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Krech [Internal]

#### The image of the Noble Savage arises from the colonial drive to order and make sense within Western frames by labeling indigenous peoples as connected to the environment. This representation is dehumanizing and fails to acknowledge Native ontologies

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Even though an invention of Madison Avenue, the Crying Indian is an effective image and advocate because its assumptions are not new. From the moment they encountered the native people of North America and represented them in texts, prints, paintings, sculptures, performances—in all conceivable media—Europeans classified them in order to make them sensible. They made unfamiliar American Indians familiar by using customary taxonomic categories, but in the process often reduced them simplistically to one of two stereotypes or images, one noble and the other not. For a long time, the first has been known as the Noble Savage and the second as the Ignoble Savage. The Noble Savage, the first of the two stereotypes or images, has drawn persistently on benign and increasingly romantic associations; the Ignoble Savage, the second, on a menacing malignancy The first has emphasized the rationality, vigor, and morality of the nature-dwelling native; the second, the cannibalistic, bloodthirsty, inhuman aspects of savage life. Often elements from the two stereotypes have been combined in a single portrait.2 The label savage, which English-speaking people used for North American Indians (and their imagery) for centuries, presents problems today. With its derivation from silvaticus (Latin), cognates sauvage (French), salvage (Spanish), selvaggio (Italian), and the related forms silva, selva, and sylvan—which have woodland, wooded, forest, and wild among principal meanings—savage connoted originally a state of nature.5 But in their theories of social evolution, nineteenth-century anthropologists and sociologists positioned savages on the earliest and lowest rungs of human society. Overwhelmingly derogatory connotations effaced the original woodland meanings of savage and even survived the now-discredited evolutionary schemes. Today. North American Indians frequently say that they are members of a particular tribal group or nation, or that they are Native Americans, American Indians, or (in particular) just Indians. They also refer to themselves as native or indigenous people, and sometimes as aboriginal people. For these reasons, the term Noble Indian (one manifestation of which is the Ecological Indian) is used here for the stereotype or image that others have called Noble Savage, and Indian, native, indigenous, and other terms are used for the people.4 There can be no doubt about the depth of ideas implicit in the image of the Noble Indian. Always present for more than five hundred years (even if overwhelmed by ignoble imagery). Noble Indians have, however, changed in attributes.6 In their earliest embodiment they were peaceful, carefree, unshackled, eloquent, wise people living innocent, naked lives in a golden world of nature. The origins of nature-dwelling nobles are deep in the ancient world. When Columbus speculated that he found the Islands of the Blessed and their natural residents, his readers were not surprised. They commonly linked several mythic places originating in pagan or Christian thought—-notably the Islands of the Blessed, Arcadia, Elysium, the Earthly Paradise, the Garden of Eden, and the Golden Age (collectively ideas of earthly paradise, eternal spring, and innocent life removed in space or time). Allegorical for some but literal for others who located them in geographical space, these places were objects of fancy and search in the New World and elsewhere. The potency of this imagery as a source of ennobling sentiment over two and one-half centuries simply cannot be overstated, as Europeans drew liberally on it to represent the New World and its inhabitants, in the context of a nostalgic longing for the past and a simpler life. Among many affected by Columbus was Peter Martyr, who compiled accounts of discovery and wrote of an American Indian golden world, and Martyr influenced in turn Amerigo Vespucci's famous depictions of New World lives. For centuries, they and others invoked Tacitus and other ancients, and classical analogs like Scythians (stamped by many as simple, frugal, honest, natural folk) in order to make the indigenous people of the New World comprehensible to themselves and their audiences. In Virginia, they depicted Indians leading "gentle, loving, and faithful" lives "void of all guile and treason," exactly "after the manner of the Golden Age." Elsewhere they associated primitiveness with virtue in similar scenes.6 The French, seizing on liberty and equal access to basic resources as characteristic of "savage" life and important virtues to emulate, were without peer over two centuries in developing an imagery of noble indigenousness. Michel de Montaigne. Baron de Lahontan, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau were especially influential in this process. Montaigne drew widely upon Tacitus, missionaries to the New World, and Tupinambas at the French court both to laud the naturalness of Brazilians and to condemn the French as corrupt, greedy, and vain. He used the New World, one historian remarked, "as a stick for beating the Old."7 Lahontan invented a natural, noble "Intelligent Savage" named Adario as a literary device to critique the European scene (including those who left him without property). Others copied Lahontan widely, and in the second half of the eighteenth century the Noble Indian ruled, especially in Rousseau's major works presenting "savage" lite as simple, communal, happy, free, equal, and pure— as inherently good, and exemplified by America's indigenous people. Like other synthesizers with perfect timing, Rousseau was a lightning rod for charged feelings opposed to his, and a touchstone for many who subsequently portrayed Indians as gentle, egalitarian, free people living in pure nature—and in sharp contrast to life in the city and in civilization. One train of influence runs toward and converges with the nature poetry of William Wordsworth, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, and others, which located the Noble Indian's day in the past, and a nearly uninterrupted path runs from Wordsworth to James Fenimore Cooper, best-selling author from the early 1820s through the 1840s and arguably the most important nineteenth-century figure for development of the Noble Indian imagery. Cooper's heroes are all in and of nature. Nature herself, a heroine of unsurpassed dimensions, shares the stage with Leatherstocking, the protagonist of heroic proportions in Cooper's most famous novels. Every manner of Indian can be found in Cooper's novels, Noble and Ignoble, each taking on and reproducing the character of their tribes, and Cooper's must famous Indian heroes are dignified, firm, faultless, wise, graceful, sympathetic, intelligent, and of beautiful bodily pro portions reminiscent of classical sculpture. By 1900. skill in nature, an important attribute of Coopers Noble Indians, encapsulated noble indigenousness. It fit neatly with the day's effort to reform policy in natural resources (water, forests, wildlife, and lauds and parks, from which came managed use in the progressive conservation movement), American Indian affairs, and America's youth. The most important writers for Noble Indiana from roughly 1875 through 1940 were Ernest Thompson Seton and—tor the first time— an Indian: Charles Eastman (Ohiyesa), a Dakota or Sioux. Their influence was pervasive. With Captain Seth Eastman, the famous soldier artist, as his maternal grandfather, Eastman took the white man's road to Dartmouth College and Boston University Medical School. After marriage—his wife was a self-described Yankee nonconformist, avowed romantic, and vivid and accomplished writer—Eastman wrote more than ten best-selling books that ennobled Indians both by resurrecting romantic visions of lives long past and by emphasizing skills in nature, or woodcraft. Eastman sometimes pointedly apposed an idyllic past with a demoralizing present (even if the present was a way station to a positive civilized future), and contrasted Indians who kill animals because they need them with whites who kill them wantonly. In perhaps his most famous work. The Soul of the Indian, Eastman first paid homage to Coleridge, and then painted his boyhood with his relatives as natural, altruistic, and reverent, and his current life as artificial, selfish, and materialistic.8 Both Cooper and Eastman influenced Ernest Thompson Seton, first Chief Scout of the Boy Scouts and charismatic naturalist, artist, author, public speaker, conservationist, and youth-movement activist who reached millions through his writings and activities. One of Seton's major goals was to instill manhood in boys through woodcraft >r outdoor life exemplified by Cooper's "Ideal Indian." Eastman's talk of the need to form character through fishing, signaling, making ire. constructing canoes, forecasting weather, and other skills—what he called the "School of Savagery" or the "natural way"—dovetailed with Seton's aims. And Seton's Ideal Indian was like Eastman's: He was kind, hospitable, cheerful, obedient, reverent, clean, chaste, brave, courteous, honest, sober, thrifty, and provident; he condemned accumulation, waste, and wanton slaughter; and he held land, animals, and all property in common, thereby curbing greed and closing the gulf between rich and poor. The imagerv of Noble Indians shifted again during the extraordinary-era of 1965-75, known primarily for violent antiwar and civil rights movements, assassination, and societal upheaval, when bitter battles were also waged over pesticides, oil spills, flammable rivers, industrial and human waste, and related environmental issues. It was during this period that the Crying Indian came to the fore, reinforcing both practical and ideological slants present in the work of Seton, Eastman, and other predecessors. New Ecological Indians exploded onto the scene. As critics linked many current global predicaments to industrial society, spoke openly of earlier less complex times as being more environmentally friendly, and castigated Christianity for anthropocentrism, they marshaled Ecological Indians (as deployment of the Crying Indian makes clear) to the support of environmental and antitechnocratic causes.1" Ecological Indians constituted fertile soil for those seeking alternative "counterculture!\* lives. In the back to-nature movement, many sought communal life shot through with American Indian tribal metaphors and material culture, as well as native religion-—or any religious tradition, in fact, perceived as more in tune with ecology and in harmony with nature. Greenpeace marked the convergence of ecology, environmentalism, critique of the social order, and images of American Indians as ecological prophets. More widely, environmentalists joined American Indians in their vision quests and struggles, and thought of themselves as "tribalists." In their conscious antitechnocratic critique of Western society, Rousseau was reborn. American Indians embraced the new shift in perception and actively helped construct the new image of themselves. At occupied Alcatraz Island, they argued for social and political rights and advocated forming an Indian center of ecology. A new canon emerged: best-selling native texts in which nature and the environment figured significantly, and that critiqued, implicitly or explicitly, white civilization. Several crossed over notably with the environmental movement, and the new canon's expressions of an animistic world have affected many. By far most influential was Black Elk Speaks, the nineteenth-century biographical, historical, and visionary reminiscences of a Lakota holy man as told to John G. Neihardt, a poet who believed that literature existed to show people how to "live together decently on this planet." Published in 1932 to no stir, this work was rediscovered in the late 1960s and propelled by events into a widely reprinted and translated instant classic." Since those tumultuous days. Noble Indians have saturated public culture. They grace the covers of fiction and non fiction best-sellers, and pervade children's literature. They leap from movies and television screens, fill canvases, take shape in sculptures, find expression in museum and gallery exhibitions, animate dance and other performances, and appear on T-shirts. Time and again the dominant image is of the Indian in nature who understands the systemic consequences of his actions, feels deep sympathy with all living forms, and takes steps to conserve so that earth's harmonies are never unbalanced and resources never in doubt. This is the Ecological Indian. Exemplifying him, the Crying Indian brims over with ecological prescience and wisdom. On matters involving the environment, he is pure and white people are polluting. He cries because he feels a sense of loss, as (he silently proclaims) other American Indians do also. And if he could cry because he and others lived in nature without disturbing its harmonies (or throwing trash upon it), then he possessed authority to speak out against pollution. The immediate forces that brought the Crying Indian into existence, as well as the long history of images of nobility preceding this one, have borne considerable fruit. The Ecological Indian has influenced hiimanitarians concerned about the global environment and health, so-called deep and spiritual ecologists, metaphysicians and new biologists interested in the Gaia hypothesis of an organic earth, ecofeminists, the Rainbow Family and other alternative groups, and self-help advocates.12 Historians and other scholars have called Indians "the first" American environmentalists or ecologists to "respect" environmental limits and the "need to restrain human impact,"' to possess "the secret of how to live in harmony with Mother Earth, to use what she offers without hurting her," and to "[preserve] a wilderness ecological balance wheel."15 Finally (and not least), in Hollywood, the Ecological Indian has become today's orthodoxy to reach millions, as the creators of the Lakotas in Dances with Wolves or of the animated Pocahontas, who talks to Grandmother Willow, the tree, and sings about herons and otters who "are my friends" and the "hoop that never ends," play on their presumed closeness to nature, nobility, and ecological sainthood. Few visual or textual representations of the Native North American have been as persistent over time as this one has, in one form or another, and few others are as embedded in native identity today. The Ecological Indian has embraced conservation, ecology, arid environmentalism; has been premised on a spiritual, sacred attitude toward land and animals, not a practical utilitarian one; and has been applied in North America to all indigenous people. Explicit at several notable moments in the history of Noble Indians (as in the eighteenth century and today), and in the gaze of the Crying Indian, is the fact that the image usually stands against, not alone. Habitually coupled with its opposite, the Nonecological White Man, tile Ecological Indian proclaims both that the American Indian is a nonpolluting ecologist, conservationist, and environmentalist, and that the white man is not. "The Indian," Vine Deloria, Jr., a Lakota author and lawyer, has remarked, '"lived with his land/' In contrast, " The white destroyed his land. He destroyed the planet earth.™1\* But what does it mean to say that Indians are ecologists or conservationists? Because they are the most consistent attributes of the image of the Ecological Indian, the concepts should be defined with care. Embedded in them are certain cultural premises about the meanings of humanity, nature, animate, inanimate, system, balance, and harmony, and their suitability for indigenous American Indian thought or behavior should not be taken as a given. Ecology, to start with, which is concerned mainly with interactions or interrelations between organisms and the animate and inanimate environments m winch tlicv live, has a distinct disciplinary history in which systemic balance, stability, and harmony have been central to ecological metaphors and premises. The idea of a well-regulated nature or of a balance in nature derives from antiquity, and through the centuries has been linked with different divine plans. In the seventeenth century, the balance was connected to God's harmony, and from that time until the late twentieth century, balance and harmony have remained central despite a major paradigmatic change from religion to science in comprehending the natural world. When George Perkins Marsh published Man and Nature; Or, Physical Geography as Modified by Human Action, one of the most critical early works for the development of both conservation and ecology, in 1864, the title initially contemplated was Man the Disturber of Nature s Harmonies. For Marsh and many others, nature in the absence of man was self-regulating, in balance, or in equilibrium; and man if he were "imprudent" could "[disturb] harmonies," producing "exhausted regions."\*'5 Over the last twenty-five years, ecology has been in ferment. For those who favor rigorous, quantitative methodologies and replicable results,j>roof that balance, stability, or harmony exists has been elusive. Ecologists have abandoned these and other long-held assumptions in favor oi chaotic dynamics in systems, and long-term disequilibrium and flux. The ferment is due to the recognition that organisms are as likely to behave unpredictably as predictably; that in the absence of human interference (if that is possible), natural systems are not inherently balanced or harmonious; and that left alone, biological communities do not automatically undergo predictable succession toward some steady-state climax community, which is an illusion. Natural systems, today's ecologists emphasize, are open systems on which random external events like fire or tempest have unpredictable impacts. As the biologist Daniel Botkin emphasized, "Change now appears to be intrinsic and natural at many scales of time and place in the biosphere."16 The implications of this fundamental shift in thought for assumptions about the very people perceived as part of nature, the indigenous people of North America and elsewhere, are profound. In a balanced, harmonious, steady-state nature, indigenous people reproduced balance and harmony. In an open nature in which balance and climax are questionable, they become,, like all people, dynamic forces whose impact, subtle or not, cannot be assumed. Some who write about environmentalism use the term ecology where they mean "environmental"—as in ecology movement. This unfortunate confusion unnecessarily conflates a scientific discipline with a moral and political cause, and muddies the definition of ecology. In this book the two terms are kept separate. Environmentalism has distinct meanings ranging from the belief that the environment and its components have basic rights to remain unmolested, to the idea that technological change and sustainable growth are compatible with proper care for the environment. One of the most inclusive— and, because of its breadth, useful—definitions of environmentalism is "ideologies and practices which inform and flow from a concern for the environment."17 When speaking of Native Americans as ecologists, we do not necessarily mean that they used mathematical or hypothetico-deductive techniques, but we should mean that they have understood and thought about the environment and its interrelating components in systemic ways (even if the system, all increasingly agree, is more metaphor than hard and bounded reality). When we speak of them as environmentalists, we presumably mean showing concern for the state of the environment and perhaps acting on that concern.18 Conservation, the second major attribute of the Ecological Indian, has also acquired different meanings through time, some of which (like the very general idea of "prudent husbanding") have ancient roots. Moreover, as w;ith ecology and environmentalisin, conservation has often been conflated with preservation—as in conservation as "preservation from destructive influences, natural decay or waste."19 Yet it makes sense to differentiate conservation from preservation. At the turn of the twentieth century, at least two separate camps debated conservation and preservation issues (the debates continue today). The most famous pitted Gifford Pinchot; widely regarded as the founder of contemporary conservationist policy in America, against John Muir, the preservationist. The two fought over the fate of Hetch Hetchy, a canyon in Yosemite National Park that thirsty urbanites wanted to make useful by a dam and lake. Pinchot and Muir battled heatedly, Muir's preservation assuming the sacral pristineness of nature and Pinchot s conservation privileging rational planning and efficient use: two very different approaches to environmental relations. Pinchot, who was Theodore Roosevelt's forestry chief, won the day even though Roosevelt had left office by the time Congress legislated damming Hetch Hetchy.20 In 1910, Pinchot wrote that conservation's "first principle" was "development, the use of the natural resources now existing on this continent for the benefit of the people who live here now." The second was "the prevention of waste,1' and the third that "natural resources must be developed and preserved for the benefit of the many, and not merely for the profit of a few."21 Conservationists, as one observer noted in 1970, were "fairly united in attacking instances of apparent waste or unwise use." Waste or unwise use included obtaining products in a manner that proved destructive to the environment when a nondestructive method would do, obtaining less than the maximum sustained yield from resources, ignoring useful by-products of extractive processes, and using energy resources inefficiently.22 Today, conservation is defined in different ways. Some regard it as management "of human use” of the biosphere so that it may yield the greatest sustainable benefit to present generations while maintaining its potential to meet the needs and aspirations of future generations." Others emphasize that it means "all that man thinks and does to soften his impact upon his natural environment and to satisfy all his own true needs while enabling that environment to continue in healthy working order."25 Narrower definitions—by Bryan Norton and John Passmore, respectively, both philosophers—focus on conservation as\* using a resource "wisely, with the goal of maintaining its future availability or productivity." or as/Jiving;"natural resources for later consumption." The conservationist promotes careful husbandry and sustainable development; if he opposes anything, it is waste. The emphasis in preservation is quite different, "a saving^/rom rather than a saving for" as in conservation, according to Passmore; specifically "the saving of species and wilderness from damage or destruction." For Norton, preservation is protecting^ "an ecosystem or a species, to the extent possible, from the disruptions attendant upon it from human use." The preservationist, in other words, seeks to keep habitats from further deterioration or use even for purposes of conservation.24 If we describe a Native American as a conservationist, we do not mean that he calculates sustainable yield into the distant future or, in a preservationist-like manner, leaves the environment in an undisturbed, pristine state, but rather that he does not waste or "despoil, exhaust, or extinguish," and that he does, with deliberation, leave the environment and resources like animal populations in a usable state for succeeding generations.25 People everywhere creatively construct meaningful frameworks for understanding their past; they everywhere actively invent tradition. "History," as Greg Dening, a historian, reminded us, "is both a metaphor of the past and metonym of the present." No matter who their authors may be, narratives about the Native American past must be read in this light. As Edward Bruner, an anthropologist, underscored, narratives about Native North Americans are contingent on the times in which they were created. They mirror relations between Native Americans and people of European descent. They reflect not just changing national governmental policies toward indigenous people, but understandings of native people that vary from one moment to the next. Given that traditions are often fashioned creatively, it seems unwise to assume uncritically that the image of the Ecological Indian faithfully reflects North American Indian behavior at any time in the past.26 Quite the reverse: For while this image may occasionally serve or have served useful polemical or political ends, images of noble and ignoble indigenousness, including the Ecological Indian, are ultimately dehumanizing. They deny both variation within human groups and commonalities between them. As the historian Richard White remarked, the idea that Indians left no traces of themselves on the land "demeans Indians. It makes them seem simply like an animal species, and thus deprives them of culture."27 In a related vein, Henry M. Brackenridge, a lawyer with archaeology as his avocation, remarked some 180 years ago on a voyage on the Missouri River how "mistaken" are those "who look for primitive innocence and simplicity in what they call the state of nature." As he traveled along the Missouri, Brackenridge mused on the "moral character" of Indians he encountered: "They have amongst them their poor, their envious, their slanderers, their mean and crouching, their haughty and overbearing, their unfeeling and cruel, their weak and vulgar, their dissipated and wicked; and they have also, their brave and wise, their generous and magnanimous, their rich and hospitable, their pious and virtuous, their frank, kind, and affectionate, and in fact, all the diversity of characters that exists amongst the most refined people." One need not believe that moral or emotional or psychological traits are universal (like most anthropologists today, I would assert that to be human is fundamentally to be a cultural being) to appreciate that no simple stereotype satisfied Brackenridge, who refused to reduce Indians to silhouetted nobility or ignobility.28 Yet as its simplistic, seductive appeal works its charm, the Noble Indian persists long beyond memory of when or how it entered currency. At first a projection of Europeans and European-Americans, it eventually became a self-image. American Indians have taken on the Noble Indian/Ecological Indian stereotype, embedding it in their self-fashioning, just as other indigenous people around the world have done with similar primordial ecological and conservationist stereotypes.29 Yet its relationship to native cultures and behavior is deeply problematic. The Noble Indian/Ecological Indian distorts culture. It masks cultural diversity. It occludes its actual connection to the behavior it purports to explain. Moreover, because it has entered the realm of common sense and as received wisdom is perceived as a fundamental truth, it serves to deflect any desire to fathom or confront the evidence for relationships between Indians and the environment.50

Nadasdy

#### The image of the ecologically noble savage damages both ecology and our relationship to indigenous peoples. This image uses flawed Western concepts of conservation and environmentalism to judge the “authenticity” of indigenous peoples by treating them as children of nature and undermining our understanding of the inconsistency and complexity of ecologies. An epistemological break is key to challenge these modernist notions that erase indigenous cultures

Paul **Nadasdy**, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Spring 0**5**, “Transcending the Debate over the Ecologically Noble Indian: Indigenous Peoples and Environmentalism”, Ethnohistory 52:2, acc. 2/19/13, p. 292-294

Critics of this view point out that the image of the ecologically noble savage has deep historical roots and, indeed, that it is little more than a (marginally) new twist on the age-old stereotype of the noble savage (Krech 1999). And, as with the older stereotype, use of the image of ecological nobility (despite its seemingly positive connotations) can actually have serious adverse consequences for indigenous people. The stereotype denies the realities of native people's lives, reducing the rich diversity of their beliefs, values, social relations, and practices to a one-dimensional caricature. Worse still, these critics point out, the image of ecological nobility is an unattainable ideal. Anthropologists, archaeologists, and historians have shown that indigenous people—even hunters, supposedly the most ecologically noble of all —do not live up to this ideal and never have. Instead, they have always altered their environments according to their needs, sometimes quite dramatically (e.g., Butzer 1993; Krech 1999; Paul Martin 1967; Red-ford 1991; White and Crononi988). But when indigenous people fail to live up to the impossible standards of ecological nobility, Euro-Americans tend to judge them harshly, as guilty of betraying their own cultural beliefs and values. As with older incarnations of the noble savage stereotype, the image of ecological nobility authorizes Euro-Americans to judge how "authentic" indigenous people are (see Beugei996; Conklini997; Conklin and Graham 1995; Cruikshank 1998: 60; Wenzel 1991).5 Thus, when environmentalists unexpectedly find themselves opposed by indigenous people, they are more likely to dismiss any opposition as a result of cultural loss or "contamination" than to take indigenous people's concerns seriously. There are two main problems with this standard refutation of indigenous ecological nobility. First, it is framed negatively; it focuses on what indigenous people do not do (that is, they fail to live up to an impossible ecological ideal), rather than on what they do. While this may help us understand why Euro-American environmentalists react the way they do when indigenous people do not act as expected, it tells us nothing about the latter's motives. Second, those critics of ecological nobility who make this type of argument retain an imperialist perspective insofar as they continue to evaluate indigenous people's actions according to a Euro-American ideal (they merely allow for indigenous people not to live up to it). Part of the reason the debate over ecological nobility has been unable to transcend its imperialist roots, I suggest, is that scholars have focused on only half of the problem. While they have painstakingly examined the cultural assumptions underlying Euro-American notions of "indigenousness," they have paid relatively scant attention to the equally problematic assumptions about "environmentalism" that underlie the image of ecological nobility. Yet terms like environmentalism and conservation are notoriously ill defined. Some scholars embroiled in the debate over ecological nobility (see, e.g., Alvard 1994; Brightman 1987; Hames 1987,1991) have responded to this conceptual fuzziness by coming up with more rigorous definitions. Their approach has been adopted by researchers interested in developing techniques for scientifically managing land and wildlife that will be compatible with local indigenous peoples' beliefs and practices (e.g., Zavaleta 1999). Such an approach, however, does little to advance our understanding of the relationship between indigenous people and environmentalists, because it ignores the fact that the concepts of conservation and environmentalism are of Euro-American origin to begin with, thus rendering any attempt to use these concepts to classify indigenous ideas and practices —regardless of how subtly or precisely they have been defined — extremely problematic. While many scholars (e.g., Berkes 1987,1999:151-53; Harries-Jonesi993: 49; Krech 1999: 212-13; White 1985) have acknowledged the culturally contingent nature of concepts like conservation, most nevertheless continue to use them as yardsticks against which to judge indigenous peoples' beliefs and practices in the ongoing debate over ecological nobility (i.e., either Indian people are acting as conservationists or they are not). One notable exception is Steve Langdon (2002), who argues that the standard model of wildlife conservation is based on outmoded assumptions about ecological equilibrium that fly in the face of current scientific understandings of chaos and complexity—even among ecologists. Nevertheless, this standard "puritanical" model of conservation retains its power at least in part because its roots lie in Judeo-Christian —particularly Protestant—assumptions that link "the good" with sacrifice and self-denial, while evil is seen as the product of excess and self-indulgence. Thus, Langdon argues, contemporary wildlife conservation is a constellation of beliefs and practices rooted in a particular set of cultural values rather than in some "objective" understanding of animal population dynamics. As a result, any attempt to use "conservation" as an objective measure of behavior necessarily privileges one particular set of cultural values while simultaneously obscuring the power relations that make that very privileging possible. Significantly, he then goes on to demonstrate in detail how this dynamic plays out in the case of waterfowl management in western Alaska, where the discourse and practice of conservation have undermined Yup'ik goose hunters' claims to decision-making power over local goose hunting.

Jacques [1]

#### The idea of the “noble savage” places indigenous peoples as inferior, justifying the control and colonization of both indigenous peoples and the environment

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"The history of man's effort to subjugate nature is also the history of man's subjugation by man."45 Control of Indian people by controlling Indian land is a poignant example. Given colonial visions of the European superiority in ideas of religion, government, culture and control of the environment, Indian nations were not permitted to have the same control of resources as Europeans. Instead, Indian title was a compromised version of land and resource control that only implied use and occupancy, not mastery of land and resources that the Europeans assigned themselves. Western ideas of title included fee simple property that could be sold. In contrast, "aboriginal title" did not allow similar transfer/sale privilege.. 6 Aboriginal title was not determined by examining the governance systems in place-which were complex and largely well-organized in egalitarian and peaceful means4 7-but through race. This is evident in the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Sandoval. In Sandoval, Pueblo tribes differed from other Indian nations in that they owned their land in fee title since the time of Spanish contact in New Mexico. 48 Despite this undisputed title, the Supreme Court ruled that Congress could still impose control over the reservation simply because the people were Indian. The people of the pueblos, although sedentary rather than nomadic in their inclinations, and disposed to peace and industry, are nevertheless Indians in race, customs, and domestic government. Always living in separate and isolated communities, adhering to primitive modes of life, largely influenced by superstition and [fetishism], and chiefly governed according to the crude customs inherited from their ancestors, they are essentially a simple, uninformed and inferior people.49 As the Court proclaims, application of the federal trust, plenary power and federal control of environmental policy is based on notions of an inferior race. This theory allows for the perpetuation of an institutionalized, hierarchical relationship where non- Indians control Indian land and may perpetuate violence "in good faith." Further reinforcing European notions of racial difference was the divergent relationships Indian peoples and Anglos had with nature. 50 Anglo conceptions typically viewed nature as an opportunity for material wealth based on the control of nature.5 ' This utilitarian relationship to the natural world promoted vast conversions of natural resources into usable commodities and industries. 52 These industries were then transformed into increased industrial and military capacity used to further expansion and to acquire more resources.53 In contrast, many tribal epistemologies did not recognize the ability to own or master an animate nature.5 4 Viewing nature as alive restricts the uses of natural resources and severely restricts commodification and industry as a matter of respect. 55 Conversely, viewing nature as inanimate, as did Anglos, allows for maximum exploitation.5 6 Some scholars see this type of worldview as a foundation for imperialism because societies that extract the most short-term energy from natural resources gain dominant social positions and power over those who temper their exploitation. 5 7 A. The Doctrine of Discovery The English colonists came up with two justifications for taking the Native Americans' lands. First, they argued that colonists would civilize the Indians and 'cover their naked miserie, with civil use of foode and cloathing.' In royal charters given to the companies organizing the colonization, mention was always made of the obligation to bring Christianity to the 'savages.' The other part of the rationale was that Europeans could put the land to a 'higher use,' making it more productive by intensive cultivation and by bringing in livestock. In 1625, Samuel Purchas argued that God did not intend for the land to remain as 'that unmanned wild Countrey, which [the savages] range rather than inhabite.'58 From the very beginning, Europeans sought to control the ontology of nature by imposing western norms of separating nature from society. Groups with a communal and cohesive relationship with nature were seen as outside of the social contract and were marginalized as irrational. As such, "savage as the wolf" and "noble savage" constructions were used to imagine American Indian people as inferior.5 9 These characterizations become the underlying justifications for domination of people portrayed as "unfortunate children of nature"6 0 who need to be controlled, managed and dominated like nature itself under the rubric of Enlightenment civilization. The first version of colonial jurisprudence to utilize this characterization in the United States was the method of dividing resources for use via title, as understood by discovery tenets.

Jacques [2]

#### These racist representations are what allowed the dispossession of land

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Currently, federal Indian environmental policy relies on the annulment of treaties that were made in sacred trust between American Indian tribes and the United States government. In the years since signing these agreements, non-Indians have used racial discrimination against Indian tribes to justify their maltreatment and dispossession of Indian land. This injustice became institutionalized over time by unilateral decisions made by the United States Congress and President, and was further supported by numerous Supreme Court decisions. Court rulings that allowed for the abrogation of treaties at the discretion of the United States Congress are perhaps the most egregious of these injustices. One of the most pernicious outcomes of these decisions by the Court and Congress has been to sever full tribal relationships with their land, a central component of the negotiated treaties. This set of broken relationships is at the bottom of an unsustainable and unlivable land management system that has occurred on a number of Indian reservations. The premise of this Article is that the environmental policy of the United States government, because it exerts control over Indian nations' natural resources in violation of specific treaties, is inherently violent. We define violence in this case as a breach of the reciprocal relationship established between Indian tribes and the federal government through treaties. To demonstrate our premise, we first conceptualize and configure the concept of violence as it applies to environmental Indian policy. Second, the violence of broken treaties to gain Indian resources is not a new phenomenon as we demonstrate in an analysis of the Medicine Lodge Treaty, the subsequent Jerome Agreement, and the Lonie Wolf v. Hitchcock Supreme Court case that officially instituted congressional plenary power over all Indian nations.' Third, we demonstrate how environmental policy operates under visions of racial and ethnic superiority in order to continue colonial control of Indian resources. This vision of racial and ethnic superiority was institutionalized by Supreme Court precedence, and continues to put the control of Indian resources in non-Indian hands. Finally, we suggest that current environmental policy has not only committed violence against tribes but also against the earth through exploitation of reservations. The way to end such violence and exploitation of Indian people and the earth is to retract plenary power over environmental policy and exploitation, acknowledge treaty relationships as sacred sovereign-to-sovereign promises, and place tribal lands back in tribal hands. To draw out the violence embedded in broken treaties we first describe mainstream understandings of violence in the modern era. Such understandings of violence are typically blind to the violence committed by government institutions acting in the name of rationality, progress, or material benefit for the state. Second, we argue that the hierarchical relations, which replaced the reciprocal treaty relations, are inherently violent because they force one party into the role of a ward with compromised agency. The modern understanding of violence, as found in social contract theory and the Post-Westphalian state, is particularly important in the case of American Indian law and policy. Since early discussion of the subject by Greek scholars, in order for an action to be considered violent it must be an illegitimate, irrational behavior of a minority of individuals in society.2 During the casting of modernity, this became an axiom of the social contract. One purpose of the social contract was to keep violence at a minimum so that people could be free to live their lives without the risk of violence that was thought to exist outside formal social organization. 3 To enter the social contract is to gain civility and the ability to have real property.4 "What man [sic] loses by the social contract is his natural liberty and an unlimited right to everything he tries to get and succeeds in getting; what he gains is civil liberty and the proprietorship of all he possesses." 5 Thus, the social contract provides the civility of imposed limits on violent human appetites while providing a system where the possession of real property is possible. Outside the social contract there is no such thing as "private property" to social contract theorists, merely the ability to temporarily use a resource. This is important because, as we discuss below, the doctrine of discovery allotted private property rights to "discoverers." Indian tribes possessed only use rights because they were seen to be outside the social contract, residing in a state of nature.6

McGhee

#### This type of thinking reifies colonialism

Robert **McGhee**, Curator of Western Arctic Archaeology at the Canadian Museum of Civilization American Antiquity 73(4) 20**08**. “ABORIGINALISM AND THE PROBLEMS OF INDIGENOUS ARCHAEOLOGY” http://www.unl.edu/rhames/courses/current/readings/McGheeAmAnt08.pdf

Amore important outcome of the legitimization of Indigenous archaeology lies in its reinforcement of stereotypes of Indigenous uniqueness. Wax (1997:53) has identiﬁed the problems caused by the ease with which Native American leaders ﬁnd political leverage in presenting themselves to the world “as passive and abused ‘noble savages,’ torn from the mythic wilderness of the ages of European exploration.” Sahlins (1995:119) notes that academic efforts to defend Aboriginal ways of life by “endowing them with the highest cultural values of western societies” have the paradoxical result of “delivering them intellectually to the imperialism that has been afﬂicting them economically and politically.” In preserving and maintaining this essentialist self-image, they encourage perpetuation of their public stereotype as Primitives, as a special class of human who will always be marginal to the dominant culture and society. The demands for Indigenous archaeology do not arise in response to an intellectual problem but, rather, from the emotions and political reactions of scholars to Aboriginal communities that are socially and economically marginal, and that conceive of this situation as the result of historical mistreatment at the hands of Western society. Nicholas and Andrews (1997a:12) feel that “As archaeologists and anthropologists from a dominant society, we have an obligation to contribute to the well-being of First Peoples.” Such a reaction is indeed admirable, if very patronizing. Any community must ﬁnd means to alleviate the misery of its most marginal members, and archaeology’s association with the heritage of such peoples is a profoundly political engagement. However, archaeologists must recognize that by using the authority of their discipline as a means of advancing causes based on assumptions of the unique needs and capabilities of Indigenous peoples, they risk following the trail blazed by ancestral anthropologists who first established Aboriginals as a special category of humans. This academic concept was to prove extremely useful in the theory and practice of colonial administration, generally to the detriment of the peoples administered. In conspiring to believe in the paradigm of Aboriginality, and in reinforcing it by providing historical justiﬁcation, archaeologists are complicit in maintaining the intellectual conditions under which poor and marginalized Indigenous societies can continue to exist into the future. Rather than abetting such tragedies, we might emulate Kuper (1988:243) in hoping that “although certain things have been done badly in the past, we may still aspire to do them better in future. ... If we liberate ourselves, we may be able to free others. Anthropologists developed the theory of primitive society, but we may make amends if we render it obsolete at last, in all its protean forms.” Archaeologists can make an important contribution to this goal by exposing the myths of stable enduring societies on which the idea of the Primitive or the Aboriginal is founded.

Rajaram

#### We must begin by resisting these forms of colonialism – it’s reduces people to a lesser humanity that renders any violence possible

**Rajaram** 0**6** (Kumar, no shit, Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology, Central European University, Budapest, Hungary “Dystopic Geographies of Empire,” Alternatives 31, 475–506)

It is important that bodies and groups also represent or denote an absent conceptual frame, a more or less metaphysical framework that is the form of the polity. The polity is not to be understood solely in terms of how it organizes bodies, but in terms also of what the sum of these organized bodies represent. The form of the polity enables and orders its content. It signifies the polity as an aesthetic landscape of order, worthy of affective affiliation. At the same time, the aesthetic landscape may be understood as a subject of work: Aesthetically pleasing landscapes require a certain amount of policing. Undesirable elements, blots on the landscape, become identifiable as elements that have no place in the orderly polity. They are thus subject to expulsion or erasure, acts that enable the boundary of the community to be drawn and its affective order asserted. Such blots on the landscape are, as aesthetically unpleasing elements, placed in a visceral zone. It is in this zone that torture takes place. The zone spills over into the norm (for example, the economic relation to which migrant workers are subject to in Malaysia). This complex process of boundary making against “otherness” confined to a zone of visceral relations was the fundamental aspect of European colonial adventuring in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It remains as the underpinning aspect of contemporary colonialism. Its overt features (invasion of sovereign states, economic imperialism) remain the principal subject of contention. This leaves a more inimical spacing process unheeded (or, this inimical spacing process is not adequately theorized in terms of its relation to contemporary colonialism). This oversight, if it is an oversight, enables the ongoing process of place-making against the most marginal and vulnerable. If we are to articulate the claims of those marginalized and vulnerable groups as resounding political and moral claims that intrude into and unsettle the foreclosing boundaries of contemporary polities, then we must first begin by thinking the (very colonial) process of legitimization and delegitimzation that establishes the border as a limit concept differentiating belonging from nonbelonging. It is of fundamental importance that the aestheticization of the polity that is part and parcel of this colonial spacing process I have identified makes, by default, the polity’s overarching goal to be order and its maintenance. Order, not justice. This arises from a remarkable sleight of hand. We have come to think of justice and order in closely related terms: in terms of the maintenance of a society and what it represents (that absent metaphysical framework to which Timothy Mitchell has pointed so effectively). This is a stultifying aesthetics, where what is fundamentally being imposed is a way of orienting the future and restricting what it is to be human. Thinking justice, on the other hand, necessarily questions the imposition of stultifying orders and identifies those elements and groups it serves. It identifies the colonial present in ongoing processes of polity formation and maintenance in the contemporary world.

Katz

#### Dehumanization is the root of all evil – it is a precondition to any impact

Katheryn D. **Katz**, Professor of Law at Albany Law School of Union University, 19**97**, “Article: The Clonal Child: Procreative Liberty And Asexual Reproduction”, Albany Law Journal of Science & Technology, 8 Alb. L.J. Sci. & Tech. 1, **gender modified**, acc. 3/27/13

It is undeniable that throughout human history dominant and oppressive groups have committed unspeakable wrongs against those viewed as inferior. Once a person (or a people) has been characterized as sub-human, there appears to have been no limit to the cruelty that was or will be visited upon ~~him~~ [them]. For example, in almost all wars, hatred towards the enemy was inspired to justify the killing and wounding by separating the enemy from the human race, by casting them as unworthy of human status. This same rationalization has supported: genocide, chattel slavery, racial segregation, economic exploitation, caste and class systems, coerced sterilization of social misfits and undesirables, n90 unprincipled medical experimentation, n91 the subjugation of women, and the social Darwinists' theory justifying indifference to the poverty and misery of others. n92 [\*19]

Advocacy Text

#### The advocacy –

#### We affirm the idea that there should not be restrictions on the production of crude oil by indigenous peoples in the United States

Krech [Oil]

#### The prohibition on development of oil by indigenous peoples is part of this mentality of the “Ecological Indian” – one which denies agency to these peoples unless they fit within this stereotyped image

Shepard **Krech** III, PhD and Professor of Anthropology and Environmental Studies at Brown University, 19**99**, “The Ecological Indian: Myth and History”, W. W. Norton & Company, New York: London, acc. 2/15/13, p. 215-216

But what should be made of the differences of opinion among the Navajo? Of Hopi Indians who favor strip-mining, arguing that the most important part of their guiding philosophy and prophecy is to know "how to use the gifts of Mother Earth"? Of Miccosukee Indians, who proposed building sixty-five houses in Everglades National Park against the objections of the Park Service and environmentalists whispering that they are poor stewards of the land and therefore undeserving of special rights as Indians? Of the Alaskan Inupiat, who killed hundreds of caribou in the 1970s, used only part of the kill, left bloated carcasses behind, and were accused by white hunters (who had acted in virtually identical fashion themselves) of placing the herds in jeopardy? Of the Wisconsin Chippewa, who reportedly let thousands of fish spoil in warm weather? Of Rosebud Sioux activists, who wanted to stop use of the reservation for off-reservation trash out of concern—as the tribal chairman remarked facetiously—for Mother Earth, yet had never protested Rosebud's existing open dumps? Of Crow Indians and Indians from Wind River, the joint Shoshone-Arapahoe reservation in Wyoming, who, in separate incidents, killed many elk and, to the horror of big-game hunters and biologists, reputedly took only choice cuts for themselves, or only meat or antlers for sale, leaving many animals to rot? Or of the Ute who want a dam and reservoir—over strong objections from the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund—probably to transport low-sulfur coal through a coal slurry-pipeline to power plants at some future time?" For the sake of a simple narrative, critics who excoriate the larger society as they absolve Indians of all blame sacrifice evidence that in recent years, Indian people have had a mixed relationship to the environment. They victimize Indians when they strip them of all agency in their lives except when their actions fit the image of the Ecological Indian. Frozen in this image, native people should take only what they need and use all that they take, and if they must participate in larger markets, far better it be to profit from hydroponic vegetables, fish, or other "traditional" products than from oil, coal, trash, and like commodities. As one journalist remarked, "native people are supposed to be keepers of the earth, not protectors of its poisons."12 The connections between Indians and nature have been so tightly drawn over five hundred years, and especially in the last quarter of the twentieth century, that many non-Indians expect indigenous people to walk softly in their moccasins as conservationists and even (in Muir's sense) preservationists. When they have not, they have at times eagerly been condemned, accused of not acting as Indians should, and held to standards that they and their accusers have seldom met.

Kemp

#### These restrictions prevent Natives from developing oil –

John **Kemp**, Reuters market analyst, 2/5/**13**, “COLUMN-Tribes call for faster drilling on Indian lands: Kemp”, http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/column-tribes-call-for-faster-drilling-on-indian-lands-kemp, acc. 2/5/13

LONDON, Feb 5 (Reuters) - Native American communities are often portrayed as victims of avaricious oil and gas drillers and pipeline companies, who despoil the prairie with little thought for sacred sites. In fact, tribes are some of the largest petroleum developers in the United States and are pressing the federal government for more control over drilling on their own territory. The tribes should be ideally placed to benefit from the horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing techniques that have revolutionised production across the United States. Instead, much of the development has taken place around them on privately owned and state property as drillers try to avoid the cost, complexity and delays of trying to obtain permission to drill from the federal overseers of Indian lands. For almost a century, oil and gas has been produced on reservations and other lands held in trust by the federal government for Native Americans. In northern New Mexico, almost 3,000 active and plugged oil and gas wells are scattered across 377,000 acres of the Jicarilla Apache Nation, covering about a third of the tribe's reservation lands, which are crisscrossed by 2,000 miles of gas-gathering pipelines and roads. "We rely on oil and gas resources to provide governmental services to our tribal members and to those non-tribal members living on the reservation," Jicarilla President Levi Pesata told the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs in February 2012 ("Energy Development in Indian Country" Senate Hearing 112-628).

Deming

#### Restrictions on oil drilling are founded in these images of the Noble Savage

David **Deming**, associate professor of arts and sciences at the University of Oklahoma, 2/14/**12**, “The Noble Savage”, http://lewrockwell.com/orig9/deming8.1.1.html, acc. 2/1/13

All of this would be of academic interest only, were it not the case that the modern environmental movement and many of our public policies are based implicitly on the myth of the Noble Savage. The fountainhead of modern environmentalism is Rachel Carson's Silent Spring. The first sentence in Silent Spring invoked the Noble Savage by claiming "there was once a town in the heart of America where all life seemed to live in harmony with its surroundings." But the town Carson described did not exist, and her polemic, Silent Spring, introduced us to environmental alarmism based on junk science. As the years passed, Rachel Carson was elevated to sainthood and the template laid for endless spasms of hysterical fear-mongering, from the population bomb, to nuclear winter, the Alar scare, and global warming. Human beings have not, can not, and never will live in harmony with nature. Our prosperity and health depend on technology driven by energy. We exercise our intelligence to command nature, and were admonished by Francis Bacon to exercise our dominion with "sound reason and true religion." When we are told that our primary energy source, oil, is "making us sick," or that we are "addicted" to oil, these are only the latest examples of otherwise rational persons descending into gibberish after swooning to the lure of the Noble Savage. This ignorant exultation of the primitive can only lead us back to the Stone Age.

Shulock

#### We don’t call for roleplaying or posit ourselves as the state. The 1AC is a productive and effective means of analysis that is necessary for change

**Shulock 99** Nancy, PROFESSOR OF PUBLIC POLICY --- professor of Public Policy and Administration and director of the Institute for Higher Education Leadership & Policy (IHELP) at Sacramento State University, The Paradox of Policy Analysis: If It Is Not Used, Why Do We Produce So Much of It?, Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Vol. 18, No. 2, 226–244 (1999)

In my view, none of these radical changes is necessary. As interesting as our politics might be with the kinds of changes outlined by proponents of participatory and critical policy analysis, we do not need these changes to justify our investment in policy analysis. Policy analysis already involves discourse, introduces ideas into politics, and affects policy outcomes. The problem is not that policymakers refuse to understand the value of traditional policy analysis or that policy analysts have not learned to be properly interactive with stakeholders and reflective of multiple and nontechnocratic perspectives. The problem, in my view, is only that policy analysts, policymakers, and observers alike do not recognize policy analysis for what it is. Policy analysis has changed, right along with the policy process, to become the provider of ideas and frames, to help sustain the discourse that shapes citizen preferences, and to provide the appearance of rationality in an increasingly complex political environment. Regardless of what the textbooks say, there does not need to be a client in order for ideas from policy analysis to resonate through the policy environment.10¶ Certainly there is room to make our politics more inclusive. But those critics who see policy analysis as a tool of the power elite might be less concerned if they understood that analysts are only adding to the debate—they are unlikely to be handing ready-made policy solutions to elite decisionmakers for implementation. Analysts themselves might be more contented if they started appreciating the appropriation of their ideas by the whole gamut of policy participants and stopped counting the number of times their clients acted upon their proposed solutions. And the cynics disdainful of the purported objectivism of analysis might relax if analysts themselves would acknowledge that they are seeking not truth, but to elevate the level of debate with a compelling, evidence-based presentation of their perspectives. Whereas critics call, unrealistically in my view, for analysts to present competing perspectives on an issue or to “design a discourse among multiple perspectives,” I see no reason why an individual analyst must do this when multiple perspectives are already in abundance, brought by multiple analysts. If we would acknowledge that policy analysis does not occur under a private, contractual process whereby hired hands advise only their clients, we would not worry that clients get only one perspective.¶ Policy analysis is used, far more extensively than is commonly believed. Its use could be appreciated and expanded if policymakers, citizens, and analysts themselves began to present it more accurately, not as a comprehensive, problem-solving, scientific enterprise, but as a contributor to informed discourse. For years Lindblom [1965, 1968, 1979, 1986, 1990] has argued that we should understand policy analysis for the limited tool that it is—just one of several routes to social problem solving, and an inferior route at that. Although I have learned much from Lindblom on this odyssey from traditional to interpretive policy analysis, my point is different. Lindblom sees analysis as having a very limited impact on policy change due to its ill-conceived reliance on science and its deluded attempts to impose comprehensive rationality on an incremental policy process. I, with the benefit of recent insights of Baumgartner, Jones, and others into the dynamics of policy change, see that even with these limitations, policy analysis can have a major impact on policy. Ideas, aided by institutions and embraced by citizens, can reshape the policy landscape. Policy analysis can supply the ideas.

Nixon

#### Obsession with short-time frame impacts obscures ongoing violence that doesn’t fit neatly within conventional temporal frames

**Nixon 10** (Rob, Rachel Carson Professor of English, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor, pp 1-14)

When Lawrence Summers, then president of the World Bank, advocated thai the bank develop a scheme to export rich nation garbage, toxic waste, and heavily polluting industries to Africa, he did so in the calm voice of global managerial reasoning.' Such a scheme. Summers elaborated, would help correct an inefficient global imbalance in toxicity. Underlying his plan is an overlooked but crucial subsidiary benefit that he outlined: offloading rich-nation toxins onto the world's poorest continent would help ease the growing pressure from rich-nation environmentalists who were campaigning against garbage dumps and industrial effluent thai they condemned as health threats and found aesthetically offensive. Summers thus rationalized his poison-redistribution ethic as offering a double gain: it would benefit the United States and Europe economically, while helping appease the rising discontent of rich-nation environmentalists. Summers' arguments assumed a direct link between aesthetically unsightly waste and Africa as an out-of-sighl continent, a place remote from green activists' terrain of concern. In Summers' win win scenario for the global North, the African recipients ot his plan were triply discounted: discounted as political agents, discounted as long-term casualties of what 1 call in this book "slow violence," and discounted as cultures possessing environmental practices and concerns of their own. I begin with Summers' extraordinary proposal because it captures the strategic and representational challenges posed by slow violence as it impacts the environments and the environ-mentalism of the poor.¶ Three primary concerns animate this book, chief among them my conviction that we urgently need to rethink—politically, imaginatively, and theoretically what 1 call "slow violence." By slow violence 1 mean a violence that occurs gradually and out of sight, a violence of delayed destruction that is dispersed across time and space, an attritional violence that is typically not viewed as violence at all. Violence is customarily conceived as an event or action that is immediate in time, explosive and spectacular in space, and as erupting into instant sensational visibility. We need, I believe, to engage a different kind of violence, a violence that is neither spectacular nor instantaneous, but rather incremental and accretive, its calamitous repercussions playing out across a range of temporal scales. In so doing, we also need to engage the representational, narrative, and strategic challenges posed by the relative invisibility of slow violence. Climate change, the thawing cryosphere, toxic drift, biomagnification, deforestation, the radioactive aftermath s of wars, acidifying oceans, and a host of other slowly unfolding environmental catastrophes present formidable representational obstacles that can hinder our efforts to mobilize and act decisively. The long dyings the staggered and staggeringly discounted casualties, both human and ecological that result from war's toxic aftermaths or climate change are underrepresented in strategic planning as well as in human memory.¶Had Summers advocated invading Africa with weapons of mass destruction, his proposal would have fallen under conventional definitions of violence and been perceived as a military or even an imperial invasion. Advocating invading countries with mass forms of slow-motion toxicity, however, requires rethinking our accepted assumptions of violence to include slow violence. Such a rethinking requires that we complicate conventional assumptions about violence as a highly visible act that is newsworthy because it is event focused, time bound, and body bound. We need to account for how the temporal dispersion of slow violence affects the way we perceive and respond to a variety of social afflictions from domestic abuse to posttraumatic stress and. in particular, environmental calamities. A major challenge is representational: how to devise arresting stories, images, and symbols adequate to the pervasive but elusive violence of delayed effects. Crucially, slow violence is often not just attritional but also exponential, operating as a major threat multiplier; it can fuel long-term, proliferating conflicts in situations where the conditions for sustaining life become increasingly but gradually degraded.¶ Politically and emotionally, different kinds of disaster possess unequal heft. Palling bodies, burning towers, exploding heads, avalanches, volcanoes, and tsunamis have a visceral, eye-catching and page-turning power that tales of slow violence, unfolding over years, decades, even centuries, cannot match. Stories of toxic buildup, massing greenhouse gases, and accelerated species loss due to ravaged habitats arc all cataclysmic, but they are scientifically convoluted cataclysms in which casualties are postponed, often for generations. In an age when the media venerate the spectacular, when public policy is shaped primarily around perceived immediate need, a central question is strategic and representational: how can we convert into image and narrative the disasters that are slow moving and long in the making, disasters that are anonymous and that star nobody, disasters that are attritional and of indifferent interest to the sensation-driven technologies of our image-world? How can we turn the long emergencies of slow violence into stories dramatic enough to rouse public sentiment and warrant political intervention, these emergencies whose repercussions have given rise to some of the most critical challenges of our time?¶ This book's second, related focus concerns the environ mentalism of the poor, for it is those people lacking resources who are the principal casualties of slow violence. Their unseen poverty is compounded hy the invisibility of the slow violence that permeates so many of their lives. Our media bias toward spectacular violence exacerbates the vulnerability of ecosystems treated as disposable by turbo-capitalism while simultaneously exacerbating the vulnerability of those whom Kevin Bale, in another context, has called "disposable people."2 It is against such conjoined ecological and human disposability that we have witnessed a resurgent environmentalist!! of the poor, particularly (though not exclusively) across the so-called global South. So a central issue that emerges is strategic: if the neoliberal era has intensified assaults on resources, it has also intensified resistance, whether through isolated site-specific struggles or through activism that has reached across national boundaries in an effort to build translocal alliances.¶ "The poor" is a compendious category subject to almost infinite local variation as well as to fracture along fault lines of ethnicity, gender, race, class, region, religion, and generation. Confronted with the militarization of both commerce and development, impoverished communities are often assailed by coercion and bribery that test their cohesive resilience. How much control will, say, a poor hardwood forest community have over the mix of subsistence and market strategies it deploys in attempts at adaptive survival? How will that community negotiate competing definitions of its own poverty and long-term wealth when the guns, the bulldozers, and the moneymen arrive? Such communities typically have to patch together threadbare improvised alliances against vastly superior military, corporate, and media forces. As such, impoverished resource rebels can seldom afford to be single-issue activists: their green commitments are seamed through with other economic and cultural causes as they experience environmental threat not as a planetary abstraction but as a set of inhabited risks, some imminent, others obscurely long term.¶ The status of environmental activism among the poor in the global South has shifted significantly in recent years. Where green or environmental discourses were once frequently regarded with skepticism as neocolo-nial. Western impositions inimical to the resource priorities of the poor in the global South, such attitudes have been tempered by the gathering visibility and credibility of environmental justice movements that have pushed back against an antihuman environmenialism that too often sought (under the banner of universalism) to impose green agendas dominated by rich nations and Western NGOs. Among those who inhabit the front lines of the global resource wars, suspicions that environmentaUsm is another guise of what Andrew Ross calls "planetary management" have not. of course, been wholly allayed.1 But those suspicions have eased somewhat as the spectrum of what counts as environmenialism has broadened. Western activists are now more prone to recognize, engage, and learn from resource insurrections among the global poor that might previously have been discounted as not properly environmental.' Indeed, 1 believe that the fate of environ mentalism—and more decisively, the character of the biosphere itself—will be shaped significantly in decades to come by the tension between what Ramachandra Guha and Joan Martinez-Alier have called "full-stomach' and "empty-belly" environmenialism.'¶ The challenge of visibility that links slow violence to the environmen-talism of the poor connects directly to this hook's third circulating concern—the complex, often vexed figure of the environmental writer-activist. In the chapters that follow 1 address not just literary but more broadly rhetorical and visual challenges posed by slow violence; however, 1 place particular emphasis on combative writers who have deployed their imaginative agility and worldly ardor to help amplify the media marginalized causes of the environmentally dispossessed. I have sought to stress those places where writers and social movements, often in complicated tandem, have stralcgized against attritional disasters that afflict embattled communities. The writers I engage arc geographically wide ranging—from various parts of the African continent, from the Middle East. India, the Caribbean, the United States, and Britain—and work across a variety of forms. Figures like Wangari Maathai. Arundhati Roy. lndra Sinha. Ken Saro-Wiwa, Abdulrah-man Munif. Njabulo Ndebcle, Nadine Gordimer, Jamaica Kincaid, Rachel Carson, and June Jordan are alive to the inhabited impact of corrosive transnational forces, including petro-imperialism. the megadam industry, outsourced toxicity, neocolonial tourism, antihuman conservation practices, corporate and environmental deregulation, and the militarization of commerce, forces that disproportionately jeopardize the livelihoods, prospects, and memory banks of the global poor. Among the writers 1 consider, some have testified in relative isolation, some have helped instigate movements for environmental justice, and yet others, in aligning themselves with preexisting movements, have given imaginative definition to the issues at stake while enhancing the public visibility of the cause.¶ Relations between movements and writers are often fraught and fric-tional. not least because such movements themselves are susceptible to fracture from both external and internal pressures.\* That said, the writers I consider are enraged by injustices they wish to see redressed, injustices they believe they can help expose, silences they can help dismantle through testimonial protest, rhetorical inventiveness, and counterhistories in the face of formidable odds. Most are restless, versatile writers ready to pit their energies against what Edward Said called "the normalized quiet of unseen power."" This normalized quiet is of particular pertinence to the hushed havoc and injurious invisibility that trail slow violence.¶ In this book, I have sought to address our inattention to calamities that are slow and long lasting, calamities that patiently dispense their devastation while remaining outside our flickering attention spans—and outside the purview of a spectacle-driven corporate media. The insidious workings of slow violence derive largely from the unequal attention given to spectacular and unspectacular time. In an age that venerates instant spectacle, slow violence is deficient in the recognizable special effects that fill movie theaters and boost ratings on TV. Chemical and radiological violence, for example, is driven inward, somatized into cellular dramas of mutation that—particularly in the bodies of the poor—remain largely unobserved, undiagnosed, and untreated. From a narrative perspective, such invisible, mutagenic theater is slow paced and open ended, eluding the tidy closure, the containment, imposed by the visual orthodoxies of victory and defeat.¶ Let me ground this point by referring, in conjunction, to Rachel Carson's Silenl Spring and Frantz Fanon's The Wretched of the Earth. In 1962 Silent Spring jolted a broad international public into an awareness of the protracted, cryptic, and indiscriminate casualties inflicted by dichlorodiphenyltrichlo-roethane (DDT). Yet. just one year earlier, Fanon. in the opening pages of Wretched of the Earth, had comfortably invoked DDT as an affirmative metaphor for anticolonial violence: he called for a DDT-filled spray gun to be wielded as a weapon against the "parasites" spread bv the colonials' Christian church." Fanon's drama of decolonization is, of course, studded with the overt weaponry whereby subjugation is maintained {"by dint of a great array of bayonets and cannons") or overthrown ("by the searing bullets and bloodstained knives") after "a murderous and decisive struggle between the two protagonists."' Yet his temporal vision of violence—and of what Aime Cesaire called "the rendezvous of victory"—was uncomplicated by the concerns thai an as-yet inchoate environmental justice movement (catalyzed in part by Silent Spring) would raise about lopsided risks that permeate the land long term, blurring the clean lines between defeat and victory, between colonial dispossession and official national self determination.11 We can ccr lainly read Fanon, in his concern with land as property and as fount of native dignity, retrospectively with an environmental eye. But our theories of violence today must be informed by a science unavailable to Fanon, a science that addresses environmentally embedded violence that is often difficult to source, oppose, and once set in motion, to reverse.¶ Attritional catastrophes that overspill clear boundaries in time and space arc marked above all by displacements temporal, geographical, rhetorical, and technological displacements that simplify violence and underestimate, in advance and in retrospect, the human and environmental costs. Such displacements smooth the way for amnesia, as places are rendered irretrievable to those who once inhabited them, places that ordinarily pass unmourned in the corporate media. Places like the Marshall Islands, subjected between 1948 and 1958 to sixty-seven American atmospheric nuclear "tests," the largest of them equal in force to 1.000 I liroshima-sizcd bombs. In 1950 the Atomic Energy Commission declared the Marshall Islands "by far the most contaminated place in the world," a condition that would compromise independence in the long term, despite the islands' formal ascent in 1979 into the ranks of self-governing nations." The island republic was still in pan governed by an irradiated past: well into the 1980s its history of nuclear colonialism, long forgotten by the colonizers, was still delivering into the world "jellyfish babies"—headless, eyeless, limbless human infants who would live for just a few hours.11¶ If, as Said notes, struggles over geography are never reducible to armed struggle but have a profound symbolic and narrative component as well, and if, as Michael Watts insists, we must attend to the "violent geographies of fast capitalism." we need to supplement both these injunctions with a deeper understanding of the slow violence of delayed effects that structures so many of our most consequential forgetting\*." Violence, above all environmental violence, needs to be seen—and deeply considered—as a contest not only over space, or bodies, or labor, or resources, but also over time. Wc need to bear in mind Faulkner's dictum that "the past is never dead. It's not even past." His words resonate with particular force across landscapes permeated by slow violence, landscapes of temporal overspill that elude rhetorical cleanup operations with their sanitary beginnings and endings.1'1¶ Kwamc Anthony Appiah famously asked. "Is the 'Post-' in "PostcoloniaF the 'Post-' in 'Postmodern'?" As environmentalists wc might ask similarly searching questions of the "post" in postindustrial, post Cold War, and post-conflict." For if the past of slow violence isnevcrpast. so too the post is never fully post: industrial particulates and effluents live on in the environmental elements wc inhabit and in our very bodies, which cpidcmiologically and ecologically are never our simple contemporaries.'" Something similar applies to so-called postconflict societies whose leaders may annually commemorate, as marked on the calendar, the official cessation of hostilities, while ongoing intcrgcncrational slow violence (inflicted by, say. uncxplodcd landmines or carcinogens from an arms dump) may continue hostilities by other means.¶ Ours is an age of onrushing turbo-capitalism, wherein the present feels more abbreviated than it used to—at least for the world's privileged classes who live surrounded by technological time-savers that often compound the sensation of not having enough lime. Consequently, one of the most pressing challenges of our age is how to adjust our rapidly eroding attention spans to the slow erosions of environmental justice. If, under ncoliberalism, the gult between enclaved rich and outcast poor has become ever more pronounced, ours is also an era of enclaved time wherein for many speed has become a sell justifying, propulsive ethic that renders uneventful" violence (to those who live remote from its attritional lethality) a weak claimant on our time. The attosecond pace of our age, with its restless technologies of infinite promise and infinite disappointment, prompts us to keep flicking and clicking distractedly in an insatiable and often insensate — quest for quicker sensation.¶ The oxymoronic notion of slow violence poses a number of challenges; scientific, legal, political, and representational. In the long arc between the emergence of slow violence and its delayed effects, both the causes and the memory of catastrophe readily fade from view as the casualties incurred typically pass untallied and unremembered. Such discounting in turn makes it far more difficult to secure effective legal measures for prevention, restitution, and redress. Casualties from slow violence are moreover, out of sync not only with our narrative and media expectations but also with the swift seasons of electoral change. Politicians routinely adopt a "last in, first out" stance toward environmental issues, admitting them when limes are flush, dumping them as soon as times get tight. Because preventative or remedial environmental legislation typically targets slow violence, it cannot deliver dependable electoral cycle results, even though those results may ultimately be life saving. Relative to bankable pocket-book actions—there'll be a tax rebate check in the mail next August—environmental payouts seem to lurk on a distant horizon. Many politicians—and indeed many voters—routinely treat environmental action as critical yet not urgent. And so generation after generation of two- or four-year cycle politicians add to the pileup of deferrable actions deferred. With rare exceptions, in the domain of slow violence "yes, but not now, not yet" becomes the modus operandi.¶ How can leaders be goaded to avert catastrophe when the political rewards of their actions will not accrue to them but will be reaped on someone else's watch decades, even centuries, from now? How can environmental activists and storytellers work to counter the potent political, corporate, and even scientific forces invested in immediate self-interest, procrastination, and dissembling? We see such dissembling at work, for instance, in the afterword to Michael Crichton's 2004 environmental conspiracy novel, Slate of Fear, wherein he argued that we needed twenty more years of daia gaihcringon climate change before any policy decisions could be ventured.1\* Although the National Academy of Sciences had assured former president George W. Bush that humans were indeed causing the earth to warm. Bush shopped around for views that accorded with his own skepticism and found them in a private meeting with Crichton, whom he described as "an expert scientist.\*'¶ To address the challenges of slow violence is to confront the dilemma Rachel Carson faced almost half a century ago as she sought to dramatize what she eloquently called "death by indirection."'" Carson's subjects were biomagnification and toxic drift, forms of oblique, slow-acting violence that, like climate change, pose formidable imaginative difficulties for writers and activists alike. In struggling to give shape to amorphous menace, both Carson and reviewers of 5ilcn( Spring resorted to a narrative vocabulary: one reviewer portrayed the book as exposing "the new, unplottcd and mysterious dangers wc insist upon creating all around us,"" while Carson herself wrote of "a shadow that is no less ominous because it is formless and obscure."10 To confront slow violence requires, then, that we plot and give figurative shape to formless threats whose fatal repercussions are dispersed across space and time. The representational challenges are acute, requiring creative ways of drawing public attention to catastrophic acts that are low in instant spectacle but high in long-term effects. To intervene representation-ally entails devising iconic symbols that embody amorphous calamities as well as narrative forms that infuse those symbols with dramatic urgency.¶ Seven years after Rachel Carson turned our attention to ihe lethal mechanisms of "death by indirection," Johan Gaining, the influential Norwegian mathematician and sociologist, coined the term "indirect or structural violence."'' Gakung's theory of structural violence is pertinent here because some of his concerns overlap with the concerns that animate this book, while others help throw inio relief the rather different features I have soughi to highlight by introducing the term "slow violence." Structural violence, forGaltung, stands in opposition to the more familiar personal violence thai dominates our conceptions of what counts as violence per sc." Galtung was concerned, as I am, with widening the field of what constitutes violence. He soughi to foreground ihe vast structures thai can give rise to acts of personal violence and constitute forms of violence in and of themselves. Such structural violence may range from the unequal morbidity that results from a commodificd health care system, to racism itself. What I share with Gal-tung's line of thought is a concern with social justice, hidden agency, and certain forms of violence that are imperceptible.¶ In these terms, for example, we can recognize that the structural violence embodied by a neoliberal order of austerity measures, structural adjustment, rampant deregulation, corporate megamergers, and a widening gulf between rich and poor is a form of covert violence in its own right that is often a catalyst for more recognizably overt violence. For an expressly environmental example of structural violence, one might cite Wangari Maathai's insistence that the systemic burdens of national debt to the IMF and World Bank borne by many so-called developing nations constitute a major impediment to environmental sustainability.JI So. too, feminist earth scientist Jill Schneiderman, one of our finest thinkers about environmental time, has written about the way in which environmental degradation may "masquerade as inevitable."14¶ For all the continuing pertinence of the theory of structural violent t and for all the modifications the theory has undergone, the notion bears the impress of its genesis during the high era of structuralist thinking that tended toward a static determinism. We see this, for example, in Gakung's insistence that "structural violence is silent, it does not show—its is essentially static, it is the tranquil waters."1\* In contrast to the static connotations of structural violence, I have sought, through the notion of slow violence, to foreground questions of time, movement, and change, however gradual. The explicitly temporal emphasis of slow violence allows us to keep front and center the representational challenges and imaginative dilemmas posed not just by imperceptible violence but by imperceptible change whereby vio lence is decoupled from its original causes by the workings of time. Time becomes an actor in complicated ways, not least because the temporal tern plates of our spectacle-driven, 24/7 media life have shifted massively since Galtung first advanced his theory of structural violence some forty years ago. To talk about slow violence, then, is to engage directly with our contemporary politics of speed.¶ Simply put. structural violence is a theory that entails rethinking different notions of causation and agency with respect to violent effects. Slow violence, by contrast, might well include forms of structural violence, but has a wider descriptive range in calling attention, not simply to questions of agency, but to broader, more complex descriptive categories of violence enacted slowly over time. The shift in the relationship between human agency and time is most dramatically evident in our enhanced understanding of the accelerated changes occurring at two scalar extremes—in the life-sustaining circuits of planetary biophysics and in the wired brain's neural circuitry. The idea of structural violence predated both sophisticated contemporary ice-core sampling methods and the emergence of cyber technology. My concept of slow violence thus seeks to respond both to recent, radical changes in our geological perception and our changing technological experiences of time.¶ Let me address the geological aspect first. In 2000, Paul Crutzen. the Nobel Prize-winning atmospheric chemist, introduced the term "the Anthropo-cene Age" (which he dated to James Watt's invention of the steam engine). Through the notion of "the Anthropocene Age." Crutzen sought to theorize an unprecedented epochal effect: the massive impact by the human species, from the industrial era onward, on our planet's life systems, an impact that, as his term suggests, is geomorphic, equal in force and in long-term implications to a major geological event.\* Crutzen's attempt to capture the epochal scale of human activity's impact on the planet was followed by Will Steffen's elaboration, in conjunction with Crutzen and John McNeill, of what they dubbed the Great Acceleration, a second stage of the Anthropocene Age that they dated to the mid-twentieth century. Writing in 2007. Steffen ct al. noted how "nearly three-quarters of the anthropogenically driven rise in COt concentration has occurred since 1950 (from about 310 to 380 ppm), and about half of the total rise (48 ppm) has occurred in just the last 30 years."-7 The Australian environmental historian Libby Robin has put the case succinctly: "We have recently entered a new geological epoch, the Anthropocene. There is now considerable evidence that humanity has altered the biophysical systems of Earth, not just the carbon cycle . . . but also the nitrogen cycle and ultimately the atmosphere and climate of the whole globe."" What, then, are the consequences for our experience of time of this newfound recognition thai we have inadvertently, through our unprecedented biophysical species power, inaugurated an Anthropocene Age and are now engaged in (and subject to) the hurtling changes of the Great Acceleration?¶ Over the past two decades, this high-speed planetary modification has been accompanied (at least for those increasing billions who have access to the Internet) by rapid modifications to the human cortex. It is difficult, but necessary, to consider simultaneously a geologically-paced plasticity, however relatively rapid, and the plasticity of brain circuits reprogrammed by a digital world that threatens to "info-whelm" us into a state of perpetual distraction. If an awareness of the Great Acceleration is (to put it mildly) unevenly distributed, the experience of accelerated connectivity (and the paradoxical disconnects that can accompany it) is increasingly widespread. In an age of degraded attention spans it becomes doubly difficult yet increasingly urgent that we focus on the toll exacted, over time, by the slow violence of ecological degradation. We live, writes Cory Doctorow, in an era when the electronic screen has become an "ecosystem of interruption technologies.''" Or as former Microsoft executive Linda Stone puts it, we now live in an age of "continuous partial attention.?" Fast is faster than it used to be, and story units have become concomitantly shorter. In this cultural milieu of digitally speeded up time, and foreshortened narrative, the intergenerational aftermath becomes a harder sell. So to render slow violence visible entails, among other things, redefining speed: we see such efforts in talk of accelerated species loss, rapid climate change, and in attempts to recast "glacial"-once a dead metaphor for "slow-as a rousing, iconic image of unacceptably fast loss. Efforts to make forms of slow violence more urgently visible suffered a setback in the United States in the aftermath of 9/11, which reinforced a spectacular, immediately sensational, and instantly hyper-visible image of what constitutes a violent threat. The fiery spectacle of the collapsing towers was burned into the national psyche as the definitive image of violence, setting back by years attempts to rally public sentiment against climate change, a threat that is incremental, exponential, and far less sensationally visible. Condoleezza Rice's strategic fantasy of a mushroom cloud looming over America if the United States failed to invade Iraq gave further visual definition to cataclysmic violence as something explosive and instantaneous, a recognizably cinematic, immediately sensational, pyrotechnic event. The representational bias against slow violence has, furthermore, a critically dangerous impact on what counts as a casualty in the first place. Casualties of slow violence-human and environmental-are the casualties most likely not to be seen, not to be counted. Casualties of slow violence become light-weight, disposable casualties, with dire consequences for the ways wars are remembered, which in turn has dire consequences for the projected casualties from future wars. We can observe this bias at work in the way wars, whose lethal repercussions spread across space and time, are tidily bookended in the historical record. Thus, for instance, a 2003 New York Times editorial on Vietnam declared that" during our dozen years there, the U.S. killed and helped kill at least 1.5 million people.'?' But that simple phrase "during our dozen years there" shrinks the toll, foreshortening the ongoing slow-motion slaughter: hundreds of thousands survived the official war years, only to slowly lose their lives later to Agent Orange. In a 2002 study, the environmental scientist Arnold Schecter recorded dioxin levels in the bloodstreams of Bien Hoa residents at '35 times the levels of Hanoi's inhabitants, who lived far north of the spraying." The afflicted include thousands of children born decades after the war's end. More than thirty years after the last spray run, Agent Orange continues to wreak havoc as, through biomagnification, dioxins build up in the fatty tissues of pivotal foods such as duck and fish and pass from the natural world into the cooking pot and from there to ensuing human generations. An Institute of Medicine committee has by now linked seventeen medical conditions to Agent Orange; indeed, as recently as 2009 it uncovered fresh evidence that exposure to the chemical increases the likelihood of developing Parkinson's disease and ischemic heart disease." Under such circumstances, wherein long-term risks continue to emerge, to bookend a war's casualties with the phrase "during our dozen years there" is misleading: that small, seemingly innocent phrase is a powerful reminder of how our rhetorical conventions for bracketing violence routinely ignore ongoing, belated casualties.

Biyanwala

#### Structural violence comes first – anything else renders its effect invisible

**Biyanwila 8**—University of Western Australia (Janaka, Re-empowering labour : Knowledge, ontology and counter-hegemony, http://www.tasa.org.au/uploads/2011/05/Biyanwila-Janaka-Session-59-PDF.pdf)

An essential component of union power and issues of empowerment is the production of knowledge. The disempowerment of labour under the neo-liberal intellectual hegemony highlights the need for new forms of counter-hegemonic knowledge. The dominant unions, both in the global South as well as the North, maintain a mono culture of knowledge that situate unions primarily within the realm of production, systems of industrial relations and formal labour markets. In subordinating the realm of social reproduction, and ‘informal’ labour markets, this approach to knowledge evade the lived reality of those, the majority, enduring multiple forms of violence, from hunger to social exclusion in their every day lives. The re-empowerment of unions relates to elaborating union approaches to knowledge or epistemic frameworks that encourage a deeper understanding of union practices as well as communication with other movements. This paper suggests a return to the realm of ontology, the domain of being, in terms of prioritising and transforming the insecurity and violence in everyday life, particularly in the global South. An emphasis on ontology suggests reinforcing social and democratic approaches to knowledge, in order for unions to engage as a counter movement revitalising their identities as civil society actors. ¶ Introduction ¶ Central to debates around union renewal and empowerment is the development of counterhegemonic knowledge capable of organising and mobilising workers (Moody 1997; Lambert, 2002; Waterman, 2005; Clawson, 2003; Hyman, 2004; Webster et al., 2008). Most dominant unions, or the consolidated segments of the labour movement, are compromised within hegemonic knowledge, creating consent to positivist instrumental approaches to knowledge. This mono-culture of knowledge (Sousa, 2003), despite a discourse of diversity and organising ‘new’ workers, represents unions as economic actors, restricted to the workplace, within systems of industrial relations based on a formal economy of exchange. Meanwhile, the less consolidated segments of the labour movement, such as new unions and worker organisations, rely on counter-hegemonic knowledge, or ecologies of knowledge, elaborating their collective identities as a social movement within civil society. The realm of civil society involving organisations, networks and movements, is a space of hegemonic and counterhegemonic struggles, interrelated to the state. Unions as actors within civil society foreground a social and moral economy which is central to strategic theoretical perspectives of ‘community unionism’ and ‘social movement unionism’ (Moody, 1997; Lambert, 2002; Waterman, 2005; Clawson, 2003; Webster et al., 2008). The representation of unions as actors within civil society, emphasise the movement dimension of unions as well as new approaches to knowledge. Nevertheless, these perspectives often fail to factor in the experience of violence in the everyday lives of workers, particularly in the global South. The “South” refers to a status of subordination, in the core-periphery hierarchies of uneven capitalist development, where the historical experience of colonialism, racism, anti-colonial struggles, as well as disillusionment with post-colonial state forms influence the Southern trade union identities (Lambert, 2002).¶ An often ignored significant structural effect of neo-liberal globalisation, particularly in the South, is the spread of violence and insecurity. Under neo-liberal ideology, the spread of “flexible labour markets” and the privatisation public goods, depends on authoritarian state forms that prioritise ‘national security’ over ‘human security’. The generative mechanism of this violence and insecurity are structures of power that reproduce conditions of exploitation, oppression and subjugation (Das, 1990; Galtung, 1996, 2004; Moser, 2001). Various manifestations of violence that permeate multiple scales and temporalities are generated by structural coupling of capitalism, patriarchy, racism and imperialism (Das, 1990; Moser, 2001; Panitch, 2002; Ali and Ercelan, 2004). The adoption of new coercive domestic and international measures by the US in the post 9-11 context, under the ‘war against terrorism’, reflects the restructuring of the coercive apparatuses of all states to coordinate and maintain the US global hegemony (Panitch, 2002). These authoritarian state strategies often depend on ‘uncivil’ actors in civil society for reproducing structures of violence. Of course, this structural violence is debilitating and undermines individual and collective agency. Nevertheless, it is also at the root of social protest and mobilisation (Panitch, 2002). The multiplicity of struggles from Communists Maoists in tribal areas of India to the Zapatistas in indigenous areas of Mexico, illustrate collective struggles forced into violent modes of resistance. ¶ Violence as an expression of power relations involves structural and cultural dimensions. Structural violence (of hunger, poverty, malnutrition, illiteracy) and cultural violence (patriotic, patriarchal, etc) are embedded in power hierarchies based on class, gender, ethnicity, region, caste, age, (dis)ability, and sexuality. These structures of violence are stratified and differentiated with visible and invisible effects. While direct violence, physical and/or verbal, is visible, they emerge from the more invisible cultural and structural violence (Galtung, 2004). Indeed the resistance to structural violence of state and capital by counter forces also appropriates cultural meanings to legitimize their use of violence as the mode of struggle (Ibid.). According to Galtung (2004), transforming violence through human agency requires a counter discourse of peace and non-violence which must be “built in the culture and in the structure, not only in the ‘human mind’”.

Kavalski

#### Prioritize the ethics of the 1AC – the complex nature of the world means we can’t trust predictive claims

Emlian **Kavalski**, Professor of International Relations at the University of Alberta, “The Fifth Debate and the Emergence of Complex International Relations Theory: Notes on the Application of Complexity Theory to the Study of International Life,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Volume 20, Number 3, September, 200**7**, p. 449-551

Although such reflexivity animated the discussions of the fourth debate in IR, it nevertheless failed to challenge the hierarchical one-world view of the discipline. Such ontological commitment still allows for the perpetuation of linear thinking and the division between natural and social sciences. The main contribution of constructivism—the driving force behind the fourth debate—is its ability to bring scholars from diverse perspectives ‘to sit at one table’ (Wiener 2006, 4). It is these conversations around the IR table that made possible the permeation of their discourses by CT. In this respect, CIR theory reflects the ‘mosaic’ of constructivist theory-building (Wiener 2006, 16), but it takes it outside the immediate ontological realm of ‘political science’ and positions it within the broader context of living systems.15 Within the fourth debate, the study of international life is mainly about the examination of interdependent and overlapping sets of social arrangements. Constructivism, therefore, perpetuates the false dichotomy between ‘human’ and ‘non-human’ systems which prevents it from augmenting the study of international life with ‘naturalistic scientific updatings’ (Alker 2000, 143). Thus, despite constructivism’s emphasis that theorizing does not develop outside of context, it still remains preoccupied mainly with the respective political cultures, practices and behaviours without acknowledging the very (‘natural’) environment within, through and with which interactions occur. In other words, ‘environment’ connotes not an abstract linguistic construction, but a concept that is ‘localised, heterogeneous, radically temporal and is itself a collection of systems’ (Smith and Jenks 2006, 53). Thus, constructivism’s delineation of the fourth debate in the study of international life overlooks the foundational panarchic ontology of complexity—that is, human/social systems are also networked with nonhuman/natural ones. In this respect, CIR theory aims to rectify such shortcoming of traditional IR approaches and, thereby, outlines the fifth debate in IR—the cross-pollination between natural and social sciences. (In) conclusion: what next? As Beaumont (1994, 145) has quipped, there is something paradoxical about concluding an article on complexity, since the sequential unfolding of uncertainties, dilemmas and paradoxes works against focusing analysis and drawing neat conclusions. Yet, the perception of complexity does not automatically imply a ‘“defeatist” attitude’ (LaPorte 1975, 328). Therefore, this overview of the application of CT to world politics calls us to start thinking about the study of international life from a complex systems perspective. The proponents of CIR theory maintain that complexity cannot be regulated (and, thereby, structured through methodological tools), but that it is experienced. Such an assertion confronts the conventional wisdom of IR with the patterns of complexity: the former is premised on the separation of the ‘objects of knowledge from their contexts’ and the latter, while distinguishing between the objects, ‘interconnects’ them (Browaeys and Baets 2003, 335). The emergent attempts at comprehending the complexity of international life, therefore, have initiated the fifth debate in IR. The claim here is that this development has important emancipatory (and, thereby, policy) implications. Such a prospect has been made possible through the ontological innovation of CIR theory—the envisioning of social science imagination as a ‘system of interference’ that makes particular forms of the social real while foreclosing others (Law and Urry 2004, 397). On the one hand, CIR theory insists that complex systems thinking ‘should compel the strongest states to act in ways that reduce the vulnerability of the weakest’ (Snyder and Jervis 1993, 20). Rosenau (2003, 330), for instance, argues that the complexity (or what he calls ‘fragmegration’) of international life has made it possible for a wide range of individual and collective actors to put pressure on ‘rights-insensitive states’ across all the dimensions of state capabilities that have previously been impervious to demands on behalf of human rights. This acknowledges that activism generates its own countervailing forces that assume a continuing expansion of the analytical skills that enable people to alter their priorities across whole systems and subsystems (that is, alter habit-driven behaviour) as they discover that ‘the former cannot provide satisfying solutions to major problems and that the latter cannot contain low-intensity conflicts and maintain a satisfying degree of public order’ (Rosenau 1990, 457). Thus, in contrast to the reactionary stance of mainstream IR, CIR theory advocates an emancipatory agenda for a ‘new vision of politics that emphasises responsibility’ (Barnett 2005, 115) made possible by the promise of ‘immanent self-ordering’ (Parfitt 2006, 424). On the other hand, several CIR theoreticians have pointed out that the recognition of the complexity of international life diminishes the likelihood of recourse to force in world affairs—the suggestion is that the acknowledgement of the unpredictability and contradictions of international interactions as well as policies informed by CT should make foreign-policy-making more peaceful (Puente 2006; Suedfeld and Tetlock 1977). For instance, some have argued that policy-makers who recognize the unintended consequences of complexity indicate preferences for diplomacy over military confrontation (Raphael 1982; Wallace and Suedfeld 1988). For instance, the case of the 2003 invasion of Iraq points to the problem of reductionist decision-making—that is, even if the ‘rules of the game’ are completely known and understood at the local level, it might be impossible to predict regional/global outcomes; furthermore, the quandary of policy formulation based on parsimonious (simplifying) analysis is inherent rather than situational, because ‘planning based on predictions is not merely impractical; it is [also] logically impossible’ (Mathews et al 1999, 450).

Cohen and Zenko

#### Their impact is hype

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Last August, the Republican presidential contender Mitt Romney performed what has become a quadrennial rite of passage in American presidential politics: he delivered a speech to the annual convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars. His message was rooted in another grand American tradition: hyping foreign threats to the United States. It is “wishful thinking,” Romney declared, “that the world is becoming a safer place. The opposite is true. Consider simply the jihadists, a near-nuclear Iran, a turbulent Middle East, an unstable Pakistan, a delusional North Korea, an assertive Russia, and an emerging global power called China. No, the world is not becoming safer.”¶ Not long after, U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta echoed Romney’s statement. In a lecture last October, Panetta warned of threats arising “from terrorism to nuclear proliferation; from rogue states to cyber attacks; from revolutions in the Middle East, to economic crisis in Europe, to the rise of new powers such as China and India. All of these changes represent security, geopolitical, economic, and demographic shifts in the international order that make the world more unpredictable, more volatile and, yes, more dangerous.” General Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, concurred in a recent speech, arguing that “the number and kinds of threats we face have increased significantly.” And U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton reinforced the point by claiming that America resides today in a “very complex, dangerous world.”¶ Within the foreign policy elite, there exists a pervasive belief that the post–Cold War world is a treacherous place, full of great uncertainty and grave risks. A 2009 survey conducted by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press found that 69 percent of members of the Council on Foreign Relations believed that for the United States at that moment, the world was either as dangerous as or more dangerous than it was during the Cold War. Similarly, in 2008, the Center for American Progress surveyed more than 100 foreign policy experts and found that 70 percent of them believed that the world was becoming more dangerous. Perhaps more than any other idea, this belief shapes debates on U.S. foreign policy and frames the public’s understanding of international affairs. ¶ There is just one problem. It is simply wrong. The world that the United States inhabits today is a remarkably safe and secure place. It is a world with fewer violent conflicts and greater political freedom than at virtually any other point in human history. All over the world, people enjoy longer life expectancy and greater economic opportunity than ever before. The United States faces no plausible existential threats, no great-power rival, and no near-term competition for the role of global hegemon. The U.S. military is the world’s most powerful, and even in the middle of a sustained downturn, the U.S. economy remains among one of the world’s most vibrant and adaptive. Although the United States faces a host of international challenges, they pose little risk to the overwhelming majority of American citizens and can be managed with existing diplomatic, economic, and, to a much lesser extent, military tools. ¶ This reality is barely reflected in U.S. national security strategy or in American foreign policy debates. President Barack Obama’s most recent National Security Strategy aspires to “a world in which America is stronger, more secure, and is able to overcome our challenges while appealing to the aspirations of people around the world.” Yet that is basically the world that exists today. The United States is the world’s most powerful nation, unchallenged and secure. But the country’s political and policy elite seems unwilling to recognize this fact, much less integrate it into foreign policy and national security decision-making.¶ The disparity between foreign threats and domestic threat-mongering results from a confluence of factors. The most obvious and important is electoral politics. Hyping dangers serves the interests of both political parties. For Republicans, who have long benefited from attacking Democrats for their alleged weakness in the face of foreign threats, there is little incentive to tone down the rhetoric; the notion of a dangerous world plays to perhaps their greatest political advantage. For Democrats, who are fearful of being cast as feckless, acting and sounding tough is a shield against GOP attacks and an insurance policy in case a challenge to the United States materializes into a genuine threat. Warnings about a dangerous world also benefit powerful bureaucratic interests. The specter of looming dangers sustains and justifies the massive budgets of the military and the intelligence agencies, along with the national security infrastructure that exists outside government -- defense contractors, lobbying groups, think tanks, and academic departments. ¶ There is also a pernicious feedback loop at work. Because of the chronic exaggeration of the threats facing the United States, Washington overemphasizes military approaches to problems (including many that could best be solved by nonmilitary means). The militarization of foreign policy leads, in turn, to further dark warnings about the potentially harmful effects of any effort to rebalance U.S. national security spending or trim the massive military budget -- warnings that are inevitably bolstered by more threat exaggeration. Last fall, General Norton Schwartz, the U.S. Air Force chief of staff, said that defense cuts that would return military spending to its 2007 level would undermine the military’s “ability to protect the nation” and could create “dire consequences.” Along the same lines, Panetta warned that the same reductions would “invite aggression” from enemies. These are a puzzling statements given that the U.S. defense budget is larger than the next 14 countries’ defense budgets combined and that the United States still maintains weapons systems designed to fight an enemy that disappeared 20 years ago.¶ Of course, threat inflation is not new. During the Cold War, although the United States faced genuine existential threats, American political leaders nevertheless hyped smaller threats or conflated them with larger ones. Today, there are no dangers to the United States remotely resembling those of the Cold War era, yet policymakers routinely talk in the alarmist terms once used to describe superpower conflict. Indeed, the mindset of the United States in the post-9/11 world was best (albeit crudely) captured by former Vice President Dick Cheney. While in office, Cheney promoted the idea that the United States must prepare for even the most remote threat as though it were certain to occur. The journalist Ron Suskind termed this belief “the one percent doctrine,” a reference to what Cheney called the “one percent chance that Pakistani scientists are helping al Qaeda build or develop a nuclear weapon.” According to Suskind, Cheney insisted that the United States must treat such a remote potential threat “as a certainty in terms of our response.” ¶ Such hair-trigger responsiveness is rarely replicated outside the realm of national security, even when the government confronts problems that cause Americans far more harm than any foreign threat. According to an analysis by the budget expert Linda Bilmes and the economist Joseph Stiglitz, in the ten years since 9/11, the combined direct and indirect costs of the U.S. response to the murder of almost 3,000 of its citizens have totaled more than $3 trillion. A study by the Urban Institute, a nonpartisan think tank, estimated that during an overlapping period, from 2000 to 2006, 137,000 Americans died prematurely because they lacked health insurance. Although the federal government maintains robust health insurance programs for older and poor Americans, its response to a national crisis in health care during that time paled in comparison to its response to the far less deadly terrorist attacks.¶ Rather than Cheney’s one percent doctrine, what the United States actually needs is a 99 percent doctrine: a national security strategy based on the fact that the United States is a safe and well-protected country and grounded in the reality that the opportunities for furthering U.S. interests far exceed the threats to them. Fully comprehending the world as it is today is the best way to keep the United States secure and resistant to the overreactions that have defined its foreign policy for far too long.¶ BETTER THAN EVER¶ The United States, along with the rest of the world, currently faces a period of economic and political uncertainty. But consider four long-term global trends that underscore just how misguided the constant fear-mongering in U.S. politics is: the falling prevalence of violent conflict, the declining incidence of terrorism, the spread of political freedom and prosperity, and the global improvement in public health. In 1992, there were 53 armed conflicts raging in 39 countries around the world; in 2010, there were 30 armed conflicts in 25 countries. Of the latter, only four have resulted in at least 1,000 battle-related deaths and can therefore be classified as wars, according to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program: the conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, and Somalia, two of which were started by the United States. ¶ Today, wars tend to be low-intensity conflicts that, on average, kill about 90 percent fewer people than did violent struggles in the 1950s. Indeed, the first decade of this century witnessed fewer deaths from war than any decade in the last century. Meanwhile, the world’s great powers have not fought a direct conflict in more than 60 years -- “the longest period of major power peace in centuries,” as the Human Security Report Project puts it. Nor is there much reason for the United States to fear such a war in the near future: no state currently has the capabilities or the inclination to confront the United States militarily. ¶ Much of the fear that suffuses U.S. foreign policy stems from the trauma of 9/11. Yet although the tactic of terrorism remains a scourge in localized conflicts, between 2006 and 2010, the total number of terrorist attacks declined by almost 20 percent, and the number of deaths caused by terrorism fell by 35 percent, according to the U.S. State Department. In 2010, more than three-quarters of all victims of terrorism -- meaning deliberate, politically motivated violence by nonstate groups against noncombatant targets -- were injured or killed in the war zones of Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, and Somalia. Of the 13,186 people killed by terrorist attacks in 2010, only 15, or 0.1 percent, were U.S. citizens. In most places today -- and especially in the United States -- the chances of dying from a terrorist attack or in a military conflict have fallen almost to zero.¶ As violence and war have abated, freedom and democratic governance have made great gains. According to Freedom House, there were 69 electoral democracies at the end of the Cold War; today, there are 117. And during that time, the number of autocracies declined from 62 to 48. To be sure, in the process of democratizing, states with weak political institutions can be more prone to near-term instability, civil wars, and interstate conflict. Nevertheless, over time, democracies tend to have healthier and better-educated citizens, almost never go to war with other democracies, and are less likely to fight nondemocracies.¶ Economic bonds among states are also accelerating, even in the face of a sustained global economic downturn. Today, 153 countries belong to the World Trade Organization and are bound by its dispute-resolution mechanisms. Thanks to lowered trade barriers, exports now make up more than 30 percent of gross world product, a proportion that has tripled in the past 40 years. The United States has seen its exports to the world’s fastest-growing economies increase by approximately 500 percent over the past decade. Currency flows have exploded as well, with $4 trillion moving around the world in foreign exchange markets every day. Remittances, an essential instrument for reducing poverty in developing countries, have more than tripled in the past decade, to more than $440 billion each year. Partly as a result of these trends, poverty is on the decline: in 1981, half the people living in the developing world survived on less than $1.25 a day; today, that figure is about one-sixth. Like democratization, economic development occasionally brings with it significant costs. In particular, economic liberalization can strain the social safety net that supports a society’s most vulnerable populations and can exacerbate inequalities. Still, from the perspective of the United States, increasing economic interdependence is a net positive because trade and foreign direct investment between countries generally correlate with long-term economic growth and a reduced likelihood of war. ¶ A final trend contributing to the relative security of the United States is the improvement in global health and well-being. People in virtually all countries, and certainly in the United States, are living longer and healthier lives. In 2010, the number of people who died from AIDS-related causes declined for the third year in a row. Tuberculosis rates continue to fall, as do the rates of polio and malaria. Child mortality has plummeted worldwide, thanks in part to expanded access to health care, sanitation, and vaccines. In 1970, the global child mortality rate (deaths of children under five per 1,000) was 141; in 2010, it was 57. In 1970, global average life expectancy was 59, and U.S. life expectancy was 70. Today, the global figure is just under 70, and the U.S. figure is 79. These vast improvements in health and well-being contribute to the global trend toward security and safety because countries with poor human development are more war-prone.¶ PHANTOM MENACE¶ None of this is meant to suggest that the United States faces no major challenges today. Rather, the point is that the problems confronting the country are manageable and pose minimal risks to the lives of the overwhelming majority of Americans. None of them -- separately or in combination -- justifies the alarmist rhetoric of policymakers and politicians or should lead to the conclusion that Americans live in a dangerous world.¶ Take terrorism. Since 9/11, no security threat has been hyped more. Considering the horrors of that day, that is not surprising. But the result has been a level of fear that is completely out of proportion to both the capabilities of terrorist organizations and the United States’ vulnerability. On 9/11, al Qaeda got tragically lucky. Since then, the United States has been preparing for the one percent chance (and likely even less) that it might get lucky again. But al Qaeda lost its safe haven after the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, and further military, diplomatic, intelligence, and law enforcement efforts have decimated the organization, which has essentially lost whatever ability it once had to seriously threaten the United States. ¶ According to U.S. officials, al Qaeda’s leadership has been reduced to two top lieutenants: Ayman al-Zawahiri and his second-in-command, Abu Yahya al-Libi. Panetta has even said that the defeat of al Qaeda is “within reach.” The near collapse of the original al Qaeda organization is one reason why, in the decade since 9/11, the U.S. homeland has not suffered any large-scale terrorist assaults. All subsequent attempts have failed or been thwarted, owing in part to the incompetence of their perpetrators. Although there are undoubtedly still some terrorists who wish to kill Americans, their dreams will likely continue to be frustrated by their own limitations and by the intelligence and law enforcement agencies of the United States and its allies.¶ As the threat from transnational terrorist groups dwindles, the United States also faces few risks from other states. China is the most obvious potential rival to the United States, and there is little doubt that China’s rise will pose a challenge to U.S. economic interests. Moreover, there is an unresolved debate among Chinese political and military leaders about China’s proper global role, and the lack of transparency from China’s senior leadership about its long-term foreign policy objectives is a cause for concern. However, the present security threat to the U.S. mainland is practically nonexistent and will remain so. Even as China tries to modernize its military, its defense spending is still approximately one-ninth that of the United States. In 2012, the Pentagon will spend roughly as much on military research and development alone as China will spend on its entire military. ¶ While China clumsily flexes its muscles in the Far East by threatening to deny access to disputed maritime resources, a recent Pentagon report noted that China’s military ambitions remain dominated by “regional contingencies” and that the People’s Liberation Army has made little progress in developing capabilities that “extend global reach or power projection.” In the coming years, China will enlarge its regional role, but this growth will only threaten U.S. interests if Washington attempts to dominate East Asia and fails to consider China’s legitimate regional interests. It is true that China’s neighbors sometimes fear that China will not resolve its disputes peacefully, but this has compelled Asian countries to cooperate with the United States, maintaining bilateral alliances that together form a strong security architecture and limit China’s room to maneuver.¶ The strongest arguments made by those warning of Chinese influence revolve around economic policy. The list of complaints includes a host of Chinese policies, from intellectual property theft and currency manipulation to economic espionage and domestic subsidies. Yet none of those is likely to lead to direct conflict with the United States beyond the competition inherent in international trade, which does not produce zero-sum outcomes and is constrained by dispute-resolution mechanisms, such as those of the World Trade Organization. If anything, China’s export-driven economic strategy, along with its large reserves of U.S. Treasury bonds, suggests that Beijing will continue to prefer a strong United States to a weak one. ¶ NUCLEAR FEAR¶ It is a matter of faith among many American politicians that Iran is the greatest danger now facing the country. But if that is true, then the United States can breathe easy: Iran is a weak military power. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Iran’s “military forces have almost no modern armor, artillery, aircraft or major combat ships, and UN sanctions will likely obstruct the purchase of high-technology weapons for the foreseeable future.” ¶ Tehran’s stated intention to project its interests regionally through military or paramilitary forces has made Iran its own worst enemy. Iran’s neighbors are choosing to balance against the Islamic Republic rather than fall in line behind its leadership. In 2006, Iran’s favorability rating in Arab countries stood at nearly 80 percent; today, it is under 30 percent. Like China’s neighbors in East Asia, the Gulf states have responded to Iran’s belligerence by participating in an emerging regional security arrangement with the United States, which includes advanced conventional weapons sales, missile defenses, intelligence sharing, and joint military exercises, all of which have further isolated Iran.¶ Of course, the gravest concerns about Iran focus on its nuclear activities. Those fears have led to some of the most egregiously alarmist rhetoric: at a Republican national security debate in November, Romney claimed that an Iranian nuclear weapon is “the greatest threat the world faces.” But it remains unclear whether Tehran has even decided to pursue a bomb or has merely decided to develop a turnkey capability. Either way, Iran’s leaders have been sufficiently warned that the United States would respond with overwhelming force to the use or transfer of nuclear weapons. Although a nuclear Iran would be troubling to the region, the United States and its allies would be able to contain Tehran and deter its aggression -- and the threat to the U.S. homeland would continue to be minimal.¶ Overblown fears of a nuclear Iran are part of a more generalized American anxiety about the continued potential of nuclear attacks. Obama’s National Security Strategy claims that “the American people face no greater or more urgent danger than a terrorist attack with a nuclear weapon.” According to the document, “international peace and security is threatened by proliferation that could lead to a nuclear exchange. Indeed, since the end of the Cold War, the risk of a nuclear attack has increased.” ¶ If the context is a state-against-state nuclear conflict, the latter assertion is patently false. The demise of the Soviet Union ended the greatest potential for international nuclear conflict. China, with only 72 intercontinental nuclear missiles, is eminently deterrable and not a credible nuclear threat; it has no answer for the United States’ second-strike capability and the more than 2,000 nuclear weapons with which the United States could strike China. ¶ In the past decade, Cheney and other one-percenters have frequently warned of the danger posed by loose nukes or uncontrolled fissile material. In fact, the threat of a nuclear device ending up in the hands of a terrorist group has diminished markedly since the early 1990s, when the Soviet Union’s nuclear arsenal was dispersed across all of Russia’s 11 time zones, all 15 former Soviet republics, and much of eastern Europe. Since then, cooperative U.S.-Russian efforts have resulted in the substantial consolidation of those weapons at far fewer sites and in comprehensive security upgrades at almost all the facilities that still possess nuclear material or warheads, making the possibility of theft or diversion unlikely. Moreover, the lessons learned from securing Russia’s nuclear arsenal are now being applied in other countries, under the framework of Obama’s April 2010 Nuclear Security Summit, which produced a global plan to secure all nuclear materials within four years. Since then, participants in the plan, including Chile, Mexico, Ukraine, and Vietnam, have fulfilled more than 70 percent of the commitments they made at the summit.¶ Pakistan represents another potential source of loose nukes. The United States’ military strategy in Afghanistan, with its reliance on drone strikes and cross-border raids, has actually contributed to instability in Pakistan, worsened U.S. relations with Islamabad, and potentially increased the possibility of a weapon falling into the wrong hands. Indeed, Pakistani fears of a U.S. raid on its nuclear arsenal have reportedly led Islamabad to disperse its weapons to multiple sites, transporting them in unsecured civilian vehicles. But even in Pakistan, the chances of a terrorist organization procuring a nuclear weapon are infinitesimally small. The U.S. Department of Energy has provided assistance to improve the security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, and successive senior U.S. government officials have repeated what former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said in January 2010: that the United States is “very comfortable with the security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.”¶ A more recent bogeyman in national security debates is the threat of so-called cyberwar. Policymakers and pundits have been warning for more than a decade about an imminent “cyber–Pearl Harbor” or “cyber-9/11.” In June 2011, then Deputy Defense Secretary William Lynn said that “bits and bytes can be as threatening as bullets and bombs.” And in September 2011, Admiral Mike Mullen, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, described cyberattacks as an “existential” threat that “actually can bring us to our knees.” ¶ Although the potential vulnerability of private businesses and government agencies to cyberattacks has increased, the alleged threat of cyberwarfare crumbles under scrutiny. No cyberattack has resulted in the loss of a single U.S. citizen’s life. Reports of “kinetic-like” cyberattacks, such as one on an Illinois water plant and a North Korean attack on U.S. government servers, have proved baseless. Pentagon networks are attacked thousands of times a day by individuals and foreign intelligence agencies; so, too, are servers in the private sector. But the vast majority of these attacks fail wherever adequate safeguards have been put in place. Certainly, none is even vaguely comparable to Pearl Harbor or 9/11, and most can be offset by commonsense prevention and mitigation efforts. ¶ A NEW APPROACH¶ Defenders of the status quo might contend that chronic threat inflation and an overmilitarized foreign policy have not prevented the United States from preserving a high degree of safety and security and therefore are not pressing problems. Others might argue that although the world might not be dangerous now, it could quickly become so if the United States grows too sanguine about global risks and reduces its military strength. Both positions underestimate the costs and risks of the status quo and overestimate the need for the United States to rely on an aggressive military posture driven by outsized fears. ¶ Since the end of the Cold War, most improvements in U.S. security have not depended primarily on the country’s massive military, nor have they resulted from the constantly expanding definition of U.S. national security interests. The United States deserves praise for promoting greater international economic interdependence and open markets and, along with a host of international and regional organizations and private actors, more limited credit for improving global public health and assisting in the development of democratic governance. But although U.S. military strength has occasionally contributed to creating a conducive environment for positive change, those improvements were achieved mostly through the work of civilian agencies and nongovernmental actors in the private and nonprofit sectors. The record of an overgrown post–Cold War U.S. military is far more mixed. Although some U.S.-led military efforts, such as the NATO intervention in the Balkans, have contributed to safer regional environments, the U.S.-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have weakened regional and global security, leading to hundreds of thousands of casualties and refugee crises (according to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, 45 percent of all refugees today are fleeing the violence provoked by those two wars). Indeed, overreactions to perceived security threats, mainly from terrorism, have done significant damage to U.S. interests and threaten to weaken the global norms and institutions that helped create and sustain the current era of peace and security. None of this is to suggest that the United States should stop playing a global role; rather, it should play a different role, one that emphasizes soft power over hard power and inexpensive diplomacy and development assistance over expensive military buildups.¶ Indeed, the most lamentable cost of unceasing threat exaggeration and a focus on military force is that the main global challenges facing the United States today are poorly resourced and given far less attention than “sexier” problems, such as war and terrorism. These include climate change, pandemic diseases, global economic instability, and transnational criminal networks -- all of which could serve as catalysts to severe and direct challenges to U.S. security interests. But these concerns are less visceral than alleged threats from terrorism and rogue nuclear states. They require long-term planning and occasionally painful solutions, and they are not constantly hyped by well-financed interest groups. As a result, they are given short shrift in national security discourse and policymaking.

# 2AC

## Util

#### Their impact calculus renders life meaningless

**Dillon ‘99** [Political Theory, Another Justice – April 164-165]

Quite the reverse. The subject was never a firm foundation for justice, much less a hospitable vehicle for the reception of the call of another Justice. It was never in possession of that self-possession which was supposed to secure the certainty of itself, of a self-possession that would enable it ultimately to adjudicate everything. The very indexicality required of sovereign subjectivity gave rise rather to a commensurability much more amenable to the expendability required of the political and material economies of mass societies than it did to the singular, invaluable, and uncanny uniqueness of the self. The value of the subject became the standard unit of currency for the political arithmetic of States and the political economies of capitalism.34 They trade in it still to devastating global effect. The technologisation of the political has become manifest and global. Economies of evaluation necessarily require calculability.35 Thus no valuation without mensuration and no mensuration without indexation. Once rendered calculable, however, units of account are necessarily submissible not only to valuation but also, of course, to devaluation. Devaluation, logically, can extend to the point of counting as nothing. Hence, no mensuration without demensuration either. There is nothing abstract about this: the declension of economies of value leads to the zero point of holocaust. However liberating and emancipating systems of value—rights—may claim to be, for example, they run the risk of counting out the invaluable. Counted out, the invaluable may then lose its purchase on life. Here with, then, the necessity of championing the invaluable itself. For we must never forget that, “we are dealing always with whatever exceeds measure.”36 But how does that necessity present itself? Another Justice answers: as the surplus of the duty to answer to the claim of Justice over rights. That duty, as with the advent of another Justice, is integral to the lack constitutive of the human way of being. The event of this lack is not a negative experience. Rather, it is an encounter with a reserve charged with possibility. As possibility, it is that which enables life to be lived in excess without the overdose of actuality.37 What this also means is that the human is not decided. It is precisely undecidable. Undecidability means being in a position of having to decide without having already been fully determined and without being capable of bringing an end to the requirement for decision.

#### And, toleration of evil in the name of survival destroys the value to life

**Callahan ‘73** [Daniel J. Callahan, The Tyranny of Survival: And other pathologies of civilized life. Pg 91-93//delo-uwyo]

That individuals, tribes, communities and nations have committed so much will, energy and intelligence to survival has meant that they have survived, and their descendants are present to tell the tale. Nothing is so powerful a motive force, for self or society, as the threat of annihilation, nothing so energizing as the necessity to live. Without life, all else is in vain. Leaving aside the question of whether we need more enlightened attitudes toward suicide in our society, which we may. it is still not for nothing that suicide has been looked upon with abhorrence, whether from a religious or a psycho- logical perspective. It seems to violate the most fundamental of human drives, and has always required a special explana- tion or justification. The value of survival could not be so readily abused were it not for its evocative power.2 But abused it has been. In the name of survival, all manner of social and political evils have been committed against the rights of individuals, including the right to life. The purported threat of Communist domina- tion has for over two decades fueled the drive of militarists for ever-larger defense budgets, no matter what the cost to other social needs. During World War II, native Japanese-Ameri- cans were herded, without due process of law, into detention camps. This policy was later upheld by the Supreme Court in Korematsu v. United States (1944) in the general context that a threat to national security can justify acts otherwise bla- tantly unjustifiable. The survival of the Aryan race was one of the official legitimations of Nazism. Under the banner of survival, the government of South Africa imposes a ruthless apartheid, heedless of the most elementary human rights. The Vietnamese war has seen one of the greatest of the many absurdities tolerated in the name of survival: the destruction of villages in order to save them. But it is not only in a political setting that survival has been evoked as a final and unarguable value. The main rationale B. F. Skinner offers in Beyond Freedom and Dignity for the controlled and conditioned society is the need for survival.3 For Jacques Monod, in Chance and Necessity, sur- vival requires that we overthrow almost every known religious, ethical and political system.4 In genetics, the survival of the gene pool has been put forward as sufficient grounds for a forceful prohibition of bearers of offensive genetic traits from marrying and bearing children. Some have even suggested that we do the cause of survival no good by our misguided medical efforts to find means by which those suffering from such com- mon genetically based diseases as diabetes can live a normal life, and thus procreate even more diabetics. In the field of population and environment, one can do no better than to cite Paul Ehrlich, whose works have shown a high dedication to survival, and in its holy name a willingness to contemplate governmentally enforced abortions and a denial of food to starving populations of nations which have not enacted popu- lation-control policies. For all these reasons, it is possible to counterpoise over against the need for survival a "tyranny of survival." There seems to be no imaginable evil which some group is not willing to inflict on another for the sake of survival, no rights. liberties or dignities which it is not ready to suppress. It § Marked 14:24 § is easy, of course, to recognize the danger when survival is falsely and manipulatively invoked. Dictators never talk about their aggressions, but only about the need to defend the fatherland, to save it from destruction at the hands of its enemies. But my point goes deeper than that. It is directed even at a legitimate concern for survival, when that concern is allowed to reach an intensity which would ignore, suppress or destroy other funda- mental human rights and values. The potential tyranny of survival as a value is that it is capable, if not treated sanely, of wiping out all other values. Survival can become an obsession and a disease, provoking a destructive singlemindedness that will stop at nothing. We come here to the fundamental moral dilemma. If, both biologically and psychologically, the need for survival is basic to man, and if survival is the precondition for any and all human achievements, and if no other rights make much sense without the premise of a right to life-then how will it be possible to honor and act upon the need for survival without, in the process, destroying everything in human beings which makes them worthy of survival? To put it more strongly, if the price of survival is human degradation, then there is no moral reason why an effort should be made to ensure that survival. It would be the Pyrrhic victory to end all Pyrrhic victories. Yet it would be the defeat of all defeats if, because human beings could not properly manage their need to survive, they suc- ceeded in not doing so. Either way, then, would represent a failure, and one can take one's pick about which failure would be worse, that of survival at the cost of everything decent in man or outright extinction.

## T Restriction

#### ONE, We meet – there are restrictions on production – that’s Kemp

#### TWO, Counter interpretation – restriction is something that blocks usage of land

**Berger 1** Justice Opinion, INDUSTRIAL RENTALS, INC., ISAAC BUDOVITCH and FLORENCE BUDOVITCH, Appellants Below, Appellants, v. NEW CASTLE COUNTY BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT and NEW CASTLE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF LAND USE, Appellees Below, Appellees. No. 233, 2000SUPREME COURT OF DELAWARE776 A.2d 528; 2001 Del. LEXIS 300April 10, 2001, Submitted July 17, 2001, Decided lexis

We disagree. Statutes must be read as a whole and all the words must be given effect. 3 The word "restriction" means "a limitation (esp. in a deed) placed on the use or enjoyment of property." 4 If a deed restriction has been satisfied, and no longer limits the use or enjoyment of the property, then it no longer is a deed restriction -- even though the paper on which it was written remains. [\*\*6] Thus, the phrase "projects containing deed restrictions requiring phasing…," in Section 11.130(A)(7) means presently existing deed restrictions. As of June 1988, the Acierno/Marta Declaration contained no remaining deed restrictions requiring phasing to coincide with improvements to the transportation system. As a result, the Acierno/Marta projects should not have been included in the scope of the Budovitches' TIS.

#### THREE, we meet – secretary approval is a statutory restriction that includes the possibility of complete prohibition

**U.S. Code ‘5** 25 U.S.C. § 3504 : US Code - Section 3504: Leases, business agreements, and rights-of-way involving energy development or transmission, 2005,

An Indian tribe may grant a right-of-way over tribal land for a¶ pipeline or an electric transmission or distribution line without¶ review or approval by the Secretary if -¶ (1) the right-of-way is executed in accordance with a tribal¶ energy resource agreement approved by the Secretary under¶ subsection (e);¶ (2) the term of the right-of-way does not exceed 30 years;¶ (3) the pipeline or electric transmission or distribution line¶ serves -¶ (A) an electric generation, transmission, or distribution¶ facility located on tribal land; or¶ (B) a facility located on tribal land that processes or¶ refines energy resources developed on tribal land; and¶ (4) the Indian tribe has entered into a tribal energy resource¶ agreement with the Secretary, as described in subsection (e),¶ relating to the development of energy resources on tribal land¶ (including the periodic review and evaluation of the activities¶ of the Indian tribe under an agreement described in subparagraphs¶ (D) and (E) of subsection (e)(2)).¶ (c) Renewals¶ A lease or business agreement entered into, or a right-of-way¶ granted, by an Indian tribe under this section may be renewed at¶ the discretion of the Indian tribe in accordance with this section.¶ (d) Validity¶ No lease, business agreement, or right-of-way relating to the¶ development of tribal energy resources under this section shall be¶ valid unless the lease, business agreement, or right-of-way is¶ authorized by a tribal energy resource agreement approved by the¶ Secretary under subsection (e)(2).¶ (e) Tribal energy resource agreements¶ (1) On the date on which regulations are promulgated under¶ paragraph (8), an Indian tribe may submit to the Secretary for¶ approval a tribal energy resource agreement governing leases,¶ business agreements, and rights-of-way under this section.¶ (2)(A) Not later than 270 days after the date on which the¶ Secretary receives a tribal energy resource agreement from an¶ Indian tribe under paragraph (1), or not later than 60 days after¶ the Secretary receives a revised tribal energy resource agreement¶ from an Indian tribe under paragraph (4)(C) (or a later date, as¶ agreed to by the Secretary and the Indian tribe), the Secretary¶ shall approve or disapprove the tribal energy resource agreement.¶ (B) The Secretary shall approve a tribal energy resource¶ agreement submitted under paragraph (1) if -¶ (i) the Secretary determines that the Indian tribe has¶ demonstrated that the Indian tribe has sufficient capacity to¶ regulate the development of energy resources of the Indian tribe;¶ (ii) the tribal energy resource agreement includes provisions¶ required under subparagraph (D); and¶ (iii) the tribal energy resource agreement includes provisions¶ that, with respect to a lease, business agreement, or right-of-¶ way under this section -¶ (I) ensure the acquisition of necessary information from the¶ applicant for the lease, business agreement, or right-of-way;¶ (II) address the term of the lease or business agreement or¶ the term of conveyance of the right-of-way;¶ (III) address amendments and renewals;¶ (IV) address the economic return to the Indian tribe under¶ leases, business agreements, and rights-of-way;¶ (V) address technical or other relevant requirements;¶ (VI) establish requirements for environmental review in¶ accordance with subparagraph (C);¶ (VII) ensure compliance with all applicable environmental¶ laws, including a requirement that each lease, business¶ agreement, and right-of-way state that the lessee, operator, or¶ right-of-way grantee shall comply with all such laws;¶ (VIII) identify final approval authority;¶ (IX) provide for public notification of final approvals;¶ (X) establish a process for consultation with any affected¶ States regarding off-reservation impacts, if any, identified¶ under subparagraph (C)(i);¶ (XI) describe the remedies for breach of the lease, business¶ agreement, or right-of-way;¶ (XII) require each lease, business agreement, and right-of-¶ way to include a statement that, if any of its provisions¶ violates an express term or requirement of the tribal energy¶ resource agreement pursuant to which the lease, business¶ agreement, or right-of-way was executed -¶ (aa) the provision shall be null and void; and¶ (bb) if the Secretary determines the provision to be¶ material, the Secretary may suspend or rescind the lease,¶ business agreement, or right-of-way or take other appropriate¶ action that the Secretary determines to be in the best¶ interest of the Indian tribe;¶

#### BLM requirements are a restriction

Bruce M. **Penderey**, program director and a staff attorney with the Wyoming Outdoor Council, 20**10**, “BLM’s Retained Rights: How Requiring Environmental Protection Fulfills Oil And Gas Lease Obligations”, http://law.lclark.edu/live/files/5647, acc online

There are approximately 39,000,000 acres of federal mineral estate in the eleven western states subject to onshore oil and gas leases issued by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM). The leases grant the lessee the right to extract any oil or natural gas that may be found on the lease. However, the leases make the grant of rights "subject to" a number of reservations of authority to the federal government. The BLM lease provides that these retained rights stem from applicable laws; the terms, conditions, and stipulations in the lease; the Secretary of Interior's regulations and formal orders in effect when the lease is issued; and regulations and formal orders issued afterward if not inconsistent with the lease rights granted. A BLM regulation makes the lease subject to three further reservations of authority: stipulations; restrictions deriving from specific, nondiscretionary statutes; and reasonable measures the BLM authorized officer might require. A review of these authorities shows BLM retains substantial rights allowing it to regulate the time, place, and manner of oil and gas development. Development can be conditioned by regulating the timing of operations and the siting and design of facilities, as well as specification of the rates of oil and gas development and production. BLM can suspend operation of leases and can even prohibit development if impacts are substantially different or greater than normal. BLM retains the right to prevent "adverse impacts" by requiring "reasonable measures" to prevent environmental harms. These rights stem from provisions in the Mineral Leasing Act, Federal Land Policy and Management Act, National Environmental Policy Act, Endangered Species Act, Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, National Historic Preservation Act, other statutes, BLM's leasing and operations regulations, the terms in the lease itself, and formal orders such as BLM Resource Management Plans, Onshore Oil and Gas Order Number 1, Executive Orders, and Secretarial and Department of Interior Solicitor Orders and Opinions, all of which the lease is made "subject to. "If BLM fully exercises these retained rights it can considerably reduce environmental disturbance due to oil and gas development on the public lands. Means available for exercising these retained rights include requiring phased or paced development, directional drilling, suspension of operations on leases in the interest of conservation of resources, unitization of leases, and a number of best management practices, including placing netting over waste pits to reduce wildlife mortality, requiring "closed-loop" drilling fluid systems to reduce pollution, and requiring mats to be placed on the ground during drilling to reduce chilling impacts, to name a few. This Article argues that given the mandatory, nondiscretionary nature of many of the authorities a federal onshore oil and gas lease has been made subject to, not only does BLM have numerous retained rights, it in fact has an obligation to fully assert them, and several policy changes that could accomplish this are suggested.

#### We meet production – the restrictions are on a place

#### Their Anell evidence about prohibitions on production is NOT APPLICABLE TO OUR SPECIFIC AFFs. It uses an example of Canadian regulations on milk production that allowed milk to still be produced in multiple forms, as long as market sharing quotas were met. Because the milk was still produced, the ruling was that this was a regulation and not a restriction. HOWEVER, when apllying this example to our case, it doesn’t make sense. The Natives CANNOT produce oil because of the approval process—means the distinction this evidence makes only risks flowing aff—we meet this interp—there IS net decrease of oil produced as a part of the approval process

#### FOUR, we don’t explode limits – we only allow Affs that include the chance of total prohibition – we don’t allow all their regulations Affs

#### FIVE, They kill the topic – there are no direct federal prohibitions on the use of wind or solar; only we can give meaning to every topic word; it’s key to set predictable limits

#### SIX, They kill oil and gas restrictions affs - The Secretary of the Interior can grant leases ANYWHERE in the OCS which proves that approval is a restriction

**U.S. Code ‘12** 43 USC § 1337 - Leases, easements, and rights-of-way on the outer Continental Shelf, Last Updated 2012 http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/43/1337

(a) Oil and gas leases; award to highest responsible qualified bidder; method of bidding; royalty relief; Congressional consideration of bidding system; notice (1) The Secretary is authorized to grant to the highest responsible qualified bidder or bidders by competitive bidding, under regulations promulgated in advance, any oil and gas lease on submerged lands of the outer Continental Shelf which are not covered by leases meeting the requirements of subsection (a) of section 1335 of this title. Such regulations may provide for the deposit of cash bids in an interest-bearing account until the Secretary announces his decision on whether to accept the bids, with the interest earned thereon to be paid to the Treasury as to bids that are accepted and to the unsuccessful bidders as to bids that are rejected. The bidding shall be by sealed bid and, at the discretion of the Secretary, on the basis of— (A) cash bonus bid with a royalty at not less than 121/2 per centum fixed by the Secretary in amount or value of the production saved, removed, or sold; (B) variable royalty bid based on a per centum in amount or value of the production saved, removed, or sold, with either a fixed work commitment based on dollar amount for exploration or a fixed cash bonus as determined by the Secretary, or both; (C) cash bonus bid, or work commitment bid based on a dollar amount for exploration with a fixed cash bonus, and a diminishing or sliding royalty based on such formulae as the Secretary shall determine as equitable to encourage continued production from the lease area as resources diminish, but not less than 121/2 per centum at the beginning of the lease period in amount or value of the production saved, removed, or sold; (D) cash bonus bid with a fixed share of the net profits of no less than 30 per centum to be derived from the production of oil and gas from the lease area; (E) fixed cash bonus with the net profit share reserved as the bid variable; (F) cash bonus bid with a royalty at no less than 121/2 per centum fixed by the Secretary in amount or value of the production saved, removed, or sold and a fixed per centum share of net profits of no less than 30 per centum to be derived from the production of oil and gas from the lease area; (G) work commitment bid based on a dollar amount for exploration with a fixed cash bonus and a fixed royalty in amount or value of the production saved, removed, or sold; (H) cash bonus bid with royalty at no less than 12 and 1/2 per centum fixed by the Secretary in amount or value of production saved, removed, or sold, and with suspension of royalties for a period, volume, or value of production determined by the Secretary, which suspensions may vary based on the price of production from the lease; or (I) subject to the requirements of paragraph (4) of this subsection, any modification of bidding systems authorized in subparagraphs (A) through (G), or any other systems of bid variables, terms, and conditions which the Secretary determines to be useful to accomplish the purposes and policies of this subchapter, except that no such bidding system or modification shall have more than one bid variable.

## Kritik 2AC

#### Perm do both

#### Perm do the plan as a means of denying the legitimacy of the United States of America

#### No specific internal link – their K just describes the world in the abstract – make them tie their link arguments to our plan, and how the AFF causes their impacts, not just how \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ in theory might cause them

#### Alt fails – no way it can overcome the magnitude of their link – they can’t tell you what it actually does to address Native oppression

#### Permutation is key --- political struggle for land-return must work through colonial institutions – ALFRED is wrong

**Corntassel 12**—University of Victoria, Canada (Jeff, Re-envisioning resurgence: Indigenous pathways to decolonization and sustainable self-determination, Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society 1;1:86-101)

Being Indigenous today means struggling to reclaim and regenerate one’s relational, place-based existence by challenging the ongoing, destructive forces of colonization. Whether through ceremony or through other ways that Indigenous peoples (re)connect to the natural world, processes of resurgence are often contentious and reflect the spiritual, cultural, economic, social and political scope of the struggle. As Mohawk scholar Taiaiake Alfred (2009) points out in his extensive study on the psychological and physical impacts of colonialism on Indigenous peoples within a Canadian context, “...colonialism is best conceptualized as an irresistible outcome of a multigenerational and multifaceted process of forced dispossession and attempted acculturation – a disconnection from land, culture, and community – that has resulted in political chaos and social discord within First nations communities and the collective dependency of First Nations upon the state” (p. 52). This disconnection from our lands, cultures and communities has led to social suffering and the destruction of families and yet “...the real deprivation is the erosion of an ethic of universal respect and responsibility that used to be the hallmark of indigenous societies” (Alfred, 2009, p. 43). When considering how colonization systematically deprives us of our experiences and confidence as Indigenous peoples, the linkages between colonialism, cultural harm, and the disintegration of community health and well-being become clearer. Furthermore, this is a spiritual crisis just as much as it is a political, social, and economic one. Despite Prime Minister Harper’s assertions, that “we” in Canada “have no history of colonialism” (Ljunggren, 2009), contemporary colonialism continues to disrupt Indigenous relationships with their homelands, cultures and communities. One of our biggest enemies is compartmentalization, as shape-shifting colonial entities attempt to sever our relationships to the natural world and define the terrain of struggle. For example, policymakers who frame new government initiatives as “economic development” miss the larger connections embedded within Indigenous economies linking homelands, cultures and communities. By focusing on “everyday” acts of resurgence, one disrupts the colonial physical, social and political boundaries designed to impede our actions to restore our nationhood. In order to live in a responsible way as selfdetermining nations, Indigenous peoples must confront existing colonial institutions, structures, and policies that attempt to displace us from our homelands and relationships, which impact the health and well-being of present generations of Indigenous youth and families. Indigenous resurgence means having the courage and imagination to envision life beyond the state.

Condo – double turn

#### The removal of the State would leave all Native American open to extermination by racist groups

**Fire Rider 05** (Marty, “Why Churchill political agenda is wrong for Indians Tulsa”, Native American Times. Vol. XI, Iss. 13; pg. 8. 3/30/05)

I think we can agree that Churchill's political philosophy is liberal socialism regarding foreign policy. If that is his position he is entitled to that. In describing his fellow Americans, for instance, Churchill cannot refrain from using the language of spite. The victims of the Sept. 11 attacks he compares to Nazis; even middle-class Americans he disparages as vapid hedonists too engrossed in materialism to care about the sufferings of "brown-skinned" people overseas. Basically, he advocates that America is the evil empire of the world and needs to be replaced or severely weakened. But if America was to collapse as a legal government does Churchill or anyone believe that in a chaotic world with no laws that Indians would fair any better. It would be a world of unchecked Indian racism and discrimination by all hate groups be it left or right.If the September 11th victims are technocrats supporting the evil economic empire of America as Churchill professes, then is not he a hypocrite by educating American youth who will graduate with degrees to enter the technocratic economy of America? But what does the U.S. foreign policy have to do with a starving Indian on the Reservation or urban living? What has Churchill done for the poor Indian? Our AIM organization has helped to repair Indian elders homes; provide reservation security to protect the people against police abuse and tribal goons; written legal constitutions for reservations; legal research for tribes and individuals; feeding and clothing Indians; having the local Bureau of Indian Affairs office investigated for incompetence and complacency by the Inspector Generals Office, including other agencies as well, or advising Tribal governments. Further, our national Indian radio talk show is effective in educating and empowering our people. In other words we are in the field fighting daily for our people. We are AIM and we would lay our lives down in defense of our people, but only if attacked. If violence was the only Indian way we as a people would have been exterminated a long time ago. We in AIM do not support, nor condone violence. We do not need someone making noisy speeches about foreign policy, we need leaders fighting for and helping our people on domestic issues, that is the real AIM. Sadly, there is much discrimination in the world regarding indigenous people. But American Indians have problems nearly as equal such as third world living conditions on many reservations.

**Denying the centrality of the state destroys all hope of changing it. We must analyze state policy in order to understand it and reorient it**

**Krause & Williams,** 19**97** Prof. Political Sci. at Geneva Graduate Institute of Int’l Studies and Asst. Prof. Political Sci. at University of Southern Main [Keith and Michael, Critical Security Studies, Pg, XV-XVI]

These (and other) critical perspectives have much to say to each other in the construction of a critical theory of international relations and, in turn, to contemporary security studies. While elements of many approaches may be found in this volume, no one perspective dominates. If anything, several of the contributions to this volume stand more inside than outside the tradition of security studies, which reflects our twofold conviction about the place of critical perspectives in contemporary scholarship. First, **to stand too far outside prevailing discourses is almost certain to result in continued disciplinary exclusion.** Second, to move toward alternative conceptions of security and security studies, one must necessarily reopen the questions subsumed under the modem conception of sovereignty and the scope of the political. To do this, **one must take seriously the prevailing claims about the nature of security.**

Many of the chapters in this volume thus retain a concern with the centrality of the state as a locus not only of obligation but of effective political action. In the realm of organized violence, states also remain the preeminent actors. **The task of a critical, approach is not to deny the centrality of the state in this realm but, rather, to understand more fully its structures, dynamics, and possibilities for reorientation. From a critical perspective, state action is flexible and capable of reorientation, and analyzing state policy need not therefore be tantamount to embracing the statist assumptions of orthodox conceptions. To exclude a focus on state action from a critical perspective on the grounds that it plays inevitably within the rules of existing conceptions simply reverses the error of essentializing the state. Moreover, it loses the possibility of influencing what remains the most structurally capable actor in contemporary world politics.**

## CP 2AC

#### Perm do both

#### Doesn’t solve – maintains flawed representations

#### Links to net benefit

#### The epistemology of the Aff comes first – voting Aff challenges Western frames of the environment as applied to indigenous peoples – this is a prior question to policy engagement

#### Any counterplan that does not engage or challenge this dominant epistemology fails to solve

**Agent counterplans are a voter:**

**FIRST, Aff ground – they moot the 1AC and prevent us from getting offense, makes it impossible for the Aff to win**

**SECOND, topic specific education – it’s the only unique thing we can gain this year, process counterplans prevent policy specific discussion**

**THIRD, no solvency advocate – they have no evidence that actually advocates the process of the counterplan in the context of our aff**

#### The CP would be send a massive signal of unpredictability to investors

**Ford 5** Matthew Ford, Law Student at St John's University School of Law in New York. 9/15, “John Roberts, Stare Decisis, and the Return of Lochner: An Impetus to Jump-Start the Labor Movement.” Mr. Zine Magazine, A Project of the Monthly Review. http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/ford180905.html

Our common law system is based largely on the idea of "stare decisis," the idea that the rulings of judges are generally binding. Such a system is designed to create continuity so as to send a signal to society about what sort of behavior society will or will not tolerate, to avoid confusion certain to arise if laws are constantly changing, and to diminish the likelihood of agitating society as a whole or creating a backlash by overturning laws that are widely valued. However, as Judge Roberts put it, "[S]tare decisis is not an inexorable command" ("Transcript: Day Two of the Roberts Confirmation Hearings," 13 September 2004). The Supreme Court can overturn precedent when it sees fit, or, in the words of Roberts, "You have to consider whether [precedent has] created settled expectations that should not be disrupted in the interest of regularity in the legal system" ("Transcript: Day Two of the Roberts Confirmation Hearings," 13 September 2004). If Roberts sticks to his word, large, well-organized, militant groups such as the Women's Rights Movement should find comfort in the fact that Roberts has implicitly acknowledged that the overturning of such a key precedent as Roe v. Wade would likely lead to large-scale upheaval by the well-organized feminist movement that would shake society so forcefully that to even fathom overturning the ruling is to start trouble.

**Means it can’t solve**

**Koester and Weaver 10** [Eric Koester and Bryn Weaver, “The Startup Visa-A White Paper”, Prepared for Submission to Congress, 8-18-2010]

**Procedures that yield uncertain or delayed results prevent investments. Investors in an early stage startup company are likely to invest in a particular founder or group of founders** in addition to the business plan or technology. Also, **startup companies often derive a significant portion of their potential from their ability to move quickly and adapt flexibly. It is impracticable to put a new business on hold for several months while the founder waits for a visa to become effective or to rely on a process that may or may not ever provide a long-term visa. Having a quick, clear application process with criteria that are as objective as possible will reduce uncertainty and delay for investors and founders** and allow the visa process to proceed at a speed that meets the timing of the investment process.

**Perm do the counterplan—it’s justified**

#### Saying “Federal Government” doesn’t mean “all three branches” – any one body acts as it

**Chicago 7** (University of Chicago Manual of Style, “Capitalization, Titles”, http://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org/CMS\_FAQ/CapitalizationTitles/CapitalizationTitles30.html)

Q. When I refer to the government of the United States in text, should it be U.S. Federal Government or U.S. federal government? A.The government of the United States is not a single official entity. Nor is it when it is referred to as the federal government or the U.S. government or the U.S. federal government. It’s **just a government**, which, like those in all countries, has some official bodies that act and operate in the name of government: the Congress, the Senate, the Department of State, etc.

You CP

#### Perm do both

#### Doesn’t solve – doesn’t change federal policy – must engage – answers on the K prove.

#### No reason plan gives power to tribal governments – not about Aff

#### No risk of exploitation – self-D is key

#### Their only evidence about removing restrictions is about allowing companies to drill on federal lands on reservations, which is not what the plan does. The plan only affects sovereign tribal areas –

#### Your notions of exploitation are racist – prioritize the ability of natives to make this choice for themselves

Sheila **Foster**, Associate Professor of Law, Rutgers School of Law, July 19**98**, “Justice from the Ground Up: Distributive Inequities, Grassroots Resistance, and the Transformative Politics of the Environmental Justice Movement”, California Law Review, 86 Calif. L. Rev. 775, lexis, acc. 3/25/13

[\*806] Environmental racism manifests itself quite differently in the case of Native Americans, reflecting a particular racial ideology rather than measurable acts of discrimination. When tribal sovereignty is not respected, Native-American groups often find themselves fighting racial paternalism and cultural imperialism. n128 Tribes are faced with having to prove, to both environmentalists and politicians alike, that they are competent enough to manage their land and natural resources in a way that removes the incentive for abusive waste projects and preserves the integrity of tribal sovereignty. n129 As the counsel to the Campo Band of Mission Indians in their battle to develop a tribal waste project explains, the "major issue" facing tribes in this context is not "environmental," but instead one of "power and racism." He criticizes the mainstream environmental community for its assumption that "if an Indian community decides to accept such a project, it either does not understand the potential consequences or has been bamboozled by an unprincipled waste company." This assumption is "clearly" a "racist" one; it implies "that Indians lack the intelligence to balance and protect adequately their own economic and environmental interests." Moreover, it is "the same assumption that guided the federal policies that very nearly eradicated Indian people in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries." As such, it is "environmental racism" and ultimately "every bit as destructive as the open hostility to Indian people that we experience in many parts of this country." n130

#### Exploitation wont happen – tribes can manage their own negotiations

Judith V. **Royster**, Chapman Professor of Law and Co-Director, Native American Law Center at the University of Tulsa College of Law, March 20**12**, “Tribal Energy Development: Renewables and the Problem of the Current Statutory Structures”, Stanford Environmental Law Journal, 31 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 91, lexis, acc 12/10/12

But nearly twenty years have passed since the regulations were [\*136] promulgated in 1994. Indian tribes have thirty years of experience with IMDA minerals agreements, and many of the energy tribes have become sophisticated negotiators of development deals. Certainly tribes are the best determiners of cultural and social impacts, and often of the economic impacts as well. In light of those factors, the standards for approval of IMDA agreements are due for amendment.¶ Amending the statute itself to revisit the appropriate factors may be the best choice, but a simpler and perhaps quicker fix is also available. The Department could amend the regulations to reflect modern realities. Similar to the best interests determination in the regulations for agricultural and other surface leases, the IMDA regulations could provide that in reviewing an IMDA minerals agreement, the Secretary will defer to the tribe's determination that the agreement is in its best interest, to the maximum extent possible. n204 Although the conditional "maximum extent possible" language preserves the Secretary's ultimate authority under the statute, the regulation would ensure that the Secretary will undertake the minerals agreement review process with due respect for the tribe's decision. Even if a deferential review is current practice, embedding it in the regulations strengthens the tribe's role in the decision making process.

#### Exploitation is the SQ

#### Tribal governments aren’t bad

Sheila **Foster**, Associate Professor of Law, Rutgers School of Law, July 19**98**, “Justice from the Ground Up: Distributive Inequities, Grassroots Resistance, and the Transformative Politics of the Environmental Justice Movement”, California Law Review, 86 Calif. L. Rev. 775, lexis, acc. 3/25/13

For instance, consider Native Americans who in some instances have "chosen" to develop hazardous waste facilities on their land. Their decisions to do so have attracted both internal and external controversy. Internal controversies often involve the complex relationship between tribal members and their representative tribal councils, who often make these decisions in tandem with either the federal government or private developers. n121 External controversies often involve neighboring [\*804] communities or environmental groups claiming that the proposed siting will threaten natural resources or public health. n122 Indisputably, commercial waste vendors are attracted to Native American communities because they are impoverished and often desperately in need of [\*805] economic resources. n123 Tribal governments sometimes view these projects as providing tribal economic self-sufficiency, including full employment of tribal members and investment capital for future projects. n124 Moreover, as some have noted, despite situations of desperate poverty, tribal governments, because of the activism of tribal members, have prudently rejected proposals for environmentally unsound sites on their reservations. n125

## Politics 2AC

#### decline Doesn’t cause war

**Miller 2k** – Professor of Management, Ottawa (Morris, Poverty As A Cause Of Wars?, http://www.pugwash.org/reports/pac/pac256/WG4draft1.htm, AG)

Thus, these armed conflicts can hardly be said to be caused by poverty as a principal factor when the greed and envy of leaders and their hegemonic ambitions provide sufficient cause. The poor would appear to be more the victims than the perpetrators of armed conflict. It might be alleged that some dramatic event or rapid sequence of those types of events that lead to the exacerbation of poverty might be the catalyst for a violent reaction on the part of the people or on the part of the political leadership who might be tempted to seek a diversion by finding/fabricating an enemy and going to war. According to a study undertaken by Minxin Pei and Ariel Adesnik of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, there would not appear to be any merit in this hypothesis. After studying 93 episodes of economic crisis in 22 countries in Latin America and Asia in the years since World War II they concluded that Much of the conventional wisdom about the political impact of economic crises may be wrong... The severity of economic crisis - as measured in terms of inflation and negative growth - bore no relationship to the collapse of regimes. A more direct role was played by political variables such as ideological polarization, labor radicalism, guerilla insurgencies and an anti-Communist military... (In democratic states) such changes seldom lead to an outbreak of violence (while) in the cases of dictatorships and semi-democracies, the ruling elites responded to crises by increasing repression (thereby using one form of violence to abort another.

#### resilient

**Globe and Mail 2010** (5/31/10, BRIAN MILNER, "While gloom says bear, TIGER points to bull", lexis, WEA)

Even at the height of the remarkable rebound of 2009 that brought stocks back from the dead zone, the bears never retreated to their lairs. Negative sentiment among investors remained stubbornly high, no matter how promising the economic indicators looked. And then along came the Greeks and their little sovereign debt problem, the Chinese and their public hand-wringing over asset bubbles and the North Koreans and their latest idiotic sabre-ratting to remind nervous markets just how fragile the nascent global recovery could turn out to be. The latest survey of American investors last week showed bearish sentiment hovering close to 30 per cent, with plenty of room for an uptick in the months ahead, as the optimists come to realize that a V-shaped recovery was never in the cards after the worst global financial and economic crisis since the Great Depression. The world's most overexposed permabear, Nouriel Roubini, is still grabbing headlines with his dire Greece-is-just-the-tip-of-the-iceberg warnings. (Well, he does have a new book to sell.) And such high-profile Canadian bruins as gold-loving money manager Eric Sprott and eminent strategist and data miner David Rosenberg have never veered from their sombre outlooks. The fact that May turned into a particularly brutal month for just about everything but U.S. Treasuries - even after last week's modest rebound, the Dow posted its worst performance for the month in 70 years - only added fuel to arguments that worse, much worse, is yet to come. I mention all this to Eswar Prasad, when I reach the Cornell University economics professor at his hotel in Beijing. Prof. Prasad is a noted China watcher who once headed the IMF's China division and still keeps in close touch with top government finance officials. But on this call, I'm more interested in one of his other hats as a shrewd analyst of global economic and market trends. "My inclination also is to be a bear," the affable academic says. "But the data don't support my bearishness as much as I would like. One has to be a little cautious, because these are based on a variety of indicators. Some of them certainly show more strength than I had realized." The data he's talking about come out of his work on a new composite index derived from a broad set of economic, market and confidence measures in the G20 countries and designed to provide a quarterly snapshot of the global recovery. "All signs are that the recovery has some momentum," says Prof. Prasad, who developed the index at the Brookings Institution, a Washington think tank where he is also a senior fellow. "But I wouldn't call it solid enough momentum that we can consider it 'in the bag.'" The new index, cutely named TIGER (Tracking Indices for the Global Economic Recovery), is a joint effort by Brookings and the Financial Times. And TIGER shows that since the world began climbing out of the deep trough about the middle of last year, big emerging economies have roared ahead, while the developed world has experienced much more uneven results. Industrial production and trade have bounced back handsomely - total exports from the big emerging countries now exceed pre-crisis levels - but the employment picture remains cloudy and consumption has yet to develop a new head of steam. "It's much easier at this stage to list all the things that could derail the recovery," Prof. Prasad says. "But all of those things are still conjectural. The reality, and the data, is that things are looking better."

#### Laundry list of thumpers

**Ford, 3/28**/13 John, Staff. PolicyMic.“Why Obama Signing Sequestration Into Law Was a Strategic Move” http://www.policymic.com/articles/31012/why-obama-signing-sequestration-into-law-was-a-strategic-move

President Barack Obama finally signed the Sequester into law, locking the infamous spending cuts into place, at least until this September. It is rare for a president to sign into a law a program that he actively opposes – President Obama called them "dumb" – so why did this one allow these cuts with relatively little confrontation? At the risk of seeming weak, President Obama is engaging in a tactical withdrawal here, not a retreat. The president sees that no more can be done on the budget stalemate at this time; with public opinion favoring him, and a popular mandate still only four months fresh, he is better off using his political capital on other reforms. With over half of his term gone, and a huge laundry list of initiatives still tabled, every move Obama makes is a time management puzzle. And with another inevitable fight on the budget scheduled for the summer, it is time for him to focus on other things for the spring. What is next for the president now that the budget is, for the moment, a settled issue? According to the White House, he is going to emphasize projects that do not require budgetary support: a raise to the minimum wage, immigration, and housing, for example. This strategic decision comes at a cost, however. Despite Obama's emphasis in the State of the Union address on education – particularly on preschool – Head Start is a sad casualty of the sequestration. The program faces $400 million in cuts. The president's hopes for more investment in the national infrastructure and research and development are also being dashed for the time being. At the same time, Republicans in the House should expect a lot of schmoozing from the White House over the next six months. The president isn't giving up on the budget yet, and he's going to need allies for the next round.

#### It’s unstoppable. Not even AFL-CIO can stop reform.

**Brown, 3/27**/13. “Immigration talks back on track, union says” CARRIE BUDOFF BROWN for POLITICO (White House Correspondent @Politico) http://www.politico.com/story/2013/03/immigration-talks-back-on-track-union-says-89398.html

On Friday evening, AFL-CIO officials said Senate Republicans had rejected their latest language on wages. The language said “visas will be issued only when the employment of foreign workers will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of similarly situated workers in the United States.” Avendaño likened the Republican proposal that included three bands where two-thirds of new workers would be paid below the median wage as “congressionally sanctioned poverty.” But on Wednesday, Avendaño said she expects Congress to move forward on a bill regardless of whether the Chamber of Commerce and labor unions can reach a deal on the future flow of low-skilled workers. “There is momentum — and I would argue it is unstoppable momentum — on getting a bill done and details are not going to hold up this bill,” Avendaño said. “We are going to see something and we will see what happens during the political process.” She said a temporary worker program shouldn’t be necessary for lawmakers to take up comprehensive immigration reform legislation — a position that puts her at odds with Senate Republicans, who insist that any bill include such a program. “It is the call for legalization that is driving this whole process and anything that distracts from that is really either irrelevant or is certainly not strong enough to be able to support the momentum behind this bill,” Avendaño said.

#### PC fails

Jay **Cost**, "Obama the Bargainer; How to Lose Friends and Alienate Congress," WEEKLY STANDARD, 2--11--**13**, LN.

All of these stories point in the same direction: This president does not have a solid congressional outreach program, does not have a steady grasp of the expectations of legislators in either party, and does a notably poor job of communicating to them what he expects. Thus, a drifting and listless policy process, finally given direction by some power player outside the White House, often acting to avert imminent disaster, has marked almost every major deal during his tenure. There is little reason to expect anything different in the next four years. In the end, President Obama simply does not spend enough time talking to members of Congress. He is too aloof, and most accounts suggest he dislikes the seemingly petty, parochial nature of Capitol Hill. In an interview with journalist Ron Suskind, President Obama articulated what he believes to be the core of a president's job, and what he learned from the troubles of his first term: While this statement would surely make the republicans of the founding generation turn over in their graves, it does encapsulate the job of the modern president, but only in part. Yes, he is to stand, almost godlike, above the political process and tell a story, but the modern presidential deity is not in line with the watchmaker God of the 18th-century rationalists. It is not enough to put the pieces in motion, then stand back. Instead, a president must be more like the God of the Old and New Testaments, above the world and sovereign over it, but also intimately involved in it, guiding, encouraging, cajoling, and threatening people to make the right choices. The ideal modern president, to borrow a phrase from Theodore Roosevelt, is one actually in the arena, whose face is marred by dust and sweat and blood. President Obama does not much care for the arena, and his successes came despite this distaste, not because of it. In fact, Nancy Pelosi probably deserves most of the credit for the legislative victories of 2009-2010. She functioned as a de facto prime minister, with her eyes always on big, national projects while she dealt with the provincial concerns of this committee chair or that subcommittee member. She, not Obama, was the one in the arena. What this means is that major breakthroughs on legislation in the next four years are likely to depend on political actors outside the White House. Pelosi's power is only a fraction of what it was, but policy success will still depend on congressional entrepreneurs as long as the White House remains disengaged. Thus, a whole host of issues will likely go unaddressed, above all, the looming entitlement crisis. One issue that could see movement is immigration reform, a topic of discussion where there is overlap between the parties and there are potential leaders in Congress, like Marco Rubio, who could help in whipping his party and negotiating a compromise with the other side. But little such progress will be due to President Obama. It is highly unlikely that he will act as the collective bargainer Neustadt envisioned. He will not be the one to help hammer out policy differences between Senate Democrats and House Republicans, such as illegal immigrants' status under Obamacare, or help the appropriators find the money needed for enforcement, or create a political space where both parties can declare victory. Sure enough, last week's campaign-style speech in Las Vegas on immigration reform was classic Obama. Not only did it do nothing to advance the ball on the sensitive negotiations in Congress, but the president demanded immediate amnesty, something to which Republicans will never agree. He also said he would insist that Congress vote on his proposal if it did not act in a timely fashion. That captures Obama's problem in a nutshell. Insisting that Congress do something is a good way to make sure nothing happens. Instead, as Harry Truman once said, the president must spend his time flattering, kissing, and kicking people to get them to do what they are supposed to do anyway. Barack Obama does not do this. He thinks it beneath him. After four years in office, he still fails to grasp the essence of modern presidential power.

Not intrinsic

**They control the agenda, takes out the link to the disad**

Dan **Froomkin**, “How the Oil Lobby Greases Washington’s Wheels,” HUFFINGTON POST, 4-6-**11**, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/04/06/how-the-oil-lobby-greases\_n\_845720.html, accessed 6-2-12

With so much public opposition, **why do subsidies remain?** You might as well ask **why there is no carbon tax,** or why there was no significant reform legislation passed after the BP oil spill. The answer is that **one of the many things the industry can do with its fat pocketbook is hire a veritable army of sharp lobbyists and back them up with big wads of cash**

**§ Marked 14:32 § in the form of campaign donations and spending**. The end result is that **the industry has a remarkable ability to get its way on Capitol Hill**. According to the Center for Responsive Politics' website, **the oil and gas industry has spent more than $1 billion on lobbying** since 1998, **including a jaw-dropping $147 million just last year.** For comparison's sake, $147 million is about **equivalent to the total budget of 100 congressional offices.** **That's more than the** $103 million spent in 2010 by the **financial service industry**, another potent lobbying force -- but considerably less than the $240 million spent by the pharmaceutical industry. Among major industries, Opensecrets.org ranked Big Oil fifth in terms of lobbying dollars spent, **behind only Big Pharma, electric** utilities, **business associations and insurance. The oil** and gas **industry** used its $147 million to **employ 788 individual lobbyists** in 2010 -- **some** **500** (or almost two thirds) **of whom**, according to Opensecrets.org, **are former federal employees who came through the revolving door particularly well versed in the ways of government**. All told, **that's well more than one oil and gas lobbyist per member of Congress** out there on the Hill **arming allies with talking points and briefing books, spinning the undecided and pressuring the opposition**. **And there's more of them every year**. Consider the trendlines. As recently as 2004, the oil and gas industry spent about $52 million a year in lobbying; by 2009, that figure was up to $175 million -- or a 300 percent increase in just five years.

# 1AR

## Politics

#### No uq link--House Republicans are pushing for drilling on federal lands

**Eilperin 3-28**-13 (Juliet, staff writer, "House GOP energy plan: drill more, mine more" Washington Post) www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2013/03/28/house-gop-energy-plan-drill-more-mine-more/

House Republicans launched their “Idea Lab”Thursday, outlining their energy agenda for the coming year. The common theme is the importance of fossil fuels to the nation’s energy mix, whether it’s extracting them at home, shipping them in from Canada or exporting them overseas. “Producing more in America and that means opening a lot more resources we have in America that are right now closed by the Obama administration,” Rep. Steve Scalise (R-La.), vice chairman of the House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Energy and Power, told reporters in a conference call. Scalise added the United States could become a “net exporter of energy” in a decade, “But again, it takes the right policies in Washington.” Scalise and the subcommittee’s chairman, Rep. Ed Whitfield (R-Ky.), said their top priorities included immediate approval of the Keystone XL pipeline extension; increasing oil and gas drilling on federal lands; reforming federal rules to make it easier to export oil and gas; and forcing federal agencies to take the full costs of their actions into account when adopting regulations.

**Immigration momentum only to do with gop agenda, not with obamas fw outlined in their 1nc ev**

**Hirsh 2/7** (Michael, “There’s No Such Thing as Political Capital”, <http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/there-s-no-such-thing-as-political-capital-20130207>, )

Meanwhile, **the Republican members of the Senate’s so-called Gang of Eight are pushing hard for a new spirit of compromise on immigration reform**, a sharp change after an election year in which the GOP standard-bearer declared he would make life so miserable for the 11 million illegal immigrants in the U.S. that they would “self-deport.” But **this turnaround has very little to do with Obama’s personal influence**—his political mandate, as it were. **It has almost entirely to do with just two numbers: 71 and 27. That’s 71 percent for Obama, 27 percent for** Mitt **Romney, the breakdown of the Hispanic vote in the 2012 presidential election.** Obama drove home his advantage by giving a speech on immigration reform on Jan. 29 at a Hispanic-dominated high school in Nevada, a swing state he won by a surprising 8 percentage points in November. But **the movement on immigration has mainly come out of the Republican Party’s recent introspection**, **and the realization** by its more thoughtful members, such as Sen. Marco Rubio of Florida and Gov. Bobby Jindal of Louisiana, **that without such a shift the party may be facing demographic death** in a country where the 2010 census showed, for the first time, that white births have fallen into the minority. **It’s got nothing to do with Obama’s political capital or,** indeed, **Obama at all**.¶

#### Dems will strong-arm immigration through Congress. Short-circuits debate.

**York 3/28**/2013 “Byron York: Democrats set to jam immigration reform through Senate” Washington Examiner. (Byron York, The Examiner's chief political correspondent) http://washingtonexaminer.com/byron-york-democrats-set-to-jam-immigration-reform-through-senate/article/2525736

Byron York: Democrats set to jam immigration reform through Senate Given the enormity of the changes that would result from comprehensive immigration reform, Senate Democrats wouldn't try to rush a bill through the Judiciary Committee before the public gets a chance to know what's in it -- would they? In the past few days, even though proposed reform legislation from the so-called Gang of Eight hasn't even been written, there have been strong indications that that's exactly what Democrats intend to do.

#### Uniqueness overwhelms link: congressional conflict will get resolved.

David **Yonkman, 3/28**/2013. “Sessions to Leahy: Don’t Rush Immigration Reform” Washington correspondent. Newsmax. http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/sessions-leahy-immigration-reform/2013/03/28/id/496793

With an influential group of eight senators nearing completion on a comprehensive immigration bill, tensions are rising over the issue, with key senators feuding and the union representing immigration agents demanding to be heard. Members of the Senate Judiciary Committee dueled over whether there is a “rush” to complete an immigration bill, as the “Gang of Eight” signaled they would be ready to announce their bill after the Senate returns from recess. Republican Sen. Jeff Sessions of Alabama cautioned Democratic Chairman Patrick Leahy of Vermont against “a rush to pass an amnesty bill before the American people know what’s in it.” “It seems the chairman is arguing we can put a bill on the floor two weeks after the Gang of Eight potentially produces legislation in early April,” Sessions said in a statement provided to Newsmax. “The chairman’s suggestion that we don’t need hearings on this new proposal because we have held immigration hearings in the past misses the entire point,” Sessions said. “The massive proposal being cobbled together by a group of senators in secret must be independently judged and reviewed by the Judiciary Committee in the full light of day.” Sessions’ statement was in response to a testy private letter from Leahy. “I hope it is not your intention to discredit the process we undertake in the Judiciary Committee before we begin,” Leahy wrote to Sessions. “I intend to proceed to comprehensive immigration reform with all deliberate speed.” Negotiations with the eight senators were left in limbo last Friday as Congress went into a two-week recess, but senators on both sides have signaled they were open to compromise over issues such as wages for new low-skilled workers that have split business and labor groups. They were finalizing details on a bill this week that they plan to publicize by April 8. President Barack Obama weighed in Wednesday as well, saying last-minute obstacles are “resolvable” and predicting Congress could pass historic legislation by the end of the summer.

### A2 Avendano

#### She’s part of the labor unions

**Brown, 3/27**/13. “Immigration talks back on track, union says” CARRIE BUDOFF BROWN for POLITICO (White House Correspondent @Politico) http://www.politico.com/story/2013/03/immigration-talks-back-on-track-union-says-89398.html

Ana Avendaño, immigration director for the AFL-CIO, said negotiations are continuing with a bipartisan group of senators and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce on the outlines of a broad new visa program aimed at balancing the need for foreign workers in low-skilled jobs with the desires of American workers competing for those same jobs.