### 2ac spanos

### ASPEC 2AC

#### Not a voting issue – just a reason their cp should compete

#### Agent cp’s are bad – they moot the 1ac, cause shallow debate that can’t be sustained over the course of the year and trivializes the educational function of the topic

#### The plan isn’t the plan – it is only a rough approximation, the bill would contain actual details - spec’ing congress for your DA’s solves your offense

#### Spec is infinitely regressive, not grounded in the rez, and causes a race to the bottom – reasonability is a better standard

#### ‘Resolved’ means to enact a policy by law

Words and Phrases 64 (Permanent Edition)

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

#### Saying “Federal Government” doesn’t mean “all three branches” – any one body acts as it

Chicago 7 (University of Chicago Manual of Style, “Capitalization, Titles”, http://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org/CMS\_FAQ/CapitalizationTitles/CapitalizationTitles30.html)

Q. When I refer to the government of the United States in text, should it be U.S. Federal Government or U.S. federal government? A. The government of the United States is not a single official entity. Nor is it when it is referred to as the federal government or the U.S. government or the U.S. federal government. It’s just a government, which, like those in all countries, has some official bodies that act and operate in the name of government: the Congress, the Senate, the Department of State, etc.

#### USFG does not mean all 3 branches

**Finnegan,** 0**7** – Legal filing (“Amended and Restated Purchase Agreement, <http://www.secinfo.com/d11MXs.v2yf4.d.htm>, ZP)

“United States Federal Government” means the government of the United States of America, and any body or entity exercising executive, legislative, judicial, regulatory or administrative functions of the government of the United States of America. For avoidance of doubt, this definition includes, without limitation, agencies of the government of the United States of America that are subject to the Federal Assignment of Claims Act.

### AT: T – R&D 2AC

#### The plan gets a class 103 license – over 50%

NRC, No Date [“PART 50—DOMESTIC LICENSING OF PRODUCTION AND UTILIZATION FACILITIES

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/cfr/part050/part050-0022.html]

A class 103 license will be issued, to an applicant who qualifies, for any one or more of the following: To transfer or receive in interstate commerce, manufacture, produce, transfer, acquire, possess, or use a production or utilization facility for industrial or commercial purposes; Provided, however, That in the case of a production or utilization facility which is useful in the conduct of research and development activities of the types specified in section 31 of the Act, such facility is deemed to be for industrial or commercial purposes if the facility is to be used so that more than 50 percent of the annual cost of owning and operating the facility is devoted to the production of materials, products, or energy for sale or commercial distribution, or to the sale of services, other than research and development or education or training.

#### And, incentives for energy production are the commercial transfer of resources linked to market expansion

EIA, 01 [United States Department of Energy Environmental Information Incentives, Mandates, and Government Programs for Promoting Renewable Energy, “Report Date: February 2001 Next Release Date: None Incentives, Mandates, and Government Programs for Promoting Renewable Energy by Mark Gielecki, Fred Mayes, and Lawrence Prete, [http//lobby.la.psu.edu/\_107th/128\_PURPA/Agency\_Activities/EIA/Incentive\_Mandates\_and\_Government.htm](http://lobby.la.psu.edu/_107th/128_PURPA/Agency_Activities/EIA/Incentive_Mandates_and_Government.htm)]

A financial incentive is defined in this report as providing one or more of the following benefits: A transfer of economic resources by the Government to the buyer or seller of a good or service that has the effect of reducing the price paid, or, increasing the price received, respectively; Reducing the cost of production of the good or service; or, Creating or expanding a market for producers.

#### And, counter interp applied r and d only – means no spinoff advantages

EIA 99 – Energy Information Administration / Federal Energy Market Interventions 1999: Primary Energy, "3. Federal Energy Research and Development", <http://www.eia.gov/oiaf/servicerpt/subsidy/pdf/research.pdf>)

Research and Development Defined

Federal energy-related R&D can be described as falling into three classes: basic research, research that seeks to develop newenergy technologies**,** and research that seeks to improve existing technologies. • Basic Research. The potential beneficiaries of basic research could be considered to be the population of the United States or the world as a whole. Basic research includes research projects designed to pursue the advancement of scientific knowledge and the understanding of phenomena rather than specific applications. • Research To Develop New Technologies. The efforts in this context involve attempts to discover new scientific knowledge that can have commercial application. Although the end objective of the research is known, the research task is difficult and uncertain. • Research To Improve Existing Technologies. These efforts emphasize the use of scientific knowledge to design and test new processes that may have substantial technical and cost uncertainties. The immediate beneficiaries are generally well defined: current producers and consumers of particular fuels or operators, and customers of the technology being improved. Energy Research and Development as a Subsidy It is easier to measure energy R&D spending than to it characterize from a subsidy perspective. R&D spending is intended to create useful knowledge that benefits society. Thus, all Federal R&D spending could, in a general way, be considered a subsidy to knowledge; however, the extent to which specific R&D programs actually affect energy markets is more difficult to ascertain. The results of research are inherently uncertain. Many programs will advance knowledge across a range of energy and non-energy applications, rather than in the context of a particular fuel or form of consumption. Further, the knowledge obtained may be negative, in the sense that the research may only reveal technical or economic dead ends to be avoided in the future.42 Thus, only a portion of Federal energy R&D is likely to achieve results (in the form of changes in energy costs or consumption) that can be attributed specifically to a particular R&D program. Moreover, to the extent that there are attributable results, they are likely to be measurable only years after the funded research effort is initiated. Federal R&D is intended to support research that the private sector would not undertake. It is not supposed to substitute for private-sector R&D. However, the creation of a Government-funded R&D program could, under some circumstances, displace private-sector R&D. In that case, the Federal program would not produce anynet new knowledge but simplyreduce private costs. It is impossible, however, to know with certainty what private-sector firms would have done in the (hypothetical) absence of a Federal program. In general, the less “basic” the R&D program and the more focused on near-term commercialization, the greater the risk that the program will be a substitute for private-sector R&D. There are no means to determine conclusively whether or not particular Federal energy R&D projects are substitutes or complements for private-sector activities. Moreover, because research is risky, with failure an inherent part of the process, the effectiveness of Federal R&D cannot easily be assessed. This report makes no judgments on either of these issues. Rather, it surveys the current composition of Federal R&D spending and provides a degree of historical perspective on the changing composition of Federal energy R&D efforts. There is another issue that is specific to U.S. energy R&D programs: much U.S. energy R&D is aimed not at producing fuels per se but at developing fuel-consuming capital equipment (particularly power generation technologies). Such projects may be more properly viewed as a subsidy to capital equipment manufacturers than to fuel producers or consumers. Although, in principle, all successful power generation R&D benefits electricity consumers, the effects on fuel producers are more ambiguous. Because they are energy-saving technologies, the new technologies will only benefit producers if they help to expand the market for their fuel. Thus, if one seeks to understand the effects, rather than the intent, of R&D spending, the success of the programs must be evaluated, noting that expenditures will necessarily occur long before technology adoption, and considering the competitive consequences of any new technologies introduced. Finally, much of the expenditure that is formally defined as “energy research and development” in the U.S. Government’s budget accounts is not directly expended on energy research or development. Some of the funds are expended for environmental restoration and waste management for energy (particularly nuclear) research facilities, or on R&D on environmental restoration and waste management, or on overhead or difficult-to-allocate functions. Such spending may not have a material impact on current or future energy markets. Energy Research and Development Trends Table 8 allocates Federal energy R&D by energy type and function. Currently, nearly two-thirds of Federal energy R&D ($2.8 billion) is allocated to basic research. DOE’s largest single basic research program is the General Science Program, funded at $1.6 billion in fiscal year 1999. Basic research is difficult to characterize as an energy subsidy, however, because it cannot be allocated between energy and non-energy benefits, or among forms of energy. Therefore, the balance of this chapter focuses on applied energy R&D. Table 8 lists both “estimated” and “actual” research and development appropriations for fiscal year 1992. The estimated appropriations are drawn from the Department of Energy’s fiscal year 1993 budget proposal, prepared in early 1992, which showed appropriations by budget account for the previous fiscal year.43 The estimated appropriations were used in EIA’s 1992 subsidy report. The actual appropriations are drawn from the Office of the Chief Financial Officer’s Appropriation History Tables, prepared in early 1997, which show final appropriations by budget account. The differences between the two columns have multiple causes. The Department transfers (with the approval of Congress) unspent monies from one account to another. This may take place well after the end of a fiscal year if the Department has multi-year spending authority for a particular account. The largest difference between the two columns is due to a large reprogramming of funds for fusion research. There have also been several changes of classification. For example, the account “Biological and Environmental Research” has been transferred from “Environment, Safety, and Health” to “General Science.” In addition, minor errors in the original 1992 report have been corrected in the final appropriations column. For example, some of the expenditures on wind in the “Wind, Photovoltaic, and Other Solar” category were interchanged with biomass expenditures in the 1992 report. Applied R&D is aimed primarily at improving existing technology. Appropriations for applied energy R&D were about $1.5 billion in fiscal year 1999. Of that amount, more than half is allocated to nuclear activities. Within the range of nuclear projects, most of the money is spent on environmental management rather than R&D per se. For coal, the bulk of spending supports development of clean coal technologies. Solar, photovoltaic, and wind energy absorb the major share of renewable energy research funds ($134 million out of a total of $327 million). Expenditures shown as “unallocated” in Table 8 are administrative and miscellaneous programs associated with R&D. For example, unallocated expenditures for nuclear R&D ($143 million) in fiscal year 1999 include program termination costs and program direction. For renewable energy programs, they include program direction and funding for the National Renewable Energy Laboratory ($22 million in fiscal year 1999). The unallocated appropriation for basic energy research ($49.8 million in fiscal year 1999) funds personnel in a variety of research centers and provides support services and other related expenses. Figure 3 illustrates trends in Federal applied energy R&D appropriations from fiscal year 1978 through fiscal year 1998. There were sharp reductions in energy R&D appropriations during the early 1980s, followed by modest growth after 1992. R&D spending by fuel type is dominated by nuclear power R&D, although coal R&D appropriations were boosted in the late 1980s by the advent of the Clean Coal Technology Program, and renewable energy appropriations have risen somewhat since 1990. Federal R&D spending related to oil and gas is budgeted at $164 million in fiscal year 1999. Another recent trend in Federal R&D is a tendency for Congress to mandate research on particular projects. Title XIII of the Energy Policy Act of 1992 wrote much of DOE’s coal R&D program into law and added some new areas of research, mandating R&D on coal-fired diesel engines, nonfuel coal use, coalbed methane, metallurgical coal development, coal gasification, coal liquefaction, lowrank coal use, and magnetohydrodynamic power generation. There are similar detailed provisions throughout the law for research on other energy sources, including nuclear power, end use, and renewable energy. Nuclear Power Figure 4 Illustrates trends in DOE’s nuclear power R&D programs. DOE received an appropriation of $640 million for nuclear R&D in fiscal year 1999, but the majority of the funds ($466.6 million) are allocated to the cleanup of contaminated nuclear energy and research sites. About two-thirds of the cleanup funds are being used for site closures, and the balance is slated for site and project completion. Non-Defense Environmental Safety and Health A substantial portion of Government-funded nuclear R&D is for managing and addressing the environmental legacy resulting from nuclear energy and research activities. The goal is to clean up as many contaminated sites as possible by 2006. For fiscal year 1999, more than one-half of nondefense environmental, safety, and health funds are allocated for site closures. Improving Existing Power Plants and Enhancing Nuclear Power The Nuclear Energy Research Initiative provides funds for R&D at universities, national laboratories, and industry to advance nuclear power technology. It includes proliferation-resistant reactor and fuel technologies, highperformance, high-efficiency reactor technology, advanced nuclear fuels, and new technologies for the minimization and management of nuclear waste. The fiscal year 1999 appropriation for this program is $19 million, out of the $30 million for new or improved nuclear power plants.

#### Prefer it -

#### Over limiting – excluding new reactor type slays the most fertile source of aff ground – kills innovation which is key to creativity and education about the topic

#### Functional limits check topic explosion and guarantee ground

#### Predictability outweighs – our aff relies on the most precise vision of how nuclear power functions and is from the EIA which is most qualified

#### Reasonability –competing interps are bad and cause a race to the bottom that destroys substantive debate

### Incentives 2AC

#### No definition of what energy production is in their interpretation

#### Counter-interpretation – disbursements of public funds for contingent commitments

Webb, 93 – lecturer in the Faculty of Law at the University of Ottawa (Kernaghan, “Thumbs, Fingers, and Pushing on String: Legal Accountability in the Use of Federal Financial Incentives”, 31 Alta. L. Rev. 501 (1993) Hein Online)

In this paper, "financial incentives" are taken to mean disbursements 18 of public funds or contingent commitments to individuals and organizations, intended to encourage, support or induce certain behaviours in accordance with express public policy objectives. They take the form of grants, contributions, repayable contributions, loans, loan guarantees and insurance, subsidies, procurement contracts and tax expenditures.19 Needless to say, the ability of government to achieve desired behaviour may vary with the type of incentive in use: up-front disbursements of funds (such as with contributions and procurement contracts) may put government in a better position to dictate the terms upon which assistance is provided than contingent disbursements such as loan guarantees and insurance. In some cases, the incentive aspects of the funding come from the conditions attached to use of the monies.20 In others, the mere existence of a program providing financial assistance for a particular activity (eg. low interest loans for a nuclear power plant, or a pulp mill) may be taken as government approval of that activity, and in that sense, an incentive to encourage that type of activity has been created.21 Given the wide variety of incentive types, it will not be possible in a paper of this length to provide anything more than a cursory discussion of some of the main incentives used.22 And, needless to say, the comments made herein concerning accountability apply to differing degrees depending upon the type of incentive under consideration.

By limiting the definition of financial incentives to initiatives where *public* *funds are* either disbursed or *contingently committed*, a large number of regulatory programs with incentive *effects* which exist, but in which no money is forthcoming,23 are excluded from direct examination in this paper. Such programs might be referred to as *indirect* incentives. Through elimination of indirect incentives from the scope of discussion, thedefinition of the incentive instrument becomes both more manageable and more particular. Nevertheless, it is possible that much of the approach taken here may be usefully applied to these types of indirect incentives as well.24 Also excluded from discussion here are social assistance programs such as welfare and ad hoc industry bailout initiatives because such programs are not designed primarily to *encourage* behaviours in furtherance of specific public policy objectives. In effect, these programs are assistance, but they are not incentives.

#### And, incentives for energy production are the commercial transfer of resources linked to market expansion

EIA, 01 [United States Department of Energy Environmental Information Incentives, Mandates, and Government Programs for Promoting Renewable Energy, “Report Date: February 2001 Next Release Date: None Incentives, Mandates, and Government Programs for Promoting Renewable Energy by Mark Gielecki, Fred Mayes, and Lawrence Prete, [http//lobby.la.psu.edu/\_107th/128\_PURPA/Agency\_Activities/EIA/Incentive\_Mandates\_and\_Government.htm](http://lobby.la.psu.edu/_107th/128_PURPA/Agency_Activities/EIA/Incentive_Mandates_and_Government.htm)]

A financial incentive is defined in this report as providing one or more of the following benefits: A transfer of economic resources by the Government to the buyer or seller of a good or service that has the effect of reducing the price paid, or, increasing the price received, respectively; Reducing the cost of production of the good or service; or, Creating or expanding a market for producers.

#### Core literature – excluding core incentives authoritatively and has no basis in literature – most new literature suggests moving beyond squo which has reached a bottleneck – aff innovation DA

#### Nuclear affs – loan guarantees are necessary to back very costly affs – they force nuclear to denerate to SMR’s or Wake-style one-reactor affs – those give bigger DA links and encourage broader debates

#### Functional limits solve – states and process CPs check

#### Reasonability – don’t incentivize going for topicality at the expense of topic – if we have lit that we’re in the topic you can predict us

### K

#### The role of the ballot is to simulate the enactment of the plan --- debate is a game and that game requires the neg to prove that the entire plan is a bad idea – their framework creates a self-serving vision of the topic where they create goal posts, assert we don’t meet them and then suddenly they have assembled a coherent neg argument – that disincentives substantive debate and research

#### And, imagining scenarios, even if unlikely or flawed is a pre requisite to good analysis – the aff isn’t a research paper, just dismiss poorly constructed impacts

Wimbush, 08 – director of the Center for Future Security Strategies

(S. Enders, senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and the author of several books and policy articles, “A Parable: The U.S.-ROK Security Relationship Breaks Down”, Asia Policy, Number 5 (January 2008), 7-24)

What if the U.S.-ROK security relationship were to break down? This essay explores the alternative futures of such a scenario. **Analyzing scenarios is one technique** for trying to understand the increasing complexity of strategic environments. A scenario is **an account of an imagined sequence of events.** The intent of a scenario is to **suggest how alternative futures might arise** **and where they might lead**, where conflicts might occur, **how the interests of different actors** might be challenged, and the kinds of strategies actors might pursue to achieve their objectives. Important to keep in mind is that **scenarios are nothing more than** invented, in-depth stories—stories about what different futures could look like and what might happen along plausible pathways to those futures. The trends and forces that go into building a scenario **may be carefully researched,** yet a scenario is not a research paper. Rather, it is a work of the imagination. As such, scenarios are, first, **tools that can help bring order to the way analysts think** about what might happen in future security environments; **second**, scenarios are a provocative way of revealing possible dynamics of future security environments that might not be apparent simply by projecting known trends into the future. Scenarios are particularly useful in suggesting where the interests and actions of different actors might converge or collide with other forces, trends, attitudes, and influences. By using scenarios, to explore the question “what if this or that happened?” in a variety of different ways, with the objective of uncovering as many potential answers as possible, **analysts can build hedging strategies for dealing with many different kinds of potential problems**. Though they may choose to discount some of these futures and related scenarios, analysts will not be ignorant of the possibilities, with luck avoiding having to say: “I never thought about that.”

#### Anti-nuclear opposition is directly responsible for the spread of lethal coal fired plants throughout the US and the world

King ‘9 - Host and Executive Producer of “White House Chronicle” — a news and public affairs program airing on PBS

After 40 Years, Environmentalists Start To See the Nuclear Light, Llewellyn King, November 25, 2009 – 8:47 pm

Although very little happened, Nov. 24 was a red letter day for the nation’s nuclear power industry. No new nuclear reactors were purchased, no breakthrough in treating nuclear waste was announced, and the Obama administration did not declare that it would pay for new reactors.¶ Instead, the source of the industry’s happiness was The Washington Post leading Page One with an article that detailed how the environmental movement, after 40 years of bitter opposition, now concedes that nuclear power will play a role in averting further harm from global warming.¶ Mind you, not every environmental group has come around, but the feared and respected Natural Resources Defense Council has allowed that there is a place for nuclear power in the world’s generating mix and Stephen Tindale, a former anti-nuclear activist with Friends of the Earth in the United Kingdom, has said, yes, we need nuclear.¶ For the nuclear industry which has felt itself vilified, constrained and damaged by the ceaseless and sometimes pathological opposition of the environmental movement, this changing attitude is manna from on high.¶ No matter that the environmentalists, in opposing nuclear since the late 1960s, have critically wounded the U.S. reactor industry and contributed to the construction of scores of coal and gas-fired plants that would not have been built without their opposition to nuclear.¶ In short, the environmental movement contributed in no small way to driving electric utilities to the carbon fuels they now are seeking to curtail.¶ Nuclear was such a target of the environmental movement that it embraced the “anything but nuclear” policy with abandon. Ergo its enthusiasm for all forms of alternative energy and its spreading of the belief —still popular in left-wing circles — that wind and solar power, with a strong dose of conservation, is all that is needed.¶ A third generation of environmental activists, who have been preoccupied with global climate change, have come to understand that a substantial amount of new electric generation is needed. Also some environmentalists are beginning to be concerned about the visual impact of wind turbines, not to mention their lethality to bats and birds.¶ Of all of the deleterious impacts of modern life on the Earth, it is reasonable to ask why the environmentalists went after nuclear power. And why they were opposed to nuclear power even before the 1979 accident at Three Mile Island in Pennsylvania and the catastrophic 1986 Chernobyl reactor failure in Ukraine. Those deserved pause, but the movement had already indicted the entire nuclear enterprise.¶ Having written about nuclear energy since 1969, I have come to believe that the environmental movement seized on nuclear first because it was an available target for legitimate anger that had spawned the movement in the ’60s. The licensing of nuclear power plants gave the protesters of the time one of the only opportunities to affect public policy in energy. They seized it; at first timorously, and then with gusto.¶ The escalation in environmental targets tells the story of how the movement grew in confidence and expertise; and how it added political allies, like Ralph Nader and Rep. Ed Markey, D-Mass.¶ The first target was simply the plants’ cooling water heating up rivers and estuaries. That was followed by wild extrapolations of the consequences of radiation (mutated children). Finally, it settled on the disposition of nuclear waste; that one stuck, and was a lever that turned public opinion easily. Just mention the 240,000-year half-life of plutonium without mentioning how, as an alpha-emitter, it is easily contained.¶ It is not that we do not need an environmental movement. We do. It is just that sometimes it gets things wrong.¶ In the days of the Atomic Energy Commission, the environmental groups complained that it was policeman, judge and jury. Indeed.¶ But environmental groups are guilty of defining environmental virtue and then policing it, even when the result is a grave distortion, as in the nuclear imbroglio. Being both the arbiter of environmental purity and the enforcer has cost the environment 40 years when it comes to reducing greenhouse gases.

#### Continued reliance on coal kills 13,000 people every year and spreads hazardous pollution

Zelman 11 Joanna, The Huffington Post, "Power Plant Air Pollution Kills 13,000 People Per Year, Coal-Fired Are Most Hazardous: ALA Report", 3/15, www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/03/14/power-plant-air-pollution-coal-kills\_n\_833385.html

The American Lung Association (ALA) recently released a new report on the dramatic health hazards surrounding coal-fired power plants.¶ The report, “Toxic Air: The Case For Cleaning Up Coal-Fired Power Plants,” reveals the dangers of air pollution emitted by coal plants.¶ One of the starkest findings in the report claims, “Particle pollution from power plants is estimated to kill approximately 13,000 people a year.”¶ So what's the biggest culprit?¶ “Coal-fired power plants that sell electricity to the grid produce more hazardous air pollution in the U.S. than any other industrial pollution sources.” According to the report details, over 386,000 tons of air pollutants are emitted from over 400 plants in the U.S. per year. Interestingly, while most of the power plants are located in the Midwest and Southeast, the entire nation is threatened by their toxic emissions.¶ An ALA graph shows that while pollutants such as acid gases stay in the local area, metals such as lead and arsenic travel beyond state lines, and fine particulate matter has a global impact. In other words, while for some workers the pollution may be a tradeoff for employment at a plant, other regions don’t reap the same benefits, but still pay for the costs to their health.¶ The report connected specific pollutants with their health effects. According to the ALA, 76% of U.S. acid gas emissions, which are known to irritate breathing passages, come from coal-fired power plants. Out of all industrial sources, these plants are also the biggest emitter of airborne mercury, which can become part of the human food chain through fish and wildlife -- high mercury levels are linked to brain damage, birth defects, and damage to the nervous system. Overall, air pollutants from coal plants can cause heart attacks, strokes, lung cancer, birth defects, and premature death.¶ The American Lung Association isn’t the only group to connect coal plants with death and illness. A recent study released in the Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences found that, due in large part to health problems, coal costs the U.S. $500 billion per year. Specifically, the study found that the health costs of cancer, lung disease, and respiratory illnesses connected to pollutant emissions totaled over $185 billion per year.

#### The pragmatic process of power generation is key – effective transition away from fossil fuels requires discussion of practical alternatives and willingness to support corporate production of energy

Monbiot 11 (George, columnist for The Guardian, has held visiting fellowships or professorships at the universities of Oxford (environmental policy), Bristol (philosophy), Keele (politics), Oxford Brookes (planning), and East London (environmental science), March 31, "The double standards of green anti-nuclear opponents",[http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/georgemonbiot/2011/mar/31/double-standards-nuclear)](http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/georgemonbiot/2011/mar/31/double-standards-nuclear%29)

Like most environmentalists, I want renewables to replace fossil fuel, but I realise we make the task even harder if they are also toreplace nuclear power**.** I'm not saying, as many have claimed, that we should drop our concerns about economic growth, consumption, energy efficiency and the conservation of resources. Far from it. What I'm talking about is how we generate the electricity we will need. Given that, like most greens, I would like current transport and heating fuels to be replaced with low-carbon electricity, it's impossible to see, even with maximum possible energy savings, how the electricity supply can do anything other than grow. All the quantified studies I have seen, including those produced by environmental organisations, support this expectation. Ducking the challenge of how it should be produced is not an option. Nor have I changed my politics (and nor for that matter am I an undercover cop, a mass murderer, a eugenicist or, as one marvellous email suggested, "the consort of the devil"). In fact it's surprising how little the politics of energy supply change with the mass-generation technology we choose. Whether or not there is a nuclear component, we are talking about large corporations building infrastructure, generating electricity and feeding it into the grid. My suspicion of big business and my belief that it needs to be held to account remain unchanged.

#### The Aff’s a prerequisite to the Alt – we make tech better

Feenberg 7 (Andrew, Canada Research Chair in the Philosophy of Technology in the School of Communication at Simon Fraser University, Danish Yearbook of Philosophy, Volume 42, “Between Reason and Experience,” p. 24-27, http://www.sfu.ca/~andrewf/books/Between\_Reason\_and\_Experience\_DYP42.pdf)

As I reformulate this social version of the technical revealing, it has political consequences. Political protests arise as feedback from disastrous technical projects and designs reaches those excluded from the original networks of control. These protests are often based on scientific knowledge of the devastation caused by technology designed in indifference to human needs. This is the point at which objective facts enter experience as motives for distrust and fear of technology and technical authority. The subjects become aware of the contingency of the technically structured world on choices and decisions that do not proceed from a supposedly pure rationality. The lifeworld reacts back on technology through the objective contents of knowledge of its side effects. There have been many attempts to articulate the implications of this new situation. My approach is closest to that of Ulrich Beck. Like him I argue that we are entering a new phase of technological development in which the externalities associated with the prevailing technologies threaten the survival of the industrial system (Beck, 1992). This threat has begun to force redesign of many technologies and changes in the disciplines and training underlying the technical professions. Beck explains the transition from a capitalism based on distinct spheres with little interaction, to a “reflexive modernity” in which interaction between spheres becomes the norm. Multiple approaches and cross disciplinary conceptions increasingly shape the design process in response. He develops the social consequences of the resultant changes while I have focused primarily on the technological dimension of the new phase. In this phase, what Gilbert Simondon calls “concretizing” innovations emerge designed to accommodate a wider range of social influences and contextual factors.12 As design is pulled in different directions by actors attempting to impose their differing functional requirements on devices, the winning design strategies are often those that reconcile multiple functions in simple and elegant structures capable of serving them all. Examples abound: hybrid engines in automobiles, refrigerants and propellants that do not damage the ozone layer, substitutes for lead in consumer products, and so on. In the process of developing these technologies environmental, medical and other concerns are brought to bear on design by new actors excluded from the original technological regime. Of course, no small refinements such as these can resolve the environmental crisis, but the fact that they are possible at all removes the threat of technological regression as a major alibi for doing nothing. The emergence of a radically new technical politics requires us to rethink the basic concept of rationality that has supplied the existing industrial society with its highest philosophical sanction. Heidegger and Marcuse help us to understand the limitations of the prevailing concept. They remind us that the hypostatization of a reason fragmented into specializations and differentiated from a broader cultural and normative context is not inevitable but belongs to a specific historical era, an era that may well be approaching its end. A new understanding of rationality is possible based not on a return to a teleological worldview in which we can no longer believe but on recognition of the complexity of experiences that have been cast in artificially narrow instrumental schemas. Concrete experience is thus the touchstone of this ontology because it is only there that the world reveals itself in its multifarious and unpredictable connections and potentialities. From this new standpoint specialization and differentiation will not disappear, but they will be treated as methodologically useful rather than as ontologically fundamental. The resultant breaching of the boundaries between disciplines and between the technical realm and the lifeworld responds to the crisis of industrial society. We may learn to bound the cosmos in modern forms by attending to the limits that emerge from the unintended interactions of domains touched by powerful modern technologies. This is the form in which the lived world we have discovered in the thought of Heidegger and Marcuse becomes active in the structure of a rationality that still has for its mission the explanation of objective nature. The discovery of a limit reveals the significance of that which is threatened beyond it. This dialectic of limitation is most obvious in the case of threats to human health or species survival. On the one side, the experienced world gains a ground in respect for an object, in this case the human body or a threatened species. On the other side, a concrete technical response is solicited employing the means at hand in new combinations or inventing new ones. From this standpoint no return to a qualitative science is possible or necessary. Modern science objectifies and reifies by its very nature but it could operate within limits standing in for the lost essences of antiquity and like them referring us to an irreducible truth of experience. As we encounter this truth we are reminded of the necessity of restraint. This must be a productive restraint leading to a process of transformation, not a passive refusal of a reified system. The forward looking Janus face is fundamental and grants hope not by rejecting scientific-technical achievements but by revealing their essential nature as processes in which human action can intervene.13 Innovative responses to the new limits can serve in the reconstruction of both technical disciplines and technology. To be sure, the process character and full complexity of reality cannot be reflected immediately in the scientific-technical disciplines, but the disciplines can be deployed in fluid combinations that reflect the complexity of reality as it enters experience through humanly provoked disasters of all sorts and through the consciousness of new threats of which we ourselves are the ultimate source. The goal is not merely to survive but to reconstruct modern technology around a new model of wealth that is environmentally compatible and that draws on human capacities suppressed or ignored in the present dispensation. Marcuse interpreted this in terms of the surrealist “hazard objectif,” the rather fantastic notion of an aesthetically formed world in which “human faculties and desires ... appear as part of the objective determinism of nature – coincidence of causality through nature and causality through freedom” (Marcuse, 1969: 31).

#### Tech optimism based on empirical research is good

Krier 85 (James E., Professor of Law at the University of Michigan, “The Un-Easy Case for Technological Optimism,” Michigan Law Review, Vol. 84, No. 3; December 1985, pp. 405-429)

A technological optimist is **not** simply **a person with unqualified enthusiasm about technological promise**. Saint-Simon (1760-1825) was an enthusiast, but he was not a technological optimist as the term is currently used. Saint-Simon, rather, was a utopian who happened to attach his vision to technocratic expertise.4 He was the forefather of Technocracy, an active utopian movement in the 1930s and one not entirely dead even today.5 Technological optimists are not utopians, but something less - let us say quasi-utopians, after a recent usage (applied to himself) of Robert Dahl's.6 Unlike any self-respecting pure utopian, quasi-utopians (and technological optimists) seek not perfection but **tolerable imperfection**, tolerable because it is better than anything else they consider attainable though not nearly as good as lots of alternatives that can be imagined. But technological optimists are also something more than mere be- lievers, or faddists, or techniks.7 Their views are rigorously formulated, grounded in an apparent reality, based on knowledge and experience, and artfully defended. There are no crazies among the best of the optimists; they are **conservative, respected experts who command enormous authority**. They have a very specific position namely, "that exponential technological growth will allow us to expand resources ahead of exponentially increasing demands."8

#### Prefer util

Cummiskey 90 – Professor of Philosophy, Bates (David, Kantian Consequentialism, Ethics 100.3, p 601-2, p 606, jstor, AG)

We must not obscure the issue by characterizing this type of case as the sacrifice of individuals for some abstract "social entity." It is not a question of some persons having to bear the cost for some elusive "overall social good." Instead, the question is whether some persons must bear the inescapable cost for the sake of other persons. Nozick, for example, argues that "to use a person in this way does not sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that he is a separate person, that his is the only life he has."30 Why, however, is this not equally true of all those that we do not save through our failure to act? By emphasizing solely the one who must bear the cost if we act, one fails to sufficiently respect and take account of the many other separate persons, each with only one life, who will bear the cost of our inaction. In such a situation, what would a conscientious Kantian agent, an agent motivated by the unconditional value of rational beings, choose? We have a duty to promote the conditions necessary for the existence of rational beings, but both choosing to act and choosing not to act will cost the life of a rational being. Since the basis of Kant's principle is "rational nature exists as an end-in-itself' (GMM, p. 429), the reasonable solution to such a dilemma involves promoting, insofar as one can, the conditions necessary for rational beings. If I sacrifice some for the sake of other rational beings, I do not use them arbitrarily and I do not deny the unconditional value of rational beings. **Persons** may **have "dignity**, an unconditional and incomparable value" that transcends any market value (GMM, p. 436), **but**, as rational beings, persons **also** have **a fundamental equality which dictates that some must** sometimes **give way for the sake of others.** The formula of the end-in-itself thus does not support the view that we may never force another to bear some cost in order to benefit others. If one focuses on the equal value of all rational beings, then equal consideration dictates that one sacrifice some to save many. [continues] According to Kant, the objective end of moral action is the existence of rational beings. Respect for rational beings requires that, in deciding what to do, one give appropriate practical consideration to the unconditional value of rational beings and to the conditional value of happiness. Since agent-centered constraints require a non-value-based rationale, the most natural interpretation of the demand that one give equal respect to all rational beings lead to a consequentialist normative theory. We have seen that there is no sound Kantian reason for abandoning this natural consequentialist interpretation. In particular, a consequentialist interpretation does not require sacrifices which a Kantian ought to consider unreasonable, and it does not involve doing evil so that good may come of it. It simply requires an uncompromising commitment to the equal value and equal claims of all rational beings and a recognition that, in the moral consideration of conduct, one's own subjective concerns do not have overriding importance.

#### Alt cedes the political – energy specific

**Kuzemko 12** [Caroline Kuzemko, CSGR University of Warwick, Security, the State and Political Agency: Putting ‘Politics’ back into UK Energy, <http://www.psa.ac.uk/journals/pdf/5/2012/381_61.pdf>]

Both Hay (2007) and Flinders and Buller (2006) suggest that there are other forms that depoliticisation can take, or in the terminology of Flinders and Buller ‘tactics’ which politicians can pursue in order to move a policy field to a more indirect governing relationship (Flinders and Buller 2006: 296). For the purposes of understanding the depoliticisation of UK energy policy, however, two of Colin Hay’s forms of depoliticisation are most useful: the ‘… offloading of areas of formal political responsibility to the market…’ and the passing of policymaking responsibility to quasipublic, or independent, authorities (Hay 2007: 82-3). 1 What each of these forms of depoliticisation has in common is the degree to which they can serve, over time, to reduce political capacity by removing processes of deliberation and contestation, thereby reducing the ability for informed agency and choice. In that politics can be understood as being inclusive of processes of deliberation, contestation, informed agency and collective choice the lack of deliberation and capacity for informed agency would result in sub-optimal politics (Hay 2007: 67; cf. Gamble 2000; Wood 2011; Jenkins 2011). There seems little doubt that, with regard to energy as a policy area, the principal of establishing a more indirect governing system had become accepted by UK political elites. One of the very few close observers of UK energy policy from the 1980s to early 2000s claims that both Conservative and New Labour politicians had actively sought to remove energy from politics, making it an ‘economic’ subject: From the early 1980s, British energy policy, and its associated regulatory regime, was designed to transform a state-owned and directed sector into a normal commodity market. Competition and 1 "These"forms"are"referred"to"elsewhere"by"the"author"as"‘marketised’"and"‘technocratic’"depoliticisation"(Kuzemko" 2012b:").liberalization would, its architects hoped, take energy out of the political arena… Labour shared this vision and hoped that energy would drop off the political agenda…. (Helm 2003: 386) 2 As already suggested this paper considers the intention to depoliticise energy to have been reasonably successful. By the early 2000s the Energy Ministry had been disbanded, there was little or no formal Parliamentary debate, energy was not represented at Cabinet level, responsibility for the supply of energy had been passed to the markets, it was regulated by an independent body, and the (cf. Kuzemko 2012b). Furthermore, the newly formed Energy Directorate within the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), which now had responsibility for energy policy, had no specific energy mandates but instead mandates regarding encouraging the right conditions for business with an emphasis on competition (Helm et al 1989: 55; cf. Kuzemko 2012b: 107). As feared by various analysts who write about depoliticisation as a sub-optimal form of politics, these processes of depoliticisation had arguably resulted in a lack of deliberation about energy and its governance outside of narrow technocratic elite circles. Within these circles energy systems were modelled, language was specific and often unintelligible to others, including generalist politicians or wider publics, and this did, indeed, further encourage a high degree of disengagement with the subject (cf. Kern 2010; Kuzemko 2012b; Stern 1987). Technical language and hiring practices that emphasised certain forms of economic education further isolated elite technocratic circles from political contestation and other forms of knowledge about energy. Arguably, by placing those actors who have been elected to represent the national collective interest at one remove from processes of energy governance the result was a lack of formal political capacity in this policy field. It is worth, briefly, at this point reiterating the paradoxical nature of depoliticisation. Whilst decisions to depoliticise are deeply political, political capacity to deliberate, contest and act in an issue area can be reduced through these processes. Depoliticisation has been an ongoing form of governing throughout the 20 th century it may (Burnham 2001: 464), however, be particularly powerful and more difficult to reverse when underpinned by increasingly dominant ideas about how best to govern. For example Hay, in looking for the domestic sources of depoliticisation in the 1980s and 1990s, suggests that these processes were firmly underpinned by neoliberal and public choice ideas not only about the role of the state but also about the ability for political actors to make sound decisions relating, in particular, to economic governance (Hay 2007: 95-99). Given the degree to which such ideas were held increasingly to be legitimate over this time period depoliticisation was, arguably, genuinely understood by many as a process that would result in better governance (Interviews 1, 2, 3, 15 cf. Hay 2007: 94; Kern 2010). This to a certain extent makes decisions to depoliticise appear both less instrumental but also harder to reverse given the degree to which such ideas become further entrenched via processes of depoliticisation (cf. Kuzemko 2012b: 61-66; Wood 2011: 7).

#### Turns the k

**McClean ‘1**

[David. Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy. “The Cultural Left and the Limits of Social Hope” [www.americanphilosophy.org/archives/2001%2520Conference/Discussion%2520papers/david\_mcclean.htm+foucault+habermas+slapped+cud&hl=en&gl=us&ct=clnk&cd=1](http://www.americanphilosophy.org/archives/2001%2520Conference/Discussion%2520papers/david_mcclean.htm+foucault+habermas+slapped+cud&hl=en&gl=us&ct=clnk&cd=1) 2001]

Yet for some reason, at least partially explicated in Richard Rorty's Achieving Our Country, a book that I think is long overdue, leftist critics continue to cite and refer to the eccentric and often a priori ruminations of people like those just mentioned, and a litany of others including Derrida, Deleuze, Lyotard, Jameson, and Lacan, who are to me hugely more irrelevant than Habermas in their narrative attempts to suggest policy prescriptions (when they actually do suggest them) aimed at curing the ills of homelessness, poverty, market greed, national belligerence and racism. I would like to suggest that it is time for American social critics who are enamored with this group, those who actually want to be relevant, to recognize that they have a disease, and a disease regarding which I myself must remember to stay faithful to my own twelve step program of recovery. The disease is the need for elaborate theoretical "remedies" wrapped in neological and multi-syllabic jargon. These elaborate theoretical remedies are more "interesting," to be sure, than the pragmatically settled questions about what shape democracy should take in various contexts, or whether private property should be protected by the state, or regarding our basic human nature (described, if not defined (heaven forbid!), in such statements as "We don't like to starve" and "We like to speak our minds without fear of death" and "We like to keep our children safe from poverty"). As Rorty puts it, "When one of today's academic leftists says that some topic has been 'inadequately theorized,' you can be pretty certain that he or she is going to drag in either philosophy of language, or Lacanian psychoanalysis, or some neo-Marxist version of economic determinism. . . . These futile attempts to philosophize one's way into political relevance are a symptom of what happens when a Left retreats from activism and adopts a spectatorial approach to the problems of its country. Disengagement from practice produces theoretical hallucinations"(italics mine).[(1)](file:///E:\\WINDOWS\\Temporary%20Internet%20Files\\Content.IE5\\OTKXU3YH\\the%20city.htm" \l "N_1_) Or as John Dewey put it in his The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy, "I believe that philosophy in America will be lost between chewing a historical cud long since reduced to woody fiber, or an apologetics for lost causes, . . . . or a scholastic, schematic formalism, unless it can somehow bring to consciousness America's own needs and its own implicit principle of successful action." Those who suffer or have suffered from this disease Rorty refers to as the Cultural Left, which left is juxtaposed to the Political Left that Rorty prefers and prefers for good reason. Another attribute of the Cultural Left is that its members fancy themselves pure culture critics who view the successes of America and the West, rather than some of the barbarous methods for achieving those successes, as mostly evil, and who view anything like national pride as equally evil even when that pride is tempered with the knowledge and admission of the nation's shortcomings. In other words, the Cultural Left, in this country, too often dismiss American society as beyond reform and redemption. And Rorty correctly argues that this is a disastrous conclusion, i.e. disastrous for the Cultural Left. I think it may also be disastrous for our social hopes, as I will explain. Leftist American culture critics might put their considerable talents to better use if they bury some of their cynicism about America's social and political prospects and help forge public and political possibilities in a spirit of determination to, indeed, achieve our country - the country of Jefferson and King; the country of John Dewey and Malcom X; the country of Franklin Roosevelt and Bayard Rustin, and of the later George Wallace and the later Barry Goldwater. To invoke the words of King, and with reference to the American society, the time is always ripe to seize the opportunity to help create the "beloved community," one woven with the thread of agape into a conceptually single yet diverse tapestry that shoots for nothing less than a true intra-American cosmopolitan ethos, one wherein both same sex unions and faith-based initiatives will be able to be part of the same social reality, one wherein business interests and the university are not seen as belonging to two separate galaxies but as part of the same answer to the threat of social and ethical nihilism. We who fancy ourselves philosophers would do well to create from within ourselves and from within our ranks a new kind of public intellectual who has both a hungry theoretical mind and who is yet capable of seeing the need to move past high theory to other important questions that are less bedazzling and "interesting" but more important to the prospect of our flourishing - questions such as "How is it possible to develop a citizenry that cherishes a certain hexis, one which prizes the character of the Samaritan on the road to Jericho almost more than any other?" or "How can we square the political dogma that undergirds the fantasy of a missile defense system with the need to treat America as but one member in a community of nations under a "law of peoples?"The new public philosopher might seek to understand labor law and military and trade theory and doctrine as much as theories of surplus value; the logic of international markets and trade agreements as much as critiques of commodification, and the politics of complexity as much as the politics of power (all of which can still be done from our arm chairs.) This means going down deep into the guts of our quotidian social institutions, into the grimy pragmatic details where intellectuals are loathe to dwell but where the officers and bureaucrats of those institutions take difficult and often unpleasant, imperfect decisions that affect other peoples' lives, and it means making honest attempts to truly understand how those institutions actually function in the actual world before howling for their overthrow commences. This might help keep us from **being slapped down in debates by true policy pros who actually know what they are talking about** but who lack awareness of the dogmatic assumptions from which they proceed, and who have not yet found a good reason to listen to jargon-riddled lectures from philosophers and culture critics with their snobish disrespect for the so-called "managerial class."

#### Environmental management is inevitable – concrete action key

Levy 99- PhD @ Centre for Critical Theory at Monash

Neil, “Discourses of the Environment,” ed: Eric Darier, p. 215

If the ‘technological fix’ is unlikely to be more successful than strategies of limitation of our use of resources, we are, nevertheless unable simply to leave the environment as it is. There is a real and pressing need for space, and more accurate, technical and scientific information about the non-human world. For we are faced with a situation in which the processes we have already set in train will continue to impact upon that world, and therefore us for centuries. It is therefore necessary, not only to stop cutting down the rain forests, but to develop real, concrete proposals for action, to reverse or at least limit the effects of our previous interventions. Moreover, there is another reason why our behavior towards the non-human cannot simply be a matter of leaving it as it is, at least in so far as our goals are not only environmental but also involve social justice. For if we simply preserve what remains to us of wilderness, of the countryside and of park land, we also preserve patterns of very unequal access to their resources and their consolations (Soper 1995: 207).in fact, we risk exacerbating these inequalities. It is not us, but the poor of Brazil, who will bear the brunt of the misery which would result from a strictly enforced policy of leaving the Amazonian rain forest untouched, in the absence of alternative means of providing for their livelihood. It is the development of policies to provide such ecologically sustainable alternatives which we require, as well as the development of technical means for replacing our current greenhouse gas-emitting sources of energy. Such policies and proposals for concrete action must be formulated by ecologists, environmentalists, people with expertise concerning the functioning of ecosystems and the impact which our actions have upon them. Such proposals are, therefore, very much the province of Foucault’s specific intellectual, the one who works ‘within specific sectors, at the precise points where their own conditions of life or work situate them’ (Foucault 1980g: 126). For who could be more fittingly described as ‘the strategists of life and death’ than these environmentalists? After the end of the Cold War, it is in this sphere, more than any other, that man’s ‘politics places his existence as a living being in question’ (Foucault 1976: 143). For it is in facing the consequences of our intervention in the non-human world that the hate of our species, and of those with whom we share this planet, will be decided?

### cp

#### Agent counterplans are a voting issue for deterrence – they kill aff ground and shift the debate to a focus on implementation – it is impossible to defend every aspect of our agent. It also kills topic education because the literature base isn’t deep enough for a year’s worth of agent debates.

#### Links to politics – perceived as trading off with defense acquisition funds for ‘boots on the ground’

Ethan Kapstein (Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security. He is a retired naval officer and former banker who has held positions at Harvard University, the OECD, and the University of Minnesota. Kapstein is currently teaching at the University of Texas at Austin where he is Slick Professor of International Affairs at the LBJ School of Public Affairs and Dennis O’Connor Regent’s Professor of Business at the McCombs School of Business) December 2009 “Smart Defense Acquisition:

Learning from French Procurement Reform” http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS%20Policy%20Brief%20-%20defense%20acquisition\_1.pdf

Role of Congress: The role of Congress must be part of any serious discussion of acquisition reform. Its role in defense acquisition is not inevitably harmful. However the media, think tanks, and the administration should object strenuously when Congress channels unnecessary funds to procurement that should be going directly to our “boots on the ground” instead. President Obama has made a good start in this direction and he should be supported by all those concerned by the high costs of modern weaponry.

#### Conditionality is bad – generates 2ac strategic skew by disincentivizng best use of offense – creates argumentative irresponsibility making debate poor advocate training – rigorous pre-round research solves offense

#### DoD mismanagement of procurement deals ensure delays, cost overruns, and rollback – also links to politics

Free Republic August 2012 “Should the US Remilitarize Military Procurement? (or leave it to the BUREAUCRATS!)” http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/2915559/posts

Since experienced military officers have been removed from the procurement system, the only people who now judge whether or not a weapon or a piece of equipment is ready to go into service are the Pentagon's lawyers, accountants and political appointees. The power of lobbyists also grows directly out of the system's lack of direct military involvement. It is time to scrap the whole procurement system and return control of the purchase of weapons to the uniformed military. The US military is facing potentially catastrophic funding cuts due to last year's so-called "sequestration" deal between the President and the Republicans in Congress. If Congress and the President fail to agree on future tax and spending policy, on January 1, 2013 automatic cuts will automatically begin, which will result in an almost $50 billion dollar cut from the 2013 defense budget. It is also estimated that over the course of he next ten years the act will, in theory, cut as much as $492 billion from the defense budget. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta has described these cuts as "catastrophic." Congresswoman Colleen Hanabusa (D Hawaii) has agreed with Panetta, calling them "devastating and disastrous." Pressure has never been greater to ensure that the defense procurement system works at maximum efficiency. Ideally, this means that the procurement system should provide the armed services with high quality, reliable and affordable weapons and equipment, on schedule and without unplanned cost increases. Unfortunately, at present there is little sign that either the Obama administration or Congress are ready to make the dramatic, comprehensive reforms that are needed for America's complex and confusing Federal Acquisition Regulations which govern the procurement system. Today's economic problems, however, are serious enough so that they might open the way for reforms that would make a significant difference to the way the system works. Ever since the early days of the Reagan build-up in the early 1980's, there has been a lively and, at times, nasty debate over military procurement reform. The bureaucratic system, which the US Department of Defense uses to design, develop and produce the seemingly infinite number of military weapons and equipment required, is widely recognized as broken. Almost all new weapons and new equipment are delivered to our troops late, and these items almost always seem to end up costing far more than originally planned. Often, a new weapon which had been in development for years, is cancelled because the leadership of the Defense Department decides that it has grown too expensive, as shown below. The cancellation then results in wasted billions that have already been spent . In the 1950's, the Pentagon may have had some significant problems, but the procurement system itself was not one of them. As one former Air Force General said, "Procurement decisions were made by the highest ranking officer technically qualified to make the decision." In the early 1960's, under then Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, a new management system was put into place. McNamara removed authority for major procurement decisions from the Army, Air Force and Navy and gave it to senior political appointees in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). Essentially, the decision-making power was given to a group of civilian political appointees and analysts who owed their positions to McNamara and no one else. These civilians were known as the "Whiz Kids." Their ideas were neatly summed up by Charles Hitch, McNamara's Comptroller of the Defense Department when he said, "We regard all military problems ... as economic problems in the efficient allocation and use of resources." By reducing the role of the men and women in the military to the mere fulfilling of a set of economic, statistical requirements, Secretary of Defense McNamara not only eliminated the role of traditional warrior virtues in the conduct of US military operations, he also removed officers with real-world experience from the procurement process. Many of the failures experienced by the US military since the McNamara era have been due to the excessive use of business management principles and techniques instead of reliance on strategy and doctrine based on military experience. The McNamara system has undergone several minor reforms since the early 1960's, notably the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. This legislation strengthened the role of the nation's senior military officer, namely, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. It made him the principal military advisor to the President and thus no longer just the "first among equals." Regrettably, the Goldwater-Nichols Act Act failed to give the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs solid authority over the procurement process. Even worse, as former Secretary of the Navy John Lehman put it, "The intention of the legislation was to get uniformed people completely out of procurement." Another unsuccessful reform effort was the disastrous concept of the "Lead System Integrator," promoted in by Bill Clinton's first Secretary of Defense and former McNamara whiz kid, Les Aspin, in 1993. As the concept was implemented, the Pentagon's cadre of civilian engineers and scientists, which had been built up and trained during the 1980s explicitly to supervise and hold accountable the big defense contractors, were let go. Supposedly, these civil service scientists and engineers, who had accumulated years of experience working with uniformed armed service members and who understood their needs, could be laid off because their work would be done by the defense industry itself –- exactly as happened. These experienced men and women were replaced by the "Lead System Integrator," which gave near total design and development authority for new weapons and equipment to the major defense contractors. Left without close and expert supervision from Defense Department scientists and engineers, programs developed under this concept have unsurprisingly experienced spectacularly large cost overruns and delays. For example, the Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS), which provides early warning of missile launches, and had an estimated cost of $3.68 billion in 1995 dollars, will end up costing more than $10 billion in 2012 dollars. Despite all the small scale changes that have been made, the essence of the McNamara procurement system has survived. Since experienced military officers have been removed from the system, the only people who now judge whether or not a weapon or a piece of equipment is ready to go into service are the Pentagon's lawyers, accountants, and political appointees. As these lawyers, accountants and political appointees lack the judgment based on military experience that the uniformed servicemen and servicewoman have, they insist on unnecessary extensive design reviews and test procedures, which, although perhaps occasionally beneficial, add considerably to the price of any weapon or piece of equipment procured. Excessive, repetitive testing can not only add to the overall expense of the weapon or item being bought, but also mislead the Defense Department into thinking that an item is ready to go into service when its parts may have been tested repeatedly, but the whole weapon has not been properly tested -- a problem that recently occurred in the F-22 when the oxygen system for the pilot was found not to work properly with the pilot's flight vest. Often a program is begun which is beyond today's technological state of the art. Sometimes this is due to excessive optimism --- but sometimes because the leaders of the Defense Department foresee the need for something and imagine that if they begin a new program, the military eventually will get what it needs. Sometimes this kind of gamble pays off, more often it fails. The Army's RAH-66 Comanche reconnaissance and attack helicopter, for example, would have combined stealth with extremely advanced electronic sensors and communications systems. In the mid 1980's, when the program began, no one had ever tried to apply stealth technology to a helicopter. No one even knew if it could be done. While the Comanche fulfilled some of its promise, it failed to live up to all of its original requirements. So the RAH-66 was cancelled in 2004 after the Army had spent $6.9 billion on the program. Had a soldier, rather than a politician, made the decision, the Comanche, if it had fulfilled 80 or 90 percent of its requirements, might have gone into production. Because it was cancelled, the Army had to keep its old light reconnaissance helicopters in service. The needs of the lawyers, accountants and political appointees were fulfilled, but the needs of the soldiers were not. Today, control over all major military spending decisions remain exclusively in the hands of political appointees, and soldiers, sailors and airmen are left with the job of trying to defend their country and themselves with the inferior results of decisions made by politicians. Even worse, due to the long time frames involved in building today's extremely complex weapons, military officers may find themselves responsible for implementing programs which were devised by politicians who long ago disappeared from the scene. The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, for instance, which is now in the early stages of production and deployment, was designed to fulfill a requirement formulated by the aforementioned Les Aspin. If anyone ought to be held accountable for the cost overruns, delays and other problems with the program, it is he; but in1995, he died. It was also Aspin, however, who brilliantly insisted that a single aircraft be designed for the Air Force, Navy and Marines and that it incorporate stealth technology, advanced electronics, and that the Navy version be aircraft carrier capable and the the Marine version be a "Jump Jet" with the ability to operate from extremely small carriers or short runways. He also insisted that the airplane be "affordable" and that international partners be brought into the development process. Given this set of requirements it's a miracle that the F-35 can actually get off the ground, let alone the fact that it is probably the deadliest all around aircraft flying today. Of course the one thing that the F-35 is not, is cheap. Now, unfortunately, the F-35 is in danger either of being canceled or being purchased in ridiculously small numbers. Similar results were obtained by the Air Force with both the B-2 bomber and the F-22 air superiority fighter. The USAF originally wanted more than 200 B-2 bombers to replace the B-52s and more than 700 F-22s to replace the F-15s. In the end, due to the high costs of both programs, the USAF got 21 B-2s and 187 F-22s. Similar problems exist with almost every major Defense Department procurement program, the significant exception being the Navy's new anti-submarine warfare, reconnaissance and patrol aircraft, the P-8. One of the main reasons the P-8 program has not had the usual cost problems is that the plane itself is based on the Boeing 737 airliner which has been in production since the mid-1960s. Any problems with the airplane were solved long ago, and since the Navy and the Air Force have previously bought versions of the 737 for training and transport, the military was already familiar with the aircraft. Another failed program is the Medium Air Defense System (MEADS), which started as a international US, German, and Italian program that aimed to develop and deploy a more advanced version of the Patriot anti-aircraft and missile defense weapon system. Even though MEADS uses the existing PAC 3 Patriot missile, the system's new radar and new command and control system turned out to be far more expensive and harder to develop than expected. Both Germany and Italy were reluctant to go ahead with the program, but instead of figuring out a graceful way to unwind the program, the US unilaterally announced that it would not buy any systems for the US Army, even though the Defense Department would fulfill its obligations by spending more than $100 million to complete the development of the system. Congress, of course, is having had a hard time understanding why so much money was going to be spent on something that would never be deployed. The House of Representatives has balked at appropriating the money needed to finish the development phase of the program. This has given Germany and Italy solid grounds on which to complain that the US is breaking the promises it made.

#### Grid is resilient and sustainable

**Clark 12**, MA candidate – Intelligence Studies @ American Military University, senior analyst – Chenega Federal Systems, 4/28/’12 (Paul, “The Risk of Disruption or Destruction of Critical U.S. Infrastructure by an Offensive Cyber Attack,” American Military University)

In 2003, a simple physical breakdown occurred – trees shorted a power line and caused a fault – that had a cascading effect and caused a power blackout across the Northeast (Lewis 2010). This singular occurrence has been used as evidence that the electrical grid is fragile and subject to severe disruption through cyber-attack, a disruption that could cost billions of dollars, brings business to a halt, and could even endanger lives – if compounded by other catastrophic events (Brennan 2012). A power disruption the size of the 2003 blackout, the worst in American¶ history at that time (Minkel 20f08), is a worst case scenario and used as an example of the¶ fragility of the U.S. energy grid. This perceived fragility is not real when viewed in the context¶ of the robustness of the electrical grid.¶ When asked about cyber-attacks against the electrical grid in April of 2012, the¶ intelligence chief of U.S. Cyber Command Rear Admiral Samuel Cox stated that an attack was¶ unlikely to succeed because of the “huge amounts of resiliency built into the [electrical] system¶ that makes that kind of catastrophic thing very difficult” (Capaccio 2012). This optimistic view¶ is supported by an electrical grid that has proven to be robust in the face of large natural¶ catastrophes. Complex systems like the electrical grid in the U.S. are prone to failures and the¶ U.S. grid fails frequently. Despite efforts to reduce the risk out power outages, the risk is always¶ present. Power outages that affect more than 50,000 people have occurred steadily over the last¶ 20 years at a rate of 12% annually and the frequency of large catastrophes remains relatively¶ high and outages the size of the 2003 blackout are predicted to occur every 25 years (Minkel¶ 2008). In a complex system that is always at risk of disruption, the effect is mitigated by policies¶ and procedures that are meant to restore services as quickly as possible. The most visible of these policies is the interstate Emergency Management Assistance Compact, a legally binding¶ agreement allowing combined resources to be quickly deployed in response to a catastrophic¶ disaster such as power outages following a severe hurricane (Kapucu, Augustin and Garayev¶ 2009).¶ The electrical grid suffers service interruptions regularly, it is a large and complex system¶ supporting the largest economy in the world, and yet commerce does not collapse (Lewis 2010).¶ Despite blizzards, earthquakes, fires, and hurricanes that cause blackouts, the economy is¶ affected but does not collapse and even after massive damage like that caused by Hurricane¶ Katrina, national security is not affected because U.S. military capability is not degraded (Lewis¶ 2010).¶ Cyber-security is an ever-increasing concern in an increasingly electronic and¶ interconnected world. Cyber-security is a high priority “economic and national security¶ challenge” (National Security Council n.d.) because cyber-attacks are expected to become the¶ top national security threat (Robert S. Mueller 2012). In response to the threat Congress is¶ crafting legislation to enhance cyber-security (Brito and Watkins 2012) and the Department of¶ Homeland Security budget for cyber-security has been significantly increased (U.S. Senate¶ Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 2012).

### DA

#### Plan popular

Jenkins-Smith et al 12

[Hank C. Jenkins-Smith, Carol L. Silva, Kerry G. Herron, Sarah R. Trousset, and Rob P. Rechard, “Enhancing the Acceptability and Credibility of a Repository for Spent Nuclear Fuel”, National Academy of Engineering of the National Academies, The Bridge on Managing Nuclear Waste, Summer 2012, Volume 42, Number 2, http://www.nae.edu/Publications/Bridge/59220/59232.aspx]

The effects of combining a repository with a reprocessing facility are shown in Table 2. Again, the changes in support are shown for those who initially opposed, were neutral, or supported each option. As with co-location of a repository with a national research laboratory, co-location of a repository with a reprocessing facility also increased support. Among those who either initially opposed the repository or were neutral, nearly half said the addition of the reprocessing capability would increase support for the repository. A smaller percentage said the combination would decrease support. Given the consistent and generally supportive attitudes of most Americans toward reprocessing (as discussed above), the increase in support for repositories co-located with reprocessing facilities is not surprising and could be helpful in informing policies. The implications are that public acceptance of an SNF repository is sensitive to the overall design attributes of the facility. If it is exclusively for disposal, the perceived risks and associated negative images tend to dominate perceptions (especially when SNF has been designated a “waste”). If the facility is more heterogeneous, that is, it includes design elements that address offsetting risk/benefits (such as a laboratory or reprocessing facility), thus attaching resource value to SNF, prospects for public acceptance improve.

#### Plan builds PC

Press Action 3/12/12 (“US Nuclear Industry Operates as if Fukushima Never Happened”) <http://www.pressaction.com/news/weblog/full_article/nuclearsubsidies03122012/>

Both Democrats and Republicans have had a long love affair with commercial nuclear power, and the relationship is showing no signs of losing steam. Since the 1950s, members of both parties have enthusiastically lavished electric utility companies with expensive gifts, ranging from subsidies to protection from liability for disasters to loan guarantees, all underwritten by U.S. taxpayers. The political calculus is simple: nuclear power enjoys unanimous support in Washington. Try to name one member of the U.S. Senate or House of Representatives who favors shutting down the nation’s 104 commercial nuclear reactors. Federal agencies, from the Atomic Energy Commission to the Department of Energy to the Nuclear Regulatory, have worked diligently through the years to promote nuclear power. At the state level, support for nuclear power also is extremely strong, although there are some politicians—albeit a tiny number—who have publicly called for the closure of certain nuclear plants. On the one-year anniversary of the start of the nuclear disaster at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant in Japan, one would assume a voice in official Washington would have emerged calling for an end to the nation’s experiment with nuclear power. In Germany, government officials made the decision to phase out nuclear power by 2022 in response to Fukushima. There’s no such sentiment among the ruling elite in the United States. Locating a member of Congress opposed to the continued operation of nuclear power plants is as hard as finding a lawmaker who favors breaking ties with Israel over its mistreatment of Palestinians for the last 60 years. In fact, it’s more than hard, it’s impossible. It’s very rare to find an issue where there is a noteworthy difference between Democrats and Republicans. When there are differences, they tend to be subtle, although party officials and the corporate media will attempt to sensationalize a slight difference to create an impression that the U.S. political system permits honest and real debate.

no push

#### Political capital is irrelevant and academically bankrupt – but winners win

Michael Hirsch (chief correspondent for National Journal, previously served as the senior editor and national economics correspondent for Newsweek, based in its Washington bureau) February 7, 2013 “There’s No Such Thing as Political Capital” <http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/there-s-no-such-thing-as-political-capital-20130207>

On Tuesday, in his State of the Union address, President Obama will do what every president does this time of year. For about 60 minutes, he will lay out a sprawling and ambitious wish list highlighted by gun control and immigration reform, climate change and debt reduction. In response, the pundits will do what they always do this time of year: They will talk about how unrealistic most of the proposals are, discussions often informed by sagacious reckonings of how much “political capital” Obama possesses to push his program through.¶ Most of this talk will have no bearing on what actually happens over the next four years.¶ Consider this: Three months ago, just before the November election, if someone had talked seriously about Obama having enough political capital to oversee passage of both immigration reform and gun-control legislation at the beginning of his second term—even after winning the election by 4 percentage points and 5 million votes (the actual final tally)—this person would have been called crazy and stripped of his pundit’s license. (It doesn’t exist, but it ought to.) In his first term, in a starkly polarized country, the president had been so frustrated by GOP resistance that he finally issued a limited executive order last August permitting immigrants who entered the country illegally as children to work without fear of deportation for at least two years. Obama didn’t dare to even bring up gun control, a Democratic “third rail” that has cost the party elections and that actually might have been even less popular on the right than the president’s health care law. And yet, for reasons that have very little to do with Obama’s personal prestige or popularity—variously put in terms of a “mandate” or “political capital”—chances are fair that both will now happen.¶ What changed? In the case of gun control, of course, it wasn’t the election. It was the horror of the 20 first-graders who were slaughtered in Newtown, Conn., in mid-December. The sickening reality of little girls and boys riddled with bullets from a high-capacity assault weapon seemed to precipitate a sudden tipping point in the national conscience. One thing changed after another. Wayne LaPierre of the National Rifle Association marginalized himself with poorly chosen comments soon after the massacre. The pro-gun lobby, once a phalanx of opposition, began to fissure into reasonables and crazies. Former Rep. Gabrielle Giffords, D-Ariz., who was shot in the head two years ago and is still struggling to speak and walk, started a PAC with her husband to appeal to the moderate middle of gun owners. Then she gave riveting and poignant testimony to the Senate, challenging lawmakers: “Be bold.”¶ As a result, momentum has appeared to build around some kind of a plan to curtail sales of the most dangerous weapons and ammunition and the way people are permitted to buy them. It’s impossible to say now whether such a bill will pass and, if it does, whether it will make anything more than cosmetic changes to gun laws. But one thing is clear: The political tectonics have shifted dramatically in very little time. Whole new possibilities exist now that didn’t a few weeks ago.¶ Meanwhile, the Republican members of the Senate’s so-called Gang of Eight are pushing hard for a new spirit of compromise on immigration reform, a sharp change after an election year in which the GOP standard-bearer declared he would make life so miserable for the 11 million illegal immigrants in the U.S. that they would “self-deport.” But this turnaround has very little to do with Obama’s personal influence—his political mandate, as it were. It has almost entirely to do with just two numbers: 71 and 27. That’s 71 percent for Obama, 27 percent for Mitt Romney, the breakdown of the Hispanic vote in the 2012 presidential election. Obama drove home his advantage by giving a speech on immigration reform on Jan. 29 at a Hispanic-dominated high school in Nevada, a swing state he won by a surprising 8 percentage points in November. But the movement on immigration has mainly come out of the Republican Party’s recent introspection, and the realization by its more thoughtful members, such as Sen. Marco Rubio of Florida and Gov. Bobby Jindal of Louisiana, that without such a shift the party may be facing demographic death in a country where the 2010 census showed, for the first time, that white births have fallen into the minority. It’s got nothing to do with Obama’s political capital or, indeed, Obama at all.¶ The point is not that “political capital” is a meaningless term. Often it is a synonym for “mandate” or “momentum” in the aftermath of a decisive election—and just about every politician ever elected has tried to claim more of a mandate than he actually has. Certainly, Obama can say that because he was elected and Romney wasn’t, he has a better claim on the country’s mood and direction. Many pundits still defend political capital as a useful metaphor at least. “It’s an unquantifiable but meaningful concept,” says Norman Ornstein of the American Enterprise Institute. “You can’t really look at a president and say he’s got 37 ounces of political capital. But the fact is, it’s a concept that matters, if you have popularity and some momentum on your side.”¶ The real problem is that the idea of political capital—or mandates, or momentum—is so poorly defined that presidents and pundits often get it wrong

. “Presidents usually over-estimate it,” says George Edwards, a presidential scholar at Texas A&M University. “The best kind of political capital—some sense of an electoral mandate to do something—is very rare. It almost never happens. In 1964, maybe. And to some degree in 1980.” For that reason, political capital is a concept that misleads far more than it enlightens. It is distortionary. It conveys the idea that we know more than we really do about the ever-elusive concept of political power, and it discounts the way unforeseen events can suddenly change everything. Instead, it suggests, erroneously, that a political figure has a concrete amount of political capital to invest, just as someone might have real investment capital—that a particular leader can bank his gains, and the size of his account determines what he can do at any given moment in history.¶ Naturally, any president has practical and electoral limits. Does he have a majority in both chambers of Congress and a cohesive coalition behind him? Obama has neither at present. And unless a surge in the economy—at the moment, still stuck—or some other great victory gives him more momentum, it is inevitable that the closer Obama gets to the 2014 election, the less he will be able to get done. Going into the midterms, Republicans will increasingly avoid any concessions that make him (and the Democrats) stronger.¶ But the abrupt emergence of the immigration and gun-control issues illustrates how suddenly shifts in mood can occur and how political interests can align in new ways just as suddenly. Indeed, the pseudo-concept of political capital masks a larger truth about Washington that is kindergarten simple: You just don’t know what you can do until you try. Or as Ornstein himself once wrote years ago, “Winning wins.” In theory, and in practice, depending on Obama’s handling of any particular issue, even in a polarized time, he could still deliver on a lot of his second-term goals, depending on his skill and the breaks. Unforeseen catalysts can appear, like Newtown. Epiphanies can dawn, such as when many Republican Party leaders suddenly woke up in panic to the huge disparity in the Hispanic vote.¶ Some political scientists who study the elusive calculus of how to pass legislation and run successful presidencies say that political capital is, at best, an empty concept, and that almost nothing in the academic literature successfully quantifies or even defines it. “It can refer to a very abstract thing, like a president’s popularity, but there’s no mechanism there. That makes it kind of useless,” says Richard Bensel, a government professor at Cornell University. Even Ornstein concedes that the calculus is far more complex than the term suggests. Winning on one issue often changes the calculation for the next issue; there is never any known amount of capital. “The idea here is, if an issue comes up where the conventional wisdom is that president is not going to get what he wants, and he gets it, then each time that happens, it changes the calculus of the other actors” Ornstein says. “If they think he’s going to win, they may change positions to get on the winning side. It’s a bandwagon effect.”¶ ALL THE WAY WITH LBJ¶ Sometimes, a clever practitioner of power can get more done just because he’s aggressive and knows the hallways of Congress well. Texas A&M’s Edwards is right to say that the outcome of the 1964 election, Lyndon Johnson’s landslide victory over Barry Goldwater, was one of the few that conveyed a mandate. But one of the main reasons for that mandate (in addition to Goldwater’s ineptitude as a candidate) was President Johnson’s masterful use of power leading up to that election, and his ability to get far more done than anyone thought possible, given his limited political capital. In the newest volume in his exhaustive study of LBJ, The Passage of Power, historian Robert Caro recalls Johnson getting cautionary advice after he assumed the presidency from the assassinated John F. Kennedy in late 1963. Don’t focus on a long-stalled civil-rights bill, advisers told him, because it might jeopardize Southern lawmakers’ support for a tax cut and appropriations bills the president needed. “One of the wise, practical people around the table [said that] the presidency has only a certain amount of coinage to expend, and you oughtn’t to expend it on this,” Caro writes. (Coinage, of course, was what political capital was called in those days.) Johnson replied, “Well, what the hell’s the presidency for?”¶ Johnson didn’t worry about coinage, and he got the Civil Rights Act enacted, along with much else: Medicare, a tax cut, antipoverty programs. He appeared to understand not just the ways of Congress but also the way to maximize the momentum he possessed in the lingering mood of national grief and determination by picking the right issues, as Caro records. “Momentum is not a mysterious mistress,” LBJ said. “It is a controllable fact of political life.” Johnson had the skill and wherewithal to realize that, at that moment of history, he could have unlimited coinage if he handled the politics right. He did. (At least until Vietnam, that is.)¶ And then there are the presidents who get the politics, and the issues, wrong. It was the last president before Obama who was just starting a second term, George W. Bush, who really revived the claim of political capital, which he was very fond of wielding. Then Bush promptly demonstrated that he didn’t fully understand the concept either.¶ At his first news conference after his 2004 victory, a confident-sounding Bush declared, “I earned capital in the campaign, political capital, and now I intend to spend it. That’s my style.” The 43rd president threw all of his political capital at an overriding passion: the partial privatization of Social Security. He mounted a full-bore public-relations campaign that included town-hall meetings across the country.¶ Bush failed utterly, of course. But the problem was not that he didn’t have enough political capital. Yes, he may have overestimated his standing. Bush’s margin over John Kerry was thin—helped along by a bumbling Kerry campaign that was almost the mirror image of Romney’s gaffe-filled failure this time—but that was not the real mistake. The problem was that whatever credibility or stature Bush thought he had earned as a newly reelected president did nothing to make Social Security privatization a better idea in most people’s eyes. Voters didn’t trust the plan, and four years later, at the end of Bush’s term, the stock-market collapse bore out the public’s skepticism. Privatization just didn’t have any momentum behind it, no matter who was pushing it or how much capital Bush spent to sell it.¶ The mistake that Bush made with Social Security, says John Sides, an associate professor of political science at George Washington University and a well-followed political blogger, “was that just because he won an election, he thought he had a green light. But there was no sense of any kind of public urgency on Social Security reform. It’s like he went into the garage where various Republican policy ideas were hanging up and picked one. I don’t think Obama’s going to make that mistake.… Bush decided he wanted to push a rock up a hill. He didn’t understand how steep the hill was. I think Obama has more momentum on his side because of the Republican Party’s concerns about the Latino vote and the shooting at Newtown.” Obama may also get his way on the debt ceiling, not because of his reelection, Sides says, “but because Republicans are beginning to doubt whether taking a hard line on fiscal policy is a good idea,” as the party suffers in the polls.¶ THE REAL LIMITS ON POWER¶ Presidents are limited in what they can do by time and attention span, of course, just as much as they are by electoral balances in the House and Senate. But this, too, has nothing to do with political capital. Another well-worn meme of recent years was that Obama used up too much political capital passing the health care law in his first term. But the real problem was that the plan was unpopular, the economy was bad, and the president didn’t realize that the national mood (yes, again, the national mood) was at a tipping point against big-government intervention, with the tea-party revolt about to burst on the scene. For Americans in 2009 and 2010—haunted by too many rounds of layoffs, appalled by the Wall Street bailout, aghast at the amount of federal spending that never seemed to find its way into their pockets—government-imposed health care coverage was simply an intervention too far. So was the idea of another economic stimulus. Cue the tea party and what ensued: two titanic fights over the debt ceiling. Obama, like Bush, had settled on pushing an issue that was out of sync with the country’s mood.¶ Unlike Bush, Obama did ultimately get his idea passed. But the bigger political problem with health care reform was that it distracted the government’s attention from other issues that people cared about more urgently, such as the need to jump-start the economy and financial reform. Various congressional staffers told me at the time that their bosses didn’t really have the time to understand how the Wall Street lobby was riddling the Dodd-Frank financial-reform legislation with loopholes. Health care was sucking all the oxygen out of the room, the aides said.¶ Weighing the imponderables of momentum, the often-mystical calculations about when the historic moment is ripe for an issue, will never be a science. It is mainly intuition, and its best practitioners have a long history in American politics. This is a tale told well in Steven Spielberg’s hit movie Lincoln. Daniel Day-Lewis’s Abraham Lincoln attempts a lot of behind-the-scenes vote-buying to win passage of the 13th Amendment, banning slavery, along with eloquent attempts to move people’s hearts and minds. He appears to be using the political capital of his reelection and the turning of the tide in the Civil War. But it’s clear that a surge of conscience, a sense of the changing times, has as much to do with the final vote as all the backroom horse-trading. “The reason I think the idea of political capital is kind of distorting is that it implies you have chits you can give out to people. It really oversimplifies why you elect politicians, or why they can do what Lincoln did,” says Tommy Bruce, a former political consultant in Washington.¶ Consider, as another example, the storied political career of President Franklin Roosevelt. Because the mood was ripe for dramatic change in the depths of the Great Depression, FDR was able to push an astonishing array of New Deal programs through a largely compliant Congress, assuming what some described as near-dictatorial powers. But in his second term, full of confidence because of a landslide victory in 1936 that brought in unprecedented Democratic majorities in the House and Senate, Roosevelt overreached with his infamous Court-packing proposal. All of a sudden, the political capital that experts thought was limitless disappeared. FDR’s plan to expand the Supreme Court by putting in his judicial allies abruptly created an unanticipated wall of opposition from newly reunited Republicans and conservative Southern Democrats. FDR thus inadvertently handed back to Congress, especially to the Senate, the power and influence he had seized in his first term. Sure, Roosevelt had loads of popularity and momentum in 1937. He seemed to have a bank vault full of political capital. But, once again, a president simply chose to take on the wrong issue at the wrong time; this time, instead of most of the political interests in the country aligning his way, they opposed him. Roosevelt didn’t fully recover until World War II, despite two more election victories.¶ In terms of Obama’s second-term agenda, what all these shifting tides of momentum and political calculation mean is this: Anything goes. Obama has no more elections to win, and he needs to worry only about the support he will have in the House and Senate after 2014. But if he picks issues that the country’s mood will support—such as, perhaps, immigration reform and gun control—there is no reason to think he can’t win far more victories than any of the careful calculators of political capital now believe is possible, including battles over tax reform and deficit reduction.¶ Amid today’s atmosphere of Republican self-doubt, a new, more mature Obama seems to be emerging, one who has his agenda clearly in mind and will ride the mood of the country more adroitly. If he can get some early wins—as he already has, apparently, on the fiscal cliff and the upper-income tax increase—that will create momentum, and one win may well lead to others. “Winning wins.”

Opp cost

#### Either comprehensive immigration won’t pass or small bills will inevitably pass – no disad

Munro, Dec 31 (2012, Neil, “Obama promises new immigration plan but keeps endgame close to his vest,” <http://dailycaller.com/2012/12/31/obama-promises-new-immigration-plan-but-keeps-endgame-close-to-his-vest/>

12/31/2012)

“A bunch of Democrats are not going to be supportive,” de Posada predicted. That rejection would damage Obama’s standing among Latinos in the 2014 race, he said, and help GOP outreach. De Posada said the GOP can win some sympathy among Latinos by pushing an ambitious bill that would welcome temporary migrant workers from across the United States’ southern border. In turn, that sympathy will ensure that Latinos actually listen to the GOP’s economic and social messages, he said. However, various right-of-center immigration reformers are already trying to win passage of small-scale measures that don’t include a pathway to citizenship for illegal immigrants, or invitations to new migrant workers. The small-scale bills can help American workers and high-tech employers, and also split the various ethnic, ideological and business groups now pushing for easier immigration, say the reform advocates. A comprehensive bill “will not pass, just as it didn’t last time around [and if Obama] were actually serious, he would agree to a piecemeal approach where each piece could garner sufficient support to pass,” said Rosemary Jenks, director of government relations at NumbersUSA, an immigration-reform group.

Silverstein 1/15 (Ken, 1/15/13, <http://www.forbes.com/sites/kensilverstein/2013/01/15/after-fukushima-u-s-seeks-to-advance-small-nuclear-reactors/>, RBatra)

Two years ago, some thought that the nuclear energy had been leveled. But the industry today is picking up steam by getting construction licenses to build four new units and by getting government funding to develop smaller nuclear reactors that are less expensive and which may be less problematic when it comes to winning regulatory approval.

The creators of those roughly 100-megawatt electric modules want to sell their products first in this country before they would market them overseas to lesser-developed nations that don’t have a huge transmission infrastructure. They would be factory-built before being shipped and fueled to where the energy is needed. To the extent that more electric generation is required, no problem: Just lay the small-scale modules next to each other, making the financial outlays more manageable.

“Restarting the nation’s nuclear industry and advancing small modular reactor technologies will help create new jobs and export opportunities for American workers and businesses, and ensure we continue to take an all-of-the-above approach to American energy production,” says Energy Secretary Steven Chu.

To that end, the Obama administration is partnering with Babcock & Wilcox and Bechtel to develop those smaller nuclear reactors for the federally-owned utility Tennessee Valley Authority. The Department of Energy is expected to invest about $450 million in the project, which equates to roughly half of the overall cost. Industry will pony up the other half.

#### Plan doesn’t pass fast enough to catch the disad – if their link is true, fiat would drag the plan through Congressional mud.

Paul C. Light (director of the Center for Public Service) 1999 The President’s Agenda: Domestic Policy Choice from Kennedy to Clinton p. 53-54

Presidents face several structural limits on agenda size, but the congressional calendar involves the greatest institutional restrictions. Though Congress can act quickly during a crisis, most legislation must pass through a **series of decision points** en route to enactment. According to John Kennedy, the process contains a number of **hurdles**: "It is very easy to defeat a bill in the Congress. It is much more difficult to pass one. To go through a subcommittee...and get a majority vote, the full committee and get a majority vote, go to the Rules Committee and get a rule, go to the Floor of the House and get a majority, start all over again in the Senate, subcommittee and full committee, and in the Senate there is unlimited debate, so you can never bring a matter to a vote if there is enough determination on the part of the opponents, even if they are a minority, to go through the Senate with the bill. And then unanimously get a conference between the House and Senate to adjust the bill, or if one member objects, to have it go back through the Rules Committee, back through the Congress, and have this done on a **controversial** piece of legislation where powerful groups are **opposing** it, that is an **extremely difficult** task."

#### Their impact is empirically denied—no escalation

**Hartzell 2000** (Caroline A., 4/1/2000, Middle Atlantic Council of Latin American Studies Latin American Essays, “Latin America's civil wars: conflict resolution and institutional change.” http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary\_0286-28765765\_ITM)

Latin America has been the site of fourteen civil wars during the post-World War II era, thirteen of which now have ended. Although not as civil war-prone as some other areas of the world, Latin America has endured some extremely violent and destabilizing intrastate conflicts. (2) The region's experiences with civil wars and their resolution thus may prove instructive for other parts of the world in which such conflicts continue to rage. By examining Latin America's civil wars in some depth not only might we better understand the circumstances under which such conflicts are ended but also the institutional outcomes to which they give rise. More specifically, this paper focuses on the following central questions regarding Latin America's civil wars: Has the resolution of these conflicts produced significant institutional change in the countries in which they were fought? What is the nature of the institutional change that has taken place in the wake of these civil wars? What are the factors that are responsible for shaping post-war institutional change?

#### Instability’s inevitable—drug trafficking

**Grudgings 2009** (Stuart, Rueters, Latin America ex-leaders urge reform of US drug war, http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSN11358345)

RIO DE JANEIRO, Feb 11 (Reuters) - The war against drugs is failing and the U.S. government should break with "prohibition" policies that have achieved little more than cram its prisons and stoke violence, three former Latin American presidents said

on Wednesday. The respected former presidents urged the United States and Latin American governments to move away from jailing drug users to debate the legalization of marijuana and place more emphasis on the treatment of addicts. Former Colombian President Cesar Gaviria said there was no meaningful debate over drugs policy in the United States, despite a broad consensus that current policies had failed. "The problem today in the U.S. is that narco-trafficking is a crime and so any politician is fearful of talking about narco-trafficking or talking about policies because they will be called soft," he said. Gaviria has joined with former Brazilian President Fernando Henrique Cardoso and former Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo to try to change the debate on drugs in Latin America, where trafficking gangs have killed tens of thousands of people and weakened democracies through corruption. From Mexico's gang wars to the drug-funded FARC guerrilla group in Colombia and daily shoot-outs between gangs and police in Rio de Janeiro's shantytowns, much of the region is scarred by drug violence and many believe U.S. policies have failed. A United Nations meeting in Vienna next month will frame international drugs policy for the next 10 years, and the three former presidents, whose group is called the Latin American Commission on Drugs and Democracy, said it is time for change. They pointed to falling street prices for cocaine and still high levels of consumption in the United States despite decades of policies focused on punishing users and cutting supplies from Latin American countries such as Colombia. 'PREJUDICES, FEARS' The presidents' commission released a report calling on governments to refocus policies toward treating users, move toward decriminalizing marijuana, and invest more in education campaigns. It said current policies were rooted in "prejudices, fears and ideological visions" that inhibited debate. Even as the group met in Rio on Wednesday, police arrested 51 people in a major operation in the city and other states against a suspected drug smuggling ring that sent cocaine to Europe and brought back synthetic drugs like Ecstasy. Organized crime has flourished around drugs and is now threatening the stability of Mexico, where a spiraling war between rival gangs killed more than 5,700 people last year. Cardoso, one of Latin America's most respected figures, said U.S. leadership was essential to break the cycle of drug-related crime and violence. "It will be almost impossible to solve Mexico's problems and other countries' problems without a more ample, comprehensive set of policies from the U.S. government," he said. Despite winning power on broad promises of change, drugs policy featured little in U.S. President Barack Obama's election campaign and there are few indications that he will embark on a major overhaul. Gaviria said Washington appeared increasingly isolated in its repressive approach as Latin America and Europe move toward treating drug abuse as a health problem rather than a crime. (Editing by Raymond Colitt and Kieran Murray)