**2NC Limits Good**

**Debate – Limits kill the activity**

**Rowland 84 -** (Robert C., Baylor U., “Topic Selection in Debate”, American Forensics in Perspective. Ed. Parson, p. 53-4)

The first major problem identified by the work group as relating to topic selection is the decline in participation in the National Debate Tournament (NDT) policy debate. As Boman notes: There is a growing dissatisfaction with academic debate that utilizes a policy proposition. Programs which are oriented toward debating the national policy debate proposition, so-called “NDT” programs, are diminishing in scope and size.4 This decline in policy debate is tied, many in the work group believe, to excessively broad topics. The most obvious characteristic of some recent policy debate topics is extreme breath. A resolution calling for regulation of land use literally and figuratively covers a lot of ground. Naitonal debate topics have not always been so broad. Before the late 1960s the topic often specified a particular policy change.5 The move from narrow to broad topics has had, according to some, the effect of limiting the number of students who participate in policy debate. First, the breadth of the topics has all but destroyed novice debate. Paul Gaske argues that because the stock issues of policy debate are clearly defined, it is superior to value debate as a means of introducing students to the debate process.6 Despite this advantage of policy debate, Gaske belives that NDT debate is not the best vehicle for teaching beginners. The problem is that broad policy topics terrify novice debaters, especially those who lack high school debate experience. They are unable to cope with the breadth of the topic and experience “negophobia,”7 the fear of debating negative. As a consequence, the educational advantages associated with teaching novices through policy debate are lost: “Yet all of these benefits fly out the window as rookies in their formative stage quickly experience humiliation at being caugh without evidence or substantive awareness of the issues that confront them at a tournament.”8 The ultimate result is that fewer novices participate in NDT, thus lessening the educational value of the activity and limiting the number of debaters or eventually participate in more advanced divisions of policy debate. In addition to noting the effect on novices, participants argued that broad topics also discourage experienced debaters from continued participation in policy debate. Here, the claim is that it takes so much times and effort to be competitive on a broad topic that students who are concerned with doing more than just debate are forced out of the activity.9 Gaske notes, that “broad topics discourage participation because of insufficient time to do requisite research.”10 The final effect may be that entire programs either cease functioning or shift to value debate as a way to avoid unreasonable research burdens. Boman supports this point: “It is this expanding necessity of evidence, and thereby research, which has created a competitive imbalance between institutions that participate in academic debate.”11 In this view, it is the competitive imbalance resulting from the use of broad topics that has led some small schools to cancel their programs.

**Interpretation - Financial incentives require the disbursement of public funds directly linked to energy production. Limiting out indirect incentives makes the topic manageable**

**Webb, 93** – lecturer in the Faculty of Law at the University of Ottawa (Kernaghan, “Thumbs, Fingers, and Pushing on String: Legal Accountability in the Use of Federal Financial Incentives”, 31 Alta. L. Rev. 501 (1993) Hein Online) ]

In this paper, "financial incentives" are taken to mean disbursements 18 of public funds or contingent commitments to individuals and organizations, intended to encourage, support or induce certain behaviours in accordance with express public policy objectives. They take the form of grants, contributions, repayable contributions, loans, loan guarantees and insurance, subsidies, procurement contracts and tax expenditures.19 Needless to say, the ability of government to achieve desired behaviour may vary with the type of incentive in use: up-front disbursements of funds (such as with contributions and procurement contracts) may put government in a better position to dictate the terms upon which assistance is provided than contingent disbursements such as loan guarantees and insurance. In some cases, the incentive aspects of the funding come from the conditions attached to use of the monies.20 In others, the mere existence of a program providing financial assistance for a particular activity (eg. low interest loans for a nuclear power plant, or a pulp mill) may be taken as government approval of that activity, and in that sense, an incentive to encourage that type of activity has been created.21 Given the wide variety of incentive types, it will not be possible in a paper of this length to provide anything more than a cursory discussion of some of the main incentives used.22 And, needless to say, the comments made herein concerning accountability apply to differing degrees depending upon the type of incentive under consideration.

By limiting the definition of financial incentives to initiatives where *public* *funds are* either disbursed or *contingently committed*, a large number of regulatory programs with incentive *effects* which exist, but in which no money is forthcoming,23 are excluded from direct examination in this paper. Such programs might be referred to as *indirect* incentives. Through elimination of indirect incentives from the scope of discussion, thedefinition of the incentive instrument becomes both more manageable and more particular. Nevertheless, it is possible that much of the approach taken here may be usefully applied to these types of indirect incentives as well.24 Also excluded from discussion here are social assistance programs such as welfare and ad hoc industry bailout initiatives because such programs are not designed primarily to *encourage* behaviours in furtherance of specific public policy objectives. In effect, these programs are assistance, but they are not incentives.

**‘For’ requires a direct relationship, it can’t be something that just affects the object**

**Words and Phrases, 4** (Words and Phrases Permanent Edition, “For,” Volume 17, p. 338-343 November 2004, Thomson West)

WD Tenn 1942. The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 uses the words “production for commerce” as denoting an intention to deal in a restricted way with question of coverage in connection with those employed directly in production of articles to be sold, shipped or transported across state lines in commerce, producing goods “for” a certain purpose implying a direct relation as distinguished from producing something which only “affects” a certain purpose which implies an indirect relation.

**[their card isn’t a definition, it is only a contextual use of the word thus = no precision]**

**Precision is vital—turns solvency and research quality**

**Resnick 1** [Evan Resnick, Journal of International Affairs, 0022197X, Spring 2001, Vol. 54, Issue 2, “Defining Engagement”]

In matters of national security, establishing a clear definition of terms is a **precondition** for **effective policymaking**. Decisionmakers who invoke critical terms in an erratic, ad hoc fashion risk alienating their constituencies. They also risk exacerbating misperceptions and hostility among those the policies target. Scholars who commit the same error undercut their ability to conduct valuable empirical research. Hence, if scholars and policymakers fail rigorously to define "engagement," they undermine the ability to build an effective foreign policy.

### Restrictions Link to Limits

**Limiting the meaning of ‘restriction’ to only DIRECT governmental limitations is necessary – Otherwise the topic become unmanagable**

**TWN** (Third World Network) February **2010** “WTO claims financial crisis not due to GATS” http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/wto.info/2010/twninfo100204.htm

Permissible measures depend on the definition to be given to the term "restriction" contained in GATS Article XI, which, however, is not further specified in the Agreement. In that regard, it is worth noting that the IMF distinguishes between restrictions on payments and transfers - including exchange restrictions - from the underlying transaction on the basis of a technical criterion: "The guiding principle in ascertaining whether a measure is a restriction on payments and transfers for current transactions under Article VIII, Section 2 [of the Fund's Articles of Agreement], is whether it involves a direct governmental limitation on the availability or use of exchange as such." The Fund therefore identifies these restrictions by this technical criterion, rather than by the purposes or economic effects of the restrictions, which would be the way to identify trade restrictions only. If no such technical criterion were used, **it would be almost impossible to distinguish between** trade and exchange **restrictions, as both may be used to achieve the same purposes and have the same economic effect.**

**Broadly defining ‘restriction’ is bad – obliterates subtleties in meaning, undermines all legal and policy analysis under the topic**

Eric **Heinze** (Senior Lecturer in Law, University of London, Queen Mary. He has held fellowships from the Fulbright Foundation and the French and German governments. He teaches Legal Theory, Constitutional Law, Human Rights and Public International Law. JD Harvard) **2003** “The Logic of Liberal Rights A study in the formal analysis of legal discourse” http://mey.homelinux.org/companions/Eric%20Heinze/The%20Logic%20of%20Liberal%20Rights\_%20A%20Study%20in%20%20%28839%29/The%20Logic%20of%20Liberal%20Rights\_%20A%20Study%20in%20%20-%20Eric%20Heinze.pdf

Variety of ‘restrictions’

The term ‘restriction’, defined so broadly, embraces any number of familiar concepts: ‘deprivation’, ‘denial’, ‘encroachment’, ‘incursion’, ‘infringement’, ‘interference’, ‘limitation’, ‘regulation’. Those terms commonly comport differences in meaning or nuance, and are not all interchangeable in standard legal usage. For example, a ‘deprivation’ may be distinguished from a ‘limitation’ or ‘regulation’ in order to denote a full denial of a right (e.g. where private property is wholly appropriated by the state 16 Agents without compensation) as opposed to a partial constraint (e.g. where discrete restrictions are imposed on the use of property which nonetheless remains profitably usable). Similarly, distinctions between acts and omissions can leave the blanket term ‘restriction’ sounding inapposite when applied to an omission: if a state is accused of not doing enough to give effect to a right, we would not colloquially refer to such inaction as a ‘restriction’. Moreover, in a case of extreme abuse, such as extrajudicial killing or torture, it might sound banal to speak merely of a ‘restriction’ on the corresponding right. However, the term ‘restriction’ will be used to include all of those circumstances, in so far as they all comport a purpose or effect of extinguishing or diminishing the right-seeker’s enjoyment of an asserted right. (The only significant distinction which will be drawn will be between that concept of ‘restriction’ and the concept of ‘breach’ or ‘violation’. The terms ‘breach’ or ‘violation’ will be used to denote a judicial determination about the legality of the restriction.6) Such an axiom may seem unwelcome, in so far as it obliterates subtleties which one would have thought to be useful in law. It must be stressed that we are seeking to eliminate that variety of terms not for all purposes, but only for the very narrow purposes of a formal model, for which any distinctions among them are irrelevant.

**AT: Reasonability**

**Infinitely regressive**

**Stone ’23 –** [Justice in the Circuit Court of Appeals, 8th Circuit. Sussex Land & Live Stock Co v. Midwest Refining Co, 1923. Lexis//GBS-JV]

Where the use of land affects others, the use must be "reasonable" to escape liability for resultant damage to others. What is "reasonable" depends upon a variety of considerations and circumstances. It is an elastic term which is of uncertain value in a definition. It has been well said that "reasonable," means with regard to all the interest affected, his own and his neighbor's and also having in view public policy. But, elastic as this rule is, both reason and authority have declared certain limitations beyond which it cannot extend. One of these limitations is that it is "unreasonable" and unlawful for one owner to physically invade the land of another owner. There can be no damnum absque injuria where there is such a trespass.

### AT: war

### 1nc China War f/l

**No China war**

b.) US Diplomacy

Zhang **11** – Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for Asia Pacific Studies at Lingnan University, Hong Kong (Baohui, March/April, "The Security Dilemma in the U.S.-China Military Space Relationship,")

As Kevin Narizny points out in his study of grand strategy, political turnover in the executive office often leads to dramatic shifts in state behavior. In particular, changes in control of government from one party to another can lead states to redefine their strategic goals and the means of promoting them. 40 The profound and ongoing strategic adjustment by the Obama administration has indeed borne out this argument. The much-maligned grand strategy of primacy and unilateralism has given way to a new stance that emphasizes strategic restraint and multilateral diplomacy. Smart power, rather than military preponderance, is now seen by many as the best way to pursue U.S. interests in the world. The current strategic adjustment by the U.S. has significantly lowered China’s traditional concern about the threat posed by a hegemonic America. China’s foreign policy analysts have reached a consensus that the U.S. has suffered a significant relative decline and is in the process of strategic retreat. 41 As a result, the old hegemonic system is believed to have disintegrated. This new perception of the U.S. position in the world has also led the PLA to reassess the likelihood of war between the two countries. Some Chinese military strategists now believe that the relative decline of the U.S. has critically affected the ability and will of the American military to engage in major foreign wars. Lei Sihai, a strategist with a PLA background, claims that “the military capability of the U.S. has declined significantly and it is no longer capable of launching major wars.” 42 Major General Jin Yinan, a strategist at the PLA National Defense University, has suggested that **the rise of China and the relative decline of the U.S. have made a war scenario between them very unlikely**. 43 Thus, the strategic landscape between China and the U.S., as seen by Chinese experts from both civilian and military backgrounds, has shifted because of changes in American grand strategy and military strategy. This change in perception has relaxed Chinese concerns about national security. It marks a significant turnaround from China’s view of the American threat from the mid-1990s to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, when the American pursuit of hegemony was seen as the greatest threat in China’s strategic environment. After U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates announced major changes in the Pentagon’s 2010 budget, including cancelling the procurement of F-22 fighters and key missile defense programs, one PLA strategist characterized these adjustments as “a comprehensive rethinking about U.S. geopolitical strategies.” As the analysis emphasizes, “Gates’s and Obama’s thinking no longer shows aggressiveness. Instead, they seek a new security framework through accommodation. These significant adjustments in U.S. military strategies, especially the decisions to cut missile defense and stop procurement of F-22 fighters, which are directed mainly against China and Russia, should be welcomed. They are conducive for relaxing relations among great powers and reducing their strategic misunderstanding.” 44 Moreover, Chinese experts have taken keen notice of the new space policy of the Obama administration, which opposes deployment of weapons in space and is willing to explore international agreements on the issue. As observed by a recent PLA analysis, “Obama’s willingness to reach an international treaty banning space-based weapons and to establish a global cooperative mechanism will have positive impacts on the world’s efforts for space arms control and prevention of an arms race.” 45

### Exts – No War

Studies

Miller 2k – economist, adjunct professor in the University of Ottawa’s Faculty of Administration, consultant on international development issues, former Executive Director and Senior Economist at the World Bank (Morris, Winter, Interdisciplinary Science Reviews, Vol. 25, Iss. 4, “Poverty as a cause of wars?”)

The question may be reformulated. Do wars spring from a popular reaction to a sudden economic crisis that exacerbates poverty and growing disparities in wealth and incomes? Perhaps one could argue, as some scholars do, that it is some dramatic event or sequence of such events leading to the exacerbation of poverty that, in turn, leads to this deplorable denouement. This exogenous factor might act as a catalyst for a violent reaction on the part of the people or on the part of the political leadership who would then possibly be tempted to seek a diversion by finding or, if need be, fabricating an enemy and setting in train the process leading to war. According to a study undertaken by Minxin Pei and Ariel Adesnik of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, there would not appear to be any merit in this hypothesis. **After studying ninety-three episodes of economic crisis in twenty-two countries** in Latin America and Asia in the years since the Second World War they concluded that:19 Much of the **conventional wisdom** about the political impact of economic crises may be wrong ... The severity of economic crisis - as measured in terms of inflation and negative growth - bore no relationship to the collapse of regimes ... (or, in democratic states, rarely) to an outbreak of violence ... In the cases of dictatorships and semidemocracies, the ruling elites responded to crises by increasing repression (thereby using one form of violence to abort another).

### 1nc China Relations f/l

**Alt Causes**

* Taiwan
* Sino Japanese Tensions
* Korea
* Political Unrest

**Lieberthal 07 –** Michigan University Professor, (Kenneth, Jan, “China’s March on the 21st Century,” <http://www.aspeninstitute.org/atf/cf/%7BDEB6F227-659B-4EC8-8F84-8DF23CA704F5%7D/CMTCFINAL052307> )

Even in view of the above factors, however, too much can go wrong in the coming years to war-rant optimism about the future of U.S.-China relations. Indeed, on balance, left to the natural course of events, U.S.-China relations are more likely to sink into confrontation and antagonism rather than enhance constructive engagement. Given the importance of the relationship and the extent their fundamental interests are compatible,why should mutual antagonism be regarded as the more likely natural outcome?

First, there are always unanticipated developments that could plunge the relationship into a long-term, downward spiral. The list ofpotentially disruptive events is unfortunately long and not very improbable. The types ofissues include the following.

• Cross-Strait military conflict that draws in the United States and results in a major U.S.- China war. Cross-Strait relations have stabilized considerably over the past two years, and Beijing has put into place a policy that seeks to deter Taiwan’s independence for many years to come rather than to force its unification with the Mainland. Still,there is very little mutu- al trust and understanding across the Strait. The most likely path to cross-Strait conflict is miscalculation. Should such conflict begin, the chances of American military participation are high, and once U.S.and PRC forces engage each other in hostilities, the likelihood of serious escalation is higher still.

• A crisis in Northeast Asia that goes seriously awry. Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations are poor and mutual threat perceptions have grown. Both Japan and China are rapidly chang- ing their roles in Asia, and for the first time must figure out how to deal with each other at a time when both are strong and robust. A major crisis could well produce fundamental dam- age to U.S.-China relations and implicate America in the Japanese foreign policy agenda to a greater extent than might otherwise be wise. System collapse in North Korea could also lead to serious trouble,potentially producing not only chaos but also civil war in the North,with U.S.and Chinese forces drawn into a deadly and fluid situation. The outcome could produce entirely new levels of stress and division in U.S.-China relations and Northeast Asia more generally.

• Large-scale political unrest in China, perhaps growing out of a financial or environmental crisis. Ifthe government reasserts control,in such circumstances it is likely to do so through violent means.Given current social strains,the scale of unrest and ofthe resulting repression would likely dwarf those of 1989 (when demonstrators were primarily intellectuals). China is and will for the coming two decades undergo four simultaneous,tension-inducing transi- tions at unprecedented speed and scale:urbanization,marketization,privatization,and glob- alization. The underlying strains are inevitably system-wide, deep, and pervasive. Massive breakdown followed by large scale repression could make constructive engagement with China politically unsustainable in the United States.

All three ofthe above types ofproblems would likely arise against Beijing’s preferences,but each could put U.S.-China relations into a steep downward spiral.