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#### A. Interpretation --- Debate is a space for mutually exclusive clash over the desirability of eliminating restrictions and increasing federal government incentives for energy production.

#### B. Violation

#### Restriction-Only direct prohibition is a restriction – their argument that there are ideological restrictions are only regulations

Sinha 6

<http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/437310/>

Supreme Court of India Union Of India & Ors vs M/S. Asian Food Industries on 7 November, 2006 Author: S.B. Sinha Bench: S Sinha, Mark, E Katju CASE NO.: Writ Petition (civil) 4695 of 2006 PETITIONER: Union of India & Ors. RESPONDENT: M/s. Asian Food Industries DATE OF JUDGMENT: 07/11/2006 BENCH: S.B. Sinha & Markandey Katju JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T [Arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) No. 17008 of 2006] WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4696 OF 2006 [Arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) No. 17558 of 2006] S.B. SINHA, J :

We may, however, notice that this Court in State of U.P. and Others v. M/s. Hindustan Aluminium Corpn. and others [AIR 1979 SC 1459] stated the law thus:

"It appears that a distinction between regulation and restriction or prohibition has always been drawn, ever since Municipal Corporation of the City of Toronto v. Virgo. Regulation promotes the freedom or the facility which is required to be regulated in the interest of all concerned, whereas prohibition obstructs or shuts off, or denies it to those to whom it is applied. The Oxford English Dictionary does not define regulate to include prohibition so that if it had been the intention to prohibit the supply, distribution, consumption or use of energy, the legislature would not have contented itself with the use of the word regulating without using the word prohibiting or some such word, to bring out that effect."

#### 2-USFG---The resolution indicates affs should advocate topical government change---the explicitly exclude USFG action

**Ericson 3** (Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb combination. For example, should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action though governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase free trade, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

#### Vote negative

#### Education

#### ---The resolution is the most predictable & educational place to locate the debate.

Zwarensteyn 2012

Ellen C., Masters Candidate in Communications at Grand Valley State University, High School Policy Debate as an Enduring Pathway to Political Education: Evaluating Possibilities for Political Learning, Masters Theses. Paper 35, http://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/theses/35

Galloway (2007) also advances an argument concerning the privileging of the resolution as a basis for debating. Galloway (2007) cites three pedagogical advantages to seeing the resolution and the first affirmative constructive as an invitation to dialogue. “First, all teams have equal access to the resolution. Second, teams spend the entire year preparing approaches for and against the resolution. Finally, the resolution represents a community consensus of worthwhile and equitably debatable topics rooted in a collective history and experience of debate” (p. 13). An important starting point for conversation, the resolution helps frame political conversations humanely. It preserves basic means for equality of access to base research and argumentation. Having a year-long stable resolution invites depth of argument and continuously rewards adaptive research once various topics have surfaced through practice or at debate tournaments.

#### ---The resolution requires switch-sides debate and is the single best educational tool for developing critical decision-making skills and finding personal meaning in argumentation.

Zwarensteyn 2012

Ellen C., Masters Candidate in Communications at Grand Valley State University, High School Policy Debate as an Enduring Pathway to Political Education: Evaluating Possibilities for Political Learning, Masters Theses. Paper 35, http://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/theses/35

As discussed previously, sources of political information matters to how politically pluralistic the general public is. Mutz (2007) and Mutz and Martin (2001) fear the public is selfselecting both the source of their news along with their peer groups preventing the airing and hearing of multiple sides of an argument. This study suggests debate has two supportive roles to help resolve these fears. First, to debate outsiders, the resolution may appear obscure, boring, or isolated from their daily lives. For debaters, however, they must embrace the resolution and soon come to realize a rich complexity of argumentative potential permitting students (or teams and squads) to choose areas of the topic that are intellectually intriguing, competitively beneficial, and/or personally rewarding. The resolution then requires switch-side debating – enabling a depth of argument unrivaled by other high school experiences. Benefits to switchside debates have been offered by Galloway (2007), Harrigan (2008), and Mitchell (2010). Speaking to the intellectual flexibility required of policy debaters, this study concurs how switch side debating enables a range and intensity of argument and how switch-side debating indirectly encourages students to find personal meaning in argumentation. Many debaters interviewed compared their experiences to other high school opportunities and identified a depth of argument in debate unparalleled by civics, government, student councils, other simulation activities, or various service learning opportunities. The competitive necessity to anticipate and research all sides of an argument prior to being in a competitive round encourages a thorough examination of relevant political literature. In a debate rounds, debaters must listen to all of another’s argument, answer the argument at its best intention, consider strategic compromise on argumentation, anticipate the competitive direction of the argument, and directly compare arguments against each other. This practice demands a practice of open political inquiry. As a result of the demand for open inquiry, students are challenged “…to rethink unsubstantiated claims or arguing for positions they personally do not hold, playing devil’s advocate to make sure the full range of positions are well represented or to challenge a too-simple formation that has not grappled with possible objections” (Colby, Beaumont, Ehrlich, and Corngold, 2007, p. 74). Second, debaters must present multiple sides of an issue. This practice enables hearing legitimacy in opposing argumentation as debaters do not have the luxury to entirely self selecting arguments for presentation or for defense. Thus, debate releases an umbrella of intellectual ideas. Once the ideas are released, debaters can develop personal advocacies and identities through argument. Even after establishing argumentative preferences, students recognized their success was tied to an intellectual flexibility to respond to numerous arguments. This study confirms the work of Galloway (2007) by establishing debate as a dialogical imperative whereby planning, listening, and responding may help establish empathy through seeing the humanity and credibility in one another’s arguments.

#### Clash

#### ---Specific, limited resolutions ensure mutual ground which is key to sustainable argumentative clash without sacrificing the potential for creativity or openness.

Steinberg & Freeley 2008

Austin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, AND \*\*David L. Steinberg , Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making pp45-

Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007. Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose. Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### ---The preservation of clash comes before the evaluation of the affirmative --- The impossibility of objective knowledge means the political clash informs the basis for representations, discourse, epistemology and ontology; not the other way around.

Swyngedouw 2009

Erik, School of Environment and Development, Manchester University, The Antinomies of the Postpolitical City: In Search of a Democratic Politics of Environmental Production, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, Volume 33, Issue 3, pages 601–620

Political struggles are central in shaping alternative or different trajectories of socio-metabolic change and the construction of new and emancipatory urban environmental geographies. All manner of critical social-theoretical analyses have been mobilized to account for these processes. Marxist and post-Marxist perspectives, environmental justice arguments, deconstructionist and poststructural musings, science/technology studies, complexity theory, postcolonial, feminist and Latourian views, among others, have attempted to produce what I would ultimately be tempted to call a ‘sociological’ analysis of urban political-ecological transformations. What they share, despite their different — and often radically opposed — ontological and epistemological claims, is the view that critical social theory will offer an entry into strategies, mechanisms, technologies of resistance, transformation and emancipatory political tactics. In other words, the implicit assumption of this sociological edifice is that ‘the political’ is instituted by the social, that political configurations, arrangements and tactics arise out of the social condition or process or, in other words, that the social colonizes ‘the political’ (Arendt, 1968). The properly political moment is assumed to flow from this ‘sociological’ understanding or analysis of the process. Or in other words, the ‘political’ emerges, both theoretically and practically, from the social process, a process that only knowledge has access to. Put differently, most urban political ecological perspectives assume the political to arise from analysis, but neither theorizes nor operationalizes the properly political within a political ecological analysis. This opens a theoretical and practical gap as the properly political is evacuated from the theoretical considerations that have shaped (urban) political ecology thus far. This ‘retreat of the political’ (Lefort, 1988; Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, 1997) requires urgent attention. This retreat of the properly political as a theoretical and practical object stands in strange contrast to the insistence of urban political ecology that urban socio-environmental conditions and processes are profoundly political ones and that, consequently, the production of different socio-environmental urban trajectories is a decidedly political process. Considering the properly political is indeed all the more urgent as environmental politics increasingly express a postpolitical consensual naturalization of the political. As argued by Swyngedouw (2007a), Žižek (2002 [1992]) and Debruyne (2007), among others, the present consensual vision that the environmental condition presents a clear and present danger that requires urgent techno-managerial re-alignments and a change in the practices of governance and of regulation, also annuls the properly political moment and contributes to what these and other authors have defined as the emergence and consolidation of a postpolitical condition. These will be the key themes I shall develop in this contribution. First, I shall explore what might be meant by the ‘properly’ political. In conversation with, and taking my cue from, political philosophers and theorists like Slavoj Žižek, Jacques Rancière, Alain Badiou, Etienne Balibar, Claude Lefort, David Crouch, Mustafa Dikeç, Chantalle Mouffe and Peter Hallward, I attempt to theorize and re-centre the political as a key moment in political-ecological processes. What these perspectives share is not only the refusal to accept the social as the foundation of the political, but, more profoundly, the view that the absence of a foundation for the social (or, in other words, the ‘social’ being constitutively split, inherently incoherent, ruptured by all manner of tensions and conflicts) calls into being ‘the political’ as the instituting moment of the social (see, e.g., Marchart, 2007; Stavrakakis, 2007). Put differently, it is through the political that ‘society’ comes into being, achieves a certain coherence and ‘sustainability’. Prioritizing ‘the political’ as the foundational gesture that permits ‘the social’ maintains ‘absolutely the separation of science and politics, of analytic description and political prescription’ (Badiou, quoted in Hallward, 2003a: 394). This is not to say, of course, that politics and science are not enmeshed (on the contrary, they are and increasingly so), but rather that unravelling the science/politics imbroglios (as pursued by, among others, critical sociologies of science, science and technology studies, science-discourse analysis and the like) does not in itself permit opening up either the notion or the terrain of the political. The aim of this article, in contrast, is to recover the notion of the political and of the political polis from the debris of contemporary obsessions with governing, management, urban polic(y)ing and its associated technologies (Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, 1997).

#### ---Unbridled affirmation makes research impossible and destroys dialogue.

Hanghoj 2008

Thorkild, researcher for the Danish Research Centre on Education and Advanced Media Materials, http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information\_til/Studerende\_ved\_SDU/Din\_uddannelse/phd\_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf

Debate games are often based on pre-designed scenarios that include descriptions of issues to be debated, educational goals, game goals, roles, rules, time frames etc. In this way, debate games differ from textbooks and everyday classroom instruction as debate scenarios allow teachers and students to actively imagine, interact and communicate within a domain-specific game space. However, instead of mystifying debate games as a “magic circle” (Huizinga, 1950), I will try to overcome the epistemological dichotomy between “gaming” and “teaching” that tends to dominate discussions of educational games. In short, educational gaming is a form of teaching. As mentioned, education and games represent two different semiotic domains that both embody the three faces of knowledge: assertions, modes of representation and social forms of organisation (Gee, 2003; Barth, 2002; cf. chapter 2). In order to understand the interplay between these different domains and their interrelated knowledge forms, I will draw attention to a central assumption in Bakhtin’s dialogical philosophy. According to Bakhtin, all forms of communication and culture are subject to centripetal and centrifugal forces (Bakhtin, 1981). A centripetal force is the drive to impose one version of the truth, while a centrifugal force involves a range of possible truths and interpretations. This means that any form of expression involves a duality of centripetal and centrifugal forces: “Every concrete utterance of a speaking subject serves as a point where centrifugal as well as centripetal forces are brought to bear” (Bakhtin, 1981: 272). If we take teaching as an example, it is always affected by centripetal and centrifugal forces in the on-going negotiation of “truths” between teachers and students. In the words of Bakhtin: “Truth is not born nor is it to be found inside the head of an individual person, it is born between people collectively searching for truth, in the process of their dialogic interaction” (Bakhtin, 1984a: 110). Similarly, the dialogical space of debate games also embodies centrifugal and centripetal forces. Thus, the election scenario of The Power Game involves centripetal elements that are mainly determined by the rules and outcomes of the game, i.e. the election is based on a limited time frame and a fixed voting procedure. Similarly, the open-ended goals, roles and resources represent centrifugal elements and create virtually endless possibilities for researching, preparing, presenting, debating and evaluating a variety of key political issues. Consequently, the actual process of enacting a game scenario involves a complex negotiation between these centrifugal/centripetal forces that are inextricably linked with the teachers and students’ game activities. In this way, the enactment of The Power Game is a form of teaching that combines different pedagogical practices (i.e. group work, web quests, student presentations) and learning resources (i.e. websites, handouts, spoken language) within the interpretive frame of the election scenario. Obviously, tensions may arise if there is too much divergence between educational goals and game goals. This means that game facilitation requires a balance between focusing too narrowly on the rules or “facts” of a game (centripetal orientation) and a focusing too broadly on the contingent possibilities and interpretations of the game scenario (centrifugal orientation). For Bakhtin, the duality of centripetal/centrifugal forces often manifests itself as a dynamic between “monological” and “dialogical” forms of discourse. Bakhtin illustrates this point with the monological discourse of the Socrates/Plato dialogues in which the teacher never learns anything new from the students, despite Socrates’ ideological claims to the contrary (Bakhtin, 1984a). Thus, discourse becomes monologised when “someone who knows and possesses the truth instructs someone who is ignorant of it and in error”, where “a thought is either affirmed or repudiated” by the authority of the teacher (Bakhtin, 1984a: 81). In contrast to this, dialogical pedagogy fosters inclusive learning environments that are able to expand upon students’ existing knowledge and collaborative construction of “truths” (Dysthe, 1996). At this point, I should clarify that Bakhtin’s term “dialogic” is both a descriptive term (all utterances are per definition dialogic as they address other utterances as parts of a chain of communication) and a normative term as dialogue is an ideal to be worked for against the forces of “monologism” (Lillis, 2003: 197-8). In this project, I am mainly interested in describing the dialogical space of debate games. At the same time, I agree with Wegerif that “one of the goals of education, perhaps the most important goal, should be dialogue as an end in itself” (Wegerif, 2006: 61).

#### Creating reasonable starting points for discussion is good, exclusion for the sake of depth is key to advocacy skills

Talisse 2005

Robert, philosophy professor at Vanderbilt, Philosophy & Social Criticism, 31.4, “Deliberativist responses to activist challenges” \*note: gendered language in this article refers to arguments made by two specific individuals in an article by Iris Young

These two serious activist challenges may be summarized as follows. First, the activist has claimed that political discussion must always take place within the context of existing institutions that due to structural inequality grant to certain individuals the power to set discussion agendas and constrain the kinds of options open for consideration prior to any actual encounter with their deliberative opponents; the deliberative process is in this sense rigged from the start to favor the status quo and disadvantage the agents of change. Second, the activist has argued that political discussion must always take place by means of antecedent ‘discourses’ or vocabularies which establish the conceptual boundaries of the deliberation and hence may themselves be hegemonic or systematically distorting; the deliberative process is hence subject to the distorting influence of ideology at the most fundamental level, and deliberative democrats do not have the resources by which such distortions can be addressed. As they aim to establish that the deliberativist’s program is inconsistent with her own democratic objectives, this pair of charges is, as Young claims, serious (118). However, I contend that the deliberativist has adequate replies to them both. Part of the response to the first challenge is offered by Young herself. The deliberative democrat does not advocate public political discussion only at the level of state policy, and so does not advocate a program that must accept as given existing institutional settings and contexts for public discussion. Rather, the deliberativist promotes an ideal of democratic politics according to which deliberation occurs at all levels of social association, including households, neighborhoods, local organizations, city boards, and the various institutions of civil society. The longrun aim of the deliberative democrat is to cultivate a more deliberative polity, and the deliberativist claims that this task must begin at more local levels and apart from the state and its policies. We may say that deliberativism promotes a ‘decentered’ (Habermas, 1996: 298) view of public deliberation and a ‘pluralistic’ (Benhabib, 2002: 138) model of the public sphere; in other words, the deliberative democrat envisions a ‘multiple, anonymous, heterogeneous network of many publics and public conversations’ (Benhabib, 1996b: 87). The deliberativist is therefore committed to the creation of ‘an inclusive deliberative setting in which basic social and economic structures can be examined’; these settings ‘for the most part must be outside ongoing settings of official policy discussion’ (115). Although Young characterizes this decentered view of political discourse as requiring that deliberative democrats ‘withdraw’ (115) from ‘existing structural circumstances’ (118), it is unclear that this follows. There certainly is no reason why the deliberativist must choose between engaging arguments within existing deliberative sites and creating new ones that are removed from established institutions. There is no need to accept Young’s dichotomy; the deliberativist holds that work must be done both within existing structures and within new contexts. As Bohman argues, Deliberative politics has no single domain; it includes such diverse activities as formulating and achieving collective goals, making policy decisions and means and ends, resolving conflicts of interest and principle, and solving problems as they emerge in ongoing social life. Public deliberation therefore has to take many forms. (1996: 53) The second challenge requires a detailed response, so let us begin with a closer look at the proposed argument. The activist has moved quickly from the claim that discourses can be systematically distorting to the claim that all political discourse operative in our current contexts is systematically distorting. The conclusion is that properly democratic objectives cannot be pursued by deliberative means. The first thing to note is that, as it stands, the conclusion does not follow from the premises; the argument is enthymematic. What is required is the additional premise that the distorting features of discussion cannot be corrected by further discussion. That discussion cannot rehabilitate itself is a crucial principle in the activist’s case, but is nowhere argued. Moreover, the activist has given no arguments to support the claim that present modes of discussion are distorting, and has offered no analysis of how one might detect such distortions and discern their nature.20 Rather than providing a detailed analysis of the phenomenon of systematic distortion, Young provides (in her own voice) two examples of discourses that she claims are hegemonic. First she considers discussions of poverty that presume the adequacy of labor market analyses; second she cites discussions of pollution that presume that modern economies must be based on the burning of fossil-fuels. In neither case does she make explicit what constitutes the distortion. At most, her examples show that some debates are framed in ways that render certain types of proposals ‘out of bounds’. But surely this is the case in any discussion, and it is not clear that it is in itself always a bad thing or even ‘distorting’. Not all discursive exclusions are distortions because the term ‘distortion’ implies that something is being excluded that should be included. Clearly, then, there are some dialectical exclusions that are entirely appropriate. For example, it is a good thing that current discussions of poverty are often cast in terms that render white supremacist ‘solutions’ out of bounds; it is also good that pollution discourses tend to exclude fringe-religious appeals to the cleansing power of mass prayer. This is not to say that opponents of market analyses of poverty are on par with white supremacists or that Greens are comparable to fringe-religious fanatics; it is rather to press for a deeper analysis of the discursive hegemony that the activist claims undermines deliberative democracy. It is not clear that the requested analysis, were it provided, would support the claim that systematic distortions cannot be addressed and remedied within the processes of continuing discourse. There are good reasons to think that continued discussion among persons who are aware of the potentially hegemonic features of discourse can correct the distorting factors that exist and block the generation of new distortions. As Young notes (116), James Bohman (1996: ch. 3) has proposed a model of deliberation that incorporates concerns about distorted communication and other forms of deliberative inequality within a general theory of deliberative democracy; the recent work of Seyla Benhabib (2002) and Robert Goodin (2003: chs 9–11) aims for similar goals. Hence I conclude that, as it stands, the activist’s second argument is incomplete, and as such the force of the difficulty it raises for deliberative democracy is not yet clear. If the objection is to stick, the activist must first provide a more detailed examination of the hegemonic and distorting properties of discourse; he must then show both that prominent modes of discussion operative in our democracy are distorting in important ways and that further discourse cannot remedy these distortions.

#### Government starting point is best

#### ---Procedural energy policy research is a prerequisite to the affirmative --- Reformist research is critical to inform broader challenges to fossil fuel production.

Lohmann 2012

Larry, FINANCIALIZATION, COMMODIFICATIONAND CARBON:THE CONTRADICTIONS OFNEOLIBERAL CLIMATE POLICY, SOCIALIST REGISTER, http://thecornerhouse.org.uk/sites/thecornerhouse.org.uk/files/Socialist%20Register%20Neoliberal%20Climate%20Policy%20Contradictions.pdf

Scapegoating ideology, however, is as double-edged as its cynical variety, or as the climate commodification process itself. Depending on political circumstances, calls for ‘better regulation’ or ‘crackdowns on corruption’ can intersect fruitfully with the more strategic, long-term campaigns for decommodification of the earth’s carbon-cycling capacity being undertaken by grassroots movements and groups such as Via Campesina, the California Movement for Environmental Justice, and movements in Ecuador, Canada and Nigeria opposing fossil fuel extraction.37 Useful information on patterns of subsidies provided to fossil fuel polluters by the EU ETS, or on the perverse incentives associated with HFC-23 projects, often come from groups clinging to the fetish of reform, and important analyses of the contradictions of the climate commodity from Wall Street consultants who would be horrified at the extent to which their contributions are aiding the understanding of radical movements against the trade. Thus while frank discussion of the consequences of the continuing unfolding of the contradiction between exchange-value and use-value in carbon markets is more politically productive when undertaken with affected publics than with fetish-constrained state officials and technocrats, or in the pages of the financial press, political spaces for breaking the trance that carbon markets have imposed on climate policy can be, and are being, opened at many levels.

#### ---Abdication of government political strategies makes political change impossible.

Stevenson 2009

Ruth, PhD, senior lecturer and independent consultant – Graduate School of the Environment @ Centre for Alternative Technology, “Discourse, power, and energy conflicts: understanding Welsh renewable energy planning policy,” *Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy*, Volume 27, pg. 512-526

It could be argued that this result arose from the lack of expertise of the convenors of the TAN 8 in consensual decision making. Indeed, there is now more research and advice on popular participation in policy issues at a community level (eg Kaner et al, 1996; Ostrom, 1995; Paddison, 1999). However, for policy making the state remains the vehicle through which policy goals must be achieved (Rydin, 2003) and it is through the state that global issues such as climate change and sustainable development must be legislated for, and to some extent enacted. It is therefore through this structure that any consensual decision making must be tested. This research indicates that the policy process cannot actually overcome contradictions and conflict. Instead, encompassing them may well be a more fruitful way forward than attempts at consensus. Foucault reinforces the notion that the `field of power' can prove to be positive both for individuals and for the state by allowing both to act (Darier, 1996; Foucault, 1979). Rydin (2003) suggests that actors can be involved in policy making but through `deliberative' policy making rather than aiming for consensus: ``the key to success here is not consensus but building a position based on divergent positions'' (page 69). Deliberative policy making for Rydin involves: particular dialogic mechanisms such as speakers being explicit about their values, understandings, and activities: the need to move back and forth between memories (historical) and aspirations (future); moving between general and the particular; and the adoption of role taking (sometimes someone else's role). There is much to be trialed and tested in these deliberative models, however, a strong state is still required as part of the equation if we are to work in the interests of global equity, at least until the messages about climate change and sustainable development are strong enough to filter through to the local level. It is at the policy level that the usefulness of these various new techniques of deliberative policy making must be tested, and at the heart of this must be an understanding of the power rationalities at work in the process.

### 1NC

#### ---Democratizing energy politics is bad --- Centralization is key to nuclear power.

Sovacool 2006

Benjamin, doctoral candidate in the Department of Science and Technology Studies at the Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University, Reactors, Weapons, X-Rays, and Solar Panels: Using SCOT, Technological Frame, Epistemic Culture, and Actor Network Theory to Investigate Technology, Journal of Technical Studies, http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/ejournals/JOTS/v32/v32n1/sovacool.html

Sociologists such as Wiebe Bijker (1992, 1996), Donald MacKenzie (1993, 1999), Trevor Pinch (1999, 2001), and historian Thomas Hughes (2001) have promoted a model called the social construction of technology. This model holds that technological systems commit policymakers to a particular set of technical arrangements and are inherently “socially constructed artifacts” (Hughes 2001, 52; Bijker & Law 1992; Kline & Pinch 1999). These authors propose that large technological systems often involve many distinct agents, subjecting them to an interpretive flexibility that gives the same technological artifact varying meanings for different groups (Kline & Pinch 2001, 113-114). Or, as political theorist Landon Winner (1999) puts it, “artifacts have politics.” The methodological approach called the social construction of technology (SCOT) suggests that technological systems are often organized according to five interrelated themes. First, technological artifacts are viewed as intrinsically complex and, like “the social” or “the economic,” contain meaning that is not fixed but emergent (MacKenzie 1998; Bijker & Law 1992). This meaning materializes through what John Law refers to as “heterogeneous engineering,” the process by which multiple meanings get manufactured into technological objects. Second, because the development of technology involves competing organizations, consumers, entrepreneurs, and politicians seeking to maintain a particular set of technical arrangements, artifacts are often the product of conflict, difference, and resistance. Third, technologies involve strategy and “are not neutral servants of whatever social or political order chooses to adopt them. Their adoption and operation involves changes to that order – changes that are not automatic consequences of new technology but must themselves be engineered, often in the face of conflict and resistance” (MacKenzie 1998, 14). Fourth, since “technological systems contain messy, complex, problem-solving components,” technologies encompass not only physical artifacts but also an entire network of organizations, processes, people, research programs, regulatory laws, and knowledge systems (Hughes 2001; Bijker, Hughes, & Pinch 2001). Fifth, since technologies are “invented and developed by system builders and their associates, the components of technological systems are socially constructed artifacts” with disparate effects on social, economic, and cultural practices (Hughes 2001, 52; Bijker & Law 1992). Thus, SCOT proposes that both social determinism and technological determinism are flawed because “neither the purely social nor the exclusively technical is a determinant” in constructing technology. Rather, technological designs are shaped both by inescapable physical realities and ambient socio-cultural factors. Approaches to understanding technology, then, must recognize that objects are not universal or independent of context (MacKenzie 1998, p. 216). Rather, SCOT can reveal that apparently stable technologies started with many possible futures and have been shaped by “particular social interests and relevant social groups and interpretations” (Mort 2002, p. 22). The classic example of a socially constructed technology is Langdon Winner’s discussion of the American nuclear reactor. Winner proposes (1986, 1999) that the construction and operation of nuclear reactors in the United States requires an authoritarian, systems-centered, immensely powerful but inherently unstable technological approach. This approach blurs the distinction between social and technological determinism. Nuclear reactors are deeply woven in the conditions of modern politics, and fundamentally change the exercise of power and the experience of citizenship. As one environmentalist lamented in the 1970s: The increased deployment of nuclear power facilities must lead society toward authoritarianism. Indeed, safe reliance upon nuclear power as the principle source of energy may be possible only in a totalitarian state. (cited in Winner 1986, p. 19)

#### ---Rejecting technocratic energy solutions fails --- Privileges long term solutions we don’t have time for while undermining the nuclear power industry.

Hayward 2006

Steven F., previously the F.K. Weyerhaeuser Fellow at AEI, The Fate of the Earth in the Balance, SOCIETY AND CULTURE, http://www.aei.org/outlook/society-and-culture/the-fate-of-the-earth-in-the-balance/

It was not surprising, then, that the Socolow/ Pacala stabilization wedges appear in former vice president Al Gore’s book and movie, An Inconvenient Truth. In fact, the Socolow/Pacala scheme is the only policy framework Gore includes. In both the book and the movie, however, only six of Socolow and Pacala’s seven wedges show up for duty. One wedge is missing: nuclear power. Gore passes over this omission without comment, so few if any viewers of Gore’s film know of this telling omission. One would think that if climate change genuinely threatens the extinction of human civilization, as Gore and others repeatedly tell us, all options would be on the table and their tradeoffs weighed seriously. Nuclear power is in use already, with highly favorable results from a greenhousegas emissions standpoint. It is not a coincidence that the industrialized nation with the lowest greenhouse-gas intensity (the amount of greenhouse gas emitted to dollar of economic output) is France, which generates about 80 percent of its electricity with nuclear power (compared to about 20 percent in the United States). According to the International Energy Agency, the United States generates 0.55 kilograms of carbon dioxide for each dollar of economic output; the comparable figure for France is 0.29 kilograms— about half as much.3 If the United States had the same greenhouse-gas intensity as France, global greenhouse-gas emissions would be nearly 10 percent lower. A new generation of nuclear technology has eliminated the risk of catastrophic meltdowns or Chernobyl-type explosions, and fuel reprocessing can reduce nuclear waste to a manageable level. It would seem that only environmental correctness prevents the former vice president and other leading environmentalists from mentioning a technology that numerous energy experts say is an essential component of a serious greenhouse strategy.4 Climate Change as a Cultural and Philosophical Issue This small example of environmental atavism reveals a more fundamental aspect of the public discourse about climate change. At the core of environmentalist animus against nuclear power is a categorical suspicion about technology itself, which is connected to a larger philosophical pessimism about human civilization and man’s supposed separation or alienation from nature. We have seen this style of argument during the long controversy over the arms race in the late stages of the Cold War, during which the immense political and technical aspects of the problem were, for a certain cast of mind, entirely subsumed beneath a more general critique of how the arms race was merely symptomatic of a larger crisis of civilization. Unless this larger crisis was addressed, it was suggested, there would be no hope the arms race could be solved. It was not but twenty years ago that the large nuclear weapons arsenals of the superpowers threatened the instantaneous destruction of civilization and perhaps human life itself. Today, climate change is said to threaten the same things, only more slowly. It is remarkable how similarly the leading advocates for these two problems understand and conceptualize them. In the case of both the arms race then and climate change today, we are told that the issue is ultimately philosophical in nature, and that wholesale changes in our philosophical perspective must necessarily precede political and policy remedies to the problem. Should this perspective be taken seriously? What can it really mean? The Fate of the Earth in the Balance The peculiarity of this approach to major global problems is best seen by comparing the two leading popular books on each issue, Jonathan Schell’s 1982 bestseller The Fate of the Earth, and Al Gore’s 1991 bestseller Earth in the Balance (whose main arguments reappear in truncated form in An Inconvenient Truth). It is not just the titles that are strikingly similar; a close reading reveals the two books to be identical in their overarching philosophy.5 In both, mankind is poised on the abyss, facing, in Gore’s words, “the most serious threat that we have ever faced,”6 or “the nearness of extinction,”7 to use only one of Schell’s many apocalyptic formulations. (An index entry—“despair; see also futility”8—conveys the mood better than any quotation from the main text.) In fact, if one substitutes “global warming” for “nuclear weapons” in the text of Fate of the Earth, the result is so shockingly close to Earth in the Balance that one could almost make out a case for plagiarism on Gore’s part. Perhaps some publisher will have the wit to meld the two books into one: The Fate of the Earth in the Balance. But such a combination is not necessary. The two books directly intersect in several places. Gore writes, for example, that: the political will that led to mass protests against escalating the arms race during the early 1980s came from a popular awareness that civilization seemed to be pulled toward the broad lip of a downslope leading to a future catastrophe—nuclear war—that would crush human history forever into a kind of black hole. . . . This is not unlike the challenge we face today in the global environmental crisis. The potential for true catastrophe lies in the future, but the downslope that pulls us toward it is becoming recognizably steeper with each passing year.9 In this, Gore was only returning the favor to Schell, who occasionally paused long enough from his lament over nuclear catastrophe to include a few nods to ecocatastrophe. For his part, Schell mentions “global heating through an increased ‘greenhouse effect,’” adding: The nuclear peril is usually seen in isolation from the threats to other forms of life and their ecosystems, but in fact should be seen as the very center of the ecological crisis—as the cloud-covered Everest of which the more immediate, visible kinds of harm to the environment are the mere foothills. Both the effort to preserve the environment and the effort to save the species from extinction by nuclear arms would be enriched and strengthened by this recognition.10 Both books display an affectation for gilding their arguments with lots of brief references to major thinkers from a wide variety of disciplines. Consider Schell on Heisenberg: The famous uncertainty principle, formulated by the German physicist Werner Heisenberg, has shown that our knowledge of atomic phenomena is limited because the experimental procedures with which we must carry out our observations inevitably interfere with the phenomena that we wish to measure. Schell applies Heisenberg’s scientific insight to all forms of human investigation, writing that “a limit to our knowledge is fixed by the fact that we are incarnate beings, not disembodied spirits.”11 The supposed separation from nature implied by Heisenberg’s idea limits our appreciation for both nature and our predicament. Gore follows down the same track: Earlier this century, the Heisenberg Principle established that the very act of observing a natural phenomenon can change what is being observed. Although the initial theory was limited in practice to special cases in subatomic physics, the philosophical implications were and are staggering. It is now apparent that since Descartes reestablished the Platonic notion and began the scientific revolution, human civilization has been experiencing a kind of Heisenberg Principle writ large. . . . [T]he world of intellect is assumed to be separate from the physical world.12 Gore opens his hit movie and companion book An Inconvenient Truth with an homage to the famous photo of the Earth taken from the moon by the Apollo 8 astronauts in 1968. This image, he tells us, played a key role in galvanizing the world’s environmental consciousness, underscoring the fragility of the planet. As he put it fulsomely in Earth in the Balance: Those first striking pictures taken by the Apollo astronauts of the earth floating in the blackness of space were so deeply moving because they enabled us to see our planet from a new perspective—a perspective from which the preciousness and fragile beauty of the earth was suddenly clear.13 Schell uses the same trope: As it happens, our two roles in the nuclear predicament have been given visual representation in the photographs of the earth that we have taken with the aid of another technical device of our time, the spaceship. These pictures illustrate, on the one hand, our mastery over nature, which has enabled us to take up a position in the heavens and look back on the earth as though it were just one more celestial body, and, on the other, our weakness and frailty in the face of that mastery, which we cannot help feeling when we see the smallness, solitude, and delicate beauty of our planetary home.14 These are only a few of the many examples that can be drawn of both books’ derivative and allusive nature. Both authors offer up references to Plato, Aristotle, - 3 -Augustine, Francis Bacon, Einstein, Descartes, and Hannah Arendt in what might be called, to paraphrase Arendt, the banality of promiscuous allusion, all to bolster a superficial philosophical or anthropological point that is far distant from the politics and policy of either issue. Most troubling is that both authors depict dissent from their point of view to be a pathology of some kind, foreclosing that there could be any rational basis for a different point of view. Gore compares dissenters to his view of our environmental predicament to gardenvariety substance abusers, arguing that people who are oblivious to our “collision” with nature are “enablers” who are “helping to ensure that the addictive behavior continues. The psychological mechanism of denial is complex, but again addiction serves as a model.”15 Elsewhere Gore compares our “dysfunctional civilization” to dysfunctional families, whose members suffer from “a serious psychological disorder.” While Gore begins this discussion by saying that family dysfunctionality is a metaphor, he ends by applying the concept literally: “The model of the dysfunctional family has a direct bearing on our ways of thinking about the environment.”16 Schell is close aboard: “A society that systematically shuts its eyes to an urgent peril to its physical survival and fails to take any steps to save itself cannot be called psychologically well.”17 Both authors call for making their particular issue the paramount global priority in the same terms. Gore argues that “we must make the environment the central organizing principle [emphasis added] for civilization. . . . [T]he tide in this battle will turn only when the majority of people in the world become sufficiently aroused by a shared sense of urgent danger to join in an all-out effort.”18 Schell wrote, “If we felt the peril for what it is—an urgent threat to our whole human substance— we would let it become the organizing principle [emphasis added] of our global collective existence: the foundation on which the world was built.”19 Having laid the groundwork for a wholesale change in our priorities, both Schell and Gore are surprisingly light on the social and political architecture of their alternative world. This is explicitly so in Schell’s case: “I have not sought to define a political solution to the nuclear predicament. . . . I have left to others those awesome, urgent tasks.”20 Gore’s approach is better supported; he offers a laundry list of specific policy recommendations mostly on energy and resource use, but it falls far short of his desired “wrenching transformation” of civilization. If the broader solution to our predicament is not clear even in outline, it is because neither author fully grasps the magnitude of the critique he is making, such that a political solution—at least, a solution that is compatible with liberal democracy—is impossible. Neither man understands why. The Real Source for The Fate of the Earth in the Balance Despite the parade of quotes and references from Plato and Arendt, there is one thinker conspicuously absent from both Schell and Gore’s numerous citations but whose spirit is present on almost every page of both books: Martin Heidegger. Perhaps the absence of a reference to Heidegger is due to reticence or discretion, given Heidegger’s dubious and complicated association with Nazism. Nothing derails an argument faster than playing the reductio ad Hitlerum card. More likely it is the abstruse and difficult character of Heidegger’s arguments; Gore and Schell may not realize how closely the core of their argument about the technological alienation of man from nature tracks Heidegger’s more thorough account in his famous 1953 essay “The Question Concerning Technology.”21 Heidegger asks, “What is modern technology?” His understanding of technology is sometimes rendered in translation as “technicity” to convey a defective way of knowing about phenomena, and to distinguish the term from its more common usage to mean mere scientific instrumentality (think gadgets). Heidegger believed that our mode of objectifying nature alienates mankind from perceiving and contemplating pure “Being.” Whatever this may mean—and even Heidegger’s followers admit it is obscure (Heidegger himself wrote that “we are asking about something which we barely grasp”22 )—Heidegger suggests that philosophy has been asking the wrong questions since the very beginning, and the culmination of this wrong track is - 4 If one substitutes “global warming” for “nuclear weapons” in the text of Fate of the Earth, the result is so shockingly close to Earth in the Balance that one could almost make out a case for plagiarism on Gore’s part.modern technology, which completes the alienation of man from nature. This is where Heidegger prepares the way for Gore. Modern technology, according to Heidegger, puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it supply energy which can be extracted and stored as such. . . . The earth now reveals itself as a coal-mining district, the soil as a mineral deposit. The field that the peasant formerly cultivated and set in order appears different from how it did when to set in order still meant to take of and maintain. . . . But meanwhile even the cultivation of the field has come under the grip of another kind of setting-in-order, which sets upon [italics in original] nature. It sets upon it in the sense of challenging it. Agriculture is now the mechanized food industry. Air is now set upon to yield nitrogen, the earth to yield ore, ore to yield uranium, for example; uranium is set upon to yield atomic energy, which can be released either for destruction or for peaceful use.23 Here are Gore’s parallel passages: [O]ur civilization is holding ever more tightly to its habit of consuming larger and larger quantities every year of coal, oil, fresh air and water, trees, topsoil, and the thousand other substances we rip from the crust of the earth. . . . We seem increasingly eager to lose ourselves in the forms of culture, society, technology, the media, and the rituals of production and consumption, but the price we pay is a loss of our spiritual lives.24 And: Our seemingly compulsive need to control the natural world . . . has driven us to the edge of disaster, for we have become so successful at controlling nature than we have lost our connection to it.25 It is possible to compile a long inventory of close parallels between Heidegger and Gore. For example, Heidegger told interviewers in 1966: [T]echnicity increasingly dislodges man and uproots him from the earth. . . . The last 30 years have made it clearer that the planet-wide movement of modern technicity is a power whose magnitude in determining [our] history can hardly be overestimated.26 Heidegger also found the earth-from-space photos as affecting as Gore and Schell: I don’t know if you were shocked, but [certainly] I was shocked when a short time ago I saw the pictures of the earth taken from the moon. We do not need atom bombs at all [to uproot us]—the uprooting of man is already here. All our relationships have become merely technical ones. It is no longer upon an earth than man lives today.27 Gore likes to cite the supposed proverb that the Chinese symbol for “crisis” also means “opportunity.” Heidegger was fond of quoting a line from the German poet Hölderlin: “Where danger lies, there too grows the chance for salvation.” And is it necessary to mention that Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle also shows up for duty in Heidegger’s essay on technology? Heidegger is often said to have advocated a return to pre-Socratic philosophy, though in fact he was skeptical that there was any philosophical solution to the problem he perceived. Gore follows Heidegger closely when he criticizes Plato and the Western philosophic tradition for preparing the ground for modern man’s estrangement from nature: The strange absence of emotion, the banal face of evil so often manifested by mass technological assaults on the global environment, is surely a consequence of the belief in an underlying separation of intellect from the physical world. At the root of this belief lies a heretical understanding of humankind’s place in the world as old as Plato, as seductive in its mythic appeal as Gnosticism, as compelling as the Cartesian promise of Promethean power—and it has led to tragic results.28 Political Implications Assuming for the purposes of discussion that Gore’s Heideggerian analysis is correct, can a reconnection of intellect and the physical world be accomplished through politics—or led by politicians? Heidegger did not think so, which is why he said it would be impossible for him - 5 -to write an ethical or political treatise.29 He doubted democracy offered any hope. In an interview late in life, Heidegger said, “For me today it is a decisive question as to how any political system—and which one—can be adapted to an epoch of technicity. I know of no answer to this question. I am not convinced that it is democracy.”30 Heidegger was contemptuous of postwar democratic reforms—calling them “halfway measures”— including individual constitutional rights, because: I do not see in them any actual confrontation with the world of technicity, inasmuch as behind them all, according to my view, stands the conception that technicity in its essence is something that man holds within his own hands. Heidegger thought American democracy was the most hopeless of all, in words that sound in substance exactly like Gore’s complaint: [Americans] are still caught up in a thought that, under the guise of pragmatism, facilitates the technical operation and manipulation [of things], but at the same time blocks the way to reflection upon the genuine nature of modern technicity.31 (Separately, Heidegger wrote that America epitomized “the emerging monstrousness of modern times.”32 ) From here it is possible to comprehend more dispassionately Heidegger’s attraction to the Nazi movement in the 1930s. He had no brief for fascism in general or National Socialism in particular, nor was he an antiSemite.33 What he expressed in his famous “Rector’s Address”34 in 1934 was that the “inner truth and greatness” of the Nazi movement was its potential “encounter between technicity on the planetary level and modern man,” and that it “casts its net in these troubled waters of ‘values’ and ‘totalities,’” or, as he put it a 1948 letter to Herbert Marcuse, “a spiritual renewal of life in its entirety.”35 In other words, the “wrenching transformation” of Germany that the Nazi revolution set in motion held the potential for reconnecting humankind with the essence of Being in a primal, pre-Socratic way. Heidegger’s moral blindness to the phenomenon in front of him exposes the hazard of an excessively abstract approach to human existence. As Heidegger’s example shows, the idea of transforming human consciousness through politics is likely an extremist—and potentially totalitarian—project. Reviewing the fundamentally Heideggerian understanding of our environmental predicament in Gore’s thought throws new light on the deeper meaning of Gore’s call for a “wrenching transformation” of civilization on the level of thought. Gore would no doubt be sincerely horrified at the suggested parallel between his themes and Heidegger’s moral blindness toward political extremism, and rightly reject it as the implication of his views. He is, thankfully, too imbued with the innate American democratic tradition to embrace any such extremism.36 But it is fair to ask whether he has fully thought through the implications of his ambitious critique. In the case of both Gore and Schell before him, the Heideggerian approach reveals a certain cast of mind: deeply pessimistic, but utopian at the same time. Our salvation demands submitting to the moral authority of their “vision” to change our “consciousness.” After all, one aspect of Plato that Heidegger approves of is the view that mankind will suffer unremitting disaster until either rulers become philosophers or philosophers become rulers. (Indeed it was the failure of intellectuals to guide the Nazi movement that led to its ruin, Heidegger thought.) Gore seems to be making a round trip, looking to end up on either end of this potentiality, envisioning himself either as a ruler who has become a philosopher or as a philosopher who may yet (again) become a ruler. Is it so farfetched to suggest that this has some problematic, if unintended, political implications? One of Gore’s sound and important arguments in Earth in the Balance and An Inconvenient Truth is that it is a profound error to suppose that the earth’s environment is so robust that there is little or nothing that mankind could do to damage it seriously. He is right, as was Heidegger, to point out the immense earthshaking power of modern technology. But there is a symmetrical observation to be made of Gore’s metaphysical approach to the problem, which is that it is an equally profound error to suppose that the environment of human liberty is so robust that there is no political - 6 In the case of both Gore and Schell before him, the Heideggerian approach reveals a certain cast of mind: deeply pessimistic, but utopian at the same time.intervention on behalf of the environment that could not damage liberty in serious ways, especially if the environment is elevated to the central organizing principle of civilization. Implicit in this goal is downgrading human liberty as the central organizing principle of civilization. There are no index entries in Earth in the Balance for “liberty,” “freedom,” or “individualism.” Heidegger believed the liberal conceptions of these great terms were meaningless or without foundation. There is no acknowledgement in Gore’s book that this is even a serious consideration. Gore’s one discussion of the matter is not reassuring: In fact, what many feel is a deep philosophical crisis in the West has occurred in part because this balance [between rights and responsibilities] has been disrupted: we have tilted so far toward individual rights and so far away from any sense of obligation that it is now difficult to muster an adequate defense of any rights vested in the community at large or the nation—much less rights properly vested in all humankind or in posterity.37 But Is It Necessary? Is Gore’s high-level metaphysical analysis necessary in the first place? Do we really have to resolve or unwind the problem of Platonic idealism and Cartesian dualism to address the problem of climate change? The example of the previous case in point--the arms race--suggests an answer. The arms race did not require a revolution in human consciousness or a transformation of national and global political institutions to bring about rapid and favorable changes. The kind of grandiose, pretentious thinking exemplified in Fate of the Earth played little or no role in these shifts. The problem turned out to be much simpler. The acute problem of the superpower arms race was mostly a moral problem--not a metaphysical problem--arising from the character of the irreconcilable regimes. As was frequently pointed out, the United States never worried about British or French nuclear weapons. Once the United States and the Soviet Union were able to establish a level of trust and common interest, unwinding the arms race became a relatively easy matter. Nuclear weapons and the threat of nuclear proliferation in unsavory regimes (Iran, North Korea) is still around today, but the acute existential threat of the arms race has receded substantially. In the early 1980s, The Fate of the Earth became the Bible for the nuclear freeze movement--the simplistic idea brought to you by the same people who thought Ronald Reagan was a simpleton. To his credit, then representative and later senator Gore opposed the nuclear freeze. Nowadays Gore has started to call for an immediate freeze on greenhouse-gas emissions, which he must know is unrealistic. His explanation in a recent speech shows that he missed entirely the lesson from that earlier episode: An immediate freeze [on CO2 emissions] has the virtue of being clear, simple, and easy to understand. It can attract support across partisan lines as a logical starting point for the more difficult work that lies ahead. I remember a quarter century ago when I was the author of a complex nuclear arms control plan to deal with the then rampant arms race between our country and the former Soviet Union. At the time, I was strongly opposed to the nuclear freeze movement, which I saw as simplistic and naive. But, three-quarters of the American people supported it--and as I look back on those years I see more clearly now that the outpouring of public support for that very simple and clear mandate changed the political landscape and made it possible for more detailed and sophisticated proposals to eventually be adopted.[38] The irony of this statement is that since the moral and political differences between the United States and the Soviet Union could not be resolved diplomatically, the way to move relations forward was to convert relations into a technical problem (i.e., negotiations over the number and specifications of weapons systems). Gore remained firmly within the technocratic arms-control community throughout this period, even as Schell and others tried to moralize the arms-control problem with the nuclear freeze proposal. But the moral confusion (some critics said the premise of moral equivalence) of the freeze idea made it a sideshow at best and a hindrance at worst. On the contrary, President Reagan’s resistance to the freeze, as well as the conventions of the arms-control process to which Gore held, were crucial to his strategy for changing the dynamic of the arms race. Having been an arms-control technocrat in the 1980s, Gore today wants to turn the primarily technical and economic problems of climate change into a moral problem. Gore’s argument that climate change is a moral problem and not a political problem is not serious, since the leading prescriptions for treating the problem all require massive applications of political power on a global scale. Skeptics and cynics might dismiss Gore’s metaphysical speculations as mere intellectual preening, as many critics did with Fate of the Earth in the 1980s. But such an approach to environmental issues may be an obstacle to many practical, incremental steps that can be taken to solve real climate-policy problems. Once one grasps the Heideggerian character of the Gore approach to thinking about environmental problems, the hesitance about nuclear power comes into better focus. Gore and others in his mold dislike large-scale technologies because they are intrinsic to mankind’s mastery of nature that is driving our supposed alienation from nature. This same premise also explains the frequently hostile reaction of many environmentalists to suggestions that adaptation to climate change should be a part of any serious climate policy, even though many leading climate scientists and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change have embraced adaptation. The suggestion that technologies for climate modification might be developed, which would be the climate policy equivalent of Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative, are greeted contemptuously for the same reason.

#### Deconstructive ethics are inherently anti-authoritarian---embracing the 1AC’s critique of logocentrism entails a fundamental critique of authority that breaks down hierarchical political institutions

Saul Newman 1, senior lecturer in politics at Goldsmiths College, University of London, 2001, From Bakunin to Lacan: Anti-authoritarianism and the dislocation of power, p. 128-131

In any case, for Derrida, justice performs a deconstructive displacing of law. For a decision to be just, Derrida argues, for it to account for the singularity denied by law, it must be different each time. It cannot be the mere application of the rule—it must continually reinvent the rule. Therefore, justice conserves the law because it operates in the name of the law; but, at the same time, suspends the law because it is being continually reinterpreted.405

Justice, moreover, exists in an ethical realm because it implies a freedom and a responsibility for one’s own actions.406 Justice is the experience of the impossible because it always exists in a state of suspension and undecidability. It is always incalculable: the promise of something yet to come, which must never be completely grasped because then it would cease to be justice and become law. As Derrida says: “There is an avenir for justice and there is no justice except to the degree that some event is possible which, as an event, exceeds calculation, rules, programs, anticipations.”407 Justice is an “event” that opens itself to the other, to the impossible: its effects are always unpredictable because it cannot be determined, as law can and is, by an a priori discourse. It is an excess that overflows from law and cannot be grasped by it. Justice functions as an open, empty signifier: its meaning or content is not predetermined.

So justice occupies an ethical ground that cannot be reduced to law or political institutions, and it is for this reason that justice opens up the possibility for a transformation of law and politics.408 My critique of the place of power in political philosophy has been aimed at precisely this: a transformation of politics, particularly the politics of resistance. This transformation, though, is not an absolute destruction, but rather a refounding of political and legal discourse in a way that unmasks their lack of legitimate ground and, thus, leaves them open to continual and unpredictable reinterpretation. The classical political discourse of emancipation, for instance, should not be rejected but, rather, reformulated in this manner. While the Enlightenment ideal of emancipation has the potential for becoming a discourse of humanist domination—we have seen this in the experience of anarchism—it can also become a discourse of liberation if it can be un-moored from its humanist foundations and refounded as a nonplace. As Derrida says:

Nothing seems to me less outdated than the classical emancipatory ideal. We cannot attempt to disqualify it today, whether crudely or with sophistication, at least not without treating it too lightly and forming the worst complicities. But beyond these identified territories of juridico-politicization on the grand political scale, beyond all self-serving interpretations . . . other areas must constantly open up that at first seem like secondary or marginal areas.409

One could argue that because poststructuralism abandons the humanist project, it denies itself the possibility of using the ethical-political content of this discourse for resistance against domination. In other words, it has thrown the baby out with the bath water. Because Derrida, on the other hand, does not rule out the Enlightenment-humanist project, he does not deny himself the emancipative possibilities contained in its discourses. Nor should the antiauthoritarian project deny itself these possibilities. Perhaps, as we shall see later on, the ethical-political content of anarchism itself, which is derived from Enlightenment-humanism, can be adopted by the anti-authoritarian argument— that is, if it can be freed from the humanist foundations which limit it to certain forms of subjectivity. Derrida suggests that we can do precisely this: we can free the discourse of emancipation from its essentialist foundations, thereby expanding it to include other political identities and struggles hitherto regarded as of little importance. In other words, the discourse of emancipation can be left structurally open, so that its content would no longer be limited or determined by its foundations. The Declaration of the Rights of Man, for instance, may be expanded to encompass the rights of women and even animals.410 The logic of emancipation is still at work today, although in different forms and represented by different struggles.

The question of rights reflects upon the differences between deconstructive politics and the revolutionary political logic of anarchism. Both strategies have a notion of political rights and a form of emancipatory struggle on the basis of these rights. The difference is, though, that anarchism sees these rights as essential and founded in natural law, while the politics of deconstruction would see these rights as radically founded: in other words, these rights are without stable foundations and, therefore, their content is not prefixed. This leaves them open to a plurality of different political articulations. This logic of a radical refounding based on a lack will become clearer later. As we have seen, however, the anarchist discourse of rights is founded upon a stable human essence. We have also seen the way in which these rights are strictly determined by this human essence: they remain rights limited by the figure of man and are denied to any form of subjectivity outside this conception. Stirner’s notion of the un-man, as a subjectivity excluded by man, was a reaction to this oppressive humanist logic. A deconstructive analysis questions this idea of natural, inalienable rights. Derrida, for instance, in his critique of liberal social contract theory, suggests that these “natural” rights are actually constituted discursively through the social contract and that, therefore, they cannot claim to be natural.411 These rights, then, are displaced from the social to the natural realm, and the social is subordinated to the natural, just as writing is subordinated to speech. As Derrida argues in his critique of Rousseau, the social is the supplement that threatens, and at the same time is necessary for, the identity of the natural: the idea of natural rights can only be formulated discursively through the contract. There is no pure natural foundation for rights, then, and this leaves them open to change and reinterpretation. They can no longer remain inscribed within human essence and, therefore, can no longer be taken for granted. If they are without firm foundations, we cannot always assume that they will continue to exist: they must be fought for, and in the process they will be reformulated by these struggles.

Deconstructive An-archy

It is through this deconstructive logic that political action becomes an-archic. An-archic action is distinguished here from anarchist action, which is, as we have seen, political action governed by an original principle such as human essence or rationality. While it is conditioned by certain principles, an-anarchic action is not necessarily determined or limited by them. An-archic action is the possible outcome of a deconstructive strategy aimed at undermining the metaphysical authority of various political and philosophical discourses. Reiner Schurmann defines an-archic action as action without a “why?”412 However, my deconstructive notion of an-archy might be somewhat different: it may be defined as action with a “why?”—action that is forced to account for itself and question itself, not necessarily in the name of a founding principle, but in the name of the deconstructive enterprise it has embarked upon. In other words, anarchic action is forced to account for itself, just as it forces authority to account for itself. It is this self-questioning that allows political action to resist place, to avoid becoming what it opposes. So this notion of an-archism may be a way of advancing the anti-authoritarian political project embarked upon by the classical anarchists. An-archism seeks to make this anti-authoritarian project account for itself, making it aware of the essentialist and potentially dominating categories within its own discourse. Moreover, it seeks, through the logic of deconstruction, to free the anti-authoritarian project from these categories that inevitably limit it. It therefore expands the anarchist critique of authority by pushing it beyond its own limits, and allowing it to reinvent itself. Derrida’s unmasking of the authority and hierarchy which continues to inhabit western thought, as well as his outlining of various strategies to counter it, have made this an-archist intervention possible.

Derrida occupies a number of crucial terrains, then, in the anti-authoritarian argument. His unmasking and deconstruction of the textual authority of logocentric philosophy has allows us to criticize, using the same logic, the political institutions and discourses which are based on this authority. The logic that he employs here is important for the perspective of our argument: it questions the purity and closure of any identity. A pure identity of resistance, an uncontaminated point of departure is denied because it is always contaminated by the identity it excludes. Using this logic, then, the identity of the human subject in anarchist discourse is contaminated by the identity of power. Derrida also forces anti-authoritarian thought to resist oppositional thinking, to operate outside the binary structures which have hitherto imprisoned it within the pernicious logic of place.

#### ---Nuclear power is key to survival --- Only immediate energy source that can stop global warming.

Lovelock 2004

James, independent scientist and the creator of the Gaia hypothesis of the Earth as a self-regulating organism, Nuclear power is the only green solution, http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/commentators/james-lovelock-nuclear-power-is-the-only-green-solution-6169341.html

Sir David King, the Government's chief scientist, was far-sighted to say that global warming is a more serious threat than terrorism. He may even have underestimated, because, since he spoke, new evidence of climate change suggests it could be even more serious, and the greatest danger that civilisation has faced so far. Most of us are aware of some degree of warming; winters are warmer and spring comes earlier. But in the Arctic, warming is more than twice as great as here in Europe and in summertime, torrents of melt water now plunge from Greenland's kilometre-high glaciers. The complete dissolution of Greenland's icy mountains will take time, but by then the sea will have risen seven metres, enough to make uninhabitable all of the low lying coastal cities of the world, including London, Venice, Calcutta, New York and Tokyo. Even a two metre rise is enough to put most of southern Florida under water. The floating ice of the Arctic Ocean is even more vulnerable to warming; in 30 years, its white reflecting ice, the area of the US, may become dark sea that absorbs the warmth of summer sunlight, and further hastens the end of the Greenland ice. The North Pole, goal of so many explorers, will then be no more than a point on the ocean surface. Not only the Arctic is changing; climatologists warn a four-degree rise in temperature is enough to eliminate the vast Amazon forests in a catastrophe for their people, their biodiversity, and for the world, which would lose one of its great natural air conditioners. The scientists who form the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change reported in 2001 that global temperature would rise between two and six degrees Celsius by 2100. Their grim forecast was made perceptible by last summer's excessive heat; and according to Swiss meteorologists, the Europe-wide hot spell that killed over 20,000 was wholly different from any previous heat wave. The odds against it being a mere deviation from the norm were 300,000 to one. It was a warning of worse to come. What makes global warming so serious and so urgent is that the great Earth system, Gaia, is trapped in a vicious circle of positive feedback. Extra heat from any source, whether from greenhouse gases, the disappearance of Arctic ice or the Amazon forest, is amplified, and its effects are more than additive. It is almost as if we had lit a fire to keep warm, and failed to notice, as we piled on fuel, that the fire was out of control and the furniture had ignited. When that happens, little time is left to put out the fire before it consumes the house. Global warming, like a fire, is accelerating and almost no time is left to act. But with six billion, and growing, few options remain; we can not continue drawing energy from fossil fuels and there is no chance that the renewables, wind, tide and water power can provide enough energy and in time. If we had 50 years or more we might make these our main sources. But we do not have 50 years; the Earth is already so disabled by the insidious poison of greenhouse gases that even if we stop all fossil fuel burning immediately, the consequences of what we have already done will last for 1,000 years. Every year that we continue burning carbon makes it worse for our descendants and for civilisation. Worse still, if we burn crops grown for fuel this could hasten our decline. Agriculture already uses too much of the land needed by the Earth to regulate its climate and chemistry. A car consumes 10 to 30 times as much carbon as its driver; imagine the extra farmland required to feed the appetite of cars. By all means, let us use the small input from renewables sensibly, but only one immediately available source does not cause global warming and that is nuclear energy. True, burning natural gas instead of coal or oil releases only half as much carbon dioxide, but unburnt gas is 25 times as potent a greenhouse agent as is carbon dioxide. Even a small leakage would neutralise the advantage of gas. The prospects are grim, and even if we act successfully in amelioration, there will still be hard times, as in war, that will stretch our grandchildren to the limit. We are tough and it would take more than the climate catastrophe to eliminate all breeding pairs of humans; what is at risk is civilisation. As individual animals we are not so special, and in some ways are like a planetary disease, but through civilisation we redeem ourselves and become a precious asset for the Earth; not least because through our eyes the Earth has seen herself in all her glory. There is a chance we may be saved by an unexpected event such as a series of volcanic eruptions severe enough to block out sunlight and so cool the Earth. But only losers would bet their lives on such poor odds. Whatever doubts there are about future climates, there are no doubts that greenhouse gases and temperatures both are rising. We have stayed in ignorance for many reasons; important among them is the denial of climate change in the US where governments have failed to give their climate scientists the support they needed. The Green lobbies, which should have given priority to global warming, seem more concerned about threats to people than with threats to the Earth, not noticing that we are part of the Earth and wholly dependent upon its well being. It may take a disaster worse than last summer's European deaths to wake us up. Opposition to nuclear energy is based on irrational fear fed by Hollywood-style fiction, the Green lobbies and the media. These fears are unjustified, and nuclear energy from its start in 1952 has proved to be the safest of all energy sources. We must stop fretting over the minute statistical risks of cancer from chemicals or radiation. Nearly one third of us will die of cancer anyway, mainly because we breathe air laden with that all pervasive carcinogen, oxygen. If we fail to concentrate our minds on the real danger, which is global warming, we may die even sooner, as did more than 20,000 unfortunates from overheating in Europe last summer. I find it sad and ironic that the UK, which leads the world in the quality of its Earth and climate scientists, rejects their warnings and advice, and prefers to listen to the Greens. But I am a Green and I entreat my friends in the movement to drop their wrongheaded objection to nuclear energy. Even if they were right about its dangers, and they are not, its worldwide use as our main source of energy would pose an insignificant threat compared with the dangers of intolerable and lethal heat waves and sea levels rising to drown every coastal city of the world. We have no time to experiment with visionary energy sources; civilisation is in imminent danger and has to use nuclear - the one safe, available, energy source - now or suffer the pain soon to be inflicted by our outraged planet.

#### ---No offense --- Increasing environmental pressures make centralization inevitable

Shearman & Smith 2007

David, Emeritus professor of medicine at Adelaide University, Secretary of Doctors for the Environment Australia, and an Independent Assessor on the IPCC, Joseph Wayne, lawyer and philosopher with a research interest in environmentalism. He is the author of Global Meltdown (Praeger, 1998) and Healing in a Wounded World (Praeger, 1997), THE CLIMATE CHANGE CHALLENGE AND THE FAILURE OF DEMOCRACY, pg 158

As we have said, it is not too difficult to see how this present regime of global capitalism and liberal democracy will end: It will end through ecological necessity. Nature will take humanity by the throat and confront it with the biospherical damage that it has done. It is most unlikely in our opinion that some form of spontaneous, unorganized democratic groundswell will awaken the masses to their fates before it is too late. Rather any such resistance to the system must come from an organized vanguard, unafraid to ultimately rule in the name of the common good. These new philosopher kings feature what we call the “authoritarian alternative” discussed earlier.

#### ---Delaying the transition away from democracy causes extinction.

Daniel 2012

Charles, To what extent is democracy detrimental to the current and future aims of environmental policy and technologies?, POLIS Journal Vol. 7, Summer 2012, http://www.polis.leeds.ac.uk/assets/files/students/student-journal/ug-summer-12/charles-daniel.pdf

This is exactly what Mark Beeson suggests in his argument for the coming of environmental authoritarianism. He acknowledges the fact that individual liberty has led to ‘environmentally destructive behaviour’ (Beeson 2010: 276). Whilst democracy has allowed for a more open discussion on environmental issues as well as raising awareness, there has been too much trust put on ecological enlightenment through education. For Beeson, this ‘relies too much on an optimistic, naïve view of human nature’ (Beeson 2010: 282), the idea that an attitude of respect, through the emergence of a shared cosmopolitan rhetoric will produce environmental improvement is wide of the mark. As Beeson rightly points out, the ‘sobering reality’ is that as the human population continues to grow, consuming resources on an unprecedented scale, ‘policy-makers will have less and less capacity to intervene to keep damage to the environment from producing serious social disruption’ (Beeson 2010: 283). Liberal democracy, through the necessities dictated by a capitalist economy has built its survival on the continued exploitation of environmental resources to a point where an attempt to gain control of this practice has become almost impossible. The article, whilst not wholly advocating the Asian political model (indeed Beeson highlights the fact that China is a ruthless exploiter of its own natural environment and sets a poor example for the rest of the continent), is appropriately pessimistic towards the success of liberal democracy. It therefore seems rational to put forward soft authoritarianism as a viable alternative: for it avoids trust in the individual, taking a negative view of human nature and advocates the need for state control, particularly surrounding urgent policy issues like the environment. Whilst it is difficult to accept, it may be the case that ‘good forms of authoritarianism, in which environmentally unsustainable forms of behaviour are simply forbidden, may become not only justifiable, but essential for the survival of humanity’ (Beeson 2010: 289).

### 1NC Case

#### No solvency – Collective structures are responsible for an overwhelming majority of consumption.

Jensen 2009

Derrick, activist and the author of many books, most recently What We Leave Behind and Songs of the Dead, Forget Shorter Showers, Orion Magazine, http://www.orionmagazine.org/index.php/articles/article/4801/

WOULD ANY SANE PERSON think dumpster diving would have stopped Hitler, or that composting would have ended slavery or brought about the eight-hour workday, or that chopping wood and carrying water would have gotten people out of Tsarist prisons, or that dancing naked around a fire would have helped put in place the Voting Rights Act of 1957 or the Civil Rights Act of 1964? Then why now, with all the world at stake, do so many people retreat into these entirely personal “solutions”? Part of the problem is that we’ve been victims of a campaign of systematic misdirection. Consumer culture and the capitalist mindset have taught us to substitute acts of personal consumption (or enlightenment) for organized political resistance. An Inconvenient Truth helped raise consciousness about global warming. But did you notice that all of the solutions presented had to do with personal consumption—changing light bulbs, inflating tires, driving half as much—and had nothing to do with shifting power away from corporations, or stopping the growth economy that is destroying the planet? Even if every person in the United States did everything the movie suggested, U.S. carbon emissions would fall by only 22 percent. Scientific consensus is that emissions must be reduced by at least 75 percent worldwide. Or let’s talk water. We so often hear that the world is running out of water. People are dying from lack of water. Rivers are dewatered from lack of water. Because of this we need to take shorter showers. See the disconnect? Because I take showers, I’m responsible for drawing down aquifers? Well, no. More than 90 percent of the water used by humans is used by agriculture and industry. The remaining 10 percent is split between municipalities and actual living breathing individual humans. Collectively, municipal golf courses use as much water as municipal human beings. People (both human people and fish people) aren’t dying because the world is running out of water. They’re dying because the water is being stolen. Or let’s talk energy. Kirkpatrick Sale summarized it well: “For the past 15 years the story has been the same every year: individual consumption—residential, by private car, and so on—is never more than about a quarter of all consumption; the vast majority is commercial, industrial, corporate, by agribusiness and government [he forgot military]. So, even if we all took up cycling and wood stoves it would have a negligible impact on energy use, global warming and atmospheric pollution.” Or let’s talk waste. In 2005, per-capita municipal waste production (basically everything that’s put out at the curb) in the U.S. was about 1,660 pounds. Let’s say you’re a die-hard simple-living activist, and you reduce this to zero. You recycle everything. You bring cloth bags shopping. You fix your toaster. Your toes poke out of old tennis shoes. You’re not done yet, though. Since municipal waste includes not just residential waste, but also waste from government offices and businesses, you march to those offices, waste reduction pamphlets in hand, and convince them to cut down on their waste enough to eliminate your share of it. Uh, I’ve got some bad news. Municipal waste accounts for only 3 percent of total waste production in the United States. I want to be clear. I’m not saying we shouldn’t live simply. I live reasonably simply myself, but I don’t pretend that not buying much (or not driving much, or not having kids) is a powerful political act, or that it’s deeply revolutionary. It’s not. Personal change doesn’t equal social change.

#### ---Individual local strategies fail to adapt to the inevitability of global concerns and guarantees a world dominated by violence.

Monbiot 2004

George, journalist, academic, and political and environmental activist, Manifesto for a New World Order, p. 11-13

The quest for global solutions is difficult and divisive. Some members of this movement are deeply suspicious of all institutional power at the global level, fearing that it could never be held to account by the world’s people. Others are concerned that a single set of universal prescriptions would threaten the diversity of dissent. A smaller faction has argued that all political programmes are oppressive: our task should not be to replace one form of power with another, but to replace all power with a magical essence called ‘anti-power’. But most of the members of this movement are coming to recognize that if we propose solutions which can be effected only at the local or the national level, we remove ourselves from any meaningful role in solving precisely those problems which most concern us. Issues such as cli­mate change, international debt, nuclear proliferation, war, peace and the balance of trade between nations can be addressed only globally or internationally. Without global measures and global institutions, it is impossible to see how we might distribute wealth from rich nations to poor ones, tax the mobile rich and their even more mobile money, control the shipment of toxic waste, sustain the ban on landmines, prevent the use of nuclear weapons, broker peace between nations or prevent powerful states from forcing weaker ones to trade on their terms. If we were to work only at the local level, we would leave these, the most critical of issues, for other people to tackle. Global governance will take place whether we participate in it or not. Indeed, it must take place if the issues which concern us are not to be resolved by the brute force of the powerful. That the international institutions have been designed or captured by the dictatorship of vested interests is not an argument against the existence of international institutions, but a reason for overthrowing them and re­placing them with our own. It is an argument for a global political system which holds power to account. In the absence of an effective global politics, moreover, local solutions will always be undermined by communities of interest which do not share our vision. We might, for example, manage to persuade the people of the street in which we live to give up their cars in the hope of preventing climate change, but unless everyone, in all communities, either shares our politics or is bound by the same rules, we simply open new road space into which the neighbouring communities can expand. We might declare our neighbour­hood nuclear-free, but unless we are simultaneously work­ing, at the international level, for the abandonment of nuclear weapons, we can do nothing to prevent ourselves and everyone else from being threatened by people who are not as nice as we are. We would deprive ourselves, in other words, of the power of restraint. By first rebuilding the global politics, we establish the political space in which our local alternatives can flourish. If, by contrast, we were to leave the governance of the necessary global institutions to others, then those institutions will pick off our local, even our national, solutions one by one. There is little point in devising an alternative economic policy for your nation, as Luis Inacio ‘Lula’ da Silva, now president of Brazil, once advocated, if the International Monetary Fund and the financial speculators have not first been overthrown. There is little point in fighting to protect a coral reef from local pollution, if nothing has been done to prevent climate change from destroying the conditions it requires for its survival.

#### We have already crossed the threshold of sustainability – Continued technological advancement is key to undo the damage and prevent extinction of all species

AtKisson 1 (President and CEO of The AtKisson Group, an international sustainability consultancy to business and government, “Sustainability is Dead— Long Live Sustainability” <http://www.rrcap.unep.org/uneptg06/course/Robert/SustainabilityManifesto2001.pdf>)

The evidence that we are beyond the limits to growth is by now overwhelming: the alarms include climatic change, disappearing biodiversity, falling human sperm counts, troubling slow-downs in food production after decades of rapid expansion, the beginning of serious international tensions over basic needs like water. Wild storms and floods and eerie changes in weather patterns are but a first visible harbinger of more serious trouble to come, trouble for which we are not adequately prepared. Indeed, change of all kinds—in the Biosphere (nature as a whole), the Technosphere (the entirety of human manipulation of nature), and the Noösphere (the collective field of human consciousness)—is happening so rapidly that it exceeds our capacity to understand it, control it, or respond to it adequately in corrective ways. Humanity is simultaneously entranced by its own power, overwhelmed by the problems created by progress, and continuing to steer itself over a cliff. Our economies and technologies are changing certain basic structures of planetary life, such as the balance of carbon in the atmosphere, genetic codes, the amount of forest cover, species variety and distribution, and the foundations of cultural identity. Unless we make technological advances of the highest order, many of the destructive changes we are causing to nature are irreversible. Extinct species cannot (yet) be brought back to life. No credible strategy for controlling or reducing carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere has been put forward. We do not know how to fix what we’re breaking. At the same time, some of the very products of our technology— plutonium, for instance—require of us that we maintain a very high degree of cultural continuity, economic and political stability, and technological capacity and sophistication, far into the future. To ensure our safety and the safety of all forms of life, we must always be able to store, clean up, and contain poisons like plutonium and persistent organic toxins. Eventually we must be able to eliminate them safely. At all times, we must be able to contain the actions of evil or unethical elements in our societies who do not care about the consequences to life of unleashing our most dangerous creations. In the case of certain creations, like nuclear materials and some artificially constructed or genetically modified organisms, our secure custodianship must be maintained for thousands of years. We are, in effect, committed to a high-technology future. Any slip in our mastery over the forces now under our command could doom our descendants—including not just human descendants, but also those wild species still remaining in the oceans and wilderness areas—to unspeakable suffering. We must continue down an intensely scientific and technological path, and we can never stop.

#### Its try or die for managerialism- if we win any solvency deficit to the aff, you have to vote neg to avoid extinction and try for sustainability through tech. Our discursive commitment to innovation solves.

Atkisson 01 (Alan, former executive editor of the pioneering journal In Context: A Quarterly of Humane Sustainable Culture, co-founded the Sustainable Seattle initiative, later recognized by the United Nations as a model project in urban sustainability and indicator development, “Sustainability is Dead— Long Live Sustainability,” October, http://www.rrcap.ait.asia/uneptg06/course/Robert/SustainabilityManifesto2001.pdf)

Transformation is Possible Dramatic civilizational change—transformation, in a word—is not so difficult to imagine. History is full of examples. Global history since the Renaissance, with all our remarkable transformations in technology, economics, and culture, is largely a product of humanity learning to take seriously the evidence of its senses, to reflect on that evidence carefully, and to make provisional conclusions that can be tested. This is the cornerstone of science. If we are to take seriously the evidence of our senses and our science, we must provisionally conclude that we are now largely responsible for living conditions on this planet. We have the power to fundamentally shape climate, manage ecosystems, design life-forms, and much more. The fact that we are currently doing these things very badly obscures the fact that we are doing them, and can therefore learn to do them better. Designing and managing the world is now our responsibility. That is the hypothesis that must now be tested by humanity as a whole, if we are to prevent collapse and succeed in restoration. To succeed, we must take our responsibility as world-shapers far more seriously than we currently do. History demonstrates that we, as a species, have the power to create the future we envision. If, therefore, we give in to despair, collapse will follow. If we cultivate a vision of ourselves as powerful and wise stewards of our planetary home, transformation becomes possible. Examples of cultural transformation occurring in a generation or less abound. The Meiji Restoration transformed Japan from a closed, agricultural society to an industrial one in just a few decades. The wholesale redirection of the North American and European economies during World War II took just a few years. The Apollo Program’s success in putting humans on the moon transpired, on schedule, within a decade. The fall of the Berlin Wall . . . the end of Apartheid . . . the change in China from a state-planned to a market economy . . . much of recent history suggests that transformation is not only possible, but a frequent occurrence in civilizational evolution. None of these events, however, remotely approaches the scale of global transformation we must now effect in technology, energy, transportation, agriculture, infrastructure, and economics, based on a new cultural understanding of our role as nature’s managers, the world's architects, the planet’s artists and engineers. But this testimony from history illustrates something profoundly important about transformation, in addition to its raw and indisputable possibility: no transformative change truly happens suddenly. Nor does transformation involve the magical or instantaneous creation of a new culture. “Transformation” is the name we give to the extremely accelerated adoption of existing innovations, together with the acceleration of innovation itself. Understanding transformation in these terms gives, to those who seek to create one, a reason for hope. An enormous amount of design work, preliminary to a transformation of the kind envisioned here, has already been done. Inventions, policies, models, scenarios, alternatives . . . innovations of all kinds have been developed by thoughtful and committed people over a generation, and the speed of innovation is increasing. Intense and focused commitment by a critical mass of talented, dedicated, and influential people—in business, government, religion, the arts, the civil sector, every walk of life—could accelerate the process by which innovation enters the mainstream of technical and social practice, and thereby turns humanity on a more hopeful course. By framing ambitious and visionary goals, and by highlighting the dangers and risks of inaction, this corps of skilled and forward-looking individuals in groups, organizations, corporations and governments could inspire others. The numbers involved could grow exponentially, and as institutions became thoroughly oriented toward achieving transformation, enormous resources could be mobilized, accelerating the transformation process still further. One generation of intensely focused investment, research, and redevelopment—redesigning our energy systems, overhauling our chemical industries, rebuilding our cities, finding substitutes for wood and replanting lost forests, and so much more—could transform the world as we know it into something far more beautiful, satisfying, and sustainable. This I believe: Sustainability is possible. Sustainability is desirable. Sustainability is a goal worthy of one’s life’s work. Sustainability is the great task of the next century. Sustainability is the next challenge on the road to our destiny.

#### Tech optimism based on empirical research is good---prefer specific experts

Krier 85 James E., Professor of Law at the University of Michigan, “The Un-Easy Case for Technological Optimism,” Michigan Law Review, Vol. 84, No. 3; December 1985, pp. 405-429

A technological optimist is not simply a person with unqualified enthusiasm about technological promise. Saint-Simon (1760-1825) was an enthusiast, but he was not a technological optimist as the term is currently used. Saint-Simon, rather, was a utopian who happened to attach his vision to technocratic expertise.4 He was the forefather of Technocracy, an active utopian movement in the 1930s and one not entirely dead even today.5 Technological optimists are not utopians, but something less - let us say quasi-utopians, after a recent usage (applied to himself) of Robert Dahl's.6 Unlike any self-respecting pure utopian, quasi-utopians (and technological optimists) seek not perfection but tolerable imperfection, tolerable because it is better than anything else they consider attainable though not nearly as good as lots of alternatives that can be imagined. But technological optimists are also something more than mere believers, or faddists, or techniks.7 Their views are rigorously formulated, grounded in an apparent reality, based on knowledge and experience, and artfully defended. There are no crazies among the best of the optimists; they are conservative, respected experts who command enormous authority. They have a very specific position namely, "that exponential technological growth will allow us to expand resources ahead of exponentially increasing demands."8 This is the precise meaning of technological optimism as a term of art.

#### Scientific knowledge is best because it subjects itself to constant refinement based on empirical evidence

Hutcheon 93—former prof of sociology of education at U Regina and U British Columbia. Former research advisor to the Health Promotion Branch of the Canadian Department of Health and Welfare and as a director of the Vanier Institute of the Family. Phd in sociology, began at Yale and finished at U Queensland. (Pat, A Critique of "Biology as Ideology: The Doctrine of DNA", http://www.humanists.net/pdhutcheon/humanist%20articles/lewontn.htm)

The introductory lecture in this series articulated the increasingly popular "postmodernist" claim that all science is ideology. Lewontin then proceeded to justify this by stating the obvious: that scientists are human like the rest of us and subject to the same biases and socio-cultural imperatives. Although he did not actually say it, his comments seemed to imply that the enterprise of scientific research and knowledge building could therefore be no different and no more reliable as a guide to action than any other set of opinions. The trouble is that, in order to reach such an conclusion, one would have to ignore all those aspects of the scientific endeavor that do in fact distinguish it from other types and sources of belief formation.¶ Indeed, if the integrity of the scientific endeavor depended only on the wisdom and objectivity of the individuals engaged in it we would be in trouble. North American agriculture would today be in the state of that in Russia today. In fact it would be much worse, for the Soviets threw out Lysenko's ideology-masquerading-as-science decades ago. Precisely because an alternative scientific model was available (thanks to the disparaged Darwinian theory) the former Eastern bloc countries have been partially successful in overcoming the destructive chain of consequences which blind faith in ideology had set in motion. This is what Lewontin's old Russian dissident professor meant when he said that the truth must be spoken, even at great personal cost. How sad that Lewontin has apparently failed to understand the fact that while scientific knowledge -- with the power it gives us -- can and does allow humanity to change the world, ideological beliefs have consequences too. By rendering their proponents politically powerful but rationally and instrumentally impotent, they throw up insurmountable barriers to reasoned and value-guided social change.¶ What are the crucial differences between ideology and science that Lewonton has ignored? Both Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn have spelled these out with great care -- the former throughout a long lifetime of scholarship devoted to that precise objective. Stephen Jay Gould has also done a sound job in this area. How strange that someone with the status of Lewontin, in a series of lectures supposedly covering the same subject, would not at least have dealt with their arguments!¶ Science has to do with the search for regularities in what humans experience of their physical and social environments, beginning with the most simple units discernible, and gradually moving towards the more complex. It has to do with expressing these regularities in the clearest and most precise language possible, so that cause-and-effect relations among the parts of the system under study can be publicly and rigorously tested. And it has to do with devising explanations of those empirical regularities which have survived all attempts to falsify them. These explanations, once phrased in the form of testable hypotheses, become predictors of future events. In other words, they lead to further conjectures of additional relationships which, in their turn, must survive repeated public attempts to prove them wanting -- if the set of related explanations (or theory) is to continue to operate as a fruitful guide for subsequent research.¶ This means that science, unlike mythology and ideology, has a self-correcting mechanism at its very heart. A conjecture, to be classed as scientific, must be amenable to empirical test. It must, above all, be open to refutation by experience. There is a rigorous set of rules according to which hypotheses are formulated and research findings are arrived at, reported and replicated. It is this process -- not the lack of prejudice of the particular scientist, or his negotiating ability, or even his political power within the relevant university department -- that ensures the reliability of scientific knowledge. The conditions established by the community of science is one of precisely defined and regulated "intersubjectivity". Under these conditions the theory that wins out, and subsequently prevails, does so not because of its agreement with conventional wisdom or because of the political power of its proponents, as is often the case with ideology. The survival of a scientific theory such as Darwin's is due, instead, to its power to explain and predict observable regularities in human experience, while withstanding worldwide attempts to refute it -- and proving itself open to elaboration and expansion in the process. In this sense only is scientific knowledge objective and universal. All this has little relationship to the claim of an absolute universality of objective "truth" apart from human strivings that Lewontin has attributed to scientists.¶ Because ideologies, on the other hand, do claim to represent truth, they are incapable of generating a means by which they can be corrected as circumstances change. Legitimate science makes no such claims. Scientific tests are not tests of verisimilitude. Science does not aim for "true" theories purporting to reflect an accurate picture of the "essence" of reality. It leaves such claims of infallibility to ideology. The tests of science, therefore, are in terms of workability and falsifiability, and its propositions are accordingly tentative in nature. A successful scientific theory is one which, while guiding the research in a particular problem area, is continuously elaborated, revised and refined, until it is eventually superseded by that very hypothesis-making and testing process that it helped to define and sharpen. An ideology, on the other hand, would be considered to have failed under those conditions, for the "truth" must be for all time. More than anything, it is this difference that confuses those ideological thinkers who are compelled to attack Darwin's theory of evolution precisely because of its success as a scientific theory. For them, and the world of desired and imagined certainty in which they live, that very success in contributing to a continuously evolving body of increasingly reliable -- albeit inevitably tentative -- knowledge can only mean failure, in that the theory itself has altered in the process.

#### Humanity won’t stop the technological or managerial project

Kateb 97 George, Professor of politics at Princeton, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_m2267/is\_/ai\_19952031

But the question arises as to where a genuine principle of limitation on technological endeavor would come from. It is scarcely conceivable that Western humanity--and by now most of humanity, because of their pleasures and interests and their own passions and desires and motives--would halt the technological project. Even if, by some change of heart, Western humanity could adopt an altered relation to reality and human beings, how could it be enforced and allowed to yield its effects? The technological project can be stopped only by some global catastrophe that it had helped to cause or was powerless to avoid. Heidegger's teasing invocation of the idea that a saving remedy grows with the worst danger is useless. In any case, no one would want the technological project halted, if the only way was a global catastrophe. Perhaps even the survivors would not want to block its reemergence. As for our generation and the indefinite future, many of us are prepared to say that there are many things we wish that modern science did not know or is likely to find out and many things we wish that modern technology did not know how to do. When referring in 1955 to the new sciences of life, Heidegger says We do not stop to consider that an attack with technological means is being prepared upon the life and nature of man compared with which the explosion of the hydrogen bomb means little. For precisely if the hydrogen bombs do not explode and human life on earth is preserved, an uncanny change in the world moves upon us (1966, p. 52). The implication is that it is less bad for the human status or stature and for the human relation to reality that there be nuclear destruction than that (what we today call) genetic engineering should go from success to success. To such lengths can a mind push itself when it marvels first at the passions, drives, and motives that are implicated in modern technology, and then marvels at the feats of technological prowess. The sense of wonder is entangled with a feeling of horror. We are past even the sublime, as conceptualized under the influence of Milton's imagination of Satan and Hell. It is plain that so much of the spirit of the West is invested in modern technology. We have referred to anger, alienation, resentment. But that cannot be the whole story. Other considerations we can mention include the following: a taste for virtuosity, skill for its own sake, an enlarged fascination with technique in itself, and, along with these, an aesthetic craving to make matter or nature beautiful or more beautiful; and then, too, sheer exhilaration, a questing, adventurous spirit that is reckless, heedless of danger, finding in obstacles opportunities for self-overcoming, for daring, for the very sort of daring that Heidegger praises so eloquently when in 1935 he discusses the Greek world in An Introduction to Metaphysics (1961, esp. pp. 123-39). All these considerations move away from anger, anxiety, resentment, and so on. The truth of the matter, I think, is that the project of modern technology, just like that of modern science, must attract a turbulence of response. The very passions and drives and motives that look almost villainous or hypermasculine simultaneously look like marks of the highest human aspiration, or, at the least, are not to be cut loose from the highest human aspiration.

#### The alt provides no basis for distinguishing between good and bad technology – evaluating consequences on a case-by-case bases solves blind faith in tech while avoiding the alt’s reflexive rejection

Schafer 9 [Arthur Schafer, Director of the Centre for Professional and Applied Ethics, University of Manitoba, Jan 1 2009, Review of *The End of Ethics In A Technological Society,* http://umanitoba.ca/faculties/arts/departments/philosophy/ethics/media/End\_of\_Ethics\_In\_A\_Technological\_Society.pdf]

In the book under review, Lawrence E. Schmidt and Scott Marratto reject holus bolus the Enlightenment faith in reason and progress and seem personally affronted by Bacon’s aphorism that “knowledge is power”. 1 On the technophilia-technophobia spectrum, they fall near the extreme end of the technophobia pole. Whereas Enlightenment philosophes were confident that the advance of modern science would make our world more reasonable, humane and prosperous, Schmidt & Marratto deny that that scientific knowledge brings progress in any form. They do concede at one point that “we cannot turn off the lights and live in the dark.” [p.xiv] Nevertheless, they advocate a “clear and absolute” set of limits “to what human beings may ethically do to themselves, to other human beings or to the environment (nature)” [p.xiv] and they appear to reject most, if not all, of what technology has to offer. Readers who seek rational criteria with which to evaluate the moral acceptability of new technologies will find little more on offer than vague platitudes. ¶ The authors argue at length that liberal (consequentialist) theories cannot offer “any solutions to the moral dilemmas that we face in the technological society”. [p.166] Instead, they ask the reader to accept a “supersensuous, supernatural, or metaphysically transcedent good”. [p.166] The supernatural, they insist, will provide all the answers we need. Disappointingly, however, when it comes to the crunch they fold their tents and slink away into the night. “It has not been our purpose in this book … to argue for the superiority of transcendental moral realism.” [p.166] Readers who prefer evidence and arguments to dogma are unhelpfully referred to Real Ethics by John Rist. Perhaps Schmidt and Marratto ought to have held up on publishing their thoughts until they were prepared to offer some kind of reasoned justification for their position. At all events, they either can’t or won’t tell us how to draw a reasonably defensible moral dividing line between good and bad technologies.¶ According to the religious traditionalism favoured by the authors, the universe is part of God’s benevolent creation, and human beings are assigned a starring role in the cosmic drama. Since no scientific worldview can offer similar assurances, science appears bleak and pessimistic. In place of religion’s flattering assumption that heavenly bodies exist as human adornments, science informs us that planet earth is merely one of many planets in a solar system that is merely one of innumerable solar systems in a galaxy that is merely one among billions of galaxies. Thus, science makes it difficult to hang onto the comforting notion that humankind is at the centre of the universe. Worse, biological science tells us that humanity has gradually evolved from a series of animal ancestors over a period lasting millions of years. This doesn’t fit well with such religious claims as that the earth is less than ten thousand years old and that God created humankind at one fell swoop and in His own image. ¶ In other words, if one accepts the perspective of physics and evolutionary biology then the theologians’ “orderly universe” [p.165] vanishes. If humanity is the product of evolutionary natural selection acting on random heritable variations then appeals to Human Nature as the absolute foundation for ethics will be stripped of their normative force. If there is no divine blueprint then we can no longer denounce scientific developments on the grounds that they are “unnatural” attempts to “play God”. Science is subversive precisely because it undermines traditional appeals to Natural Law of the sort favoured by Schmidt and Marratto.¶ This largely explains why the authors are highly critical of modernity. They see modern ethics as amounting to no ethics at all. That’s because modern ethics denies that the meaning of life can be read off from Nature. According to modernism– secular, liberal and humanistic - there is no meaning of life waiting “out there” to be discovered. Progress is possible but first we have to decide what we mean by “progress”. For today’s secular humanist, progress is usually defined, minimally, as a reduction in pain and suffering for human beings and other sentient creatures. To achieve this, we are obliged to use science and technology in order better to understand ourselves and the world in which we live. The overarching goal is to make life a little less terrible for each succeeding generation. On this secular view, it is we (rather than God) who must work out what it means for a life to go well or badly. Since we are alone in the universe, it is we who must ultimately decide what is to count as meaning and purpose.¶ Against this secular approach to ethics, Schmidt and Marratto advocate that we view the universe sub specie aeternitatis. They cling unshakeably to their conviction that the universe is ordered according to a (divine) blueprint, designed and brought into existence by a benevolent creator. Once we discover the harmonious design that pervades the universe, we will then also have discovered the key to “objective” ethics. Unlike scientific investigation and experimentation, which merely reveal the nature of the physical world, the doctrine of Natural Law promises to reveal how we should live.¶ Here’s an example of how the debate plays out. The world’s first “test tube baby”, Louise Brown, was born thirty years ago, in 1978. It would be no exaggeration to say that this event generated a widespread sense of moral panic. Doomsayers abounded, eager to announce that the technology employed by Doctors Edwards and Steptoe was the beginning of the end of human civilization. Religious leaders and some bioethicists stepped smartly to the microphone in order to anathematize IVF technology as profoundly “unnatural”; scientists were accused of “playing God”. Inevitably, the fearful image of Dr. Frankenstein was invoked. To “manufacture” a baby in this way was an unparalleled act of hubris. If IVF technology were not immediately banned it would quickly destroy the mystery of sex, procreation, and childbirth. Marriages would crumble, sex would cease or would lose its significance and respect for the sanctity of human life would erode. We were, it was claimed, on the slippery slope to a dystopic “brave new world”. The only way to avoid these dire consequences would be to impose a world-wide ban on IVF. Eighteen years later, with the cloning of Dolly the sheep, a second moral panic generated similar fearful predictions.¶ On a consequentialist approach, by contrast, one investigates the facts pertaining to any new technology and then attempts to do a careful balancing of the likely benefits and harms before deciding whether individuals should be permitted to make their own decisions about adopting or rejecting the technology. Admittedly, predicting and assessing the likely future consequences of our decisions, both individual and collective, is no easy task. But this much is clear: the doomsayers were wildly wrong in their fearful predictions about the negative consequences of IVF. Louise Brown is today a well-functioning young woman and some 100,000 childless couples have been able to give birth to children. Not such a big deal, you might think.

### 1NC F

#### ---Renewables will never work---Rare earth metal shortages and intermittency

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<http://www.postcarbon.org/report/127153-energy-nine-challenges-of-alternative-energy>

Unlike what is generally assumed, the input to an alternative energy process is not money per se: It is resources and energy, and the type and volume of the resources and energy needed may in turn limit the scalability and affect the cost and feasibility of an alternative. This is particularly notable in processes that rely on advanced technologies manufactured with rare-earth elements. Fuel cells, for example, require platinum, palladium, and rare-earth elements. Solar-photovoltaic technology requires gallium, and in some forms, indium. Advanced batteries rely on lithium. Even technology designed to save energy, such as light-emitting diode (LED) or organic LED (OLED) lighting, requires rare earthsindium, and gallium. Expressing the costs of alternative energy only in monetary terms obscures potential limits arising from the requirements for resources and energy inputs. Because alternative energy today constitutes only a small fraction of total energy production, the volume of resources and energy demanded for its production has so far been easily accommodated. This will not necessarily be the case with large-scale expansion. For example, thin-film solar has been promoted as a much lower-cost, more flexible, and more widely applicable solar-conversion technology compared to traditional silicon panels. Thin-film solar currently uses indium because of its versatile properties, but indium is also widely used as a component of flat-screen monitors. Reserves of indium are limited, and a 2007 study found that at current rates of consumption, known reserves of indium would last just thirteen years. 7 Can greatly increased demand for these resources be accommodated? As shown in table 18.1, successful deployment to 2030 of a range of new energy technologies (and some non-energy advanced technologies) would substantially raise demand for a range of metals beyond the level of world production today. In the case of gallium, demand from emerging technologies would be expected to reach six times today’s total global production by 2030; for indium, more than three times today’s production—compared to just fractional increases in the demand for ruthenium and selenium. Although alternative metals and materials exist for certain technologies (albeit often with performance tradeoffs), embarking on a particular technology deployment path without consideration of long-term availability of material inputs can substantially raise risks. These risks are not limited to physical availability and price; they include potential supply disruptions as a consequence of the uneven geographical distribution of production and reserves. Currently, China is the dominant world source (over 95 percent) of the rare-earth element neodymium, a key input in the production of permanent magnets used in hybrid-vehicle motors and windmill turbines. In 2009, the Chinese government announced restrictions on the export of rare earths, ostensibly to encourage investment within China of industries using the metals. Whether for the rare earths themselves or for final products made from them, import dependency in the face of such a high concentration of production would do little to alleviate energy security concerns now seen in terms of import dependency on the Middle East for oil. Alternative energy production is reliant not only on a range of resource inputs, but also on fossil fuels for the mining of raw materials, transport, manufacturing, construction, maintenance, and decommissioning. Currently, no alternative energy exists without fossil-fuel inputs, and no alternative energy process can reproduce itself—that is, manufacture the equipment needed for its own production—without the use of fossil fuels. In this regard, alternative energy serves as a supplement to the fossil-fuel base, and its input requirements may constrain its development in cases of either material or energy scarcity.

#### ---Turn-Electricity prices

#### A. Renewables triple electricity prices – eliminates its sustainability and use

IER 12 (Institute for Energy Research, “Solar Subsidies Make Electricity Bills More Expensive” http://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/2012/07/19/13253/)

Renewable energy supporters have been emphatic in calling for the United States government to provide subsidies comparable to those offered by foreign “competitors,” yet it is worth noting that the foreign experience with renewable energy subsidies has not led to especially effective results. One of the most striking examples is Germany—the world’s largest solar power producer whose energy industry is facing serious economic problems now that the German government is imposing massive cuts to its solar subsidies. In 1990, Germany enacted a feed-in tariff law that requires utilities to purchase electricity generated with renewable electricity at a fixed price that is guaranteed for 20 years. These subsidies, which were then boosted in 2000 and 2004, led to Germany becoming the world leader in solar power. However, after the initial growth that led the country to become the world’s first solar energy producer, today its solar manufacturing and production industry is crashing rapidly due to cuts in these generous subsidies.[i] In February of this year, the German government announced drastic new cuts to the country’s solar incentives. After several months of heated discussion, the German Bundestag (the lower house of the country’s parliament) approved 20 to 30 percent subsidy reductions, depending on the size of the solar energy system.[ii] These subsidy reductions, the first of which began in 2009, have hit the country’s solar industry hard—since December of last year, over a half dozen German solar manufacturers have declared bankruptcy.[iii] These are likely just the first of many, as the country intends to phase all solar subsidies out by 2017. Apart from the fact that enacting massive solar subsidies was a controversial decision for a rather cloudy country, as solar power is intermittent and works only when the sun shines, providing large subsidies for an industry over an extended period of time removed many of the incentives that influence whether a business succeeds or fails in the market. Namely, analysts attempting to determine the reasons why Germany’s solar experiment has floundered have noted that the solar industry increasingly relied on governmental funding, rather than pursuing innovations to improve their product and cut production costs.[iv] Most importantly, Germany’s solar subsidies have been expensive with little evidence to prove they are worth the cost. Last year, over €8 billion ($10.2 billion) was paid out to German solar farm operators and homeowners with solar panels, but only 3.3 of the country’s power supply was generated by solar in the same time period.[v] Two decades of highly-subsidized renewable energy have had a noticeable effect on the country’s electricity prices. Currently, Germany’s solar feed-in tariffs vary from $0.166 per kWh on the low end to $0.297 per kWh on the high end, which makes it $0.2315 per kWh on average.[vi] This represents a large portion of the price of residential electricity: an average customer in Germany pays about $0.3523 per kWh (€0.2781) of electricity used.[vii] Those who believe that the United States should emulate Germany’s model should consider the following: 35 cents per kWh for electricity is three times as much as U.S. customers paid on average for electricity last year (11.8 cents per kWh).[viii]Germany’s solar feed-in tariff alone is 41-152% greater than US total residential electricity rates. Germans also have the 2nd highest electricity prices in Europe—outdone only by wind-dependent Denmark—and this situation will inevitably be made worse by the fact that Germany has pledged to phase out nuclear energy and become more reliant on renewable energy sources.[ix]

#### B. High electricity prices destroy the sustainable RE investment

Bryce 12 (ROBERT BRYCE is a senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute's Center for Energy Policy and the Environment. He has been writing about energy for two decades and his articles have appeared in numerous publications ranging from The Wall Street Journal to The New York Times and the Atlantic Monthly to the Washington Post. “THE HIGH COST OF RENEWABLE-ELECTRICITY MANDATES” http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/eper\_10.htm)

Residential electricity rates are soaring, and they are doing so at the worst possible time. Between 2006 and 2010, the rates increased at a pace faster than inflation. The result: annual electricity costs for the average homeowner are up by about $300 over that time period.[100] The recent surge in rates reverses a decadeslong trend. In 1960, the inflation-adjusted cost of residential electricity was $0.14 per kilowatt-hour. By 2005, the average cost of a kilowatt-hour delivered to residential customers had fallen to $0.09.[101] But by October 2011, the average cost had surged, to just over $0.12.[102] The U.S. electricity sector, one of the biggest industries in the world, posted sales of $369 billion in 2010.[103] These rising costs are adding a strain to the U.S. economy at the same time that the country is struggling with persistently high unemployment and record levels of food-stamp usage, up 71 percent since 2007. While there are many reasons for the persistence of unemployment and the soaring food-stamp rolls, it's clear that higher-cost electricity hurts the overall economy as it slows growth and acts as a regressive tax on the poor and the working class. Between the beginning of the recession and June 2011, real median incomes in the U.S. declined by 9.8 percent.[104] That decline means that higher electricity costs are taking a larger percentage of disposable income from low- and middle-income workers.[105] Although some regulations governing the electricity-generation sector can be justified on health-related grounds—with the quest for cleaner air as a frequently cited goal—the push for renewable energy is largely elective. And that should be a concern, given the regressive nature of higher electricity prices. In her 2009 report for the Oak Ridge National Laboratory about the impact of RPS mandates on low-income consumers, Barbara R. Alexander noted: The impact of poverty on a household's ability to afford essential utility services is significant. Low-income households have an energy burden (percentage of income that must be spent to keep the heat and lights on) that has increased from 10% to over 25% for those households in the lowest quintile by income over the past decade, reflecting increased prices and essentially flat income for this group. This contrasts with the energy burden of moderate-income households, which is 4% of income on average. Anywhere from 20 to 30% of households in many utility service territories are "low income." The ability of current low income bill payment assistance programs-whether funded through taxes or utility rates-to meet these needs and assure access to affordable electricity service is well documented to be insufficient and likely to be even more so due to the recent economic recession and the downward trend in employment.[106] The deleterious effect that higher energy prices are having on the poor is well documented. In early 2009, the Wall Street Journal reported "a record number of U.S. households are seeking state assistance to pay their heating bills even as fuel prices have eased recently." The paper said that low-income energyassistance programs in a dozen states had seen applications jump by at least 25 percent. In Texas alone, 150,000 households sought assistance, triple the number recorded a year earlier. Similar increases were seen in Florida. The paper reported that the number of applicants for energy-cost assistance in California more than doubled. "Other states with big jumps included Tennessee at 60%, Arkansas at 50%, Arizona at 35%, Alaska at 34%, New Mexico and Oregon at 26% and Alabama, Massachusetts and New Hampshire at 25%."[107] The upward surge in families needing assistance with their energy bills continues. In November 2011, the National Energy Assistance Directors' Association (NEADA) reported that 8.9 million low-income families received assistance for energy bills in fiscal year 2011 and "approximately 10 million households are expected to apply for assistance in FY 2012."[108] The group reported that 52 percent of the people surveyed said that "energy bills were more difficult to pay than in the previous year." In December, the group issued another report, which found that the number of military families receiving assistance for their energy bills had increased by 156 percent since 2008.[109] The continuing need for energy-related financial assistance is occurring at the same time that the federal government is cutting funding for the Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP). In fiscal year 2011, total funding for LIHEAP was about $4.5 billion. By late December 2011, the projected amount available for fiscal year 2012 was about $2.6 billion.[110]

## \*\*\*2NC

### 2NC Cards – Framework

#### Switching sides doesn’t require you check your identity at the door, if you don’t think you should have to work with the state you can argue the state should stop intervening in energy policy by reducing restrictions.

#### Moreover, arguing both sides does not mean you have to stop having an identity, it is the same as keeping an open mind, their argument are analogous to the dogmatic positions that racists and homophobs take “I don’t hate gay black people, they just go against my personal beliefs

English et al 2007

Eric English, Stephen Llano, Gordon R. Mitchell, Catherine E. Morrison, John Rief and Carly Woods, Communications—University of Pittsburg “Debate as a Weapon of Mass Destruction,” Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies, Volume 4, Number 2, June, http://www.pitt.edu/~gordonm/JPubs/EnglishDAWG.pdf

It is our position, however, that rather than acting as a cultural technology expanding American exceptionalism, switch-side debating originates from a civic attitude that serves as a bulwark against fundamentalism of all stripes. Several prominent voices reshaping the national dialogue on homeland security have come from the academic debate community and draw on its animating spirit of critical inquiry. For example, Georgetown University law professor Neal Katyal served as lead plaintiff ’s counsel in Hamdan , which challenged post-9/11 enemy combat defini- tions.12 The foundation for Katyal’s winning argument in Hamdan was laid some four years before, when he collaborated with former intercollegiate debate champion Laurence Tribe on an influential Yale Law Journal addressing a similar topic.13 Tribe won the National Debate Tournament in 1961 while competing as an undergraduate debater for Harvard University. Thirty years later, Katyal represented Dartmouth College at the same tournament and finished third. The imprint of this debate training is evident in Tribe and Katyal’s contemporary public interventions, which are characterized by meticulous research, sound argumentation, and a staunch commitment to democratic principles. Katyal’s reflection on his early days of debating at Loyola High School in Chicago’s North Shore provides a vivid illustration. ‘‘I came in as a shy freshman with dreams of going to medical school. Then Loyola’s debate team opened my eyes to a different world: one of argumentation and policy.’’ As Katyal recounts, ‘‘the most important preparation for my career came from my experiences as a member of Loyola’s debate team.’’14 The success of former debaters like Katyal, Tribe, and others in challenging the dominant dialogue on homeland security points to the efficacy of academic debate as a training ground for future advocates of progressive change. Moreover, a robust understanding of the switch-side technique and the classical liberalism which underpins it would help prevent misappropriation of the technique to bolster suspect homeland security policies. For buried within an inner-city debater’s files is a secret threat to absolutism: the refusal to be classified as ‘‘with us or against us,’’ the embracing of intellectual experimentation in an age of orthodoxy, and reflexivity in the face of fundamentalism. But by now, the irony of our story should be apparent \*the more effectively academic debating practice can be focused toward these ends, the greater the proclivity of McCarthy’s ideological heirs to brand the activity as a ‘‘weapon of mass destruction.’’

---SSD allows us to TEST ideas and experiment with arguments---the static fixedness under their interpretation cannot result in the same educational benefits

Koehle 2010

Joe, Phd candidate in communications at Kansas, former West Georgia debater, http://mccfblog.org/actr/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/Koehle\_Paper\_ACTR-editedPDF.pdf.

Much like criticism of the sophists has persisted throughout time; **criticism of switch side debate has been a constant feature** since the advent of tournament-style debating. Harrigan documents how numerous these criticisms have been in the last century, explaining that Page 15 Koehle 15 complaints about the mode of debate are as old as the activity itself (9). **The most famous controversy** over modern switch side debate occurred in 1954, **when the U.S. military academies** and the Nebraska teachers‟ colleges **decided to boycott the resolution**: “Resolved: That the United States should extend diplomatic relations to the communist government of China.” The schools that boycotted the topic argued that it was ethically and educationally indefensible to defend a recognition of communists, and even went so far as to argue that “a pro-recognition stand by men wearing the country‟s uniforms would lead to misunderstanding on the part of our friends and to distortion by our enemies” (English et al. 221). Switch side debate was on the defensive, and debate coaches of the time were engaged in virulent debate over the how to debate. The controversy made the national news when the journalist Edward Murrow became involved and opined on the issue in front of millions of TV viewers. English et al. even go so far as to credit **the “debate about debate” with helping accelerate the implosion of the famous red- baiting Senator Joseph McCarthy** (222). The debate about debate fell back out of the national spotlight after the high-profile incident over the China resolution, but it never ended in the debate community itself. The tenor of **the debate reached a fever pitch when outright accusations of modern sophistry** (the bad kind) **were published** in the Spring 1983 edition of the National Forensic Journal, **when** **Bernard K. Duffy** wrote, “The Ethics of Argumentation in Intercollegiate Debate: A Conservative Appraisal.” Echoing the old Platonic argument against sophistic practice, **Duffy argued that switch side debate has ignored ethical considerations** in the pursuit of teaching cheap techniques for victory (66). The 1990‟s saw a divergence of criticisms into two different camps. The first camp was comprised of traditional critics who argued that debate instruction and practice promoted form over substance. For example, a coach from Boston College lamented that absent a change, “Debate instructors and their students will become the sophists of our age, susceptible to the traditional indictments elucidated by Isocrates and others” (Herbeck). Dale Bertelstein published a response to the previously cited article by Muir about switch side debate that launched into an extended discussion of debate and sophistry. This article continued the practice of coaches and communications scholars developing and applying the Platonic critique of the sophists to contemporary debate practices. Alongside this traditional criticism **a newer set of critiques of switch side debate emerged.** Armed with the language of Foucauldian criticism, Critical Legal Studies, and critiques of normativity and statism, many people who were uncomfortable with the debate tradition of arguing in favor of government action began to question the reason why one should ever be obliged to advocate government action. They began **to argue that switch side debate was a mode of debate that unnecessarily constrained people to the hegemony of debating the given topic.** These newer criticisms of switch side debate gained even more traction after the year 2000, with several skilled teams using these arguments to avoid having to debate one side of the topic. William Spanos, a professor of English at SUNY Binghamton decided to link the ethos of switch side debate to that of neo-conservatism after observing a debate tournament, saying that “the arrogant neocons who now saturate the government of the Bush…learned their „disinterested‟ argumentative skills in the high school and college debate societies and that, accordingly, they have become masters at disarming the just causes of the oppressed.” (Spanos 467) **Contemporary policy debate is now under attack from all sides**, caught in its own dissoi logoi. Given the variety of assaults upon switch side debate by both sides of the political spectrum, **how can switch side debate be justified**? Supporters of switch side debate have made many arguments justifying the value of the practice that are not related to any defense of sophist Page 17 Koehle 17 techniques. I will only briefly describe them so as to not muddle the issue, but they are worthy of at least a cursory mention. The first defense is the most pragmatic reason of all: **Mandating people debate both sides of a topic is most fair to participants** **because it helps mitigate the potential for a topic that is biased towards one side**. More theoretical justifications are given, however. Supporters of switch side debate have argued that **encouraging students to play the devil‟s advocate creates a sense of self-reflexivity that is crucial to promoting tolerance and preventing dogmatism** (Muir 287). Others have attempted to justify switch side debate in educational terms and advocacy terms, explaining that it is a path to diversifying a student‟s knowledge by encouraging them to seek out paths they may have avoided otherwise, which in turn creates better public advocates (Dybvig and Iversen). In fact, **contemporary policy debate and its reliance upon switching sides creates an oasis of argumentation free from the demands of advocacy, allowing students to test out ideas and become more well-rounded advocates** as they leave the classroom and enter the polis (Coverstone). Finally, **debate empowers individuals to become critical thinkers capable of making sound decisions** (Mitchell, “Pedagogical Possibilities”, 41).

#### ---Switch side debate empirically improves policymaking --- EPA water policy.

Mitchell 2010

Gordon R., Associate Professor and Director of Graduate Studies in the Department of Communication at the University of Pittsburgh, Switch-Side Debating Meets Demand-Driven Rhetoric of Science, Rhetoric & Public Affairs, http://www.pitt.edu/~gordonm/JPubs/Mitchell2010.pdf

Yet the picture grows more complex when one considers what is happening over at the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), where environmental scientist Ibrahim Goodwin is collaborating with John W. Davis on a project that uses switch-side debating to clean up air and water. In April 2008, that initiative brought top intercollegiate debaters from four universities to Washington, D.C., for a series of debates on the topic of water quality, held for an audience of EPA subject matter experts working on interstate river pollution and bottled water issues. An April 2009 follow-up event in Huntington Beach, California, featured another debate weighing the relative merits of monitoring versus remediation as beach pollution strategies. “We use nationally ranked intercollegiate debate programs to research and present the arguments, both pro and con, devoid of special interest in the outcome,” explains Davis. “In doing so, agency representatives now remain squarely within the decision-making role thereby neutralizing overzealous advocacy that can inhibit learned discourse.”

#### ---Doesn’t turn us into Karl Rove---being able to see BOTH sides of an issue allows us to find the flaws and inconsistencies with racist, exeptionalist arguments, we can wade through bad arguments when we are forced to make them, that’s Zwarsteyn.

#### ---Rejecting switch side debate makes exclusion covert without improving the quality of debates.

Day 1966

Dennis, Assistant professor and director of forensics @ U. of Wisconsin, Madison, *central states speech journal,* “The Ethics of Democratic Debate” v17 p8

The ethic suggested here is similar to another ethical position which is widely accepted. Most readily acknowledge an ethical responsibility to oppose overt attempts to silence debate or suppress the expression of minority and unpopular views, even when such attempts are made in the name of personal conviction. Most fail, however, to recognize the more subtle and dangerous form of suppression which takes place in the name of personal conviction: an individual’s failure to give effective expression to an argument which is not otherwise being effectively expressed, because the argument is in opposition to his personal conviction on a problem. The act of suppression is no less harmful to the decision-making process because it is covert instead of overt. The social effects are the same: decision based on incomplete debate. The covert suppression of argument and information is as ethically culpable as is overt suppression. And personal conviction is no justification for either. Covert suppression is the greater threat to democratic processes because it is clandestine and is more difficult to overcome because of the ego involvement that usually accompanies personal conviction.

## \*\*\*1NR

### \*\*\*Case

### 2NC A2: No Ecoauthoritarianism

#### Environmental decline makes the transition to authoritarianism inevitable---the only question is whether it can be effective

Mark Beeson 10, Professor and Head of the Department of Political Science & International Studies, University of Birmingham, 2010, “The coming of environmental authoritarianism,” Environmental Politics, Vol. 19, No. 2, DOI:10.1080/09644010903576918

The conclusions that emerge from the following discussion are necessarily impressionistic, speculative and rather dispiriting. The empirical evidence upon which such inferences depend is, by contrast, more and more compelling and unequivocal. There is little doubt that the natural environment everywhere is under profound, perhaps irredeemable stress. Parts of Southeast Asia and China are distinctive only in having already gone further than the most of the West in the extent of the degradation that has already occurred (see Jasparro and Taylor 2008). The only issue that remains in doubt is the nature of the response to this unfolding crisis. The extent of the problem, the seemingly implacable nature of the drivers of environmental decline, the limited capacity for action at the national level and the region's unimpressive record of cooperation and environmental management do not inspire confidence. Consequently, the prospects for an authoritarian response become more likely as the material base of existence becomes less capable of sustaining life, let alone the ‘good life’ upon which the legitimacy of democratic regimes hinges.

#### The environmental crisis will collapse democracy---embracing deliberation now causes delayed response that ensures extinction

David Shearman 7, Emeritus professor of medicine at Adelaide University, Secretary of Doctors for the Environment Australia, and an Independent Assessor on the IPCC; and Joseph Wayne Smith, lawyer and philosopher with a research interest in environmentalism, 2007, The Climate Change Challenge and the Failure of Democracy, p. 153-156

As we have said, it is not too difficult to see how this present regime of global capitalism and liberal democracy will end: It will end through ecological necessity. Nature will take humanity by the throat and confront it with the biospherical damage that it has done. It is most unlikely in our opinion that some form of spontaneous, unorganized democratic groundswell will awaken the masses to their fates before it is too late. Rather any such resistance to the system must come from an organized vanguard, unafraid to ultimately rule in the name of the common good. These new philosopher kings feature what we call the “authoritarian alternative” discussed earlier.

### 2NC A2: Ethics

#### This debate should be about formulated ethical responses to the upcoming environmental crunch – even if authoritarianism sounds like a dirty word to you – resolving the environment and extinction of the human race is the most ethical decision – remember that the very definition of the word ethics is human to human interactions

Wapner 2003

Paul, associate professor and director of the Global Environmental Policy Program at American University. “Leftist Criticism of "Nature" Environmental Protection in a Postmodern Age,” Dissent Winter http://www.dissentmagazine.org/menutest/archives/2003/wi03/wapner.htm

All attempts to listen to nature are social constructions-except one. Even the most radical postmodernist must acknowledge the distinction between physical existence and non-existence. As I have said, postmodernists accept that there is a physical substratum to the phenomenal world even if they argue about the different meanings we ascribe to it. This acknowledgment of physical existence is crucial. We can't ascribe meaning to that which doesn't appear. What doesn't exist can manifest no character. Put differently, yes, the postmodernist should rightly worry about interpreting nature's expressions. And all of us should be wary of those who claim to speak on nature's behalf (including environmentalists who do that). But we need not doubt the simple idea that a prerequisite of expression is existence. This in turn suggests that preserving the nonhuman world-in all its diverse embodiments-must be seen by eco-critics as a fundamental good. Eco-critics must be supporters, in some fashion, of environmental preservation. Postmodernists reject the idea of a universal good. They rightly acknowledge the difficulty of identifying a common value given the multiple contexts of our value-producing activity. In fact, if there is one thing they vehemently scorn, it is the idea that there can be a value that stands above the individual contexts of human experience. Such a value would present itself as a metanarrative and, as Jean-François Lyotard has explained, postmodernism is characterized fundamentally by its "incredulity toward meta-narratives." Nonetheless, I can't see how postmodern critics can do otherwise than accept the value of preserving the nonhuman world. The nonhuman is the extreme "other"; it stands in contradistinction to humans as a species. In understanding the constructed quality of human experience and the dangers of reification, postmodernism inherently advances an ethic of respecting the "other." At the very least, respect must involve ensuring that the "other" actually continues to exist.

#### Extinction outweighs

Bostrum 12 (Nick, Professor of Philosophy at Oxford, directs Oxford's Future of Humanity Institute and winner of the Gannon Award, Interview with Ross Andersen, correspondent at The Atlantic, 3/6, “We're Underestimating the Risk of Human Extinction”, <http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/03/were-underestimating-the-risk-of-human-extinction/253821/>)

Bostrom, who directs Oxford's Future of Humanity Institute, has argued over the course of several papers that human extinction risks are poorly understood and, worse still, severely underestimated by society. Some of these existential risks are fairly well known, especially the natural ones. But others are obscure or even exotic. Most worrying to Bostrom is the subset of existential risks that arise from human technology, a subset that he expects to grow in number and potency over the next century.

Despite his concerns about the risks posed to humans by technological progress, Bostrom is no luddite. In fact, he is a longtime advocate of transhumanism---the effort to improve the human condition, and even human nature itself, through technological means. In the long run he sees technology as a bridge, a bridge we humans must cross with great care, in order to reach new and better modes of being. In his work, Bostrom uses the tools of philosophy and mathematics, in particular probability theory, to try and determine how we as a species might achieve this safe passage. What follows is my conversation with Bostrom about some of the most interesting and worrying existential risks that humanity might encounter in the decades and centuries to come, and about what we can do to make sure we outlast them.

Some have argued that we ought to be directing our resources toward humanity's existing problems, rather than future existential risks, because many of the latter are highly improbable. You have responded by suggesting that existential risk mitigation may in fact be a dominant moral priority over the alleviation of present suffering. Can you explain why?

Bostrom: Well suppose you have a moral view that counts future people as being worth as much as present people. You might say that fundamentally it doesn't matter whether someone exists at the current time or at some future time, just as many people think that from a fundamental moral point of view, it doesn't matter where somebody is spatially---somebody isn't automatically worth less because you move them to the moon or to Africa or something. A human life is a human life. If you have that moral point of view that future generations matter in proportion to their population numbers, then you get this very stark implication that existential risk mitigation has a much higher utility than pretty much anything else that you could do. There are so many people that could come into existence in the future if humanity survives this critical period of time---we might live for billions of years, our descendants might colonize billions of solar systems, and there could be billions and billions times more people than exist currently. Therefore, even a very small reduction in the probability of realizing this enormous good will tend to outweigh even immense benefits like eliminating poverty or curing malaria, which would be tremendous under ordinary standards.

### \*\*\*DA

### 2NC Impact Overview – RiMal

#### An overwhelming preponderance of evidence concludes the probability and magnitude of global warming makes it categorically distinct from every other impact.

Shearman & Smith 2007

David, Emeritus professor of medicine at Adelaide University, Secretary of Doctors for the Environment Australia, and an Independent Assessor on the IPCC, Joseph Wayne, lawyer and philosopher with a research interest in environmentalism. He is the author of Global Meltdown (Praeger, 1998) and Healing in a Wounded World (Praeger, 1997), THE CLIMATE CHANGE CHALLENGE AND THE FAILURE OF DEMOCRACY, pg 4-6

This impending crisis is caused by the accelerating damage to the natural environment on which humans depend for their survival. This is not to deny that there are other means that may bring catastrophe upon the earth. John Gray for example5 argues that destructive war is inevitable as nations become locked into the struggle for diminishing resources. Indeed, Gray believes that war is caused by the same instinctual behavior that we discuss in relation to environmental destruction. Gray regards population increases, environmental degradation, and misuse of technology as part of the inevitability of war. War may be inevitable but it is unpredictable in time and place, whereas environmental degradation is relentless and has progressively received increasing scientifi c evidence. Humanity has a record of doomsayers, most invariably wrong, which has brought a justifiable immunity to their utterances. Warnings were present in The Tales of Ovid and in the Old and New Testaments of the Bible, and in more recent times some of the predictions from Thomas Malthus and from the Club of Rome in 1972, together with the “population bomb” of Paul Ehrlich, have not eventuated. The frequent apocalyptic predictions from the environmental movement are unpopular and have been vigorously attacked. So it must be asked, what is different about the present warnings? As one example, when Sir David King, chief scientist of the UK government, states that “in my view, climate change is the most severe problem that we are facing today, more serious than the threat of terrorism,”6 how is this and other recent statements different from previous discredited prognostications? Firstly, they are based on the most detailed and compelling science produced with the same scientific rigor that has seen humans travel to the moon and create worldwide communication systems. Secondly, this science embraces a range of disciplines of ecology, epidemiology, climatology, marine and fresh water science, agricultural science, and many more, all of which agree on the nature and severity of the problems. Thirdly, there is virtual unanimity of thousands of scientists on the grave nature of these problems. Only a handful of skeptics remain. During the past decade many distinguished scientists, including numerous Nobel Laureates, have warned that humanity has perhaps one or two generations to act to avoid global ecological catastrophe. As but one example of this multidimensional problem, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has warned that global warming caused by fossil fuel consumption may be accelerating.7 Yet climate change is but one of a host of interrelated environmental problems that threaten humanity. The authors have seen the veils fall from the eyes of many scientists when they examine all the scientific literature. They become advocates for a fundamental change in society. The frequent proud statements on economic growth by treasurers and chancellors of the exchequer instill in many scientists an immediate sense of danger, for humanity has moved one step closer to doom. Science underpins the success of our technological and comfortable society. Who are the thousands of scientists who issue the warnings we choose to ignore? In 1992 the Royal Society of London and the U.S. National Academy of Sciences issued a joint statement, Population Growth, Resource Consumption and a Sustainable World,8 pointing out that the environmental changes affecting the planet may irreversibly damage the earth’s capacity to maintain life and that humanity’s own efforts to achieve satisfactory living conditions were threatened by environmental deterioration. Since 1992 many more statements by world scientifi c organizations have been issued.9 These substantiated that most environmental systems are suffering from critical stress and that the developed countries are the main culprits. It was necessary to make a transition to economies that provide increased human welfare and less consumption of energy and materials. It seems inconceivable that the consensus view of all these scientists could be wrong. There have been numerous international conferences of governments, industry groups, and environmental groups to discuss the problems and develop strategy, yet widespread deterioration of the environment accelerates. What is the evidence? The Guide to World Resources, 2000 –2001: People and Ecosystems, The Fraying Web of Life10 was a joint report of the United Nations Development Program, the United Nations Environment Program, the World Bank, and the World Resources Institute. The state of the world’s agricultural, coastal forest, freshwater, and grassland ecosystems were analyzed using 23 criteria such as food production, water quantity, and biodiversity. Eighteen of the criteria were decreasing, and one had increased (fiber production, because of the destruction of forests). The report card on the remaining four criteria was mixed or there was insufficient data to make a judgment. In 2005, The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment Synthesis Report by 1,360 scientifi c experts from 95 countries was released.11 It stated that approximately 60 percent of the ecosystem services that support life on earth—such as fresh water, fi sheries, and the regulation of air, water, and climate—are being degraded or used unsustainably. As a result the Millennium Goals agreed to by the UN in 2000 for addressing poverty and hunger will not be met and human well-being will be seriously affected.

### 2NC A2: NP Doesn’t Solve

#### ---Nuclear power is increasing and new tech solves

Worthington-Smart Planet-2/9/12

http://www.smartplanet.com/blog/intelligent-energy/the-us-nuclear-renaissance-has-begun/13058

There are cooling towers on the horizon in the United States. The nuclear renaissance is slated to begin in rural Georgia with new reactors being built over the next five years, and work is already underway to leap another generation ahead. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) today announced that it has granted licenses to a consortium of utilities to erect two Westinghouse AP 1000 reactors at Southern Company’s existing Vogtle site, clearing a path to end a decades long hiatus in new construction. Westinghouse’s design incorporates passive cooling, which extends the duration under which a reactor can operate safely without outside intervention in the event of a disaster. The AP 1000 is classified as Generation III+ reactor. Generation III+ reactors have more redundant systems than older reactor designs. Those include emergency cooling systems, a double containment system, and an ashtray like cooling area to capture molten fuel in the event of a meltdown. Existing U.S. nuclear reactors require active cooling such as electric water pumps. Japan’s Fukushima used active cooling, and its reactors melted down last spring when external power was unavailable. There are a total of 104 nuclear plants in the U.S today that are dependent upon active cooling. The meltdown risk associated with those legacy reactors and the high capital requirements of nuclear power are some of the reasons why no new reactor has been built in the U.S since the late 1970’s, when the 1979 Three Mile Island incident soured public sentiment. For now, anti-nuclear sentiment has been marginalized. The U.S. is energy hungry and nuclear power is receiving generous government subsidies. The Vogtle reactors would power up to 1 million homes at a cost of US$14 billion, CNN reported. A $8.3 billion conditional loan was granted by the Department of Energy to help ease the project’s capital requirements. The Vogtle reactors may be completed as soon as 2015 and 2016 - unless the project is stalled. (A number of environmental groups plan to sue). Meanwhile, multiple AP 1000s are already operating in China, and the U.S. is playing catch up. The design is the latest reactor to have received the NRC’s approval. However, that alone failed to satisfy NRC chairperson Gregory Jaczko. Jaczko withheld his support for Southern Company’s license unless the NRC was given binding assurances by Southern Co. that the design would be updated to incorporate lessons the NRC learned post Fukushima. He was the lone vote in opposition. The NRC has taken action to advance domestic nuclear safety by establishing a Fukushima focused task force. It outlined its goals in two memos (see here and here). Eventually, future reactors will push the safety bar even further. Those include small modular nuclear reactors (SMRs) and a transition away from uranium to a safer thorium fuel cycle. Proponents want SMR designs out for deployment by 2022. SMRs cluster together compact passively cooled reactors to match the output of obsolete coal or nuclear facilities. Steam output from many modules would power a common generator to produce electricity. The SMR concept was brought closer toward reality last month when the U.S. Department of Energy outlined how it intends to support the design and licensing of SMRs. The NRC recently certified a Westinghouse SMR design that is based upon the AP 1000

#### ---This is true globally --- Nuclear is inevitable, just a question of kind and degree.

Brook 2011

Barry, Barry, Senior Fellow at the Breakthrough Institute and a Research Professor at the University of Adelaide in Australia, For climate’s sake, nuclear power is not an ‘option’, it is a ‘necessity’ http://bravenewclimate.com/2011/07/17/nuclear-climate-necessity/

Worldwide, nuclear power is not going away (although equally, it is not currently being deployed at a rate anywhere near sufficient to displace fossil fuels any time soon). Of the G20 economic forum nations, 15 have nuclear power, four are planning to take it up in the near future, although now, as noted above, Germany have stated that they wish to phase out their use within 10 years (we will see). An interesting fact that most people are unaware of is this: the countries that currently have commercial nuclear power already cover almost 80% of global greenhouse gas emissions. When you add those nations who have commissioned plants, are planning deployment, or already have research reactors, this figure rises to over 90%. I know it’s an over-used cliché, but the nuclear genie truly is out of the bottle, and it is pointless discussing how to try and jam the stopper back in. In this context, the oft-repeated claim that new technologies ‘fail the crucial proliferation test’ is asinine nonsense, and counterproductive if our aim is to increase global security. We should instead be discussing seriously how, as a global society, we will use this low-carbon energy source safely and cleanly, with minimal risk and maximal advantage to all nations.

### 2NC A2: Authortiarianism Fails/Wont Be ecological

#### Environmental authoritarianism would be super-effective

Charles Daniel 12, University of Leeds, Summer 2012, “To what extent is democracy detrimental to the current and future aims of environmental policy and technologies?,” POLIS Journal, Vol. 7, <http://www.polis.leeds.ac.uk/assets/files/students/student-journal/ug-summer-12/charles-daniel.pdf>

Whilst not completely discrediting democracy, the previous chapter certainly highlights a number of shortcomings in the reality of the continued pursuit of consumerist tendencies through a culture based on liberalism and individuality. The evidence suggests that there needs to be a higher level of adaptability from modern states and a move away from the pursuit of the values of modernity, however difficult a concept this may be to accept. Despite its clear political shortcomings, is it possible that an authoritarian approach may be the most logical and efficient system to tackle the challenges of the environment?

As stated previously in the introduction, the reference to ‘authoritarianism’ should not be perceived in its traditional expression but rather in a more hybrid and rational sense. The best reference point for this is to be found in Robert Scalapino’s model of ‘soft authoritarianism’. He defines this as controlled political life, where freedom of speech is limited, yet those in power accept ‘the existence of a civil society outside the state’ (Scalapino 1993: 74). It also combines a market-orientated system with a paternalistic social order that persuades rather than coerces (Roy 1994). Scalapino’s model, it should be noted, is centred on defining the nature of Asian political models, such as those used by Singapore and to an extent China, rather than a historical western expression of authoritarianism. Francis Fukuyama, who regarded it as the most serious competitor to liberal democracy, furthered Scalapino’s discussion on soft authoritarianism. He emphasised the cultural relativity of this mode of government, as a result of its grounding in historical values and regarded it as the primary explanation for Asia’s continued economic dominance. As he put it:

‘The Asian experience has forced people in the West to confront weaknesses in their own societies in a way that none of the other ideological alternatives has. Only Asians have been able to master the modern technological world and create capitalist societies competitive with those of the West - indeed, some would argue, superior in many ways. This alone is enough to suggest that Asia's relative share of global power will increase steadily. But Asia also poses an ideological challenge.’ (Fukuyama 1995: 61)

For Fukuyama, the Asian political grounding in Confucian values of loyalty and obedience to authority combined with historical experience, has allowed soft authoritarianism to build a system that will arguably be considered as a more popular mode of government over democracy in Far Eastern political culture. Whilst Western societies attempt to cultivate their democratic values from an ideological grounding that in turn produces institutions, civil society and culture, Asian models are orientated in a reverse structure, putting primacy on cultural experience and teachings (Fukuyama 1995). The essence of Asian society is therefore not centered on individual rights and freedom but rather on a deeply ingrained moral code and communitarian ethics. The difficulty however, as Fukuyama highlights, is that soft authoritarianism is culturally relative and therefore would be difficult to transfer to western societies as a viable alternative to democracy. However when it comes to environmental issues, there is no reason to suggest that soft authoritarianism cannot be used as a political reference point for policy decisions, even amongst Western governments. For, contained within soft authoritarianism lies transferable principles, the most compelling one being trust and obedience in authoritative bodies to carry out policies for the long-term benefit of the community, rather than the short-term interest of the individual. If democracy is to be considered a failing political system in the context of an over-developed society, then this well articulated form of government does pose an interesting alternative.

### 2NC A2: No Link

#### Only top-down, centralized imposition of constraints on freedom can guarantee planetary survival---their ethic will fail to improve ecological outcomes which means authoritarianism is inevitable

Mathew Humphrey 7, Reader in Political Philosophy at the University of Nottingham, UK, 2007, Ecological Politics and Democratic Theory: The Challenge to the Deliberative Ideal, p. 14-15

In terms of the first of these points, that our democratic choices reflect a narrow understanding of our immediate interests and not an enlightened view of our long-term welfare, the case is made by Ophuls. He claims that we are now 'so committed to most of the things that cause or support the evils' with which he is concerned that 'we are almost paralysed; nearly all the constructive actions that could be taken at present... are so painful to so many people in so many ways that they are indeed totally unrealistic, and neither politicians nor citizens would tolerate them' (Ophuls, 1977: 224).4 Environmentally friendly policies can be justifiably imposed upon a population that 'would do something quite different if it was merely left to its own immediate desires and devices' (Ophuls, 1977: 227): currently left to these devices, the American people 'have so far evinced little willingness to make even minor sacrifices... for the sake of environmental goals' (Ophuls, 1977: 197). Laura Westra makes a similar argument in relation to the collapse of Canadian cod fisheries, which is taken to illustrate a wider point that we cannot hope to 'manage' nature when powerful economic and political interests are supported by 'uneducated democratic preferences and values' (Westra, 1998: 95). More generally reducing our 'ecological footprint' means 'individual and aggregate restraints the like of which have not been seen in most of the northwestern world. For this reason, it is doubtful that persons will freely embrace the choices that would severely curtail their usual freedoms and rights... even in the interests of long-term health and self-preservation.” (Westra, 1998: 198). Thus we will require a 'top-down' regulatory regime to take on 'the role of the "wise man" of Aristotelian doctrine as well as 'bottom-up' shifts in values (Westra, 1998: 199). Ophuls also believes that in certain circumstances (of which ecological crisis is an example) 'democracy must give way to elite rule' (1977: 159) as critical decisions have to be made by competent people.

The classic statement of the collective action problem in relation to environmental phenomena was that of Hardin (1968). The 'tragedy' here refers to the "remorseless working of things' towards an 'inevitable destiny' (Hardin, 1968: 1244, quoting A. N. Whitehead). Thus even if we are aware of where our long-term, enlightened interests do lie, the preferred outcome is beyond our ability to reach in an uncoerced manner. This is the n-person prisoners' dilemma, a well established analytical tool in the social analysis of collectively suboptimal outcomes. A brief example could be given in terms of an unregulated fishery. The owner of trawler can be fully aware that there is collective over-extraction from the fishing grounds he uses, and so the question arises of whether he should self-regulate his own catch. If he fishes to his maximum capacity, his gain is a catch fractionally depleted from what it would be if the fisheries were fully stocked. If the 'full catch' is 1, then this catch is 1 - £, where £ is the difference between the full stock catch and the depleted stock catch divided by the number of fishing vessels. If the trawlerman regulates his own catch, then he loses the entire amount that he feels each boat needs to surrender, and furthermore he has no reason to suppose that other fishermen would behave in a similar fashion, in fact he will expect them to benefit by catching the fish that he abjures. In the language of game theory he would be a 'sucker', and the rational course of action is to continue taking the maximum catch, despite the predictable conclusion that this course of action, when taken by all fishermen making the same rational calculation, will lead to the collapse of the fishery. Individual rationality leads to severely suboptimal outcomes. Under these circumstances an appeal to conscience is useless, as it merely places the recipient of the appeal in a 'double-bind'. The open appeal is 'behave as a responsible citizen, or you will be condemned. But there is also a covert appeal in the opposite direction; 'If you do behave as we ask, we will secretly condemn you for a simpleton who can be shamed into standing aside while the rest of us exploit the commons' (Hardin, 1968: 246). Thus the appeal creates the imperative both to behave responsibly and to avoid being a sucker.

In terms of democracy, what this entails is that, in general, we have to be prepared to accept coercion in order to overcome the collective action problem.5 The Leviathan of the state is the institution that has the political power required to solve this conundrum. 'Mutual coercion, mutually agreed on" is Hardin's famous solution to the tragedy of the commons. Revisiting the 'tragedy' argument in 1998, Hardin held that '[i]ts message is, I think, still true today. Individualism is cherished because it produces freedom, but the gift is conditional: The more population exceeds the carrying capacity of the environment, the more freedoms must be given up' (Hardin, 1998: 682). On this view coercion is an integral part of politics: the state coerces when it taxes, or when it prevents us from robbing banks. Coercion has, however, become 'a dirty word for most liberals now' (Hardin, 1968: 1246) but this does not have to be the case as long as this coercion comes about as a result of the democratic will. This however, requires overcoming the problems raised by the likes of Ophuls and Westra, that is, it is dependent upon the assumption that people can agree to coerce each other in order to realise their long-term, 'enlightened' self-interest. If they cannot, and both the myopic and collective action problem ecological objections to democracy arc valid, then this coercion may not be 'mutually agreed upon' but rather imposed by Ophuls' ecological 'elite' or Westra's Aristotelian 'wise man'. Under these circumstances there seems to be no hope at all for a reconciliation of ecological imperatives and democratic decision-making: we are faced with a stark choice, democracy or ecological survival.

### 2NC A2: Round Not Key/Nothing Leaves the Room

#### ---This round is key --- The debate space is a critical avenue to reframe climate change and mobilize change.

Nisbet 2009

Matthew, assistant professor at American University’s School of Communication, a research fellow at AU’s Center for Social Media, and an affiliated researcher at the Center for Climate Change Communication at George Mason University, Communicating Climate Change: Why Frames Matter for Public Engagement, Environment, http://www.environmentmagazine.org/Archives/Back%20Issues/March-April%202009/Nisbet-full.html

U.S. presidents, especially newly elected ones, are often given discretion to pursue their preferred legislative priorities. Yet research shows that presidential popularity is not enough to pass policy initiatives. The efforts of recent administrations to pass health care, welfare, or immigration reforms have depended on generating widespread public support and mobilization while effectively countering the communication efforts of opponents of these reforms.1 When these conditions are not met, as in health care and immigration reforms, presidents have suffered major policy defeats. There is no reason to suspect that climate change policy will be any different, especially given the long history of partisan gridlock in U.S. politics. In the context of two wars and an economic crisis, absent a shift in the polls and a surge in input from a diversity of constituents, it is unlikely over the next four years that a strong majority in Congress will accept the political risks needed to pass meaningful policy actions such as a cap-and-trade bill, carbon tax, or new international climate treaty. More importantly, democratic principles are at stake. Policies to address climate change will bear directly on the future of Americans, impacting their pocketbooks, lifestyles, and local communities. These decisions are therefore too significant to leave to just elected officials and experts; citizens need to be actively involved. Reframing the relevance of climate change in ways that connect to a broader coalition of Americans—and repeatedly communicating these new meanings through a variety of trusted media sources and opinion leaders—can generate the level of public engagement required for policy action. Successfully reframing climate change means remaining true to the underlying science of the issue, while applying research from communication and other fields to tailor messages to the existing attitudes, values, and perceptions of different audiences, making the complex policy debate understandable, relevant, and personally important.2 This approach to public outreach, however, will require a more careful understanding of U.S. citizens’ views of climate change as well as a reexamination of the assumptions that have traditionally informed climate change communication efforts.

### 2NC A2: Democracy Solves

#### They can’t win they solve:

#### 1) Their participation in democratic forums is disempowering and exacerbates power differentials within communities---turns the whole case and means decisions are worse than they’d be with no deliberation at all

Tina Nabatchi 7, Assistant Professor of Public Administration and International Affairs and a Faculty Research Associate at the Program for the Advancement of Research on Conflict and Collaboration at Syracuse University, 2007, Deliberative Democracy: The Effects of Participation on Political Efficacy, p. 66-67

As noted earlier, one of the strongest arguments in favor of deliberative democracy is that such participation has intrinsic benefits for citizens. Not all agree with this assertion. Some scholars argue that the inverse is true, that participation can injure citizens, causing them to feel frustrated and to perceive personal inefficacy and powerlessness.

Real-life deliberation can fan emotions unproductively, can exacerbate rather than diminish power differentials among those deliberating, can make people feel frustrated with the system that made them deliberate, is ill-suited to many issues, and can lead to worse decisions than would have occurred if no deliberation had taken place (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2002: 191).

Advocates of deliberative democracy argue that "[w]hen people come into contact with those who are different, they become better citizens, as indicated in their values and behavior" (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2005: 232); however, to get the full benefits of associational involvement, the groups must be diverse. The logic here is straightforward - to experience the benefits of deliberation, one must hear a variety of viewpoints. Despite this argument, social psychology research indicates that it is difficult to get people involved in heterogeneous groups, and that when they do join such a group, they tend to interact with groups members who are similar to them (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2005; Sunstein, 2003).

#### 2) The plan is a worse abuse of centralization---the overwhelming majority of people want to have less involvement in politics, not more---the aff paradoxically forces people into a deconstructive system they don’t want

Tina Nabatchi 7, Assistant Professor of Public Administration and International Affairs and a Faculty Research Associate at the Program for the Advancement of Research on Conflict and Collaboration at Syracuse University, 2007, Deliberative Democracy: The Effects of Participation on Political Efficacy, p. 64-65

Not all scholars agree that deliberative democracy has such benefits; in fact, many see a distinct dark side to deliberative democracy. On a practical note, some scholars point to the high the transaction costs for participants in deliberative forums and suggest that these costs may outweigh the potential benefits of participation for citizens and policy makers (e.g., Huntington, 1975). For citizens, transaction costs may include time, money (e.g., lost wages or child care costs), and otherwise forgoing more preferable activities (Rydin and Pennington, 2000). Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002) articulate this issue well:

The last thing people want is to be more involved political decisionmaking; they do not want to provide much input to those who are assigned to make these decisions; and they would rather not know all the details of the decisionmaking process. Most people have strong feelings on few if any of the issues the government needs to address and would much prefer to spend their time in non-political pursuits.

Moreover, "securing broad-based, meaningful deliberation on contentious issues from ordinary citizens, most of whom have little desire to engage in public policy discussions, is next to impossible no matter how creative the contrived forum may be" (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2005: 228). Following this argument, the lack of political participation among Americans may in fact not be a bellwether of democratic crisis, but rather a sign of widespread content and satisfaction with the status quo (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2002; Macedo et ah, 2005). In fact some scholars argue that many of the problems of governance in the United States today stem from an excess of democracy (Huntington, 1975: 113).

#### 3) Elite control is inevitable---only a stable transition to eco-authoritarianism causes elite governance based on environmental principles of sustainability for everyone---solves all their elitism impacts

David Shearman 7, Emeritus professor of medicine at Adelaide University, Secretary of Doctors for the Environment Australia, and an Independent Assessor on the IPCC; and Joseph Wayne Smith, lawyer and philosopher with a research interest in environmentalism, 2007, The Climate Change Challenge and the Failure of Democracy, p. 131-134

It is foolish to attempt to sketch any detailed model of what an ecologically sustainable authoritarian government would be like. We cannot anticipate the full scope of the environmental damage to which the planet will be subjected before humans wake up, if they do so at all. However some broad generalizations can be made at this point in history.

We propose that any sustainable society, even if it takes the form of a group of tribes living in a state depicted by the Mad Max/Road Warrior movies will be centered around ecology rather than economics. Concerns will be biologically based rather than consumption based. This will become the necessity. Recognizing the move to conflict and war for environmental resources (chapter 3) we emphasize the need for structures that utilize peaceful mechanisms. However attractive to us as near primates, the guerrilla methods of The Monkey Wrench Gang29 must be denounced.

We advocate a form of governance by authoritarianism abhorrent to liberal thinkers. But society is already managed by the hidden hand of the financial elite, and freedom is illusory and diminishing. Little can be done about the fact that we, the ordinary people, will wear chains, as we have always done. But perhaps the type of chains and how tightly they bind us can be influenced by our thinking.

We commence with a description of the elites that we don’t want; it is then possible to see the flip side of this character. Government today is primarily influenced by economic policies and modes of thought and is executed by the elected politician who with very few exceptions has emerged as adept at working corrupt party machines. Those who out- maneuver their colleagues to gain leadership are reluctant to leave and often begin the inevitable moves to authoritarianism. They are universally poorly regarded by the electors, and it is worthwhile to quote the insightful remarks of that brilliant iconoclastic writer and political commentator H.L. Mencken (1880–1956) who observed that politicians

seldom if ever get there [into power] by merit alone, at least in democratic states. Sometimes, to be sure, it happens, but only by a kind of miracle. They are chosen normally for quite different reasons, the chief of which is simply their power to impress and enchant the intellectually underprivileged . . . Will any of them venture to tell the plain truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth about the situation of the country, foreign or domestic? Will any of them refrain from promises that he knows he can’t fulfill—that no human being could fulfill? Will any of them utter a word, however obvious, that will alarm and alienate any of the huge pack of morons who cluster at the public trough, wallowing in the pap that grows thinner and thinner, hoping against hope? Answer: maybe for a few weeks at the start . . . But not after the issue is fairly joined, and the struggle is on in earnest . . . they will divest themselves from their character as sensible, candid and truthful men, and become simply candidates for office, bent only on collaring votes.30

Hans-Hermann Hoppe in his book Democracy: The God that Failed develops Mencken’s critique of democracy in this respect.31 He says that democratic popular elections make it impossible (difficult, we believe) for good and decent people to rise to the top. Much like a pot of boiling water containing impurities, the scum will rise to the top. And as we have seen, they do so. Hoppe, with his typical tough turn of phrase, laments that under democracy the leaders are increasingly bad and sadly only “rarely assassinated.”32

The democratic system itself attracts to politics those people who are the most unsuitable for government. We should add that most authoritarian systems are also defective in this respect. The ruling elites typically first obtain power by violence, usually in the midst of the breakdown of democracy. An oppressive state machine is then set up and perpetuated by megalomaniac types who lust for power as a mode of personal advancement.

Have we set ourselves an insurmountable problem? Who are to be new elites? In capitalist society, where money and self-promotion rule, they are invisible. Since we wish to avoid self-selection, how are they to be drafted into service? Intellectualism alone is not sufficient, for in the past century the intellectual has succumbed to the hymns of tyranny as often as the rest of us.33

Perhaps we could commence by identifying those leaders in history who were humble and worked for the common good. Yes, there were some who did not fit the selfish mores of society. We crucified them, ignored them, burned them, or, in modern times, shot them. Jesus Christ, Buddha, Socrates, St. Francis of Assisi, Dali Lama, and Gandhi. The difficulty of the task indicates the inadequacies of humankind.

Let us take the question a stage further. Are there any individuals, not interested in self-aggrandizement and accumulation of material assets, who have broad intellectual, scientific, and social managerial skills to lead humanity through the environmental crisis? By definition, they have not placed their head above the parapet to join the scramble of economic rationalism. Such persons of integrity and learning have been sought for centuries. Aristotle referred to them as aristocracy. This meant ”the best,” as interpreted by Graham in The Case Against the Democratic State.34 They were those with the abilities and attitudes of mind to be entrusted with government. The sixteenth century philosopher Etienne de la Boetie said in his treatise, The Politics of Obedience, the following:

There are always a few, better endowed than others . . . These are in fact the men who, possessed of clear minds and farsighted spirit, are not satisfied, like the brutish mass, to see what is at their feet, but rather look about them, behind and before, and even recall the things of the past in order to judge those of the future, and compare both with their present condition. These are the ones who, having good minds of their own, have further trained them by study and learning. Even if liberty had finally perished from the earth, such men would invent it. For them slavery has no satisfaction, no matter how well disguised.35

Both de la Boetie and Hoppe are primarily concerned with the preservation of freedom of the individual, this being the core value in their systems. But for us freedom is not the most fundamental value and is merely one value among others. Survival strikes us as a much more basic value. Now our proposal is that since fighters for freedom are always likely to arise, the probability of fighters for life and survival arising must be as great if not greater. This will be especially so if the opportunity is provided for such ecowarrior/philosophers to develop and be nurtured in special institutions called “real universities” or academies. At present our leaders are primarily trained in institutions that perpetuate and legitimate our environmentally destructive system. The conventional university trains narrow, politically correct thinkers who ultimately become the economic warriors of the system. Our proposal is to counter this by an alternative framework for the training and complete education of a new type of person who will be wise and fit to serve and to rule. Unlike the narrowly focused economic rationalist universities of today, the real university will train holistic thinkers in all of the arts and sciences necessary for tough decision making that the environmental crisis confronts us with. These thinkers will be the true public intellectuals with knowledge well grounded in ecology. Chapter 9 will describe in more detail how we might begin the process of constructing such real universities to train the ecowarriors to do battle against the enemies of life. We must accomplish this education with the dedication that Sparta used to train its warriors. As in Sparta, these natural elites will be especially trained from childhood to meet the challenging problems of our times.

Government in the future will be based upon (or incorporate, depending on the level of breakdown of civilization) a supreme office of the biosphere. The office will comprise specially trained philosopher/ecologists. These guardians will either rule themselves or advise an authoritarian government of policies based upon their ecological training and philosophical sensitivities. These guardians will be specially trained for this task.

### 2NC A2: Death of Community

We’re key to action and human integrity

Trombetta 2008

Maria Julia, Environmental security and climate change: analyzing the discourse, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 21:4, 585-602

The recognition and constitution of a problem as a threat implies the identification of the political community that deserves protection, the legitimization of the means to provide security and eventually their institutionalization. Some of these aspects are more settled and consolidated than others, as are the different logics of security, such as the antagonistic, emergency-based one evoked by the Copenhagen School. These developed because, within a particular context, they were the most effective response against a specific representation of threats. This, however, does not mean that they are not open to negotiation when challenged by a new environment and threats. Climate change poses threats that are largely uncertain, diffuse, difficult to quantify and yet potentially catastrophic. This reflects the logic of a risk society portrayed by Beck. This article has explored how the practices associated with security are challenged by the attempts to transform environmental crises and climate change into a security issue, and has shown how appeals to security have emphasized the relevance of preventive, nonconfrontational measures and the importance of other actors than states in providing security. A potentially nonessentialist approach like securitization, which focuses on the social process that specifies threats, can be relevant in studying how various environmental issues gain priority and mobilize social action. However, the Copenhagen School identifies the ‘securityness’ of security with a specific logic determined by the realist tradition. In this way the School has imposed a problematic fixity that tends to essentialize an historical- and sector-specific understanding of security and the practices legitimized by it. Even if this logic is still relevant, the analysis of environmental security discourses and the securitization of climate change have shown that transforming an issue like climate change into a security issue is not about applying a fixed meaning of security and the practices associated with it. Rather, it is a reflexive and contextualized process that generates meanings and practices.

#### Description of extinction scenarios are inevitable – but we’re key to collective action

Paschalidis 1997

Gregory, of Aristotle University of Thessaloniki. “Images of War and the War of Images.” http://genesis.ee.auth.gr/dimakis/Gramma/7/06-paschalidis.htm

The choice, then, of the whole of the anti-war tradition of visual artists, photoreporters and activists of representing the suffering body as a way to expose the evils of war and establish a common ground of sensibility and understanding should seem now more clear and legitimate. If the beginnings of the modern humanistic tradition, in the Renaissance, were marked by the reinstatement of the dignity and the celebration of the beauty of the human body, it seems inevitable that the image of the degraded and defiled human body has since become the most potent symbol of everything that takes away from it and destroys its dignity and beauty, and thus, the most compelling incitation for ameliorative action. Ever since Leonardo and Goya, humanism is a quintessentially visual and at the same time embodied discourse, that constructs humanity as the most inclusive imagined community possible, through images that project a foundational, species identity centred on the human body. In the era of the generalized war of images brought about by the worldwide dissemination of the technical image, we are regularly confronted with images that instigate war and images that castigate war; images that legitimize war and images that reject and deny it; images that sublimate and glorify warfare and images that demystify and deglorify it; images that obscure its costs and obfuscate its grim reality, and images that expose the death, the destruction and the despair it causes; images that extoll the catastrophic potential of modern war technology, and images that focus on the insanity of it all; images that praise military virtue and patriotic duty, and images that testify to the courage of all those who oppose war, who resist violence and militarism. This war between war images is impossible to be won by restricting or avoiding them, or rejecting them all wholesale. This war can only be won by producing, by multiplying and by disseminating as much as possible, those images that castigate war, that expose its horror, that undermine the rhetoric and the ideologies that lead to it and legitimize it. The war against war involves, of course, much more than engaging in this war of images. We cannot possibly win the former, however, without having first prevailed in the latter.

#### Value to life is subjective --- life is a prerequisite

Lisa Schwartz, Chair at the Centre for Health Economics and Policy Analysis, 2002

“Medical Ethic: A Case Based Approach” Chapter 6, www.fleshandbones.com/readingroom/pdf/399.pdf

The second assertion made by supporters of the quality of life as a criterion for decisionmaking is closely related to the first, but with an added dimension. This assertion suggests that the determination of the value of the quality of a given life is a subjective determination to be made by the person experiencing that life. The important addition here is that the decision is a personal one that, ideally, ought not to be made externally by another person but internally by the individual involved. Katherine Lewis made this decision for herself based on a comparison between two stages of her life. So did James Brady. Without this element, decisions based on quality of life criteria lack salient information and the patients concerned cannot give informed consent. Patients must be given the opportunity to decide for themselves whether they think their lives are worth living or not. To ignore or overlook patients’ judgement in this matter is to violate their autonomy and their freedom to decide for themselves on the basis of relevant information about their future, and comparative consideration of their past. As the deontological position puts it so well, to do so is to violate the imperative that we must treat persons as rational and as ends in themselves.

#### They can’t win an impact that matters---constant deconstructive criticism precludes a conception of the overall common good---freedom to live according to self-defined values ends up harming everyone---only embracing coercion in the name of the environment accords the highest possible relation to the other

Mathew Humphrey 7, Reader in Political Philosophy at the University of Nottingham, UK, 2007, Ecological Politics and Democratic Theory: The Challenge to the Deliberative Ideal, p. 17-18

In seeking lo challenge what they see as widely accepted and deeply held values in contemporary societies, the eco-authoritarians seek to both promote a new set of values and recontest or downgrade existing ones on the grounds that they are harmful to the prospects of ecological survival. The fundamental divide here is between a politics of the right and a politics of the good. Eco-authoritarians see liberalism (as a manifestation of the politics of the right) as being a transient phenomenon crucially dependent upon the temporary conditions of material abundance ushered in by the fossil fuel age. Liberalism is a function of the material conditions that make it possible and is parasitic upon unsustainable economic policies. When the tragedy of the commons strikes, then 'the concept of inalienable rights, the purely self-defined pursuit of happiness, liberty as maximum freedom of action, and laissez-faire all become problematic1 (Ophuls, 1977: 152). As an account of the rights embedded in liberal ideology this is itself a contestable account, but it illustrates the way in which liberal democracy is understood in this body of literature. The problem lies in the rights that are granted which allow us to live according to our self-defined values. Westra also holds that the proliferation, under conditions of liberal democracy, of individual and aggregate rights is undesirable from an environmental point of view (1998: 57). The choices we make under these conditions are not constrained by a conception of the common good, and so can be harmful to all (Westra, 1998: 155). Hardin focuses on one particular right, that of procreation - it is ‘painful' to have to deny, categorically, the claim embodied in the UN Declaration on Human Rights that 'any choice and decision with regard to the size of the family must irrevocably rest with the family itself, and cannot be made by anyone else' (1968: 1246). Nonetheless it is the case that to 'couple the concept of the freedom to breed with.. .an equal right to the commons is to lock the world into a tragic course of action' (1968: 1246).

So, the kinds of 'basic liberties' that would be constitutionally entrenched in, say, a Rawlsian liberal society in order to ensure people the right to choose their own form of life are seen on this view as profoundly problematic in terms of their ecological consequences. Abrogating these rights may violate the liberal conception of justice, but 'injustice is preferable to total ruin' (Ophuls, quoting Hardin, 1977: 148). Justice, anyway, is one of the political concepts for which a move away from the liberal definition is suggested as explained later in this chapter. Against the politics of the right the eco-authoritarians recommend a virtue politics based upon a conception of the common good. Against the liberal desire to allow people to choose their own values, ‘wisdom’ tells us that not all values are equal and that virtue matters in life (Ophuls, 1977: 237). Virtue here entails recognising the necessity of living life according to 'ecological values' and being prepared to abandon or reconfigure those values that are not conducive to the end of sustainability. Westra offers the overarching value of (ecological) 'integrity' as the embodiment of this politics of the common good. This in turn is defined in terms of ecosystem health, resilience, the optimum potential for speciation and development, and the non-constraint of non-human nature by the actions of human beings (see Westra, 1998: 7-8). Integrity 'demands' that approximately one-third of the earth's surface be left in a wild and unmanaged state. The value of integrity is taken to embody the good of all, and so is uncompromising in its prescription of infinite, non-negotiable value to life (1998: 12). Integrity serves to ground the precautionary principle, which should be mandatory in public policy7 Integrity is 'more basic' than justice, and is an anti-democratic principle (1998: 9) because democratic choices are inadequate when it comes to realising the principle (1998: 222). The principle is rendered 'compatible' with the idea of right simply by being recast in terms of a right, the fundamental and trumping 'right' to integrity, which is taken to operate at both a micro (organism) and macro (species, ecosystem) level. Only such a principle can protect people from unchosen harm, whereas democracy can inflict unchosen harms, or at least the risk of such harms, onto defeated minorities.

As a manifestation of the common good it behoves all of us to live according to the principle of ecological integrity, and to the extent that we do not embrace this principle voluntarily, those in authority will have to force it upon us, rather in the fashion of the forced administration of anti-psychotic medicines. The Aristotelian 'wise man' referred to above will have the task of running a top-down regulatory regime - 'the "top-down" regulatory and public policy aspect will have to be prescribed by an interdisciplinary team of biologists, ecologists, political scientists, medical specialists and philosophers with a strong traditional moral basis' (1998: 198-9). Given our poor habits of making democratic decisions that are not underpinned by conceptions of the common good (1998: 155), of choosing leaders for the 'wrong' reasons and making decisions on the basis of uninformed preferences, we have to accept the imperative to downgrade the value of democracy and accept more authoritarian forms of public rule. This downgrading of the value of democracy is common across this literature, although at times it seems in tension with the projection of mutual coercion mutually agreed upon, which implies a democratically legitimated move towards authoritarian forms of government.