Washington, D.C. His remarks were delivered on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the Nunn-Lugar initiative, which the president called one of the smartest and most successful national security programs.¶ He lauded the visionary leadership of the two former senators, Nunn, D-Ga., and Richard Lugar, R-Ind. (Yes, in those days it was OK for members of opposite parties to work together for the good of the country.) He urged the nation to be vigilant with regard to the nonproliferation theme of Nunn-Lugar and to continue to invest in people and technology: “We have to sustain the partnerships we have, and that includes Russia.” The president also said, “It took decades – and extraordinary sums of money – to build those arsenals. It’s going to take decades – and continued investments – to dismantle them.”

#### MOX infrastructure is *reverse causal* – the plan *creates* broader nuclear cooperation

Sokova ’10

Elena, research associate at the Monterey Institute of International Studies “Plutonium Disposition”, NTI, 9-16-2010, http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/plutonium-disposition-14/

To ensure the plutonium subject to disposition is irreversibly removed from use in nuclear weapons, the September 2000 agreement specified the two sides would implement monitoring and inspection activities. The agreement also provides for International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) verification once appropriate agreements with the IAEA are concluded. These provisions were re-emphasized in the 2010 protocol, which states that each party will "begin consultations with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at an early date and undertake all other necessary steps to conclude appropriate agreements with the IAEA to allow it to implement verification measures."[14] Nevertheless, much work on the establishment of a verification regime still needs to be done and this is unlikely to be completed before 2011, by which point the protocol should have entered into force.[15]¶ The 2010 protocol to the PMDA represents a significant step forward, but the agreement itself is limited in scope. Once the two countries have disposed of the required 34 metric tons, significant quantities will remain. The United States will continue to possess 16 tons of excess military plutonium in various waste and fuel forms, while Russia will retain at least 16 tons of weapons-grade plutonium declared excess to its defense program. These numbers are likely to increase once the two parties begin dismantling their nuclear arsenals under the 2010 START follow-on treaty. However, the United States and Russia can continue plutonium disposition beyond 34 metric tons should they wish to do so and the existence of an operational infrastructure for MOX fuel fabrication makes this possible.

#### Plutonium cooperation is vital – all other agreements are focused on arms reductions but don’t address weapons-grade material

Clinton and Lavrov ’10

Secretary of State and Russian Foreign Minister, “Signing of the Plutonium Disposition Protocol”, Mission of the United States Geneva Switzerland, 4-13-2010, http://geneva.usmission.gov/2010/04/14/signing-pmda/

SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, good afternoon, and let me state the obvious. I am very pleased that Foreign Minister Lavrov and I are able to do this together. We have had many meetings over the past 15 months and I always look forward to a productive discussion, a candid exchange of views, and a determination to make progress together. This is an historic time for U.S.-Russian relations. Last week, our presidents signed the new START treaty, which will make our two countries and the world safer and more secure by reducing the number of strategic nuclear weapons in our stockpiles. And this week, we’ve gathered with representatives from more than 45 nations to address the urgent global threat posed by vulnerable nuclear material. And now, we are taking another step to increase our mutual security and deepen our bilateral cooperation. Under the agreement we are about to sign, the United States and Russia will each irreversibly and transparently dispose of no less than 34 metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium. Together, that is enough material for nearly 17,000 nuclear weapons. And we will put in place the framework and infrastructure needed to dispose of even more plutonium from defense programs in the future. The agreement provides for monitoring and inspections that will ensure that this material will never again be used for weapons or any other military purpose. By using civil nuclear reactors to dispose of the plutonium, we gain an added benefit – to produce electricity for our people, even as we remove a potential serious danger. And I want to thank the two teams from both Russia and the United States who worked together to hammer out this agreement. I see familiar faces, both from my country and now, after so many meetings, familiar faces from Russia. And Minister Lavrov and I could not be standing here without the extraordinary expertise and commitment that these teams brought to this occasion. Thank you very much. FOREIGN MINISTER LAVROV: Thank you. And I believe that the protocol which we are about to sign, the protocol to the agreement on utilization of weapon-grade plutonium, the agreement of the year 2000, actually, signed at that time but not implemented because of some technical reasons – the protocol which we are signing today is going to remove those technical impediments and obstacles, and the agreement would be implemented in practical terms. Thirty-four tons of plutonium, which the United States and Russia each would utilize, is a lot. It’s certainly a step in the direction of our shared goal of nuclear disarmament, because apart from actual limitations and reductions in nuclear strategic offensive arms, you need to do something about the plutonium which is released because of that process. And the event which you are witnessing here today is of – well, maybe not less important, but certainly it’s of very significant importance. And we would be doing this process, we would be doing these – implementing these obligations transparently, as the Secretary said, and in the way which would absolutely preclude military use of this plutonium in the future and which ensure its effective and safe usage for peaceful purposes to produce nuclear energy. And we certainly consider that this step is the contribution by the Russian Federation and the United States towards the implementation of Article Six of the fNonproliferation Treaty. When this mechanism starts working, we expect its positive influence on the process of nonproliferation, including making the process of nuclear disarmament multilateral at some point, hopefully not very far from today. And this is what we believe is the significance of this event. To utilize 34 metric tons of plutonium in Russia, the Russian Government will spend approximately $2.5 billion and we are grateful to the United States for contributing to this program by providing up to $400 million for this particular program. Thank you very much, and I join the Secretary in thanking the teams which negotiated this agreement.

#### Nuclear cooperation spills up – creates the momentum for integrated responses to future threats

Luongo ‘07

Kenneth N., executive director of the Russian-American Nuclear Security Advisory Council “Improving U.S.-Russian Nuclear Cooperation”, Partnership for Global Security, 2007, http://www.partnershipforglobalsecurity.org/publications/Articles%20and%20Commentary/improving\_nuc\_coop.html

Expediting fissile material disposition and elimination. Although programs that support the disposal of excess fissile materials in the United States and Russia have shown progress, there is room, and need, for improvement. The Highly Enriched Uranium Purchase agreement could be expanded to handle more than the current allotment of 500 metric tons. The plutonium disposition program, now in political limbo, could be put back on track so that implementation can proceed as scheduled. In addition, the United States and Russia should begin to determine how much more plutonium is excess and could be eliminated. Ending plutonium production in Russia. Continuing plutonium production for both military and commercial purposes adds to the already significant burden of improving nuclear material security in Russia. Steps should be taken to end this production expeditiously. Russia has three remaining plutonium-producing reactors, which currently produce approximately 1.5 metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium per year. However, the reactors also provide heat and energy for surrounding towns, and in order to shut them down, other energy sources must be provided. In 2000, Congress prohibited the use of funds to build alternative fossil-fuel energy plants at these sites, the method preferred by both Russia and the United States for replacing the nuclear plants. The estimated cost of the new plants is on the order of $420 million. Congress should lift its prohibition and provide funding for building the replacement plants. Also, Congress should provide funds to enable the United States and Russia to continue their work on an inventory of Russia's plutonium production. Finally, Congress should authorize and fund incentives to help end plutonium reprocessing in Russia. In 2000, program officials requested about $50 million for a set of projects to provide Russia with an incentive to end its continued separation of plutonium from spent fuel. But Congress approved only $23 million, and the Bush administration's proposed budget eliminated all funding. These programs should be reconstituted. There is no question that U.S.-Russian nuclear relations need to be adapted to the 21st century. The foundation for this transition has been laid by the endurance and successes of the cooperative security agenda. Today, each country knows much more about the operation of the other's weapons facilities. Technical experts cooperate on topics that were once taboo. And the most secretive weapons scientists in both nations have become collaborators on efforts to protect international security. Both nations must now recognize that more progress is needed and that it can be built on this foundation of achievement--if, in fact, elimination of the last vestiges of Cold War nuclear competition and the development of effective cooperation in fighting future threats is what the United States and Russia truly seek.

#### That solves nuclear war

Allison and Blackwill 11

[Graham Allison, Director, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs; Douglas Dillon Professor of Government; Faculty Chair, Dubai Initiative, Harvard Kennedy School, Robert D. Blackwill, International Council Member, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs 10-30, "10 Reasons Why Russia Still Matters"http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/21469/10\_reasons\_why\_russia\_still\_matters.html]

That central point is that Russia matters a great deal to a U.S. government seeking to defend and advance its national interests. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s decision to return next year as president makes it all the more critical for Washington to manage its relationship with Russia through coherent, realistic policies. No one denies that Russia is a dangerous, difficult, often disappointing state to do business with. We should not overlook its many human rights and legal failures. Nonetheless, Russia is a player whose choices affect our vital interests in nuclear security and energy. It is key to supplying 100,000 U.S. troops fighting in Afghanistan and preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Ten realities require U.S. policymakers to advance our nation’s interests by engaging and working with Moscow. First, Russia remains the only nation that can erase the United States from the map in 30 minutes. As every president since John F. Kennedy has recognized, Russia’s cooperation is critical to averting nuclear war. Second, Russia is our most consequential partner in preventing nuclear terrorism. Through a combination of more than $11 billion in U.S. aid, provided through the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program, and impressive Russian professionalism, two decades after the collapse of the “evil empire,” not one nuclear weapon has been found loose. Third, Russia plays an essential role in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and missile-delivery systems. As Washington seeks to stop Iran’s drive toward nuclear weapons, Russian choices to sell or withhold sensitive technologies are the difference between failure and the possibility of success. Fourth, Russian support in sharing intelligence and cooperating in operations remains essential to the U.S. war to destroy Al Qaeda and combat other transnational terrorist groups. Fifth, Russia provides a vital supply line to 100,000 U.S. troops fighting in Afghanistan. As U.S. relations with Pakistan have deteriorated, the Russian lifeline has grown ever more important and now accounts for half all daily deliveries. Sixth, Russia is the world’s largest oil producer and second largest gas producer. Over the past decade, Russia has added more oil and gas exports to world energy markets than any other nation. Most major energy transport routes from Eurasia start in Russia or cross its nine time zones. As citizens of a country that imports two of every three of the 20 million barrels of oil that fuel U.S. cars daily, Americans feel Russia’s impact at our gas pumps. Seventh, Moscow is an important player in today’s international system. It is no accident that Russia is one of the five veto-wielding, permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, as well as a member of the G-8 and G-20. A Moscow more closely aligned with U.S. goals would be significant in the balance of power to shape an environment in which China can emerge as a global power without overturning the existing order. Eighth, Russia is the largest country on Earth by land area, abutting China on the East, Poland in the West and the United States across the Arctic. This territory provides transit corridors for supplies to global markets whose stability is vital to the U.S. economy. Ninth, Russia’s brainpower is reflected in the fact that it has won more Nobel Prizes for science than all of Asia, places first in most math competitions and dominates the world chess masters list. The only way U.S. astronauts can now travel to and from the International Space Station is to hitch a ride on Russian rockets. The co-founder of the most advanced digital company in the world, Google, is Russian-born Sergei Brin. Tenth, Russia’s potential as a spoiler is difficult to exaggerate. Consider what a Russian president intent on frustrating U.S. international objectives could do — from stopping the supply flow to Afghanistan to selling S-300 air defense missiles to Tehran to joining China in preventing U.N. Security Council resolutions. So next time you hear a policymaker dismissing Russia with rhetoric about “who cares?” ask them to identify nations that matter more to U.S. success, or failure, in advancing our national interests.

#### Even absent the broader relationship, nuclear cooperation solves nuclear war

Lukyanov ’11

Fyodor, editor-in-chief of Russia in Global Politics magazine, “Nuclear destruction remains the basis of relations”, The Telegraph, 1-5-2011, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sponsored/russianow/opinion/8241050/Nuclear-destruction-remains-the-basis-of-Russia-US-relations.html

When President Dmitry Medvedev warned in his latest state-of-the-nation address that a new arms race could begin in the next decade, the hall erupted in applause. No wonder. For many of the Russian senators in the audience, that term calls to mind their younger years, something pleasant in and of itself. Added to which many people on both sides of the Atlantic, it seems, sorely miss those “good old days” when everything was clear: two worlds, two systems, and explicit rules of the game.¶ One finds oneself thinking of the advantages of a systemic confrontation, given the political and legal free-for-all into which the planet has been sinking ever since.¶ But reminiscences aside, what did the president mean? And we should consider that Prime Minister Vladimir Putin also said in his recent interview with Larry King that an arms race would lead not only to the failure of the anti-missile defence shield but also to the non-ratification of Start II. The latter is doubtful: that agreement is not of such calibre. But as for the anti-missile defences, Moscow’s logic is understandable.¶ The question remains: can Russia and the US break the vicious circle of mutual nuclear containment, or will this type of relationship, frankly absurd today, be preserved in future?¶ Whatever Moscow and Washington do, the material and technological basis of their relations remains not simply restraint, but Mutually Assured Destruction. Another use for the vast arsenals they amassed up to the late Eighties simply does not exist. No international problem requires such a quantity of nuclear charges and missiles. The political logic of that period has long since lost its force; the whole world has changed. But you can’t argue with weapons: the logic of arsenals still dictates, no matter how often Russia and the United States reiterate that they no longer see each other as adversaries.¶ A quick liquidation of stockpiles will not be achieved. First of all, strategic nuclear forces are mainly political weapons and a matter of status. No one will simply give these up. This is especially true of Russia, which no longer has any other features of a superpower. And, judging by discussions underway in Washington, idealists there are being squeezed on all sides, too.¶ Second, one needs at the very least a qualitatively different level of trust between Russia and the United States; the first shoots that appeared during the “reset” may very soon be trampled.¶ And finally, the time when these two giants set the tone in the nuclear sphere has long since past. Proliferation goes on, quietly. China’s nuclear arsenal, though only a fraction of Russia’s and America’s, is becoming an increasingly important factor in that country’s growing influence. Neither Washington nor Moscow can allow the other to be in the same “league” with Beijing because then the counterweights to its influence would be even less.¶ Nevertheless, the needlessness of assured destruction is obvious, and this situation must be somehow overcome. The only way is a gradual rapprochement in the strategic sphere which will make the nuclear containment of Russia and the United States an anachronism. And for this, joint work on anti-missile defences would be ideal. If this is undertaken in earnest, sooner or later it will become apparent that missiles aimed at each other are patently absurd given that the “adversaries” are building a joint shield. This is a long, hard road, the success of which, though not guaranteed, is none the less possible. Especially when one realises the real threats facing both countries in the 21st century.¶ On the other hand, it’s obvious what will happen if, in the sphere of anti-missile defence, nothing comes together and they each go their own way. In that case, the old type of relations will inevitably recur since that same nuclear rubicon will be preserved. An American missile defence system would be built against any other country possessing missile potential, including, of course, Russia – even if Russia were not the main object. Moscow would then automatically begin searching for ways of overcoming that anti-missile shield.¶ No one will abolish mutual nuclear deterrence as the basis of balance so long as the two nuclear superpowers are not engaged in a common cause. All of this goes beyond the bounds of rational argument, but the burden of arsenals aimed at one another will continue to return us to the confrontation of 30 years ago, even if in a farcical form.¶ One must not forget that all this is a game of nerves. These gigantic arsenals are inapplicable; the anti-missile system is virtual since most likely it will never be created. The paradox is that the political effect of the idea of an anti-missile shield is more than real since it touches the heart of the problem of strategic stability.

#### Extinction

Corcoran 9 – PhD, Senior Fellow @ Global Security

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That brings us to Russia, our former main adversary, now a competitive partner and still a potential future adversary, particularly as relations have gradually soured in recent years. Russia is the only other nation with a formidable arsenal of some three thousand strategic weapons. Our opposing arsenals were built up in the period when Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) was the underlying strategic concept -- each side deterred from striking the other by the prospect of assured retaliatory destruction. The situation became even madder as both sides worked to develop a capability to destroy the other's strike force with a crippling first strike. This resulted in further large increases in the sizes of the arsenals, as well as early warning systems and hair-trigger launch-on-warning alert procedures. The final result was an overall system in which each side could destroy the other in a matter of minutes. And it also raised another chilling specter, Nuclear Winter, in which the atmospheric dust raised from a major nuclear exchange would block sunlight for an extended period and essentially destroy human civilization globally. The collapse of the Soviet Union collapsed this threat, but did not eliminate it. US and Russian nuclear forces remained frozen in adversarial positions. The May 2002 Moscow Treaty began to address this legacy and is leading to a reduction in strategic nuclear forces down to levels of about two thousand on each side by 2012. These levels are still sufficient to destroy not only both nations but also human civilization. It is hard to even construct scenarios where the use of even a few strategic nuclear weapons does not risk a total escalation. Strikes on Russian warning facilities or strike forces would almost certainly bring a wave of retaliatory strikes. Strikes on hardened command centers would be of questionable effectiveness and also risk total escalation. In addition, successful elimination of Russian leaders could greatly complicate any efforts to stop escalation short of a total nuclear exchange.

#### Converting plutonium to MOX solves nuclear terrorism

Reilly '12

Bill, Bill Reilly, a retired colonel, formerly headed the U.S. Army's reactor program., "MOX offers a nuclear power boost," 7/1/12, updated 1/29/13 www.columbiatribune.com/opinion/op-ed/mox-offers-a-nuclear-power-boost/article\_4075b9c4-bd1c-5f22-99fb-0783224782cf.html#.USFCOOi1nn4

As the Cold War receded, the United States and Russia reached a historic agreement to reduce their respective stockpiles of weapons plutonium by 34 metric tons each. Combined, 68 metric tons of plutonium is enough material for 17,000 nuclear weapons.¶ Disposing of excess weapons material has been a longstanding goal of the U.S. government. What's behind it is concern that plutonium and another weapons material, highly enriched uranium, could be stolen from stockpiles of dismantled Russian nuclear warheads and sold on the black market to rogue governments or terrorist groups.¶ A separate agreement with Russia has resulted in the down-blending of nearly 500 metric tons of Russia's excess highly enriched uranium into reactor fuel for use in U.S. nuclear plants. Today, half of the electricity generated at nuclear plants in the United States is produced with fuel derived from dismantled Russian warheads that were once aimed at U.S. targets.¶ Although the agreement on plutonium covered only a fraction of the stockpiles in both countries, it demonstrates the value of turning megatons into megawatts. Once plutonium is converted into MOX, it no longer is useful for weapons production. As more and more weapons plutonium is destroyed, the risk that some of it might fall into the wrong hands will lessen.¶ The shift to MOX fuel for everyday use reduces the cost of producing nuclear-generated electricity, a clean and affordable alternative to fossil fuels. Demonstrating the use of MOX at nuclear power plants is an important step toward a clean-energy economy.¶ And it could go a long way toward making the world a safer place by reducing the risk of nuclear proliferation.

#### Top security analysts agree that the threat is real

Ogilvie-White 6 – PhD, senior lecturer in the School of Social and Political Sciences, teaching on the subjects of foreign policy and international organisations

“Preventing Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism: Nuclear Security in Southeast Asia,” http://www.issr.uq.edu.au/sites/default/files/1%20-%20Preventing%20Nuclear%20and%20Radiological%20Terrorism%20-%20Nuclear%20Security%20in%20Southeast%20Asia.pdf

In the worst-case scenario – the theft and detonation of an intact nuclear weapon - ¶ hundreds of thousands of lives could be lost from a single blast, with immediate¶ property damage running into many billions of dollars.¶ 6¶ The medium and long-term ¶ impact would also be devastating, with radioactive contamination potentially causing ¶ long-term health effects and hundreds of billions of dollars in lost economic activity¶ and property damage.¶ 7¶ Given these estimates, and reports that Osama Bin Laden ¶ considers the acquisition of a nuclear weapon by Al Qaeda “a duty”, it is not ¶ surprising that the global threat of nuclear terrorism is considered extremely grave, to¶ the extent that prominent, highly regarded security analysts have called it the most¶ serious threat facing the world.

#### Terrorists have motivation

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“Preventing Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism: Nuclear Security in Southeast Asia,” http://www.issr.uq.edu.au/sites/default/files/1%20-%20Preventing%20Nuclear%20and%20Radiological%20Terrorism%20-%20Nuclear%20Security%20in%20Southeast%20Asia.pdf

In June 2004, Mohamed ElBaradei, the usually circumspect Director General of the ¶ International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), described the threat of nuclear ¶ terrorism as “real and imminent”, and talked of a “race against time” to prevent ¶ terrorists from obtaining nuclear and radioactive materials.¶ 1¶ While the probability of ¶ nuclear terrorism remains much smaller than the likelihood of terrorism involving ¶ conventional means of violence, the danger of ‘high-end’ terrorism involving ¶ chemical, biological, nuclear and radiological (CBNR) weapons is growing, and has ¶ been of increasing concern to states and organizations around the world for the past ¶ decade. Well before the horrific attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States, ¶ terrorism experts pointed to a disturbing trend in international terrorist incidents that ¶ called into question the established wisdom that non-state actors possessed neither the¶ capabilities nor the motivation to carry out their destructive acts using weapons of ¶ mass destruction (WMD).¶ 2¶ In particular, the March 1995 nerve gas attack on the ¶ Tokyo subway system, challenged such assumptions, leading some observers to ¶ conclude that a new brand of terrorism was emerging, representing a very different ¶ and potentially far more lethal threat than the more traditional types of ideological, ¶ ethnic/nationalist and separatist terrorism of the past.¶ 3¶ The attacks of 9-11 and the ¶ subsequent discovery that the Al Qaeda network has been actively engaged in efforts¶ to acquire CBNR weapons has confirmed the worst fears of terrorism experts and ¶ injected a new sense of urgency to an already highly charged debate.

#### Cutting access to fissile material from Russian facilities is key

Conolly ’12

Catherine, MA candidate at King’s College London, “The Threat To The West From Soviet Nukes”, 2-12-2012, http://theriskyshift.com/2012/02/threat-to-west-from-soviet-nukes-html/#ixzz28GLMDMoR

Fissile Materials Russia produces the world’s largest stockpile of weapons-grade plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU), and whilst security at many of the sites storing this material has been modernised, not all sites are adequately secured. At the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia also left tonnes of this fissile material in extremely inadequately secured storage sites in the former Soviet countries. During the 1990’s there was a huge amount of HEU and plutonium stolen from such sites, with one Russian prosecutor stating that “potatoes were guarded better” than the nuclear materials at one site. In one instance, it was reported that a Russian Naval officer walked into a military base through a hole in the fence, opened the padlock on a shed, and walked away from the site with ‘several kilograms of HEU in his backpack’. There is ‘ample evidence of significant black-market trade in nuclear materials’, and weapons-grade plutonium and HEU being sold illicitly have been seized by authorities on a number of occasions. For example, in March of 2010 three men were arrested attempting to sell HEU in Georgia; the HEU is believed to have originated in a nuclear fuel plant in Siberia. There have almost certainly been instances in which the materials have not been intercepted by authorities before it came into the possession of non-state actors. What This Means for the West The risk of non-state actors or rogue nations acquiring a nuclear weapons or enough fissile material to create an improvised nuclear device is very real. The lax security at Russian and former Soviet storage sites is of great cause for concern; we already know that huge amounts of fissile material have been stolen and are readily available on the black-market, whilst the fact that there is no confirmed evidence of tactical nuclear weapons being stolen or sold is little cause for comfort.

#### Nuclear terrorism from Russian stocks leads to retaliation and extinction

Ayson 10 - Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington

Robert, “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via InformaWorld

But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington’s early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response.

#### Even absent an attack on the US, an attack on Russia leads to retaliation against the US – guarantees escalation

Dunlop and Smith ‘06

William, scientist at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories and Harold, distinguished visiting scholar and professor at the Goldman School of Public Policy, University of California at Berkeley, “Who did it? Using international forensics to detect and deter nuclear terrorism,” Arms Control Today, October 1, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006\_10/CVRForensics

Among these, Moscow perhaps presents the most compelling case for international cooperation on post-detonation nuclear forensics. Russia has the largest stockpile of poorly secured nuclear devices in the world. It also has porous borders and poor internal security, and it continues to be a potential source of contraband nuclear material and weapons, despite the best efforts of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program. If terrorists obtained the nuclear material in Russia and set Moscow as their target, they would not have to risk transporting the weapon, stolen or makeshift, across international borders. Attacks by Chechen terrorists in Beslan and at the Dubrovka Theater in Moscow offer ample proof that a willingness to commit mass murder for fanatical reasons rests within Russian borders, and a foreign source of operatives, particularly from the neighboring Islamic states to the south, is by no means inconceivable.[2] Moscow is also a predominately Christian city where local authorities routinely discriminate against Muslim minorities. Furthermore, extremists might conclude that a nuclear blast in Moscow could inflict damage well beyond that directly stemming from the attack. The Soviet generation that came to power during the Cold War retained a memory of the United States as an ally in the Great Patriotic War. The present Russian generation has no such remembrance but seems to have retained the animosities and suspicions that were a part of the nuclear standoff. Hence, nuclear terrorists may well believe that they could cause another East-West cold war or even encourage Russia to retaliate against the United States. After all, the sinking of the Kursk was believed by some influential Russians to be the result of U.S. action.[3] How much more likely would be such a view if the Kremlin were destroyed? As long as the world is filled with suspicion and conflict, such reactions are to be expected and, more importantly, anticipated.[4] One has only to remember the early reactions and suspicions in the United States following the 1996 TWA Flight 800 airline disaster.[5]

#### Moscow strike activates the doomsday machins – makes nuclear war inevitable

CNANW ‘09

Canadian Network to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, “Questions and Answers on "RLOAD" and De-alerting”, http://www.web.net/~cnanw/index.htm

On the Russian side, command of nuclear weapons is said to be very centralized and strictly controlled. However, they have not in recent times had both the radar and the satellite warning systems available all the time because too few satellites are orbiting and some of the radars built by USSR are now in independent States; so they must be relying on only one system for part of the time. They also have a "dead hand" system codenamed 'Perimetr', which comprises non-armed rockets that can be launched automatically and fly over Russia broadcasting launch codes and launch orders to the missile silos. This is meant to be activated automatically (after an enabling action by the high command) if Moscow is destroyed and communication by the high command to the nuclear forces is lost. It has been said that the system could be activated inadvertently at a moment of crisis. [The working of Perimetr is better described in our recent paper "Replace LoW Policy"]

#### Extinction

Rosenbaum ‘07

Ron, award winning journalist and author, “The Return of the Doomsday Machine?”, 8/31/2007, Slate Magazine, http://www.slate.com/id/2173108/pagenum/all/

In Strangelove, the doomsday machine was a Soviet system that automatically detonated some 50 cobalt-jacketed hydrogen bombs pre-positioned around the planet if the doomsday system's sensors detected a nuclear attack on Russian soil. Thus, even an accidental or (as in Strangelove) an unauthorized U.S. nuclear bomb could set off the doomsday machine bombs, releasing enough deadly cobalt fallout to make the Earth uninhabitable for the human species for 93 years. No human hand could stop the fully automated apocalypse. An extreme fantasy, yes. But according to a new book called Doomsday Men and several papers on the subject by U.S. analysts, it may not have been merely a fantasy. According to these accounts, the Soviets built and activated a variation of a doomsday machine in the mid-'80s. And there is no evidence Putin's Russia has deactivated the system. Instead, something was reactivated in Russia last week. I'm referring to the ominous announcement—given insufficient attention by most U.S. media (the Economist made it the opening of a lead editorial on Putin's Russia)—by Vladimir Putin that Russia has resumed regular "strategic flights" of nuclear bombers. (They may or may not be carrying nuclear bombs, but you can practically hear Putin's smirking tone as he says, "Our [nuclear bomber] pilots have been grounded for too long. They are happy to start a new life.") These twin developments raise a troubling question: What are the United States' and Russia's current nuclear policies with regard to how and when they will respond to a perceived nuclear attack? In most accounts, once the president or Russian premier receives radar warning of an attack, they have less than 15 minutes to decide whether the warning is valid. The pressure is on to "use it or lose it"—launch our missiles before they can be destroyed in their silos. Pressure that makes the wrong decision more likely. Pressure that makes accidental nuclear war a real possibility. Once you start to poke into this matter, you discover a disturbing level of uncertainty, which leads me to believe we should be demanding that the United States and Russia define and defend their nuclear postures. Bush and Putin should be compelled to tell us just what "failsafe" provisions are installed on their respective nuclear bombers, missiles, and submarines—what the current provisions against warning malfunctions are and what kinds of controls there are over the ability of lone madman nuclear bombers to bring on the unhappy end of history. As for the former Soviet Union, the possible existence of a version of a doomsday machine is both relevant and disturbing. In the Strangelove film, the Soviet ambassador tells the president and generals in the U.S. war room that the device was designed to deter a surprise attack, the kind of attack that might otherwise prevent retaliation by "decapitating" the Soviet command structure. The automated system would insure massive world-destroying retaliation even if the entire Soviet leadership were wiped out—or had second thoughts. As a result, some referred to it as the "dead hand" doomsday device. It is Dr. Strangelove himself, the madman U.S. nuclear strategist played by Peter Sellers, who detects the flaw in this plan. After being apprised of the system's existence by the Soviet ambassador, and the likelihood of its being triggered by a U.S. bomber on an unauthorized mission to nuke its Soviet target, Dr. Strangelove exclaims: Yes, but the ... whole point of the doomsday machine ... is lost ... if you keep it a secret! Why didn't you tell the world, eh? In other words, a doomsday machine kept secret is no good for deterrence, only for retaliation by extinction. Did the Soviets actually design a variation on a doomsday device and not tell us about it? And could an accidental or terrorist nuclear attack on Putin's Russia (by Chechens, for instance) trigger an antiquated automated dead-hand system and launch missiles capable of killing tens, maybe hundreds, of millions at unknown targets that might include the United States? Up until Aug. 10 of this year, I would have thought these questions were best consigned to the realm of apocalyptic film fantasy. But on that day I came upon a startling essay in the London Times Literary Supplement. It was a review (titled "Deadly Devices") of a book recently published in the United Kingdom: Doomsday Men: The Real Dr. Strangelove and the Dream of the Superweapon by nuclear-age historian P.D. Smith of University College London. (It will be out in the United States in December.) The TLS reviewer, Christopher Coker (who is on the faculty of the London School of Economics), asserted that the book demonstrates that "only after the Berlin Wall had been breached and ... the Cold War began to thaw did military analysts realize the Russians had actually built a version of the [doomsday] device. The details of this top-secret Soviet system were first revealed in 1993 by Bruce G. Blair, a former American ICBM launch control officer, now one of the country's foremost experts on Russian arms. Fearing that a sneak attack by American submarine-launched missiles might take Moscow out in 13 minutes, the Soviet leadership had authorized the construction of an automated communication network, reinforced to withstand a nuclear strike. At its heart was a computer system similar to the one in Dr. Strangelove. Its code name was Perimetr. It went fully operational in January 1985. It is still in place."

#### Credible arms control solves an Artic Nuclear Weapons Free Zone

Wallace and Staples ’10

Michael Wallace, Professor Emeritus, political science, University of British Columbia and Director of the Canadian Pugwash Group and Stephen Staples, Executive Director, Rideau Institute and Director of the Canadian Pugwash Group and author of a book on missile defense, “Ridding the Artic of Nuclear Weapons: A Task Long Overdue”, March 2010

Might there be other reasons for the Russians to abandon their Northern Fleet bases? Here we enter ¶ into the realm of speculation. In 2002 the two largest nuclear powers appeared to be backing away from ¶ earlier commitments to achieve deep cuts in their nuclear arsenals, post Cold War. The U.S. gave notice ¶ of its withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty; immediately thereafter, the Russians repudiated the detailed limits contained within the as yet unratified 1993 START II arms control treaty. With ¶ the existing START agreement due to expire in December 2009,¶ 92¶ an interim agreement called SORT¶ 93¶ was cobbled together to take its place. Unlike earlier arms control agreements, which set forth precise ¶ counting rules and detailed requirements as to what was permitted and what was not, SORT provided ¶ only the loosest restrictions on warhead numbers, types and configurations: each side was to reduce the number of its deployed strategic warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200 apiece. But how this was to be ¶ done was left vague; in the words of Secretary Colin Powell, “the Treaty will allow you to have as many ¶ warheads as you want.”¶ 94¶ The treaty makes no distinction between those deployed on launch vehicles, ¶ those in storage but “active” and those in “inactive storage.”¶ 95¶ In a crowning absurdity, the treaty was ¶ set to expire on the very date its limits came into force!¶ We have developed this point at length for a specific reason: Under the ¶ current arms control regime, there is no treaty-induced incentive to make hard ¶ choices between which strategic systems to retain and which to dismantle. The ¶ only real restrictions on the development of additional strategic systems are ¶ fiscal. Why then would Russia wish to abandon her most powerful strategic ¶ nuclear bases, especially as they are located front and centre in the region ¶ of greatest competition for Arctic resources?¶ One can conceive of a possible world in which Russia would have a significant incentive to de-nuclearize its Arctic regions: if it were a condition ¶ for a much more significant and enforceable strategic arms control treaty ¶ that would guarantee Russia strategic parity with the U.S. If, as has been ¶ proposed by a number of prominent security experts, a new arms control ¶ treaty were negotiated and the number of nuclear warheads for each side ¶ reduced to 1,000 or even 500 – these numbers representing genuine parity ¶ with no “fiddles” in the form of readily retrievable reserves or ABM ¶ systems – then it would be hard to imagine the Russians turning it down. ¶ Space does not allow a detailed discussion of this here, but the bloated ¶ white elephant that represents the Russian military-nuclear complex is something most Russians, ¶ even in the military, would like to see severely pruned.¶ And – here is the reassuring part of the argument – if Russia is to keep only a minimal deterrent, then, ¶ as argued above, keeping its most reliable, invulnerable and effective land-based missiles is by far the ¶ most rational course. Thus, in one feel swoop, a huge obstacle to achieving an ANWFZ is swept aside.¶ As things stand now, this may well be the strategic equivalent of the old saying that if wishes were ¶ horses, beggars would ride. Certainly we are a very long way from legions of mounted poor. But the ¶ atmosphere for deep cuts in nuclear stockpiles is more favourable than it has been since the 1987 INF ¶ Treaty. We will know the answer, one way or the other, in the next few months.

#### That prevents Arctic war

Wallace and Staples ’10

Michael Wallace, Professor Emeritus, political science, University of British Columbia and Director of the Canadian Pugwash Group and Stephen Staples, Executive Director, Rideau Institute and Director of the Canadian Pugwash Group and author of a book on missile defense, “Ridding the Artic of Nuclear Weapons: A Task Long Overdue”, March 2010

Most of the preceding discussion – and indeed, nearly all discussion of the problems and prospects of an ANWFZ – has proceeded on the assumption that the middle powers, the NNWS who make up much of the Arctic littoral, can only achieve our goal by cleverly manoeuvring around the immovable “givens” posed by the dominant nuclear powers that exercise de facto military control over the Arctic, and whose tight web of bases, nuclear deployments and alliance commitments are essentially unchallengeable. But the world’s climate is altering. The physical climate, of course, is changing, and nowhere more rapidly and dramatically than in the Arctic Ocean and littoral. But the political climate is changing with equal speed: more and more, the states and peoples of the Arctic are challenging outmoded nuclear deployments and alliances whose rationale is rooted in the Cold War and not in present-day reality. In requesting – insisting – that nuclear weapons be removed from the Arctic we are neither abandoning our traditional allies nor attempting to create new conflicts. Rather we, the peoples of the Arctic, are not only challenging the leftover detritus of the rickety Cold War structure but even more fundamentally challenging the relevance of the Westphalian paradigm itself as a useful model for governance in the Arctic. The outworn zero-sum competition between nation states is everywhere giving way to geographical communities of interest aimed directly at a win-win outcome for all the participants. In the Arctic, of course, are many additional challenges, chief among them perhaps finding ways to cope with the rapidly changing physical climate and ways to assure the well-being of the oft-neglected original inhabitants.

#### Cooperation prevents an aggressive Russian military posture

Trent ‘11

Packard C. Lieutenant, United States Navy B.S., United States Merchant Marine Academy, 2003 “AN EVALUATION OF THE ARCTIC—WILL IT BECOME AN AREA OF COOPERATION OR CONFLICT?” Naval Postgraduate School March 2011 http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/theses/2011/March/11Mar\_Trent.pdf

D. CONCLUSION This chapter has examined counterarguments to the proposition that Arctic will become a zone of cooperation. It has revealed the means by which the Arctic might be pushed towards conflict through the unresolved disputes in the Arctic, Russia dependency on the Arctic, and an increase of military and security presence in the Arctic. There are a significant number of potential flashpoints that could ignite the Arctic into conflict. The discussion of territorial disputes highlighted issues arising from access to shipping channels and navigable waterways, specific territorial claims, and international maritime boundaries between and beyond territorial waters. Also examined was Russia’s dependency on the amount of oil and gas available in the Arctic. Russia’s main focus is regaining the status of a superpower by being aggressive and unpredictable in order to control the resources in the Arctic. Russia’s influence and behavior are provocative to other Arctic nations and if Russia is not willing to change its approach, the Arctic may be headed towards conflict. Russia is a potentially hostile superpower in the Arctic, and in order defend their claims, the other Arctic nations have increased or plan to increase their military capabilities and assets. This will allow the Arctic nations to be more strategically aligned, especially with Russia. The Arctic nations are building or have plans to build a more combat capable Arctic force to protect its sovereignty and national interests in the Arctic. Conley and Kraut, argue that Russia is not the only Arctic nation that has a twotrack approach, stressing cooperation yet increasing combat capability in the Arctic. All Arctic nations have a vested interest in ensuring the Arctic region is stable in order to maximize economic gain and benefit; all Arctic nations are also keeping their military options open and available for use to project sovereignty and to transmit to other nations a sense of claim and identity. The difference among the Arctic nations is in the degree and emphasis of implementation of the two-track approach.261 However, Russia is the powerhouse in the Arctic and will aggressively pursue a number of tactics to exploit this. For instance, Russia is deploying what it sees as a “win-win” Arctic strategy: gain early military and commercial regional supremacy and hope to win equally at the United Nations and other multilateral tables. Other Arctic nations tend to place more emphasis on working bilaterally or within international governance structures and operating cooperatively with other Arctic nations, but all to a greater or lesser degree have or are making military adjustments to preserve their options. The question for the future will be if or how Russia will maintain its dual approach, or if it will continue to rely more heavily on developing an aggressive defense posture to achieve its means and determine the future of the Arctic to its liking.262 All of these factors—to include territorial claims, Russia’s dependency, and the militarization of the Arctic—can potentially lead to conflict in the Arctic. It all depends on which one has the potential to flash and cause the conflict. Until all of these issues are resolved peacefully with all sides in agreement, the potential for conflict will remain.

#### US-Russian Arctic conflict goes nuclear

Cohen ‘10

Ariel Senior Research Fellow for Russian and Eurasian Studies and International Energy Policy, The Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies “From Russian Competition to Natural Resources Access: Recasting U.S. Arctic Policy” The Heritage Foundation 6/15/10 http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/06/from-russian-competition-to-natural-resources-access-recasting-us-arctic-policy

To advance its position, Russia has undertaken a three-year mission to map the Arctic.[26] The Kremlin is also moving rapidly to establish a comprehensive sea, ground, and air presence. Under Putin, Russia focused on the Arctic as a major natural resources base. The Russian national leadership insists that the state, not the private sector, must take the lead in developing the vast region. The Kremlin published its Arctic doctrine in March 2009.[27] The main goal is to transform the Arctic into Russia’s strategic resource base and make Russia a leading Arctic power by 2020. Russian Militarization of the Arctic. The military is an important dimension of Moscow’s Arctic push. The policy calls for creating “general purpose military formations drawn from the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation” as well as “other troops and military formations [most importantly, border units] in the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation, capable of ensuring security under various military and political circumstances.”[28] These formations will be drawn from the armed forces and from the “power ministries” (e.g., the Federal Security Service, Border Guard Service, and Internal Ministry). Above all, the policy calls for a coast guard to patrol Russia’s Arctic waters and estuaries. Russia views the High North as a major staging area for a potential nuclear confrontation with the United States and has steadily expanded its military presence in the Arctic since 2007. This has included resuming air patrols over the Arctic, including strategic bomber flights.[29] During 2007 alone, Russian bombers penetrated Alaska’s 12-mile air defense zone 18 times.[30] The Russian Navy is expanding its presence in the Arctic for the first time since the end of the Cold War, increasing the operational radius of the Northern Fleet’s submarines. Russia is also reorienting its military strategy to meet threats to the country’s interests in the Arctic, particularly with regard to its continental shelf.[31] Russia is also modernizing its Northern Fleet. During 2008 and 2009, Russian icebreakers regularly patrolled in the Arctic. Russia has the world’s largest polar-capable icebreaker flotilla, with 24 icebreakers. Seven are nuclear, including the 50 Years of Victory, the largest icebreaker in the world.[32] Russia plans to build new nuclear-powered icebreakers starting in 2015.[33] Moscow clearly views a strong icebreaker fleet as a key to the region’s economic development. Russia ’s Commercial Presence. Russia’s energy rush to the Arctic continues apace. On May 12, 2009, President Dmitry Medvedev approved Russia’s security strategy.[34] This document views Russia’s natural resources in the Arctic as a base for both economic development and geopolitical influence. Paragraph 11 identifies potential battlegrounds where conflicts over energy may occur: “The attention of international politics in the long-term will be concentrated on controlling the sources of energy resources in the Middle East, on the shelf of the Barents Sea and other parts of the Arctic, in the Caspian Basin and in Central Asia.” The document seriously considers the use of military force to resolve competition for energy near Russia’s borders or those of its allies: “In case of a competitive struggle for resources it is not impossible to discount that it might be resolved by a decision to use military might. The existing balance of forces on the borders of the Russian Federation and its allies can be changed.”[35] In August 2008, Medvedev signed a law that allows “the government to allocate strategic oil and gas deposits on the continental shelf without auctions.” The law restricts participation to companies with five years’ experience in a region’s continental shelf and in which the government controls at least a 50 percent stake. This effectively allows only state-controlled Gazprom and Rosneft to participate.[36] However, when the global financial crisis ensued, Russia backtracked and began to seek foreign investors for Arctic gas development.

#### Traditional defense doesn’t apply to an Arctic security dilemma

Golts 11 – independent Russian military analyst

Alexander, Russia in the Arctic, “THE ARCTIC: A CLASH OF INTERESTS OR CLASH OF AMBITIONS,” http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1073.pdf

Unfortunately, the absence of rational reasons for the confrontation over Arctic access does not always exclude the possibility of confrontation. At present, Russia is showing (at least in words) the intention to strengthen its military capabilities in the Arctic region. Does Russia have any opportunities to do so? First of all, one should keep in mind that the military dimension always played a key role in the development of the Arctic region. Beginning at least in the 1930s, the Soviet and then Russian military have been the overlords of the Arctic, although the role that was attached to the region in the country’s strategic security would fluctuate depending on the foreign policy context. The Soviet authorities looked at the Arctic from different angles. During World War II, communication lines linking the Soviet Union with its allies in the anti-Nazi coalition were laid in the Arctic region. After the Cold War began, the Arctic became the front line in an imaginary nuclear war with the United States, as it was in the Arctic that Soviet strategists expected the approach of strategic bombers or ballistic missiles from across the North Pole. Testing grounds (Novaya Zemlya, Plesetsk, and Nenoksa) where the Soviet Union, as a nuclear superpower, tested its armaments were also located in deserted Arctic regions. The Basics of State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic Region, Russia’s main national Arctic doctrinal document, which the Russian government endorsed in 2001, concentrated on military issues much more than did the 2008 document. It insisted that “all types of activity in the Arctic are tied to the interests of defense and security to the maximum degree.” The list of priorities features as Item #1 the “reliable functioning of the Russian Navy’s group of strategic sea-based nuclear forces deployed there for deterring the threats of aggression against the Russian Federation and its allies.” Item #2 is “reliable control over the state border of the Russian Federation and Arctic maritime areas in order to defend the Russian Federation’s national interests in the region.” 22

### Indo-Pak

#### MOX disposition is modeled by India and Pakistan

Zarate 9 - research fellow at NPEC as well as a legislative fellow at the House Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade

Robert, “Zarate on U.S. and Russian Plutonium Management,” Non-Proliferation Education Policy Center, http://www.npolicy.org/article.php?aid=253&rid=1

U.S. and Russian stockpiles only account for roughly half of the estimated 500 metric tons of separated plutonium. As Figure 1 illustrates, de jure nuclear­weapon States Britain, France, and China, non­nuclear­weapon States Japan, Germany and Belgium, and de facto nuclear­armed States India, Israel and Pakistan, all have significant stocks of separated plutonium.¶ The choices that the U.S. and Russia make with regard to plutonium disposition and management may have no small effect on how other countries with significant stocks of separated plutonium decide to dispose of their weapons­ready material. The prudence of current U.S. and Russian plans depends heavily on:¶ whether it is desirable for others countries—such non­nuclear­weapon States with large stocks of separated plutonium like Japan and Germany—emulate the MOX conversion­only approach; and¶ whether other countries would be are encouraged to pursue uneconomical and proliferation­sensitive plutonium/MOX trade or spent fuel reprocessing technologies. The U.S. has refrained from reprocessing spent fuel since the 1970s, in an effort to discourage global commerce in MOX and other plutonium­based fuels and acquisition of reprocessing technologies. However, when the DoE and Rosatom’s predecessor announced this November 2007 plutonium disposition plan, then­Secretary of Energy Samuel Bodman claimed that MOX fuel is plutonium in “a form which cannot be used to construct a weapon.”[31] As a result, the U.S. has already sent mixed signals regarding its opposition to commerce in plutonium­based fuels.¶ It remains to be seen whether the current U.S. and Russian plans will encourage these proliferation­sensitive activities. But to the extent that the U.S. Government desires to be consistent with past nonproliferation policy, the current U.S. and Russian plans do run this risk. A key question is whether the Obama Administration’s DoE also sees MOX fuel as a feasible and safe fuel for future civil nuclear power­generation.

#### Solves Pakistan loose nuclear material

Ijaz 1 – \*Mansoor, a nuclear scientist, is chairman of Crescent Investment Management in New York; his father was an early pioneer in Pakistan's nuclear program AND \*\*R. James Woolsey, an attorney, was director of central intelligence from 1993 to 1995

“How Secure Is Pakistan's Plutonium?,” NYT, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/28/opinion/28WOOL.html

A deeply disturbing picture of terrorist intent has emerged in recent weeks as blueprints for building nuclear weapons have been discovered in the wreckage of abandoned Al Qaeda safe houses. These blueprints and other documents, while largely available in the public domain, sharpen the need for a vigorous American policy to deal with unsecured nuclear, chemical and biological materials. Even if terrorist manufacture of nuclear bombs is unlikely, substantial dangers remain of terrorists using radioactive material in low-tech "dirty" bombs.¶ The main nuclear security problem posed by Al Qaeda today is access to radioactive materials in Pakistan. However, for a decade we have focused on the former Soviet Union. Since the end of the cold war, approximately 175 incidents of smuggling or attempted theft of nuclear materials there have been thwarted. But the threat remains, as the Russian Defense Ministry reported on Nov. 6, when the last attempt at theft was made.¶ For Russia, a sensible solution is available — the Nunn-Lugar "cooperative threat reduction" program to improve the security of Russia's nuclear materials, technology and expertise. This week, the House Republican leadership will decide whether to finance the next phase. The program is only 40 percent complete; finishing it will take another quarter of a century at the current rate of funding. It is past time to fully implement and finance this important legislation.¶ The Nunn-Lugar initiative can serve as a valuable precedent in addressing security problems in Pakistan. Neither Pakistan nor India has signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Nor has either country engaged in negotiations, under the auspices of the United Nations Conference on Disarmament, to protect against theft of fissile materials. This reluctance in India and Pakistan to recognize international norms, however, should not alter our resolve to improve the security of nuclear materials in South Asia.¶ While Islamabad is widely believed to have the material for 25 to 40 medium-yield bombs, most of its nuclear devices are kept in component parts, not as assembled warheads. The storage procedures, quite elaborate prior to Sept. 11, were altered again on Oct. 7 when the American bombing of Afghanistan began. Separately stored uranium and plutonium cores and their detonation assemblies were moved to six new secret locations around the country.¶ The new storage patterns were designed to allow for rapid assembly and deployment, but attackers will nonetheless find it much more difficult to confiscate Pakistan's nuclear weapons. Even if Al Qaeda obtained radioactive materials from a sympathizer at one of Pakistan's plants for making weapons-grade nuclear materials, as some reports have suggested, the material would still have to be shaped into a fissionable core with detonation switches and delivery housings.¶ Such a complex effort would be difficult to carry out in an Afghan cave. But we can hardly count on terrorists always being under bombardment in caves.¶ Pakistan's nuclear command hierarchy, overhauled in 2000, was also revamped on Oct. 7 in the wake of a broad military-intelligence shake-up. Pakistan's president and army chief, Pervez Musharraf, created the strategic planning division and appointed a moderate general, Khalid Kidwai, to oversee Pakistani nuclear assets.¶ Self-policing, however, is not enough. Since 1990, American sanctions have blocked sale or transfer of any technology that might have a military use — including technologies that would improve nuclear security. American export license controls — and, where necessary, Non-Proliferation Treaty and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty compliance rules preventing United States exports — should be waived to transfer the technology needed to protect Pakistan's nuclear arsenals and materials from unauthorized use.¶ The Bush administration should make available American vaults, sensors, alarms, tamper-proof seals, closed-circuit cameras and labels to identify, track and secure Islamabad's nuclear materials.¶ Such precautions would dramatically reduce the probability that even the most devoted bin Laden supporter inside a Pakistani nuclear enrichment facility would get very far in trying to deliver stolen uranium or plutonium to terrorists.¶ There is a real risk that Pakistan's fanatics might collaborate with Al Qaeda; the plans, recently discovered in Kabul, for a helium balloon armed with anthrax have been attributed to a Pakistani nuclear scientist turned Taliban philanthropist. But the risk is manageable if we can help the Musharraf government focus on this threat, as Russia has done in the Nunn-Lugar cooperative threat reduction program.¶ Unless we follow such a course, we face the very real possibility of terrorist militias obtaining not just blueprints but the materials to fashion and detonate weapons of mass destruction. We also risk sharpening the debate in Pakistani military and political circles about whether its nuclear expertise should be shared with other Muslim countries. It is hard to think of two developments that are less in our interest.

#### A new terrorist attack leads to India-Pakistan nuclear war

Imonti 12 – Analyst @ National Interest, retired director of a private equity firm where he was an investment strategist for seven years

Felix, “Is Pakistan's Paranoia Pushing it Into a Nuclear War with India?,” http://www.unknowncountry.com/insight/pakistans-paranoia-pushing-it-nuclear-war-india

The high command has concluded that the only equalizer for the weaker of the competitors is the tactical nuclear weapon. What makes this a very high risk strategy is the Pakistani first-strike policy.¶ India nearly retaliated against Pakistan after the 2008 Mumbai attack. That was before Pakistan had begun deploying tactical nuclear weapons. India would have been able to use its superior forces to crush Pakistani defenses.¶ Should there be another deadly attack by a Pakistan based terrorist organization, especially if it involves a stolen nuclear warhead, the Indians will not hesitate to retaliate. This time, the Indian army will encounter nuclear weapons in the field. Then, Delhi that has no tactical nuclear weapons will have to decide if a strategic response is to be used. The survival of South Asia and far beyond will be depending on that decision.

#### Other security systems are insufficient

Bunn ‘12 – Matthew, Professor of Public Policy @ Harvard, AND \*\*Eben Harrell, Research Associate at the Project on Managing the Atom in the Belfer Center

“Consolidation: Thwarting Nuclear Theft,” http://www.nuclearsummit.org/files/Consolidation\_Thwarting\_Nuclear\_Theft.pdf

Sites in areas where the adversary threat is especially high. While terrorist groups such as al ¶ Qaeda have demonstrated some degree of global reach, there is no doubt that there are some countries where terrorists and thieves can put together large and capable conspiracies more easily than ¶ they can in other countries. A nuclear security system that could reduce the risk of theft to a low ¶ level in Canada, for example, might not be sufficient to keep the risk low in Pakistan. Stocks in ¶ countries facing particularly severe adversary threats should have higher priority in consolidation ¶ eff orts than stocks in other countries.

#### This is the highest magnitude

Case 11 – MBA @ Sasin Institute

David, “Is Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal vulnerable to terrorists?,” Global Post, http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/asia-pacific/pakistan/110612/pakistan-nuclear-arsenal-terrorists-plutonium

The stakes couldn’t be much higher. Pakistan is volatile cocktail of instability, extremism and nuclear warheads. While Western leaders routinely pay lip service to Islamabad’s efforts to safeguard its deadly weapons, the truth is that the U.S.-Pakistani alliance is marred by mistrust and ideological differences. As a result, the U.S. knows little about where the nukes are and whether they are well-protected.¶ As relations deteriorate, recent events add evidence to what U.S. officials have long alleged: that elements within the Pakistani government cooperate with international jihadi networks. Meanwhile, these networks appear increasingly sophisticated in their ability to infiltrate and attack the Pakistani military, the stewards of the world’s most vulnerable nuclear arsenal. As such, the risk of terrorists grabbing Pakistani plutonium for a dirty bomb or nuclear explosion in a major city lurks as one of the world’s biggest threats, and the Obama administration lacks options to do much about it.

#### Deterrence won’t check – terrorism disrupts conventional norms

Sharma 12 – Professor PolSci at University of Auckland

Ashok, Winter/Spring, “The Enduring Conflict and the Hidden Risk of India-Pakistan War” SAIS Review, Vol 32 No 1, ProjectMuse

Despite the diplomatic and political initiatives and confidence-building measures to better the Indo-Pak relationship, it continues to be threatening. There are many issues, such as the memories of violent partition, complex territorial disputes, continuing insurgency and terrorist attacks in Kashmir and India, and current strategic and security realities in South Asia that do not allow these two nations to be cordial neighbors. The tense and hostile Indo-Pak relationship provides a platform for lingering disaster and threats to South Asian regional stability. It has been contended, and many scholars and analysts have argued, that nuclearization of India and Pakistan in May 1998 has stabilized the military contest in South Asia and averted major war. Although there have been incidents which brought both countries to a crisis situation, nuclear deterrence has prevented a full-fledged war. Contrary to this perception, in the post-nuclear test phase, any small incident of Indo-Pak tension has created the fear of nuclear conflict. The South Asian region is now witnessing a nuclear arms race with the progression of longer-range and more reliable delivery systems. India and Pakistan are not only involved in nuclear advancement, but they are also putting forth their best efforts to enhance conventional military warfare. These developments threaten to put India and Pakistan on the verge of war. What emerges is an insight into the conflicting relationship and the hidden risk of war between India and Pakistan. This paper argues that Indo-Pak historical tension has put these two countries into a nuclear and conventional arms race. The strategic geometry in South Asia; India and Pakistan’s respective military strategies, such as India’s cold start doctrine (CSD) and Pakistan’s strategic equivalence; the presence of Islamic jihadi outfits in Pakistan; continuing terrorist attacks in India; the politically volatile situation in Pakistan; and increasing popular pressure in India on the government’s inability to respond to Pakistani misadventure and terrorism may put them into a war-like situation. There is a general perception that, since both India and Pakistan are nuclear power nations, this would deter any conventional or nuclear war between them. But the interplay of the abovementioned multiple factors, as well as developments backed by the differing views of Indian and Pakistani strategists about the danger of war, asymmetrical expectations of how a war would develop, and the miscalculation arising out of ballistic missile defense systems contradicts the [End Page 130] deterrence theory. These factors suggest that there is a strong possibility of conventional war between India and Pakistan, which may escalate into a nuclear conflict. The complex strategic geometry of the region and the involvement of external powers, mainly the United States and China, as well as their considerable stakes in the region make the situation even more volatile. Any Indo-Pak conventional or nuclear war has the potential to drag these powers into the conflict, impacting the U.S.-China relationship. Questioning Nuclear Deterrence Theory and Risk of War The threat perception arising out of the historical tension and enduring rivalry has put India and Pakistan into a security dilemma. This has resulted in an arms build-up and nuclear competition between the two South Asian rivals. Finally, in May 1998, India conducted its nuclear test and Pakistan followed suit. Today, both possess nuclear weapons and a missile delivery system with retaliatory capability. The enduring hostilities have caused India and Pakistan to rely heavily on nuclear weapons. Since then, it has been argued that possession of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan would ultimately lessen or prevent the risk of Indo-Pak war. Contrary to the deterrence theory, however, the nuclear build-up puts them at risk of war. There are situations and examples that question the continuity of steady nuclear order in the subcontinent. Factors such as prevention of preventive war during periods of transition when one side has a temporary advantage; the development of survivable second-strike forces; an accidental nuclear war; and, finally, the ability to keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of terrorists call into question the nuclear deterrence argument.2 The entry of non-state actors into the nuclear market and possible proliferation of nuclear technology in the hands of rogue nations or terrorist organizations is another dimension that endangers nuclear stability in South Asia. In 2003, then-CIA director George Tenet revealed that Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadir Khan had been passing nuclear secrets and technology to North Korea and Iran, exposing the weakness of Pakistan’s existing export control legislation. The A.Q. Khan episode proves that there is continuing and substantial craving for nuclear technology know-how through horizontal proliferation from aspiring nuclear countries such as Iran, and terrorist organizations looking to supplement their abilities. [End Page 131] The capability of external nuclear powers to intervene in the Indo-Pak nuclear arena keeps these nations from nuclear escalation.3 However, this ability may encourage Pakistan to attack India using limited force—precisely because of its expectation that its patrons would intervene diplomatically if the going gets tough. Aside from nuclear modernization, the U.S.-India nuclear agreement and China-Pakistan nuclear nexus have placed new emphasis on likely nuclear proliferation in the subcontinent. Very deep military and nuclear technology support from China to Pakistan may create a false impression among Pakistani strategists and military leaders and may thereby encourage Pakistan to flex its military muscle against India

#### Terrorist attack escalates – goes nuclear, no restraints

Zarate 11 - research fellow at NPEC as well as a legislative fellow at the House Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade

Robert, “An alarming South Asia powder keg”, Washington Post, February 18, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/18/AR2011021805662.html

In 1914, a terrorist assassinated Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo - unleashing geopolitical forces and World War I. Today, while the United States rightly worries about al-Qaeda targeting the homeland, the most dangerous threat may be another terrorist flash point on the horizon. Lashkar-i-Taiba holds the match that could spark a conflagration betweennuclear-armedhistoric rivals India and Pakistan. Lashkar-i-Taiba is a Frankenstein's monster of the Pakistani government's creation 20 years ago. It has diverse financial networks and well-trained and well-armed cadres that have struck Indian targets from Mumbai to Kabul. It collaborates with the witches' brew of terrorist groups in Pakistan, including al-Qaeda, and has demonstrated global jihadist ambitions. It is merely a matter of time before Lashkar-i-Taiba attacks again. Significant terrorist attacks in India, against Parliament in 2001 and in Mumbai in 2008, brought India and Pakistan to the brink of war. The countries remain deeply distrustful of each other. Another major strike against Indian targets in today's tinderbox environment could lead to a broader, more devastating conflict. The United States should be directing political and diplomatic capital to prevent such a conflagration. The meeting between Indian and Pakistani officials in Bhutan this month - their first high-level sit-down since last summer - set the stage for restarting serious talks on the thorny issue of Kashmir. Washington has only so much time. Indian officials are increasingly dissatisfied with Pakistan's attempts to constrain Lashkar-i-Taiba and remain convinced that Pakistani intelligence supports the group. An Indian intelligence report concluded last year that Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate was involved in the 2008 Mumbai attacks, and late last year the Indian government raised security levels in anticipation of strikes. India is unlikely to show restraintin the event of another attack. Lashkar-i-Taiba may also feel emboldened since the assassination in early January of a moderate Punjabi governor muted Pakistani moderates and underscored the weakness of the government in Islamabad. The group does not want peace talks to resume, so it might act to derail progress. Elements of the group may see conflict with India as in their interest, especially after months of unrest in Kashmir. And the Pakistani government may not be able to control the monster it created. A war in South Asia would be disastrous not just for the United States. In addition to the human devastation, it would destroy efforts to bring stability to the region and to disrupt terrorist havens in western Pakistan. Many of the 140,000 Pakistani troops fighting militants in the west would be redeployed east to battle Indian ground forces. This would effectively convert tribal areas bordering Afghanistan into a playing field for militants. Worse, the Pakistani government might be induced to make common cause with Lashkar-i-Taiba, launching a proxy fight against India. Such a war would also fuel even more destructive violent extremism within Pakistan. In the worst-case scenario, an attack could lead to a nuclear war between India and Pakistan. India's superior conventional forces threaten Pakistan, and Islamabad could resort to nuclear weapons were a serious conflict to erupt. Indeed, The Post reported that Pakistan's nuclear weapons and capabilities are set to surpass those of India. So what can the United States do to ratchet down tensions? We need to build trust, confidence and consistent lines of communications between India and Pakistan. This begins by helping both parties pave the way for a constructive dialogue on the status of Kashmir. Steps toward progress would include pushing for real accountability of figures responsible for the 2008 Mumbai attacks and the handing over of wanted Lashkar-i-Taiba facilitators such as Indian crime lord Dawood Ibrahim. The United States also needs to disrupt the terrorist group's fundraising and planning. The focus should be on unearthing names and disrupting cells outside Pakistan that are tied to Lashkar-i-Taiba, which involves pressuring Islamabad for the names of Westerners who may have trained at Lashkar-i-Taiba camps. This is among the thorniest U.S. national security and counterterrorism problems. It requires officials to focus on imagining the "aftershocks" of a terrorist attack and act before the threat manifests - even as other national security issues such as unrest in the Middle East boil over. Yet without political attention, diplomatic capital and sustained preventative actions, a critical region could descend into chaos. History shows that the actions of a small group of committed terrorists, such as the Black Hand in 1914 or al-Qaeda in 2001 - can spark broader wars. History could repeat itself with Lashkar-i-Taiba. Asymmetric threats that serve as flash points for broader geopolitical crises may be the greatest threat we face from terrorism.

#### Nuclear winter

Fai 1 - Kashmiri American Council

Ghulam Nabi, The Washington Times, “The most dangerous place”, July 8, Lexis

The foreign policy of the United States in South Asia should move from the lackadaisical and distant (with India crowned with a unilateral veto power) to aggressive involvement at the vortex. The most dangerous place on the planet is Kashmir, a disputed territory convulsed and illegally occupied for more than 53 years and sandwiched between nuclear-capable India and Pakistan. It has ignited two wars between the estranged South Asian rivals in 1948 and 1965, and a third could trigger nuclear volleys and a nuclear winter threatening the entire globe. The United States would enjoy no sanctuary.

#### Major powers get drawn in

Caldicott 2 - Founder of Physicians for Social Responsibility and Nominee for the Nobel Peace Prize

Helen, “The New Nuclear Danger: George W. Bush’s Military-Industrial Complex”, p. xiii

The use of Pakistani nuclear weapons could trigger a chain reaction. Nuclear-armed India, an ancient enemy could respond in kind. China, India’s hated foe, could react if India used her nuclear weapons, triggering a nuclear holocaust on the subcontinent. If any of either Russia or America’s 2,250 strategic weapons on hair-trigger alert were launched either accidentally or purposefully in response, nuclear winter would ensue, meaning the end of most life on earth.

### Solvency

#### TVA adoption solves the treaty and jump-starts utility use of MOX in the US

Wolfe '12

Clinton R., PhD in Chemistry, executive director of Citizens for Nuclear Technology Awareness in Aiken, S.C. He formerly chaired the Technical Advisory Panel to the U.S. Department of Energy's Plutonium Focus Area, "Guest Article" The Greenville News, Greenville, SC, 8/10/12www.c-n-t-a.com/letters.htm#GN1208

As the need for nuclear power grows, we must pursue serious efforts toward converting nuclear-weapons materials into fuel for power reactors. In particular, reactors can use a Mixed-Oxide fuel made from plutonium to generate enormous amounts of electricity for homes and businesses. A substantial amount of excess plutonium in the U.S. stockpile is now available for this purpose. The Tennessee Valley Authority is considering the use of the mixed-oxide fuel, known as MOX, at its Sequoyah plant near Chattanooga, Tenn., and at its Browns Ferry plant in northern Alabama. TVA's switch from conventional low-enriched uranium to MOX could occur as early as 2018-2020, timed to coincide with the start of MOX production at a facility under construction at the Savannah River Site here in South Carolina. Now half completed, the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility is one of the largest construction projects in the United States, with 2,200 workers at the site. This project, which is the size of eight football fields, is blazing the trail for the resumption of nuclear quality construction in the United States after a hiatus of 35 years. The idea of using weapons plutonium to make fuel for power reactors was a key factor in an historic arms-control agreement between the United States and Russia. That pact requires the elimination of 34 metric tons of plutonium by each country, under strict non-proliferation conditions. Combined, that's enough plutonium to arm 17,000 nuclear weapons. Converting that amount of plutonium into MOX fuel, thereby rendering it unsuitable for future military use, will take about 15 years. Though the agreement with Russia calls for eliminating 34 metric tons from each country's weapon stockpile it envisions the elimination of more of the weapons material in the future. Once TVA begins using MOX fuel, other nuclear utilities are likely to do the same. MOX is safe and nonthreatening; and the technology for its production and use is well-proven. Developed in this country in the 1960s, MOX was produced from plutonium in spent fuel that is left over from electricity production. MOX was pursued in this country until the mid-1970s, when it was abandoned in the U.S. on grounds that its production could lead to nuclear proliferation. Other countries such as France and Great Britain did not follow the U.S. example, and have continued to recycle plutonium. MOX has been manufactured and used safely and efficiently, with no diversion of plutonium for illicit purposes. Today MOX is used in about 30 power reactors around the world, with more planned units in the licensing stage. And that's the point. TVA's use of MOX could pave the way for a resumption of spent-fuel reprocessing in the United States. Indefinite storage of spent fuel in water pools and dry casks at nuclear plant sites around the country is senseless, considering that the material could be converted into MOX for the production of clean energy. When that happens, the amount of nuclear waste for each unit of energy will be reduced by 50 percent.

#### Commercialization key – otherwise South Carolina will shut down the SRS

Bunn '07

Matthew Bunn is a senior research associate in the Managing the Atom project at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government. Previously, he served in the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy where, among other responsibilities, he staffed the interagency working group on plutonium disposition. He was the study director for the two-volume National Academy of Sciences study Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium, published in 1994 and 1995., "Troubled Disposition: Next Steps in Dealing with Excess Plutonium," April 2007, www.armscontrol.org/act/2007\_04/Bunn

A wide range of other obstacles have contributed to these slowing schedules and escalating costs. After delays resulting from a year-long Bush administration policy review, the Bush team delayed matters further by demanding that Russia accept liability provisions that would make Russia liable even for damage caused by intentional sabotage by U.S. personnel, a provision Russian negotiators predictably rejected. Because construction of the U.S. and Russian MOX plants had been linked, this dispute resulted in years of delay in both countries. A liability protocol for plutonium disposition, in which the Bush administration effectively abandoned its earlier demands, was finally signed in September 2006, ironically not long after the linkage between U.S. and Russian construction was dropped.¶ Most U.S. officials believe that the U.S. excess plutonium stockpile poses few security issues and see getting rid of Russia 's excess plutonium stockpile as the main reason to bother with getting rid of the U.S. excess stockpile. The other major driver for the U.S. disposition effort is South Carolina , which would only allow the Energy Department to consolidate many of its plutonium stockpiles at Savannah River if there was a clear plan to do something with these stocks that would provide jobs and ultimately take them back out of the state. Congress has passed legislation that requires the Energy Department to pay substantial fines to the state if it does not meet plutonium disposition deadlines.

#### MOX has been used globally for four decades

AREVA 13

“TRANSPORT OF MOX FUEL FROM EUROPE TO JAPAN,” http://www.areva.com/EN/operations-1391/transport-of-mox-fuel-from-europe-to-japan-the-stakes.html

MOX fuel is a conventional nuclear fuel made up of a mixture of uranium and plutonium. The plutonium content varies between 5 and 10% depending on the design of the fuel. MOX fuel has been used in various countries worldwide for more than three decades. 35 reactors are loaded with MOX fuel in Europe.¶ MOX manufacturing also is a well-established process. MOX fabrication plants have been in operation in Europe for more than 40 years. The using record of MOX fuel in terms of safety, performance, and manufacturing is excellent.

# 2AC

### 2AC T – Energy Production - MOX

**We meet—reprocessing cycle and MOX produces energy**

Blaylock ‘02

Wayne, Ph.D. Candidate at Massachusetts Institute of Technology Department of Chemical Engineering, “Addressing Proliferation Concerns for a New Generation: A Study of the Generation-IV Nuclear Energy Systems Initiative and its Relation to National Non-proliferation Goals,” http://www.wise-intern.org/journal/2002/wayneblaylock.pdf)

In a partial recycle fuel cycle, a fraction of the used fuel is reprocessed and a fraction of the actinide material in the used fuel is recycled for new fuel fabrication. The recycled fuel is then returned to the reactor at least once and possibly several times for additional energy production. Uranium isotopes as well as plutonium isotopes may be removed from the fuel and placed in the nuclear reactor for energy production. If plutonium is removed, it would most likely be introduced into the reactor as plutonium oxide mixed with uranium oxide, a fuel commonly referred to as mixed oxide, or MOX, fuel. The French nuclear fuel-recycling program currently utilizes this fuel cycle. In full fissile recycle, all of the used nuclear fuel is processed to remove the reactor-usable plutonium and/or uranium. The used nuclear fuel from each recycle is once again processed to continue the cycle. This process is continued through multiple reactor cycles until essentially all fissile material is completely consumed. 17 The minor actinides as well as the fission products are disposed of in the waste stream for each processing operation. This technology would be applied, for example, in a liquid metal fast breeder reactor fuel cycle. A liquid metal reactor would be used because liquid metals are effective coolants that do not moderate neutrons. Un-moderated neutrons are important to this fuel cycle because there is a wider range of isotopes present in the full fissile recycled fuel than partially recycled fuel. Fast neutrons induce more efficient fissions across a wide isotopic range than do slow neutrons.

#### Counter-interpretation—energy production converts energy from one form to another for final consumption

COAG ‘09

Department of Climate Change on behalf of the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) Expert Group on Streamlining Greenhouse and Energy Reporting, "national Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Streamlining Protocol," http://www.climatechange.gov.au/~/media/publications/greenhouse-report/nger-streamlining-protocol.pdf)

‘Energy production’ is defined in NGER Regulation 2.23: Production of energy, in relation to a facility, means any one of the following: (a) the extraction or capture of energy from natural sources for final consumption by or from the operation of the facility or for use other than in operation of the facility; (b) the manufacture of energy by the conversion of energy from one form to another form for final consumption by or from the operation of the facility or for use other than in the operation of the facility.

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#### “Of” means energy production is modified by “nuclear power.”

Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary, 2013

Online

of: used as a function word to indicate the object of an action denoted or implied by the preceding noun <love of nature>

#### Best debate—our interpretation is the only way to discuss nuclear power – their interpretation arbitrarily limits that to just construction of the plant

MIT ’11

(“The Future of Nuclear Power”, Chapter 4 – Fuel Cycles, 2011, <http://web.mit.edu/nuclearpower/pdf/nuclearpower-ch4-9.pdf>)

The description of a possible global growth scenario for nuclear power with 1000 or so GWe deployed worldwide must begin with some specification of the nuclear fuel cycles that will be in operation. The nuclear fuel cycle refers to all activities that occur in the production of nuclear energy. It is important to emphasize that producing nuclear energy requires more than a nuclear reactor steam supply system and the associated turbine-generator equipment required to produce electricity from the heat created by nuclear fission. The process includes ore mining, enrichment, fuel fabrication, waste management and disposal, and finally decontamination and decommissioning of facilities. All steps in the process must be specified, because each involves different technical, economic, safety, and environmental consequences. A vast number of different fuel cycles appear in the literature, and many have been utilized to one degree or another. We review the operating characteristics of a number of these fuel cycles, summarized in Appendix 4. In this report, our concern is not with the description of the technical details of each fuel cycle. Rather, we stress the importance of aligning the different fuel cycle options with the global growth scenario criteria that we have specified in the last section: cost, safety, nonproliferation, and waste. This is by no means an easy task, because objective quantitative measures are not obvious, there are great uncertainties, and it is difficult to harmonize technical and institutional features. Moreover, different fuel cycles will meet the four different objectives differently, and therefore the selection of one over the other will inevitably be a matter of judgment. All too often, advocates of a particular reactor type or fuel cycle are selective in emphasizing criteria that have led them to propose a particular candidate. We believe that detailed and thorough analysis is needed to properly evaluate the many fuel cycle alternatives. We do not believe that a new technical configuration exists that meets all the criteria we have set forth, e.g. there is not a technical ‘silver bullet’ that will satisfy each of the criteria. Accordingly, the choice of the best technical path requires a judgment balancing the characteristics of a particular fuel cycle against how well it meets the criteria we have adopted. Our analysis separates fuel cycles into two classes: “open” and “closed.” In the open or once-through fuel cycle, the spent fuel discharged from the reactor is treated as waste. See Figure 4.1. In the closed fuel cycle today, the spent fuel discharged from the reactor is reprocessed, and the products are partitioned into uranium (U) and plutonium (Pu) suitable for fabrication into oxide fuel or mixed oxide fuel (MOX) for recycle back into a reactor. See Figure 4.2. The rest of the spent fuel is treated as high-level waste (HLW). In the future, closed fuel cycles could include use of a dedicated reactor that would be used to transmute selected isotopes that have been separated from spent fuel. See Figure 4.3. The dedicated reactor also may be used as a breeder to produce new fissile fuel by neutron absorption at a rate that exceeds the consumption of fissile fuel by the neutron chain reaction.2 In such fuel cycles the waste stream will contain less actinides,3 which will significantly reduce the long-term radioactivity of the nuclear waste.4

### 2AC T – USFG

#### TVA is the USFG.

Froomkin ‘96

A. Michael; Associate Professor of Law – University of Miami, “Reinventing the Government Corporation,” osaka.law.miami.edu/~froomkin/articles/reinvent.htm)

Most statutes providing for presidential appointment of directors to FGCs are silent about removal. Courts should follow the cases relating[ \*612] to independent agencies and find at least a "good cause" removal power in the absence of a congressional statement to the contrary.{351} If the FGC is private, courts should not assume that the entity's corporate status entitles the nation's directors to any more independence from the "shareholder," i.e., the government, that selected them. If the FGC is public, the directors constitutionally cannot have any more independence than other federal officers. Indeed, in the only modern case to review the removal of an FGC director, the Sixth Circuit treated the wholly owned nonstock TVA as an ordinary agency and its directors as no different from executive officers who serve at the pleasure of the President.{352} The Sixth Circuit determined that the TVA "exercises predominantly an executive or administrative function it is predominantly an administrative arm of the executive department" and that the TVA director's argument that the TVA resembled an independent agency failed.{353}

#### We meet – TVA is a federal agency

--federal agency w/ board members appointed by President and Congress

--GAO, OMB and Treasury oversight

--their financial statements are included in Treasury statements

--subject to the Government Performance and Review Act

TVA ‘12

“Budget Proposal and Management Agenda, http://www.tva.com/abouttva/pdf/budget\_proposal\_2013.pdf

TVA is a government-owned corporation and federal agency, and its mission is fundamentally different than that of publicly ¶ traded companies. TVA is governed by the TVA Board of Directors (TVA Board). The TVA Board has nine part-time members, ¶ two of whom may reside outside the TVA service area. The board members are appointed by the President of the United ¶ States with the advice and consent of the U.S. Senate. The board’s responsibilities include formulating broad goals, ¶ objectives, and policies for TVA and approving plans for their implementation; reviewing and approving annual budgets; setting ¶ and overseeing rates; and establishing a compensation plan for employees. TVA has oversight similar to other utilities such ¶ as a board of directors, SEC requirements, credit rating agencies, and Sarbanes-Oxley requirements. In addition, TVA has ¶ oversight from Congress, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Office of Management & Budget (OMB), the U.S. ¶ Treasury, and an independent inspector general. ¶ Audit Committee – The TVA Board established the Audit, Risk, and Regulation Committee. The committee is responsible for, ¶ among other things, recommending an external auditor to the TVA Board, overseeing the auditor’s work, and reviewing reports ¶ of the auditor and the TVA Inspector General. ¶ Independent Auditor – An independent auditor audits TVA’s financial statements in accordance with standards of the Public ¶ Company Accounting Oversight Board (United States) and with Government Auditing Standards issued by the Comptroller ¶ General of the United States. The auditor also provides an opinion on whether those statements are presented in conformity ¶ with U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). ¶ Independent Inspector General – An independent Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducts ongoing audits of TVA’s ¶ operational and financial matters in accordance with Government Auditing Standards, which incorporate the American Institute ¶ of Certified Public Accountants Generally Accepted Auditing Standards. The OIG has about 105 employees, including more ¶ than fifty auditors. TVA’s Inspector General is appointed by the President of the United States and confirmed by the U.S. ¶ Senate. The OIG provides semiannual reports to Congress on the results of its audit and investigative work. ¶ As required by the Inspector General Reform Act of 2008 (Pub. L. No. 110-409), the TVA OIG made an aggregate budget ¶ request of $22.4 million for FY 2013, which includes $118,000 for OIG training and $63,762 in support of the Council of the ¶ Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. TVA’s FY 2013 budget assumes OIG activities at the level requested. TVA ¶ received no additional comments from the OIG with respect to the budget proposal. ¶ Congressional Oversight – Congress provides formal oversight of TVA through two committees, the U.S. House of ¶ Representatives Transportation and Infrastructure Committee and the U.S. Senate Environment and Public Works Committee. ¶ The audit arm of Congress, the Government Accountability Office, also conducts audits of various TVA activities and ¶ programs, generally at the request of members of Congress. ¶ Executive Branch – TVA routinely submits budget information to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and TVA’s ¶ budget is included in the consolidated budget of the U.S. Government. TVA’s financial results also are included in the federal¶ government’s financial statements, which are coordinated with the U.S. Treasury and are subject to audit by GAO.¶ The TVA Act – TVA’s congressional charter, the TVA Act of 1933, as amended, defines the range of TVA’s business activities. ¶ TVA is also subject to the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA), which requires that a strategic plan and annual ¶ performance reports be submitted to Congress. ¶ Other Regulatory Oversight – In aspects of its operations, TVA is subject to regulations issued by other governmental ¶ agencies, including the Environmental Protection Agency, state environmental agencies, the SEC, and the Nuclear Regulatory ¶ Commission (NRC). TVA also complies with applicable regulations of other federal agencies, such as the Department of ¶ Labor’s Occupational Safety and Health Administration. While TVA is generally not subject to regulations issued by the ¶ Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), FERC has some regulatory authority over TVA activities. Other ¶ organizations with major influence on TVA and others in the electric utility industry include the North American Electric ¶ Reliability Corporation and the industry based Institute of Nuclear Power Operations.

#### Counterinterpretation – USFG includes federal agencies and bureaus

Chicago 7

(University of Chicago Manual of Style, “Capitalization, Titles”, <http://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org/CMS_FAQ/CapitalizationTitles/> CapitalizationTitles30.html)

Q. When I refer to the government of the United States in text, should it be US Federal Government or US federal government?

A. The government of the United States is not a single official entity. Nor is it when it is referred to as the federal government or the US government or the US federal government. It’s just a government, which, like those in all countries, has some official bodies that act and operate in the name of government: the Congress, the Senate, the Department of State, etc.

#### The doesn’t mean all three

**Merriam Webster.com**

http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/the?show=0&t=1308850317

used as a function word to indicate that a following noun or noun equivalent is a unique or a particular member of its class <*the* President> <*the* Lord>

### SOLVENCY

#### NRC says it’ll get done

AP 3/6

"Feds give SC fuel fabrication plant good report," www.midlandsconnect.com/news/story.aspx?id=868712#.UVN7ORn1e5I

COLUMBIA, S.C. (AP) -- Federal regulators have given good marks to progress at a South Carolina project to turn weapons-grade plutonium into nuclear reactor fuel.¶ The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission said appropriate progress was being made at the mixed-oxide fuel fabrication facility at the Savannah River Site near Aiken.¶ The plant to blend weapons-grade plutonium to create commercial nuclear reactor fuel would be the first of its kind in the United States. The mammoth structure is being built at a former nuclear bomb plant whose reactors have been shut down for more than a decade.¶ The project is expected to be completed in 2016. Last month, the General Accountability Office said the plant was expected to cost about $2 billion more than originally expected, putting its anticipated cost at around $7 billion.

#### On track to completion

Weaver 3/19

Lynn E., PhD from Purdue, previous dean of engineering at Auburn, associate dean for College of Engineering at OU and director for School of Nuclear Engineer and Health Physics at Georgia Institute of Technology, President of Florida Tech, author of “System Analysis of Nuclear Reactor Dynamics [Hardcover]” “Commentary: Defunding S.C. nuke-conversion site would threaten U.S. security” The Town Talk,

The U.S. MOX facility is still on target to be completed next year. It will be the first facility of its kind in this country to deal with the dangerous problem of vulnerable nuclear materials. Abandoning the project is not an option. We cannot wait for an act of nuclear terrorism before taking action to address it.¶ The possibility that something could go wrong will remain unless we stay vigilant and insist on the elimination of surplus nuclear-weapons material.

#### Plan solves

Mills 3/21

Chad, reporter, DHD News Augusta, Aiken County SC, "Report: MOX facility cost inflated by billions again, delayed 3 years," 3/21/13 www.wrdw.com/news/politics/headlines/Report-MOX-facility-cost-inflated-again-delayed-three-years-199348251.html

"The cost increase and schedule delay will not be known until DOE completes its review of the contractor’s proposal and DOE’s project oversight office completes an independent cost estimate. DOE currently plans to complete its review and approve a new project baseline by September 2013," the GAO report reads.¶ The report cites construction problems for the recent delay and cost increase.¶ There are also concerns about the lack of vendors interested in the reprocessed fuel for commercial reactors. According to another recent report by the GAO, only the Tennessee Valley Authority is seriously interested.

### 2AC States CP

#### Federal Government key to Russia

DOE 7

(Department Of Energy, Deputy Secretary of Energy, Clay Sell, Speech at the Carnegie Moscow Center, March 14, 2007, http://www.energy.gov/news/4876.htm)

Thank you Rose for that kind introduction.  And a special thank you to the Carnegie Moscow Center for putting together this morning’s event. Non-governmental organizations like the Moscow Center do unique work that plays a very important role in civil society.  The Carnegie Institute has been instrumental in bringing together the thought and opinion leaders of Russia in support of democracy and freedom. You and others took a leading role in the transformation of political discourse here over the past 15 years.  And it will be you who help keep the political and opinion leaders accountable by convening experts, fostering debate, and performing crucial research that addresses some of our world’s most important public policy challenges.  I commend you for it and I thank you for having me. One individual who personified the important role that reformers can make, even against staggering odds, was the former Russian Admiral Nikolai Yurasov.  I recall meeting the Admiral about five or six years ago back in the U.S.  He was a great and early advocate for nuclear nonproliferation and he helped to strengthen the U.S. – Russian partnership in this area. His work began opening the door to a number of opportunities for the Department of Energy.  I think fondly of him and express my condolences to his family. The strategic rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union was the most important foreign policy dynamic in the second half of the 20th century, without question.  It defined our relationship and separated the world into groups…aligned with…aligned against…or not aligned at all. But that time is over.  In the 21st century, our relationship must not be defined by a rekindling of our strategic rivalry of old, but instead by a new strategic partnership.  A partnership defined by our joint leadership on the world’s greatest challenges.  And right now, there is no greater challenge than energy. Perhaps some would say that is an overstatement.  I don’t think so.  And I would like to tell you why. Energy necessarily underpins almost every other major challenge we face. The development and success of national economies – a matter critically important to addressing the poverty and despair that breeds terrorism – will depend, in large part, on whether or not nations have secure and affordable supplies of energy. And ensuring that this continued development is achieved in a clean and environmentally sensitive way, and in a way that allows us to effectively address the challenge of global climate change, will depend on the decision we make about how to source and consume our energy. And each nation’s sense of national security will depend in large part on having stable and diverse supplies of energy.  Energy security cannot be separated from national security. And when one looks at the great potential that nuclear power can play in addressing these issues, we can add in a further issue:  energy security cannot be separated from our nonproliferation and counterterrorism policies related to fissile material. These issues matter.  How Russia leads on these issues matter.  And perhaps there is no area in which Russia and the United States together can have a greater impact than on energy. In some of these areas, like nonproliferation policy, the United States and Russia have a rich track record of cooperation on which to build…I would like to talk about that today. On broader matters of energy policy, our partnership is still emerging.  Frankly we, in the United States, see areas of great concern about what is happening here, but we also see areas of great opportunity.  I will talk about that as well.

#### No utility will invest in upgrading nuclear plants – the federal government needs to show its commitment

Gale et al. ‘9

FINANCING THE NUCLEAR RENAISSANCE: THE BENEFITS AND POTENTIAL PITFALLS OF FEDERAL & STATE GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES AND THE FUTURE OF NUCLEAR POWER IN CALIFORNIA Sony Ben-Moshe, Jason J. Crowell, Kelley M. Gale,\* Breton A. Peace, Brett P. Rosenblatt, and Kelly D. Thomason\*\* \* Kelley Michael Gale is the Finance Department Chair of Latham & Watkins‘ San Diego office and serves as global Co-Chair for the firm‘s Climate Change and Cleantech Practice Groups. He has thirty years of experience representing private and public sector clients in the development, regulation, and financing of alternative energy projects and capital intensive infrastructure projects. \*\* The co-authors are attorneys in the Project Finance Practice Group in the San Diego office of Latham & Watkins LLP. The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not reflect the views of Latham & Watkins LLP or its clients. 498 ENERGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 30:497 2009

Similar to this political risk, investors in new domestic nuclear reactors will likely face substantial regulatory and permitting risks, such as the risk of litigation by residents or environmentalists desiring to thwart any large scale development of new reactors in the United States and the risk that a largely untested regulatory approval process may not operate as anticipated, and those challenges can result in significant delays in construction of a nuclear power project. Although they are different in kind, the substance of sovereign and other risks facing large overseas infrastructure projects is similar in the sense that worst case scenarios of delay or inability to make commercial use of the projects and the magnitude of the potential losses are roughly equivalent. As a risk mitigation measure in the case of financings for natural gas liquefaction facilities and other large overseas infrastructure projects, the Export-Import Bank of the United States may approve loan guarantees and offer credit enhancements and/or direct loans to support the sale of United States exports to emerging markets throughout the world. Its loan guarantees to support the construction of large overseas infrastructure projects increase the comfort of private institutional investors because these investors believe there is a substantially lower risk that an overseas political regime will change the rules in a manner adverse to creditors if the United States government is one of those creditors.34 In a similar fashion, regulatory risk insurance and loan guarantees provided by the federal government should encourage private financing of domestic nuclear power projects because the government providing the guarantees also controls many of the risk factors which could give rise to regulatory delays in commencing commercial operation of a new nuclear project. Further, in the nuclear power industry, the federal government is reviewing development applications and reactor designs, and is equipped with a team of experts in nuclear technologies, so that if the federal government has skin in the game, so to speak, private lenders may take additional comfort that the government has performed a certain level of due diligence on a particular project and determined that there are no major flaws from its vantage point. Section II.D.3 below discusses the risks covered by federally provided regulatory risk insurance and the ways in which it can be adapted to best encourage private sector financing for nuclear energy.

#### Especially key in the context of MOX

Berry and Tolley ‘10

Professors of energy and economic policy R. Stephen Berry and George S. Tolley, “Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Future Prospects and Viability”, University of Chicago Humanities, 11-29-2010, http://humanities.uchicago.edu/orgs/institute/bigproblems/Team7-1210.pdf

The American and French nuclear power industries developed along divergent paths. The U.S. nuclear power industry as a whole experienced a rapid decline beginning in the 1970’s and culminating with the Three Mile Island accident in 1979 (TMI, a partial core meltdown in Reactor 2 at the Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating Station, remains as one of the most significant accidents in the commercial nuclear energy industry in the in the U.S.) 52. Following a period from the mid-1950’s to the mid 1970’s when the U.S. built more nuclear power plants than any other country (231 through 1974), the U.S. only built 15 after 1974 and none after 1977. 53 This shift away from nuclear power was reversed in the late 1990’s as nuclear energy was perceived as a sustainable energy solution to combat specific environmental concerns. In France, the nuclear power industry achieved a successful implementation and was prospering for many years both before and after TMI. Further, in France, nuclear power generates more than 75% of France’s electricity while in the U.S. nuclear power has never accounted for more than 20% of its electricity. 54 These varying paths of nuclear power development in the U.S. and France stem largely from government’s credible commitment or lack thereof to the industry. By analyzing the political and regulatory frameworks present in the U.S. and France, it is possible to gain a further understanding of the nuclear power industries in the U.S. and France, but more importantly discern the potential frameworks to develop nuclear reprocessing in the U.S. The differentiation in the U.S. and French nuclear industries was largely based on the government’s level of commitment over time. In the U.S., the government’s commitment to the industry was initially strong, but abated over time, while France’s government maintained a strong commitment over time. 55 The level of a government’s credible commitment to the nuclear energy industry and specifically nuclear reprocessing will play an important role in shaping the flow of capital into the technology. 56 As the industry is currently constructed, utilities are sensitive to licensing and construction costs, which may be difficult to predict based on a government’s ability to commit to the industry. Utilities must obtain construction licenses from regulatory bodies to build nuclear facilities. These investment decisions necessitate large sunk costs which must be incurred a number of years prior to operating the plant. The decision making process of the utility is ultimately influenced by uncertainty surrounding the regulatory process that can ease or complicate the process. This uncertainty increases the risk associated with these types of investments and disincentivizes investment in the technology. Therefore an “analysis of the differences in institutional environment attributes can further understanding of government’s credible commitment to the industry.” 57 In understanding the existing differentiation in the institutional environment for both the U.S. and France, it is possible to elucidate how these unique situations have created varying transaction costs for their respective industries.

#### Links to politics

Kiely 12

[EUGENE KIELY](http://www.factcheck.org/author/eugene-kiely/), Washington assignment editor USA today, February 17, 2012 Factcheck.org “Did Obama ‘Approve’ Bridge Work for Chinese Firms?” http://www.factcheck.org/2012/02/did-obama-approve-bridge-work-for-chinese-firms/

Who’s to blame, if that’s the right word, if the project ends up using manufactured steel from China? The National Steel Bridge Alliance blames the state railroad agency. The Alliance for American Manufacturing says the federal Buy American laws have been “weakened with loopholes and various exemptions that make it easier for bureaucrats to purchase foreign-made goods instead of those made in American factories with American workers.” So**,** how did Obama get blamed for the decisions by state agencies and for state projects that, in at least one case, didn’t even use federal funds? The answer is a textbook lesson in how information gets distortedwhen emails go viral. We looked at the nearly 100 emails we received on this subject and found that Obama wasn’t mentioned at all in the first few emails. Typical of the emails we received shortly after the ABC News report aired was this one from Oct. 11, 2011: “I just got an email regarding Diane Sawyer on ABC TV stating that U. S. Bridges and roads are being built by Chinese firms when the jobs should have gone to Americans. Could this possible be true?” The answer: Yes, it’s true. End of story, right? Wrong. Days later, emails started to appear in our inbox that claimed ABC News reported that Chinese firm were receiving stimulus funds to build U.S. bridges — even though the broadcast news story didn’t mention stimulus funds at all. (The report did include a clip of Obama delivering a speech on the need to rebuild America’s bridges and put Americans to work, but said nothing about the president’s $830 billion stimulus bill.) Still, we received emails such as this one on Nov. 4, 2011, that included this erroneous claim language: “Stimulus money meant to create U.S. jobs went to Chinese firms. Unbelievable….” It didn’t take long for Obama to be blamed. That same day — Nov. 4, 2011 — we received an email that made this leap to Obama: “SOME CHINESE COMPANIES WHO ARE BUILDING ‘OUR’ BRIDGES. (3000 JOBS LOST TO THE CHINESE FIRM)…..AND NOW OBAMA WANTS ‘MORE STIMULUS MONEY’…..THIS IS NUTS ! ! ! If this doesn’t make you furious nothing will….” This year, Obama’s name started to surface in the subject line of such critical emails — raising the attack on the president to yet another level and perhaps ensuring the email will be even more widely circulated. Since Jan. 17, we have gotten more than a dozen emails with the subject line, “ABC News on Obama/USA Infrastructure,” often preceded with the word “SHOCKING” in all caps. The emails increasingly contain harsh language about the president. Since Jan. 11, 23 emails carried this added bit of Obama-bashing: “I pray all the unemployed see this and cast their votes accordingly in 2012!” One of those emails — a more recent one from Feb. 8 — contained this additional line: “Tell me again how Obama’s looking out for blue collar guys. He cancels pipelines, and lets Chinese contractors build our bridges…” And so it goes, on and on. All from a news report that blamed state officials — not Obama — for spending taxpayer money on Chinese firms to build U.S. bridges.

### 2nd CP

#### TVA fixed it

Flessner 3/9

Dave, business editor for the Times Free Press., "Nuclear Regulatory Commission starts Browns Ferry review to remove sanction," 3/9/13www.timesfreepress.com/news/2013/mar/09/nrc-starts-browns-ferry-review-to-remove/

Federal regulators have begun one of the most exhaustive reviews of a TVA operating nuclear plant to determine if the federal utility has corrected problems that led to one of the most severe sanctions against any plant.¶ The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which issued a red finding for safety violations at TVA's Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant two years ago, has assembled nearly two dozen inspectors to review improvements made at the North Alabama plant.¶ "This is the most comprehensive type of review we do of any existing plant," NRC spokesman Joey Ledford said of the inspection, known as a 95003 review.¶ TVA requested the review last month in a letter to the NRC. TVA nuclear officials said they believe TVA has addressed concerns that led to the red finding in 2011.¶ NRC red-flagged the Browns Ferry plant -- only the fifth nuclear plant to ever receive such a citation -- after TVA found a defective valve had gone undetected for years at Browns Ferry's Unit 1 reactor.¶ Ledford said the NRC will likely conduct on-site inspections at Browns Ferry this spring. The other four nuclear plants red-flagged by the NRC ultimately were removed from the sanctions after such inspections.¶ TVA spokesman Mike Bradley said TVA has upgraded procedures, training and equipment over the past two years to compl

y with NRC rules.¶ "While many of the actions are ongoing, we believe that we have made solid progress in addressing the underlying causes that contributed to the valve failure and are ready for the NRC to come in for the inspection," Butler said.¶ Dave Lochbaum, a former Browns Ferry nuclear plant worker who now serves as director of the Union of Concerned Scientists Nuclear Safety Project, said the NRC review should identify outstanding problems at Browns Ferry.¶ "I'm encouraged that TVA is moving to come into compliance with fire protection rules, which have created problems in the past at Browns Ferry," he said.

### AT Japan 123

#### Japanese reprocessing inevitable, MOX solves international credibility, and this is their evidence

Asahi Shimbun 3/17

"Editorial: End nuclear fuel recycling program for sake of future generations," 3/17/13 ajw.asahi.com/article/views/editorial/AJ201303180075

Japan already has a stockpile of about 45 tons of plutonium, including those whose reprocessing has been entrusted to overseas organizations. Of them, about 10 tons are stored in Japan. They alone are theoretically sufficient to produce more than 1,000 nuclear weapons.¶ Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has pledged to reduce Japan’s dependence on nuclear power generation as much as possible. Yet he has indicated his intention to keep the nuclear fuel cycle program alive.¶ The completion of the nuclear fuel reprocessing plant at Rokkasho, Aomori Prefecture, has been delayed repeatedly due to a series of troubles. But the government is hoping to bring the plant into full-scale operation in October this year. If the Rokkasho reprocessing plant comes on stream under the current situation, the amount of plutonium in Japan will likely keep growing. This is a policy that apparently contradicts Abe’s remark about reducing Japan’s dependence on nuclear power generation.¶ Trying to use plutonium for nuclear power generation is also undesirable from the reality of international politics. North Korea and Iran are engaged in nuclear development programs, making nuclear proliferation a serious security concern for the entire world.¶ Japan is the only non-nuclear country that is internationally allowed to reprocess spent nuclear fuel on a large scale. This fact reflects the trust of the international community in Japan, which is the only nation to have suffered nuclear attacks and has been adhering to its three non-nuclear principles of neither possessing or manufacturing nuclear weapons nor allowing other countries to bring them into Japanese territory. But Japan will lose the trust of the international community if it keeps accumulating plutonium with no clear plan on how to use it. If other countries try to pursue the use of plutonium by imitating Japan, it will be difficult to stop them.¶ \*\*\*Their card starts here\*\*\*\*\*There are great concerns in the United States as well about Japan’s nuclear fuel reprocessing program. Steve Fetter, a professor at the University of Maryland, who recently served as assistant director at-large in the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, has voiced opposition to the reprocessing since he worked in the office. Fetter warns that Japan will find it hard to win international support for its reprocessing program if it starts full-scale operation at the reprocessing plant and, as a result, causes a further increase in its stockpile of plutonium.¶ \*\*\*Their card ends here\*\*\*\*\* Japan’s Nuclear Regulation Authority is expected to work out new safety standards for the reprocessing plant by the end of this year. There is no need for the government to rush to bring the Rokkasho plant online before the new standards are ready.

#### No increased risk of nuclear war from prolif

Gavin 10

Francis. Professor of International Affairs and Director of the Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law, Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, University of Texas at Austin. Same As It Ever Was: Nuclear Alarmism, Proliferation, and the Cold War. International Security. Winter 2009/2010. Muse.

Throughout the post–World War II period, analysts worried that proliferation among small or unstable countries could increase the "likelihood of nuclear war."31 Such "deterministic" assessments rested on the assumption that [End Page 14] these countries "would act less maturely with nuclear weapons under their belt, thus inevitably leading to regional, and in turn global, instability."32 Yet no nuclear crisis involving a small country has remotely approached the danger and risk levels seen during confrontations between the superpowers during the Cold War. More important, contemporary analysts often forget that two of the United States' communist adversaries whose "rogue" status, by current definitions, was unparalleled in the atomic age, pursued nuclear weapons: the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (PRC). The United States dreaded the Soviet Union's acquisition of the bomb. Joseph Stalin's Russia was both a murderous and secretive regime; it violated international norms and pursued aggressive foreign policies even before it tested an atomic bomb. The Soviet Union's behavior after its August 1949 atomic test seemed to realize the worst fears of President Harry Truman's administration when Moscow's client, North Korea, attacked South Korea without any apparent concern over the U.S. response. During the winter of 1950–51, the United States was convinced that nuclear weapons had so emboldened the Soviet Union that a third world war might be unavoidable.33 In 1953, however, fighting on the Korean Peninsula ended and tensions with the Soviets eased. Although the Soviet Union's nuclearization would remain a serious threat, in time, the United States developed policies to cope with this challenge. In 1964, when the PRC tested its first nuclear device, China was perhaps the most "rogue" state in modern history. Mao Zedong's domestic policies caused the death of tens of millions of China's citizens. Moreover, he had pursued an aggressive foreign policy before the atomic test. Examples include attacking India, fighting the United States directly in Korea and by proxy in Vietnam (where it armed a nonstate actor, the Vietcong), and threatening war over Taiwan. Mao made a series of highly irresponsible statements about the PRC surviving and even thriving in a nuclear war. No country in the post–World War II period—not Iraq, Iran, or even North Korea—has given U.S. policymakers more reason to fear its nuclearization than China.34 Within five years of the PRC's nuclear test, however, the United States and China initiated a covert dialogue. In less than a decade, they began an anti-Soviet alliance that put great pressure on Russia and helped to bring the Cold [End Page 15] War to an end. Nuclear weapons did not make China more hostile. If anything, its foreign policies became less aggressive and more mature over time. Today China has one of the most restrained and most responsible nuclear force postures and deployment policies of any nuclear power; it maintains a minimal deterrent under tight command and control while eschewing a first-use doctrine.35 That Iran—surrounded by rivals with nuclear ambitions and singled out by the United States, the largest military power in the world—has an interest in nuclear weapons is not surprising. Even assessments that view Iranian behavior as a challenge to U.S. interests in the Middle East do not consider the regime as threatening as the PRC was during the 1960s. As Shahram Chubin writes, "It is not overtly confrontational or given to wild swings in behavior or to delusional goals; it has not denounced arms control treaties to which it formally adheres; and there is evidence of pluralism and some debate within the country."36 Nuclear weapons could make Iran more aggressive. Or, as with China, they could provide international legitimacy and security, making Iran less aggressive than it has been. As one recent analysis put it, "If anything, Iran might find that possession of a nuclear weapon actually diminishes its options in the Middle East and forces it to act with greater restraint."37 A deeper understanding of nuclear history and the underlying geopolitical circumstances Iran faces makes the prospect that it would take actions (such as supplying Hamas or Hezbollah with nuclear weapons) that could invite its own destruction highly unlikely.38 [End Page 16]

## Politics

### Econ - Startups

#### No startups

--they’ll go home

--they’ll hold out for a less restrictive visa

**Gobry, 10 -** Paris-based entrepreneur (Paul, “The Startup Visa Act Must Be Stopped,” Business Insider, 3/22, http://www.businessinsider.com/why-the-startup-visa-is-actually-a-really-bad-idea-2010-3)

Finally, the Startup Visa will be bad for investors as well. The best foreign entrepreneurs will self-select away from it, either by starting their companies in their home countries (precisely what the Startup Visa wants to avoid) or by waiting to have enough money for a fair EB-5 visa (at which point it might be too late, because cookie-cutter wantrapreneurs have killed that category to get more Startup Visas).¶ Also, if foreign entrepreneurs get a green card by raising an additional million dollar round after two years, their incentive is clearly to get that million dollars, at any price, from any "qualified investor" and then bail to start a company on his own terms. This would be bad for everyone, including the investors.

#### Dense economic linkages make conflict impossible

Jervis 11 – Professor of Political Science @ Columbia

Robert, Professor in the Department of Political Science and School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University, December 2011, “Force in Our Times,” Survival, Vol. 25, No. 4, p. 403-425

Even if war is still seen as evil, the security community could be dissolved if severe conflicts of interest were to arise. Could the more peaceful world generate new interests that would bring the members of the community into sharp disputes? 45 A zero-sum sense of status would be one example, perhaps linked to a steep rise in nationalism. More likely would be a worsening of the current economic difficulties, which could itself produce greater nationalism, undermine democracy and bring back old-fashioned beggar-my-neighbor economic policies. While these dangers are real, it is hard to believe that the conflicts could be great enough to lead the members of the community to contemplate fighting each other. It is not so much that economic interdependence has proceeded to the point where it could not be reversed – states that were more internally interdependent than anything seen internationally have fought bloody civil wars. Rather it is that even if the more extreme versions of free trade and economic liberalism become discredited, it is hard to see how without building on a preexisting high level of political conflict leaders and mass opinion would come to believe that their countries could prosper by impoverishing or even attacking others. Is it possible that problems will not only become severe, but that people will entertain the thought that they have to be solved by war? While a pessimist could note that this argument does not appear as outlandish as it did before the financial crisis, an optimist could reply (correctly, in my view) that the very fact that we have seen such a sharp economic down-turn without anyone suggesting that force of arms is the solution shows that even if bad times bring about greater economic conflict, it will not make war thinkable.

### 2AC Food

#### No Food wars

Barnett 2k - Australian Research Council fellow and Senior Lecturer in Development Studies @ Melbourne U. School of Social and Environmental Enquiry

Jon, Review of International Studies, “Destabilizing the environment-conflict Thesis”, 26:271-288, Cambridge Journals Online

Considerable attention has been paid to the links between population, the environment and conflict. The standard argument is that population growth will overextend the natural resources of the immediate environs, leading to deprivation which, it is assumed, will lead to conflict and instability either directly through competition for scarce resources, or indirectly through the generation of ‘environmental refugees’. For example, according to Myers: ‘so great are the stresses generated by too many people making too many demands on their natural-resource stocks and their institutional support systems, that the pressures often create first-rate breeding grounds for conflict’.37 The ways in which population growth leads to environmental degradation are reasonably well known. However, the particular ways in which this leads to conflict are difficult to prove. In the absence of proof there is a negative style of argumentation, and there are blanket assertions and abrogations; for example: ‘the relationship is rarely causative in a direct fashion’, but ‘we may surmise that conflict would not arise so readily, nor would it prove so acute, if the associated factor of population growth were occurring at a more manageable rate’.38 It is possible though, that rather than inducing warfare, overpopulation and famine reduce the capacity of a people to wage war. Indeed, it is less the case that famines in Africa in recent decades have produced ‘first rate breeding grounds for conflict’; the more important, pressing, and avoidable product is widespread malnutrition and large loss of life.

#### Immigration isn’t key

Pumer 1-29

Brad, “We’re running out of farm workers. Immigration reform won’t help,” Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/01/29/the-u-s-is-running-out-of-farm-workers-immigration-reform-may-not-help/

But looser immigration laws may not be able to keep our food cheap forever. A recent study suggests that U.S. farms could well face a shortage of low-cost labor in the years ahead no matter what Congress does on immigration. That’s because Mexico is getting richer and can no longer supply as many rural farm workers to the United States. And it won’t be nearly as easy to import low-wage agricultural workers from elsewhere.¶ For decades, farms in the United States have relied heavily on low-wage foreign workers — mainly from Mexico — to work their fields. In 2006, 77 percent of all agricultural workers in the United States were foreign-born. (And half of those foreign workers were undocumented immigrants.) All that cheap labor has helped keep down U.S. food prices, particularly for labor-intensive fruits and vegetables.¶ But that labor pool is now drying up. In recent years, we’ve seen a spate of headlines like this from CNBC: “California Farm Labor Shortage ‘Worst It’s Been, Ever’.” Typically, these stories blame drug-related violence on the Mexican border or tougher border enforcement for the decline. Hence the call for new guest-worker programs.¶ But a new paper from U.C. Davis offers up a simpler explanation for the labor shortage. Mexico is getting richer. And, when a country gets richer, its pool of rural agricultural labor shrinks. Not only are Mexican workers shifting into other sectors like construction, but Mexico’s own farms are increasing wages. That means U.S. farms will have to pay higher and higher wages to attract a dwindling pool of available Mexican farm workers.¶ “It’s a simple story,” says Edward Taylor, an agricultural economist at U.C. Davis and one of the study’s authors. ”By the mid-twentieth century, Americans stopped doing farm work. And we were only able to avoid a farm-labor crisis by bringing in workers from a nearby country that was at an earlier stage of development. Now that era is coming to an end.”¶ Taylor and his co-authors argue that the United States could face a sharp adjustment period as a result. Americans appear unwilling to do the sort of low-wage farm work that we have long relied on immigrants to do. And, the paper notes, it may be difficult to find an abundance of cheap farm labor anywhere else — potential targets such as Guatemala and El Salvador are either too small or are urbanizing too rapidly.¶ So the labor shortages will keep getting worse. And that leaves several choices. American farmers could simply stop growing crops that need a lot of workers to harvest, such as fruits and vegetables. Given the demand for fresh produce, that seems unlikely.¶ Alternatively, U.S. farms could continue to invest in new labor-saving technologies, such as “shake-and-catch” machines to harvest fruits and nuts. “Under this option,” the authors write, “capital improvements in farm production would increase the marginal product of farm labor; U.S. farms would hire fewer workers and pay higher wages.” That could be a boon to domestic workers — studies have found that 23 percent of U.S. farm worker families are below the poverty line.¶ In the meantime, however, farm groups are hoping they can fend off that day of reckoning by revamping the nation’s immigration laws. The bipartisan immigration-reform proposal unveiled in the Senate on Monday contained several provisions aimed at boosting the supply of farm workers, including the promise of an easier path to citizenship.¶ Taylor, however, is not convinced that this is a viable long-term strategy. “The idea that you can design a guest-worker program or any other immigration policy to solve this farm labor problem isn’t realistic,” he says. “It assumes that there’s a willingness to keep doing farm work on the other side of the border. And that’s already dropping off.”

#### US-India relations high

India Today 1-21

“Obama's second term may witness new initiatives in US-India relations,” http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/obama-second-term-new-initiatives-in-us-india-relations/1/243159.html

As US President Barack Obama heads into his legacy-shaping second term in office, assumptions, expectations and suggestions abound about what his administration could mean for India with which he professes to have enduring ties.¶ Given the bipartisan support and evolving "strategic partnership" between the two democracies, India barely figured during the election campaign. Outsourcing and visas were mentioned but as a glancing reference as part of the poll rhetoric.¶ Obama has said India figures "big" in his plans, but it is not clear how and in what way he would direct US policy towards India in the next four years. A host of experts and US-based think tanks have suggested a "to-do" list as he prepares to announce his policy priorities in the inauguration address Monday and the State of the Union address next month.¶ Some observers believe "pragmatic" Obama's second term would not differ radically from the first and US-India relations would be deepened with some new initiatives.¶ Others say factors like the discovery of shale oil and gas providing the US with a strategic boost will influence its global relations and there could be a redefining of the notions of engagement. Outgoing Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has already spoken about the new means of diplomacy, what she called "smart power" that includes trade, technology and private investment, to advance US interests.¶ And change has been a recurring motif with Obama as evidenced in the slogans of "the change we believe in" in 2008 and "forward" in 2012. It is believed that the president would be thinking of his legacy as previous re-elected presidents had pursued international initiatives. It is therefore natural to expect some new issues and priorities that will shape US relations with the world and India.¶ One such issue is global trade. The year 2013 is going to be quite an important year since 2001, when the Doha Round was launched and China joined the World Trade Organisation. By the end of this year, new WTO negotiations would begin on liberalising trade in services such as consulting, banking and insurance, and on expanding the 1996 Information Technology Agreement that eliminated tariffs on trade in devices like memory chips. These talks are likely to produce the biggest negotiated liberalisation of trade since the Uruguay Round of early 1990s.¶ At the same time, negotiations could be completed on the first trans-Pacific free trade agreement and started on a trans-Atlantic deal between the US and the EU.¶ India had a glimpse of US trade agenda earlier this month when Mike Froman, an Obama administration adviser and possibly the new US Trade Representative (USTR), said the world has "turned the page" on Doha and indicated that the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) would be pushed as an alternative.¶ According to Froman, major emerging countries like India and Brazil want to maintain their developing country status and do not want to open their markets. Froman has also charged India with blocking a trade facilitation agreement on infrastructure at ports and custom stations.¶ The US and other developed countries have also begun pushing for "early harvest" agreements - the plurilateral or select group agreements on goods and services - ahead of the next WTO ministerial meet at Bali in December as the Doha Round is stalled.¶ The Obama administration has also signalled it would be push forward the New Silk Road concept mooted by Clinton -- an international infrastructure network that would remove barriers to flow of goods and people among countries of South Asia.¶ Robert D. Hormats, Under Secretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy and Environment, has spoken of an Indo-Pacific Corridor that would reach out to Southeast Asia, making the region a hub of global trade.¶ There is a strategic angle to this. Following the pullout from Iraq, and planned drawdown of troops from Afghanistan by the end of 2014 and China's growing assertiveness in East and South China sea, Obama has been reorienting US policy towards Asia-Pacific.¶ Some believe the US interest in making India an anchor country for regional economic cooperation is aimed at gaining New Delhi's support for facilitating its exit from Afghanistan. Hormat has indicated that success of Afghanistan would depend on the level of regional cooperation.¶ The US has made a "bet" on India and would perhaps shape the context in which India would take its decisions. In Obama's first term, joint initiatives in areas like energy and healthcare were launched. In the second, both countries could collaborate on maritime and cyber security.

### Biotech

#### No high skill worker shortage

Weinberger ’10 (David-, Feb. 3, Heritage Foundry, “Why China is Not an Economic Threat to the United States”, http://blog.heritage.

org/2010/02/03/why-china-is-not-an-economic-threat-to-the-u-s/)

People familiar with Wadhwa, a frequent BusinessWeek.com contributor, may be surprised at his conclusions. He is best known for challenging oft-repeated claims that America is not producing enough engineers compared to China and India. Take the stats that China graduates 650,000 engineers a year and India 350,000, compared to 70,000 in the U.S. figures Senator Reid cited on Mar. 11. By visiting universities in both nations, interviewing officials, and sifting through reams of raw data, Wadhwa's team concluded that the figures for China and India are inflated by about half because of the way their officials count "engineers."

What's more, China's and India's superior numbers don't translate into greater competitiveness, he argues. America still graduates more than enough highly skilled engineers, while the poor quality of many Chinese and Indian schools mean most of their grads are less qualified (see BusinessWeek.com, 12/27/05, "Engineering: Is the U.S. Really Falling?").

### AT Immigration

#### TVA initiated major new nuclear investments Wednesday

The Chattanoogan 2/20

"TVA, B&W Sign Small Modular Reactor Agreement Under DOE Program," 2/20/13 www.chattanoogan.com/2013/2/20/244843/TVA-BW-Sign-Small-Modular-Reactor.aspx

The Tennessee Valley Authority and Babcock & Wilcox announced Wednesday a major step in their joint effort to build and test the nation’s first small modular reactor at TVA’s Clinch River Site in Oak Ridge Tn.¶ TVA and B&W signed a contract on Feb. 7, formalizing the process toward the eventual submittal and Nuclear Regulatory Commission review of a licensing application for a B&W mPower small modular reactor nuclear plant at Clinch River.¶ The agreement is the first definitive milestone in the U.S. Department of Energy’s recently initiated SMR Licensing Technical Support Program, which aims for commercial demonstration of SMRs by 2022. DOE chose TVA in November for cost sharing in the design and licensing of the B&W mPower small modular reactor as part of the mPower America Team.¶ “TVA and B&W have now officially launched their team effort towards evaluating this new technology for the nuclear industry and starting the analysis process at TVA’s Clinch River Site,” said Dr. Joe Hoagland, TVA senior vice president for Policy and Oversight. “With strong support from DOE, we look forward to the successful development, demonstration, and analysis of SMR technology as a potential option to help TVA and the nation meet our clean-energy goals for the future.”¶ The contract also defines respective responsibilities and work scopes for TVA and B&W in preparing a license application for NRC review, including a Clinch River Site geological characterization, preliminary safety analysis report, and site environmental report.¶ Work under this contract will commence at the Clinch River Site once B&W mPower and DOE sign a cooperative agreement for the grant funds. The DOE program, which provides $452 million in funding over five years, has received more than $67 million in appropriations from Congress. Under the program, DOE will fund as much as 50 percent of the cost of design and licensing.

#### a) Guest worker program derails reform

Latino Daily News 3/30

Staff Writer, “Lawmakers Fighting Over Guest-Workers Portion of Immigration Bill”, http://www.hispanicallyspeakingnews.com/latino-daily-news/details/lawmakers-fighting-over-guest-workers-portion-of-immigration-bill/23438/

Differences over the size and details of a guest-worker program are the major obstacle to a bipartisan accord on immigration reform, The Washington Post reported.¶ Republicans, allied with the business community, want to see up to 400,000 visas a year issued to foreigners willing to fill mainly low-paying positions.¶ Labor unions and many Democrats say the maximum number of guest-worker visas per year should be closer to 10,000 and that the foreign workers should receive higher pay and have the opportunity to remain in the United States and apply for citizenship, The Post said.¶ In an interview this week with Telemundo, President Barack Obama rejected the idea that the dispute over guest-workers threatens to derail the Senate negotiations on immigration reform.¶ “I don’t agree that it’s threatening to doom the legislation,” the president told the Spanish-language network.¶ The last attempt to get immigration reform through Congress, in 2007, foundered due to a lack of consensus on how to regulate the future flow of immigrants.¶ Now, according to The Washington Post, the plan by a bipartisan group of eight senators to present a draft reform bill next month could be complicated by arguments about the guest-worker program.

#### b) border security

CSM 3-27-13 [http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/DC-Decoder/2013/0327/How-border-security-trigger-could-stop-immigration-reform]

How border security 'trigger' could stop immigration reform Congressional negotiators say immigration reform will need a border security 'trigger' to pass. But agreeing on what counts as 'border security' won't be easy, and could determine whether reform happens. Immigration reformers want to bring the more than 10 million undocumented immigrants out of the shadows. Border security hawks want assurances that if they go along with that plan, they won’t be back in 10 years deciding whether or not to legalize 10 million more. What’s Congress to do? Figure out a “trigger,” where advances in border security are deemed sufficient to trigger the beginning of the journey to citizenship for the undocumented already in the country. As immigration reform negotiations continue, determining just what counts as a “secure border” and how to link that to plans for the undocumented will be crucial. In

deed, finding an answer could determine whether a bipartisan immigration reform measure reaches President Obama’s desk or if 2013 is yet another disappointment for reformers. Historically, those on Capitol Hill have tried to craft a delicate balance between border security and a path to legal status for the undocumented. For example, the comprehensive immigration reform legislation of the George W. Bush years, which ultimately failed, had a series of triggers. In 2009, Sen. Chuck Schumer (D) of New York proposed more broadly that “operational control” of the border “must be achieved within a year of enactment of legislation.” But those triggers aren't helpful anymore. Most of the benchmarks for border security established in 2007, for example, have been met today, according to an analysis by the pro-reform advocacy group America’s Voice. Border patrol staffing north of 20,000? Check: there are more than 21,000 agents on the border at present. Requirements for unmanned drones and a variety of other observation methods? All are at or above the 2007 requirements today. Fencing? Within eight miles of the 2007 target.

#### TVA avoids the link to politics

Barker 9 - reporter for the Knoxville News Sentinel

Scott, “Tennessee Gets a Lesson in Unaccountable Government,” WSJ, Proquest

The problem is that it isn't really accountable to anyone. It is not scrutinized by shareholders and, unlike traditional government agencies, it is self-funded, so it doesn't have to justify itself to Congress to win annual appropriations.¶ TVA is the nation's largest public utility, selling power to distributors that serve 8.8 million people and 650,000 businesses and industries in most of Tennessee and portions of Alabama, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina and Virginia. It runs three nuclear plants and scores of gas-turbine, coal-fired and hydroelectric power plants. Its revenues in 2008 were $10.4 billion.¶ Established in 1933, its New Deal mission, in a nutshell, was to modernize a backward nook of the country. TVA dammed the Tennessee River and its tributaries, created a series of reservoirs, and built coal-fired plants. The Kingston Fossil Plant was the largest in the world when it was completed at taxpayer expense in 1955.¶ In 1959, Congress forced the utility to pay for its energy production with the proceeds of electricity sales. In 1997, Congress cut off TVA's tax dollars completely after Duke Energy, Southern Company and others lobbied for the government to stop paying for the utility's environmental initiatives, economic development plans, and other nonpower programs. Except for lawmakers from states where it operates, Congress then pretty much forgot TVA existed.¶ California Democrat Sen. Barbara Boxer admitted as much in January. At a hearing on the Kingston spill, she apologized for ignoring the utility over the past two years -- she is head of the Environment and Public Works Committee, which is supposed to provide oversight of TVA.¶ But she isn't the only one in Washington who wasn't watching. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) regulates private power companies, but doesn't have jurisdiction over TVA. The Treasury Department oversees government-issued bond sales. But because TVA's bonds are backed up by its own power sales, there is little immediate concern in Washington with its debts. According to the Federal Emergency Management Agency, TVA, as a federal corporation, is exempt from emergency response protocols required of government agencies. A nine-member board of presidential appointees oversees a chief executive officer who runs TVA's day-to-day operations, but the board doesn't answer to a cabinet official. In practice, TVA reports to no one.

#### Executive action solves

Lillis 2/16

Mike, Dems: Obama can act unilaterally on immigration reform, 2/16/13, The Hill, http://thehill.com/blogs/regwatch/administration/283583-dems-recognize-that-obama-can-act-unilaterally-on-immigration-reform

President Obama can – and will – take steps on immigration reform in the event Congress doesn't reach a comprehensive deal this year, according to several House Democratic leaders. While the Democrats are hoping Congress will preclude any executive action by enacting reforms legislatively, they say the administration has the tools to move unilaterally if the bipartisan talks on Capitol Hill break down. Furthermore, they say, Obama stands poised to use them.

#### Winners win – PC is a false concept

Hirsh 2/7

Michael, chief correspondent, There’s No Such Thing as Political Capital, 2/7/13, http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/there-s-no-such-thing-as-political-capital-20130207

But the abrupt emergence of the immigration and gun-control issues illustrates how suddenly shifts in mood can occur and how political interests can align in new ways just as suddenly. Indeed, the pseudo-concept of political capital masks a larger truth about Washington that is kindergarten simple: You just don’t know what you can do until you try. Or as Ornstein himself once wrote years ago, “Winning wins.” In theory, and in practice, depending on Obama’s handling of any particular issue, even in a polarized time, he could still deliver on a lot of his second-term goals, depending on his skill and the breaks. Unforeseen catalysts can appear, like Newtown. Epiphanies can dawn, such as when many Republican Party leaders suddenly woke up in panic to the huge disparity in the Hispanic vote.¶ Some political scientists who study the elusive calculus of how to pass legislation and run successful presidencies say that political capital is, at best, an empty concept, and that almost nothing in the academic literature successfully quantifies or even defines it. “It can refer to a very abstract thing, like a president’s popularity, but there’s no mechanism there. That makes it kind of useless,” says Richard Bensel, a government professor at Cornell University. Even Ornstein concedes that the calculus is far more complex than the term suggests. Winning on one issue often changes the calculation for the next issue; there is never any known amount of capital. “The idea here is, if an issue comes up

where the conventional wisdom is that president is not going to get what he wants, and he gets it, then each time that happens, it changes the calculus of the other actors” Ornstein says. “If they think he’s going to win, they may change positions to get on the winning side. It’s a bandwagon effect.”

# 1AR

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### We Meet

#### 2NC froomkin limits evidence votes aff—concludes that the TVA is a legal entity of the USFG

#### It’s part of the executive

NE District Court 93

“HILL v. TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY,” http://www.leagle.com/xmlResult.aspx?page=7&xmldoc=19932255842FSupp1413\_12038.xml&docbase=CSLWAR2-1986-2006&SizeDisp=7

2. As a government corporation, TVA is considered an agency of the executive branch. Thus, TVA employees are regarded as federal employees in the excepted service under CSRA. Dodd v. Tennessee Valley Authority,770 F.2d 1038, 1040 (Fed.Cir.1985).

#### It’s a federal agency and the electricity produced is owned by the USFG

Supreme Court 36

“Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT,” http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC\_CR\_0297\_0288\_ZS.html

4. Where a contract between an electric power corporation and the Tennessee Valley Authority, a federal agency, for the sale by the former to the latter of transmission lines leading from a government dam where electricity was generated, was attacked in behalf of the corporation upon the ground that legislation by Congress purporting to empower the federal agency was unconstitutional -- held that the corporation was not estopped by having bought electricity of the Government at the dam before and after the passage of the legislation, or by having applied to a state public service commission for approval of the contract, or by a delay of some months in the bringing of a stockholders' suit to set the contract aside. P. 323. [p289]¶ The principle that one who accepts the benefit of a statute may not question its constitutionality held inapplicable.¶ 5. The judicial power does not extend to the determination of abstract questions. P. 324.¶ 6. The Act providing for declaratory judgments does not attempt to change the essential requisites for the exercise of judicial power. By its terms, it applies to "cases of actual controversy," meaning a controversy of a justiciable nature, thus excluding advisory decrees upon hypothetical states of fact. P. 325.¶ 7. The dam across the Tennessee River at Muscle Shoals, known as the Wilson Dam, was constructed pursuant to the National Defense Act of June 3, 1916, in the exercise of constitutional functions of the Federal Government, (a) as a means of assuring abundant electric energy for the manufacture of munitions in the event of war; (b) to improve the navigability of the river. P. 326.¶ 8. Judicial notice is taken of the international situation existing when the Act of 1916 was passed. Indisputably, the Wilson Dam and its auxiliary plants, including a hydroelectric power plant, are, and were intended to be, adapted to the purposes of national defense. P. 327.¶ 9. The power to regulate interstate commerce includes the power to remove obstructions to navigation from the navigable rivers of the United States. P. 328.¶ 10. In the execution of the Wilson Dam project for the constitutional purposes above stated, the United States acquired full title to the dam site, with all riparian rights. Water power, an inevitable incident of the construction of the dam, came into the exclusive control of the Federal Government, and was convertible into electric energy. Held:¶ (1) That the water power, the right to convert it into electric energy, and the electric energy thus produced, constitute property belonging to the United States. P. 330.¶ (2) That this electric energy so produced at the Wilson Dam is property of which Congress may dispose pursuant to the authority expressly granted by § 3, Art. IV, of the Constitution. P. 330.

#### TVA employees are federal employees

CFR 13

Code of Federal Regulations, Last Updated, § 1300.101 Cross references to employee ethical conduct standards and other applicable regulations., http://cfr.regstoday.com/18cfr1300.aspx

Employees of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) are subject to the executive branch-wide standards of ethical conduct at 5 CFR part 2635 and to the TVA regulations at 5 CFR part 7901 which supplement the executive branch-wide standards. In addition, certain TVA employees are subject to executive branch-wide financial disclosure regulations at 5 CFR part 2634.

#### Supreme Court precedent proves TVA is an agency of the USFG

Martin 86 – Director of the Office of Gov Ethics

“86x1: Intra-Governmental Matters and 18 U.S.C. § 207,” http://www.oge.gov/DisplayTemplates/ModelSub.aspx?id=860

Assuming the individual about whom you have asked is an employee of TVA (as opposed to an independent contractor), the questions are whether TVA is within the "executive branch" or is an "independent agency," and whether official representations of a TVA employee are made "on behalf of the United States." Both hinge on the status of TVA vis-a-vis the Federal Government. Section 207 does not include any definitions; however, in promulgating interpretive regulations, this Office at 5 C.F.R. § 737.3(a)(1) defined "United States" or "Government" to include, in part, "any department, [or] agency. . . ." At subsection 737.3(a)(2) an "agency" is defined as "an Executive Department, a Government corporation and an independent establishment of the executive branch, which includes an independent commission." Section 831 of Title 16, United States Code, states that "[f]or the purpose of maintaining and operating the properties now owned by the United States [in a specified vicinity], . . . there is created a body corporate by the name of the 'Tennessee Valley Authority.'" There is no additional language which further qualifies that provision. In addition, 16 U.S.C. § 831r describes the TVA as "an instrumentality and agency of the Government of the United States for the purpose of executing its constitutional powers. . . ." It is our position that TVA is therefore a Government corporation and agency for purposes of our definitions. Further, courts have long held that TVA is an "agency of the Federal Government" (Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 315 (1936)), and "a corporation, an instrumentality of the United States" (Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 306 U.S. 118, 134 (1939)).¶ Given these factors, it is our opinion that a TVA employee is still an employee of the executive branch. And any representations made on behalf of TVA within the scope of an employee's official duties for TVA are representations made on behalf of the United States. Consequently, section 207 would not apply to representations your former [agency] employee might make on behalf of TVA to [your agency]. Section 207 will apply to that individual if he leaves TVA for the private sector.

### Same as EPA

#### It’s the same as the EPA

11th Circuit 2

“Tennessee Valley Authority v. United States Environmental Protection Agency,” http://elr.info/sites/default/files/litigation/32.20407.htm

The court holds that it has jurisdiction to review a U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Environmental Appeals Board (EAB) decision upholding three EPA orders against the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) requiring the TVA to obtain after-the-fact permits for modifications made to many of its coal-fired plants in the past 20 years. EPA argued that the TVA lacks independent authority to bring this action against EPA over the opposition of the Attorney General. However, the court first holds that the decisions of other courts, the language of the TVA Act, Congress' subsequent statements, and the TVA's long history of self-representation without objection from the U.S. Department of Justice support the conclusion that the TVA possesses independent litigation authority. The court also holds that although EPA and the TVA are executive branch agencies whose leaders serve at the pleasure of the president, the case is justiciable. The issue is traditionally justiciable and the dispute presents concrete adversity. In addition, the court holds that the EAB decision is a reviewable final order. The EAB decision represents the "consummation" of its decisionmaking process in this case, and it is one by which rights or obligations have been determined. Similarly, the court holds that the decision is ripe for review even though the TVA did not submit the dispute to the Attorney General or the Office of Management and Budget pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 12146 and 12088. The TVA's failure to comply with the orders does not result in any exhaustion or ripeness problems, and it does not interfere with the separation-of-powers doctrine. Lastly, the court holds that private parties have standing to challenge the EPA orders.

### USFG – Distinct from their examples

#### TVA is distinct from other corporations

TVA 12

Tennessee Valley Authority, Last Updated date, “TVA and Government-Sponsored Enterprises,” http://www.tva.gov/finance/opportun/comparison.htm

TVA is commonly compared with government-sponsored enterprises, or GSEs. However, TVA is different from GSEs in several important ways. It is true that TVA and many GSEs, including Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, were established by acts of Congress, but TVA is wholly owned by the federal government and does not issue stock. In general, the GSEs were originally chartered or sponsored by the government but are now owned by private investors. Several other differences are summarized below.

### OSPEC Good

#### Specific agency education is vital

**Elmore**, Professor of public affairs at the University of Washington, 19**80**

(Political science quarterly, pg. 605)

Analysis of policy choices matters very little if the mechanism for implementing those choices is poorly understood. In answering the question, “What percentage of the work of achieving a desired governmental action is done when the preferred analytic alternative has been identified?” Allison estimated that in the normal case, it was about 10 percent, leaving the remaining 90 percent in the realm of implementation.

## \*\*\*1AR Politics

## \*\*\*Politics

### Science Diplomacy

#### Science diplomacy doesn’t solve their impacts

Dickson 10 (David, director of SciDev, June 28 http://scidevnet.wordpress.com/category/science-diplomacy-conference-2010/ 7/9/11) HD

There’s a general consensus in both the scientific and political worlds that the principle of science diplomacy, at least in the somewhat restricted sense of the need to get more and better science into international negotiations, is a desirable objective. There is less agreement, however, on how far the concept can – or indeed should – be extended to embrace broader goals and objectives, in particular attempts to use science to achieve political or diplomatic goals at the international level. **Science**, despite its international characteristics, **is no substitute for effective diplomacy. Any more than diplomatic initiatives** necessarily **lead to good science.** These seem to have been the broad conclusions to emerge from a three-day meeting at Wilton Park in Sussex, UK, organised by the British Foreign Office and the Royal Society, and attended by scientists, government officials and politicians from 17 countries around the world. The definition of science diplomacy varied widely among participants. Some saw it as a subcategory of “public diplomacy”, or what US diplomats have recently been promoting as “soft power” (“the carrot rather than the stick approach”, as a participant described it). Others preferred to see it as a core element of the broader concept of “innovation diplomacy”, covering the politics of engagement in the familiar fields of international scientific exchange and technology transfer, but raising these to a higher level as a diplomatic objective. Whatever definition is used, three particular aspects of the debate became the focus of attention during the Wilton Park meeting: how science can inform the diplomatic process; how diplomacy can assist science in achieving its objectives; and, finally, how science can provide a channel for quasi-diplomatic exchanges by forming an apparently neutral bridge between countries. There was little disagreement on the first of these. Indeed for many, **given the increasing number of international issues with a scientific dimension that politicians have to deal with, this is essentially what the core of science diplomacy should be about**. Chris Whitty, for example, chief scientist at the UK’s Department for International Development, described how knowledge about the threat raised by the spread of the highly damaging plant disease stem rust had been an important input by researchers into discussions by politicians and diplomats over strategies for persuading Afghan farmers to shift from the production of opium to wheat. Others pointed out that the scientific community had played a major role in drawing attention to issues such as the links between chlorofluorocarbons in the atmosphere and the growth of the ozone hole, or between carbon dioxide emissions and climate change. Each has made essential contributions to policy decisions. Acknowledging this role for science has some important implications. No-one dissented when Rohinton Medhora, from Canada’s International Development Research Centre, complained of the lack of adequate scientific expertise in the embassies of many countries of the developed and developing world alike. Nor – perhaps predictably – was there any major disagreement that diplomatic initiatives can both help and occasionally hinder the process of science. On the positive side, such **diplomacy can play a significant role in facilitating science exchange and the launch of international science projects,** both **essential for the development of** modern **science**. Europe’s framework programme of research programmes was quoted as a successful advantage of the first of these. Examples of the second range from the establishment of the European Organisation of Nuclear Research (usually known as CERN) in Switzerland after the Second World War, to current efforts to build a large new nuclear fusion facility (ITER). Less positively, **increasing restrictions on entry to certain countries**, and in particular the United States after the 9/11 attacks in New York and elsewhere, **have significantly impeded scientific exchange programmes. Here the challenge for diplomats was seen as helping to find ways to ease the burdens of such restrictions**. The broadest gaps in understanding the potential of scientific diplomacy lay in the third category, namely the use of science as a channel of international diplomacy, either as a way of helping to forge consensus on contentious issues, or as a catalyst for peace in situations of conflict. On the first of these, some pointed to recent climate change negotiations, and in particular the work of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, as a good example, of the way that the scientific community can provide a strong rationale for joint international action. But others referred to **the failure of the Copenhagen climate summit** last December to come up with a meaningful agreement on action as a demonstration of the limitations of this way of thinking. It was argued that this failure **had been partly due to a misplaced belief that scientific consensus would be sufficient to generate a commitment to collective action, without taking into account the political impact that scientific ideas would have.** Another example that received considerable attention was the current construction of a synchrotron facility SESAME in Jordan, a project that is already is bringing together researchers in a range of scientific disciplines from various countries in the Middle East (including Israel, Egypt and Palestine, as well as both Greece and Turkey). The promoters of SESAME hope that – as with the building of CERN 60 years ago, and its operation as a research centre involving, for example, physicists from both Russia and the United States – SESAME will become a symbol of what regional collaboration can achieve. In that sense, it would become what one participant described as a “beacon of hope” for the region. But others cautioned that, however successful SESAME may turn out to be in purely scientific terms, its potential impact on the Middle East peace process should not be exaggerated. **Political conflicts have deep roots that cannot easily be papered over, however open-minded scientists may be to professional colleagues** coming from other political contexts. Indeed, there was even a warning that **in the developing world, high profile scientific projects**, particular those with explicit political backing, **could end up doing damage by inadvertently favouring one social group over another**. Scientists should be wary of having their prestige used in this way; those who did so could come over as patronising, appearing unaware of political realities. Similarly, those who hold science in esteem as a practice committed to promoting the causes of peace and development were reminded of the need to take into account how **advances in science** – whether nuclear physics or genetic technology – **have** also **led to new types of weaponry. Nor did science automatically lead to the reduction of global inequalities. “Science for diplomacy”** therefore **ended up with a highly mixed review.** The consensus seemed to be that science can prepare the ground for diplomatic initiatives – and benefit from diplomatic agreements – but cannot provide the solutions to either.

### 1AR TVA Avoids Politics – AT: Others Involved

#### TVA can make this decision independently

NNSA 12

MOX Program Questions and Answers, Google.doc

13. Is TVA under contract with DOE to irradiate MOX fuel?

No. DOE and TVA have entered into an interagency agreement to evaluate the use of MOX fuel at five TVA reactors, but there currently is no DOE contract to use MOX fuel in TVA reactors. Analyzing the environmental impacts and consequences of using MOX fuel is included in the Draft Surplus Plutonium Disposition (SPD) Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) and will assist TVA in its decision whether to irradiate MOX fuel in its reactors. The decision to use MOX fuel in TVA reactors will be made independently by TVA, subject to licensing by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), a government agency independent from both DOE and TVA.

### 1AR AT: Spending Link Arg

#### Plan spends zero dollars

TVA 12

“Budget Proposal and Management Agenda, http://www.tva.com/abouttva/pdf/budget\_proposal\_2013.pdf

TVA’s power program is entirely self-financed and does not receive any federal appropriations. TVA, like the rest of the ¶ electric utility industry, is challenged to meet growing customer demands with cleaner, low-cost energy resources. This will ¶ require substantial capital investments during the next decade. TVA raises capital for asset investments through power ¶ revenues, public bonds up to a limit set by Congress, and alternative financings, including lease financings.

### Wake 1AR

#### Next line of Krikorian says Obama’s words don’t match his actions – no enforcement of current laws

Krikorian 12. [Mark, executive director of the Center for Immigration Studies, "The president's unconstitutional DREAM amnesty gets rolling" Center for Immigration Studies -- cis.org/OpedsandArticles/DREAM-Amnesty-Begins-Krikorian-National-Review]

I just have to continue to say this notion that somehow I can just change the laws unilaterally is just not true. We are doing everything we can administratively. But the fact of the matter is there are laws on the books that I have to enforce. And I think there’s been a great disservice done to the cause of getting the DREAM Act passed and getting comprehensive immigration passed by perpetrating the notion that somehow, by myself, I can go and do these things. It’s just not true. \*\*\*End Wake\*\*\*¶ The post hoc rationalization is that the president hasn’t given in to the temptation of “doing things on my own” because he hasn’t really amnestied those signing up for today’s amnesty. Here’s the disclaimer on the DHS website:¶ This policy, which may be modified, superseded, or rescinded at any time without notice, is not intended to, does not, and may not be relied upon to create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by any party in any administrative, civil, or criminal matter.¶ Bunk.¶ We have lots of experience with temporary immigration statuses that “may be modified, superseded, or rescinded at any time without notice” — they’re never modified, superseded, or rescinded without notice, and everyone involved in this amnesty scheme knows that. The closest parallel is “Temporary Protected Status,” which gives a similar reprieve from deportation, plus work cards and Social Security numbers, to illegal aliens we don’t want to deport because of natural disaster or civil strife in their home countries. (This mechanism was at least created by Congress — you know, an actual law.) Hundreds of thousands of illegal aliens have benefited from this form of amnesty, and not a single one has ever been required to leave because his status was modified, superseded, or rescinded. Most notable are the thousands of Liberian illegal aliens who received this status during that country’s civil war; they’re all still here, more than 20 years later.

### 1AR Yes XO

#### Obama will XO

Kumar 3-24

Anita, “In face of hostile Congress, Obama orders in agenda,” Detroit Free Press, http://www.freep.com/article/20130324/NEWS15/303240348/In-face-of-hostile-Congress-Obama-orders-in-agenda

President Barack Obama came into office four years ago, skeptical of pushing the power of the White House to the limit, especially if it appeared to be circumventing Congress.¶ Now, as he launches his second term, Obama has grown more comfortable wielding power to try to move his agenda, particularly when a fractured, often-hostile Congress gets in his way.¶ He has done it with a package of tools, some of which date to George Washington and some invented in the modern era of an increasingly powerful presidency.¶ And he has done it with a frequency that belies his original campaign criticisms of predecessor George W. Bush, invites criticisms that he's bypassing the checks and balances of Congress and the courts, and whets the appetite of liberal activists who want him to do even more.¶ While his decision to send drones to kill U.S. citizens suspected of terrorism has garnered criticism, his use of executive orders and other powers at home is deeper and wider:¶ • He delayed the deportation of young illegal immigrants when Congress wouldn't agree.¶ • He ordered the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to research gun violence, which Congress halted nearly 15 years ago.¶ • He told the Justice Department to stop defending the Defense of Marriage Act, deciding that the 1996 law defining marriage as between a man and a woman was unconstitutional.¶ • He pledged to act on his own if Congress didn't pass policies to address climate change.¶ Possibly more than any other president in modern history, he's using executive actions to bypass or pressure a Congress, where Republicans can block any proposal.¶ "It's gridlocked and dysfunctional. The place is a mess," said Rena Steinzor, a law professor at the University of Maryland. "I think (executive action) is an inevitable tool, given what's happened."¶ Now that Obama has shown a willingness to use those tactics, advocacy groups, supporters and even members of Congress are lobbying him to do so more and more.

Act legislation that has been unable to pass Congress.

### XO Solve HS

#### Obama can avoid quota limitations executively

Endelman and Mehta 9 – \*in-house immigration attorney at BP America AND \*\* founder and managing attorney of Cyrus D. Mehta & Associates – SEX EDITED

Gary and Cyrus, “The Path Less Taken: Is There An Alternative To Waiting For Comprehensive Immigration Reform?,” Immigration Daily, http://www.ilw.com/articles/2009,0225-endelman.shtm

Dinesh Shenoy made a huge first step but it was only a first step. Is action by Congress the only, or even the best, way to break the priority date stranglehold on US immigration policy? The authors do not think so. Amendment of INA Section 245 is unlikely since action by Congress, even in the best of times, takes time. When Congress finds such time, legalization and other priority items (like recapture of unused visas) will absorb it. Beyond this, is it necessary to relax the rules on adjustment of status? What do potential immigrants really want for themselves and their spouses? The ability to work in the United States on a long-term basis and travel back home for vacation and/or family emergency. Can they only do that as adjustment applicants? Is there another way? The authors think there is. While INA Section 245 conditions adjustment of status on having a current priority date and meeting various conditions,9 there would be prohibition anywhere that would bar USCIS from allowing the beneficiary of an approved I-140 or I-130 petition to apply for an employment authorization document (EAD) and advance parole. No action by Congress would be required; executive fiat suffices. For those who want some comfort in finding a statutory basis, the government could rely on its parole authority under INA Section 212(d)(5) to grant such interim benefits either for "urgent humanitarian reasons" or "significant public benefit.10 There is nothing in 8 CFR Section 212.5 that would prohibit the DHS from granting parole for this reason on the grounds that the continued presence of I-140 or I-130 beneficiaries provide a significant public benefit. Since such parole is not a legal admission,11 there is no separation of powers argument since the Executive is not trying to change existing grounds of admission or create any new ones. Moreover, Congress appears to have provided the government with broad authority to provide work authorization to just about any non-citizen.12¶ It is undeniably true that more EAD and Parole benefits will be of limited value to retrogressed non-citizens from India and China who are already in the US in the employment-based second and third preferences. After all, most have an H-1B and can extend under Section 106(a) or Section 104(c) of AC 21, but as noted previously, some may still not be able to take advantage of AC 21. The EAD in itself will not have a portability benefit. The foreign national will still need to intend to work for the sponsoring employer even if he/she is using the EAD for open market employment. This reservation, valid as it undoubtedly is, focuses only on those already here. It speaks solely to past migration flows not to future ones. For future flows, this will supplement the H-1B by giving employers of foreign nationals another option. No longer will the constant controversy over the H-1B quota discredit all employment-based immigration in the eyes of its critics and, most importantly, in the court of public opinion. No longer will this one dispute suck all the oxygen out of our national immigration debate. Beyond that, it is manifestly not true to argue that all of our immigration needs can be solved with more H1B numbers. This will not work for those who are not H1B material. It will not work for those with essential skills but find themselves in the "Other Worker" backlog under INA Section 203(b)(3)(iii) with no hope of getting the green card any time soon. It will not eliminate the need to legalize the undocumented. If anything, allowing non-citizens with approved I-140/ I-130 petitions to receive EADs and Parole will serve to reduce the size of the permanently undocumented in America many of whom do not leave for fear they will be unable to return. The Executive would not be granting the undocumented legal status for that is what only Congress can do. But, like adjustment of status itself, the Executive certainly can create a period of stay that permits the undocumented to remain here.

#### Unilateral executive actions can solve STEM – Congress doesn’t have to lift a finger

Endelman and Mehta 9 – \*in-house immigration attorney at BP America AND \*\* founder and managing attorney of Cyrus D. Mehta & Associates – SEX EDITED

Gary and Cyrus, “The Path Less Taken: Is There An Alternative To Waiting For Comprehensive Immigration Reform?,” Immigration Daily, http://www.ilw.com/articles/2009,0225-endelman.shtm

Dinesh Shenoy had it right when he wrote in 2005 that "cut-off dates are a function of the fact that America does not have unlimited immigration.1 We know from Section 245(a)(3) of Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) that no one can apply for adjustment of status to lawful permanent resident unless an immigrant visa number is immediately available to them. Similar numerical constraints regulate consular processing as determined by INA Section 203. The place in line for a prized green card number is known in legal parlance as a priority date established through the filing of an immigrant petition or labor certification.2 As the waiting lines grow ever longer and frustrations rise, the question naturally presents itself: Is there an alternative to priority dates?¶ It was Dinesh Shenoy's great leap forward to suggest that Congress amend INA Section 245(a)(3) to allow for the submission, though not final approval, of employment-based adjustment of status cases without respect to priority dates. Since insight is original, Dinesh deserves to be allowed to speak for himself: "With this revised language, an I-140 beneficiary would be able to file his or her I-485 once an I-140 is filed, even if they know it will be many years before their priority date is reached." In order for this to happen, of course, USCIS would have to remove the requirement for an immediately available immigrant visa number from the operative regulations that govern adjustment of status, namely 8 CFR 245.1(g)(1) and 245.2 (a)(2). Other changes would also be necessary. Under the Child Status Protection Act, one needs an approved petition and a visa number to freeze the age of the child. If there is retrogression after such visa availability, the age remains frozen. However, if the precondition of a current priority date is removed or relaxed, then language will have to be inserted in INA Section 203(h)(1)(A) that will freeze the age of the child upon the filing of an I-485 adjustment application even if an immigrant visa number is not available. It will do little good to allow the parent(s) to apply for adjustment of status if their kids age out and have to leave. It would also be prudent to modify the definition of "child" set forth in INA Section 101(b)(1) so that it would then read to mean " an unmarried person under age twenty-one except for one who had applied for adjustment of status under 8 USC 1255."¶ It does not diminish the magnitude of Dinesh Shenoy's conceptual breakthrough to note that it raises several serious questions. First, it is limited to applicants for adjustment of status applicants who enjoy a signal advantage not shared by those applying for immigrant visas at American consulates abroad. However, one wonders if we can still speak of an even playing field in the aftermath of INA Section 204(j) that extends occupational mobility to adjustment applicants in a way not open to equally long-suffering consular cases.3 To the extent that one wants everyone to play by the same rules, why not allow immigrant visa applicants to apply for immigrant visas, but not be able to use them to gain entry into the USA unless and until an immigrant visa number became immediately available to them? Such a restriction could, in fact, be annotated on the face of the machine-readable immigrant visa itself to prevent any attempt at premature exercise. Second, as originally expressed, it would only apply to employment cases rather than those based on family ties. Our proposal would extend this innovation to reward the beneficiaries of approved family-based I-130 petitions. This is the answer to the wholly inadequate Family 2B category that divides families in defiance of compassion and logic. Now they can stay in the USA while they wait for their priority date to become current. Third, because prior approval of the I-140 is not required, it assumes that the current practice of concurrent filing of I-140 petitions and I-485 adjustments will continue when we know that USCIS wants to end this practice and intends to publish a notice of proposed rulemaking.4 Finally, it is highly instructive to ask whether there is a new and better way to define what "immediately available" means in the context of visa allocation. Is a current priority date the only way?¶ For the past twenty-five years, the Visa Office in the State Department has employed a more flexible mechanism to ensure a smooth and regular allocation of immigrant visas known as the "qualifying date". What is that? Simply stated, the VO anticipates what priority dates are likely to come on stream over the next 6 to 12 months, though this is subject to variance, and it then allows the National Visa Center to kick off the consular processing for these cases by sending out the Choice of Agent form. Once this response is received, the NVC lets folks know what further documentation is required and, as soon as all necessary paperwork has been provided, the case can be reported to the Visa Control branch of the Visa Office in the State Department as being documentarily qualified. That demand can then be compared against the amount of visas which are available for use in a particular month during the determination of the monthly cut-off dates. Those cut-off dates ultimately allow a case to be scheduled for a consular interview and hopefully receive their prized immigrant visas just as soon as the Visa Bulletin says they have an eligible priority date.¶ Now, this has worked pretty well in the consular context to smooth out the flow of immigrant visas so one wonders if the results would be no less stellar as a way to define immediate availability in the adjustment context. Even under the traditional priority date scheme, there is nothing in the INA that compels a particular definition or understanding of what "immediate availability" means. To require a current priority date as the only acceptable interpretation is to continue a practice that began before migration flows to this country reached the massive levels we have today. What worked before may no longer be adapted to current needs or contemporary realities. If we are to preserve the utility of priority dates as a control on permanent immigration, we have to understand and use them in a fundamentally new and different way.¶ USCIS does not have to define "immediate availability" strictly on the cut-off dates listed in the Visa Bulletin. Rather, both State and CIS could post estimated "qualifying dates" on their websites so that, precisely as now happens in a consular case, USCIS would now allow pre-filing of adjustment applications so that applicants could begin to assemble the necessary documentation and send in their I-485 packages so that USCIS could conduct necessary checks and get the case ready for formal submission when the priority date is reached. Only at that point would CIS formally request an immigrant visa number from the State Department. Not until then would the adjustment of status be considered "filed". The beauty of this is that Congress need not lift a finger; all that need be done is for USCIS to modify the definition of filing contained in 8 CFR Sections 103.2 (a)(7) and 245.2(a)(2). If Congress wanted to ratify what the USCIS had done, it could certainly do so after the fact. Everything that we now consider to be the adjustment of status process could take place before the I-485 is "filed". Nothing could be simpler. The reason to seek Congressional modification of INA 245(a) is not because it is only way forward but because, by enshrining such a procedural benefit in the INA itself, it will be a much more secure right, one not subject to administrative whim or unilateral repeal. This process would not only afford the Visa Office a more accurate picture of adjustment demand but it holds out the potential of drastically slashing processing times. Far from granting adjustment applicants any special or unfair advantage, the use of qualifying dates as a way to define immediate visa availability would serve to harmonize the green card process in and out of the United States. Clearly, close and constant coordination between the Visa Office and USCIS would be required and integration of this procedural innovation with the Child Status Protection Act is transparently necessary. Given the obvious and not insignificant benefits, any transitional angst is surely worth the effort.¶ Dinesh Shenoy is not alone. It appears that Janet Napolitano, formerly Governor of Arizona but now the newly-minted Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, is thinking of permitting adjustment of status applications to be filed before the priority date becomes current. Take a look at her January 30, 2009 Action Directive on immigration and border security. In pertinent part, Secretary Napolitano spoke of "information sharing with the Department of State's Bureau of Consular Affairs on projected adjustment caseloads to be used by that Bureau in setting each month's cutoff dates on waiting lists for immigration categories that are limited by a yearly quota" and went on to pose this very intriguing question: "What regulatory or legislative changes (including a possible pre-application filing procedure for adjustment cases) are recommended to facilitate caseload planning and make optimum use of US Citizenship and Immigration Services' adjudication capacity?5 If Secretary Napolitano wanted some precedent to support her curiosity, she need look no further than S. 2611 actually passed by the US Senate in May 2006. As part of this comprehensive immigration reform measure that died in the House of Representatives, the Senate amended INA Section 245(a) to allow for foreign-born students who had earned an "advanced degree", though not necessarily from a US university, in sciences, technology, engineering or mathematics (the famous STEM quartet!) to file for adjustment of status irrespective of priority date currency on the basis of an I-140, though no final approval could issue until an immigrant visa number became available. Interestingly, the Senate did not extend this exception to family-based adjustments nor to immigrant visa applicants outside the United States.¶ If this made sense in 2006, why not now? After all, as the USCIS has already recognized in the Optional Practical Training context by allowing a 17 month renewal as an antidote to the manifestly inadequate H-1B quota, announced quote openly by CIS as the prime rationale for their liberality, STEM students are uniquely important to the USA.6 If we are willing to treat them differently for OPT purposes, why not do so for far more weighty adjustment of status purposes? If we are concerned over potential abuse, launch it as a pilot project that is limited by time (perhaps two years as with other conditional categories) and number, say 65,000 to match the pitiable H-1B quota. In the 90 days before the second anniversary of what the authors call the "grey card"7 will have to file a petition to lift the condition, thus giving the USCIS a second chance to determine if the grey card's continued presence in the United States was in the national interest. That ought to show good faith! Throw in the requirement for the advanced degree to be made in America, something that Dinesh Shenoy left out, as noted above. At the same time, to allow for future expansion, add a provision authorizing USCIS in its discretion to extend this same remedial practice to other professions or disciplines, perhaps those best suited to health care or growing a green economy. Without Congress authorizing a single new immigrant visa, this one procedure will revolutionize employment-based migration. When combined with adjustment of status portability under INA 204 (j), this quasi-permanent category of green card applicants card will be able to live as permanent residents in all but name. In effect, a new era of vastly increased legal immigration would result from a return to system preceding the 1920's national origins quota system. By increasing the opportunity for legal immigration without the need for congressional action, such an approach combines simplicity with maximum opportunity. This is ample precedent for doing this beyond the Senate enactment of S. 2611. In 1997 the noted immigration scholar Julian Simon wrote a book in which, among other things, he argued that special preference for permanent residence should be given to foreign students who came to study in the USA.8 Simply stated, retain the general notion of a current priority date but waive it for select reasons of higher national interest. The logic of doing this is not terribly dissimilar from the concept of the EB-2 national interest waiver where the national interest of reserving jobs from Americans rightly gives way in carefully chosen instances to the retention of foreign nationals whose recognized contributions justify such exception. Do the same thing for the same reasons to allow adjustment of status applications to be filed, though not approved, without immediate availability of an immigrant visa number.