## \*\*\*2AC

### 2AC Deterrence

#### Iran proliferation makes the risk of nuke war in the Middle East extremely high- 1ac Kahl ev

#### Iran prolif setting off a chain reaction is uniquely bad bc it would show international nonprolif efforts fail- Iran pulls out of the NPT- Kahl ev

#### Prolif is bad- Busch ev

#### Risk of accidents and unauthorized use is high- New proliferants have poor command and control

#### Rapid delivery means risk of miscalculation is high

#### Theft of nuclear material 🡪 rapid further proliferation

#### South Asia proves new proliferation is destabilizing

#### New proliferation collapse arms control norms, risking nuclear use.

Cirincione 00, Director of the Non-Proliferation Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, (Joseph, “The Asian Nuclear Reaction Chain,”3-22, Foreign Policy)

Kennedy's arms control vision, negotiated by President Lyndon Johnson and implemented by President Richard Nixon, has proved to be a global success story. Since the signing of the NPT in 1968, the treaty regime has greatly restricted the spread of weapons of mass destruction. But Kennedy's legacy is now under siege, and the nonproliferation clock may be set back to the 1960s. If the United States disassembles diplomatic restraints, shatters carefully crafted threat reduction arrangements, and moves from builder to destroyer of the nonproliferation regime, then there will be little to prevent new nations from concluding that their national security requires nuclear arms. Taking elements we don't like out of the regime structure starts a dangerous round of Jenga, the tabletop game where blocks are sequentially removed from a wooden tower until the whole structure collapses. The blocks would fall quickest and hardest in Asia, where proliferation pressures are already building more quickly than anywhere else in the world. If a nuclear breakout takes place in Asia, then the international arms control agreements that have been painstakingly negotiated over the past 40 years will crumble. Moreover, the United States could find itself embroiled in its fourth war on the Asian continent in six decades--a costly rebuke to those who seek the safety of Fortress America by hiding behind national missile defenses. Consider what is already happening: North Korea continues to play guessing games with its nuclear and missile programs; South Korea wants its own missiles to match Pyongyang's; India and Pakistan shoot across borders while running a slow-motion nuclear arms race; China modernizes its nuclear arsenal amid tensions with Taiwan and the United States; Japan's vice defense minister is forced to resign after extolling the benefits of nuclear weapons; and Russia--whose Far East nuclear deployments alone make it the largest Asian nuclear power--struggles to maintain territorial coherence. Five of these states have nuclear weapons; the others are capable of constructing them. Like neutrons firing from a split atom, one nation's actions can trigger reactions throughout the region, which in turn, stimulate additional actions. These nations form an interlocking Asian nuclear reaction chain that vibrates dangerously with each new development. If the frequency and intensity of this reaction cycle increase, critical decisions taken by any one of these governments could cascade into the second great wave of nuclear-weapon proliferation, bringing regional and global economic and political instability and, perhaps, the first combat use of a nuclear weapon since 1945.

Ryan beirmeister

#### New prolif wont result in stable deterrence- and accidents outweigh

Sagan 03, Political Science at Stanford University, ‘3 (Scott– Co-director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed” p 83)

The nuclear optimists' view that the spread of nuclear weapons will produce stable deterrence is based on a rationalist assumption that the behavior of new nuclear states will reflect their interest in avoiding nuclear war. New nuclear powers will avoid preventive nuclear wars, develop survivable nuclear arsenals, and prevent nuclear weapons accidents because it is in their obvious national interests to do so. I have argued, in contrast, that the actual behavior of new proliferators will be strongly influenced by military organizations within those states and that the common biases, rigid routines, and parochial interests of these military organizations will lead to deterrence failures and accidental uses of nuclear weapons despite national interests to the contrary. The concepts behind this more pessimistic vision of proliferation are well-grounded in the rich theoretical and empirical literature on complex organizations. My theory makes less heroic assumptions about the rationality of states. It provides useful insights into U.S. nuclear history during the cold war, and it points to the checks-and-balances system of civilian control as a critical factor in creating the requirements of nuclear deterrence during the long peace. Although the jury of history is still out on the consequences of further nuclear proliferation, and will be for some time, the emerging evidence from the nuclear-proliferating world unfortunately supports this more pessimistic view.

### 2AC A2: Terrorism

#### Nuclearization causes Iranian naval aggression and increases their support for terrorism against the US and Israel.

Kahl 12 (Colin, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East and Senior Fellow, the Center for a New American Security, Iran and the Bomb, Foreign Affairs; Sep/Oct2012, Vol. 91 Issue 5, p157-162)

Specifically, a nuclear-armed Tehran would likely provide Hezbollah and Palestinian militants with more sophisticated, longer-range, and more accurate conventional weaponry for use against Israel. In an effort to bolster the deterrent capabilities of such allies, Iran might consider giving them "dual-capable" weapons, leaving Israel to guess whether these systems were conventional or armed with chemical, biological, or nuclear material. A nuclear-armed Iran might also give its proxies permission to use advanced weapons systems instead of keeping them in reserve, as Tehran reportedly instructed Hezbollah to do during the militant group's 2006 war with Israel. A nuclear-armed Iran, believing that it possessed a powerful deterrent and could thus commit violence abroad with near impunity, might also increase the frequency and scale of the terrorist attacks against U.S. and Israeli targets carried out by Hezbollah and the Quds Force, the covert operations wing of Iran's elite Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. And a bolder Iran might increase the number of Revolutionary Guard forces it deployed to Lebanon, allow its navy to engage in more frequent shows of force in the Mediterranean, and assert itself more aggressively in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. To further enhance its image in the eyes of domestic and regional audiences as the leader of an anti-Western resistance bloc, a nuclear-armed Iran might respond to regional crises by threatening to use all the means at its disposal to ensure the survival of the Assad regime in Syria, Hezbollah, or Palestinian groups. And Iran might be emboldened to play the spoiler in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process by encouraging large-scale militant attacks and might try to destabilize its neighbors through more coercive diplomacy and subversion in Iraq and the Gulf states.

### 2AC A2: Russian Econ

#### Russian FDI policy is explicitly based on CFIUS

Gill et al 2009

Franklin E., retired Research Professor of Law, University of New Mexico School of Law and Chief Corporate Financial Counsel, Sun Company, Inc. The International Lawyer Vol 43 No 2 Summer 2009, Russia and Ukraine, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/multimedia/international\_law/docs/committees/russia\_eurasia/russiaeurasiayir.authcheckdam.pdf

One of Vladimir Putin’s last acts in his capacity as Russia’s president was to sign into law, on April 29, 2008, a new federal statute requiring foreign investors wishing to acquire a substantial stake in “strategically significant” enterprises in Russia to seek advance government approval for any such acquisition.13 The law has been criticized as likely to have a chilling effect on already-wary foreign investors and further amplify the Russian Government’s power to control economic activity for political ends.14 Defenders of the law point out that many, if not most, countries have adopted some measures to restrict foreign investors’ acquisition rights in certain strategically vital spheres of economic activity.15 The United States, for instance, has maintained, since 1988, its own governmental review procedure for foreign investments affecting national security interests, under the so-called “Exon-Florio” provisions,16 and has recently en-acted amendments to the procedure designed to expand the scope of this review.17 Indeed, the official Explanatory Note to Russia’s Foreign Investment in Strategic Enterprises Law (FISEL) expressly refers to the “analogous” nature of the U.S. legislation.18 In assessing the features and likely impact of the new Russian law, it might therefore be instructive, particularly for U.S.-based observers, to compare its provisions and their implementation to those of Exon-Florio. Both Russia’s FISEL and the United States’ Exon-Florio provisions permit their respective governments to reject foreign investment transactions deemed to threaten national security interests.19 There are quite a few significant differences, however, in how the two laws are structured.

#### Inward FDI is key to Russian growth

Ogutcu 2002

Mehmet, former Head of the OECDs Global Forum on international investment and regional outreach programmes, ATTRACTING FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT FOR RUSSIA’S MODERNIZATION 19 June 2002 http://www.oecd.org/investment/investmentfordevelopment/1942539.pdf

However, what has been achieved to date is not in itself enough to guarantee an improvement in the investment climate and a long-term revival of the economy. Despite a general economic recovery, problems of a strategic nature remain. Until Russia sees stable growth in the output of competitive products, it will be too early to speak of a stable economic growth pattern. That applies not only to the raw materials sectors, but also to secondary industries and services, and it will require massive investment into industrial plants and equipment, the widespread deployment of new technologies, and an improvement in economic management in practically all sectors of the economy. That is the real essence of the Government's task of modernising the economy, as laid out in the Gref Programme for 2000-20104. FDI for modernisation Modernisation of the Russian economy will result first and foremost in stable growth in domestic demand, thereby reducing Russia's dependence on the international raw material and oil markets. However, there is still a long way to go before the country reaches that stage. To that end, Russia must create conditions conducive towards generating revenue and increasing in-bound investment, and make more effective decisions on how it uses resources and promote goods on the market. Over the past three years, investment growth has outstripped GDP growth in relative terms; but it is difficult to say that Russia is making full use of its investment potential. Its mechanisms for transforming savings into investments are ineffective, resulting in a situation where total savings in Russia significantly exceed total capital. Sector-tosector capital flow is also at a very low level. In terms of investment resources, there is a clear misbalance in supply and demand between the export-oriented raw materials sectors and the rest of the economy, which is in dire need of capital.

#### ---And, no escalation

Colonel General Leonid Ivashov, President of the Academy of Geopolitical Problems. July 2007 “Will America fight Russia,” Defense and Security, No 78. ln

Ivashov: Numerous scenarios and options are possible. Everything may begin as a local conflict that will rapidly deteriorate into a total confrontation. An ultimatum will be sent to Russia: say, change the domestic policy because human rights are allegedly encroached on, or give Western businesses access to oil and gas fields. Russia will refuse and its objects (radars, air defense components, command posts, infrastructure) will be wiped out by guided missiles with conventional warheads and by aviation. Once this phase is over, an even stiffer ultimatum will be presented - demanding something up to the deployment of NATO "peacekeepers" on the territory of Russia. Refusal to bow to the demands will be met with a mass aviation and missile strike at Army and Navy assets, infrastructure, and objects of defense industry. NATO armies will invade Belarus and western Russia. Two turns of events may follow that. Moscow may accept the ultimatum through the use of some device that will help it save face. The acceptance will be followed by talks over the estrangement of the Kaliningrad enclave, parts of the Caucasus and Caspian region, international control over the Russian gas and oil complex, and NATO control over Russian nuclear forces. The second scenario involves a warning from the Kremlin to the United States that continuation of the aggression will trigger retaliation with the use of all weapons in nuclear arsenals. It will stop the war and put negotiations into motion.

### 2AC A2: Pakistan

#### Carroll says deterrence solves

#### If Iran can constrain them, the U.S. can constrain them

**Militants won’t get pakistans weapons**

**Bandow 09**- Senior Fellow @ Cato, former special assistant to Reagan (11/31/09, Doug, “Recognizing the Limits of American Power in Afghanistan,” Huffington Post, http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=10924)

From Pakistan's perspective, limiting the war on almost any terms would be better than prosecuting it for years, even to "victory," whatever that would mean. In fact, the least likely outcome is a takeover by widely unpopular Pakistani militants. The Pakistan military is the nation's strongest institution; while the army might not be able to rule alone, it can prevent any other force from ruling. Indeed, Bennett Ramberg made the important point: "Pakistan, Iran and the former Soviet republics to the north have demonstrated a brutal capacity to suppress political violence to ensure survival. This suggests that even were Afghanistan to become a terrorist haven, the neighborhood can adapt and resist." The results might not be pretty, but the region would not descend into chaos. In contrast, warned Bacevich: "To risk the stability of that nuclear-armed state in the vain hope of salvaging Afghanistan would be a terrible mistake."

War wont go nuclear

Enders ’02 “Experts say nuclear war still unlikely,”, David Enders, Daily News Editor, January 30th 2002, DA: 7/26/10, http://www.michigandaily.com/content/experts-say-nuclear-war-still-unlikely?page=0,0

University political science Prof. Ashutosh Varshney becomes animated when asked about the likelihood of nuclear war between India and Pakistan. "Odds are close to zero," Varshney said forcefully, standing up to pace a little bit in his office. "The assumption that India and Pakistan cannot manage their nuclear arsenals as well as the U.S.S.R. and U.S. or Russia and China concedes less to the intellect of leaders in both India and Pakistan than would be warranted.” The world"s two youngest nuclear powers first tested weapons in 1998, sparking fear of subcontinental nuclear war a fear Varshney finds ridiculous. "The decision makers are aware of what nuclear weapons are, even if the masses are not," he said. "Watching the evening news, CNN, I think they have vastly overstated the threat of nuclear war," political science Prof. Paul Huth said. Varshney added that there are numerous factors working against the possibility of nuclear war. "India is committed to a no-first-strike policy," Varshney said. "It is virtually impossible for Pakistan to go for a first strike, because the retaliation would be gravely dangerous." Political science Prof. Kenneth Lieberthal, a former special assistant to President Clinton at the National Security Council, agreed. "Usually a country that is in the position that Pakistan is in would not shift to a level that would ensure their total destruction," Lieberthal said, making note of India"s considerably larger nuclear arsenal. "American intervention is another reason not to expect nuclear war," Varshney said. "If anything has happened since September 11, it is that the command control system has strengthened. The trigger is in very safe hands."

### 2AC A2:

#### No they don’t- the Soviets and Chinese prove- Waltz has it backwards.

Kahl 12 (Colin, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East and Senior Fellow, the Center for a New American Security, Iran and the Bomb, Foreign Affairs; Sep/Oct2012, Vol. 91 Issue 5, p157-162)

"History shows that when countries acquire the bomb, they feel increasingly vulnerable and become acutely aware that their nuclear weapons make them a potential target in the eyes of major powers," Waltz argues. "This awareness discourages nuclear states from bold and aggressive action."

In writing this, Waltz ignores a long history of emerging nuclear powers behaving provocatively. In 1950, for example, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin gave North Korea the green light to invade South Korea, thus beginning the Korean War. Stalin apparently assumed (incorrectly) that the United States was unlikely to respond because the Soviets had by then developed their own nuclear weapons. Waltz also claims that China became less aggressive after going nuclear in 1964. But in 1969, Mao Zedong authorized Chinese troops to attack Soviet forces on the Chinese-Soviet border. The attack was meant to warn Moscow against border provocations and to mobilize domestic Chinese support for Mao's revolution. Like Stalin before him, Mao was probably confident that China's recently acquired nuclear capabilities would limit the resulting conflict. (In the end, the border clashes produced a larger crisis than Mao had expected, raising the possibility of a Soviet nuclear strike, and China backed down.)

#### Nuclearization causes Iranian aggression, not moderation.

Kahl 12 (Colin, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East and Senior Fellow, the Center for a New American Security, Iran and the Bomb, Foreign Affairs; Sep/Oct2012, Vol. 91 Issue 5, p157-162)

Kenneth Waltz is probably right that a nuclear-armed Iran could be deterred from deliberately using nuclear weapons or transferring a nuclear device to terrorists ("Why Iran Should Get the Bomb," July/August 2012). But he is dead wrong that the Islamic Republic would likely become a more responsible international actor if it crossed the nuclear threshold. In making that argument, Waltz mischaracterizes Iranian motivations and badly misreads history. And despite the fact that Waltz is one of the world's most respected international relations theorists, he ignores important political science research into the effects of nuclear weapons, including recent findings that suggest that new nuclear states are often more reckless and aggressive at lower levels of conflict. RATIONAL BUT DANGEROUS Waltz correctly notes that Iran's leaders, despite their fanatical rhetoric, are fundamentally rational. Because Iran's leadership is not suicidal, it is highly unlikely that a nuclear-armed Iran would deliberately use a nuclear device or transfer one to terrorists. Yet even though the Islamic Republic is rational, it is still dangerous, and it is likely to become even more so if it develops nuclear weapons. Iran's government currently sponsors terrorist groups and supports militants throughout the Middle East, in part to demonstrate a capability to retaliate against the United States, Israel, and other states should they attack Iran or undermine its interests. If the Iranian leadership's sole concern was its own survival and it believed that a nuclear deterrent alone could give it enough protection, then as a nuclear state, it might curtail its support for proxies in order to avoid needless disputes with other nuclear powers. But Iran is not a status quo state, and its support for terrorists and militants is intended to be for more than just defense and retaliation. Such support is an offensive tool, designed to pressure and intimidate other states, indirectly expand Iran's influence, and advance its revisionist agenda, which seeks to make Iran the preeminent power in the Middle East, champion resistance to Israel and "arrogant powers" in the West, promote its brand of revolutionary Islamist ideology, and assert its leadership in the wider Islamic world. Tehran currently calibrates its support for militants and sponsorship of terrorism to minimize the risks of a direct confrontation with more powerful states. But if Iranian leaders perceived that a nuclear arsenal provided a substantially more robust deterrent against retaliation, they would likely pursue their regional goals more aggressively.

### 2AC A2: Bioweapons

#### No risk of a bioterror attack, and there won’t be retaliation - their evidence is hype

MATISHAK ‘10 (Martin, Global Security Newswire, “U.S. Unlikely to Respond to Biological Threat With Nuclear Strike, Experts Say,” 4-29, <http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20100429_7133.php>)

WASHINGTON -- The United States is not likely to use nuclear force to respond to a biological weapons threat, even though the Obama administration left open that option in its recent update to the nation's nuclear weapons policy, experts say (See GSN, April 22). "The notion that we are in imminent danger of confronting a scenario in which hundreds of thousands of people are dying in the streets of New York as a consequence of a biological weapons attack is fanciful," said Michael Moodie, a consultant who served as assistant director for multilateral affairs in the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency during the George H.W. Bush administration. Scenarios in which the United States suffers mass casualties as a result of such an event seem "to be taking the discussion out of the realm of reality and into one that is hypothetical and that has no meaning in the real world where this kind of exchange is just not going to happen," Moodie said this week in a telephone interview. "There are a lot of threat mongers who talk about devastating biological attacks that could kill tens of thousands, if not millions of Americans," according to Jonathan Tucker, a senior fellow with the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. "But in fact, no country out there today has anything close to what the Soviet Union had in terms of mass-casualty biological warfare capability. Advances in biotechnology are unlikely to change that situation, at least for the foreseeable future." No terrorist group would be capable of pulling off a massive biological attack, nor would it be deterred by the threat of nuclear retaliation, he added. The biological threat provision was addressed in the Defense Department-led Nuclear Posture Review, a restructuring of U.S. nuclear strategy, forces and readiness. The Obama administration pledged in the review that the United States would not conduct nuclear strikes on non-nuclear states that are in compliance with global nonproliferation regimes. However, the 72-page document contains a caveat that would allow Washington to set aside that policy, dubbed "negative security assurance," if it appeared that biological weapons had been made dangerous enough to cause major harm to the United States. "Given the catastrophic potential of biological weapons and the rapid pace of biotechnology development, the United States reserves the right to make any adjustment in the assurance that may be warranted by the evolution and proliferation of the biological weapons threat and U.S. capacities to counter that threat," the posture review report says. The caveat was included in the document because "in theory, biological weapons could kill millions of people," Gary Samore, senior White House coordinator for WMD counterterrorism and arms control, said last week after an event at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Asked if the White House had identified a particular technological threshold that could provoke a nuclear strike, Samore replied: "No, and if we did we obviously would not be willing to put it out because countries would say, 'Oh, we can go right up to this level and it won't change policy.'" "It's deliberately ambiguous," he told Global Security Newswire. The document's key qualifications have become a lightning rod for criticism by Republican lawmakers who argue they eliminate the country's previous policy of "calculated ambiguity," in which U.S. leaders left open the possibility of executing a nuclear strike in response to virtually any hostile action against the United States or its allies (see GSN, April 15). Yet experts say there are a number of reasons why the United States is not likely to use a nuclear weapon to eliminate a non-nuclear threat. It could prove difficult for U.S. leaders to come up with a list of appropriate targets to strike with a nuclear warhead following a biological or chemical event, former Defense Undersecretary for Policy Walter Slocombe said during a recent panel discussion at the Hudson Institute. "I don't think nuclear weapons are necessary to deter these kinds of attacks given U.S. dominance in conventional military force," according to Gregory Koblentz, deputy director of the Biodefense Graduate Program at George Mason University in Northern Virginia. "There's a bigger downside to the nuclear nonproliferation side of the ledger for threatening to use nuclear weapons in those circumstances than there is the benefit of actually deterring a chemical or biological attack," Koblentz said during a recent panel discussion at the James Martin Center. The nonproliferation benefits for restricting the role of strategic weapons to deterring nuclear attacks outweigh the "marginal" reduction in the country's ability to stem the use of biological weapons, he said. In addition, the United States has efforts in place to defend against chemical and biological attacks such as vaccines and other medical countermeasures, he argued. "We have ways to mitigate the consequences of these attacks," Koblentz told the audience. "There's no way to mitigate the effects of a nuclear weapon." Regardless of the declaratory policy, the U.S. nuclear arsenal will always provide a "residual deterrent" against mass-casualty biological or chemical attacks, according to Tucker. "If a biological or chemical attack against the United States was of such a magnitude as to potentially warrant a nuclear response, no attacker could be confident that the U.S. -- in the heat of the moment -- would not retaliate with nuclear weapons, even if its declaratory policy is not to do so," he told GSN this week during a telephone interview. Political Benefits Experts are unsure what, if any, political benefit the country or President Barack Obama's sweeping nuclear nonproliferation agenda will gain from the posture review's biological weapons caveat. The report's reservation "was an unnecessary dilution of the strengthened negative security and a counterproductive elevation of biological weapons to the same strategic domain as nuclear weapons," Koblentz told GSN by e-mail this week. "The United States has nothing to gain by promoting the concept of the biological weapons as 'the poor man's atomic bomb,'" he added.

#### Weather blocks and solves death toll

LAQUER 99 (Walter, Cochair of the International Research Council at The Center for Strategic and International Studies, “The New Terrorism”)

Ironically, the major factor retarding the use of gases and germs by states and terrorists is no the revulsion or moral constraints but technical difficulties. “Ideal” conditions for an attack seldom if ever exist, and the possibility of things going wrong is almost unlimited, aerosols may nor function, the wind may blow in the wrong direction, missiles carrying a deadly load may land in the wrong place or neutralize the germs on impact. In the course of time these technical difficulties may be overcome, but it is still very likely that roughly nine out of ten of the early attempts by terrorists to wage chemical or biological warfare will fail. But they will not pass unnoticed; the authorities and the public will be alerted, and the element of surprise lost. The search for perpetrators may begin even before the first successful attack. And what has just been said with regard to terrorists may also be to state terrorism.

#### Federal budget cuts kill bioterror

AHLERS ’11- senior producer, transportation and regulation, for CNN (Mike M., “Bioterror security at risk”, December 20, http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2011/12/20/bioterror-security-at-risk/)

Recent and proposed budget cuts at all levels of government are threatening to reverse the significant post-9/11 improvements in the nation's ability to respond to natural diseases and bioterror attacks, according to a report released Tuesday. "We're seeing a decade's worth of progress eroding in front of our eyes," said Jeff Levi, executive director of the Trust for America's Health, which published the report with the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation. Budget cuts already have forced state and local health departments to cut thousands of health officials, the report says. Cuts are jeopardizing the jobs of federal investigators who help states hunt down diseases, threatening the capabilities at all 10 "Level 1" state labs that conduct tests for nerve agents or chemical agents such as mustard gas, and may hurt the ability of many cities to rapidly distribute vaccines during emergencies, it says. The "upward trajectory" of preparedness, fueled by more than $7 billion in federal grants to cities and states in the past 10 years, is leveling off, and the gains of the last decade are "at risk," the report says. The 2011 report departs slightly in tone from the nine previous reports prepared by the two health advocacy groups. Earlier reports, while focusing on gaps in the nation's preparedness for pandemics and bioterror attacks, showed a "steady progression of improvement," said Levi. "Our concern this year is that because of the economic crisis... we may not be as prepared today as we were a couple of years ago," he said. Once lost, medical capabilities take time and money to rebuild, the report says. "It would be like trying to hire and train firefighters in the middle of a fire," Levi said. "You don't do that for fire protection, and we shouldn't be doing that for public health protection." There are few expressions of assurance or optimism in the 2011 report. The report says: – In the past year, 40 states and the District of Columbia have cut funds to public health. – Since 2008, state health agencies have lost 14,910 people through layoffs or attrition; local health departments have lost 34,400. – Federal PHEP grants - Public Health Emergency Preparedness grants - were cut 27 percent between fiscal 2005 and 2011, when adjusted for inflation. – Some 51 cities are at risk for elimination of Cities Readiness Initiative funds, which support the rapid distribution of vaccinations and medications during emergencies. "Two steps forward, three steps back," said Dr. F. Douglas Scutchfield of the University of Kentucky College of Public Health, in an essay accompanying the study. "As certain as the sun will rise in the east, we will experience another event that will demonstrate our inability to cope, as the resources for public health are scarce, and it will prompt the cycle of build-up, neglect, event, build-up, etc." Federal aid to state and local governments for health preparedness peeked in 2002 at about $1.7 billion, and fell to $1.3 billion in fiscal 2012, Levi said. But the impact of cuts were masked when Congress allocated more than $8 billion in emergency funds to fight the H1N1 flu in 2009, Levi said. "Now that money is gone. And so we're seeing the real impact of these cuts," he said. The TFAH report comes just two months after another report concluded that the United States is largely unprepared for a large-scale bioterror attack or deadly disease outbreak.

### 2AC T

we meet-foreign investment is a restriction on production

Hirsch-former senior energy program adviser for Science Applications International Corporation-11 Commentary: Restrictions on world oil production

<http://www.energybulletin.net/stories/2011-03-28/commentary-restrictions-world-oil-production>

Restrictions on world oil production can be divided into four categories: 1. Geology 2. Legitimate National Interests 3. Mismanagement 4. Political Upheaval Consider each in reverse order: Political upheaval is currently rampant across the Middle East, resulting in a major spike in world oil prices. No one knows how far the impacts will go or how long it will take to reach some kind of stability and what that stability will mean to oil production in the Middle Eastern countries that produce oil. We are thus relegated to best guesses, which span weeks, months, or years before there are clear resolutions. One pre-Middle East chaos country limited by political upheaval is Iraq, which is believed to have the oil reserves to produce at a much higher level, but Iraqi government chaos has severely limited oil production expansion. In another long-standing case, Nigeria has been plagued by internal political strife, which has negatively impacted its oil production. Mismanagement of oil production within a country can be due to a variety of factors, all of which mean lower oil production than would otherwise be the case. Venezuela is the poster child of national mismanagement. The country has huge resources of heavy oil that could be produced at much higher rates. Underproduction is due to the government syphoning off so much cash flow that oil production operations are starved for needed funds. In addition, Venezuela has made it extremely difficult, if not impossible for foreign oil companies to operate in the country. Another example of mismanagement is Mexico, where government confiscation of oil revenues, substandard technology, and restrictions on foreign investment has led to significant Mexican oil production decline.

We meet – the plan reduces restrictions that block, delay, and alter foreign investment on energy production

Inside Energy with Federal Lands 4/12/10 (Herman Wang, HEADLINE: Foreign energy investments spark security concerns)

Foreign firms appear to be increasingly interested in investing in US oil companies, electric utilities and other parts of the US energy infrastructure, as they are seeking to profit from America's appetite for oil, coal and other commodities, as well as the Obama administration's emphasis on renewable power. But with those deals will come scrutiny from a little-known federal panel that has the power to block the transactions for national security reasons, through a review process that industry insiders say is sometimes inconsistent, politically driven and opaque. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States is an inter-agency panel that gave the Energy Department a permanent seat in 2007 to help it investigate business transactions in which foreign governments or companies seek to acquire "major energy assets" in the US. But some experts say CFIUS does not offer enough up-front guidance to US companies that are being acquired by foreign interests, wasting time and money. "We face situations where we tell our clients we see no security risk," said Billy Vigdor, a Washington-based partner with law firm Vinson & Elkins. "And then we spend hours trying to figure out whether we should file [a disclosure] because the government might think it is, in fact, a security risk. The last thing you want is to have a contract in place, and you think you're going to close in 30 days, and then CFIUS calls and says you need a filing." Companies being acquired by a foreign-owned firm can voluntarily notify CFIUS of the transaction, but the committee also has the power to investigate all transactions it sees fit to review. Representatives from 16 federal departments and agencies, headed by the Treasury Department, comprise the committee. Those investigations can leave foreign companies feeling unfairly targeted, potentially discouraging needed foreign investment in US energy infrastructure, said Al Troner, president of Houston-based Asia Pacific Energy Consulting. Troner said CFIUS' rulings on what constitutes a security threat can be arbitrary and inconsistent. Even when the committee determines there is no security risk for a transaction, politics can sometimes trump the ruling, Troner said. Troner cited CFIUS' approval in 2006 of a deal by a Dubai-based company to manage several US ports, only to have the company back out after many lawmakers cried foul due to fears of terrorism. "We want investment, but we want 'safe' investments, even though we can't define what is safe," Troner said. "So a big problem in all this is uncertainty, which makes this a funny market to invest in. [Foreign firms] don't feel treated fairly as to what the criteria are for energy security. If you don't know what you're getting into, at a certain point, you ask if this is worth it." Steven Cuevas, who was DOE's director of investment security in 2007 when the department gained a seat on CFIUS, said the committee makes its decisions apolitically. CFIUS, originally established in 1975, received a legislative mandate in 2007 to tighten its oversight of foreign transactions, including defining critical infrastructure as an asset so vital that its incapacity or destruction would severely impact national security. A bill signed by then-President George W. Bush, sparked in large part because of the uproar over the Dubai Ports World deal, formalized CFIUS' review process, which until then had been loosely defined and applied. That same bill also gave DOE its seat on CFIUS. The committee reviews about 150 to 200 foreign business deals a year. "We left politics at the door," Cuevas said. "As with any national security program, you really need to look at the issues in national security and not worry about politics. It's not a situation where there's a bright-line rule. You have to look at each transaction by itself. The standard is, does this transaction, by itself, pose a risk to national security?" Richard Oehler, a Seattle-based partner with law firm Perkins Cole, said prior to the 2007 legislation, CFIUS primarily concerned itself with defense contracting and other issues related to defense and intelligence. The legislation, however, with its definition of critical infrastructure, put an increased focus on US energy assets. "They were not focused on energy, until the politicians redefined [CFIUS]," Oehler said. Cuevas, now a renewable-energy lobbyist with French-owned nuclear company Areva, was a Bush administration political appointee assigned the task of setting up DOE's new role on CFIUS. He said he could not disclose, for confidentiality reasons, how many transactions DOE reviewed during his time working on the committee. Cuevas left his DOE post in 2009 with inauguration of the Obama administration. "When we started the CFIUS program at DOE, we had no processes in place," he said. "There was no record keeping. I spent the last year and a half with the department trying to standardize those steps of review, who signs off on transaction, who tracks them. We were simply trying to keep up with the transactions. We set the foundation, and the folks that are there now are fleshing it out." Last month, DOE issued a draft policy outlining its role on CFIUS that is similar to the Bush administration's policy. The policy, signed by DOE Deputy Secretary Daniel Poneman, prescribes that the department's risk analyses must consider the "criticality and/or vulnerability of the US assets being acquired" and "the threat to those assets posed by the acquiring entity and the consequences to national security if the threat is realized." Each transaction must also be reviewed on whether it involves critical infrastructure and technology, as well as how the transaction would impact long-term projections of US energy consumption. In addition, if a foreign government-owned entity is involved in the transaction, DOE will assess "the adherence of the subject country to nonproliferation control regimes, including treaties and multilateral supply guidelines," the draft policy states. After the review, DOE can clear the transaction with no further action; refer it to CFIUS for a 45-day national security investigation; clear the case conditionally, pending the creation of a "mitigation" plan to resolve security concerns; or recommend to the president to block the deal. Energy Secretary Steven Chu is DOE's primary representative to CFIUS, but much of the department's responsibilities on the committee are delegated to Jonathan Elkind, DOE's principal deputy assistant secretary for policy and international affairs. Elkin was not available for comment. Cliff Vrielink, a Houston-based partner with Vinson & Elkins, said CFIUS can sometimes give US companies pause when seeking to be acquired by a foreign firm. "CFIUS presents a hurdle for a foreign buyer that a domestic buyer doesn't have," Vrielink said. "When someone as an asset they want to sell, and they have an auction where multiple companies have put in bids, the foreign buyer has the uncertain timing of a CFIUS filing, which can be a significant factor." Complicating matters for foreign companies is the fact that CFIUS reviews are not based on a clear set of guidelines and regulations outlining, for instance, how much of a US company a foreign firm can acquire without triggering an investigation. "We, as Americans, are fortunate in that in so many areas, we have bright-letter law, and I think that's one thing that's always been an attraction for foreign investment, that we have the sanctity of contracts and bright-letter law," Vrielink said.

#### **Mitigation measures delay and alter deals even if they’re not blocked**

Marchick 07 (David, partner at Covington & Burling, where he advises

companies on the CFIUS process, “Swinging the Pendulum too Far: An Analysis of the CFIUS Process Post-Dubai Ports World,” Jan, http://www.nfap.net/researchactivities/studies/NFAPPolicyBriefCFIUS0107.pdf)

In the 18 years that Exon-Florio has been in force, there have been slightly more than 1700 CFIUS filings. Only one transaction has formally been blocked by the President — a 1990 aerospace investment by a Chinese company. From the data, one would think that CFIUS has merely been a rubber stamp, approving 99.9 percent of the acquisitions. The data belie actual practice, since tough restrictions are imposed by CFIUS as a condition for approval — typically through “mitigation” or “national security” agreements. In addition, parties typically will abandon a transaction in the face of a possible rejection rather than force the President to formally block a proposed acquisition. The public relations damage to a company if a President were to block an acquisition would be substantial.

#### Production deals with a high level of scrutiny are considered “restricted”.

Vinson & Elkins LLP 12 (V&E China Practice Update E-communication, “China Amends Foreign Investment Policy: New Foreign Investment Industry Guidance Catalogue,” January 13, http://www.velaw.com/resources/pub\_detail.aspx?id=20405)

The Catalogue classifies foreign direct investments in the various Chinese industry sectors as “encouraged,” “restricted,” “permitted,” or “prohibited,” and sets out specific industries in which foreign investment is either “encouraged,” “restricted,” or “prohibited.” Activities not listed are, in the absence of other rules to the contrary, considered to be “permitted” for foreign investments. Foreign investment in “encouraged” industries may enjoy certain tax benefits and is often subject to less strict administrative requirements from approval authorities. The “restricted” category includes industries into which foreign investment is subject to a higher level of scrutiny, stricter administrative requirements, and may be denied at the discretion of the approval authorities. Foreign investment is not permitted in industries categorized as “prohibited.”

#### Voss clearly says CFIUS reviews restrict production- the Ralls wind example is the biggest example of the US restricting production!

Voss, their author, 12 (CJ Attorney at Stoel Rives LLP) September 24, 2012 "Energy Law Alert: CFIUS Intervenes in Chinese-Owned Wind Project" http://www.stoel.com/showalert.aspx?Show=9813)

On September 12 a U.S. wind project development company, Ralls Corporation ("Ralls"), owned by two Chinese nationals, filed suit against the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States ("CFIUS"), an inter-agency U.S. government body charged with assessing the potential national security effects of foreign acquisitions of U.S. businesses. The Ralls complaint alleged that CFIUS exceeded its authority by blocking Ralls's investment in and development of a proposed 40-megawatt wind project in Oregon, through its acquisition of four Oregon limited liability companies (the "Oregon Projects"). Ralls subsequently filed a motion requesting that the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia issue a temporary restraining order ("TRO") to permit Ralls to resume construction of the Oregon Projects so that Ralls could benefit from approximately $25 million in federal investment tax credits. On September 19, Ralls withdrew its motion for a TRO following an agreement with CFIUS regarding the resumption of preliminary construction activities. The CFIUS order to which the lawsuit responds marks an unprecedented intervention by the U.S. government in renewable energy project development, which, since its inception, has benefitted from substantial investment by foreign investors.

#### ---C/I

#### Restrictions mean qualification on production

Wright v. Magellan Behavioral Health, Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48718  2007

In the instant case, the Court is required to interpret the word "restriction" as used by the parties in the Agreement. The parties apparently agree that the legal definition of restriction--"a limitation or qualification," Black's Law Dictionary 1341 (8th ed. 1999)--is a good place to start. Thus, the Court must determine whether the board's supervision requirement falls within this definition.

#### That means conditions on production not just prohibitions

Google Dictionary

qual·i·fi·ca·tion

noun /ˌkwäləfəˈkāSHən/

qualifications, plural

A quality or accomplishment that makes someone suitable for a particular job or activity

- only one qualification required—fabulous sense of humor

The action or fact of becoming qualified as a practitioner of a particular profession or activity

- an opportunity for student teachers to share experiences before qualification

A condition that must be fulfilled before a right can be acquired; an official requirement

- the five-year residency qualification for presidential candidates

#### ---Their interpretation is bad

#### A. Over limits – Their interpretation only allows drill baby drill affirmatives – kills affirmative ground because status quo production is sky high – plan innovation is necessary to circumvent this and produce non-stale debate

#### B. Capital key – Future oil and gas production depends on foreign capital – that’s Ellis – it’s intrinsically tied to extraction which proves its core aff ground

#### Reasonability first – predictability and debatable interpretations first – limits for limits sake is a race to the bottom and kills affirmative ground

### 2AC CP

#### ---Conditionality is illegitimate and a voting issue. Time constraints and the no risk nature of conditionality undermine 2AC strategy. Independently, conditionality undermines the value of debate by causing superficial exploration of competing policy options.

#### Doesn’t solve the economy – FDI key, not jobs

#### U.S. coal exports to China are low, but downward pressure on domestic demand expands them massively

Bryan Walsh 12, Senior Editor at TIME, May 31, 2012, “Drawing Battle Lines Over American Coal Exports to Asia,” online: http://science.time.com/2012/05/31/drawing-battle-lines-over-american-coal-exports-to-asia/

But across the Pacific Ocean, the demand for coal has never been hotter, with China burning 4.1 billion tons in 2010 alone, far more than any other country in the world. That insatiable demand forced China in 2009 to become a net coal importer for the first time, in part because congested rail infrastructure raised the cost of transporting coal from the mines of the country’s northwest to its booming southern cities. In April, Chinese coal imports nearly doubled from a year earlier. Right now Australia and Indonesia supply much of China’s foreign coal. U.S. coal from the Powder River Basin could be a perfect addition to the Chinese market. Montana and Wyoming are just short train trips to ports on the Pacific Northwest coast, and from there it’s a container ship away from Asian megacities where coal doesn’t have to compete with cheap natural gas and air-pollution regulations are far weaker than in the U.S. To a wounded Big Coal, China is a potential savior.¶ As I write in the new edition of TIME, there’s just one problem: right now, ports on the West Coast lack the infrastructure needed to transfer coal from railcars into container ships. (Just 7 million of the 107 million tons of U.S.-exported coal left the country via Pacific Ocean ports last year.) That’s why coal companies like Peabody and Ambre Energy are ready to spend millions to build coal-export facilities at a handful of ports in Washington and Oregon. If all those plans go forward, as much as 150 million tons of coal could be exported from the Northwest annually—-nearly all of it coming from the Powder -River -Basin and headed to Asia. Even if the U.S. kept burning less and less coal at home, it would have a reason to keep mining it.

#### SMRs cause coal plant retiring

Marcus King et al 11, Associate Director of Research, Associate Research Professor of International Affairs, Elliot School of International Affairs, The George Washington University, et al., March 2011, “Feasibility of Nuclear Power on U.S. Military Installations,” http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/Nuclear%20Power%20on%20Military%20Installations%20D0023932%20A5.pdf

SMRs have potential advantages over larger plants because they provide owners more flexibility in financing, siting, sizing, and end-use applications. SMRs can reduce an owner's initial capital outlay or investment because of the lower plant capital cost. Modular components and factory fabrication can reduce construction costs and schedule duration. Additional modules can be added incrementally as demand for power increases. SMRs can provide power for applications where large plants are not needed or may not have the necessary infrastructure to support a large unit such as smaller electrical markets, isolated areas, smaller grids, or restricted water or acreage sites. Several domestic utilities have expressed considerable interest in SMRs as potential replacements for aging fossil plants to increase their fraction of non-carbon-emitting generators. Approximately 80 percent of the 1174 total operating U.S. coal plants have power outputs of less than 500 MWe; 100 percent of coal plants that are more than 50 years old have capacities below 500 MWe [3]. SMRs would be a viable replacement option for these plants.

#### U.S. exports lock in expanded Chinese coal capacity---causes warming over the tipping point---it’s unique because absent U.S. exports the rising cost of coal will cause a shift to renewables

Thomas M. Power 12, Research Professor and Professor Emeritus, Department of Economics, University of Montana; Principal, Power Consulting; February 2012, “The Greenhouse Gas Impact of Exporting Coal from the West Coast: An Economic Analysis,” <http://www.sightline.org/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2012/02/Coal-Power-White-Paper.pdf>

The cumulative impact of these coal port proposals on coal consumption in Asia could be much larger than even that implied by the two pending proposals. If Arch, Peabody, and other western U.S. coal producers’ projections of the competitiveness of western coal in Asia are correct, facilitating the opening of the development of West Coast coal ports could have a very large impact on the supply of coal to China and the rest of Asia.

6.4 The Long-term Implications of Fueling Additional Coal-Fired Electric Generation

Although the economic life of coal-fired generators is often given as 30 or 35 years, a permitted, operating, electric generator is kept on line a lot longer than that, as long as 50 or more years through ongoing renovations and upgrades. Because of that long operating life, the impact of the lower Asian coal prices and costs triggered by PRB coal competing with other coal sources cannot be measured by the number of tons of coal exported each year. Those lower coal costs will lead to commitments to more coal being burned for a half-century going forward.

That time-frame is very important. During exactly this time frame, the next half-century, the nations of the world will have to get their greenhouse gas emission stabilized and then reduced or the concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere may pass a point that will make it very difficult to avoid massive, ongoing, negative climate impacts. Taking actions now that encourage fifty-years of more coal consumption around the world is not a minor matter. Put more positively, allowing coal prices to rise (and more closely approximate their full cost, including “external” costs) will encourage extensive investments in improving the efficiency with which coal is used and the shift to cleaner sources of energy. This will lead to long-term reductions in greenhouse gas emissions that will also last well into the next half-century. 57

### 2AC NeoLib K

#### The role of the judge is that of a policymaker – the role of the ballot is to weigh the costs and benefits of simulated government action

#### A. Predictability – the resolution begs for federal government action – only way for the affirmative to understand the role of the judge

#### B. Fairness – checks multiple negative critical frameworks

#### That’s a voting issue

#### Abdication of simulated policy enactment makes political change impossible – policy focus key

Stevenson 2009

Ruth, PhD, senior lecturer and independent consultant – Graduate School of the Environment @ Centre for Alternative Technology, “Discourse, power, and energy conflicts: understanding Welsh renewable energy planning policy,” *Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy*, Volume 27, pg. 512-526

It could be argued that this result arose from the lack of expertise of the convenors of the TAN 8 in consensual decision making. Indeed, there is now more research and advice on popular participation in policy issues at a community level (eg Kaner et al, 1996; Ostrom, 1995; Paddison, 1999). However, for policy making the state remains the vehicle through which policy goals must be achieved (Rydin, 2003) and it is through the state that global issues such as climate change and sustainable development must be legislated for, and to some extent enacted. It is therefore through this structure that any consensual decision making must be tested. This research indicates that the policy process cannot actually overcome contradictions and conflict. Instead, encompassing them may well be a more fruitful way forward than attempts at consensus. Foucault reinforces the notion that the `field of power' can prove to be positive both for individuals and for the state by allowing both to act (Darier, 1996; Foucault, 1979). Rydin (2003) suggests that actors can be involved in policy making but through `deliberative' policy making rather than aiming for consensus: ``the key to success here is not consensus but building a position based on divergent positions'' (page 69). Deliberative policy making for Rydin involves: particular dialogic mechanisms such as speakers being explicit about their values, understandings, and activities: the need to move back and forth between memories (historical) and aspirations (future); moving between general and the particular; and the adoption of role taking (sometimes someone else's role). There is much to be trialed and tested in these deliberative models, however, a strong state is still required as part of the equation if we are to work in the interests of global equity, at least until the messages about climate change and sustainable development are strong enough to filter through to the local level. It is at the policy level that the usefulness of these various new techniques of deliberative policy making must be tested, and at the heart of this must be an understanding of the power rationalities at work in the process.

#### Permutation do both

#### ---The affirmative is a prerequisite to the critique.

#### (A.) The alternative fractures the left --- rejecting the plan unites the alternative with right wing china bashers and the pentagons militarist china policy

Bello & Mittal 2000

Walden, Anuradha, Dangerous Liaisons: Progressives, the Right, and the Anti-China Trade Campaign, Institute for Food and Development Policy/Food First, May, http://www.tni.org/archives/archives\_bello\_china

A coalition of forces seeks to deprive China of permanent normal trading relations (PNTR) as a means of obstructing that country's entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO). We do not approve of the free-trade paradigm that underpins NTR status. We do not support the WTO; we believe, in fact, that it would be a mistake for China to join it. But the real issue in the China debate is not the desirability or undesirability of free trade and the WTO. The real issue is whether the United States has the right to serve as the gatekeeper to international organizations such as the WTO. More broadly, it is whether the United States government can arrogate to itself the right to determine who is and who is not a legitimate member of the international community. The issue is unilateralism-the destabilizing thrust that is Washington's oldest approach to the rest of the world. The unilateralist anti-China trade campaign enmeshes many progressive groups in the US in an unholy alliance with the right wing that, among other things, advances the Pentagon's grand strategy to contain China. It splits a progressive movement that was in the process of coming together in its most solid alliance in years. It is, to borrow Omar Bradley's characterization of the Korean War, "the wrong war at the wrong place at the wrong time".

#### (B.) Nationalist scapegoating precludes anti-capitalist mobilization --- causes an independent war with china that is a disad to the alternative

Moody 2000

Kim, staff writer for Labor Notes and author of An Injury to All and Workers in a Lean World, Protectionism or Solidarity? (Part I), http://www.solidarity-us.org/site/node/951

From a Marxist point of view, it seems obvious that the roots of economic nationalism have something to do with imperialism, and that globalization is at heart imperialism shorn of colonialism and dressed up as inevitability and the free market.[See note 6] Nationalism, of course, like reformist ideology in general, has many deep, often complex roots in U.S. history and culture, but like much in the daily consciousness of all classes in society it requires material nourishment over time. While it is primarily capital that has benefitted from imperialism, its fruits have, over time, worked their way through the U.S. economy to benefit a majority of the working class enough to cement national loyalty and underwrite reformist consciousness.[See note 7] It seems clear that for a quarter of a century or more following World War Two, the relative, though uneven, growth of working class living standards reinforced the belief that there was a close connection between living in the United States, being an American, and either experiencing more economic security than any working class in history or, at least, seeing the possibility of attaining that kind of material well-being. This perception was not simply the complacent consciousness of the white majority, much less of some small labor aristocracy. It was also in part what drove the social movements of the 1950s and 1960s, above all the African American civil rights and liberation movements. Even for the excluded, the incredible wealth of the nation and the well-being of so many within it, offered hope-the potential of giving the myth of the American Dream some reality if only the visible barriers of discrimination could be dismantled. Outside U.S. borders, however, only in a select few countries of Europe and the English-speaking settler nations could workers aspire to such living standards. For the majority of the world's toilers, the uneven world created by imperialism meant that the outer possibility was not the struggle up from poverty to prosperity, but only from misery to poverty, so long as the structures of imperialism (globalization) remained in place. By the 1970s, U.S. and then world capitalism experienced an accelerating crisis of profitability and the deepest worldwide recession since the 1930s, both of which increased simultaneously capital's movement abroad and its desire to tame labor at home. Yet it was almost a decade before capital's offensive against the U.S. working class took on momentum and the living standards associated with U.S. international "hegemony" began to deteriorate visibly. Within the unionized working class, the "Blue Collar Blues" and Black worker rebellions of the late 1960s and early 1970s were largely broken by the world recession of 1974-75-as well as by actions of the labor bureaucracy and the state. The old collective bargaining institutions, occasionally helped by strikes, however, continued to be able to recoup economic losses for those covered by them until the late 1970s. With the beginnings of real income decline and, at the same time, the first signs of an import "crisis" in the late 1970s, economic nationalism got a new lease on life, directing attention and activity toward "the border" and protectionism. The "problem" was easily seen as imports on the one hand, and, somewhat later, immigrants on the other: foreigners, here or there, "taking" American jobs. For years, as Dana Frank shows in detail, the unions put this message out to their members and the public in various "Buy American" campaigns. Since imports were real, this view had credibility, just as it does in the case of China or the steel industry today-even if it could be demonstrated that more jobs were lost to domestic downsizing, lean production methods, new technology, and other homespun means of increasing profits. There was more, however, for the impact of this crisis fell on an institutional setup that already encouraged economic nationalism. When the CIO abandoned the fight for a broad class political agenda on questions such as housing, education, health care, pensions, unemployment income and mass transportation in the late 1940s, it turned instead to constructing "private welfare states" through industry-by-industry or company-by-company benefits bargaining. This retreat both abandoned a broader class perspective and laid the basis for a new kind of economic nationalism unique in most respects to the United States. It was an economic nationalism (and narrow political consciousness) in which the nation, the employer, and the union became intimately intertwined. "What's good for General Motors is what's good for the nation," was GM chairman C.E. Wilson's capitalist view of the bonds of corporation and nation. For the worker, whose health care, retirement and children's future depended on company-provided, even if union-won, benefits (largely not available from the state in the U.S.), the union was a natural amendment to Wilson's self-serving equation of capital and nation. Even after the CEOs publicly broke the corporation-nation equation in favor of the new executive cosmopolitanism and investor globalism in the 1980s, the link between the nation, the company, the union, and the worker's economic well-being remained imbedded in the negotiated "private welfare state." Furthermore, the deterioration of the benefits of that setup could easily be blamed simultaneously on the new cosmopolitanism of the corporation and the external threat of imports. Hate the company for its betrayal of the economic nation, but defend it from the "outsider" in order to save your benefits. Appropriate the flag to fight management, as so many strikes have, but look to the defense of the business in the protection afforded by the border.

#### ---Turn --- Interdependence.

#### (A.) Rejecting trade makes war inevitable --- Extend Patrick --- Collapsing trade relations creates a spiraling cycle of suspicion and nationalism where every foreign business action is seen as zero sum with American national security.

#### (B.) Solves their turns --- Interdependence creates an ethic of mutual recognition and respect between competitors that doesn’t require the instrumentalization of all life.

Badhwar 2007

Neera K., Associate Professor of Philosophy at University of Oklahoma - September “Friendship and Commercial Societies” Forthcoming in Politics, Philosophy, and Economics <http://praxeology.net/guest-badhwar1.htm>

I have argued that the critics of market societies misunderstand both markets and friendship by conceiving of them in radically dichotomous terms. Instrumentality, fungibility, impersonality etc. come in varying degrees and characterize not only market, but also non-market, relationships, including friendship. Further, although market relations are primarily instrumental, they are not entirely so, because the individuals involved are not mere means to ends. It is this recognition that ultimately justifies the prohibition of force and fraud that is essential to a market relationship, and free markets are the most potent social force for promoting this recognition. Moreover, like all productive or creative activities, market activities play an important role in a meaningful life and, thus, are essentially structured by moral norms. For all these reasons, far from militating against friendship, market relations often give rise to friendship, and market societies are friendlier to civic and character friendship than any other developed form of society.

#### ---Turn --- Anti-markets

#### (A.) CFIUS securitization is anti-market neoliberalism.

Daily Times 2006

EDITORIAL: Economic neo-liberalism vs political realism, February 26th, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2006%5C02%5C26%5Cstory\_26-2-2006\_pg3\_1

Ditto for CNOOC’s Unocal bid. China had no part to play in rearing Al Qaeda but it is a country most US lawmakers consider the next challenge to America. And energy is an important sector for reasons of security. This is an area where neo-liberal economics with its deregulation and laissez faire meets geopolitical requirements and gets upstaged. So, while the US and the Western world do not tire of preaching the merits of neo-liberalism and even argue that trade and business activity across frontiers creates mutual stakes to everyone’s advantage, politics has its own ideas of security and protectionism.

#### (B.) The removal of anti-market forces solves bad capitalism and is historically distinct from the system described in their evidence.

De Landa 1998

Manuel, Markets and Antimarkets in the World Economy, http://www.alamut.com/subj/economics/de\_landa/antiMarkets.html

When approaching the subject of economic power, one can safely ignore the entire field of linear mathematical economics (so-called competitive equilibrium economics), since there monopolies and oligopolies are basically ignored. Yet, even those thinkers who make economic power the center of their models, introduce it in a way that ignores historical facts. Authors writing in the Marxist tradition, place real history in a straight-jacket by subordinating it to a model of a progressive succession of modes of production. Capitalism itself is seen as maturing through a series of stages, the latest one of which is the monopolistic stage in this century. Even non-Marxists economists like Galbraith, agree that capitalism began as a competitive pursuit and stayed that way till the end of the nineteenth century, and only then it reached the monopolistic stage, at which point a planning system replaced market dynamics. However, Fernand Braudel has recently shown, with a wealth of historical data, that this picture is inherently wrong. Capitalism was, from its beginnings in the Italy of the thirteenth century, always monopolistic and oligopolistic. That is to say, the power of capitalism has always been associated with large enterprises, large that is, relative to the size of the markets where they operate. [6] Also, it has always been associated with the ability to plan economic strategies and to control market dynamics, and therefore, with a certain degree of centralization and hierarchy. Within the limits of this presentation, I will not be able to review the historical evidence that supports this extremely important hypothesis, but allow me at least to extract some of the consequences that would follow if it turns out to be true. First of all, if capitalism has always relied on non-competitive practices, if the prices for its commodities have never been objectively set by demand/supply dynamics, but imposed from above by powerful economic decision-makers, then capitalism and the market have always been different entities. To use a term introduced by Braudel, capitalism has always been an "antimarket". This, of course, would seem to go against the very meaning of the word "capitalism", regardless of whether the word is used by Karl Marx or Ronald Reagan. For both nineteenth century radicals and twentieth century conservatives, capitalism is identified with an economy driven by market forces, whether one finds this desirable or not. Today, for example, one speaks of the former Soviet Union's "transition to a market economy", even though what was really supposed to happen was a transition to an antimarket: to large scale enterprises, with several layers of managerial strata, in which prices are set not taken. This conceptual confusion is so entrenched that I believe the only solution is to abandon the term "capitalism" completely, and to begin speaking of markets and antimarkets and their dynamics.

#### ---The alternative fails --- Collective structures are responsible for an overwhelming majority of consumption.

Jensen 2009

Derrick, activist and the author of many books, most recently What We Leave Behind and Songs of the Dead, Forget Shorter Showers, Orion Magazine, http://www.orionmagazine.org/index.php/articles/article/4801/

WOULD ANY SANE PERSON think dumpster diving would have stopped Hitler, or that composting would have ended slavery or brought about the eight-hour workday, or that chopping wood and carrying water would have gotten people out of Tsarist prisons, or that dancing naked around a fire would have helped put in place the Voting Rights Act of 1957 or the Civil Rights Act of 1964? Then why now, with all the world at stake, do so many people retreat into these entirely personal “solutions”? Part of the problem is that we’ve been victims of a campaign of systematic misdirection. Consumer culture and the capitalist mindset have taught us to substitute acts of personal consumption (or enlightenment) for organized political resistance. An Inconvenient Truth helped raise consciousness about global warming. But did you notice that all of the solutions presented had to do with personal consumption—changing light bulbs, inflating tires, driving half as much—and had nothing to do with shifting power away from corporations, or stopping the growth economy that is destroying the planet? Even if every person in the United States did everything the movie suggested, U.S. carbon emissions would fall by only 22 percent. Scientific consensus is that emissions must be reduced by at least 75 percent worldwide. Or let’s talk water. We so often hear that the world is running out of water. People are dying from lack of water. Rivers are dewatered from lack of water. Because of this we need to take shorter showers. See the disconnect? Because I take showers, I’m responsible for drawing down aquifers? Well, no. More than 90 percent of the water used by humans is used by agriculture and industry. The remaining 10 percent is split between municipalities and actual living breathing individual humans. Collectively, municipal golf courses use as much water as municipal human beings. People (both human people and fish people) aren’t dying because the world is running out of water. They’re dying because the water is being stolen. Or let’s talk energy. Kirkpatrick Sale summarized it well: “For the past 15 years the story has been the same every year: individual consumption—residential, by private car, and so on—is never more than about a quarter of all consumption; the vast majority is commercial, industrial, corporate, by agribusiness and government [he forgot military]. So, even if we all took up cycling and wood stoves it would have a negligible impact on energy use, global warming and atmospheric pollution.” Or let’s talk waste. In 2005, per-capita municipal waste production (basically everything that’s put out at the curb) in the U.S. was about 1,660 pounds. Let’s say you’re a die-hard simple-living activist, and you reduce this to zero. You recycle everything. You bring cloth bags shopping. You fix your toaster. Your toes poke out of old tennis shoes. You’re not done yet, though. Since municipal waste includes not just residential waste, but also waste from government offices and businesses, you march to those offices, waste reduction pamphlets in hand, and convince them to cut down on their waste enough to eliminate your share of it. Uh, I’ve got some bad news. Municipal waste accounts for only 3 percent of total waste production in the United States. I want to be clear. I’m not saying we shouldn’t live simply. I live reasonably simply myself, but I don’t pretend that not buying much (or not driving much, or not having kids) is a powerful political act, or that it’s deeply revolutionary. It’s not. Personal change doesn’t equal social change.

#### ---Individual local strategies fail to adapt to the inevitability of global concerns and guarantees a world dominated by violence.

Monbiot 2004

George, journalist, academic, and political and environmental activist, Manifesto for a New World Order, p. 11-13

The quest for global solutions is difficult and divisive. Some members of this movement are deeply suspicious of all institutional power at the global level, fearing that it could never be held to account by the world’s people. Others are concerned that a single set of universal prescriptions would threaten the diversity of dissent. A smaller faction has argued that all political programmes are oppressive: our task should not be to replace one form of power with another, but to replace all power with a magical essence called ‘anti-power’. But most of the members of this movement are coming to recognize that if we propose solutions which can be effected only at the local or the national level, we remove ourselves from any meaningful role in solving precisely those problems which most concern us. Issues such as cli­mate change, international debt, nuclear proliferation, war, peace and the balance of trade between nations can be addressed only globally or internationally. Without global measures and global institutions, it is impossible to see how we might distribute wealth from rich nations to poor ones, tax the mobile rich and their even more mobile money, control the shipment of toxic waste, sustain the ban on landmines, prevent the use of nuclear weapons, broker peace between nations or prevent powerful states from forcing weaker ones to trade on their terms. If we were to work only at the local level, we would leave these, the most critical of issues, for other people to tackle. Global governance will take place whether we participate in it or not. Indeed, it must take place if the issues which concern us are not to be resolved by the brute force of the powerful. That the international institutions have been designed or captured by the dictatorship of vested interests is not an argument against the existence of international institutions, but a reason for overthrowing them and re­placing them with our own. It is an argument for a global political system which holds power to account. In the absence of an effective global politics, moreover, local solutions will always be undermined by communities of interest which do not share our vision. We might, for example, manage to persuade the people of the street in which we live to give up their cars in the hope of preventing climate change, but unless everyone, in all communities, either shares our politics or is bound by the same rules, we simply open new road space into which the neighbouring communities can expand. We might declare our neighbour­hood nuclear-free, but unless we are simultaneously work­ing, at the international level, for the abandonment of nuclear weapons, we can do nothing to prevent ourselves and everyone else from being threatened by people who are not as nice as we are. We would deprive ourselves, in other words, of the power of restraint. By first rebuilding the global politics, we establish the political space in which our local alternatives can flourish. If, by contrast, we were to leave the governance of the necessary global institutions to others, then those institutions will pick off our local, even our national, solutions one by one. There is little point in devising an alternative economic policy for your nation, as Luis Inacio ‘Lula’ da Silva, now president of Brazil, once advocated, if the International Monetary Fund and the financial speculators have not first been overthrown. There is little point in fighting to protect a coral reef from local pollution, if nothing has been done to prevent climate change from destroying the conditions it requires for its survival.

#### ---Value to life is an affirmative argument --- expression of economic human potential is critical

Badhwar 2007

Neera K., Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Oklahoma, Friendship and Commercial Societies, Forthcoming in *Politics, Philosophy, and Economics*, http://praxeology.net/guest-badhwar1.htm

None of this is to deny that when the means to an end is not a human being or a human relationship, and the end in question is morally permissible, the end is unqualifiedly more important than the means, since the value of the means derives from the value of the end. Hence, if economic production were only a means to the ends of survival, comfort, pleasure, personal relationships etc., then it could fairly be said to be lower on the scale of value than these ends. But **there is no reason to think that production is only a means to these ends** (although its role as a means is hardly negligible in the absence of a regular delivery of manna from heaven). **To relegate it to a lower realm of human existence**, as Schwarzenbach and other critics do, **is to show a serious misunderstanding of** its role in a good **human life.** People engage in economic production for many of the same sorts of reasons that they engage in intellectual or artistic production – proving theorems, writing treatises, making music - or, indeed, building friendships: for the sake of exercising their creative or productive powers in worthwhile enterprises. Although Fromm fails to appreciate this about economic production, he appreciates better than even some defenders of free markets the meaning and importance of productiveness as such. “Productiveness,” he states, “is man’s ability to use his powers and to realize the potentialities inherent in him” (1949: 84), and again, “[p]roductiveness means that he experiences himself as the embodiment of his powers and as the `actor’; that he feels himself one with his powers and at the same time that they are not masked and alienated from him” (86). When productiveness is understood as a positive expression of human potentiality and not simply as a means to the ends of survival, comfort, or wealth, we can appreciate the entrepreneurial and creative spirit that animates all worthwhile activities, including market activities.

And then we can understand why, for instance, a philosophy Ph.D. would find satisfaction in the enterprise of producing skateboards “adorned with uplifting art.”[34] Worthwhile activity in any sphere exercises our imaginative, emotional, and intellectual powers to create things of worth and, thereby, engages and re-shapes our identity. This is at least one reason why the failure of a business enterprise can be as devastating as the failure of a long-term scientific enterprise - or of a long-term friendship. Seeing commercial activities as “poiesis” and friendship as “praxis” distorts the nature of both business enterprises and friendships.

## \*\*\*1AR

### \*\*\*Topicality

### 1ar w/m

#### 1. We meet this on face – the 1AC plan text says “on oil and natural gas production” – plan text in a vacuum first because it’s critical to stable understanding of affirmative ground

#### 2. Hirsch evidence says restrictions on foreign investment are directly tied to production of oil and natural gas since that capital infusion is the only thing that can result in the construction of drilling operations

#### 3. No distinction between their caselist and the plan – even prohibition affs like ANWR or OCS are essentially restrictions on investment for the production of oil and natural gas

#### 4. Restrictions on foreign investment are access restrictions on production of oil

Exxon Mobile no date (“Risk factors,” http://www.exxonmobil.com/Corporate/safety\_climate\_mgmt\_risk.aspx)

Access limitations. A number of countries limit access to their oil and gas resources, or may place resources off-limits from development altogether. Restrictions on foreign investment in the oil and gas sector tend to increase in times of high commodity prices, when national governments may have less need of outside sources of private capital. Many countries also restrict the import or export of certain products based on point of origin.

#### 5. The plan is directly tied to oil and gas production-Capital is intrinsically tied to future increases

Houston Chronicle 1/4/12 International players jump at U.S. shale Simone Sebastian

<http://www.chron.com/business/article/International-players-jump-at-U-S-shale-2439490.php>

Energy companies are funneling billions of dollars into the booming business of U.S. shale drilling. They are investing euros, yuan and krone, too. Chinese corporation Sinopec and French company Total this week became the latest in a string of foreign firms to announce big bets on the resurgence of U.S. fossil fuel production. International energy companies are signing billion-dollar deals with U.S. firms to reap the financial benefits of their oil fields and siphon knowledge from their experience in extracting petroleum from dense shale rock to carry the skills overseas. In return, they are ponying up the funds to get more wells drilled, so the oil and natural gas bounty trapped deep below can get to market quickly. "The big motivation for (U.S.companies) wanting to find a partner is finding someone with big pockets," said Scott Hanold, energy research analyst for RBC Capital Markets. "They are just money men at the end of the day." Total signed its second shale compact with Oklahoma-based natural gas producer Chesapeake Energy last week to secure acreage in Ohio's burgeoning Utica shale. The French energy giant got 25 percent interest in a 619,000-acre joint venture with Chesapeake and Houston-based EnerVest. In exchange, it forked over $700 million cash along with a promise to fund 60 percent, or about $1.63 billion, of the group's drilling and well completion costs in the Utica. The companies plan to have 25 rigs operating by 2014. China's Sinopec International Petroleum Exploration & Production Corp. muscled its way into U.S. shale with a $2.2 billion investment in oil fields owned by Oklahoma-based energy company Devon, announced Tuesday. The Chinese corporation gains one-third interest in Devon's 1.2 million acres in the Utica shale, the Michigan Basin, the Mississippian in Oklahoma, the Tuscaloosa marine shale in Louisiana and the Niobrara in Wyoming. Sinopec will pay $900 million cash when the deal closes, expected in 2012's first quarter, and cover 70 percent of Devon's drilling costs, about $1.6 billion.

#### 6. CFIUS reviews apply to investments in the extraction phase.

Clark 11 (Harry, partner with Dewey & LeBoeuf LLP, with Jonathan Ware, “LIMITS ON INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS IN THE PETROLEUM SECTOR: CFIUS INVESTMENT SCREENING, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS, ANTI-BRIBERY RULES, AND OTHER MEASURES,” http://tjogel.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/ware\_final1.pdf)

Transactions in the energy sector have been subject to CFIUS review at various stages of the value chain, including extraction, transportation, conversion to power, and supply to the U.S. government. 39 Over time CFIUS appears to be paying closer attention to deals involving these types of assets, creating some uncertainty for potential mergers and acquisitions in this sector.

#### 7. CFIUS review of Ralls explicitly banned production!

Voss, their author, 12 (CJ Attorney at Stoel Rives LLP) September 24, 2012 "Energy Law Alert: CFIUS Intervenes in Chinese-Owned Wind Project" http://www.stoel.com/showalert.aspx?Show=9813)

On July 25, 2012, CFIUS issued an Order Establishing Interim Mitigation Measures requiring Ralls to cease further construction and operation of the Oregon Projects, remove all stockpiled or stored items from the Oregon Project sites, and cease access to the sites except to the extent required to remove stored or stockpiled property. In an amended order, dated August 2, 2012, CFIUS modified its prior order, adding further restrictions on Ralls's activities, including a prohibition on the sale or transfer of the Oregon Projects to any third party for the purpose of installing any Sany products and restrictions on the sale or transfer of the equity or assets of the Oregon Projects.

#### President can block that shit, if this isn’t t then tera isn’t, and fuck that

#### Yess you read voss evidence, it said ralls was a restriction on operation which is the same as production, here is more evidence from their only violation author CFIUS reviews are a prohibition.

Voss, their author, 12 (CJ Attorney at Stoel Rives LLP) September 24, 2012 "Energy Law Alert: CFIUS Intervenes in Chinese-Owned Wind Project" http://www.stoel.com/showalert.aspx?Show=9813)

If an investigation is undertaken, it must be completed within 45 days after the initial determination to investigate. CFIUS concludes action under Exon-Florio only if it has determined that a proposed transaction raises no unresolved national security concerns (with or without mitigation measures). Otherwise, CFIUS will refer the transaction to the President with a recommendation that it be suspended or prohibited. The President must make a determination relating to the transaction within 15 days after CFIUS has made its recommendation.

#### All of these meet on production, the plan only removes on production, no neg on presumption because we solve, all of our advantages are about energy.

#### A restriction is a qualification on production, That’s Wright v Magellan and Google Dictionary, their evidence is just as arbitrary, defining for their own purposes creatively highlighted and anell is about milk production. Counterinterpretation solves their arguments, our aff is codeded in law, mountain ranges are not, none of these affs have a solvency advocate anyway and no advantages.

#### prefer our interpretation.

#### Don’t ruin the topic because of their ticky tacky distinction, democracy was ruined because no affs had a mechanism that could defeat generic counterplans---number of hours is a red herring, we only add one mechanism and all of the affs in his case list have the same advantages and impacts

#### Aff ground outweighs, 2 links, financial incentives affs are solved by states, and production is sky high now so affs have no advantage uniqueness, that is our capital key argument.

#### Staleness: they only allow offshore drilling and anwr affs, those don’t have advantages outside of energy security and price shocks, that stifles aff innovation, they limit out the fracking aff, SMR lisencing barriers and EPA regs because those are not explicit prohibitions, those affs are key to novelty which defeats generics. It also makes education less valuable because its all redundant, their interpretation is just the nuclear subsidies topic.

#### Neg ground is inevitable, they number of affs is a red herring, we only add one mechanism, its still a restriction that prevents production, they get links to their energy disads.

#### Arbitrary limits are worse than no limits---the aff wont have a reasonable idea of what is t or not, causes shallow poorly researched debates.

#### Reasonability is critical, topicality is the death penalty which means they have a high burden to prove we ruin the topic, your role is not to craft the topic anyway it is to decide if our affirmative made it impossible to debate, otherwise going for t is over incentivized which trades off with substance, competiting interpretations are a hollow race to limits.

### \*\*\*IFR CP

### CP

#### Technology fails

Brown 2008

Paul, former Guardian environment correspondent, author of Global Warning and Voodoo Economics and the Doomed Nuclear Renaissance, email exchange with Polly Higgins, an environmental lawyer, The Environmentalist's Nuclear Debate: (2) Mark Lynas, http://thelazyenvironmentalist.blogspot.com/2008/08/environmentalists-nuclear-debate-2-mark.html

1. Is it true, as Lynas asserts, that 4th gen nuclear would prevent nuclear proliferation? 2. Is the design indeed close to fail-safe? 3. Is it accurate to say that 4th Generation nuclear is more realistic than Carbon Capture and Storage? This is the response I received from Paul Brown: "There are no grounds for saying that a fourth generation of nuclear power would prevent proliferation. There are three generations at present, the third generation is the one being constructed in Finland and another in France. It is the type the government wants to build in England. Many "new" designs for new nuclear power stations exist, all of them called fourth generation reactors. What this means is they could be the new form of reactors adopted after this present third generation. For all of them it is claimed they will be cheaper, safer, and better in every way than the present generation. All this is unproved hype. None has been built so it all theory - like so much else about the nuclear industry. The reason they have not been built is essentially because the first one (of every design) would be very expensive to build and might not work. No government is prepared to fund them so far. The fourth generation that Lynas is talking about is a design that will burn existing stocks of plutonium and uranium thereby reducing stocks of these bomb making materials, therefore reducing proliferation dangers. The UK government was asked by British Nuclear Fuels to sanction research and development into building one of these at Sellafield but was refused on the grounds of cost. So the answer to your first question is no - Lynas is not correct - and no one knows whether an "integral fast reactor breeder plant" would really work. Fast breeders only worked on small scale dustbin size projects and broke every time France, Japan, and Russia tried to scale them up. Second question: Note the "close to" fail-safe. Could have said in theory the design is fail safe. In other words it has not been tried, so how can you know? Nuclear fission is a controlled nuclear explosion. It is virtually impossible to make it fail-safe.

### \*\*\*Iran Advantage

### AT: Moderates behavior

#### No they don’t- the Soviets and Chinese prove- Waltz has it backwards.

Kahl 12 (Colin, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East and Senior Fellow, the Center for a New American Security, Iran and the Bomb, Foreign Affairs; Sep/Oct2012, Vol. 91 Issue 5, p157-162)

"History shows that when countries acquire the bomb, they feel increasingly vulnerable and become acutely aware that their nuclear weapons make them a potential target in the eyes of major powers," Waltz argues. "This awareness discourages nuclear states from bold and aggressive action."

In writing this, Waltz ignores a long history of emerging nuclear powers behaving provocatively. In 1950, for example, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin gave North Korea the green light to invade South Korea, thus beginning the Korean War. Stalin apparently assumed (incorrectly) that the United States was unlikely to respond because the Soviets had by then developed their own nuclear weapons. Waltz also claims that China became less aggressive after going nuclear in 1964. But in 1969, Mao Zedong authorized Chinese troops to attack Soviet forces on the Chinese-Soviet border. The attack was meant to warn Moscow against border provocations and to mobilize domestic Chinese support for Mao's revolution. Like Stalin before him, Mao was probably confident that China's recently acquired nuclear capabilities would limit the resulting conflict. (In the end, the border clashes produced a larger crisis than Mao had expected, raising the possibility of a Soviet nuclear strike, and China backed down.)

#### Nuclearization causes Iranian aggression, not moderation.

Kahl 12 (Colin, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East and Senior Fellow, the Center for a New American Security, Iran and the Bomb, Foreign Affairs; Sep/Oct2012, Vol. 91 Issue 5, p157-162)

Kenneth Waltz is probably right that a nuclear-armed Iran could be deterred from deliberately using nuclear weapons or transferring a nuclear device to terrorists ("Why Iran Should Get the Bomb," July/August 2012). But he is dead wrong that the Islamic Republic would likely become a more responsible international actor if it crossed the nuclear threshold. In making that argument, Waltz mischaracterizes Iranian motivations and badly misreads history. And despite the fact that Waltz is one of the world's most respected international relations theorists, he ignores important political science research into the effects of nuclear weapons, including recent findings that suggest that new nuclear states are often more reckless and aggressive at lower levels of conflict. RATIONAL BUT DANGEROUS Waltz correctly notes that Iran's leaders, despite their fanatical rhetoric, are fundamentally rational. Because Iran's leadership is not suicidal, it is highly unlikely that a nuclear-armed Iran would deliberately use a nuclear device or transfer one to terrorists. Yet even though the Islamic Republic is rational, it is still dangerous, and it is likely to become even more so if it develops nuclear weapons. Iran's government currently sponsors terrorist groups and supports militants throughout the Middle East, in part to demonstrate a capability to retaliate against the United States, Israel, and other states should they attack Iran or undermine its interests. If the Iranian leadership's sole concern was its own survival and it believed that a nuclear deterrent alone could give it enough protection, then as a nuclear state, it might curtail its support for proxies in order to avoid needless disputes with other nuclear powers. But Iran is not a status quo state, and its support for terrorists and militants is intended to be for more than just defense and retaliation. Such support is an offensive tool, designed to pressure and intimidate other states, indirectly expand Iran's influence, and advance its revisionist agenda, which seeks to make Iran the preeminent power in the Middle East, champion resistance to Israel and "arrogant powers" in the West, promote its brand of revolutionary Islamist ideology, and assert its leadership in the wider Islamic world. Tehran currently calibrates its support for militants and sponsorship of terrorism to minimize the risks of a direct confrontation with more powerful states. But if Iranian leaders perceived that a nuclear arsenal provided a substantially more robust deterrent against retaliation, they would likely pursue their regional goals more aggressively.

### AT Pakistan

#### Nukes embolden Pakistan making India-Pakistan conflict more likely

Kahl 12 (Colin, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East and Senior Fellow, the Center for a New American Security, Iran and the Bomb, Foreign Affairs; Sep/Oct2012, Vol. 91 Issue 5, p157-162)

Waltz also asserts that "India and Pakistan have both become more cautious since going nuclear." But Pakistan's development of nuclear weapons has in fact facilitated its strategy of engaging in low-intensity conflict against India, making the subcontinent more crisis-prone. As the political scientist S. Paul Kapur has shown, as Islamabad's nuclear capabilities have increased, so has the volatility of the Indian-Pakistani rivalry. Since 1998, when both India and Pakistan openly tested nuclear devices, Islamabad has appeared more willing to back militant groups fighting in disputed Kashmir and to support groups that have conducted terrorist attacks elsewhere in India. Furthermore, in 1999, Pakistan sent conventional forces disguised as insurgents across the Line of Control in the Kargil district of Kashmir, triggering a limited war with India. This move was encouraged by the Pakistanis' belief that their nuclear deterrent placed clear limits on India's ability to retaliate with conventional weapons. Additionally, over the past decade, Pakistani-backed militants have engaged in high-profile terrorist attacks inside India itself, including the 2001 attack on the New Delhi parliament complex and the 2008 Mumbai attacks.

### AT bioweapons

**Delivery fails**

**Newhouse, CDI Senior Fellow, 2 –** senior fellow at the Center for Defense Information. Former senior policy advisor on European Affairs to secretary of state. Former director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. (John, World Policy Journal 7/31 V.XIX; N.2 p. 21)

Temperature, sunlight, wind, and moisture can all prevent effective delivery of chemical weapons. Biological pathogens are living organisms and thus more fragile than chemical agents. Chlorine in the water supply can kill them. Munitions can as easily vaporize an agent as dispense one. If released from a bomb or warhead, explosive effects would destroy all but 1-2 percent of the agent. 31

### Nuclear War outweighs

#### Nuclear winter outweighs – no adaptation.

Starr 2008

Steven, Associate member of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation Director of Clinical Laboratory Science Program, University of Missouri-Columbia, Catastrophic Climatic Consequences of Nuclear Conflict, International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation, Bulletin 28 April 2008, http://www.inesap.org/bulletin-28/catastrophic-climatic-consequences-nuclear-conflict

Climatic changes resulting from nuclear conflict would occur many thousands of times faster – and thus would likely be far more catastrophic – than the climatic changes predicted as a result of global warming.40 The rapidity of the war-induced changes, appearing in a matter of days and weeks, would allow human populations and the whole plant and animal kingdoms no time to adapt. It is worth noting that the same methods and climate models used to predict global warming were used in these studies to predict global cooling resulting from nuclear war. These climate models have proved highly successful in describing the cooling effects of volcanic clouds during extensive U.S. evaluations and in international intercomparisons performed as part of the Fourth Assessment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.41 Predicted drops in average global temperatures caused by small, moderate, and large nuclear conflicts are contrasted with the effects of global warming during the last century in Figure 4 and with average surface air temperatures during the last 1,000 years in Figure 5. There are, of course, other important considerations which must be made when estimating the overall environmental and ecological impacts of nuclear war. These must include the release of enormous amounts of radioactive fallout, pyrotoxins, and toxic industrial chemicals into the ecosystems. A decade after the conflict, when the smoke begins to clear, there will also be massive increases in the amount of deadly ultraviolet light which will reach the surface of the Earth as a result of ozone depletion. All these by-products of nuclear war must be taken into account when comparing the danger of nuclear conflict to other potential dangers now confronting humanity and life on Earth. Conclusions We cannot allow our political and military leaders to continue to ignore the potential cataclysmic climatic and environmental consequences posed by the use of nuclear weapons. Civilization remains at risk from nuclear winter despite a three-fold reduction in global nuclear arsenals during the last 20 years. This is due in part to the fact that nuclear arms control agreements have focused primarily on the dismantlement of delivery systems and have failed to include the verified dismantlement of nuclear warheads. Future negotiations must consider all the potential effects of the total number of nuclear weapons in the nuclear arsenals.44 The U.S. and Russia must recognize the senselessness of continued planning for a nuclear first-strike which, if launched, would make the whole world including their own country uninhabitable. As a first step, they should end their preparations for the pre-emptive use of their nuclear arsenals, stand-down their high-alert strategic nuclear forces, and eliminate the standard operating procedure of launch-on-warning.45 It is essential that all the nuclear weapon states be convinced of the need to honor their commitments under Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, to “act in good faith” to eliminate their nuclear arsenals. As long as they ignore this commitment and maintain nuclear weaponry as the cornerstone of their military forces, they confer validity to the false idea that nuclear weapons provide security to those who possess them, and thus encourage non-nuclear weapon states to follow in their footsteps. The unalterable conclusion is that a nuclear war cannot be won and must not be fought. Nuclear weapons must be seen not only as instruments of mass murder, but as instruments of global annihilation which put all humanity and civilization under a common threat of destruction.

#### Waltz describes how states *should* act—overestimates new proliferants ability to control their weapons.

Sagan, Political Science at Stanford University, ‘3 (Scott– Co-director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed” p 158)

Waltz's optimism is fueled by a strong belief that the constraints of the international system, and the potential costs of any nuclear war, will produce similar, and essentially rational, decisions in all states. As he puts it, "Whatever the identity of rulers, and whatever the characteristics of their states, the national behaviors they produce are strongly conditioned by the world outside" (Ch. 4, p. 132). This assumption, that states will recognize and act in their "objective" interests, as determined by external forces, undergirds his entire argument. In contrast, my pessimism is fueled by the belief that the military and other government organizations play a very important intervening role between the interests of states~~men~~ and the behavior of states. The information these organizations pass on, the plans and routines they develop, and the biases they hold continually shape the actions of states in very important ways. Waltz stresses the unprecedented power of nuclear weapons and argues that "nobody but an idiot can fail to comprehend their destructive force[.] What more is there to learn?" (Ch. 4, p. 132). Unfortunately, there is a lot more to learn. States have to learn how to avoid accidents, how to prevent terrorists from stealing their weapons, how to build sur-vivable forces, how to control their militaries, and how to limit escalation. All political leaders may well desire such reasonable things. Yet, between the desire and the deed lies the shadow of organizations. The difficult tasks of proper organizational design and management are not automatically achieved simply because senior states~~men~~ understand the effects of nuclear weapons. And they certainly are not guaranteed to exist in every state that develops these horribly destructive weapons. To prevent them from ever possessing such weapons. This antiterrorist imperative adds yet one more compelling reason why the spread of nuclear weapons to potential proliferanl states is to be feared, not welcomed. The best way, by far, to prevent Islamic terrorists from possessing nuclear weapons is to prevent unstable states, especially unstable Islamic states, from possessing nuclear weapons. Pakistan is clearly the most serious concern in the short run. Pakistani weapons lack the advanced Permissive Actions Link (PALs) locks that make it difficult for a terrorist or other unauthorized individual to use a stolen nuclear weapon. In June 2001, Pakistani officials also acknowledged that there were no specialized Pakistani teams trained on how to seize or dismantle a nuclear weapon if one was stolen. No dedicated personnel reliability program (PRP) was in place to ensure the psychological stability and reliability of the officers and guards of Pakistan's nuclear forces. 12 Instead, Pakistani soldiers and scientists with nuclear responsibilities were reviewed and approved for duty if they were not suspected of being Indian agents by the Inter Services Intelligence (IS!) agency.