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#### Interpretation - ‘financial incentives’ precludes direct purchases from the government

Edward W. Nelson et al (M.D., former Chairman of the OPTN/UNOS Ethics Committee, James E. Childress, Ph.D. Jennie Perryman, R.N., M.S.N. Victor Robards, M.D. Albert Rowan Michael S. Seely, R.N., B.S.N. Sylvester Sterioff, M.D. Mary Rovelli Swanson, R.N., M.B.A.) 1993 “Financial Incentives for Organ Donation” http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/resources/bioethics.asp?index=4

A definition of terms is necessary prior to a discussion of the concept of financial incentives for organ donation. First, financial incentives, as discussed here, do not mean additional monies spent for public or professional education or recognition and counseling of organ donor families. Because the concept of financial incentives fundamentally changes the process of organ procurement, it has been argued that the term "donor" is no longer applicable and would need to be replaced by a term such as 'vendor." The term "rewarded gifting" has been suggested and has been justly criticized as an oxymoron by those opposed to financial incentives and a despicable euphemism by those who promote this concept. Of greatest practical significance is the distinction between "incentive" and "payment" since a system of financial incentives may indeed be a viable option if, as interpreted by law, "incentives" do not amount to "purchases" and "donors" are therefore not transformed into 'vendors."

#### Vote Neg for Limits – allowing direct purchases multiplies the number of affs and hurts pre-round preparation for all debates

### 1NC Disad

#### Energy efficiency is coming now and will stabilize the climate

**Lovins 10** \*Amory B. Lovins (&) is Chairman and Chief Scientist of Rocky Mountain Institute and Chairman Emeritus of Fiberforge Corporation, he advises governments and major firms worldwide on advanced energy and resource efficiency, In 2009, Time named him one of the 100 most influential people in the world, and Foreign Policy, one of the 100 top global thinkers [“Profitable Solutions to Climate, Oil, and Proliferation, Amory B. Lovins, June 10th 2010, PDF]

INTRODUCTION Fortunately, many companies understand this and are investing in energy efficiency. whether or not they are concerned about climate. IBM and STMicroelectronics have long cut their carbon emissions 6% yeaf with 2- to 3-year paybacks from making their factories more energy efficient. DuPont said it would cut its 2010 global green house emissions to 60% below 1990’s; by 2006, it had achieved an 80% reduction at a S3.000-million profit. Presentation at 15 June 2009 to 9th Royal Colloquium “Climate Action: Tuning in on energy, water and food security,” Bönliamn, Sweden. Dow’s $1,000-million investment in energy efficiency has so far returned $9,000 million in savings. BP met its operational carbon reduction goals 8 years early at a $2,000-million profit. United Technologies cut its energy use per dollar 45% during 2003–07. GE is cutting its energy intensity 30% during 2005–2012 to build shareholder value. Interface may hold the record with 1996– 2008 reductions of 71% in absolute greenhouse-gas emissions while offsetting the rest, growing the company twothirds, and doubling profits. Even these achievements just scratch the surface of what is possible and worthwhile: McKinsey&Company showed (McKinsey&Company 2009) how to cut forecast 2030 global greenhouse-gas emissions by 70% at an average cost of just $6 per tonne of CO2 equivalent. Including the newer technologies and integrative designs described below would have made that potential bigger and much cheaper (less than zero). If global energy intensity—primary energy used per dollar of real GDP—continued to drift down by just 1% year-1 under canonical long-term trends of population and economic growth and of decarbonizing fuels, then global CO2 emission rates would about triple by 2100, so we would all be toast. However, can we make toast, not be toast? If energy intensity fell not by 1% but by 2% year-1, emissions would stabilize, and if intensity fell by 3–4% year-1, climate could stabilize (to the extent irreversible changes aren’t already underway). Is this conceivable? Yes: the US has spontaneously cut its energy intensity by 2–4% year-1 for most of the past few decades, under both high and low energy prices. Denmark in 1980–2006 shrank its carbon intensity 2.7% year-1. China cut its energy intensity over 5% year-1 for a quarter century through 2001.2 Attentive Western firms are profitably cutting their energy intensity 6–16% year-1. Therefore, why should 3–4% year-1 be difficult—especially since most of the forecast growth is in countries like China and India that are building their infrastructure from scratch, and can more easily build it right than fix it later? And since virtually everyone who does energy efficiency makes money, why should this be costly? Detailed analyses cited below show how the US, for example, can save about half its oil and gas use at about one-fifth of their current price, and about three-fourths of its electricity use at about one-eighth the electricity’s price. Even Japan, with 2- to 3-fold lower energy intensity, has found ways to save two-thirds of the remaining energy (National Institute for Environmental Studies 2009). These opportunities are best described in two main themes: burning oil and producing electricity. These, respectively, cause 43 and 41% of US, and roughly 45 and 30% of global, fossil-fuel carbon emissions. Electricity generation is \*50% coal fired in the US, 42% in the world, so each unit of electricity saved displaces 3–4 units of especially carbon-intensive fuel—huge climate leverage.

#### Construction of new reactors causes warming – trades off with energy efficiency

**Roche\* 7 – \***Site editor, no direct author given, but N02 Nuclear Power.org is a site created and run by Pete Roche who is an energy consultant based in Edinburgh and policy adviser to the Scottish Nuclear Free Local Authorities, and the National Steering Committee of [UK NFLA](http://nfznsc.gn.apc.org/). Pete was co-founder of the Scottish Campaign to Resist the Atomic Menace (SCRAM), he has represented Greenpeace at international meetings and is active in several other areas relating to environmental protection and nuclear power [http://www.no2nuclearpower.org.uk/reports/Opportunity\_Costs\_Nuclear.pdf, January 2007 “Opportunity Costs of Nuclear Power]

Introduction The opportunity cost of any investment is the cost of forgoing the alternative outcomes that could have been purchased with the same money. So, of course all investments will forego other opportunities, but this briefing looks at those potential investments, which would be foregone, if we invest in nuclear power. Many advocates of new nuclear construction call for a “balanced energy policy” and promote the idea that ‘we need every energy technology’ in order to successfully tackle the climate change problem. This idea suggests that we have infinite amounts of money to spend on energy projects, which is obviously nonsense. Resources are scarce, so we need to make choices. Because climate change is a serious and urgent problem then we must spend our limited resources as effectively and quickly as possible - best buys first, not the more the merrier. For each dollar we spend we need to buy the maximum amount of “solution” possible. (The “least cost” solution) On both criteria, cost and speed, nuclear power is probably the least effective climate-stabilizing option on offer. As well as being more expensive, and taking longer to implement, the problem with spending on nuclear power is that it will detract from spending on other more effective options. Not only does nuclear power drain resources away from other options, but it also distracts attention from important decisions that have to be made to support those other options. And because there are so many problems associated with getting new reactor construction off the ground, it might not work. So in the worst case we might find that efforts to tackle climate change are seriously damaged by a decision to go ahead with reactor construction. Although the nuclear industry likes to give the impression that it can now finance new reactors without taxpayer subsidies, there are still large uncertainties about how the waste and decommissioning liabilities will be financed in many countries. Thus building new reactors could be potentially storing up future opportunity costs for taxpayers which they will have to accept whether they like it or not. Catastrophic opportunity cost Since we do not have unlimited resources, we have to choose how we spend. If we buy more of one thing, then it will be necessary for us to have less of another. Because of the seriousness of the climate change threat, it is essential that we spend our limited resources on the fastest and most effective climate solutions. Nuclear power is just the opposite. Investment in more expensive nuclear power will, in effect, worsen climate change because each dollar we spend is buying less solution than it would do if we were to spend it on energy efficiency. (1) Amory Lovins, of the respected Rocky Mountain Institute, says investing in nuclear power would be the worst thing we could do for climate change, because efforts to ‘revive’ this moribund technology will divert investment from cheaper market winners – cogeneration, renewables, and efficiency. Standard studies tend to compare the cost of new reactors with alternative centralised fossil-fuelled plants. They conclude that it might be possible to revive nuclear power if construction and operation is heavily subsidised or if carbon is heavily taxed. Lovins says these efforts would be futile, because large centralised power stations are not the real competition. Neither fossil-fuel or nuclear can compete with windpower, some other renewables, combined heat and power (CHP) and energy efficiency. We should not allow fears of a looming energy gap, or the urgency of tackling climate change to stampede us into making irrational decisions. Diversification has its merits, but the strategic value of a diversified portfolio would not be enough to justify buying every technology on offer at whatever cost. Lovins calculates that one US dollar buys roughly:- • 10kWh of new nuclear electricity (at its 2004 subsidised level) • 12-17kWh of wind powered electricity • 9-17kWh of gas-fired industrial cogeneration (adjusted for carbon emissions) • 20-65kWh of residential building cogeneration (again adjusted for carbon) • anything up to 100kWh of savings from energy efficiency A portfolio of least-cost investments in energy efficiency and decentralised generation will beat nuclear power by a large and rising margin.

#### Extinction

**Sify 10** – Sydney newspaper citing Ove Hoegh-Guldberg, professor at University of Queensland and Director of the Global Change Institute, and John Bruno, associate professor of Marine Science at UNC (Sify News, “Could unbridled climate changes lead to human extinction?”, <http://www.sify.com/news/could-unbridled-climate-changes-lead-to-human-extinction-news-international-kgtrOhdaahc.html>, WEA)

The findings of the comprehensive report: 'The impact of climate change on the world's marine ecosystems' emerged from a synthesis of recent research on the world's oceans, carried out by two of the world's leading marine scientists. One of the authors of the report is Ove Hoegh-Guldberg, professor at The University of Queensland and the director of its Global Change Institute (GCI). 'We may see sudden, unexpected changes that have serious ramifications for the overall well-being of humans, including the capacity of the planet to support people. This is further evidence that we are well on the way to the next great extinction event,' says Hoegh-Guldberg. 'The findings have enormous implications for mankind, particularly if the trend continues. The earth's ocean, which produces half of the oxygen we breathe and absorbs 30 per cent of human-generated carbon dioxide, is equivalent to its heart and lungs. This study shows worrying signs of ill-health. It's as if the earth has been smoking two packs of cigarettes a day!,' he added. 'We are entering a period in which the ocean services upon which humanity depends are undergoing massive change and in some cases beginning to fail', he added. The 'fundamental and comprehensive' changes to marine life identified in the report include rapidly warming and acidifying oceans, changes in water circulation and expansion of dead zones within the ocean depths. These are driving major changes in marine ecosystems: less abundant coral reefs, sea grasses and mangroves (important fish nurseries); fewer, smaller fish; a breakdown in food chains; changes in the distribution of marine life; and more frequent diseases and pests among marine organisms. Study co-author John F Bruno, associate professor in marine science at The University of North Carolina, says greenhouse gas emissions are modifying many physical and geochemical aspects of the planet's oceans, in ways 'unprecedented in nearly a million years'. 'This is causing fundamental and comprehensive changes to the way marine ecosystems function,' Bruno warned, according to a GCI release. These findings were published in Science

### 1NC Disad

#### Obama is winning but its close and reversible – the average of recent polls puts Obama ahead

**Cook, 10/4**/12 – editor and publisher of the Cook Political Report for National Journal (Charlie, “Mitt Romney Breaks His Losing Streak” <http://www.nationaljournal.com/columns/cook-report/the-cook-report-romney-breaks-his-losing-streak-20121004?mrefid=mostViewed>)

Too many political observers see politics in an entirely binary way: Everything has to be either a “0” or a “1”; a race is either tied or it’s over; every election is either won or stolen. Some people never want to admit that their side lost. And some people think that a poll either tells them what they want to hear or is methodologically flawed—or crooked. It’s like an obnoxious sports fan (often found in Philadelphia) who views a ruling by a referee or umpire as either favorable or a bad call. Denial and simplicity reign.

The presidential election is neither tied nor over. Of the 16 most recent national polls using live telephone interviewers calling both respondents with landlines and those with cell phones (between 30 and 40 percent of voters do not have landlines and cannot legally be called by robo-pollsters), one has the race even, two have Obama with a narrow 2-point edge, five have 3-point Obama margins, two have 5-point Obama advantages, another pair have 6-point Obama leads, two have 7-point leads, and one has an 8-point Obama lead. This would strongly suggest that the Obama lead is between 3 and 6 percentage points; such brand-name polls as those by CNN, Fox News, and NBC News/Wall Street Journal are among those in that 3- to 6-point range.

Conversations with Democratic and Republican pollsters and strategists suggest that Colorado, Florida, North Carolina, and Virginia are the most competitive swing states. Some high-quality private polling shows Romney with very narrow leads in both North Carolina and Virginia, but a few other equally sophisticated surveys show Obama with narrow advantages in those two states. At least one private survey shows Florida even, but most show the Sunshine State and Colorado with narrow Obama leads, in the small- to mid-single-digit range. Just a hair or two better for Obama but still quite close are Nevada and Wisconsin, followed by Iowa. Things really get ugly for Romney in Ohio and Michigan, and, finally, in Pennsylvania, which is no longer competitive. Ohio shows a 5- to 8-point lead for Obama in private polling. In Michigan, Obama’s lead is slightly wider, and in Pennsylvania, Romney faces close to a 10-point deficit. It is mathematically possible for Romney to reach 270 electoral votes without Michigan, Ohio, or Pennsylvania, but it is in reality exceedingly unlikely.

It would take a very consequential event to change the trajectory of this race. Time will tell whether Romney’s strong debate performance on Wednesday night was the event that he needed—particularly in swing states such as Ohio. But at least he energized his supporters and sent a clear message that the race is not over.

#### The public opposition to the plan is massive

**The Economist, 12** [February 18th, The 30-year itch America’s nuclear industry struggles to get off the floor, <http://www.economist.com/node/21547803>]

Still, nuclear power faces strong headwinds. A poll taken last year showed that 64% of Americans opposed building new nuclear reactors. The NRC's last new reactor approval predates Three Mile Island, Chernobyl and Fukushima, all of which dented public support (and not just in America either: nuclear power supplies three-fourths of France's electricity, yet in one poll 57% of French respondents favoured abandoning it). America's anti-nuclear movement has been as quiet as its nuclear industry, but as one comes to life so will the other.

#### Romney would support an Israeli strike on Iran

Robert W. Merry 8-1-2012; editor of The National Interest and the author of books on American history and foreign policyRomney Edges U.S. toward War with Iran <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/romney-edges-us-toward-war-iran-7275>

The major newspapers all understood that GOP presidential candidate Mitt Romney’s expressions in Jerusalem last weekend were important, which is why they played the story on page one. But only the New York Times captured the subtle significance of what he said. The paper’s coverage, by Jodi Rudoren and Ashley Parker, reported that Romney sought to adhere to the code that says candidates shouldn’t criticize the president on foreign soil. “But,” they added, “there were subtle differences between what he said—and how he said it—and the positions of his opponent.” Most significantly, while Obama talks about stopping Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons, Israel insists Tehran should be prevented from having even the capacity to develop nuclear weapons. This means no nuclear development even for peaceful purposes. Romney embraced the Israeli language. In doing so, he nudged his nation closer to war with Iran. Based on Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s oft-repeated expressions, he clearly seems bent on attacking Iran to destroy or delay its nuclear program and, if possible, undermine the Iranian regime. And he wants America at his side when he does it. Obama has been seeking to dissuade Israel from contemplating such an assault in order to give the president’s austere sanctions regimen a chance to work. But what does he mean by “a chance to work?” If he means a complete capitulation by Iran, he’s dreaming, of course. History tells us that nations don’t respond to this kind of pressure by accepting humiliation. That’s the lesson of Pearl Harbor, as described in my commentary in these spaces. Many close observers of the Iran drama believe there may be an opportunity for a negotiated outcome that allows Iran to enrich uranium to a limited extent—say, 5 percent—for peaceful purposes. Iran insists, and most experts agree, that the Non-Proliferation Treaty allows such enrichment for energy production. In any event, numerous signatories to the NPT do in fact maintain limited enrichment programs for peaceful ends. Obama seems torn between pursuing such an outcome and embracing the Israeli position, which demands that Iran foreswear all enrichment and any peaceful nuclear development. In last spring’s Istanbul meeting between Iran and the so-called P5+1 group (the United States, Britain, France, China, Russia and Germany), there seemed to be a genuine interest on the part of those six nations to explore an outcome that would allow for some enrichment by Iran. Five weeks later in Baghdad, the P5+1 group seemed to backtrack and insist upon zero enrichment. Talks are ongoing but only among low-level technical people; any serious negotiations are on hold pending the election. Thus Obama has managed to maintain his flexibility during the delicate campaign period. But now we have Romney in Israel essentially telling the people there that they need fear no ambivalence on his part. If elected, he will embrace the Netanyahu position, which is designed to ensure the collapse of any negotiations attending anti-Iran sanctions, which Netanyahu already has labeled a failure. “We have to be honest,” he said over the weekend, during Romney’s visit, “and say that the sanctions and diplomacy so far have not set back the Iranian program by one iota.” That’s the view that Romney subtly embraced in Jerusalem.

#### Great power war

Trabanco 2009 – Independent researcher of geopolitical and military affairs (1/13/09, José Miguel Alonso Trabanco, “The Middle Eastern Powder Keg Can Explode at Anytime,” http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=11762)

In case of an Israeli and/or American attack against Iran, Ahmadinejad's government will certainly respond. A possible countermeasure would be to fire Persian ballistic missiles against Israel and maybe even against American military bases in the regions. Teheran will unquestionably resort to its proxies like Hamas or Hezbollah (or even some of its Shiite allies it has in Lebanon or Saudi Arabia) to carry out attacks against Israel, America and their allies, effectively setting in flames a large portion of the Middle East. The ultimate weapon at Iranian disposal is to block the Strait of Hormuz. If such chokepoint is indeed asphyxiated, that would dramatically increase the price of oil, this a very threatening retaliation because it will bring **intense** financial and **economic havoc upon the West**, which is already facing significant trouble in those respects. In short, the necessary conditions for a major war in the Middle East are given. Such conflict could rapidly spiral out of control and thus a relatively minor clash could quickly and **dangerously escalate by engulfing the whole region** and perhaps even beyond. There are many key players: the Israelis, the Palestinians, the Arabs, the Persians and their respective allies and some **great powers could become involved** in one way or another (America, Russia, Europe, China). Therefore, any miscalculation by any of the main protagonists can trigger something no one can stop. Taking into consideration that the stakes are too high, perhaps it is not wise to be playing with fire right in the middle of a powder keg.

### 1NC CP

#### The United States federal government should:

#### Develop and require the use of non-nuclear renewable energy for the Department of Defense

#### incentivize international use of a United States-based internationally-accessible reprocessing plant.

#### Other sources solve

**Partemore and Nagl, their author, 10** – Fellow at the Center for New American Security and \*ph.d, president of center for new American Security (Christine and John, September “Fueling the Future Force Preparing the Department of Defense for a Post-Petroleum Era” <http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_Fueling%20the%20Future%20Force_NaglParthemore.pdf> ) Jacome

There is an array of reliable, renewable fuels that should be considered as alternative supplies to petroleum, including multiple generations of biofuels. Biotechnicians have long proven the technical ability to produce hydrocarbon equivalents to fossil fuels, including the jet fuel blends that DOD requires. Efforts by the National Laboratories, academia and the private sector are focusing on basic science that will enable more efficient use of secondgeneration biological fuel sources (made from non-food crops) by increasing efficiency in processing plant materials while retaining net energy gains, and by overcoming other technical hurdles. Others are leap-frogging beyond second-generation biofuels to fuels derived from algae. Still other options include displacing petroleum by using electricity or natural gas to power transportation, and using distributed renewable energy at overseas and forward operating bases to displace petroleum in powering generators. It is encouraging that growth in renewable energy supply availability frequently outpaces expectations. Ethanol production grew 164 percent between 2002 and 2006, and biodiesel production expanded from 1 trillion Btu to 32 trillion Btu over the same period. Wind, solar and geothermal supplies also have expanded faster than most analysts predicted over the past decade.12 These supply-side changes show how technical, economic and policy decisions, such as tax regimes that Congress has enacted to even the playing field with fossil fuels, can affect energy trends. Any effective DOD energy strategy must also be flexible enough to account for the fact that its leaders will have to make energy decisions based on imperfect information. Specific projections regarding how rapidly fuel alternatives could achieve large-scale production and consumption are often treated as proprietary. This uncertainty is particularly problematic for DOD, which has limited manpower and funds to invest in fuel research and development.

#### The plan ends proliferation, ensures NPT stability, and spurs a global nuclear transition while guaranteeing American energy leadership

**Szabo 10** – J.D., George Washington University Law School; Financial Analyst, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Aaron, “Reprocessing: The Future Of Nuclear Waste”, 29 Temp. J. Sci. Tech. & Envtl. L. 231, lexis, dml)

Using international agreements n132 through the GNEP, the United States could partially fund**,** develop**, and** operate **a multinational reprocessing plant**. The development of such a multinational reprocessing plant would help: (1) prevent the **proliferation of nuclear weapons**, (2) create **uniform safety conditions**, as set by the IAEA, and (3) establish **international fuel requirements**, providing minimum and maximum nuclear fuel levels for each participating state, through appropriate state legislation. **Preventing nuclear proliferation is** critical **to the Non-Proliferation Treaty** [\*250] (NPT). n133 Many signatory nations to the NPT favored a statement in the NPT to expressly prohibit reprocessing. n134 However, reprocessing can also be an effective tool to prevent horizontal n135 **and** vertical **proliferation**. n136 An international agreement can be reached that would establish a reprocessing plant within one country that would serve as the reprocessing center for all spent fuel. That agreement **would counter arguments from non-nuclear weapon states** that they require their own reprocessing plants for commercial use. n137 Also, allowing non-nuclear weapon states to join the reprocessing agreement **would** resolve concerns **over vertical proliferation and** provide access **to reprocessed fuel for commercial use**. Further, authorizing the IAEA to oversee all safeguards of the reprocessing process would decrease the ability of countries to secretly create and distribute plutonium. n138 A single multinational reprocessing plant could also decrease the potential for proliferation by keeping **all spent fuel in a single location** and all transportation of spent fuel to an **IAEA-approved and multinationally-guarded structure**. n139 Placing spent fuel in one safe location would also provide effective oversight with fewer opportunities for diversion, theft, or loss. n140 Participation by multiple countries creates internal checks and balances, assuring that no one country could act against the interest of the international community. n141 Creating uniform safeguards would decrease the ability of single states to develop programs that do not meet IAEA safety standards and would give the IAEA strong oversight and control over the reprocessing plant. n142 The Rokkasho plant, built with IAEA oversight, proves that a reprocessing plant can be built with the IAEA is inspecting each step of construction. n143 Also, allowing the IAEA to set standards on shipping and delivery eliminates issues over possible misfeasance during shipping, such as ships being rerouted to other countries or terrorist organizations. n144 Finally, a single multinational reprocessing plant could decrease unilateral nuclear energy power and regional hegemony. Requiring each state to enact free-trade legislation could negate issues related to antidumping and countervailing duties. n145 [\*251] One large reprocessing plant, bound by an agreement that the participating states have a need for the power, would prevent any one country from obtaining too much nuclear fuel and, thus, use the fuel to increase that state's power internationally. That provision would prevent non-nuclear weapon states from being denied nuclear fuel or the inability to create their own nuclear fuel.

### 1NC Proliferation f/l

#### US won’t exert leadership

Cleary 12

Richard Cleary, American Enterprise Institute Research Assistant, 8/13/12, Richard Cleary: Persuading Countries to Forgo Nuclear Fuel-Making, npolicy.org/article.php?aid=1192&tid=30

The cases above offer a common lesson: The U.S., though constrained or empowered by circumstance, can exert considerable sway in nonproliferation matters, **but** often elects not to apply the most powerful tools at its disposal for fear of jeopardizing other objectives. The persistent dilemma of how much to emphasize nonproliferation goals, and at what cost, has contributed to cases of nonproliferation failure. The **inconsistent** or incomplete **application** of U.S. power in nonproliferation cases is most harmful when it gives the impression to a nation that either sharing sensitive technology or developing it is, or will become, acceptable to Washington. **U.S. reticence** historically, with some exceptions, to prioritize nonproliferation—and in so doing reduce the chance of success in these cases—**does not leave room for** great **optimism about future U.S. efforts at persuading countries to forgo nuclear fuel-making**.

#### Countries say no

Cleary 12

Richard Cleary, American Enterprise Institute Research Assistant, 8/13/12, Richard Cleary: Persuading Countries to Forgo Nuclear Fuel-Making, npolicy.org/article.php?aid=1192&tid=30

The examples above show the limitations of both demand and supply side efforts. Supply side diplomatic interventions, made before the transfer of technology, have been at times effective, particularly in precluding nuclear fuel-making in the short term and buying time for more lasting solutions. However, as the Pakistan and Brazil cases illustrated, supply side interventions are no substitute for demand side solutions: **Countries face** political choices regarding nuclear fuel-making. A nation set upon an independent fuel-making capacity, such as Pakistan or Brazil, is unlikely to give up **efforts because of supply side controls**. Multilateral fuel-making arrangements, as proposed repeatedly by the United States, have not materialized and therefore seem to have had little tangible influence.

#### Prolif leadership fails—US hypocrisy and hapless NPT

Wellen, editor of the Foreign Policy in Focus blog, 12

(Russ, staff writer, 6/19/12, "West’s Idea of Nuclear Disarmament Doesn’t Include Itself," http://truth-out.org/news/item/9758-wests-idea-of-nuclear-disarmament-doesnt-include-itself, accessed 9-15-12, CMM)

The West insists on nuclear nonproliferation but refuses to reciprocate with meaningful disarmament.

When dueling narratives clash and the subject is nuclear weapons, the sparks that fly could make flashing sabers seem dim in comparison. According to conventional thinking in the West, Iran is not abiding by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and restraining itself from all nuclear weapons activities. Thus, it should be denied its right to enrich uranium. But in the view of much of the rest of the world, the West is making little more than cosmetic efforts to roll back its nuclear arsenals. Therefore, it has no business denying Iran nuclear energy - not to mention nuclear weapons (but that's another story).

In other words, the side that committed to disarming thinks that the side that promised not to proliferate continues to proliferate. And the side that promised not to proliferate thinks that the side that committed to disarming is not disarming.

In truth, abundant evidence exists that any nuclear weapons work Iran has done since 2003 is conceptual - if that - work which is not expressly forbidden by the NPT. The uranium Iran enriches to the higher levels that worry the West seems to be for medical isotopes, which are used for radiation therapy, as well as diagnosis. Combined with enrichment at lower levels for nuclear energy, it serves as a bargaining chip in negotiations.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Imperfect Arbiter

The drafters of the NPT, as with any treaty, sought to balance the needs of different parties. In this case, it was between Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) and non-NWS. Signatories among the latter forfeited their rights to develop or acquire nuclear weapons; the former, meanwhile, promised to roll back the numbers of their weapons with an eye toward total disarmament. In addition, they would assist non-NWS to establish their nuclear energy programs and use their own possession of nuclear weapons to extend an umbrella of deterrence to certain non-NWS.

Ideally, the NPT bestows equal benefits on all parties, but, like many treaties, it's riddled with loopholes and gray areas. For example, Article 6 - debated nigh unto death - is chock full of them. It reads: "Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control."

Where there should be key words are noncommittal terms. For example, preceding "to pursue" with "undertakes" adds a preliminary step that almost seems designed to allow parties with nuclear weapons to stall. "Good faith" may be inherent to contracts, but in the context of a nuclear treaty, it sounds Pollyanna-ish. "Effective measures" and "early date" are much too open to interpretation.

With regards to disarmament, a recent report that the Obama administration may be considering reducing the total numbers of deployed strategic nuclear weapons to as low as 300 generated a flurry of excitement - and a blizzard of overwrought reactions from conservatives. Whether or not the leaked news was just red meat for conservatives, no weapon reductions will be enacted until after the election.

In fact, even though President Obama assumed office with an apparent personal investment in disarmament, his administration seems to have suffered few qualms about letting it, if not exactly die, then wither on the vine. When push came to shove over the New Strategic Arms Reduction (START) treaty, it bet the farm to secure Republican ratification of a treaty that guaranteed little more than verification and confidence building. The administration proposed to increase funding for nuclear-weapon modernization to $88 billion during the next decade - 20 percent more than the Bush administration sought. Even the Republican-led House Appropriations Committee balked at such exorbitance in the current economic climate and allocated $500 million less than the administration's $7.6 billion request for fiscal year 2013.

As Joseph Cirincione, president of the Ploughshares Fund, recently wrote in Foreign Affairs magazine: "Obama has let the bureaucracy suffocate his plan to move step by step toward, as he said in Prague, 'the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.'" Cirincione explained that, "there are far more entrenched officials and contractors that benefit from the sprawling nuclear complex than officials who believe in the president's stated vision."

The apparent intention on the part of the United States to fund its own program into perpetuity at however fluctuating levels likely isn't lost on non-NWS. This realization has finally begun to rear its head in established media such as the London Review of Books. In the February issue, national-security specialists Campbell Craig and Jan Ruzicka write of the vast sums that the Obama administration committed to nuclear-weapon modernization.

What clearer demonstration could there be that the US government is not serious about reducing its stockpiles? Central to the idea of nonproliferation is the presumption that if smaller states are to be discouraged from acquiring a bomb, nuclear states will need to take real steps towards disarmament. Otherwise, non-nuclear states will regard their demands as self-serving and hypocritical - reason enough to think about creating an arsenal of their own.

Extending this line of thinking one step further, New START may not only seem perfunctory to non-NWS, but might also look like a smokescreen for continued nuclear-weapons funding.

#### SMR implementation trades off with safety—turns case

Dr. Edwin **Lyman 11**, Senior Scientist, Global Security Program, Union of Concerned Scientists, July 14, 2011, Testimony Before the Energy and Water Development Subcommittee, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate, "An Examination of the Safety and Economics of Light Water Small Modular Reactors"

Proponents of small modular reactors (SMRs) claim that their designs have inherent safety features compared to large reactors, and some even argue that their reactors would have been able to withstand an event as severe as Fukushima. We find these claims to be unpersuasive. For any plant--large or small--the key factor is the most severe event that the plant is designed to withstand--the so-called maximum ``design-basis'' event. Unless nuclear safety requirements for new reactors are significantly strengthened, one cannot expect that either small or large reactors will be able to survive a beyond-design- basis event like Fukushima. Although some light-water SMR concepts may have desirable safety characteristics, unless they are carefully designed, licensed, deployed and inspected, SMRs could pose comparable or even greater safety, security and proliferation risks than large reactors.

Some SMR vendors argue that their reactors will be safer because they can be built underground. While underground siting could enhance protection against certain events, such as aircraft attacks and earthquakes, it could also have disadvantages as well. For instance, emergency diesel generators and electrical switchgear at Fukushima Daiichi were installed below grade to reduce their vulnerability to seismic events, but this increased their **susceptibility to flooding**. And in the event of a serious accident, emergency crews could have greater difficulty accessing underground reactors.

Some SMR vendors emphasize that their designs are “passively safe''. However, no credible reactor design is completely passive and can shut itself down and cool itself in every circumstance without need for intervention. Some reactor designs--large or small--have certain passive safety features that allow the reactor to depend less on operator action for a limited period of time following design-basis accidents. Small reactors may have an advantage because the lower the power of a reactor, the easier it is to cool through passive means such as natural convection cooling with water or even with air. However, accidents affecting multiple small units may cause complications that could outweigh the advantages of having lower heat removal requirements per unit. Moreover, passively safe reactors generally require some equipment, such as valves, that are designed to operate automatically, but are not 100 percent reliable.

Operators will always be needed to monitor systems to ensure they are functioning as designed, and to intervene if they fail to do so. Both passive systems and operator actions would require functioning instrumentation and control systems, which were unreliable during the severe accidents at Three Mile Island and Fukushima. Passive systems may not work as intended in the event of beyond-design-basis accidents, and as result passive designs should also be equipped with highly reliable active backup systems and associated instrumentation and control systems.

But more backup systems generally mean higher costs. This poses a particular problem for SMRs, which begin with a large economic disadvantage compared to large reactors.

According to the standard formula for economies-of-scale, the overnight capital cost per kilowatt of a 125 megawatt reactor would be roughly 2.5 times greater than that of a 1,250 megawatt unit, all other factors being equal. Advocates argue that SMRs offer advantages that can offset this economic penalty, such as a better match of supply and demand, reduced upfront financing costs, reduced construction times, and an accelerated benefit from learning from the construction of multiple units. However, a 2007 paper by Westinghouse scientists and their collaborators that quantified the cost savings associated with some of these factors found that they could not overcome the size penalty: the paper found that at best, the capital cost of four 335 megawatt reactors was slightly greater than that of one 1,340 megawatt reactor.

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Given that there is no apparent capital cost benefit for SMRs, it is not surprising that the SMR industry is seeking to reduce operating and maintenance (O&M) costs by pressuring the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to weaken certain regulatory requirements for SMRs. Deputy Assistant Energy Secretary John Kelly told the NRC in March that the NRC's regulatory requirements for SMRs will ``directly influence the operating cost, which will be a large determinant into the economic feasibility of these plants.''

For example, the industry argues that regulatory requirements for SMRs in areas such as emergency planning, control room staffing, and security staffing can be weakened because SMRs contain smaller quantities of radioactive substances than large reactors and therefore pose lower risks to the public. The NRC is currently considering the technical merits of these arguments.

However, small reactors will not necessarily be safer than large reactors on a per-megawatt basis. Simply put, the risk to the public posed by one 1,200-megawatt reactor will be comparable to that posed by six 200-megawatt reactors (assuming that all units are independent), unless the likelihood of a serious accident is significantly lower for each small reactor. But such an outcome will not be assured under the current regulatory regime. The NRC has a long-standing policy that new nuclear reactors--large or small--are not required to be safer than operating reactors. One consequence of this policy is that **new reactor designs that have inherent safety features** not present in current reactors **may not actually end up** being **safer** in the final analysis **if designers compensate by narrowing safety margins** in other areas, such as by reducing containment strength or the diversity and redundancy of safety systems. Any safety advantages will be eroded further if the NRC allows SMR owners to reduce emergency planning zones and the numbers of required operators and security officers.

One of the early lessons from Fukushima is that prevention of serious nuclear accidents requires significant margins of safety to protect against extreme events. Earlier this week, UCS and the NRC's Fukushima Near-Term Task Force each issued recommendations for strengthening nuclear safety requirements. Consider the following examples:

--Emergency planning zones around U.S. nuclear plants extend to a radius of 10 miles. Yet significant radiological contamination from the Fukushima accident has been detected well beyond a distance of 10 miles from the plant. In fact, radiation levels high enough to trigger resettlement if they occurred in the United States have been detected more than 30 miles away from the Fukushima site. The discussion we should be having today is whether current emergency planning zones need to be increased, not whether we can shrink them for SMRs.

--As we have seen at Fukushima, nuclear plants with multiple reactors that experience severe accidents present extreme challenges. In its June 2011 report to the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency of Japan (NISA) stated that:

``The accident occurred at more than one reactor at the same time, and the resources needed for accident response had to be dispersed. Moreover, as two reactors shared the facilities, the physical distance between the reactors was small . . . The development of an accident occurring at one reactor affected the emergency responses at nearby reactors.

``Reflecting on the above issues, Japan will take measures to ensure that emergency operations at a reactor where an accident occurs can be conducted independently from operation at other reactors if one power station has more than one reactor. Also, Japan will assure the engineering independence of each reactor to prevent an accident at one reactor from affecting nearby reactors. In addition, Japan will promote the development of a structure that enables each unit to carry out accident responses independently, by choosing a responsible person for ensuring the nuclear safety of each unit.''

The NRC will need to consider these issues in developing its licensing approach for small modular reactor sites, which may host two to four times the number of units present at the largest U.S. nuclear plant site today. The NRC has acknowledged that some of its current regulations and procedures do not account for events affecting multiple units on a site. For instance, according to the NRC, emergency planning regulations focus on single-unit events with regard to requirements for emergency operations staffing, facilities, and dose projection capability. Also, the NRC's guidance for probabilistic risk assessment, an analysis tool which is used in many regulatory applications, does not require the consideration of multiple- unit events. The NRC Fukushima Near-Term Task Force is recommending that emergency preparedness requirements be revised to address multi-unit events, which could have a significant impact on SMR licensing.

--Fukushima also demonstrated how rapidly a nuclear reactor accident can progress to a core meltdown if multiple safety systems are disabled. A well-planned and executed terrorist attack could cause damage comparable to or worse than the earthquake and tsunami that initiated the Fukushima crisis, potentially in even less time. And although Osama bin Laden is gone, the terrorist threat to domestic infrastructure may actually increase over time if al Qaeda seeks to retaliate. This is the wrong time to consider reducing security requirements for nuclear powerplants, regardless of their size. However, **SMR vendors have emphasized that reducing security staffing is critical for** the **economic viability** of their projects. Christofer Mowry of B&W told the NRC in March that ``whether SMRs get deployed in large numbers or not is going to come down to operations and maintenance (O&M). And the biggest variable that we can attack directly . . . is the security issue.'' A Nuclear Energy Institute representative said in a presentation in June that ``optimal security staffing levels (for SMRs) may appreciably differ from current levels.''

UCS is also concerned that reducing safety and security requirements for SMRs could facilitate their sale to utilities or other entities in the United States and abroad that do not have prior experience with nuclear power. Some SMR vendors argue that their technology is so safe that it can be deployed to remote areas, military bases, and countries in the developing world that have relatively low electric demand and no nuclear experience or emergency planning infrastructure. **However, SMRs deployed in this manner could raise additional safety and security concerns** compared to their deployment by established and experienced nuclear utilities.

#### SMR expansion offsets IAEA oversight resources—turns prolif

Dr. Edwin **Lyman 11**, Senior Scientist, Global Security Program, Union of Concerned Scientists, July 14, 2011, Testimony Before the Energy and Water Development Subcommittee, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate, "An Examination of the Safety and Economics of Light Water Small Modular Reactors"

The distributed deployment of small reactors would also put great strains on existing licensing and inspection resources. Nuclear reactors are qualitatively different from other types of generating facilities, not least because they require a much more extensive safety and security inspection regime. Similarly, deployment of individual small reactors at widely distributed and remote sites around the world would strain the resources of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its ability to adequately safeguard reactors to guard against proliferation, since IAEA inspectors would need to visit many more locations per installed megawatt around the world. Maintaining robust **oversight over** vast networks of **SMRs** around the world **would be difficult, if feasible at all**.

UCS believes that SMRs are only suitable for deployment where there is an established infrastructure to cope with emergencies, and if sufficient numbers of trained operator and security staff can be provided. It is unrealistic to assume the near-term availability of SMRs that are so safe they can be shipped around the world without the need to ensure the highest levels of competence and integrity of local regulatory authorities, plant operators, emergency planning organizations, and security forces. Fukushima has demonstrated the importance of timely offsite response in the event of a severe accident, so the accessibility of reactors in remote locations also must be a prime consideration. Even within the United States, small utilities with little or no experience in operating nuclear plants need to fully appreciate the unique challenges and responsibilities associated with nuclear power and should not expect that small modular reactors will provide any relief in this regard.

#### Proliferation is not going to happen

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After listening to a compelling briefing for a proposal or even in summarizing an argument presented by himself, Secretary of State George Marshall was known to pause and ask, "But how could we be wrong?" In that spirit, it is important to examine the reasons why the nonproliferation regime might actually be more robust than it appears. Start with the bottom line. There are no more nuclear weapons states now than there were at the end of the Cold War. Since then, one undeclared and largely unrecognized nuclear weapons state, South Africa, eliminated its arsenal, and one new state, North Korea, emerged as the sole self-declared but unrecognized nuclear weapons state.  One hundred and eighty-four nations have forsworn the acquisition of nuclear weapons and signed the NPT. At least 13 countries began down the path to developing nuclear weapons with serious intent, and were technologically capable of completing the journey, but stopped short of the finish line: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Egypt, Iraq, Italy, Libya, Romania, South Korea, Sweden, Taiwan, and Yugoslavia. Four countries had nuclear weapons but eliminated them: South Africa completed six nuclear weapons in the 1980s and then, prior to the transfer of power to the postapartheid government, dismantled them. Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine together inherited more than 4,000 strategic nuclear weapons when the Soviet Union dissolved in December 1991. As a result of negotiated agreements among Russia, the United States, and each of these states, all of these weapons were returned to Russia for dismantlement. Ukraine's 1,640 strategic nuclear warheads were dismantled, and the highly enriched uranium was blended down to produce low-enriched uranium, which was sold to the United States to fuel its nuclear power plants. Few Americans are aware that, thanks to the Megatons to Megawatts Program, half of all the electricity produced by nuclear power plants in the United States over the past decade has been fueled by enriched uranium blended down from the cores of nuclear warheads originally designed to destroy American cities. Although they do not minimize the consequences of North Korea's or Iran's becoming a nuclear weapons state, those confident in the stability of the nuclear order are dubious about the prospects of a cascade of proliferation occurring in Asia, the Middle East, or elsewhere. In Japan, nuclear neuralgia has deep roots. The Japanese people suffered the consequences of the only two nuclear weapons ever exploded in war. Despite their differences, successive Japanese governments have remained confident in the U.S. nuclear umbrella and in the cornerstone of the United States' national security strategy in Asia, the U.S.-Japanese security alliance. The South Koreans fear a nuclear-armed North Korea, but they are even more fearful of life without the U.S. nuclear umbrella and U.S. troops on the peninsula. Taiwan is so penetrated and seduced by China that the terror of getting caught cheating makes it a poor candidate to go nuclear. And although rumors of the purchase by Myanmar (also called Burma) of a Yongbyon-style nuclear reactor from North Korea cannot be ignored, questions have arisen about whether the country would be able to successfully operate it.  In the Middle East, it is important to separate abstract aspirations from realistic plans. Few countries in the region have the scientific and technical infrastructure to support a nuclear weapons program. Saudi Arabia is a plausible buyer, although the United States would certainly make a vigorous effort to persuade it that it would be more secure under a U.S. nuclear umbrella than with its own arsenal. Egypt's determination to acquire nuclear weapons, meanwhile, is limited by its weak scientific and technical infrastructure, unless it were able to rent foreign expertise. And a Turkish nuclear bomb would not only jeopardize Turkey's role in NATO but also undercut whatever chances the country has for acceding to the EU.  Looking elsewhere, Brazil is now operating an enrichment facility but has signed the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which outlaws nuclear weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, and has accepted robust legal constraints, including those of the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials. Other than South Africa, which retains the stockpile of 30 bombs' worth of highly enriched uranium that was once part of its nuclear program, it is difficult to identify other countries that might realistically become nuclear weapons states in the foreseeable future.

#### No Prolif and at worst its slow – management issues

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[NUCLEAR DOGS THAT HAVE NOT BARKED](http://web.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.library.wisc.edu/ehost/detail?vid=3&hid=8&sid=7585163c-914e-4787-9fd6-b2e36f800b43%40sessionmgr12&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#toc)

"TODAY, ALMOST any industrialized country can produce a nuclear weapon in four to five years," a former chief of Israeli military intelligence recently wrote in The New York Times, echoing a widely held belief. Indeed, the more nuclear technology and know-how have diffused around the world, the more the timeline for building a bomb should have shrunk. But in fact, rather than speeding up over the past four decades, proliferation has gone into slow motion.

Seven countries launched dedicated nuclear weapons projects before 1970, and all seven succeeded in relatively short order. By contrast, of the ten countries that have launched dedicated nuclear weapons projects since 1970, **only three have achieved a bomb**. And only one of the six states that failed -- Iraq -- had made much progress toward its ultimate goal by the time it gave up trying. (The jury is still out on Iran's program.) What is more, even the successful projects of recent decades have needed a long time to achieve their ends. The average timeline to the bomb for successful projects launched before 1970 was about seven years; the average timeline to the bomb for successful projects launched after 1970 has been about 17 years.

International security experts have been unable to convincingly explain this remarkable trend. The first and most credible conventional explanation is that the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) has prevented a cascade of new nuclear weapons states by creating a system of export controls, technology safeguards, and on-site inspections of nuclear facilities. The NPT regime has certainly closed off the most straightforward pathways to the bomb. However, the NPT became a formidable obstacle to would-be nuclear states only in the 1990s, when its export-control lists were expanded and Western states finally became serious about enforcing them and when international inspectors started acting less like tourists and more like detectives. Yet the proliferation slowdown started at least 20 years before the system was solidified. So the NPT, useful though it may be, cannot alone account for this phenomenon.

A second conventional explanation is that although the NPT regime may not have been very effective, American and Israeli bombs have been. Syria's nascent nuclear effort, for instance, was apparently dealt a major setback by an Israeli air raid on its secret reactor construction site in 2007. But the record of military strikes is mixed. Contrary to the popular myth of the success of Israel's 1981 bombing of the Osiraq reactor in Iraq, the strike actually spurred Iraqi President Saddam Hussein to move beyond vague intentions and commit strongly to a dedicated nuclear weapons project, which lasted until the 1990-91 Gulf War. Moreover, the bombs that the United States dropped on Iraq during that conflict mostly missed Saddam's nuclear sites.

Finally, some analysts have asserted that nuclear weapons projects become inefficient due to political leaders' flagging levels of commitment. But these analysts are reversing cause and effect: leaders lose interest when their nuclear programs are not running well. And some nuclear weapons projects, such as France's, have performed well despite very tepid support from above. The imperfect correlation between the commitment of leaders and the quality of nuclear programs should not be surprising, for although commentators may speak casually of "Mao's bomb" or "Kim Jong Il's bomb," the real work has to be carried out by other people.

[ARRESTED DEVELOPMENT](http://web.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.library.wisc.edu/ehost/detail?vid=3&hid=8&sid=7585163c-914e-4787-9fd6-b2e36f800b43%40sessionmgr12&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#toc)

A MORE CONVINCING explanation of the proliferation slowdown begins with the observation that during the early days of the nuclear age, most states with nuclear ambitions were in the developed world, whereas since the mid-1960s, most would-be nuclear states have been in the developing world. As proliferation has become a mainly developing-world phenomenon, timelines to the bomb have slowed down dramatically. But the relevant difference here is not primarily economic. Some nuclear programs in very poor states have fared rather well, such the one undertaken by famine-stricken China in the 1950s and 1960s. Conversely, wealthy oil states, such as Iraq and Libya, spent vast amounts on decades-long nuclear quests but still failed.

National income is only one dimension of development, however, and in this case it is not the most important one. As the political scientist Francis Fukuyama has stressed, despite strong rates of economic growth, most developing countries struggle to establish high-quality state bureaucracies. And a dysfunctional bureaucracy is likely to produce a dysfunctional nuclear weapons project.

Nuclear research and development organizations depend heavily on intense commitment, creative thinking, and a shared spirit of cooperation among large numbers of highly educated scientific and technical workers. To elicit this positive behavior, management needs to respect their professional autonomy and facilitate their efforts, and not simply order them around. Respect for professional autonomy was instrumental to the brilliant successes of the earliest nuclear weapons projects. Even in Stalin's Soviet Union, as the historian David Holloway has written, "it is striking how the apparatus of the police state fused with the physics community to build the bomb.… [The physics community's] autonomy was not destroyed by the creation of the nuclear project. It continued to exist within the administrative system that was set up to manage the project."

By contrast, most rulers of recent would-be nuclear states have tended to rely on a coercive, authoritarian management approach to advance their quest for the bomb, using appeals to scientists' greed and fear as the primary motivators. That coercive approach is a major mistake, because it produces a sense of alienation in the workers by removing their sense of professionalism. As a result, **nuclear programs lose their way**. Moreover, underneath these bad management choices lie bad management cultures. In developing states with inadequate civil service protections, every decision tends to become politicized, and state bureaucrats quickly learn to keep their heads down. Not even the highly technical matters faced by nuclear scientific and technical workers are safe from meddling politicians. The result is precisely the reverse of what the politicians intend: not heightened efficiency but rather a mixture of bureaucratic sloth, corruption, and endless blame shifting.

Although it is difficult to measure the quality of state institutions precisely, the historical record strongly indicates that the more a state has conformed to the professional management culture generally found in developed states, the less time it has needed to get its first bomb and the lower its chances of failure. Conversely, the more a state has conformed to the authoritarian management culture typically found in developing states, the more time it has needed to get its first bomb and the **higher its chances of failure.**

### 1NC Hegemony f/l

#### Heg doesn’t solve war – Better empirical analysis votes neg

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Simply stated, the hegemonic stability theory proposes that international peace is only possible when there is one country strong enough to make and enforce a set of rules. At the height of Pax Romana between 27 BC and 180 AD, for example, Rome was able to bring unprecedented peace and security to the Mediterranean. The Pax Britannica of the nineteenth century brought a level of stability to the high seas. Perhaps the current era is peaceful because the United States has established a de facto Pax Americana where no power is strong enough to challenge its dominance, and because it has established a set of rules that a generally in the interests of all countries to follow. Without a benevolent hegemony, some strategists fear, instability may break out around the globe. Unchecked conflicts could cause humanitarian disaster and, in today’s interconnected world economic turmoil that would ripple throughout global financial markets. If the United States were to abandon its commitments abroad, argued Art, the world would “become a more dangerous place” and, sooner or later, that would “rebound to America’s detriment.” If the massive spending that the United States engages in actually produces stability in the international political and economic systems, then perhaps internationalism is worthwhile. There are good theoretical and empirical reasons, however, the belief that U.S. hegemony is not the primary cause of the current era of stability.

First of all, the hegemonic stability argument overstates the role that the United States plays in the system. No country is strong enough to police the world on its own. The only way there can be stability in the community of great powers is if self-policing occurs, ifs **states have decided that their interest are served by peace**. If no pacific normative shift had occurred among the great powers that was filtering down through the system, then no amount of international constabulary work by the United States could maintain stability. Likewise, if it is true that such a shift has occurred, then most of what the hegemon spends to bring stability would be wasted. The 5 percent of the world’s population that live in the United States simple could not force peace upon an unwilling 95. At the risk of beating the metaphor to death, the United States may be patrolling a neighborhood that has already rid itself of crime. Stability and unipolarity may be simply coincidental.

In order for U.S. hegemony to be the reason for global stability, the rest of the world would have to expect reward for good behavior and fear punishment for bad. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has not always proven to be especially eager to engage in humanitarian interventions abroad. Even rather incontrovertible evidence of genocide has not been sufficient to inspire action. Hegemonic stability can only take credit for influence those decisions that would have ended in war without the presence, whether physical or psychological, of the United States. Ethiopia and Eritrea are hardly the only states that could go to war without the slightest threat of U.S. intervention. Since most of the world today is free to fight without U.S. involvement, something else must be at work. Stability exists in many places where no hegemony is present.

Second, the limited empirical evidence we have suggests that there is little connection between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. During the 1990s the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially, By 1998 the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990. To internationalists, defense hawks, and other believers in hegemonic stability this irresponsible "peace dividend" endangered both national and global security "No serious analyst of American military capabilities," argued Kristol and Kagan, "doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet Americas responsibilities to itself and to world peace."" If the pacific trends were due not to U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, however, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence.

The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable Pentagon, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums; no security dilemmas drove mistrust and arms races; no regional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat ofinternational war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and it kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. It is also worth noting for our purposes that the United States was no less safe.

#### Hegemony destroys credible deterrence

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Well into the Obama presidency, the broadest foreign policy challenge facing the United States remains unmentioned. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States has frequently threatened dire consequences for states that pursue policies contrary to its interests. But despite the formidable power that backs these threats, they are often ignored. When threatened with U.S. military action, Milosevic did not fold, the Taliban did not give in, nor did Saddam roll over. Similarly, Iran and North Korea continue to resist U.S. pressure to stop their nuclear programs. Despite their relative weakness vis-à-vis the world’s sole superpower, all these states defied it. In contrast, during the Cold War, U.S. threats were taken seriously by the Soviet Union, the world’s other superpower. Despite their tremendous power, the Soviets were deterred from invading Western Europe and coerced into withdrawing their missiles from Cuba. Why were U.S. threats heeded by another superpower but are now disregarded by far less powerful states? Two explanations are commonly offered. The first is that the United States is militarily overextended and needs to make more troops available or to augment its own power for its threats to be credible. The second is that while the Soviets were evil, they were also rational. The enemies of today, alas, are not. Both these views are wrong. Despite being at war in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States is capable of badly damaging any regime that defies it while suffering little itself. And America’s new enemies are not more “irrational” than its old ones. If U.S. threats were able to deter shoe-slamming “we will bury you” Soviet premier Khrushchev with his 3,000 intercontinental nuclear weapons, why are we unable to stop Kim Jong-Il and his handful of rudimentary warheads—not to mention Ahmadinejad, who has none? Because threats are not the problem. Deterrence and coercion do not only require credible threats that harm will follow from defiance. They require credible assurances that no harm will follow from compliance. In order for America to expect compliance with U.S. demands, it must persuade its foes that they will be punished if and only if they defy us. During the Cold War, the balance of power between the two superpowers made assurances superfluous. Any U.S. attack on the Soviet Union would prompt Moscow to retaliate, imposing catastrophic costs on America. The prospect of an unprovoked U.S. attack was therefore unthinkable. Soviet power meant Moscow knew no harm would follow from complying with U.S. demands. But in today’s world, none of our enemies has the wherewithal to retaliate. U.S. threats, backed by the most powerful military in history, are eminently credible. The problem is the very same power advantage undermines the credibility of U.S. assurances. Our enemies feel vulnerable to an American attack even if they comply with our demands. They are therefore less likely to heed them. As the world’s most powerful state, the United States must work hard to assure other states that they are not at the mercy of an unpredictable behemoth. This is particularly important in the aftermath of the Iraq invasion, which many see, rightly or wrongly, as unprovoked. To make its assurances credible, the United States must restrain itself through multilateral action, a less aggressive military posture, and by pledging to eschew regime change. A failure to make American assurances credible will continue to hinder U.S. goals. As long as other regimes suspect we are bent on eliminating them even if they comply with our demands, it will be difficult to stop them from pursuing policies opposed to U.S. interests. The same old problems will persist. Iran and North Korea will maintain their nuclear programs. China and Russia will become increasingly belligerent. And Burma and Sudan will maintain policies that further already endemic human rights abuses. In sum, non-credible assurances will lead to a world in which U.S. power fails to bring about the desired results in a peaceful manner. This should come as no surprise. It follows from the unparalleled power of the United States.

#### And our allies can deter

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More than two decades after the Cold War dramatically ended, the U.S. maintains a Cold War military. America has a couple score allies, dozens of security commitments, hundreds of overseas bases, and hundreds of thousands of troops overseas. Yet international hegemonic communism has disappeared, the Soviet Union has collapsed, Maoist China has been transformed, and pro-communist Third World dictatorships have been discarded in history's dustbin.

The European Union has a larger economy and population than America does. Japan spent decades with the world's second largest economy. South Korea has 40 times the GDP and twice the population of North Korea. As Colin Powell exclaimed in 1991, "I'm running out of demons. I'm running out of enemies. I'm down to Castro and Kim Il-sung."

Yet America accounts for roughly half of the globe's military outlays. In real terms the U.S. government spends more on the military today than at any time during the Cold War, Korean War, or Vietnam War. It is difficult for even a paranoid to concoct a traditional threat to the American homeland.

Terrorism is no replacement for the threat of nuclear holocaust. Commentator Philip Klein worries about "gutting" the military and argued that military cuts at the end of the Cold War "came back to haunt us when Sept. 11 happened." Yet the reductions, which still left America by far the world's most dominant power, neither allowed the attacks nor prevented Washington from responding with two wars.

And responding with two wars turned out to be a catastrophic mistake. Evil terrorism is a threat, but existential threat it is not. Moreover, the best response is not invasions and occupations — as the U.S. has learned at high cost in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Rather, the most effective tools are improved intelligence, Special Forces, international cooperation, and restrained intervention.

Attempts at nation-building are perhaps even more misguided than subsidizing wealthy industrialized states. America's record isn't pretty. The U.S. wasn't able to anoint its preferred Somali warlord as leader of that fractured nation. Washington's allies in the still unofficial and unstable nation of Kosovo committed grievous crimes against Serb, Roma, and other minorities. Haiti remains a failed state after constant U.S. intervention. The invasion of Iraq unleashed mass violence, destroyed the indigenous Christian community, and empowered Iran; despite elections, a liberal society remains unlikely. After nine years most Afghans dislike and distrust the corrupt government created by the U.S. and sustained only by allied arms.

The last resort of those who want America to do everything everywhere is to claim that the world will collapse into various circles of fiery hell without a ubiquitous and vast U.S. military presence. Yet there is no reason to believe that scores of wars are waiting to break out. And America's prosperous and populous allies are capable of promoting peace and stability in their own regions.

#### Hegemony doesn’t solve China war

**Macdonald and Parent 11** (Paul, **Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College, and Joseph, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami. “Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment”. International Security** Spring 2011, Vol. 35, No. 4, Pages 7-44.)

Most important, the United States is not in free fall. Extrapolating the data into the future, we anticipate the United States will experience a “moderate” decline, losing from 2 to 4 percent of its share of great power GDP in the ªve years after being surpassed by China sometime in the next decade or two.95 Given the relatively gradual rate of U.S. decline relative to China, the incentives for either side to run risks by courting conflict are minimal. The United States would still possess upwards of a third of the share of great power GDP, and would have little to gain from provoking a crisis over a peripheral issue. Conversely, China has few incentives to exploit U.S. weakness.96 Given the importance of the U.S. market to the Chinese economy, in addition to the critical role played by the dollar as a global reserve currency, it is unclear how Beijing could hope to consolidate or expand its increasingly advantageous position through direct confrontation.

In short, the United States should be able to reduce its foreign policy commitments in East Asia in the coming decades without inviting Chinese expansionism. Indeed, there is evidence that a policy of retrenchment could reap potential benefits. The drawdown and repositioning of U.S. troops in South Korea, for example, rather than fostering instability, has resulted in an improvement in the occasionally strained relationship between Washington and Seoul.97 U.S. moderation on Taiwan, rather than encouraging hard-liners in Beijing, resulted in an improvement in cross-strait relations and reassured U.S. allies that Washington would not inadvertently drag them into a Sino-U.S. conflict.98 Moreover,Washington’s support for the development of multilateral security institutions, rather than harming bilateral alliances, could work to enhance U.S. prestige while embedding China within a more transparent regional order.99

A policy of gradual retrenchment need not undermine the credibility of U.S. alliance commitments or unleash destabilizing regional security dilemmas. Indeed, even if Beijing harbored revisionist intent, it is unclear that China will have the force projection capabilities necessary to take and hold additional territory. 100 By incrementally shifting burdens to regional allies and multilateral institutions, the United States can strengthen the credibility of its core commitments while accommodating the interests of a rising China. Not least among the benefits of retrenchment is that it helps alleviate an unsustainable ªnancial position. Immense forward deployments will only exacerbate U.S. grand strategic problems and risk unnecessary clashes.101

#### Or Asian war

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During this time Asia itself—sometimes defined as including China, India, Japan, and Russia and comprising perhaps half the world's population—had an occasional impact on the great powers, but it was never a primary focus. In the past two decades, however, Asia has emerged as a region whose economic, military, and diplomatic power has begun to rival and perhaps even exceed that of Europe. Its growing influence gives scholars a wonderful opportunity in the fields of international relations generally and Asian security specifically to produce increasingly rigorous and theoretically sophisticated work. Because Europe was so important for so long a period, in seeking to understand international relations, scholars have often simply deployed concepts, theories, and experiences derived from the European experience to project onto and explain Asia. **This approach is problematic at best**. Eurocentric ideas have yielded several mistaken conclusions and predictions about conflict and alignment behavior in Asia. For example, since the early 1990s many Western analysts have predicted dire scenarios for Asia, whereas many Asian experts have expressed growing optimism about the region's future. 4 It is an open question whether Asia, with its very different political economy, history, culture, and demographics, will ever function like the European state system. This is not to criticize European-derived theories purely because they are based on the Western experience: The origins of a theory are not necessarily relevant to its applicability. Rather these theories do a poor job as they are applied to Asia; what I seek to show in this article is that more careful attention to their application can strengthen the theories themselves.

In this article I make two claims about the levels of conflict and types of alignment behavior in Asia. First, I argue that the pessimistic predictions of Western scholars after the end of the Cold War that Asia would experience a period of increased arms racing and power politics has largely failed to materialize, a reality that scholars must confront if they are to develop a better understanding of Asian relations. Second, contrary to the expectations of standard formulations of realism, and although U.S. power confounds the issue, Asian states do not appear to be balancing against rising powers such as China. Rather they seem to be bandwagoning. [End Page 58]

I make these claims with great care. Asia is empirically rich and, in many ways, different from the West. Thus efforts to explain Asian issues using international relations theories largely derived inductively from the European experience can be problematic. Focusing exclusively on Asia's differences, however, runs the risk of essentializing the region, resulting in the sort of ori- entalist analysis that most scholars have correctly avoided. 5 I am not making a plea for research that includes a touch of realism, a dash of constructivism, and a pinch of liberalism. 6 The same social-scientific standards—falsifiability, generalizability, and clear causal logic—should apply in the study of Asian international relations as has been applied to the study of Europe. To achieve this, scholars must not dismiss evidence that does not fit their theories. Instead they must consider such evidence and sharpen their propositions so that they may be falsified.

Many of the criticisms that I make in this article could apply to other international relations theories such as liberalism or constructivism. I have chosen to focus on realist approaches because of their wide use in Western scholarship on Asia. In addition, determining which predictions emerge from which variant of realist theory is often the subject of heated debate; in particular, efforts to single out predictions that apply to Asia can be extremely frustrating. 7

I have three caveats: First, I am not claiming a priori that difference will triumph over similarity. Whether Asian and Western international relations are different is an open question, and in many cases scholars may conclude that there are no significant differences. Instead of ignoring or dismissing potential differences as unimportant, however, scholars should ask: Is this situation different? And if so, why? Such questions are likely to yield useful answers not only for scholars of international relations but also for those specializing in either security or Asian studies.

Second, scholarship on Asian international relations from all perspectives is increasingly theoretically rich and empirically sophisticated. Research from the realist and liberal schools has explored issues such as U.S.-China and U.S.-Japan relations, as well as the changing dynamics of the Japan-South [End Page 59] Korea-U.S. alliance. 8 Literature with a cultural or constructivist perspective has addressed topics including the formation of identity, prostitution and its relationship to U.S. overseas troop deployments, and antimilitarist sentiment in Japan. 9 More historically oriented work has emerged that challenges all of the prevailing paradigms. 10 Despite these encouraging trends, such work remains the exception rather than the norm.

Finally, the concept of "Asia" lends itself to highly problematic and often sweeping generalizations. The term "Asia" often refers to a geographic area that takes in Russia and Japan, encompasses the entire Pacific Ocean including Australia, and ranges as far west as India and Pakistan. These countries have different cultures, histories, political institutions, economies, geographic features, and climates. Accordingly, wherever possible I refer either to individual countries, to Northeast Asia (comprising Japan, China, the Korean Peninsula, and occasionally Russia), or to Southeast Asia (whose principal countries include Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam). This article does not cover South Asia (principally the countries of Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka). When I do refer to Asia as a whole, it is mainly to differentiate it from "the West." 11 [End Page 60]

This article is composed of three major sections. In the first section, I explain why the pessimistic predictions of the 1990s about a return of power politics to Asia have not materialized and why scholarship needs to acknowledge this fact. In the second section, I argue that the Chinese experience of the past two decades poses a challenge to realist theories. The third section argues that Asian countries balance differently from countries in the West. I conclude by discussing the tension between area studies and political science theorizing in the field of comparative politics. I argue that this tension is healthy because it forces both sides of the debate to sharpen their scholarship. The field of international relations can benefit from such a discussion, as well. Elevating the Asian experience to a central place in the study of international relations will provide an excellent opportunity to inject vitality into the stale paradigm wars that currently characterize the field.

Post-Cold War Pessimism over Asia

Following the end of the Cold War in 1991, some scholars in the West began to predict that Asia was "ripe for rivalry." 12 They based this prediction on the following factors: wide disparities in the levels of economic and military power among nations in the region; their different political systems, ranging from democratic to totalitarian; historical animosities; and the lack of international institutions. Many scholars thus envisaged a return of power politics after decades when conflict in Asia was dominated by the Cold War tension between the United States and the Soviet Union. In addition, scholars envisaged a return of arms racing and the possibility of major conflict among Asian countries, [End Page 61] almost all of which had rapidly changing internal and external environments. More specific predictions included the growing possibility of Japanese rearmament; 13 increased Chinese adventurism spurred by China's rising power and ostensibly revisionist intentions; 14 conflict or war over the status of Taiwan; 15 terrorist or missile attacks from a rogue North Korea against South Korea, Japan, or even the United States; 16 and arms racing or even conflict in Southeast Asia, prompted in part by unresolved territorial disputes. 17 [End Page 62]

More than a dozen years have passed since the end of the Cold War, yet none of these pessimistic predictions have come to pass. Indeed there has not been a major war in Asia since the 1978-79 Vietnam-Cambodia-China conflict; and with only a few exceptions (North Korea and Taiwan), Asian countries do not fear for their survival. Japan, though powerful, has not rearmed to the extent it could. China seems no more revisionist or adventurous now than it was before the end of the Cold War. And no Asian country appears to be balancing against China. In contrast to the period 1950-80, the past two decades have witnessed enduring regional stability and minimal conflict. Scholars should directly confront these anomalies, rather than dismissing them.

Social scientists can learn as much from events that do not occur as from those that do. The case of Asian security provides an opportunity to examine the usefulness of accepted international relations paradigms and to determine how the assumptions underlying these theories can become misspecified. Some scholars have smuggled ancillary and ad hoc hypotheses about preferences into realist, institutionalist, and constructivist theories to make them fit various aspects of the Asian cases, including: assumptions about an irrational North Korean leadership, predictions of an expansionist and revisionist China, and depictions of Japanese foreign policy as "abnormal." 18 Social science moves forward from the clear statement of a theory, its causal logic, and its predictions. Just as important, however, is the rigorous assessment of the theory, especially if predictions flowing from it fail to materialize. Exploring why scholars have misunderstood Asia is both a fruitful and a necessary theoretical exercise.

Two major problems exist with many of the pessimistic predictions about Asia. First, when confronted with the non-balancing of Asian states against China, the lack of Japanese rearmament, and five decades of non-invasion by North Korea, scholars typically respond: Just wait. This reply, however, is intellectually ambiguous. Although it would be unfair to expect instantaneous national responses to changing international conditions, a dozen years would seem to be long enough to detect at least some change. Indeed Asian nations have historically shown an ability to respond quickly to changing circumstances. The Meiji restoration in Japan in 1868 was a remarkable example of governmental response to European and American encroachment, and by 1874 [End Page 63] Japan had emerged from centuries of isolation to occupy Taiwan. 19 More recently, with the introduction of market reforms in late 1978, when Deng Xiaoping famously declared, "To get rich is glorious," the Chinese have transformed themselves from diehard socialists to exuberant capitalists beginning less than three years after Mao's death in 1976. 20 In the absence of a specific time frame, the "just wait" response is unfalsifiable. Providing a causal logic that explains how and when scholars can expect changes is an important aspect of this response, and reasonable scholars will accept that change may not be immediate but may occur over time. Without such a time frame, however, the "just wait" response is mere rhetorical wordplay designed to avoid troubling evidence.

A more rigorous response in the Chinese case would be to argue that conditions of balancing, not timing per se, are the critical factor. In this view, China's relatively slow military modernization and limited power projection capabilities suggest that its potential threat to other Asian countries is growing only slowly; thus the conditions necessary to produce costly all-out balancing efforts do not yet exist. Moreover, even though many of the conditions that theorists argue can lead to conflict do already exist in East Asia, the region has so far avoided both major and minor interstate conflict. Most significant, in less than two decades China has evolved from being a moribund and closed middle power to the most dynamic country in the region, with an economy that not only will soon surpass Japan's (if it has not already) but also shows many signs of continuing growth. This dramatic power transition has evoked hardly any response from China's neighbors. 21 By realist standards, China should be provoking balancing behavior, merely because its overall size and projected rate of growth are so high. [End Page 64]

Second, pessimistic predictions about Asia's future often suffer from incompletely specified evidentiary standards. **Scholars will frequently select evidence that supports their arguments and dismiss contradictory evidence as epiphenomenal**. For example, in his most recent book, John Mearsheimer argues that although Japan (and Germany) have "the potential in terms of population and wealth to become great powers...they depend on the United States for their security, and are effectively semi-sovereign states, not great powers." 22 This begs a number of questions: For instance, why define Japan, which has the second largest economy in the world, as "semi-sovereign"? Indeed why would such an economically advanced state ever allow itself to remain "semi-sovereign"? Mearsheimer's book is focused on building a theory of offensive realism, but the logic of offensive realism would lead to the conclusion that Japan should have rearmed long ago. The onus is on those predicting an increase in power politics in Asia to state clearly what evidence would falsify their arguments or challenge their assumptions, not to explain away objections or ignore contradictory evidence. A clearer explication of their hypotheses and the refutable propositions would be a genuine contribution to the field.

More than a dozen years after the end of the Cold War, much of Asia bears little resemblance to the picture painted by the pessimists. Although the years 1950-80 saw numerous armed conflicts, since then there has been no major interstate war in either Northeast or Southeast Asia. Countries do not fear for their survival in either area. In Northeast Asia, rivalry and power politics remain muted. Japan has not rearmed, China shows little sign of having revisionist tendencies, and North Korea has neither imploded nor exploded. Southeast Asia, as well, remains free of the kinds of arms races and power politics that some have expected. As Muthiah Alagappa writes, "Viewed through the ahistorical realist lens, the contemporary security challenges could indeed suggest that Asia is a dangerous place. But a comprehensive historical view would suggest otherwise. Although Asia still faces serious internal and international challenges, there are fewer challenges than before and most of the region's disputes and conflicts have stabilized." 23 The field of international relations would be better served if the pessimists not only admitted this reality but also asked why this might be the case. Because China has such an important [End Page 65] influence on Northeast, Southeast, and even South Asia, I offer the tentative outline of such an explanation in the following section.

China, Hierarchy, and Balancing

The most hotly debated of the pessimistic predictions about Asia concerns the rise of a revisionist China. After two decades of rapid economic growth, China appears poised to become a great power once again. Thus for Richard Betts, the question becomes: "Should we want China to get rich or not? For realists, the answer should be no, since a rich China would overturn any balance of power." 24 Concern over a revisionist and destabilizing China has only increased in the past decade, as its economy continues to grow and its military and technological capabilities further expand. 25

Yet concern over a strong China may be misplaced. **Historically, it has been Chinese weakness that has led to chaos in Asia. When China has been strong and stable, order has been preserved**. East Asian regional relations have historically been hierarchic, more peaceful, and more stable than those in the West. 26 Until the intrusion of the Western powers in the nineteenth century, East Asian interstate relations were remarkably stable, punctuated only occasionally by [End Page 66] conflict between countries. The system was based on Chinese military and economic power but was reinforced through centuries of cultural exchange, and the units in the system were sovereign states that had political control over recognized geographic areas. East Asian international relations emphasized formal hierarchy among nations while allowing considerable informal equality. With China as the dominant state and surrounding countries as peripheral or secondary states, as long as hierarchy was observed there was little need for interstate war. This contrasts sharply with the Western tradition of international relations, which has consisted of formal equality between nation-states, informal hierarchy, and near-constant interstate conflict. 27

In the nineteenth century, the traditional East Asian order was demolished as both Western and Asian powers (in particular, Japan) scrambled to establish influence in the region. After a century of tumult in Asia, the late 1990s saw the reemergence of a strong and confident China, the growing stabilization of Vietnam, and increasingly consolidated political rule around the region. Although realists and liberals have tended to view modern East Asia as potentially unstable, if the system is experiencing a return to a pattern of hierarchy, the result may be increased stability.

China in 2003 appears to be reemerging as the gravitational center of East Asia. From a historical perspective, a rich and strong China could again cement regional stability. However, a century of chaos and change, and the growing influence of the rest of the world (in particular the United States), would lead one to conclude that a Chinese-led regional system would not look like its historical predecessor. Indeed Chung-in Moon argues that the Westphalian notion of sovereignty holds sway in Asia, although he also admits that this is frequently compromised and often contested. 28

Even if a hierarchic system does not reemerge in East Asia, and even if countries in the region do not adopt Westphalian norms in their entirety, the question [End Page 67] of whether a more powerful China will be a revisionist or a status quo state remains. 29 Although the evidence is mixed, much in China's behavior points to Beijing's desire to stabilize the region. According to political scientist Xinbo Wu, "Both the political leadership and the Chinese public believe that... China must regain major-power status." 30 Wu also notes that China perceives the international environment in the past decade as less hostile, and even benign. At the same time, Beijing views its relationship with Washington as potentially the most troubling, believing that the United States is the primary constraint on Chinese maneuvering and influence in the region. 31 It is not clear, however, if China intends to challenge the United States for regional supremacy. For three decades, China has made a conscious decision to confine itself to a relatively modest second-strike nuclear force, although this could change depending on U.S. actions regarding missile defense. 32

Does China have territorial or ideological ambitions? The evidence so far suggests that although China has outstanding territorial disputes with a number of countries, it has neither revisionist nor imperial aims. First, China has shown a genuine desire to join the world community, perhaps best reflected in its considerable efforts to become a member of the World Trade Organization. Wu notes that "the PRC understands that the best way to defend its interest is to make its own voice heard in the rule-making process," 33 by joining influential regional and international institutions. This explains Chinese active participation in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the ASEAN Regional Forum, and a number of other international institutions. 34 [End Page 68]

Second, in the past two decades China has resolved territorial disputes with Afghanistan, Burma, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Nepal, Pakistan, and Russia. More recently, it has resolved its disputes with Cambodia and Vietnam, renouncing support from the Khmer Rouge and embracing the Paris Peace Accords of 1991 that brought elections to Cambodia, and normalizing relations and delineating its border with Vietnam. 35 Jianwei Wang writes that "the fact that no war for territory has been fought in East Asia since the 1980s indicates a tendency to seek peaceful settlement of the remaining disputes." 36 On maritime disputes, Jean-Marc Blanchard notes that all Asian countries except Cambodia, North Korea, and Thailand have signed the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which has provided an institutional forum for parties to address disputes over fishing rights, trade routes, and other matters. 37

China does have unresolved territorial disputes over Taiwan, with ASEAN over the Spratly Islands, and with Japan over the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands. 38 Many other Asian nations also have unresolved territorial issues, resulting from a century of regional change, not from Chinese revisionism.For example, Japan and Russia have yet to resolve their dispute over the Northern territories, nor have Japan and Korea resolved their dispute over Tokto Island. **Thus these territorial disputes by themselves are not an indicator of Chinese ambitions.**

Countries in East Asia are also deciding how to deal with China's growing economy. Japanese investment in China continues to expand, and Japanese companies are increasingly seeing their fortunes tied to the Chinese market. Japan runs a $27 billion trade deficit with China. 39 Forty thousand Taiwanese companies have investments in the mainland, employing 10 million people. The Taiwanese central bank estimates that total mainland investment is between [End Page 69] $40 and $50 billion. 40 Sixty percent of Taiwanese foreign direct investment went to China in 2001, despite rising political tensions. The capitalization of China's stock market is the largest in Asia except for Japan's, despite being just a decade old—larger than the capitalization of stock markets in Brazil, Hong Kong, India, Mexico, South Korea, or Taiwan. 41

The growing importance of China's economy in some ways parallels China's historical role. Historical precedents may not be tremendously helpful, however, in assessing whether hierarchy will reemerge in Asia, because other Asian nations' willingness to accept subordinate positions in a Sino-centric hierarchy will depend on beliefs about how a dominant China would behave in the future. Additionally, it is not clear if China is willing to make more adjustments to calm fears or further integrate into the globalized world. This possibility deserves serious investigation, however, and it could be a fruitful line of research. Because the evidence of Chinese revisionism over the past decade of rapid growth is limited at best, scholars should explore the possibility that China will be a stabilizing force in Northeast and Southeast Asia. One way in which East Asian relations may manifest themselves differently than realists expect concerns the issue of whether other nations in the region fear China's growing power and will seek to balance against it, or whether those nations will instead choose to bandwagon with it.

Balancing versus Bandwagoning and the Role of the United States

Contrary to the conventional wisdom, Northeast and Southeast Asian nations are not obviously balancing against China. Relying on variations of "mercantile realism," "soft balancing," and "reluctant realism," 42 however, scholars contend that this is likely to change in the future. Yet any argument that balancing may occur in Asia or that balancing has a different meaning in Asia is an admission that such countries are not acting as balance of power realists expect. [End Page 70] Although the issue of balancing is complicated by the presence of U.S. diplomatic, economic, cultural, and military power in Asia, it is still possible to make tentative assessments about the region. Instead of assuming that Asia will balance rising Chinese power, posing this as a question would be a more productive exercise. 43

Hierarchy can be global as well as regional, and the United States is clearly the dominant state both in the international order and in Asia. This has important implications for scholarly understanding of the region. As China continues on the path of economic growth and military modernization, the key question is whether the United States can or will allow China to resume its place atop the Asian regional hierarchy. As this section shows, the answer to this question is not obvious. It is difficult to predict the reaction of other Asian nations to the possibility of increased U.S.-Chinese confrontation as a result of continued Chinese economic and military growth. If, as realists expect, Asian nations do not balance against China, a U.S. attempt to form a balancing coalition with East Asian states to contain China could be highly problematic. In addition, **if the U**nited **S**tates **withdraws significantly from the region, Asia may not become the dangerous or unstable region that balance of power adherents would suggest**, because other nations may acquiesce to China's central position in Asia. 44

Discerning balancing behavior in Asia is especially difficult given the overwhelming dominance of U.S. power in the region. As argued by Michael Mastanduno and others, the conventional view is that by balancing China, the United States acts as a stabilizing force in the region. According to Mastanduno, "American power and presence have helped to keep traditional power rivals in the region from engaging in significant conflict and have reassured smaller states who have traditionally been vulnerable to major regional wars." 45 The U.S. alliance system in Northeast and Southeast Asia, as well as [End Page 71] the provision of naval facilities to the United States by Singapore and the Philippines, are manifestations of this balancing behavior. The implication is that there would be considerably more conflict in the region were the United States to pull back or otherwise reduce its military presence. 46

The ability of the United States to maintain regional peace and stability, however, **especially in Northeast Asia**, is an open question. As Alagappa notes, "**The claim that stability in Northeast Asia is predicated on the U.S. role rests on several controversial assertions**...that the United States checks China's growing power and influence, which is feared by other Asian states; [and] that nearly all countries trust and prefer the United States....[However,] containment of China does not appeal to many Asian states." 47 Although the United States still retains overwhelming power in the region, its scope is considerably smaller than it was at its height a quarter century ago. In addition, both East Asian and Southeast Asian countries have grown significantly stronger, richer, and generally more stable. This transition at least requires an explanation. That the United States plays an important security role in Asia is relatively uncontroversial. Whether some type of U.S. withdrawal would be deleterious for the region is far more questionable.

Mastanduno writes that U.S. hegemony in Asia is incomplete in many respects and functions more as a "holding operation." 48 And although Avery Goldstein argues that balancing does occur in Asia, he too suggests that its contribution to regional security is less clear. 49 The distribution of power and potential for conflict do not lead to obvious bipolarity or multipolarity. 50 Part of what makes understanding Asia so difficult is this complexity. Indeed some scholars have argued that underlying the core U.S. strategy is the belief that China's future behavior can be changed in a positive direction, through either democratization or integration into the global economy (or some combination of both), and that engagement is a policy tool toward that end. 51 [End Page 72]

Realism's Japan Problem

Japan's foreign policy provides perhaps the strongest evidence to date that balancing is not occurring in Asia as realist theories would predict. For the past twenty years, realists have consistently predicted that Japan would rearm, or at least become increasingly assertive in parallel with its growing economic power, but it has not. Although Japan is very powerful, it has not yet adopted the trappings of a great power. In contrast to realists who argue that power considerations will ultimately influence Japanese foreign policy, and in contrast to constructivists who argue that Japan's culture or domestic politics explain its foreign policy, 52 I offer another explanation.

Scholars have spent decades speculating about whether and when Japan might become a "normal" power. 53 This is the wrong question. Arguments about whether Japan is "normal" or "militant" essentialize the country and miss the point. Japan invaded other Asian states a century ago because the system in Asia was highly unstable and Japan sought to protect itself. In the current era, Japan has little to gain from challenging either a strong China or the United States, but much to lose by starting great power competition. Geography, population, and economics mean not only that Japan benefits from a strong international order, but also that it is relatively safe from military threats.

There are two major realist explanations for Japan's foreign policy behavior, both of which are often conflated in the literature. The first is the great power explanation, which holds that Japan is so rich and technologically advanced that it will soon want to become a great power once again (this is the "power maximization" hypothesis). Second is the umbrella (or "power satisfaction") explanation: According to this hypothesis, when U.S. forces withdraw from Japan, it will rearm and become a normal power. 54 [End Page 73]

These explanations are mutually incompatible: Japan cannot be a normal great power and yet be protected by the U.S. security umbrella. Of the two, the power maximization hypothesis is most easily falsified. Realists have no explanation for why Japan, the world's second-largest economy, has not sought to balance or challenge the United States (the world's largest power) or why Japan has not attempted to provide for its own security. As Waltz has written, "Countries with great power economics have become great military powers, whether or not reluctantly." 55 In addition to having the world's second largest economy, Japan is arguably the world's finest manufacturing nation and one of it most technologically sophisticated. Yet not only does Japan lack aircraft carriers, intercontinental missiles, and nuclear weapons, but it does not send troops abroad. In sum, Japan is hard to invade, but it also evinces almost no significant military or diplomatic strength. So although Japan is relatively strong, it has not rearmed to the extent it could, nor has it rearmed to the extent that a "great power" would (see Table 1).

In support of the great power explanation, Michael Desch offers evidence of Japanese supposed intentions: marginally increased defense spending, pursuit of a virtual nuclear deterrent, and growing nationalistic rhetoric from selected politicians. 56 Yet this evidence is speculative at best. The key is not the offhand remark of a right-wing politician, but rather that Japan could easily triple its defense budget and still spend only what other powers such as France and Germany do (Figure 1). In addition, Japan could modify its constitution, develop a nuclear arsenal, deploy intercontinental ballistic missiles, and build aircraft carriers. It could also forge a foreign policy independent from that of the United States and attempt to exert far more influence in diplomatic arenas. This would be convincing evidence that Japan is, or aspires to be, a great power. Discussion of Japan as a virtual, potential, or nascent power is simply an admission that Japan does not function as a typical realist nation-state. [End Page 74]

The U.S. umbrella explanation is also unconvincing, for at least two reasons. First, it does not explain why the second largest economic power in the international system would trust the world's only superpower to provide for its security. Threats arise through the mere existence of capabilities—intentions can always change for the worse. 57 As Robert Jervis writes, "Minds can be changed, new leaders can come to power, values can shift, new opportunities and dangers can arise." 58 A weak, peaceful country may alter its goals as it becomes stronger. Second, the umbrella explanation fails to account for why Japan did not doubt the U.S. commitment to its security in the past. Arguments about the U.S. umbrella implicitly assume that Japan is realist and would rearm if the United States departed the region. If this is true, and if there is no other factor that keeps Japanese foreign policy from becoming more assertive, then **Japan should have rearmed at least a decade ago**, when the Japanese economy was at its height and when Tokyo had many reasons to doubt the U.S. commitment to its defense.

A Japanese policymaker in 1985 might have concluded that, given the previous fifteen years or so of negative signals from Washington, the U.S. commitment to Japan was unlikely to endure. In 1969 President Richard Nixon had [End Page 75] called for "Asia for Asians" and began a major drawdown of U.S. troops and commitments to the region. 59 By 1985 **Japan had seen the U**nited **S**tates **abandon South Vietnam, withdraw recognition of Taiwan, and pull half of its troops out of South Korea**. In the mid-1980s U.S. concern over Japanese trading and economic policies was at its peak. This concern manifested itself in intense U.S. pressure on Japan to alter some of its economic agreements, among them the 1985 Plaza Accords that attempted to devalue the yen relative to the dollar, and the 1988 Structural Impediments Initiative that sought to force changes in Japan's domestic economic practices. 60 In addition, the United States had begun to pressure Japan over "burden sharing" and attempted to make the Japanese pay more for the U.S. troops already deployed. All these indicators [End Page 76] suggested that the United States would cease to be a reliable ally of Japan. In addition, Japanese economic growth was at its highest, national sentiment about Japan's future was increasingly optimistic, and Japan was by some measures a better technological and manufacturing country than the United States.

From a realist perspective, only the most naïve and myopic of leaders would focus solely on the present. Thus Japan has had ample reason to doubt the U.S. commitment to its defense. Yet in 1976 Tokyo pledged to keep defense spending at 1 percent of Japan's gross domestic product, which has essentially remained unchanged. In addition, Japanese leaders had little reaction to either the Vietnam or Taiwan pullouts by the United States. Further, in the mid-1980s there was no concomitant change in the policies of Japan's Self-Defense Forces. 61 Japan did not rearm despite real tensions with the United States in the 1980s, nor did it make any major changes in its foreign policy. 62

There is a third alternative concerning Japan's foreign policy, which I refer to as the hierarchic explanation. According to this explanation, Japan is a status quo secondary power that has not rearmed to the level it could because it has no need to, and because it has no intention of challenging either China or the United States for dominance in Asia. Japan does not fear for its survival, and it accepts the centrality of China in regional politics. The historical animosities and lingering mistrust over Japan for its colonial aggression in the late nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century are reasons sometimes cited for a fear of Japanese rearmament. In the late nineteenth century, Japan faced decaying and despotic Chinese and Korean monarchies, a significant regional power vacuum, and pressures from Western nations. Today the militaries of South Korea and China are well equipped, their economies are robust, and there is no threat of Western colonization. Thus it is unlikely that Japan needs or will seek to expand its diplomatic and military influence on the Asian landmass.

In addition to explaining the historical pattern of Japanese foreign policy, the hierarchic explanation generates a different set of questions about Japan's future. For example, could Japan tilt toward China? Could Japan see the United States as the real threat to its survival? If Washington were to pressure Tokyo to take sides in an increasingly acrimonious U.S.-China relationship, it is [End Page 77] not clear that Japan would antagonize a geographically proximate power for the sake of a tenuous alliance with a distant power. 63 In fact, there is evidence that Japan does not view its relationship with the United States as purely positive. There is also increasing evidence that the Japanese do not fear a strong China as much as they do a strong United States. A May 1995 Yomiuri Shimbun poll found that 26.6 percent of Japanese identified the United States as a security threat to their country, whereas only 21.3 percent identified China as a threat. 64 In countering the assumption that Japan has no choice but to rely on the United States, former Prime Minister Yashuiro Nakasone has said that "a worm can turn." 65 A more recent opinion poll by Asahi Shimbun in May 2001 found that 74 percent of the Japanese public opposed revision of article 9 of the constitution (which prohibits Japan from using force "as means of settling international disputes"). 66 And in a magazine article, politician Ozawa Ichiro, who makes no mention of China, does mention the need for multilateralism to protect Japan from "Anglo-Saxon principles." 67

As to whether Japan could tilt toward China, Ted Galen Carpenter writes, "[U.S.] officials who assume that a more active Japan will be an obedient junior partner of the United States are in for an unpleasant surprise. Tokyo shows signs of not only being more active on the security front, but also of being more independent of the United States. Nowhere is that trend more evident than with respect to policy toward China." 68 For example, Japan has made clear that it does not wish to be drawn into any conflict over the status of Taiwan. In fact, the United States cannot count on Japan to support or provide bases in the event of a China-Taiwan conflict. 69 Japanese cooperation with China is increasing [End Page 78] in other ways as well. Bilateral trade volume between Japan and China in 1997 amounted to $570 billion, fifty-two times greater than in 1972. China is now Japan's second-largest trading partner, and Japan ranks as China's largest trading partner. Moreover, China is the largest recipient of Japanese investment in Asia. 70

Japan is neither normal nor abnormal, militaristic nor pacifist. Its survival and economic health are best provided by a stable order. Neither China nor the United States threatens Japan militarily. Thus Japan has not seen fit to rearm extensively, despite its capacity to build aircraft carriers and nuclear weapons. 71 Furthermore, Japan has shown no signs of balancing against China.

South Korea, Vietnam, and Their Nonbalancing Behavior

Given the lack of evidence of Japanese balancing, might other countries in Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia—particularly South Korea and Vietnam—seek to balance China? First, if forced to choose between the United States and China, it is unclear which state either country would support. Second, **the importance of the U**nited **S**tates **in curtailing an Asian arms race may be overstated**. If the United States pulls out of the region, **China could take a greater role in organizing the system, and the countries of Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia would adjust—with order preserved.**

#### Or mid-east war

MacDonald and Parent 11 \*Paul K. MacDonald, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College, and Joseph M. Parent, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami [November/December 2011, “The Wisdom of Retrenchment: America Must Cut Back to Move Forward,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 90, No. 6]

Retrenchment would also require the United States to minimize its presence in South Asia and the Middle East. The United States has an interest in ensuring the flow of cheap oil, yet armed interventions and forward deployments are hardly the best ways to achieve that goal. These actions have radicalized local populations, provided attractive targets for terrorists, destabilized oil markets, and inflamed the suspicions of regional rivals such as Iran. Similarly, the United States has a strong incentive to deny terrorist groups safe havens in ungoverned spaces. It is unclear, however, whether large troop deployments are the most cost-effective way to do so. The U.S.-led nato mission in Afghanistan has established temporary pockets of stability, but it has enjoyed little success in promoting good governance, stamping out corruption, or eradicating the most dangerous militant networks. Nor have boots on the ground improved relations with or politics in Pakistan.

#### Also Middle East war will never happen

**Ferguson 06 –** Professor of History at Harvard University, Senior Research Fellow of Jesus College, Oxford, and Senior Fellow of the Hoover Institution, Stanford(Niall, LA Times, July 24)

Could today's quarrel between Israelis and Hezbollah over Lebanon produce World War III? That's what Republican Newt Gingrich, the former speaker of the House, called it last week, echoing earlier fighting talk by Dan Gillerman, Israel's ambassador to the United Nations. Such language can — for now, at least — safely be dismissed as hyperbole. This crisis is not going to trigger another world war. Indeed, I do not expect it to produce even another Middle East war worthy of comparison with those of June 1967 or October 1973. In 1967, Israel fought four of its Arab neighbors — Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iraq. In 1973, Egypt and Syria attacked Israel. Such combinations are very hard to imagine today. Nor does it seem likely that Syria and Iran will escalate their involvement in the crisis beyond continuing their support for Hezbollah. Neither is in a position to risk a full-scale military confrontation with Israel, given the risk that this might precipitate an American military reaction. Crucially, Washington's consistent support for Israel is not matched by any great power support for Israel's neighbors. During the Cold War, by contrast, the risk was that a Middle East war could spill over into a superpower conflict. Henry Kissinger, secretary of State in the twilight of the Nixon presidency, first heard the news of an Arab-Israeli war at 6:15 a.m. on Oct. 6, 1973. Half an hour later, he was on the phone to the Soviet ambassador in Washington, Anatoly Dobrynin. Two weeks later, Kissinger flew to Moscow to meet the Soviet leader, Leonid Brezhnev. The stakes were high indeed. At one point during the 1973 crisis, as Brezhnev vainly tried to resist Kissinger's efforts to squeeze him out of the diplomatic loop, the White House issued DEFCON 3, putting American strategic nuclear forces on high alert. It is hard to imagine anything like that today. In any case, this war may soon be over. Most wars Israel has fought have been short, lasting a matter of days or weeks (six days in '67, three weeks in '73). Some Israeli sources say this one could be finished in a matter of days. That, at any rate, is clearly the assumption being made in Washington.

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has been in no hurry to get to the scene (she is due to arrive in Israel today). Nor has she scheduled any visits to Arab capitals. Compare this leisurely response to the frenetic shuttle diplomacy of the Kissinger era. While striving to secure a settlement between Israel and Syria, Rice's predecessor traveled 24,230 miles in just 34 days.

And yet there are other forms that an escalation of the Middle East conflict could conceivably take. A war between states may not be in the cards, much less a superpower conflict. What we must fear, however, is a spate of civil wars -- to be precise, ethnic conflicts -- across the region.

#### Power decline guarantees retrenchment

**MacDonald and Parent 11** (Paul, **Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College, and Joseph, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami. “Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment”. International Security** Spring 2011, Vol. 35, No. 4, Pages 7-44.)

This article has advanced three main arguments. First, retrenchment pessimists are incorrect when they suggest that retrenchment is an uncommon policy response to great power decline. States often curtail their commitments and mellow their ambitions as they fall in the ranks of great powers. Second and related, declining great powers react in a prompt and proportionate manner to their dwindling fortunes. They do this for the same reason that they tend to seize opportunities to expand: international incentives are strong inducements. In the high-stakes world of great power politics, states can seldom afford to fool themselves or pamper parochial interests when relative power is perilously slipping away. Third, the rate of relative decline explains not only the extent of retrenchment but also the form. The faster the rate of decline, the more likely states are to reform their militaries, increase reliance on allies, and refrain from using force in international disputes. Taken together, these findings suggest that retrenchment is an attractive strategy for dealing with great power decline. Although we make no claim that the rate of relative decline explains everything, we suggest that our study represents a solid first cut and that domestic political factors loom too large in discussions of power transitions and hegemonic change.

#### Heg is bad

#### Heg decline causes multilateralism

**He 10**—Professor of Political Science at Utah State University [Kai He (Postdoctoral fellow in the Princeton-Harvard China and the World Program at Princeton University (2009–2010) and a Bradley fellow of the Lynda and Harry Bradley Foundation (2009–2010), “The hegemon’s choice between power and security: explaining US policy toward Asia after the Cold War,” Review of International Studies (2010), 36, pg. 1121–1143]

When US policymakers perceive a rising or a stable hegemony, the anarchic nature of the international system is no longer valid in the mind of US policymakers because the preponderant power makes the US immune from military threats. In the self-perceived, hierarchic international system with the US on the top, power-maximisation becomes the strategic goal of the US in part because of the ‘lust for power’ driven by human nature and in part because of the disappearance of the security constraints imposed by anarchy. Therefore, selective engagement and hegemonic dominion become two possible strategies for the US to maximise its power in the world. The larger the power gap between the US and others, the more likely selective engagement expands to hegemonic dominion. When US policymakers perceive a declining hegemony in that the power gap between the hegemon and others is narrowed rather than widened, US policymakers begin to change their hierarchic view of the international system. The rapid decline of relative power causes US policymakers to worry about security imposed by anarchy even though the US may remain the most powerful state in the system during the process of decline. Offshore balancing and multilateralism, therefore, become two possible policy options for the US to maximise its security under anarchy. The possible budget constraints during US decline may lead to military withdrawals from overseas bases. In addition, the US becomes more willing to pay the initial ‘lock-in’ price of multilateral institutions in order to constrain other states’ behaviour for its own security.

US foreign policy towards Asia preliminarily supports the power-perception hegemonic model. When President George H. W. Bush came to power, the US faced ‘dual deficits’ even though the US won the Cold War and became the hegemon by default in the early 1990s. The domestic economic difficulty imposed a declining, or at least uncertain, hegemony to the Bush administration. Consequently, Bush had to withdraw troops from Asia and conducted a reluctant offshore balancing strategy in the early 1990s. Although the US still claimed to keep its commitments to Asian allies, the US words with the sword became unreliable at best.

During President Clinton’s first tenure, how to revive US economy became the first priority of the administration. The perception of a declining hegemon did not totally fade until the middle of the 1990s when the US economy gradually came out of the recession. Multilateral institutions, especially APEC, became Clinton’s diplomatic weapon to open Asia’s market and boost US economy. In addition, the US also endorsed the ARF initiated by the ASEAN states in order to retain its eroding political and military influence after the strategic retreats in the early 1990s.

However, the US ‘new economy’ based on information technology and computers revived policymakers’ confidence in US hegemony after the Asian miracle was terminated by the 1997 economic crisis. The second part of the 1990s witnessed a rising US hegemony and the George W. Bush administration reached the apex of US power by any measure in the early 21st century. Therefore, since Clinton’s second tenure in the White House, US foreign policy in general and towards Asia in particular has become more assertive and power-driven in nature. Besides reconfirming its traditional military alliances in Asia, the US deepened its military engagement in the region through extensive security cooperation with other Asian states.

The selective engagement policy of the US in the late 1990s was substantially expanded by the Bush administration to hegemonic dominion after 9/11. The unrivalled hegemony relieved US of concerns over security threats from any other states in the international system. The ‘lust for power’ without constraints from anarchy drove US policymakers to pursue a hegemonic dominion policy in the world. The ‘pre-emption strategy’ and proactive missile defence programs reflected the power-maximising nature of the hegemonic dominion strategy during the George W. Bush administration.

What will the US do in the future? The power-perception hegemonic model suggests that the US cannot escape the fate of other great powers in history. When US hegemony is still rising or at a stable stage, no one can stop US expansion for more power. When its economy can no longer afford its power-oriented strategy, the US will face the same strategic burden of ‘imperial overstretch’ that Great Britain suffered in the 19th century. However, the power-perception hegemonic model also argues that US foreign policy depends on how US policymakers perceive the rise and fall of US hegemony.

#### Multilateralism leads to global cooperation and solves the escalation of conflicts

**Pouliot 11**—Professor of Poli Sci @ McGill University [Vincent Pouliot, “Multilateralism as an End in Itself,” International Studies Perspectives (2011) 12, 18–26]

Because it rests on open, nondiscriminatory debate, and the routine exchange of viewpoints, the multilateral procedure introduces three key advantages that are gained, regardless of the specific policies adopted, and tend to diffuse across all participants. Contrary to the standard viewpoint, according to which a rational preference or functional imperative lead to multilateral cooperation, here it is the systematic practice of multilateralism that creates the drive to cooperate. At the theoretical level, the premise is that it is not only what people think that explains what they do, but also what they do that determines what they think (Pouliot 2010). Everyday multilateralism is a self-fulfilling practice for at least three reasons.

First, the joint practice of multilateralism creates mutually recognizable patterns of action among global actors. This process owes to the fact that practices structure social interaction (Adler and Pouliot forthcoming).2 Because they are meaningful, organized, and repeated, practices generally convey a degree of mutual intelligibility that allows people to develop social relations over time. In the field of international security, for example, the practice of deterrence is premised on a limited number of gestures, signals, and linguistic devices that are meant, as Schelling (1966:113) put it, to ‘‘getting the right signal across.’’ The same goes with the practice of multilateralism, which rests on a set of political and social patterns that establish the boundaries of action in a mutually intelligible fashion. These structuring effects, in turn, allow for the development of common frameworks for appraising global events. Multilateral dialog serves not only to find joint solutions; it also makes it possible for various actors to zoom in on the definition of the issue at hand—a particularly important step on the global stage.

The point is certainly not that the multilateral procedure leads everybody to agree on everything—that would be as impossible as counterproductive. Theoretically speaking, there is room for skepticism that multilateralism may ever allow communicative rationality at the global level (see Risse 2000; Diez and Steans 2005). With such a diverse and uneven playing field, one can doubt that discursive engagement, in and of itself, can lead to common lifeworlds. Instead, what the practice of multilateralism fosters is the emergence of a shared framework of interaction—for example, a common linguistic repertoire—that allows global actors to make sense of world politics in mutually recognizable ways. Of course, they may not agree on the specific actions to be taken, but at least they can build on an established pattern of political interaction to deal with the problem at hand—sometimes even before it emerges in acute form. In today’s pluralistic world, that would already be a considerable achievement.

In that sense, multilateralism may well be a constitutive practice of what Lu (2009) calls ‘‘political friendship among peoples.’’ The axiomatic practice of principled and inclusive dialog is quite apparent in the way she describes this social structure: ‘‘While conflicts, especially over the distribution of goods and burdens, will inevitably arise, under conditions of political friendship among peoples, they will be negotiated within a global background context of norms and institutions based on mutual recognition, equity in the distribution of burdens and benefits of global cooperation, and power-sharing in the institutions of global governance rather than domination by any group’’ (2009:54–55). In a world where multilateralism becomes an end in itself, this ideal pattern emerges out of the structuring effects of axiomatic practice: take the case of NATO, for instance, which has recently had to manage, through the multilateral practice, fairly strong internal dissent (Pouliot 2006). While clashing views and interests will never go away in our particularly diverse world, as pessimists are quick to emphasize (for example, Dahl 1999), the management of discord is certainly made easier by shared patterns of dialog based on mutually recognizable frameworks.

#### Extinction

**Masciulli 11**—Professor of Political Science @ St Thomas University [Joseph Masciulli, “The Governance Challenge for Global Political and Technoscientific Leaders in an Era of Globalization and Globalizing Technologies,” Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society February 2011 vol. 31 no. 1 pg. 3-5]

What is most to be feared is enhanced global disorder resulting from the combination of weak global regulations; the unforeseen destructive consequences of converging technologies and economic globalization; military competition among the great powers; and the prevalent biases of short-term thinking held by most leaders and elites. But no practical person would wish that such a disorder scenario come true, given all the weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) available now or which will surely become available in the foreseeable future. As converging technologies united by IT, cognitive science, nanotechnology, and robotics advance synergistically in monitored and unmonitored laboratories, we may be blindsided by these future developments brought about by technoscientists with a variety of good or destructive or mercenary motives. The current laudable but problematic openness about publishing scientific results on the Internet would contribute greatly to such negative outcomes.

To be sure, if the global disorder-emergency scenario occurred because of postmodern terrorism or rogue states using biological, chemical, or nuclear WMDs, or a regional war with nuclear weapons in the Middle East or South Asia, there might well be a positive result for global governance. Such a global emergency might unite the global great and major powers in the conviction that a global concert was necessary for their survival and planetary survival as well. In such a global great power concert, basic rules of economic, security, and legal order would be uncompromisingly enforced both globally and in the particular regions where they held hegemonic status. That concert scenario, however, is flawed by the limited legitimacy of its structure based on the members having the greatest hard and soft power on planet Earth.

At the base of our concerns, I would argue, are human proclivities for narrow, short-term thinking tied to individual self-interest or corporate and national interests in decision making. For globalization, though propelled by technologies of various kinds, “remains an essentially human phenomenon . . . and the main drivers for the establishment and uses of disseminative systems are hardy perennials: profit, convenience, greed, relative advantage, curiosity, demonstrations of prowess, ideological fervor, malign destructiveness.” These human drives and capacities will not disappear. Their “manifestations now extend considerably beyond more familiarly empowered governmental, technoscientific and corporate actors to include even individuals: terrorists, computer hackers and rogue market traders” (Whitman, 2005, p. 104).

In this dangerous world, if people are to have their human dignity recognized and enjoy their human rights, above all, to life, security, a healthy environment, and freedom, we need new forms of comprehensive global regulation and control. Such effective global leadership and governance with robust enforcement powers alone can adequately respond to destructive current global problems, and prevent new ones. However, successful human adaptation and innovation to our current complex environment through the social construction of effective global governance will be a daunting collective task for global political and technoscientific leaders and citizens. For our global society is caught in “the whirlpool of an accelerating process of modernization” that has for the most part “been left to its own devices” (Habermas, 2001, p. 112). We need to progress in human adaptation to and innovation for our complex and problematical global social and natural planetary environments through global governance. I suggest we need to begin by ending the prevalent biases of short-termism in thinking and acting and the false values attached to the narrow self-interest of individuals, corporations, and states.

I agree with Stephen Hawking that the long-term future of the human race must be in space. It will be difficult enough to avoid disaster on planet Earth in the next hundred years, let alone the next thousand, or million. . . . There have been a number of times in the past when its survival has been a question of touch and go. The Cuban missile crisis in 1962 was one of these. The frequency of such occasions is likely to increase in the future. We shall need great care and judgment to negotiate them all successfully. But I’m an optimist. If we can avoid disaster for the next two centuries, our species should be safe, as we spread into space. . . . But we are entering an increasingly dangerous period of our history. Our population and our use of the finite resources of planet Earth, are growing exponentially, along with our technical ability to change the environment for good or ill. But our genetic code still carries the selfish and aggressive instincts that were of survival advantage in the past. . . . Our only chance of long term survival is not to remain inward looking on planet Earth, but to spread out into space. We have made remarkable progress in the last hundred years. But if we want to continue beyond the next hundred years, our future is in space.” (Hawking, 2010)

Nonetheless, to reinvent humanity pluralistically in outer space and beyond will require securing our one and only global society and planet Earth through effective global governance in the foreseeable future. And our dilemma is that the enforcement powers of multilateral institutions are not likely to be strengthened because of the competition for greater (relative, not absolute) hard and soft power by the great and major powers. They seek their national or alliance superiority, or at least, parity, for the sake of their state’s survival and security now. Unless the global disorder-emergency scenario was to occur soon—God forbid—the great powers will most likely, recklessly and tragically, leave global survival and security to their longer term agendas. Pg. 4-5

#### Hegemony causes prolif

**Monteiro 12**\*Nuno P. Monteiro is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University [<http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00064>, “Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity is not Peaceful”]

A unipole carrying out a defensive-dominance strategy will seek to preserve all three aspects of the status quo: maintaining the territorial boundaries and international political alignments of all other states, as well as freezing the global distribution of power. 60 This strategy can lead to conflict in two ways, both of which stem from uncertainty about the unipole’s intentions. First, not knowing the extent of the unipole’s determination to pursue a strategy of defensive dominance may spur some minor powers to develop their capabilities. Second, uncertainty about the degree to which the unipole will oppose small changes to the status quo may lead some minor powers to attempt them. In both cases, the opposition of the unipole to these actions is likely to lead to war. In this section, I lay out these two pathways to conflict and then illustrate them with historical examples. To be sure, states can never be certain of other states’ intentions. 61 There are a couple of reasons, however, why this uncertainty increases in unipolarity, even when the unipole appears to be determined to maintain the status quo. First, other states cannot be certain that the unipole will always pursue nonrevisionist goals. This is particularly problematic because unipolarity minimizes the structural constraints on the unipole’s grand strategy. As Waltz writes, “Even if a dominant power behaves with moderation, restraint, and forbearance, weaker states will worry about its future behavior. . . . The absence of se rious threats to American security gives the United States wide latitude in making foreign policy choices.” 62 Second, unipolarity takes away the principal tool through which minor powers in bipolar and multipolar systems deal with uncertainty about great power intentions—alliances with other great powers. Whereas in these other systems minor powers can, in principle, attenuate the effects of uncertainty about great power intentions through external balancing, in a unipolar world no great power sponsor is present by definition. In effect, the systemic imbalance of power magnifies uncertainty about the unipole’s intentions. 63 Faced with this uncertainty, other states have two options. First, they can accommodate the unipole and minimize the chances of conºict but at the price of their external autonomy. 64 Accommodation is less risky for major powers because they can guarantee their own survival, and they stand to beneªt greatly from being part of the unipolar system. 65 Major powers are therefore unlikely to attempt to revise the status quo. Minor powers are also likely to accommodate the unipole, in an attempt to avoid entering a confrontation with a preponderant power. Thus, most states will accommodate the unipole because, as Wohlforth points out, the power differential rests in its favor. 66 Accommodation, however, entails greater risks for minor powers because their survival is not assured if the unipole should turn against them. Thus some of them are likely to implement a second strategic option—resisting the unipole. The structure of the international system does not entirely determine whether or not a minor power accommodates the unipole. Still, structure conditions the likelihood of accommodation in two ways. To begin, a necessary part of a strategy of dominance is the creation of alliances or informal security commitments with regional powers. Such regional powers, however, are likely to have experienced conflict with, or a grievance toward, at least some of its neighboring minor powers. The latter are more likely to adopt a recalcitrant posture. Additionally, by narrowing their opportunities for regional integration and security maximization, the unipole’s interference with the regional balance of power is likely to lower the value of the status quo for these minor powers. 67 As the literature on the “value of peace” shows, countries that attribute a low value to the status quo are more risk acceptant. This argument helps explain, for example, Japan’s decision to attack the United States in 1941 and Syria’s and Egypt’s decision to attack Israel in 1973. 68 In both cases, aggressor states knew that their capabilities were significantly weaker than those of their targets. They were nonetheless willing to run the risk of launching attacks because they found the prewar status quo unacceptable. 69 Thus, for these states, the costs of balancing were lower relative to those of bandwagoning. In an international system with more than one great power, recalcitrant minor powers would, in principle, be able to balance externally by finding a great power sponsor. 70 In unipolarity, however, no such sponsors exist. 71 Only major powers are available, but because their survival is already guaranteed, they are likely to accommodate the unipole. And even if some do not, they are unlikely to meet a recalcitrant minor power’s security needs given that they possess only limited power-projection capabilities. 72 As such, recalcitrant minor powers must defend themselves, which puts them in a position of extreme selfhelp. There are four characteristics common to states in this position: (1) anarchy, (2) uncertainty about other states’ intentions, (3) insufªcient capabilities to deter a great power, and (4) no potential great power sponsor with whom to form a balancing coalition. The ªrst two characteristics are common to all states in all types of polarity. The third is part of the rough-and-tumble of minor powers in any system. The fourth, however, is unique to recalcitrant minor powers in unipolarity. This dire situation places recalcitrant minor powers at risk for as long as they lack the capability to defend themselves. They depend on the goodwill of the unipole and must worry that the unipole will shift to a strategy of offensive dominance or disengagement. Recalcitrant minor powers will therefore attempt to bolster their capabilities through internal balancing. To deter an eventual attack by the unipole and bolster their chances of survival in the event deterrence fails, recalcitrant minor powers will attempt to reinforce their conventional defenses, develop the most effective asymmetric strategies possible, and, most likely in the nuclear age, try to acquire the ultimate deterrent—survivable nuclear weapons. 73 In so doing, they seek to become major powers. Defensive dominance, however, also gives the unipole reason to oppose any such revisions to the status quo. First, such revisions decrease the benefits of systemic leadership and limit the unipole’s ability to convert its relative power advantage into favorable outcomes. In the case of nuclear weapons, this limitation is all but irreversible, virtually guaranteeing the recalcitrant regime immunity against any attempt to coerce or overthrow it. Second, proliferation has the potential to produce regional instability, **raising** the **risk of arms races**. These would force the unipole to increase defense spending or accept a narrower overall relative power advantage. Third, proliferation would lead to the emergence of a recalcitrant major power that could become the harbinger of an unwanted large-scale balancing attempt.

## 2NC

### Exts – No War

#### They have a flawed psychological bias – prefer our evidence

**Fettweis 10** – Professor of national security affairs @ U.S. Naval War College (Chris, Georgetown University Press, “Dangerous times?: the international politics of great power peace” Google Books) Jacome

Hegemony’s Psychological Appeal

Raison d'etat cannot entirely account for the anathematic status of strategic restraint. Many people simply prefer internationalism and enjoy the prestige it appears to confer. It is human to desire greatness, to want to belong to the best team, political party or state. While all people everywhere take pride in their country or their culture, Americans have long been exceptional in their exceptionalism." The pleasure and pride that the citizens of Rome felt toward their empire is similar to that which Americans hold toward their republic. Like all people, they do not readily accept being second-best in anything, from math scores to basketball to automobile quality. "Americans love a winner," Patton told his troops on the eve of D-Day, "and will not tolerate a loser. Americans play to win, all the time .... The very thought of losing is hateful to an American." Being "number one" has a cachet that will not soon weaken as long as people are competitive by nature. We all like to bask in the reflected glory of national greatness.

Triumphalism extends beyond the masses into the halls of government and ivorytowers of academia. Some of the more strident internationalists clearly feel hostility toward the idea of sharing the stage with other powers not so much because of actual threats such a situation might pose (since they know better than anyone that such threats are minimal), but rather because they recoil from the notion that the United States should relinquish its title as de facto champion of the world without a struggle. Strategic restraint to some people would herald the end ofthe American Century and all the glory and prestige that accompanies it. Schlesinger wistfully implored his restraint-minded countrymen to "recognize, as we return to the womb, that we are surrendering a magnificent dream."" Few people make international affairs their chosen profession in order to recommend that the United States withdraw from most international affairs. Strategists are professionally predisposed to favor internationalism, if for no other reason than that it is more interesting and appealing than restraint. The national honor, after all, is at stake,

### Exts – Other Countries Deter

#### Other countries will step it up

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But not so fast! According to AEI's Arthur Brooks, Heritage's Ed Feulner, and the Weekly Standard's Bill Kristol, any attempt to shrink the big government of garrisons and guns will "make the world a more dangerous place, and ... impoverish our future." Whose side are you on, tea partiers? Messrs Brooks, Feulner, and Kristol assert that military spending "is neither the true source of our fiscal woes, nor an appropriate target for indiscriminate budget-slashing in a still-dangerous world". They aver that "anyone seeking to restore our fiscal health should look at entitlements first, not across-the-board cuts aimed at our men and women in uniform". This is bogus. Sure, Medicare and Social Security cost more, but spending on war and its infrastructure remains a titanic expense. The path from debt, whether for governments or families, is to cut back across the board. If you're in the red and you spend a ridiculous amount of your income on your porcelain egret collection, the fact that you spend even more on rent and student loan payments is obviously no excuse not to cut back on egret miniatures. And, in fact, America's martial profligacy is a "true source of our fiscal woes". According to Joseph Stiglitz and Linda Bilmes: There is no question that the Iraq war added substantially to the federal debt. This was the first time in American history that the government cut taxes as it went to war. The result: a war completely funded by borrowing. U.S. debt soared from $6.4 trillion in March 2003 to $10 trillion in 2008 (before the financial crisis); at least a quarter of that increase is directly attributable to the war. And that doesn't include future health care and disability payments for veterans, which will add another half-trillion dollars to the debt.As a result of two costly wars funded by debt, our fiscal house was in dismal shape even before the financial crisis—and those fiscal woes compounded the downturn. Perhaps because they see the wrong-headedness of their line of defence, Messrs Brooks, Feulner, and Kristol retreat to the claim that in order to make money, America has to spend money: Furthermore, military spending is not a net drain on our economy. It is unrealistic to imagine a return to long-term prosperity if we face instability around the globe because of a hollowed-out U.S. military lacking the size and strength to defend American interests around the world. Global prosperity requires commerce and trade, and this requires peace. But the peace does not keep itself. Again: completely shabby. The real question at issue here is how much military spending is necessary to keep the trade routes open, and how much of that the United States must kick in. By asserting, rather audaciously, that America's level of military spending is not a "net drain" on the economy, they imply the return on the marginal trillion is positive. I doubt it. The return on the three trillion blown on the war on Iraq, for example, is certainly much, much, much less than zero once the cost of removing financial and human capital from productive uses is taken into account. Also, if prosperity requires peace, it's utterly mysterious how starting expensive wars is supposed to help. When thinking about peace as a global public good, it can help to recall that the United States is not the only country that benefits from it. Suppose the United States were to cut its military budget in half to something like the size of the combined budgets of the next five or six countries. This might not suffice if you're itching to invade Yeman, Iran, and who knows what else Mr Kristol's got his eye on. But if the argument is that the purpose of military spending is to secure a calm climate conducive to global trade, it's hard to believe $350 billion per annum will not suffice. But let's say it doesn't, for the sake of argument. Will nations with an equally strong interest in keeping the peace simply faint on their divans whenever a commerce-threatening war breaks out? Of course not. Even the French are perfectly capable of keeping the sea lanes open. The reality is that much of the world is free-riding off the security provided by American military dominance. Were American taxpayers to refuse to bear so much of the burden of keeping the world safe for Danish container ships, **other countries** **would** surely **step up**. Furthermore, considerations of basic distributive fairness suggest they should.

### a/t: Statistics

#### **Statistics go our way –our evidence looks at holistic history and looks at wars directly involved by the U.s.**

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How well, then, does the argument that unipolar systems are peaceful account for the first two decades of unipolarity since the end of the Cold War? Table 1 presents a list of great powers divided into three periods: 1816 to 1945, multipolarity; 1946 to 1989, bipolarity; and since 1990, unipolarity.46 Table 2 presents summary data about the incidence of war during each of these periods. Unipolarity is the most conflict prone of all the systems, according to at least two important criteria: the percentage of years that great powers spend at war and the incidence of war involving great powers. In multipolarity, 18 percent of great power years were spent at war. In bipolarity, the ratio is 16 percent. In unipolarity, however, a remarkable 59 percent of great power years until now were spent at war. This is by far the highest percentage in all three systems. Furthermore, during periods of multipolarity and bipolarity, the probability that war involving a great power would break out in any given year was, respectively, 4.2 percent and 3.4 percent. Under unipolarity, it is 18.2 percent—or more than four times higher.47 These figures provide no evidence that unipolarity is peaceful.48

In sum, the argument that unipolarity makes for peace is heavily weighted toward interactions among the most powerful states in the system. This should come as no surprise given that Wohlforth makes a structural argument: peace ºows from the unipolar structure of international politics, not from any particular characteristic of the unipole.49 Structural analyses of the international system are usually centered on interactions between great powers.50 As Waltz writes, “The theory, like the story, of international politics is written in terms of the great powers of an era.”51 In the sections that follow, however, I show that in the case of unipolarity, an investigation of its peacefulness must consider potential causes of conflict beyond interactions between the most important states in the system.

#### Yes, we have a chart for your viewing pleasure



### a/t: Asia War

#### Or Asian war

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During this time Asia itself—sometimes defined as including China, India, Japan, and Russia and comprising perhaps half the world's population—had an occasional impact on the great powers, but it was never a primary focus. In the past two decades, however, Asia has emerged as a region whose economic, military, and diplomatic power has begun to rival and perhaps even exceed that of Europe. Its growing influence gives scholars a wonderful opportunity in the fields of international relations generally and Asian security specifically to produce increasingly rigorous and theoretically sophisticated work. Because Europe was so important for so long a period, in seeking to understand international relations, scholars have often simply deployed concepts, theories, and experiences derived from the European experience to project onto and explain Asia. **This approach is problematic at best**. Eurocentric ideas have yielded several mistaken conclusions and predictions about conflict and alignment behavior in Asia. For example, since the early 1990s many Western analysts have predicted dire scenarios for Asia, whereas many Asian experts have expressed growing optimism about the region's future. 4 It is an open question whether Asia, with its very different political economy, history, culture, and demographics, will ever function like the European state system. This is not to criticize European-derived theories purely because they are based on the Western experience: The origins of a theory are not necessarily relevant to its applicability. Rather these theories do a poor job as they are applied to Asia; what I seek to show in this article is that more careful attention to their application can strengthen the theories themselves.

In this article I make two claims about the levels of conflict and types of alignment behavior in Asia. First, I argue that the pessimistic predictions of Western scholars after the end of the Cold War that Asia would experience a period of increased arms racing and power politics has largely failed to materialize, a reality that scholars must confront if they are to develop a better understanding of Asian relations. Second, contrary to the expectations of standard formulations of realism, and although U.S. power confounds the issue, Asian states do not appear to be balancing against rising powers such as China. Rather they seem to be bandwagoning. [End Page 58]

I make these claims with great care. Asia is empirically rich and, in many ways, different from the West. Thus efforts to explain Asian issues using international relations theories largely derived inductively from the European experience can be problematic. Focusing exclusively on Asia's differences, however, runs the risk of essentializing the region, resulting in the sort of ori- entalist analysis that most scholars have correctly avoided. 5 I am not making a plea for research that includes a touch of realism, a dash of constructivism, and a pinch of liberalism. 6 The same social-scientific standards—falsifiability, generalizability, and clear causal logic—should apply in the study of Asian international relations as has been applied to the study of Europe. To achieve this, scholars must not dismiss evidence that does not fit their theories. Instead they must consider such evidence and sharpen their propositions so that they may be falsified.

Many of the criticisms that I make in this article could apply to other international relations theories such as liberalism or constructivism. I have chosen to focus on realist approaches because of their wide use in Western scholarship on Asia. In addition, determining which predictions emerge from which variant of realist theory is often the subject of heated debate; in particular, efforts to single out predictions that apply to Asia can be extremely frustrating. 7

I have three caveats: First, I am not claiming a priori that difference will triumph over similarity. Whether Asian and Western international relations are different is an open question, and in many cases scholars may conclude that there are no significant differences. Instead of ignoring or dismissing potential differences as unimportant, however, scholars should ask: Is this situation different? And if so, why? Such questions are likely to yield useful answers not only for scholars of international relations but also for those specializing in either security or Asian studies.

Second, scholarship on Asian international relations from all perspectives is increasingly theoretically rich and empirically sophisticated. Research from the realist and liberal schools has explored issues such as U.S.-China and U.S.-Japan relations, as well as the changing dynamics of the Japan-South [End Page 59] Korea-U.S. alliance. 8 Literature with a cultural or constructivist perspective has addressed topics including the formation of identity, prostitution and its relationship to U.S. overseas troop deployments, and antimilitarist sentiment in Japan. 9 More historically oriented work has emerged that challenges all of the prevailing paradigms. 10 Despite these encouraging trends, such work remains the exception rather than the norm.

Finally, the concept of "Asia" lends itself to highly problematic and often sweeping generalizations. The term "Asia" often refers to a geographic area that takes in Russia and Japan, encompasses the entire Pacific Ocean including Australia, and ranges as far west as India and Pakistan. These countries have different cultures, histories, political institutions, economies, geographic features, and climates. Accordingly, wherever possible I refer either to individual countries, to Northeast Asia (comprising Japan, China, the Korean Peninsula, and occasionally Russia), or to Southeast Asia (whose principal countries include Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam). This article does not cover South Asia (principally the countries of Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka). When I do refer to Asia as a whole, it is mainly to differentiate it from "the West." 11 [End Page 60]

This article is composed of three major sections. In the first section, I explain why the pessimistic predictions of the 1990s about a return of power politics to Asia have not materialized and why scholarship needs to acknowledge this fact. In the second section, I argue that the Chinese experience of the past two decades poses a challenge to realist theories. The third section argues that Asian countries balance differently from countries in the West. I conclude by discussing the tension between area studies and political science theorizing in the field of comparative politics. I argue that this tension is healthy because it forces both sides of the debate to sharpen their scholarship. The field of international relations can benefit from such a discussion, as well. Elevating the Asian experience to a central place in the study of international relations will provide an excellent opportunity to inject vitality into the stale paradigm wars that currently characterize the field.

Post-Cold War Pessimism over Asia

Following the end of the Cold War in 1991, some scholars in the West began to predict that Asia was "ripe for rivalry." 12 They based this prediction on the following factors: wide disparities in the levels of economic and military power among nations in the region; their different political systems, ranging from democratic to totalitarian; historical animosities; and the lack of international institutions. Many scholars thus envisaged a return of power politics after decades when conflict in Asia was dominated by the Cold War tension between the United States and the Soviet Union. In addition, scholars envisaged a return of arms racing and the possibility of major conflict among Asian countries, [End Page 61] almost all of which had rapidly changing internal and external environments. More specific predictions included the growing possibility of Japanese rearmament; 13 increased Chinese adventurism spurred by China's rising power and ostensibly revisionist intentions; 14 conflict or war over the status of Taiwan; 15 terrorist or missile attacks from a rogue North Korea against South Korea, Japan, or even the United States; 16 and arms racing or even conflict in Southeast Asia, prompted in part by unresolved territorial disputes. 17 [End Page 62]

More than a dozen years have passed since the end of the Cold War, yet none of these pessimistic predictions have come to pass. Indeed there has not been a major war in Asia since the 1978-79 Vietnam-Cambodia-China conflict; and with only a few exceptions (North Korea and Taiwan), Asian countries do not fear for their survival. Japan, though powerful, has not rearmed to the extent it could. China seems no more revisionist or adventurous now than it was before the end of the Cold War. And no Asian country appears to be balancing against China. In contrast to the period 1950-80, the past two decades have witnessed enduring regional stability and minimal conflict. Scholars should directly confront these anomalies, rather than dismissing them.

Social scientists can learn as much from events that do not occur as from those that do. The case of Asian security provides an opportunity to examine the usefulness of accepted international relations paradigms and to determine how the assumptions underlying these theories can become misspecified. Some scholars have smuggled ancillary and ad hoc hypotheses about preferences into realist, institutionalist, and constructivist theories to make them fit various aspects of the Asian cases, including: assumptions about an irrational North Korean leadership, predictions of an expansionist and revisionist China, and depictions of Japanese foreign policy as "abnormal." 18 Social science moves forward from the clear statement of a theory, its causal logic, and its predictions. Just as important, however, is the rigorous assessment of the theory, especially if predictions flowing from it fail to materialize. Exploring why scholars have misunderstood Asia is both a fruitful and a necessary theoretical exercise.

Two major problems exist with many of the pessimistic predictions about Asia. First, when confronted with the non-balancing of Asian states against China, the lack of Japanese rearmament, and five decades of non-invasion by North Korea, scholars typically respond: Just wait. This reply, however, is intellectually ambiguous. Although it would be unfair to expect instantaneous national responses to changing international conditions, a dozen years would seem to be long enough to detect at least some change. Indeed Asian nations have historically shown an ability to respond quickly to changing circumstances. The Meiji restoration in Japan in 1868 was a remarkable example of governmental response to European and American encroachment, and by 1874 [End Page 63] Japan had emerged from centuries of isolation to occupy Taiwan. 19 More recently, with the introduction of market reforms in late 1978, when Deng Xiaoping famously declared, "To get rich is glorious," the Chinese have transformed themselves from diehard socialists to exuberant capitalists beginning less than three years after Mao's death in 1976. 20 In the absence of a specific time frame, the "just wait" response is unfalsifiable. Providing a causal logic that explains how and when scholars can expect changes is an important aspect of this response, and reasonable scholars will accept that change may not be immediate but may occur over time. Without such a time frame, however, the "just wait" response is mere rhetorical wordplay designed to avoid troubling evidence.

A more rigorous response in the Chinese case would be to argue that conditions of balancing, not timing per se, are the critical factor. In this view, China's relatively slow military modernization and limited power projection capabilities suggest that its potential threat to other Asian countries is growing only slowly; thus the conditions necessary to produce costly all-out balancing efforts do not yet exist. Moreover, even though many of the conditions that theorists argue can lead to conflict do already exist in East Asia, the region has so far avoided both major and minor interstate conflict. Most significant, in less than two decades China has evolved from being a moribund and closed middle power to the most dynamic country in the region, with an economy that not only will soon surpass Japan's (if it has not already) but also shows many signs of continuing growth. This dramatic power transition has evoked hardly any response from China's neighbors. 21 By realist standards, China should be provoking balancing behavior, merely because its overall size and projected rate of growth are so high. [End Page 64]

Second, pessimistic predictions about Asia's future often suffer from incompletely specified evidentiary standards. **Scholars will frequently select evidence that supports their arguments and dismiss contradictory evidence as epiphenomenal**. For example, in his most recent book, John Mearsheimer argues that although Japan (and Germany) have "the potential in terms of population and wealth to become great powers...they depend on the United States for their security, and are effectively semi-sovereign states, not great powers." 22 This begs a number of questions: For instance, why define Japan, which has the second largest economy in the world, as "semi-sovereign"? Indeed why would such an economically advanced state ever allow itself to remain "semi-sovereign"? Mearsheimer's book is focused on building a theory of offensive realism, but the logic of offensive realism would lead to the conclusion that Japan should have rearmed long ago. The onus is on those predicting an increase in power politics in Asia to state clearly what evidence would falsify their arguments or challenge their assumptions, not to explain away objections or ignore contradictory evidence. A clearer explication of their hypotheses and the refutable propositions would be a genuine contribution to the field.

More than a dozen years after the end of the Cold War, much of Asia bears little resemblance to the picture painted by the pessimists. Although the years 1950-80 saw numerous armed conflicts, since then there has been no major interstate war in either Northeast or Southeast Asia. Countries do not fear for their survival in either area. In Northeast Asia, rivalry and power politics remain muted. Japan has not rearmed, China shows little sign of having revisionist tendencies, and North Korea has neither imploded nor exploded. Southeast Asia, as well, remains free of the kinds of arms races and power politics that some have expected. As Muthiah Alagappa writes, "Viewed through the ahistorical realist lens, the contemporary security challenges could indeed suggest that Asia is a dangerous place. But a comprehensive historical view would suggest otherwise. Although Asia still faces serious internal and international challenges, there are fewer challenges than before and most of the region's disputes and conflicts have stabilized." 23 The field of international relations would be better served if the pessimists not only admitted this reality but also asked why this might be the case. Because China has such an important [End Page 65] influence on Northeast, Southeast, and even South Asia, I offer the tentative outline of such an explanation in the following section.

China, Hierarchy, and Balancing

The most hotly debated of the pessimistic predictions about Asia concerns the rise of a revisionist China. After two decades of rapid economic growth, China appears poised to become a great power once again. Thus for Richard Betts, the question becomes: "Should we want China to get rich or not? For realists, the answer should be no, since a rich China would overturn any balance of power." 24 Concern over a revisionist and destabilizing China has only increased in the past decade, as its economy continues to grow and its military and technological capabilities further expand. 25

Yet concern over a strong China may be misplaced. **Historically, it has been Chinese weakness that has led to chaos in Asia. When China has been strong and stable, order has been preserved**. East Asian regional relations have historically been hierarchic, more peaceful, and more stable than those in the West. 26 Until the intrusion of the Western powers in the nineteenth century, East Asian interstate relations were remarkably stable, punctuated only occasionally by [End Page 66] conflict between countries. The system was based on Chinese military and economic power but was reinforced through centuries of cultural exchange, and the units in the system were sovereign states that had political control over recognized geographic areas. East Asian international relations emphasized formal hierarchy among nations while allowing considerable informal equality. With China as the dominant state and surrounding countries as peripheral or secondary states, as long as hierarchy was observed there was little need for interstate war. This contrasts sharply with the Western tradition of international relations, which has consisted of formal equality between nation-states, informal hierarchy, and near-constant interstate conflict. 27

In the nineteenth century, the traditional East Asian order was demolished as both Western and Asian powers (in particular, Japan) scrambled to establish influence in the region. After a century of tumult in Asia, the late 1990s saw the reemergence of a strong and confident China, the growing stabilization of Vietnam, and increasingly consolidated political rule around the region. Although realists and liberals have tended to view modern East Asia as potentially unstable, if the system is experiencing a return to a pattern of hierarchy, the result may be increased stability.

China in 2003 appears to be reemerging as the gravitational center of East Asia. From a historical perspective, a rich and strong China could again cement regional stability. However, a century of chaos and change, and the growing influence of the rest of the world (in particular the United States), would lead one to conclude that a Chinese-led regional system would not look like its historical predecessor. Indeed Chung-in Moon argues that the Westphalian notion of sovereignty holds sway in Asia, although he also admits that this is frequently compromised and often contested. 28

Even if a hierarchic system does not reemerge in East Asia, and even if countries in the region do not adopt Westphalian norms in their entirety, the question [End Page 67] of whether a more powerful China will be a revisionist or a status quo state remains. 29 Although the evidence is mixed, much in China's behavior points to Beijing's desire to stabilize the region. According to political scientist Xinbo Wu, "Both the political leadership and the Chinese public believe that... China must regain major-power status." 30 Wu also notes that China perceives the international environment in the past decade as less hostile, and even benign. At the same time, Beijing views its relationship with Washington as potentially the most troubling, believing that the United States is the primary constraint on Chinese maneuvering and influence in the region. 31 It is not clear, however, if China intends to challenge the United States for regional supremacy. For three decades, China has made a conscious decision to confine itself to a relatively modest second-strike nuclear force, although this could change depending on U.S. actions regarding missile defense. 32

Does China have territorial or ideological ambitions? The evidence so far suggests that although China has outstanding territorial disputes with a number of countries, it has neither revisionist nor imperial aims. First, China has shown a genuine desire to join the world community, perhaps best reflected in its considerable efforts to become a member of the World Trade Organization. Wu notes that "the PRC understands that the best way to defend its interest is to make its own voice heard in the rule-making process," 33 by joining influential regional and international institutions. This explains Chinese active participation in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the ASEAN Regional Forum, and a number of other international institutions. 34 [End Page 68]

Second, in the past two decades China has resolved territorial disputes with Afghanistan, Burma, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Nepal, Pakistan, and Russia. More recently, it has resolved its disputes with Cambodia and Vietnam, renouncing support from the Khmer Rouge and embracing the Paris Peace Accords of 1991 that brought elections to Cambodia, and normalizing relations and delineating its border with Vietnam. 35 Jianwei Wang writes that "the fact that no war for territory has been fought in East Asia since the 1980s indicates a tendency to seek peaceful settlement of the remaining disputes." 36 On maritime disputes, Jean-Marc Blanchard notes that all Asian countries except Cambodia, North Korea, and Thailand have signed the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which has provided an institutional forum for parties to address disputes over fishing rights, trade routes, and other matters. 37

China does have unresolved territorial disputes over Taiwan, with ASEAN over the Spratly Islands, and with Japan over the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands. 38 Many other Asian nations also have unresolved territorial issues, resulting from a century of regional change, not from Chinese revisionism.For example, Japan and Russia have yet to resolve their dispute over the Northern territories, nor have Japan and Korea resolved their dispute over Tokto Island. **Thus these territorial disputes by themselves are not an indicator of Chinese ambitions.**

Countries in East Asia are also deciding how to deal with China's growing economy. Japanese investment in China continues to expand, and Japanese companies are increasingly seeing their fortunes tied to the Chinese market. Japan runs a $27 billion trade deficit with China. 39 Forty thousand Taiwanese companies have investments in the mainland, employing 10 million people. The Taiwanese central bank estimates that total mainland investment is between [End Page 69] $40 and $50 billion. 40 Sixty percent of Taiwanese foreign direct investment went to China in 2001, despite rising political tensions. The capitalization of China's stock market is the largest in Asia except for Japan's, despite being just a decade old—larger than the capitalization of stock markets in Brazil, Hong Kong, India, Mexico, South Korea, or Taiwan. 41

The growing importance of China's economy in some ways parallels China's historical role. Historical precedents may not be tremendously helpful, however, in assessing whether hierarchy will reemerge in Asia, because other Asian nations' willingness to accept subordinate positions in a Sino-centric hierarchy will depend on beliefs about how a dominant China would behave in the future. Additionally, it is not clear if China is willing to make more adjustments to calm fears or further integrate into the globalized world. This possibility deserves serious investigation, however, and it could be a fruitful line of research. Because the evidence of Chinese revisionism over the past decade of rapid growth is limited at best, scholars should explore the possibility that China will be a stabilizing force in Northeast and Southeast Asia. One way in which East Asian relations may manifest themselves differently than realists expect concerns the issue of whether other nations in the region fear China's growing power and will seek to balance against it, or whether those nations will instead choose to bandwagon with it.

Balancing versus Bandwagoning and the Role of the United States

Contrary to the conventional wisdom, Northeast and Southeast Asian nations are not obviously balancing against China. Relying on variations of "mercantile realism," "soft balancing," and "reluctant realism," 42 however, scholars contend that this is likely to change in the future. Yet any argument that balancing may occur in Asia or that balancing has a different meaning in Asia is an admission that such countries are not acting as balance of power realists expect. [End Page 70] Although the issue of balancing is complicated by the presence of U.S. diplomatic, economic, cultural, and military power in Asia, it is still possible to make tentative assessments about the region. Instead of assuming that Asia will balance rising Chinese power, posing this as a question would be a more productive exercise. 43

Hierarchy can be global as well as regional, and the United States is clearly the dominant state both in the international order and in Asia. This has important implications for scholarly understanding of the region. As China continues on the path of economic growth and military modernization, the key question is whether the United States can or will allow China to resume its place atop the Asian regional hierarchy. As this section shows, the answer to this question is not obvious. It is difficult to predict the reaction of other Asian nations to the possibility of increased U.S.-Chinese confrontation as a result of continued Chinese economic and military growth. If, as realists expect, Asian nations do not balance against China, a U.S. attempt to form a balancing coalition with East Asian states to contain China could be highly problematic. In addition, **if the U**nited **S**tates **withdraws significantly from the region, Asia may not become the dangerous or unstable region that balance of power adherents would suggest**, because other nations may acquiesce to China's central position in Asia. 44

Discerning balancing behavior in Asia is especially difficult given the overwhelming dominance of U.S. power in the region. As argued by Michael Mastanduno and others, the conventional view is that by balancing China, the United States acts as a stabilizing force in the region. According to Mastanduno, "American power and presence have helped to keep traditional power rivals in the region from engaging in significant conflict and have reassured smaller states who have traditionally been vulnerable to major regional wars." 45 The U.S. alliance system in Northeast and Southeast Asia, as well as [End Page 71] the provision of naval facilities to the United States by Singapore and the Philippines, are manifestations of this balancing behavior. The implication is that there would be considerably more conflict in the region were the United States to pull back or otherwise reduce its military presence. 46

The ability of the United States to maintain regional peace and stability, however, **especially in Northeast Asia**, is an open question. As Alagappa notes, "**The claim that stability in Northeast Asia is predicated on the U.S. role rests on several controversial assertions**...that the United States checks China's growing power and influence, which is feared by other Asian states; [and] that nearly all countries trust and prefer the United States....[However,] containment of China does not appeal to many Asian states." 47 Although the United States still retains overwhelming power in the region, its scope is considerably smaller than it was at its height a quarter century ago. In addition, both East Asian and Southeast Asian countries have grown significantly stronger, richer, and generally more stable. This transition at least requires an explanation. That the United States plays an important security role in Asia is relatively uncontroversial. Whether some type of U.S. withdrawal would be deleterious for the region is far more questionable.

Mastanduno writes that U.S. hegemony in Asia is incomplete in many respects and functions more as a "holding operation." 48 And although Avery Goldstein argues that balancing does occur in Asia, he too suggests that its contribution to regional security is less clear. 49 The distribution of power and potential for conflict do not lead to obvious bipolarity or multipolarity. 50 Part of what makes understanding Asia so difficult is this complexity. Indeed some scholars have argued that underlying the core U.S. strategy is the belief that China's future behavior can be changed in a positive direction, through either democratization or integration into the global economy (or some combination of both), and that engagement is a policy tool toward that end. 51 [End Page 72]

Realism's Japan Problem

Japan's foreign policy provides perhaps the strongest evidence to date that balancing is not occurring in Asia as realist theories would predict. For the past twenty years, realists have consistently predicted that Japan would rearm, or at least become increasingly assertive in parallel with its growing economic power, but it has not. Although Japan is very powerful, it has not yet adopted the trappings of a great power. In contrast to realists who argue that power considerations will ultimately influence Japanese foreign policy, and in contrast to constructivists who argue that Japan's culture or domestic politics explain its foreign policy, 52 I offer another explanation.

Scholars have spent decades speculating about whether and when Japan might become a "normal" power. 53 This is the wrong question. Arguments about whether Japan is "normal" or "militant" essentialize the country and miss the point. Japan invaded other Asian states a century ago because the system in Asia was highly unstable and Japan sought to protect itself. In the current era, Japan has little to gain from challenging either a strong China or the United States, but much to lose by starting great power competition. Geography, population, and economics mean not only that Japan benefits from a strong international order, but also that it is relatively safe from military threats.

There are two major realist explanations for Japan's foreign policy behavior, both of which are often conflated in the literature. The first is the great power explanation, which holds that Japan is so rich and technologically advanced that it will soon want to become a great power once again (this is the "power maximization" hypothesis). Second is the umbrella (or "power satisfaction") explanation: According to this hypothesis, when U.S. forces withdraw from Japan, it will rearm and become a normal power. 54 [End Page 73]

These explanations are mutually incompatible: Japan cannot be a normal great power and yet be protected by the U.S. security umbrella. Of the two, the power maximization hypothesis is most easily falsified. Realists have no explanation for why Japan, the world's second-largest economy, has not sought to balance or challenge the United States (the world's largest power) or why Japan has not attempted to provide for its own security. As Waltz has written, "Countries with great power economics have become great military powers, whether or not reluctantly." 55 In addition to having the world's second largest economy, Japan is arguably the world's finest manufacturing nation and one of it most technologically sophisticated. Yet not only does Japan lack aircraft carriers, intercontinental missiles, and nuclear weapons, but it does not send troops abroad. In sum, Japan is hard to invade, but it also evinces almost no significant military or diplomatic strength. So although Japan is relatively strong, it has not rearmed to the extent it could, nor has it rearmed to the extent that a "great power" would (see Table 1).

In support of the great power explanation, Michael Desch offers evidence of Japanese supposed intentions: marginally increased defense spending, pursuit of a virtual nuclear deterrent, and growing nationalistic rhetoric from selected politicians. 56 Yet this evidence is speculative at best. The key is not the offhand remark of a right-wing politician, but rather that Japan could easily triple its defense budget and still spend only what other powers such as France and Germany do (Figure 1). In addition, Japan could modify its constitution, develop a nuclear arsenal, deploy intercontinental ballistic missiles, and build aircraft carriers. It could also forge a foreign policy independent from that of the United States and attempt to exert far more influence in diplomatic arenas. This would be convincing evidence that Japan is, or aspires to be, a great power. Discussion of Japan as a virtual, potential, or nascent power is simply an admission that Japan does not function as a typical realist nation-state. [End Page 74]

The U.S. umbrella explanation is also unconvincing, for at least two reasons. First, it does not explain why the second largest economic power in the international system would trust the world's only superpower to provide for its security. Threats arise through the mere existence of capabilities—intentions can always change for the worse. 57 As Robert Jervis writes, "Minds can be changed, new leaders can come to power, values can shift, new opportunities and dangers can arise." 58 A weak, peaceful country may alter its goals as it becomes stronger. Second, the umbrella explanation fails to account for why Japan did not doubt the U.S. commitment to its security in the past. Arguments about the U.S. umbrella implicitly assume that Japan is realist and would rearm if the United States departed the region. If this is true, and if there is no other factor that keeps Japanese foreign policy from becoming more assertive, then **Japan should have rearmed at least a decade ago**, when the Japanese economy was at its height and when Tokyo had many reasons to doubt the U.S. commitment to its defense.

A Japanese policymaker in 1985 might have concluded that, given the previous fifteen years or so of negative signals from Washington, the U.S. commitment to Japan was unlikely to endure. In 1969 President Richard Nixon had [End Page 75] called for "Asia for Asians" and began a major drawdown of U.S. troops and commitments to the region. 59 By 1985 **Japan had seen the U**nited **S**tates **abandon South Vietnam, withdraw recognition of Taiwan, and pull half of its troops out of South Korea**. In the mid-1980s U.S. concern over Japanese trading and economic policies was at its peak. This concern manifested itself in intense U.S. pressure on Japan to alter some of its economic agreements, among them the 1985 Plaza Accords that attempted to devalue the yen relative to the dollar, and the 1988 Structural Impediments Initiative that sought to force changes in Japan's domestic economic practices. 60 In addition, the United States had begun to pressure Japan over "burden sharing" and attempted to make the Japanese pay more for the U.S. troops already deployed. All these indicators [End Page 76] suggested that the United States would cease to be a reliable ally of Japan. In addition, Japanese economic growth was at its highest, national sentiment about Japan's future was increasingly optimistic, and Japan was by some measures a better technological and manufacturing country than the United States.

From a realist perspective, only the most naïve and myopic of leaders would focus solely on the present. Thus Japan has had ample reason to doubt the U.S. commitment to its defense. Yet in 1976 Tokyo pledged to keep defense spending at 1 percent of Japan's gross domestic product, which has essentially remained unchanged. In addition, Japanese leaders had little reaction to either the Vietnam or Taiwan pullouts by the United States. Further, in the mid-1980s there was no concomitant change in the policies of Japan's Self-Defense Forces. 61 Japan did not rearm despite real tensions with the United States in the 1980s, nor did it make any major changes in its foreign policy. 62

There is a third alternative concerning Japan's foreign policy, which I refer to as the hierarchic explanation. According to this explanation, Japan is a status quo secondary power that has not rearmed to the level it could because it has no need to, and because it has no intention of challenging either China or the United States for dominance in Asia. Japan does not fear for its survival, and it accepts the centrality of China in regional politics. The historical animosities and lingering mistrust over Japan for its colonial aggression in the late nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century are reasons sometimes cited for a fear of Japanese rearmament. In the late nineteenth century, Japan faced decaying and despotic Chinese and Korean monarchies, a significant regional power vacuum, and pressures from Western nations. Today the militaries of South Korea and China are well equipped, their economies are robust, and there is no threat of Western colonization. Thus it is unlikely that Japan needs or will seek to expand its diplomatic and military influence on the Asian landmass.

In addition to explaining the historical pattern of Japanese foreign policy, the hierarchic explanation generates a different set of questions about Japan's future. For example, could Japan tilt toward China? Could Japan see the United States as the real threat to its survival? If Washington were to pressure Tokyo to take sides in an increasingly acrimonious U.S.-China relationship, it is [End Page 77] not clear that Japan would antagonize a geographically proximate power for the sake of a tenuous alliance with a distant power. 63 In fact, there is evidence that Japan does not view its relationship with the United States as purely positive. There is also increasing evidence that the Japanese do not fear a strong China as much as they do a strong United States. A May 1995 Yomiuri Shimbun poll found that 26.6 percent of Japanese identified the United States as a security threat to their country, whereas only 21.3 percent identified China as a threat. 64 In countering the assumption that Japan has no choice but to rely on the United States, former Prime Minister Yashuiro Nakasone has said that "a worm can turn." 65 A more recent opinion poll by Asahi Shimbun in May 2001 found that 74 percent of the Japanese public opposed revision of article 9 of the constitution (which prohibits Japan from using force "as means of settling international disputes"). 66 And in a magazine article, politician Ozawa Ichiro, who makes no mention of China, does mention the need for multilateralism to protect Japan from "Anglo-Saxon principles." 67

As to whether Japan could tilt toward China, Ted Galen Carpenter writes, "[U.S.] officials who assume that a more active Japan will be an obedient junior partner of the United States are in for an unpleasant surprise. Tokyo shows signs of not only being more active on the security front, but also of being more independent of the United States. Nowhere is that trend more evident than with respect to policy toward China." 68 For example, Japan has made clear that it does not wish to be drawn into any conflict over the status of Taiwan. In fact, the United States cannot count on Japan to support or provide bases in the event of a China-Taiwan conflict. 69 Japanese cooperation with China is increasing [End Page 78] in other ways as well. Bilateral trade volume between Japan and China in 1997 amounted to $570 billion, fifty-two times greater than in 1972. China is now Japan's second-largest trading partner, and Japan ranks as China's largest trading partner. Moreover, China is the largest recipient of Japanese investment in Asia. 70

Japan is neither normal nor abnormal, militaristic nor pacifist. Its survival and economic health are best provided by a stable order. Neither China nor the United States threatens Japan militarily. Thus Japan has not seen fit to rearm extensively, despite its capacity to build aircraft carriers and nuclear weapons. 71 Furthermore, Japan has shown no signs of balancing against China.

South Korea, Vietnam, and Their Nonbalancing Behavior

Given the lack of evidence of Japanese balancing, might other countries in Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia—particularly South Korea and Vietnam—seek to balance China? First, if forced to choose between the United States and China, it is unclear which state either country would support. Second, **the importance of the U**nited **S**tates **in curtailing an Asian arms race may be overstated**. If the United States pulls out of the region, **China could take a greater role in organizing the system, and the countries of Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia would adjust—with order preserved.**

### a/t: Mid East War

#### Also Middle East war will never happen

**Ferguson 06 –** Professor of History at Harvard University, Senior Research Fellow of Jesus College, Oxford, and Senior Fellow of the Hoover Institution, Stanford(Niall, LA Times, July 24)

Could today's quarrel between Israelis and Hezbollah over Lebanon produce World War III? That's what Republican Newt Gingrich, the former speaker of the House, called it last week, echoing earlier fighting talk by Dan Gillerman, Israel's ambassador to the United Nations. Such language can — for now, at least — safely be dismissed as hyperbole. This crisis is not going to trigger another world war. Indeed, I do not expect it to produce even another Middle East war worthy of comparison with those of June 1967 or October 1973. In 1967, Israel fought four of its Arab neighbors — Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iraq. In 1973, Egypt and Syria attacked Israel. Such combinations are very hard to imagine today. Nor does it seem likely that Syria and Iran will escalate their involvement in the crisis beyond continuing their support for Hezbollah. Neither is in a position to risk a full-scale military confrontation with Israel, given the risk that this might precipitate an American military reaction. Crucially, Washington's consistent support for Israel is not matched by any great power support for Israel's neighbors. During the Cold War, by contrast, the risk was that a Middle East war could spill over into a superpower conflict. Henry Kissinger, secretary of State in the twilight of the Nixon presidency, first heard the news of an Arab-Israeli war at 6:15 a.m. on Oct. 6, 1973. Half an hour later, he was on the phone to the Soviet ambassador in Washington, Anatoly Dobrynin. Two weeks later, Kissinger flew to Moscow to meet the Soviet leader, Leonid Brezhnev. The stakes were high indeed. At one point during the 1973 crisis, as Brezhnev vainly tried to resist Kissinger's efforts to squeeze him out of the diplomatic loop, the White House issued DEFCON 3, putting American strategic nuclear forces on high alert. It is hard to imagine anything like that today. In any case, this war may soon be over. Most wars Israel has fought have been short, lasting a matter of days or weeks (six days in '67, three weeks in '73). Some Israeli sources say this one could be finished in a matter of days. That, at any rate, is clearly the assumption being made in Washington.

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has been in no hurry to get to the scene (she is due to arrive in Israel today). Nor has she scheduled any visits to Arab capitals. Compare this leisurely response to the frenetic shuttle diplomacy of the Kissinger era. While striving to secure a settlement between Israel and Syria, Rice's predecessor traveled 24,230 miles in just 34 days.

And yet there are other forms that an escalation of the Middle East conflict could conceivably take. A war between states may not be in the cards, much less a superpower conflict. What we must fear, however, is a spate of civil wars -- to be precise, ethnic conflicts -- across the region.

### 2NC Disease Impact

#### Heg stops coordination that’s key to solve disease

**Weber et al. 7 \***Steven Weber is a Professor of Political Science at UC-Berkeley and Director of the Institute of International Studies, Naazneen Barma, Matthew Kroenig, Ely Ratner, [“How Globalization Went Bad”, January-February 2007, Foreign Policy]

The same is true for global public health. Globalization is turning the world into an enormous petri dish for the incubation of infectious disease. Humans cannot outsmart disease, because it just evolves too quickly. Bacteria can reproduce a new generation in less than 30 minutes, while it takes us decades to come up with a new generation of antibiotics. **Solutions are only possible when and where we get the upper hand**. Poor countries where humans live in close proximity to farm animals are the best place to breed extremely dangerous zoonotic disease. **These are often the same countries, perhaps not entirely coincidentally, that feel threatened by American powe**r. Establishing an early warning system for these diseases—exactly what we lacked in the case of SARS a few years ago and exactly what we lack for avian flu today—will require a significant level of intervention into the very places that don’t want it. That will be true as long as international intervention means American interference. The most likely sources of the next ebola or HIV-like pandemic are the countries that simply won’t let U.S. or other Western agencies in, including the World Health Organization. Yet the threat is too arcane and not immediate enough for the West to force the issue. What’s needed is another great power to take over a piece of the work, a power that has more immediate interests in the countries where diseases incubate and one that is seen as less of a threat. **As long as the United States remains the world’s lone superpower, we’re not likely to get any help.** Even after HIV, SARS, and several years of mounting hysteria about avian flu, the world is still not ready for a viral pandemic in Southeast Asia or sub-Saharan Africa. America can’t change that alone.

#### Extinction

**GREGER 08 –** M.D., is Director of Public Health and Animal Agriculture at The Humane Society of the United States (Michael Greger, , Bird Flu: A Virus of Our Own Hatching, <http://birdflubook.com/a.php?id=111>)

Senate Majority Leader Frist describes the recent slew of emerging diseases in almost biblical terms: “All of these [new diseases] were advance patrols of a great army that is preparing way out of sight.”3146 Scientists like Joshua Lederberg don’t think this is mere rhetoric. He should know. Lederberg won the Nobel Prize in medicine at age 33 for his discoveries in bacterial evolution. Lederberg went on to become president of Rockefeller University. “Some people think I am being hysterical,” he said, referring to pandemic influenza, “but there are catastrophes ahead. We live in evolutionary competition with microbes—bacteria and viruses. There is no guarantee that we will be the survivors.”3147 There is a concept in host-parasite evolutionary dynamics called the Red Queen hypothesis, which attempts to describe the unremitting struggle between immune systems and the pathogens against which they fight, each constantly evolving to try to outsmart the other.3148 The name is taken from Lewis Carroll’s Through the Looking Glass in which the Red Queen instructs Alice, “Now, here, you see, it takes all the running you can do to keep in the same place.”3149 Because the pathogens keep evolving, our immune systems have to keep adapting as well just to keep up. According to the theory, animals who “stop running” go extinct. So far our immune systems have largely retained the upper hand

, but the fear is that given the current rate of disease emergence, the **human race is losing the race**.3150 In a Scientific American article titled, “Will We Survive?,” one of the world’s leading immunologists writes: Has the immune system, then, reached its apogee after the few hundred million years it had taken to develop? Can it respond in time to the new evolutionary challenges? These perfectly proper questions lack sure answers because we are in an utterly unprecedented situation [given the number of newly emerging infections].3151 The research team who wrote Beasts of the Earth conclude, “Considering that bacteria, viruses, and protozoa had a more than two-billion-year head start in this war, a victory by recently arrived Homo sapiens would be remarkable.”3152 Lederberg ardently believes that emerging viruses may imperil human society itself. Says NIH medical epidemiologist David Morens, When you look at the relationship between bugs and humans, the more important thing to look at is the bug. When an enterovirus like polio goes through the human gastrointestinal tract in three days, its genome mutates about two percent. That level of mutation—two percent of the genome—has taken the human species eight million years to accomplish. So who’s going to adapt to whom? Pitted against that kind of competition, Lederberg concludes that the human evolutionary capacity to keep up “may be dismissed as almost totally inconsequential.”3153 To help prevent the evolution of viruses as threatening as H5N1, the least we can do is take away a few billion feathered test tubes in which viruses can experiment, a few billion fewer spins at pandemic roulette. The human species has existed in something like our present form for approximately 200,000 years. “Such a long run should itself give us confidence that our species will continue to survive, at least insofar as the microbial world is concerned. Yet such optimism,” wrote the Ehrlich prize-winning former chair of zoology at the University College of London, “might easily transmute into a tune whistled whilst passing a graveyard.”3154

### a/t: Attempt at Heg Inev

**90’s us power declined – bush decided to withdraw from asia**

#### Power decline guarantees retrenchment

**MacDonald and Parent 11** (Paul, **Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College, and Joseph, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami. “Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment”. International Security** Spring 2011, Vol. 35, No. 4, Pages 7-44.)

This article has advanced three main arguments. First, retrenchment pessimists are incorrect when they suggest that retrenchment is an uncommon policy response to great power decline. States often curtail their commitments and mellow their ambitions as they fall in the ranks of great powers. Second and related, declining great powers react in a prompt and proportionate manner to their dwindling fortunes. They do this for the same reason that they tend to seize opportunities to expand: international incentives are strong inducements. In the high-stakes world of great power politics, states can seldom afford to fool themselves or pamper parochial interests when relative power is perilously slipping away. Third, the rate of relative decline explains not only the extent of retrenchment but also the form. The faster the rate of decline, the more likely states are to reform their militaries, increase reliance on allies, and refrain from using force in international disputes. Taken together, these findings suggest that retrenchment is an attractive strategy for dealing with great power decline. Although we make no claim that the rate of relative decline explains everything, we suggest that our study represents a solid first cut and that domestic political factors loom too large in discussions of power transitions and hegemonic change.

#### Policymakers won’t hold on to heg

**Macdonald and Parent 11** \* Paul-**Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College, and Joseph, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami [November/ December 2011, “The Wisdom of Retrenchment”** <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136510/joseph-m-parent-and-paul-k-macdonald/the-wisdom-of-retrenchment>]

Others warn that the U.S. political system is too fragmented to implement a coordinated policy of retrenchment. In this view, even if the foreign policy community unanimously subscribed to this strategy, it would be unable to outmaneuver lobbying groups and bureaucracies that favor a more activist approach. Electoral pressures reward lucrative defense contracts and chest-thumping stump speeches rather than sober appraisals of declining fortunes. Whatever leaders' preferences are, bureaucratic pressures promote conservative decisions, policy inertia, and big budgets -- none of which is likely to usher in an era of self-restraint. Despite deep partisan divides, however, Republicans and Democrats have often put aside their differences when it comes to foreign policy. After World War II, the United States did not revert to the isolationism of earlier periods: both parties backed massive programs to contain the Soviet Union. During the tempestuous 1960s, a consensus emerged in favor of détente with the Soviets. The 9/11 attacks generated bipartisan support for action against al Qaeda and its allies. Then, in the wake of the global financial crisis of 2008, politicians across the spectrum recognized the need to bring the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq to an end. When faced with pressing foreign policy challenges, U.S. politicians generally transcend ideological divides and forge common policies, sometimes expanding the United States' global commitments and sometimes contracting them. Today, electoral pressures support a more modest approach to foreign affairs. According to a 2009 study by the Pew Research Center, 70 percent of Americans would rather the United States share global leadership than go it alone. And a 2010 study by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs found that 79 percent of them thought the United States played the role of world policeman more than it should. Even on sacrosanct issues such as the defense budget, the public has demonstrated a willingness to consider reductions. In a 2010 study conducted by the Program for Public Consultation at the University of Maryland, 64 percent of respondents endorsed reductions in defense spending, supporting an average cut of $109 billion to the base-line defense budget. Institutional barriers to reform do remain. Yet when presidents have led, the bureaucrats have largely followed. Three successive administrations, beginning with that of Ronald Reagan, were able to tame congressional opposition and push through an ambitious realignment program that ultimately resulted in the closure of 100 military bases, saving $57 billion. In its 2010 defense budget, the Obama administration succeeded in canceling plans to acquire additional F-22 Raptors despite fierce resistance by lobbyists, members of Congress, and the air force brass. The 2010 budget also included cuts to the navy's fleet of stealth destroyers and various components of the army's next generation of manned ground vehicles. Thus, claims that retrenchment is politically impractical or improbable are unfounded. Just as a more humble foreign policy will invite neither instability nor decline, domestic political factors will not inevitably prevent timely reform. To chart a new course, U.S. policymakers need only possess foresight and will.

### a/t: Goldstein

**Gold stein is summarizing theories not supporting one- he concludes both ways their ev. is a straw person**

**The alternative isn’t a transition war-their author concedes**

Goldstein 7 \*Avery Goldstein, the David M. Knott Professor of Global Politics and International Relations at the University of Pennsylvania, Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute [2007, “Power transitions, institutions, and China's rise in East Asia: Theoretical expectations and evidence,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 30, No. 4&5, p. 639-682]

Institutionalist theory, especially as outlined in the work of Robert Keohane, offers grounds for qualified optimism that the rise of China is not necessarily destined to produce an intensification of international conflict. 20 Even under the conditions of anarchy that power-transition theorists expect to fuel a desire to maximize power compared with rivals, institutionalist theory indicates that states may rationally choose to create and sustain cooperation that promise benefits for all. International institutions can provide information and shape expectations in ways that clarify for a self-interested state that the price paid for seizing an immediate advantage may be that it forfeits the benefits available through sustained cooperation. Institutions serve this purpose by highlighting common interests and perhaps more importantly by providing transparency about state behavior. By enhancing transparency about behavior, institutions enable states to recognize that continued cooperation is conditional, establish the expectation that defection in pursuit of relative advantage will be punished and reciprocated, and thereby reduce the temptation for any state to treat those with whom it has been cooperating as gullible.21

Analysts who rely on this theoretical perspective envision the possibility that a rising China will remain eager to be integrated with, rather than challenge, the institutions of the US-led international order. Its logic also suggests reasons why China would be a satisfied participant rather than the dissatisfied challenger power-transition theory warns about. Cooperation need not be rooted in Chinese embrace of others' values or political beliefs, but simply recognition that integration with these institutions is essential to their own pursuit of wealth and power. And unlike the nervous anticipation of decline and challenge that power-transition theory posits, institutionalist theory highlights reasons why the US would be likely to encourage the assimilation of a rising China within the existing international order - Washington, too, is expected to recognize its own self-interest in the economic and security benefits available through expanding cooperation with a wealthier and more powerful China. 22

Institutionalist theory, then, directs attention to China's efforts since 1980 to 'open up' and join the international economic order that was established under American leadership beginning in the mid-twentieth century. The clearest manifestation of this trend was Beijing's accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001. But more generally, over the past 25 years China's leaders have recognized the economic benefits their country derives from international integration. Indeed, they now view their policies fostering trade and foreign direct investment as keys to sustaining the growth necessary for China to emerge as a true great power. 23 Institutionalist theory suggests that this self-interest is a powerful incentive for Beijing to mute conflicts with valued economic partners and to manage, if not resolve, security rivalries that could disrupt mutually beneficial cooperation.24 As such, institutionalist theory offers a perspective that sharply contrasts with the typically gloomy forecast offered by power-transition theory - intensifying conflict as a rising China assertively challenges the international order shaped by the long dominant US.

#### This transition will be uniquely peaceful

**Macdonald and Parent 11** (Paul, **Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College, and Joseph, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami. “Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment”. International Security** Spring 2011, Vol. 35, No. 4, Pages 7-44.)

Contrary to these predictions, our analysis suggests some grounds for optimism. Based on the historical track record of great powers facing acute relative decline, the United States should be able to retrench in the coming decades. In the next few years, the United States is ripe to overhaul its military, shift burdens to its allies, and work to decrease costly international commitments. It is likely to initiate and become embroiled in fewer militarized disputes than the average great power and to settle these disputes more amicably. Some might view this prospect with apprehension, fearing the steady erosion of U.S. credibility. Yet our analysis suggests that retrenchment need not signal weakness. Holding on to exposed and expensive commitments simply for the sake of one’s reputation is a greater geopolitical gamble than withdrawing to cheaper, more defensible frontiers.

Some observers might dispute our conclusions, arguing that hegemonic transitions are more conflict prone than other moments of acute relative decline. We counter that there are deductive and empirical reasons to doubt this argument. Theoretically, hegemonic powers should actually find it easier to manage acute relative decline. Fallen hegemons still have formidable capability, which threatens grave harm to any state that tries to cross them. Further, they are no longer the top target for balancing coalitions, and recovering hegemons may be influential because they can play a pivotal role in alliance formation. In addition, hegemonic powers, almost by definition, possess more extensive overseas commitments; they should be able to more readily identify and eliminate extraneous burdens without exposing vulnerabilities or exciting domestic populations.

We believe the empirical record supports these conclusions. In particular, periods of hegemonic transition do not appear more conflict prone than those of acute decline. The last reversal at the pinnacle of power was the Anglo- American transition, which took place around 1872 and was resolved without armed confrontation. The tenor of that transition may have been inºuenced by a number of factors: both states were democratic maritime empires, the United States was slowly emerging from the Civil War, and Great Britain could likely coast on a large lead in domestic capital stock. Although China and the United States differ in regime type, similar factors may work to cushion the impending Sino-American transition. Both are large, relatively secure continental great powers, a fact that mitigates potential geopolitical competition.93 China faces a variety of domestic political challenges, including strains among rival regions, which may complicate its ability to sustain its economic performance or engage in foreign policy adventurism.94

#### 15 cases it worked

**Parent and MacDonald 11** (Joseph M. Parent is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami. Paul K. MacDonald is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Wellesley College. “The Wisdom of Retrenchment: America Must Cut Back to Move Forward” http://www.ihavenet.com/World-United-States-The-Wisdom-of-Retrenchment-America-Must-Cut-Back-to-Move-Forward-Foreign-Affairs.html)

Even if a policy of retrenchment were possible to implement, would it work? **The historical record suggests it would**. Since 1870, there have been 18 cases in which a great power slipped in the rankings, as measured by its GDP relative to those of other great powers. Fifteen of those declining powers implemented some form of retrenchment. Far from inviting aggression, this policy resulted in those states' being more likely to avoid militarized disputes and to recover their former rank than the three declining great powers that did not adopt retrenchment: France in the 1880s, Germany in the 1930s, and Japan in the 1990s. Those states never recovered their former positions, unlike almost half of the 15 states that did retrench, including, for example, Russia in the 1880s and the United Kingdom in the first decade of the twentieth century.

### 2NC Tech Impact

#### And that means extinction categorically outweighs

**Ćirković 8**—Professor of Physics @ University of Novi Sad in Serbia and Senior Research Associate at the Astronomical Observatory of Belgrade [Milan M. Ćirković Ph.D. (Fellow of the Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies), “How can we reduce the risk of human extinction?,” Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies, September 17, 2008, pg. http://ieet.org/index.php/IEET/print/2606]

There is a discontinuity between risks that threaten 10 percent or even 99 percent of humanity and those that threaten 100 percent. For disasters killing less than all humanity, there is a good chance that the species could recover. If we value future human generations, then reducing extinction risks should dominate our considerations. Fortunately, most measures to reduce these risks also improve global security against a range of lesser catastrophes, and thus deserve support regardless of how much one worries about extinction.

## 1NR

### Uq

Obama win – average of polls up in key swing states – cook

#### Obama is ahead in all swing states although it’s close

**Kroll, 10/1/12 –** Mother Jones' Dark Money reporter. He is based in the DC bureau(Andy, Mother Jones, “New Poll: Mitt's Got a Serious Swing State Problem”,

<http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2012/10/poll-obama-ahead-romney-swing-states>

Veteran politicos and journalists who've done a few tours on the campaign trail like to say that, in a tight race, you shouldn't put much faith in national presidential polls. It's the state-level polls, especially those in the handful of fiercely fought battleground states, that really matter.

By that measure, President Obama has opened up a sizable lead over Mitt Romney with five weeks until Election Day. According to a new ABC News/Washington Post poll, Obama leads Romney 52 percent to 41 percent among likely voters in swing states, which include Ohio, Florida, North Carolina, and Virginia. Nationwide, 49 percent of likely voters say they'd vote for Obama in November, while 47 percent said the same for Romney.

Obama's swing state advantage in this latest poll doesn't appear to be a fluke. Last week, Quinnipiac University/New York Times/CBS News polls showed Obama ahead by 10 points in Ohio and nine in Florida. RealClearPolitics' polling averages in the top nine swing states show Obama ahead in all of them, albeit by single-digit margins.

These latest swing state polls suggest that Romney's path to 270 electoral college votes is slimmer than ever. Romney needs to win the bulk of the top nine swing states—Florida, Ohio, North Carolina, Iowa, New Hampshire, Virginia, Colorado, Wisconsin, and Nevada—to have a shot at prevailing on November 6.

#### Romney gains are a temporary bounce – his overall chance of winning is still only 15%

**Silver, 10/5/**12 – Nate, “Oct. 5: Day After Debate, Strong Swing State Polls for Romney,” <http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/>)

Polling trends can sometimes be odd in reaction to news events. One factor is that supporters of a particular candidate may be more enthusiastic, and more inclined to respond to surveys, after he gets a favorable development in the news cycle. The methodology that a pollster applies, particularly its likely voter model, may amplify or mitigate these effects.

The We Ask America polls, for instance, had a lot of voters who identified as Republican in their samples. I don’t think there’s necessarily anything wrong with that — I’d rather that pollsters give the most honest snapshot of what they were finding in the field on the day that they conducted their interviews. Part of the reason that critiques about “oversampling” Democrats or Republicans are misguided is because the party identification breakouts themselves provide interesting information. It’s logical to conclude, for instance, that Republicans may have been especially likely to respond to pollsters after Mr. Romney’s strong debate performance. That would also explain why Mr. Romney’s bounce was more modest in the Rasmussen Reports polls, as they weight their samples by party identification (a poor methodological choice, in my view), which may dampen the enthusiasm effect.

There is another type of polling bias, however, which is potentially more relevant when there is polling after a major development in the news cycle. Namely, polls are very probably biased toward high-information voters who take more interest in the news and are more likely to respond to political surveys. This issue may be more profound in automated polls, which have especially low response rates — often only 3 or 4 percent of the people they call respond to them.

So it’s hard to distinguish a genuine shift toward Mr. Romney, from a real but potentially temporary shift based on changes in voter enthusiasm, from an artificial change caused by a bias toward heavy news consumers.

But now there’s another complication: the government reported a strong jobs report on Friday, which changed the tone of the news cycle. To the extent that the polls reflected people’s reaction to the news coverage of the debate as much as the debate itself, the jobs report could blunt some of Mr. Romney’s momentum if the tenor of news coverage changes.

The FiveThirtyEight forecast did show a clear shift toward Mr. Romney on Friday, giving him a 15.1 percent chance of winning the Electoral College — up from 12.9 percent on Thursday.

#### Strong methodology problems with these newest polls

**Blumenthal, 10/5**/12 – editor of Pollster.com (Mark, “Obama-Romney Polls Start To See Romney Debate Bounce,” Huffington Post,

<http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/05/obama-romney-polls-debate_n_1943786.html>

Within the swing states, the only fresh data come from one-day, automated, recorded-voice polls conducted by both Rasmussen and We Ask America (a subsidiary of the Illinois Manufacturers Association) in Florida, Ohio and Virginia. Generally, pollsters prefer to call over several nights in order to make multiple attempts to interview voters who might not be at home or otherwise available on any one night. So these Rasmussen and We Ask America results should be interpreted with caution.

Five of the six one-night polls show single-digit shifts to Romney. The change on the Rasmussen surveys is relatively modest, averaging a roughly two-point gain for Romney on the margin. The We Ask America surveys show much bigger shifts. The more subtle changes are to be expected on the Rasmussen polls, since the pollster weights its samples to match party identification targets.

Another reason for caution: The one-night, automated surveys either miss voters in cell-phone-only households entirely (We Ask America) or rely on a small number of cell-phone-only interviews conducted with a non-random Internet panel (Rasmussen). Roughly one-third of U.S. adults now live in cell-phone-only households.

The new state polls have helped narrow the Obama-Romney margin on the HuffPost Pollster tracking model of the national popular vote. As of this writing, the HuffPost model, which is based on all available surveys both national and statewide, gives Obama a roughly three-point lead (48.3 to 45.2 percent), though it will continue to update as new polls become available.

Over the next week, new polls will be released using more rigorous methods, including national surveys that are usually more accurate than statewide surveys. The polls still to come will reach voters with more distance from their immediate reactions to Wednesday night's debate and will also begin to reflect any response to Friday's jobs report (showing the unemployment level declining to 7.8 percent).

#### The newest jobs report boosted Obama

**Kowalski, 10/5/**12 (Alex, Bloomberg, U.S. Jobless Rate Declines to 7.8%; 114,000 Jobs Added,

<http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-05/u-s-jobless-rate-unexpectedly-falls-to-7-8-114-000-jobs-added.html>

The unemployment rate in the U.S. unexpectedly fell to 7.8 percent in September, the lowest since President Barack Obama took office in January 2009, as employers took on more part-time workers.

The economy added 114,000 workers last month after a revised 142,000 gain in August that was more than initially estimated, Labor Department figures showed today in Washington. The jobless rate dropped from 8.1 percent, and hourly earnings climbed more than forecast.

“We’re seeing some firming in the labor market,” said Dean Maki, New York-based chief U.S. economist at Barclays Plc. “It’s still not booming or extraordinarily robust, but it is a labor market that we expect to continue to be firm enough to push the unemployment rate lower.”

Today’s report, the penultimate before the November presidential election, may give Obama a boost after he stumbled in this week’s debate against Republican challenger Mitt Romney. Stocks advanced, returning the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index above its highest close since 2007, as investors bet better job prospects will give workers the wherewithal to boost spending, helping cushion the economy from a global slowdown.

The S&P 500 Index rose 0.4 percent to 1,466.97 at 1:10 p.m. in New York. The yield on the benchmark 10-year Treasury note climbed to 1.72 percent from 1.67 percent late yesterday.

Obama used today’s report to press home his message that the economy is on the mend after the worst recession since the Great Depression.

Led to Crisis

“We’ve made too much progress to return to the policies that led to the crisis in the first place,” Obama said at a campaign rally in Fairfax, Virginia, a suburb of Washington.

Unemployment had been higher than 8 percent since February 2009, the longest stretch since monthly jobless figures were first compiled in 1948. The 7.8 percent matches the January 2009 figure.

The decline in the unemployment rate is “good news for Obama,” said Alan Abramowitz, a political scientist at Emory University in Atlanta. The drop below 8 percent is “symbolically important” to voters, he said.

#### Historically this means Obama is likely to win

**Silver, 10/5**/12 (Nate, “Jobs News Makes Obama’s Case Easier”

<http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/05/jobs-news-makes-obamas-case-easier/?gwh=93714D03872E6AAC10EE9E847E5F7B41#more-35589>

Historically, there has been no relationship at all between the unemployment rate on Election Day and the incumbent’s performance.

However, there has been a relationship between the change in the unemployment rate in the months leading up to the election and how well the incumbent does. The decline in unemployment under Mr. Obama this year since December is the largest in an election year since Ronald Reagan’s re-election bid, when it declined to 7.3 percent in Sept. 1984 from 8.3 percent in Dec. 1983.

The drop in unemployment alone is no guarantee of re-election — there was also a considerable drop in unemployment in 1976, and Gerald Ford lost.

However, the FiveThirtyEight economic index, which accounts for the payrolls numbers along with six other economic data series, would project a narrow re-election for Mr. Obama by about 3 percentage points — similar to Mr. Bush’s margin over John Kerry in 2004. Especially with the Friday jobs report, the economic numbers now seem just strong enough to make the incumbent a favorite for re-election, based on the way the public has evaluated their presidents historically.

I’m less inclined to predict what immediate effect the numbers will have on the polls — whether Friday’s news outweighs, for instance, Mr. Obama’s poor performance in Wednesday night’s debate. Mr. Obama did not win the election on Friday any more than he lost it on Wednesday.

But for the first time in a long while, Mr. Obama should be happy if the discussion turns toward the economy.

#### Jobs report shifts momentum – means Obama will win undecided voters

**Kuhnhenn, 10/5**/12 - Jim Kuhnhenn covers politics and the White House for The Associated Press. (Jim, “Analysis: Lower jobless number give Obama a positive trend line; is public feeling it?” Washington Post,

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/analysis-lower-jobless-number-give-obama-a-positive-trend-line-is-public-feeling-it/2012/10/05/88e6bd88-0f39-11e2-ba6c-07bd866eb71a_story.html>

John Sides, a political scientist at George Washington University who has examined the intersection of economic data and politics, said Obama could benefit simply from the good media coverage the jobs numbers might get after a debate where his performance was panned.

“It changes the story line, but that may be what affects voter behavior in the end,” Sides said. “A small number of undecided voters may be sensitive to good news and bad news about the two candidates. In that way the good economic news is helpful for Obama.”

#### Jobs report erases any movement Romney had from the debate

**Lee, 10/5**/12 (Don, Los Angeles Times, “Unemployment rate drops to 7.8% in September,” <http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-jobs-report-20121006,0,3135294.story>)

Stock investors reacted cautiously to the employment news. The White House cheered Friday's report, coming just two days after Obama's first debate with Republican challenger Mitt Romney.

"Given the dearth of positive news, it's still a welcomed report," said Harry Holzer, a professor of public policy at Georgetown University. For Obama, he added, "the timing of this may cut short any strong movement to Romney because of the bad debate."

The jobs report, the next-to-last one before the Nov. 6 election, takes away one of Romney's talking points — that, under Obama's watch, the economy has struggled with more than 8% unemployment for 40-plus consecutive months.

#### Higher ad spending means Obama wins

**Cohn, 10/5/12** (Nate, “How Romney Is Coping With Obama’s Newfound Ad Spending Advantage,” <http://www.tnr.com/blog/electionate/108231/how-romney-coping-obamas-newfound-ad-spending-advantage>)

While Democrats spent the summer fretting about an onslaught of GOP Super-PAC spending, the Wesleyan Media project and CMAG have found that Team Obama actually aired 31 percent more advertisements than Team Romney in battleground media markets between September 9 and September 30. Not only is Team Obama airing more advertisements across the board, but Obama is airing more advertisements than Romney in 14 of the 15 top media markets, and Romney’s efforts to compensate are forcing him to make sacrifices in Iowa and New Hampshire.

To compensate for fewer resources, the Romney campaign is understandably trying to maximize the efficiency of their spending. How can a campaign maximize efficiency on ad spending? By concentrating spending in the most critical areas and staying away from media markets where money is wasted appealing to voters in other states. As a result, Team Romney is generally holding close in the most important areas, like Cleveland, Washington, Tampa, and Las Vegas. In the top 10 markets, Obama is out-airing Romney by a modest 25 percent, a decent margin but probably not enough to move the needle decidedly in Obama’s direction.

But the Romney campaign is getting outspent by a wide margin in less efficient media markets where Romney is making sacrifices and Obama has money to burn. The two states where this could hurt Romney most are New Hampshire and Iowa, where many of the states’ media markets extend beyond state borders, forcing the campaigns to spend money appealing to voters outside of the battlegrounds.

The media markets in blue areas are those where Obama is airing at least twice as many advertisements as Romney, while Romney is out-airing Obama by a 2-to-1 margin in the red markets.

While there are a few tiny blue markets ensconced deep inside of a state, most of the blue markets are the inefficient areas where dollars are wasted appealing to voters across state lines.

This is especially troubling for Romney in New Hampshire, where the Boston, Burlington, and Portland media markets serve neighboring Massachusetts, Vermont, and Maine. As a result, competing in New Hampshire requires the campaigns to air advertisements over much of New England, causing the campaign’s to spend far more money to achieve saturation in tiny New Hampshire than the state’s four electoral votes might suggest.

Iowa has eight media markets, but only Cedar Rapids and Des Moines exclusively serve the Hawkeye State. The other six media markets include Rochester, MN, Sioux City (which covers parts of South Dakota and Nebraska), Omaha, NE, Davenport, IA (which covers the quad-cities region, including Illinois), Quincy, IL, and Ottumwa, IA (including parts of Missouri).

Just how much is Romney hurting in these markets? He’s getting outspent by more than 3:1 in New Hampshire and between 2:1 and 5:1 in the Iowa media markets listed above. He’s also getting outspent by a wide margin in the Florida Panhandle, where media markets cross into Alabama and Georgia (although there are few swing voters here).

It's worth emphasizing that many of these markets where Obama is outspending Romney by a ridiculous margin are very small (Zanesville) or neither side is spending very much money at all (Wilmington) despite big differences on a percentage basis. But most of the areas where both sides are spending reasonable sums and Romney is getting outspent are inefficient markets like Davenport or Boston.

The decision to focus on more efficient markets is understandable, but there is a real risk in getting outspent by a big margin in areas with many persuadable voters, like Iowa and New Hampshire. In 2008, Obama did exceptionally well in moderate, Midwestern areas where he was able to outspend McCain by a meaningful margin, like Omaha and the Red River Valley, while McCain held his own in areas where he was able to match the president, like Minneapolis.

Obama is an incumbent president, so advertisements might be less likely to move the needle than they were four years ago. But it is still dangerous for Romney to get out-advertised by 2-to-1 in critical media markets like Davenport, Iowa. The accumulated effects of getting decisively outspent in peripheral media markets could easily sway a tight statewide race in a state like Iowa. Perhaps that's why Obama appears to have made large gains in Iowa and New Hampshire over the last few weeks. So long as Obama appears well positioned in Ohio and Wisconsin, New Hampshire's four electoral votes won't figure prominently into the electoral math. But if Romney loses Wisconsin, Ohio, and Iowa, the race is over.

### Link

Polls = highly unpop

#### SMRs are unpopular with the public which turns the aff – their evidence is skewed

Baker, 2012 ( Matthew, American Security Project, “Do Small Modular Reactors Present a Serious Option for the Military’s Energy Needs?” <http://americansecurityproject.org/blog/2012/do-small-modular-reactors-present-a-serious-option-for-the-militarys-energy-needs/>, 6/22/2012)

Thirdly, some supporters of SMR technology seem to have a skewed opinion of public perception toward nuclear energy. Commissioner of the U.S. NuclearRegulatory Commission, William C. Ostendorff, didn’t seem to think that the recent Fukushima disaster would have any impact on the development on SMRs.Opinion polls suggest Americans are more likely to think that the costs of nuclear outweigh its benefits since the Fukushima disaster. For SMRs to be the philosopher’s stone of the military’s energy needs the public needs to be on board.

plan drives a wedge into Obama’s base --- they’re key to re-election  
Mick ’10 (Jason Mick, 6-19-10, Daily Tech, Obama Fights For Nuclear, Environmentalists Label Him a Shill <http://www.dailytech.com/Obama+Fights+For+Nuclear+Environmentalists+Label+Him+a+Shill/article18781.htm>,)

Despite these small victories, President Obama's nuclear vision faces many impending obstacles.  Despite the fact that you could tear down one of the nation's old reactors, replace it with a dozen modern clean reactor designs and still have less net waste, some environmentalist groups remain adamantly opposed to new plant construction.  They have vowed to bury the bid for clean nuclear power under a flood of lawsuits.  If the suits succeed, they will raise the cost of nuclear so high, that it can't even compete with the most expensive forms of nuclear energy, like solar power.  
  
And perhaps the biggest obstacle to Obama's nuclear vision will come in 2012.  That is the year when he will face reelection.  That may prove challenging given that one of his former key constituent groups -- the environmental lobby -- has become one of his staunchest critics.  Regardless, the U.S. is making its first true nuclear progress in 30 years, and that is among the many factors that will already make President Obama's presidency noteworthy.

#### Nuclear extremely unpopular

Ramana 11 (M. V. Ramana is currently appointed jointly with the Nuclear Futures Laboratory and the Program on Science and Global Security, both at Princeton University, and works on the future of nuclear energy in the context of climate change and nuclear disarmament Ramana is a member of the International Panel on Fissile Materials and the BulletinÕs Science and Security Board. Jul 1, 2011 Nuclear power and the public SAGE Journals)

Japan is by no means alone. Around the world, nuclear energy has declined in popularity. In the United States, for example, a Washington Past-ABC poll conducted in April 2011 found that 64 percent of Americans opposed the construction of new reactors (Craighill and Cohen, 3011). Another poll, conducted by CBS News in March 2011, soon after the Fukushima crisis began, found that only 43 percent of those polled would approve of building new reactors, down from 357 percent approval rating in 2008 (Cooper and Sussman, 2011). Support for nuclear power was similar or lower in countries as varied as Chile (12 percent), Thailand (16.6 percent), Australia (34 percent), and the United Kingdom (35 percent) (Fowler, 2011; Green, 2011; van der Zee, 2011). Even in France, which relies on nuclear power for [about three-quarters of its electricity, one poll found that a majority (57 percent) were in favor of abandoning nuclear energy (Buffery, 2011). These approval ratings are not strictly comparable because the polls were conducted by different agencies, asking different questions and providing different kinds of information prior to asking the questions.\* Nevertheless, there is little doubt among those who study public opinion on nuclear power that, by and large, it does not command much support. Nuclear power wasnt always so unpopular, For example, in the United States in 1977, when CBS News conducted its first poll on nuclear power, 69 percent of those surveyed expressed support for building more nuclear plants. Just two years later, after the Three Mile Island accident, public support had plummeted to 46 percent, and it dropped further to 34 percent after the 1986 Chernobyl accident. Since the 1980s, a majority of the US population has consistently opposed the construction of new nuclear reactors (Kosa and Dunlap, 1994: Bolsen and Cook, 2008). Not coincidentally, there has been practically no nuclear construction in the United States since Three Mile Island. The public perceives nuclear power as a very risky technology. In some cases, association with nuclear facilities is even subject to stigma. The nuclear industry has tried a variety of strategies to break down public resistance to nuclear power, but they haven't worked well. With growing public concern about global warming, the industry is experimenting with a new strategy—playing up the climate mitigation potential of nuclear power. While this has increased the benefit side of the equation for nuclear power, it hasn't decrease d the risk pe rception assoc iate d with the technology, and nuclear power remains a reluctant choice at best. Renewable energy technologies offer the same benefits, making it unlikely that a large-scale "nuclear renaissance" will materialize. A dreaded technology What explains public opposition to nuclear power? Proponents of nuclear power often dismiss opposition as a "not in my backyard" (NIMBY) phenomenon. There is some evidence for this assertion: In polls, people typically express less opposition to nuclear power in general than to a nuclear plant that would be constructed in their own vicinity. But this is only part of the story—the majority of those opposing a project are opposed regardless of whether the project is to be located in their vicinity or not. Therefore, the NIMBY phenomenon does not really explain opposition to nuclear power. A more fundamental reason that the term NIMBY is inappropriate is that it overlooks the ethical objections that many people have to a variety of hazardous facilities—including waste incinerators, oil refineries, and chemical plants, as well as nuclear power plants. Opposition to these facilities arises not only from a desire to avoid personal harm but also from the feeling that no community should be subjected to the risks that come with such facilities. Many researchers have suggested that the term NIMBY be avoided, if not entirely discarded (Burningham, 2000; Freudenburg and Pastor, 1092; lleiman, 1090; Kraft and Clary, 1991; Wolsink, 2006). The question, then, is why so many people see nuclear facilities as unacceptable, not just in their own backyard but in anyone's backyard. The public is not homogeneous, and different individuals oppose nuclear power for different reasons.-' But for the majority, opposition to nuclear power seems to be tied to perceptions of the risk of nuclear accidents, concerns about the disposal of nuclear waste, and low levels of trust in the nuclear establishment (Whitfield et aL, 2009). Of particular importance is the public's perception that nuclear power is a risky technology. To someone who evaluates risk using metrics such as the number of major accidents, or the number of deaths on a day-to-day basis, thismight seem inexplicable. But studies of risk perception have revealed that most people have a much more comprehensive conception of risk that is based on characteristics such as the famil-iarity of the hazard; whether exposure to the hazard is undertaken voluntarily; features of the technology such as the magnitude of accidents it could potentially' give rise to; inequities in risks and benefits; and the long-term implications of exposure to the hazard (Slovic etaU 1982). For decades now, psychometric studies based on detailed opinion surveys have examined how nuclear power fares in the public mind. Paul Slovic, a leading practitioner of this methodology and a pioneer in studying risk perception, has summarized the results of this research: "nuclear power had the dubious distinction of scoring at or near the extreme negative end for most of the [above-mentioned] characteristics. Its risks were seen as involuntary, unknown to those exposed or to science, uncontrollable, unfamiliar, catastrophic, severe (fatal), and dreaded.... These results have since been replicated with many different populations in numerous countries" (Slovic, 1994). Given these problematic perceptions of nuclear power, opposition to nuclear facilities is not surprising.

Democrats oppose nuclear power – economics and the environment – kills Obamas base

Entine 6 (Jon Entine 10/6/6 fellow on science and public policy at the American Enterprise Institute Transcript of an AEI Conferency <http://www.aei.org/events/filter.all,eventID.1394/transcript.asp>)

At this conference at least we will set aside the debate over the myriad possible causes of global warming and focus on what we might do to address it; we are going to look today at nuclear energy.  Traditionally political predilection has driven the debate over nuclear energy with exceptions, of course.  Conservatives have tended to be supportive of nuclear technology considering the risks acceptable and the Left has been instinctively hostile.  Political passions have often masqueraded as economics and environmental science.  The double threat of global warming and high energy prices may be challenging those once rock-hard positions.