# Round 1 – Neg vs Wayne BB

## 1NC

### Buddhism

#### Desire creates the illusion of the self and the suffering that defines the human condition. Our only capacity is thus to affirm the extermination of this desire in the face of perpetual death and an impermanent reality

**DOLLIMORE 1998** (Jonathan Dollimore 1998 (Death, Desire and Loss in Western Culture, p 54-56.)

Siddhartha Gautama (560-477 BC) was a prince who, because of his high privilege, encountered suffering and death relatively late in life. Legend tells us that when he did eventually encounter them the trauma was the greater, and changed his life: he became Buddha, the Enlightened One. In the religion he founded, life is experienced as a permanent intrinsic unsatisfactoriness manifested as suffering (dukkha) and pain: birth is painful, old age is painful, sickness is painful, death is painful, sorrow, lamentation, dejection, and despair are painful. Contact with unpleasant things is painful, not getting what one wishes is painful. In short the five groups of grasping [the elements, skandbasy which make up a person] are painful. ('Sermon at Benares', in Burtt, p. 30) Everything about life involves suffering and dissatisfaction, a sense of lack. If we strive to overcome that lack we fail, and suffering becomes marked by a renewed craving, now intensified by an acute sense of loss. Suffering derives directly from the fact that everything that exists is radically mutable. In particular, happiness, if it is achieved, cannot last. Suffering haunts happiness from the outside and the inside. Where Buddhism differs from Western religions is in the full acceptance of mutability; happiness lies in achieving that acceptance. Suffering is perpetuated by, and inseparable from, ignorance, and mitigated by wisdom. The deepest ignorance is to fail to see, or to disavow, the fact that everything that exists is mutable and transient. The force of this position may be seen, again, in contrast with Christianity; for the Buddhist the source of suffering is ignorance rather than sin. And the real source of suffering is desire (kama) or craving (tanha, literally 'thirst'), both of which are intrinsic to, constitutive of, humankind. There is a Buddhist doctrine of 'conditioned arising' or 'dependent origination' which asserts that everything that exists is dependent on certain prevailing conditions; nothing is intrinsically self-sufficient, independent or stable. This is especially true of selfhood. Buddhism completely denies the idea of a transcendent or autonomous self so powerful in Western religion and philosophy. To believe that there is some essential inner self or consciousness which is the real me, ultimately identifiable apart from everything that happens to me, is an illusion: What we call a personality is just an individual stream of becoming; a cross-section of it at any given moment in an aggregate of the five skandhas which (as long as it continues) are in unstable and unceasing interaction with each other, (p. 86) There is no I. Even to believe in an I which possesses emotions (albeit helplessly) is mistaken. One of the problems with desire, and why it cannot make us happy, is that it presupposes a self which does not exist; at the core of our being we are empty. Everything that constitutes the individual is marked by the unsatisfactoriness and suffering which is dukkha. Nor is there such a thing as the soul. The person is only a fleeting series of discontinuous states held together by desire, by craving. When desire is extinguished the person is dissolved. Since life and suffering are synonymous, the extinction of desire is the goal of human endeavor. Until that happens we continue to exist through a series of rebirths. It is not death as such which is deplored, but rebirth; it is not death but rebirth which we must escape. So much so that in some early texts rebirth is described as 'redeath'. Desire perpetuates life, which is synonymous with suffering, and which leads to death. Desire perpetuates death; it keeps one dying. The self is merged with ultimate reality not by identifying the core of the self (soul/essence) with ultimate reality (God/the universal) but by extinguishing self into non-being (nirvana). This is the aspect of Buddhism which has fascinated Western philosophers like Schopenhauer and artists like Wagner; with whatever degree of misinterpretation, they have been drawn by the ideas of empowerment through renunciation, nullification and quiescence; of the apparent ability to move freely with the mutability and change which arc the apparent cause of suffering; of choosing freely not to pursue the illusion of freedom, in a sense to eliminate the illusion of self; of becoming discontinuous, mindless. Not to escape mutability but to become it; not to just go with the flow of endless change, but to become it. To achieve the state of nirvana - that is, a state of being which is essentially empty of desire and striving. The wisdom of Buddhism does not desire to transcend change or to affirm an essential ultimate relationship of self to the absolute and unchanging (Platonic forms, the Christian God); nor does the Buddhist desire to die or to cease to be (the death drive): he or she does not desire annihilation but rather learns how to cease desiring. Nirvana is the utter cessation of desire or craving; it means extinction.

#### Use the ballot to engage in meditative affirmation of the status quo.

**Astma 6 –** Professor of Philosophy at Columbia College

(Stephen, “Against Transcendentalism: Monty Python’s The Meaning of Life and Buddhism”, *Monty Python and Philosophy* ebook copy, dml)

Upon close inspection, Buddha shows, paradise crumbles. The atman, on the other hand, is a no show. The Buddha thinks that atman is nowhere to be found except in the literary inventions of Hinduism and the confusions of its followers. Buddhism, contrary to all dualistic theories, asserts that **we are not made up of two metaphysically different parts**, a permanent spirit and an impermanent body. Buddhism breaks with most religions, East and West, by recognizing that we are each a finite tangle of qualities, all of which eventually exhaust themselves, and none of which, conscious or other, carries on independently. All humans, according to Buddha, are composed of the five aggregates (khandas ); body (rupa), feeling (vedana), perception (sanna), dispositions or volitional tendencies (sankhara) and consciousness (vinnana). If the Buddha was standing around in the battlefield setting of the Bhagavad Gita, he would certainly chime-in and object to Krishna’s irresponsible claim that a permanent soul resides in Arjuna and his enemies. Show me this permanent entity, the Buddha would demand. Is the body permanent? Are feelings permanent? What about perceptions, or dispositions, or even consciousness? The Buddha says “If there really existed the atman, there would be also something that belonged to this atman. As however, in truth and reality, neither an atman nor anything belonging to an atman can be found, is it not really an utter fool’s doctrine to say: This is the world, this am I; after death I shall be permanent, persisting and eternal?” (Mijjhima Nikaya) Buddha examines all the elements of the human being, finds that they are all fleeting, and finds no additional permanent entity or soul amidst the tangle of human faculties. There is no ghost in the machine. What’s So Grotesque about That? In their rejection of transcendentalism, Buddhism and Monty Python converge in their celebrations of the grotesque. The Python crew seems to relish the disgusting facts of human biology and they take every opportunity to render them through special effects. Throughout Monty Python’s The Meaning of Life, blood spurts, vomit spews, babies explode from birth canals, decapitated heads abound, and limbs putrefy. Theravada Buddhism also celebrates the revolting, treating it as a meditation focus for contemplating the lack of permanence. The transcendentalist consoles herself with the idea that this physical body may decay and perish, but an eternal soul will outlast the material melt-down—not so for the Buddha. In an attempt to undercut human vanity and demonstrate the impermanence of all things, Buddhist scriptures are filled with nauseating details about rotting carcasses and putrid flesh. In the Anguttara Nikaya, for example, the scripture asks, “Did you never see in the world the corpse of a man or a woman, one or two or three days after death, swollen up, blue-black in color, and full of corruption? And did the thought never come to you that you also are subject to death, that you cannot escape it?” (III, 35) When I was at a monastery in Southern Thailand, I chanced upon some reproductions of “dhamma paintings” from the mid-nineteenth century. These pictures were from a Chaiya manuscript discovered nearby, and they depicted, in detail, the “Ten Reflections on Foulness” (asubha kammatthana). The paintings illustrate the various uses of corpses as objects for contemplating impermanence. Following the great Theravadan philosopher Buddhaghosa’s Visuddhimagga text (“Path of Purification”), the artist rendered decaying corpses in rather comprehensive stages of dismemberment and putrification. According to Buddhaghosa, staring at a bloated corpse will be particularly useful to me if I’m feeling overly attached and arrogant about the shape and morphology of my body. If instead I’m feeling snobby or bigoted about my skin’s color or complexion, I should focus on the livid corpse that ranges from green to blue-black in color. Or, if I mistakenly feel that my body is my own, I am to rectify this error by meditating on a worm-infested corpse (puluvaka). As Buddhaghosa explains, “The body is shared by many and creatures live in dependence on (all parts and organs) and feed (on them). And there they are born, grow old, and die, evacuate and pass water; and the body is their maternity home, their hospital, their charnel ground, their privy and their urinal.” Buddhist “mindfulness” (meditational awareness) about the body is being aware of its transience, its brevity, its fugacity. The physical body is slowly macerating, and to try to hold onto it or recompose it is a pipe-dream. The single issue that invited comment from film reviewers when Monty Python’s The Meaning of Life was released was its wallow in the grotesque. One exclaimed that the film’s “ramshackle bouts of surreal physical comedy—a clotted mass of frenzied bodies, debris, mud, and gore—induce feelings of revolt and despair.”53 In light of the film’s critique of transcendentalism, however, this reviewer got it just backward. Far from despairing, the Pythons aimed to smash the deceptive veneer of puritanical snobbery that devalues the flesh and overvalues the invisible spirit. Like Buddhism, Python asks us to “say yes” to our true nature, **filled as it is with impermanence and unpleasantness.** At first this may seem jarring and disturbing, but in the long run **it is preferable to self-deception through figmentary transcendent reality**. Buddha’s rejection of a permanent transcendental soul is known as the anatta, or “no-self ” doctrine (and the companion doctrine that rejects the idea of a permanent God is called paticca samuppada, or “dependent arising,” because it denies the need for any transcendent uncaused cause). The most important Buddhist critique of the transcendental soul finds place in Monty Python’s The Meaning of Life. It is the idea that belief in unseen, eternal, and divine realities ultimately **distracts us from our own humanity**. Transcendentalism **dehumanizes us by feeding selfish craving**. If we embrace a worldview that pivots on the idea that we will attain immortality, then we are going to be overly concerned with our soul’s protection and its future fate. We become **more concerned with saving our own souls** than valuing and attending to the needs of those around us. Simply put, belief in a soul and a heaven of blissful happiness actually **makes you less ethical in this life**. The rejection of souls, heaven, and God, does not lead, as so many critics contend, to bleak egoistic nihilism. Many transcendentalists foretell a gloomy picture without the security of otherworldly meaning, predicting rampant hedonism (pure pleasure seeking) or nihilistic apathy. The Buddha disagrees and thinks that these life patterns are to be avoided as much as otherworldly dogmatism. The extremes, excesses, and general sufferings of the hedonist strategy and the nihilist strategy are revealed in the film. Terry’s Jones’s Mr. Creosote, for instance, is the giant embodiment of the crass pursuit of sensual gratification. After gorging himself on multiple servings of food and wine at a fancy French restaurant, his unchecked desire for the pleasures of chocolate puts him over the edge. Though he claims he can eat no more, Cleese easily seduces him with a single, small, “vaffer-thin” chocolate mint. Mr. Creosote then begins to inflate and he soon explodes, showering the restaurant in his blood and entrails. Obviously, such hedonism and self-gratification is not an appropriate fall-back for those who reject transcendental metaphysics and ethics. Nor is it appropriate to give oneself over to despair or indifference. The folly of that is illustrated in the movie’s gruesome portrayal of a liver transplant. After Graham Chapman starts the bloody business of removing this poor chap’s liver in his dining room, his partner, Cleese, chats up the man’s wife (Terry Jones in drag) in the kitchen. Cleese asks if she too would give up her liver, but she replies, “No . . . I don’t want to die.” Cleese perseveres and introduces her to Eric Idle, who steps out of her refrigerator and commences a musical tour of the sublime immensity of the universe and the tiny insignificance of her life: Just remember that you’re standing on a planet that’s evolving And revolving at nine hundred miles an hour, That’s orbiting at nineteen miles a second, so it’s reckoned, A sun that is the source of all our power. The sun and you and me and all the stars that we can see, Are moving at a million miles a day In an outer spiral arm, at forty thousand miles an hour, Of the galaxy we call the Milky Way. The Universe itself keeps on expanding and expanding In all of the directions it can whizz As fast as it can go, at the speed of light you know, Twelve million miles a minute, and that’s the fastest speed there is. So remember when you’re feeling very small and insecure How amazingly unlikely is your birth And pray that there’s intelligent life somewhere up in space Because there’s bugger all down here on earth. “Makes you feel so sort of insignificant, doesn’t it?” Cleese and Chapman ask. “Can we have your liver then?” She gives in—“Yeah. All right, you talked me into it”—and the two doctors set upon her with their knives. Just as Mr. Creosote succumbs to sensual overindulgence, this housewife opts for a groundless underindulgence. Just because she realizes she lives in an almost infinitely large universe, that is no reason for her to think that her life is worthless in itself and not worth continuing. This is what the extreme nihilist does (indeed, this is what nihilism is all about), and the Python crew is showing us the absurdity of it. Life **does not become meaningless** once you give up the idea that you are playing a role in a transcendentally planned drama. The values of family, work, love, understanding, simple pleasures, and peace, **don’t go away** once you reject transcendent meaning. Nor does the woman’s natural desire for self-preservation and the avoidance of suffering evaporate once she realizes her own finitude. Transcendental dogmatism is dehumanizing, but so are the opposing extremes of hedonism and nihilistic skepticism. The Buddha made this point explicitly when he argued for a Middle Way between all opposing extremes. Just as **one should find a middle way** between the slaveries of excessive indulgence and excessive asceticism (self-denial), so too one must avoid embracing both absolutist worldviews (like Palin’s toadying transcendentalist chaplain) and relativist worldviews (where all values and meanings are leveled or negated). The Buddha’s Middle Way doctrine seeks to reclaim human values and meaning by avoiding overly rigid blind faith and also avoiding distracting speculations about matters that are remote from lived experience. Back Down to Earth So, what are these more down-to-earth human values that must be rescued from transcendental flights-of-fancy and nihilistic negativity? In light of the film’s critique of transcendentalism, the extremely modest list of values offered at the end as final “answers” to the meaning of life make good sense. They are introduced by Palin (in drag) as he interrupts the Vegas-style celebration of perpetual Christmas. “Well, that’s the end of the film,” she announces. “Now here’s the Meaning of Life.” She opens an envelope and reads, “Well, it’s nothing special. Try and be nice to people, avoid eating fat, read a good book every now and then, get some walking in, and try and live together in peace and harmony with people of all creeds and nations.” This rather modest sounding list makes perfect sense if we no longer pine for some more grand transcendental meaning. Once we dispatch both the otherworldly values (toadying to God and conserving our sperm, for example) and the otherworldly “realities” which ground those values (soul, heaven, God), then **matters of meaning become markedly more pragmatic and demystified**. Like Buddha’s philosophy, the essential goals in life become attempts to realize moderation, actualize one’s potential, and reduce suffering. When we try to make issues of ultimate meaning more melodramatic than this, we end up with the distracting and dehumanizing edifices of transcendentalism. The Buddha offers us Four Noble Truths that can be used to fight these temptations and distractions. First, he says “All life is suffering, or all life is unsatisfactory (dukkha).” This seems pessimistic at first, but he’s simply pointing out that to have a biological body is to be subject to pain, illness, and eventually death. To have family and friends means that we are open to inevitable loss, disappointment, and also betrayal. But more importantly, even when we feel joy and happiness, these too are transient experiences that will fade because all things are impermanent. Second, the Buddha says “Suffering is caused by craving or attachment.” When we have a pleasurable experience we try to repeat it over and over or try to hang on to it and turn it into a permanent thing. Sensual experiences are not themselves the causes of suffering—they are inherently neutral phenomena. It is the psychological state of craving that rises up in the wake of sensations which causes us to have unrealistic expectations of those feelings—sending us chasing after fleeting experiences that cannot be possessed. The Third Noble Truth states that the cure for suffering is non-attachment or the cessation of craving. In the Samyutta Nikaya text, the Buddha says that the wise person “regards the delightful and pleasurable things of this world as impermanent, unsatisfactory and without atman (any permanent essence), as a disease and sorrow—it is he who overcomes the craving” (12:66). And the Fourth Noble Truth is an eight-fold path that helps the follower to steer a Middle Way of ethical moderation. Following the simple eight-fold path, which contains simple recommendations similar those listed at the end of Monty Python’s The Meaning of Life, allows the follower to overcome egoistic craving. Perhaps the most important craving that must be overcome, according to Buddha, is the craving for immortality. The Buddha claimed that giving up transcendental tendencies would help us to better see the people all around us who need our help. We would become more compassionate, he argued, because we would not be distracted by cravings for the “other world.” Mind the Mindfulness As the Pythons suggest, however, not all dehumanizing distraction comes from “above.” Often, we lose sight of compassion and humane living by drowning ourselves in a sea of trivial diversions. In existential terms, we lose our “authentic self ” in the unimportant hustle and bustle of everyday matters. Consider again the executives of the Very Big Corporation of America. Later in the film, we learn that just before they were attacked by the mutineers sailing the Crimson Permanent Assurance they were having a meeting about “Item Six on the Agenda, the Meaning of Life.” The board chairman, Graham Chapman, turns things over to Michael Palin: “Now Harry, you’ve had some thoughts on this.” “That’s right, yeah. I’ve had a team working on this over the past few weeks,” Palin explains in his best American accent: What we’ve come up with can be reduced to two fundamental concepts. One, people are not wearing enough hats. Two, matter is energy; in the Universe there are many energy fields which we cannot normally perceive. Some energies have a spiritual source which act upon a person’s soul. However, this soul does not exist ab initio, as orthodox Christianity teaches; it has to be brought into existence by a process of guided self-observation. However, this is rarely achieved owing to man’s unique ability to be distracted from spiritual matters by everyday trivia. The other Board members sit quietly through Palin’s impressive and important report. But, they need clarification about one of the more important points: “What was that about hats again?” one of them asks. Distraction reigns again in Part IV, Middle Age, when the hyper-pleasant, smiley, and vapid American couple (Palin and, in drag, Idle) are served up a “philosophy conversation” in the form of flashcard prompts. The waiter (Cleese) tries to get the insipid couple started on their philosophy conversation by asking, “Did you ever wonder why we’re here?” They fail utterly to stay on topic. “Oh! I never knew that Schopenhauer was a philosopher,” Idle exclaims. Palin responds, “Yeah. . . . He’s the one that begins with an S. WIFE: “Oh.” HUSBAND: “Um [pause] . . . like Nietzsche.” WIFE: “Does Nietzsche begin with an S?” HUSBAND: “There’s an S in Nietzsche.” WIFE: “Oh wow! Yes there is. Do all philosophers have an S in them?” HUSBAND: “Yeah I think most of them do.” WIFE: “Oh! Does that mean [the popular singer] Selina Jones is a philosopher?” HUSBAND: “Yeah, Right. She could be. She sings about the meaning of life.” WIFE: “Yeah, that’s right, but I don’t think she writes her own material.” HUSBAND: “No. Maybe Schopenhauer writes her material?” WIFE: “No. Burt Bacharach writes it.” HUSBAND: “There’s no S in Burt Bacharach.” If we combine this tedious conversation and the Boardroom’s fascination with hats, the results of Palin’s research begins to make sense. Human beings must “create” their “souls” day-by-day (rather than simply discover them, ready made) through “a process of guided self-observation.” The great enemy of this process, these sketches show, **is distraction**. This is a conception of the soul that the Buddha could agree with. It embraces impermanence, avoids transcendentalist metaphysics, and accepts the view that we must actively cultivate our “souls.” This is the point of Buddhist “mindfulness” (sati)—a powerful meditation that cuts through the dehumanizing distractions. There’s nothing mystical or particularly fancy about it. **You can do it in your daily activities as well as in isolated contemplation**. It just requires you to focus your mind and senses in the present moment, and to resist the mind’s natural tendency to wander off into the past or future, **to replay events or imagine scenarios that fill our minds** with worries, regrets, hopes or cravings. Mindfulness is a state of awareness that comes from training and discipline, a state that shuts out the drifting distractions of life and reveals the uniqueness of each present moment. In doing this careful attending, one can become more present in his or her own life. Mindfulness helps to rehumanize a person by taking their head out of the clouds. And according to Buddhism it reconnects us better with our compassionate hearts by revealing other human beings as just human beings. Once the distractions of trivia, or theoretical, transcendental, or ideological overlays are removed, **we may become better able to know ourselves** and compassionately recognize ourselves in others. We may even come to learn that, in fact, we should all wear more hats. But **we will only know for sure if we are less distracted and more mindful**.

### Presumption

**Vote neg on presumption – meaning is dissuasive**

Baudrillard, ’10 (Jean, Carnival and Cannibal; Ventriloquous Evil, p. 70-73) [m leap]

IN THE PROMETHEAN PERSPECTIVE of unlimited growth, there is not merely the desire to make everything function, to liberate everything, but also the desire to make everything signify. Everything is to be brought under the aegis of meaning (and reality). In some cases we know that knowledge will forever escape us. But in the immense majority of cases we do not even know what has disappeared and has always already eluded us. Now, science makes a systematic effort to eradicate this secret area, this 'constellation of the mystery"' and to eliminate this demarcation line between the violable and the inviolable. All that is concealed must be revealed; everything must be reducible to analysis. Hence the whole effort (particularly since the death of God, who restrained this attempt to break open the natural world) leads to an extension of the field of meaning (of knowledge, analysis, objectivity and reality). Now, everything inclines us to think that this accumulation, this over-production, this proliferation of meaning constitutes (a little like the accumulation of greenhouse gases) a virtual threat for the species (and for the planet), since it is gradually destroying, through experimentation, that domain of the inviolable that serves us, as it were, as an ozone layer and protects us from the worst—from the lethal irradiation and obliteration of our symbolic space. Shouldn't we then, work precisely in the opposite direction, to extend the domain of the inviolable? To restrain the production of meaning the way they are trying to restrain the production of greenhouse gases, to reinforce that constellation of the mystery and that intangible barrier that serves as a screen against the welter of information, interaction and universal exchange. This countervailing work exists—it is the work of thought. Not the analytic work of an understanding of causes, of the dissection of an object-world, not the work of a critical, en-lightened thought, but another form of understanding or intelligence, which is the intelligence of the mystery.

### Monologism K

**Next off is the method kritik:**

#### The aff’s method of relating to the topic and the discursive space this topic creates rejects meeting the meaning of the resolution

**Ericson 3** (Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb combination. For example, should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action though governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase free trade, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

#### This rhetorical move monologizes debate – game spaces like debate are distinct from other forms of education and public speaking

**Hanghoj 2008** – PhD, assistant professor, School of Education, University of Aarhus, also affiliated with the Danish Research Centre on Education and Advanced Media Materials, located at the Institute of Literature, Media and Cultural Studies at the University of Southern Denmark (Thorkild, http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information\_til/Studerende\_ved\_SDU/Din\_uddannelse/phd\_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf)

Debate games are often based on pre-designed scenarios that include descriptions of issues to be debated, educational goals, game goals, roles, rules, time frames etc. In this way, debate games differ from textbooks and everyday classroom instruction as debate scenarios allow teachers and students to actively imagine, interact and communicate within a domain-specific game space. However, instead of mystifying debate games as a “magic circle” (Huizinga, 1950), I will try to overcome the epistemological dichotomy between “gaming” and “teaching” that tends to dominate discussions of educational games. In short, educational gaming is a form of teaching. As mentioned, education and games represent two different semiotic domains that both embody the three faces of knowledge: assertions, modes of representation and social forms of organisation (Gee, 2003; Barth, 2002; cf. chapter 2). In order to understand the interplay between these different domains and their interrelated knowledge forms, I will draw attention to a central assumption in Bakhtin’s dialogical philosophy. According to Bakhtin, all forms of communication and culture are subject to centripetal and centrifugal forces (Bakhtin, 1981). A centripetal force is the drive to impose one version of the truth, while a centrifugal force involves a range of possible truths and interpretations. This means that any form of expression involves a duality of centripetal and centrifugal forces: “Every concrete utterance of a speaking subject serves as a point where centrifugal as well as centripetal forces are brought to bear” (Bakhtin, 1981: 272). If we take teaching as an example, it is always affected by centripetal and centrifugal forces in the on-going negotiation of “truths” between teachers and students. In the words of Bakhtin: “Truth is not born nor is it to be found inside the head of an individual person, it is born between people collectively searching for truth, in the process of their dialogic interaction” (Bakhtin, 1984a: 110). Similarly, the dialogical space of debate games also embodies centrifugal and centripetal forces. Thus, the election scenario of The Power Game involves centripetal elements that are mainly determined by the rules and outcomes of the game, i.e. the election is based on a limited time frame and a fixed voting procedure. Similarly, the open-ended goals, roles and resources represent centrifugal elements and create virtually endless possibilities for researching, preparing, presenting, debating and evaluating a variety of key political issues. Consequently, the actual process of enacting a game scenario involves a complex negotiation between these centrifugal/centripetal forces that are inextricably linked with the teachers and students’ game activities. In this way, the enactment of The Power Game is a form of teaching that combines different pedagogical practices (i.e. group work, web quests, student presentations) and learning resources (i.e. websites, handouts, spoken language) within the interpretive frame of the election scenario. Obviously, tensions may arise if there is too much divergence between educational goals and game goals. This means that game facilitation requires a balance between focusing too narrowly on the rules or “facts” of a game (centripetal orientation) and a focusing too broadly on the contingent possibilities and interpretations of the game scenario (centrifugal orientation). For Bakhtin, the duality of centripetal/centrifugal forces often manifests itself as a dynamic between “monological” and “dialogical” forms of discourse. Bakhtin illustrates this point with the monological discourse of the Socrates/Plato dialogues in which **the teacher never learns anything new** from the students, despite Socrates’ ideological claims to the contrary (Bakhtin, 1984a). Thus, discourse becomes monologised when “someone who knows and possesses the truth **instructs someone** who is ignorant of it and in error”, where “a thought is either affirmed or repudiated” by the authority of the teacher (Bakhtin, 1984a: 81). In contrast to this, dialogical pedagogy fosters inclusive learning environments that are able to expand upon students’ existing knowledge and collaborative construction of “truths” (Dysthe, 1996). At this point, I should clarify that Bakhtin’s term “dialogic” is both a descriptive term (all utterances are per definition dialogic as they address other utterances as parts of a chain of communication) and a normative term as dialogue is an ideal to be worked for against the forces of “monologism” (Lillis, 2003: 197-8). In this project, I am mainly interested in describing the dialogical space of debate games. At the same time, I agree with Wegerif that “one of the goals of education, perhaps the most important goal, should be dialogue as an end in itself” (Wegerif, 2006: 61).

#### Monologism subverts meaningful dialogue—monopolizing makes the discussion one-sided and subverts any meaningful neg role – forces us to play foil to them

**Galloway 7** – professor of communications at Samford University (Ryan, “Dinner And Conversation At The Argumentative Table: Reconceptualizing Debate As An Argumentative Dialogue”, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 28 (2007), ebsco)

Debate as a dialogue sets an argumentative table, where all parties receive a relatively fair opportunity to voice their position. Anything that fails to allow participants to have their position articulated denies one side of the argumentative table a fair hearing. The affirmative side is set by the topic and fairness requirements. While affirmative teams have recently resisted affirming the topic, in fact, the topic selection process is rigorous, taking the relative ground of each topic as its central point of departure.¶ Setting the affirmative reciprocally sets the negative. The negative crafts approaches to the topic consistent with affirmative demands. The negative crafts disadvantages, counter-plans, and critical arguments premised on the arguments that the topic allows for the affirmative team. According to fairness norms, each side sits at a relatively balanced argumentative table.¶ When one side takes more than its share, competitive equity suffers. However, it also undermines the respect due to the other involved in the dialogue. When one side excludes the other, it fundamentally denies the personhood of the other participant (Ehninger, 1970, p. 110). A pedagogy of debate as dialogue takes this respect as a fundamental component. A desire to be fair is a fundamental condition of a dialogue that takes the form of a demand for equality of voice. **Far from** being **a banal request for links** to a disadvantage, fairness is a demand for respect, a demand to be heard, a demand that a voice backed by literally months upon **months of preparation**, research, and critical thinking not be silenced.¶ Affirmative cases that suspend basic fairness norms **operate to exclude** particular negative strategies. Unprepared, one side comes to the argumentative table unable to meaningfully participate in a dialogue. They are unable to “understand what ‘went on…’” and are left to the whims of time and power (Farrell, 1985, p. 114). Hugh Duncan furthers this line of reasoning:¶ Opponents not only tolerate but honor and respect each other because in doing so they enhance their own chances of thinking better and reaching sound decisions. Opposition is necessary because it sharpens thought in action. We assume that argument, discussion, and talk, among free an informed people who subordinate decisions of any kind, because it is only through such discussion that we reach agreement which binds us to a common cause…If we are to be equal…relationships among equals must find expression in many formal and informal institutions (Duncan, 1993, p. 196-197).¶ **Debate compensates for the exigencies of the world by offering a framework that maintains equality for the sake of the conversation** (Farrell, 1985, p. 114).¶ For example, an affirmative case on the 2007-2008 college topic might defend neither state nor international action in the Middle East, and yet claim to be germane to the topic in some way. The case essentially denies the arguments that state action is oppressive or that actions in the international arena are philosophically or pragmatically suspect. Instead of allowing for the dialogue to be modified by the interchange of the affirmative case and the negative response, the affirmative subverts any meaningful role to the negative team, preventing them from offering effective “counter-word” and undermining the value of a meaningful exchange of speech acts. **Germaneness and other substitutes for topical action do not accrue the dialogical benefits** of topical advocacy.

#### This dialogic process focus delimits political futures and solve the aff better: Dialogue is a way of expressing micro-political potentiality, infusing dissident subjectivity into a new dimension of political reality, cultivating an ethic of care between participants

**Dutta-Bergman, 06** (Mohan, “U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Middle East : A Critical Cultural Approach” Journal of Communication Inquiry 2006 30: 102)

Policy is not determined a priori; rather, it is a product of a coconstructive process arrived at through the dialogue between the participating members. Dialogue was first conceptualized as a theoretical approach to public relations in the work of Pearson (1989), who suggested that ethical public relations is based on a dialogic system, and not on monologic policies (see Botan & Taylor, 2003). The concept of dialogue in public relations was further developed by Botan (1997), who posited that dialogue “elevates publics to the status of communication equal with the organization” (p. 192). The dialogic relationship is characterized by such qualities as “mutuality, open-heartedness, directness, honesty, spontaneity, frankness, lack of pretense, nonmanipulative intent, communion, intensity, and love in the sense of responsibility for another” (Johannesen, 1971, p. 375). Johannesen (1971) further stated that “the essential element in dialogue is turning toward, outgoing to, and reaching for the other. And a basic element in dialogue is ‘seeing the other’or ‘experiencing the other side’” (p. 375). In otherwords, dialogue is enacted in the process of reaching out to the other participant, based on the willingness to become completely involved with each other. For Buber (1958), dialogic communication calls for genuineness, empathy, unconditional positive regards, presentness, spirit of mutual equality, and a supportive communication climate. The notions of genuineness and reciprocal commitment are articulated by Friedman (2004) in his description of dialogue: If it is the interaction between man and man [sic] which makes possible authentic human existence, it follows that the precondition of such authentic existence is that each overcomes the tendency toward appearance, that each meets the other in his personal existence and makes him present as such, and that neither attempts to impose his own truth or view on the other. (p. 100) The emphasis on dialogue in the culture-centered approach suggests the ability of cultural participants to communicate openly and honestly, without feeling as if one is being judged. The dialogical space fosters “**free expression**, seeks understanding, and avoids value judgments that stifle” (Johannesen, 1971, p. 376). Central to the theorization of the culture-centered approach is the location of power that informs the relationships between cultures. By being actively aware of the critical role of power in the relationship between two cultures, the approach seeks to resist the traditional one-way flow of communication (determined by differences in access to power) by replacing it with a mutual commitment to valuing human dignity and diversity of values among cultural participants (see Grunig, 1989, for similar articulation in the symmetrical model of public relations). The awareness of the power differential in the relationship gives the participants a starting point for creating a space that is equally accessible to both participants; this awareness also provides a framework for minimizing the exercise of power based on superiority (see Dutta-Bergman, 2005). What emerges as a result is a sense of understanding among the engaged participants based on reflexive engagement. This sense of understanding informs policies and communicative strategies of all engaged members rather than the unidirectional influence exerted by the more powerful actor on less powerful ones as embodied in the one-way models based on access to power. At its core, the culture-centered approach metamorphoses the way public relations campaigns are conceptualized, designed, and implemented. By locating culture at the center of theorizing about communication processes, it predicates human dignity in cross-cultural relationships. By celebrating the relationship between cultures, it shifts the role of public diplomacy theorists and practitioners from informing and persuading to understanding, dialoguing, and relationship building. Communication scholars and practitioners working on public diplomacy can facilitate the development of relationships and work toward the creation of platforms that allow opportunities for developing mutual understanding rather than imposing a particular set of values on a culture through one-way public diplomacy efforts that emphasize sending out messages through leaflets, television, radio, or Internet (Beers, 2002a). Tactically, the culture-centered approach builds on community-based strategies that focus on exploring mutually meaningful points of entry into the discursive space and include participatory methods of communication. For instance, town hall meetings and public discussion forums can serve as important tools for promoting mutual understanding through dialogue between cultures. However, the choice of participatory channels is not solely adequate to ensure that the culture-centered approach is being practiced. The success of the culture-centered approach depends on the sincerity, genuineness, and mutual respect among the participants; it depends on the intent that drives the communication process. The participants need to be open to reciprocal communication to be able to achieve understanding based on a culturecentered perspective. The importance of the genuineness of intent is evident in the following example. In her report on public diplomacy in the post-9/11 climate, Beers (2002a) discussed then Secretary of State Colin Powell’s appearance on MTV (with a viewing audience of about 375 million globally), where he took questions from global audiences in building the U.S. image abroad. In his response to a question regarding the perception of the United States as the Satan of contemporary politics, Powell stated, Satan? Oh well. I reject the characterization. Quite the contrary. I think the American people, the United States of America, presents a value system to the rest of the world that is based on democracy, based on economic freedom, based on the individual rights of men andwomen. . . . We are a country of countries, and we touch every country, and every country in the world touches us. (n.p.) Powell used the event as an image-building exercise, demonstrating a monologue rather than a dialogue, using the event as an opportunity to influence the other without being open to the possibility of “listening” to inputs. A culture-centered approach would recommend that instead of using the question as an opportunity for image building, Powell should have participated in dialogue about the values and beliefs underlying the perception of the United States as the Satan of contemporary politics, exploring the underlying policies and practices that contribute to such perception, and perhaps altering those aspects of U.S. foreign policy that underlie this resentment of the United States. The application of a culture-centered approach would change the event as an opportunity for image building to a dialogical platform for discussion of real issues based on a sincere commitment to mutual understanding and participating in dialogue about U.S. policy abroad where both parties remain open to change. Central to relationship-based public relations is the very idea that both participants in the relationship can be equally affected; that both participants are open to the possibilities of change based on the lessons learned from engaging in the relationship; and both participants are sincere and committed to the relationship. In other words, the adoption of the culture-centered approach in U.S. international public diplomacy implies the openness of the **U**nited **S**tates to change and modify its policies based on the meaning drawn from the dialogue with other cultures. Change in this context flows multidirectionally and influences the many participants in the cultural process. The culture-centered approach informs us of **new ways of looking at public diplomacy** beyond persuasion-based propaganda to the promotion of understanding between cultures.

### T

#### Production is extraction, conversion, and distribution of energy – excludes R&D

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3. SUBSIDIES THROUGH THE FUEL CYCLE

Because no two fuel cycles are exactly the same, examining subsidies through the context of a generic fuel cycle is instructive in providing an overall framework from which to understand how common subsidization policies work. Subsidies are grouped into preproduction (e.g., R&D, resource location), production (e.g., extraction, conversion/generation, distribution, accident risks), consumption, postproduction (e.g., decommissioning, reclamation), and externalities (e.g., energy security, environmental, health and safety).

3.1 Preproduction

Preproduction activities include research into new technologies, improving existing technologies, and market assessments to identify the location and quality of energy resources.

3.1.1 Research and Development

R&D subsidies to energy are common worldwide, generally through government-funded research or tax breaks. Proponents of R&D subsidies argue that because a portion of the financial returns from successful innovations cannot be captured by the innovator, the private sector will spend less than is appropriate given the aggregate returns to society. Empirical data assembled by Margolis and Kammen supported this claim, suggesting average social returns on R&D of 50% versus private returns of only 20 to 30%.

However, the general concept masks several potential concerns regarding energy R&D. First, ideas near commercialization have much lower spillover than does basic research, making subsidies harder to justify. Second, politics is often an important factor in R&D choices, especially regarding how the research plans are structured and the support for follow-on funding for existing projects.

Allocation bias is also a concern. Historical data on energy R&D (Table III) demonstrate that R&D spending has heavily favored nuclear and fossil energy across many countries. Although efficiency, renewables, and conservation have captured a higher share of public funds during recent years, the overall support remains skewed to a degree that may well have influenced the relative competitiveness of energy technologies. Extensive public support for energy R&D may also reduce the incentive for firms to invest themselves. U.S. company spending on R&D for the petroleum refining and extraction sector was roughly one-third the multi-industry average during the 1956-1998 period based on survey data from the U.S. National Science Foundation. For the electric, gas, and sanitary services sector, the value was one-twentieth, albeit during the more limited 1995-1998 period.

3.1.2 Resource Location

Governments frequently conduct surveys to identify the location and composition of energy resources. Although these have addressed wind or geothermal resources on occasion, they most often involve oil and gas. Plant siting is another area where public funds are used, primarily to assess risks from natural disasters such as earthquakes for large hydroelectric or nuclear installations. Survey information can be important to evaluate energy security risks and to support mineral leasing auctions, especially when bidders do not operate competitively. However, costs should be offset from lease sale revenues when evaluating the public return on these sales. Similarly, the costs of siting studies should be recovered from the beneficiary industries.

3.2 Production

Energy production includes all stages from the point of resource location through distribution to the final consumers. Specific items examined here include resource extraction, resource conversion (including electricity), the various distribution links to bring the energy resource to the point of final use, and accident risks.

#### Vote neg:

#### 1. Limits—R&D enables obscure energy types that financial incentive research wouldn’t cover—overstretched neg burdens and prevents any limiting function based on object content.

#### 2. At best they’re indirect which means they’re FX

### Starting Point PIC

#### We affirm the value critical ecological literacy as policy paradigm. Resolved: we should substantially increase research and development funding for biomimetic solar power.

#### There are no prerequisites, however – we PIC out of that – creating a telos for the operationalization of history is violent

Corbin and Klinger 2k3 (Carol, prof comm @ U College of Cape Breton Geoffrey, prof comm @ Depauw “"Service Guarantees Citizenship": The Generation of Criticism in a Postmodern Public Sphere” “<http://ac-journal.org/journal/vol6/iss4/iss4/articles/mck.htm>)

We share with Nietzsche a skeptical approach to the historical method and advance a genealogical alternative.[5](javascript:refpop('mckcites.htm#note5');) To elucidate our position, we first need to better understand the meaning and interplay among our primary network of terms—past, history, present, and genealogy. Importantly, we distinguish "the past" from "history." The former is more the sum total of that which has happened—the wars, the famines, the depressions, the babies, the praxis of the everyday. In contrast, we use the word "history" to refer to the narrativization of "the past" which means selecting those bits and pieces from the past that the historian finds significant. History is always a story of what happened from a particular perspective written in such a way as to accomplish some purpose. As Nietzsche recognizes, we are intentionally and consciously reproducing the past for the purpose of either simply entertaining ourselves, or guiding our actions.¶ The pejorative understanding of terms like past, present, or future, usually involves the assumption of temporality. We maintain, however, that terms like "the present" are not merely temporal, but material states. The present of an 80-year old man is different than the present of a teenager. Different experiences and memories create two remarkably different "presents." So what makes "a present" is not the same for all of us, it is not fixed, and it is not certain. Generations are bound through their shared presents, which involve the recollection of shared experiences through collective memory.[6](javascript:refpop('mckcites.htm#note6');) To facilitate communication between generations, and we do believe that communication is the key to draw generations together, each group must come to contextualize problems in the same structurational set, or what Lyotard called the "collective imaginary." We focus on the place where imagination becomes "real," where it achieves the ontological state of being that marks it as something material.¶ Genealogy is a unique way of approaching the past, one that differs significantly from the historical approach. One key difference between the two approaches is the starting point of the procedure in each. With history, critics always jump back to some imaginary point of origin, and from that point of origin they trace causes and effects back toward the present position. With genealogy, on the other hand, critics start with themselves, and trace their genealogical roots backwards. Genealogy starts in the present and organizes materials of the past in a more disciplined way than history. The starting point of history is always variable. It depends on the interests and the inclinations of the particular historian who writes the narrative, and it tends to reinforce the claim that the historian advances.[7](javascript:refpop('mckcites.htm#note7');) Instead of starting in the past and working to the point of present action, the genealogist begins with the present and works back. The genealogical approach changes the approach to the past. The past no longer becomes constraining, but a trope—and nothing more—that can be used in approaching present day problems.¶ We believe that the genealogical approach helps us understand the living matter, the living memory, the living person and that within the living there is a need for cross-generational communication, and persuasion, and identification. As we note above, genealogy cannot be understood as a temporal phenomenon. Living in "a present" involves not merely growing older, but freezing your psychological mindset, freezing your take on the ideology, freezing your take on society and culture in a particular portion or fragment of your life.[8](javascript:refpop('mckcites.htm#note8');) For us, the ballyhoo surrounding the "generation gap" is a very real problem--and possibility—rooted in a radical reinterpretation of traditional approaches to ontological inquiry.[9](javascript:refpop('mckcites.htm#note9');)¶ The boundaries of a generation are created not from shared time, but shared experience. As [Ortega](javascript:refpop('mckcites.htm#or');) notes, "Age, then, is not a date, but a 'zone of dates'" (470. Now assuredly there are significant differences between individuals within generations, but insofar as individual identity is the product of social construction, individuals within generations share experience within similar structural and symbolic systems. Thus, even seeing a generation as a biological entity misses the point. As Ortega notes, "A generation is an integrated manner of existence, or, if you prefer, a fashion in living" (45). Thus, "at any given moment a generation is one and the same thing as human life" (67). Moreover, the "'spirit of the times' has a peculiar character not possessed by the world of individual beliefs" (39).[10](javascript:refpop('mckcites.htm#note10');)As such, a generation is not a collective of individuals, but a marker for human experience. The "greatest influence which the spirit of the times . . . exerts on each individual life is exercised not by the simple fact of being there . . . but because the greater portion of my world, of my beliefs, arises out of that collective repertory, and coincides with its contents" (39-40).¶

### Mystery DA

#### Imagining a world and populating it with your actions as a mental experiment is politically impotent and counter-productive

**Baudrillard, ’01** (Jean, *Dust Breeding*, http://www.egs.edu/faculty/jean-baudrillard/articles/dust-breeding/)

Destiny – modern man is left with an endless experimentation of himself

Our reality has become experimental. Without destiny, modern ~~man~~ is left with an endless experimentation of ~~himself~~. Let's take two recent examples. The first one, the Loft Story show, is a media illusion of live reality. The second one, the case of Catherine Millet’s book, is a phantasmatic illusion of live sex. The Loft show has become a universal concept: a human amusement park combined with a ghetto, solitary confinement (huis-clos), and an Angel of Death. The idea is to use voluntary seclusion as a laboratory for synthetic conviviality, for a telegenetically modified society. In this space, where **everything is meant to be seen** (as in "Big Brother", other reality-TV shows, etc.), we realize that there is nothing left to see. It becomes a mirror of dullness, of nothingness, on which the disappearance of the other is blatantly reflected (even though the show alleges different objectives). It also reveals the possibility that human beings are fundamentally not social. **This space becomes the equivalent of a "ready-made**" just-as-is (telle quelle) transposition of an "everyday life" that has already been trumped by all dominant models. It is **a synthetic banality, fabricated in closed circuits and supervised by a monitoring screen**. In this sense, the artificial microcosm of the Loft Story is similar to Disneyland which gives the illusion of a real world, a world out-there, whereas both Disney's world and the world outside of it are mirror images of one another. All of the United States is (in) Disneyland. And we, in France, are all inside the Loft. No need to enter reality’s virtual reproduction. We are already in it. The televisual universe is merely a holographic detail of the global reality. Even in our most mundane activities we are deep into experimental reality. And this explains our fascination with immersion and spontaneous interactivity. Does it mean that it is all pornographic voyeurism? Not at all. Sex is everywhere else to be found, but that's not what people want. What people deeply desire is a spectacle of banality. This spectacle of banality is today's true pornography and obscenity. It is the obscene spectacle of nullity (nullité), insignificance, and platitude. This stands as the complete opposite of the theater of cruelty. But perhaps there is still a form of cruelty, at least a virtual one, attached to such a banality. At a time when television and the media in general are less and less capable of accounting for (rendre compte) the world's (unbearable) events, they rediscover daily life. They discover existential banality as the deadliest event, as the most violent piece of information: the very location of the perfect crime. Existential banality is the perfect crime. And people are fascinated (but terrified at the same time) by this indifferent "nothing-to-say" or "nothing-to-do," by the indifference of their own lives. Contemplating the Perfect Crime --banality as the latest form of fatality-- has become a genuine Olympic contest, the latest version of extreme sports. What makes it worse is the fact that the public is mobilized as the judge of all this. The public has become Big Brother. We are well beyond panopticism, beyond visibility as a source of power and control. It is no longer a matter of making things visible to the external eye. It is rather a question of making things transparent to themselves, through **the diffusion of control into the masses**, a mode of control which by the same token erases the marks of the system. Thus, the audience is involved in a gigantic exercise of negative counter-transference (contre-transfert), and this is once again where the dizzying attraction of this kind of spectacle comes from. In fact, all this corresponds to the inalienable right or desire to be nothing and to be regarded as such. There are two ways to disappear. Either you demand not to be seen (the current issue with image rights); or you turn to the maddening exhibitionist display of your insignificance. You make yourself insignificant in order to be seen as such. This is the ultimate protection against the need to exist and the duty to be oneself. But this situation also creates the contradictory demand to simultaneously not be seen and to be perpetually visible. Everyone must have it both ways. No ethic or law can solve this dilemma. There is no possibility to adjudicate between the unconditional right to see and the unconditional right not to be seen. Complete information is a basic human rights requirement. And this necessity brings with it the idea of forced visibility, including the right to be over-exposed by the media. Foucault used to refer to self-expression as the ultimate form of confession. Keeping no secret. Speaking, talking, endlessly communicating. This is a form of violence which targets the singular being and ~~his~~ secrecy. It is also a form of **violence against language**. In this mode of communicability, language loses its originality. Language simply becomes a medium, an operator of visibility. It has lost its symbolic and ironic qualities, **those which make language more important than what it conveys**. The worst part of this obscene and indecent visibility is the forced enrollment, the automatic complicity of the spectator who has been blackmailed into participating. The obvious goal of this kind of operation is to enslave the victims. But the victims are quite willing. They are rejoicing at the pain and the shame they suffer. Everybody must abide by society's fundamental logic: interactive exclusion. Interactive exclusion, what could be better! Let’s all agree on it and practice it with enthusiasm! If everything ends with visibility (which, similar to the concept of heat in the theory of energy, is the most degraded form of existence), the point is still to make such a loss of symbolic space and such an extreme disenchantment with life an object of contemplation, of sidereal observation (sidération), and of perverse desire. "While humanity was once according to Homer an object of contemplation for the Gods, it has now become a contemplation of itself. Its own alienation has reached such a degree that humanity’s own destruction becomes a first rate aesthetic sensation" (Walter Benjamin). Everywhere the experimental takes over the real and the imaginary. Everywhere, principles of scientific evidence and verification are introduced. Under the scalpel of the camera, and without recourse to any symbolic language or context, **we are vivisecting and dissecting social relations**. The case of Catherine Millet is another example of experimental reality, another type of vivi-sexion. In her book, the sexual imaginary is blown away. All that’s left is a principle of unlimited verification of sexual operations. It is a mechanism which is no longer sexual. A double misinterpretation is taking place. The idea of sexuality is turned into the ultimate reference. Whether it is repressed or it is displayed, sexuality is at best nothing more than a hypothesis. It is incorrect to take a hypothesis for a truth or a solid reference. It may well be that the sexual hypothesis is nothing more than a fantasy. In any case, it is through its repression that sexuality has gained such a strange power of attraction. Once it is played out, sexuality loses its postulated quality. Hence, it is absurd and misplaced to act it out and to systematically call for sexual "liberation." One never liberates a hypothesis. And how sad is the idea of demonstrating sexuality through the sexual act! As if displacements, deviations, transfers, and metaphors had nothing to do with sex. Everything is in the filter of seduction, in détournement. Not the seduction in sex and desire, but the seduction of playing with sex and desire (le jeu avec the sexe et le désir). This is exactly what makes impossible the idea of "live sex." The concepts of live death or live news are just as naively naturalist. They are all linked to the pretentious claim that everything can happen in the real world, that everything craves to find its place inside an all encompassing reality. After all, this is the essence of power too: "**The corruption of power is to inscribe into reality what was only found in dreams**."

**Turns the environment – by obliterating the symbolic illusion of the world, they reconcile humanity to ecological catastrophe**

**Baudrillard, ’07** (Jean, International Journal of Baudrillard Studies; Volume 4, Number 2 (July, 2007), *Darwin’s Artificial Ancestors and the Terroristic Dream of the Transparency of the Good*, http://www.ubishops.ca/baudrillardstudies/vol4\_2/v4-2-baudrillard.html#\_edn2)

It seems that the more the human race **reconciles itself with nature, the less it is reconciled with itself**. Above and beyond the violence it inflicts on others, there is a violence specific to the human race in general, a violence of the species against itself in which it treats itself as a residue, as a survivor – even in the present – of a coming catastrophe. As if it too were ready to repent of an evolution which has brought it such privileges and carried it to such extremes. This is the same conjuncture as the one to which Canetti refers, in which we stepped out of history, except that here we have not stepped out of history, but have passed a point beyond which nothing is either human or inhuman any longer and what is at stake, which is even more immense, is the tottering of the species into the void. It is quite possible that, in this process, the species itself is commencing its own disappearance, either by disenchantment with – or ressentiment towards – itself, or out of a deliberate inclination which leads it here and now to manage that disappearance as its destiny. Surreptitiously, in spite of our superiority (or perhaps because of it), we are carrying over on to our own species the treatment we mete out to the others, all of which are virtually dying out. In an animal milieu which has reached saturation point, species are spontaneously dissuaded from living. The effects produced by the finite nature of the earth, for the first time contrasting violently with the infinity of our development, are such that our species is automatically switching over to **collective suicide**. Whether by external (**nuclear) violence** or internal (**biological) virulence**. We are subjecting ourselves as a human species to the same experimental pressure as the animal species in our laboratories. ~~Man~~ is without prejudice: he is using ~~him~~self as a guinea-pig, just as he is using the rest of the world, animate or inanimate. ~~He~~ is cheerfully gambling with the destiny of ~~his~~ own species as ~~he~~ is with that of all the others. In his blind desire to know more, ~~he~~ is programming ~~his~~ own destruction with the same ease and ferocity as the destruction of the others. ~~He~~ cannot be accused of a superior egoism. ~~He~~ is sacrificing himself, as a species, to an unknown experimental fate, unknown at least as yet to other species, who have experienced only natural fates. And, whereas it seemed that, linked to that natural fate, there was something like an instinct of self-preservation – long the mainstay of a natural philosophy of individuals and groups – this experimental fate to which the human species is condemning itself by unprecedented, artificial means, this scientific prefiguring of its own disappear­ance, sweeps away all ideas of a self-preservation instinct. The idea is, indeed, no longer discussed in the human sciences (where the focus of attention would seem, rather, to be on the death drive) and this disappearance from the field of thought signals that, beneath a frenzy for ecological conservation which is really more to do with nostalgia and remorse, a wholly different tendency has already won out, the sacrificing of the species to boundless experimentation. A contradictory dual operation: ~~man~~, alone of all species, is seeking to construct his immortal double, an unprecedented artificial species. ~~He~~ caps natural selection with an artificial super-­selection, claiming sole possession of a soul and a consciousness and, at the same time, ~~he~~ is putting an end to natural selection which entailed the death of each species in accordance with the law of evolution. In ending evolution (of all species including ~~his~~ own), ~~he~~ is contravening the symbolic rule and hence truly deserves to disappear. And this is without doubt the destiny he is preparing for ~~him~~self, in a roundabout way, in that, in his arrogant desire to end evolution, ~~man~~ is ushering in involution and the revival of inhuman, biogenetic forms. Here again, we have before us a reversive effect, running counter to any ideal or 'scientific' vision of the species. The idea running through the writings of Darwin that natural selection leads to a species capable of morally transcending natural selection is thoroughly specious. In aiming for virtual (technical) immortality and ensuring its exclusive perpetuation by a projection into artifacts, the human species is precisely losing its own immunity and specificity and becoming immortalized as an inhuman species; it is abolishing in itself the mortality of the living in favour of the immortality of the dead. It is immortalizing itself as the zero degree of a living species, as an operational artifact which no longer even obeys the law of species, except the law of artificial species, whose mortality is perhaps even more rapid. As a result, by going down these paths of artifice which were supposed to ensure its indefinite survival, it is perhaps hurtling even more quickly to its doom. The human species is currently domesticating itself, this time for good, by means of its technologies. It is submitting collectively to the same rituals as insepcts. Soon it will submit to the same controlled techniques of reproduction as the protozoa, will inflict on itself the same biogenetic (phylo- or ontogenetic) destiny to which it has subjected others. It no longer, in fact, sees itself as different from the others, in spite of its supremacy. It treats itself as a species that may be ruthlessly exploited, condemned to a brutalization and annihilation of its own. Here again, all the advances it has made and has forced others to accept have had a reversive effect upon it. To such an extent that it – the guardian, in its zoos, museums, reserves and laboratories, of condemned species – regards itself as a condemned species, and keeps an anxious eye trained on its biospheric destiny.

#### Their attempt at academic change through critical ecological literacy sustains power’s ability to constrain ANY resistance by turning those victims of power into ghosts. The tradition of liberal citizenship is a ghostly attempt to remember past political struggles that ultimately fetishize movements of the past, especially in academic subculture—this turns the case.

**Occupied UC Berkeley 2k9.** <http://anticapitalprojects.wordpress.com/2009/11/19/the-necrosocial/>, the necrosocial: civic life, social death, and the UC, nov. 19

Totally managed death. A machine for administering death, for the proliferation of technologies of death. As elsewhere, things rule. Dead objects rule. In this sense, it matters little what face one puts on the university—whether Yudof or some other lackey. These are merely the personifications of the rule of the dead, the pools of investments, the buildings, the flows of materials into and out of the physical space of the university—each one the product of some exploitation—which seek to absorb more of our work, more tuition, more energy. The university is a machine which wants to grow, to accumulate, to expand, to absorb more and more of the living into its peculiar and perverse machinery: high-tech research centers, new stadiums and office complexes. And at this critical juncture the only way it can continue to grow is by more intense exploitation, higher tuition, austerity measures for the departments that fail to pass the test of ‘relevancy.’ But the ‘irrelevant’ departments also have their place.  With their ‘pure’ motives of knowledge for its own sake, they perpetuate the blind inertia of meaning ostensibly detached from its social context.  As the university cultivates its cozy relationship with capital, war and power, these discourses and research programs play their own role, co-opting and containing radical potential.  And so we attend lecture after lecture about how ‘discourse’ produces ‘subjects,’ ignoring the most obvious fact that we ourselves are produced by this discourse about discourse which leaves us believing that it is only words which matter, words about words which matter.  The university gladly permits the precautionary lectures on biopower; on the production of race and gender; on the reification and the fetishization of commodities.  A taste of the poison serves well to inoculate us against any confrontational radicalism.  And all the while power weaves the invisible nets which contain and neutralize all thought and action, that bind revolution inside books, lecture halls. There is no need to speak truth to power when power already speaks the truth.  The university is a graveyard–así es. The graveyard of liberal good intentions, of meritocracy, opportunity, equality, democracy. Here the tradition of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living. We graft our flesh, our labor, our debt to the skeletons of this or that social cliché. In seminars and lectures and essays, we pay tribute to the university’s ghosts, the ghosts of all those it has excluded—the immiserated, the incarcerated, the just-plain-fucked. They are summoned forth and banished by a few well-meaning phrases and research programs, given their book titles, their citations.  This is our gothic—we are so morbidly aware, we are so practiced at stomaching horror that the horror is thoughtless. In this graveyard our actions will never touch, will never become the conduits of a movement, if we remain permanently barricaded within prescribed identity categories—our force will be dependent on the limited spaces of recognition built between us.  Here we are at odds with one another socially, each of us: students, faculty, staff, homebums, activists, police, chancellors, administrators, bureaucrats, investors, politicians, faculty/ staff/ homebums/ activists/ police/ chancellors/ administrators/ bureaucrats/ investors/ politicians-to-be.  That is, we are students, or students of color, or queer students of color, or faculty, or Philosophy Faculty, or Gender and Women Studies faculty, or we are custodians, or we are shift leaders—each with our own office, place, time, and given meaning.  We form teams, clubs, fraternities, majors, departments, schools, unions, ideologies, identities, and subcultures—and thankfully each group gets its own designated burial plot.  Who doesn’t participate in this graveyard?

#### Lives are meaningless if you vote affirmative—endless simulation causes lack of creativity and originality that kills value to life.

**Baudrillard 90.** Jean Baudrillard, French philosopher, writer, and professor of sociology at the Universite de Paris-X, The Transparency of Evil: Essays on Extreme Phenomena, Verso Books 1990.

There is something particularly nauseating about this prodigious useless-ness, about a proliferating yet hypertrophied world, which cannot give birth to anything. So many reports, archives, documents—and not a single idea generated; so many plans, programmes, decisions—and not a single event precipitated; so many sophisticated weapons produced—and no war declared! This saturation goes way beyond the surplus that Bataille spoke of; all societies have found some way to dispose of that through useless or sumptuous expense. There is no possible way for us to spend all that has been accumulated—all we have in prospect is a slow or brutal decompensation, with each factor of acceleration serving to create inertia, bringing us closer to absolute inertia. What we call crisis is in fact a foreshadowing of this absolute inertia.

#### Their desire to isolate and expel environmental pollutors feeds into a virulent form of opposition that produces a self-defeating violence – the system of values the 1ac maps will annihilate its own subjects – the only alternative is the logic of exception.

**Baudrillard, ‘08** (Jean Baudrillard, *Present Considerations: The uncertainty of all value* *systems*, International Journal of Baudrillard Studies <http://www.ubishops.ca/baudrillardstudies/vol5_1/v5-1-article2-petit.html>) – Ellipses to correct a typo

Baudrillard: It's a diagnosis. Our society has expelled violence (at the same time as it has expelled evil, illness, negativity and death – I don't mean it has eliminated them, but it has expelled them **from its system of values**). All forms of wildcat, spontaneous violence, historical and political, have been stifled or neutralized. Just as all forms of concrete freedom are being absorbed into the only freedom which remains, the freedom of the market and of market values, and the assumption of these into glob­alism, so all forms of violence are reduced and muzzled to the exclusive advantage of the terrorist and police-style violence of the new world order. The system has the monopoly of violence: a monopoly of the extermination of any singularity, any negativity, of death itself, and of real violence in the virtual violence of generalized pacification, fundamentalist [intégriste] violence (the only violence, that of the sys­tem, not that of terrorists, which remains small-scale and blind). Against this, new forms of violence are arising; or, rather, new forms of anony­mous, anomalous virulence – a reactive, reactional vehemence against the dominant thrust of society, **against any dominant system** – which is no longer a historical vio­lence of liberation, but **a violence from the confines** of a sacrificed destiny, from the confines of a sacrificed symbolic order, from the confines of the perfect crime or, in other words, of total integration (the integrism of the system) and even **of the democratic aspects of the system** (enforced liberation, enforced interactivity in all its forms) – that is to say, **the absence of destiny**. This new violence is no longer directed against the absence of freedom and against oppression, but against the absence of destiny and the democratic leukaemia of all our cells. Petit: An absence like that ,exhibited by H.B., the hostage-taker at the Neuilly Infants’ school, in 1995. In a book which – sadly – passed unnoticed, Alain Brossat Wrote of him: What the public will hot forgive the “monster” is his directly exhibiting ... what is basi­cally at stake in the crisis: not the economy, but living beings, not objects, but human relations, not car sales figures, but whether or not the life-world is fit to live in ...5 Baudrillard: He's right, because that violence on the part of H.B. or Florence Rey6 is no longer a political violence with a determinate objective (political violence has been absorbed and transformed into transpolitical energy for the benefit of the sys­tem). It's a violence cut off from its object and turning back against that object itself – against the political and the social. It's no longer anarchistic or revolution­ary, it's worse because its objective is no longer to set the system to rights or to transform the world by violently and historically. bringing something new into being; it takes the system itself as its object, aiming at systematic destabilization. It's not interested in the system's internal contradictions; it targets the very principle of the social and the political. It spontaneously takes a viral, temperamental form. It's an esoteric form which is its own justification, an exclusive violence which is merely the correlative of a system of exclusion. It answers the systematic exclusion our society practices by even more exclusion, cutting itself off from the social world by indifference or hatred. For it may be aggravated or apathetic: it may take the form of **an active terrorism or** that of **the inertia and irrepressible conformism of the masses**. No longer having ,either **object or objective**, it willfully (like all forms of virus arid virulence) **confuses the murderer and the victim**, **in an immense Stockholm syndrome**, precisely reflecting in this the system itself and its “perfect crime” – that is to say, its current ideal operation in which we are all simultaneously victims, murderers and accomplices (this is the truth of consensus, interactivity, and every­thing cycling back on itself). Taking a lofty, otherworldly view of the whole process – the process of the system and that of the violence which opposes it while reflecting its characteristic features (exclusion, autarky, anomaly, virulence) – one might conclude that it's an immense suicidal process, suicide being the perfect crime, inasmuch as in that act **murderer and victim are one**. In the history of humanity, then, the various lethal forms of violence are com­ing increasingly to resemble one another, as the terms are mingled and the roles merged (a confusion opened up irreversibly by the nuclear and by all the forms of complicity in pollution and death) to the point of wiping out, in the logical func­tioning of the system, any demarcation line between accomplice and victim (as any demarcation line between subject and object is being wiped out in philosophy and the sciences), and giving the image of a collective suicide, in which the attribution of responsibility becomes entirely secondary. Petit: But the threshold you speak of at which we break with this can, it seems, have only a clandestine existence. How are we to go on living in your world, our world, without being compromised? Baudrillard: **The only exception** is singularity. Singularity is the singularity of that anom­alous violence I'm referring to, the singularity which stands opposed to real violence, to the violence of any reality principle. For the basic violence, the basic deception, is the violence of the reality principle. Now, the system produces more and more reality, more and more of the social, more and more politics, more and more sex, more and more information, etc. That is its own peculiar violence. But at the same time, and in the same process, it **paradoxically produces more and more singularity** (of beings, of unidentified, refractory, excluded forces, which have no need of it to exist and are definitively exiled from the system). The example of the social sphere is fantastic. One day soon, that sphere will be fully realized, and the only people remaining will be the “excluded”. In a perfectly conformist sociality, only anomalous individuals and desocialized categories will be left, and they **won't** even **have any relationship**, dialectical or otherwise, **with** the social **institutions**. This is what's happening today at an increasingly rapid rate. As the social sphere is completed, with the discourse on “the social” playing its part, it expels everyone from the game (the homeless, the unemployed, vagrants, etc., and all the desocialized categories one after the other). In the end, the only people left in die[the] social sphere will be sociologists and social workers, all those for whom the “social” their stock in trade, and they will be left grappling with their object, which, though fully realized; has now become virtual. Retrospectively, it will be seen that the social sphere was only ever invented as a place to park the have-nots, and that today they're even being gradually expelled from there, like the Indians being driven off their reservations, thus allowing the better-off classes to occupy the social sphere as a second home. A strange contradictory movement, this, in which there's a growing mismatch between an idealistic, voluntaristic, expert dis­course, in which everything's getting better and better by pressing on regardless with imaginary solutions, and the real (if I dare use the term) state of affairs, in which everything's getting inexorably worse. The most disturbing thing is that the two are developing contradictorily and in, parallel, with the same irresistible dynamism. Flourishing social provision and galloping exclusion. Educational progress and mental, retardation. Perhaps there isn't even a contradiction or distor­tion here, merely a twist in the, same phenomena? This distortion can be seen everywhere: one day the construction of Europe will finally be completed, and there will really be no countries left to be part of it; it will in fact be constructed by successive exclusions and extraditions. It might even be the case, in the end, that when globalism has fully taken shape, and the cycle of information is perfectly inte­grated, there won't be anyone left on the networks any more. This is the perfect rule – the one where **there are only exceptions**. The perfect crime: the one in which there are only victims and accomplices, but no murderers (our present con­dition). The perfect social sphere: the one in which everyone is among “the excluded”. Perfect communication (the ecstasy of communication): when no one speaks to anyone any more.

### Phantasie Natura

#### Their call to retreat from environmentally destructive practices foregrounds an artificially pure environmental state presided over by a moral narrative in which humans have violated some pre-existing "natural" order. There is no “natural world” with which you can interrogate your relationship: the natural world springs forth from chaos, and our moral regulations can’t restrict our interactions with it

**CRONON ‘96** [William; Frederick Jackson Turner Professor of History, Geography, and Environmental Studies at the University of Wisconsin at Madison; Uncommon Ground; 1996; p. 47-51]

But theme parks and shopping malls are by no means the only ways in which the virtual and the natural are converging in our time. It is well worth remembering that **some of the most dramatic environmental problems** we appear to be facing as we enter the twenty-first century **exist mainly as simulated representations in complex computer models** of natural systems. **Our awareness of the ozone hole** over the Antarctic, for instance, **depends** very much **on the ability of machines to process** large amounts of **data to produce maps of atmospheric phenomena that we ourselves could never witness at first hand.** No one has ever seen the ozone hole.However real the problem may be, our knowledge of it cannot help being virtual. **The same is** **even more** **true of** the phenomenon called **global warming, which many** people now **take to be an absolute fact of nature.** Like the ozone hole, **it too is probably real, but our knowledge** of it **could hardly be more simulated**. The computer models on which we base our **predictions** of what will happen as concentrations of greenhouse gases rise **are** in fact still **so unsophisticated that they cannot even do an accurate job of predicting past climatic change, let alone** change in **the future. Load** into them the **data for 1900, and the weather they will predict** for our present time **bears little resemblance to what we are now experiencing**. Given this rather awkward weakness in their software, the modelers have had to resort to a less trouble-some forecasting technique. They run their programs forward in time, once using the data for today's mixture of atmospheric gases, and once with doubled levels of carbon dioxide. After the computer has done its job, they compare the two runs and describe what will happen when we double the carbon dioxide. The only trouble is that this description is of the simulated doubling of a modeled gas in a virtual atmosphere, all of which bears only the most hypothetical relationship to the future world, for which we of course have no empirical data whatsoever. The model's ability to predict the future is no more assured than its proven inability to predict the past.18 But <48> because the phenomenon being predicted is so complex, because its consequences could be so catastrophic, and because we have no better way to investigate it, we have no choice but to rely on these flawed tools. In a very real sense, **global warming is the ultimate example of a virtual crisis in virtual nature—which is far from saying that it is unreal.** Instead, it is proof that **the virtual and the natural can converge in surprising ways**. None of this is very reassuring for environmentalists and others who look to nature as the ultimate foundation for their moral vision. In the face of culturally constructed landscapes and increasingly virtual experiences of the world, **many** of us **would not be at all unhappy if nature would reassert its own authority over all this** human **unreality. This may be** one reason **why environmentalists so often seem drawn to prophecies of ecological doom that offer elaborate descriptions of the disasters that will soon occur because of our misdeeds against the earth.** The genre is familiar enough to constitute yet another nature for our list. **It is the nightmare inversion of Eden** to which that eloquent U-Haul sign bore witness**: nature as demonic other**, nature as **avenging angel,** nature as **the return of the repressed. It can range from something as trivial as** those uncooperative **snails in our** Irvine **garden,** to natural disasters like earthquakes or floods, **to the hypothetical horrors of global warming.** At whatever scale we experience them, these things represent a nonhuman world that despite our best efforts **we** never quite succeed in fully controlling. Often we come close enough that we congratulate ourselves prematurely for our own triumph—and then **are surprised when** the long-silent fault or **the hundred-year flood suddenly reveals our hubris. As one man wrote to Time magazine** following the Northridge quake, "**If Mother Nature has proved one thing, it is that she can be a real ~~bitch."~~**19 Even beyond the earthquake and the fires, **California offered numerous examples of nature in apparent rebellion during our stay.** Early in the year reports surfaced of a high school in nearby Westminster where 292 **students** had been **infected with tuberculosis by a single classmate,** twelve of them with drug-resistant forms that would respond slowly to treatment if they responded at all. A little later the newspapers announced that the first **killer bees** had finally **made it to California, and** offered dire predictions of what this would mean for people who would now have to worry about being stung by them.20 More dramatically, **in April a**

**young woman jogging near her home** in the Sierra Nevada foothills **was stalked and pulled from the trail by a female mountain lion and** then quickly **mauled to death. The lioness was hunted down and shot**, lest she kill again. **The woman left behind two small children; the lion, a seven-week-old cub. It undoubtedly says something about** people's **ideas of nature,** perhaps even their ideas of human nature, **that public appeals on behalf of these young orphans** soon **yielded $9,000 for the two children ... and $21,000 for the cub.**21**What is interesting about such events is** not that they occur. After all, what could be more natural than a mountain lion killing its prey or a great fault relieving its pent-up strain? What is really intriguing is **the meaning we** <50> **assign to them,** for we have an inveterate habit of **turning them into moral fables.** The snails in my Irvine garden become small gruesome symbols of the limits to human control. The earthquakes exemplify nature's terrifying randomness—and also people's hubris in pretending that rare, irregular events can safely be ignored simply because they cannot be predicted. **The mountain lion can serve as** a token of nature's savagery—or as the **innocent victim of human beings who** in their efforts to live closer to nature unthinkingly **invade the lion's home. Every environmental disaster,** all the way up to global warming**, stands as a potential indictment of the ignorant or culpable human actions that contributed to it. The human inclination is to transform all such events into**

stories that carry **a moral lesson.** Nature as demonic other is Job's whirlwind, the horror of random suffering that is all the more terrifying because it offers no discernible justification for the pain it inflicts on the innocent and the guilty alike. **Nature as the avenging angel is the dark side of the Eden story, the punishment** that follows **in the wake of** our having listened to **Satan's seductive advice.** It is this story that makes us shake our heads so knowingly even as we sympathize with the families that lost their homes in the Laguna Can-yon fire. It's too bad, we say, but they brought it on themselves by building there. What did they expect? After all, the fires are only natural. We do this even though we ourselves have almost surely made similar bargains with nature, whether we live in the fault zone or the floodplain or the path of great storms. When we become victims, these things are never our fault, though it is easy enough for us to see how others have foolishly placed themselves in harm's way. **People are drawn to nature as avenging angel for much the same reason that they are drawn to nature as Eden**. It should by now be clear that **the two are** in fact **opposite sides of the same moral coin. The one represents** our vision of **paradise:** the good that is so utterly compelling that we feel no hesitation in claiming nature as our authority for embracing it. **The other is our vision of hell: the place where those who transgress against nature will finally endure the pain and retribution they so justly deserve.** There is a wonderfully attractive clarity in this way of thinking about nature, for **it turns the non-human world into a moral universe** whose parables and teachings are strikingly **similar to those of a religion. We need such teachings, for they give meaning and value to our lives.** To the extent that **environmentalism serves as a kind of secular religion for many people in the modern world,** it is capable of doing great good if **it can teach us the stories**, as religions often try to do, **that will help us to live better, more responsible lives.** **And yet:** we must never forget that **these stories are ours, not nature's.** The natural world does not organize itself into parables. Only people do that, because **this is our peculiarly human method for making the world make sense.** And because people differ in their beliefs, because their visions of the true, the good, and the beautiful are not always the same, they <51> inevitably differ as well in their understanding of what nature means and how it should be used—because nature is so often the place where we go searching for the fulfillment of our desires. This points to one final vision of nature that recurs everywhere in this book: nature as contested terrain. Over and over again in these essays, we encounter the central paradox of this complex cultural construct. On the one hand, **people in Western cultures use the word "nature" to describe a universal reality, thereby implying that it is and must be common to all people. On the other hand, they also pour into that word all their most personal and culturally specific values: the essence of who they think they are, how and where they should live, what they believe to be good and beautiful, why people should act in certain ways. All these things are described as natural, even though everything we know about human history and culture flies in the face of that description. The result is a human world in which these many human visions of nature are always jostling against each other, each claiming to be universal and each soon making the unhappy discovery that even its nearest neighbors refuse to acknowledge that claim.**

#### This understanding of a “natural world” abstracts our own role in consumptive practices- divorcing political solutions from personal economic choices and re-entrenching destructive practices at the level of everyday social practices, turning case

**SMITH ‘1** [Daniel Somers; Assistant Professor at Ramapo College, Carnegie Council Fellow; Place-Based Environmentalism and Global Warming: Conceptual Contradictions of American Environmentalism;*Ethics & International Affairs*; Volume 15, No. 2; 2001; http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/viewMedia.php?prmTemplateID=8&prmID=108]

Given the long and continuing migration of political and economic power to urban and corporate centers, these views have had serious implications for people living in economically and politically marginal rural areas. If the best nature is pristine and endangered, then it must be "protected," which often means excluding materially productive land uses. In some cases, as in the Northern Forest, protection may also involve allowing certain prescribed land uses (usually those that are aesthetically pleasing) to continue in a similarly idealized vision of "traditional" working landscapes. Either way, the process of objectification is a form of conceptual power that helps to make this assertion of control over the places where others live politically feasible and morally palatable. This situation is by no means restricted to the United States or other developed countries. In places like the rainforests of Amazonia and Indonesia, or the Himalayas of Nepal, indigenous and other rural inhabitants who have little political clout are frequently overwhelmed by internationally funded conservation initiatives that, fueled by well-meaning desires to protect forests, mountains, and biodiversity, can be ignorant of or even hostile toward local subsistence needs and cultures[15](http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/viewMedia.php?prmTemplateID=8&prmID=108#footnote15#footnote15). Equally important is how these popular views of nature shape the awareness and definition of environmental problems. **Infatuation with wild**, **pristine nature tends to steer our attention away from our own impacts on the larger "nature" that surrounds us, especially where these impacts are indirect or subtle, as is the case with climate change.** As William Cronon points out, **"To the extent that we live in an urban-industrial civilization but** at the same time **pretend** to ourselves **that our *real* home is in the wilderness,** to just that extent **we give ourselves permission to evade responsibility for the lives we actually lead"** [2](http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/viewMedia.php?prmTemplateID=8&prmID=108#footnote2#footnote2). Thus, we "get back to nature" by driving on the interstate or flying in a plane and then using the latest high-tech outdoor gear. **We "get away from it all" by making a flurry of commercial transactions with travel agents, adventure outfitters, and ecotourism guides. Meanwhile, we define as "problems" those activities**, like development and clear-cutting, **that have obvious effects and can be attributed to others.** If our principal goal is to keep roads out of wilderness or protect scenery from rapacious timber corporations, **it becomes much easier to ignore the implications of our own personal and seemingly insignificant actions. Instead of emphasizing the role of consumer demand in driving the** degradation of wilderness, resource extraction in more mundane landscapes, and the **buildup of greenhouse gases that threaten rare and common places alike, we can point at the proximate destroyers of pristine nature** and confirm our personal sense of virtue by supporting environmental groups that seek to stop them. **Lost is consideration of the extraordinary amount of resources used and waste generated by Americans per capita.** Mathis **Wackernagel and** William **Rees** have developed a method for calculating the "ecological footprint" of individuals and communities based on the land area required to produce various goods, and including the estimated forest land that would be required to sequester carbon emitted from burning fossil fuels. They **estimate that there are approximately 1.5 hectares of productive land available for each human, and that the average North American uses the equivalent of between four and five hectares. "If everyone** on Earth **lived like the average** Canadian or **American, we would need** at least **three** such **planets to live sustainably"** [17](http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/viewMedia.php?prmTemplateID=8&prmID=108#footnote17#footnote17). Moreover, there is little reason to expect that middle- and upper-class environmentalists contribute any less to the problem than do others. Those who live in large homes on biologically impoverished suburban plots of land and travel to the mountains on weekends or to exotic "ecotourism" destinations for vacation, undoubtedly have a greater negative impact on the environment than do average citizens.

#### Our criticism is the alternative -- our argument is that the 1AC's flawed approach to the politics of ecology make their speech act a step in the wrong direction. Voting negative entails an acknowledgement of the hybrid quality of ecology as interlocking form within cultural politics rather than separate from it -- their idealized mythos of nature is wholly incompatible with making cultural analysis a starting point for ecology

**Proctor and Pincetl '96** James D Proctor, Department of Geography, University of California, Santa Barbara, and Stephanie Pincetl, independent conservation researcher. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 1996, volume 14, pages 683-708 "Nature and the reproduction of endangered space: the spotted owl in the Pacific Northwest and southern California" <http://www.geog.ucsb.edu/~jproctor/pdf/E&P1996.pdf>

Our intent in this paper is to examine how **nature is being literally and figuratively constructed in the context of the nationally significant biodiversity-conservation efforts** taking place in the Far West of the USA. **These efforts are largely built on a crude realist premise that nature is some biophysical entity under siege by humans**. Yet the threads of nature and culture are somewhat more entangled than many conservationists are willing to admit; as Raymond Williams observed, "The idea of nature contains, though often unnoticed, an extraordinary amount of human history" (1980, page 67). In the last decade scholars from geography and other fields have explored the notion of nature as a social construct (Bennett and Chaloupka, 1993; Burgess, 1990; Cosgrove, 1984; Cronon, 1995; Demeritt, 1994; Evernden, 1993; FitzSimmons, 1989; Harrison and Burgess, 1994; Lynch, 1993; Milton, 1993; Oeschlaeger, 1991; Olwig, 1984; Simmons, 1993; Smith, 1990). Throughout this literature, emphasis has generally been placed on a **postempiricist epistemology, on nature as more than a set of plainly evident facts**. This position has become so diffuse in contemporary critical inquiry into questions of nature and environment that the epistemological gap between the literature of social constructivism and that of conservationism appears impossible to bridge. **Without further development the postempiricist position of social constructivism becomes problematic in its flirtation with epistemological relativism as well as in its ontological silence**. In its strong (and patently self-contradictory) form, relativism asserts that all truth is a matter of context, and that context is sufficiently heterogeneous to mitigate against any possibility of intersubjectively approved truth claims (Krausz, 1989; Margolis, 1986). Though not always explicitly addressed, **epistemological relativism is operationally denied in part, or at least cordoned off to less troublesome territory, by virtually all social theoretical accounts (save perhaps those advancing nihilist platforms).** Yet the social construction of nature literature is rarely clear in this regard. An epistemological position that is a refinement of the social construction of nature argument is Katherine Hayles's (1995) constrained constructivism. Hayles accepts social constructivism, but argues that constructivism occurs within a bounded set of possibilities, where the bounds are comprised of biophysical constraints: "No matter how gravity is conceived, no viable model could predict that when someone steps off a cliff on earth, she will remain spontaneously suspended in midair. Although the constraints that lead to this result are interpreted differently in different paradigms, they operate universally to eliminate certain configurations from the realm of possible answers" (page 52). Hayles's position provides a means to consider biophysical processes as actors in shaping knowledges of nature, and in responding to schemes of human practice based on these knowledges. Nonhuman species, for example, cannot adapt to all biodiversity-management schemes with equal success-though any judgment of success is also mediated through particular knowledges, which may highlight or obscure the status of certain species. **Biological science thus plays the paradoxical role in biodiversity conservation**

**of interpreting the realities of threatened species and their habitats via an epistemological language of thoroughly human origin. The social construction of nature is more than an epistemological project**, of course. Differentiated human forces have transformed the earth (Turner et ai, 1990) with biophysical impacts that are increasingly becoming a focus of concern, leading to widespread conservation efforts. Yet again, **these impacts are not**

**understood outside of socially constructed knowledges of nature**. The ontological (realitytransforming) and epistemological (knowledge-creating) dimensions of the social construction of nature are linked in complex ways. Bruno Latour (1993) weaves together these dimensions of the social construction of nature through his position that the mixing of the human and the nonhuman in reality-a process he terms 'translation'-has resulted not merely in altered 'natures' but in nature -culture hybrids, joint biophysical- human networks. **Latour cites ozone depletion as an example; this is typically considered a biophysical phenomenon of anthropogenic origin**. **His account**, however, **of the discourse surrounding ozone depletion suggests that the ontological elements of culture and nature are more inalienably interwoven**: "On page four of my daily newspaper, I learn that **the measurements taken above the Antarctic are not good this year**: the hole in the ozone layer is growing ominously larger. Reading on, I turn from upper-atmosphere chemists to Chief Executive Officers of Atochem and Monsanto, **companies** that **are modifying their assembly lines in order to replace the innocent chlorofluorocarbons, accused of crimes against the ecosphere**. A few paragraphs later, I come across **heads of state of major industrialized countries who are getting involved with chemistry, refrigerators**, aerosols and inert gases ... Toward the bottom of the page, **Third World countries and ecologies add their grain of salt and talk about international treaties, moratoriums, the rights of future generations**, and the right to development. **The same article mixes together chemical reactions and political reactions. A single thread links the most esoteric sciences and the most sordid politics, the most distant sky and some factory in the Lyon suburbs, danger on a global scale and the impending local elections or the next board meeting"** (1993, page 1). Latour argues that modernity is characterized not only by the proliferation of nature - culture hybrids, but by the contradictory epistemological practices of purification, of radical distancing of objects from subjects, of 'nature' from 'culture', thus hyperpolarizing the discourses between, for instance, the natural sciences and cultural studies: "Our intellectual life is out of kilter. Epistemology, the social sciences, the sciences of texts-all have their privileged vantage point, provided that they remain separate. If the creatures we are pursuing cross all three spaces, we are no longer understood. Offer the established disciplines some fine sociotechnological network, some lovely translations, and the first group will extract our concepts and pull out all the roots that might connect them to society or to rhetoric; the second group will erase the social the political dimensions, and purify our network of any object; the third group, finally, will retain our discourse and rhetoric but purge our work of any undue references to reality*horresco referens*-or to power play. In the eyes of our critics the ozone hole above our heads, the moral law in our hearts, the autonomous text, may each be of interest, but only separately" (1993, page 5). It is thus not surprising, following Latour's argument, that there has been so little engagement of the social-construction-of-nature thesis by natural scientists, as both sides have each attempted to stake their contrary epistemological claims on the same reality. In recent times, in fact, natural-**science-based conservationists have strongly rejected social constructivism because of what they perceive to be its nihilist leanings** (Soule and Lease, 1995). **The irony of this rejection, by some natural scientists and others, is that it is predicated on a particular social construction of nature-one which is purified of its embeddedness in cultural schemes of knowledge and transformative practices, and hence stakes out this pure nature as worthy of protection from adverse human influence**. The close association of biodiversity-protection efforts with applied natural science (for example, conservation biology), coupled with the predominant objective of these efforts in the preservation of more quintessentially natural places, is thus understandable in this light.

## 2NC – PIC, Mystery, Phantasie

### 2nc pic – pics good

**Best internal link to education**

Branson 2007 (Josh, edebate, http://www.ndtceda.com/pipermail/edebate/2007-May/071122.html, 5/31)

B) How to make debate more like the technical policy world? Narrower debates. PICs are vital to this (sorry, Duck). Thinking back on my 8 years in debate, the topic about which I can best converse with experts about is the design of emissions trading schemes. That was because the literature was deep and the prevalence of upstream/downstream/auctioned/timetable PICs narrowed the debates and forced a real in-depth discussion. I just don’t think we get that in a ton of debates, because most PICs are either wanky rhetoric PICs (and yes I was an extreme culprit) or something even worse like Consultation. Thinking back on it, I don’t think that the legal topic was worded particularly poorly, I just think that our strategic norms of judging/debating create a lot of problems in generating the type of education a lot of us want. But one of the most striking thing for me about last year’s topic was that I learned more from Repko’s post about his day at the Supreme Court than I did from all the debates I judged combined. In any event, how to create the types of narrow debates that will general real sustainable expertise on topics is tough.

### 2nc phantasie natura – overview

#### Even progressive strategies replicate the ecological failures of the status quo by relying on a Cartesian ontology that stands over Nature and acts to protect it. This subject/object dichotomy is the root of environmental crises – no progress is possible in their framework

DeLuca 05 – PhD, Dept. of Communication Studies, University of Iowa (Kevin, “Thinking with Heidegger”, Ethics and the Environment, Project Muse)

The first stasis point revolves around humanity’s relation to nature. To put it plainly, in environmental circles it is still a Cartesian world, wherein the founding act is human thinking (cogito ergo sum) and the earth is object to humanity’s subject. This position is clear in mainstream environmentalism, where humans act to save the object earth and, fundamentally, this action is motivated by the subject’s self-interest. So, we must save the rain forests because they contain potential medical resources and because they alleviate global warming. Now certainly this base anthropocentrism has come under attack from various radical environmentalisms that posit biocentrism or ecocentrism. I would argue, however, that these anti-anthropocentric positions have not escaped the gravity of Cartesianism. This is evident at both theoretical and practical levels. Theoretically, in the effort to avoid the stain of anthropocentrism all beings are posited as having equal intrinsic worth/value and difference is leveled. The banana slug is equal to homo sapiens. There are problems with this. Most obviously, the concept of intrinsic worth/value is philosophically incoherent—worth/value by definition is always relational. More significantly for this discussion, to posit intrinsic worth/value is to deny the ecological insight that all beings are constituted in relation to other beings and their environment. Further, to deny difference is to blunt analysis of our current situation and to deny the differential levels of effects different species have. Homo sapiens is not another type of slug and must be analyzed with that awareness. In practice, radical groups, most notably Earth First!, often demonize humans as a cancer on the planet. As the metaphor suggests, humans are seen as somehow different from all other forms of life, an alien other, not a part but apart. Even more significantly, the metaphor of cancer suggests humans to be active subjects preying on the object earth. Indeed, the problem with humanity, as with the cancer cell, is that it is too active. Although radical groups offer a different valuation, note that this position does not trouble the terms of Cartesianism. The dichotomies subject-object, human-animal, culture-nature, civilization-wilderness, remain intact. The active subject humanity threatens the object earth. The stasis point in actual environmental debates revolves around reform and radical environmental groups dismissing each other’s seemingly oppositional positions as, respectively, anthropocentic and compromised versus misanthropic and unrealistic, while remaining oblivious to the underlying Cartesian presuppositions they both share. In other words, reform environmentalists privilege humanity while radical environmentalists demonize humanity. In this morality play on the fate of the planet, humanity, whether hero or villain, is the actor. Heidegger’s thinking on the subject-object dichotomy, Descartes, and the phenomenology of the structure of reality offer a useful lever with which to displace these dichotomies and challenge the traditional ontology that undergirds and girdles environmental thinking. Citing the Cartesian ontology of the world as dominant, Heidegger in Being and Time works to “demonstrate explicitly not only that Descartes’ conception of the world is ontologically defective, but that his Interpretation and the foundations on which it is based have led him to pass over both the phenomenon of the world and the Being of those entities withinthe- world which are proximally ready-to-hand” (1962, 128). Briefly, Heidegger critiques Descartes for positing a “bare subject without a world” (1962, 192) and for relying on mathematics, which produces the sort of Reality it can grasp, thus “the kind of Being which belongs to sensuous perception is obliterated, and so is any possibility that the entities encountered in such perception should be grasped in their Being” (1962, 130). Descartes’ ontology presumes the dynamic of an isolated subject grasping mathematically world as object. Arguably, it is this perspective that is at the root of the environmental crisis, for the world is reduced to an object laid out before me and I am reduced to a detached subject that has only a use-relation to a dead world. Heidegger disdains “the Cartesian approach of positing a subject one can come across in isolation” (1962, 248) and rejects the “perennial philosophical quest to prove that an ‘external world’ is present-at-hand” (1962, 250). Instead, Heidegger offers a different foundational starting point: “The Interpretation of the world begins, in the first instance, with some entity within-the-world, so that the phenomenon of the world in general no longer comes into view” (1962, 122). Humanity is never the isolated subject that surveys and grasps the world-as-object displayed before it. Heidegger continues: “Our investigation takes its orientation from Being-in-the-World—that basic state of Dasein by which every mode of its being gets co-determined” (1962, 153). Heidegger concludes: “In clarifying Being-in-the-world we have shown that a bare subject without a world never ‘is’ proximally, nor is it ever given”(1962, 152). Heidegger explicitly clarifies this point in response to Descartes: “If the ‘cogito sum’ is to serve as the point of departure for the existential analytic of Dasein, then it needs to be turned around, and furthermore its content needs new ontologico-phenomenal confirmation. The ‘sum’ is then asserted first, and indeed in the sense that “I am in a world.” As such an entity, ‘I am’ in the possibility of Being towards various ways of comporting myself—namely, cogitationes—as ways of Being alongside entities within the world” (1962, 254). Heidegger, then, is suggesting a Copernican revolution with respect to humanity’s relation to the world, for it is never a matter of “to” but “in.” Humanity is never a subject over and against or above the world apart from the world; rather, the subject is always in the world, a part of the world, and, indeed, is constituted by relations in the world. Further, in an important point that is not so clear in Being and Time but that becomes evident in later writings, “I am in the world” on earth, that Being-in-theworld is always already Being-in-the-world on earth. Earth is “that on which and in which man bases his dwelling. . . . Upon the earth and in it, historically man grounds his dwelling in the world. . . . The world grounds itself on the earth, and earth juts through world” (1993, 169, 171, 172). In displacing the subject-object dichotomy that so circumscribes environmental theory and practice, Heidegger’s thought opens up a horizon of possibilities of other ways/beginnings/trajectories for environmentalism. What would it mean to approach all environmental issues from a fundamental understanding of Being-in-the-world on earth?

**THE QRITIQ TURNS CASE – the affirmative’s effort to restore the lost state of balance is a suicidal narrative that assumes we must sacrifice ourselves for a nature we really don’t have ANY control over**

**CRONON ‘96** [William; Frederick Jackson Turner Professor of History, Geography, and Environmental Studies at the University of Wisconsin at Madison; Uncommon Ground; 1996; p. 82-83]

But such a perspective is possible only if we accept the wilderness premise that nature, to be natural, must also be pristine—remote from humanity and untouched by our common past. In fact, everything we know about environmental history suggests that people have been manipulating the natural world on various scales for as long as we have a record of their passing. Moreover, we have unassailable evidence that many of **the environmental changes we now face also occurred quite apart from human intervention at one time or another in the earth's past.**31 **The point is not that our current problems are trivial, or that our devastating effects on the earth's ecosystems should be accepted as inevitable or "natural." It is rather that we seem unlikely to make much progress in solving these problems if we hold up to ourselves as the mirror of nature a wilderness we ourselves cannot inhabit. To do so is merely to take to a logical extreme the paradox that was built into wilderness from the beginning: if nature dies because we enter it, then the only way to save nature is to kill ourselves. The absurdity of this proposition flows from the underlying dualism it expresses. Not only does it ascribe greater power to humanity than we in fact possess**—physical and biological nature will surely survive in some form or another long after we ourselves have gone the way of all flesh—**but in the end it offers us little more than a self-defeating counsel of despair. The tautology gives us no way out: if wild nature is the only thing worth saving, and if our mere presence destroys it, then the sole solution to our own unnaturalness, the only way to protect sacred wilderness from profane humanity, would seem to be sui-cide. It is not a proposition that seems likely to produce very positive or practical results.**

**The idea that we have a duty to preserve the world in which we live as the highest value is sustained by a fantasy of this world as a once-perfect garden, free from contamination. This erases the complex and festering reality of the world around us, stigmatizing as evil itself anyone who would question their depiction of the world**

**CRONON ‘96** [William; Frederick Jackson Turner Professor of History, Geography, and Environmental Studies at the University of Wisconsin at Madison; Uncommon Ground; 1996; p. 36-37]

The appeal to nature as naive reality is often linked to a second major cluster of ideas that surround this word: nature as moral imperative. One need not travel a very great distance in speaking of "the nature of x" to get from "this is the way x really is" to "this is way x ought to be." **The great attraction of nature for those who wish to ground their moral vision in external reality is precisely its capacity to take disputed values and make them seem innate, essential, eternal, non-negotiable.** When we speak of "the natural way of doing things," we implicitly suggest that there can be no other way, and that all alternatives, being unnatural, should have no claim on our sympathies. **Nature in such arguments becomes a kind of trump card against which there can be no defense,** at least not as long as our opponents share our values—and how could they not, if those values are as natural as we claim? **Only a fool or an incorrigible sinner could fail to respond to so compelling a moral imperative. This habit of appealing to nature for moral authority is in large measure a product of the European Enlightenment.** By no means all people in history have sought to ground their beliefs in this particular way. Indeed, **it would have been far more common in the past for people in Western traditions to cite God as the authority for their beliefs. The fact that so many now cite Nature instead** (implicitly capitalizing it as they once might have capitalized God) **suggests the extent to which Nature has become a secular deity in this post-romantic age.** Because the values that people attach to nature as moral imperative are so dependent on cultural context, it makes little sense to discuss this phenome-non in the abstract. **Nature as moral imperative always implies a very particular vision of what ideal nature is supposed to be. For some modern Americans, ideal nature is clearly a pristine wilderness, as I argue elsewhere in this book.** For others, as Kenneth Olwig notes in his essay, **ideal nature is the pastoral countryside or the small town, while others still would cele-brate the suburb or even the city as the natural home of humankind**. It hardly needs saying that nothing in physical nature can help us adjudicate among these different visions, for in all cases nature merely serves as the mirror onto which societies project the ideal reflections they wish to see. **The Judeo-Christian tradition nonetheless has one core myth that is so deeply embedded in Western thought that it crops up almost anytime people speak of nature. It is so widespread in modern environmental thinking that it deserves to be labeled as a separate cluster of ideas in its own right: nature as Eden**. Candace Slater, Carolyn Merchant, and Kenneth Olwig were responsible for introducing this concept to our seminar in Irvine, and their essays explore it in detail. It quickly became one of the most fertile topics <37> we discussed. Candace in particular argued that a great many environmental controversies revolve around what she calls "Edenic narratives," **in which an original pristine nature is lost through some culpable human act that results in environmental degradation and moral jeopardy. The tale may be one of paradise lost or paradise regained, but the role of the narrative is always to project onto actual physical nature one of the most powerful and value-laden fables in the Western intellectual tradition. The myth of Eden describes** a perfect landscape, **a place so benign and beautiful and good that the imperative to preserve or restore it could be questioned only by those who ally themselves with evil.**

### 2nc mystery – at: baudrillard indicts

**Attacks against Baudrilard’s theory are reactions to our dangerous obsession with reality—their attempt to proscribe truth to our kritik proves their complicity with simulation.**

**Baudrillard 94.** Jean Baudrillard, “Radical Thought,” translated by Francois Debrix, <http://www.egs.edu/faculty/jean-baudrillard/articles/radical-thought/>

Say: I am real, this is real, the world is real, and nobody laughs. But say: this is a simulacrum, you are only a simulacrum, this war is a simulacrum, and everybody bursts out laughing. With a condescending and yellow laughter, or perhaps a convulsive one, as if it was a childish joke or an obscene invitation. Anything which belongs to the order of simulacrum is obscene or forbidden, similar to that which belongs to sex or death. However, our belief in reality and evidence is far more obscene. Truth is what should be laughed at. One may dream of a culture where everyone bursts into laughter when someone says: this is true, this is real.

### 2nc mystery – at: cdp

**Fear and demonization of the “new right” is what gives it its power – the more the right is opposed and scapegoated, the more legitimacy and political authority it gains. This collusion furthers only to foster racism. Instead of fighting for ideology, we need to realize that the line between right and left is meaningless and unhelpful.**

**Baudrillard in 97** [Jean, May 7, “A Conjuration of Imbeciles”]

But today the left is deprived of its political energy. It has become a purely moralistic law-making structure, a representative of universal values, a sacred holder of the reign of Virtue, and an incarnation of antiquated values such as Good or Truth. It now acts as a jurisdiction which asks everyone to act responsibly while still granting itself the right to remain **irresponsible**. The political illusion of the left (which had remained frozen during twenty years of opposition) turned into a platform of historical morality (and not of historical direction) once it came to power. It then became the holder of a morality of truthfulness, basic rights, and good conscience, having thus reached a zero degree on the political scale and, undoubtedly, the lowest point of the genealogy of morals. Its moralization of all values marked its historical failure (and the failure of thinking in general). Since then, even reality, the principle of reality, has become an act of faith. Try to question the reality of war, for example, and you immediately become a betrayer of moral law. With the left and the traditional right both deprived of political substance, where has the political gone to? Well, simply, it has moved to the far right. As Bruno Latour so accurately noted the other day in Le Monde, the only political discourse today in France is that of Le Pen's Front National. All the rest is moral and pedagogic discourse, teachers' lessons and lecturers' tirades, managers' rhetoric and programmers' jargon. By contrast, having given himself to evil and immorality, Le Pen has been able to take over all of the political, the remnant of what has been abandoned or **voluntarily rejected** by a political ideology of Good deeds and Enlightenment values. The more he is antagonized by a moral coalition (a sign of political impotence), the more he enjoys the benefits of political immorality, the benefits which come with being the only one on the side of evil. In the past, whenever the traditional right decided to implement an ideology of morality and order, you could always count on the left, always attempting to antagonize those so-called moral values in the name of political claims. But today, the left is experiencing the same condition that once characterized the traditional right. Suddenly responsible for the defense of moral order, the left has no choice but to witness the slippage of abandoned political energies toward political forces which do not hesitate to antagonize its newly created order. Conversely, the left keeps on reactivating the source of evil by continuing to embody the rule of virtue, which of course is nothing more than the rule of supreme hypocrisy. If Le Pen did not exist, we would have to **invent him**! Indeed, it is thanks to him that we can get rid of our evil share, of what is the worst part of us. It is as such that we can curse Le Pen. If he were to disappear, however, we would be left begging for pity! We would be left struggling with our own racist, sexist, and nationalist (everyone's fate) viruses. Simply, we would be abandoned to the murderous negativity of society. As such, Le Pen is the perfect mirror of the political class which uses him to conjure up its own evils, just as every individual uses the political class to cast away any form of corruption inherent to society (both are similar types of corrupt and cathartic functions). Trying to put an end to this, trying to purify society and moralize public life, trying to eradicate what claims to embody evil is a complete misunderstanding of the way evil operates, of the way politics itself operates. Opting for a mode of unilateral denunciation, and ignoring the very principle of reversibility of evil, anti-Le Pen supporters have left him with a monopolistic control over the evil share. Having thus been cast away, Le Pen can no longer be dislodged. By demonizing him in the name of virtue, the political class simply offers him a most comfortable situation. Le Pen simply has to pick up and recycle the discourse of ambivalence, of denial of evil, and of hypocrisy that his opponents constantly throw at him in the course of their battle for the defense of law or the defense of a good cause. Le Pen's enemies provide him with the energy he needs. Too eager to discredit him, they simply transform his mistakes into (his own) victories. They do not see that good never comes from a purification of evil (evil always retaliates in a forceful way), but rather from a subtle treatment which turns evil against itself. All this shows us that Le Pen may be the embodiment of worthlessness and idiocy. No doubt! But he is above all the symptom of his opponents' stupidity. The imbeciles are those who, by denouncing him, blatantly reveal their own impotence and idiocy and glaringly demonstrate how absurd it is to antagonize him face to face. They simply have not understood the rules of evil that his game of musical chairs follow. By continuing to antagonize him, the imbeciles give life to their own ghosts, their negative doubles. This shows, indeed, a terrifying lack of lucidity on their part. But what drives such a perverse effect, the fact that the left remains trapped in a discourse of denunciation whereas Le Pen maintains a privilege of enunciation? What pushes one to gain all the profits from the crime while the other suffers the negative effects of recrimination? What causes one to "get off" [s'eclatant] with evil when the other gets lost with the victim? Well, it's quite simple. By incarcerating Le Pen in a ghetto, it is in fact the democratic left which becomes incarcerated and which affirms itself as a discriminatory power. It becomes exiled within its own obsession and automatically grants a privilege of justice to what it demonizes. And, of course, Le Pen never misses an opportunity to claim republican legality and fairness on his behalf. But it is above all on the imaginary but very pregnant figure of the rebel and persecuted soul that he establishes his prestige. Thus, he can enjoy the consequences of both legality and illegality. A victim of ostracism, Le Pen has an incredible freedom of language and can deploy an unmatched arrogance of judgement, something that the left has deprived itself of. Let's give an example of such a magical thought that today stands in for political thought. Le Pen is blamed for the sentiment of rejection and exclusion of immigrants in France. But this is just a drop in an ocean of social exclusion that has overwhelmed all of society (recently, exclusion itself, as well as the "social breakdown" that politicians like to mention, were all excluded by the decree signed by the President of the Republic to dissolve the National Assembly). We are all both responsible and victim at the same time of this inextricable and complex process of exclusion. There is something typically magical in the need to conjure up this virus, which is everywhere to be found (it is a direct function of our social and technical "progress"), and in the desire to exorcise the curse of exclusion (and our impotence by the same token) through the figure of a hated man, institution, or organization, no matter who or what they are. It is as if we were faced with a tumor in need of extraction whereas, in fact, the metastases have already expanded everywhere. The Front National simply follows the course of the social metastases, and is all the more virulent since people think that they have eradicated the disease when, in fact, it has already infected the entire body. Not to mention that this process of magical projection of the Front National takes place along the same lines as this party's own process of demonization of immigrants. One must always be suspicious of the ruse of contamination, a ruse which, by means of the transparency of evil, mutates positivity into negativity, and a demand for liberty into "democratic despotism." As usual, it is a question of reversibility, of a subtle encirclement of evil whose rational intelligence is never suspected. While modern pathology tells us a lot about the physical body, we do not pay attention to this mode of analysis when it comes to the social body. To remain within the political, we must step away from ideology and look at things through the lens of social physics. Our democratic society is a stasis. Le Pen is a metastasis. Global society is dying of inertia and immune deficiency. Le Pen is simply the visible transcription of such a viral condition; he is the spectacular projection of the virus. This happens in dreams too. Le Pen is a burlesque, hallucinatory figuration of a latent state, of a silent inertia caused by forced integration and systematic exclusion. Since the hope of finally curing social inequalities has truly disappeared (by and large), it is no surprise if resentment has moved to the level of racial inequality. The failure of the social explains the success of the racial (and of all the other fatal strategies). As such, Le Pen is the only savage analyst in today's society. The fact that he is placed on the far right is merely the sad result of the fact that analysts are no longer to be found on the left or the far left. Judges, intellectuals no longer analyze. Only the immigrants perhaps, as polar opposites, could become analysts too. But they already have been recycled by a good and responsible humanitarian thought. Le Pen is the only one who operates a radical erasure of the so-called distinction between right and left. This is, no doubt, an erasure by default. But the harsh criticism of this conventional distinction which was unleashed in the 1960s (and culminated in 1968) has unfortunately disappeared from the political scene today. Le Pen simply recuperates a de facto situation that the political class refuses to confront (it even uses elections to deny it), but whose extreme consequences will be felt some day. If, one day, political imagination, political will, and political demand hope to rebound, they will have to take into account the radical abolition of the antiquated and artificial distinction between right and left, which, in fact, has been largely damaged and compromised over the past decades, and which only holds today through some sort of complicit corruption on both sides. This distinction is dead in practice but, by means of an incurable revisionism, is constantly reaffirmed.

### 2nc mystery – at: democracy

**Democracy is a fiction—their attempt to recreate Enlightenment values like democratic responsibility is the ULTIMATE simulation, assuring the autonomy of the virtual.**

**Baudrillard 94.** Jean Baudrillard, “Radical Thought,” translated by Francois Debrix, <http://www.egs.edu/faculty/jean-baudrillard/articles/radical-thought/>

All this defines the insoluble relationship between thought and the real. A certain type of thought is an accomplice of the real. It starts with the hypothesis that there is a real reference to an idea and that there is a possible "ideation" of reality. This is no doubt a comforting perspective, one which is based on meaning and deciphering. This is also a polarity, similar to that used by ready-made dialectical and philosophical solutions. The other thought, on the contrary, is ex-centric from the real. It is an "ex-centering"[2.](http://www.egs.edu/faculty/jean-baudrillard/articles/radical-thought/#note2) of the real world and, consequently, it is alien to a dialectic which always plays on adversarial poles. It is even alien to critical thought which always refers to an ideal of the real. To some extent, this thought is not even a denial of the concept of reality. It is an illusion, that is to say a "game"[3.](http://www.egs.edu/faculty/jean-baudrillard/articles/radical-thought/#note3) played with desire (which this thought puts "into play"), just like metaphor is a "game" played with truth. This radical thought comes neither from a philosophical doubt nor from a utopian transference[4.](http://www.egs.edu/faculty/jean-baudrillard/articles/radical-thought/#note4) (which always supposes an ideal transformation of the real). Nor does it stem from an ideal transcendence. It is the "putting into play"[5.](http://www.egs.edu/faculty/jean-baudrillard/articles/radical-thought/#note5) of this world, the material and immanent illusion of this so-called "real" world - it is a non-critical, non-dialectical thought. So, this thought appears to be coming from somewhere else. In any case, there is an incompatibility between thought and the real. Between thought and the real, there is no necessary or natural transition. Not an "alternation,"[6.](http://www.egs.edu/faculty/jean-baudrillard/articles/radical-thought/#note6) not an alternative either: only an "alterity"[7.](http://www.egs.edu/faculty/jean-baudrillard/articles/radical-thought/#note7) keeps them under pressure[8.](http://www.egs.edu/faculty/jean-baudrillard/articles/radical-thought/#note8). Only fracture, distance and alienation safeguard the singularity of this thought, the singularity of being a singular event, similar in a sense to the singularity of the world through which it is made into an event. Things probably did not always happen this way. One may dream of a happy conjunction of idea and reality, in the shadow of the Enlightenment and of modernity, in the heroic ages of critical thought. But that thought, which operated against a form of illusion - superstitious, religious, or ideological - is substantially over. And even if that thought had survived its catastrophic secularization in all the political systems of the 20th century, the ideal and almost necessary relationship between concept and reality would in any case have been destroyed today. That thought disappeared under the pressure of a gigantic simulation, a technical and mental one, under the pressure of a precession of models to the benefit of an autonomy of the virtual, from now on liberated from the real, and of a simultaneous autonomy of the real that today functions for and by itself - *motu propio* - in a delirious perspective, infinitely self-referential. Expelled, so to speak, from its own frame, from its own principle, pushed toward its extraneity, the real has become an extreme phenomenon. So, we no longer can think of it as real. But we can think of it as "ex-orbitated," as if it was seen from another world - as an illusion then.

**Their aff is impossible—all democratic potential has been crushed by the virtual—the affirmative is delirious.**

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Representations of suffering children entrench the idea of a powerless victim in need of Western benevolence

**Marten,** BA Sociology and Anthropology from Edith Cowan University, **2001**

(Jennifer Anne Ricarda, December 21, LIKE A BANANA TREE: Towards a Model of Children in Disasters: an Exploration of an Anthropological Problem, <http://www.radixonline.org/resources/marten-thesis.doc>)

Media representations of children in emergencies and disasters are an exemplar of this power relations interface. In what she terms “the iconography of emergencies” radical psychologist Victoria Burman (1996) proposes that children and the single child become icons of suffering in disaster and conflict, forming a matrix in which a number of dominant and hegemonic discourses converge. Here, suffering children become representatives of the infantilized ‘Other’, representing vulnerable incompetent populations from developing countries, being rescued by dominant, competent paternalistic western nations.  Burman proposes that media appeals for relief represent the solitary child, or groups of children as passive victims, and contextualize childhood as an homogenous essentialized entity, using the romantic Western model of innocent and vulnerable childhood, which has been “stolen” from these children. Consequently, children as active producers of knowledge or active agents in response and reconstruction are ignored. Media focuses on particular children’s narratives often ignore the underlying social, political and economic causes of conflict and disaster. The vulnerable or suffering child, so often portrayed alone, in a ruined world, becomes objectified, without tradition, culture or history (Burman, 1996). This objectification is taken further in studies of what has been termed “**disaster pornography**” (Omar & de Waal, 1993, cited in Burman, 1994, p.246). This might be defined as the fascination with, attraction to, and commercial exploitation of, disaster images, especially of children, which result in the dehumanization and loss of subjectivity of victims and survivors. Alongside this concept is disaster tourism, the nightly television visits from a comfortable space, to disaster zones, where bodies in the street, or the injured in hospitals become identityless extras in the latest disaster movie. If the textual representation of the (usually) male western doctor, filmed attending the injured or sick child of the developing world is deconstructed, a map of cultural imperialist relations emerges between western industrialized and developing countries (Burman, 1996, pp. 246-247). As Bankoff (2001) earlier argued, this encourages a view of vulnerable societies as weak, passive victims, unable to assist themselves. Finally. although most studies of children in media representations of disaster have come out of psychological disciplines (Beinart, 1992, Myers, 1992, cited in Burman, 1994), it would seem to offer anthropology a fertile area for further research.

**We must remain distanced and safeguarded from thought grounded in reality in order to reconceptualize illusions.**

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## 1NR – T, Monologism

### 1nr t – at: we meet

#### The aff is not a financial incentive for energy production

Book 11 [Managing Director, ClearView Energy Partners, LLC]

Kevin, Testimony before U.S. HOUSE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS,

SUBCOMMITTEES ON SELECT REVENUE MEASURES AND OVERSIGHT, SEPTEMBER 22, http://waysandmeans.house.gov/UploadedFiles/Booktestimony922.pdf

Incentive cost ratios, implied abatement costs and implied displacement costs offer three possible ways to measure the performance of federal financial incentives for energy production and consumption. Metrics of this sort could be used to prioritize spending – dynamically, perhaps through a reverse auction – or through legislated formulas that balance incentives for high-yield, low-cost sources with high-potential, emerging sources. Fuels or technologies that consistently fall short of established benchmarks may require a different type of government financial intervention (e.g. manufacturing assistance or pre-competitive R&D in place of production tax credits) or a different mode of financial support (e.g. loan guarantees instead of tax credits or deductions).

#### R&D only has potential incentive effects—plan just attempts to create tech for energy production—distinct from subsidies for energy production

**Painuly**, UNEP Collaborating Centre on Energy and Environment @ Risø National Laboratory, **‘1**

(J.P., “Barriers to renewable energy penetration; a framework for analysis,” Renewable Energy Vol. 24, Issue 1, p. 73–89)

5. Measures to overcome barriers¶ It may not be possible to achieve technical potential but research and development can reduce the gap between techno-economic potential and technical potential. In most of the cases, the aim is to achieve or move closer to techno-economic potential.¶ Imperfections and distortions in the market coupled with unfavourable financial, institutional and regulatory environments imply that governmental intervention is not only desirable but also a must to promote RETs. The role of governments in technology transfer has been outlined in the IPCC special report on technology transfer [15], which is relevant for renewables too. The role includes generic actions to remove barriers, building human and institutional capacity, setting up research and development infrastructure, creating an enabling environment for investment, and providing information and mechanisms to promote RETs.¶ Policy approaches to achieve the techno-economic potential can either remove the barriers or **create conditions** where the market is forced to act, ignoring the barriers. The former normally works at the micro level addressing the barriers directly, and the latter mostly at macro level addressing the barriers indirectly. For example, setting up information centres, establishing codes and standards etc. address the barriers directly, whereas increasing energy prices through pollution taxation addresses the barriers indirectly.¶ The measures required to promote RETs thus follow from (a) identification of barriers through administration of questionnaires/interview of the stakeholders, and (b) feedback from stakeholders on the measures to overcome the barriers, obtained by extending the questionnaire/interview to include questions related to the possible measures. Finally, policy actions need to be designed and implemented to operationalise the measures identified to overcome the barriers. Some of the policy actions taken by various governments and implicit barrier removal measures in these are discussed below. Measures taken by IEA countries have been discussed in IEA [16] and [17]. Several possibilities may exist and the one that best suits a country should be chosen. Several of these measures have been explored by the Global Environment Facility (GEF) through support to RET projects in different countries (see [2] for details).¶ 5.1. Energy sector liberalisation¶ This is a broad term encompassing several policy measures such as restructuring of the energy sector, opening up to introduce competition and removing other controls. Some examples of the specific policies are; creating separate entities for generation and distribution in the electricity sector, allowing private sector entry and diluting or removing controls on energy pricing, fuel use, fuel import, and capacity expansion etc. Institutional measures such as setting up independent regulatory bodies may be needed for success of these policy actions. The basic purpose of liberalisation is to increase efficiency of the energy sector through facilitating market competition. The initial impact of such measures may be unfavourable to RETs due to increased competitiveness. However, in the long term a liberalised energy market may provide a better environment for the healthy growth of RETs.¶ 5.2. Guaranteed markets¶ Since renewable energy is not able to compete in the energy market with existing barriers, energy suppliers may be required by law to include a part of the energy from renewables in their supply mix. Examples of such measures are the Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation (NFFO) law in the UK, Electricity Feed Law (EFL) in Germany, and Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) in the US. The NFFO guarantees pre-determined electricity prices for competitively selected renewable energy projects. It promotes reduced cost of RETs due to competitive process for project selection. Any extra cost to the electricity companies is reimbursed by a small charge to all electricity consumers. Five NFFO orders have been issued since the law was passed in 1989. The costs of generating electricity under NFFO contracts have been halved; NFFO-5 contracts were at an average of 2.71 p/kWh compared with the average pool selling price of 2.60 p/kWh in 1998 [18]. NFFO has now been succeeded by the New & Renewable Energy Policy. EFL required electricity network operators to buy all the electricity from renewables at premium prices. In April 1998, the EFL was changed slightly and now utilities are not required to accept more than 5% of their total electricity from renewable sources. In February 2000, the EFL was replaced by the Renewable Energy Law, which provides a guaranteed price for electricity from renewables [19]. RPS requires each retail supplier of electricity to provide a specified percentage of renewable energy in its electricity supply portfolio. The obligations have been made tradable through renewable energy credits (RECs) with a view to introducing flexibility and reducing costs. A variation of these mechanisms is two-way metering, which is under consideration in some EU countries. In this, distributed electricity generation (generally at household level) can be used to meet own demand and surplus electricity can be fed back to the grid, allowing the household meter to run backwards. The buyback rate is thus 100% of the utility price [16]. Although these measures may improve economic efficiency of RETs, the impact in the short run is an increased cost of electricity.¶

5.3. Economic/financial incentives¶ Several governments provide capital subsidies for installation of renewable energy systems. However the capital subsidies need to have a defined phase out time frame to ensure efficiency improvements in RETs. For example, capital subsidies for wind energy in Denmark were phased out in 10 years time. Tax exemption, credit facilities and third party financing mechanisms are other measures in some IEA countries [16]. Incentive-based renewable energy programmes are in operation in several developing countries. The World Bank's renewable energy programmes in Indonesia (solar home system project), Sri Lanka, Laos etc. are incentive-based programmes. The ESMAP programme in Africa, sponsored by UNDP, World Bank and other donors is another example of use of financial incentives to promote renewable energy. Several developing countries such as India, China etc. have their own incentive-based renewable energy programmes. Developing countries such as Uganda, Zimbabwe etc. have also provided micro-credits to consumers through revolving funds.¶

5.4. Government investments¶ In countries where governments are major players in the energy sector, they have made national plans and strategies for promotion of RETs. Governments have also made investments through specialised agencies created for RET development.¶

5.5. Information and awareness campaigns¶ Several countries have initiated informative programmes to promote renewable energy. The stakeholders can be educated and supplied with the necessary tools to evaluate the RETs and design implementation. The campaigns are both general in nature as well as targetting specific RET product promotion.¶

5.6. Standards and regulations¶ Deregulation of the electricity industry to allow renewable energy producers access to the grid has been carried out in several countries. Regulatory measures to provide a guaranteed market for renewable energy have been taken, and standards formulated to boost confidence in RET products.¶

5.7. Institutional measures¶ Specialised agencies to plan and promote RETs have been created in several countries. Regulatory agencies have also been set up in response to the need for liberalisation of the energy sector. Other measures include promotion of energy service companies (ESCOs) that address several barriers such as lack of up-front financing, credit facilities, and technical knowledge.¶

5.8. Research and development¶ Since high cost is a major barrier to RET penetration, R&D programmes have been set up to make it more competitive. Long-term RET technology costs can be reduced through research.¶

5.9. Facilitating measures¶ Several facilitating measures have been taken by governments. These include financing for feasibility studies, planning and fixing targets for renewable energy contribution, resource assessment for RETs at national and regional levels, siting of renewable energy systems, technology demonstrations etc. Skill development through training in various aspects of RETs (such as technical, regulatory, managerial, financial skills etc.) has been arranged by some governments and also facilitated through GEF projects.

### 1nr monologism – overview

#### First is becoming – dialogue teaches an ethic of care and respect towards the other in which we do not subordinate them to the status of an uninformed student – that’s Dutta-Bergmann – only debates about macro-institutional change access this

**Ruiz and Minguez 2001** Prof. Dr Pedro Ortega Ruiz, Facultad de Educacio´ n, Campus de Espinardo, Universidad de Murcia, “Global Inequality and the Need for Compassion: issues in moral and political education” Journal of Moral Education, Vol. 30, No. 2, 2001

In addition to the reality of the dominant presence of instrumental reason in modern society, another closely linked phenomenon is shaping life at the level of the individual and society, individuals and peoples. We refer to the phenomenon of the increasing globalisation of ways of life in our complex societies which derive as much from the new forms of production as from the influence of science and technology upon life and social organisation (Waters, 1995). This explains the problems we find in guaranteeing a base of social solidarity in a general sense and the provision of forms of identity sufficiently strong for the social agents. It is difficult to represent the society in which we live in a unified manner. As individuals we belong to diverse communities, at times mutually contradictory. It is difficult to escape the need of having to choose between diverse forms of identity and belonging (Bafircena, 1997). The phenomenon of globalisation has **invalidated** the autistic, localist-focused procedures for highlighting and resolving problems because the great part of our social life is determined by global processes; that is to say, in those processes in which the influence of cultures, political economies, media and national frontiers are all weakened. The emergence of globalisation has made it possible to overcome the concept of nation states, giving way to another, wider reality: humanity, world citizenship or human family to foster the birth of new areas of identity beyond that of the nation state (Luhmann, 1997). During the last few decades it could be thought that the relationships and obligations of the citizen started and finished in their local community, in their polis, or at most in their national community. Now, on the other hand, we are concerned by problems occurring far from our frontiers or the conventional established limits. We have become aware that we are immersed in problems of such magnitude (environmental pollution, poverty and marginalisation of a large part of the world’s population, ethnic–cultural conflicts, etc.) that we seriously question localist attempts and have thrown to the winds the recipes so long applied to solve our problems. A new concept of citizenship and the citizen has been imposed on us. Our polis has become too small. The diversity of cultures and national frontiers are **no longer barriers** to the recognition of our **inter-dependency** and implication in problems which we now must share. These features (primacy of instrumental reason and globalisation) cannot go unnoticed in our pedagogy. Youth cannot be educated according to **out-dated localist schemes** already undermined by the real situation; nor offer educational models which place the learners in the position of open-mouthed spectators at what happens around them, distanced from the social reality which is supposedly impossible to change, governed by the implacable laws of market forces. To educate, as we understand it, is above all a praxis orientated towards enabling the learners to “read” and interpret reality and furthermore to take responsibility in the face of this reality. It is to help them grow in responsibility, to honour our obligations toward others.

#### Second, Turns case—supplanting dialogue to protest oppression leads to even worse forms of authority

**Morson 4**

http://www.flt.uae.ac.ma/elhirech/baktine/0521831059.pdf#page=331

Northwestern Professor, Prof. Morson's work ranges over a variety of areas: literary theory (especially narrative); the history of ideas, both Russian and European; a variety of literary genres (especially satire, utopia, and the novel); and his favorite writers -- Chekhov, Gogol, and, above all, Dostoevsky and Tolstoy. He is especially interested in the relation of literature to philosophy.

Bakhtin viewed the whole process of “ideological” (in the sense of ideas and values, however unsystematic) development as an endless dialogue. As teachers, we find it difficult to avoid a voice of authority, however much we may think of ours as the rebel’s voice, because our rebelliousness against society at large speaks in the authoritative voice of our subculture. We speak the language and thoughts of academic educators, even when we imagine we are speaking in no jargon at all, and that jargon, inaudible to us, sounds with all the overtones of authority to our students. We are so prone to think of ourselves as fighting oppression that it takes some work to realize that we ourselves may be felt as oppressive and overbearing, and that our own voice may provoke the same reactions that we feel when we hear an authoritative voice with which we disagree. So it is often helpful to think back on the great authoritative oppressors and reconstruct their self-image: helpful, but often painful. I remember, many years ago, when, as a recent student rebel and activist, I taught a course on “The Theme of the Rebel” and discovered, to my considerable chagrin, that many of the great rebels of history were the very same people as the great oppressors. There is a famous exchange between Erasmus and Luther, who hoped to bring the great Dutch humanist over to the Reformation, but Erasmus kept asking Luther how he could be so certain of so many doctrinal points. We must accept a few things to be Christians at all, Erasmus wrote, but surely beyond that there must be room for us highly fallible beings to disagree. Luther would have none of such tentativeness. He knew, he was sure. The Protestant rebels were, for a while, far more intolerant than their orthodox opponents. Often enough, the oppressors are the ones who present themselves and really think of themselves as liberators. Certainty that one knows the root cause of evil: isn’t that itself often the root cause? We know from Tsar Ivan the Terrible’s letters denouncing Prince Kurbsky, a general who escaped to Poland, that Ivan saw himself as someone who had been oppressed by noblemen as a child and pictured himself as the great rebel against traditional authority when he killed masses of people or destroyed whole towns. There is something in the nature of maximal rebellion against authority that produces ever greater intolerance, unless one is very careful. For the **skills** of fighting or refuting an oppressive power are not those of openness, self-skepticism, or real **dialogue**. In preparing for my course, I remember my dismay at reading Hitler’s Mein Kampf and discovering that his self-consciousness was precisely that of the rebel speaking in the name of oppressed Germans, and that much of his amazing appeal – otherwise so inexplicable – was to the German sense that they were rebelling victims. In our time, the Serbian Communist and nationalist leader Slobodan Milosevic exploited much the same appeal. Bakhtin surely knew that Communist totalitarianism, the Gulag, and the unprecedented censorship were constructed by rebels who had come to power. His favorite writer, Dostoevsky, used to emphasize that the worst oppression comes from those who, with the rebellious psychology of “the insulted and humiliated,” have seized power – unless they have somehow cultivated the value of dialogue, as Lenin surely had not, but which Eva, in the essay by Knoeller about teaching The Autobiography of Malcolm X, surely had. Rebels often make the worst tyrants because their word, the voice they hear in their consciousness, has borrowed something crucial from the authoritative word it opposed, and perhaps exaggerated it: the aura of righteous authority. If one’s ideological becoming is understood as a struggle in which one has at last achieved the truth, one is likely to want to impose that truth with maximal authority; and rebels of the next generation may proceed in much the same way, in an ongoing spiral of intolerance.

### 1nr monologism – at: we defend plan

#### moots discussion

Patrick **Speice and** Jim **Lyle**, “Traditional Policy Debate: Now More Than Ever,” OCEAN POLICY ADRIFT, DRG, 200**3**, www.wfu.edu/Student-organizations/debate/MiscSites/DRGArticles/SpeiceLyle2003htm.htm

The plan is a necessary convention in debate because it is a specific statement of topical advocacy that the affirmative is bound to defend, and all negative ground comes from attacks on the plan and it’s justifications. If the affirmative team argues for the judge to vote for them based on statements not related to the plan, it is likely that these portions of the 1AC will not be topical. Allowing teams to advocate non-topical statements as a reason to vote for them makes it impossible for the negative to debate. The affirmative could simply defend a statement such a “racism is bad” or “2 + 2 = 4.” Such non-falsifiable statements make going negative immensely unattractive, as the affirmative would win virtually every debate. Teams that run such affirmatives, or that justify such affirmatives by divorcing the judge’s decision from a topical plan-focus, skew the debate in such a way that it becomes a “rigged game” in favor of the affirmative.