### 1

#### POLITICS- CIR will pass this year---Obama building momentum

The Hill 3/25 (Justin Sink and Meghashyam Mali, “Obama: 'The time has come' to move immigration reform in Congress,”

http://thehill.com/video/administration/290129-obama-the-time-has-come-to-move-immigration-reform)

Obama said he expects debate on an immigration bill to “begin next month” at a ceremony where 28 people, including 13 armed servicemembers, became citizens. Bipartisan groups in both the House and Senate are moving closer to unveiling separate immigration reform proposals, and the president is hoping to build momentum for a deal. “We've known for years that our immigration system is broken, that we're not doing enough to harness the talent and ingenuity of all those who want to work hard and find a place in America,” Obama said. “And after avoiding the problem for years, the time has come to fix it once and for all. The time has come for comprehensive, sensible immigration reform.” Speaking from the East Room, Obama argued that immigration strengthens the country. “It keeps us vibrant, it keeps us hungry, it keeps us prosperous. It is what makes us such a dynamic country,” he said. “If we want to keep attracting the best and the brightest, we've got to do a better job of welcoming them.” Advocates for immigration reform see a real chance for legislation to pass Congress this year, despite opposition from some House GOP lawmakers, many of whom have said they will oppose measures that grant “amnesty” to illegal immigrants and have questioned proposed protections for gay or lesbian couples. Immigration reform is a potent political issue for Obama, who won more than 70 percent of the Hispanic vote in 2012. Since that showing, a growing number of conservative lawmakers have signaled they would back immigration reform, including measures to provide a pathway to citizenship. Groups aligned with Obama have signaled their intention of pressuring Congress. On Monday, The New York Times reported that Organizing for Action — the political group born from the president's reelection campaign — will launch a new online effort featuring the stories of some 7,000 supporters, some of whom entered the country illegally. The Senate’s “Gang of Eight” introduced their framework, calling for a pathway to citizenship, heightened border security, increased high-skilled immigration and a guest worker program, in January. But since then, senators have been tied down in negotiations over the details of the plan, with many key issues still unresolved. Obama said he wanted to see debate begin on a congressional bill by April. “We are making progress, but we've got to finish the job, because this issue is not new,” Obama said. “Everyone pretty much knows what's broken, everyone knows how to fix it.”

#### New nuclear spending triggers fights.

Levine 12 (Greg, “Obama Drops Nuclear Energy from Convention Speech” http://my.firedoglake.com/gregglevine/2012/09/07/obama-drops-nuclear-energy-from-convention-speech/)

President Obama no longer promises to “safely harness nuclear power”–that likely would have sounded like a cruel joke in a world now contaminated by the ongoing Fukushima disaster–but beyond that, he does not promise anything about nuclear power at all. There was no platitude, no carefully crafted signal to the industry that has subsidized much of Obama’s political career, no mention of nuclear power whatsoever. That is not to say that the entire 2012 Democratic National Convention was a nuclear-free zone. A few hours before the president took the stage at the Time Warner Cable Arena, James Rogers, co-chair of the Charlotte host committee, and oh, by the way, CEO of Duke Energy, stepped to the lectern and endorsed Obama’s “all of the above” energy “strategy” (they keep using that word; I do not think it means what they think it means): We need to work even harder toward a future of affordable, reliable and cleaner energy. That means we need to invest heavily in new zero-emission power sources, like new nuclear, wind and solar projects, as well as new technologies, like electric vehicles. Well, if you are looking for a future of affordable, reliable and cleaner energy, you need look no further than nu–wait, what? If you are looking for those three features in an energy future, it is hard to imagine a worse option than the unsustainably expensive, chronically unreliable and dangerously dirty nuclear power plant. And, as has been discussed here many times, nuclear is not a zero-emission source, either. The massive carbon footprint of the nuclear fuel lifecycle rivals coal, and that doesn’t even consider the radioactive isotopes that facilities emit, even when they are not encountering one of their many “unusual events.” But the CEO of the Charlotte-based energy giant probably has his eyes on a different prize. Rogers, who has been dogged by questions about a power grab after Duke’s merger with Progress Energy and his lackluster performance as fundraiser-in-chief for the DNC, sits atop a company that operates seven US nuclear power plants, and is partners in a plan to build two new AP1000 reactors in Cherokee County, South Carolina. That last project, which is under active review by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, awaiting a combined construction and operating license, is one of a small handful of proposed new nuclear facilities currently scrambling for financing. The South Carolina plant, along with a pair of reactors in Georgia, two slated for a different site in South Carolina, and possibly one more in Tennessee, represent what industry lobbyists like to call the “nuclear renaissance.” But completion of any of the above is nowhere close to guaranteed, and even if some of these reactors are eventually built, none will be able to generate even one kilowatt of commercial power until years after President Obama completes his sought-after second term. Which, if you really care about America’s energy future, is, of course, all for the better. As even James Rogers noted in his speech (and he gets props for this): [W]e cannot lose sight of energy efficiency. Because the cleanest, most efficient power plant is the one we never have to build. That Duke’s CEO thought to highlight efficiency is interesting. That President Obama, with his well-documented ties to the nuclear industry, chose not to even mention nuclear power is important. In the wake of Fukushima, where hundreds of thousands of Japanese have been displaced, where tens of thousands are showing elevated radiation exposure, and where thousands of children have thyroid abnormalities, no one can be cavalier about promising a safe harnessing of the atom. And in a world where radioisotopes from the breached reactors continue to turn up in fish and farm products, not only across Japan, but across the northern hemisphere, no one can pretend this is someone else’s problem. Obama and his campaign advisors know all this and more. They know that most industrialized democracies have chosen to shift away from nuclear since the start of the Japanese crisis. They know that populations that have been polled on the matter want to see nuclear power phased out. And they know that in a time of deficit hysteria, nuclear power plants are an economic sinkhole. And so, on a night when the president was promised one of the largest audiences of his entire campaign, he and his team decided that 2012 was not a year to throw a bone to Obama’s nuclear backers. Obama, a consummate politician, made the decision that for his second shot at casting for the future, nuclear power is political deadweight.

#### Comprehensive immigration reform is key to the economy and highly skilled workers

Farrell 12/13/12 (Chris, a contributing editor for Bloomberg Businessweek. From 1986-97, he was on the magazine's staff, as a corporate finance staff and department editor and then as an economics editor. Farrell wrote Right on the Money: Taking Control of Your Personal Finances and Deflation: What Happens When Prices Fall? Among Farrell's many awards are a National Magazine Award, two Loeb Awards, and the Edward R. Murrow Award. Farrell is a graduate of the London School of Economics and Stanford University. “Obama’s Next Act: Immigration Reform” <http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-12-13/obamas-next-act-immigration-reform>)

Washington won’t get much of a reprieve from verbal pyrotechnics once the drama of the fiscal cliff is over. Up next: major immigration reform. President Obama has made it clear that a comprehensive overhaul of the nation’s badly frayed immigration system is a second-term priority. Many Republican lawmakers are convinced the big takeaway from the 2012 election results is that conservatives need to rethink their hard-line stance on immigration—including illegal immigrants. Here’s what Washington should do before tackling the tough job of rewriting the immigration laws: Create a quicksilver path to citizenship for the 11 million to 12 million undocumented workers in the U.S. (excluding the small number convicted of violent crimes or multiple felonies). The shift in status acknowledges that these foreign-born newcomers, like previous generations of immigrants, overcame significant obstacles to come to the U.S. to make a better life for their families. Illegal immigrants are neighbors heading off to work, sending their kids to school, and attending church. Their everyday lives would vastly improve by moving from the shadows of society into the mainstream. More important from a public-policy perspective, the change would give a boost to the economy’s underlying dynamism. “What you’re doing in the short run is making it easier for workers to move between jobs, a relatively small effect,” says Gordon Hanson, a professor of economics at the University of California at San Diego. “The larger effect from eliminating uncertainty for these immigrants is creating incentives for them to make long-term investments in careers, entrepreneurship, education, homes, and community.” Let’s state the obvious: A rapid transformation of illegal immigrants into legal immigrants isn’t in the cards. Amnesty—let alone citizenship—is an anathema to large parts of the electorate. Too bad, since the scholarly evidence is compelling that immigrants—documented or not, legal or illegal—are a boon to the net economy. “Competition fosters economic growth,” says Michael Clemens, senior fellow at the Center for Global Development in Washington. The economic return from attracting skilled immigrants to the U.S. is well known. Foreign-born newcomers account for some 13 percent of the population, yet they are responsible for one-third of U.S. patented innovations. The nation’s high-tech regions such as Silicon Valley, the Silicon Hills of Austin, Tex., and Boston’s Route 128 rely on immigrant scientists, engineers, entrepreneurs, and employees. Better yet, economist Enrico Moretti at the University of California at Berkeley calculates that a 1 percent increase in the share of college-educated immigrants in a city hikes productivity and wages for others in the city. Less appreciated is how much the economy gains from the efforts of less-skilled immigrants, including illegal workers. Throughout the country, foreign-born newcomers have revived beaten-down neighborhoods as immigrant entrepreneurs have opened small businesses and immigrant families have put down stakes. Immigrant workers have played a vital role keeping a number of industries competitive, such as agriculture and meatpacking. Cities with lots of immigrants have seen their per capita tax base go up, according to David Card, an economist at UC Berkeley. Despite the popular impression that a rising tide of immigrants is associated with higher crime rates, research by Robert Sampson of Harvard University and others offer a compelling case that it’s no coincidence that the growing ranks of immigrants tracks the reduction in crime in the U.S. But don’t newcomers—legal and illegal—drive down wages and job opportunities for American workers? Not really. A cottage industry of economic studies doesn’t find any negative effect on native-born wages and employment on the local level. On the national level the research shows the impact on native-born Americans doesn’t drift far from zero, either positively or negatively. “In both cases, immigrants are more likely to complement the job prospects of U.S.-born citizens than they are to compete for the same jobs as U.S.-born citizens,” Giovanni Peri, an economist at the University of California at Davis, writes in Rationalizing U.S. Immigration Policy: Reforms for Simplicity, Fairness, and Economic Growth. The counterintuitive results reflect a numbers of factors. Immigrants expand the size of the economic pie by creating new businesses, new jobs, and new consumers. Middle-class families find it easier to focus on careers with affordable immigrant labor offering gardening, child care, and other services. Many illegal immigrants aren’t fluent in English, so they don’t compete for the same jobs as native-born workers. Another factor behind the lack of direct competition is the higher educational level of native-born Americans. In 1960 about half of U.S.-born working-age adults hadn’t completed high school, while the comparable figure today is about 8 percent. The real downside concern is on the fiscal side of the immigrant ledger. Yes, more taxes would go into Social Security, Medicare, and the like with legalization, but more people would qualify for Medicaid, welfare, and other benefits. At the local level, many school districts are strained financially from educating immigrant children, legal and illegal. That said, the prospect of fiscal costs would diminish as newly legalized immigrant workers move freely around the country seeking jobs, entrepreneurs are comfortable expanding their payrolls, and immigrant parents push their children to live the American Dream. “Over time, as entrepreneurs emerge and families are better able to get their kids through high school and college, you’re reducing the long-run fiscal claim of the group,” says Hanson. There is no economic evidence that making roughly 6 percent of the workforce illegal will benefit the economy. Plenty of research supports the opposite case. A fast track to legality offers Washington a rare twofer: a just move that’s economically efficient.

**Decline goes nuclear**

**Harris and Burrows 09** PhD European History @ Cambridge, counselor in the National Intelligence Council (NIC) & member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit

Mathew, and Jennifer “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis” <http://www.ciaonet.org/journals/twq/v32i2/f_0016178_13952.pdf>

Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample Revisiting the Future opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that period include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in the same period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in which the potential for greater conflict could grow would seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile economic environment as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. Terrorism’s appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups\_inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks\_and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn. The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on preemption rather than defense, potentially leading to escalating crises. 36 Types of conflict that the world continues to experience, such as over resources, could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this could result in interstate conflicts if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between states in a more dog-eat-dog world.

### 2

#### TOPICALITY- Restrictions must legally mandate less production, not just regulate it

Anell 89

Chairman, WTO panel, "To examine, in the light of the relevant GATT provisions, the matter referred to the

CONTRACTING PARTIES by the United States in document L/6445 and to make such findings as will assist the CONTRACTING PARTIES in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in Article XXIII:2." 3. On 3 April 1989, the Council was informed that agreement had been reached on the following composition of the Panel (C/164): Composition Chairman: Mr. Lars E.R. Anell Members: Mr. Hugh W. Bartlett Mrs. Carmen Luz Guarda CANADA - IMPORT RESTRICTIONS ON ICE CREAM AND YOGHURT Report of the Panel adopted at the Forty-fifth Session of the CONTRACTING PARTIES on 5 December 1989 (L/6568 - 36S/68)

<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/88icecrm.pdf>

The United States argued that Canada had failed to demonstrate that it effectively restricted domestic production of milk. The differentiation between "fluid" and "industrial" milk was an artificial one for administrative purposes; with regard to GATT obligations, the product at issue was raw milk from the cow, regardless of what further use was made of it. The use of the word "permitted" in Article XI:2(c)(i) required that there be a limitation on the total quantity of milk that domestic producers were authorized or allowed to produce or sell. The provincial controls on fluid milk did not restrict the quantities permitted to be produced; rather dairy farmers could produce and market as much milk as could be sold as beverage milk or table cream. There were no penalties for delivering more than a farmer's fluid milk quota, it was only if deliveries exceeded actual fluid milk usage or sales that it counted against his industrial milk quota. At least one province did not participate in this voluntary system, and another province had considered leaving it. Furthermore, Canada did not even prohibit the production or sale of milk that exceeded the Market Share Quota. The method used to calculate direct support payments on within-quota deliveries assured that most dairy farmers would completely recover all of their fixed and variable costs on their within-quota deliveries. The farmer was permitted to produce and market milk in excess of the quota, and perhaps had an economic incentive to do so. 27. The United States noted that in the past six years total industrial milk production had consistently exceeded the established Market Sharing Quota, and concluded that the Canadian system was a regulation of production but not a restriction of production. Proposals to amend Article XI:2(c)(i) to replace the word "restrict" with "regulate" had been defeated; what was required was the reduction of production. The results of the econometric analyses cited by Canada provided no indication of what would happen to milk production in the absence not only of the production quotas, but also of the accompanying high price guarantees which operated as incentives to produce. According to the official publication of the Canadian Dairy Commission, a key element of Canada's national dairy policy was to promote self-sufficiency in milk production. The effectiveness of the government supply controls had to be compared to what the situation would be in the absence of all government measures.

#### Regulations are explicitly distinct from restrictions.

Sinha 6

<http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/437310/>

Supreme Court of India Union Of India & Ors vs M/S. Asian Food Industries on 7 November, 2006 Author: S.B. Sinha Bench: S Sinha, Mark, E Katju CASE NO.: Writ Petition (civil) 4695 of 2006 PETITIONER: Union of India & Ors. RESPONDENT: M/s. Asian Food Industries DATE OF JUDGMENT: 07/11/2006 BENCH: S.B. Sinha & Markandey Katju JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T [Arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) No. 17008 of 2006] WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4696 OF 2006 [Arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) No. 17558 of 2006] S.B. SINHA, J :

We may, however, notice that this Court in State of U.P. and Others v. M/s. Hindustan Aluminium Corpn. and others [AIR 1979 SC 1459] stated the law thus:

"It appears that a distinction between regulation and restriction or prohibition has always been drawn, ever since Municipal Corporation of the City of Toronto v. Virgo. Regulation promotes the freedom or the facility which is required to be regulated in the interest of all concerned, whereas prohibition obstructs or shuts off, or denies it to those to whom it is applied. The Oxford English Dictionary does not define regulate to include prohibition so that if it had been the intention to prohibit the supply, distribution, consumption or use of energy, the legislature would not have contented itself with the use of the word regulating without using the word prohibiting or some such word, to bring out that effect."

#### And production of nuclear power means electricity generation, not fuel fabrication

Young 05

(Steve, Whitepaper [WP-019] Environmental Regulation and Nuclear Power, http://www.unixworks.net/papers/wp-019.pdf)

The "nuclear fuel cycle" can be broken down into three stages. The "front end" of the cycle consists of uranium mining, milling, conversion, enrichment, and fuel fabrication. The middle of the cycle involves nuclear power and weapons production. The "back end" of the cycle includes waste management, storage, and disposal. Nuclear materials and waste require transport among the various steps in the fuel cycle. This section outlines the environmental laws presently governing these stages of the nuclear fuel cycle. 341

#### B. Violation- the restriction plank of the plan is not topical—

#### 1. fuel testing is merely a safety regulation to be cleared as a hurdle, it does not actually prohibit production from MOX

#### 2. the part that reduces the restriction on fuel testing is a restriction on the FUEL FABRICATION STAGE, not the electricity production stage

#### C. Voting issue-

#### 1. limits- they explode the topic to include hundreds of tiny regulations affs- labor, tax, and environmental requirements all become topical if the aff is allowed to get rid of something that delays or costs money

#### 2. Precision key to ground and education-- restrictions must be a distinct term for debate to occur

Eric Heinze (Senior Lecturer in Law, University of London, Queen Mary. He has held fellowships from the Fulbright Foundation and the French and German governments. He teaches Legal Theory, Constitutional Law, Human Rights and Public International Law. JD Harvard) 2003 “The Logic of Liberal Rights A study in the formal analysis of legal discourse” http://mey.homelinux.org/companions/Eric%20Heinze/The%20Logic%20of%20Liberal%20Rights\_%20A%20Study%20in%20%20%28839%29/The%20Logic%20of%20Liberal%20Rights\_%20A%20Study%20in%20%20-%20Eric%20Heinze.pdf

Variety of ‘restrictions’

The term ‘restriction’, defined so broadly, embraces any number of familiar concepts: ‘deprivation’, ‘denial’, ‘encroachment’, ‘incursion’, ‘infringement’, ‘interference’, ‘limitation’, ‘regulation’. Those terms commonly comport differences in meaning or nuance, and are not all interchangeable in standard legal usage. For example, a ‘deprivation’ may be distinguished from a ‘limitation’ or ‘regulation’ in order to denote a full denial of a right (e.g. where private property is wholly appropriated by the state 16 Agents without compensation) as opposed to a partial constraint (e.g. where discrete restrictions are imposed on the use of property which nonetheless remains profitably usable). Similarly, distinctions between acts and omissions can leave the blanket term ‘restriction’ sounding inapposite when applied to an omission: if a state is accused of not doing enough to give effect to a right, we would not colloquially refer to such inaction as a ‘restriction’. Moreover, in a case of extreme abuse, such as extrajudicial killing or torture, it might sound banal to speak merely of a ‘restriction’ on the corresponding right. However, the term ‘restriction’ will be used to include all of those circumstances, in so far as they all comport a purpose or effect of extinguishing or diminishing the right-seeker’s enjoyment of an asserted right. (The only significant distinction which will be drawn will be between that concept of ‘restriction’ and the concept of ‘breach’ or ‘violation’. The terms ‘breach’ or ‘violation’ will be used to denote a judicial determination about the legality of the restriction.6) Such an axiom may seem unwelcome, in so far as it obliterates subtleties which one would have thought to be useful in law. It must be stressed that we are seeking to eliminate that variety of terms not for all purposes, but only for the very narrow purposes of a formal model, for which any distinctions among them are irrelevant.

### 3

#### SPENDING DISAD- The New Budget is drawing GOP support and will avoid sequestration-New spending collapses the deal

Federal Times 3/25 (“GOP shows openness to Obama budget plan,” http://www.federaltimes.com/article/20130325/AGENCY01/303250002/GOP-shows-openness-Obama-budget-plan?odyssey=mod%7Cnewswell%7Ctext%7CCongress%7Cp)

Key congressional Republicans are calling a comprehensive White House deficit-reduction plan a solid first step toward striking the kind of bipartisan deal that would substantially lessen defense spending cuts. The White House last week quietly unveiled details of President Obama’s plan to further shrink the federal deficit by $1.8 trillion. The Obama administration’s blueprint, expected to be the backbone of next month’s fiscal 2014 budget request, proposes trimming future Pentagon spending by only $100 billion in 10 years — $400 billion less than mandated under the sequester. It calls for the same amount in domestic cuts. For the Pentagon, the Obama plan would not only remove the nine more years of the so-called “meat-ax approach” of the sequester, which calls for cuts of around $50 billion annually for nine more years. It also would delay the $100 billion in defense cuts it proposes until 2019, meaning it would give lawmakers five budget cycles during which to replace them or void any future legislative language ordering them. “The president’s budget ... does deal with the deficit,” DoD acquisition chief Frank Kendall said March 20 during a National Defense Industrial Association-sponsored conference in Springfield, Va. “It does do the things that need to be done, if it were passed, to avoid sequestration.” A Defense Department official told Defense News the Pentagon’s 2014 budget plan will not include the $50 billion-per-year sequester cuts because the White House and its Office of Management and Budget have not issued such instructions. The White House, after several messy and failed attempts at negotiating with congressional Republican leaders, is trying a new strategy. Obama and his top aides are reaching out to rank-and-file Republicans in the Senate, believing that starting talks toward a sequester-voiding “grand bargain” with House GOP leaders will go nowhere. Top Republicans in both chambers, in a series of interviews, applauded the White House’s plan as a positive first step, with most pledging to give it serious consideration. “I very much, as I’ve said to the president, do appreciate the fact they put some entitlement reforms in there, and I support those,” said GOP Sen. Bob Corker of Tennessee, one of the dozen Republican senators courted by Obama during a wonky March 6 dinner at Washington’s posh Jefferson Hotel. “That’s new.” Corker called the Obama plan “a beginning point.” The plan unveiled last week appears aimed at attracting some pro-defense Senate Republicans, such as longtime Armed Services Committee member Sen. John McCain of Arizona, who worried about the sequester creating a “hollow military.” “I would consider any plan that avoids sequestration,” McCain said in a brief interview March 20. He also attended the March 6 dinner. The plan appears to target other Senate Republicans who, like Corker, want deeper cuts to domestic entitlement programs. For instance, Obama is proposing $735 billion in entitlement program cuts, an apparent olive branch aimed at those 12 GOP senators the White House calls the “caucus of common sense.” But Republicans made clear the Obama proposal is merely an opening offer. “They know we [GOP senators] think that’s not near enough,” Corker said. “We’ve had a frank conversation about this.” The White House plan also piqued the interest of some key House Republicans. “If [Obama has] got a sequestration-replacement plan, certainly we have a passing interest in that,” Rep. Hal Rogers, R-Ky., chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, told Defense News on March 21, minutes after the lower chamber approved a measure to avoid a government shutdown that he helped craft. Asked if the White House plan — which congressional Republicans have demanded for months — is, to him, a step in the right direction toward turning off the sequester, Rogers replied “sure.” The chairman of the House Appropriations Defense subcommittee, Rep. John Young, R-Fla., a longtime pro-military lawmaker, also welcomed the White House plan. Young said during a brief March 21 interview that he wants to find a way to replace the sequester cuts with other deficit-reduction measures. Sen. James Inhofe, R-Okla., ranking member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, told Defense News on March 20 he would be open to $100 billion in defense cuts as a way to avoid the final nine years of the $500 billion sequester cut. “If you isolate the $100 [billion], obviously I would support that,” Inhofe said. “But I doubt it’s going to be quite that easy. … I anticipate [White House officials] are using that as a carrot to get tax increases. But that sure has my attention.” How the plan works Sources say the 2014 budget plan — due to Congress on April 8 — replaces the $1 trillion in deficit reduction achieved by sequester cuts in two ways. One is through “more than $600 billion” in new federal revenue that the administration expects will be collected via higher tax rates imposed on the wealthiest Americans by the January fiscal cliff-avoidance law, sources say. The other way is through $500 billion labeled “interest savings” on a summary of Obama’s plan posted on the White House website. Having already put $2.5 trillion in deficit-reduction steps into law, if the president and congressional Republicans can strike a deal that hits the $1.8 trillion target, Washington would have shaved $4.3 trillion from the deficit since 2011. The Defense official said the coming 2014 Pentagon budget request will indeed ignore the sequester, and instead assume the White House’s $1.8 trillion deficit-reduction plan — or something similar — is adopted later this year. “The president has put forward a specific plan that will avoid sequestration’s harmful budget cuts and reduce the deficit in a balanced way — by cutting spending, finding savings in entitlement programs and closing tax loopholes,” according to the White House’s website.

#### The impact is collapse of naval power which causes great power war and collapses trade

Collins-the diplomat-2/28/13

The Consequences of Sequestration

http://thediplomat.com/2013/02/28/the-consequences-of-sequestration/?all=true

The upcoming budget sequester—slated to begin on March 1st—and the recent Defense Department decision to in effect cancel the deployment of the aircraft carrier USS Harry Truman to the Persian Gulf, are disturbing signals that without a significant change, the United States may be increasingly hard pressed to serve as the primary security guarantor for the world’s key sea lanes. The regions of highest concern for negative security impacts from U.S. defense budget paralysis are East and Southeast Asia, the Persian Gulf, and the Indian Ocean. A less formidable U.S. naval presence in the Persian Gulf—and the message it sends regarding the limits of American naval and military power more broadly—reverberate loud and clear in both friendly and hostile capitals around the globe. Perhaps even worse, the signals are particularly frightening in countries like Vietnam, the Philippines, and Singapore, who see a strong U.S. forward military presence as a guarantee that helps protect them from falling victim to the depredations of powerful neighbors like China. If more powerful maritime countries like Japan and South Korea lose confidencein the U.S. ability to serve as an offshore balancer and peacekeeper, they will upgrade their militaries more rapidly, fueling regional naval competition. Meanwhile smaller powers like Singapore will be forced to hedge their diplomatic and security bets in ways that make them less reliable partners for the U.S, with ominous medium and long-term national security implications. In conjunction with budget pressures, U.S. domestic oil production is rising and reducing U.S. reliance on oil imports. Indeed, Valero, the world’s largest independent oil refiner and product retailer, expects that by the end of 2013, refineries in the PADD III region (primarily the U.S. Gulf Coast), which account for half of the country’s total refining capacity, will no longer need to import light or medium crude oil because domestic production has risen so quickly. Budget pressures and reduced demand on imported oil in turn further increase the political temptation to treat U.S. forward deployed naval forces as an area ripe for budget cutting. Doing so would have serious strategic consequences for the U.S. and many other countries with global trade interests. The U.S. has for the past 60 years been a peacemaking force in the global maritime commons because its unquestioned naval power, strong commitment visible to friend and foe alike, and relative diplomatic even-handedness in ensuring the safe passage of global trade–including oil, raw materials, and finished goods–across key maritime corridors regardless of their destination. Fulfilling this critical role undeniably requires substantial military spending—but the strategic dividends of keeping global sea lanes open and wielding commensurate influence and power to proactively shape events far outweigh the dollar costs of keeping a critical mass of ships forward deployed. However, politicians on both sides of the aisle have so far failed to seriously consider that Washington’s budget stasis signals to other maritime stakeholders that the U.S. guarantee of free maritime passage and management of regional conflicts is less reliable than they thought. In turn, these countries—namely China (which already distrusts the U.S. guarantee), Japan, India, and South Korea—now have much greater incentives to build and operate naval forces capable of securing maritime national interests without Washington’s help. In East Asia, the cancelled Persian Gulf carrier deployment is likely being viewed as a strategic opportunity by China and North Korea. Recent U.S. moves suggest Washington’s diplomatic rhetoric about a “Pivot to Asia” outweighs its political will to underwrite a large and capable military presence in the Asia-Pacific region. Regional countries like Vietnam and Singapore that support a robust U.S. presence in Southeast Asia to balance China’s rise now once again face the prospect of having to hedge their bets between the U.S. and China—a calculation that inevitably bends the regional power balance in Beijing’s favor. Furthermore, the perception that the U.S. lacks both the funding and political resolve to support forward military deployments also risks catalyzing further destabilizing actions by North Korea, which recently tested its third nuclear device. Risk perception has changed permanently due to U.S. political short-sightedness and isolationist impulses that overlook the impacts of budget decision-making beyond its borders. Even if a budget deal is reached relatively soon, the fact that Washington has, for short-term political reasons, elected to significantly alter U.S. military posture in a region that provides roughly 30% of the global oil supply, lowers confidence in U.S. security guarantees around the world. And unlike financial markets that tend to forgive mistakes and problems relatively quickly, the international security arena has a much lower margin of error and the U.S. may pay a much steeper foreign policy price for making maritime power projection subject to short-term political whims. The naval power underpinning the maritime Pax Americana that has existed for much of the period since World War II has been a global fixture that endured economic ebbs and flows. The perception of waning U.S. naval power will serve as an impetus for other regional powers with global interests to assume a more active role in protecting commerce bound for their shores. In such an environment, maritime frictions run an elevated risk of flaring into conflict in Asia, where historical grievances have smoldered for decades, and becoming confrontational further afield in places like the Indian Ocean region and Persian Gulf. Signals of wavering U.S. security commitment to the Persian Gulf are also likely to embolden Iran in its pursuit of nuclear weapons and regional influence. A little over a year ago the U.S. Navy was able to simultaneously deploy the USS Carl Vinson, USS Abraham Lincoln, and USS Enterprise carrier strike groups in and near the Persian Gulf to deter Iranian provocations amid a period of heightened tensions. Now, if a similar scenario were to unfold, the Pentagon would not have the assets in place to make such a timely show of force. Three carriers make an exponentially larger impression on an adversary than one does, and the weakened position Washington has put itself in will unnerve U.S. regional allies and give Iran a freer hand to test U.S. resolve in ways that could potentially risk armed conflict. Last spring the U.S. Navy was already stretched thin and had to quickly move the USS Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group from Thailand into the Arabian Sea. Putting fewer warships to sea due to budget fights poses a significant risk of forcing the U.S. military to have to choose between having key naval assets in the Persian Gulf or East Asia. Such a state of affairs would be a grave problem if, as today, multiple security contingencies simultaneously exist in both areas. The Defense Department risks spreading itself too thin, diluting the deterrent power of having carrier strike groups close by, and thus removing a vital tool of influence that enhances the credibility and effectiveness of American diplomacy that has long helped keep the peace in complex, and often unstable strategic theatres.If U.S. security commitments to maintaining large-scale forward deployed naval forces capable of shaping events continue to remain subject to the daily ebb and flow of the political tides in Washington, allies and potential foes alike will lose confidence in America’s capability. Accordingly, the era of maritime Pax Americana would erode and place the world at risk of reverting back to a much more chaotic state of affairs in the global maritime commons. A reversion to this type of environment would bring with it a higher risk of significant state-state conflict and catalyze activities by state and non-state groups opposed to freedom of transit through important zones such as the Persian Gulf and South China Sea. This in turn would risk effectively imposing a heavy tax on global trade at exactly the juncture when it can least afford it. The period in which the fledgling U.S. Navy earned its expeditionary stripes fighting the Barbary Pirates 200 years ago was this type of world. Now, it is high time both sides of the aisle in Washington ask themselves if they wish to set the wheels in motion for a possible return to maritime anarchy and unconstrained naval competition in strategic regions. The damage done to U.S. allies’ confidence and potential foes’ awe that deters them from initiating conflicts is not yet irreparable, but once other parties begin building up naval forces and altering operational philosophies based on the signals American political actions send, path dependency sets in and makes maintaining U.S. naval preeminence in core areas of strategic interest much more costly and less likely to succeed. Isolationism has consistently forced the U.S.to become involved in conflicts that could have been prevented or minimized by earlier, pro-active engagement. Moreover, this usually occurs on unfavorable terms and the current period is almost certainly no different. Robust forward maritime engagement is essential and the U.S. should resist isolationist impulses despite short-term financial difficulties at home.

### 4

#### COUNTERPLAN- The United States federal government should waive fuel testing requirements and automatically grant license amendments for energy production using fuel fabricated with plutonium from dismantled nuclear weapons.

### 5

#### KRITIK---Securitizing nuclear proliferation roots the affirmative in colonial knowledge production --- The claim that new proliferation is categorically distinct from the existing risk reifies the orientalist binary that structures modern international relations and violently represents the global south.

Gusterson 1999

Hugh, prof anthro @ George Mason, “Nuclear Weapons and the Other in the Western Imagination”

According to the literature on risk in anthropology, **shared fears often re- veal as much about the identities and solidarities of the fearful as about the ac- tual dangers that are feared** (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982; Lindenbaum 1974). **The immoderate reactions in the West to the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan, and to Iraq's nuclear weapons program earlier, are examples of an entrenched discourse on nuclear proliferation that has played an important role in structuring the Third World, and our relation to it, in the Western imagination. This discourse, dividing the world into nations that can be trusted with nuclear weapons and those that cannot, dates back**, at least, **to the Non-Proliferation Treaty** of 1970. The Non-Proliferation Treaty embodied a bargain between the five coun- tries that had nuclear weapons in 1970 and those countries that did not. Accord- ing to the bargain, the five official nuclear states (the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and China)3 promised to assist other signa- tories to the treaty in acquiring nuclear energy technology as long as they did not use that technology to produce nuclear weapons, submitting to international in- spections when necessary to prove their compliance. Further, in Article 6 of the treaty, the five nuclear powers agreed to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament" (Blacker and Duffy 1976:395). **One hundred eighty-seven countries have signed the treaty, but Israel, India, and Pakistan have refused, saying it enshrines a system of global "nuclear apartheid." Although the Non-Proliferation Treaty divided the countries of the world into nu- clear and nonnuclear by means of a purely temporal metric4**-designating only those who had tested nuclear weapons by 1970 as nuclear powers**-the treaty has become the legal anchor for a global nuclear regime that is increasingly le- gitimated in Western public discourse** in racialized terms. In view of recent developments in global politics-the collapse of the Soviet threat and the recent war against Iraq, **a nuclear-threshold nation in the Third World-the importance of this discourse in organizing Western geopolitical understandings is only growing. It has become an increasingly important way of legitimating U.S. mili- tary programs in the post-Cold War world** since the early 1990s, when U.S. military leaders introduced the term rogue states into the American lexicon of fear, identifying a new source of danger just as the Soviet threat was declining (Klare 1995). **Thus in Western discourse nuclear weapons are represented so that "theirs" are a problem whereas "ours" are not. During the Cold War the Western dis- course on the dangers of "nuclear proliferation" defined the term in such a way as to sever the two senses of the word proliferation. This usage split off the "ver- tical" proliferation of the superpower arsenals** (the development of new and im- proved weapons designs and the numerical expansion of the stockpiles) **from the "horizontal" proliferation of nuclear weapons to other countries, presenting only the latter as the "proliferation problem."** Following the end of the Cold War, the American and Russian arsenals are being cut to a few thousand weap- ons on each side.5 However, the United States and Russia have turned back ap- peals from various nonaligned nations, especially India, for the nuclear powers to open discussions on a global convention abolishing nuclear weapons. Article 6 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty notwithstanding, the Clinton administration has declared that nuclear weapons will play a role in the defense of the United States for the indefinite future. Meanwhile, in a controversial move, the Clinton administration has broken with the policy of previous administrations in basi- cally formalizing a policy of using nuclear weapons against nonnuclear states to deter chemical and biological weapons (Panofsky 1998; Sloyan 1998). **The dominant discourse that stabilizes this system of nuclear apartheid in Western ideology is a specialized variant within a broader system of colonial and postcolonial discourse that takes as its essentialist premise a profound Oth- erness separating Third World from Western countries.6 This inscription of Third World** (especially Asian and Middle Eastern) **nations as ineradicably dif- ferent from our own has,** in a different context, **been labeled "Orientalism"** by Edward Said (1978). Said argues **that orientalist discourse constructs the world in terms of a series of binary oppositions that produce the Orient as the mirror image of the West: where "we" are rational and disciplined, "they" are impul- sive and emotional; where "we" are modern and flexible, "they" are slaves to an- cient passions and routines; where "we" are honest and compassionate, "they" are treacherous and uncultivated. While the blatantly racist orientalism of the high colonial period has softened, more subtle orientalist ideologies endure in contemporary politics. They can be found,** as Akhil Gupta (1998) has argued, **in discourses of economic development that represent Third World nations as child nations lagging behind Western nations in a uniform cycle of development** or, as Lutz and Collins (1993) suggest, in the imagery of popular magazines, such as National Geographic. I want to suggest here that another variant of contempo- rary orientalist ideology is also to be found in U.S. national security discourse.Following Anthony Giddens (1979), I define ideology as a way of con- structing political ideas, institutions, and behavior which (1) makes the political structures and institutions created by dominant social groups, classes, and na- tions appear to be naturally given and inescapable rather than socially con- structed; (2) presents the interests of elites as if they were universally shared; (3) obscures the connections between different social and political antagonisms so as to inhibit massive, binary confrontations (i.e., revolutionary situations); and (4) legitimates domination. **The Western discourse on nuclear proliferation is ideological in all four of these senses: (1) it makes the simultaneous ownership of nuclear weapons by the major powers and the absence of nuclear weapons in Third World countries seem natural and reasonable while problematizing at- tempts by such countries as India, Pakistan, and Iraq to acquire these weapons; (2) it presents the security needs of the established nuclear powers as if they were everybody's; (3) it effaces the continuity between Third World countries' nuclear deprivation and other systematic patterns of deprivation in the underde- veloped world in order to inhibit a massive north-south confrontation; and (4) it legitimates the nuclear monopoly of the recognized nuclear powers**.

#### ---Causes global war --- **Creates a paranoid logic that utilizes the presumption of American innocence to justify incalculable violence.**

Gusterson 2012

Hugh, professor of anthropology at George Mason University, Designed for Death: Helen Caldicott interviews Hugh Gusterson, http://www.guernicamag.com/interviews/designed-for-death/

Helen Caldicott: It’s totally hypocritical for the United States, even if they’re not replacing their warheads, to lecture other countries about not developing their own warheads, when America still has in stockpile, ready to go, thousands of hydrogen bombs, which could induce nuclear winter and the end of most life on Earth. Hugh Gusterson: When the United States ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1970, one of the things they ratified was Article 6, which committed the established nuclear powers to negotiate, in good faith, ending the arms race and eliminating all nuclear weapons. In 1970 they agreed to a prompt cessation of the nuclear arms program. I don’t think many people would think that waiting until 1992 to end nuclear testing was a prompt cessation of the nuclear arms race. People from countries that don’t have nuclear weapons are getting increasingly impatient with the United States, especially, but with all the nuclear powers, wondering when they’re going to get serious about honoring their obligations under Article 6. The United States was busy proposing sanctions against Iran, which was enriching uranium. There are innocent and less innocent reasons for enriching uranium. Iran is allowed under the terms of the treaty to enrich uranium for nuclear energy plants. But the United States was proposing sanctions on Iran for violating the Non-Proliferation Treaty, when I think any detached, objective observer would say that by far the largest violators of the treaty must have been the Russians and the Americans for sitting on these enormous stockpiles in spite of Article 6 commitments. I found, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, most people in the nuclear weapons labs were unaware of Article 6 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. I remember having conversations with very well-educated nuclear warhead designers, and one of them told me, flat out, I was wrong in saying that the United States and Russia had any commitment under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty to end the arms race. I was so angry that I went home and Xeroxed the treaty and mailed it to him. Those commitments under the treaty have been much better reported by the U.S. press more recently. In the last five or six years knowledgeable Americans have become more aware of how the rest of the world feels about them. As an anthropologist, I find it particularly offensive when you talk to weapons scientists, or to other kinds of nuclear weapons professionals, that there’s a uniform assumption that Americans are the only people who can be uniquely trusted with nuclear weapons in a way that black and brown people, non-Christians in particular, cannot. You hear it said that only Americans and Europeans have the strength required of people to have nuclear weapons. This flies in the face of the evidence, since the United States is the only country ever to abuse weapons. Helen Caldicott: Is this the projection of the dark side by these Americans onto others? Hugh Gusterson: All of this is a struggle with our unconscious persona that we find difficult to come to terms with, and then project onto other people. It’s been well established by psychologists as part of the process that makes it possible to wage war on other people. You don’t have to go to a nuclear weapons lab to find this kind of casual racism. You can open the opinion page of any American newspaper and find it there at least once a week, about Iraq or Iran or North Korea. It’s become something not even necessary to justify.

#### **---Defining nuclear energy implementation in terms of national interest and leadership removes the political context of reactors, their promotion of US reactors over others promotes international accidents**

Dufner 11 (Dr. Ulrike Dufner, director of the Heinrich Böll Foundation in Istanbul, “Nationalism and Nuclear Energy in the International Political Discourse” http://www.tr.boell.org/web/51-1412.html)

The catastrophe at the nuclear power plants of Japan last year is still present in our memory: every day we could follow the details on TV of the horrible consequences of the catastrophe; e.g. huge areas had to be abandoned because of contamination, nuclear clouds bearing the risk of spreading the contamination to regions far from Japan. Never before were weather reports, especially wind reports, of such a great concern as after the accident in Fukushima. And even later, when media interest shifted to other events around the globe, the tragedy in Japan continued. Recently, Japan had to close all its nuclear power plants, which produced 30% of Japan’s energy. Within the framework of its foreign policy program, HBSD organized several meetings with civil society representatives from other countries. One example was the Ani Dialogue II meeting of young CSO members from Armenia and Turkey in July 2011. Another example was the round table on “Pipelines and Politics” at the international conference, “Turkey’s Foreign Policy Decoded”, held in December 2011. At all these formal and informal meetings, which were held after (!) the accident in Fukushima, we were confronted with very similar arguments: a) “It is our right to have nuclear power plants. Nobody can prevent us from possessing this technology and deny our right of development. Nuclear energy becomes a matter of national interest and pride”. If we think this attitude out, it means that to expose a society to an incalculable risk is considered a national right. By questioning nuclear energy, you can then easily be on par with a national enemy. b) Some even argue that the refusal of nuclear energy is part of an international imperialist conspiracy against developing countries. Interestingly, they do not even discuss in whose interest the very expensive and economically unreasonable technology lies. The direct costs of the Fukushima catastrophe are calculated to be around 50 billion dollars, keeping aside the costs of the next decades. From an economic point of view, nuclear energy is not efficient – even without calculating the costs of such a catastrophic accident. c) “Nuclear energy is necessary to fill the energy gap; we do not have other energy sources; we are much too dependent on the foreign energy supply; we have to diversify our energy supply and go nuclear”. Interestingly, when asking about alternative scenarios and the potential of renewable or energy efficiency, one rarely gets an answer. Some even argue, we would have to cut off the lights. Although Japan was relying heavily on nuclear energy, the country was able to phase out nuclear energy. It would be worthwhile to examine the examples of Japan or Germany. But instead, without even looking at their policies, new arguments are put forward about why these two countries are so different and the local conditions are not comparable. d) Others claim Fukushima will not happen in “our” nuclear power plants, we (will) use better, newer technology, hereby expressing some kind of “national pride” and fully ignoring the fact that the quality of the accident in Fukushima was far beyond all worst case scenarios projected by experts. As soon as issues are equated with the so-called “national interest” there seems to be a deadlock of thinking. The deep-rooted – and historically explainable – mistrust against “arguments stemming from the industrialized world” is, in a way, instrumentalized to impede further arguments. The question of why nuclear energy companies should be working more in the interest of the developing countries is completely left out of the argument. How such a highly dangerous technology could be in the “interest of a nation” is not even questioned. A similar deadlock can be observed when debating the issue of the nuclear program of Iran. Here, once again, to possess peaceful nuclear technology is taken for granted and once more defined as a “right”. Even the critics of the regime strongly defend the “national right to possess nuclear energy”. When disagreeing with this logic, as Iran is one of the leading energy exporting countries, I was confronted with the reply: “This is a very German perspective”. Let us ignore the fact that this is not a German discourse. What is striking is that national arguments are even put forward from those who have to seek refuge from their own country. Concerning Iran, one reason for this commonly shared attitude might be the debate about the nuclear weapons program, Iran’s obligation to allow inspections by the IAEA according to the NPT and the sanctions imposed as Iran does not fulfill these obligations. There also seems to be a broad consensus among critics of the Iranian regime on the refusal of sanctions. Furthermore, it is argued that according to the NPT, a nuclear weapons program is prohibited, but not a nuclear energy program. Therefore, Iran has the right to possess this technology program. Insisting on this legal argument seems to impede any critical debate about advantages and disadvantages. Although this juridical argument is in itself correct, the debate about nuclear energy is not a debate about legal rights; it is much more a debate about sustainable energy policies and the risks of nuclear energy. As the debate about nuclear energy is framed alongside a discourse of “rights of nations”, I would propose to shift the notion in the debate towards the “interest of societies and people”. This might open ways to end the impasse in the discussion and to overcome the mental deadlock. The issue is not the denial of rights, but the search for an intelligent energy policy that does not put societies at risk. As could be seen from Chernobyl and Fukushima, nuclear power plants are not only a risk for the countries where they are established, the effects of nuclear accidents do not stop at national borders. We have to overcome nationalist discourses and think in categories that provide answers to the challenges of global concern, such as energy politics.

#### ---Their conflict scenarios are false and have only been constructed due to imperialist knowledge production, as an academic you have an ethical obligation to reject security epistemology

San Juan 1995 Professor of English and Comparative Literature at UConn, Hegemony and Strategies of Transgression, pg 1-2

Scenes of carnage in Somalia, East Timor, Haiti, in the occupied territories of Palestine and in all the fragments of what was once Yugoslavia. . . . Images of violent confrontations in South Africa, and not too long ago in Los Angeles, and now in Yemen and Rwanda. . . . The year 1994 opened with the uprising of the Indian communities led by the Zapatista National Liberation Front in Chiapas. Mexico, just after the signing of the North America Free Trade Agreement. Signs of the apocalypse? Or of the long-awaited devolution from the age of the superpowers? In the prologue to Tlie Rules Are No Game, Anthony Wilden (1987) has given us a background to this landscape of horrendous waste, disfigurations of pieties and ressentimeni. Connecting "local knowledges" with their overarching reality, Noam Chomsky (1991) has rendered in bold strokes the lessons of the paradigmatic First World (United States)-Third World (Vietnam) encounter in our time, recalling what Mark Twain (1992), in his "To the Person Sitting in Darkness," did for his audience at the turn of the century. Faced with this multitudinous reality, the practitioners of "humane letters" in the United States—quite a separate tribe from the aforementioned disturbers of the peace—have displayed erudition and ingenuity in theorizing but have failed to engage with crude, sublunary happenings. Why? Because all (except for those skeptics on the fringe and other scandalous but marginalized cottscietilicizers) have refused to understand exactly what is meant by the dominant, expansive, and virtually inescapable stranglehold of the United States—its economic, political, and cultural hegemony—over the world system in terms of the everyday lives of masses of people in what is called the "Third World." Although the term "cultural imperialism" has been domesticated for ideology-critique (Tomlinson 1991) and token criticism of certain government policies is the standard tare for liberals, still the majority of U.S. intellectuals and arbiters of taste function today without any thought of how their words and actions, whether they know it or not. "represent" the claims to (cultural/racial) superiority of a nation-state whose interventions in Latin America, Asia, and the Middle East have brought disaster and misery to millions since the nineteenth century. Edward Said's recent Culture and Imperialism is just one reminder of that record. Unless there is some sophisticated criticism and disavowal of this complicity, I am afraid that the activities of U.S. academics can only serve to advance transnational capital's ascendancy for now and throughout the next century.

### Proliferation

#### ARMS- Technology doesn’t equate to non-proliferation – political considerations outweigh

Feiveson 1 (Harold, currently serves as the Secretary-Treasurer of the Federation of American Scientists Council and is a Senior Research Policy Scientist of the Program on Science and Global Security at Princeton University. “The Search for Proliferation-Resistant Nuclear Power” http://www.fas.org/faspir/2001/v54n5/nuclear.htm )

It should be recognized straight away that many in the nuclear industry worldwide believe that intrinsic or technical proliferation resistance should not be given much attention in the development of nuclear power. Their arguments are several. For example: Proliferation is manifestly a political problem. Therefore, it is counterproductive to impose technical constraints on the development of nuclear power except in a few problem countries, such as Iraq and North Korea. If countries are determined to obtain nuclear weapons they can do so most directly via a dedicated program and not through civil nuclear power. Institutional constraints - that is, the entire nonproliferation regime defined by the NPT, safeguards agreements, supplier agreements, etc. � are adequate and could be improved further without imposing technical constraints on nuclear power. The shape of technology, international politics, and ways people think about weapons of mass destruction are impossible to gauge over the long term. Indeed, nuclear weapons may in the future be far less a matter of concern than other weapons of mass destruction. Therefore, we cannot sensibly attempt today to design a proliferation-resistant nuclear future for the long term. In practice, it will be extraordinarily difficult to contrive an effective proliferation- resistant nuclear fuel cycle for sophisticated states, and difficult even to do so for unsophisticated states. To a point, there is merit in all of these arguments, and taken together they underscore the truth that the civilian nuclear fuel cycle is only a part, possibly even a small part, of the greater problem of addressing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

#### The US will not exercise leadership

Henry Sokolski, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, 2/7/12, Obama's Nuclear Mistake, www.nationalreview.com/blogs/print/290330

What prompted Obama to kick this political nest? A stunning inattention to nuclear-export realities, his own nuclear-control rhetoric, and history. In 2008, President Bush negotiated a nuclear-cooperative agreement with the United Arab Emirates (UAE). This agreement featured two new and important nonproliferation conditions. The first required the UAE to forswear making nuclear fuel — a process that can bring states to the very brink of acquiring bombs. The second stipulated that the UAE must open its nuclear facilities to intrusive nuclear inspections authorized under a special international understanding known as the Additional Protocol. While it negotiated this agreement with the UAE, the Bush administration also peddled its new, tougher conditions to existing and prospective U.S. civilian-nuclear-technology recipients, including Jordan, Egypt, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, and Vietnam. Initially, this effort enjoyed President Obama’s support after he succeeded Bush: He put the final touches on the UAE deal and in 2009 sold it as the new nonproliferation “Gold Standard” for future civilian nuclear-cooperation deals. After a year’s effort trying to get Jordan, Vietnam, and South Korea to forswear making nuclear fuel, though, Team Obama started to go wobbly. First, in the late summer of 2010, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced that the U.S. had initialed a nuclear deal with Vietnam that lacked the Gold Standard conditions. The Hill went nuts. Letters were sent to the secretary of state, and State quietly put the Vietnam agreement on ice while the National Security Council ordered an interagency policy review. Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg, who wanted to uphold the standard, fought Deputy Secretary of Energy Daniel Poneman, who did not. Nothing was decided. Then, in July of 2011, Steinberg left the government. In short order, Poneman prevailed over remaining resistance within State. Late last year, State resumed nuclear cooperation talks with Vietnam. Anxious to notify the Hill, as required by law, Undersecretary of State Eileen Tauscher and Deputy Secretary Poneman tried to arrange a private, classified briefing with the House and Senate foreign-affairs committee chairmen and ranking members. But all the important members were out of town. So instead, the two officials sent them a short note. It was a knee-slapper. First, it said the administration had decided that pushing the Bush administration’s Gold Standard would actually risk undermining nuclear nonproliferation. “We are concerned,” Tauscher and Poneman argued, that pushing this standard would “reduce[ ] the number of future U.S. partners, minimizing our nonproliferation influence.” Second, they noted that “France and Russia in particular are very aggressive in pursuing nuclear business,” that “neither imposes enrichment or reprocessing conditions in their agreements,” and that for every billion dollars of exports, the U.S. is able to support 10,000 jobs. So, if we want jobs, we have to back off pushing nuclear nonproliferation? That seems to be the letter’s conclusion. Yet it’s unclear if there are any significant U.S. reactor exports to be made, or any truly American vendors to make them. Nearly 80 percent of Westinghouse’s nuclear division is now Japanese- and Kazakhstani-owned; roughly half of General Electric’s is Japanese-owned. As for nuclear manufacturing, nearly all of that is now done overseas. Also, the Fukushima tsunami disaster has endangered whatever U.S. nuclear reactor or component exports might otherwise be left. Certainly prospective foreign customers have been loath to forswear suing U.S. nuclear firms in the case of a nuclear accident. Yet without such a pledge, U.S. vendors will not sell. The letter’s most egregious error, though, is its misreading of the nuclear market. Contrary to the two officials’ suggestion, the most profitable nuclear sales prospect is not overseas reactors, where profit margins can be negative. Instead, it’s supplying nuclear fuel to run the U.S.’s 104 power reactors, the world’s largest fleet. Russia and France are eager to penetrate this market. France is building a $4.8 billion fuel-fabrication plant in Georgia for the U.S. Department of Energy and has secured a $2 billion conditional federal loan guarantee to enrich uranium in Idaho. Russia would like to establish a similar U.S. enrichment project. Bottom line: If the U.S. wants to make a nuclear buck, doing so while maintaining nonproliferation standards depends far less on what other nuclear suppliers are doing overseas than those foreign suppliers’ export profits depend on securing U.S. taxpayer funds and loan guarantees. So far, however, Team Obama has avoided exploiting this leverage. Impatient, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs has reported out a bill (H.R. 1280) to push the Gold Standard by increasing congressional oversight over U.S. civilian nuclear-cooperative agreements. The Senate has yet to act.

#### Political considerations overwhelm new tech

Green 2010 (Jim, PhD in Science and Technology Studies, Australian Coordinator of the Beyond Nuclear Initiative, NUCLEAR WEAPONS, NUCLEAR POWER & INTEGRAL FAST REACTORS <http://foe.org.au/sites/default/files/IFR-FoEA-web-Feb2010.pdf>)

In theory, there is much to like about the idea of conventional reprocessing with the use of separated plutonium as fuel (in breeders or mixed uranium/plutonium 'MOX' reactors). In theory, it has many of the same potential benefits as IFRs including drawing down fissile material stockpiles. In practice, reprocessing has increased rather than decreased proliferation risks. Very little plutonium has been used as reactor fuel in breeders or MOX reactors. But the separation of plutonium from spent fuel continues apace such that stockpiles of separated 'civil' plutonium − which can be used directly in weapons − are increasing by about five tonnes annually and amount to over 270 tonnes, enough for 27,000 nuclear weapons. IFR advocates demonstrate little or no understanding of the realpolitik responsible for, amongst other things, turning attractive theories into the problem of plutonium stockpiling and the failure to take the simplest steps to address the problem – namely, suspending or reducing the rate of reprocessing such that plutonium stockpiles are drawn down rather than continually increasing. If IFR technology is developed and deployed, it will be in an environment where crass commercial and political imperatives have demonstrably prevented even the simplest steps being taken to reduce weapons proliferation risks. IFR advocate Tom Blees argues that: "Privatized nuclear power should be outlawed worldwide, with complete international control of not only the entire fuel cycle but also the engineering, construction, and operation of all nuclear power plants. Only in this way will safety and proliferation issues be satisfactorily dealt with. Anything short of that opens up a Pandora's box of inevitable problems." He also argues that: "The shadowy threat of nuclear proliferation and terrorism virtually requires us to either internationalize or ban nuclear power."

#### Proliferation is stable – history proves

Dratler 10 (Jay, Goodyear Professor of Intellectual Property, Emeritus Ph.D. degrees in physics from the University of California (San Diego), and a J.D. degree from Harvard Law School, where he was articles editor of the Harvard Law Review. “The Case for Nuclear Proliferation” <http://jaydiatribe.blogspot.com/2010/04/case-for-nuclear-proliferation.html>)

**The strongest argument for nuclear proliferation is** not speculation, but history**. Since the first and only use of nuclear weapons** (against Japan in 1945), **no one has invaded a country that had them,** with the possible exception of Israel. **Besides brief border skirmishes, all significant armed conflicts since 1945 but one have involved nuclear haves fighting in nuclear have-nots**, or have-nots fighting among themselves. Here’s the list: 1947: India (have-not) and Pakistan (have-not) over partition and Kashmir (have not) 1950-53: North Korea (have-not) in South Korea (have-not) 1950-53: US (have) and allies in South Korea (have-not) against North Korea (have-not) and China (have) 1950-53: China (have) in North Korea (have-not) and South Korea (have-not) against US (have) 1954-63: France (have) in Indochina (have-not) 1965: India (have-not) in Pakistan (have-not) over Kashmir (have-not) 1967: Soviet Union (have) in Hungary (have-not) 1968: Soviet Union (have) in Czechoslovakia (have-not) 1971: India (have-not) in Pakistan (have-not), creating Bangladesh (have-not) 1964-75: US (have) in Vietnam (have-not) 1979-89: Soviet Union (have) in Afghanistan (have-not) 1982: UK (have) in Falklands (have-not) against Argentina (have-not) 1983: US (have) in Grenada (have-not) 1989: US (have) in Panama (have-not) 1991: US (have) in Iraq (have-not) (Operation Desert Storm) 1995: US (have) and NATO (have) in bombing campaign in Bosnia and Kosovo (have-nots) 2001-present: US (have) in Iraq (have-not) (Operation Iraqi Freedom) 2001-present: US (have) in Afghanistan (have-not) 2008: Russia (have) in Georgia (have-not) [Other colonial actions, which involved haves against colonized have-nots, are not listed. Nor are civil wars and conflicts in Africa, all of whose nations are nuclear have-nots.] **The only exception** known to me **is Pakistan’s brief invasion of India** (in 1999, over Kashmir, as usual). That invasion occurred when both nations had nuclear weapons. But India’s strong conventional response and enormous international pressure stopped it. Other possible but unproven exceptions involved foreign invasions of Israel in 1967 and 1973, when Israel may have had nuclear weapons but, if it did, didn’t reveal or use them. The conclusion that follows from this list in inescapable. Since the development of nuclear weapons, major powers possessing them (except for India and Pakistan) were too prudent or too civilized to make war among themselves. **The unbroken record of military carnage that had preoccupied and devastated Eurasia and most of the “civilized” world for the previous two centuries stopped in its tracks**. But **the record of carnage continued in smaller countries lacking nuclear weapons**, either because they fought among themselves, or (more often) because they were invaded or fought over by nuclear powers. Looking at these data, **an unbiased observer has to conclude that nuclear weapons, with their unthinkable potential consequences, don’t cause wars.** They prevent them**.** The destructive power of nuclear weapons is war’s reductio ad absurdum. It demonstrates graphically how pointless, senseless and useless war is. That is a lesson that Europe and the rest of the world should have learned (but didn’t) from World War I, a serious attempt at mutual genocide that accomplished absolutely nothing. Better late than never.

#### Even “rogue states” won’t cause conflict with nukes

Dratler 10 (Jay, Goodyear Professor of Intellectual Property, Emeritus Ph.D. degrees in physics from the University of California (San Diego), and a J.D. degree from Harvard Law School, where he was articles editor of the Harvard Law Review. “The Case for Nuclear Proliferation” <http://jaydiatribe.blogspot.com/2010/04/case-for-nuclear-proliferation.html>)

Rogue Regimes After terrorists and crazies, **rogue regimes are the next strongest argument against nuclear proliferation**. **What would happen, conventional wisdom screams, if a terrible tyrant got nuclear weapons**? Conventional wisdom acts as if this question highlights a mere hypothetical future peril. But it doesn’t. Terrible tyrants have had and have nuclear weapons, and nothing extraordinary has happened. With the possible exception of Hitler, **Stalin was the worst** tyrant in human history. He was certainly the most paranoid. Yet he had nuclear weapons for four years before he died. **He didn’t use them**. Nor did his Soviet successors. **North Korea’s Kim Jong Il is every bit as paranoid as Stalin and far more prone to making idle external threats. Yet he has done nothing rash** and is unlikely to do so. Why? Because he knows that a single 50-megaton thermonuclear bomb could erase Pyongyang and his regime forever, even if he and a few select leaders managed to survive in some deep bunker. He also knows that his four-million-strong starving army is no proof against the atom’s awesome power. So Kim waits and occasionally blusters. Waits for what? If he or his minions have any semblance of wisdom, they will exploit the reduction in paranoia that their small nuclear arsenal permits and begin improving their civilian economy. If and as that happens, the long-suffering North Korean people will begin a gradual and painful climb toward a better life. It may take decades. It may take a century. But eventually **cooler and wiser heads will prevail amidst the stalemate of multilateral nuclear deterrence. Conventional wisdom acts as if there were some easy external “solution” to localized tyrannies,** if only they didn’t have nuclear weapons. But **history reveals that view as nonsense**. The Castro brothers, Kim, and Mugabe have been around for decades. They are all likely to die peacefully, of old age. No external force seriously challenged them during their (and Kim’s father’s) long reigns. No external force seriously challenges them now although only Kim has an arguable nuclear deterrent. What would change if each of them had a small nuclear arsenal? Their countries are small enough to be easy subjects for others’ nuclear deterrence. **A few missiles could literally annihilate their entire nations. The only real difference a small nuclear arsenal might make would be giving the lie to the paranoid fear of foreign invasion that they use to keep their own people’s aspirations in check**. The proof of the pudding is Iraq. Part of our justification for invading was removing the tyrant Saddam. That wasn’t the main reason; Israel and oil were. But never mind. It was a reason with which every supporter of the war—left or right—(including me, before the blunders started) could agree. Soon we will have spent well over a trillion dollars in direct and indirect costs. We will have suffered over 4,000 dead and 30,000 wounded to remove a tyrant who we thought had weapons of mass destruction but didn’t. That expense and the enormous economic drain of two wars are among the principal reasons for our national decline. With our sad example in mind, the rest of the world is unlikely to challenge local tyrants by conventional invasion for a century, if ever. Certainly the world’s most rapidly rising power (China) will not. And we have found it like pulling teeth to get our NATO allies to contribute to the supposedly agreeable mission of fighting the tyrannical Taliban in Afghanistan. So the notion that rogue regimes would be more susceptible to external “regime change” without than with nuclear weapons is sheer fantasy. **The notion that local tyrants would commit personal and national suicide by starting a nuclear war is equally absurd.** The Castro brothers, Kim Jong Il, and Robert Mugabe will die peaceably of old age, and their successors will change their policies. **Or their smarter underlings or people will remove them. It is impossible to foresee, let alone predict, that their possession of nuclear weapons would make any difference at all**. The only difference it might make is assuaging their paranoia enough to let them spend less on tools of war and more on their people, if only to improve the chances of their regimes’ survival against mutiny or popular revolt.

#### No miscalculation – cost/benefit analysis

Waltz 95—Kenneth, pol sci prof at Berkeley (“The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate”, p. 45, direct access to original source was not available, ZBurdette)

Third, nuclear weaponry makes miscalculation diffi­cult because it is hard not to be aware of how much damage a small number of warheads can do. Early in this century Norman Angeil argued that war could not occur because it would not pay. But conventional wars have brought political gains to some countries at the ex­pense of others. Among nuclear countries, possible losses in war overwhelm possible gains. In the nuclear age Angell’s dictum becomes persuasive. When the ac­tive use of force threatens to bring great losses, war becomes less likely. This proposition is widely accepted but insufficiently emphasized. Nuclear weapons reduced the chances of war between the United States and the Soviet Union and between the Soviet Union and China. One must expect them to have similar effects elsewhere. Where nuclear weapons threaten to make the cost of wars immense, who will dare to start them?

### Terror

#### TERROR- No risk – in fact its zero risk

Mueller 2009

John, Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies, Mershon Center, Professor of Political Science 30 April 2009 “THE ATOMIC TERRORIST?” http://www.icnnd.org/research/Mueller\_Terrorism.pdf

In an article on the prospects for atomic terrorism, Bill Keller of The New York Times suggests that “the best reason for thinking it won’t happen is that it hasn’t happened yet,” and that, he worries, “is terrible logic.”33 However, “logic” aside, there is another quite good reason for thinking it won’t happen: the task is incredibly difficult. I have arrayed a lengthy set of obstacles confronting the would-be atomic terrorist. Those who warn about the likelihood of a terrorist bomb contend that a terrorist group could, if often with great difficulty, surmount each obstacle—that doing so in each case is “not impossible.”34 But it is vital to point out that, while it may be “not impossible” to surmount each individual step, the likelihood that a group could surmount a series of them quickly becomes vanishingly small. Even the very alarmed Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier contend that the atomic terrorists’ task “would clearly be among the most difficult types of attack to carry out” or “one of the most difficult missions a terrorist group could hope to try.” But, stresses the CIA’s George Tenet, a terrorist atomic bomb is “possible” or “not beyond the realm of possibility.”35 Accordingly, it might be useful to take a stab at estimating just how “difficult” the atomic terrorists’ task, in aggregate, is—that is, how far from the fringe of the “realm of possibility” it might be. Most discussions of atomic terrorism deal in a rather piecemeal fashion with the subject--focusing separately on individual tasks such as procuring HEU or assembling a device or transporting it. However, as the Gilmore Commission, a special advisory panel to the President and Congress, stresses, setting off a nuclear device capable of producing mass destruction presents not only “Herculean challenges,” but it requires that a whole series of steps be accomplished: obtaining enough fissile material, designing a weapon “that will bring that mass together in a tiny fraction of a second,” and figuring out some way to deliver the thing. And it emphasizes that these merely constitute “the minimum requirements.” If each is not fully met, the result is not simply a less powerful weapon, but one that can’t produce any significant nuclear yield at all or can’t be delivered.36 Following this perspective, an approach that seems appropriate is to catalogue the barriers that must be overcome by a terrorist group in order to carry out the task of producing, transporting, and then successfully detonating an improvised nuclear device. Table 1 attempts to do this, and it arrays some 20 of these—all of which must be surmounted by the atomic aspirant. Actually, it would be quite possible to come up with a longer list: in the interests of keeping the catalogue of hurdles down to a reasonable number, some of the entries are actually collections of tasks and could be divided into two or three or more. For example, number 5 on the list requires that heisted highly-enriched uranium be neither a scam nor part of a sting nor of inadequate quality due to insider incompetence; but this hurdle could as readily be rendered as three separate ones. In contemplating the task before them, would-be atomic terrorists effectively must go though a exercise that looks much like this. If and when they do so, they are likely to find their prospects daunting and accordingly uninspiring or even terminally dispiriting. Assigning and calculating probabilities The discussion thus far has followed a qualitative approach: synthesizing a considerable amount of material to lay out the route a terrorist group must take to acquire and detonate an atomic bomb in the most likely scenario. It seems to me that this exercise by itself suggests the almost breathtaking enormity of the difficulties facing the would-be atomic terrorist. This conclusion can be reinforced by a quantitative assessment. Assigning a probability that terrorists will be able to overcome each barrier is, of course, a tricky business, and any such exercise should be regarded as rather tentative and exploratory, or perhaps simply as illustrative—though it is done all the time in cost/benefit analysis. One might begin a quantitative approach by adopting probability estimates that purposely, and heavily, bias the case in the terrorists’ favor. In my view, this would take place if it is assumed that the terrorists have a fighting chance of 50 percent of overcoming each of the 20 obstacles displayed in Table 1, though for many barriers, probably almost all, the odds against them are surely much worse than that. Even with that generous bias, the chances that a concerted effort would be successful comes out to be less than one in a million, specifically 1,048,576. If one assumes, somewhat more realistically, that their chances at each barrier are one in three, the cumulative odds they will be able to pull off the deed drop to one in well over three billion—specifically 3,486,784,401. What they would be at the (still entirely realistic) level of one in ten boggles the mind. Moreover, all this focuses on the effort to deliver a single bomb. If the requirement were to deliver several, the odds become, of course, even more prohibitive.

#### 2. Terrorists would use nuclear weapons for coercion rather than military detonation.

Schelling 2011

Thomas C., Nobel Laureate in Economics, Whatever happened to nuclear terrorism, Chicago Project on Security & Terrorism, http://cpost.uchicago.edu/blog/2011/09/06/thomas-c-schelling-whatever-happened-to-nuclear-terrorism/

If a team is assembled that, in isolation, spends months making a workable bomb, or a few bombs, what will they spend their evening hours talking about? They are all concentrated on a nuclear weapon. Won’t they continually converse about what the thing is good for, what should properly be done with it, how it might be used to advance some important objective, and whether they might have any influence on its use? They will almost certainly have spent more hundreds of hours trying to think strategically about the possible uses of a few nuclear weapons than any head of government, or even senior government adviser has devoted to the question. It’s possible—I think likely—that they may be listened to. And what “strategy” might they propose? I propose that they will conclude that exploding a weapon over Los Angeles or Vladivostok or Bremen will “waste” the weapon. They will think, “we are a nuclear power. There are the USA, Russia, France, Britain, China, Israel, India, Pakistan, North Korea, Maybe Iran, and now US. We have status, power, influence. Let’s use it!”

#### 3. **No retaliation**

Crowley 10 (Michael Senior Editor the New Republic, January, “Obama and Nuclear Deterrence”, <http://www.tnr.com/node/72263>]

The Los Angeles Times ran an [important story](http://www.latimes.com/news/nation-and-world/la-na-obama-nuclear4-2010jan04,0,2198537,full.story) yesterday about the Obama administration's Nuclear Posture Review, which evaluates U.S. policy towards the use of nuclear weapons. Apparently there's a debate inside the administration--one that is splitting the civilians from the generals--not just about the size of our nuclear stockpile but also how we conceive of possible first-strike and retaliatory policies. **A core issue under debate**, officials said, **is whether the U**nited **S**tates **should shed its long-standing ambiguity about whether it would use nuclear weapons in certain circumstances**, in hopes that greater specificity would give foreign governments more confidence to make their own decisions on nuclear arms. Some in the U.S. argue that the administration should assure foreign governments that it won't use nuclear weapons in reaction to a biological, chemical or conventional attack, but only in a nuclear exchange. Others argue that the United States should promise that it would never use nuclear weapons first, but only in response to a nuclear attack. As the story notes, some **experts don't place much weight on how our publicly-stated doctrine emerges because they don't expect foreign nations to take it literally**. And **the reality is that any decisions about using nukes will certainly be case-by-case**. But I'd still like to see some wider discussion of the underlying questions, which are among the most consequential that policymakers can consider. **The questions are particularly vexing when it comes to terrorist groups and rogue states. Would we**, for instance, **actually nuke Pyongyang if it sold a weapon to terrorists who used it in America? That implied threat seems to exist, but I actually doubt that** a President **Obama--**or any president, for that matter--**would go through with it.**

#### 4. No extinction

Frost 5(Robin, teaches political science at Simon Fraser University, British Colombia, “Nuclear Terrorism after 9/11,” Adelphi Papers, December)

An existential threat. **When applied to nuclear terrorism, the phrase ‘existential threat’ implies that a state such as the United States could be destroyed by terrorists wielding nuclear weapons. Yet to destroy the United States or any other large industrial state**, in the sense of inflicting such damage to its government, economy, population and infrastructure that it could no longer function as a coherent political and economic entity, **would require a large number of well-placed nuclear weapons with yields in the tens or hundreds of kilotons. It is unlikely that terrorists could successfully obtain, emplace and detonate a single nuclear weapon, while no plausible radiological device or devices could do any significant damage on a national level.**

### **Russia**

COOP---Geopolitics prevents total break of ties

Eugene B. Rumer, senior fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, and Celeste A. Wallander, director of the Russia and Eurasia Program and the Trustee Fellow at CSIS, Winter 2003, The Washington Quarterly

Given Russia's geopolitical predicament, it is difficult to imagine how a rational, even selfish, assessment of Russian interests would lead Russia toconcludethat it would be best served by undermining the United States. The fallout from a weaker and diminished U.S. role in global security affairs would carry with it a number of serious challenges to Russian security interests, ranging from a strong Russian stake in partnership with the United States on geopolitically balancing China to the immediate threat to Russian security in the event of U.S. abandonment of **its** security assistance to Central Asia to the prospect of Iran armed with nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles with Moscow well within range. Thus, although Russia apparently has a strong interest in making clear to the United States that it is not to be taken for granted and that its interests and sensitivities are not to be brushed aside, Russia has no compelling rational interest in undermining or geopolitically balancing the United States' international position.

#### war wont escalate

Colonel General Leonid Ivashov, President of the Academy of Geopolitical Problems. July 2007 “Will America fight Russia,” Defense and Security, No 78. ln

Ivashov: Numerous scenarios and options are possible. Everything may begin as a local conflict that will rapidly deteriorate into a total confrontation. An ultimatum will be sent to Russia: say, change the domestic policy because human rights are allegedly encroached on, or give Western businesses access to oil and gas fields. Russia will refuse and its objects (radars, air defense components, command posts, infrastructure) will be wiped out by guided missiles with conventional warheads and by aviation. Once this phase is over, an even stiffer ultimatum will be presented - demanding something up to the deployment of NATO "peacekeepers" on the territory of Russia. Refusal to bow to the demands will be met with a mass aviation and missile strike at Army and Navy assets, infrastructure, and objects of defense industry. NATO armies will invade Belarus and western Russia. Two turns of events may follow that. Moscow may accept the ultimatum through the use of some device that will help it save face. The acceptance will be followed by talks over the estrangement of the Kaliningrad enclave, parts of the Caucasus and Caspian region, international control over the Russian gas and oil complex, and NATO control over Russian nuclear forces. The second scenario involves a warning from the Kremlin to the United States that continuation of the aggression will trigger retaliation with the use of all weapons in nuclear arsenals. It will stop the war and put negotiations into motion.

#### ---Despite high alert status there is zero chance of u.s. or russian accidental launch – most qualed evidence

Ryabikhin, Koltunov and Misanikov, 2009 (Dr. Lenoid, Executive Secretary of the Committee of Scientist for Global Security and Arms Control, Viktor, Ret. General and Deputy Director of the Institute for Strategic Stability of Rosatom, Dr. Eugene, Senior Research Scientist at the Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies, “De-altering: Decreasing the Operational Readiness of Strategic Nuclear Forces, Discussion Paper presented at the Seminar on Reframing De-Alert: Decreasing the Operational Readiness of Nuclear Weapons Systems in the U.S.-Russia Contextm, June, http://www.ewi.info/system/files/RyabikhinKoltunovMiasnikov.pdf)

Most of the experts define de-alerting as implementing some reversible physical changes in a weapon system that would significantly increase time between the decision to use the weapon and the actual moment of its launch. The proponents of this concept consider it as one of the ways to maintain strategic stability. They provide the following arguments in support of this concept. 􀂃 Radical changes have occurred in US-Russian relations. Russia and the United States are building strategic partnership relationship. In such situation the high alert readiness of strategic offensive forces targeted at each other does not correspond to the character of our relations. 􀂃 Strategic nuclear forces high alert readiness in combination with a concept of launch-on-warning strike increases the risk of “accidental” nuclear war (as a result of mistakes in the C3I system, inadequate situation analysis, mistaken decision-making, unauthorized action of personnel or even terrorists, provocation from the “third” states or non-state actors, etc.); 􀂃 False signals about missile attacks obtained from early warning system that may trigger an accidental launch. This assumption was very popular when the Russian early warning system was weakened as a result of collapse of the Soviet Union. Analysis of the above arguments shows, that they do not have solid grounds. Today Russian and U.S. ICBMs are not targeted at any state. High alert status of the Russian and U.S. strategic nuclear forces has not been an obstacle for building a strategic partnership. The issue of the possibility of an “accidental” nuclear war itself is hypothetical. Both states have developed and implemented constructive organizational and technical measures that practically exclude launches resulting from unauthorized action of personnel or terrorists. Nuclear weapons are maintained under very strict system of control that excludes any accidental or unauthorized use and guarantees that these weapons can only be used provided that there is an appropriate authorization by the national leadership. Besides that it should be mentioned that even the Soviet Union and the United States had taken important bilateral steps toward decreasing the risk of accidental nuclear conflict**.** Direct emergency telephone “red line” has been established between the White House and the Kremlin in 1963. In 1971 the USSR and USA signed the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Nuclear War Threat. This Agreement established the actions of each side in case of even a hypothetical accidental missile launch and it contains the requirements for the owner of the launched missile to deactivate and eliminate the missile. Both the Soviet Union and the United States have developed proper measures to observe the agreed requirements.

#### the war wouldn’t lead to extinction

James J. Wirtz et al, Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, Winter 2006-2007, “The Short Shadow of U.S. Primacy?”, International Security

Because policymakers can never ignore even the remotest possibility of retaliation, U.S. officials would have to possess nerves of steel or brains of lead to undertake an attack on Russia based on the assumptions that guide Lieber and Press's analysis. An assessment of first-strike prospects should not rest on the idea that U.S. strategy and weapons will work perfectly and that the opponent will not receive or execute orders to retaliate. The hypothetical attack described by Lieber and Press is too serious a matter to be based on these kinds of assumptions. For instance, in an analysis of a "limited" U.S. nuclear strike against Soviet strategic forces involving 1,740 aimpoints and 4,108 attacking nuclear warheads, Barbara Levi, Frank von Hippel, and William Daugherty estimated that 25 million to 54 million Soviets might be killed or injured by the immediate effects of such an attack. n8 Lieber and Press's scenario involves only 799 targets and 2,890 nuclear weapons (p. 20), so the Russian casualties suffered in the attack would probably be near the low end of this earlier casualty estimate, or about the same number of casualties suffered by the Soviet Union in World War II. And if one reintroduces the prospect of retaliation into the scenario, one discovers something more than the nuclear taboo to restrain the United States. Daugherty, Levi, and von Hippel estimated that if the Soviets retaliated using 100 one-megaton nuclear warheads against U.S. urban areas in a way optimized to inflict the greatest number of casualties, they could promptly cause somewhere between 25 million and 66 million deaths, a high price to pay to reduce casualties from a potential Russian nuclear attack. n9 If the Russians were deterred from launching a concerted countervalue attack with their remaining forces, they might instead launch a series of attacks against the conventional military facilities of the United States and its allies to blunt a possible U.S. effort to exploit its moment of nuclear primacy. Even if the scenario described by Lieber and Press unfolds as advertised, the Russians could still deliver hundreds of tactical nuclear weapons against military bases, weapons storage facilities, command and control centers, ports, and critical transportation hubs using conventional (tactical aircraft operating on one-way missions if necessary) and unconventional methods of delivery. Given the high population densities and proximity of urban areas to military facilities in Japan and Europe, millions in countries the United States considers allies could die in this nuclear exchange.

#### **Warming won’t destroy the world---their models are empirically false**

Fuller 10 (Thomas, SF Environmental Policy Examiner, Mar 3, <http://www.climatechangefraud.com/climate-reports/6518-global-warming-is-real-but-effects-have-been-exaggerated-and-we-dont-know-the-future>)

Temperatures have risen 0.7 degrees Celsius over the past century, which is about twice the rate of the previous century. Even if Anthony Watts and Steve McIntyre are absolutely correct about urban heat island effects and paleoclimatic temperature reconstructions, the earth has warmed--and both Watts and McIntyre have said so on their websites repeatedly. This is not really part of the controversy at all. Nor is the reality of the greenhouse effect. Nor is the capability of CO2 contributing to the greenhouse effect. Nor is the reality of human contributions of large amounts of CO2. Almost all skeptics agree with the scientific consensus about this. (It is very convenient for the climate establishment to say they 'deny' this, but the skeptics mostly don't.) What many (not just skeptics) disagree on is the observed effects to date and the future effects as estimated. The Effects Have Been Exaggerated The current warming began around 1880 (give or take a decade) upon the conclusion of the Little Ice Age. The warming has not been even or steady--it accelerates and decelerates for reasons we don't really understand. Those who cry for political action to combat global warming have described some effects of it that they claim have already occurred. In almost every case, their claims have proven to be exaggerated. The 'poster children' for global warming have been polar bears, Himalayan glaciers, African agriculture, increased damage and destruction due to hurricanes and floods, Amazonian rainforests and Arctic ice. Polar bears face an uncertain future. Climate change is just one of many factors that are changing for them. Other factors include human encroachment on their habitat, the response of other wildlife to changes, and most importantly, hunting. Some of the sub-populations of polar bears are decreasing. Some are increasing and some are staying the same. The single most important contribution we could make to helping the population of polar bears increase is to stop shooting them. If we were serious about preserving large numbers of polar bears, we would limit the expansion of human activities throughout their habitat, which would make polar bears less of a threat to people and remove one of the reasons for our killing them. Polar bears have lived through periods of higher temperatures than now, including periods of zero Arctic ice cover. They can swim 200 miles without resting, and Arctic ice loss in and of itself is not a threat to polar bears. Arctic ice comes and goes. We're not sure exactly why, and we're not sure exactly of the cycles that govern its increase and decrease. The most recent decrease was dramatic, but only because it was the first decrease we were able to photograph from satellites. We now know that much of the reason for the 2007 low point of ice cover was that winds and currents pushed Arctic ice out of the Arctic to warmer parts of the Atlantic, where it then melted normally. It has since recovered dramatically. Himalayan glaciers increase and decrease, and always have, just like glaciers all over the world. Claims in the IPCC report that they will disappear by 2035 are flat out wrong. The error was caused because for years the area of Himalayan glaciers were measured in November, when snow cover made them look bigger. When the time of measurement was switched to September, they amazingly looked smaller. Although Indian scientists understood this, the journalists whose comments were hijacked for the IPCC report did not. The Amazonian rain forest can be compared to polar bears. The biggest threat it faces is encroachment of humans on its territory. The Amazon is being torn down for firewood, hardwood furniture and living space. It is being burned for slash and burn agriculture--some of that to grow biofuels to combat global warming. Like all forests, it is vulnerable to drought--being rainforest, it is more vulnerable than some other forests. If global warming produces drought in the Amazon, it will have an impact. However, the computer models that project scenarios of global warming cannot produce sufficient detail to say whether global warming will bring drought to the Amazon. The most that models can say is that overall precipitation worldwide should increase by 5%. Hurricanes and floods cause damage. Loss of life due to them has been reduced by between 95% and 99%, due to better weather predictions, but damage has increased. But none of the increase is attributable to climate change. Rather, a host of papers have shown that all of the increased damages due to hurricanes and floods is easily explained by richer people building more expensive property in areas vulnerable to storms and floods. African agriculture is, like agriculture anywhere, vulnerable to drought--just like the Amazon rainforest. However, a single report examining the possible effects of drought on cereal production on irrigated farms in 3 African countries was taken by the IPCC and reported as the probable future for all agricultural production throughout all the continent. The report was incorrect. African agricultural production is increasing and is expected to increase in the future. The Future Is Not Likely To Be As Desperate As We Are Told The rate of temperature rise has slowed, from about 2 degrees C per century (1975-19998) to about 1.2 degrees C per century (1995-2009). However, the recent slowdown is over too short a period to be statistically significant. Nonetheless, this is quite different from projections of accelerating temperature rises. This is what Phil Jones, director at CRU and a staunch advocate of the global warming establishment, said in an interview last week. Flaws in recent scientific studies have been found which make it distinctly possible that the temperature rises we have experienced are not unique--not even unusual. Keith Briffa, a member of the CRU team and a staunch advocate of the global warming establishment, said that he thought temperatures had been warmer than today 1,000 years ago in an email that was part of the Climategate release of emails and documents. Arctic ice has recovered about 25% of the ice it lost in 2007. Hurricanes are predicted to be less frequent in future--although it is possible that some will be stronger. The Amazon and polar bears both need our help and attention--but the current threats to them are from sources other than climate change, and we can easily make both strong enough to resist climate change if we change our current bad habits of shooting polar bears and burning down forests. Global warming is predicted to provide net benefits to many parts of the world, especially in the first few decades of this century**.** Generally speaking, cold kills more people than heat (although this is not a straightforward issue), CO2 is often good for many crops (but not all, and it's good for weeds as well), and the natural progress of economic development will strengthen the communities of people who are currently very poor enough that, like the Amazon and the polar bear, they will be better able to resist the effects of climate change after 2050. A generation of politicians supported by a cadre of scientists have consistently exaggerated the extent of the effects of past and projected climate change due to human contributions of CO2. This has distorted the debate, caused enormous expenditures of taxpayers' money on green projects that will have little or no effect on global warming and led to scientific misbehaviour that threatens public confidence in the best way we have for understanding the world around us. The scientists and politicians who have performed this disservice need to be held accountable for this. It has badly distracted us from doing the right things at the right times to take better care of each other and the planet we live on.

#### Even if it did, no extinction

Green 11 (Roedy, PHD from British Colombia, “Extinction of Man”, http://mindprod.com/environment/extinction.html//umich-mp)

Mankind is embarking on a strange ecological experiment. Over a couple of centuries, man is burning the carbon accumulated over millions of years by plants. The CO₂ levels are now at the level of the Permian extinction. There have been two mass extinctions in earth history, the Permian, 230 million years ago, was the worst. 70% of all species were lost. It was caused by natural global warming when volcanoes released greenhouse gases. (The other extinction event more familiar to most people was the more recent KT Cretaceous-Tertiary Mass Extinction event, 65 million years ago. It was caused when an asteroid plunged into the earth at Chicxulub Mexico wiping out the dinosaurs and half of earth’s species.) We are re-experiencing the same global warming conditions that triggered the more devastating Permian extinction, only this time it is man made. When it gets too hot, plants die. When it gets too hot and dry, massive fires ravage huge areas. When plants die, insects and herbivores die. When insects die, even heat-resistant plant’s don’t get pollinated and die. Birds die without insects to eat. Carnivores die without herbivores to eat, all triggered by what seems so innocuous — heat. Similarly, in the oceans, when they get just a few degrees too warm, corals expel their symbiotic algae and die soon thereafter. When coral reefs die, the fish that live on them die, triggering extinction chains. Satellites can chart the loss of vegetation over the planet. We are losing 4 species per hour, a rate on the same scale as the Permian and KT extinction events. Man has no ability to live without the support of other species. We are committing suicide and killing the family of life on earth along with us. The question is, will we wipe ourselves out along with the rest of the planet’s ecology? Man (sic) is very adaptable. He (sic) will destroy his food supply on land and in the oceans as a result, but some people will survive. That is not complete extinction.

#### Icecore extractions prove warming is fake

Idso 11 (Craig D. Idso, Ph.D. (cidso@co2science.org), is lead author of Climate Change Reconsidered, published by the Nongovernmental International Panel on Climate Change (NIPCC). An earlier version of this article appeared on the NIPCC Web site. Subscriptions to the NIPCC email distribution list are free of charge and can be ordered at <http://www.nipccreport.org/about/emailsignupform.html>. “ Arctic Study Finds No Recent Warming” <http://www.heartland.org/full/29549/Arctic_Study_Finds_No_Recent_Warming.html>)

Climate alarmists contend the earth's near-surface air temperatures of the past decade were unprecedentedly high relative to the warmth of the entire past millennium, due primarily to human carbon dioxide emissions. They also claim this warming has been most strongly expressed throughout the Arctic, which they often describe as the planet's "canary in a coal mine," for the planet as a whole. Working with an ice core that retrieved from the Akademii Nauk (AN) ice cap (~80°31'N, 94°49'E) of the Severnaya Zemlya archipelago (which is located in the central Russian Arctic between the Kara and Laptev Seas), scientists used oxygen isotopes to reconstruct temperatures covering the period 1883-1998. After confirming “good correlations and similarities” between their oxygen isotope data and 15 temperature stations distributed throughout the Atlantic and Eurasian sub-Arctic, the scientists reported the oxygen isotope data “show pronounced 20th-century temperature changes, with a strong rise about 1920 and the absolute temperature maximum in the 1930s," the scientists reported. Accordingly, **the data show there was no net warming of the Atlantic and Eurasian sub-Arctic over the entire last 80 years of the 20th century**. The findings, published in the peer-reviewed *Journal of Glaciology*, cast doubt on alarmist assertions of alarming recent global temperature rise given the Arctic is expected to be the first place on the planet to exhibit anthropogenic-induced global warming, and is expected to exhibit that warming more strongly than other regions of the globe.

#### Warming is cyclical – explains climate better than IPCC models.

Bell 2012

Larry, Professor of Architecture @ University of Houston, author of Climate of Corruption: Politics and Power behind the Global Warming Hoax, Global Warming Or Natural, Predictable Climate Change?, Forbes, January 2012, http://thegwpf.org/the-climate-record/4737-global-warming-or-natural-predictable-climate-change.html

An extensively peer-reviewed study published last December in the Journal of Atmospheric and Solar-Terrestrial Physics indicates that observed climate changes since 1850 are linked to cyclical, predictable, naturally occurring events in Earth’s solar system with little or no help from us. The research was conducted by Nicola Scafetta, a scientist at Duke University and at the Active Cavity Radiometer Solar Irradiance Monitor Lab (ACRIM), which is associated with the NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory in California. It takes issue with methodologies applied by the U.N.’s Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change (IPCC) using “general circulation climate models” (GCMs) that, by ignoring these important influences, are found to fail to reproduce the observed decadal and multi-decadal climatic cycles. As noted in the paper, the IPCC models also fail to incorporate climate modulating effects of solar changes such as cloud-forming influences of cosmic rays throughout periods of reduced sunspot activity. More clouds tend to make conditions cooler, while fewer often cause warming. At least 50-70% of observed 20th century warming might be associated with increased solar activity witnessed since the “Maunder Minimum” of the last 17th century. Dr. Scafetta’s study applies an astronomically-based model that reconstructs and correlates known warming and cooling phases with decadal and multi-decadal cycles associated with influences of planetary motions, most particularly those of Jupiter and Saturn. This “astronomical harmonics model” was used to address various cycles lasting 9.1, 10-10.5, 20-21, and 60-62 year-long periods. The 9.1-year cycle was shown to be likely related to decadal solar/lunar tidal oscillations, while those of ten years and longer duration relate to planetary movements about the Sun that may have solar influences that modulate electromagnetic properties of Earth’s upper atmosphere which can regulate the cloud system. Scafetta’s findings contradict IPCC claims that all warming observed from 1970 to 2000 has been man-made (“anthropogenically-induced”) based upon models that exclude natural quasi 20-year and 60-year climate cycle contributions. These cycles have been clearly detected in all global surface temperature records of both hemispheres since 1850, and are also evident in numerous astronomical records. The 60-year cycle is particularly easy to observe in significant surface temperature maxima that occurred in 1880-1881, 1940-1941, and 2000-2001. These momentarily warmer periods coincided with times when orbital positions of Jupiter and Saturn were relatively close to the Sun and Earth. A 60-year modulation cycle also corresponds with warming/cooling induced in the ocean surface which appears to correlate with the frequency of major Atlantic hurricanes, and is seen in the sea level rise since 1700 as well as in numerous ocean and terrestrial records dating back centuries. Further evidence of a 60-year cycle is referenced in ancient Sanskrit texts among observed monsoon rainfall cycles. Scafetta believes that a natural 60-year climate cycle associated with astronomical cycles may also explain calendars adopted in traditional Chinese, Tamil and Tibetan civilizations, since all major ancient civilizations knew about 20-year and 60-year Jupiter and Saturn cycles. Indeed, Scafetta pointed out to me that in the Hindu tradition, the 60-year cycle is known as the cycle of Brihaspati, the name of Jupiter, and that every 60 years special ceremonies are celebrated by some populations, such as the Sigui ceremony among the Dogon people of Africa. Proper reconstructions of natural 20-year and 60-year cycles, along with other independent studies, indicate that the IPCC has seriously overestimated human climate contributions. For example, according to all GCM simulations, increased CO2 concentrations should have produced an increased tropical warming trend with altitude, which is contrary to what balloon and satellites observations actually show. GCM interpretations also allege that volcano activity may have contributed an offsetting 0.1-0.2 degrees of cooling influence between from 1970 to 2000. However, that conclusion appears to significantly overestimate the volcano signal because the models predicted deep and large cooling spikes associated with eruptions which are observed to be much smaller in global surface temperature records. Accordingly, this too suggests that the 1970-2000 warming effect attributed to anthropogenic influences should be reduced. Moreover, some of the observed 0.5 degrees of warming recorded by surface stations during the 1970-2000 period which IPCC models associated with human greenhouse gases emissions, may be explained by improperly corrected urban “heat island” effects and other land use change influences. Finally, three major available global surface temperature record sources report a steady-to-cooling trend since 2001. These measurements contradict the strong warming predicted by all IPCC models during the same period that are attributed primarily to a continuing increase in CO2 emissions. Indeed, only one global surface record source shows a slight increase in the temperature since 2001. This occurred because missing temperature data needed to be adjusted or filled in to complete the records…which appears to be the case with NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies model data resulting from poor sampling during the last decade for Antarctic and Arctic regions and the use of a 1200 km smoothing methodology. The Duke University/NASA JPL study estimates that as much as 0.3 degrees of warming from 1970 to 2000 may have been naturally induced by the 60-year modulation during the warming phase, amounting to at least 43-60% of the 0.5-0.7 degrees allegedly caused by human greenhouse emissions. Additional natural warming can be explained by increased solar activity during the last four centuries, as well as simply being part of a natural and persistent warming recovery since the end of the Little Ice Age of AD 1300-1900. Nicola Scaletta concludes that the scientific method requires that a physical model fulfill two conditions…it must be able to reconstruct as well as predict (or forecast) direct physical observations. Here, he argues that all climate models used by the IPCC can do neither. “They seriously fail to properly reconstruct even the large multi-decadal oscillations found in the global surface temperature which have climatic meaning. Consequently, the IPCC projections for the 21st century cannot be trusted.” In fact, he argues that “By not properly reconstructing the 20-year and 60-year natural cycles we found that the IPCC GCMs have seriously overestimated also the magnitude of the anthropogenic contribution to recent warming.” Unlike the current IPCC models, the astronomical harmonics model can have real climate forecasting value. By combining current trend information with natural cycle patterns Scafetta believes that the global temperature “may not significantly increase during the next 30 years mostly because of the negative phase of the 60-year cycle.” He goes on to say: “If multi-secular natural cycles (which according to some authors have significantly contributed to the observed 1700-2010 warming and may contribute to an additional natural cooling by 2100) are ignored, the same projected anthropogenic emissions would imply a global warming by about 0.3-1.2 degrees C by 2100, contrary to the IPCC 1.0-3.6 degree C projected warming.” Scafetta projects that the global climate may remain approximately steady until 2030-2040 (as was observed from the 1940s to the 1970s) because the 60-year cycle entered into its current cooling phase around 2000-2003. The climate may further cool if additional natural long and short-term cycles also enter into cooling phases. In fact the present warm period may well be at the top of a natural millennial cycle as previously occurred during Roman and Medieval times.

#### ---No risk of nuclear war with Russia.

Graham 2007

Thomas, senior advisor on Russia in the US National Security Council staff 2002-2007, September 2007, Russia in Global Affairs “The Dialectics of Strength and Weakness”

An astute historian of Russia, Martin Malia, wrote several years ago that “Russia has at different times been demonized or divinized by Western opinion less because of her real role in Europe than because of the fears and frustrations, or hopes and aspirations, generated within European society by its own domestic problems.” Such is the case today. To be sure, mounting Western concerns about Russia are a consequence of Russian policies that appear to undermine Western interests, but they are also a reflection of declining confidence in our own abilities and the efficacy of our own policies. Ironically, this growing fear and distrust of Russia come at a time when Russia is arguably less threatening to the West, and the United States in particular, than it has been at any time since the end of the Second World War. Russia does not champion a totalitarian ideology intent on our destruction, its military poses no threat to sweep across Europe, its economic growth depends on constructive commercial relations with Europe, and its strategic arsenal – while still capable of annihilating the United States – is under more reliable control than it has been in the past fifteen years and the threat of a strategic strike approaches zero probability. Political gridlock in key Western countries, however, precludes the creativity, risk-taking, and subtlety needed to advance our interests on issues over which we are at odds with Russia while laying the basis for more constructive long-term relations with Russia. 7. To rebuild relations, we need to focus on common interests, but we can’t ignore values. To a great extent, this is already happening in U.S.-Russian relations. Because of an overlap in interests, the two countries are working together effectively on a number of nuclear security, counterterrorism, and non-proliferation issues, including Iran and North Korea. But we cannot avoid the issue of values, because they shape the way we think about our interests and are critical to the trust needed to deal with sensitive issues, even when outside observers would posit a common interest.

#### ---No U.S. accidental launch and no accidental nuclear war with russia – systems are fail safe

Slocombe, 2009 (Walter B., Former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, “De-Altering: Diagnoses, Prescriptions, and Side Effects”, Discussion Paper Presented at the Seminar on Reframing De-Alert: Decreasing the Operational Readiness of Nuclear Weapon Systems in the U.S.-Russia Context, East-West Institute, June, http://www.ewi.info/system/files/Slocombe.pdf)

Let’s start with Technical Failure – the focus of a great deal of the advocacy, or at least of stress on past incidents of failures of safety and control mechanisms.4 **Much of the “de-alerting” literature points to a succession of failures to follow proper procedures and draw from that history the inference that a relatively simple procedural failure could produce a nuclear detonation.** The argument is essentially that nuclear weapons systems are sufficiently susceptible of pure accident (including human error or failure at operational/field level) that it is essential to take measures that have the effect of making it necessary to undertake a prolonged reconfiguration of the elements of the nuclear weapons force for a launch or detonation to be physically possible. Specific measures said to serve this objective include separating the weapons from their launchers, burying silo doors, removal of fuzing or launching mechanisms, deliberate avoidance of maintenance measures need to permit rapid firing, and the like. . My view is that this line of action is unnecessary in its own terms and highly problematic from the point of view of other aspects of the problem and that there is a far better option that is largely already in place, at least in the US force – the requirement of external information – a code not held by the operators -- to arm the weapons. Advocates of other, more “physical,” measures often describe the current arrangement as nuclear weapons being on a “hair trigger.” That is – at least with respect to US weapons – a highly misleading characterization. The “hair trigger” figure of speech confuses “alert” status – readiness to act quickly on orders -- with susceptibility to inadvertent action. The “hair trigger” image implies that a minor mistake – akin to jostling a gun – will fire the weapon. The US StratCom commander had a more accurate metaphor when he recently said that US nuclear weapons are less a pistol with a hair trigger than like a pistol in a holster with the safety turned on – and he might have added that in the case of nuclear weapons the “safety” is locked in place by a combination lock that can only be opened and firing made possible if the soldier carrying the pistol receives a message from his chain of command giving him the combination**.** Whatever other problems the current nuclear posture of **the US** **nuclear force** may present, it **cannot** reasonably be said to be on a “hair trigger.” Since the 1960s the US has taken a series of measures to insure that US nuclear weapons cannot be detonated without the receipt of both external information and properly authenticated authorization to use that information. These devices – generically Permissive Action Links or “PALs” – are in effect combination locks that keep the weapons locked and incapable of detonation unless and until the weapons’ firing mechanisms have been unlocked following receipt of a series of numbers communicated to the operators from higher authority. Equally important in the context of a military organization, launch of nuclear weapons (including insertion of the combinations) is permitted only where properly authorized by an authenticated order. This combination of reliance on discipline and procedure and on receipt of an unlocking code not held by the military personnel in charge of the launch operation is designed to insure that the system is “fail safe,” i.e., that whatever mistakes occur, the result will not be a nuclear explosion. Moreover, in recent years, both the US and Russia, as well as Britain and China, have modified their procedures so that even if a nuclear-armed missile were launched, it would go not to a “real” target in another country but – at least in the US case - to empty ocean**.** In addition to the basic advantage of insuring against a nuclear detonation in a populated area, the fact that a missile launched in error would be on flight path that diverged from a plausible attacking trajectory should be detectable by either the US or the Russian warning systems, reducing the possibility of the accident being perceived as a deliberate attack. De-targeting, therefore, provides a significant protection against technical error.5 These arrangements – PALs and their equivalents coupled with continued observance of the agreement made in the mid-90s on “de-targeting” – do not eliminate the possibility of technical or operator-level failures, but they come very close to providing absolute assurance that such errors cannot lead to a nuclear explosion or be interpreted as the start of a deliberate nuclear attack.6 The advantage of such requirements for external information to activate weapons is of course that the weapons remain available for authorized use but not susceptible of appropriation or mistaken use. The drawback from a deterrence and operational point of view is, of course, that the system for transmitting the information must not be susceptible of interruption – that is, there must be assurance that an authorized decision maker will be able to act and have the decision – and the accompanying authenticated orders and unlock combinations – communicated to and received by the operators of the weapon systems. Accordingly, a system of combination-locked safeties requires a highly survivable network for decision and communication with the operators. Otherwise there would be pressures for early transmission of the codes, with their insertion subject to a later execute order or even more dangerous, pre-delegation of authority to issue the execute orders. In this, as in other aspects of measures to meet the “never” requirement, a highly capable and highly survivable command and control system is essential.