# Politics

## 1NC

#### Hagel will be confirmed but it’s a huge fight---requires all of Obama’s political capital

Wong and Raju 1-6 Scott and Manu, 2013, “Hagel takes fire from Hill,” http://www.nj.com/us-politics/index.ssf/2013/01/hagel\_takes\_fire\_from\_hill.html

Senate Democrats and Republicans are far from sold on President Barack Obama's expected nomination of Chuck Hagel as secretary of defense. In fact, Obama's decision to tap the Vietnam veteran and outspoken former Republican senator is likely to spark another nasty fight with Congress right on the heels of the fiscal cliff showdown and just before another likely battle royal over the debt ceiling. Republicans on Sunday unleashed a fresh barrage of attacks amid reports Obama would nominate Hagel on Monday for the top job at the Pentagon. The new Senate minority whip, Texas Republican John Cornyn, said he's firmly against Hagel's nomination. Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.), an Air Force reservist who serves on the Armed Services Committee that will consider the nod, said Hagel would hold the "most antagonistic" views toward Israel of any defense secretary in U.S. history. And despite heaping praise on Hagel when he retired from the Senate after the 2008 elections, Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) on Sunday failed to extend an olive branch to the Nebraska Republican, instead suggesting there would be "tough questions" ahead. Even Senate Democrats are privately signaling they're not yet on board with the Hagel pick, and that the White House has a lot of work to do to get him across the finish line. The nomination comes at a tricky time for the administration -- just as the fights over raising the debt ceiling and government appropriations are set to begin. And it could put a number of at-risk or pro-Israel Democrats in tough political spots -- especially if the nomination fight grows even more contentious. Democrats are also scratching their heads over why Obama appears willing to go to the mat for Hagel, while abandoning his push for a close friend and member of his inner circle, U.N. Ambassador Susan Rice, to become secretary of state. Rice, an unabashed Democrat, abandoned her bid after withering GOP criticism over the deadly attacks on the U.S. Consulate in Libya. Though different in substance, the controversy over Rice's remarks is not unlike the current pushback over Hagel's past foreign policy positions and controversial remarks. But Hagel lacks a natural constituency in the Senate, given that he's grown alienated from the GOP, yet Democrats are suspicious of his record. "It is a strange signal for the White House to send that they are willing to fight for Hagel but not Rice," one Senate Democratic aide said Sunday. "Democrats are not currently unified behind Hagel, and it will take some real work by the administration to get them there, if it's even possible." Senior Republicans agreed, noting that after Hagel infuriated Republicans and Democrats alike over the years, there isn't a natural base for him. "I can't imagine why [Obama] would choose to burn his political capital on this nomination. For what? There is no constituency for Chuck Hagel," one senior GOP aide said. "Obama will expend every ounce of political capital he has to get him across the finish line. Dems will hate this." On Sunday, the 66-year-old Hagel did receive an endorsement from Senate Majority Whip Dick Durbin (D-Ill.), a key Obama ally and No. 2 in Democratic Senate leadership. Durbin noted that Hagel is a Republican, recipient of two Purple Hearts from wounds he received in Vietnam, and did stints on the Senate Foreign Relations and Intelligence committees. "Yes, he is a serious candidate if the president chooses to name him," Durbin stated. Freshman Sen. Heidi Heitkamp (D-N.D.) called Hagel "a patriot" and said she was keeping an open mind. "Let's hear what the senator has to say," she said. And Democrats predicted last month that Hagel -- who served in the Senate from 1997 to 2009 -- would be confirmed. "We all know him up here, he'll be fine," Senate Armed Services Chairman Carl Levin (D-Mich.) said in mid-December.

#### Plan wrecks capital

Dicker 12 Daniel is a Senior Columnist at The Street. “Why Isn't Natural Gas an Election Issue?” 9/4, http://www.thestreet.com/story/11684440/1/why-isnt-natural-gas-an-election-issue.html?cm\_ven=GOOGLEN

Why has this opportunity towards increased reliance on natural gas been so obvious and yet so difficult for politicians of both parties to embrace?¶ It hasn't been solely because 2012 is an election year. Boone Pickens was on CNBC last week marking the fourth anniversary of his "Pickens Plan," the failed congressional effort to invest in truck natural gas engines and fuelling infrastructure to run them on.¶ In fact, if anyone wanted to see political partisanship in action slowing the real economic progress this nation could make, they'd find no better example than the history of the Pickens plan and other natural gas initiatives in Washington.¶ **Both radical wings of each party have made advocating natural gas use** impossible. Democratic environmentalists are concerned about hydraulic fracturing and its possible impact to aquifers. Republicans are reluctant to approve further federal spending of any kind as well as risk a charge of "picking winners" in natural gas -- a charge they have made successfully against Democrats.¶ Of course, both radical wings of both parties are wrong: Overwhelming evidence from every independent research source has concluded that hydraulic fracturing of shale for natural gas has proven to be safe to our water supplies and is getting safer all the time.¶ Republican reticence to support natural gas expansion belies a long history of government incentives for developing new energy sources, from as far back as our development of coal to our much discussed modern tax incentives for crude oil exploration and production.¶ It is a fact that our government has been picking winners in energy for as long as there's been government.¶ The advantages of natural gas conversion and greater use are obvious but bear repeating. Natural gas is a domestic source of energy and promises energy independence here in the U.S. Production, transport and building of infrastructure for natural gas would mean millions of new jobs. Natural gas prices are literally half that of competing oil and gasoline. Finally, carbon emissions for natural gas are about a third that for coal and other fossil fuels.¶ What's not to like?¶ But it seems both radical wings of each party continue to wield enormous influence. Neither candidate has made natural gas a cornerstone of a new and necessary energy policy.

#### Hagel’s key to foreign policy restraint that prevents unsustainable squandering of U.S. power---the alternative is Flournoy who would lock in a neocon foreign policy

Kelley Beaucar Vlahos 12-25, longtime political reporter for FoxNews.com and a contributing editor at The American Conservative, Washington correspondent for Homeland Security Today magazine, 12/25/12, “Give Us Chuck Hagel for Christmas,” <http://original.antiwar.com/vlahos/2012/12/24/give-us-hagel-for-christmas/>

Now a Democratic President is reportedly mulling him for defense secretary and the same Republican automatons and neoconservative harpies are pulling no punches to thwart it. They complain about his allegedly insufficient support of Israel (massaged, cajoled and translated for full-effect into charges of anti-Semitism), driven in part by his unwillingness to impose harsh economic sanctions or use of force against Iran. He also voted against designating Hezbollah a terrorist organization, and has encouraged open relations with Hamas in hopes of reanimating the corpse of the Middle East pace process.

Furthermore, Hagel’s flagrant disdain for the runaway MIC (military industrial complex), preemptive war, and senseless foreign occupation is such an aberration to the Washington establishment that when the bunker busters in Congress, American Israel supporters and rightwing 101st Keyboard Brigade heard he might be nominated, their attack was so immediate and vicious it’ll likely serve as a model for smear efficiency for years to come. If the U.S. Army had deployed these superlative tactics in say, Afghanistan, they might have actually won the so-called “war of perception” over the Taliban 10 years ago. Too bad most of Hagel’s critics prefer calling the shots from over here, rather than putting their rear-ends in harm’s way over there.

The War Against Hagel has hardly been decisive, however, at least as we near the end of the year, leaving some space for his supporters to mount a proper defense, which of this writing, is increasingly vigorous. There seems to be a common theme to every blog post and op-ed penned for his purpose: the man is a welcome independent thinker in the Era of the Borg — and he’s no phony, else he would have safely buzzed off with the rest of the political hive long ago. The Atlantic’s Jeffrey Goldberg, usually quite scornful of Realist foreign policy arguments — especially concerning Iran — said Thursday he worries about rightwing developments in Israel even more than Hagel’s purportedly soft approach on Iran, and suggested quite baldy that Hagel’s independence would be a help not a hindrance where it counts:

What we need are American officials who will speak with disconcerting bluntness to Israel about the choices it is making…Maybe the time has come to redefine the term “pro-Israel” to include, in addition to providing support against Iran (a noble cause); help with the Iron Dome system (also a noble cause); and support to maintain Israel’s qualitative military edge (ditto), the straightest of straight talk about Israel’s self-destructive policies on the West Bank. Maybe Hagel, who is not bound to old models, could be useful in this regard.

Many of us see Hagel’s impact in much broader terms than just the Israel question. We’ve had too many armchair generals and dutiful yes men at the levers of power, cleaving to an unsustainable post-9/11 orthodoxy that has militarized our foreign policy and politicized our military. The neoconservatism of the Bush years has bled literally into the so-called humanitarian interventionism of the Obama era, and for the first time, there is an opportunity to check that with the presence of a known Realist who, as Harvard’s Stephen Walt says, is “opposed to squandering U.S. power, prestige, and wealth on misbegotten crusades,” and is immune to the “threat inflation” both sides routinely engage in to justify lining the pockets of the defense industry. After nearly 12 years of constant war, Hagel’s references to Iraq and Afghanistan as a meat grinder to which we’ve wastefully sent too many of our own children, and his belief that he is the “the real conservative” because he actually calls for restraint, should be a refreshing prospect, and not feared by Americans conditioned to accept there is a military solution for every problem.

“In a town dominated by often-unexamined conventional wisdom, the appointment of Hagel to DoD would be a welcome relief,” wrote Michael Cohen for The Guardian last week. Reached on the phone, Cohen told me that Hagel would be a “transformational pick,” but acknowledged that the challenges loom large for a non-conformist now squared against not only members of his own party, but neoconservatives wielding their “long knives,” and the pro-war wing of the Democratic establishment, too. “Look, he is not one of them,” Cohen said, “he’s not a neoconservative nor a liberal hawk, he thinks there should be limits on American power.”

Although President Obama has, so far, not said a word about Hagel, the former senator who quietly spent the last four years chairing the moderate Atlantic Council, is enjoying an enthusiastic defense from myriad commentators across the mainstream, including Andrew Sullivan, Steve Clemons, Peter Beinart — even Jim Judis at The New Republic. Several ambassadors — including Bush-era Nick Burns and Ryan Crocker and three Israel representatives — signed on to a letter encouraging his nomination.

Meanwhile, The National Journal and The Washington Post have published biographical sketches emphasizing Hagel’s Vietnam War record and its impact on his post-war career and personal philosophy (this hardly makes up, however, for the Post’s incoherent broadside published by its editorial page on Dec. 19). And of course, The American Conservative’s Daniel Larison and Scott McConnell, not to mention our own Justin Raimondo, are astutely swatting away the haters at every turn of this increasingly torrid offensive.

Michele Flournoy

But while many of us here at Antiwar would like a Hagel nomination for Christmas, the biggest concern (aside from his Swift Boating) is that we might find Michele Flournoy under the tree instead. For those who never heard of her, she founded the Center for a New American Security in 2007 in anticipation of a new Democratic White House. The think tank was designed to promote a more muscular Democratic military policy, which meant its top people supported Hillary Clinton for president as well as the U.S. counterinsurgency in Iraq, and then Afghanistan, known then as the Petraeus Doctrine. Once Obama won, it became the go-to policy shop for the White House and a revolving door to the Pentagon and State Department for its senior fellows. Flournoy went on to take Doug Feith’s position as Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, the No. 3 job at the Pentagon. What she actually did in the fabled “E-Ring” to advance policy or to help extricate the military from an increasingly disastrous war in Afghanistan, is anyone’s guess. But the “hot policy wonk” and top COINdinista apparently made all the right friends and greased all the right skids, and is now the favored pick by the neocons, who see a kindred soul where Hagel is just heartburn ready to happen.

So buttressed is Flournoy by the Washington elite that people like Paul Wolfowitz, who in all reality should be ignored completely for his role in one of the worst war blunders in American history, are rolling out to defend her (in Wolfowitz’s case, maybe he should have cooled his wheels at home). After admitting he’s “not deeply familiar with Michele Flournoy’s record at the Defense Department or with her overall qualifications to be Secretary of Defense,” he says the fact 3,500 Afghan security forces have died this year (compared to 307 Americans) is proof enough she knows what she is doing. I say it’s proof enough that nothing has really changed since the Bush administration, except there are more troops in Afghanistan now (about 68,000) and the U.S. casualty count was much lower then —- 117 in 2007 to be exact.

When liberal flak Eleanor Clift wrote about the prospects of the “first female defense secretary” back in November, all she could muster in her favor was Flournoy’s Oxford pedigree, a stint in the lackluster Clinton Pentagon policy shop and quotes like these from former colleagues: “she has spent a great deal of time thinking how to deploy our military instruments economically and effectively.” Glad she was thinking about it before she left her post in February. Not much came out of if, however, if today’s accounts of continuing bloat, waste and mission creep are any indication.

Frankly, one hears a lot about Flournoy the “team player” but very little about her vision, ideas or actual accomplishments. The fact is, “the team” has been on a losing streak in Afghanistan since Obama took office, while her think tank, of which she continues to serve on the board of directors, has reaped all the benefits and influence as a conduit between the Pentagon, Foggy Bottom, the White House and greedy defense industry. “She’s a safe pick, she will carry the water — if you pick Hagel it would be saying ‘I want to push the envelope a little bit on foreign policy,’” said Cohen, “pushing it in a more realist direction than we have in the past.”

Perhaps that is why so many of us here are excited about the prospect. There are some areas where Hagel and the readers on this page might diverge, particularly on domestic issues. He’s a solid pro-life social conservative. He voted for the Patriot Act (he later fought for broader constitutional safeguards, saying he took an oath to protect the constitution, not “an oath of office to my party or my president”). We don’t know yet where he would stand on the controversial detention provisions in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). We have no idea whether he would stanch the flow of U.S. personnel and weapons into Africa or how he would deal with a newly inherited drone war. As for the Pentagon labyrinth itself, as University of Texas professor (and expert COIN critic) Celeste Ward Gventer tells me, “the problems are systemic and largely exceed the decision or personality of one man, even if he is at the apex.”

Still, if a Flournoy pick would signal an endorsement of the status quo, a Hagel nod would serve to challenge it. This inclination to question policy is quite attractive to observers like us who are tired of living in a fake candy cane marshmallow bubble world when it comes to foreign policy and national security. As a senator, Hagel often addressed these issues realistically, with no regard to how it might hurt his chances for a presidential nomination, which turned out to be short-lived as a result (quite sad, considering the parade of ham-n-egger Republicans who ended up running, and losing, in the last two elections).

#### Foreign policy restraint’s key to the legitimacy of U.S. power and global liberal norms---avoids great power war and builds coalitions to ensure China rises peacefully

Kevin Fujimoto 12, Lt. Colonel, U.S. Army, January 11, 2012, “Preserving U.S. National Security Interests Through a Liberal World Construct,” online: <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/index.cfm/articles/Preserving-US-National-Security-Interests-Liberal-World-Construct/2012/1/11>

With a credible threat to its leading position in a unipolar global order, the United States should adopt a grand strategy of “investment,” building legitimacy and capacity in the very institutions that will protect our interests in a liberal global construct of the future when we are no longer the dominant imperial power. Similar to the Clinton era's grand strategy of “enlargement,”2 investment supports a world order predicated upon a system of basic rules and principles, however, it differs in that the United States should concentrate on the institutions (i.e., United Nations, World Trade Organization, ASEAN, alliances, etc.) that support a world order, as opposed to expanding democracy as a system of governance for other sovereign nations.

Despite its claims of a benevolent expansion, China is already executing a strategy of expansion similar to that of Imperial Japan's Manchukuo policy during the 1930s.3 This three-part strategy involves: “(i) (providing) significant investments in economic infrastructure for extracting natural resources; (ii) (conducting) military interventions (to) protect economic interests; and, (iii) . . . (annexing) via installation of puppet governments.”4 China has already solidified its control over neighboring North Korea and Burma, and has similarly begun more ambitious engagements in Africa and Central Asia where it seeks to expand its frontier.5

Noted political scientist Samuel P. Huntington provides further analysis of the motives behind China's imperial aspirations. He contends that “China (has) historically conceived itself as encompassing a “‘Sinic Zone'. . . (with) two goals: to become the champion of Chinese culture . . . and to resume its historical position, which it lost in the nineteenth century, as the hegemonic power in East Asia.”6 Furthermore, China holds one quarter of the world's population, and rapid economic growth will increase its demand for natural resources from outside its borders as its people seek a standard of living comparable to that of Western civilization.

The rise of peer competitors has historically resulted in regional instability and one should compare “the emergence of China to the rise of. . . Germany as the dominant power in Europe in the late nineteenth century.”7 Furthermore, the rise of another peer competitor on the level of the Soviet Union of the Cold War ultimately threatens U.S. global influence, challenging its concepts of human rights, liberalism, and democracy; as well as its ability to co-opt other nations to accept them.8 This decline in influence, while initially limited to the Asia-Pacific region, threatens to result in significant conflict if it ultimately leads to a paradigm shift in the ideas and principles that govern the existing world order.

A grand strategy of investment to address the threat of China requires investing in institutions, addressing ungoverned states, and building legitimacy through multilateralism. The United States must build capacity in the existing institutions and alliances accepted globally as legitimate representative bodies of the world's governments. For true legitimacy, the United States must support these institutions, not only when convenient, in order to avoid the appearance of unilateralism, which would ultimately undermine the very organizations upon whom it will rely when it is no longer the global hegemon.

The United States must also address ungoverned states, not only as breeding grounds for terrorism, but as conflicts that threaten to spread into regional instability, thereby drawing in superpowers with competing interests. Huntington proposes that the greatest source of conflict will come from what he defines as one “core” nation's involvement in a conflict between another core nation and a minor state within its immediate sphere of influence.9 For example, regional instability in South Asia10 threatens to involve combatants from the United States, India, China, and the surrounding nations. Appropriately, the United States, as a global power, must apply all elements of its national power now to address the problem of weak and failing states, which threaten to serve as the principal catalysts of future global conflicts.11

Admittedly, the application of American power in the internal affairs of a sovereign nation raises issues. Experts have posed the question of whether the United States should act as the world's enforcer of stability, imposing its concepts of human rights on other states. In response to this concern, The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty authored a study titled, The Responsibility to Protect,12 calling for revisions to the understanding of sovereignty within the United Nations (UN) charter. This commission places the responsibility to protect peoples of sovereign nations on both the state itself and, more importantly, on the international community.13 If approved, this revision will establish a precedent whereby the United States has not only the authority and responsibility to act within the internal affairs of a repressive government, but does so with global legitimacy if done under the auspices of a UN mandate.

Any effort to legitimize and support a liberal world construct requires the United States to adopt a multilateral doctrine which avoids the precepts of the previous administration: “preemptive war, democratization, and U.S. primacy of unilateralism,”14 which have resulted in the alienation of former allies worldwide. Predominantly Muslim nations, whose citizens had previously looked to the United States as an example of representative governance, viewed the Iraq invasion as the seminal dividing action between the Western and the Islamic world. Appropriately, any future American interventions into the internal affairs of another sovereign nation must first seek to establish consensus by gaining the approval of a body representing global opinion, and must reject military unilateralism as a threat to that governing body's legitimacy.

Despite the long-standing U.S. tradition of a liberal foreign policy since the start of the Cold War, the famous liberal leviathan, John Ikenberry, argues that “the post-9/11 doctrine of national security strategy . . . has been based on . . . American global dominance, the preventative use of force, coalitions of the willing, and the struggle between liberty and evil.”15 American foreign policy has misguidedly focused on spreading democracy, as opposed to building a liberal international order based on universally accepted principles that actually set the conditions for individual nation states to select their own system of governance. Anne-Marie Slaughter, the former Dean of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, argues that true Wilsonian idealists “support liberal democracy, but reject the possibility of democratizing peoples . . .”16 and reject military primacy in favor of supporting a rules-based system of order.

Investment in a liberal world order would also set the conditions for the United States to garner support from noncommitted regional powers (i.e., Russia, India, Japan, etc.), or “swing civilizations,” in countering China's increasing hegemonic influence.17 These states reside within close proximity to the Indian Ocean, which will likely emerge as the geopolitical focus of the American foreign policy during the 21st century, and appropriately have the ability to offset China's imperial dominance in the region.18

Critics of a liberal world construct argue that idealism is not necessary, based on the assumption that nations that trade together will not go to war with each other.19 In response, foreign affairs columnist Thomas L. Friedman rebukes their arguments, acknowledging the predicate of commercial interdependence as a factor only in the decision to go to war, and argues that while globalization is creating a new international order, differences between civilizations still create friction that may overcome all other factors and lead to conflict.20

Detractors also warn that as China grows in power, it will no longer observe “the basic rules and principles of a liberal international order,” which largely result from Western concepts of foreign relations. Ikenberry addresses this risk, citing that China's leaders already recognize that they will gain more authority within the existing liberal order, as opposed to contesting it. China's leaders “want the protection and rights that come from the international order's . . . defense of sovereignty,”21 from which they have benefitted during their recent history of economic growth and international expansion.

Even if China executes a peaceful rise and the United States overestimates a Sinic threat to its national security interest, the emergence of a new imperial power will challenge American leadership in the Indian Ocean and Asia-Pacific region. That being said, it is more likely that China, as evidenced by its military and economic expansion, will displace the United States as the regional hegemonic power. Recognizing this threat now, the United States must prepare for the eventual transition and immediately begin building the legitimacy and support of a system of rules that will protect its interests later when we are no longer the world's only superpower.

#### Unchecked Chinese rise risks global nuclear war

C. Dale Walton 7, Lecturer in International Relations and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, 2007, Geopolitics and the Great Powers in the 21st Century, p. 49

Obviously, it is of vital importance to the United States that the PRC does not become the hegemon of Eastern Eurasia. As noted above, however, regardless of what Washington does, China's success in such an endeavor is not as easily attainable as pessimists might assume. The PRC appears to be on track to be a very great power indeed, but geopolitical conditions are not favorable for any Chinese effort to establish sole hegemony; a robust multipolar system should suffice to keep China in check, even with only minimal American intervention in local squabbles. The more worrisome danger is that Beijing will cooperate with a great power partner, establishing a very muscular axis. Such an entity would present a critical danger to the balance of power, thus both necessitating very **active American intervention** in Eastern Eurasia and **creating the** underlying **conditions for a massive**, and probably **nuclear, great power war**. Absent such a "super-threat," however, the demands on American leaders will be far more subtle: creating the conditions for Washington's gentle decline from playing the role of unipolar quasi-hegemon to being "merely" the greatest of the world's powers, while aiding in the creation of a healthy multipolar system that is not marked by close great power alliances.

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### AT: Uniqueness Overwhelms/PC Not Key

#### Hagel will be a huge fight---PC’s key

Chuck Todd et al 1-8, MSNBC anchor, 1/8/13, “First Thoughts: No margin for error in Hagel nomination,” http://firstread.nbcnews.com/\_news/2013/01/08/16412788-first-thoughts-no-margin-for-error-in-hagel-nomination?lite

\*\*\* No margin for error in Hagel nomination: Yesterday’s official rollout of Chuck Hagel for defense secretary went about as well as it could have for the Obama White House. Statements of praise for Hagel by folks like Colin Powell and Robert Gates? Check. A statement of past praise from John McCain (who said in 2006 Hagel would make a “great secretary of state”), even though McCain is now taking a skeptical look at the nominee? Check. And getting Chuck Schumer, perhaps the Democratic senator with the most reservations about Hagel, to issue a non-committal statement? Check. So the White House feels pretty good about where things stand, although this won’t be an easy fight. Yet what Team Obama can’t afford is any new negative information, any other shoe to drop. Bottom line: There is no margin for error from this point onward. Hagel’s support, at best, in the Senate is an inch deep and that “inch” would get him the votes he needs. But it wouldn’t take much for the bottom to, well, fall out. This is going to be a precarious few weeks. Very few senators are in D.C. right now, so the interest groups will be front and center. Hagel needs his confirmation hearing sooner, rather than later, but right now, it’s unclear when those hearings will be scheduled. Hagel also needs FACE time with senators, and he won’t have that opportunity for a good week or so. ¶ \*\*\* Obama’s confidence -- 2009 vs. 2013: As we wrote yesterday, Obama is clearly projecting a level of confidence at the start of this second term than he did four years ago, in particular, on foreign policy. Just look at the initial comfort level with his picks for his second-term national security team (Hagel, John Kerry, John Brennan) vs. the first-term team (Hillary Clinton, Bob Gates, Leon Panetta, Jim Jones). At the start of his first term, the president was no less confident about his foreign policy judgment but he made the calculation that he needed to placate the Washington establishment so he stuck with the Republican Gates at Defense, brought in Hillary to State, brought in a former general, Jim Jones, as his National Security Adviser. Gates and Clinton worked out, but Jones didn’t. ¶ \*\*\* Amplifying his views, using political capital: Now? The president is using his national security choices to amplify his views in a way that was missing four years ago. Kerry, Hagel, Brennan and keeping Tom Donilon as NSA (even potentially elevating Deputy NSA Denis McDonough to White House chief of staff) indicates the president is not just interested in running foreign policy out of the White House, but he wants to leave an Obama imprint on Defense, CIA, State etc. But it may be more than that -- Obama is displaying a confidence that he didn’t necessarily show after 2008. Much of this is what you get with a second-term president who got more than 51% of the popular vote (for the second-straight time). He may NOT be saying it the same way Bush did in 2004-05 after winning a second term, but he’s, so far, displaying the following notion: Obama believes he’s earned political capital, and he’s going to use it.

#### Hagel will be confirmed but it’s a fight---Obama’s clearing the agenda of other issues

Julie Pace 1-7, AP White House Correspondent, 1/7/13, “Obama digs in for a fight on Hagel, Brennan picks,” http://www.mercurynews.com/breaking-news/ci\_22324209/obama-nominate-chuck-hagel-defense-secretary

Digging in for a fight, President Barack Obama riled Senate Republicans and some Democrats, too, on Monday by nominating former senator and combat veteran Chuck Hagel to lead the Pentagon and anti-terrorism chief John Brennan as the next director of the Central Intelligence Agency.¶ Hagel and Brennan, in separate Senate confirmation hearings, will face sharp questions on a range of contentious issues, including U.S. policy about Israel and Iran, targeted drone attacks and harsh interrogation tactics. Of the two men, Hagel is expected to face a tougher path, though both are likely to be confirmed.¶ Hagel would be the first enlisted soldier and first Vietnam veteran to head the Pentagon.¶ "These two leaders have dedicated their lives to protecting our country," Obama said, standing alongside them and the men they would succeed during a ceremony in the White House East Room. "I urge the Senate to confirm them as soon as possible so we can keep our nation secure and the American people safe."¶ For Obama, a pair of combative confirmation hearings could turn into a distraction as he opens his second term. But the president signaled he was ready to take that risk.

### AT: No Obama PC

#### Yes capital

Hennessey 12/29 Kathleen, LA Times, 2012, www.latimes.com/news/politics/la-pn-obama-fiscal-cliff-vote-20121228,0,2652554.story

The move was meant to increase the political heat on Republicans, who opposed Obama’s plan to allow taxes to rise on top earners. If no deal is reached, Republicans could find themselves in the position of blocking the legislation that would prevent the tax hike for most taxpayers. Obama delivered the same message Friday night, after a meeting with congressional leaders at which Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nev.) and Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) agreed to work together to try to reach a last-minute compromise to avoid the fiscal cliff. “There’s not much time, but there’s still time to act,” said Sen. Roy Blunt (R-Mo.), in the GOP address. “The president will never have more political capital than he does right now, and the next few days will begin to define his second term. He was elected to lead.”

### AT: Executive Shields

#### Executive action links

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Although presidents can use their unilateral powers to shape the policy process directly, **in reality they are rarely in a position to exercise them at will**. As with other presidential powers, they are limited in their ability to command by decree and must be strategic in how they use them (see Neustadt 1990). Presidential decisions regarding when and what types of unilateral powers to exercise are shaped by a variety of conditions in the political environment, especially the president's political relationship with Congress. With respect to executive orders, we expect that chief executives will likely sign directives when they perceive that conditions in the political environment will garner them more political payoffs rather than costs. In certain circumstances, conditions might be ripe for presidents to pursue executive orders that initiate significant policies. At other times, there may be less political incentive to act unilaterally resulting in presidents pursuing policy success through the traditional legislative route in Congress. What is it about the president's political relationship with Congress that might lead him to eschew the legislative process in favor of unilateral action? The literature typically focuses on divided government, as it serves as a proxy for periods when the president and Congress might disagree on policy solutions (e.g., Deering and Maltzman 1999; Howell 2003; Mayer 2001). However, scholars have not yet fully tested the underlying theory behind why divided government should affect presidents' decisions to use executive orders. The presence of divided government should matter because (1) it is often harder for presidents to assemble a sufficient number of votes to achieve policy success through the legislative process because their party holds fewer seats, and (2) the policy preferences of presidents and legislators are more likely to diverge when different parties control these institutions. These are distinct components that are associated with party control, and we should assume that each will influence executive order activity. From the president's perspective, larger seat majorities in Congress should make it easier to achieve his preferred policies. When the president has a majority of seats in the House and a filibuster-proof supermajority in the Senate, as the Democratic party possessed in 2009 and 2010, it is easier (though by no means a certainty) for his party to usher in major policy change through the legislative process. Thus, presidents will have less need to issue major executive orders to achieve policy success since Congress may be more receptive to their policy proposals. During these conditions, presidents also might be more reticent to use executive orders to achieve significant policies for fear that such actions might be viewed by Congress as an assault on the legislative process. This approach could backfire by **disrupting the cooperative relationship that a president might enjoy with his party in Congress.**

### AT: Gas Lobby

#### The lobby’s super weak

Overby 11/23 Peter is an NPR reporter. “With Little Clout, Natural Gas Lobby Strikes Out,” 2012, http://www.vpr.net/npr/113138252/

There is almost a century's worth of natural gas in shale rock formations all over the country, enough to make a significant change in the debate about America's energy future. But as Congress moves toward writing a new national energy policy, **natural-gas lobbyists have been mostly missing in action.** "Natural gas is the cleanest of the fossil fuels," says Christopher Flavin, president of the Worldwatch Institute, a think tank that does environmental research. "I think nobody's ever argued that. The big thing, of course, that's changed is that shale gas has now opened up as this enormous resource." Natural gas emits half the carbon of coal. Flavin and some other top environmentalists want Congress to embrace natural gas as a transition fuel, to move the country away from coal and toward clean fuels that haven't yet come on the market. A Changing Landscape? "I'm actually hopeful that we will see a change in the whole landscape of the politics around natural gas as a result," Flavin says. But the change hasn't come yet on Capitol Hill. When the House passed its climate-change bill in June, the big winner was coal. The measure — called Waxman-Markey for its two lead sponsors, Reps. Henry Waxman (D-CA) and Edward Markey (D-MA) — would give electric utilities longer deadlines to keep burning coal, and would commit millions of federal dollars to research new technologies that would reduce coal's carbon emissions. Waxman-Markey had no such incentives for natural gas, and those in the industry are frustrated. That's because about a century's worth of natural gas is available in shale formations all over the country. "I know I had many conversations with representatives, trying to tell the natural gas story," says Steven Malcolm, CEO of Williams Companies, a big independent producer of natural gas. "I don't know why we didn't fare better. I heard one representative say **there wasn't a critical mass of natural gas represented."** Soon after Waxman-Markey passed, leaders of the natural gas industry met at an annual conference in Denver — where former Sen. Tim Wirth chewed them out. Wirth used to represent Colorado and has long been an advocate of natural gas. Since 1998, he has been president of the United Nations Foundation, a nonprofit organization that works on climate change. Wirth told the industry leaders that on Waxman-Markey, they blew it. "Every industry was deeply engaged, except one: Yours," he said. "The natural gas industry, the industry with the most to gain and the most to offer, was not at the bargaining table." It's an especially harsh verdict because the Waxman-Markey bill was drafted only after high-profile negotiations with proponents of coal, nuclear, oil, wind, solar and other energy sources. What Kept Natural Gas Out? Three things kept natural gas away from that table. First of all: politics. The industry likes Republicans and historically has funneled most of its campaign contributions to the GOP. But now, of course, it's the Democrats who control Congress. The second problem: The natural gas industry has a lot of global-warming skeptics. Fred Julander, president of Julander Energy Co. in Denver, isn't one of them, but he understands their perspective. "They want to be honest brokers," Julander says. "They don't want to take advantage of something they don't believe in, even if it improves their bottom line if it's based on a falsehood — which is, I mean, is in some ways commendable, but in some ways is short-sighted." And the industry's third problem is size. It's made up mostly of medium to **small companies** that can't compete on Capitol Hill.

### Link Wall

#### PC outweighs GOP---Obama needs to get Democrats on board for Hagel too which means even if they win this turn, our link outweighs

#### The plan’s controversial---makes Obama seem in bed with natural gas

Berman 12 Dan is a writer at Politico. “**When it comes to natural gas, Obama can’t win,”** 5/16, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0512/76402.html

President Barack Obama talked up natural gas in his State of the Union address, his top aides have held dozens of meetings with natural gas industry leaders and his administration has given the industry what it wanted on two big regulatory issues.¶ What he’s gotten in return: **a giant headache.**¶ Industry backers have hammered away at virtually all of the White House’s rule-making efforts while pouring millions of dollars into campaigns fighting Obama’s reelection.¶ At the same time, environmentalists and even some Republicans have complained that natural gas is too cozy with the White House.¶ The gas industry’s had plenty of access. This year, the White House Office of Management and Budget held at least a dozen meetings on fracking with senior officials from companies like ExxonMobil, Anadarko and BP, as well as Republican congressional staffers, tribal leaders and industry lobby shops.¶ But the White House seems unable to decide how close it wants to be to the industry. Obama and Cabinet officials like Energy Secretary Steven Chu, Interior Secretary Ken Salazar and EPA chief Lisa Jackson consistently praise natural gas. And recent headlines have trumpeted the newfound closeness; Bloomberg, for instance, went with “Obama Warms to Energy Industry by Supporting Natural Gas” while National Journal chose: “White House’s Coziness With Big Oil Irks GOP.”¶ White House energy adviser Heather Zichal insisted Monday that the relationship isn’t that simple.¶ “It’s safe to say the notion that we rolled out the welcome mat or have this hunky-dory relationship where we’re all holding hands and singing ‘Kumbaya’ is not exactly where we’re at today,” Zichal said at an American Petroleum Institute event.¶ “What I can say is that we were in the middle of working on a number of regulations that directly impact the oil and gas industry,” she added. “There was no way for us to finalize a regulation that made sense without us actually engaging with the industry.”¶ The past several weeks have demonstrated the love-hate relationship with industry.¶ On April 13, Obama signed an executive order meant to coordinate the administration’s activities on natural gas and perhaps answer criticism that the administration is trying to end hydraulic fracturing. Industry lobbyists met that afternoon with Zichal.¶ The White House press office even blasted out a release quoting supportive statements from places like the American Petroleum Institute, Business Roundtable and Dow Chemical.¶ But when the EPA and Interior Department each rolled out their much-anticipated rules regarding fracking, they were hammered by the industry and its GOP allies. And when Sen. Jim Inhofe (R-Okla.) started a media blitz using a two-year-old video of a regional EPA administrator saying he wanted to “crucify” law-breaking oil and gas companies, some of the same groups that had praised the executive order called for the person to be fired (he stepped down within five days).¶ Making things worse for the White House, environmentalists who are happy the agencies were tackling fracking in the first place complained that the rules were watered down.¶ “I agree it seems like they’re trying to somehow make the industry happy, but we think that the White House absolutely should be holding the industry to a much higher standard,” said Amy Mall of the Natural Resources Defense Council. “We know the industry can operate with cleaner and safer methods.”

#### Reducing environmental regulations triggers massive Congressional battles and requires PC expenditure

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Despite these notable pledges and actions, rising criticism of environmental programs also was evident throughout the 1990s and the first decade of the twenty-first century both domestically and internationally. So too were a multiplicity of efforts to chart new policy directions. For instance, intense opposition to environmental and natural resource policies arose in the 104th Congress (1995–1997), when the Republican Party took control of both the House and Senate for the first time in forty years. Ultimately, much like the earlier effort in Ronald Reagan’s administration, the antiregulatory campaign on Capitol Hill failed to gain much public support. 2 Nonetheless, **pitched battles over environmental and energy policy continued in every Congress** through the 110th (2007–2009), and they were equally evident in the executive branch as the Bush White House sought to rewrite environmental rules and regulations to favor industry and to dramatically increase development of U.S. oil and natural gas supplies on public lands. 3 Yet growing dissatisfaction with the effectiveness, efficiency, and equity of environmental policies was by no means confined to congressional conservatives and the Bush administration. It could be found among a broad array of interests, including the business community, environmental policy analysts, environmental justice groups, and state and local government officials. 4 Since 1992, governments at all levels have struggled to redesign environmental policy for the twenty-first century. Under Presidents Bill Clinton and GeorgeW. Bush, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) tried to “reinvent” environmental regulation through the use of collaborative decision making involving multiple stakeholders, public-private partnerships, market-based incentives, information disclosure, and enhanced flexibility in rulemaking and enforcement (see chapters 7, 9, and 10). 5 Particularly during the Clinton administration, new emphases within the EPA and other federal agencies and departments on ecosystem management and sustainable development sought to foster comprehensive, integrated, and long-term strategies for environmental protection and natural resource management (see chapter 8). 6 Many state and local governments have pursued similar goals, with adoption of a wide range of innovative policies that promise to address some of the most important criticisms directed at contemporary environmental policy (see chapters 2 and 11). The election of President Barack Obama in 2008 signaled the likelihood of even greater attention to innovative policy ideas in the years ahead as the nation demonstrated a new sense of urgency about climate change and a determination to address a range of environmental, energy, and resource challenges despite a poor economy. The precise way in which Congress, the states, and local governments will change environmental policies remains unclear. The partisan gridlock of the past decade may give way to greater consensus on the need to act. Yet policy change rarely comes easily in the U.S. political system. Its success will likely depend on several key conditions: public support for change, how the various policy actors stake out and defend their positions on the issues, the way the media cover these disputes, the relative influence of opposing interests, and the state of the economy. Political leadership, as always, will play a role, especially in reconciling deep divisions between the major political parties on environmental protection and natural resource issues. Political conflict over the environment is not going to vanish any time soon. Indeed, it **will likely increase** as the United States and other nations struggle to define how they will respond to the latest generation of environmental problems. In this chapter we examine the continuities and changes in environmental politics and policy since 1970 and discuss their implications for the early twenty-first century. We review the policymaking process in the United States, and we assess the performance of government institutions and political leadership. We give special attention to the major programs adopted in the 1970s, their achievements to date, and the need for policy redesign and priority setting for the years ahead. The chapters that follow address in greater detail many of the questions explored in this introduction. The Role of Government and Politics The high levels of political conflict over environmental protection efforts during recent years underscores the important role government plays in devising solutions to the nation’s and the world’s mounting environmental ills. Global climate change, population growth, the spread of toxic and hazardous chemicals, loss of biological diversity, and air and water pollution all require diverse actions by individuals and institutions at all levels of society and in both the public and private sectors. These actions range from scientific research and technological innovation to improved environmental education and significant changes in corporate and consumer behavior. As political scientists we believe government has an indispensable role to play in environmental protection and improvement. The chapters in this volume thus focus on environmental policies and the government institutions and political processes that affect them. Our goal is to illuminate that role and to suggest needed changes and strategies.

#### Empirics prove the plan’s controversial

Tom Barnes, Contributor, 12 [“Natural gas extraction tax debated in House,” Post-Gazette Harrisburg Bureau, March 29, http://www.post-gazette.com/stories/local/state/natural-gas-extraction-tax-debated-in-house-265999/?print=1]

HARRISBURG -- House **Democrats and Republicans wrangled** for five hours Tuesday **in a bitter partisan debate over** whether to enact a hefty new tax on extracting **natural gas** from Marcellus Shale, but the issue still has a long way to go.¶ Democrats favored the measure, called Senate Bill 1155, while Republicans were generally opposed. It would impose a severance tax of 39 cents per thousand cubic feet (MCF) of natural gas extracted from the vast areas of underground shale in Pennsylvania. It would generate $120 million this fiscal year, $326 million next year, $408 million in 2012 and $495 million in 2013.¶ But even the supporters said the bill was just "a first step," with difficult negotiations expected with the Republican-controlled Senate. Many senators favor a lower tax rate, like one in Arkansas, which has a 1.5 percent tax on the market value of the extracted gas for the first several years.¶ The rhetoric over the bill was loud from both sides. "It's unconscionable that these gas drillers don't pay a severance tax," said Rep. Greg Vitali, D-Delaware, adding that all other 24 states with Marcellus drilling have a tax.¶ "These [gas] people are making tons of money, billions in gross profits," he said. "They hired a former Pennsylvania governor for $900,000 [as a lobbyist]. They gave a [Republican] candidate for governor nearly $400,000. A rate of 39 cents per MCF is fair and reasonable. They can afford it."¶ Rep. Barbara McIlvaine Smith, D-Chester, said, "We are the only shale state without a shale tax. People must think we have a big S on our forehead -- for stupid."¶ Rep. Bryan Lentz, D-Delaware, added, "If this tax is defeated, the headlines will read 'Corporations Win, People Lose.' If you vote against this bill you are doing the bidding of the gas industry, which can and should pay its fair share."¶ Republicans strongly disagreed, claiming such a high tax will stifle the drilling industry as it gets going in the state, providing thousands of jobs and other types of taxes to the state and localities where drilling is going on.¶ GOP legislators also objected that the bill was unconstitutional, because House Democrats on Monday had taken a measure on a different subject, which the Senate had already passed, and added totally new tax language to it. Republicans said that legally, revenue-raising bills must start in the House, not the Senate.¶ Republicans also objected that the rewritten bill provides $97 million -- 80 percent of the $120 million expected from the tax in the first year -- to fill a state budget hole, rather than helping replenish the nearly bankrupt Environmental Stewardship Fund, which protects farmland and open space.¶ "People are fed up with higher taxes," Rep. Scott Hutchinson, R-Venango said. "There's a firestorm sweeping across the nation and state. People don't want us to use this money to feed the Leviathan called state government."¶ "To come in with the highest tax rate in the country is unbelievable," said Rep. Daryl Metcalfe, R-Cranberry. "It will kill jobs in Pennsylvania."¶ Rep. Matt Baker, R-Tioga, said, "Like sharks in a feeding frenzy, big state government preys on drillers and landowners. It will impede job creation. This is the wrong way to go. It's a monumental tax, the largest in the whole country."¶ Rep. Dan Frankel, D-Squirrel Hill, insisted that contrary to what opponents said, states like Wyoming, Oklahoma, New Mexico and Montana have higher gas taxes than what this bill contains.¶ Other Democrats said that while the 39 cents per MCF may be the highest rate in the country, other taxes on drillers in Pennsylvania, such as income and property taxes, are lower, so the overall tax isn't the highest in the U.S.¶ Initially, 60 percent of the shale-tax revenue was to go to the state general fund and 40 percent was to be split several ways, including going to county and local governments, environmental improvements and the hazardous sites cleanup fund. But under an amendment by Rep. Kate Harper, R-Montgomery, that passed Tuesday night, those percentages were reversed, with 40 percent going to the state. She said the original version of the bill didn't provide enough for local government or the Environmental Stewardship Fund in the first year.¶ Everyone agreed that the bill is far from the final word on the subject of a shale gas tax. Erik Arneson, an aide to Senate Republican leader Dominic Pileggi, said the 39 cents per MCF "is not an approach that would win majority support in the Senate."¶ But Democrats said Tuesday night's affirmative vote on the amendment at least keeps the process moving forward, with upcoming talks aimed at producing a bill that can pass both chambers and be signed by Gov. Ed Rendell before legislators go home in mid-October.

### AT: Winners Win---Top Level

#### Obama’s Velcro---only blame sticks to him---means winners lose---healthcare proves

Nicholas & Hook 10 Peter and Janet, Staff Writers---LA Times, “Obama the Velcro president”, LA Times, 7-30, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jul/30/nation/la-na-velcro-presidency-20100730/3

If Ronald Reagan was the classic Teflon president, Barack **Obama is made of Velcro**.¶ Through two terms, Reagan eluded much of the responsibility for recession and foreign policy scandal. In less than two years, Obama has become **ensnared in blame**.¶ Hoping to better insulate Obama, White House aides have sought to give other Cabinet officials a higher profile and additional public exposure. They are also crafting new ways to explain the president's policies to a skeptical public.¶ But Obama remains **the colossus of his administration** — to a point where trouble anywhere in the world is often his to solve.¶ The president is on the hook to repair the Gulf Coast oil spill disaster, stabilize Afghanistan, help fix Greece's ailing economy and do right by Shirley Sherrod, the Agriculture Department official fired as a result of a misleading fragment of videotape.¶ **What's not sticking to Obama is a legislative track record that his recent predecessors might envy. Political dividends from passage of a healthcare overhaul or a financial regulatory bill have been fleeting.¶** Instead, voters are measuring his presidency by a more immediate yardstick: Is he creating enough jobs? So far the verdict is no, and that has taken a toll on Obama's approval ratings. Only 46% approve of Obama's job performance, compared with 47% who disapprove, according to Gallup's daily tracking poll.¶ "I think the accomplishments are very significant, but I think most people would look at this and say, 'What was the plan for jobs?' " said Sen. Byron L. Dorgan (D-N.D.). "The agenda he's pushed here has been a very important agenda, but it hasn't translated into dinner table conversations."

#### Can’t win on energy

Eisler 12 Matthew is a Researcher @ the Chemical Heritage Foundation. “Science, Silver Buckshot, and ‘All of The Above’” April 2, http://scienceprogress.org/2012/04/science-silver-buckshot-and-%E2%80%9Call-of-the-above%E2%80%9D/

Conservatives take President Obama’s rhetoric at face value. Progressives see the president as disingenuous. No doubt White House planners regard delaying the trans-border section of the Keystone XL pipeline and approving the Gulf of Mexico portion as a stroke of savvy realpolitik, but one has to wonder whether Democratic-leaning voters really are as gullible as this scheme implies. And as for the president’s claims that gasoline prices are determined by forces beyond the government’s control (speculation and unrest in the Middle East), it is probably not beyond the capacity of even the mildly educated to understand that the administration has shown little appetite to reregulate Wall Street and has done its part to inflate the fear premium through confrontational policies in the Persian Gulf. Committed both to alternative energy (but not in a rational, comprehensive way) and cheap fossil fuels (but not in ways benefiting American motorists in an election year), President **Obama has accrued** no political capital **from his energy policy from either the left or the right** by the end of his first term.¶ The president long ago lost the legislative capacity for bold action in practically every field, including energy, but because the GOP’s slate of presidential candidates is so extraordinarily weak in 2012, he may not need it to get re-elected. At least, that is the conventional wisdom in Democratic circles. Should President Obama win a second term, Congress is likely to be **even more hostile** than in his first term, as in the Clinton years. And as in the Clinton years, that will probably mean four more years of inaction and increased resort to cant.

#### Winners lose---PC’s not renewable, is zero-sum, and diminishes fast

Ryan 9 Selwyn, Professor Emeritus and former Director, Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of the West Indies, “Obama and political capital,” 1/18 http://www.trinidadexpress.com/index.pl/article\_opinion?id=161426968

Like many, I expect much from Obama, who for the time being, is my political beast of burden with whom every other politician in the world is unfavourably compared. As a political scientist, I however know that given the structure of American and world politics, it would be **difficult for him to deliver half of what he has promised**, let alone all of it. Reality will **force him to make many "u" turns** and detours which may well land him in quick sand. Obama will, however, begin his stint with a **vast accumulation of political capital**, perhaps more than that held by any other modern leader. Seventy-eight per cent of Americans polled believe that his inauguration is one of the most historic the country will witness. Political capital is, however, a lumpy and **fast diminishing asset** in today's world of instant communication, which once misspent, is **rarely ever renewable**. The world is full of political leaders like George Bush and Tony Blair who had visions, promised a lot, and probably meant well, but who **did not know how to husband** the **political capital** with which they were provided as they assumed office. They squandered it as quickly as they emptied the contents of the public vaults. Many will be watching to see how Obama manages his assets and liabilities register. Watching with hope would be the white young lady who waved a placard in Obama's face inscribed with the plaintive words, "I Trust You." Despite the general optimism about Obama's ability to deliver, many groups have already begun to complain about being betrayed. Gays, union leaders, and women have been loud in their complaints about being by-passed or overlooked. Some radical blacks have also complained about being disrespected. Where and when is Joshua going to lead them to the promised land, they ask? When is he going to pull the troops out of Iraq? Civil rights groups also expect Obama to dis-establish Guantanamo as soon as he takes office to signal the formal break with Dick Cheney and Bush. They also want him to discontinue the policy which allows intelligence analysts to spy on American citizens without official authorisation. In fact, Obama startled supporters when he signalled that he might do an about-turn and continue this particular policy. We note that Bush is signalling Obama that keeping America safe from terrorists should be his top priority item and that he, Bush, had no regrets about violating the constitutional rights of Americans if he had to do so to keep them safe. Cheney has also said that he would do it again if he had to. The safety of the republic is after all the highest law. Other groups-sub-prime home owners, workers in the automobile sector, and the poor and unemployed generally all expect Obama to work miracles on their behalf, which of course he cannot do. Given the problems of the economy which has not yet bottomed out, **some promises have to be deferred** beyond the first term. Groups, however, expect that the promise made to them during the campaign must be kept. Part of the problem is that almost every significant social or ethnic group believes that it was instrumental in Obama's victory. White women felt that they took Obama over the line, as did blacks generally, Jews, Hispanics, Asians, rich white men, gays, and young college kids, to mention a few of those whose inputs were readily recognisable. Obama also has a vast constituency in almost every country in the world, all of whom expect him to save the globe and the planet. Clearly, he is the proverbial "Black Knight on a White Horse." One of the "realities" that Obama has to face is that **American politics is not a winner-take-all system**. It is pluralistic vertically and horizontally, and getting **anything done politically**, even when the President and the Congress are controlled by the same party, **requires groups to negotiate, bargain and engage in serious horse trading.** No one takes orders from the President who can only use moral or political suasion and promises of future support for policies or projects. The system was in fact deliberately engineered to prevent overbearing majorities from conspiring to tyrannise minorities. The system is not only institutionally diverse and plural, but socially and geographically so. As James Madison put it in Federalist No 10, one of the foundation documents of republicanism in America, basic institutions check other basic institutions, classes and interests check other classes and interests, and regions do the same. All are grounded in their own power bases which they use to fend off challengers. The coalitions change from issue to issue, and there is no such thing as party discipline which translated, means you do what I the leader say you do. Although Obama is fully aware of the political limitations of the office which he holds, he is fully aware of the vast stock of political capital which he currently has in the bank and he evidently plans to enlarge it by drawing from the stock held by other groups, dead and alive. He is clearly drawing heavily from the caparisoned cloaks of Lincoln and Roosevelt. Obama seems to believe that by playing the all-inclusive, multipartisan, non-ideological card, he can get most of his programmes through the Congress without having to spend capital by using vetoes, threats of veto, or appeals to his 15 million strong constituency in cyberspace (the latent "Obama Party").

### AT: Compartmentalization

#### PC is key and zero sum---best scholarship proves

Matthew N. Beckmann and Vimal Kumar 11, Profs Department of Political Science, @ University of California Irvine "How Presidents Push, When Presidents Win" Journal of Theoretical Politics 2011 23: 3 SAGE

Before developing presidents’ lobbying options for building winning coalitions on Capitol Hill, it is instructive to consider **cases where the president has no political capital** and no viable lobbying options. In such circumstances of **imposed passivity** (beyond offering a proposal), **a president’s fate is clear**: his proposals are subject to pivotal voters’ preferences. So if a president lacking political capital proposes to change some far-off status quo, that is, one on the opposite side of the median or otherwise pivotal voter, a (Condorcet) winner always exists, and it coincides with the pivot’s predisposition (Brady and Volden, 1998; Krehbiel, 1998) (see also Black (1948) and Downs (1957)). Considering that there tends to be substantial ideological distance between presidents and pivotal voters, positive presidential inﬂuence without lobbying, then, is not much inﬂuence at all.¶ As with all lobbyists, presidents looking to push legislation must do so indirectly by **push**ing the **lawmakers whom they need to pass it**. Or, as Richard Nesustadt artfully explained:¶ The essence of a President’s persuasive task, with congressmen and everybody else, is to induce them to believe that what he wants of them is what their own appraisal of their own responsibilities requires them to do in their interest, not his…Persuasion deals in the coin of self-interest with men who have some freedom to reject what they ﬁnd counterfeit. (Neustadt, 1990: 40) ¶ Fortunately for contemporary presidents, today’s White House affords its occupants an unrivaled supply of **persuasive carrots and sticks**. Beyond the ofﬁce’s unique visibility and prestige, among both citizens and their representatives in Congress, presidents may also **sway lawmakers** by using their discretion in budgeting and/or rulemaking, unique fundraising and campaigning capacity, control over executive and judicial nominations, veto power, or numerous other options under the chief executive’s control. Plainly, when it comes to the arm-twisting, brow-beating, and horse-trading that so often characterizes legislative battles, modern presidents are uniquely well equipped for the ﬁght. In the following we employ the omnibus concept of ‘presidential political capital’ to capture this conception of presidents’ positive power as persuasive bargaining.¶ Speciﬁ- cally, we deﬁne presidents’ political capital as the **class of tactics White House ofﬁcials employ to induce changes in lawmakers’ behavior.**¶Importantly, this conception of presidents’ positive power as persuasive bargaining not only **meshes with previous scholarship** on lobbying (see, e.g., Austen-Smith and Wright (1994), Groseclose and Snyder (1996), Krehbiel (1998: ch. 7), and Snyder (1991)), but also **presidential practice.** For example, Goodwin recounts how President Lyndon Johnson routinely allocated ‘rewards’ to ‘cooperative’ members:¶ The rewards themselves (and the withholding of rewards) . . . might be something as unobtrusive as receiving an invitation to join the President in a walk around the White House grounds, knowing that pictures of the event would be sent to hometown newspapers . . . [or something as pointed as] public works projects, military bases, educational research grants, poverty projects, appointments of local men to national commissions, the granting of pardons, and more. (Goodwin, 1991: 237) Of course, **presidential political capital is a scarce commodity with a ﬂoating value**. Even a favorably situated president enjoys only a **ﬁnite supply of political capital**; **he can only promise or pressure so much**. What is more, this capital **ebbs and ﬂows as realities and/or perceptions change**. So, similarly to Edwards (1989), we believe presidents’ bargaining resources cannot fundamentally alter legislators’ predispositions, but rather operate ‘at the margins’ of US lawmaking, **however important those margins may be** (see also Bond and Fleisher (1990), Peterson (1990), Kingdon (1989), Jones (1994), and Rudalevige (2002)). Indeed, our aim is to explicate those margins and show how **presidents may systematically inﬂuence them.**

#### Empirically disproven---vote-trading occurs all the time

Rowley et al 98 (Charles Kershaw Rowley, Professor of Economics at George Mason University, Robert D. Tollison, Professor of Economics at Clemson University, Gordon Tullock, Professor of Law and Economics at George Mason University, “The Political economy of rent-seeking”, Google Books pg. 455)

The U.S. Congress is hindered with respect to vote trading opportunities both by its bicameral structure and by the geographic representation basis of both its chambers. Under such constraints, the rules of the legislative process tend to be important as a determinant of the "efficiency" of pork-barrel politics. In one respect, these rules have always encouraged vote-trading in the U.S. to a greater degree than is the case with most European parliamentary democracies: party discipline is much looser and policy cross-overs by individual congressmen always much more frequent. However, this stimulus to interest group rent-seeking is a consistent feature of the U.S. policy, and not an especial development of the past quarter century. To explain the dynamic of vote-trading in the U.S. over the period in question, it is necessary, therefore, to scrutinize developments in the complex structure of internal decision-making institutions to which Congress delegates substantial authority. Choices registered in these institutions constrain the influence of House or Senate majorities, preventing comparisons between certain collective choice alternatives, while facilitating others. Preeminent among these institutions is the committee/subcommittee system. Committees are endowed with considerable authority to initiate legislation within their defined jurisdictions. In some instances, amendments to their proposals are confined, by convention, to the particular subject matter of such proposals. Bills, as amended, are usually voted up or down, though amendments from the floor are not completely precluded. In the event of disagreement between the House and the Senate, the committees select the conference representatives, whose compromises are protected from amendment.

### AT: No China War

#### Offensive intent

Maginnis 11 – Robert Maginnis, retired Lt. Col., US Army, national security and foreign affairs analyst, August 31, 2011, “Pentagon Report Exposes China Menace,” online: http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=45871

First, China’s intentions are global and offensive. Constantine Menges wrote in China: The Gathering Threat, “In the traditional Chinese view, the world needs a hegemon—or dominant state—to prevent disorder. The Communist Chinese regime believes China should be that hegemon.”

That view was echoed in 2010 by Liu Mingfu, a Chinese senior colonel and author of The China Dream. Liu said “China’s big goal in the 21st century is to become world No. 1, the top power,” Reuters reported. The Pentagon’s report stops short of that forecast but admits the regime “anticipates becoming a world-class economic and military power by 2050.”

China’s latest defense White Paper provides evidence of its global ambitions. The paper, according to the Pentagon report, introduces the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) to new global missions intended to grow China’s influence, such as international peacekeeping efforts, counter-piracy operations, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

These other-than-war operations are made possible by China’s new investments in large amphibious ships, a hospital ship, long-range transport aircraft and improved logistics. Such assets extend China’s global influence and provide the PLA important expeditionary know-how and capabilities for future operations.

China’s global ambitions are also evidenced by its increased liaison with foreign militaries and increased joint exercises. Last year, China expanded relations to 150 different militaries, which reflects an effort to collect information and build partnerships.

Beijing’s foreign outreach includes more joint exercises. In 2010, the PLA participated in 32 joint exercises—up from eight in 2009—to increase its influence, enhance ties with partner states, and provide opportunities to improve capabilities and gain operational insights from more advanced militaries.

China’s White Paper also announces the regime’s “active defense” security strategy, which pretends to focus on defense and promises to attack only if attacked. But Mosher says China’s use of the term “active defense” is just a euphemism for the PLA’s “determination to strike first in the event of a crisis.” He concludes “active defense” is “not defensive at all, but is a strategy of offense and expansion.”

### NW Turns Warming

#### Nuclear war turns warming

Duncan Clark 9, editorial environmental consultant to the London Guardian, co-director of GreenProfile, January 2, 2009, “The carbon footprint of nuclear war,” online: http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/blog/2009/jan/02/nuclear-war-emissions

Almost 700m [million] tonnes of CO2 would be released into the Earth's atmosphere by even the smallest nuclear conflict, according to a US study that compares the environmental costs of developing various power sources

Just when you might have thought it was ethically sound to unleash a nuclear attack on a nearby city, along comes a pesky scientist and points out that atomic warfare is bad for the climate. According to a new paper in the journal Energy & Environmental Science, even a very limited nuclear exchange, using just a thousandth of the weaponry of a full-scale nuclear war, would cause up to 690m tonnes of CO2 to enter the atmosphere

– more than UK's annual total.

The upside (kind of) is that the conflict would also generate as much as 313m tonnes of soot. This would stop a great deal of sunlight reaching the earth, creating a significant regional cooling effect in the short and medium terms – just like when a major volcano erupts. Ultimately, though, the CO2 would win out and crank up global temperatures an extra few notches.

The paper's author, Mark Z Jacobson, a professor of civil and environmental engineering at Stanford University, calculated the emissions of such a conflict by totting up the burn rate and carbon content of the fabric of our cities. "Materials have the following carbon contents: plastics, 38–92%; tyres and other rubbers, 59–91%; synthetic fibres, 63–86%; woody biomass, 41–45%; charcoal, 71%; asphalt, 80%; steel, 0.05–2%. We approximate roughly the carbon content of all combustible material in a city as 40–60%."

But why would a Stanford engineer bother calculating such a thing? Given that the nuclear exchange would also kill up to 17 million people, who's going to be thinking about the impact on global warming?

The purpose of the paper is to compare the total human and environmental costs of a wide range of different power sources, from solar and wind to nuclear and biofuels. One of the side-effects of nuclear power, the report argues, is an increased risk of nuclear war: "Because the production of nuclear weapons material is occurring only in countries that have developed civilian nuclear energy programs, the risk of a limited nuclear exchange between countries or the detonation of a nuclear device by terrorists has increased due to the dissemination of nuclear energy facilities worldwide."

"As such," Jacobson continues, "it is a valid exercise to estimate the potential number of immediate deaths and carbon emissions due to the burning of buildings and infrastructure associated with the proliferation of nuclear energy facilities and the resulting proliferation of nuclear weapons … Although concern at the time of an explosion will be the deaths and not carbon emissions, policy makers today must weigh all the potential future risks of mortality and carbon emissions when comparing energy sources."

## 2NR

### Yes China War

#### Economic interdependence doesn’t solve---Chinese belligerence causes miscalc and crisis escalation

Medcalf & Heinrichs 11 - Rory Medcalf is Director of the International Security Programme at the Lowy Institute, Sydney. Raoul Heinrichs is Sir Arthur Tange Scholar at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, and editor of the Lowy Institute Strategic Snapshot series, June 27, 2011, “Asia’s Maritime Confidence Crisis,” online: http://the-diplomat.com/2011/06/27/asia%E2%80%99s-maritime-confidence-crisis/?print=yes

To the casual observer, recent security tensions in Asian waters might seem a storm in a Chinese teacup. The spectacle of opposing vessels – often motley flotillas of civilian patrol boats, fishing trawlers and survey ships – jostling near contested reefs, rocks and islets in the South and East China seas is the kind of activity that was likened back in Cold War days to a game of ‘nautical chicken’. Surely, in an age of economic interdependence and nuclear weapons, this petty posturing wouldn’t lead to great-power war?

Yet such wishful thinking ignores the real dangers of Asia’s China-centric maritime incidents. In the absence of effective mechanisms for crisis-management and confidence-building, these events are increasing in frequency and intensity. The harassment by Chinese civilian vessels of the USNS Impeccable in 2009 presaged a serious set of encounters in 2010, including North Korea’s sinking of the Cheonan and a diplomatic crisis between China and Japan over the ramming of a Japanese customs vessel near the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands.

Though major power tensions have eased somewhat in 2011, encounters have continued. Chinese helicopters have continued to ‘buzz’ Japanese naval units, even in the sensitive period following Japan’s earthquake and tsunami. In March, a Philippine survey ship was shadowed and harassed by Chinese patrol boats, eliciting formal diplomatic protests from Manila. More recently, in May and June, Chinese patrol boats have allegedly severed seismic cables aboard Vietnamese vessels operating near disputed territories in the South China Sea. Washington has weighed in, particularly with signals of reassurance to its ally Manila – prompting Chinese warnings about fanning flames and getting burned.

At the weekend, Sino-US and Sino-Vietnamese talks seem to have put a lid on the simmering tensions. And the chance that such incidents will lead to major military clashes shouldn’t be overstated. But each encounter involves risks, however small, of miscalculation and casualties. As the number and tempo of incidents increases, so does the likelihood that an episode will escalate to armed confrontation, diplomatic crisis or possibly even conflict. An accumulation of incidents could also play into a wider deterioration of relations among major powers, with dangerous implications for regional peace and stability.

# T

## 1NC

#### Restrictions on production must mandate a decrease in the quantity produced

Anell 89 Lars is the Chairman of the WTO panel adopted at the Forty-Fifth Session of Contracting Parties on December 5, 1989. Other panel members: Mr. Hugh Bartlett and Mrs. Carmen Luz Guarda. “Canada – Import Restrictions on Ice Cream and Yoghurt,” http://www.wto.org/english/tratop\_e/dispu\_e/88icecrm.pdf

The United States argued that Canada had failed to demonstrate that it effectively restricted domestic production of milk. The differentiation between "fluid" and "industrial" milk was an artificial one for administrative purposes; with regard to GATT obligations, the product at issue was raw milk from the cow, regardless of what further use was made of it. The use of the word "permitted" in Article XI:2(c)(i) required that there be a limitation on the total quantity of milk that domestic producers were authorized or allowed to produce or sell. The provincial controls on fluid milk did not restrict the quantities permitted to be produced; rather dairy farmers could produce and market as much milk as could be sold as beverage milk or table cream. There were no penalties for delivering more than a farmer's fluid milk quota, it was only if deliveries exceeded actual fluid milk usage or sales that it counted against his industrial milk quota. At least one province did not participate in this voluntary system, and another province had considered leaving it. Furthermore, Canada did not even prohibit the production or sale of milk that exceeded the Market Share Quota. The method used to calculate direct support payments on within-quota deliveries assured that most dairy farmers would completely recover all of their fixed and variable costs on their within-quota deliveries. The farmer was permitted to produce and market milk in excess of the quota, and perhaps had an economic incentive to do so. 27. The United States noted that in the past six years total industrial milk production had consistently exceeded the established Market Sharing Quota, and concluded that the Canadian system was a regulation of production but not a restriction of production**.** Proposals to amend Article XI:2(c)(i) to replace the word "restrict" with "regulate" had been defeated; what was required was the reduction of production. The results of the econometric analyses cited by Canada provided no indication of what would happen to milk production in the absence not only of the production quotas, but also of the accompanying high price guarantees which operated as incentives to produce. According to the official publication of the Canadian Dairy Commission, a key element of Canada's national dairy policy was to promote self-sufficiency in milk production. The effectiveness of the government supply controls had to be compared to what the situation would be in the absence of all government measures.

#### Vote negative:

#### Including regulations is a limits disaster---undermines preparedness for all debates

Doub 76 William is a principal in the law firm of Doub and Muntzing. Previously he was a partner in LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby, and MacRae. He was a member of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (1971-1974). He served as a member of the Executive Advisory Committee to the Federal Power Commission (1968-1971) and was appointed by the President to the President’s Air Quality Advisory Board. He is a past chairman of the U.S. National Committee of the World Energy Conference. “Energy Regulation: A Quagmire for Energy Policy,” http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev.eg.01.110176.003435

FERS began with the recognition that federal energy policy must result from concerted efforts in all areas dealing with energy, not the least of which was the manner in which energy is regulated by the federal government. Energy self sufficiency is improbable, if not impossible, without sensible regulatory processes, and effective regulation is necessary for public confidence. Thus, the President directed that "a comprehensive study be undertaken, in full consultation with Congress, to determine the best way to organize all energy-related regulatory activities of the government." An interagency task force was formed to study this question. With 19 different federal departments and agencies contributing, the task force spent seven months deciphering the present organizational makeup of the federal energy regulatory system, studying the need for organizational improvement, and evaluating alternatives. **More than 40 agencies were found to be involved** with making regulatory decisions on energy. Although only a few deal exclusively with energy, most of the 40 could **significantly affect** the **availability and/or cost of energy**. For example, in the field of gas transmission, there are five federal agencies that must act on siting and land-use issues, seven on emission and effluent issues, five on public safety issues, and one on worker health and safety issues-all before an onshore gas pipeline can be built. The complexity of energy regulation is also illustrated by the case of Standard Oil Company (Indiana), which reportedly must file about 1000 reports a year with 35 different federal agencies. Unfortunately, this example is the rule rather than the exception.

#### And precision---only direct prohibition is a restriction---key to predictability

Sinha 6 S.B. Sinha is a former judge of the Supreme Court of India. “Union Of India & Ors vs M/S. Asian Food Industries,” Nov 7, http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/437310/

We may, however, notice that this Court in State of U.P. and Others v. M/s. Hindustan Aluminium Corpn. and others [AIR 1979 SC 1459] stated the law thus: "It appears that a distinction between regulation and restriction or prohibition has always been drawn, ever since Municipal Corporation of the City of Toronto v. Virgo. Regulation promotes the freedom or the facility which is required to be regulated in the interest of all concerned, whereas prohibition obstructs or shuts off, or denies it to those to whom it is applied. The Oxford English Dictionary does not define regulate to include prohibition so that if it had been the intention to prohibit the supply, distribution, consumption or use of energy, the legislature would not have contented itself with the use of the word regulating without using the word prohibiting or some such word, to bring out that effect."

## 2NC

#### Including energy regulations adds five million research hours

Tugwell 88 Franklin Tugwell joined The Asia Foundation's Board of Trustees in 2010. Dr. Tugwell has served as the President and CEO of Winrock International since 1999. Previously, Dr. Tugwell was the executive director of the Heinz Endowments of Pittsburgh, the founder and president of the Environment Enterprises Assistance Fund, and as a senior consultant for International Projects and Programs at PG&E Enterprises. He served as a deputy assistant administrator at USAID (1980-1981) and as a senior analyst for the energy program at the U.S. Office of Technology Assessment (1979-1980). Dr. Tugwell was also a professor at Pomona College and an adjunct distinguished professor at the Heinz School of Carnegie Mellon University. Additionally, he serves on the Advisory Board and International Committee of the American Council on Renewable Energy and on the Joint Board of Councilors of the China-U.S. Center for Sustainable Development. He also serves on the Board of Eucord (European Cooperative for International Development). Dr. Tugwell received a PhD in political science from Columbia University. “The Energy Crisis and the American Political Economy,” ISBN 0-8047-1500-9

Finally, administering energy regulations proved a costly and cumbersome endeavor, exacting a price all citizens had to pay. As the energy specialist Paul MacAvoy has noted: "More than 300,000 firms were required to respond to controls, ranging from the three dozen major refining companies to a quarter of a million retailers of petroleum products. The respondents had to file more than half a million reports each year, which probably took more than five million man-hours to prepare, at an estimated cost alone of $80 mil- lion."64 To these expenditures must be added the additional costs to the government of collecting and processing these reports, monitor- ing compliance, and managing the complex process associated with setting forth new regulations and adjudicating disputes. All to- gether, it seems likely that the administrative costs, private and public, directly attributable to the regulatory process also exceeded $1 billion a year from 1974 to 1980.^

#### Including energy regs is too big---it’s torture for the neg

Edwards 80 Opinion in BAYOU BOUILLON CORP. v. ATLANTIC RICHFIELD CO. Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit. May 5

Comprehending the applicability and complexity of federal energy regulation necessitates both a stroll down the tortuous legislative path and a review of legal challenges so numerous as to require the establishment of a Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals.

#### That destroys education---too much to comprehend

Stafford 83 G. William is an Associate at Ross, Marsh and Foster. Review of “Federal Regulation of Energy” by William F. Fox, Jr, http://felj.org/elj/Energy%20Journals/Vol6\_No2\_1985\_Book\_Review2.pdf

It may safely be said that any effort to catalogue "the entire spectrum of federal regulation of energy"' in a single volume certainly requires an enterprising effort on the part of the author. In this regard, Mr. Willam F. Fox, Jr., an Associate Professor of Law at Catholic University of America, has undertaken an examination of a vital aspect of United States policy in Federal Regulation of Energy, published in 1983 with an annual pocket supplement available. Despite the complex nature of the subject of his work, Mr. Fox has prepared a text that provides a significant description of many aspects of federal energy regulatory policy. Initially, the book's title may prove somewhat misleading in that it approaches the subject from an historical perspective focused more on substantive than procedural issues. Although a reader gets the impression that the author at time has tried to do too much -at least from the standpoint of the energy practitioner- the historical and technical insights it offers the student of federal energy relation are valuable. Moreover; its detailed explanations of the methods used to tneet federal energy goals are useful for those in the position of initiating energy policy. This strength notwithstanding, it appears unlikely that an energy law practitioner would benefit significantly from its use, other than from its historical point of view. A general impression is that the author may have been overly ambitious in his effort to undertake the monumental task of evaluating laws, regulations, and significant judicial decisions in a single work.

#### Contextual definitions bad – intent to define outweighs

Kupferbreg 87Eric University of Kentucky, Senior Assistant Dean, Academic & Faculty Affairs at Northeastern University, College of Professional Studies Associate Director, Trust Initiative at Harvard School of Public Health 1987 “Limits - The Essence of Topicality” http://groups.wfu.edu/debate/MiscSites/DRGArticles/Kupferberg1987LatAmer.htm

Often, field contextual definitions are too broad or too narrow for debate purposes. Definitions derived from the agricultural sector necessarily incorporated financial and bureaucratic factors which are less relevant in considering a 'should' proposition. Often subject experts' definitions reflected administrative or political motives to expand or limit the relevant jurisdiction of certain actors. Moreover, field context is an insufficient criteria for choosing between competing definitions. A particularly broad field might have several subsets that invite restrictive and even exclusive definitions. (e.g., What is considered 'long-term' for the swine farmer might be significantly different than for the grain farmer.) Why would debaters accept definitions that are inappropriate for debate? If we admit that debate is a unique context, then additional considerations enter into our definitional analysis.

#### Regulation is strictly distinct from restriction of production

Qureshi 46 Indian representative at the United National Social and Economic Council. Verbatim report of the sixth meeting of committee IV. Oct 31st, http://www.wto.org/gatt\_docs/English/SULPDF/90220091.pdf

Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out that in Article 47, Paragraph 1, the regulation of production should not mean restriction of production, otherwise the whole aim of raising the standard of living will be defeated; nor should it mean to discourage the production of certain commodities if certain countries find it necessary to do so and to expand their production in the interests of their country.

#### Energy production is only electricity creation, not extraction

Vaekstfonden 6 Vaekstfonden is a Danish government backed investment fund that facilitates the supply of venture capital in terms of start-up equity and high-risk loans "THE ENERGY INDUSTRY IN DENMARK- perspectives on entrepreneurship andventure capital" No Specific Cited, Latest Data From 2006 s3.amazonaws.com/zanran\_storage/www.siliconvalley.um.dk/ContentPages/43667201.pdf

In all, 20 industry experts were interviewed about the composition and dynamics of the Danish energy sector. Insights from a minimum of 3 industry experts have been assigned to each of the stages in the value chain. Following is a brief description of what the different stages encompass.

Raw material extraction

This stage encompass the process before the actual production of the energy. As an example it is increasingly expensive to locate and extract oil from the North Sea. Likewise coal, gas and waste suitable for energy production can be costly to provide.

Energy production

Energy production encompasses the process, where energy sources are transformed into heat and power.Transmission and distribution

Energy transmission and distribution is in this report defined as the infrastructure that enables the producers of energy to sell energy to consumers.

Consumption

The last stage in the value chain is consumption. This stage encompasses products and services that geographically are placed near the consumers. As an example, decentralized energy production via solar power systems is part of the consumption stage.

# Coal CP

## 1NC

#### TEXT: The United States Federal Government should fund the development and fund installation of emissions mitigation technology for coal-fired plants in the United States. The United States Federal Government should ban the export of any new technologies developed.

#### New EPA regulations require coal to get to the level of natural gas for emissions—only possible with new technologies.

Dayen 12—David Dayen, FDL News, 3/27/12, The End of Coal? New EPA Rules Will Limit GHG Emissions, <http://news.firedoglake.com/2012/03/27/the-end-of-coal-new-epa-rules-will-limit-ghg-emissions/>

After years of study, the EPA will finally release their initial greenhouse gas emissions rules for power plants, which are likely to end the construction of any coal-fired plants from this point forward.¶ The proposed rule — years in the making and approved by the White House after months of review — will require any new power plant to emit no more than 1,000 pounds of carbon dioxide per megawatt of electricity produced. The average U.S. natural gas plant, which emits 800 to 850 pounds of CO2 per megawatt, meets that standard; coal plants emit an average of 1,768 pounds of carbon dioxide per megawatt.¶ Industry officials and environmentalists said in interviews that the rule, which comes on the heels of tough new requirements that the Obama administration imposed on mercury emissions and cross-state pollution from utilities within the past year, dooms any proposal to build a coal-fired plant that does not have costly carbon controls.¶“This standard effectively bans new coal plants,” said Joseph Stanko, who heads government relations at the law firm Hunton and Williams and represents several utility companies. “So I don’t see how that is an ‘all of the above’ energy policy.”¶ I don’t see how coal is “cheap energy.” Pollutants from coal caused a public health crisis and hundreds of thousands if not millions of preventable illnesses and deaths. No coal executive ever paid a dime for that. If they have the technology to create “clean coal” and get under the emissions limits, they can deploy it. They might have to – gasp! – pay for their own research and development to make that happen. It would be a small price to pay in exchange for all the externality costs everyone else has picked up over the years.

#### Government support can help develop and install needed tech

CATF 9—Clean Air Task Force, September, 2009, Innovation Policy for Climate Change: REPORT TO THE NATION

Coal consists primarily of carbon and burning a ton of coal releases about two tons of CO2. In 2007, coal-fired plants—fewer than 1500 boiler-turbine-generator units on perhaps 500 sites—generated 48.5 percent of U.S. electrical power and more than 35 percent of the nation’s CO2 emissions.a Like the United States, China and India have abundant coal reserves that can be cheaply mined for producing low-cost electrical power. China is putting up new coal-burning plants at a high rate and India seems poised to follow within the next decade. Unless PCC technology is reduced to practice and implemented soon, it will be very difficult to stabilize, much less bring down, atmospheric concentrations of CO2.¶ There are two basic ways of reducing or eliminating the CO2 produced when coal burns. The coal can be gasified, for instance in an integrated gasification combined cycle (IGCC) plant, with the CO2 removed prior to combustion. Or CO2 can be removed after coal is burned. The second route is technologically straightforward and at least in principle would permit existing coal-fired power plants to be retrofitted. (IGCC would almost certainly require new construction; so, most likely, would a third alternative, oxyfuel combustion, which burns coal in nearly pure oxygen so as to leave flue gases consisting of nearly pure CO2 to facilitate separation.) Any of these paths would be costly. Adding PCC to an average-size U.S. power plant would probably require an initial investment in the range of $500 million. Operating costs would increase substantially, in part because a considerable fraction of the electricity generated would be consumed in separating out the CO2 and compressing it for transport and sequestration.¶ Separation processes of a sort widely used in industry for other purposes and well understood by chemists and chemical engineers can remove 90 percent or more of the CO2 in flue gas. Gas separation is a standard process in the chemical industry, with many thousands of plants operating worldwide to produce industrial gases for sale, including CO2, which has value in uses that range from carbonating beverages to shielding welding arcs and enhanced oil recovery. Because these markets are small relative to anthropogenic CO2 emissions, experience transfers only partially, and processes such as scrubbing flue gases with amines (compounds related to ammonia, which bind the CO2 for later separation) have yet to be demonstrated on the scale of typical power plants. Long-term sequestration of highly compressed CO2 would likewise need further demonstration for any CCS option. Nonetheless, the major obstacles to PCC appear to lie in the costs, not in technologies for either capture or storage. Expensive new equipment would be needed, costly to operate as well as to build. Electricity costs would rise. Indeed, they might double.¶ Proprietary amine-based processes for separating CO2 from nitrogen (the principal constituent in air, and hence in CO2-heavy flue gases) have been available for decades. They work something like sulfur dioxide scrubbing. All coal contains up to a few percent sulfur, which combines with oxygen during combustion to form sulfur dioxide. In the scrubber, sulfur dioxide reacts chemically with another substance to form a solid that can be disposed of. Power companies began installing sulfur dioxide scrubbers several decades ago; with experience, costs have come down and performance has improved. Amine scrubbers, somewhat similarly, pass flue gases through a solution of an amine compound, generally in water, to absorb (i.e., dissolve) CO2. In a downstream stage, the CO2 is released (“stripped”), leaving a relatively pure gas to be compressed for transport and storage, with the amine solution regenerated for reuse. A 500 MW plant that produces 10 tons per hour of sulfur dioxide might emit some 500 tons per hour of CO2. Thus equipment of much larger size is needed and both first costs and operating costs will be much greater.¶ There are two primary reasons for increased operating costs. In most of the PCC processes so far envisioned, steam from the boiler would be bled off for process heat (e.g., to strip the CO2 from solution). Energy that would otherwise drive the turbine to generate electricity will be lost. (In retrofits, moreover, the turbine may have to be operated off of design conditions, resulting in further losses.) Second, electricity equivalent to a significant portion of the plant’s electrical output will be consumed for driving compressors and pumps, notably for raising the pressure of the CO2 to perhaps 2000 pounds per square inch (over 100 times atmospheric pressure) prior to transport and storage. These “parasitic” losses could amount to 30 percent of the electrical output otherwise available.¶ In the absence of utility-scale demonstrations, cost estimates are uncertain. Engineering studies prepared by the Department of Energy (DOE) for representative cases of retrofits to an existing coal-fired plant and for a new “greenfield” plant, with and without what is described as “advanced amine-based capture technology,” yield an estimated incremental cost of 6.9 ¢ per kilowatt-hour (kWh) for the retrofit case and 5.5 ¢ per kWh for a new plant.b These can be compared with generating costs for a typical pulverized coal plant, put by DOE at 6.4 ¢ per kWh.¶ Costs would probably decline somewhat over time, but gas separation is a relatively mature technology and none of the alternatives to amine separation under investigation appear to hold substantial promise of major, rather than incremental, gains. These alternatives include different amine compounds and combinations of amines, ammonia as a solvent instead of an amine, distillation, membranes that pass CO2 preferentially, and porous solids to adsorb it.¶ In addition to cost increases, retrofitting of existing pulverized coal plants would sharply reduce generating capacity, while retrofitting may be impossible at some sites, perhaps a considerable number, for lack of space (ground area occupied might nearly double). Some of the technical compromises necessary in retrofits could be avoided for new plants, but not the fundamental issue of high investment and operating costs. Gasifying coal and removing the CO2 before combustion, rather than at the “end of the pipe,” holds more promise for greenfield construction.¶ Policy¶ Coal-fired power plants emit huge tonnages of CO2. Equipping such plants to control CO2 emissions will drastically diminish their cost advantages over other generating technologies, perhaps raising the costs above some alternatives. Government technology and innovation policies should support long-term R&D and demonstration aimed at substantial improvements in PCC and CCS (e.g., pre-combustion gasification), but without the expectation of breakthroughs (which are possible but by no means assured), and at higher overall thermal cycle efficiencies, which moderate emissions since less coal must be burned to generate a given amount of electrical power.¶ To this point, business and financing arrangements for implementing PCC have hardly been explored. Chemical companies and equipment suppliers have had little incentive to push forward with engineering development and demonstration. Alternatives for government include simply paying some or all of the costs or mandating installation and allowing the market to determine how costs would be apportioned and revenues raised (e.g., through higher rates for electricity).

## 2NC

#### Most qualified evidence says their methane arg could not possibly be stupider

Carolyn Ruppel, Chief of the US Geological Survey Gas Hydrates Project 12, and Diane Noserale, USFGS scientist, May/June 2012, “Gas Hydrates and Climate Warming—Why a Methane Catastrophe Is Unlikely,” online: <http://soundwaves.usgs.gov/2012/06/>

News stories and Web postings have raised concerns that climate warming will release large volumes of methane from gas hydrates, kicking off a chain reaction of warming and methane releases. But recent research indicates that most of the world’s gas hydrate deposits should remain stable for the next few thousand years. Of the gas hydrates likely to become unstable, few are likely to release methane that could reach the atmosphere and intensify climate warming.

Gas Hydrates Primer

Gas hydrates are an ice-like combination of natural gas and water that can form in deep-water ocean sediments near the continents and within or beneath continuous permafrost. Specific temperatures and pressures and an ample supply of natural gas are required for gas hydrates to form and remain stable.

An estimated 99 percent of gas hydrates are in ocean sediment and the remaining 1 percent in permafrost areas (see map). Methane hydrate or “methane ice,” which is the most common type of gas hydrate, represents a highly concentrated form of methane: one cubic foot of methane hydrate traps about 164 cubic feet of methane gas.

The amount of methane trapped in the Earth’s gas hydrate deposits is uncertain, but even the most conservative estimates conclude that about 1,000 times more methane is trapped in hydrates than is consumed annually worldwide to meet energy needs. The most active area of gas-hydrate research focuses on gas hydrates’ potential as an alternative source of natural gas (for example, see http://web.mit.edu/mitei/research/studies/documents/natural-gas-2011/Supplementary\_Paper\_SP\_2\_4\_Hydrates.pdf [842 KB PDF]); the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) Gas Hydrates Project has several programs addressing this topic (see http://energy.usgs.gov/OilGas/UnconventionalOilGas/GasHydrates.aspx).

Gas Hydrates and Climate Change

Gas hydrate researchers are examining the link between climate change and the stability of methane-hydrate deposits. Warming climate could cause gas hydrates to break down (dissociate), releasing the methane that they now trap.

Methane is a potent greenhouse gas. For a given volume, methane causes 15 to 20 times more greenhouse-gas warming than carbon dioxide, and so the release of large volumes of methane to the atmosphere could, in theory, exacerbate climate warming and cause more gas hydrates to destabilize.

Some research suggests that such large-scale, climate-driven dissociation events have occurred in the past. For example, extreme warming during the Paleocene-Eocene Thermal Maximum about 55 million years ago may have been related to a large-scale release of methane from global methane hydrates. Some scientists have also advanced the clathrate-gun hypothesis to explain observations that may be consistent with repeated, catastrophic dissociation of gas hydrates and triggering of submarine landslides during the late Quaternary (400,000 to 10,000 years ago).

Methane As a Greenhouse Gas

The atmospheric concentration of methane, like that of carbon dioxide, has increased since the onset of the Industrial Revolution. Methane in the atmosphere comes from many sources, including wetlands, rice cultivation, termites, cows and other ruminants, forest fires, and fossil-fuel production. Some researchers have estimated that as much as 2 percent of atmospheric methane may originate with dissociation of global gas hydrates. Currently, scientists do not have a tool to say with certainty how much, if any, atmospheric methane comes from hydrates.

Although methane is a potent greenhouse gas, it does not remain in the atmosphere for long; within about 10 years, it reacts with other compounds in the atmosphere to form carbon dioxide and water. Thus, methane that is released to the atmosphere ultimately adds to the amount of carbon dioxide, the main greenhouse gas.

Climate-Driven Gas Hydrate Dissociation

For the most part, warming at rates documented by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change for the 20th century should not lead to catastrophic breakdown of methane hydrates or major leakage of methane to the ocean-atmosphere system from gas hydrates that dissociate. Although most methane hydrates would have to experience sustained warming over thousands of years before dissociation was triggered, gas hydrates in some places are dissociating now in response to short- and long-term climatic processes.

The following discussion refers to the numbered type locales or sectors shown in the diagram of gas-hydrate deposits below.

Sector 1, Thick Onshore Permafrost: Gas hydrates that occur within or beneath thick terrestrial permafrost will remain largely stable even if climate warming lasts hundreds of years. Over thousands of years, warming could cause gas hydrates at the top of the stability zone, about 625 feet (190 meters) below the Earth’s surface, to begin to dissociate.

Sector 2, Shallow Arctic Shelf: The shallow-water continental shelves that circle parts of the Arctic Ocean were formed when sea-level rise during the past 10,000 years inundated permafrost that was at the coastline. Subsea permafrost is thawing beneath these continental shelves, and associated methane hydrates are likely dissociating now. (For example, see related Sound Waves article "Degradation of Subsea Permafrost and Associated Gas Hydrates Offshore of Alaska in Response to Climate Change.") If methane from these gas hydrates reaches the seafloor, much of it will likely be emitted to the atmosphere. Less than 1 percent of the world’s gas hydrates probably occur in this setting, but this estimate could be revised as scientists learn more.

Sector 3, Upper Edge of Stability: Gas hydrates on upper continental slopes, beneath 1,000 to 1,600 feet (300 to 500 meters) of water, lie at the shallowest water depth for which methane hydrates are stable. The upper continental slopes, which ring all of the world’s continents, could host gas hydrate in zones that are roughly 30 feet (10 meters) thick. Warming ocean waters could completely dissociate these gas hydrates in less than 100 years. Methane emitted at these water depths will probably dissolve or be oxidized in the water column and is unlikely to reach the atmosphere. About 3.5 percent of the Earth’s gas hydrates occur in this climate-sensitive setting.

Sector 4, Deepwater: Most of the Earth’s gas hydrates, about 95 percent, occur in water depths greater than 3,000 feet (1,000 meters). They are likely to remain stable even with a sustained increase in bottom temperatures over thousands of years. Most of the gas hydrates in these settings occur deep within the sediments. If the gas hydrates do dissociate, the released methane should remain trapped in the sediments, migrate upward to form new gas hydrates, or be consumed by oxidation in near-seafloor sediments. Most methane released at the seafloor would likely dissolve or be oxidized in the water column. A recent article, “Methane Hydrates and Contemporary Climate Change,” provides more detail.

#### Be skeptical of their evidence—qualified research concludes neg

Andrew Revkin 11, Senior Fellow for Environmental Understanding at Pace University Academy for Applied Environmental Studies and Founder of the Dot Earth blog for The New York Times, "Methane Time Bomb in Arctic Seas – Apocalypse Not," December 14, The New York Times, dotearth.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/14/methane-time-bomb-in-arctic-seas-apocalypse-not/

A very important research effort has been under way during recent summers in the warming, increasingly ice-free shallows off Russia’s Siberian coast. There, an international array of scientists has been investigating widening areas of open water that are disgorging millions of tons of methane each year.¶ Given that methane, molecule for molecule, has at least 20 times the heat-trapping properties of carbon dioxide, it’s important to get a handle on whether these are new releases, the first foretaste of some great outburst from thawing sea-bed stores of the gas, or simply a longstanding phenomenon newly observed.¶ If you read the Independent of Britain, you’d certainly be thinking the worst. The newspaper has led the charge in fomenting worry over the gas emissions, with portentous, and remarkably similar, stories in 2008 and this week. [Dec. 29, 1:44 p.m. | Updated | Steve Connor, the writer (also science editor) at The Independent, alerted me that the article has been revised with a new headline and expanded to include content that didn't make it into the piece when first published.]¶ If you read geophysical journals and survey scientists tracking past and future methane emissions, you get an entirely different picture:¶ A paper published in Dec. 6 in the Journal of Geophysical Research appears to confirm pretty convincingly that the gas emissions seen in recent years are from a thawing process that has been under way for 8,000 years — since seas rose sufficiently to cover the near-shore seabed. Sharp warming of the sea in the region since 1985 has clearly had an influence on the seabed, according to the paper, led by Igor Dmitrenko of the Leibniz Institute of Marine Sciences in Kiel, Germany.¶ But read this summary of the paper from the American Geophysical Union, which publishes the journal, and see if you feel reassured that the “methane time bomb” there is safe for a long time to come:¶ [T]he authors found that roughly 1 meter of the subsurface permafrost thawed in the past 25 years, adding to the 25 meters of already thawed soil. Forecasting the expected future permafrost thaw, the authors found that even under the most extreme climatic scenario tested this thawed soil growth will not exceed 10 meters by 2100 or 50 meters by the turn of the next millennium. The authors note that the bulk of the methane stores in the east Siberian shelf are trapped roughly 200 meters below the seafloor… [Read the rest.]¶ Here’s the link to the paper itself: “Recent changes in shelf hydrography in the Siberian Arctic: Potential for subsea permafrost instability.”¶ To review, the authors confirm “drastic bottom layer heating over the coastal zone” that they attribute to warming of the Arctic atmosphere, but conclude that “recent climate change cannot produce an immediate response in sub-sea permafrost

t.” That’s the understatement of the year considering their conclusion that even under sustained heating, the brunt of the sub-sea methane won’t be affected in this millennium.¶ It’s worth considering the risks of “single-study syndrome,” given that other recent work continues to find disturbing amounts of methane emissions in Arctic shallows.¶ But scientists who track methane in the atmosphere in the Arctic and elsewhere around the planet see no big surge that can be pinned on such releases. Before I distributed the link to the new paper above to relevant scientists, I’d already heard from Ed Dlugokencky, one of the top federal researchers tracking methane trends. He sent a detailed review of atmospheric measurements from the Arctic to the Equator and concluded, quite simply:¶ [B]ased on what we see in the atmosphere, there is no evidence of substantial increases in methane emissions from the Arctic in the past 20 years.

#### Soft power fails---no coordination between US diplomatic agencies and it’s not key to influence

Adelman 11---Master’s and PhD from Georgetown’s School. Frmr director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, former Ambassador to the UN, and former member of Pentagon's Defense Policy Board (6/18/11, Ken, Not-So-Smart Power, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/04/18/not\_so\_smart\_power)

I didn't hear of similar activities from soft-power agencies -- past diplomats, USAID directors, agricultural-aid types -- with their Egyptian counterparts. The only diplomatic initiative that got any public attention involved the gifted former U.S. ambassador to Egypt, Frank Wisner, who was suddenly dispatched to Cairo at Clinton's request. But he, or she, made a real hash of it, for just as Obama had finally realized that Mubarak must go, Wisner publicly announced that Mubarak must stay -- at least for a while, to provide stability in any transition. Not exactly a case study in smart power.

To his credit, even Nye admits that the line between soft and hard power is a blurry one, though he generally equates the former with the State Department and USAID budgets and the latter with the Pentagon. Yet the distinction breaks down pretty quickly, especially when you consider that many U.S. military activities have boosted America's reputation and enhanced its influence abroad -- more so than any diplomatic or U.S. foreign-aid event. The U.S. Navy's quick, effective reaction to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, its timely assistance to Cyclone Nargis in Burma, its relief from awful flooding in Pakistan, and now its efforts in Japan have all been superb. What case studies from soft-power budgets that Joe Nye so desperately wants maintained could he use in his Kennedy School of Government classes to match these from the hard-power Pentagon budget?

Moreover, America's prime soft-power agency may be too soft to be effective. Let's recall: The State Department agreed to the Mubarak government's request for its approval before any U.S. democracy programs for Egypt got launched. To put it simply, the soft-power agency consented that anti-dictator programs appropriated by the U.S. Congress first get approved by that dictator.

And recent Washington Post editorials have complained about the State Department being unable, or unwilling, to spend allocated funds on an effective freedom agenda. Its Feb. 5, 2011, editorial, for instance, included this astonishing fact: "Congress allocated $30 million in the fiscal 2010 budget for the State Department to fund Internet freedom. But 16 months later, none of the funds have been allocated." What's not to like in such a mission?

The State Department has been reluctant, if not resistant, in helping modern-day freedom fighters in Iran, Libya, and Syria. This seems a no-brainer, as they're all places of need. There should be none of the usual fears of offending the host government, because the governments of these three countries couldn't be any more hostile to the United States or more ferocious toward their own people than they are now.

Besides resting on soft assumptions, emphasis on soft power may lead to soft thinking. Take Clinton's hallmark "three Ds" of defense, diplomacy, and development. While Americans do defense and diplomacy, they don't do development well. The United States can't be held responsible for another country doing what's needed to develop. By now, there's a checklist of how countries can go from poverty to prosperity -- low taxes, private property protected by law, restrained and limited government, solid currency, modern infrastructure, and attacks on corruption. But the State Department simply can't do much to ensure these elements are done well.

I wish to end on a positive note, especially because Joseph Nye is such a fine person. He's contributed enormously to the United States, always asking hard questions on conventional thinking. He surely would welcome the same on today's fashionable thinking.

All this may boil down to a big difference. I've come to believe that liberals focus primarily on intentions, while conservatives focus more on results. No doubt the soft-power goals of the State Department and USAID on diplomacy, foreign aid, exchange programs, and the like seem wonderful. They're peaceful, caring, intercultural, and so on. They signal the right intentions.

The hard-power association with Pentagon budgets, weapons, and soldiers seems quite contrary. They signal the wrong intentions. But looking at the actual results of soft power versus hard power may yield results that make today's fashionable thinking seem soft, if not altogether squishy.

#### No impact to biodiversity

Sagoff 97  Mark, Senior Research Scholar – Institute for Philosophy and Public policy in School of Public Affairs – U. Maryland, William and Mary Law Review, “INSTITUTE OF BILL OF RIGHTS LAW SYMPOSIUM DEFINING TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT REGULATION: MUDDLE OR MUDDLE THROUGH? TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE MEETS THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT”, 38 Wm and Mary L. Rev. 825, March, L/N

Note – Colin Tudge - Research Fellow at the Centre for Philosophy at the London School of Economics. Frmr Zoological Society of London: Scientific Fellow and tons of other positions. PhD. Read zoology at Cambridge.

Simon Levin = Moffet Professor of Biology, Princeton. 2007 American Institute of Biological Sciences Distinguished Scientist Award 2008 Istituto Veneto di Scienze Lettere ed Arti 2009 Honorary Doctorate of Science, Michigan State University 2010 Eminent Ecologist Award, Ecological Society of America 2010 Margalef Prize in Ecology, etc… PhD

Although one may agree with ecologists such as Ehrlich and Raven that the earth stands on **the brink of** an episode of **massive extinction, it may not follow** from this grim fact **that human** being**s will suffer** as a result. On the contrary, skeptics such as science writer Colin Tudge have challenged biologists to explain **why we need more than a tenth of the 10 to 100 million species that grace the earth**. Noting that "cultivated systems often out-produce wild systems by 100-fold or more," Tudge declared that "the argument that humans need the variety of other species is, when you think about it, a theological one." n343 Tudge observed that "the elimination of all but a tiny minority **of our fellow creatures does not affect the material well-being of humans** one iota."n344 This skeptic challenged ecologists to list more than 10,000 species (other than unthreatened microbes) that are essential to ecosystem productivity or functioning. n345 "**The human species could survive just as well** if 99.9% of our fellow creatures went extinct, provided only that we retained the appropriate 0.1% that we need." n346   [\*906]   The monumental Global Biodiversity Assessment ("the Assessment") identified two positions with respect to redundancy of species. "At one extreme is the idea that each species is unique and important, such that its removal or loss will have demonstrable consequences to the functioning of the community or ecosystem." n347 The authors of the Assessment, a panel of eminent ecologists, endorsed this position, saying it is "unlikely that there is much, if any, ecological redundancy in communities over time scales of decades to centuries, the time period over which environmental policy should operate." n348 These eminent ecologists rejected the opposing view, "the notion that species overlap in function to a sufficient degree that removal or loss of a species will be compensated by others, with negligible overall consequences to the community or ecosystem." n349  Other biologists believe, however, that species are so fabulously redundant in the ecological functions they perform that the life-support systems and processes of the planet and ecological processes in general will function perfectly well with fewer of them, certainly fewer than the millions and millions we can expect to remain **even if** **every threatened organism becomes extinct**. n350 Even the kind of sparse and miserable world depicted in the movie Blade Runner could provide a "sustainable" context for the human economy as long as people forgot their aesthetic and moral commitment to the glory and beauty of the natural world. n351 The Assessment makes this point. "Although any ecosystem contains hundreds to thousands of species interacting among themselves and their physical environment, the emerging consensus is that the system is driven by a small number of . . . biotic variables on whose interactions the balance of species are, in a sense, carried along." n352   [\*907]   To make up your mind on the question of the functional redundancy of species, consider an endangered species of bird, plant, or insect and ask how the ecosystem would fare in its absence. The fact that the creature is endangered suggests an answer: it is already in limbo as far as ecosystem processes are concerned. What crucial ecological services does the black-capped vireo, for example, serve? Are any of the species threatened with extinction necessary to the provision of any ecosystem service on which humans depend? If so, which ones are they?  Ecosystems and the species that compose them have changed, dramatically, continually, and totally in virtually every part of the United States. There is little ecological similarity, for example, between New England today and the land where the Pilgrims died. n353 In view of the constant reconfiguration of the biota, **one may wonder why Americans have not suffered more as a result of ecological catastrophes**. The cast of species in nearly every environment changes constantly-local extinction is commonplace in nature-but the crops still grow. Somehow, it seems, property values keep going up on Martha's Vineyard in spite of the tragic disappearance of the heath hen.  One might argue that the sheer number and variety of creatures available to any ecosystem buffers that system against stress. Accordingly, we should be concerned if the "library" of creatures ready, willing, and able to colonize ecosystems gets too small. (Advances in genetic engineering may well permit us to write a large number of additions to that "library.") In the United States as in many other parts of the world, however, the number of species has been increasing dramatically, not decreasing, as a result of human activity. This is because the hordes of exotic species coming into ecosystems in the United States far exceed the number of species that are becoming extinct. Indeed, introductions may outnumber extinctions by more than ten to one, so that the United States is becoming more and more species-rich all the time largely as a result of human action. n354 [\*908] Peter Vitousek and colleagues estimate that over 1000 non-native plants grow in California alone; in Hawaii there are 861; in Florida, 1210. n355 In Florida more than 1000 non-native insects, 23 species of mammals, and about 11 exotic birds have established themselves. n356 Anyone who waters a lawn or hoes a garden knows how many weeds desire to grow there, how many birds and bugs visit the yard, and how many fungi, creepy-crawlies, and other odd life forms show forth when it rains. All belong to nature, from wherever they might hail, but not many homeowners would claim that there are too few of them. Now, not all exotic species provide ecosystem services; indeed, some may be disruptive or have no instrumental value. n357 This also may be true, of course, of native species as well, especially because all exotics are native somewhere. Certain exotic species, however, such as Kentucky blue grass, establish an area's sense of identity and place; others, such as the green crabs showing up around Martha's Vineyard, are nuisances. n358 Consider an analogy [\*909] with human migration. Everyone knows that after a generation or two, immigrants to this country are hard to distinguish from everyone else. The vast majority of Americans did not evolve here, as it were, from hominids; most of us "came over" at one time or another. This is true of many of our fellow species as well, and they may fit in here just as well as we do. It is possible to distinguish exotic species from native ones for a period of time, just as we can distinguish immigrants from native-born Americans, but as the centuries roll by, species, like people, fit into the landscape or the society, changing and often enriching it. Shall we have a rule that a species had to come over on the Mayflower, as so many did, to count as "truly" American? Plainly not. When, then, is the cutoff date? Insofar as we are concerned with the absolute numbers of "rivets" holding ecosystems together, extinction seems not to pose a general problem because a far greater number of kinds of mammals, insects, fish, plants, and other creatures thrive on land and in water in America today than in prelapsarian times. n359 The Ecological Society of America has urged managers to maintain biological diversity as a critical component in strengthening ecosystems against disturbance. n360 Yet as Simon Levin observed, "much of the detail about species composition will be irrelevant in terms of influences on ecosystem properties." n361 [\*910] He added: "For net primary productivity, as is likely to be the case for any system property, **biodiversity matters only up to a point**; above a certain level, increasing biodiversity is likely to make **little difference**." n362 What about the use of plants and animals in agriculture? There is no scarcity foreseeable. "Of an estimated 80,000 types of plants [we] know to be edible," a U.S. Department of the Interior document says, "only about 150 are extensively cultivated." n363 About twenty species, not one of which is endangered, provide ninety percent of the food the world takes from plants. n364 Any new food has to take "shelf space" or "market share" from one that is now produced. Corporations also find it difficult to create demand for a new product; for example, people are not inclined to eat paw-paws, even though they are delicious. It is hard enough to get people to eat their broccoli and lima beans. It is harder still to develop consumer demand for new foods. This may be the reason the Kraft Corporation does not prospect in remote places for rare and unusual plants and animals to add to the world's diet. Of the roughly 235,000 flowering plants and 325,000 nonflowering plants (including mosses, lichens, and seaweeds) available, farmers ignore virtually all of them in favor of a very few that are profitable. n365 To be sure, any of the more than 600,000 species of plants could have an application in agriculture, but would they be preferable to the species that are now dominant? Has anyone found any consumer demand for any of these half-million or more plants to replace rice or wheat in the human diet? There are reasons that farmers cultivate rice, wheat, and corn rather than, say, Furbish's lousewort. There are many kinds of louseworts, so named because these weeds were thought to cause lice in sheep. How many does agriculture really require? [\*911] The species on which agriculture relies are domesticated, not naturally occurring; they are developed by artificial not natural selection; they might not be able to survive in the wild. n366 This argument is not intended to deny the religious, aesthetic, cultural, and moral reasons that command us to respect and protect the natural world. These spiritual and ethical values should evoke action, of course, but we should also recognize that they are spiritual and ethical values. We should recognize that ecosystems and all that dwell therein compel our moral respect, our aesthetic appreciation, and our spiritual veneration; we should clearly seek to achieve the goals of the ESA. There is no reason to assume, however, that these goals have anything to do with human well-being or welfare as economists understand that term. These are ethical goals, in other words, not economic ones. Protecting the marsh may be the right thing to do for moral, cultural, and spiritual reasons. We should do it-but someone will have to pay the costs. In the narrow sense of promoting human welfare, protecting nature often represents a net "cost," not a net "benefit." It is largely for moral, not economic, reasons-ethical, not prudential, reasons- that we care about all our fellow creatures. They are valuable as objects of love not as objects of use. What is good for   [\*912]  the marsh may be good in itself even if it is not, in the economic sense, good for mankind. The most valuable things are quite useless.

## 1NR

#### No incentive to drill gas hydrates, even if the economic calculus changes

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The timeline for commercialization of gas hydrate deposits depends most critically on two factors: (1) research and development advances to prove the resource and to surmount some of the other key obstacles and (2) an economic, political, or natural gas supply climate in which there is urgency to develop the resource potential of gas hydrates. Gas hydrates, despite the amount of methane they sequester, are probably the least likely of unconventional resources to be tapped for natural gas within the next few decades, **even if the economics or supply model changes dramatically**. Still, there are strong arguments to be made for a continuing R&D effort to address the remaining challenges in advancing gas hydrates along a trajectory towards viability as a resource. Activities undertaken now will be critical for ensuring the availability of this gas twenty or more years in the future and for improving the energy security of nations currently lacking access to a domestic gas supply.

#### Transportation issues block solvency

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The economic evaluations discussed above incorporate some of the prospective costs associated with pipelines. It is important to note that transportation issues probably pose an even greater economic challenge for gas hydrates than for many conventional gas reservoirs or for some other forms of unconventional gas. The primary reason is geographic: Many conventional and unconventional (e.g., shale, coalbed) deposits are closer to production and distribution infrastructure than the deepwater marine and permafrost areas where resource-grade gas hydrates are concentrated. This is one factor motivating researchers to maintain that initial commercialscale production of gas from hydrate will probably occur on the Alaskan North Slope near existing infrastructure that can immediately exploit the gas to run on-site operations.

# SEP CP

## 1NC

#### The United States Federal Government should establish that the penalty for violating the Environmental Protection Agency’s New Source Performance Standards and National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants Reviews for natural gas production may include entry into a Supplemental Environmental Project.

#### Implementation of the Supplemental Environmental Projects should follow the 1991 *Policy on the Use of Supplemental Environmental Projects in EPA Settlements*, and any conflicting federal laws and regulations should be modified to provide a narrow exemption for the above penalty.

#### Penalties determine regulatory compliance—restrictions are irrelevant if penalties are marginal

CPR 8 – The Center for Progressive Reform, a nonprofit research and educational organization with a network of Member Scholars working to protect health, safety, and the environment through analysis and commentary, 2008, “Environmental Enforcement,” <http://progressiveregulation.org/perspectives/environEnforce.html>

Effective enforcement is key to ensuring that the ambitious goals of our environmental statutes are realized. Enforcement refers to the set of actions that the government can take to promote compliance with environmental law. . Currently, rates of noncompliance with environmental laws remain disturbingly high; experts believe that as many as twenty to forty percent of firms regulated by federal environmental statutes regularly violate the law. Tens of millions of citizens live in areas out of compliance with the health based standards of the Clean Air Act, and close to half of the water bodies in the country fail to meet water quality standards set by the Clean Water Act. In communities burdened by multiple sources of pollution, noncompliance has particularly serious health consequences for affected residents.

As in virtually every other area of government regulation, environmental enforcement traditionally has been based on the theory of deterrence. This theory assumes that persons and businesses act rationally to maximize profits, and will comply with the law where the costs of noncompliance outweigh the benefits of noncompliance. The job of enforcement agencies is to make both penalties and the probability of detection high enough that it becomes irrational– unprofitable-- for regulated firms to violate the law.

EPA’s enforcement policies traditionally have reflected these principles. EPA has emphasized the importance of regular inspections and monitoring activity to detect noncompliance, and has responded to violations with swift and appropriate sanctions. EPA’s policies also mandate that the agency recover the economic benefit firms realize through noncompliance, since **if a firm is able to profit from illegal activity, it has little incentive to comply in the first place.**

State environmental agencies actually carry out the majority of enforcement activity in this country because most states have received authority from EPA to administer federal environmental laws under EPA oversight (see CPR Perspective on Devolution) States also administer and enforce their own state laws. As in other areas of environmental regulation, the quality of state enforcement programs vary considerably. Some states carefully follow EPA mandates and vigorously enforce environmental requirements. In other states, enforcement is relatively lax, and agencies rarely respond to violations with penalties.

Citizen enforcement also is a feature of most federal environmental statutes. The statutes allow citizens to sue companies for violations when the government fails to do so and various, often strict, procedural conditions are met. Traditionally, Congress has viewed citizen enforcement as an important supplement to agency enforcement and an important prod to agency regulators.

What People are Fighting About

In recent years there has been a sharp debate over the future direction of environmental enforcement. Many states and regulated entities advocate a more business-friendly, conciliatory enforcement strategy, one that does not emphasize enforcement actions and penalties as the keys to securing compliance. In their view, businesses are likely to comply without resort to sanctions because of adherence to social and political norms, market forces, and other factors.

Thus, many states have reduced funding for inspections. enforcement cases and similar activities, and shifted resources toward compliance assistance programs. Some have created “customer service centers” for regulated entities. Many states do not follow EPA guidance for responding to violations with “timely and appropriate” enforcement actions. Many impose only limited penalties on violators, penalties that typically are far lower than those assessed by EPA in similar circumstances. Many states fail to recover economic benefit when assessing penalties--a core element of deterrence theory. In the past decade, almost one-half of the states have enacted environmental audit privilege or immunity laws that preclude penalties for violations voluntarily disclosed and corrected by regulated entities as a result of environmental audits. These laws also keep materials contained in environmental audits secret and exempt from public disclosure.

At the same time, EPA has to some degree deemphasized traditional enforcement and used its limited resources to provide more compliance assistance to small businesses and other regulated sectors. It has also searched for positive incentives for companies that carry out self-policing efforts. Until very recently, however, EPA has continued to demand that the states impose sanctions, conduct inspections, and bring enforcement actions as the main tools for deterring firms from violating the law. EPA also resisted the most far-reaching efforts of states to weaken enforcement of environmental laws. Funding shortfalls and emerging policy changes in such areas as whether new sources must obtain new permits have taken their toll and EPA’s commitment to deterrence-based enforcement appears to be weakening.

In reaction to these changes, environmental groups, contend that government enforcement is too lax, that too often fines for violating environmental requirements have become no more than a routine cost of doing business for regulated entities, and that the government lacks the resources to pursue most violations. They would like to more vigorously enforce environmental violations. During the past decade or so, however, the Supreme Court has erected a series of hurdles to citizen enforcement of environmental laws. The Court has imposed restrictions on who has standing to bring suit, what type of illegal conduct can be challenged, when a decision is “ripe” for suit, when government agencies can be sued, and when attorneys fees can be awarded to successful plaintiffs’ attorneys. These court-imposed obstacles have significantly undermined the role envisioned by Congress for citizen enforcers.

#### Establishing SEP penalties solves inevitable environmental crisis

Jeff Ganguly, Executive Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, Fall 1998, COMMENT: ENVIRONMENTAL REMEDIATION THROUGH SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROJECTS AND CREATIVE NEGOTIATION: RENEWED COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT IN FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT, 26 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 189, Lexis

Such a dynamic has been developing through EPA's employment of SEPs as well. While oversight is critical to ensure the SEP program continues to attain breakthrough achievements in creative and effective settlement agreements, the unique ability of SEPs to respond to the individual circumstances of environmental problems must be maintained. Thus, while litigation remains an effective tool to apply pressure and force action in some cases, dispute resolution and creative settlements should become the goal in the new generation of environmental enforcement. The use of SEPs is only one advantage to dispute resolution, as SEP provisions could be written into federal statutes and become an everyday part of adjudicated relief. Dispute resolution also saves time and money. n303 All of these qualities, as evidenced by the MHD settlement, are the most effective means of responding to environmental crises. Apart from outright prevention, dispute negotiation and community remediation through creative settlements and SEPs continue to be one of the most effective means of preserving and protecting human health and the environment.

# Spot Pricing DA

#### US LNG exports cause a global transition from oil indexation to spot pricing

Hulbert 12 (Matthew Hulbert - Lead Analyst at European Energy Review, government consultant, Senior Research Fellow @ Netherlands Institute for International Relations, working on energy and political risk. Senior Energy Analyst at Datamonitor for global utilities. “Why America Can Make or Break A New Global Gas World,” 8/05/2012 http://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewhulbert/2012/08/05/why-america-can-make-or-break-a-new-global-gas-world)

The same **debate is raging in the US**. Despite the phenomenal breakthroughs in American shale developments, the front runner of the revolution now risks becoming a victim of its own success in terms of Henry Hub prices dropping so low, that full cycle economics for US shale gas plays have become negative. Unless prices organically firm, or US producers learn the dark art of supply restraint, current output levels will be difficult to maintain or enhance for American consumers. Companies will fold; fields will be mothballed, with Chesapeake providing the best ‘poster boy’ example of how precarious shale gas economics have become. The quick fix option to get Henry Hub back at a sustainable $4-7/MMbtu level (and by far the most lucrative for some of the mid-cap players involved), is to sign up international LNG contracts. That’s exactly what’s being done, with some of the larger IOCs (Royal Dutch Shell, BP and ExxonMobil) also aggressively pushing for LNG exports to capitalise on huge spreads, not to mention preventing further write-downs on shale assets. It’s not like Chinese champions working on US plays would have any ideological opposition to such a prospect. In total, **FERC has around 125bcm/y of LNG applications currently awaiting approval** – even on a ‘bad day’ 40-50bcm exports should be very feasible by 2020. **That would make the US** the third largest LNG player in the world. **It’s also going to be** the crucial factor over the next five years **to decide where gas markets are heading**. **America will be** decisive **for** future pricing models**,** **whether they shift to gas (rather than oil) fundamentals**. US LNG could be the straw that breaks oil indexation back.

#### Spot pricing causes short term volatility---Russia floods the market to crowd out producers and engages in collusion to drive up future prices

Hulbert 12 (Matthew Hulbert - Lead Analyst at European Energy Review, government consultant, Senior Research Fellow @ Netherlands Institute for International Relations, working on energy and political risk. Senior Energy Analyst at Datamonitor for global utilities. “Why America Can Make or Break A New Global Gas World,” 8/05/2012 http://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewhulbert/2012/08/05/why-america-can-make-or-break-a-new-global-gas-world)

But it’s not all bad news for Russia. The first point is that most consumers (especially continental Europeans) are labouring under the illusion that spot markets mean cheap prices. What they miss, is that **setting gas prices based on gas fundamentals has got nothing to do with being cheap** – it’s purely about achieving a cost reflective price for whatever the markets (and fundamentals) suggest gas should be. Gas on gas competition might well have positive medium term effects on price given marginal costs of production are generally cheaper than oil. But there are never any guarantees. If anything, **prices could initially be far more volatile than those associated with piped gas given the cyclical nature of the beast**, not to mention adapting to new upstream investment regimes unable to fall back on the oil ‘certainties’ of old. But assuming these initial hurdles are jumped and gas markets are politically allowed to bed in, that’s where the real fun and games start. As much as consumers think they’ve taken the political sting out of gas producers tails, **spot markets could actually give producers far more leverage to manipulate prices, either on a collective or bilateral basis**. When you take a quick look at the map, it’s clear to see **supply side dynamics are essentially oligopolistic in Europe, a position that Russia might decide to capitalise on**. The question is whether Russia would have the nerve to go for it, or be able to take the ideological leap of faith needed to explore and exploit a potentially lucrative new world of gas benchmarks?

Much would depend on pricing pressures involved and how far convergence has got, but **the lower prices go, the more compelling prospect supply side collusion would become**. Warning shots along such lines have been repeatedly fired by the GECF (even if often behind closed doors) with Russia, Algeria, Iran and Venezuela all wanting to recalibrate markets back towards producer interests. Obviously someone would have to shoulder initial opportunity costs and absorb likely free riding, enforce quotas and restrict new market entry at the fringe. They would also need to find a swing producer, that many have long thought would be Qatar, but actually, flags up a huge opportunity for Russia here.

Instead of issuing empty threats to flood markets or decimate upstream investments, independent gas benchmarks might just provide Moscow with sufficient incentive to do what it should always have done: get to grips with the fact that US shale has made Russia a price taker in Europe (and Asia), and start developing LNG prospects to reclaim control of global gas fundamentals. Despite sitting on over 30% of global gas supplies, Russian LNG production accounts for less than 5% of global share. Moscow has let itself become a fringe player in a global gas world. A ridiculous statement when you consider Russia is the gas equivalent to Saudi Arabia for oil. Developing Shtokman, Sakhalin and indeed Bazhenov and Achimov fields will undoubtedly put some people’s nose out of joint, but given **Russia’s own unconventional reserves are estimated to be ten times larger than the whole of Europe**, it still has the time (and potential) to break anybody in the field on volume to dictate long term prices. If global gas benchmarks are the way of the future, then we should at least be aware that **Russia has the potential to play a pivotal role as the swing LNG producer** of the world. **The initial 62 million tonnes of LNG Shtokman and Sakhalin should hold, tells us as much.**

Not only could Russia lean far heavier on Qatar, Australia, Algeria, West African and burgeoning Latin American LNG production **to align short term prices**, **it would set the stage for a serious approach towards a** gas cartel **as** the logical conclusion of independent global gas prices. Worst of all, Russia’s swing status would be built on the shoulders of a well-supplied, but largely isolated US market. If the US goes native, Europe fails to develop indigenous supplies, and Asia soaks up excess supplies, then **Russia can have lots of fun applying its own logic of ‘gas on gas’ competition**. That should certainly give Europe something to think about at the wrong end of the Eurasian pipeline. But you never know, if Brussels asks the Chinese politely, the clever chaps in Beijing might have a plan C. Beijing LNG ‘freedom carriers’ making their way to Europe by 2025 might just be a better bet than hoping the US delivers on its global gas potential. Ironic times indeed.

#### Causes Russian resurgence

Fang et al 12 (Songying Fang - Ph.D. Assistant Professor of Political Science Rice University. Amy Myers Jaffe - Fellow in Energy Studies JamesA. Baker III Institute for Public Policy Rice University. TedTemzelides, Ph.D., Prof of Economics. “New Alignments? The Geopolitics of Gas and Oil Cartels and the Changing Middle East,” January 2012, <http://www.bakerinstitute.org/publications/EF-pub-GasOilCartels-012312.pdf>)

Ill this study, we investigate three related questions raised by the above observations. First, what is the likelihood that Russia will be successful in creating new coalitions in energy markets in the near future? Russia’s aggressive use of its own energy exports as a tool of statecraft and diplomatic leverage in recent years **has reintroduced fears of an “energy weapon”** that could be wielded in international discourse. It has been argued that tightening energy markets could raise the benefits and possible chances of success for an energy exporting country that, alone or in combination with others, **is trying to wrest political concessions** by threatening to cut off energy supplies. Such an event would present a challenge for the international economy, and it could even lead to military conflict.2

#### Russian resurgence causes global nuclear war

Blank 9 – Dr. Stephen Blank , Research Professor of National Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, March 2009, “Russia And Arms Control: Are There Opportunities For The Obama Administration?,” online: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub908.pdf

Proliferators or nuclear states like China and Russia can then deter regional or intercontinental attacks either by denial or by threat of retaliation.168 Given a multipolar world structure with little ideological rivalry among major powers, it is unlikely that they will go to war with each other. Rather, like Russia, they will strive for exclusive hegemony in their own “sphere of influence” and use nuclear instruments towards that end. However, wars may well break out between major powers and weaker “peripheral” states or between peripheral and semiperipheral states given their lack of domestic legitimacy, the absence of the means of crisis prevention, the visible absence of crisis management mechanisms, and their strategic calculation that asymmetric wars might give them the victory or respite they need.169 Simultaneously,

The states of periphery and semiperiphery have far more opportunities for political maneuvering. Since war remains a political option, these states may find it convenient to exercise their military power as a means for achieving political objectives. Thus international crises may increase in number. This has two important implications for the use of WMD. First, they may be used deliberately to offer a decisive victory (or in Russia’s case, to achieve “intra-war escalation control”—author170) to the striker, or for defensive purposes when imbalances in military capabilities are significant; and second, crises increase the possibilities of inadvertent or accidental wars involving WMD.171

Obviously nuclear proliferators or states that are expanding their nuclear arsenals like Russia can exercise a great influence upon world politics if they chose to defy the prevailing consensus and use their weapons not as defensive weapons, as has been commonly thought, but as offensive weapons to threaten other states and deter nuclear powers. Their decision to go either for cooperative security and strengthened international military-political norms of action, or for individual national “egotism” will critically affect world politics. For, as Roberts observes,

But if they drift away from those efforts [to bring about more cooperative security], the consequences could be profound. At the very least, the effective functioning of inherited mechanisms of world order, such as the special responsibility of the “great powers” in the management of the interstate system, especially problems of armed aggression, under the aegis of collective security, could be significantly impaired. Armed with the ability to defeat an intervention, or impose substantial costs in blood or money on an intervening force or the populaces of the nations marshaling that force, the newly empowered tier could bring an end to collective security operations, undermine the credibility of alliance commitments by the great powers, [undermine guarantees of extended deterrence by them to threatened nations and states] extend alliances of their own, and perhaps make wars of aggression on their neighbors or their own people.172

# Solvency

## 1NC

#### Federal regulation prevents future backlash---states are insufficient

Friedman 12 Thomas Friedman – winner of three Pulitzer Prizes, columnist for Foreign affairs, Previously chief economic correspondent in the Washington bureau and chief White House correspondent. “Get It Right on Gas,” August 4, 2012, The New York Times)

On July 19, Forbes interviewed George Phydias Mitchell, who, in the 1990s, pioneered the use of fracking to break natural gas free from impermeable shale. According to Forbes, Mitchell argued that **fracking needs to be regulated by the** D**epartment** o**f** E**nergy, not just states: “**Because if they don’t do it right, there could be trouble,” he says. There’s no excuse not to get it right. “There are good techniques to make it safe that should be followed properly,” he says. But, the smaller, independent drillers, “are wild.” “It’s tough to control these independents. If they do something wrong and dangerous, they should punish them.”¶ Adds Fred Krupp, the president of the Environmental Defense Fund who has been working with the government and companies on drilling standards: “The economic and national security advantages of natural gas are obvious, but if you tour some of these areas of intensive development the environmental impacts are equally obvious.” We need nationally accepted standards for controlling methane leakage, for controlling water used in fracking — where you get it, how you treat the polluted water that comes out from the fracking process and how you protect aquifers — and for ensuring that communities have the right to say no to drilling. “The key message,” said Krupp, “is you gotta get the rules right. States need real inspector capacity and compliance schemes where companies certify they have done it right and there are severe penalties if they perjure.”¶ **Energy companies who want to keep regulations lax need to understand that a series of mishaps around natural gas will** — justifiably — trigger an environmental backlash to stop it.

#### EPA Regulation key to solve warming and doesn’t hurt industry production

NYT 12 John Broder, April 18, 2012, "U.S. Caps Emissions in Drilling for Fuel" [www.nytimes.com/2012/04/19/science/earth/epa-caps-emissions-at-gas-and-oil-wells.html](http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/19/science/earth/epa-caps-emissions-at-gas-and-oil-wells.html)

Oil and gas companies will have to capture toxic and climate-altering gases from wells, storage sites and pipelines under new air quality standards issued on Wednesday by the Environmental Protection Agency.¶ The rule is the first federal effort to address serious air pollution associated with the natural gas drilling process known as hydraulic fracturing, or fracking, which releases toxic and cancer-causing chemicals like benzene and hexane, as well as methane, a powerful greenhouse gas.¶ The standards were proposed last summer in response to complaints from citizens and environmental groups that gases escaping from the 13,000 wells drilled each year by fracking were causing health problems and widespread air pollution.¶ Industry groups said meeting the proposed standards would cost hundreds of millions of dollars and slow the boom in domestic natural gas production. The original proposal was significantly revised, **giving industry more than two years to comply and lowering the cost.**¶ “Because these regulations rely on technologies and practices that are already in use by some companies and required by some states, they are practical, flexible, affordable and achievable,” Gina McCarthy, head of the E.P.A.’s office of air and radiation, said in a conference call. “Natural gas is key to our clean energy future.”¶ She said **the new rule would reduce emissions of volatile organic compounds by** 190,000 to **290,000 tons per year and toxic air pollutants by** 12,000 to **20,000** tons a year.¶ The agency said that **the industry could meet the standards by deploying existing technology**, and that nearly half the wells drilled using hydraulic fracturing already had the gas capture equipment, known as “green completions.”¶ The agency said that once the rule was fully effective, in January 2015**, the industry would save** $11 million to **$19 million a year** because drillers would be able to capture and sell the methane that is now burned off, or flared.¶ Methane is a potent heat-trapping gas, 20 times more powerful in its effect on the atmosphere than carbon dioxide. The E.P.A. estimates that **capturing methane from thousands of new wells will reduce greenhouse gas emissions by** the equivalent of 28 million to **44 million tons a year**, making the rule one of the federal government’s largest measures to mitigate climate change.¶ The American Petroleum Institute, which had lobbied to weaken the proposed rule, said the revised standards issued Wednesday were an improvement over the original proposal. Howard **Feldman, the institute’s** director **of regulatory and scientific affairs, said the industry had** already adopted many of the requirements **of the new rule and welcomed the delay in its effective date.**¶“The industry has led efforts to reduce emissions by developing new technologies that were adopted in the rule,” Mr. Feldman said. “E.P.A. has made some improvement in the rules that allow our companies to continue reducing emissions while producing the oil and natural gas our country needs.”¶ Other industry groups were less generous. The Western Energy Alliance, a group of independent oil and gas companies, said the new rule’s costs far outweighed its benefits and accused the E.P.A. of using the Clean Air Act illegally to deal with global warming.¶ Kathleen Sgamma, the group’s vice president for government affairs, also asserted that the rules were not flexible enough “to account for new exploratory areas where infrastructure does not yet exist.”¶ “Small businesses disproportionately operate in such conditions, and this rule could make exploring in new areas cost-prohibitive,” she said.¶ Environmental advocacy groups said the new rule was a step forward for clean air. The American Lung Association said that the reduction of a variety of emissions, including sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxide and volatile organic compounds, would improve the health of people living downwind from oil and gas operations.¶ Ann Brewster Weeks, senior counsel for the Clean Air Task Force, said **reductions in emissions that contribute to smog and global warming were good news** but objected to the E.P.A.’s concessions on the timetable.

## 2NC

#### States are ineffective---Federal regulation is necessary to set baseline standards---solves environmental concerns, federalism and industry confidence

Freeman 12 (Jody Freeman - Harvard law professor, was the White House counselor for energy and climate change in 2009 and 2010, “The Wise Way to Regulate Gas Drilling,” July 5, 2012, New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/06/opinion/the-wise-way-to-regulate-hydraulic-fracturing.html?partner=rssnyt&emc=rssx

AMERICA’S energy future has been transformed by the production of natural gas made possible by hydraulic fracturing. This gas is a much cleaner source of electricity than coal. The problem is that the fracturing process used to extract the gas can, if done improperly, pollute surface and drinking water and emit dangerous air pollution.

States like Texas, Pennsylvania and New York are now rushing to impose their own rules. But **what we really need is a system of federal oversight that will promote confidence in this technique and provide the industry with uniform standards** without overregulating it.

The federal government has the power to regulate some but not all the risks. For example, the Environmental Protection Agency has set standards to control emissions of toxic and greenhouse gases from the drilling process and is considering new rules for polluted wastewater. But in 2005, Congress exempted the fracturing process itself — a process in which huge quantities of water, sand and toxic chemicals are injected into tight shale rock, to force open the rock and capture the gas trapped within — from federal regulation.

**The states have moved forward with a patchwork of regulations — s**ome specific and prescriptive, others vague and general. Many states require some disclosure of the chemicals the drillers use, but in some states drillers decide which chemicals constitute proprietary secrets and therefore do not have to be disclosed. Some states allow operators to store toxic wastewater from the fracturing process in open pits, risking surface or groundwater contamination. Some **states** simply **lack the experience or resources to enforce their standards.**

**The uneven approach is bad** not only for the environment but also for industry, because **under the current system, mistakes by a few bad apples could lead to overregulation or even outright bans on drilling**.

A better approach is one already reflected in many environmental laws: cooperative federalism**. The federal government sets baseline standards, which states can exceed but not fall below**. Ideally, these would be general “performance standards” rather than detailed specifications, giving the states flexibility to meet them.

States might be required to develop comprehensive plans to manage environmental risks. **These plans could account for regional differences and would be based on best practices for disclosure, drilling location, well construction and wastewater treatment.** States would implement and enforce the rules and issue and oversee the operating permits. The federal government could step in if states abdicated their responsibility. Such a regulatory system — with minimum federal standards as well as state plans — has been in place for coal mining since 1977.

For this to work, Congress must lift the regulatory exemptions for hydraulic fracturing. This would allow the E.P.A. to set minimum requirements for the drilling process, which states would implement through federally approved programs. The E.P.A. and the Interior Department, which regulates gas drilling on federal lands, could then establish a clear, comprehensive and consistent federal framework for hydraulic fracturing. The cost would be reasonable: the International Energy Agency recently estimated that adequate environmental protections could increase drilling costs by 7 percent.

**Some might say that a federal role isn’t necessary.** But pollution risks go beyond state borders. If natural gas extraction is a national priority, its safety and efficacy should be of national concern, too. The Obama administration has taken some initial steps to coordinate the federal government’s approach but has been timid about calling for a stronger federal role. Only a national regulatory system can strike the right balance, simultaneously **realizing hydraulic fracturing’s energy promise and minimizing the risks while respecting state authority.**

# Econ

## 1NC

#### Even massive economic decline has zero chance of war

Robert Jervis 11, Professor in the Department of Political Science and School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University, December 2011, “Force in Our Times,” Survival, Vol. 25, No. 4, p. 403-425

Even if war is still seen as evil, the security community could be dissolved if severe conflicts of interest were to arise. Could the more peaceful world generate new interests that would bring the members of the community into sharp disputes? 45 A zero-sum sense of status would be one example, perhaps linked to a steep rise in nationalism. More likely would be a worsening of the current economic difficulties, which could itself produce greater nationalism, undermine democracy and bring back old-fashioned beggar-my-neighbor economic policies. While these dangers are real, it is hard to believe that the conflicts could be great enough to lead the members of the community to contemplate fighting each other. It is not so much that economic interdependence has proceeded to the point where it could not be reversed – states that were more internally interdependent than anything seen internationally have fought bloody civil wars. Rather it is that even if the more extreme versions of free trade and economic liberalism become discredited, it is hard to see how without building on a preexisting high level of political conflict leaders and mass opinion would come to believe that their countries could prosper by impoverishing or even attacking others. Is it possible that problems will not only become severe, but that people will entertain the thought that they have to be solved by war? While a pessimist could note that this argument does not appear as outlandish as it did before the financial crisis, an optimist could reply (correctly, in my view) that the very fact that we have seen such a sharp economic down-turn without anyone suggesting that force of arms is the solution shows that even if bad times bring about greater economic conflict, it will not make war thinkable.

#### Growth’s unsustainable and causes extinction because of physical demands on space, water, forests, and habitat---tech can’t solve because collapse of ecosystem services is irreversible

David Shearman 7, Emeritus professor of medicine at Adelaide University, Secretary of Doctors for the Environment Australia, and an Independent Assessor on the IPCC; and Joseph Wayne Smith, lawyer and philosopher with a research interest in environmentalism, 2007, The Climate Change Challenge and the Failure of Democracy, p. 153-156

Hundreds of scientists writing in Millennium Assessment and other scientific reports pronounce that humanity is in peril from environmental damage. If liberal democracy is to survive it will need to offer leadership, resolve, and sacrifice to address the problem. To date there is not a shred of evidence that these will be provided nor could they be delivered by those at the right hand of American power. Some liberal democracies that recognize that global warming is a dire problem are trying but nevertheless failing to have an impact on greenhouse emissions. To arrest climate change, greenhouse reductions of 60 to 80 percent are required during the next few decades. By contrast the Kyoto Protocol prescribes reductions of only a few percent. The magnitude of the problem seems overwhelming, and indeed it is. So much so, it is still denied by many because it cannot be resolved without cataclysmic changes to society. Refuge from necessary change is being sought in technological advances that will allow fossil fuels to be used with impunity, but this ignores the kernel of the issue. If all humanity had the ecological footprint of the average citizen of Australia or the United States, at least another three planets would be needed to support the present population of the world.2 The ecological services of the world cannot be saved under a regime of attrition by growth economies that each year use more land, water, forests, natural resources, and habitat. Technological advances cannot retrieve dead ecological services.

The measures required have been discussed and documented for several decades. None of them are revolutionary new ideas. We will discuss the main themes of a number of important issues such as the limits to growth, the separation of corporatism and governance, the control of the issue of credit (i.e., financial reform), legal reform, and the reclaiming of the commons. Each of these issues has been discussed in great depth in the literature, and a multitude of reform movements have been spawned. Unfortunately, given the multitude of these problems and the limited resources and vision of the reformers, each of the issues tends to be treated in isolation. From an ecological perspective, which is a vision seeking wholeness and integration, this is a mistake. These areas of reform are closely interrelated and must be tackled as a coherent whole to bring about change. Banking and financial reform is, for example, closely related to the issue of control and limitation of corporate power, because finance capital is the engine of corporate expansion. The issue of reclaiming the commons and protecting the natural environment from corporate plunder is also intimately connected to the issue of the regulation of corporate power. In turn this is a legal question, and in turn legal structures are highly influenced by political and economic factors. Finally, the issue of whether there are ecological limits to growth underlies all these issues. Only if an ecologically sustainable solution can be given to this totality of problems can we see the beginnings of a hope for reform of liberal democracy. And even then, there still remains a host of cultural and intellectual problems that will need to be solved. The prospects for reform are daunting, but let us now explore what in principle is needed.

THE LIMITS TO GR OWTH

Our loving marriage to economic growth has to be dissolved. The dollar value of all goods and services made in an economy in one year is expressed as the gross domestic product (GDP). It is a flawed measurement in that it does not measure the true economic and social advance of a society,3 but it is relevant to our discussion here for most of the activities it measures consume energy. Each country aims for economic growth, for every economy needs this for its success in maintaining employment and for the perceived ever-expanding needs of its populace. Politicians salivate about economic growth, it is their testosterone boost. Most would be satisfied with 3 percent per annum and recognize that this means that the size of the economy is 3 percent greater than the previous year. On this basis the size of the economy doubles every 23 years. In 43 years it has quadrupled. Now in 23 years let us suppose that energy needs will also double in order to run this economy. Therefore if greenhouse emissions are to remain at today’s level, then approximately half the energy requirements in 23 years’ time will have to be alternative energy. The burgeoning energy requirements of the developing countries have not yet been included in these considerations. To date, these countries have been reluctant to consider greenhouse reductions saying that they have a right to develop without hindrance, and in any case the developed countries are responsible for most of the present burden of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. It is not difficult to calculate therefore that there is no future for civilization in the present cultural maladaptation to the growth economy. Sustainable economic growth is an oxymoron. These arguments about doubling time apply to all other environmental calculations. Other forms of pollution that arise from the consumer society will also increase proportionally to growth, the human and animal wastes, mercury, the persistent organic pollutants, and so on. And even if some of these are ameliorated, others will arise from the activities of the burgeoning population. Science tells us that we have already exceeded the capacity of the earth to detoxify these.

In advocating a no-growth economy it has been shown in many studies that beyond the basic needs of health, nutrition, shelter, and cultural activity, which can be provided with much less income than Westerners presently enjoy, there is little correlation between wealth and happiness or well-being. A no-growth economy4 would supply the essentials for life and happiness. Human and economic activity fuelling the consumer market would be severely curtailed and the resources redeployed to truly sustainable enterprises, basic care and repair of the environment, conservation of energy, and the manufacture of items and systems that support these needs. The standard of living as measured at present (again by flawed criteria) will fall, but there may be no alternative. The fundamental question is how can a transition be made under a liberal democracy that has consumerism and a free market as its lifeblood?

#### Economic collapse inevitable --- now’s better than later

MacKenzie 8 [Debora, Are We Doomed, New Scientist, Vol. 197 Issue 2650, p32-35, 4p, 4 May 2005, EBSCO)

DOOMSDAY. The end of civilisation. Literature and film abound with tales of plague, famine and wars which ravage the planet, leaving a few survivors scratching out a primitive existence amid the ruins. Every civilisation in history has collapsed, after all. Why should ours be any different? Doomsday scenarios typically feature a knockout blow: a massive asteroid, all-out nuclear war or a catastrophic pandemic. Yet there is another chilling possibility: what if the very nature of civilisation means that ours, like all the others, is destined to collapse sooner or later? A few researchers have been making such claims for years. Disturbingly, recent insights from fields such as complexity theory suggest that they are right. It appears that once a society develops beyond a certain level of complexity it becomes increasingly fragile. Eventually, it reaches a point at which even a relatively minor disturbance can bring everything crashing down. Some say we have already reached this point, and that it is time to start thinking about how we might manage collapse. Others insist it is not yet too late, and that we can - we must - act now to keep disaster at bay. History is not on our side. Think of Sumeria, of ancient Egypt and of the Maya. In his 2005 best-seller, Jared Diamond of the University of California, Los Angeles, blamed environmental mismanagement for the fall of the Mayan civilisation and others, and warned that we might be heading the same way unless we choose to stop destroying our environmental support systems. Lester Brown of the Earth Policy Institute in Washington DC agrees. He has that governments must pay more attention to vital environmental resources. "It's not about saving the planet. It's about saving civilisation," he says. Others think our problems run deeper. From the moment our ancestors started to settle down and build cities, we have had to find solutions to the problems that success brings. "For the past 10,000 years, problem solving has produced increasing complexity in human societies," says Joseph Tainter, an archaeologist at the University of Utah, Salt Lake City, and author of the 1988 book The Collapse of Complex Societies. If crops fail because rain is patchy, build irrigation canals. When they silt up, organise dredging crews. When the bigger crop yields lead to a bigger population, build more canals. When there are too many for ad hoc repairs, install a management bureaucracy, and tax people to pay for it. When they complain, invent tax inspectors and a system to record the sums paid. That much the Sumerians knew. Diminishing returns There is, however, a price to be paid. Every extra layer of organisation imposes a cost in terms of energy, the common currency of all human efforts, from building canals to educating scribes. And increasing complexity, Tainter realised, produces diminishing returns. The extra food produced by each extra hour of labour - or joule of energy invested per farmed hectare - diminishes as that investment mounts. We see the same thing today in a declining number of patents per dollar invested in research as that research investment mounts. This law of diminishing returns appears everywhere, Tainter says. To keep growing, societies must keep solving problems as they arise. Yet each problem solved means more complexity. Success generates a larger population, more kinds of specialists, more resources to manage, more information to juggle - and, ultimately, less bang for your buck. Eventually, says Tainter, the point is reached when all the energy and resources available to a society are required just to maintain its existing level of complexity. Then when the climate changes or barbarians invade, overstretched institutions break down and civil order collapses. What emerges is a less complex society, which is organised on a smaller scale or has been taken over by another group. Tainter sees diminishing returns as the underlying reason for the collapse of all ancient civilisations, from the early Chinese dynasties to the Greek city state of Mycenae. These civilisations relied on the solar energy that could be harvested from food, fodder and wood, and from wind. When this had been stretched to its limit, things fell apart. Western industrial civilisation has become bigger and more complex than any before it by exploiting new sources of energy, notably coal and oil, but these are limited. There are increasing signs of diminishing returns: the energy required to get is mounting and although global is still increasing, constant innovation is needed to cope with environmental degradation and evolving - the yield boosts per unit of investment in innovation are shrinking. "Since problems are inevitable," Tainter warns, "this process is in part ineluctable." Is Tainter right? An analysis of complex systems has led Yaneer Bar-Yam, head of the New England Complex Systems Institute in Cambridge, Massachusetts, to the same conclusion that Tainter reached from studying history. Social organisations become steadily more complex as they are required to deal both with environmental problems and with challenges from neighbouring societies that are also becoming more complex, Bar-Yam says. This eventually leads to a fundamental shift in the way the society is organised. "To run a hierarchy, managers cannot be less complex than the system they are managing," Bar-Yam says. As complexity increases, societies add ever more layers of management but, ultimately in a hierarchy, one individual has to try and get their head around the whole thing, and this starts to become impossible. At that point, hierarchies give way to networks in which decision-making is distributed. We are at this point. This shift to decentralised networks has led to a widespread belief that modern society is more resilient than the old hierarchical systems. "I don't foresee a collapse in society because of increased complexity," says futurologist and industry consultant Ray Hammond. "Our strength is in our highly distributed decision making." This, he says, makes modern western societies more resilient than those like the old Soviet Union, in which decision making was centralised. Things are not that simple, says Thomas Homer-Dixon, a political scientist at the University of Toronto, Canada, and author of the 2006 book The Upside of Down. "Initially, increasing connectedness and diversity helps: if one village has a crop failure, it can get food from another village that didn't." As connections increase, though, networked systems become increasingly tightly coupled. This means the impacts of failures can propagate: the more closely those two villages come to depend on each other, the more both will suffer if either has a problem. "Complexity leads to higher vulnerability in some ways," says Bar-Yam. "This is not widely understood." The reason is that as networks become ever tighter, they start to transmit shocks rather than absorb them. "The intricate networks that tightly connect us together - and move people, materials, information, money and energy - amplify and transmit any shock," says Homer-Dixon. "A financial crisis, a terrorist attack or a disease outbreak has almost instant destabilising effects, from one side of the world to the other." For instance, in 2003 large areas of North America and Europe suffered when apparently insignificant nodes of their respective electricity grids failed. And this year China suffered a similar blackout after heavy snow hit power lines. Tightly coupled networks like these create the potential for propagating failure across many critical industries, says Charles Perrow of Yale University, a leading authority on industrial accidents and disasters. Credit crunch Perrow says interconnectedness in the global production system has now reached the point where "a breakdown anywhere increasingly means a breakdown everywhere". This is especially true of the world's financial systems, where the coupling is very tight. "Now we have a debt crisis with the biggest player, the US. The

consequences could be enormous." "A networked society behaves like a multicellular organism," says Bar-Yam, "random damage is like lopping a chunk off a sheep." Whether or not the sheep survives depends on which chunk is lost. And while we are pretty sure which chunks a sheep needs, it isn't clear - it may not even be predictable - which chunks of our densely networked civilisation are critical, until it's too late. "When we do the analysis, almost any part is critical if you lose enough of it," says Bar-Yam. "Now that we can ask questions of such systems in more sophisticated ways, we are discovering that they can be very vulnerable. That means civilisation is very vulnerable." So what can we do? "The key issue is really whether we respond successfully in the face of the new vulnerabilities we have," Bar-Yam says. That means making sure our "global sheep" does not get injured in the first place - something that may be hard to guarantee as the climate shifts and the world's fuel and mineral resources dwindle. Scientists in other fields are also warning that complex systems are prone to collapse. Similar ideas have emerged from the study of natural cycles in ecosystems, based on the work of ecologist Buzz Holling, now at the University of Florida, Gainesville. Some ecosystems become steadily more complex over time: as a patch of new forest grows and matures, specialist species may replace more generalist species, biomass builds up and the trees, beetles and bacteria form an increasingly rigid and ever more tightly coupled system. "It becomes an extremely efficient system for remaining constant in the face of the normal range of conditions," says Homer-Dixon. But unusual conditions - an insect outbreak, fire or drought - can trigger dramatic changes as the impact cascades through the system. The end result may be the collapse of the old ecosystem and its replacement by a newer, simpler one. Globalisation is resulting in the same tight coupling and fine-tuning of our systems to a narrow range of conditions, he says. Redundancy is being systematically eliminated as companies maximise profits. Some products are produced by only one factory worldwide. Financially, it makes sense, as mass production maximises efficiency. Unfortunately, it also minimises resilience. "We need to be more selective about increasing the connectivity and speed of our critical systems," says Homer-Dixon. "Sometimes the costs outweigh the benefits." Is there an alternative? Could we heed these warnings and start carefully climbing back down the complexity ladder? Tainter knows of only one civilisation that managed to decline but not fall. "After the Byzantine empire lost most of its territory to the Arabs, they simplified their entire society. Cities mostly disappeared, literacy and numeracy declined, their economy became less monetised, and they switched from professional army to peasant militia." Pulling off the same trick will be harder for our more advanced society. Nevertheless, Homer-Dixon thinks we should be taking action now. "First, we need to encourage distributed and decentralised production of vital goods like energy and food," he says. "Second, we need to remember that slack isn't always waste. A manufacturing company with a large inventory may lose some money on warehousing, but it can keep running even if its suppliers are temporarily out of action." The electricity industry in the US has already started identifying hubs in the grid with no redundancy available and is putting some back in, Homer-Dixon points out. Governments could encourage other sectors to follow suit. The trouble is that in a world of fierce competition, private companies will always increase efficiency unless governments subsidise inefficiency in the public interest. Homer-Dixon doubts we can stave off collapse completely. He points to what he calls "tectonic" stresses that will shove our rigid, tightly coupled system outside the range of conditions it is becoming ever more finely tuned to. These include population growth, the growing divide between the world's rich and poor, financial instability, weapons proliferation, disappearing forests and fisheries, and climate change. In imposing new complex solutions we will run into the problem of diminishing returns - just as we are running out of cheap and plentiful energy. "This is the fundamental challenge humankind faces. We need to allow for the healthy breakdown in natural function in our societies in a way that doesn't produce catastrophic collapse, but instead leads to healthy renewal," Homer-Dixon says. This is what happens in forests, which are a patchy mix of old growth and newer areas created by disease or fire. If the ecosystem in one patch collapses, it is recolonised and renewed by younger forest elsewhere. We must allow partial breakdown here and there, followed by renewal, he says, rather than trying so hard to avert breakdown by increasing complexity that any resulting crisis is actually worse. Lester Brown thinks we are fast running out of time. "The world can no longer afford to waste a day. We need a Great Mobilisation, as we had in wartime," he says. "There has been tremendous progress in just the past few years. For the first time, I am starting to see how an alternative economy might emerge. But it's now a race between tipping points - which will come first, a switch to sustainable technology, or collapse?" Tainter is not convinced that even new technology will save civilisation in the long run. "I sometimes think of this as a 'faith-based' approach to the future," he says. Even a society reinvigorated by cheap new energy sources will eventually face the problem of diminishing returns once more. Innovation itself might be subject to diminishing returns, or perhaps absolute limits. Studies of the way by Luis Bettencourt of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, New Mexico, support this idea. His team's work suggests that an ever-faster rate of innovation is required to keep cities growing and prevent stagnation or collapse, and in the long run this cannot be sustainable.

#### Economic collapse prevents extinction from environmental destruction

Speth 8Served as President Jimmy Carter’s White House environmental adviser and as head of the United Nations’ largest agency for international development Prof at Vermont law school. Former dean of the Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies at Yale University . Former Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center, teaching environmental and constitutional law. .Former Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality in the Executive Office of the President. Co-founder of the Natural Resources Defense Council. Was law clerk to U.S. Supreme Court Justice Hugo L. Black JD, Yale. (James Gustave, The Bridge at the Edge of the World: Capitalism, the Environment, and Crossing from Crisis to Sustainability, Gigapedia, 6-9)

But the much larger and more threatening impacts stem from the economic activity of those of us participating in the modern, increasingly prosperous world economy. This activity is consuming vast quantities of resources from the environment and returning to the environment vast quantities of waste products. The damages are already huge and are on a path to be ruinous in the future. So, a fundamental 7 facing societies today perhaps the fundamental question is how can the operating instructions for the modern world economy be changed so that economic activity both protects and restores the natural world? With increasingly few exceptions, modern capitalism is the operating system of the world economy. I use “modern capitalism” here in a broad sense as an actual, existing system of political economy, not as an idealized model. Capitalism as we know it today encompasses the core economic concept of private employers hiring workers to produce products and services that the employers own and then sell with the intention of making a profi t. But it also includes competitive markets, the price mechanism, the modern corporation as its principal institution, the consumer society and the materialistic values that sustain it, and the administrative state actively promoting economic strength and growth for a variety of reasons. Inherent in the dynamics of capitalism is a powerful drive to earn profi ts, invest them, innovate, and thus grow the economy, typically at exponential rates, with the result that the capitalist era has in fact been characterized by a remarkable exponential expansion of the world economy. The capitalist operating system, whatever its shortcomings, is very good at generating growth. These features of capitalism, as they are constituted today, work together to produce an economic and political reality that is highly destructive of the environment. An unquestioning society-wide commitment to economic growth at almost any cost; enormous investment in technologies designed with little regard for the environment; powerful corporate interests whose overriding objective is to grow by generating profit, including profi t from avoiding the environmental costs they create; markets that systematically fail to recognize environmental costs unless corrected by government; government that is subservient to corporate interests and the growth imperative; rampant consumerism spurred by a worshipping of novelty and by sophisticated advertising; economic activity so large in scale that its impacts alters the fundamental biophysical operations of the planet all combine to deliver an ever-growing world economy that is undermining the planet’s ability to sustain life. The fundamental question thus becomes one of transforming capitalism as we know it: Can it be done? If so, how? And if not, what then? It is to these questions that this book is addressed. The larger part of the book proposes a variety of prescriptions to take economy and environment off collision course. Many of these prescriptions range beyond the traditional environmental agenda. In Part I of the book, Chapters 1–3, I lay the foundation by elaborating the fundamental challenge just described. Among the key conclusions, summarized here with some oversimplifi cation, are: • The vast expansion of economic activity that occurred in the twentieth century and continues today is the predominant (but not sole) cause of the environmental decline that has occurred to date. Yet the world economy, now increasingly integrated and globalized, is poised for unprecedented growth. The engine of this growth is modern capitalism or, better, a variety of capitalisms. • A mutually reinforcing set of forces associated with today’s capitalism combines to yield economic activity inimical to environmental sustainability. This result is partly the consequence of an ongoing political default a failed politics that not only perpetuates widespread market failure all the nonmarket environmental costs that no one is paying but exacerbates this market failure with deep and environmentally perverse subsidies. The result is that our market economy is operating on wildly wrong market signals, lacks other correcting mechanisms, and is thus out of control environmentally. • The upshot is that societies now face environmental threats of unprecedented scope and severity, with the possibility of various catastrophes, breakdowns, and collapses looming as distinct possibilities, especially as environmental issues link with social inequities and tensions, resource scarcity, and other issues. 9 • Today’s mainstream environmentalism aptly characterized as incremental and pragmatic “problem solving” has proven insufficient to deal with current challenges and is not up to coping with the larger challenges ahead. Yet the approaches of modern-day environmentalism, despite their limitations, remain essential: right now, they are the tools at hand with which to address many very pressing problems. • The momentum of the current system fi fty-fi ve trillion dollars in output in 2004, growing fast, and headed toward environmental disaster is so great that only powerful forces will alter the trajectory. Potent measures are needed that address the root causes of today’s destructive growth and transform economic activity into something environmentally benign and restorative. In short, my conclusion, after much searching and considerable reluctance, is that most environmental deterioration is a result of systemic failures of the capitalism that we have today and that long-term solutions must seek transformative change in the key features of this contemporary capitalism. In Part II, I address these basic features of modern capitalism, in each case seeking to identify the transformative changes needed.

## 2NC

#### US manufacturing is high and resilient---it can adapt to shocks to the system

Skie 9-6 – Erik Skie, Manufacturing and Distribution Managing Partner at CliftonLarsonAllen, law firm, September 6th, 2012, “Survey Shows Resilient Manufacturing Sector Is Adapting to New Environment” www.cliftonlarsonallen.com/Manufacturing/Survey-Shows-Resilient-Manufacturing-Sector-Is-Adapting-to-New-Environment.aspx

Over the last several decades, U.S. manufacturers have faced an onslaught of challenges that had led many to predict the eventual demise of U.S. manufacturing. As recently as five years ago, the conventional wisdom was that the United States could not compete with the low labor costs in countries like China, Vietnam, and India. In addition, purchasing tactics like those implemented by the “big three” auto companies underscored the perspective that life as a manufacturer would be precarious at best.¶ **The dynamic shifts in this industry are almost unparalleled in any other sector of our economy.** Interestingly, though, **in a recent survey of almost 400 small to mid-sized manufacturers across the country,** most have returned to financial stability after the Great Recession and are focused on future opportunities**.**¶ **Stiff competition has produced a U.S. manufacturing base that is** innovative**,** adaptable**, and** resilient **in the face of adversity.** Since August 2009, the Institute of Supply Chain Management’s (ISM) Manufacturing Production Index (PMI), a measure of manufacturing activity in the United States, has shown expansion for 33 of the past 35 months.¶ Here are some survey respondents’ observations on opportunities and challenges in today’s manufacturing industry.¶ Expanding domestic sales¶ Over the past decade the trend has been to send work to low cost-producers overseas. However, the anticipated profit improvements of off-shoring, which are primarily driven by lower wages, have sometimes been elusive due to collateral issues like longer lead times, less flexibility, and the need to carry more inventory. While there is still a clear role for overseas production, more companies have turned to re-shoring in

the past 24 months for their more complex, design intensive, lower volume, and higher mix products. The need for supply chain intimacy is creating renewed demand for flexible, responsive U.S. domestic production.¶ International sales¶ The U.S. manufacturing base has been the home for tremendous product innovations for many years. As globalization has increased, the middle class in places like China is growing rapidly and turning a once producer-only economy into a nation of consumers. **China’s increased consumption of U.S. brands and technology** has been a blessing for U.S. manufacturers like General Motors. **The aerospace industry is benefitting as well**, with Boeing seeing significant backlog for their products in China.

#### No conflicts resulted from the recession – disproves the impact

Barnett 9**—**senior managing director of Enterra Solutions LLC (Thomas, The New Rules: Security Remains Stable Amid Financial Crisis, 25 August 2009, http://www.aprodex.com/the-new-rules--security-remains-stable-amid-financial-crisis-398-bl.aspx)

When the global financial crisis struck roughly a year ago, the blogosphere was ablaze with all sorts of scary predictions of, and commentary regarding, ensuing conflict and wars -- a rerun of the Great Depression leading to world war, as it were. Now, as global economic news brightens and recovery -- surprisingly led by China and emerging markets -- is the talk of the day, it's interesting to look back over the past year and realize how globalization's first truly worldwide **recession has had** virtually **no impact** whatsoever **on** the **international security** landscape. None of the more than three-dozen ongoing conflicts listed by GlobalSecurity.org can be clearly attributed to the global recession. Indeed, the last new entry (civil conflict between Hamas and Fatah in the Palestine) predates the economic crisis by a year, and three quarters of the chronic struggles began in the last century. Ditto for the 15 low-intensity conflicts listed by Wikipedia (where the latest entry is the Mexican "drug war" begun in 2006). Certainly, the Russia-Georgia conflict last August was specifically timed, but by most accounts the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics was the most important external trigger (followed by the U.S. presidential campaign) for that sudden spike in an almost two-decade long struggle between Georgia and its two breakaway regions. Looking over the various databases, then, we see a most familiar picture: the usual mix of civil conflicts, insurgencies, and liberation-themed terrorist movements. Besides the recent Russia-Georgia dust-up, the only two potential state-on-state wars (North v. South Korea, Israel v. Iran) are both tied to one side acquiring a nuclear weapon capacity -- a process wholly **unrelated to** global **economic trends**. And with the United States effectively tied down by its two ongoing major interventions (Iraq and Afghanistan-bleeding-into-Pakistan), our involvement elsewhere around the planet has been quite modest, both leading up to and following the onset of the economic crisis: e.g., the usual counter-drug efforts in Latin America, the usual military exercises with allies across Asia, mixing it up with pirates off Somalia's coast). Everywhere else we find serious instability we pretty much let it burn, occasionally pressing the Chinese -- unsuccessfully -- to do something. Our new Africa Command, for example, hasn't led us to anything beyond advising and training local forces. So, to sum up: •No significant uptick in mass violence or unrest (remember the smattering of urban riots last year in places like Greece, Moldova and Latvia?); •The usual frequency maintained in civil conflicts (in all the usual places); •Not a single state-on-state war directly caused (and no great-power-on-great-power crises even triggered); •No great improvement or disruption in great-power cooperation regarding the emergence of new nuclear powers (despite all that diplomacy); •A modest scaling back of international policing efforts by the system's acknowledged Leviathan power (inevitable given the strain); and •No serious efforts by any rising great power to challenge that Leviathan or supplant its role. (The worst things we can cite are Moscow's occasional deployments of strategic assets to the Western hemisphere and its weak efforts to outbid the United States on basing rights in Kyrgyzstan; but the best include China and India stepping up their aid and investments in Afghanistan and Iraq.) Sure, we've finally seen global defense spending surpass the previous world record set in the late 1980s, but even that's likely to wane given the stress on public budgets created by all this unprecedented "stimulus" spending. If anything, the friendly cooperation on such stimulus packaging was the most notable great-power dynamic caused by the crisis. Can we say that the world has suffered a distinct shift to political radicalism as a result of the economic crisis? Indeed, no. The world's major economies remain governed by center-left or center-right political factions that remain decidedly friendly to both markets and trade. In the short run, there were attempts across the board to insulate economies from immediate damage (in effect, as much protectionism as allowed under current trade rules), but there was no great slide into "trade wars." Instead, the World Trade Organization is functioning as it was designed to function, and regional efforts toward free-trade agreements have not slowed. Can we say Islamic radicalism was inflamed by the economic crisis? If it was, that shift was clearly overwhelmed by the Islamic world's growing disenchantment with the brutality displayed by violent extremist groups such as al-Qaida. And looking forward, austere economic times are just as likely to breed connecting evangelicalism as disconnecting fundamentalism. At the end of the day, the economic crisis did not prove to be sufficiently frightening to provoke major economies into establishing global regulatory schemes, even as it has sparked a spirited -- and much needed, as I argued last week -- discussion of the continuing viability of the U.S. dollar as the world's primary reserve currency. Naturally, plenty of experts and pundits have attached great significance to this debate, seeing in it the beginning of "economic warfare" and the like between "fading" America and "rising" China. And yet, in a world of globally integrated production chains and interconnected financial markets, such "diverging interests" hardly constitute signposts for wars up ahead. Frankly, I don't welcome a world in which America's fiscal profligacy goes undisciplined, so bring it on -- please! Add it all up and it's fair to say that this global financial crisis has proven the great resilience of America's post-World War II international liberal trade order.

# Warming

## 1NC

#### Climate regulations are already closing the worst coal plants.

Keller 12—Ryan Keller, Examiner, 11/5/12, EPA planning new anti-coal regulations for after election, <http://www.examiner.com/article/epa-planning-new-anti-coal-regulations-for-after-election>

According to Conn Carroll at the Washington Examiner on Sunday, the Environmental Protection Agency is planning new anti-coal regulations to be implemented at the end of the month should President Barack Obama win reelection on Tuesday. These regulations will prevent new plants from being built and will cost Americans nearly a trillion dollars.¶ More than 50 EPA staff are now crashing to finish greenhouse gas emission standards that would essentially ban all construction of new coal-fired power plants. Never before have so many EPA resources been devoted to a single regulation. The independent and non-partisan Manhattan Institute estimates that the EPA’s greenhouse gas coal regulation will cost the U.S. economy $700 billion.¶ Should Obama win, then the EPA will have another term to continue their agenda against coal and to advance “green energy,” further deindustrializing the country, all in the name of stopping global warming, of course, even though it stopped 16 years ago according to the U.K. Met Office.¶ Throughout the last four years, Obama has made sure that the EPA has been able to advance this agenda.¶ In 2011, Obama’s EPA issued new mandates that will cause energy prices for most Americans to rise, though Obama campaign contributor General Electric will be exempt. According to the EPA mandates, utility companies will have to pay an initial outlay of $800 million in order to reduce harmful emissions as dictated by the Clean Air Act. This will cost $129 billion and cause one-fifth of coal plants to be shut down, according to the Edison Electric Institute.¶ Earlier this year, the administration proposed “the first rules to cut carbon dioxide emissions from new U.S. power plants,” according to Reuters. Plants would be forced to cut emissions by 50 percent, which “would effectively stop the building of most new coal-fired plants.”¶ This was the plan for Obama from the beginning. As he infamously told the San Francisco Chronicle while campaigning in 2008, he plans on bankrupting the coal industry: “If somebody wants to build a coal powered plant, they can, it’s just that, it will bankrupt them because they’re going to be charged a huge sum for all that greenhouse gas that’s being emitted.”¶ And the plan is working.¶ This past summer, the Energy Information Administration announced that 175 coal-fired generators, a record number, will be “retired” over the next few years due to decreasing demand and crippling federal regulations. This means that 8.5 percent of U.S. coal capacity will be gone.

#### U.S. coal exports to China are low, but downward pressure on domestic demand expands them massively

Bryan Walsh 12, Senior Editor at TIME, May 31, 2012, “Drawing Battle Lines Over American Coal Exports to Asia,” online: http://science.time.com/2012/05/31/drawing-battle-lines-over-american-coal-exports-to-asia/

But across the Pacific Ocean, the demand for coal has never been hotter, with China burning 4.1 billion tons in 2010 alone, far more than any other country in the world. That insatiable demand forced China in 2009 to become a net coal importer for the first time, in part because congested rail infrastructure raised the cost of transporting coal from the mines of the country’s northwest to its booming southern cities. In April, Chinese coal imports nearly doubled from a year earlier. Right now Australia and Indonesia supply much of China’s foreign coal. U.S. coal from the Powder River Basin could be a perfect addition to the Chinese market. Montana and Wyoming are just short train trips to ports on the Pacific Northwest coast, and from there it’s a container ship away from Asian megacities where coal doesn’t have to compete with cheap natural gas and air-pollution regulations are far weaker than in the U.S. To a wounded Big Coal, China is a potential savior.¶ As I write in the new edition of TIME, there’s just one problem: right now, ports on the West Coast lack the infrastructure needed to transfer coal from railcars into container ships. (Just 7 million of the 107 million tons of U.S.-exported coal left the country via Pacific Ocean ports last year.) That’s why coal companies like Peabody and Ambre Energy are ready to spend millions to build coal-export facilities at a handful of ports in Washington and Oregon. If all those plans go forward, as much as 150 million tons of coal could be exported from the Northwest annually—-nearly all of it coming from the Powder -River -Basin and headed to Asia. Even if the U.S. kept burning less and less coal at home, it would have a reason to keep mining it.

#### U.S. exports lock in expanded Chinese coal capacity---causes warming over the tipping point---it’s unique because absent U.S. exports the rising cost of coal will cause a shift to renewables

Thomas M. Power 12, Research Professor and Professor Emeritus, Department of Economics, University of Montana; Principal, Power Consulting; February 2012, “The Greenhouse Gas Impact of Exporting Coal from the West Coast: An Economic Analysis,” <http://www.sightline.org/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2012/02/Coal-Power-White-Paper.pdf>

The cumulative impact of these coal port proposals on coal consumption in Asia could be much larger than even that implied by the two pending proposals. If Arch, Peabody, and other western U.S. coal producers’ projections of the competitiveness of western coal in Asia are correct, facilitating the opening of the development of West Coast coal ports could have a very large impact on the supply of coal to China and the rest of Asia.

6.4 The Long-term Implications of Fueling Additional Coal-Fired Electric Generation

Although the economic life of coal-fired generators is often given as 30 or 35 years, a permitted, operating, electric generator is kept on line a lot longer than that, as long as 50 or more years through ongoing renovations and upgrades. Because of that long operating life, the impact of the lower Asian coal prices and costs triggered by PRB coal competing with other coal sources cannot be measured by the number of tons of coal exported each year. Those lower coal costs will lead to commitments to more coal being burned for a half-century going forward.

That time-frame is very important. During exactly this time frame, the next half-century, the nations of the world will have to get their greenhouse gas emission stabilized and then reduced or the concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere may pass a point that will make it very difficult to avoid massive, ongoing, negative climate impacts. Taking actions now that encourage fifty-years of more coal consumption around the world is not a minor matter. Put more positively, allowing coal prices to rise (and more closely approximate their full cost, including “external” costs) will encourage extensive investments in improving the efficiency with which coal is used and the shift to cleaner sources of energy. This will lead to long-term reductions in greenhouse gas emissions that will also last well into the next half-century. 57

#### No impact---mitigation and adaptation will solve

Robert O. Mendelsohn 9, the Edwin Weyerhaeuser Davis Professor, Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, Yale University, June 2009, “Climate Change and Economic Growth,” online: http://www.growthcommission.org/storage/cgdev/documents/gcwp060web.pdf

These statements are largely alarmist and misleading. Although climate change is a serious problem that deserves attention, society’s immediate behavior has an extremely low probability of leading to catastrophic consequences. The science and economics of climate change is quite clear that emissions over the next few decades will lead to only mild consequences. The severe impacts predicted by alarmists require a century (or two in the case of Stern 2006) of no mitigation. Many of the predicted impacts assume there will be no or little adaptation. The net economic impacts from climate change over the next 50 years will be small regardless. Most of the more severe impacts will take more than a century or even a millennium to unfold and many of these “potential” impacts will never occur because people will adapt. It is not at all apparent that immediate and dramatic policies need to be developed to thwart long‐range climate risks. What is needed are long‐run balanced responses.

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#### EPA regulations will cause coal plants to close or retrofit to reduce emissions.

Cover 12—Matt Cover, CNS News, 8/22/12, EPA Regulations Will Close Coal Plants, Raise Electricity Prices, GAO Says, August 22, 2012, http://cnsnews.com/news/article/epa-regulations-will-close-coal-plants-raise-electricity-prices-gao-says

(CNSNews.com) – New regulations issued by the Environmental Protection Agency will lead to the closure of older, coal-fired power plants and boost electricity prices in some parts of the country, according to a new report from the Government Accountability Office.¶ The GAO, at the behest of Sen. Jay Rockefeller (D-W.Va.), reviewed a host of information from government sources such as the EPA and Energy Information Agency (EIA) as well as private energy-sector forecasters to determine the likely impact of four new EPA regulations aimed at coal-fired power plants.¶ None of the regulations has taken effect yet and two have yet to be finalized by EPA. In fact, one of the regulations – the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule – was struck down by a federal court on Tuesday, after the GAO issued its findings.¶ (In a 2-1 decision, a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit said the EPA’s cross-state air pollution rule – which sought to reduce downwind pollution from power plants -- exceeded the agency's statutory authority. The court faulted the EPA for imposing "massive emissions reduction requirements" on upwind states without regard to limits imposed by law.)¶ GAO found that as many as 12 percent of coal-fired power plants may be closed because the EPA regulations make it too expensive for power companies to operate them, despite coal being one of world’s cheapest fuels.¶ “It is uncertain how power companies may respond to four key Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulations, but available information suggests companies may retrofit most coal-fueled generating units with controls to reduce pollution, and that 2 to 12 percent of coal-fueled capacity may be retired,” GAO said.¶ These changes – either installing expensive retrofits or closing power plants – will drive up electricity prices by as much as 13.5 percent in some areas of the country.

#### China’s replacing coal with renewables---other producers are reducing exports

Eric de Place 11-1, Senior Researcher, Sightline Institute, leads Sightline’s work on climate and energy policy, 11/1/12, “Is China’s Demand for Coal Evaporating?,” http://daily.sightline.org/2012/11/01/is-chinas-demand-for-coal-evaporating/

China, which accounts for about half of the entire world’s annual coal consumption, is also the world’s top importer. To a very large extent China drives the global coal trade. But as a flurry of recent news accounts reveal, China’s demand for coal is weakening—and it’s sending shockwaves throughout the industry.

Here are a few key trends to watch.

Chinese demand for coal is down. The government is urging Chinese mining firms to rein in production as unused coal stockpiles grow and prices fall in tandem with a struggling national economy. Major newspapers in China are reporting that “the outlook is not rosy for the coal industry.” And in fact, China’s largest coal producer posted a 7 percent drop in profits in the third quarter.

China is going green. One of Australia’s top economists, Ross Garnaut, recently erupted over the “blind belief” in China’s unquenchable thirst for coal imports. He points out:

China had exceeded its ambitious emissions targets, cutting coal-fired generation by more than 7 per cent in the past year. A rapid expansion in hydroelectricity, wind, biomass, solar and nuclear power had pushed down coal’s share of energy production from 85 to 73 per cent.

Competition from natural gas. As in the United States, China’s age-old coal habit appears to be under threat from natural gas. Natural gas imports from Central Asia are up by a third, year over year, while high prices suggest strong demand. Meanwhile, China is poised to get into shale gas in a big way with scores of companies bidding on domestic exploration rights. What’s more, Reuters reports that China is exploring coal gasification in remote parts of the country.

Imports are down. According to official state sources, September’s coal imports were down by nearly 19 percent on a year-over-year basis. Or maybe it was closer to 22 percent. (Chinese data reports are notoriously unreliable, which should put some caution in would-be investors.) Regardless, it appears that coal imports have fallen to a 15-month low.

One contributing factor is that China’s banks are pulling back on lending to coal traders. Prices are falling while the number of overdue loans is climbing.

Coal exporters are struggling. Indonesia is a major coal supplier, but China’s slowdown is cutting deep into its industry. The world’s other major coal exporter, Australia, is also taking a hit where at least one mining company there is planning to temporarily shutter operations. And the pain is already arriving in the US. As one outlet reports, “US producers of coal used in steelmaking have been seeing once robust exports slow to a trickle.”

#### China has potential to massively reduce dependence on coal but U.S. exports undermine momentum and cause coal reversion

Thomas M. Power 12, Research Professor and Professor Emeritus, Department of Economics, University of Montana; Principal, Power Consulting; February 2012, “The Greenhouse Gas Impact of Exporting Coal from the West Coast: An Economic Analysis,” <http://www.sightline.org/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2012/02/Coal-Power-White-Paper.pdf>

4. China Has Tremendous Potential to Reduce Dependence on Coal, but Coal Exports from the U.S. Will Reduce Incentives to Capture that Potential

4.1 Chinese Efforts to Improve the Energy Efficiency of the Economy 38

The Chinese government and the large state-owned enterprises that both produce, distribute, and use larger amounts of energy are well aware of the burden that high and rising energy costs can impose on the overall economy and the viability and success of individual enterprises. The energy policies embodied in the last several five-year plans have focused heavily on improving overall energy efficiency in order to effectively control energy costs.

Like energy planners within government as well as within autonomous enterprises around the world, Chinese energy planners do not simply arbitrarily “make up” their energy efficiency targets. Rather they look at energy costs and the costs of implementing and operating different energy-using technologies and pursue the most cost-effective measures currently available. The value of the energy cost savings (along with potential environmental, health, and safety benefits) are weighted against the cost of the efficiency improvements. In that sense energy costs (including external social costs) drive the investment in efficiency.

Past Chinese efforts to improve the energy efficiency of the economy have focused on:39

• Boosting the energy efficiency of coal-fired electric generation by building larger generating plants with more fuel efficient conversion of fuel into electricity, retrofitting older power plants, and shutting down small thermal plants with low thermal efficiency. These efforts reduced the coal used per kwh generated by almost a quarter between 1978 and 2008.

• Increasing the energy efficiency of the electric transmission and distribution system resulting in almost a 30 percent reduction in line losses over the same time period.

• Consolidating coal mining into larger enterprises that can make use of safer and more energy- and coal-efficient technologies.

• Shutting down outdated production lines in major energy-using industrial sectors including, besides electricity and coal, steel, cement, non-ferrous metals, paper, and coke. Steel production in China, for instance, uses two to three times as much coke per ton of steel produced than the rest of the world and releases disproportionately larger volumes of greenhouse gases as a result. 40 That is one of the reasons efforts are being made to close the many older, smaller, and less efficient steel production facilities.

#### No lashout – CCP knows it would be suicide and PLA wouldn’t support it

Gilley 4 [Bruce, former contributing editor at the Far Eastern Economic Review, M.A. Oxford, 2004, China’s Democratic Future, p. 114]

Yet the risks, even to a dying regime, may be too high. An unprovoked attack on Taiwan would almost certainly bring the U.S. and its allies to the island's rescue. Those forces would not stop at Taiwan but might march on Beijing and oust the CCP, or attempt to do so through stiff sanctions, calling it a threat to regional and world peace. Such an attack might also face the opposition of the peoples of Fujian, who would be expected to provide logis¬tical support and possibly bear the worst burdens of war. They, like much of coastal China, look to Taiwan for investment and culture and have a close affinity with the island. As a result, there are doubts about whether such a plan could be put into action. A failed war would prompt a Taiwan declaration of independence and a further backlash against the CCP at home, just as the May Fourth students of 1919 berated the Republican government for weakness in the face of foreign powers. Failed wars brought down authoritarian regimes in Greece and Portugal in 1974 and in Argentina in 1983. Even if CCP leaders wanted war, it is unlikely that the PLA would oblige. Top officers would see the disastrous implications of attacking Taiwan. Military caution would also guard against the even wilder scenario of the use of nuclear weapons against Japan or the U.S.47 At the height of the Tiananmen protests it appears there was consideration given to the use of nuclear weapons in case the battle to suppress the protestors drew in outside countries.48 But even then, the threats did not appear to gain even minimal support. In an atmosphere in which the military is thinking about its future, the resort to nuclear confrontation would not make sense.