### Seabasing

The CP creates a more flexible, quick-reacting military which accesses the best internal to heg

DSB 3 (Defense Science Board, Federal Advisory Committee established to provide independent advice to the Secretary of Defense. Statements, opinions, conclusions and recommendations in this report do not necessarily represent the official position of the Department of Defense, August, “Defense Science Board Task Force on SEA BASING”, http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/ADA429002.pdf, AV)

Sea basing is a critical capability for the United States in a world where flexible, quick-response military action will be required in areas far from fixed bases available or suitable for American military use. The seabase replaces or augments the fixed, in-theater airports and seaports, on which past military operations have focused and depended, with a maneuverable facility at sea—a mobile base of operations, command center, logistics node and transportation hub. A commander can place a seabase where and when he chooses to exploit enemy weaknesses and employ the element of surprise, confusing enemy defensive preparations. A seabase can be a center for reconstitution and redeployment of forces in succeeding stages of complex operations. As a base for maneuver forces, it represents a far more serious threat than that of precision fires only, whether delivered by aircraft or cruise missiles. The force at sea threatens adversaries with destruction, invasion and ultimately loss of power. The sustaining power of the seabase can maintain the pace of military operations so that operational pauses characteristic of past expeditionary forcible entries disappear. The need to pause for supply and regrouping following entry and before moving to operational objectives is no longer necessary. Thus, the period of vulnerability, during which enemy forces organize and mount defenses, disappears.

Outweighs ground presence

Hammond, 8 (Major Michael F. is the S–3 of the 526th Brigade Support Battalion, 2d Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), which is currently deployed to Iraq. He has a master’s degree in military logistics from North Dakota State University. *Army Logistician*, Sept-Oct, Sense and Respond: Military Logistics in a Global Security Environment)

During the Cold War, the U.S. military spent billions of dollars preparing for a conventional land war on the European continent that could occur in response to a Soviet invasion. After the fall of the Soviet Union and its satellite countries, the threat of another world war seemed implausible and U.S. political leaders began to downsize the military. But the attacks on 11 September 2001 brought a renewed focus on military capabilities to meet a new threat: global terrorism. Military planners then recognized the need for a reconfigured military structure with more expeditionary units, a paradigm shift in training the force, and a general shift in the thought process behind planning, including logistics planning. The recently downsized U.S. Army had to operate jointly with the Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force to meet the new threat to the Nation’s interests. This joint force mentality is crucial to success in today’s complex and uncertain security environment—an environment that is global in nature and displays the characteristics of a new set of threats. New military applications and thought processes continue to change and transform our military forces. One of those concepts is “sense and respond” logistics. Sense and respond logistics is a network-centric concept that enables logistics planners to provide precise logistics support to the warfighter. Soldiers use sense and respond to predict, anticipate, and coordinate a full range of logistics processes, giving the combatant commander numerous options to plan mission support. Military logisticians are using sense and respond to plan logistics support for combat troops who face unknown threats in an insurgent environment. [continues] Military planners now must understand the global security threat that is facing our Nation. Cold War tactics and planning techniques are no longer effective. The strategic imperative of today’s global security environment is the ability to maneuver from strategic distances. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and its satellite countries and the repositioning of globally-stationed U.S. troops and assets to the United States, the ability of our military to project strength in distant areas like the Middle East is much more important. The global security threat will not disappear, and power projection platforms in the United States are necessary and will become increasingly more important. A shift in military policy is critical, and a change in policy would be a good reason to adopt sense and respond logistics. Military planners should be encouraged to further study and adopt sense and respond principles. The fear of change within the U.S. military must be overcome by the next generation of military logisticians. Cultural barriers that prohibit the adoption of sense and respond in military circles still exist and will be a detriment to future military planning in a global security environment.

**our hard power internal links outweigh**

**Klein and Morales 4**

United States Naval Institute, Lt. Com John and Col. Rich, both of USN

http://elibrary.ru/item.asp?id=7854563

Since deploying joint forces in a maritime environment has benefits, what can be done to minimize the potential negative repercussions? There are two possible solutions. First, **our Sea Basing efforts should be inclusive of our allies**. More than just a token presence, these **allied forces must be sizable enough to ensure a sense of partnership with the United States and promote the idea of collective security**. Incorporating foreign troops alongside U.S. sea-based forces will require dramatic changes in operational concepts and joint doctrine. Nevertheless, **the rewards are great if we succeed in bringing allies into the fold.**

**solves deterrence and heg**

**Sabins, 2004**

Amol Sabnis, Lt. Cdr, Indian Navy, 2004, “Concept of Sea Basing and its Effect on Indo-US Relations: The Way Ahead,” online

Sea basing will give the US the capability to quickly deploy its forces in any part of the globe. This would give the US the potential to act unilaterally in any crisis. Although the US would not prefer to act without allies, the very fact that it has the potential may be unnerving to many countries including its current allies.38 The manner in which the US decided to “liberate” Iraq may justify their fears. The capabilities inherent in sea basing may reinforce the perception of the willingness of US to use pre-emptive policy without considering the views of other countries. Taking the effect of this to the extreme, one can imagine a condition in which the majority of the countries are aligned against the US instead of being aligned with the US – a wholly undesirable effect! Of course, in the present circumstances, it is highly improbable and it would not be fair to ascribe such a situation only to the US policy of sea basing. Nevertheless, the possibility will remain and increase if the US relies more on its military power vice other elements of national power.

**Land bases are obsolete – sea basing key in the short and long term**

**Parker ’10** (Gregory, Federal Executive Fellow, Brookings Institution, Seabasing Since the Cold War: Maritime Reflections of American Grand Strategy

<http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2010/0630_seabasing_parker.aspx>, jj)

It is time to reverse that trend**. As the nexus of conflict moves** south from Mackinder’s heartland **to the nations of the world’s littorals, so too must U.S. military operations focus on new methods in these areas**, enabled and supported by appropriate organizations and platforms. In this world, **seabasing constitutes a powerful and coherent model for amphibious assault and a modular “plug and play” approach to the littorals that invites both joint and international participation. By putting the base back in seabasing and thinking “inside the box,” the U.S. can begin to adjust to this new nexus of conflict and begin to send foreign policy back to sea.**

### Iran

**No escalation to great power war or nuclear use**

**Davis et al** – senior political scientist at RAND - 6/6/**11**, Iran’s Nuclear Future: Critical U.S. Policy Choices, Prepared for the United States Air Force, RAND, (Lynn E. Davis, Jeffrey Martini, Alireza Nader, Dalia Dassa Kaye, James T. Quinlivan, Paul Steinberg), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2011/RAND\_MG1087.pdf

Current U.S. Conventional and Nuclear Posture Is Sufficient. The case for why Iran will be deterred from using nuclear weapons against U.S. military forces rests on a number of considerations. First, while possibilities of a proxy conflict or limited military engagements exist, it is difficult to see a conflict between the United States and Iran escalating to a major conventional conflict, because Iran faces overwhelming destruction. Crossing the nuclear threshold risks further devastation for Iran, thereby directly threatening the regime’s survival; also, in using its nuclear weapons, Iran would be using up the very weapons it had acquired for other purposes. Second, the United States, with the deployment of long-range conventional precision-strike systems, has credible military capabilities to inflict high levels of devastation without resorting to the use of nuclear weapons. In this approach, existing U.S. declarations with respect to using nuclear weapons would remain unchanged. The threat of U.S. nuclear retaliation could be made more explicit in the event of a conventional conflict so as to reduce the prospect of Iran misreading U.S. intentions.

### North Korea

**No full scale war**

Paul **Stares**, CFR Center for Preventive Action Director and Conflict Prevention Senior Fellow, 8/12/20**10**, “Handling Tensions on the Korean Peninsula," http://www.cfr.org/publication/22788/handling\_tensions\_on\_the\_korean\_peninsula.html, access 12/7/2010

Other than firing some coastal artillery and detaining a South Korean fishing boat that recently strayed into North Korea waters, Pyongyang has responded primarily with belligerent rhetoric and apocalyptic warnings. The recent ROK-U.S. naval exercises, for example, elicited threats of a "retaliatory sacred war." But by historical standards, such bombast is unexceptional. The recent North Korean provocations also pale in comparison to earlier attacks and skirmishes, most notably during the late 1960s when, among other things, the Blue House--South Korea's presidential residence--was attacked, or in the 1980s when the South Korean cabinet was bombed during a visit to Burma.

These far-worse periods of inter-Korean tensions never ignited another war, and the incentives to prevent this from happening are even greater today. South Korea fears losing its hard-won prosperity, while a much weaker North knows that it would never survive another major conflict.

**Provocations inevitable—the plan doesn’t matter**

Victor **Cha**, Georgetown University Government Professor, CSIS Korea Chair, Former Deputy Head of U.S. Delegation to the 6 party talks on North Korea disarmament, Bush Administration Asian Affairs Director, **10**, "How to Respond to North Korea," http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2010/11/23/how-to-respond-to-north-korea/belligerence-and-internal-weakness, access 11/24/10

The military actions by North Korea today have, in my opinion, very little to do with “frustration” with the American negotiating position or with sanctions. Such a view presumes that all the U.S. need do is sit down with the North and all will be good. As a former negotiator who has sat down for many hours with them, I can tell you that that is far from the problem.

These provocations have to be seen as the latest in a series of belligerent acts — starting with the April 2009 missile test, the May 2009 nuclear test, the March 2010 sinking of the Cheonan, and now this. The government's actions are part of a deliberate strategy to show external strength to the world and its own people as it undergoes a shaky leadership transition. Regimes of this nature do not become passive or nice when they are internally weak. On the contrary, they show belligerence.

The U.S. has a special envoy in the region now. This would be a good opportunity to focus on China’s response. First, the Chinese must clearly state that they condemn the North Korean attack and view it as a violation of the 1953 armistice of which they are a signatory.

Beijing cannot make excuses for the North Korean military strike as it did for the Cheonan sinking. Second, the U.S. and the other permanent members of the Security Council need to consult in the United Nations about what appropriate measures need to be taken to condemn the action. Third, the U.S. needs to consult with its military allies in the region to ensure readiness in case of further provocation.

With the South Koreans in particular, the difficult challenge will be to fashion a response that is strong enough to deter, but not too strong so as to escalate to a war. This is a tough needle to thread.

Some will say that all the North wants is a peace treaty and assistance, but I find this hard to swallow. For the past 20 years, the offer of a peace agreement, energy, food, and diplomatic recognition have been on the negotiation table — whether this was George H.W. Bush’s “modest proposal”; Bill Clinton’s "Agreed Framework;" George Bush’s "Six Party Joint Statement" or Barack Obama’s “Strategic Patience” approach. The problem is not the United States’ approach.

### Space

**Space colonization is impossible --- humans can’t adjust**

Theunis **Piersma 10**, professor of animal ecology at the University of Groningen in the Netherlands and senior research scientist at the Royal Netherlands Institute for Sea Research in Den Burg, “Why space is the impossible frontier,” NewScientist, 11-16-10, <http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg20827860.100-why-space-is-the-impossible-frontier.html>

Hawking, Obama and other proponents of long-term space travel are making a grave error. Humans cannot leave Earth for the several years that it takes to travel to Mars and back, for the simple reason that **our biology is intimately connected to Earth.**

To function properly, we need gravity. Without it, the environment is less demanding on the human body in several ways, and this shows upon the return to Earth. Remember the sight of weakened astronauts emerging after the Apollo missions? That is as nothing compared with what would happen to astronauts returning from Mars.

One of the first things to be affected is the heart, which shrinks by as much as a quarter after just one week in orbit (The New England Journal of Medicine, vol 358, p 1370). Heart atrophy leads to decreases in blood pressure and the amount of blood pushed out by the heart. In this way heart atrophy leads to reduced exercise capacity. Astronauts returning to Earth after several months in the International Space Station experience dizziness and blackouts because blood does not reach their brains in sufficient quantities.

Six weeks in bed leads to about as much atrophy of the heart as one week in space, suggesting that the atrophy is caused by both weightlessness and the concomitant reduction in exercise.

Other muscle tissue suffers too. The effects of weightlessness on the muscles of the limbs are easy to verify experimentally. Because they bear the body's weight, the "anti-gravity" muscles of the thighs and calves degenerate significantly when they are made redundant during space flight.

Despite the best attempts to give replacement exercise to crew members on the International Space Station, after six months they had still lost 13 per cent of their calf muscle volume and 32 per cent of the maximum power that their leg muscles could deliver (Journal of Applied Physiology, vol 106, p 1159).

Various metabolic changes also occur, including a decreased capacity for fat oxidation, which can lead to the build-up of fat in atrophied muscle. Space travellers also suffer deterioration of immune function both during and after their missions (Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine, vol 79, p 835).

Arguably the most fearsome effect on bodies is bone loss (The Lancet, vol 355, p 1569). Although the hardness and strength of bone, and the relative ease with which it fossilises, give it an appearance of permanence, bone is actually a living and remarkably flexible tissue. In the late 19th century, the German anatomist Julius Wolff discovered that bones adjust to the loads that they are placed under. A decrease in load leads to the loss of bone material, while an increase leads to thicker bone.

It is no surprise, then, that in the microgravity of space bones demineralise, especially those which normally bear the greatest load. Cosmonauts who spent half a year in space lost up to a quarter of the material in their shin bones, despite intensive exercise (The Lancet, vol 355, p 1607). Although experiments on chicken embryos on the International Space Station have established that bone formation does continue in microgravity, formation rates are overtaken by bone loss.

What is of greatest concern here is that, unlike muscle loss which levels off with time, bone loss seems to continue at a steady rate of 1 to 2 per cent for every month of weightlessness. During a three-year mission to Mars, space travellers could lose around 50 per cent of their bone material, which would make it extremely difficult to return to Earth and its gravitational forces. Bone loss during space travel certainly brings home the maxim "use it or lose it".

Bone loss is not permanent. Within six months of their return to Earth, those cosmonauts who spent half a year in space did show partial recovery of bone mass. However, even after a year of recovery, men who had been experimentally exposed to three months of total bed rest had not fully regained all the lost bone, though their calf muscles had recovered much earlier (Bone, vol 44, p 214).

Space agencies will have to become very creative in addressing the issue of bone loss during flights to Mars. There are concepts in development for spacecraft with artificial gravity, but nobody even knows what gravitational force is needed to avoid the problems. So far, boneless creatures such as jellyfish are much more likely than people to be able to return safely to Earth after multi-year space trips. For humans, gravity is a Mars bar.

The impossibility of an escape to space is just one of many examples of how our bodies, and those of our fellow organisms, are inseparable from the environments in which we live. In our futuristic ambitions we should not forget that our minds and bodies are connected to Earth as by an umbilical cord.

**Space exploration risks extra-terrestrial viruses**

**Caldicott 2k** (Helen, Keep Space for Peace, Address to the Global Network Against Weapons and Nuclear Power in Space, http://www.space4peace.org/articles/madness.htm, AG)

But there is a problem, it is believed that there could be bacteria on Mars. Now, you know about the Ebola virus. Everyone is scared by Ebola viruses well as HIV and many other dangerous viruses. Scientists predict that there could be a massive epidemic of some uncontrollably dangerous virus in the future. It's quite interesting, though, when you look at history, in the early to mid-1300s, one quarter of the European population died as the result of a flea from China that carried the plague. When the Spaniards began to explore the Americas, they brought with them the smallpox virus, that killed tens of thousands of people. European explorers to Polynesian Hawaii in the 1500s, infected the natives with microbes. We killed a large number of Aborigines from just the common cold and flu in Australia. So if 300 grams of Martian soil slams into the desert on earth and bursts apart, there is a possibility that the earth could be infected, and the microbes could spread. The scientists will not have microscopes, labs and gram-positive stains to search for Martian bacteria, before they return. And what about our bacteria infecting Mars?

**Extinction**

**Yu 9—**Dartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Science (Victoria, Human Extinction: The Uncertainty of Our Fate, 22 May 2009, http://dujs.dartmouth.edu/spring-2009/human-extinction-the-uncertainty-of-our-fate, AMiles)

A pandemic will kill off all humans. In the past, humans have indeed fallen victim to viruses. Perhaps the best-known case was the bubonic plague that killed up to one third of the European population in the mid-14th century (7). While vaccines have been developed for the plague and some other infectious diseases, new viral strains are constantly emerging — a process that maintains the possibility of a pandemic-facilitated human extinction. Some surveyed students mentioned AIDS as a potential pandemic-causing virus. It is true that scientists have been unable thus far to find a sustainable cure for AIDS, mainly due to HIV’s rapid and constant evolution. Specifically, two factors account for the virus’s abnormally high mutation rate: 1. HIV’s use of reverse transcriptase, which does not have a proof-reading mechanism, and 2. the lack of an error-correction mechanism in HIV DNA polymerase (8). Luckily, though, there are certain characteristics of HIV that make it a poor candidate for a large-scale global infection: HIV can lie dormant in the human body for years without manifesting itself, and AIDS itself does not kill directly, but rather through the weakening of the immune system. However, for more easily transmitted viruses such as influenza, the evolution of new strains could prove far more consequential. The simultaneous occurrence of antigenic drift (point mutations that lead to new strains) and antigenic shift (the inter-species transfer of disease) in the influenza virus could produce a new version of influenza for which scientists may not immediately find a cure. Since influenza can spread quickly, this lag time could potentially lead to a “global influenza pandemic,” according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (9). The most recent scare of this variety came in 1918 when bird flu managed to kill over 50 million people around the world in what is sometimes referred to as the Spanish flu pandemic. Perhaps even more frightening is the fact that only 25 mutations were required to convert the original viral strain — which could only infect birds — into a human-viable strain (10).

### Regionalism solves

**Regional cooperation fills in**

**Sachs, 11** – Director of The Earth Institute, Quetelet Professor of Sustainable Development, and Professor of Health Policy and Management at Columbia University. He is also Special Advisor to United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon (Jeffrey, “A World of Regions,” 5/26, http://www.social-europe.eu/2011/05/a-world-of-regions/)

In almost every part of the world, long-festering problems can be solved through closer cooperation among neighboring countries. The European Union provides the best model for how neighbors that have long fought each other can come together for mutual benefit. Ironically, today’s decline in American global power may lead to more effective regional cooperation. This may seem an odd time to praise the EU, given the economic crises in Greece, Spain, Portugal, and Ireland. Europe has not solved the problem of balancing the interests of strong economies in the North and those of weaker economies in the South. Still, the EU’s accomplishments vastly outweigh its current difficulties. The EU has created a zone of peace where once there was relentless war. It has provided the institutional framework for reuniting Western and Eastern Europe. It has fostered regional-scale infrastructure. The single market has been crucial to making Europe one of the most prosperous places on the planet. And the EU has been a global leader on environmental sustainability. For these reasons, the EU provides a unique model for other regions that remain stuck in a mire of conflict, poverty, lack of infrastructure, and environmental crisis. New regional organizations, such as the African Union, look to the EU as a role model for regional problem-solving and integration. Yet, to this day, most regional groupings remain too weak to solve their members’ pressing problems. In most other regions, ongoing political divisions have their roots in the Cold War or the colonial era. During the Cold War, neighbors often competed with each other by “choosing sides” – allying themselves with either the United States or the Soviet Union. Pakistan tilted towards the Americans; India towards the Soviets. Countries had little incentive to make peace with their neighbors as long as they enjoyed the financial support of the US or the USSR. On the contrary, continued conflict often led directly to more financial aid. Indeed, the US and Europe often acted to undermine regional integration, which they believed would limit their roles as power brokers. Thus, when Gamal Abdel Nasser launched a call for Arab unity in the 1950’s, the US and Europe viewed him as a threat. The US undercut his call for strong Arab cooperation and nationalism, fearing a loss of American influence in the Middle East. As a result, Nasser increasingly aligned Egypt with the Soviet Union, and ultimately failed in the quest to unite Arab interests. Today’s reality, however, is that great powers can no longer divide and conquer other regions, even if they try. The age of colonialism is finished, and we are now moving beyond the age of US global dominance. Recent events in the Middle East and Central Asia, for example, clearly reflect the decline of US influence. America’s failure to win any lasting geopolitical advantage through the use of military force in Iraq and Afghanistan underscore the limits of its power, while its budget crisis ensures that it will cut its military resources sooner rather than later. Similarly, the US played no role in the political revolutions underway in the Arab world, and still has not demonstrated any clear policy response to them. President Barack Obama’s recent speech on the Middle East is a further display of America’s declining influence in the region. The speech drew the most attention for calling on Israel to return to its 1967 borders, but the effect was undercut when Israel flatly rejected the US position. The world could see that there would be little practical follow-up. The rest of the speech was even more revealing, though it drew little public notice. When Obama discussed the Arab political upheavals, he noted the importance of economic development. Yet when it came to US action, the most that the US could offer financially was slight debt relief for Egypt ($1 billion), scant loan guarantees ($1 billion), and some insurance coverage for private investments. The real message was that the US government would contribute very little financially to the region’s economic recovery. The days when a country could depend on large-scale American financing are over. We are, in short, moving to a multi-polar world. The Cold War’s end has not led to greater US dominance, but rather to the dissemination of global power to many regions. East Asia, South Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East have new geopolitical and economic influence. Each region, increasingly, must find its own path to economic development, energy and food security, and effective infrastructure, and must do so in a world threatened by climate change and resource scarcity. Each region, therefore, will have to secure its own future. Of course, this should occur in a context of cooperation across regions as well as within them. The Middle East is in a strong **position to help itself**. There is a high degree of economic complementarity between Egypt and the oil-rich Gulf States. Egypt can supply technology, manpower, and considerable expertise for the Arab region, while the Gulf provides energy and finance, as well as some specialists. The long-delayed vision of Arab economic unity should be returned to the table. Israel, too, should recognize that its long-term security and prosperity will be enhanced as part of an economically stronger region. For the sake of its own national interests, Israel must come to terms with its neighbors. Other regions also will find that the decline of US power increases the **urgency of stronger cooperation** between neighbors. Some of the greatest tensions in the world – say India and Pakistan, or North and South Korea – should be defused as part of region-wide strengthening. As the EU shows, ancient enmities and battle lines can be turned into mutually beneficial cooperation if a region looks forward, to resolving its long-term needs, rather than backward, to its long-standing rivalries and conflicts.

**Not key anymore**

**Preble 8/3/2010** (Christopher Preble, director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, taught history at St. Cloud State University and Temple University, was a commissioned officer in the U.S. Navy, Ph.D. in history from Temple University. “U.S. Military Power: Preeminence for What Purpose?” 8/3/10) <http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/u-s-military-power-preeminence-for-what-purpose/>

Most in Washington still embraces the notion that America is, and forever will be, the world’s indispensable nation. Some scholars, however, questioned the logic of hegemonic stability theory from the very beginning. A number continue to do so today. They advance arguments diametrically at odds with the primacist consensus. Trade routes need not be policed by a single dominant power; the international economy is complex and resilient. Supply disruptions are likely to be temporary, and the costs of mitigating their effects should be borne by those who stand to lose — or gain — the most. Islamic extremists are scary, but hardly comparable to the threat posed by a globe-straddling Soviet Union armed with thousands of nuclear weapons. It is frankly absurd that we spend more today to fight Osama bin Laden and his tiny band of murderous thugs than we spent to face down Joseph Stalin and Chairman Mao. Many factors have contributed to the dramatic decline in the number of wars between nation-states; it is unrealistic to expect that a new spasm of global conflict would erupt if the United States were to modestly refocus its efforts, draw down its military power, and call on other countries to play a larger role in their own defense, and in the security of their respective regions.

### at: cling to power

**No U.S. lashout**

**Parent 11**—Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami—AND—Paul K. MacDonald, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College (Joseph M., Spring 2011, *International Security*, Vol. 35, No. 4, http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC\_a\_00034, RBatra)

With regard to militarized disputes, declining great powers demonstrate more caution and restraint in the use of force: they were involved in an average of 1.7 fewer militarized disputes in the five years following ordinal change compared with other great powers over similar periods.67 Declining great powers also initiated fewer militarized disputes, and their disputes tended to escalate to lower levels of hostility than the baseline category (see figure 2).68 These findings suggest the need for a fundamental revision to the pessimist’s argument regarding the war proneness of declining powers.69 Far from being more likely to lash out aggressively, declining states refrain from initiating and **escalating military disputes**. Nor do declining great powers appear more vulnerable to external predation than other great powers. This may be because external predators have great difficulty assessing the vulnerability of potential victims, or because retrenchment allows vulnerable powers to effectively recover from decline and **still deter potential challengers.**

### A2 SMRs Solve Prolif

#### SMRs can’t prevent prolif.

Doyle & Newman, ‘11

[Neal, Former Program Coordinator -- Project on Managing the Atom, Andrew, Former Research Associate -- Project on Managing the Atom, 1-18, “Modular Nuclear Reactors Can Meet Safe, Secure, and Proliferation Resistant Energy Demands,” http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/publication/20960/modular\_nuclear\_reactors\_can\_meet\_safe\_secure\_and\_proliferation\_resistant\_energy\_demands.html]

Smaller, modular reactors are a potentially important part of the nuclear future because they could potentially reduce the risk of accidents, terrorism, and proliferation. However, there are many other risks from the existing nuclear complex that need to be managed. As nuclear energy use spreads, making sure it is safe, secure, and used only for peaceful purposes will require a new global management framework. This should include new or strengthened institutions that can effectively accomplish agreed safety, security, and nonproliferation goals while respecting states’ interests in sovereignty and energy security. Russia and the United States, working with other countries, should lead an international negotiation of effective global nuclear safety standards, binding on all participants. Improving safety will also require all states to: strengthen existing regulatory approaches, and establish effective nuclear regulation in “newcomer” states building their first nuclear power plants, to align with the global standard; build “reporting cultures” in which all staff are encouraged to report and resolve all problems that arise that could have an effect on safety; and commit to accepting IAEA-led peer reviews for major civilian facilities. Leading nuclear states must also work together to forge effective global standards for nuclear security, building on agreements already in place, such as the amended Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and Facilities, the International Convention on the Suppression of Nuclear Terrorism, and the IAEA’s physical protection recommendations. Expanded exchange of international best practice and more comprehensive and detailed reporting on safety and security-related incidents is vital to this mission. If, on the other hand, nuclear energy is pursued *without* such measures, the result could be both dangerous and inimical to the conditions necessary to achieve and sustain large-scale nuclear growth. Even a single catastrophe – whether a Chernobyl-scale accident, a successful sabotage (a “security Chernobyl”), or worse yet, a terrorist nuclear bomb – would severely undermine prospects for nuclear growth.

### SMR Attack

#### Military SMRs create unique risks -- hostile operating environments make disasters likely.

**Smith, ‘11**

[Terrence P., Program Coordinator and Research Assistant, William E. Simon Chair in Political Economy -- CSIS, “An Idea I Can Do Without: “Small Nuclear Reactors for Military Installations”,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, http://csis.org/blog/idea-i-can-do-without-small-nuclear-reactors-military-installations]

Nowhere in these key points is there even a hint of, “Hey this is not necessarily the best thing since sliced bread.” My initial response to each of these “key points”: (1) Takes the assumption it is a good idea and pushes a pursuit of the capability soon and hard to maintain a competitive technological edge, before examining the wisdom of the idea to begin with; (2) Just because DoD is interested in it, does not make it a good idea; (3) Arguing that they are better than larger reactors is not an argument for them being a good idea; (4) See my first point, but add in military advantage. The report describes DoD’s interest in the reactors as stemming from two “critical vulnerabilities”: 1) “the dependence of U.S. military bases on the fragile civilian electrical grid,” and 2) “the challenge of safely and reliably supplying energy to troops in forward operating locations.” The proposed solution: small nuclear reactors that (in many of the proposed plans) are “self-contained and highly mobile.” This would allow the military to use them in forward bases and pack ‘em up and move ‘em out when we are done. But in an era where the U.S. is engaged in global fights with our bases often placed in unfriendly neighborhoods, the idea of driving around nuclear reactors and material (particularly through areas that have “ a fragile civilian electrical grid”) hardly seems like the idea of the century to me. The report counters that “some” designs promise to be “virtually impervious to accidents” and have design characteristics that “might” allow them to be proliferation-resistant. The plans that use low-enriched uranium, sealed reactor cores, ect., do make them a safer option that some current designs of larger nuclear reactors, but, again, if we are going to be trucking these things around the world, when it comes to nuclear material a “might” doesn’t sit well with me.