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1. Prices are stable now but a decline collapses Putin’s regime – can’t maintain social spending

Reguly, The Globe And Mail European Business Correspondent, 9-15-12

(Eric, “For Russia, high energy prices a necessity, not a luxury,” <http://m.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/international-business/european-business/for-russia-high-energy-prices-a-necessity-not-a-luxury/article4546314/?service=mobile>, accessed 9-16-12, ads)

The Kremlin does not take political dissent with good grace. Last December, Vladimir Putin, then prime minister, now president for the third time, was rattled by the mass protests after the parliamentary elections, which some voters suspected were rigged. Since then, he has cracked down on the non-believers. Three young women, members of the band Pussy Riot, were sentenced to two years in prison after belting out an anti-Putin song in a Russian Orthodox cathedral. Opposition activists have been jailed, some under dubious circumstances. On Saturday, about 50,000 protesters are expected to gather near the Kremlin to denounce the political crackdown and call for Mr. Putin’s resignation. No wonder the Kremlin is ramping up public spending even as its debt-choked European neighbours are doing the opposite. Russia’s social contract, in which the masses agree to stay out of the Kremlin’s way as long as living standards rise, appears to be demanding more and more helicopter drops of bundles of cash. If the spending slows down, the Kremlin’s fine balancing act may fall apart. Mr. Putin’s government can afford to spend as long as energy prices remain buoyant. Increasingly, Russia is an oil and natural gas economy. It is roughly tied with Saudi Arabia as the world’s top oil exporter. State-controlled Gazprom, the world’s biggest gas producer, is one of Russia’s biggest export earners and supplies about half of Europe’s gas consumption. Much to the Kremlin’s delight, oil prices have held up remarkably well in the face of the feeble American economic recovery, the recession in the 17-country euro zone and slowing growth in China. On Friday, Brent crude, the best measure of global prices, traded at more than $117 (U.S.) a barrel, about three times its post-2008 low.

## 2. Nuclear power reduces oil dependence – displaces oil power generation, powers maritime and ground transportation, and causes hydrogen transition

American Nuclear Society, 12

(“Top 10 Myths about Nuclear Energy,” <http://www.new.ans.org/pi/resources/myths/>, accessed 9-15-12, ads)

Myth # 10: Nuclear energy can't reduce our dependence on foreign oil. Truth: Nuclear-generated electricity powers electric trains and subway cars as well as autos today. It has also been used in propelling ships for more than 50 years. That use can be increased since it has been restricted by unofficial policy to military vessels and ice breakers. In the near-term, nuclear power can provide electricity for expanded mass-transit and plug-in hybrid cars. Small modular reactors can provide power to islands like Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Nantucket and Guam that currently run their electrical grids on imported oil. In the longer-term, nuclear power can directly reduce our dependence on foreign oil by producing hydrogen for use in fuel cells and synthetic liquid fuels.

## 3. Collapse forces Putin out – causes rampant nationalism

Friedlander, UC Berkley [College of](http://www.ias.berkeley.edu/node/351) Letters and Science, 2009

(Monica, May 13, “Ken Jowitt Offers New Perspective on Russian Politics,” <http://www.ias.berkeley.edu/node/351>, accessed 8-24-12, ads)

An expert in comparative politics and post-Communist societies, Jowitt has taught political science at Berkeley for 37 years. He is the Robson Professor Emeritus of Political Science at Berkeley and the Pres and Maurine Hotchkis Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution. He’s also a sought-after speaker worldwide. Russia today, Jowitt said, is neither autocratic nor imperialistic. It is neither Communist nor accepting of Western democracy. And though its ruling elite may not be Stalinist in the sense of wielding absolute power, it is openly defiant, even offensive in its policy and rhetoric, both internally and externally. All of this makes old political stereotypes obsolete. Jowitt described Vladimir Putin — the de facto leader of Russia even after having ceded the presidency and assumed the formal title of prime minister — as a vulgar, ruthless politician “with less charisma than this podium.” But he is adept at solidifying his dominance of Russian politics and defining Russia as a great sovereign power whose foreign policy is based on crude self-interest and defiance of the West. “When you create a new identity in the absence of institutions, personality becomes especially important,” Jowitt explained. “And the cult of personality around Putin is a function of making it clear to the outside and the inside that there’s a new name in town and it’s not democracy and it’s not Yeltsin.”For the first time since the French Revolution, Jowitt said, the world has only one prevailing ideology: the Western liberal capitalist democracy. And unlike his predecessor, Boris Yeltsin, who tried to mimic the West, Putin feels threatened by it and is determined to keep it at bay. If he feels provoked by NATO’s expansion to or near Russian borders, Putin will push back — as he did when Russia invaded Georgia last year. But such behavior in itself does not make Russia imperialistic. “Last year Putin could have occupied all of Georgia,” Jowitt said. “We’re talking about a state that could not have stood for four more days. And Russia could bring Ukraine to its knees right now.” But it does not, Jowitt said, because Putin’s focus is on political and economic stability, not costly military aggression. Jowitt described Putin as the ultimate ruthless pragmatist. “What’s the [deal](http://ls.berkeley.edu/?q=node/911)? Who wins? Who loses? It’s pure interest,” he said. “If Russia’s interest and yours coincide, fantastic. And if they don’t coincide, they can be hostile or violent, so it’s better [for us] to recognize and accommodate them to avoid violence.” Putin’s antagonistic stance, however, is born out of a “high state of anxiety,” not a desire for world domination. Jowitt repeatedly compared him to a rebellious teenager: “Putin and his Russian elite are in their junior-high-school phase. Their behavior is sullen, rude, even combative. They are seen wearing black-leather jackets at rock concerts, hurling hurtful, despicable insults at the United States, claiming that the United States is no better than Stalin and the Nazis.” At home Putin acts the same way, Jowitt said. “He distances himself from ordinary politicians by likening ordinary politicians to tampon salesmen.” Surprise, surprise! Putin’s state of mind must be understood from the standpoint of a regime still unsettled in its attempts to establish its identity, Jowitt said, fearful that its new power will be undermined from either inside or outside. Jowitt attributes this anxiety to three major factors: the pro-democracy movements in former Soviet republics (the “color revolutions” in states like Ukraine and Georgia); the international movement toward globalization; and the flood of “arrogant, self confident American democracy and market advisors” who descended on Russia in the 1990s preaching liberal capitalist ideology to a fragile, emerging democracy. The response? “Surprise, surprise! A lot of Russians weren’t interested.” That’s something that the U.S. never understood, Jowitt said. Americans, he explained, have always subscribed to the view best described by Thomas Paine’s revolutionary words, “We have the power to begin the world all over again.” But, Jowitt said, “Note that he didn’t not include the words ‘in our image.’ This comes up over and over again – Reagan, Woodrow Wilson, George Bush. We don’t take into account that there’s no social, political, or economic critical mass and no desire for western liberal democracy [in Russia today].” Instead, quite the opposite may be true, Jowitt cautioned. Far from becoming more democratic, Russia could fall prey to what he described as “rage-filled, anti-Western” forces” who could take power in a crisis. And leadership that comes out of a crisis, he said, is always unpredictable. “The threat to Russian stability today comes from the inside,” Jowitt said. “If the Russian economy collapses … we might be in a situation where we see the appearance of nihilistic ideologies and movements clustered around leaders trying to form an alliance with parts of the Russian military.” The result of such developments, Jowitt concluded, would be a far less palatable alternative to Putin’s rule. “In light of the economic recession and what Russia is today and what it is not, a state mercantilistic Russia led by non-ideological Putin may not be the optimal political outcome for Russia. But in 2009, it’s not at all a bad second-best.”

## 4. Nuclear war

Irsraelyan, Former Soviet Ambassador, 98

(Victor, diplomat and arms control negotiator, “Russia at the Crossroads,” Lexis, accessed 8-30-12, ads)

The first and by far most dangerous possibility is what I call the power scenario. Supporters of this option would, in the name of a "united and undivided Russia," radically change domestic and foreign policies. Many would seek to revive a dictatorship and take urgent military steps to mobilize the people against the outside "enemy." Such steps would include Russia's denunciation of the commitment to no-first-use of nuclear weapons; suspension of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) I and refusal to ratify both START II and the Chemical Weapons Convention; denunciation of the Biological Weapons Convention; and reinstatement of a full-scale armed force, including the acquisition of additional intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple warheads, as well as medium- and short-range missiles such as the SS-20. Some of these measures will demand substantial financing, whereas others, such as the denunciation and refusal to ratify arms control treaties, would, according to proponents, save money by alleviating the obligations of those agreements. In this scenario, Russia's military planners would shift Western countries from the category of strategic partners to the category of countries representing a threat to national security. This will revive the strategy of nuclear deterrence -- and indeed, realizing its unfavorable odds against the expanded NATO, Russia will place new emphasis on the first-use of nuclear weapons, a trend that is underway already. The power scenario envisages a hard-line policy toward the CIS countries, and in such circumstances the problem of the Russian diaspora in those countries would be greatly magnified. Moscow would use all the means at its disposal, including economic sanctions and political ultimatums, to ensure the rights of ethnic Russians in CIS countries as well as to have an influence on other issues. Of those means, even the use of direct military force in places like the Baltics cannot be ruled out. Some will object that this scenario is implausible because no potential dictator exists in Russia who could carry out this strategy. I am not so sure. Some Duma members -- such as Victor Antipov, Sergei Baburin, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, and Albert Makashov, who are leading politicians in ultranationalistic parties and fractions in the parliament -- are ready to follow this path to save a "united Russia." Baburin's "Anti-NATO" deputy group boasts a membership of more than 240 Duma members. One cannot help but remember that when Weimar Germany was isolated, exhausted, and humiliated as a result of World War I and the Versailles Treaty, Adolf Hitler took it upon himself to "save" his country. It took the former corporal only a few years to plunge the world into a second world war that cost humanity more than 50 million lives. I do not believe that Russia has the economic strength to implement such a scenario successfully, but then again, Germany's economic situation in the 1920s was hardly that strong either. Thus, I am afraid that economics will not deter the power scenario's would-be authors from attempting it. Baburin, for example, warned that any political leader who would "dare to encroach upon Russia" would be decisively repulsed by the Russian Federation "by all measures on heaven and earth up to the use of nuclear weapons." n10 In autumn 1996 Oleg Grynevsky, Russian ambassador to Sweden and former Soviet arms control negotiator, while saying that NATO expansion increases the risk of nuclear war, reminded his Western listeners that Russia has enough missiles to destroy both the United States and Europe. n11 Former Russian minister of defense Igor Rodionov warned several times that Russia's vast nuclear arsenal could become uncontrollable. In this context, one should keep in mind that, despite dramatically reduced nuclear arsenals -- and tensions -- Russia and the United States remain poised to launch their missiles in minutes. I cannot but agree with Anatol Lieven, who wrote, "It may be, therefore, that with all the new Russian order's many problems and weaknesses, it will for a long time be able to stumble on, until we all fall down together." n12

**2**

**Engaging political questions corrupts our relationship to God**

**Copeland, University of Miami School of Law associate professor, 9**

(Charlton C., "God-Talk in the Age of Obama: Theology and Religious Political Engagement," Denver University Law Review, 86 Denv. U.L. Rev. 663, 2009, l/n, accessed 1-27-12, mss)

The rejection of the social order and its culture as a response to the call of Jesus Christ represents the separatist resolution to the problem of Christ and Culture. Based on its theological interpretation of both the identity and activity of Jesus Christ and the social order as impossibly at odds, the exclusivist Christian articulates a resolution that places Christ against culture. The exclusivist reads the gap between Christ and culture as unbridgeable, and resolves that **the social order must be rejected, if Christ is to be retained**. **The rejection of "the world" and abdication of responsibility for its transformation is the outcome** of the exclusivist's theological worldview. Adherents of the exclusivist type foreground Jesus' identity as the founder of a new law. The exclusivist's interpretation of the meaning of the life of Jesus emphasizes the power, authority, and love of God, as evidenced in the person of Jesus, and the command that man respond to God through love of neighbor. n16 Jesus inaugurates a new order at whose root lies love. To the extent that the "new creation" requires a changed community, the evidence of the community's authentic commitment to the sovereignty of Jesus is its response to the commands of God in its actions. This chasm between the new creation and the social order is evident in the gap between the norms that govern each domain. In contrast to the "new creations" norm of love, the social order is governed and maintained by power, violence, and threat. n17 Richard Niebuhr describes the exclusivist type's view of the created order is "a realm under the power of evil." n18 The relationships in the realm of the world "characterized by the prevalence in it of lies, hatred, and murder; it is the heir of Cain." n19 The exclusivist's separation of Christ from culture is parasitic upon his understanding of the "nature and prevalence of sin." The exclusive Christian is required to reject the world because it continues to be a place in which sin persists. In fact, the world is not merely the place in which sin is resident, but the exclusivist maintains that sin is endemic to the world. Rather than explaining the prevalence of sin by locating it in hu [\*669] man nature, the exclusivist sites the explanation for sin's continued prevalence in the corrupted culture in which humanity resided. By distinction, those who are members of the community marked by the sovereign lordship of Jesus "have passed from the darkness [of the culture] into the light," and must separate from the world in order to maintain the purity and integrity of this community. n20 The exclusivist discourages Christian involvement in political life. Political life is envisaged as brutish and base. Political life in the social order is seen as involving nothing more than the pursuit and deployment of power. **The state and its maintenance through political life are incompatible with Christianity.** Beyond the merely neutral recognition of the state as necessary for the constraint of an otherwise sinful order, the exclusivist sees the state as "the chief offender against life." n21 The only safety against its domination is "nonparticpation." Thus the only appropriate resolution to the conflict between life in Christ and life in culture is near-complete separation of the two realms.

**Your ultimate concern ought to be how to be properly related to God- it’s the only worthwhile source of value**

**Craig, Talbot School of Theology philosophy research professor, 4**

(Dr. William Lane, Ph.D. in philosophy from the University of Birmingham (England), Th.D. under from the University of Munich, "Does God Exist?" 2004, delveintojesus.com/Articles/64/Does-God-Exist.aspx, accessed 11-20-11, mss)

C. S. Lewis once remarked that God is not the sort of thing one can be moderately interested in. After all, if God does not exist, there's no reason to be interested in God at all. On the other hand, if God does exist, then this is of paramount interest, and our **ultimate concern** ought to be how to be **properly related** to this being upon whom we depend moment by moment for our very existence. So people who shrug their shoulders and say, "What difference does it make if God exists?" merely show that they haven't yet thought very deeply about this problem. Even atheist philosophers like Sartre and Camus who have thought very seriously about this problem admit that the existence of God makes a tremendous difference for man. Let me mention just three reasons why it makes a big difference whether God exists. 1. If God does not exist, **life is** ultimately **meaningless**. If your life is doomed to end in death, then ultimately it does not matter how you live. In the end it makes no ultimate difference whether you existed or not. Sure, your life might have a relative significance in that you influenced others or affected the course of history. But **ultimately [hu]mankind is doomed to perish in the heat death of the universe.** Ultimately it makes no difference who you are or what you do. Your life is inconsequential. Thus, the contributions of the scientist to the advance of human knowledge, the research of the doctor to alleviate pain and suffering, the efforts of the diplomat to secure peace in the world, the sacrifices of good people everywhere to better the lot of the human race ultimately all these come to nothing. Thus, if atheism is true, life is ultimately meaningless. 2. If God does not exist, then we must ultimately live without hope. If there is no God, then there is ultimately no hope for deliverance from the shortcomings of our finite existence. For example, there is no hope for deliverance from evil. Although many people ask how God could create a world involving so much evil, by far most of the suffering in the world is due to man's own inhumanity to man. The horror of two world wars during the last century effectively destroyed the 19th century's naive optimism about human progress. If God does not exist, then we are locked without hope in a world filled with gratuitous and unredeemed suffering, and there is no hope for deliverance from evil. Or again, if there is no God, there is no hope of deliverance from aging, disease, and death. Although it may be hard for you as university students to contemplate, the sober fact is that unless you die young, someday you you yourselfwill be an old man or an old woman, fighting a losing battle with aging, struggling against the inevitable advance of deterioration, disease, perhaps senility. And finally and inevitably you will die. There is no afterlife beyond the grave. Atheism is thus a philosophy without hope. 3. On the other hand, if God does exist, then not only is there meaning and hope, but there is also the possibility of coming to know God and His love personally. Think of it! That the **infinite God** should love you and want to be your personal friend! This **would be the highest status a human being could enjoy**! Clearly, if God exists, it makes not only a tremendous difference for mankind in general, but it could make a life-changing difference for you as well. Now admittedly none of this shows that God exists. But does show that it makes a tremendous difference whether God exists. Therefore, even if the evidence for and against the existence of God were absolutely equal, the rational thing to do, I think, is to believe in Him. That is to say, it seems to me positively irrational when the evidence is equal to prefer death, futility, and despair over hope, meaningfulness and happiness.

[Matt note: gender-paraphrased]

**There’s no impact to death- science proves**

**Lanza and Berman,** Wake Forest School of Medicine Chief Scientific Officer, **9**

[Dr. Robert, Wake Forest University School of Medicine Advanced Cell Technology Chief Scientific Officer and Adjunct Professor, part of the team that cloned the first human embryo, first scientist to clone an endangered animal, first to generate stem cells using a method that doesn’t require the destruction of human embryos, and Bob, Marymount College astronomy adjunct professor, *Biocentricism: How Life and Consciousness are the Keys to Understanding the True Nature of the Universe*, 2009, 188-92, mss]

Mr. Bentley's observation is not so trivial a point. What sort of time is that which separates a man from his past—which separates one now from the next—and yet gives continuity to the thread of consciousness? Eighty is the last "now," we say, but who knows that time and space—now seen as forms of intuition rather than immutable standalone entities—are not actually "always." A cat, even when mortally ill, keeps those wide calm eyes focused on the everchanging kaleidoscope of the here-and-now. There is no thought of death, and hence no fear of it. What comes, comes. We believe in death because we have been told we will die. Also, of course, because most of us strictly associate ourselves with the body, and we know that bodies die, end of story. Religions may go on and on about the afterlife, but how do we know this is true? Physics may tell us that energy is never ever lost, and that our brains, minds, and hence the feeling of life operate by electrical energy, and therefore this energy like all others simply cannot vanish, period. And while this sounds very intellectually nice and hopeful, how can we be sure that we will still experience the sense of life—that mystery neuro-researchers pursue with such futility, like the dream hallway that stretches ever longer the farther along the corridor we run? The biocentric view of the timeless, spaceless cosmos of consciousness allows for **no true death in any real sense.** When a body dies, it does so not in the random billiard-ball matrix but in the all-is- still-inescapably-life matrix. Scientists think that they can say where individuality begins and ends, and we generally reject the multiple universes of Star-gate, Star Trek, The Matrix and such as fiction. But it turns out there is more than a morsel of scientific truth in this popular cultural genre. This can only accelerate during the coming shift in worldview, from the belief that time and space are entities in the universe to one in which time and space belong only to the living. Our current scientific worldview offers no escape for those afraid of death. But why are you here now, perched seemingly by chance on the cutting edge of all infinity? The answer is simple—the door is never closed! **The mathematical possibility of your consciousness ending is zero.** Logical, everyday experience puts us in a milieu where defined objects come and go, and everything has a natal moment. Whether pencil or kitten, we see items entering the world and others dissolving or vanishing. Logic is a fabric woven of such beginnings and endings. Conversely, those entities that are timeless by nature, such as love, beauty, consciousness, or the universe as a whole, have always dwelt outside the cold grasp of limitation. So the Great Everything, which we now know to be synonymous with consciousness, could hardly fit within the ephemeral category. Instinct joins with what science we can employ here, to affirm that it is so, even if no argument, alas, can demonstrate immortality to everyone's satisfaction. Our inability to remember infinite time is meaningless because memory is a particularly limited and selective circuit within the neural network. Nor by definition could we recall a time of nothingness: no help there either. Eternity is a fascinating concept, one that doesn't indicate a perpetual existence in time without end. Eternity doesn't mean a limitless temporal sequence. Rather, it resides outside of time altogether. The Eastern religions have of course argued for millennia that birth and death are equally illusory. (Or at least, their core teachings have done so. For the masses in every religion, there are more peripheral notions; in Eastern sects these include reincarnation.) Because consciousness transcends the body, because internal and external are fundamentally distinctions of language and practicality alone, we're left with Being or consciousness as the bedrock components of existence. The problem many face when pondering such things is not just that language is dualistic by nature and therefore poorly suited for such inquiries, but that there are onion layers of "truth" depending on the level of understanding. Science, philosophy, religion, and metaphysics all deal with the challenges of addressing a wide audience with a huge spectrum of comprehension, education, inclination, and bias. When a skilled science speaker steps up to a lectern, he already knows who his particular audience is for that day. A physicist giving a popular lecture, especially to youngsters, will avoid all equations, lest the audience's eyes start to glaze. Terms such as electron will need to be briefly defined. If, on the other hand, the audience has a good science background—let's say it's a talk for secondary school science teachers—then statements like "electrons orbit an atom's nucleus" and "Jupiter revolves around the sun" involve already-familiar terms, and no one would be left behind. Yet if the audience is even more sophisticated, composed of physicists and astronomers, both statements would now be false. An electron doesn't really orbit; it shimmers at a likely distance from the center in a state of probability alone, its position and motion undefined until an observer forces its wave-function to collapse. And Jupiter orbits not the sun but the barycenter, the vacant point in space outside the sun's surface where the two bodies' gravities balance like a seesaw. What is correct in one context is wrong in another. The same holds for science, philosophy, metaphysics, and cosmology. When a person strictly identifies his only existence with his body and is certain the universe is a separate, random, external entity, then saying "Death isn't real" is not only ludicrous, it's untrue. His body's cells will all indeed die. His false and limited sense of being an isolated organism—this will end, too. Claims of an afterlife will be met with an appropriately justifiable skepticism: "What has an afterlife, my rotting corpse? How?" The next level upward has our individual feeling himself to be a living entity, a spirit perhaps, ensconced in a body; if he's had spiritual experiences or else religious or philosophical beliefs of an immortal soul being part and parcel of his essence, then now it makes more sense for him to accept that something goes on even after the body is gone, and he'll not waver in this view even as his atheistic friends deride him for wishful thinking. The concept of death has always meant one thing only: an end that has no reprieve or ambiguity. It can only happen to something that has been born or created, something whose nature is bounded and finite. That fine wine glass you inherited from your grandmother can have a death when it falls and shatters into a dozen fragments; it's gone for keeps. Individual bodies also have natal moments, their cells destined to age and self-destruct after about ninety generations, even if not acted upon by outside forces. Stars die too, albeit after enjoying lifespans usually numbered in the billions of years. Now comes the biggie, the oldest question of all. Who am I? If I am only my body, then I must die. If I am my consciousness, the sense of experience and sensations, then I cannot die for the simple reason that consciousness may be expressed in manifold fashion sequentially, but it is ultimately unconfined. Or if one prefers to pin things down, the "alive" feeling, the sensation of "me" is, so far as science can tell, a sprightly neuro-electrical fountain operating with about 100 watts of energy

, the same as a bright light bulb. We even emit the same heat as a bulb, too, which is why a car rapidly gets warmer, even during a cold night, especially when a driver is accompanied by a passenger or two. Now the truly skeptical might argue that this internal energy merely "goes away" at death and vanishes. But one of the **surest axiom**s **of science** is that energy can never die, ever. Energy is known with **scientific certainty** to be deathless; it can neither be created nor destroyed. It merely changes form. Because absolutely everything has an energy-identity, nothing is exempt from this **immortality**. Staying with the car analogy a bit longer, say you drive up a hill. The gasoline's energy, stored in its chemical bonds, is released to power the vehicle and let it fight gravity. As it ascends, it uses fuel but gains potential energy. This means that the fight with gravity has yielded a stored form of energy, a coupon that never expires even after a billion years. The car can cash in this coupon of potential energy at any time, so let's do it now, by letting the automobile coast down with the engine off. As it does so, it gains speed, which is kinetic energy, the energy of motion. It is using up its gravitational potential energy as it loses altitude but gains kinetic energy. You step on the brakes, which get hot, which is another way of saying its atoms are speeding up—more kinetic energy. Hybrid cars use this braking energy to charge their batteries. In short, energy keeps changing forms, but it never diminishes in the least. Similarly, **the essence of who you are**, which is energy, can neither diminish nor "go away"—there simply isn't any "away" in which to go. We inhabit a closed system.

# 3

## Nuclear production locks in production-ism through obsession with finance, competitiveness and technological solutions

**Maciejewska et al., Wroclaw Sociology and Faculty of Social Sciences institute, 2011**

(Malgorzata, “Lack of power or lack of democracy: the case of the projected nuclear power plant in Poland”, Economic and Environmental Studies, 11.3, project muse, ldg)

The mainstream discourse on nuclear power rarely takes up the question of how the global energy industry is organized. In the modern economy the production of energy around the world, which is supposed to be a kind of public good and to guarantee sustainable development, is planned and arranged under free market conditions. As a part of the global chain of extraction, production and trading, it is subordinated to the neoliberal logic on terms of which the society and economy is governed as a business enterprise with the logic of maximum interest and minimum loss. This imposes on different actors (from the international corporations to individual households) the discipline of competitiveness and profitability, resulting in the growth of existing inequalities as ‘the invisible hand’ of the free market economy legitimizes those subjects which are already in power. The modern global economy is based on irrational production and social inequalities where one can observe the processes of work intensification and the cheapening of labor. The markets are dominated by the unproductive virtual economy (See Peterson, 2002) where the major players are the financial institutions which, by means of sophisticated financial tools, buy and sell virtual products (currencies, stocks, insurances, debts and its derivatives). In effect, the major actors in the capitalist economy are the international investors who have the capability of financial liquidity, and operate with those sophisticated financial tools on the global stock market. Even when they lose those capacities because of indebtedness, the states and international organizations seem often to be willing to repair the damage by transferring the taxes paid by citizens. (This is actually happening now, during the financial crisis, when southern and western European countries are subjected to shock therapy under which governments introduce austerity measures.) The praxis of nuclear power producers and the discourse which legitimizes it is therefore reduced to one goal – increasing financial revenues. The Polish plan to build the atomic power plant seems to be another element of the competitiveness strategy. In the authorities’ mind set it could put Poland into the position of more a competitive, more dynamic economy, as expected by the European Union and international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank. The welfare of Poland’s or Niger’s society does not fit into that picture. The nuclear establishment does not take into account the most important aspect of sustainable development: the overall reduction of energy consumption and therefore of energy production. Such a policy could bring a wide range of profits to the societies, the ecosystem, as well as the economy. On the contrary, the increase of power production and power use is one of the core concepts of pro-atomic discourse. This dogmatic belief draws the ideological line indicated at the beginning: the question of energy use and the ideas for solving this problem are seen only as a matter of technological challenges and the amount of financial and material means which have to be invested in them, but not as an effort to re-organize and restructure the modern economy.

## Unmitigated market competition makes extinction inevitable and turns case

**Wise et al., Universidad Autónoma de Zacatecas development studies professor, 2010**

Raúl, “Reframing the debate on migration, development and human rights: fundamental elements”, October, [www.migracionydesarrollo.org](http://www.migracionydesarrollo.org), DOA: 10-13-12, ldg)

At the end of the first decade of the 21st century, a general crisis centered in the United States affected the global capitalist system on several levels (Márquez, 2009 and 2010). The consequences have been varied: Financial. The overflowing of financial capital leads to speculative bubbles that affect the socioeconomic framework and result in global economic depressions. Speculative bubbles involve the bidding up of market prices of such commodities as real estate or electronic innovations far beyond their real value, leading inevitable to a subsequent slump (Foster and Magdof, 2009; Bello, 2006). Overproduction. Overproduction crises emerge when the surplus capital in the global economy is not channeled into production processes due to a fall in profit margins and a slump in effective demand, the latter mainly a consequence of wage containment across all sectors of the population (Bello, 2006). Environmental. Environmental degradation, climate change and a predatory approach to natural resources contribute to the destruction of the latter, along with a fundamental undermining of the material bases for production and human reproduction (Fola- dori and Pierri, 2005; Hinkelammert and Mora, 2008). Social. Growing social inequalities, the dismantling of the welfare state and dwindling means of subsistence accentuate problems such as poverty, unemployment, violence, insecurity and labor precariousness, increasing the pressure to emigrate (Harvey, 2007; Schierup, Hansen and Castles, 2006). The crisis raises questions about the prevailing model of globalization and, in a deeper sense, the systemic global order, which currently undermines our main sources of wealth—labor and nature—and overexploits them to the extent that civilization itself is at risk. The responses to the crisis by the governments of developed countries and international agencies promoting globalization have been short-sighted and exclusivist. Instead of addressing the root causes of the crisis, they have implemented limited strategies that seek to rescue financial and manufacturing corporations facing bankruptcy. In addition, government policies of labor flexibilization and fiscal adjustment have affected the living and working conditions of most of the population. These measures are desperate attempts to prolong the privileges of ruling elites at the risk of imminent and increasingly severe crises. In these conditions, migrants have been made into scapegoats, leading to repressive anti- immigrant legislation and policies (Massey and Sánchez, 2006). A significant number of jobs have been lost while the conditions of remaining jobs deteriorate and deportations increase. Migrants’ living standards have drastically deteriorated but, contrary to expectations, there have been neither massive return flows nor a collapse in remittances, though there is evidence that migrant worker flows have indeed diminished.

## The alternative is to embrace commons instead of enclosures

## Discourse of the commons solves-creates space to challenge neoliberalism

**De Angelis, East London political economy professor, 2003**

(Massimo, “Reflections on alternatives, commons and communities”, Winter, <http://www.commoner.org.uk/deangelis06.pdf>, DOA: 7-2-12, ldg)

This movement has posed the question of a plurality of “alternatives” to the social processes and arrangements that produce the horrors of modern global capital. In order to take the many calls for and practices of alternatives seriously, we have to make them relevant to the real people at the fringe or outside the movement. In other words, we want to move from movement to society not so much by persuading people to “join” our movement, but through a language and a political practice that by tracing the connections between diverse practices attempts to dissolve the distinctions between inside and outside the movement, i.e., actually moves ‘from movement to society’. To make the possibility of a new world that contains many worlds an actuality, we have to be able to shape our own discourse in such a way as to echo the needs and aspirations coming from below. We have to give coherence to their plurality, without imposing a model or reiterating dead ideologies. We need a discourse that helps to articulate the many alternatives that spring out of the points of crises of neoliberal capital, which seriously threaten to dispossess people of their livelihood and impose on them new or more intensified commodified patterns of life. We need a discourse that builds on the plurality of the many concrete struggles and their methods and help us to articulate a vision – not a plan – of the whole. Then we can better evaluate what are the global implications of our local struggles, as well as the local implications of global struggles for the building of a world that contains many worlds. But most of all, we need a discourse that recognizes the power we have to shape alternatives, at every level in society, that sets out from the simple fact that, contrarily to common belief, alternatives do exist, are everywhere and plural. To clarify, I think that every social node, that is every individual or network of individuals is a bearer of alternatives. This is evident not only when struggles erupt in any of the waged or unwaged local and trans-local nodes of social production. We just need to look around in the relative normality of daily routines to see that every social node “knows” of different ways to do things within its life-world and sphere of action longs for a different space in which things can be done in different ways. Each social node expresses needs and aspirations that are the basis of alternatives. For example: the alternative to working 10 hours a day is working 6; the alternative to poverty is access to the means of existence; the alternative to indignity is dignity; the alternative to building that dam and uprooting communities is not building that dam and leaving communities where they are; the alternative to tomatoes going rotten while transported on the back of an old woman for 20 miles is not GM tomatoes that do not rot, but access to land near home, or a home, or a road and a truck. Since every social node is aware of a spectrum of alternatives, the problem is simply how to make these alternatives actual? What resources are needed? How to coordinate alternatives in such a way that they are not pitted against each other as is the case of the competitive markets’ understanding of alternatives? How to solve the many existing problems without relying on the alienating coordinating mechanism of the market and creating instead social relations of mutual enrichment, dignity, and respect? These are I believe the bottom line questions on which a new political discourse must be based. Once we acknowledge the existence of the galaxy of alternatives as they emerge from concrete needs and aspirations, we can ground today’s new political discourse in the thinking and practice of the actualization and the coordination of alternatives, so as each social node and each individual within it has the power to decide and take control over their lives. It is this actualization and this coordination that rescues existing alternatives from the cloud of their invisibility, because alternatives, as with any human product, are social products, and they need to be recognized and validated socially. Our political projects must push their way through beyond the existing forms of coordination, beyond the visible fist of the state, beyond the invisible hand of competitive markets, and beyond the hard realities of their interconnections that express themselves in today forms of neoliberal governance, promoting cooperation through competition and community through disempowerment. As I will argue, this new

# CASE

# Solvency

**The affirmative use of the political to answer the call of ethics causes the political to make itself indispensable in a never ending cycle of control—legal institutions thus co-opt social activism and shift unique individuals to the position of generic citizens, eliminating the relationships which provide the very meaning to life.**

Hershock, 1999

(Peter D., Project Fellow at the EastWest Center, Ph.D. in Philosophy from the University of Hawaii, "Changing the Way Society Changes: Transposing Social Activism into a Dramatic Key", Journal of Buddhist Ethics 6, p 158-160, http://jbe.gold.ac.uk/6/hershock991.pdf) cnb

The trouble is that, like other technologies biased toward control, the more successful legislation becomes, the more it renders itself necessary. Because it aims at rigorous definition — at establishing hard boundaries or limits — crossing the threshold of legislative utility means creating conditions under which the definition of freedom becomes so complex as to be self–defeating. Taken to its logical end, legally–biased social activism is thus liable to effect an infinite density of protocols for maintaining autonomy, generating a matrix of limits on discrimination that would finally be conducive to what might be called “axiological entropy” — a state in which movement in any direction is equally unobstructed and empty of dramatic potential. Contrary to expectations, complete “freedom of choice” would not mean the elimination of all impediments to meaningful improvisation, but rather an erasure of the latter’s conditions of possibility.The effectiveness and efficiency of “hard,” control–biased technologies depend on our using natural laws — horizons of possibility — as fulcrums for leveraging or dictating changes in the structure of our circumstances. Unlike improvised contributions to changes taking place in our situation, dictating the terms of change effectively silences our situational partners. Technological authority thus renders our circumstances mute and justifies ignoring the contributions that might be made by the seasons or the spiritual force of the mountains to the meaning —

the direction of movement — of our ongoing patterns of interdependence. With the “perfection” of technically–mediated control, our wills would know no limit. We would be as gods, existing with no imperatives, no external compulsions, and no priorities. We would have no reason to do one thing first or hold one thing, and not another, as most sacred or dear.Such “perfection” is, perhaps, as fabulous and unattainable as it is finally depressing. Yet the vast energies of global capital are committed to moving in its direction, for the most part quite uncritically. The consequences — as revealed in the desecration and impoverishing of both ‘external’ and ‘internal’ wilderness (for instance, the rainforests and our imaginations) — are every day more evident. The critical question we must answer is whether the “soft” technologies of legally–biased and controlled social change commit us to an equivalent impoverishment and desecration.The analogy between the dependence of technological progress on natural laws and that of social activism on societal laws is by no means perfect. Except among a scattering of philosophers and historians of science, for example, the laws of nature are not viewed as changeable artifacts of human culture. But for present purposes, the analogy need only focus our attention on the way legal institutions — like natural laws — do not prescriptively determine the shape of all things to come, but rather establish generic limits for what relationships or states of affairs are factually admissible. Laws that guarantee certain “freedoms” necessarily also prohibit others. Without the fulcrums of unallowable acts, the work of changing a society would remain as purely idealistic as using wishful thinking to move mountains. Changing legal institutions at once forces and enforces societal reform. By affirming and safeguarding those freedoms or modes of autonomy that have come to be seen as generically essential to ‘being human’, a legally–biased social activism cannot avoid selectively limiting the ways we engage with one another. The absence of coercion may be a basic aim of social activism, but if our autonomy is to be guaranteed both fair and just, its basic strategy must be one of establishing non–negotiable constraints on how we co–exist. Social activism is thus in the business of striking structural compromises between its ends and its means — between particular freedoms and general equality, and between practical autonomy and legal anonymity. By shifting the locus of freedoms from unique persons to generic citizens — and in substantial sympathy with both the Platonic renunciation of particularity and the scientific discounting of the exceptional and extraordinary — social activist methodology promotes dramatic anonymity in order to universally realize the operation of ‘blind justice’.Much as hard technologies of control silence the contributions of wilderness and turn us away from the rewards of a truly joint improvisation of order, the process of social activism reduces the relevance of the always unique and unprecedented terrain of our interdependence. This is no small loss. The institutions that guarantee our generic independence effectively pave over those vernacular relationships through which our own contributory virtuosity might be developed and shared — relationships out of which the exceptional meaning of our immediate situation might be continuously realized. In contrast with Buddhist emptiness — a practice that entails attending to the mutual relevance of all things — both the aims and strategies of social activism are conducive to an evacuation of the conditions of dramatic virtuosity, a societal depletion of our resources for meaningfully improvised and liberating intimacy with all things.

## The state is the site of White supremacy because of social paranoia – it hides the structures of gratuitous violence

Martinot and Sexton, SF State Professor and UC Irvine African American Studies Director ‘3

(Steve and Jared “The Avant-Garde of White Supremacy” 6-1-3 Social Identities Vol. 9 no. 2 accessed: 12-27-12 mlb)

The foundations of US white supremacy are far from stable. Owing to the instability of white supremacy, the social structures of whiteness must ever be re-secured in an obsessive fashion. The process of re-inventing whiteness and white supremacy has always involved the state, and the state has always involved the utmost paranoia. Vast political cataclysms such as the civil rights movements that sought to shatter this invention have confronted the state as harbingers of sanity. Yet the state’s absorption and co-optation of that opposition for the reconstruction of the white social order has been reoccurring before our very eyes. White supremacy is not reconstructed simply for its own sake, but for the sake of the social paranoia, the ethic of impunity, and the violent spectacles of racialisation that it calls the ‘maintenance of order’, all of which constitute its essential dimensions. The cold, gray institutions of this society — courts, schools, prisons, police, army, law, religion, the two-party system — become the arenas of this brutality, its excess and spectacle, which they then normalise throughout the social ﬁeld. It is not simply by understanding the forms of state violence that the structures of hyper-injustice and their excess of hegemony will be addressed. If they foster policing as their paradigm — including imprisonment, police occupations, commodiﬁed governmental operations, a renewed Jim Crow, and a re-criminalisation of race as their version of social order — then to merely catalogue these institutional forms marks the moment at which understanding stops. To pretend to understand at that point would be to afﬁrm what denies understanding. Instead, we have to understand the state and its order as a mode of anti-production that seeks precisely to cancel understanding through its own common sense.

For common sense, the opposite of injustice is justice; however, the opposite of hyper-injustice is not justice. The existence of hyperinjustice implies that neither a consciousness of injustice nor the possibility of justice any longer applies. Justice as such is incommensurable with and wholly exterior to the relation between ordinary social existence and the ethic of impunity including the modes of gratuitous violence that it fosters. The pervasiveness of state-sanctioned terror, police brutality, mass incarceration, and the endless ambushes of white populism is where we must begin our theorising. Though state practices create and reproduce the subjects, discourses, and places that are inseparable from them, we can no longer presuppose the subjects and subject positions nor the ideologies and empiricisms of political and class forces. Rather, the analysis of a contingent yet comprehensive state terror becomes primary. This is not to debate the traditional concerns of radical leftist politics that presuppose (and close off) the question of structure, its tenacity, its systematic and inexplicable gratuitousness. The problem here is how to dwell on the structures of pervasiveness, terror, and gratuitousness themselves rather than simply the state as an apparatus. It is to ask how the state exists as a formation or conﬂuence of processes with de-centred agency, how the subjects of state authority — its agents, citizens, and captives — are produced in the crucible of its ritualistic violence.

**That causes social death- outweighs other forms of suffering**

**Sexton, UC Irvine African American Studies Director ‘10**

(Jared, PhD Ethnic Stuides UC Berkeley “The Curtain of the Sky: An Introduction” 2-1-10 Critical Sociology 36:11 DOI: 10.1177/0896920509347136 via sage accessed: 12-23-12 mlb)

To suffer the loss of political sovereignty, the exploitation of labor, the dispossession of land and resources is deplorable; yet, we might say in this light that to suffer colonization is unenviable unless one is enslaved. **One may not be free, but one is at least not enslaved**. More simply, we might say of the colonized: you may lose your motherland, but you will not ‘lose your mother’ (Hartman 2007). The latter condition, the ‘social death’ under which kinship is denied entirely by the force of law, is reserved for the ‘natal alienation’ and ‘genealogical isolation’ characterizing slavery. Here is Orlando Patterson, from his encyclopedic 1982 Slavery and Social Death: I prefer the term ‘natal alienation’ because it goes directly to the heart of what is critical in the slave’s forced alienation, the loss of ties of birth in both ascending and descending generations. It also has the important nuance of a loss of native status, of deracination. It was this alienation of the slave from all formal, legally enforceable ties of ‘blood,’ and from any attachment to groups or localities other than those chosen for him [sic] by the master, that gave the relation of slavery its peculiar value to the master. The slave was the ultimate human tool, as imprintable and as disposable as the master wished. And **this was true**, at least in theory, of all slaves, no matter how elevated. (Patterson 1982: 7–8) True **even if elevated by the income and formal education of the mythic American middle class, the celebrity of a Hollywood icon, or** the **political position** of the so-called Leader of the Free World. **4 The alienation and isolation** of the slave **is** not only **vertical**, canceling ties to past and future generations **and** rendering thereby the notion of ‘descendants of slaves’ as a strict oxymoron. **It i**s also a **horizontal**

prohibition, canceling ties to the slave’s contemporaries as well. Reduced to a tool, the deracination of the slave, as Mannoni and Fanon each note in their turn, is total, more fundamental even than the displacement of the colonized, whose status obtains in a network of persecuted human relations rather than in a collection or dispersal of a class of things. Crucially, this deracination is strictly correlative to the ‘absolute submission mandated by [slave] law’ discussed rigorously in Saidiya Hartman’s 1997 Scenes of Subjection: the slave estate is the most perfect example of the space of purely formal obedience defining the jurisdictional field of sovereignty (Agamben 2000). Because the forced submission of the slave is absolute, any signs whatsoever of ‘reasoning … intent and rationality’ are recognized ‘solely in the context of criminal liability’. That is, ‘**the slave’s will [is] acknowledged only as it [is] prohibited or punished’** (Hartman 1997: 82, emphasis added). A criminal will, a criminal reasoning, a criminal intent, a criminal rationality: with these erstwhile human capacities construed as indices of culpability before the law, even the potentiality of slave resistance is rendered illegitimate and illegible a priori. The disqualification of black resistance by the logic of racial slavery is not unrelated to the longstanding cross-racial phenomenon in which the white bourgeois and **proletarian revolutions** on both sides of the Atlantic **can allegorize themselves as revolts against slavery, while the hemispheric black struggle against actually existing slavery cannot authorize itself literally in those same terms**. The latter must code itself as the apotheosis of the French and American revolutions (with their themes of Judeo-Christian deliverance) or, later, the Russian and Chinese revolutions (with their themes of secular messianic transformation) or, later still, the broad anti-colonial movements in Africa, Asia, and Latin America of the mid-20th century (with their themes of indigenous reclamation and renaissance). 5 One of the defining features of contemporary political and intellectual culture remains **this metaphoric transfer that appropriates black suffering as the template for non-black grievances, while it misrecognizes the singularity of black struggles against racial slavery** and what Loïc Wacquant calls its ‘functional surrogates’ or what Hartman terms its ‘afterlife’. Put differently, ‘the occult presence of racial slavery’ continues to haunt our political imagination: ‘nowhere, but nevertheless everywhere, a dead time which never arrives and does not stop arriving’ (Marriott 2007: xxi). Hartman’s notion of slavery’s afterlife and Wacquant’s theorization of slavery’s functional surrogates are two productive recent attempts to name the interminable terror of slavery, but we are still very much within the crisis of language – of thinking and feeling, seeing and hearing – that slavery provokes. Both scholars challenge the optimistic idea of a residual ‘legacy’ of slavery, precisely because it requires the untenable demarcation of an historic end in Emancipation. **The relations of slavery live on**, Hartman might say, **after** the death knell of formal **abolition**, mutating into ‘the burdened individuality of freedom’. The functions of the chattel system are largely maintained, Wacquant might say, despite the efforts of Reconstruction, preserved in surrogate institutional form under Jim Crow, the ghetto, and the prison. **Slavery** lives on, it **survives, despite the** grand **attempts** **on its** institutional **life forged by** the **international movements** **against slavery, segregation and mass imprisonment** (Davis 2003).

## Terrorism studies are shrouded in epistemological uncertainty—-this is a reason to prefer our impacts because of their structural nature and to discard theirs—-your role as a scholar is to reject the cult of expertism in favor of exposing the political nature of the 1ac’s knowledge claims

**Raphael, Kingston IR professor, 2009**

(Sam, Critical terrorism studies, pg 50-1, ldg)

The close relationship between the academic field of terrorism studies and the US state means that it is critically important to analyse the research output from key experts within the community. This is particularly the case because of the aura of objectivity surrounding the terrorism 'knowledge\* generated by academic experts. Running throughout the core literature is a positivist assumption, explic­itly stated or otherwise, that the research conducted is apolitical and objective (see for example, Hoffman, 1992: 27; Wilkinson. 2003). There is little to no reflexivity on behalf of the scholars, who see themselves as wholly dissociated from the politics surrounding the subject of terrorism. This reification of acade­mic knowledge about terrorism is reinforced by those in positions of power in the US who tend to distinguish the experts from other kinds of overtly political actors. For example, academics are introduced to Congressional hearings in a manner which privileges their nonpartisan input: Good morning. The Special Oversight Panel on Terrorism meets in open session to receive testimony and discuss the present and future course of ter­rorism in the Middle East.... It has been the Terrorism Panel's practice, in the interests of objectivity and withering all the facts, to pair classified briefings and open briefings.... This way we garner the best that the classified world of intelligence has to offer and the best from independent scholars working in universities, think tanks, and other institutions... (Saxton, 2010, emphasis added) The representation of terrorism expertise as ‘independent' and as providing 'objectivity' and 'facts' has significance for its contribution to the policymaking process in the US. This is particularly the case given that, as we will see, core experts tend to insulate the broad direction of US policy from critique. Indeed, as Alexander George noted, it is precisely because 'they are trained to clothe their work in the trappings of objectivity, independence and scholarship' that expert research is 'particularly effective in securing influence and respect for' the claims made by US policymakers (George, 1991b: 77). Given this, it becomes vital to subject the content of terrorism studies to close scrutiny. Based upon a wider, systematic study of the research output of key figures within the field (Raphael, forthcoming), and building upon previ­ous critiques of terrorism expertise (see Chomsky and Herman, 1979; Herman. 1982; Herman and 0'Sullivan, 1989; Chomsky. 1991; George, 1991; Jackson, 2007g). this chapter aims to provide a critical analysis of some of the major claims made by these experts and to reveal the ideological functions served by much of the research. Rather than doing so across the board, this chapter focuses on research on the subject of terrorism from the global South which is seen to challenge US interests. Examining this aspect of research is important, given that the 'threat' from this form of terrorism has led the US and its allies to intervene throughout the South on behalf of their national security, with profound consequences for the human security of people in the region. Specifically, this chapter examines two major problematic features which characterise much of the field's research. First, in the context of anti-US terrorism in the South, many important claims made by key terrorism experts simply repli­cate official US government analyses. This replication is facilitated primarily through a sustained and uncritical reliance on selective US government sources, combined with the frequent use of unsubstantiated assertion. This is significant, not least because official analyses have often been revealed as presenting a politically-motivated account of the subject. Second, and partially as a result of this mirroring of government claims, the field tends to insulate from critique those 'counterterrorism' policies justified as a response to the terrorist threat. In particular, the experts overwhelmingly 'silence' the way terrorism is itself often used as a central strategy within US-led counterterrorist interventions in the South. That is, "counterterrorism" campaigns executed or supported by Washing­ton often deploy terrorism as a mode of controlling violence (Crelinsten, 2002: 83; Stohl.2006: 18-19). These two features of the literature are hugely significant. Overall, the core figures in terrorism studies have, wittingly or otherwise, produced a body of work plagued by substantive problems which together shatter the illusion of 'objectivity'. Moreover, the research output can be seen to serve a very particu­lar ideological function for US foreign policy. Across the past thirty years, it has largely served the interests of US state power, primarily through legitimising an extensive set of coercive interventions in the global South undertaken under the rubric of various \*war(s) on terror'. After setting out the method by which key experts within the field have been identified, this chapter will outline the two main problematic features which characterise much of the research output by these scholars. It will then discuss the function that this research serves for the US state.

## Plan results in utility companies credit downgrade-takes out solvency.

**Texas Institute, 11**

(“Impact of Nuclear Power Projects on Credit Ratings and Creditor Recoveries Following Default of Investor Owned Utilities Sponsoring Nuclear Projects”, Texas Institute Research Study, September 1, 2011, 8/16/12, atl)

A credit rating is a formal opinion given by a rating agency of the potential default risk faced by investing in a particular issue of debt securities. Moody's is one of the three general purpose nationally recognized statistical rating organizations in the U.S. (See Table 7 for Moody's definition of rating scale). The rating process begins when a rating agency receives a formal request from an entity planning to issue a bond. The request for a rating is made because without one, it would be difficult for the entity to market a bond issue to the public. Once a credit rating is assigned, the rating agency monitors the credit quality of the issuer and can reassign a different credit rating to the bond. An "upgrade" occurs when there is an improvement in the credit quality of an issue; a "downgrade" occurs then there is deterioration in the credit quality of an issue. A downgrade of an issue or issuer may increase the credit spread and result in a decline in the market price of the issuer's bonds. Conclusion From a credit perspective, the risks of building new nuclear plants are notable, entailing significantly higher operating risk, with very high capital costs, and vulnerability to potential shifts in energy policy. Historically, 69% nuclear power project sponsoring utilities suffered rating downgrades while building these facilities and 52% of the nuclear power sponsors received their lowest rating during the construction period. Technical Summary and Charts As shown in Exhibit 1, 69% of investor-owned utilities suffered rating downgrades while constructing nuclear power plants. Of 52 utilities that completed nuclear plants (operating and shutdown, but not including test sites) during their construction period, seven utilities received rating upgrades, nine utilities were unchanged and the other 36 suffered downgrades. The issuers on average fell 3 credit rating notches and the issuer with the greatest rating change, Long Island Lighting Company, fell 12 notches, from Aa2 in 1972 to B2 in 1984. All of these ratings were evaluated on Moody’s assigned issuer rating, which is the issuer’s senior long term debt rating using the update algorithm. We define a utility’s nuclear plant construction period as from the date a construction permit was issued to the date of commercial operation. We examined the data from 1960 to February 2011 and discovered that half (52%) of the nuclear power sponsors received their lowest rating during their nuclear plant construction period. The average length of time needed to build a nuclear power facility is 104.6 months, which is approximately 17% of the time period reviewed. There were 46 utilities that eventually canceled at least one of their planned nuclear reactors. Eight of those utilities canceled their only planned reactor. That is, these 8 utilities merely announced plans to build nuclear plants but did not receive a construction license to begin any nuclear plant construction. The credit rating trend for these 8 utilities is normal, although the small sample size prevents statistically meaningful conclusions. Historical data suggests that nuclear power announcements did not necessarily bring negative rating impact on sponsors, but the actual construction activities did increase ratings pressure on sponsors. This is consistent with the hypothesis that very large capital expenditures required for nuclear power plant construction combined with the uncertainty associated with the last nuclear plant construction cycle would materially increase the sponsor’s operating risk in the view of rating agencies (See rating criteria for rating agencies and banks in Table 5 of Appendix). A further specific examination on Moody's rating methodology of regulated electric utilities and unregulated electric utilities (Table 6 of Appendix) clearly illustrates that although nuclear power construction may enjoy some political and regulatory support, the issuer's rating would be seriously affected by a number of other factors, especially the financial metrics. The multi-billion size of the investments and sizeable sunk costs could undoubtedly introduce material financial distress for almost any issuer. These impacts could overcome regulatory support in the form of rate of return regulation and service area monopolies, as well as tax incentives and other financial support available as a result of the job creation and tax base expansion likely to result from new nuclear plant construction.

## Plan can’t overwhelm liability concerns

**Schlissel, Senior Consultant with Synapse Energy Economics, 09**

(David, “Nuclear Loan Guarantees: Another Taxpayer Bailout Ahead?”, Union of Concerned Scientists, March 2009, 8/24/12, atl)

Despite this claim, two early attempts at stimulating construction of nuclear power plants were not very successful. The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 tried to limit nuclear technology to a government monopoly. When other governments began to acquire nuclear technology, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 established a framework for federal licensing of nuclear plants built by private companies. The AEC offered various incentives and subsidies to encourage private investment in nuclear power plants. 5 However, they were insufficient to stimulate the development of a large-scale commercial industry. In particular, they did not overcome the risk of the indeterminate but potentially huge liability in the event of a nuclear accident of any magnitude. 6 While insisting that the risk of a major nuclear accident was extremely remote, private-sector representatives informed Congress that they would be forced to stop developing nuclear power plants if legislation did not limit their liability for such an event. 7 Of particular note, General Electric officials stated that the company would not proceed with nuclear reactor development “with a cloud of bankruptcy hanging over its head.” 8 Similarly, a Westinghouse executive made it “perfectly clear” that his company would not continue its activities unless the federal government limited private-sector liability for a nuclear accident. 9 The Government Plays Underwriter Congress responded to these concerns by passing the Price-Anderson Act in 1957. 10 The act had the dual purpose of “protect[ing] the public and . . . encourag[ing] the development of the atomic energy industry.” 11 In its original form, the act limited the industry’s total liability for a single nuclear incident to $500 million, plus the maximum amount of liability insurance available on the private market, which was $60 million in 1957. 12 Yet government estimates of the damages resulting from a reactor core meltdown totaled $14 billion at the time. 13 Despite these measures, by 1961 only two small reactors were operating in the United States, with five other small plants under construction. Nuclear power plants were proving to be more expensive than anticipated. The Indian Point reactor, completed in 1962, cost twice as much as its original $55 million estimate, for example. The AEC itself estimated that nuclear-based electricity was 30 percent more costly than coal-based power. Utilities did not appear to be interested in ordering more reactors, and the Bureau of the Budget (the predecessor of today’s Office of Management and Budget) was considering cutting nuclear subsidies. 14 Congress extended the Price-Anderson Act in 1977, and again in 1988 and 2005. Each time the industry argued that it needed the extension to survive. Each time Congress also raised the combined insurance and liability limit, but to levels well below the potential costs of a serious accident, given growing populations around the plants.

## . SMRs are too costly – stunts industry growth

**Daryan Energy, 2012**

(January 3rd, 2012. “Part 10 – Small modular reactors and mass production options”, http://daryanenergyblog.wordpress.com/ca/part-10-smallreactors-mass-prod/, 8/30/12, atl)

So there are a host of practical factors in favour smaller reactors. But what’s the down side? Firstly, economies of scale. With a small reactor, we have all the excess baggage that comes with each power station, all the fixed costs and a much smaller pay-off. As I noted earlier, even thought many smaller reactors are a lot safer than large LWR’s (even a small LWR is somewhat safer!) you would still need to put them under a containment dome. It’s this process of concrete pouring that is often a bottle neck in nuclear reactor construction. We could get around the problem by clustering reactors together, i.e putting 2 or 4 reactors not only on the same site but under the same containment dome. The one downside here is that if one reactor has a problem, it will likely spread to its neighbours. How much of a showstopper this fact is depends on which type of reactors we are discussing.¶ A proposed modular reactor design with four 250 MWth reactors within the same containment building working a shared pair of turbines to produce 500 MWe¶ Also, in the shorter term small reactors would be slower to build, especially many of those we’ve been discussing, given that they are often made out of non-standard materials. Only a few facilities in the world could build them as the entire nuclear manufacturing industry is currently geared towards large LWR’s. Turning that juggernaut around would take decades. So by opting for small reactors while we’d get safer more flexible reactors, we be paying for it, as these reactors would be slower to build (initially anyway) and probably more expensive too.

## 2. SMRs can’t be commercialized-multiple barriers

**Magwood, NRC commissioner, 2011**

(William, “Economics And Safety Of Modular Reactors; Committee: Senate Appropriations; Subcommittee: Energy And Water Development”, 7-14, CQ Congressional Testimony, lexis, ldg)

That is not to say that SMRs are a new idea. The conceptual benefits of small reactors have been the subject of discussion and analysis for decades, and all the potential benefits I've mentioned have been considered in the past. The potential advantages of smaller reactors prompted the government to provide considerable financial support for the development of the mid- size, passive-safety reactors in the 1990s and to encourage the pursuit of the pebble-bed modular reactor in the early years of this century. Both efforts proved unable to overcome the economic realities

of building and operating nuclear power plants realities that tend to penalize small reactors and reward larger designs. Thus, instead of the AP-600 and 500 megawatt Simplified Boiling Water Reactor of the early 1990s, the market pushed vendors to increase the size of their designs; today, vendors offer Generation III+ technologies based on those smaller systems the 1100 megawatt AP- 1000 and the 1600 megawatt Economic Simplified Boiling Water Reactor.2 Around the turn of the century, both DOE and industry became interested in the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor, or PBMR. This was a small, high-temperature gas-cooled reactor with a generating capacity of about 165 megawatts. This technology captured considerable media attention after U.S. companies became involved in an effort to build a commercial pilot in South Africa. However, as the high costs of the project became apparent, commercial participants began to peel away and eventually the South African project was abandoned. All small reactor technologies of the past failed to find a way to overcome the fact that the infrastructure required to safely operate a nuclear power reactor of any size is considerable. Tons of steel and concrete are needed to construct containment buildings. Control rod drives, steam generators, and other key systems are hugely expensive to design and build. A larger plant with greater electric generating capacity simply has an inherently superior opportunity to recover these large up-front costs over a reasonable period. So why is today different from yesterday? The greatest difference is the fact that the technology has evolved significantly over the years. Having learned lessons from the development of Generation III+ technologies and from the failure of previous small reactors, today's SMR vendors clearly believe they have solved the riddle of small reactor economics. They are presenting novel design approaches that could lead to significant improvements in nuclear safety. For example, design concepts that I have seen thus far further advance the use of passive safety systems, applying gravity, natural circulation, and very large inventories of cooling water to reduce reliance on human intervention during an emergency. SMR designs also apply novel technologies such as integral pressure vessels that contain all major system components and use fewer and smaller pipes and pumps, thereby reducing the potential for a serious loss-of- coolant accident. Very importantly, these new SMRs are much smaller than the systems designed in the 1990s; this choice was made to assure that they could be factory-built and shipped largely intact by rail for deployment. The ability to "manufacture" a reactor rather than "constructing" it on-site could prove to be a major advantage in terms of cost, schedule reliability, and even quality control. But will innovations like these allow this new breed of SMRs to be successful? Maybe. Many years of work remain for SMR vendors to refine their designs and allow for the development of realistic and reliable cost estimates. This is much the same state of affairs that existed in the 2002 time frame when DOE launched the Nuclear Power 2010 program to spur the development and certification of Generation III+ designs such as the AP-1000. At that time, the level of design completeness was insufficient to enable vendors to provide utilities with reliable cost and schedule estimates.

## 3. SMRs aren’t safer

**Lyman, Senior Scientist in the Global Security Program at the Union of Concerned Scientists, 12**

(Edwin, May 9, 2012, Small Modular Reactor Panel Discussion Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee Summary Prepared by Derek Updegraff, Rebecca Lordan, Pierce Corden Dirksen--‐366, 8/30/12, atl)

The last panelist, Dr. Lyman, provided a more skeptical viewpoint on SMRs, characterizing public discussion on the topic as “irrational exuberance.” Lyman argued that, with a few exceptions, safety characteristics were not significantly better than full-­‐size reactors, and in general, safety tended to rely on the same sorts of features. Some safety benefits, he stated, also declined as reactor power approached the upper bound of the SMR category. Increasing the number of reactors per power station could also increase the complexity of staff members’ tasks. This became apparent at the Fukushima Daiichi Power Station, where managing the cooling needs of six reactors in a single complex placed great strain on staff. Lyman argued that the Fukushima disaster should lead to a “reset” in licensing. In his opinion, the incident exposed numerous weaknesses in how nuclear power is regulated, and in order to remedy these oversights, regulation should be revisited. Lyman was skeptical about the prospects for reductions in manufacturing cost resulting from the industrial learning process, and therefore argued that the US should expect smaller reactors to be more expensive per MW. Further, Lyman said that standard economics of scale point to SMRs having overnight capital costs a factor of 2 to 3 higher per MW than large reactors. Lyman noted that some proposed cost-­‐saving mechanisms involved cutting staffing, which would undercut the job-­‐creation benefits advanced by SMR advocates (Mr. Moor noted that, since SMRs would be new construction, they would generate jobs even if they used less staff than full-­‐size LWRs). The largest variable is safety and security: Lyman believes that if fixed costs were high, utilities would be driven to cut security, emergency and operator staff in order to remain competitive. Lyman also was concerned about the safety implications of placing SMRs closer to populated areas, if enabled by the NRC plans to “scale” emergency zones to the size of the smaller plants. In his view, smaller evacuation zones may not be appropriate for smaller reactors, since the recent accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Power Station showed the evacuation zones for large plants are not large enough. ￼ In Lyman’s view, the issue came down to whether or not nuclear power was viewed as suitable for small-­‐scale, distributed generation, for reasons of safety and proliferation.

# Grid

## 1. Cyber Terror

## No impact to cyberterror – media exaggeration

**Valeriano and Maness, Foreign Affairs Contributors, 12**

(Brandon, Lecturer of Social and Political Sciences at University of Glasgow, and Ryan, PhD Candidate at University of Illinois, “The Fog of Cyberwar”, [http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138443/brandon-valeriano-and-ryan-maness/the-fog-of-cyberwar?page=2#](http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138443/brandon-valeriano-and-ryan-maness/the-fog-of-cyberwar?page=2), 11/21/2012, da: 12/17/2012, lmm)

The Stuxnet and Flame attacks, however, are not the danger signs that some have made them out to be. First of all, the viruses needed to be physically injected into Iranian networks, likely by U.S. or Israeli operatives, suggesting that the tactic still requires traditional intelligence and military operation methods. Second, Stuxnet derailed Iran’s nuclear program for only a short period, if at all. And Flame did nothing to slow Iran’s nuclear progression directly, because it seems to have been only a data-collection operation. Some cyberattacks over the past decade have briefly affected state strategic plans, but none has resulted in death or lasting damage. For example, the 2007 cyberattacks on Estonia by Russia shut down networks and government websites and disrupted commerce for a few days, but things swiftly went back to normal. The majority of cyberattacks worldwide have been minor: easily corrected annoyances such as website defacements or basic data theft -- basically the least a state can do when challenged diplomatically. Our research shows that although warnings about cyberwarfare have become more severe, the actual magnitude and pace of attacks do not match popular perception. Only 20 of 124 active rivals -- defined as the most conflict-prone pairs of states in the system -- engaged in cyberconflict between 2001 and 2011. And there were only 95 total cyberattacks among these 20 rivals. The number of observed attacks pales in comparison to other ongoing threats: a state is 600 times more likely to be the target of a terrorist attack than a cyberattack. We used a severity score ranging from five, which is minimal damage, to one, where death occurs as a direct result from cyberwarfare. Of all 95 cyberattacks in our analysis, the highest score -- that of Stuxnet and Flame -- was only a three.

## No cyber warfare- deterrence, risk of retaliation, successful restraints, and no real impact

**Valeriano and Maness, Foreign Affairs Contributors, 12**

(Brandon, Lecturer of Social and Political Sciences at University of Glasgow, and Ryan, PhD Candidate at University of Illinois, “The Fog of Cyberwar”, [http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138443/brandon-valeriano-and-ryan-maness/the-fog-of-cyberwar?page=2#](http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138443/brandon-valeriano-and-ryan-maness/the-fog-of-cyberwar?page=2), 11/21/2012, da: 12/17/2012, lmm)

Cyberattacks are rare, and when they do occur, states are cautious in their use of force. As with conventional and nuclear conflict, some of the principles of deterrence and mutually assured destruction apply. Any aggressor in cyberspace faces the acute threat of blowback: having techniques replicated and repeated against the initiator. Once developed, a cyberweapon can easily be copied and used by a tech-savvy operative with access to a critical system such as the Defense Department’s network, which foreign-government hackers have had success infiltrating. Far from making interstate cyberwarfare more common, the ease of launching an attack actually keeps the tactic in check. Most countries’ cyberdefenses are weak, and a state trying to exploit an adversary’s weakness may be similarly vulnerable, inviting easy retaliation. An unspoken but powerful international norm against civilian targets further limits the terms of cyberwarfare.

## International cooperation solves the impact

**Valeriano and Maness, Foreign Affairs Contributors, 12**

(Brandon, Lecturer of Social and Political Sciences at University of Glasgow, and Ryan, PhD Candidate at University of Illinois, “The Fog of Cyberwar”, [http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138443/brandon-valeriano-and-ryan-maness/the-fog-of-cyberwar?page=2#](http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138443/brandon-valeriano-and-ryan-maness/the-fog-of-cyberwar?page=2), 11/21/2012, da: 12/17/2012, lmm)

Cooperation on the cyberwar threat originated in an unlikely place: Estonia. A tiny country with a population of just over one million, it has become a global leader in promoting cyberspace rules and norms that keep states, democratic and autocratic alike, in line. Estonia was thrust into the spotlight after the 2007 cyberattack by and subsequent widespread international condemnation of Russia. Instead of lashing out against its attacker, the small state sought a world forum to discuss its case; since then, it has hosted the International Conference on Cyber Conflict four times. This conference is an outcropping of NATO and hosts countries such as the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Italy. The gatherings have successfully promoted the adoption of norms and modes of restrained behavior in cyberspace. Developments include the agreement that territorial sovereignty applies to a state’s cyberspace, and that cyberwarfare is covered by Article 51 of the UN Charter, which allows a state to take action in response to an attack.

Along these same lines, cyberattacks are now being categorized on an intensity scale to help determine what a proper international response might be. To be sure, cyberterrorism is still a danger. This is a development that will be more difficult to deter. However, fear of a lone cyberterrorist -- like the recent Bond villain in Skyfall who is capable of bringing a government to its knees -- is unfounded. To be effective, cyberwarfare requires substantial infrastructure, money, and ground operatives. Because these resources are hard to come by, most cyberattacks launched by rogue individuals are trivial or personal. For example, in 2011 the hacker group Anonymous attacked and shut down the PlayStation network in response to a lawsuit against programmers who modified the software. The network was down for weeks, but aside from creating some disgruntled gamers, the attack left no real damage. In short, this seldom-used tactic will not change foreign policy calculations anytime soon. Cyberwarfare poses a threat only if it is grossly overused or mismanaged, or if it diverts resources toward a mythical fear and away from real threats.

## 2. Mission Effectiveness

## Drones only kill 2% of high level targets – prefer our stats to biased government reports

CNN, 12

“Drone strikes kill, maim and traumatize too many civilians, U.S. study says,” 9-25-12, http://www.cnn.com/2012/09/25/world/asia/pakistan-us-drone-strikes/index.html, accessed 12-19-12, ara)

U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan have killed far more people than the United States has acknowledged, have traumatized innocent residents and largely been ineffective, according to a new study released Tuesday. The study by Stanford Law School and New York University's School of Law calls for a re-evaluation of the practice, saying the number of "high-level" targets killed as a percentage of total casualties is extremely low -- about 2%. The report accuses Washington of misrepresenting drone strikes as "a surgically precise and effective tool that makes the U.S. safer," saying that in reality, "there is significant evidence that U.S. drone strikes have injured and killed civilians." It also casts doubts on Washington's claims that drone strikes produce zero to few civilian casualties and alleges that the United States makes "efforts to shield the drone program from democratic accountability." Obama reflects on drone warfare use Drones in Action The drone strike program has long been controversial, with conflicting reports on its impact from U.S. and Pakistani officials and independent organizations. President Barack Obama told CNN last month that a target must meet "very tight and very strict standards," and John Brennan, the president's top counter-terrorism adviser, said in April that in "exceedingly rare" cases, civilians have been "accidentally injured, or worse, killed in these strikes." In contrast to more conservative U.S. statements, the Stanford/NYU report -- titled "Living Under Drones" -- offers starker figures published by The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, an independent organization based at City University in London. "TBIJ reports that from June 2004 through mid-September 2012, available data indicate that drone strikes killed 2,562 - 3,325 people in Pakistan, of whom 474 - 881 were civilians, including 176 children. TBIJ reports that these strikes also injured an additional 1,228 - 1,362 individuals," according to the Stanford/NYU study. Based on interviews with witnesses, victims and experts, the report accuses the CIA of "double-striking" a target, moments after the initial hit, thereby killing first responders. It also highlights harm "beyond death and physical injury," publishing accounts of psychological trauma experienced by people living in Pakistan's tribal northwest region, who it says hear drones hover 24 hours a day. "Before this we were all very happy," the report quotes an anonymous resident as saying. "But after these drones attacks a lot of people are victims and have lost members of their family. A lot of them, they have mental illnesses." People have to live with the fear that a strike could come down on them at any moment of the day or night, leaving behind dead whose "bodies are shattered to pieces," and survivors who must be desperately sped to a hospital. The report concedes that "real threats to U.S. security and to Pakistani civilians exist in the Pakistani border areas now targeted by drones." And it acknowledges that drone strikes have "killed alleged combatants and disrupted armed actor networks." But it concludes that drone strikes, which are conducted by the CIA in a country not at war with the United States, are too harmful to civilians, too sloppy, legally questionable and do more harm to U.S. interests than good

. "A significant rethinking of current U.S. targeted killing and drone strike policies is long overdue," it says. "U.S. policy-makers, and the American public, cannot continue to ignore evidence of the civilian harm and counter-productive impacts of U.S. targeted killings and drone strikes in Pakistan." The study recommends that Washington undertake measures to rectify collateral damage -- including making public detailed legal justification for strikes, implementing mechanisms transparently to account for civilian casualties, ensuring independent investigations into drone strike deaths, prosecuting cases of civilian casualties and compensating civilians harmed by U.S. strikes in Pakistan. Nine months of research went into the report, according to its authors, which included "two investigations in Pakistan, more than 130 interviews with victims, witnesses, and experts, and review of thousands of pages of documentation and media reporting."

## Drones fail – low success rates, lack of intelligence

PakTribute, 12

(Pakistani news agency, “Drone attacks remain ineffective against militant leaders: Report,” 1-9-12, http://paktribune.com/news/Drone-attacks-remain-ineffective-against-militant-leaders-Report-246567.html, accessed 12-22-12, ara)

American intelligence agency CIA has failed to eliminate more than four Al Qaeda leaders in its highly costly and controversial 'assassination by drones' campaign inside Pakistan during 2011, revealed an annual report complied by Conflict Monitoring Centre (CMC) on drone attacks. CMC, an independent research centre, which regularly monitors drone attacks in Pakistan, has prepared an annual report (2011) on drone attacks inside Pakistani territory. The report notes 43 percent decline in drone attacks during 2011 than 2010. CIA had conducted 132 drone attacks in 2010. The number of fatalities in drone attacks has also dropped by 35 percent. Mounting protest and public backlash against drone attacks as well as tensions between US and Pakistan during the year led to the decline in drone attacks. US has suspended drone attacks after an attack by NATO helicopters on a Pakistani military check-post on November 26, 2011. US had carried out 75 drone attacks inside Pakistan during the year 2011 killing 609 people. Among them only three were Arab commanders of Al Qaeda; one was UK's most wanted and just four were senior commanders of different factions of Pakistani militants, the report said, adding that the rest were innocents. American drones fired 242 AGM-114 Hellfire missiles during the year and destroyed 38 houses, 37 vehicles, one camp and a seminary. One such missile costs for $68000 which means the CIA spent $16.456 million or Rs 1.5 billion to kill 609 people. In average, ammunition cost of every single casualty was $27000 or Rs 2.4 million. If other expenses are included the overall cost of killing one suspected militant will further rise. It may become point of concern for American taxpayer that such a huge amount of money was spent just to eliminate four Al Qaeda leaders and four Taliban commanders. The report said drone strikes also strained US-Pak relations. During 2011 collaboration and cooperation between CIA and ISI turned into confrontation. After arrest of CIA agent Raymond Davis and Abbottabad Operation, ISI busted many modules of local and international CIA agents active in the country. As a result American agency was deprived of human intelligence in many areas of North and South Waziristan. This led to ineffectiveness of the drone attacks against militant leadership, the report said. CMC's tally of the drone attacks shows that overall number of drone attacks since 2004 has crossed the figure of 300 and So far 2661 people have been killed in 303 drone attacks. An unprecedented increase in drone Attacks in South Waziristan was observed during the year. In the past, drone attacks in South Waziristan were rare in numbers as 90 percent of the attacks in 2010 occurred in North Waziristan. During the year 2011, South Waziristan was targeted more frequently. Drone attacks in South Waziristan were increased by 60 percent. During 2010 which was deadliest year of the history of drone attacks in Pakistan with highest ever number of drone attacks and subsequent deaths, only 9 out of 132 strikes were carried out in South Waziristan. However, in 2011 the number of attacks increased to 23. In North Waziristan, the CIA carried out 50 strikes while two strikes were carried out in Kurram Agency. Contrary to American claims of only 50 civilian deaths during past eight years, a UK based media organisation, The Bureau of Investigative Journalism confirmed that a minimum of 391 and a maximum of 780 innocent civilians including 175 children have so far been killed in drone attacks.

## 3. Terror

## Hegemony causes infectious disease spread

**Fidler, law professor University of Indiana, 2004**

(David, “Fighting the Axis of Illness: HIV/AIDS, Human Rights, and U.S. Foreign Policy” Harvard Human Rights Journal, Vol 17, Spring 2004, ebsco, ldg)

The hegemony and human rights dilemmas suggest that obstacles to strengthening the role of international human rights law in U.S. foreign policy on HIV/AIDS remain beyond the Bush Administration’s neoconservatism. The HIV/AIDS problem illustrates the difficulty of fighting the axis of illness in a unipolar world. The Bush Administration argued in the National Security Strategy that it wanted to preserve and enhance U.S. hegemony, especially in the military realm, in order to deal effectively with threats to U.S. national security, such as the threat posed by the axis of evil.[198] Maintaining or enhancing U.S. political, military, and economic hegemony will, in all likelihood, make the axis of illness more rather than less dangerous. The United States has strong political, security, and economic interests in deepening and expanding international trade, commerce, and investment.[199] Pursuit of these interests will stimulate the microbial resilience, human mobility, and globalization risk factors behind the HIV/AIDS pandemic and other infectious disease threats. U.S. hegemony ensures that stimulation of these risk factors will occur without significant opposition and barriers.[200] The dominance of the Westphalian framework in U.S. foreign policy on global health means that the United States has less interest in, and less well-developed policies respecting, the risk factors of social determinants of health and collective action problems. U.S. hegemony means that, without U.S. leadership in addressing these risk factors more forthrightly, public health capabilities within and among countries may not keep pace with the demands and dangers generated by accelerated microbial resilience, human mobility, and globalization

## Disease spread causes extinction.

**Keating, Foreign Policy Web Editor, 2009**

(Joshua, “The End of the World”, 11-13, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/11/13/the\_end\_of\_the\_world?page=full, ldg)

How it could happen: Throughout history, plagues have brought civilizations to their knees. The Black Death killed more off more than half of Europe's population in the Middle Ages. In 1918, a flu pandemic killed an estimated 50 million people, nearly 3 percent of the world's population, a far greater impact than the just-concluded World War I. Because of globalization, diseases today spread even faster - witness the rapid worldwide spread of H1N1 currently unfolding. A global outbreak of a disease such as ebola virus -- which has had a 90 percent fatality rate during its flare-ups in rural Africa -- or a mutated drug-resistant form of the flu virus on a global scale could have a devastating, even civilization-ending impact.How likely is it? Treatment of deadly diseases has improved since 1918, but so have the diseases. Modern industrial farming techniques have been blamed for the outbreak of diseases, such as swine flu, and as the world’s population grows and humans move into previously unoccupied areas, the risk of exposure to previously unknown pathogens increases**.** More than 40 new viruses have emerged since the 1970s, including ebola and HIV. Biological weapons experimentation has added a new and just as troubling complication.

## Hegemony collapses the economy-creates systemic imbalances.

**Mastanduno, government professor at Dartmouth, 2009**

(Michael, “System Maker and Privilege Taker U.S. Power and the International Political Economy”, World Politics, Volume 61 Number 1, project muse, ldg)

The ability of the United States to be both system maker and privilege taker has required the active collaboration of other major powers. During the cold war America’s most important economic supporters were its security partners in Western Europe—in particular, West Germany—and Japan. Since the end of the cold war the principal supporters are found increasingly in Asia, including Japan, still a security partner, and China, a potential security challenger. The United States and its international economic collaborators have engaged in a series of tacit political deals that preserve the special privileges of the United States while also satisfying the economic and security needs of the supporting actors. Although America’s partners have gradually changed, the tacit political arrangements have remained the same. The United States has maintained the relative openness of its large domestic market to absorb the products of its export-dependent supporters. It has provided security benefits to those supporters. In exchange, they have absorbed and held U.S. dollars, allowing U.S. central decision makers the luxury of maintaining their preferred mix of foreign and domestic policies without having to confront—as ordinary nations must—the standard and politically difficult trade-offs involving guns, butter, and growth. These recurring deals have proved mutually beneficial yet ultimately unsustainable. The longer they persist, the more they create cumulative economic imbalances that threaten the stability of the international economic order on which they are based. When underlying system stability has been threatened, the United States and its supporters have engaged in a struggle to adjust their policies, with each side seeking to force the burden of adjustment on the others.

## Economic crash causes nuclear world war III

O'Donnell, 2-26-2009

[Sean, Baltimore Republican Examiner writer and Squad Leader in the Marine Corps Reserve, the Baltimore Examiner, "Will this recession lead to World War III?," <http://www.examiner.com/x-3108-Baltimore-Republican-Examiner~y2009m2d26-Will-this-recession-lead-to-World-War-III>]

Could the current economic crisis affecting this country and the world lead to another world war? The answer may be found by looking back in history. One of the causes of World War I was the economic rivalry that existed between the nations of Europe. In the 19th century France and Great Britain became wealthy through colonialism and the control of foreign resources. This forced other up-and-coming nations (such as Germany) to be more competitive in world trade which led to rivalries and ultimately, to war. After the Great Depression ruined the economies of Europe in the 1930s, fascist movements arose to seek economic and social control. From there fanatics like Hitler and Mussolini took over Germany and Italy and led them both into World War II. With most of North America and Western Europe currently experiencing a recession, will competition for resources and economic rivalries with the Middle East, Asia, or South American cause another world war? Add in nuclear weapons and Islamic fundamentalism and things look even worse. Hopefully the economy gets better before it gets worse and the terrifying possibility of World War III is averted. However sometimes history repeats itself.

## 4. Arctic Conflict

## No resources or motive for conflict, cooperation consistently prevails and their evidence is all fear mongering.

**Fries, Arctic Institute Nonresident Senior Fellow, 2012**

(Tom, “Perspective Correction: How We Misinterpret Arctic Conflict”, 4-18, <http://www.thearcticinstitute.org/2012/04/perspective-correction-how-we.html>, DOA: 9-29-12, ldg)

War and conflict sell papers -- the prospect of war, current wars, remembrance of wars past. Accordingly, a growing cottage industry devotes itself to writing about the prospect of conflict among the Arctic nations and between those nations and non-Arctic states, which is mostly code for “China.” As a follower of Arctic news, I see this every day, all the time: eight articles last week, five more already this week from the Moscow Times, Scientific American or what-have-you. Sometimes this future conflict is portrayed as a political battle, sometimes military, but the portrayals of the states involved are cartoonish, Cold-War-ish...it’s all good guys and bad guys. I’m convinced that this is nonsense, and I feel vindicated when I see the extent to which these countries' militaries collaborate in the high North. From last week's meeting of all eight Arctic nations' military top brass (excepting only the US; we were represented by General Charles Jacoby, head of NORAD and USNORTHCOM) to Russia-Norway collaboration on search & rescue; from US-Canada joint military exercises to US-Russia shared research in the Barents...no matter where you look, the arc of this relationship bends towards cooperation. But there's a bigger misconception that underlies the predictions of future Arctic conflict that we read every week. This is the (usually) unspoken assumption that the governments of these states are capable of acting quickly, unilaterally and secretly to pursue their interests in the Arctic. False. This idea that some state might manage a political or military smash-and-grab while the rest of us are busy clipping our fingernails or walking the dog is ridiculous. The overwhelming weight of evidence suggests that the governments of the Arctic states are, like most massive organizations, bureaucratic messes. Infighting between federal agencies is rampant all around, as are political shoving matches between federal and state/provincial/regional governments. Money is still scarce, and chatter about military activism isn’t backed up by much: Canada is engaged in a sad debate over the downgrading of the proposed Nanisivik port; the United States’ icebreaker fleet is barely worth mentioning and shows little sign of new life in the near-term future; US Air Force assets are being moved 300+ miles south from Fairbanks to Anchorage; and Russia’s talk about a greater Arctic presence has been greatly inflated for the sake of the recent elections. In a more general sense, we have viciously polarized governments in the US and, to a lesser extent, Canada, as well as numerous “hotter” wars elsewhere that will take the lion’s share of our blood and treasure before the Arctic gets a drop of either. The smaller states might be able to act more nimbly, but Norway and Denmark are successful Scandinavian social-market economies with modestly-sized militaries who aren’t likely to put military adventurism in the Arctic at the top of their to-do lists. They’re also patient decision-makers who are making apparently sincere (if not always successful) efforts to incorporate their resident indigenous communities into national politics. This makes fast, unilateral, secret action unlikely. And then there is Russia. From the outside, it can often seem as though the Russian government rules by fiat. This reasonably leads to the concern that someone might take it into his head to assert Russia’s military might or otherwise extend the country’s sovereignty in the Arctic. But it is fairly clear that Russia’s success is currently, and for the near-term future, dependent on its position within the constellation of global hydrocarbon suppliers. To continue to develop its supply base, Russia needs the assistance of the oil majors of neighboring states, and indeed it is showing signs of warming up to foreign engagement with its Arctic hydrocarbons in significant ways. Its political relationships with its regular customers are also critical to its future success. Russia isn’t likely to wantonly sour those relationships by acting aggressively against all four of its wealthy, well-networked littoral brothers in Europe and North America. It’s not only the handcuffs of many colors worn by the Arctic states that will keep them from getting aggressive, it is also the good precedents that exist for cooperation here. Russia and Norway recently resolved a forty year-old dispute over territory in the Barents. There are regular examples of military cooperation among the four littoral NATO states and between Norway and Russia. Even the US and Russia are finding opportunities to work together. Meanwhile, the need to develop search-and-rescue capabilities is making cross-border cooperation a necessity for all Arctic actors. There are numerous international research and private-sector ventures, even in areas other than hydrocarbons. These will only grow in importance with time. In fact, it would seem that for many of these countries, the Arctic is a welcome relief - a site where international collaboration is comparatively amicable.

## No Arctic competition-profit, costs of operation and fear of intervention.

**Economist 2012**

(“Too much to fight over”, 6-16, <http://www.economist.com/node/21556797>, DOA; 9-29-12, ldg)

During the cold war the Arctic bristled with Soviet submarines and American bombers operating from airbases in Iceland and Greenland. The talk of Arctic security risks sometimes betrays a certain nostalgia for that period. Some people also worry about Arctic countries militarising the north. Canada conducted its biggest-ever military exercise in the north, involving 1,200 troops, in the Arctic last year. Yet the risks of Arctic conflict have been exaggerated. Most of the Arctic is clearly assigned to individual countries. According to a Danish estimate, 95% of Arctic mineral resources are within agreed national boundaries. The biggest of the half-dozen remaining territorial disputes is between the United States and Canada, over whether the north-west passage is in international or Canadian waters, hardly a casus belli. Far from violent, the development of the Arctic is likely to be uncommonly harmonious, for three related reasons. One is the profit motive. The five Arctic littoral countries, Russia, the United States, Canada, Denmark and Norway, would sooner develop the resources they have than argue over those they do not have. A sign of this was an agreement between Russia and Norway last year to fix their maritime border in the Barents Sea, ending a decades-long dispute. The border area is probably rich in oil; both countries are now racing to get exploration started. Another spur to Arctic co-operation is the high cost of operating in the region. This is behind the Arctic Council's first binding agreement, signed last year, to co-ordinate search-and-rescue efforts. Rival oil companies are also working together, on scientific research and mapping as well as on formal joint ventures. The third reason for peace is equally important: a strong reluctance among Arctic countries to give outsiders any excuse to intervene in the region's affairs. An illustration is the stated willingness of all concerned to settle their biggest potential dispute, over their maritime frontiers, according to the international Law of the Sea (LOS). Even the United States accepts this, despite its dislike for treaties—though it has still not ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, an anomaly many of its leaders are keen to end.

# Water

## Mid-east war prevents WMD terror on US soil

**de Borchgrave**, Washington Times and UPI editor, 200**6**

[Arnaud, "Al Qaeda's nuclear option," Washington Times, l/n, accessed 10-2-10, mss]

President Bush says frequently "**we are fighting them over there so they won't come over here**." "Them" are transnational terrorists and "over there" is Iraq. The insurgency in Iraq has much to do with al Qaeda's plans for a weapons of mass destruction (WMD) act of terrorism in the United States, but not the way the White House believes. Assuming the Bush administration is successful in midwifing democracy out of a near-civil war situation in Iraq, the WMD threat level will remain unchanged. High, that is. Paradoxical though this may seem to Washington's armchair strategists, the defeat of the al Qaeda-Sunni insurgency in Iraq would actually heighten, not lessen, the danger of a September 11 CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear) attack. Defeated by the U.S. in Afghanistan and again in Iraq, al Qaeda would have to conclude its strategy of forcing the U.S. into a humiliating, Vietnamlike retreat has failed.

## Impact is global nuclear war

**Speice**, 200**6**

[Patrick F., Jr., J.D. Candidate 2006, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary; B.A. 2003, Wake Forest University, William & Mary Law Review, "Negligence And Nuclear Nonproliferation: Eliminating The Current Liability Barrier To Bilateral U.S.-Russian Nonproliferation Assistance Programs," LN]

The potential consequences of the unchecked spread of nuclear knowledge and material to terrorist groups that seek to cause mass destruction in the United States are truly horrifying.   
A terrorist attack with a nuclear weapon would be devastating in terms of immediate human and economic losses. n49 Moreover, there would be immense political pressure in the United States to discover the perpetrators and retaliate with nuclear weapons, massively increasing the number of casualties and potentially triggering a full-scale nuclear conflict. n50

## Turns the case- nuclear terror spurs closed borders- even if it fails

**Allison**, Harvard Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs director, 200**7**

[Graham, "How Likely is a Nuclear Terrorist Attack on the United States?," 4-18-2007, www.cfr.org/publication/13097/how\_likely\_is\_a\_nuclear\_terrorist\_attack\_on\_the\_united\_states.html?breadcrumb=/publication/by\_type/online\_debate, accessed 9-29-10, mss]

Furthermore, the effect of a nuclear terrorist attack would reverberate **beyond U.S. shores**. After a nuclear detonation, the immediate reaction would be to **block all entry points** to prevent another bomb from reaching its target. Vital markets for international products would disappear, and closely linked financial markets would crash. Researchers at RAND, a U.S. government-funded think tank, estimated that a nuclear explosion at the Port of Los Angeles would cause immediate costs worldwide of more than $1 trillion and that shutting down U.S. ports would cut world trade by 7.5 percent. But Dr. Levi raises the possibility that, were terrorists to get their hands on enough nuclear weapons material to make a bomb, their design might fail. If a terrorist’s ten-kiloton nuclear warhead were to misfire (known to nuclear scientists as a “fizzle”) and produce a one-kiloton blast, bystanders near ground zero would not know the difference. Such an explosion would torch anyone one-tenth of a mile from the epicenter, and topple buildings up to one-third of a mile out. Does the real possibility of a fizzle or failure mean that terrorists won’t attempt a nuclear attack? Not necessarily. If terrorists pursued only fool-proof plans, they would have begun suicide bombing attacks on U.S. public transportation by now. But from a terrorist’s point of view, why pursue a course of action with a 95 percent chance of success, but at most forty victims, if you have a 10 percent chance at killing five-hundred thousand? The most important takeaway from this debate is that we must do everything technically feasible on the fastest possible time line to prevent terrorists from getting their hands on nuclear materials.[1] Whether nuclear explosion, fizzle, or total dud, the repercussions of such materials in jihadist clutches are unacceptable.