# CP

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#### TEXT: The United States Department of Energy and Federal Energy Regulatory Commission should approve applications to export natural gas.

#### Massively boosts domestic production

Matthews 12—Merrill Matthews, resident scholar at the Institute for Policy Innovation, 12/27/12, Don't ban natural-gas exports, http://blogs.providencejournal.com/ri-talks/this-new-england/2012/12/merrill-matthews-dont-ban-natural-gas-exports.html   
"'There's nothing like being a victim of your own success." That must be what American natural-gas producers are thinking right now.¶ Their profound success in recent years in expanding our national energy supply has inspired American policymakers to consider strapping them with strict new trade restrictions.¶ These regulatory efforts are deeply misguided and will ultimately deprive the country of jobs and growth.¶ Thanks to major innovations in drilling techniques, America faces a natural-gas surplus, with the per-unit price of gas now sitting at just $3 - about one-third to one-fifth the price in Europe and Asia. Utility plants have shifted from cheap coal to even cheaper - and cleaner - natural gas.¶ As a result, energy-related carbon emissions have been declining rapidly and now sit at levels not seen since the early 1990s.¶ But natural-gas supply is outpacing demand. So, producers have cut back on extraction and the drilling of new wells. Many are turning back to more profitable oil plays. The number of natural-gas rigs now in operation is half the total of a year ago.**¶** As a result, natural gas producers are looking for new markets. The U.S. currently exports some natural gas to Canada and Mexico, but the real opportunities lie in overseas markets, where prices are much higher.**¶** Shipping natural gas across great distances is challenging. It can't be easily loaded on a tanker like crude oil, so producers have to liquify it. The process involves super cooling gas to -260 degrees Fahrenheit, and the necessary facilities to cool it are predictably quite costly.¶ Most distressingly, however, is that the Department of Energy has been dragging its feet when considering natural gas firms' applications to establish export facilities. The department was waiting on a just-released study intended to assess the impact of natural-gas exports on domestic natural-gas prices. The study concluded that expanding natural-gas exports would be an economic winner.¶ "In all of these cases, benefits that come from export expansion more than outweigh the losses from reduced capital and wage income to U.S. consumers, and hence LNG exports have net economic benefits in spite of higher domestic natural gas prices," according to the report. We'll have to see how the DOE responds.¶ Private-sector companies have also been raising concerns that expanding exports could also force them to pay higher gas prices. They claim that cheap natural gas is spurring economic growth here at home and providing America's manufacturing sector with a valuable competitive advantage.¶ But their concerns, while understandable, are overblown. Allowing natural-gas exports would, at worst, drive up domestic prices only slightly. The consulting firm Deloitte took a close look at the issue and determined that allowing exports would increase domestic prices by just 1.7 percent over the next 20 years.**¶** What's more, banning exports might have the unintended consequence of driving gas prices up. Firms are already cutting back on production because of historically low prices. If they can't sell at higher prices in foreign markets, this ratcheting back will continue, causing the domestic gas supply to shrink anyway and forcing prices skyward. That's the very last thing we want.¶ And even if expanding gas exports pushes domestic prices up initially, natural-gas producers would have a new, substantial financial incentive to further ramp up production and develop more wells. This expansion would increase supply and put downward pressure on domestic prices.¶ Plus, expanding natural gas production to meet new foreign demand would create new jobs right here at home. Banning exports would deprive Americans of those opportunities.

## 2NC

#### Berman’s dead wrong---flawed data, ignores new highly productive plays

Hurdle 12-5 – Jon Hurdle, December 5th, 2012, "Are US Shale Gas Resources Overstated? Part 2" energy.aol.com/2012/12/05/are-us-shale-gas-resources-overstated-part-2/

Enthusiasm over the US natural gas production renaissance has been steadily building over the past few years and increasing production of both gas and oil from shale deposits came up numerous times during the 2012 US presidential election cycle. However, not everyone views shale gas as a supply panacea, which is the thrust of a book due out next spring written by Bill Powers with a forward by Arthur Berman.¶ Potential Gas Committee executive director John Curtis rejected Berman's reliance on the committee's "probable" category, which is based on gas in existing fields.¶ "He's dead wrong," Curtis said, arguing that restricting the resource estimate to only "probable" gas ignores the existence of highly productive plays **like the Marcellus and the Haynesville that** were not initially included **in that category because they had not been drilled**.¶ Curtis added that **any deficit between a field's actual production and its resource estimate** may reflect a lack of pipelines or undeveloped markets **for the gas** rather than a resource that undershoots expectations**.**¶ The PGC's latest estimate, published in 2010, is for total US shale resource of 687 tcf, including "probable", "possible" and "speculative" gas. Including all categories of gas, the committee estimated a total resource of 1,900 tcf, not far below the EIA's assessment of 2,203 tcf.¶ Ahead of the next PGC report, due in April 2013, Curtis said there was no indication of a need to cut its current estimate of gas resources, and there had not been in 2010 compared with the previous report two years earlier.¶ The Thorny Issue of Reserve Estimates¶ "From year-end 2008 to year-end 2010 we saw no reason to move away from our position for the quality and quantity of resources, and from 2010 to now we still do not," he said.¶ For his part, Powers cited the EIA's own data in support of his case, noting that the organization sharply cut its estimate of unproved technically recoverable resource to 482 tcf in the latest outlook from 827 tcf a year earlier, largely because of a big decline in its TRR estimate for the Marcellus Shale to 141 tcf from 410 tcf a year earlier.¶ "**The EIA is starting to walk back from its earlier claims**," Powers said, in an interview ahead of the book's scheduled publication in May 2013. He said the EIA's credibility was hurt when it cut its Marcellus estimate after the US Geological Survey calculated in its own 2011 study that the Appalachian shale play contained just 84 tcf.¶ Philip Budzik, a spokesman for the EIA, said the changing estimates reflect the industry's increasing experience in the field. "The numbers have been changing significantly over the last couple of years," he said. "Producers have been experimenting with drilling and completion techniques."¶ Any confirmed cut in US shale gas resources could have far-reaching consequences ranging from reduced energy security to more greenhouse gas emissions and higher energy costs. With increased production and optimistic projections for recoverable resources, natural gas is assuming an increasingly important role in US energy policy.¶ The EIA estimated the TRR for all forms of natural gas including tight gas and coal bed methane is 2,203 tcf, or about a century's supply at the current national consumption rate of some 24 tcf a year. Shale gas represents about a quarter of the EIA's total, or around 22 years' worth; that resource would shrink to just 5.5 years if Powers is right.¶ Dan Whitten, a spokesman for the trade group America's Natural Gas Alliance, rejected Powers's estimates, **saying that shale gas production has risen more than 12-fold over the last decade, and estimates of recoverable resources have risen at a similar rate.** Whitten said Powers's assertions have been refuted by prominent organizations including the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the Potential Gas Committee.¶ "There is no question**, with continued advances in both the technology used to produce natural gas and our understanding of resource potential, that** projections will continue to evolve," Whitten wrote in an email. "While we have not seen Mr. Powers' book, his conclusions run counter to the established science on the abundance of natural gas."

#### Throw out Berman quotes---petro-physicists uniformly reject him, he publishes on The Oil Drum because no one reputable will back him, and he’s contradicted by literally the entire energy industry

Nick Grealy 12, director of the energy consultancy No Hot Air, specialising in public perception and acceptance issues of shale energy worldwide, 2/13/12, “Annoying Post 2,” <http://oilandglory.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/02/12/is_there_really_so_much_shale_gas_in_the_ground>

I've watched The Oil and The Glory move from a centrist sane view of shale to driving into the the ditch of denial lately. Vis The report of European shale earlier this month. It would be nice to have an update on that one: How Exxon, Marathon and San Leon have affirmed their drilling programs and in the last case talked about gas (and oil) flows.

Art Berman and his Galileo complex don't really belong here. Why no mention of his Peak Oil obsessions for example? Berman does the typical Oil Drum shtick of providing reams of information that only a petrophysicist can even recognise, which is meant to impress non experts that he knows what he is talking about.

I'm no petrophysicist, but I know a lot of people who are, and they they have no time for Berman. But of course, he explains that by them being in on the plot.

As BAKINETS points out: Maybe he is right. But if its Berman v Exxon, BP, Shell, Total, Statoil, Marathon, Chevron, Reliance, BHP, Petro China, ENI, Mitsui, Petronas, Sinopec and hundreds of smaller drillers and the service sector and the chemical industry: Then the only logical conclusion is that Galileo has been reincarnated as Berman or that he's wrong.

#### Their ev says the plan results in 80tcf of natural gas

Medlock, 8 [Medlock is a fellow in Energy Studies at Rice University's James A Baker III Institute for Public Policy and an adjunct assistant professor in the [Economics Department](http://www.chron.com/?controllerName=search&action=search&channel=opinion%2Foutlook&search=1&inlineLink=1&query=%22Economics+Department%22) at Rice, “Open outer continental shelf”, http://www.chron.com/opinion/outlook/article/Open-outer-continental-shelf-1597898.php]

A confluence of factors is responsible for the recent price run-up at the pump. One important factor behind the strength of oil prices is the expectation of inadequate oil supply in the future. This has led to a debate regarding the removal of drilling access restrictions in the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf (OCS). According to the Department of Interior's Minerals Management Service (MMS), the OCS in the Lower 48 states currently under moratorium holds 19 billion barrels of technically recoverable oil. Some analysts claim that opening the OCS will not matter that much, as the quantity of oil is only about two years of U.S. consumption. But a more appropriate way to look at the issue is this: If the OCS could provide additional production of 1 million barrels per day of oil, our import dependence on Persian Gulf crude oil would be reduced by about 40 percent. Moreover, at 1 million barrels per day, the currently blocked OCS resource would last about 50 years. Of course, opening the OCS will not bring immediate supplies because it would take time to organize the lease sales and then develop the supply delivery infrastructure. However, as development progressed, the expected growth in supply would have an effect on market sentiment and eventually prices. Thus, opening the OCS should be viewed as a relevant part of a larger strategy to help ease prices over time because an increase in activity in the OCS would generally improve expectations about future oil supplies. Lifting the current moratorium in the OCS would also provide almost 80 trillion cubic feet of technically recoverable natural gas that is currently off-limits. A recent study by the Baker Institute indicates that removing current restrictions on resource development in the OCS would reduce future liquefied natural gas import dependence of the United States and lessen the influence of any future gas producers' cartel.

#### The US uses 24tcf per year – means the plan is only good for 3 years

Energy Information Administration, 8-29-2012, “Frequently Asked Questions,” http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=58&t=8

EIA estimates that there are 2,203 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of natural gas that is technically recoverable in the United States. At the rate of U.S. natural gas consumption in 2011 of about 24 Tcf per year, 2,203 Tcf of natural gas is enough to last about 92 years.

#### Even a single onshore shale field is six times bigger than all OCS resources

Inman 12 Mason, National Geographic News, Feb 29, "Estimates Clash for How Much Natural Gas in the United States", news.nationalgeographic.com/news/energy/2012/03/120301-natural-gas-reserves-united-states/

Engelder is often given credit for spurring the shale gas rush in the Marcellus with early estimates that the formation held large amounts of natural gas. In his most recent published estimate, from 2009, he figured the Marcellus could in the long run yield 489 tcf, a number in the same ballpark as the EIA's 2011 estimate.

#### Their solvency evidence is damning – un-underlined parts prove lifting ON-shore restrictions would boost production by more than the whole OCS – and OCS restrictions only make a difference of 1.5tcf per year

Baker Institute, ‘8 (Baker Institute for Public Policy, Rice University, Baker Institute Policy Report, January 2008, “Natural Gas in North America: Markets and Security,” http://connection.ebscohost.com/c/articles/30064519/study-lift-u-s-drilling-restrictions-avoid-international-lng-cartel)//CC

As might be expected, the lower requirements for LNG under this scenario stem from larger, lowcost U.S. Lower 48 natural gas production. Modeling predicts that lifting access restrictions would lead to an increase overall in Lower 48 production of about 1.5 tcf in 2015 (or a 7.5 percent increase), increasing to 3.1 tcf greater production (or a 10.1 percent increase) in every year from 2015 through 2030. More specifically, OCS production would total 5.0 tcf in 2015 and 6.1 tcf in 2025 as compared to only 3.5 tcf in 2015 and 3.9 tcf in 2025 if the restrictions remain in place. Lifting restrictions in the Rocky Mountains adds another 0.10 tcf by 2015 and 0.93 tcf by 2025.

#### Their own Ebinger evidence is damning – it conclusively says that the consensus of experts agree on-shore shale is sustainable enough for exports now

Ebinger, Senior fellow and Director of the Energy Security Initiative at Brookings, ‘12

(Charles, “Liquid Markets: Assessing the Case for US Exports of Liquefied Natural Gas,” 5-2-12, http:~/~/www.brookings.edu/~~/media/events/2012/5/02%20lng%20exports/20120502\_lng\_edu/~~/media/events/2012/5/02%20lng%20exports/20120502\_lng\_exports, accessed 10-22-12) PM

For an increase in U.S. exports of LNG to be considered feasible, there has to be an adequate and sustainable domestic resource base to support it. Natural gas currently accounts for approximately 25 percent of the U.S. primary energy mix. 3 While it currently provides only a minority of U.S. gas supply, shale gas production is increasing at a rapid rate: from 2000 to 2006, shale gas production increased by an average annual rate of 17 percent; from 2006 to 2010, production increased by an annual average rate of 48 percent (see Figure 2). 4 According to the Energy Information Adminis tration (EIA), shale gas production in the United States reached 4.87 trillion cubic feet (tcf) in 2010, or 23 percent of U.S. dry gas production. By 2035, it is estimated that shale gas production will account for 46 percent of total domestic natural gas production. 5 Given the centrality of shale gas to the future of the U.S. gas sector, much of the discussion over potential exports hinges on the prospects for its sustained availability and development. For exports to be feasible, gas from shale and other unconventional sources needs to both offset declines in conventional production and compete with new and incumbent domestic end uses. There have been a number of reports and studies that attempt to identify the total amount of technically recoverable shale gas resources—the volumes of gas retrievable using current technology irrespective of cost—available in the United States. These estimates vary from just under 700 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of shale gas to over 1,800 tcf (see table 1). To put these numbers in context, the United States consumed just over 24 tcf of gas in 2010, suggesting that the estimates for the shale gas resource alone would be enough to satisfy between 25 and 80 years of U.S. domestic demand. 6 The estimates for recoverable shale gas resources also compare with an estimate for total U.S. gas resources (onshore and offshore, including Alaska) of 2,543 tcf. 7 Based on the range of estimates below, shale gas could therefore account for between 29 percent and 52 percent of the total technically recoverable natural gas resource in the United States. sustainability of shale Gas Production In addition to the size of the economically recoverable resources, two other major factors will have an impact on the sustainability of shale gas production: the productivity of shale gas wells; and the demand for the equipment used for shale gas production. The productivity of shale gas wells has been a subject of much recent debate, with some industry observers suggesting that undeveloped wells may prove to be less productive than those developed to date. However, a prominent view among independent experts is that sustainability of shale gas production is not a cause for serious concern, owing to the continued rapid improvement in technologies and production processes.

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#### Approving exports will stay completely under the radar – neither side wants a fight and lobbyists won’t touch it

Ayesha Rascoe and Emily Stephenson, 6-27-2012, “As Congress looks away, U.S. tiptoes toward exporting a gas bounty,” Reuters, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/27/us-usa-lng-exports-idUSBRE85Q05820120627

In a bitterly divided U.S. political environment, there's at least one thing Republicans and Democrats can agree on: Avoid a public showdown on natural gas exports, arguably the most important energy policy decision in recent memory. While fluctuating gasoline prices, the Keystone pipeline and the fight over fracking steal headlines, the question of how much of the newfound U.S. shale gas bounty should be shared with the rest of the world goes largely without comment or coverage -- despite holding far wider and longer-lasting consequences. The reason is clear: unlike the relatively simple, black-and-white issues that politicians often favor and voters connect to, liquefied natural gas (LNG) is deep, deep gray. It affects a tangled web of constituents, from Big Oil to international allies such as Japan, pits free-trade orthodoxy against the domestic economy, and requires an awkward explanation of why allowing some exports -- inevitably raising U.S. energy prices in the short term, even if at the margin -- may ultimately be better for the country in the long run. All the same, this U.S. president or the next will have to make a tricky decision, and its consequences may only become clear years from now: How much U.S. gas should be sold to other countries if it means boosting prices for consumers at home? "Right now I don't think this issue is getting anywhere near the attention it deserves," said Democratic congressman Edward Markey, one of a small number of politicians actively seeking to rein in energy exports. "Keystone and Solyndra are election-year political sideshows," he said, referring to the bankruptcy of a government-funded solar panel maker. "This is the main event." But lobbyists on both sides of the issue say it suits them best to keep the subject out of the headlines. The gas producers that stand to benefit from higher selling prices see no upside from a public brawl, while many manufacturers who could benefit from continuing low prices shy away from anti-export statements. With Congress unlikely to weigh in, the decision falls to a small, obscure unit of the Energy Department, the Office of Natural Gas Regulatory Activities.

#### The CP doesn’t require congressional action

Michael Levi, senior fellow for energy @ CFR, June 2012, “A Strategy for U.S. Natural Gas Exports,” Hamilton Project, http://www.hamiltonproject.org/papers/a\_strategy\_for\_u.s.\_natural\_gas\_exports/

I thus propose that, to facilitate potential natural gas exports, the DOE should approve applications for LNG exports to non-FTA countries that are pending before it, barring specific concerns about individual applications that are not related to the broader wisdom of allowing LNG exports. In doing so, the DOE is required to find that allowing exports is in the “public interest.” The framework outlined in this paper provides one way of presenting such an assessment. The FERC must also approve modifications to terminals in order for exports to be allowed (Ebinger et al. 2012). I propose that it approve any applications to operate export terminals that have been approved by the DOE, barring problems with individual applications that are unrelated to the broader wisdom of allowing LNG exports. Implementing these steps will not require any new staffing, funding, or action by Congress, which has already put in place the legislative framework needed to approve and monitor LNG exports. Congress need only refrain from placing new statutory restrictions on LNG exports.

#### Export terminals fly under the radar

CenterPoint Energy Services, June 2012, “Deconstructing the construction of LNG export terminals,” http://info.centerpointenergy.com/CES\_Newsletter/June\_2012/ces\_feature\_article.asp

The sheer amount of attention garnered by the Keystone project makes it all the more surprising that, by comparison, construction of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) export terminals in the United States are flying under the radar. With five applications in to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and at least another six U.S. projects on the drawing board, the potential construction of export facilities will have a dramatic impact on the scale of natural gas drilling and the extent to which fracking operations are expanded in communities across the United States. The Obama administration has yet to comment on the applications, however, it is not known if this is because they will side with the naysayers or those in favor of development.

#### No politician will risk criticizing the CP

Ayesha Rascoe and Emily Stephenson, 6-27-2012, “As Congress looks away, U.S. tiptoes toward exporting a gas bounty,” Reuters, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/27/us-usa-lng-exports-idUSBRE85Q05820120627

Not since the liberalization of power markets in the 1980s have politicians had more sway over future energy costs -- or been less willing to grapple publicly with the issue. Only one hearing on LNG exports has been held to date in the Senate, and in the House of Representatives, the Energy and Commerce Committee has no plan to hold hearings at the moment. Markey has struggled to get traction behind legislation that would block gas exports, a measure almost certain to fail to pass through the divided Congress. Few lawmakers openly oppose exports, though even fewer vocally advocate a fully open market that would raise prices at home.

#### Neither side will take a stand over exports

Ayesha Rascoe and Emily Stephenson, 6-27-2012, “As Congress looks away, U.S. tiptoes toward exporting a gas bounty,” Reuters, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/27/us-usa-lng-exports-idUSBRE85Q05820120627

Democrats, often critical of the oil and gas sector, are wary of getting out in front of an issue that divides even the manufacturers benefitting from low gas prices. Republicans, who favor free trade and support fossil fuel development, are leery of being accused of raising costs for consumers and industry. "No politician wants to be accused of raising end-user prices to add to oil companies' bottom lines," says Kevin Book, an energy analyst at Clearview Energy Partners. So for most officials willing to take a stand, it is inevitably one of moderation. Few are ready to weigh in on the toughest question: How much is too much?

#### CP’s not controversial---bipartisan support

Curry 8/8 Tom is an NBC News national affairs writer. “In bipartisan call, House members urge speedier OK for gas exports,” 2012, http://nbcpolitics.nbcnews.com/\_news/2012/08/08/13182831-in-bipartisan-call-house-members-urge-speedier-ok-for-gas-exports?lite

A bipartisan group of 44 House members from Texas, Oklahoma, Louisiana, and Arkansas sent a letter Tuesday to Energy Secretary Steven Chu urging him to speed up approval of LNG exports. In a dramatic reversal from 2006, when natural gas supplies in the U.S. were tight, prices were high, and LNG imports were economically sensible, today there’s so much domestically produced natural gas that prices are low. “This surplus of natural gas has produced very low prices for producers and an absence of market opportunities for natural gas, leading to many well just being shut in," said Rep. Gene Green, D-Texas, and Rep. James Lankford, R-Okla., in a letter joined by 42 other House members. They said the Energy Department’s approval process for more LNG exports “does not seem to have a set timeline for decisions or a sense of urgency.” Among the reasons they cited for federal regulators to allow more LNG terminals to be built: job creation and the fact that exporting LNG would reduce the U.S. trade deficit as consumers abroad paid for U.S.-produced energy.

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#### Approving exports sparks new production – creates an economic incentive

Michael Levi, senior fellow for energy @ CFR, June 2012, “A Strategy for U.S. Natural Gas Exports,” Hamilton Project, http://www.hamiltonproject.org/papers/a\_strategy\_for\_u.s.\_natural\_gas\_exports/

One also needs to know how natural gas exports would affect domestic natural gas production and consumption. The Energy Information Administration (EIA) has projected that U.S. natural gas exports would draw roughly 20 percent from existing natural gas production and 80 percent from new production incentivized by access to export markets (EIA 2012c). The 20 percent drawn from existing production would come at the expense of power and industrial consumption in roughly equal amounts. These estimates are mostly insensitive to detailed assumptions about natural gas availability; they depend mainly on cost assumptions for well-understood applications of natural gas, including in power generation and industry. In any case, as I show below, they do not affect the net cost-benefit analysis here.

#### Status quo has enough supply certainty

Mufson, Washington Post, 12

(Steven, 2-1-12, “Cheap natural gas jumbles energy markets, stirs fears it could inhibit renewables,” http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/cheap-natural-gas-jumbles-energy-markets-stirs-fears-it-could-inhibit-renewables/2012/01/08/gIQApLr5hQ\_story.html, accessed 8-22-12, CMM)

There is enough certainty about supply for several companies to start pursuing export deals. Cheniere Energy Partners, which had built an import terminal for liquefied natural gas in Louisiana years ago, has won federal approval to turn it into an export terminal and is signing up customers, including Korea Gas. On Oct. 7, Dominion Power received permission from the Energy Department to turn its Cove Point facility, built in the 1970s to import liquefied natural gas from Algeria, into an export terminal. It can negotiate contracts for up to 25 years. Cove Point could export 1 billion cubic feet of natural gas a year, about 4 percent of current U.S. consumption. The EIA predicts that the United States will become a net exporter of liquefied natural gas by 2016.

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#### Hagel will be confirmed but it’s a huge fight---requires all of Obama’s political capital

Scott Wong and Manu Raju, 1-6-2013, “Hagel takes fire from Hill,” http://www.nj.com/us-politics/index.ssf/2013/01/hagel\_takes\_fire\_from\_hill.html

Senate Democrats and Republicans are far from sold on President Barack Obama's expected nomination of Chuck Hagel as secretary of defense. In fact, Obama's decision to tap the Vietnam veteran and outspoken former Republican senator is likely to spark another nasty fight with Congress right on the heels of the fiscal cliff showdown and just before another likely battle royal over the debt ceiling. Republicans on Sunday unleashed a fresh barrage of attacks amid reports Obama would nominate Hagel on Monday for the top job at the Pentagon. The new Senate minority whip, Texas Republican John Cornyn, said he's firmly against Hagel's nomination. Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.), an Air Force reservist who serves on the Armed Services Committee that will consider the nod, said Hagel would hold the "most antagonistic" views toward Israel of any defense secretary in U.S. history. And despite heaping praise on Hagel when he retired from the Senate after the 2008 elections, Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) on Sunday failed to extend an olive branch to the Nebraska Republican, instead suggesting there would be "tough questions" ahead. Even Senate Democrats are privately signaling they're not yet on board with the Hagel pick, and that the White House has a lot of work to do to get him across the finish line. The nomination comes at a tricky time for the administration -- just as the fights over raising the debt ceiling and government appropriations are set to begin. And it could put a number of at-risk or pro-Israel Democrats in tough political spots -- especially if the nomination fight grows even more contentious. Democrats are also scratching their heads over why Obama appears willing to go to the mat for Hagel, while abandoning his push for a close friend and member of his inner circle, U.N. Ambassador Susan Rice, to become secretary of state. Rice, an unabashed Democrat, abandoned her bid after withering GOP criticism over the deadly attacks on the U.S. Consulate in Libya. Though different in substance, the controversy over Rice's remarks is not unlike the current pushback over Hagel's past foreign policy positions and controversial remarks. But Hagel lacks a natural constituency in the Senate, given that he's grown alienated from the GOP, yet Democrats are suspicious of his record. "It is a strange signal for the White House to send that they are willing to fight for Hagel but not Rice," one Senate Democratic aide said Sunday. "Democrats are not currently unified behind Hagel, and it will take some real work by the administration to get them there, if it's even possible." Senior Republicans agreed, noting that after Hagel infuriated Republicans and Democrats alike over the years, there isn't a natural base for him. "I can't imagine why [Obama] would choose to burn his political capital on this nomination. For what? There is no constituency for Chuck Hagel," one senior GOP aide said. "Obama will expend every ounce of political capital he has to get him across the finish line. Dems will hate this." On Sunday, the 66-year-old Hagel did receive an endorsement from Senate Majority Whip Dick Durbin (D-Ill.), a key Obama ally and No. 2 in Democratic Senate leadership. Durbin noted that Hagel is a Republican, recipient of two Purple Hearts from wounds he received in Vietnam, and did stints on the Senate Foreign Relations and Intelligence committees. "Yes, he is a serious candidate if the president chooses to name him," Durbin stated. Freshman Sen. Heidi Heitkamp (D-N.D.) called Hagel "a patriot" and said she was keeping an open mind. "Let's hear what the senator has to say," she said. And Democrats predicted last month that Hagel -- who served in the Senate from 1997 to 2009 -- would be confirmed. "We all know him up here, he'll be fine," Senate Armed Services Chairman Carl Levin (D-Mich.) said in mid-December.

#### Plan causes a political firestorm

Schoen 10 John is a writer for NBC. “BP Spill Clouds Future of U.S. Oil Drilling,” May 28, http://www.nbcdfw.com/news/breaking/BP\_spill\_clouds\_future\_of\_U\_S\_\_oil\_drilling-95099234.html

Just a few months ago, offshore drilling was poised to play a greater role meeting in the nation’s energy needs. But the massive BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico has brought an abrupt reversal to that policy and ushered in more restrictions on new exploration, tighter controls of existing wells and higher costs for oil companies. “I continue to believe that domestic oil production is important,” President Barack Obama told reporters at a Thursday news conference. “But I also believe we can't do this stuff if we don't have confidence that we can prevent crises like this from happening again.” Some have likened the spill to the 1979 partial meltdown of a nuclear reactor at Three Mile Island — a turning point in U.S. energy policy that would effectively cap expansion of nuclear power for decades. Just as Three Mile Island didn’t put an end to nuclear power production, the BP disaster won’t put a stop to deep water drilling in the Gulf. For at least the next decade, the need for oil is just too great. But the future of U.S. offshore drilling has suddenly become as murky as the oily Gulf waters fouled by BP's runaway wellhead a mile underwater. Even if the ongoing “topkill” effort to cap the leaking well is successful, the legacy of the disaster — and the final tally of the environmental and financial damage — won’t be known for years. “There is a long term study needed — I’m talking decades — to really fully understand the consequences of this spill,” said John Stegeman, a scientist at the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution. “So that when the next one comes along — and there will be others, whether they’re this big our not — we can enhance our ability to understand and deal with and predict consequences of future spills.” For now, the spill has brought new offshore drilling to a virtual standstill. On Thursday, the Obama administration announced a six-month moratorium on deep water oil and gas drilling and ordered the shutdown of offshore exploratory wells already operating until they meet new safety requirements. Public outrage over BP’s inability to stop the runway well has created a political firestorm. Congress has held a blizzard of hearings on the cause of the accident and the implications for future drilling. Pictures of tarred beaches and oil-fouled pelicans in the Gulf Coast have intensified a decades-long debate weighing the need to expand domestic oil supplies against the risk of environmental damage. Supporters of expanded drilling argue the country can’t afford to stop looking for new domestic oil supplies. "If the delay is for a season to ensure we have the highest levels of protection in place, that's one thing," said Sen. Lisa Murkowski, R-Alaska, the ranking member the Senate’s Energy and Natural Resources Committee, on Thursday. “But if it means that existing permits are allowed to lapse … that's not acceptable to me or Alaska." The political battle lines over U.S. energy policy are complex. Over the past decade, multiple skirmishes have been fought between bipartisan alliances of energy-producing and energy-consuming states. The divisions are further complicated by the often conflicting goals of energy policy related to oil natural gas, coal, wind, solar, etc.

#### Hagel’s key to restraint that prevents unsustainable U.S. power---the alternative is Flournoy who would lock in a neocon foreign policy

Kelley Beaucar Vlahos 12-25, longtime political reporter for FoxNews.com and a contributing editor at The American Conservative, Washington correspondent for Homeland Security Today magazine, 12/25/12, “Give Us Chuck Hagel for Christmas,” <http://original.antiwar.com/vlahos/2012/12/24/give-us-hagel-for-christmas/>

Now a Democratic President is reportedly mulling him for defense secretary and the same Republican automatons and neoconservative harpies are pulling no punches to thwart it. They complain about his allegedly insufficient support of Israel (massaged, cajoled and translated for full-effect into charges of anti-Semitism), driven in part by his unwillingness to impose harsh economic sanctions or use of force against Iran. He also voted against designating Hezbollah a terrorist organization, and has encouraged open relations with Hamas in hopes of reanimating the corpse of the Middle East pace process.

Furthermore, Hagel’s flagrant disdain for the runaway MIC (military industrial complex), preemptive war, and senseless foreign occupation is such an aberration to the Washington establishment that when the bunker busters in Congress, American Israel supporters and rightwing 101st Keyboard Brigade heard he might be nominated, their attack was so immediate and vicious it’ll likely serve as a model for smear efficiency for years to come. If the U.S. Army had deployed these superlative tactics in say, Afghanistan, they might have actually won the so-called “war of perception” over the Taliban 10 years ago. Too bad most of Hagel’s critics prefer calling the shots from over here, rather than putting their rear-ends in harm’s way over there.

The War Against Hagel has hardly been decisive, however, at least as we near the end of the year, leaving some space for his supporters to mount a proper defense, which of this writing, is increasingly vigorous. There seems to be a common theme to every blog post and op-ed penned for his purpose: the man is a welcome independent thinker in the Era of the Borg — and he’s no phony, else he would have safely buzzed off with the rest of the political hive long ago. The Atlantic’s Jeffrey Goldberg, usually quite scornful of Realist foreign policy arguments — especially concerning Iran — said Thursday he worries about rightwing developments in Israel even more than Hagel’s purportedly soft approach on Iran, and suggested quite baldy that Hagel’s independence would be a help not a hindrance where it counts:

What we need are American officials who will speak with disconcerting bluntness to Israel about the choices it is making…Maybe the time has come to redefine the term “pro-Israel” to include, in addition to providing support against Iran (a noble cause); help with the Iron Dome system (also a noble cause); and support to maintain Israel’s qualitative military edge (ditto), the straightest of straight talk about Israel’s self-destructive policies on the West Bank. Maybe Hagel, who is not bound to old models, could be useful in this regard.

Many of us see Hagel’s impact in much broader terms than just the Israel question. We’ve had too many armchair generals and dutiful yes men at the levers of power, cleaving to an unsustainable post-9/11 orthodoxy that has militarized our foreign policy and politicized our military. The neoconservatism of the Bush years has bled literally into the so-called humanitarian interventionism of the Obama era, and for the first time, there is an opportunity to check that with the presence of a known Realist who, as Harvard’s Stephen Walt says, is “opposed to squandering U.S. power, prestige, and wealth on misbegotten crusades,” and is immune to the “threat inflation” both sides routinely engage in to justify lining the pockets of the defense industry. After nearly 12 years of constant war, Hagel’s references to Iraq and Afghanistan as a meat grinder to which we’ve wastefully sent too many of our own children, and his belief that he is the “the real conservative” because he actually calls for restraint, should be a refreshing prospect, and not feared by Americans conditioned to accept there is a military solution for every problem.

“In a town dominated by often-unexamined conventional wisdom, the appointment of Hagel to DoD would be a welcome relief,” wrote Michael Cohen for The Guardian last week. Reached on the phone, Cohen told me that Hagel would be a “transformational pick,” but acknowledged that the challenges loom large for a non-conformist now squared against not only members of his own party, but neoconservatives wielding their “long knives,” and the pro-war wing of the Democratic establishment, too. “Look, he is not one of them,” Cohen said, “he’s not a neoconservative nor a liberal hawk, he thinks there should be limits on American power.”

Although President Obama has, so far, not said a word about Hagel, the former senator who quietly spent the last four years chairing the moderate Atlantic Council, is enjoying an enthusiastic defense from myriad commentators across the mainstream, including Andrew Sullivan, Steve Clemons, Peter Beinart — even Jim Judis at The New Republic. Several ambassadors — including Bush-era Nick Burns and Ryan Crocker and three Israel representatives — signed on to a letter encouraging his nomination.

Meanwhile, The National Journal and The Washington Post have published biographical sketches emphasizing Hagel’s Vietnam War record and its impact on his post-war career and personal philosophy (this hardly makes up, however, for the Post’s incoherent broadside published by its editorial page on Dec. 19). And of course, The American Conservative’s Daniel Larison and Scott McConnell, not to mention our own Justin Raimondo, are astutely swatting away the haters at every turn of this increasingly torrid offensive.

Michele Flournoy

But while many of us here at Antiwar would like a Hagel nomination for Christmas, the biggest concern (aside from his Swift Boating) is that we might find Michele Flournoy under the tree instead. For those who never heard of her, she founded the Center for a New American Security in 2007 in anticipation of a new Democratic White House. The think tank was designed to promote a more muscular Democratic military policy, which meant its top people supported Hillary Clinton for president as well as the U.S. counterinsurgency in Iraq, and then Afghanistan, known then as the Petraeus Doctrine. Once Obama won, it became the go-to policy shop for the White House and a revolving door to the Pentagon and State Department for its senior fellows. Flournoy went on to take Doug Feith’s position as Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, the No. 3 job at the Pentagon. What she actually did in the fabled “E-Ring” to advance policy or to help extricate the military from an increasingly disastrous war in Afghanistan, is anyone’s guess. But the “hot policy wonk” and top COINdinista apparently made all the right friends and greased all the right skids, and is now the favored pick by the neocons, who see a kindred soul where Hagel is just heartburn ready to happen.

So buttressed is Flournoy by the Washington elite that people like Paul Wolfowitz, who in all reality should be ignored completely for his role in one of the worst war blunders in American history, are rolling out to defend her (in Wolfowitz’s case, maybe he should have cooled his wheels at home). After admitting he’s “not deeply familiar with Michele Flournoy’s record at the Defense Department or with her overall qualifications to be Secretary of Defense,” he says the fact 3,500 Afghan security forces have died this year (compared to 307 Americans) is proof enough she knows what she is doing. I say it’s proof enough that nothing has really changed since the Bush administration, except there are more troops in Afghanistan now (about 68,000) and the U.S. casualty count was much lower then —- 117 in 2007 to be exact.

When liberal flak Eleanor Clift wrote about the prospects of the “first female defense secretary” back in November, all she could muster in her favor was Flournoy’s Oxford pedigree, a stint in the lackluster Clinton Pentagon policy shop and quotes like these from former colleagues: “she has spent a great deal of time thinking how to deploy our military instruments economically and effectively.” Glad she was thinking about it before she left her post in February. Not much came out of if, however, if today’s accounts of continuing bloat, waste and mission creep are any indication.

Frankly, one hears a lot about Flournoy the “team player” but very little about her vision, ideas or actual accomplishments. The fact is, “the team” has been on a losing streak in Afghanistan since Obama took office, while her think tank, of which she continues to serve on the board of directors, has reaped all the benefits and influence as a conduit between the Pentagon, Foggy Bottom, the White House and greedy defense industry. “She’s a safe pick, she will carry the water — if you pick Hagel it would be saying ‘I want to push the envelope a little bit on foreign policy,’” said Cohen, “pushing it in a more realist direction than we have in the past.”

Perhaps that is why so many of us here are excited about the prospect. There are some areas where Hagel and the readers on this page might diverge, particularly on domestic issues. He’s a solid pro-life social conservative. He voted for the Patriot Act (he later fought for broader constitutional safeguards, saying he took an oath to protect the constitution, not “an oath of office to my party or my president”). We don’t know yet where he would stand on the controversial detention provisions in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). We have no idea whether he would stanch the flow of U.S. personnel and weapons into Africa or how he would deal with a newly inherited drone war. As for the Pentagon labyrinth itself, as University of Texas professor (and expert COIN critic) Celeste Ward Gventer tells me, “the problems are systemic and largely exceed the decision or personality of one man, even if he is at the apex.”

Still, if a Flournoy pick would signal an endorsement of the status quo, a Hagel nod would serve to challenge it. This inclination to question policy is quite attractive to observers like us who are tired of living in a fake candy cane marshmallow bubble world when it comes to foreign policy and national security. As a senator, Hagel often addressed these issues realistically, with no regard to how it might hurt his chances for a presidential nomination, which turned out to be short-lived as a result (quite sad, considering the parade of ham-n-egger Republicans who ended up running, and losing, in the last two elections).

#### Restraint’s key to the legitimacy of U.S. power---avoids great power war and prevents hostile China rise

Kevin Fujimoto 12, Lt. Colonel, U.S. Army, January 11, 2012, “Preserving U.S. National Security Interests Through a Liberal World Construct,” online: <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/index.cfm/articles/Preserving-US-National-Security-Interests-Liberal-World-Construct/2012/1/11>

With a credible threat to its leading position in a unipolar global order, the United States should adopt a grand strategy of “investment,” building legitimacy and capacity in the very institutions that will protect our interests in a liberal global construct of the future when we are no longer the dominant imperial power. Similar to the Clinton era's grand strategy of “enlargement,”2 investment supports a world order predicated upon a system of basic rules and principles, however, it differs in that the United States should concentrate on the institutions (i.e., United Nations, World Trade Organization, ASEAN, alliances, etc.) that support a world order, as opposed to expanding democracy as a system of governance for other sovereign nations.

Despite its claims of a benevolent expansion, China is already executing a strategy of expansion similar to that of Imperial Japan's Manchukuo policy during the 1930s.3 This three-part strategy involves: “(i) (providing) significant investments in economic infrastructure for extracting natural resources; (ii) (conducting) military interventions (to) protect economic interests; and, (iii) . . . (annexing) via installation of puppet governments.”4 China has already solidified its control over neighboring North Korea and Burma, and has similarly begun more ambitious engagements in Africa and Central Asia where it seeks to expand its frontier.5

Noted political scientist Samuel P. Huntington provides further analysis of the motives behind China's imperial aspirations. He contends that “China (has) historically conceived itself as encompassing a “‘Sinic Zone'. . . (with) two goals: to become the champion of Chinese culture . . . and to resume its historical position, which it lost in the nineteenth century, as the hegemonic power in East Asia.”6 Furthermore, China holds one quarter of the world's population, and rapid economic growth will increase its demand for natural resources from outside its borders as its people seek a standard of living comparable to that of Western civilization.

The rise of peer competitors has historically resulted in regional instability and one should compare “the emergence of China to the rise of. . . Germany as the dominant power in Europe in the late nineteenth century.”7 Furthermore, the rise of another peer competitor on the level of the Soviet Union of the Cold War ultimately threatens U.S. global influence, challenging its concepts of human rights, liberalism, and democracy; as well as its ability to co-opt other nations to accept them.8 This decline in influence, while initially limited to the Asia-Pacific region, threatens to result in significant conflict if it ultimately leads to a paradigm shift in the ideas and principles that govern the existing world order.

A grand strategy of investment to address the threat of China requires investing in institutions, addressing ungoverned states, and building legitimacy through multilateralism. The United States must build capacity in the existing institutions and alliances accepted globally as legitimate representative bodies of the world's governments. For true legitimacy, the United States must support these institutions, not only when convenient, in order to avoid the appearance of unilateralism, which would ultimately undermine the very organizations upon whom it will rely when it is no longer the global hegemon.

The United States must also address ungoverned states, not only as breeding grounds for terrorism, but as conflicts that threaten to spread into regional instability, thereby drawing in superpowers with competing interests. Huntington proposes that the greatest source of conflict will come from what he defines as one “core” nation's involvement in a conflict between another core nation and a minor state within its immediate sphere of influence.9 For example, regional instability in South Asia10 threatens to involve combatants from the United States, India, China, and the surrounding nations. Appropriately, the United States, as a global power, must apply all elements of its national power now to address the problem of weak and failing states, which threaten to serve as the principal catalysts of future global conflicts.11

Admittedly, the application of American power in the internal affairs of a sovereign nation raises issues. Experts have posed the question of whether the United States should act as the world's enforcer of stability, imposing its concepts of human rights on other states. In response to this concern, The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty authored a study titled, The Responsibility to Protect,12 calling for revisions to the understanding of sovereignty within the United Nations (UN) charter. This commission places the responsibility to protect peoples of sovereign nations on both the state itself and, more importantly, on the international community.13 If approved, this revision will establish a precedent whereby the United States has not only the authority and responsibility to act within the internal affairs of a repressive government, but does so with global legitimacy if done under the auspices of a UN mandate.

Any effort to legitimize and support a liberal world construct requires the United States to adopt a multilateral doctrine which avoids the precepts of the previous administration: “preemptive war, democratization, and U.S. primacy of unilateralism,”14 which have resulted in the alienation of former allies worldwide. Predominantly Muslim nations, whose citizens had previously looked to the United States as an example of representative governance, viewed the Iraq invasion as the seminal dividing action between the Western and the Islamic world. Appropriately, any future American interventions into the internal affairs of another sovereign nation must first seek to establish consensus by gaining the approval of a body representing global opinion, and must reject military unilateralism as a threat to that governing body's legitimacy.

Despite the long-standing U.S. tradition of a liberal foreign policy since the start of the Cold War, the famous liberal leviathan, John Ikenberry, argues that “the post-9/11 doctrine of national security strategy . . . has been based on . . . American global dominance, the preventative use of force, coalitions of the willing, and the struggle between liberty and evil.”15 American foreign policy has misguidedly focused on spreading democracy, as opposed to building a liberal international order based on universally accepted principles that actually set the conditions for individual nation states to select their own system of governance. Anne-Marie Slaughter, the former Dean of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, argues that true Wilsonian idealists “support liberal democracy, but reject the possibility of democratizing peoples . . .”16 and reject military primacy in favor of supporting a rules-based system of order.

Investment in a liberal world order would also set the conditions for the United States to garner support from noncommitted regional powers (i.e., Russia, India, Japan, etc.), or “swing civilizations,” in countering China's increasing hegemonic influence.17 These states reside within close proximity to the Indian Ocean, which will likely emerge as the geopolitical focus of the American foreign policy during the 21st century, and appropriately have the ability to offset China's imperial dominance in the region.18

Critics of a liberal world construct argue that idealism is not necessary, based on the assumption that nations that trade together will not go to war with each other.19 In response, foreign affairs columnist Thomas L. Friedman rebukes their arguments, acknowledging the predicate of commercial interdependence as a factor only in the decision to go to war, and argues that while globalization is creating a new international order, differences between civilizations still create friction that may overcome all other factors and lead to conflict.20

Detractors also warn that as China grows in power, it will no longer observe “the basic rules and principles of a liberal international order,” which largely result from Western concepts of foreign relations. Ikenberry addresses this risk, citing that China's leaders already recognize that they will gain more authority within the existing liberal order, as opposed to contesting it. China's leaders “want the protection and rights that come from the international order's . . . defense of sovereignty,”21 from which they have benefitted during their recent history of economic growth and international expansion.

Even if China executes a peaceful rise and the United States overestimates a Sinic threat to its national security interest, the emergence of a new imperial power will challenge American leadership in the Indian Ocean and Asia-Pacific region. That being said, it is more likely that China, as evidenced by its military and economic expansion, will displace the United States as the regional hegemonic power. Recognizing this threat now, the United States must prepare for the eventual transition and immediately begin building the legitimacy and support of a system of rules that will protect its interests later when we are no longer the world's only superpower.

#### Unchecked Chinese rise risks global nuclear war

C. Dale Walton 7, Lecturer in International Relations and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, 2007, Geopolitics and the Great Powers in the 21st Century, p. 49

Obviously, it is of vital importance to the United States that the PRC does not become the hegemon of Eastern Eurasia. As noted above, however, regardless of what Washington does, China's success in such an endeavor is not as easily attainable as pessimists might assume. The PRC appears to be on track to be a very great power indeed, but geopolitical conditions are not favorable for any Chinese effort to establish sole hegemony; a robust multipolar system should suffice to keep China in check, even with only minimal American intervention in local squabbles. The more worrisome danger is that Beijing will cooperate with a great power partner, establishing a very muscular axis. Such an entity would present a critical danger to the balance of power, thus both necessitating very **active American intervention** in Eastern Eurasia and **creating the** underlying **conditions for a massive**, and probably **nuclear, great power war**. Absent such a "super-threat," however, the demands on American leaders will be far more subtle: creating the conditions for Washington's gentle decline from playing the role of unipolar quasi-hegemon to being "merely" the greatest of the world's powers, while aiding in the creation of a healthy multipolar system that is not marked by close great power alliances.

## 1NR

### Yes Hagel/PC Key

#### Enough votes for confirmation now but it’s a game of inches---PC’s key---zero margin for error

Chuck Todd et al 1-8, MSNBC anchor, 1/8/13, “First Thoughts: No margin for error in Hagel nomination,” http://firstread.nbcnews.com/\_news/2013/01/08/16412788-first-thoughts-no-margin-for-error-in-hagel-nomination?lite

\*\*\* No margin for error in Hagel nomination: Yesterday’s official rollout of Chuck Hagel for defense secretary went about as well as it could have for the Obama White House. Statements of praise for Hagel by folks like Colin Powell and Robert Gates? Check. A statement of past praise from John McCain (who said in 2006 Hagel would make a “great secretary of state”), even though McCain is now taking a skeptical look at the nominee? Check. And getting Chuck Schumer, perhaps the Democratic senator with the most reservations about Hagel, to issue a non-committal statement? Check. So the White House feels pretty good about where things stand, although this won’t be an easy fight. Yet what Team Obama can’t afford is any new negative information, any other shoe to drop. Bottom line: There is no margin for error from this point onward. Hagel’s support, at best, in the Senate is an inch deep and that “inch” would get him the votes he needs. But it wouldn’t take much for the bottom to, well, fall out. This is going to be a precarious few weeks. Very few senators are in D.C. right now, so the interest groups will be front and center. Hagel needs his confirmation hearing sooner, rather than later, but right now, it’s unclear when those hearings will be scheduled. Hagel also needs FACE time with senators, and he won’t have that opportunity for a good week or so. ¶ \*\*\* Obama’s confidence -- 2009 vs. 2013: As we wrote yesterday, Obama is clearly projecting a level of confidence at the start of this second term than he did four years ago, in particular, on foreign policy. Just look at the initial comfort level with his picks for his second-term national security team (Hagel, John Kerry, John Brennan) vs. the first-term team (Hillary Clinton, Bob Gates, Leon Panetta, Jim Jones). At the start of his first term, the president was no less confident about his foreign policy judgment but he made the calculation that he needed to placate the Washington establishment so he stuck with the Republican Gates at Defense, brought in Hillary to State, brought in a former general, Jim Jones, as his National Security Adviser. Gates and Clinton worked out, but Jones didn’t. ¶ \*\*\* Amplifying his views, using political capital: Now? The president is using his national security choices to amplify his views in a way that was missing four years ago. Kerry, Hagel, Brennan and keeping Tom Donilon as NSA (even potentially elevating Deputy NSA Denis McDonough to White House chief of staff) indicates the president is not just interested in running foreign policy out of the White House, but he wants to leave an Obama imprint on Defense, CIA, State etc. But it may be more than that -- Obama is displaying a confidence that he didn’t necessarily show after 2008. Much of this is what you get with a second-term president who got more than 51% of the popular vote (for the second-straight time). He may NOT be saying it the same way Bush did in 2004-05 after winning a second term, but he’s, so far, displaying the following notion: Obama believes he’s earned political capital, and he’s going to use it.

#### Confirmation’s likely but votes could switch

Steve Kornacki 1-7, columnist for Salon, 1/7/13, “Hagel: Obama picks a fight he’ll win,” http://www.salon.com/2013/01/07/the\_fight\_obama\_is\_picking/

It looks like President Obama is about to spark a nomination fight by selecting Chuck Hagel for Defense secretary. The question is how serious the fight will be – a half-hearted effort by a handful of John McCain/Lindsey Graham-types or a full-fledged partisan war with the potential to peel off a few Democrats and jeopardize the nomination. ¶ Let’s start by making clear that the odds favor Hagel’s confirmation. The vast majority of Cabinet nominees sail through the process and only the occasional few are confronted with pockets of resistance that complicate their journey. Even rarer are nominees from the latter group who are ultimately rejected by the Senate, something that last happened in 1989 with John Tower, George H.W. Bush’s first choice to run the Pentagon. The most recent rejected Cabinet nominee before that? Admiral Lewis Strauss, who was nominated for Commerce secretary by Dwight Eisenhower, only to be turned down in 1959 on a 49-46 Senate vote. Also in Hagel’s favor: the party of the president nominating him controls the Senate 55-45. ¶ But there are already Republicans publicly vowing to oppose Hagel. Graham said on Sunday that it would be an “in your face” pick by Obama and called Hagel “out of the mainstream” on foreign policy issues. And because much of the opposition to Hagel will rest on charges of insufficient support for Israel and sensitivity to the threat posed by Iran, there’s at least the potential that staunchly pro-Israel Democrats might be swayed to oppose him. Chuck Schumer, for instance, pointedly refused to endorse Hagel in a recent Sunday show appearance. There’s also Hagel’s 1998 characterization of James Hormel, Bill Clinton’s nominee for ambassador to Luxembourg, as “openly, aggressively gay.” That was enough for Barney Frank, who is seeking an interim Senate appointment from Massachusetts, to go on the record opposing Hagel recently.

#### Votes are there---support from key Senators

AP 1-8, “Obama choice of GOP ex-senator Hagel for defense secretary faces tough Senate confirmation,” 1/8/13, http://www.startribune.com/nation/185864312.html?page=all&prepage=1&c=y#continue

President Barack Obama's pick of Chuck Hagel to helm the Pentagon faces rough going in the Senate as a handful of Republicans quickly announced their opposition to a former GOP colleague, and several skeptical Democrats reserved judgment until the nominee explains his views on Israel and Iran. ¶ The concerns about Hagel complicate his path to Senate confirmation but are not necessarily calamitous as the White House pushes for the first Vietnam War veteran to oversee a military emerging from two wars and staring at deep budget cuts. ¶ Obama also tapped White House counterterrorism adviser John Brennan to head the CIA. Brennan, a 25-year CIA veteran, faces no major obstacles, but he is expected to be hit with questions about torture and administration leaks of secret information. ¶ Moments after Obama announced his selection of Hagel and called him "the leader that our troops deserve," some Senate Republicans voiced opposition to the former Nebraska lawmaker who spent 12 years in the Senate. ¶ "Given Chuck Hagel's statements and actions on a nuclear Iran, Hamas and Hezbollah, I think his confirmation would send exactly the wrong message to our allies and enemies alike," Sen. David Vitter, R-La., said in a statement. "Israel, our strongest ally in the region, is dealing with a lot of threat and uncertainty right now; Hagel would make that even worse." ¶ Other Senate Republicans, including the No. 2 GOP lawmaker, John Cornyn of Texas, new member Ted Cruz of Texas and Mississippi's Roger Wicker, signaled they would vote against the nomination. ¶ Hagel has upset some Israel backers with his comment about the "Jewish lobby," his votes against unilateral sanctions against Iran while backing international penalties on the regime in Tehran and his criticism of talk of a military strike by either the U.S. or Israel against Iran. ¶ He also upset gay rights groups over past comments, including his opposition in 1998 to President Bill Clinton's choice of James Hormel as ambassador to Luxembourg. He referred to Hormel as "openly, aggressively gay." Hagel recently apologized, saying his comments were "insensitive." ¶ Those remarks and actions have created fierce opposition from some pro-Israel groups, criticism from some Republicans and unease among some congressional Democrats. ¶ The Log Cabin Republicans took out a full-page ad in The Washington Post highlighting their opposition to Hagel, and Gregory T. Angelo, interim executive director of the gay rights group, said the gay and lesbian grassroots organization is considering other steps in a campaign against Hagel's nomination. ¶ House Majority Leader Eric Cantor, R-Va., who does not have a vote on the nomination, called Hagel the "wrong man" for the job and complained that "his inflammatory statements about Israel are well outside the mainstream." ¶ In an interview with the Lincoln (Neb.) Journal Star, Hagel said his statements have been distorted and there is "not one shred of evidence that I'm anti-Israeli, not one (Senate) vote that matters that hurt Israel." ¶ In a critical sign of support for Hagel's prospects, the 66-year-old moderate Republican attracted words of praise from Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, D-Nev., Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Carl Levin, D-Mich., and Sen. Dianne Feinstein, D-Calif., who heads the Intelligence panel. ¶ Levin called Hagel "well-qualified." Feinstein described him as "a knowledgeable and independent voice with a strong grasp of the pressing national security issues facing our country." Reid said "few nominees have such a combination of strategic and personal knowledge of our national defense needs." ¶ Sen. Patrick Leahy, D-Vt., said Hagel "is a combat veteran who still carries shrapnel in his body from his wounds. He will not need on-the-job training."¶ Several Democrats, most notably Sen. Chuck Schumer of New York, and a number of Republicans, including Jim Inhofe of Oklahoma and John McCain of Arizona, said they would await the Senate process and the opportunity to question Hagel. That raises the stakes for his private meetings with senators and his confirmation hearing in the next few weeks before the Armed Services Committee. ¶ While some opposition was expected for Obama's nominee, no senator has threatened to block the selection. Republican and Democratic congressional aides said the White House wouldn't have put forth the nomination if it didn't think it had the votes for Hagel's confirmation. Democrats hold a 55-45 advantage in the Senate.

#### PC’s key in the short-term---Obama has just enough left after the fiscal cliff---Hagel’s the top priority above the debt ceiling and the sequester

CSM 1-7 – Christian Science Monitor, “Chuck Hagel: why Obama is using political capital on Pentagon pick (+video),” 1/7/13, http://www.csmonitor.com/layout/set/print/USA/Politics/2013/0107/Chuck-Hagel-why-Obama-is-using-political-capital-on-Pentagon-pick-video

In a way, Mr. Hagel is a man without a party. Many Washington analysts predict a tough confirmation fight in the Senate.

But to President Obama, who announced Hagel’s selection Monday, he is someone worth fighting for.

“Chuck Hagel is the leader that our troops deserve,” Mr. Obama said. “He is an American patriot.”

Hagel would be the first enlisted man, and the first Vietnam veteran, to head the Pentagon. He “bears the scars and the shrapnel” from his military service, Obama noted. The president takes the “man without a party” argument and turns it on its head, returning to his first-term promise to rise above party politics.

“Chuck represents the bipartisan tradition that we need more of in Washington,” Obama said. “For his independence and commitment to consensus, he's earned the respect of national security and military leaders, Republicans and Democrats, including me.”

Some Senate Democrats have endorsed Hagel, and at least three Republican senators have come out against him, while others of both parties have expressed skepticism. Democrats have a 55-45 majority in the Senate, but Republicans could decide to filibuster – which would require 60 votes to overcome. And there’s no guarantee that all the Democrats vote with the president.

So why is Obama willing to have this fight, after watching one of his top prospects for secretary of State – UN Ambassador Susan Rice – remove her name from contention over what would have been a contentious confirmation battle, had she been nominated? (Her combative style and in particular misstatements about the Sept. 11 attack on the US mission in Benghazi, Libya, riled Republicans.)

Administration officials say Obama had not necessarily settled on Ambassador Rice for State, but her withdrawal left the impression that the president’s choice had been preemptively defeated. So it may, in fact, be partly because of Rice that Obama is proceeding with Hagel. The president does not want to look weak again.

He also expressed clear personal affection for Hagel in his statement Monday. As Senate colleagues, the two had traveled together in Iraq and Afghanistan. Hagel is also close to Vice President Biden, a longtime Senate colleague. Hagel has already served the Obama administration in other capacities, including as co-chair of the president's Intelligence Advisory Board.

Now that Hagel has been nominated for the Pentagon, it is crucial that the next stage – courtesy calls to key Senate members – goes well. It is especially imperative that he reassure senators on his commitment to Israel.

On Sunday, senior White House officials reached out to key American Jewish interest groups and sought to address any concerns about Hagel, according to CNN. And on Monday, various Jewish groups put out statements of support for Hagel. However the biggest and most powerful of the pro-Israel groups – the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, or AIPAC – so far has not put out a statement.

Other aspects of the timing of Hagel’s nomination also matter. Obama just burned some political capital in getting through the Jan. 1 “fiscal cliff” deadline, in which he got the Republicans to concede on tax hikes for the wealthy. Three more fiscal cliffs loom – on spending cuts, the debt ceiling, and on short-term federal spending – and he will have less leverage than he did last week. So it may seem curious that he has chosen to embark on a tough confirmation fight amid all these other battles.

### AT: Fiscal Thumper

#### Obama won’t engage in debt ceiling debates

NYT 1/3 (MICHAEL D. SHEAR and JACKIE CALMES Lawmakers Gird for Next Fiscal Clash, on the Debt Ceiling, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/03/us/politics/for-obama-no-clear-path-to-avoid-a-debt-ceiling-fight.html?pagewanted=all&\_r=0)

With the resolution of the year-end fiscal crisis just hours old, the next political confrontation is already taking shape as this city braces for a fight in February over raising the nation’s borrowing limit. But it is a debate President Obama says he will have nothing more to do with.¶ Even as Republicans vow to leverage a needed increase in the federal debt limit to make headway on their demands for deep spending cuts, Mr. Obama — who reluctantly negotiated a deal like that 18 months ago — says he has no intention of ever getting pulled into another round of charged talks on the issue with Republicans on Capitol Hill.¶ “I will not have another debate with this Congress over whether or not they should pay the bills that they’ve already racked up through the laws that they passed,” the president said Tuesday night after he successfully pushed Republicans to allow tax increases on wealthy Americans. On Wednesday, he signed the legislation.¶ The president’s position is sure to appeal to his liberal allies, who fear another round of compromises by Mr. Obama. But it once again sets the stage for a nail-biting standoff that economists warn could lead to a damaging financial default and doubt from investors about the ability of the country to pay its obligations.¶ Moody’s, the rating agency, warned on Wednesday that the looming political battles over the nation’s debt could lower the group’s rating of American debt.¶ “We’re in for another round of brinkmanship and uncertainty,” said Mark Zandi, the chief economist at Moody’s Analytics, who predicted weeks of “angst, discussion and hand-wringing” in Washington. “I don’t think the economy can really find its footing and jump to a higher level of growth until we get to the other side of this.”¶ Joel Prakken, senior managing director of Macroeconomic Advisers, an economics forecasting firm, said bluntly, “This is kind of a mess.”¶ The financial imperative for an increase in the debt limit comes at a time of increasingly sour relations between the president and his Republican adversaries in the House. To secure a deal to avert automatic tax increases and spending cuts on Jan. 1, Mr. Obama was forced into last-minute talks with Senator Mitch McConnell of Kentucky, the Republican leader, after weeks of negotiations with Speaker John A. Boehner in the House collapsed amid acrimony and internal Republican dissension.¶ Now, the president and Mr. Boehner are signaling a fresh round of take-it-or-leave it stands that are in sharp opposition: The president says increasing the borrowing limit is nonnegotiable, while Republicans say the House is all but certain to pass a bill that raises the debt limit only in exchange for significant cuts — a challenge to Mr. Obama and the Democratic-controlled Senate.¶ Smarting from the president’s victory on taxes over the New Year’s holiday, Republicans in Congress are betting that their refusal to raise the $16.4 trillion debt ceiling will force Mr. Obama to the bargaining table on spending cuts and issues like changes in Medicare and Social Security.¶ But doing so would inevitably reprise the bitter debate over the debt ceiling that took place in the summer of 2011, when the government came close to defaulting on its debt before lawmakers and the president agreed to a 10-year package of spending cuts in exchange for Republican agreement to raise the debt ceiling by about the same amount.¶ And that is exactly what Republicans want — again.¶ “If they want to get the debt limit raised, they are going to have to engage and accept that reality,” said Brendan Buck, a spokesman for Mr. Boehner. “The president knows that.”¶ Senator Patrick J. Toomey, Republican of Pennsylvania, said flatly that his party should risk the possibility of default — including interruptions in federal benefit checks and paychecks for government workers — if it was the only way to compel the president to support deep spending cuts that will reduce the deficit.¶ “That’s disruptive, but it’s a hell of a lot better than the path that we’re on,” Mr. Toomey said Wednesday on MSNBC. “We absolutely have to have this fight over the debt limit.”¶ The Republican Party’s caucus in the House will discuss a debt ceiling strategy at a private retreat in Williamsburg, Va., this month, according to a top Republican aide, who said they were determined to insist again on spending cuts that equal the amount of increase in how much the country can borrow.¶ “The speaker told the president to his face that everything you want in life comes with a price,” the aide said. “That doesn’t change here. I don’t think he has any choice.”¶ White House officials say Mr. Obama is equally determined to avoid letting the debt ceiling become a regular Republican tool for extracting concessions on spending on programs popular with Democratic constituents.¶ “It means that he won’t negotiate on it,” a senior administration official said Wednesday about the president’s comments. ”He’s not entertaining offers about it. We’re not having meetings about it.”

### Link Wall

#### Bipartisan opposition to the plan---causes big fights

Greenwire 6 (“Rough going seen for efforts to lift congressional moratoria,” 5-26-6,

http://www.noia.org/website/download.asp?id=295)

With a growing number of Republican lawmakers facing stiff midterm races, efforts to open more offshore areas to oil and gas drilling will find tough going on Capitol Hill, environmentalists and others tracking the issue say. For now, industry groups say momentum is on their side. Though the House voted 217-203 on Thursday to reject removing congressional moratoria on most offshore natural gas drilling, industry lobbyists point out that Rep. John Peterson's (R-Pa.) plan got 46 more votes than it did last year. If there is an offshore drilling component to an upcoming House energy package, it is expected to be shaped largely by House Resources Committee Chairman Richard Pombo (R-Calif.). Pombo's plan would allow states to "opt-out" of offshore oil and gas drilling bans. States that opt-out would receive a share of offshore production revenues. Environmentalists are hopeful the **bipartisan coastal coalition** that opposes wider leasing will not be swayed in sufficient numbers to endorse an opt-out plan or other efforts that are less aggressive than Peterson's but still relax current bans. Heather Taylor, deputy legislative director for the Natural Resources Defense Council, called the argument that Thursday's vote puts industry within striking distance of winning changes to current restrictions a "stretch." "We still won. Period," Taylor said in an interview Friday. "The bottom line is that [the] vote proves that people care about our coasts, and any proposal that comes through that hurts our coasts will be rejected." Also, a House floor vote last week that would also have lifted congressional coastal oil drilling bans lost by a large margin. That prompted an environmentalist to note that an opt-out covering both oil and gas would face hurdles that could be greater than Peterson's gas-only proposal. One lobbyist who works on environmental and energy issues does not believe the House is ready to adopt the opt-out idea, which was most recently floated through legislation offered by Rep. Bobby Jindal (R-La.) that largely mirrors an opt-out and state revenue-sharing plan Pombo floated last year. "I don't see how an opt-out passes," the lobbyist said. "We have never lost a vote on this on the floor," added an aide to a Democratic lawmaker. "To succeed, Pombo has to play the middle ground. I am not sure if he is there yet." Still, an industry lobbyist seeking wider drilling said Friday the vote on Peterson's plan "proves a nuanced approach to things ... has a lot of credibility on the Hill right now." Yet the fight could get tougher if it does not happen this year. Republicans are bracing for a tough midterm election, and while votes on offshore drilling are not quite partisan showdowns, more Democrats oppose wider offshore leasing.

#### Offshore natural gas is mired in gridlock---huge backlash

Gardner 11 Timothy is a writer for Reuters. “Senate blocks move to open up offshore drilling,” May 19, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/19/us-usa-drilling-republicans-idUSTRE74I3XM20110519

The Senate blocked a move by Republicans to speed domestic offshore oil and natural gas drilling on Wednesday, a fresh sign of congressional gridlock on energy issues even as drivers endure gasoline prices near $4 a gallon. Republicans only got 42 of the 60 votes needed to consider a bill, known as the Offshore Production and Safety Act, that would have directed the Interior Department to conduct previously scheduled offshore lease sales in the Gulf of Mexico, Virginia, and Alaska. The bill, introduced by Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell, also would have extended lease terms by one year in the Gulf which the Obama administration suspended last year after the BP oil spill. It did not get approval from some Democrats in energy producing states who Republicans had hoped to get, such as Mary Landrieu from Louisiana. The bill was a response by Senate Republicans to high gasoline prices, but also to a Democratic effort that failed on Tuesday to repeal billions of dollars in tax breaks for the top five oil companies operating in the United States. Ahead of presidential and congressional elections next year, calls by politicians to do something about high gasoline prices have become louder, but analysts said there is little they can do to push prices lower in the short-term. McConnell said the Democratic bill would have done three things: "Destroy jobs, send American jobs overseas, make us more dependent on foreign sources of oil." Democrats have already painted Republicans who voted to block the oil tax break effort as standing with the top five energy companies while their profits hit $36 billion in the first quarter of the year. Republicans hope to cast Democrats who opposed their bill opening up leases as against increasing production of domestic oil. But President Barack Obama, aiming to quiet some of those arguments, has pushed his Department of the Interior to expand drilling in Alaska and the Gulf of Mexico. McConnell's bill was similar to several bills that passed recently in the Republican-controlled House of Representatives. Environmentalists praised the vote in the Senate. "After only a year since the BP Oil Disaster ... now is not the time for 'Drill, Baby, Drill,'" said Michael Brune, the executive director of the Sierra Club.

#### Plan angers Obama’s base

Maize 10 (Kennedy, “Copenhagen: The Case for Climate Adaptation”, Managing Power, March 1, http://www.managingpowermag.com/opinion\_and\_commentary/Copenhagen-The-Case-for-Climate-Adaptation\_227.html)

Energy legislation is dead for 2010, except for possible subsidies for nuclear power, clean coal, and offshore drilling, designed to appeal to Republicans. But that reach across the partisan divide likely will enrage Obama’s base among liberals and environmentalists. The predictable outcome: more gridlock and name-calling. No action.

#### Kills the agenda

Campbell 11 (James E., Distinguished Professor of Political Science and Chair of the Department and the University of Buffalo, “Political Forces on the Obama Presidency: From Elections to Governing”, http://www.polsci.buffalo.edu/documents/ObamaPresidencyChapter4.pdf)

Since neither the ideological base of a party not its supporters in the center can be ignored-—and since both have different demands—presidents must arrive at some balance between them. In no small part, the success of presidents in governing depends on their success in striking the right balance between governing to please their party’s base and governing to please the political center. Like every presidency before his, **this is the challenge for Obama’s presidency.** Its success in governing the nation, as well as the possibility of a second term, may hinge on how well the president strikes the right balance between appealing to his liberal base and simultaneously to his supporters in the political center. The principal reason why a president’s success in office depends on his ability to maintain the support of the president’s electoral coalition **(the combined partisan base and centrist supporters)** is that this is also **his governing coalition**. Since political views are generally stable, a president should expect to receive most of his support while in office from the same quarters that supported him in his election. As a consequence, the success of a president in office depends to a great extent on his ability to maintain both the support of his base and the center. Just as the president’s electoral success depended on maintaining his electoral coalition, his success in governing depends on maintaining the support of that same coalition. In effect, there is no bright line between the politics of governing and the politics of elections. In its most basic sense, the “permanent campaign” to maintain the president’s constituency of supporters from election to office and on to the next election is fundamental to presidential politics.

### AT: Winners Win---Top Level

#### Can’t win on energy

Eisler 12 Matthew is a Researcher @ the Chemical Heritage Foundation. “Science, Silver Buckshot, and ‘All of The Above’” April 2, http://scienceprogress.org/2012/04/science-silver-buckshot-and-%E2%80%9Call-of-the-above%E2%80%9D/

Conservatives take President Obama’s rhetoric at face value. Progressives see the president as disingenuous. No doubt White House planners regard delaying the trans-border section of the Keystone XL pipeline and approving the Gulf of Mexico portion as a stroke of savvy realpolitik, but one has to wonder whether Democratic-leaning voters really are as gullible as this scheme implies. And as for the president’s claims that gasoline prices are determined by forces beyond the government’s control (speculation and unrest in the Middle East), it is probably not beyond the capacity of even the mildly educated to understand that the administration has shown little appetite to reregulate Wall Street and has done its part to inflate the fear premium through confrontational policies in the Persian Gulf. Committed both to alternative energy (but not in a rational, comprehensive way) and cheap fossil fuels (but not in ways benefiting American motorists in an election year), President **Obama has accrued** no political capital **from his energy policy from either the left or the right** by the end of his first term.¶ The president long ago lost the legislative capacity for bold action in practically every field, including energy, but because the GOP’s slate of presidential candidates is so extraordinarily weak in 2012, he may not need it to get re-elected. At least, that is the conventional wisdom in Democratic circles. Should President Obama win a second term, Congress is likely to be **even more hostile** than in his first term, as in the Clinton years. And as in the Clinton years, that will probably mean four more years of inaction and increased resort to cant.

#### Winners lose---PC’s not renewable, is zero-sum, and diminishes fast

Ryan 9 Selwyn, Professor Emeritus and former Director, Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of the West Indies, “Obama and political capital,” 1/18 http://www.trinidadexpress.com/index.pl/article\_opinion?id=161426968

Like many, I expect much from Obama, who for the time being, is my political beast of burden with whom every other politician in the world is unfavourably compared. As a political scientist, I however know that given the structure of American and world politics, it would be **difficult for him to deliver half of what he has promised**, let alone all of it. Reality will **force him to make many "u" turns** and detours which may well land him in quick sand. Obama will, however, begin his stint with a **vast accumulation of political capital**, perhaps more than that held by any other modern leader. Seventy-eight per cent of Americans polled believe that his inauguration is one of the most historic the country will witness. Political capital is, however, a lumpy and **fast diminishing asset** in today's world of instant communication, which once misspent, is **rarely ever renewable**. The world is full of political leaders like George Bush and Tony Blair who had visions, promised a lot, and probably meant well, but who **did not know how to husband** the **political capital** with which they were provided as they assumed office. They squandered it as quickly as they emptied the contents of the public vaults. Many will be watching to see how Obama manages his assets and liabilities register. Watching with hope would be the white young lady who waved a placard in Obama's face inscribed with the plaintive words, "I Trust You." Despite the general optimism about Obama's ability to deliver, many groups have already begun to complain about being betrayed. Gays, union leaders, and women have been loud in their complaints about being by-passed or overlooked. Some radical blacks have also complained about being disrespected. Where and when is Joshua going to lead them to the promised land, they ask? When is he going to pull the troops out of Iraq? Civil rights groups also expect Obama to dis-establish Guantanamo as soon as he takes office to signal the formal break with Dick Cheney and Bush. They also want him to discontinue the policy which allows intelligence analysts to spy on American citizens without official authorisation. In fact, Obama startled supporters when he signalled that he might do an about-turn and continue this particular policy. We note that Bush is signalling Obama that keeping America safe from terrorists should be his top priority item and that he, Bush, had no regrets about violating the constitutional rights of Americans if he had to do so to keep them safe. Cheney has also said that he would do it again if he had to. The safety of the republic is after all the highest law. Other groups-sub-prime home owners, workers in the automobile sector, and the poor and unemployed generally all expect Obama to work miracles on their behalf, which of course he cannot do. Given the problems of the economy which has not yet bottomed out, **some promises have to be deferred** beyond the first term. Groups, however, expect that the promise made to them during the campaign must be kept. Part of the problem is that almost every significant social or ethnic group believes that it was instrumental in Obama's victory. White women felt that they took Obama over the line, as did blacks generally, Jews, Hispanics, Asians, rich white men, gays, and young college kids, to mention a few of those whose inputs were readily recognisable. Obama also has a vast constituency in almost every country in the world, all of whom expect him to save the globe and the planet. Clearly, he is the proverbial "Black Knight on a White Horse." One of the "realities" that Obama has to face is that **American politics is not a winner-take-all system**. It is pluralistic vertically and horizontally, and getting **anything done politically**, even when the President and the Congress are controlled by the same party, **requires groups to negotiate, bargain and engage in serious horse trading.** No one takes orders from the President who can only use moral or political suasion and promises of future support for policies or projects. The system was in fact deliberately engineered to prevent overbearing majorities from conspiring to tyrannise minorities. The system is not only institutionally diverse and plural, but socially and geographically so. As James Madison put it in Federalist No 10, one of the foundation documents of republicanism in America, basic institutions check other basic institutions, classes and interests check other classes and interests, and regions do the same. All are grounded in their own power bases which they use to fend off challengers. The coalitions change from issue to issue, and there is no such thing as party discipline which translated, means you do what I the leader say you do. Although Obama is fully aware of the political limitations of the office which he holds, he is fully aware of the vast stock of political capital which he currently has in the bank and he evidently plans to enlarge it by drawing from the stock held by other groups, dead and alive. He is clearly drawing heavily from the caparisoned cloaks of Lincoln and Roosevelt. Obama seems to believe that by playing the all-inclusive, multipartisan, non-ideological card, he can get most of his programmes through the Congress without having to spend capital by using vetoes, threats of veto, or appeals to his 15 million strong constituency in cyberspace (the latent "Obama Party").

### AT: PC Not Key---Top Level

#### Political scientists and experts agree

Beckman 10 Matthew N. Beckman, Professor of Political Science @ UC-Irvine, 2010, “Pushing the Agenda: Presidential Leadership in U.S. Lawmaking, 1953-2004,” pg. 50

However, many **close observers** of the presidential–congressional relationship have **long cited prevoting bargaining** across Pennsylvania Avenue **as being substantively important**. For example, discussing President Eisenhower’s legislative record in 1953, CQ staffers issued a caveat they have often repeated in the years since:¶ The **President’s leadership** often was tested beyond the glare spotlighting roll calls. . . . Negotiations off the floor and action in committee sometimes are **as important as the recorded votes**. (CQ Almanac 1953, 77)¶ **Many a political scientist has agreed**. Charles Jones (1994), for one, wrote, “However they are interpreted, roll call votes cannot be more than they are: one form of floor action on legislation. If analysts insist on scoring the president, concentrating on this stage of lawmaking can provide no more than a partial tally” (195). And Jon Bond and Richard Fleisher (1990) note that even if they ultimately are reflected in roll-call votes, “many important decisions in Congress are made in places other than floor votes and recorded by means other than roll calls . . . ” (68).

#### Dickinson concludes neg

Dickinson 9 (Matthew, professor of political science at Middlebury College. He taught previously at Harvard University, where he also received his Ph.D., working under the supervision of presidential scholar Richard Neustadt, We All Want a Revolution: Neustadt, New Institutionalism, and the Future of Presidency Research, Presidential Studies Quarterly 39 no4 736-70 D 2009)

Small wonder, then, that initial efforts to find evidence of presidential power centered on explaining legislative outcomes in Congress. Because scholars found it difficult to directly and systematically measure presidential influence or "skill," however, they often tried to estimate it indirectly, after first establishing a baseline model that explained these outcomes on other factors, including party strength in Congress, members of Congress's ideology, the president's electoral support and/or popular approval, and various control variables related to time in office and political and economic context. With the baseline established, one could then presumably see how much of the unexplained variance might be attributed to presidents, and whether individual presidents did better or worse than the model predicted. Despite differences in modeling assumptions and measurements, however, these studies came to remarkably similar conclusions: individual presidents did not seem to matter very much in explaining legislators' voting behavior or lawmaking outcomes (but see Lockerbie and Borrelli 1989, 97-106). As Richard Fleisher, Jon Bond, and B. Dan Wood summarized, "[S]tudies that compare presidential success to some baseline fail to find evidence that perceptions of skill have systematic effects" (2008, 197; see also Bond, Fleisher, and Krutz 1996, 127; Edwards 1989, 212). To some scholars, these results indicate that Neustadt's "president-centered" perspective is incorrect (Bond and Fleisher 1990, 221-23). In fact, the aggregate results reinforce Neustadt's recurring refrain that presidents are weak and that, when dealing with Congress, a president's power is "comparably limited" (Neustadt 1990, 184). The misinterpretation of the findings as they relate to PP stems in part from scholars' difficulty in defining and operationalizing presidential influence (Cameron 2000b; Dietz 2002, 105-6; Edwards 2000, 12; Shull and Shaw 1999). But it is also that case that scholars often misconstrue Neustadt's analytic perspective; his description of what presidents must do to influence policy making does not mean that he believes presidents are the dominant influence on that process. Neustadt writes from the president's perspective, but without adopting a president-centered explanation of power. Nonetheless, if Neustadt clearly recognizes that a president's influence in Congress is exercised mostly, as George Edwards (1989) puts it, "at the margins," his case studies in PP also suggest that, within this limited bound, presidents do strive to influence legislative outcomes. But how? Scholars often argue that a president's most direct means of influence is to directly lobby certain members of Congress, often through quid pro quo exchanges, at critical junctures during the lawmaking sequence. Spatial models of legislative voting suggest that these lobbying efforts are most effective when presidents target the median, veto, and filibuster "pivots" within Congress. This logic finds empirical support in vote-switching studies that indicate that presidents do direct lobbying efforts at these pivotal voters, and with positive legislative results. Keith Krehbiel analyzes successive votes by legislators in the context of a presidential veto an d finds "modest support for the sometimes doubted stylized fact of presidential power as persuasion" (1998,153-54). Similarly, David Brady and Craig Volden look at vote switching by members of Congress in successive Congresses on nearly identical legislation and also conclude that presidents *do influence* the votes of at least some legislators (1998, 125-36). In his study of presidential lobbying on key votes on important domestic legislation during the 83rd (1953-54) through 108th (2003-04) Congresses, MatthewBeckman shows that in addition to these pivotal voters, presidents also lobby leaders in both congressional parties in order to control what legislative alternatives make it onto the congressional agenda (more on this later). These lobbying efforts are correlated with a greater likelihood that a president's legislative preferences will come to a vote (Beckmann 2008, n.d.). In one of the most concerted efforts to model how bargaining takes place at the individual level, Terry Sullivan examines presidential archives containing administrative headcounts to identify instances in which members of Congress switched positions during legislative debate, from initially opposing the president to supporting him in the final roll call (Sullivan 1988,1990,1991). Sullivan shows that in a bargaining game with incomplete information regarding the preferences of the president and members of Congress, there are a number of possible bargaining outcomes for a given distribution of legislative and presidential policy preferences. These outcomes depend in part on legislators' success in bartering their potential support for the president's policy for additional concessions from the president. In threatening to withhold support, however, members of Congress run the risk that the president will call their bluff and turn elsewhere for the necessary votes. By capitalizing on members' uncertainty regarding whether their support is necessary to form a winning coalition, Sullivan theorizes that presidents can reduce members of Congress's penchant for strategic bluffing and increase the likelihood of a legislative outcome closer to the president's preference. "Hence, the skill to bargain successfully becomes a foundation for presidential power even within the context of electorally determined opportunities," Sullivan concludes (1991, 1188). Most of these studies infer presidential influence, rather than measuring it directly (Bond, Fleisher, and Krutz 1996,128-29; see also Edwards 1991). Interestingly, however, although the vote "buying" approach is certainly consistent with Neustadt's bargaining model, none of his case studies in PP show presidents employing this tactic. The reason may be that Neustadt concentrates his analysis on the strategic level: "Strategically the question is not how he masters Congress in a peculiar instance, but what he does to boost his mastery in any instance" (Neustadt 1990, 4). For Neustadt, whether a president's lobbying efforts bear fruit in any particular circumstance depends in large part on the broader pattern created by a president's prior actions when dealing with members of Congress (and "Washingtonians" more generally). These previous interactions determine a president's professional reputation--the "residual impressions of [a president's] tenacity and skill" that accumulate in Washingtonians' minds, helping to "heighten or diminish" a president's bargaining advantages. "Reputation, of itself, does not persuade, but it can make persuasions easier, or harder, or impossible" (Neustadt 1990, 54).

### 2NC Hagel/SecDef Key

#### Hagel’s key—

#### A—He’ll drive internal change at the Pentagon—that’s Vlahos—only SecDef that’ll challenge the militarist consensus

Greenwald 1/5—Glenn Greenwald, The Guardian, 1/5/13, Chuck Hagel and liberals: what are the priorities? http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2013/jan/05/hagel-liberals-gays-israel-democrats

All of the Democratic alternatives to Hagel who have been seriously mentioned are nothing more than standard foreign policy technocrats, fully on-board with the DC consensus regarding war, militarism, Israel, Iran, and the Middle East. That's why Kristol, the Washington Post and other neocons were urging Obama to select them rather than Hagel: because those neocons know that, unlike Hagel, these Democratic technocrats pose no challenge whatsoever to their agenda of sustaining destructive US policy in the Middle East and commitment to endless war.

#### B—Critical to effective diplomacy—prevents escalations

Goodsell 1/6—Paul Goodsell, Omaha World Herald, January 6, 2013, Chuck Hagel's record suggests his approach to military, budget, http://www.omaha.com/article/20130106/NEWS/701069941/1707

“The U.S. secretary of defense today is a high-stakes actor in international diplomacy,” said Ryan Crocker, a former U.S. ambassador to Lebanon, Kuwait, Syria, Pakistan, Iraq and Afghanistan.¶ Hagel, Crocker said in an open letter in the Wall Street Journal, is an experienced statesman who understands world challenges and would work well with Obama's nominee for secretary of state, Massachusetts Sen. John Kerry.¶ Crocker said Hagel sees the advantages of a nuanced, strategically patient approach in dealing with the world, using both pressure and support to influence other countries.¶Feaver said Hagel's value to the Obama administration would be that he, like the president, favors a restrained approach to using military force. Hagel voted in favor of the Iraq War but later came to oppose it. In the current debate over Iran's development of nuclear weapons, Hagel has said he favors a negotiated solution rather than military intervention.

#### C—Frames options for the President

Frum 1/8—David Frum, contributing editor at Newsweek and The Daily Beast and a CNN contributor, 1/8/13, Hagel's Views Do Matter, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/01/08/hagel-s-views-do-matter.html

Savor that, "As head of the Pentagon, Hagel would not determine foreign policy." No, he would not. But he would have substantial control over the information, advice, and policy options available to the person who does determine foreign policy.¶ Suppose a president were to request an assessment of a hypothetical strike on Iran. Suppose the secretary of defense delivers to him a plan requiring the insertion of US ground forces into Iranian cities to be sure of destroying relevant facilities. That "plan" is as much a veto of a strike as any decision.¶ Donald Rumsfeld enabled the Iraq war by producing estimates it could be won with as few as 135,000 troops. Had he instead on 300,000, the war would not have occurred: it would have seemed too heavy a lift. (As indeed it proved.)¶ A Secretary Hagel could similarly thwart policies he disapproved of by magnifying their cost and difficulty. That's why his views matter, and that's why it's so disingenuous to claim they do not.

#### D—Gives Obama cover to push for restraint

Thompson 1/7—Mark Thompson, 1-7-2013, “President Obama To Tap Ex-GOP Senator Chuck Hagel to Run Pentagon,” Time, <http://nation.time.com/2013/01/07/president-obama-to-tap-ex-gop-senator-chuck-hagel-to-run-pentagon/>

Hagel would be the first Defense Secretary since the late Caspar Weinberger, Defense chief in the Reagan Administration, to have worn a U.S. military uniform in combat — and the first enlisted man. That gives him instant credibility. Hagel “led an infantry squad in Vietnam during the bloody fighting following the Tet offensive,” Defense Secretary Leon Panetta said of him at a Memorial Day service last May. “Like millions of our generation, he demonstrated bravery, patriotism and heroism on the battlefield.”¶ With his Hagel pick following Panetta’s Democratic interregnum, Obama gets Republican cover to try to retool the Pentagon. That will include its missions as well as its business dealings. If he wants to, with Hagel in charge of the Defense department, Obama will be able to press for more substantial changes than he could with a Democrat sitting in that huge E-ring office. (Atlantic contributing editor Yochi Dreazen recently wrote about this strange state of affairs.)¶ But Hagel has never seemed to harbor a sense that it is the mission of the U.S. — or its military — to spread democracy around the world. “Militaries are built to fight and win wars, not bind together failing nations,” he wrote in 2006. “We are once again learning a very hard lesson in foreign affairs: America cannot impose a democracy on any nation — regardless of our noble purpose.” That echoes Obama’s thinking on the topic.¶ Former Senator Cohen applauds Obama’s pick and dismisses concerns that he will make bad policy. “You want a Secretary of Defense to be strong-minded,” Cohen says. “But he has to understand that this is not about Chuck Hagel, because he is not going to determine policy in the Middle East or with Iran. That’s the call of the President.”¶ Cohen, a onetime GOP Senator from Maine, embraces the idea of having a Republican Defense Secretary in a Democratic President’s Cabinet, especially when military spending cuts are looming. “You’re picking the best person to handle the job who can build a consensus on Capitol Hill, basically,” he says of the key challenge Hagel faces. “Having a Republican when you’re downsizing sends the message that we’re going to do this on a nonpartisan basis, with this man who has a military background, a war hero, Purple Hearts, etc.”¶ Cohen adds that while the Democratic Party is unfairly portrayed as being weak on defense, the Hagel nomination gives Obama some political cover. “Having a Republican there when you’re downsizing really takes away the issue of, There go the Democrats again,” he says.

#### E—Failed Hagel nomination sends a global signal of Obama weakness

FT 12-27 – Financial Times, “Hagel for defence,” 12/27/12, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ad8eba06-503d-11e2-9b66-00144feab49a.html#axzz2HN0WCy5a

Whoever succeeds Leon Panetta will have to oversee the exit of US troops from Afghanistan and manage the potentially explosive relations with Iran. He will also have to preserve America’s strategic global dominance while implementing the steep cuts that are bound to hit the Pentagon. This is a very tough brief.¶ Top of the White House’s shortlist is Chuck Hagel, a former Republican senator. The decorated Vietnam veteran would offer an injection of fresh thinking into the defence establishment. During his time on the Senate’s armed services committee, Mr Hagel demonstrated good judgment in opposing the Iraq war. His belief that the US must try hard to find a negotiated solution with Iran is right and realistic. The military option, while open, can never be the first choice, given the real risk that any conflict could result in a cure worse than the disease.¶ Yet ever since Mr Hagel emerged as the clear frontrunner, he has come under a barrage of criticism. Sadly, his critics have mostly overlooked his sensible views on the future of the US military and focused on some remarks he made several years ago about the “Jewish lobby”. These comments may have been ill-judged but there is nothing in Mr Hagel’s record on Israel that suggests bias or hostility, still less anti-Semitism. He has shown support for a two-state solution – which Israel also favours – and the necessity for the US to play an even-handed role in fostering it. The whispering campaign against him is obnoxious.¶ By choosing Mr Hagel, Mr Obama would not just make a welcome bipartisan appointment. He would also show some political muscle. While he has not yet nominated Mr Hagel, the White House has floated his name for weeks. Were the US president to prompt Mr Hagel to withdraw his name now, it would signal a big retreat. It would also come just weeks after Susan Rice, US ambassador to the UN, stepped aside in the race for secretary of state despite being the president’s preferred candidate. Two successive withdrawals would send a message at home and abroad that Mr Obama lacks resolve.

#### Makes great-power war inevitable

Christopher Fettweis 4, Professor at the U.S. Army War College, December 2004, “Resolute Eagle or Paper Tiger? Credibility, Reputation and the War on Terror,” online: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p67147\_index.html

The credibility of a state forms the basis of its reputation, which is little more than an impression of fundamental national character that serves as a guide for others trying to anticipate future actions.12 The loss of credibility can lead to reputations for weakness, fecklessness, and irresolution, which, the thinking goes, emboldens enemies and discourages the loyalty of allies. Credibility can be damaged in many ways, depending on the situation and the observer, but perhaps the surest is to fail to rise to a challenge or to pursue a goal with sufficient resolve. By doing so, a state may earn a reputation for irresolution, which can encourage more aggressive actions by revisionist powers.13 Threats made by a state without credibility may not be believed, inspiring the aggressor to press his advantage, which may lead to a challenge to an interest that is truly vital making a major war unavoidable. Thus the credibility imperative is also intimately related to the post-war American obsession with “appeasement,” which is of course a code word for a show of weakness that inadvertently encourages an aggressor.

### AT: No China War

#### Economic interdependence doesn’t solve---miscalc

Medcalf & Heinrichs 11 - Rory Medcalf is Director of the International Security Programme at the Lowy Institute, Sydney. Raoul Heinrichs is Sir Arthur Tange Scholar at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, and editor of the Lowy Institute Strategic Snapshot series, June 27, 2011, “Asia’s Maritime Confidence Crisis,” online: http://the-diplomat.com/2011/06/27/asia%E2%80%99s-maritime-confidence-crisis/?print=yes

To the casual observer, recent security tensions in Asian waters might seem a storm in a Chinese teacup. The spectacle of opposing vessels – often motley flotillas of civilian patrol boats, fishing trawlers and survey ships – jostling near contested reefs, rocks and islets in the South and East China seas is the kind of activity that was likened back in Cold War days to a game of ‘nautical chicken’. Surely, in an age of economic interdependence and nuclear weapons, this petty posturing wouldn’t lead to great-power war?

Yet such wishful thinking ignores the real dangers of Asia’s China-centric maritime incidents. In the absence of effective mechanisms for crisis-management and confidence-building, these events are increasing in frequency and intensity. The harassment by Chinese civilian vessels of the USNS Impeccable in 2009 presaged a serious set of encounters in 2010, including North Korea’s sinking of the Cheonan and a diplomatic crisis between China and Japan over the ramming of a Japanese customs vessel near the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands.

Though major power tensions have eased somewhat in 2011, encounters have continued. Chinese helicopters have continued to ‘buzz’ Japanese naval units, even in the sensitive period following Japan’s earthquake and tsunami. In March, a Philippine survey ship was shadowed and harassed by Chinese patrol boats, eliciting formal diplomatic protests from Manila. More recently, in May and June, Chinese patrol boats have allegedly severed seismic cables aboard Vietnamese vessels operating near disputed territories in the South China Sea. Washington has weighed in, particularly with signals of reassurance to its ally Manila – prompting Chinese warnings about fanning flames and getting burned.

At the weekend, Sino-US and Sino-Vietnamese talks seem to have put a lid on the simmering tensions. And the chance that such incidents will lead to major military clashes shouldn’t be overstated. But each encounter involves risks, however small, of miscalculation and casualties. As the number and tempo of incidents increases, so does the likelihood that an episode will escalate to armed confrontation, diplomatic crisis or possibly even conflict. An accumulation of incidents could also play into a wider deterioration of relations among major powers, with dangerous implications for regional peace and stability.

#### Offensive intent

Maginnis 11 – Robert Maginnis, retired Lt. Col., US Army, national security and foreign affairs analyst, August 31, 2011, “Pentagon Report Exposes China Menace,” online: http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=45871

First, China’s intentions are global and offensive. Constantine Menges wrote in China: The Gathering Threat, “In the traditional Chinese view, the world needs a hegemon—or dominant state—to prevent disorder. The Communist Chinese regime believes China should be that hegemon.”

That view was echoed in 2010 by Liu Mingfu, a Chinese senior colonel and author of The China Dream. Liu said “China’s big goal in the 21st century is to become world No. 1, the top power,” Reuters reported. The Pentagon’s report stops short of that forecast but admits the regime “anticipates becoming a world-class economic and military power by 2050.”

China’s latest defense White Paper provides evidence of its global ambitions. The paper, according to the Pentagon report, introduces the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) to new global missions intended to grow China’s influence, such as international peacekeeping efforts, counter-piracy operations, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

These other-than-war operations are made possible by China’s new investments in large amphibious ships, a hospital ship, long-range transport aircraft and improved logistics. Such assets extend China’s global influence and provide the PLA important expeditionary know-how and capabilities for future operations.

China’s global ambitions are also evidenced by its increased liaison with foreign militaries and increased joint exercises. Last year, China expanded relations to 150 different militaries, which reflects an effort to collect information and build partnerships.

Beijing’s foreign outreach includes more joint exercises. In 2010, the PLA participated in 32 joint exercises—up from eight in 2009—to increase its influence, enhance ties with partner states, and provide opportunities to improve capabilities and gain operational insights from more advanced militaries.

China’s White Paper also announces the regime’s “active defense” security strategy, which pretends to focus on defense and promises to attack only if attacked. But Mosher says China’s use of the term “active defense” is just a euphemism for the PLA’s “determination to strike first in the event of a crisis.” He concludes “active defense” is “not defensive at all, but is a strategy of offense and expansion.”

### More Restraint Impacts

#### Restraint’s key to prevent war with Russia and China---defuses Georgia, Taiwan and the South China Seas

Paul K. MacDonald 11, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College, and Joseph M. Parent, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami, November/December 2011, “The Wisdom of Retrenchment: America Must Cut Back to Move Forward,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 90, No. 6

Curbing the United States' commitments would reduce risks, but it cannot eliminate them. Adversaries may fill regional power vacuums, and allies will never behave exactly as Washington would prefer. Yet those costs would be outweighed by the concrete benefits of pulling back. A focus on the United States' core interests in western Europe would limit the risk of catastrophic clashes with Russia over ethnic enclaves in Georgia or Moldova by allowing the United States to avoid commitments it would be unwise to honor. By narrowing its commitments in Asia, the United States could lessen the likelihood of conflict over issues such as the status of Taiwan or competing maritime claims in the South China Sea. Just as the United Kingdom tempered its commitments and accommodated U.S. interests in the Western Hemisphere at the turn of the last century, the United States should now temper its commitments and cultivate a lasting compromise with China over Taiwan.

#### U.S. involvement in Georgia means conflict goes nuclear

Guldseth 9, Adviser in Strategic Communication. Post graduate in "Media, Communication and ICT" Russia's new military doctrine opens for first strike nuclear attacks in "local or regional wars", Eistein Guldseth, 10-14-2009

http://writern.blogspot.com/2009/10/russia-might-open-for-first-strike.html

The Russian newspaper Izvestia reports that Cremlin is working on a new military doctrine on first strike use of nuclear arms against “aggressors”. That must include Georgia according to President Medvedev’s statement after the war in Georgia in 2008: “The aggressor has been punished”.

Patrushev: “Nuclear weapons could be used in case of a nuclear attack, but also in 'regional or even local wars.”

According to Izvestia, “Russia will insist on the right to pre-emptive nuclear strikes against aggressor countries in its new military doctrine”, the head of the country's Security Council, Nikolai Patrushev, said.

A greater threat to Russia's neighboring countries

This new doctrine is contrary to US nuclear military policy, which do not allow for first strike attacks. This leads us once more to seriously wonder what’s going on in the Cremlin. Such an aggressive move means a further treat to Russia’s bordering countries and serves no civilized purpose. As we have seen the later period, US’ reset has had no impact on the hawks in Moscow when it comes to serious cooperation on for instance Iran. Judging from this doctrine, one could on the contrary be led to believe that Russia today poses a significant greater danger to civilization than Iran: The combination of Putins restoration of Stalin as "a great leader", Russia claiming a priveledged sphere of influence in the former Soviet space, and now the suggested doctrine of first strike use of nuclear arms

against local/regional wars and "agressors" should really start to worry all governments in the modern world.

Who's the target?

Georgia certainly will have to seriously consider it self as a prime target for a nuclear attack from Russia. The latest Russian accusations of Georgia supporting and aiding Al Quaeda operations in Russia is a reminder of the fact that the war is not over. Russia uses all means available to portray Georgia as an aggressor, and thus threatens Georgia with first strike use of nuclear arms if neccessary. Judging by Russia’s willingness to use excessive force in the attack on Georgia in 2008, this represents a real threat to Georgia and also Ukraine, where the situation on the Crimean peninsula is gradually heating up. In fact the whole of North Caucasus might be targeted due to uprise and intensivated terrorist attacs in several regions.

# SEP CP

#### TEXT: The United States Federal Government should establish that the penalty for violating leasing restrictions on natural gas drilling in the Outer Continental Shelf may include entry into a Supplemental Environmental Project.

#### Implementation of the Supplemental Environmental Projects should follow the 1991 *Policy on the Use of Supplemental Environmental Projects in EPA Settlements*, and any conflicting federal laws and regulations should be modified to provide a narrow exemption for the above penalty.

#### Penalties determine regulatory compliance—restrictions are irrelevant if penalties are marginal

CPR 8 – The Center for Progressive Reform, a nonprofit research and educational organization with a network of Member Scholars working to protect health, safety, and the environment through analysis and commentary, 2008, “Environmental Enforcement,” <http://progressiveregulation.org/perspectives/environEnforce.html>

Effective enforcement is key to ensuring that the ambitious goals of our environmental statutes are realized. Enforcement refers to the set of actions that the government can take to promote compliance with environmental law. . Currently, rates of noncompliance with environmental laws remain disturbingly high; experts believe that as many as twenty to forty percent of firms regulated by federal environmental statutes regularly violate the law. Tens of millions of citizens live in areas out of compliance with the health based standards of the Clean Air Act, and close to half of the water bodies in the country fail to meet water quality standards set by the Clean Water Act. In communities burdened by multiple sources of pollution, noncompliance has particularly serious health consequences for affected residents.

As in virtually every other area of government regulation, environmental enforcement traditionally has been based on the theory of deterrence. This theory assumes that persons and businesses act rationally to maximize profits, and will comply with the law where the costs of noncompliance outweigh the benefits of noncompliance. The job of enforcement agencies is to make both penalties and the probability of detection high enough that it becomes irrational– unprofitable-- for regulated firms to violate the law.

EPA’s enforcement policies traditionally have reflected these principles. EPA has emphasized the importance of regular inspections and monitoring activity to detect noncompliance, and has responded to violations with swift and appropriate sanctions. EPA’s policies also mandate that the agency recover the economic benefit firms realize through noncompliance, since **if a firm is able to profit from illegal activity, it has little incentive to comply in the first place.**

State environmental agencies actually carry out the majority of enforcement activity in this country because most states have received authority from EPA to administer federal environmental laws under EPA oversight (see CPR Perspective on Devolution) States also administer and enforce their own state laws. As in other areas of environmental regulation, the quality of state enforcement programs vary considerably. Some states carefully follow EPA mandates and vigorously enforce environmental requirements. In other states, enforcement is relatively lax, and agencies rarely respond to violations with penalties.

Citizen enforcement also is a feature of most federal environmental statutes. The statutes allow citizens to sue companies for violations when the government fails to do so and various, often strict, procedural conditions are met. Traditionally, Congress has viewed citizen enforcement as an important supplement to agency enforcement and an important prod to agency regulators.

What People are Fighting About

In recent years there has been a sharp debate over the future direction of environmental enforcement. Many states and regulated entities advocate a more business-friendly, conciliatory enforcement strategy, one that does not emphasize enforcement actions and penalties as the keys to securing compliance. In their view, businesses are likely to comply without resort to sanctions because of adherence to social and political norms, market forces, and other factors.

Thus, many states have reduced funding for inspections. enforcement cases and similar activities, and shifted resources toward compliance assistance programs. Some have created “customer service centers” for regulated entities. Many states do not follow EPA guidance for responding to violations with “timely and appropriate” enforcement actions. Many impose only limited penalties on violators, penalties that typically are far lower than those assessed by EPA in similar circumstances. Many states fail to recover economic benefit when assessing penalties--a core element of deterrence theory. In the past decade, almost one-half of the states have enacted environmental audit privilege or immunity laws that preclude penalties for violations voluntarily disclosed and corrected by regulated entities as a result of environmental audits. These laws also keep materials contained in environmental audits secret and exempt from public disclosure.

At the same time, EPA has to some degree deemphasized traditional enforcement and used its limited resources to provide more compliance assistance to small businesses and other regulated sectors. It has also searched for positive incentives for companies that carry out self-policing efforts. Until very recently, however, EPA has continued to demand that the states impose sanctions, conduct inspections, and bring enforcement actions as the main tools for deterring firms from violating the law. EPA also resisted the most far-reaching efforts of states to weaken enforcement of environmental laws. Funding shortfalls and emerging policy changes in such areas as whether new sources must obtain new permits have taken their toll and EPA’s commitment to deterrence-based enforcement appears to be weakening.

In reaction to these changes, environmental groups, contend that government enforcement is too lax, that too often fines for violating environmental requirements have become no more than a routine cost of doing business for regulated entities, and that the government lacks the resources to pursue most violations. They would like to more vigorously enforce environmental violations. During the past decade or so, however, the Supreme Court has erected a series of hurdles to citizen enforcement of environmental laws. The Court has imposed restrictions on who has standing to bring suit, what type of illegal conduct can be challenged, when a decision is “ripe” for suit, when government agencies can be sued, and when attorneys fees can be awarded to successful plaintiffs’ attorneys. These court-imposed obstacles have significantly undermined the role envisioned by Congress for citizen enforcers.

#### The SEP penalty causes industry noncompliance --- triggers the same industry response as the aff, while preserving the restriction

David Dana, Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law, 1998, ARTICLE: THE UNCERTAIN MERITS OF ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT REFORM: THE CASE OF SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROJECTS, 1998 Wis. L. Rev. 1181, Lexis

The previous analysis illustrates that the inclusion of SEPs in an enforcement regime may lead to negotiated settlements that cost violators substantially less than the standard monetary penalty. The particular implications of this insight for a deterrence analysis depend on whether the standard monetary penalty represents "an optimal penalty" or instead a sub- or super-optimal penalty. As a preliminary matter, a brief discussion of the concept of optimal penalty (PEN<opt>) thus may be in order. Economists typically regard the goal of an enforcement regime as the achievement of "optimal deterrence." The phrase optimal deterrence, of course, implies that absolute or complete deterrence of regulatory violations should not be the goal of an enforcement regime. Rather, the regime should act to prevent violations which will generate social costs in excess of social benefits. Conversely, of course, the regime should not discourage violations that produce net social benefits. In settings involving perfect detection and prosecution of regulatory violations by government agencies, a penalty equalling the social harm of a violation will produce optimal deterrence. Where detection and prosecution are imperfect, a penalty equalling the harm of a violation will result in underdeterrence because potential violators will discount the nominal penalty to take account of the probability that they will evade detection and/or prosecution. To achieve optimal deterrence, therefore, [\*1206] nominal penalties must equal the social harm divided by the probability of detection and prosecution. The standard monetary penalty for any particular regulatory violation - the penalty that would be imposed in the absence of any SEP settlement options - logically can have only one of three relations to the optimal penalty: The standard monetary penalty can be less than the optimal penalty, equal to the optimal penalty, or greater than the optimal penalty. In all three of these cases, the introduction of SEP settlement options into an enforcement regime is troublesome from an optimal deterrence perspective. Each case will be taken in turn. 1. pen[in'mon.std'] < pen<opt> Where the standard monetary penalty is less than the optimal penalty, regulators' exclusive reliance on monetary penalties will produce underdeterrence. n77 That is, some violations will occur even though the social costs of the violations exceed the social benefits. The introduction of SEPs into such regimes will only make matters worse: SEPs will lower regulated entities' expected penalties for regulatory violations n78 and [\*1207] hence produce more underdeterrence and more socially costly violations. For example, imagine that the harm from a particular regulatory violation has a dollar equivalent value of $ 400, and the perceived probability of detection is 0.1. The optimal penalty thus would be $ 400/0.1 or $ 4000. Assume, however, that the standard monetary penalty is only $ 3000 and regulated entities' expected penalty for violating the regulation is thus only $ 300. Profit-maximizing regulated entities will take the risk of violating the regulation if they expect to gain more than $ 300 by doing so. Now assume that a regulatory agency adds SEP settlements to the enforcement regime. The regulated entity in question now believes that there is a fifty percent probability that it could successfully negotiate a SEP in the event government regulators detect its regulatory noncompliance. n79 Assume also that the regulated entity estimates that the SEP discount or savings off the standard monetary penalty would be thirty-three percent, so that the expected cost of a SEP would be $ 2000. The total expected penalty thus would be 0.1[(0.5)($ 3000) + (0.5)(0.66)($ 3000)], or approximately $ 250. This reduction in the expected penalty from $ 300 to $ 250 could translate into real differences in regulated entities' behavior. Under the pre-SEP regime, regulated entities at least would avoid socially undesirable violations offering them less than $ 300 in savings. The addition of SEPs to the regime eliminates deterrence for violations offering between $ 250 and $ 300 in savings. 2. pen[in'mon.std'] = pen<opt> Where the standard monetary penalty equals the optimal penalty, the enforcement regime will achieve optimal deterrence. Regulated entities will be deterred from committing all of the potential violations that result in greater social loss than social gain, but they will not be deterred from [\*1208] committing any potential violations that are, on net, socially beneficial. The introduction of SEPs into the penalty regime will lower expected penalties and thus produce a shift from this state of optimal deterrence to one of underdeterrence.

#### Adopting the ’91 guidelines is key

Kenneth T. Kristl 7, Associate Professor of Law and Director of the Environmental and Natural Resources Law Clinic, Widener University School of Law, “MAKING A GOOD IDEA EVEN BETTER: RETHINKING THE LIMITS ON SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROJECTS,” Vermont Law Review, Vol. 31, 2007, <http://lawreview.vermontlaw.edu/files/2012/02/kristl.pdf>

If in fact the mitigation percentage is ultimately meaningless, why have it in the SEP Policy at all? Perhaps because it allows EPA to create the illusion that it is being “tough” on violators, consistent with the Policy’s strong assertions about the importance of “substantial monetary penalties” and deterring non-compliance. 254 One must question, however, whether the illusion is worth the price if that price is to discourage defendants from seeking to propose SEPs because of the perceived “discount” their SEP dollars will receive. The fact that almost 90% of defendants have chosen not to do SEPs strongly suggests that this discouragement of SEP participation is not merely theoretical. If EPA is really serious about encouraging more SEPs, it needs to explore why nearly 90% of defendants are turning away from what EPA says it wants to encourage. The better solution is to get rid of the 80% cap on the mitigation percentage and **re-adopt the 100% ceiling in the 1991 SEP Policy**. Such a cap would allow EPA to treat mediocre projects less favorably but would **incentivize and reward defendants who develop proposals that deliver solid environmental benefits**. More importantly, it would remove the “second class” stigma that SEPs inevitably get when SEP dollars are “discounted.” Such a change is much more likely to **increase SEP participation rates, and** thereby **allow more environmental benefits from SEPs.**

CONCLUSION

Having defendants agree to undertake Supplemental Environmental Projects holds great promise for providing environmental benefits beyond those arising from mere compliance with the law or governmental programs. If EPA is seriously committed to its stated goal of increasing the use of SEPs above the historically low participation levels, it needs to examine critically the restraints its own policies impose on such projects. The insistence on nexus and a mitigation percentage ceiling found in EPA’s approach toward SEPs both lack legal or economic justification and work to shackle SEPs in ways that **forfeit potential benefits**. Careful reexamination of nexus and the mitigation percentage ceiling justify removal of these concepts from EPA’s policies. Such a change is **simple to implement** and would unshackle SEPs, likely increase their use in environmental enforcement cases, and make the good idea of SEPs even better by **increasing the environmental benefits** that enforcement activity can bring.

#### EU will back down from pressuring Russian gas prices now—US exports change that

Alic 10/4 (Jen, geopolitical analyst, co-founder of ISA Intel (www.isaintel.com) in Sarajevo and the former editor-in-chief of ISN Security Watch in Zurich, “The Shale Gas Boom: How Scared is the Kremlin?” http://oilprice.com/Energy/Natural-Gas/The-Shale-Gas-Boom-How-Scared-is-the-Kremlin.html)

Gazprom should be scared. The US has overtaken Russia as the largest producer of natural gas courtesy of the fracking revolution, the EU suddenly feels bold enough to rebel, and Moscow could very soon lose its grip on its European gas markets. By some accounts, the Kremlin is quaking in its cupola, but other accounts—mostly Gazprom’s—it’s simply biding its time until the gas prices rise again. In mathematical terms, the EU has rather belatedly decided that things aren’t adding up and that Europeans are paying too high a price for Russian gas and not benefitting at all from the natural gas boom in the US, which has boosted supplies and caused prices to drop significantly. While Russia is selling its gas for about $10 a unit, the US is selling the same for about $3. Another variable has also surfaced: The US has become self-sufficient in natural gas and this has led other countries to shift exports of LNG destined for the US market to the European market. The prices of this non-Russian LNG is about half of what Gazprom is charging. This has somewhat worked to force Gazprom to cut prices in Western Europe, but it retains its stranglehold on Eastern Europe. Here is some more math: While Gazprom is the world’s single largest producer of natural gas, recording $44 billion in profits in 2011 alone, the company is in trouble. In September, Gazprom announced it was scrapping plans to develop a new arctic gas field, being short on funds, and its latest financial report shows a 25% drop in profits. (Incidentally, Gazprom was also recently wrong-footed by Pakistan, which decided not to go with the Russian giant for the construction of a gas pipeline from Iran to India through Pakistan. Putin responded by cancelling a state visit to Pakistan). Gazprom is attempting to make up for these shortcomings by looking eastward, to markets in Indonesia, India, Japan and China in particular. But even in these increasingly desperate times, Russia is attempting to play hard ball with China, immovable on pricing. The Kremlin is now trying to get Beijing to fund 40% of the planned Altai gas pipeline stretching some 3,000 kilometers across Russia into China for $14 billion. This would be the trade-off for more reasonable gas prices, but so far, China doesn’t look likely to play along. Then we have reports of Gazprom-Kremlin corruption. Two years ago, opposition politicians in Russia published a very attention-grabbing little booklet on how cronies of Vladimir Putin have fleeced Gazprom through pipeline construction kickbacks and below market value sales of Gazprom financial and media assets. The publication was not lost on shareholders, nor was the drop in dividends. Since 2008, Gazprom shareholder dividends dropped from $365 billion to $120 billion. The EU clearly thinks low gas prices will hold, otherwise it would not have been bold enough to launch formal proceedings against Gazprom for anti-competitive practices in a handful of Eastern European countries. To wit, the European Commission is investigating whether Gazprom is purposefully dividing gas markets by hinder the free flow of gas across EU states and imposing unfair prices. Significantly, though downplayed by Moscow, Gazprom on 29 September announced plans to restructure its European trading and logistics assets in a sign that EU pressure is having the desired effect. **The EU could win this battle as long as it holds firm, which in turn will depend on gas prices.** At the first sign of trouble, the EU will back down. Indeed, commenting on the EU’s investigation on 9 September, Putin noted that Gazprom’s prices were written in long-term contracts and that these principles had never been questioned before. It is an interesting point. **The shale gas revolution and the resultant dip in gas prices** have offered the EU the first opportunity to question Gazprom’s pricing “principles” without fear. In other words, it is the first time that Europe thinks it might have enough muscle to take on Gazprom. If one could substantiate widespread rumors that Gazprom is bankrolling anti-fracking protests with any concrete evidence, this would serve as one solid measure for determining exactly how concerned the Kremlin is. Gazprom’s scramble to hit eastern markets is also another measure, as is its attempt to make up for investment shortcomings by trying to convince China to front the costs of a massive pipeline that will otherwise not be built. Gazprom’s first mistake was its bullying of 2009, when it cut off supplies to Ukraine over a pricing quarrel. This was a power play whose message reverberated across Eastern and Western Europe. While it did much to demonstrate Gazprom’s power, it also gave the EU its first real impetus to find a way out of the Russian stranglehold. Momentum to that end was slow and littered with a handful of unviable pipeline plans, but the shale gas revolution, which Gazprom hadn’t counted on, changed that. Politically, all eyes are on Gazprom’s dwindling power base, from Brussels to Washington. Gazprom has been an extremely useful political tool for the Kremlin and diminishing that usefulness would be a geopolitical game-changer. Gazprom, however, remains insistent that the shale gas revolution is no cause for concern. In fact, Gazprom seems to think that we will soon see a halt of shale gas capital in the US and a subsequent rise in gas prices. This is where exports come in. **If Washington wishes to take advantage of Gazprom’s losses, exports will be key.** A US commitment to natural gas exports will further irk Gazprom, but on this sensitive (campaign) issue we are not likely to see movement until after the elections. The Obama administration is stalling on the issue under pressure from the Sierra Club and others, who claim exports would lead to a price increase. Exports are likely to go ahead though because they will politically too tempting to resist and because natural gas producers are itching to see this happen. **If the US starts exporting natural gas, this will give Europe that much more bargaining power against Russia.**

#### High prices are key to Russian stability

Reguly 12 (Eric, The Globe and Mail, “For Russia, high energy prices a necessity, not a luxury,” http://m.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/for-russia-high-energy-prices-a-necessity-not-a-luxury/article4546314/?service=mobile)

No wonder the Kremlin is ramping up public spending even as its debt-choked European neighbours are doing the opposite. Russia’s social contract, in which the masses agree to stay out of the Kremlin’s way as long as living standards rise, appears to be demanding more and more helicopter drops of bundles of cash. If the spending slows down, the Kremlin’s fine balancing act may fall apart.

Mr. Putin’s government can afford to spend as long as energy prices remain buoyant. Increasingly, Russia is an oil and natural gas economy. It is roughly tied with Saudi Arabia as the world’s top oil exporter. State-controlled Gazprom, the world’s biggest gas producer, is one of Russia’s biggest export earners and supplies about half of Europe’s gas consumption.

Much to the Kremlin’s delight, oil prices have held up remarkably well in the face of the feeble American economic recovery, the recession in the 17-country euro zone and slowing growth in China. On Friday, Brent crude, the best measure of global prices, traded at more than $117 (U.S.) a barrel, about three times its post-2008 low.

But Russia’s energy equation isn’t as simple as that. Just as surging U.S. shale oil and shale gas production are threatening Canadian energy exports, European shale gas and supplies from North Africa are threatening Russia’s gas stranglehold on Europe. And shale oil, no matter where it is produced, will have a dampening effect on global oil prices. The United States is becoming an energy superpower. That doesn’t mean that the country will suddenly become an energy exporter. It does mean that its energy imports will continue to shrink, denying export opportunities for Russia, OPEC and Canada.

Oil and gas prices, and market share, can make or break Russia. The Russian economic collapse of the 1990s was largely driven by sinking crude prices, which dipped below $11 in 1998. Russia duly defaulted that year, wiping out most of its banks and sending the ratio of national debt to gross domestic product to more than 80 per cent. Russia was saved when oil prices reversed direction, reaching $147 before the 2008 financial crisis hit. The energy bonanza – oil contributes about 50 per cent of federal government revenues – pushed down its debt to a mere 10 per cent of GDP (Italy’s is 120 per cent).

The embarrassment of riches proved irresistible to the government. Spending on social programs, pensions, the military and special projects surged. Russia just spent an obscene $20-billion renovating Vladivostock, the port city on the Sea of Japan, for this month’s Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation forum, and will spent a similar amount to fix up Sochi in Russia’s deep south for the 2014 Winter Olympics. High energy prices have gone from a luxury to a necessity.

Various analysts estimated last year that the Kremlin’s “break-even” oil price – where the budget balances – at about $100 a barrel. It has no doubt climbed since then. The Economist Intelligence Unit recently put the budget-clearing figure at $120. Citibank has calculated that every $10 decline in the price of oil reduces the Russian government’s revenues by $20-billion.

The Kremlin must be terrified that their energy gusher will turn into a trickle as the shale oil and gas revolution takes over the planet. European shale is nowhere near as developed as that of the U.S., but the reserves are there. Take Poland. Last year, the U.S. Department of Energy put Poland’s gas reserves at 171 trillion cubic feet, or about seven times the annual consumption in the U.S., the world’s biggest market. The estimate by the Polish Geological Institute was considerably less, but no matter how you cut it, Poland is emerging as a huge threat to Gazprom’s gas export machine.

So is **the European Commission’s just-launched anti-trust investigation into Gazprom.** The EC competition’s directorate, which almost never loses an abuse-of-dominance case, is examining whether Gazprom is hindering the free flow of gas in Europe through “no-resale” clauses and damaging competition by preventing third-party access to its pipelines. It is also examining Gazprom’s standard practice of linking gas prices to oil prices, which has protected the company from the gas-price crunch.

Already, Gazprom is letting some of its biggest European customers renegotiate long-term contracts. There is little doubt that Gazprom’s best days in Europe are over. If the rise of shale oil hurts Russia’s oil exports, the Kremlin is going to have a miserable time balancing its budgets.

Which brings us back to the rise of political dissent in Russia. The protests are getting more frequent and the Kremlin’s crackdown more brutal. If it’s this bad now, **what might it be like if the government can no longer use lavish spending to raise living standards?** If the value of Russia’s energy exports decline, protests like the one that landed Pussy Riot in prison could become commonplace. In 2009, when he was president, Dmitry Medvedev, who is now prime minister, called his country’s dependence on energy “primitive.” Today, he could add that it’s socially dangerous.

Russian economic collapse causes accidental nuclear use

Oliker and Charlick-Paley, 2 (Olga and Tanya, RAND Corporation Project Air Force, www.rand.org/pubs/monograph\_reports/MR1442/)

What challenges does today’s Russia pose for the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. military as a whole? Certainly Russia cannot present even a fraction of the threat the Soviet monolith posed and for which the United States prepared for decades. Yet, if certain negative trends continue, they may create a new set of dangers that can in some ways prove even more real, and therefore more frightening, than the far-off specter of Russian attack ever was. As a weak state, Russia shares some attributes with “failed” or “failing” states, which the academic literature agrees increase the likelihood of internal and interstate conflict and upheaval. Tracing through the specifics of these processes in Russia reveals a great many additional dangers, both humanitarian and strategic. Moscow’s efforts to reassert central control show that much control is already lost, perhaps irretrievably. This is manifested both in center-periphery relations and in the increasing failure of law and order throughout the country, most clearly seen in the increasing institutionalization of corruption and crime. Although Russia’s weakened armed forces are unlikely, by temperament and history, to carry out a coup, real concerns exist that the forces may grow less inclined to go along with aspects of government policy, particularly if they are increasingly used as instruments of internal control as in Chechnya. Moreover, the fact that the Russian military is unlikely to attempt to take power does not mean that it will not seek to increase its influence over policymaking and policy-makers. The uncertainties of military command and control threaten the possibility of accidental (or intentional) nuclear weapon use, while deterioration in the civilian nuclear sector increases the risk of a tragic accident**.** Russia’s demographic trajectory of ill health and male mortality bodes ill for the nation’s ability to resolve its economic troubles (given an increasingly graying population) and creates concerns about its continued capacity to maintain a fighting force even at current levels of effectiveness. Finally, the fact that economic, political, and demographic declines affect parts of Russia very differently, combined with increased regional political autonomy over the course of Russian independence and continuing concerns about interethnic and interregional tension, creates a danger that locality and/or ethnicity could become rallying cries for internal conflict. While some might argue that Russia’s weakness, or even the potential for its eventual collapse, has little to do with the United States, the truth is that a range of U.S. interests is directly affected by Russia’s deterioration and the threats that it embodies. The dangers of proliferation or use of nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction (WMD), heightened by Russian weakness, quite directly threaten the United States and its vital interests. Organized crime in Russia is linked to a large and growing multinational network of criminal groups that threatens the United States and its economy both directly and through links with (and support of) global and local terrorist organizations. Russia is also a major energy producer and a transit state for oil and gas from the Caspian at a time when the U.S. government has identified that region, and energy interests in general, as key to its national security. Washington’s allies, closer to Russia physically, are not only the customers for much of this energy but are also the likely victims of any refugee flows, environmental crises, or potential flare-ups of violence that Russian decline may spur. Finally, recent history suggests a strong possibility that the Untied States would play a role in seeking to alleviate a humanitarian crisis on or near Russian soil, whether it was caused by epidemic, war, or a nuclear/industrial catastrophe.

# China Gas DA

#### US exports would go to China—prevents Russian deals

Hulbert 12 (Matthew, contributor to Forbes, Analyst at European Energy Review and consultant to a number of governments & institutional investors, most recently as Senior Research Fellow, Netherlands Institute for International Relations (Clingendael), previously Senior Research Fellow at ETH Zurich working on energy and political risk, 5/26 “Why American natural Gas will change the world” http://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewhulbert/2012/05/26/why-american-natural-gas-will-change-the-world/)

This 2020 ‘lead time’ is important for Europe, not just because it’s going to take some time for US LNG trains to gather speed, but because **the first wave of exports will predominantly go to Asia.** Japan has been in the headlines post-Fukushima boosting short term demand, but the real prize remains China. Gas demand has been going up 5% year on year, while LNG shot up 31% once China’s fifth import terminal went online. That’s closely followed by India where LNG remains a strategic priority given the impossibility of getting pipelines into Delhi via Pakistan or Afghanistan. Although India and China are actively developing domestic shale reserves, (Beijing has earmarked no less than 30bcm capacity), **America should have little problem taking Asian market share, particularly if it provides greater flexibility on take or pay contracts to hedge long term price risk.**

Indeed, the mere prospect of US LNG is Asia is already creating major problems for Middle East and Russian players trying to sell gas (LNG or pipeline) on an oil indexed basis. Australia is in no better shape; despite headline figures of 80mt/y of LNG by 2018 (i.e. the world leader), cost inflation is rife and coal bed plays are looking more costly to develop than originally thought. International players are still investing in Australia (ironically as a double hedge against US LNG flopping), but given that Australian LNG docks into Asian ports for around $17-$18MM/Btu, any softening of prices could leave current (and prospective) LNG projects in the red.

#### Natural gas deals are key to broader co-op

Dan 09 (Feng, Overseas Investment Environment Department, CNPC Research Institute of Economics and Technology, “Analysis on Natural Gas Geo-politics in Central Asia-Russia Region,” Submitted to the 21st World Energy Congress, http://www.worldenergy.org/documents/congresspapers/140.pdf)

With principles of “mutual benefits and win-win benefits”, China will promote cooperation with central Asian countries and Russia in natural gas sector to achieve multilateral common and balanced development. Major markets for Russia’s natural gas export are in Europe, however, in recent years, Europe promoted cooperation with other natural gas resource countries in the world to diversify its natural gas imports to ensure the energy safety. Accordingly, potential increases for Russia to export natural gas to Europe will be quite limited. By promoting cooperation with China in natural gas sector, Russia may optimize its country/region configurations for natural gas export. At the same time, maximum economic benefits can be achieved through generation of competitions. To secure higher benefits from energy, central Asian countries actively promoted a strategy for diversification of their natural gas export. To achieve these goals, these countries strengthened cooperation with Europe, Southeast Asian countries and Northeast Asian countries in energy sectors. Since China lies close to central Asian countries, pipeline construction is characterized by short distance and low costs. Accordingly, economic benefits are high for bilateral/multilateral cooperation in natural gas sector. In addition, in the Northeast Asia Region, China is the only way for exporting of natural gas from central Asian countries to other countries. China will be or already is the most important and practical choice for diversification of natural gas export in Russia and central Asian countries. The three parties are highly complementary in energy development strategies and in economic development. Multilateral cooperation in energy sectors are beneficiary for **economic development, energy safety and regional stability of all relevant parties.** In the future, China, Russia and central Asian countries should take full advantages of market and resource potentials to expand and deepen cooperation in gas sector continuously. On base of that, cooperation in other sectors can be promoted and expanded to achieve common and balanced development.

#### Solves Central Asian instability

Weitz 12 (Richard, the director of the Hudson Institute’s Center for Political-Military Analysis, “Superpower Symbiosis: The Russia-China Axis,” November/December, http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/superpower-symbiosis-russia-china-axis)

Although sunny assessments about current Sino-Russian ties are correct, such alignments are vulnerable to **shifts in the underlying conditions that support them**. In the case of Russia and China, these shifting variables include China’s increasing military power, its growing economic penetration of Central Asia, and its impending leadership changes, along with Russia’s political disorders, dependence on a mono-economy of energy, and gloomy demographic prospects. These and other plausible changes could at some point undermine the foundations of their current entente. Interested third parties may or may not be able to shape these variables, but at least other governments need to understand the evolving dynamic of this important relationship and prepare for its future evolution.

Since the Soviet Union’s disintegration in the early 1990s, the two countries have for the most part acted on the basis of shared interests—particularly in maintaining stability in Central Asia, whose energy supplies are vital for both countries’ economic development. China consumes the resources directly, whereas Russian companies earn valuable revenue by reselling Central Asian hydrocarbons in third-party markets, especially in Europe. Both countries know that certain regional events such as further **political revolutions or civil wars** could adversely affect core security interests. Both governments especially fear ethnic separatism in their border territories supported by Islamic fundamentalist movements in Central Asia.

The shared regional security interests between Beijing and Moscow have meant that the newly independent states of Central Asia—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—have become a generally unifying element in Chinese-Russian relations. Their overlapping security interests in Central Asia are visible in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Since its founding in 2001, the SCO has essentially functioned as a Chinese-Russian condominium, providing Beijing and Moscow with a convenient multilateral framework to manage their interests in Central Asia.

#### Nuclear war

Ahrari 1 (M. Ehsan, Professor of National Security and Strategy of the Joint and Combined Warfighting School at the Armed Forces Staff College, August 2001, “Jihadi Groups, Nuclear Pakistan and the New Great Game,” http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub112.pdf)

South and Central Asia constitute a part of the world where a well-designed American strategy might well help avoid crises or catastrophe. The U.S. military would provide only one component of such a strategy, and a secondary one at that, but has an important role to play through engagement activities and regional confidence building. Insecurity has led the states of the region to seek weapons of mass destruction, missiles and conventional arms. It has also led them toward policies which undercut the security of their neighbors. If such activities continue, the result could be increased terrorism, humanitarian disasters, continued low-level conflict and potentially even major regional war or a thermonuclear exchange. A shift away from this pattern could allow the states of the region to become solid economic and political partners for the United States, thus representing a gain for all concerned.

# Europe Gas DA

#### EU will back down from pressuring Russian gas prices now—US exports change that

Alic 10/4 (Jen, geopolitical analyst, co-founder of ISA Intel (www.isaintel.com) in Sarajevo and the former editor-in-chief of ISN Security Watch in Zurich, “The Shale Gas Boom: How Scared is the Kremlin?” http://oilprice.com/Energy/Natural-Gas/The-Shale-Gas-Boom-How-Scared-is-the-Kremlin.html)

Gazprom should be scared. The US has overtaken Russia as the largest producer of natural gas courtesy of the fracking revolution, the EU suddenly feels bold enough to rebel, and Moscow could very soon lose its grip on its European gas markets. By some accounts, the Kremlin is quaking in its cupola, but other accounts—mostly Gazprom’s—it’s simply biding its time until the gas prices rise again. In mathematical terms, the EU has rather belatedly decided that things aren’t adding up and that Europeans are paying too high a price for Russian gas and not benefitting at all from the natural gas boom in the US, which has boosted supplies and caused prices to drop significantly. While Russia is selling its gas for about $10 a unit, the US is selling the same for about $3. Another variable has also surfaced: The US has become self-sufficient in natural gas and this has led other countries to shift exports of LNG destined for the US market to the European market. The prices of this non-Russian LNG is about half of what Gazprom is charging. This has somewhat worked to force Gazprom to cut prices in Western Europe, but it retains its stranglehold on Eastern Europe. Here is some more math: While Gazprom is the world’s single largest producer of natural gas, recording $44 billion in profits in 2011 alone, the company is in trouble. In September, Gazprom announced it was scrapping plans to develop a new arctic gas field, being short on funds, and its latest financial report shows a 25% drop in profits. (Incidentally, Gazprom was also recently wrong-footed by Pakistan, which decided not to go with the Russian giant for the construction of a gas pipeline from Iran to India through Pakistan. Putin responded by cancelling a state visit to Pakistan). Gazprom is attempting to make up for these shortcomings by looking eastward, to markets in Indonesia, India, Japan and China in particular. But even in these increasingly desperate times, Russia is attempting to play hard ball with China, immovable on pricing. The Kremlin is now trying to get Beijing to fund 40% of the planned Altai gas pipeline stretching some 3,000 kilometers across Russia into China for $14 billion. This would be the trade-off for more reasonable gas prices, but so far, China doesn’t look likely to play along. Then we have reports of Gazprom-Kremlin corruption. Two years ago, opposition politicians in Russia published a very attention-grabbing little booklet on how cronies of Vladimir Putin have fleeced Gazprom through pipeline construction kickbacks and below market value sales of Gazprom financial and media assets. The publication was not lost on shareholders, nor was the drop in dividends. Since 2008, Gazprom shareholder dividends dropped from $365 billion to $120 billion. The EU clearly thinks low gas prices will hold, otherwise it would not have been bold enough to launch formal proceedings against Gazprom for anti-competitive practices in a handful of Eastern European countries. To wit, the European Commission is investigating whether Gazprom is purposefully dividing gas markets by hinder the free flow of gas across EU states and imposing unfair prices. Significantly, though downplayed by Moscow, Gazprom on 29 September announced plans to restructure its European trading and logistics assets in a sign that EU pressure is having the desired effect. **The EU could win this battle as long as it holds firm, which in turn will depend on gas prices.** At the first sign of trouble, the EU will back down. Indeed, commenting on the EU’s investigation on 9 September, Putin noted that Gazprom’s prices were written in long-term contracts and that these principles had never been questioned before. It is an interesting point. **The shale gas revolution and the resultant dip in gas prices** have offered the EU the first opportunity to question Gazprom’s pricing “principles” without fear. In other words, it is the first time that Europe thinks it might have enough muscle to take on Gazprom. If one could substantiate widespread rumors that Gazprom is bankrolling anti-fracking protests with any concrete evidence, this would serve as one solid measure for determining exactly how concerned the Kremlin is. Gazprom’s scramble to hit eastern markets is also another measure, as is its attempt to make up for investment shortcomings by trying to convince China to front the costs of a massive pipeline that will otherwise not be built. Gazprom’s first mistake was its bullying of 2009, when it cut off supplies to Ukraine over a pricing quarrel. This was a power play whose message reverberated across Eastern and Western Europe. While it did much to demonstrate Gazprom’s power, it also gave the EU its first real impetus to find a way out of the Russian stranglehold. Momentum to that end was slow and littered with a handful of unviable pipeline plans, but the shale gas revolution, which Gazprom hadn’t counted on, changed that. Politically, all eyes are on Gazprom’s dwindling power base, from Brussels to Washington. Gazprom has been an extremely useful political tool for the Kremlin and diminishing that usefulness would be a geopolitical game-changer. Gazprom, however, remains insistent that the shale gas revolution is no cause for concern. In fact, Gazprom seems to think that we will soon see a halt of shale gas capital in the US and a subsequent rise in gas prices. This is where exports come in. **If Washington wishes to take advantage of Gazprom’s losses, exports will be key.** A US commitment to natural gas exports will further irk Gazprom, but on this sensitive (campaign) issue we are not likely to see movement until after the elections. The Obama administration is stalling on the issue under pressure from the Sierra Club and others, who claim exports would lead to a price increase. Exports are likely to go ahead though because they will politically too tempting to resist and because natural gas producers are itching to see this happen. **If the US starts exporting natural gas, this will give Europe that much more bargaining power against Russia.**

#### High prices are key to Russian stability

Reguly 12 (Eric, The Globe and Mail, “For Russia, high energy prices a necessity, not a luxury,” http://m.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/for-russia-high-energy-prices-a-necessity-not-a-luxury/article4546314/?service=mobile)

No wonder the Kremlin is ramping up public spending even as its debt-choked European neighbours are doing the opposite. Russia’s social contract, in which the masses agree to stay out of the Kremlin’s way as long as living standards rise, appears to be demanding more and more helicopter drops of bundles of cash. If the spending slows down, the Kremlin’s fine balancing act may fall apart.

Mr. Putin’s government can afford to spend as long as energy prices remain buoyant. Increasingly, Russia is an oil and natural gas economy. It is roughly tied with Saudi Arabia as the world’s top oil exporter. State-controlled Gazprom, the world’s biggest gas producer, is one of Russia’s biggest export earners and supplies about half of Europe’s gas consumption.

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Which brings us back to the rise of political dissent in Russia. The protests are getting more frequent and the Kremlin’s crackdown more brutal. If it’s this bad now, **what might it be like if the government can no longer use lavish spending to raise living standards?** If the value of Russia’s energy exports decline, protests like the one that landed Pussy Riot in prison could become commonplace. In 2009, when he was president, Dmitry Medvedev, who is now prime minister, called his country’s dependence on energy “primitive.” Today, he could add that it’s socially dangerous.

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Oliker and Charlick-Paley, 2 (Olga and Tanya, RAND Corporation Project Air Force, www.rand.org/pubs/monograph\_reports/MR1442/)

What challenges does today’s Russia pose for the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. military as a whole? Certainly Russia cannot present even a fraction of the threat the Soviet monolith posed and for which the United States prepared for decades. Yet, if certain negative trends continue, they may create a new set of dangers that can in some ways prove even more real, and therefore more frightening, than the far-off specter of Russian attack ever was. As a weak state, Russia shares some attributes with “failed” or “failing” states, which the academic literature agrees increase the likelihood of internal and interstate conflict and upheaval. Tracing through the specifics of these processes in Russia reveals a great many additional dangers, both humanitarian and strategic. Moscow’s efforts to reassert central control show that much control is already lost, perhaps irretrievably. This is manifested both in center-periphery relations and in the increasing failure of law and order throughout the country, most clearly seen in the increasing institutionalization of corruption and crime. Although Russia’s weakened armed forces are unlikely, by temperament and history, to carry out a coup, real concerns exist that the forces may grow less inclined to go along with aspects of government policy, particularly if they are increasingly used as instruments of internal control as in Chechnya. Moreover, the fact that the Russian military is unlikely to attempt to take power does not mean that it will not seek to increase its influence over policymaking and policy-makers. The uncertainties of military command and control threaten the possibility of accidental (or intentional) nuclear weapon use, while deterioration in the civilian nuclear sector increases the risk of a tragic accident**.** Russia’s demographic trajectory of ill health and male mortality bodes ill for the nation’s ability to resolve its economic troubles (given an increasingly graying population) and creates concerns about its continued capacity to maintain a fighting force even at current levels of effectiveness. Finally, the fact that economic, political, and demographic declines affect parts of Russia very differently, combined with increased regional political autonomy over the course of Russian independence and continuing concerns about interethnic and interregional tension, creates a danger that locality and/or ethnicity could become rallying cries for internal conflict. While some might argue that Russia’s weakness, or even the potential for its eventual collapse, has little to do with the United States, the truth is that a range of U.S. interests is directly affected by Russia’s deterioration and the threats that it embodies. The dangers of proliferation or use of nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction (WMD), heightened by Russian weakness, quite directly threaten the United States and its vital interests. Organized crime in Russia is linked to a large and growing multinational network of criminal groups that threatens the United States and its economy both directly and through links with (and support of) global and local terrorist organizations. Russia is also a major energy producer and a transit state for oil and gas from the Caspian at a time when the U.S. government has identified that region, and energy interests in general, as key to its national security. Washington’s allies, closer to Russia physically, are not only the customers for much of this energy but are also the likely victims of any refugee flows, environmental crises, or potential flare-ups of violence that Russian decline may spur. Finally, recent history suggests a strong possibility that the Untied States would play a role in seeking to alleviate a humanitarian crisis on or near Russian soil, whether it was caused by epidemic, war, or a nuclear/industrial catastrophe.

# Warming Adv

## 1NC

#### Low prices kill offshore NG

Santos 11/4 (Paulo, independent trader, analyst and algorithmic trading expert, having worked for both sell side (brokerage) and buy side (fund management) institutions, Paulo has been trading professionally for about 16 years, “Potential Issue With Offshore Drilling”, http://seekingalpha.com/article/976851-potential-issue-with-offshore-drilling)

However, there might be trouble brewing in the distance; the same kind of trouble which hit natural gas (UNG) and land-locked WTI crude (USO).

The thesis is simple

Drilling for oil onshore is a lot cheaper than drilling for it offshore. Up until recently inshore exploration was seen as somewhat exhausted with U.S. crude production falling steadily since the 70s and thus exploration had to move offshore.

But with the shale boom - using horizontal drilling and fracking techniques - onshore exploration and production of natural gas boomed with well-known consequences for natural gas prices. What is new here, is that now those consequences are flowing over to the natural gas liquids and crude markets. WTI crude production is increasing, reversing a 4 decade trend towards lower production in the U.S. (source: EIA)

The trouble for offshore drilling contractors is that this revolution is happening onshore - that place where drilling is cheaper. Already we have seen a collapse of offshore natural gas production, as we can observe in the production chart below (SOURCE: EIA)

How long until the same effect happens to the offshore drilling rigs looking for crude? Were such a thing to happen, the companies servicing the industry would naturally suffer tremendously.

Conclusion

In yet another consequence of the shale boom, the increased productivity and lower cost of inshore crude wells might drive a temporary stake through the offshore drilling business. This would probably require that the shale boom turn international to have an effect, but given the healthy valuations on the offshore drilling services sector the possible impact cannot be ignored.

#### Transition from coal requires construction---increases emissions

Lemonick 12 (Michael D. Lemonick - senior staff writer at Climate Central and a former senior science writer at Time, "Natural Gas Our New Savior? Not So Fast.."February 28th, 2012, www.climatecentral.org/blogs/natural-gas-our-new-savoir-not-so-fast/)

And if you could magically flip a switch and turn all existing coal plants in to gas plants, you would indeed cut CO2 emissions significantly.¶ But there is no magic switch, and therein, **according to a recent analysis published in Environmental Research Letters**, lies a problem. “The most surprising thing we found,” lead author Nathan Myhrvold told me recently, “is that unless you switch to a form of energy that cuts emissions really drastically” — and he isn’t talking about any piddling 50%, either — “**you basically don’t get any real effect**.” (If you recognize Myhrvold’s name, it might be because he used to be a top executive at Microsoft, or it might be from his exploits as a barbecue champion or as a donor to the Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence — but he also holds a degree in theoretical physics from Princeton.)¶ His point, and that of his co-author Ken Caldeira, a climate scientist with the Carnegie Institution of Washington, is that before a new natural-gas power plant can go into **operation it’s already made the climate problem worse.** It takes energy to build the plant, most of which comes from fossil fuels. **The process of drilling for natural gas and piping it to the plant, moreover is prone to leakage** — and methane, the main component of natural gas, is itself a powerful greenouse gas . And while the construction is going on, says the Myhrvold-Calderia study, **you’re still emitting CO2 from those old, dirty coal plants**, which can’t be switched off until the new gas plants are ready to go.¶ The bottom line that emerges from this “life-cycle analysis,” or LCA, said Myhrvold**, is that by the time we could switch from coal to gas, there would already be so much more CO2 and methane in the atmosphere that we’d be much deeper in the hole**. “It’s like living on a credit card,” he said. “It’s easy to get into a situation where it will take years and years to pay back.”¶ In fact, he argues, because CO2 stays in the atmosphere for so long once it’s up there, **a switch to natural gas would have zero effect on global temperatures by the year 2100. “**If you take 40 years to switch over entirely to natural gas,” he said, “you won’t see any substantial decrease in global temperatures for up to 250 years. **There’s** almost **no climate value** in doing it.”

#### Switch is infeasible in the short term

Levi 12 (Michael Levi - senior fellow for energy and the environment at Council on Foreign Relations, director of CFR Program on Energy Security and Climate Change. “The Climate Change Limits of U.S. Natural Gas,” August 20, 2012, <http://blogs.cfr.org/levi/2012/08/20/the-climate-change-limits-of-u-s-natural-gas/>)

The Associated Press reported last week that U.S. greenhouse gas emissions have dropped to a twenty-year low on the back of abundant natural gas. “The question,” it correctly observed, “is whether the shift is just one bright spot in a big, gloomy [climate change] picture, or a potentially larger trend.”¶ I’ve argued repeatedly in the past that surging supplies of natural gas are good news for climate change. But there are important limits to what U.S. natural gas can do. This post is going to illustrate those with some simple numbers.¶ Let’s start with a reference point. In 2009, in advance of the Copenhagen climate summit, the United States pledged to reduce (PDF) its greenhouse gas emissions to 17 percent below 2005 levels by 2020. It also repeatedly emphasized its intention to reduce those emissions to 30 and 42 percent below 2005 levels by 2025 and 2030 respectively.¶ How far down that road could a shift from coal to gas get the United States?¶ I’m going to focus on carbon dioxide emissions from energy. The EIA currently projects that U.S. emissions will be 5,429 million metric tons of carbon dioxide (MtCO2) by 2020, assuming that currently pending fuel economy rules for 2017-25 go ahead as planned. 1,787 MtCO2of that total would come from coal; 1,371 would come from natural gas.¶ That already reflects a gradual substitution of gas for coal. But what would happen if natural gas completely replaced coal? Assume that the emissions from gas are about half those from coal. Then U.S. emissions would drop to 4,536 MtCO2. That’s 24 percent below 2005 levels.¶ That leads to our first conclusion: substituting natural gas for coal has the theoretical potential to get us to our 2020 carbon goals. But, **unless we deploy it with carbon capture and sequestration, it cannot get us to our 2025 or 2030 goals.** (The 2025 and 2030 comparisons require a little bit of extra math that I won’t go through here.) One can push this a bit farther, supposing that natural gas completely replaced oil in residential, commercial, and industrial applications. Oil use in those three sectors is projected to generate 462 MtCO2 in 2020; replacing oil with natural gas could in principle reduce those emissions by somewhere around 150 MtCO2. That doesn’t change our bottom-line conclusions.¶ But we’re not done. **These figures are extreme limits that assume spectacular gains in natural gas use. Alas those gains aren’t practical.**¶Focus on the coal-to-gas shift. I estimated that a complete replacement of coal with natural gas could slice 894 MtCO2 off of U.S. emissions. You need to burn about 18.2 Mcf (thousand cubic feet) of natural gas to generate a ton of greenhouse gas emissions. This implies that completely replacing U.S. coal with natural gas would require roughly 16 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of additional natural gas. That’s a 60 percent increment to projected natural gas supplies in 2020. Put another way, it’s more than double the amount of natural gas currently used in U.S. power plants.¶ This is almost certainly not a practical addition to U.S. natural gas production. Perhaps a more reasonable (but still challenging) outer limit would see half of the U.S. coal use currently anticipated for 2020 replaced with natural gas. That would result in U.S. emissions 17 percent below 2005 levels, meeting the strict part of the Copenhagen commitment but leaving a big lift for other shifts to deliver on the follow-on targets.¶ The bottom line? Natural gas can do a lot to bend the U.S. emissions curve over the coming years. In even the medium run, though, simply **moving from coal to gas is not a substitute for broader policy,** at least not if the United States wants to realize the sorts of emissions cuts that both Barack Obama and John McCain talked about only four years ago. Best to think of gas as a climate opportunity – to forestall construction of long-lived and highly polluting infrastructure, to make carbon capture and sequestration cheaper, to balance intermittent renewable sources – rather than as a solution in itself.

#### No impact---mitigation and adaptation will solve---no tipping point or “1% risk” args

Robert O. Mendelsohn 9, the Edwin Weyerhaeuser Davis Professor, Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, Yale University, June 2009, “Climate Change and Economic Growth,” online: http://www.growthcommission.org/storage/cgdev/documents/gcwp060web.pdf

The heart of the debate about climate change comes from a number of warnings from scientists and others that give the impression that human-induced climate change is an immediate threat to society (IPCC 2007a,b; Stern 2006). Millions of people might be vulnerable to health effects (IPCC 2007b), crop production might fall in the low latitudes (IPCC 2007b), water supplies might dwindle (IPCC 2007b), precipitation might fall in arid regions (IPCC 2007b), extreme events will grow exponentially (Stern 2006), and between 20–30 percent of species will risk extinction (IPCC 2007b). Even worse, there may be catastrophic events such as the melting of Greenland or Antarctic ice sheets causing severe sea level rise, which would inundate hundreds of millions of people (Dasgupta et al. 2009). Proponents argue there is no time to waste. Unless greenhouse gases are cut dramatically today, economic growth and well‐being may be at risk (Stern 2006).

These statements are largely alarmist and misleading. Although climate change is a serious problem that deserves attention, society’s immediate behavior has an extremely low probability of leading to catastrophic consequences. The science and economics of climate change is quite clear that emissions over the next few decades will lead to only mild consequences. The severe impacts predicted by alarmists require a century (or two in the case of Stern 2006) of no mitigation. Many of the predicted impacts assume there will be no or little adaptation. The net economic impacts from climate change over the next 50 years will be small regardless. Most of the more severe impacts will take more than a century or even a millennium to unfold and many of these “potential” impacts will never occur because people will adapt. It is not at all apparent that immediate and dramatic policies need to be developed to thwart long‐range climate risks. What is needed are long‐run balanced responses.

#### Can’t solve – CO2 stays in the atmosphere for hundreds of years

Mayer Hillman, Senior Fellow at the Policy Studies Institute, 2007

*The Suicidal Planet: How To Prevent Global Climate Catastrophe*, p. 25-6

The effects of climate change cannot quickly be reversed by reducing or even eliminating future emissions of greenhouse gases. There are two reasons for this. First, greenhouse gases released into the atmosphere linger for decades (in the case of relatively short-lived gases like methane), or hundreds of years (for carbon dioxide), or even thousands of years (for the long-lived gases like per-fluorocarbons). Carbon dioxide and methane concentrations in the atmosphere are respectively one-third and more than twice as high as those at any time over the last 650,000 years. Even if no additional carbon dioxide were emitted from now on, atmospheric concentrations would take centuries to decline to pre-Industrial Revolution levels. While elevated levels of greenhouse gases remain in the atmosphere, additional warming will occur.

#### Warming’s not anthropogenic

Don J. Easterbrook 11, Emeritus Professor of Geology at Western Washington University, 2011, “Geologic Evidence of Recurring Climate Cycles and Their Implications for the Cause of Global Climate Changes: The Past is the Key to the Future,” in Evidence-Based Climate Science, ed. Easterbrook, p. 4

Recent global warming (1978-1998) has pushed climate changes into the forefront of scientiﬁc inquiry with a great deal at stake for human populations. With **no unequivocal, “smoking gun”, cause-and-effect evidence** that increasing CO2 caused the 1978-1998 global warming, and despite the media blitz over the 2007 IPCC report, **no tangible physical evidence exists** that CO2 is *causing* global warming. Computer climate models ***assume*** that CO2 is the cause and computer model simulations are all based on that **assumption**. The IPCC report has been hotly contested by many scientists (e.g., Idso and Singer, 2009; Spencer, 2010a,b; Horner, 2008). Abundant physical evidence from the geologic past provides a record of former periods of recurrent global warming and cooling that were **far more intense** than recent warming and cooling. These geologic records provide a clear evidence of global warming and cooling that could not have been caused by increased CO2. Thus, we can use these records to project global climate in the future: the past is the key to the future.

## 2NC

#### No extinction from climate change

NIPCC 11 – the Nongovernmental International Panel on Climate Change, an international panel of nongovernment scientists and scholars, March 8, 2011, “Surviving the Unprecedented Climate Change of the IPCC,” online: http://www.nipccreport.org/articles/2011/mar/8mar2011a5.html

In a paper published in Systematics and Biodiversity, Willis et al. (2010) consider the IPCC (2007) "predicted climatic changes for the next century" -- i.e., their contentions that "global temperatures will **increase by 2-4°C** and possibly beyond, sea levels will rise (~1 m ± 0.5 m), and atmospheric CO2 will increase by up to 1000 ppm" -- noting that it is "widely suggested that the magnitude and rate of these changes will result in many plants and animals going extinct," citing studies that suggest that "within the next century, over 35% of some biota will have gone extinct (Thomas et al., 2004; Solomon et al., 2007) and there will be extensive die-back of the tropical rainforest due to climate change (e.g. Huntingford et al., 2008)."

On the other hand, they indicate that some biologists and climatologists have pointed out that "many of the predicted increases in climate have **happened before**, in terms of both **magnitude and rate of change** (e.g. Royer, 2008; Zachos et al., 2008), and yet biotic communities have **remained remarkably resilient** (Mayle and Power, 2008) and in some cases **thrived** (Svenning and Condit, 2008)." But they report that those who mention these things are often "placed in the 'climate-change denier' category," although the purpose for pointing out these facts is simply to present "a **sound scientific basis** for understanding biotic responses to the magnitudes and rates of climate change predicted for the future through using the **vast data resource** that we can exploit in fossil records."

Going on to do just that, Willis et al. focus on "intervals in time in the fossil record when atmospheric CO2 concentrations increased up to 1200 ppm, temperatures in mid- to high-latitudes increased by **greater than 4°C within 60 years**, and sea levels rose by up to 3 m higher than present," describing studies of past biotic responses that indicate "the scale and impact of the magnitude and rate of such climate changes on biodiversity." And what emerges from those studies, as they describe it, "is evidence for rapid community turnover, migrations, development of novel ecosystems and thresholds from one stable ecosystem state to another." And, most importantly in this regard, they report "there is **very little evidence for broad-scale extinctions** due to a warming world."

In concluding, the Norwegian, Swedish and UK researchers say that "based on such evidence we urge some **caution in assuming broad-scale extinctions** of species will occur due solely to climate changes of the magnitude and rate predicted for the next century," reiterating that "the fossil record indicates **remarkable biotic resilience** to wide amplitude fluctuations in climate."

#### Too late---we’ve already passed irreversible tipping points

Michael McCarthy, Environment Editor of The Independent, Global warming: passing the 'tipping point', 2006 http://www.independent.co.uk/environment/global-warming-passing-the-tipping-point-466187.html

A crucial global warming "tipping point" for the Earth, highlighted only last week by the British Government, has already been passed, with devastating consequences.

Research commissioned by The Independent reveals that the accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere has now crossed a threshold, set down by scientists from around the world at a conference in Britain last year, beyond which really dangerous climate change is likely to be unstoppable.

The implication is that some of global warming's worst predicted effects, from destruction of ecosystems to increased hunger and water shortages for billions of people, cannot now be avoided, whatever we do. It gives considerable force to the contention by the green guru Professor James Lovelock, put forward last month in The Independent, that climate change is now past the point of no return.

The danger point we are now firmly on course for is a rise in global mean temperatures to 2 degrees above the level before the Industrial Revolution in the late 18th century.

At the moment, global mean temperatures have risen to about 0.6 degrees above the pre-industrial era - and worrying signs of climate change, such as the rapid melting of the Arctic ice in summer, are already increasingly evident. But a rise to 2 degrees would be far more serious.

By that point it is likely that the Greenland ice sheet will already have begun irreversible melting, threatening the world with a sea-level rise of several metres. Agricultural yields will have started to fall, not only in Africa but also in Europe, the US and Russia, putting up to 200 million more people at risk from hunger, and up to 2.8 billion additional people at risk of water shortages for both drinking and irrigation. The Government's conference on Avoiding Dangerous Climate Change, held at the UK Met Office in Exeter a year ago, highlighted a clear threshold in the accumulation of greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide (CO2) in the atmosphere, which should not be surpassed if the 2 degree point was to be avoided with "relatively high certainty".

This was for the concentration of CO2 and other gases such as methane and nitrous oxide, taken together in their global warming effect, to stay below 400ppm (parts per million) in CO2 terms - or in the jargon, the "equivalent concentration" of CO2 should remain below that level.

The warning was highlighted in the official report of the Exeter conference, published last week. However, an investigation by The Independent has established that the CO2 equivalent concentration, largely unnoticed by the scientific and political communities, has now risen beyond this threshold.

This number is not a familiar one even among climate researchers, and is not readily available. For example, when we put the question to a very senior climate scientist, he said: "I would think it's definitely over 400 - probably about 420." So we asked one of the world's leading experts on the effects of greenhouse gases on climate, Professor Keith Shine, head of the meteorology department at the University of Reading, to calculate it precisely. Using the latest available figures (for 2004), his calculations show the equivalent concentration of C02, taking in the effects of methane and nitrous oxide at 2004 levels, is now 425ppm. This is made up of CO2 itself, at 379ppm; the global warming effect of the methane in the atmosphere, equivalent to another 40ppm of CO2; and the effect of nitrous oxide, equivalent to another 6ppm of CO2.

The tipping point warned about last week by the Government is already behind us.

#### Nuclear war turns warming

Duncan Clark 9, editorial environmental consultant to the London Guardian, co-director of GreenProfile, January 2, 2009, “The carbon footprint of nuclear war,” online: http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/blog/2009/jan/02/nuclear-war-emissions

Almost 700m [million] tonnes of CO2 would be released into the Earth's atmosphere by even the smallest nuclear conflict, according to a US study that compares the environmental costs of developing various power sources

Just when you might have thought it was ethically sound to unleash a nuclear attack on a nearby city, along comes a pesky scientist and points out that atomic warfare is bad for the climate. According to a new paper in the journal Energy & Environmental Science, even a very limited nuclear exchange, using just a thousandth of the weaponry of a full-scale nuclear war, would cause up to 690m tonnes of CO2 to enter the atmosphere – more than UK's annual total.

The upside (kind of) is that the conflict would also generate as much as 313m tonnes of soot. This would stop a great deal of sunlight reaching the earth, creating a significant regional cooling effect in the short and medium terms – just like when a major volcano erupts. Ultimately, though, the CO2 would win out and crank up global temperatures an extra few notches.

The paper's author, Mark Z Jacobson, a professor of civil and environmental engineering at Stanford University, calculated the emissions of such a conflict by totting up the burn rate and carbon content of the fabric of our cities. "Materials have the following carbon contents: plastics, 38–92%; tyres and other rubbers, 59–91%; synthetic fibres, 63–86%; woody biomass, 41–45%; charcoal, 71%; asphalt, 80%; steel, 0.05–2%. We approximate roughly the carbon content of all combustible material in a city as 40–60%."

But why would a Stanford engineer bother calculating such a thing? Given that the nuclear exchange would also kill up to 17 million people, who's going to be thinking about the impact on global warming?

The purpose of the paper is to compare the total human and environmental costs of a wide range of different power sources, from solar and wind to nuclear and biofuels. One of the side-effects of nuclear power, the report argues, is an increased risk of nuclear war: "Because the production of nuclear weapons material is occurring only in countries that have developed civilian nuclear energy programs, the risk of a limited nuclear exchange between countries or the detonation of a nuclear device by terrorists has increased due to the dissemination of nuclear energy facilities worldwide."

"As such," Jacobson continues, "it is a valid exercise to estimate the potential number of immediate deaths and carbon emissions due to the burning of buildings and infrastructure associated with the proliferation of nuclear energy facilities and the resulting proliferation of nuclear weapons … Although concern at the time of an explosion will be the deaths and not carbon emissions, policy makers today must weigh all the potential future risks of mortality and carbon emissions when comparing energy sources."

#### Arctic drilling risks methane hydrate release --- extinction

Tamsin Carlisle 11, “The drilling danger of releasing giant bubbles of methane gas,” 5-27-11, <http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/industry-insights/energy/the-drilling-danger-of-releasing-giant-bubbles-of-methane-gas>

The "burps of death" are what can ensue when drillers mess with the planet's least accessible stores of natural gas.

The trouble with gas hydrates, as those ice-like deposits in the Arctic and under ocean beds are known, is that they lock up high concentrations of methane in a notoriously unstable crystalline lattice.

Change the temperature and pressure just a bit, and the whole thing collapses, releasing giant bubbles of potentially explosive methane gas in a fit of geological indigestion.

Some scientists theorise that a global firestorm resulting from one such outburst may have barbecued the dinosaurs. Another ancient oceanic burp, which did not ignite, may have triggered an equally lethal spurt of global warming linked to mass extinctions.

#### Only a massive expansion of drilling triggers the impact

Morningstar 11 [Cory Morningstar, “Destination—Hell. Are we there yet?,” Huntington News, Sunday, March 27, 2011—01:09, pg. http://www.huntingtonnews.net/2768

US Department of Energy meeting summary: "Alternatively, an undersea earthquake today, say off the Blake Ridge or the coast of Japan or California might loosen and cause some of the sediment to slide down the ridge or slump, exposing the hydrate layer to the warmer water. That in turn could cause a chain reaction of events, leading to the release of massive quantities of methane. Another possibility is drilling and other activities related to exploration and recovery of methane hydrates as an energy resource. The hydrates tend to occur in the pores of sediment and help to bind it together. Attempting to remove the hydrates may cause the sediment to collapse and release the hydrates. So, it may not take thousands of years to warm the ocean and the sediments enough to cause massive releases, only lots of drilling rigs. Returning to the 4 GtC release scenario, assume such a release occurs over a one-year period sometime in the next 50 years as result of slope failure. According to the Report of the Methane Hydrate Advisory Committee, “Catastrophic slope failure appears to be necessary to release a sufficiently large quantity of methane rapidly enough to be transported to the atmosphere without significant oxidation or dissolution.” In this event, methane will enter the atmosphere as methane gas. It will have a residence time of several decades

and a global warming potential of 62 times that of carbon dioxide over a 20-year period. This would be the equivalent of 248 GtC as carbon dioxide or 31 times the annual man-made GHG emissions of today. Put another way, this would have the impact of nearly 30 years worth of GHG warming all at once. The result would almost certainly be a rapid rise in the average air temperature, perhaps as much as 3°F immediately. This might be tolerable if that’s as far as things go. But, just like 15,000 years ago, if the feedback mechanisms kick in, we can expect rapid melting of Greenland and Antarctic ice and an overall temperature increase of 30°F."

# Europe Adv

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#### US manufacturing key to competitiveness, the economy and national security

Department of Commerce 12 (U.S. Department of Commerce in consultation with the National Economic Council, January 2012, "The Competitiveness and InnovativeCapacity of the United States www.commerce.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2012/january/competes\_010511\_0.pdf)

**A flourishing manufacturing sector in the United States is crucial to its future competitive strength**. Throughout its history, manufacturing has been a source of prosperity, innovation, and pride for the United States. **Manufacturing pays higher than average wages, provides the bulk of U.S. exports, contributes sub‐ stantially to U.S. R&D, and protects national security.**¶Manufacturing remains a vital part of the U.S. economy. In 2009, manufacturing made up 11.2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) 1 and 9.1 percent of total U.S. employment, 2 directly employing almost 12 million workers. This sector also has indirect employment effects on other sectors of the U.S. economy when it purchases inputs for production such as raw materials (such as from the agricul‐ tural and mining sectors), buildings (from the construction and real estate sec‐ tors), and services (including warehousing and transportation; professional, scientific, and technical services; and financial services). In these ways, manufac‐ turing supports millions of additional supply chain jobs across the economy.¶ In addition, many of the jobs provided by this sector are high quality. Total hourly compensation in the manufacturing sector is, on average, 22 percent higher than that in the services sector and about 91 percent of factory workers have em‐ ployer‐provided benefits compared to about 71 percent of workers across all pri‐ vate sector firms. 3¶ **Manufacturing is also the largest contributor to U.S. exports**. In 2010, the United States exported over $1.1 trillion of manufactured goods, which accounted for 86 percent of all U.S. goods exports and 60 percent of U.S. total exports (see figure 6.1). In order to support millions more jobs, President Obama’s National Export Initiative set the ambitious goal of doubling U.S. exports by the end of 2014. Moreover, the United States runs a trade surplus in the services sector, a surplus that has tripled since 2003 4 ; however, though the services sector will continue to be important, increases in services alone will not likely double U.S. exports by 2014. Indeed, **without a strong manufacturing sector, the U.S. trade surplus in services may erode** (see box 6.1).¶ A strong manufacturing sector is also crucial because successful innovation in many sectors is closely linked to the ability to manufacture products as innova‐ tive methods and ideas are generated and perfected through the process of mak‐ ing things. In the recent Report to the President on Ensuring American Leadership in Advanced Manufacturing, 5 the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST) and the President’s Innovation and Technology Advisory Committee (PITAC) emphasize the critical importance of advanced manufacturing in driving knowledge production and innovation in the United States. The PCAST researched the current state of manufacturing and concluded that U.S. leader‐ ship in manufacturing is declining and that this is detrimental **to the well‐being of the nation overall**. **Manufacturing companies in the United States are responsible for over two‐thirds of the industrial R&D6 and employ the majority of domestic scientists and engineers.**7 Furthermore, manufacturing R&D is the dominant source of innovative new service‐sector technologies, 8 hence its benefits reach beyond the manufacturing arena. The colocation of manufacturing, research, and other sectors can also be impor‐ tant. In its recent report the PCAST states: “Proximity is important in fostering in‐ novation. When different aspects of manufacturing—from R&D to production to customer delivery—are located in the same region, they breed efficiencies in knowledge transfer that allow new technologies to develop and businesses to in‐ novate.” 9 Thus, even if R&D facilities are kept in the United States, the **relocation of manufacturing facilities overseas may limit the United States’ ability to inno‐ vate.** ¶Finally, an innovative and secure domestic manufacturing base is critical to national security. **An inability to produce domestically the advanced defense systems of the modern military would put the national security of the United States at risk**. As its military comes to rely more heavily on complex and advanced technology systems, it is important that the United States retain the manufactur‐ ing capacity and knowledge necessary to produce these goods. Our continued se‐ curity not only rests on the ability to produce military products, but we must also consider how the sourcing of all critical infrastructure components, from commu‐ nications equipment to power generation, affects our ability to protect against potentially catastrophic supply chain disruptions.

#### Solves great power war

**Baru 2009** (Sanjaya is a Professor at the Lee Kuan Yew School in Singapore Geopolitical Implications of the Current Global Financial Crisis, Strategic Analysis, Volume 33, Issue 2 March 2009 , pages 163 – 168)

Hence, economic policies and performance do have **strategic consequences.**2 In the modern era, the idea that strong economic performance is the **foundation of power** was argued most persuasively by historian Paul Kennedy. 'Victory (in war)', Kennedy claimed, 'has repeatedly gone to the side with more flourishing productive base'.3 Drawing attention to the interrelationships between economic **wealth, technological innovation, and the ability of states to** efficiently **mobilize economic and technological resources for power projection and national defence**, Kennedy argued that nations that were able to better combine military and economic strength scored over others. 'The fact remains', Kennedy argued, 'that all of the major shifts in the world's military-power balance have followed alterations in the productive balances; and further, that the rising and falling of the various empires and states in the international system has been confirmed by the outcomes of the **major Great Power wars**

, where victory has always gone to the side with the greatest material resources'.4 In Kennedy's view, the geopolitical consequences of an economic crisis, or even decline, would be transmitted through a nation's inability to find adequate financial resources to simultaneously sustain economic growth and **military power**. The classic 'guns versus butter' dilemma. Apart from such fiscal disempowerment of the State, economic under-performance would also reduce a nation's attraction as a market, as a source of capital and technology, and as a 'knowledge power'. As power shifted from Europe to America, so did the knowledge base of the global economy. As China's power rises, so does its profile as a 'knowledge economy'. Impressed by such arguments, the China Academy of Social Sciences developed the concept of Comprehensive National Power (CNP) to get China's political and military leadership to focus more clearly on economic and technological performance than on military power alone in its quest for Great Power status.5 While China's impressive economic performance, and the consequent rise in China's global profile, has forced strategic analysts to acknowledge this link, the recovery of the US economy in the 1990s had reduced the appeal of the Kennedy thesis in Washington, DC. We must expect a revival of interest in Kennedy's arguments in the current context. A historian of power who took Kennedy seriously, Niall Ferguson, has helped keep the focus on the geopolitical implications of economic performance. In his masterly survey of the role of finance in the projection of state power, Ferguson defines the 'square of power' as the tax bureaucracy, the parliament, the national debt, and the central bank. These four institutions of 'fiscal empowerment' of the state enable nations to project power by mobilizing and deploying financial resources to that end.6 Ferguson shows how vital sound economic management is to strategic policy and **national power**. More recently, Ferguson has been drawing a parallel between the role of debt and financial crises in the decline of the Ottoman and Soviet Empires and that of the United States. In an early comment on the present financial crisis, Ferguson wrote: We are indeed living through a global shift in the balance of power very similar to that which occurred in the 1870s. This is the story of how an over-extended empire sought to cope with an external debt crisis by selling off revenue streams to foreign investors. The empire that suffered these setbacks in the 1870s was the Ottoman empire. Today it is the US. … It remains to be seen how quickly today's financial shift will be followed by a comparable geopolitical shift in favour of the new export and energy empires of the east. Suffice to say that the historical analogy does not bode well for America's quasi-imperial network of bases and allies across the Middle East and Asia. Debtor empires sooner or later have to do more than just sell shares to satisfy their creditors. … as in the 1870s the balance of financial power is shifting. Then, the move was from the ancient oriental empires (not only the Ottoman but also the Persian and Chinese) to western Europe. Today the shift is from the US - and other western financial centres - to the autocracies of the Middle East and East Asia. …7 An economic or financial crisis may not trigger the decline of an empire. It can certainly speed up a process already underway. In the case of the Soviet Union, the financial crunch caused by the Afghan War came on top of years of economic under-performance and the loss of political legitimacy of the Soviet State. In a democratic society like the United States, the political legitimacy of the state is constantly renewed through periodic elections. Thus, the election of Barack Obama may serve to renew the legitimacy of the state and by doing so enable the state to undertake measures that restore health to the economy. This the Soviet State was unable to do under Gorbachev even though he repudiated the Brezhnev legacy and distanced himself from it. Hence, one must not become an economic determinist, and historic parallels need not always be relevant. Politics can **intervene and offer solutions**. Political economy and politics, in the form of Keynesian economics and the 'New Deal' did intervene to influence the geopolitical implications of the Great Depression. Whether they will do so once again in today's America remains to be seen.

#### Algeria is the third largest supplier to Europe behind Russia and Norway.

Melling 10—Anthony J. Melling is an established authority on gas contracting issues. He has¶ three decades of international gas contracting and market analysis experience,¶ with particular emphasis on the UK and continental Europe. 2010. NATURAL GAS PRICING¶ AND ITS FUTURE¶ EUROPE AS THE BATTLEGROUND, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Alongside Russia and Norway, Algeria ranks in the top three external gas producers¶ supplying the EU. Whereas Russia and Norway predominantly supply by¶ pipeline, about 40 percent of Algeria’s gas exports to Europe are supplied as LNG.¶ Exports for the last ten years are shown below:¶ As in Norway and the Netherlands, gas exports are centered around a supergiant¶ gas fi eld, Hassi R’Mel.

#### AQIM sucks

**Stratfor 10**, (“AQIM: The Devolution of al Qaeda's North African Node,” 8-10)

From AQIM’s official founding in 2006 to the present, our research indicates a few discernable patterns regarding the group’s operational capacity inside Algeria. First, the majority of attacks have produced low casualty counts, from zero to three. Attacks that did achieve a higher degree of lethality (which we define as two or more people killed), were restricted mostly to Algiers and slightly to the east of the capital. Second, after GSPC’s September 2006 merger with al Qaeda, the number of violent attacks and threats against foreign/international targets within Algeria’s borders increased significantly. This was particularly evident in the spring of 2008 and continues to date.

The attack and casualty rates were highest between mid-2008 and late 2009. Indeed, during the last six months of 2009 there was a noteworthy spike in the number of attacks. However, tracing the geographical distribution of attacks last year, we noticed that AQIM had zeroed in on softer, more vulnerable targets closer to its base in the east, strongly suggesting that the group’s operational capacity had been crippled by Algerian counterterrorism efforts and that AQIM was likely trying to defend its base. The uptick in attacks appears to have been an effort on the part of the North African al Qaeda node to prove that it remained a security threat and relevant actor on the international jihadist stage. It was not a verifiable indicator that the group’s strength was surging. It could well have been nothing more than a last gasp that will not likely be repeated, unless AQIM is given room to rest and regroup. Also, since the group’s merger with al Qaeda in 2006, research shows an increase in attacks in September of each year, near the end of or directly after the Muslim holy month of Ramadan.

The more recent increase of abductions of Westerners and clashes with security forces in the Sahara-Sahel is not, as some observers believe, an indication of AQIM’s ability to effectively strike targets at a much longer range. Kidnapping and executing a 78-year-old aid worker in the Sahel simply does not make the same forceful statement as a coordinated multiple VBIED attack in Algiers. We believe this expanded activity in the south is more likely the result of a rivalry between sub-commanders seeking to raise funds for the organization and an overall indication of the weakness and lack of cohesion within the group. It could also be the result of increased initiative on the part of countries in the Sahara-Sahel region to go on the offensive against AQIM. A joint military base operated by Algeria, Mauritania, Mali and Niger was set up in April in the southern Algerian town of Tamanrasset to coordinate counterterrorism activities and clamp down on one of AQIM’s main smuggling routes. According to a report July 25 in the Algerian newspaper El Watan, Algeria will be in charge of air support, with Mali covering ground operations, Mauritania heading up communications, Niger handling logistics and Burkina Faso serving in an observation role. However, as recent events have demonstrated, the joint effort has failed to advance beyond vocal commitments and formalities.

Moreover, the North African al Qaeda node has failed in its original objective of unifying North African militants in the Sahara-Sahel and Maghreb, remaining an Algerian-run organization by location and leadership. Despite numerous attempts to recruit militants and organize cells of Europeans of North African heritage, it also has failed to strike Europe — namely France and Spain, its preferred targets — and other Western countries. Indeed, AQIM has failed to live up to al-Zawahiri’s promise when he announced the formation of al Qaeda’s new North African node, that it would “be a bone in the throat of the American and French crusaders and their allies.”

And pressure against the group is intensifying. The military operations by French-backed Mauritanian troops in Mauritania and Mali in July were likely a harbinger of a more aggressive counterterrorism stance against the group by countries in the region. Paris’ open declaration of war on AQIM after the death of the French hostage will certainly add energy to the effort. However, instead of putting French troops on the ground in Algeria, an idea that Algeria openly rejected (probably because of the sensitive colonial history between the two countries), France’s declaration will likely lead to enhanced military and intelligence efforts against the North African al Qaeda node. Joining France’s call, Niger’s military leader, whose remarks were conveyed by French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner, said July 28 his government is ready to “take necessary action” against terrorism and AQIM in the Sahara-Sahel.

Meanwhile, Algeria itself is continuing its assault against AQIM. The Algerian daily newspaper El Khabar reported July 26 that Algerian security forces, responding to a number of small attacks against army patrols in the region, launched an operation July 21 that included heavy air strikes against suspected AQIM hideouts in Tizi Ouzou and Bouira provinces. This followed an announcement by the Ministry of Defense in June that it was reinforcing its National Gendarmerie police force by adding 9,000 members in an effort to take the offensive against AQIM. According to El Khabar, citing official sources in the ministry, Algeria has dispatched an additional 16,000 police to the southern Sahara-Sahel region of the country to confront AQIM and combat cross-border crime and smuggling. This would increase the security coverage in the south five-fold compared to the previous three years. The coverage has been further expanded by a recent doubling of the number of air patrols conducted unilaterally by the Algerian police and jointly by the police and the Algerian army.

As part of the overall build-up, Algerian security forces also have incorporated a new communications network known as “Ronital.” Set up in the Tizi Ouzou region of the Kabylie Mountains, where Algiers is concentrating its fight against AQIM, Ronital serves as a unified communications network operated by Algeria’s central command to ensure the secure and reliable transmission of electronic messages, including sound and images.

As the government offensive continues, AQIM’s future seems bleak. In all likelihood, attacks involving small arms and IEDs against military and civilian convoys and slightly more hardened symbols of the Algerian state such as police stations will continue to be concentrated in Algeria, near AQIM’s eastern stronghold in Blida and Boumerdes provinces. It does not appear that AQIM has the operational freedom to conduct large VBIED attacks against hard targets in Algiers, as it has done in the past. If the regional security momentum continues at its current pace, 2011 may see al Qaeda’s North African node further reduced and fragmented, its remnants pushed farther south into the Sahara-Sahel and the northern portions of Mali, Mauritania and Niger. Indeed, abductions of Westerners and clashes with security forces in that region may even increase, but only because the group is unable to secure the propaganda victories and financial resources it needs due to the success of Algerian security operations. Like the Islamic State of Iraq, if criminal enterprises like smuggling and kidnapping-for-ransom operations become AQIM’s predominant focus, it may find its credibility among jihadists and appeal to potential recruits eroded, making its already tenuous position even more difficult.

#### Removing offshore drilling restrictions destroys U.S.-European energy coop---key to overall relations which solve prolif, Russian expansion, Middle East stability and a peaceful Chinese rise

David Koranyi 12, deputy director of the Atlantic Council's Dinu Patriciu Eurasia Center, 9/4/12, “An Emerging Transatlantic Rift on Energy?” http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/romney-energy-policy-emerging-transatlantic-rift-on-energy

Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney recently unveiled his energy plans for the United States, which promises to fulfill the country’s four-decades’-old dream of energy independence. It has the potential to do so. But the price could ultimately be high: a breakdown in global climate negotiations and a rift in relations with Europe.

American and European energy markets are on a diverging path. The US has edged closer to self-sufficiency with respect to fossil fuels, due mostly to the extensive development of its unconventional resources. From 60 percent in 2005, net petroleum imports were down to 45 percent of the US supply last year. By 2020, this rate could be further reduced close to zero, excluding Canada and Mexico. Shale gas made the United States the number one natural gas producer in the world, overtaking Russia, and revitalized manufacturing and the chemical industry.

Meanwhile, climate-conscious Europe's already high energy import dependence continues to grow. Use of renewable resources mandated by the European Union are spreading dynamically, but will take time to mature. Indigenous unconventional gas faces mixed reactions in some member states. In the wake of the Fukushima accident, nuclear energy is on decline in most countries. Ironically, coal use has increased lately in Germany, due to the nuclear power plant closures and flaws in the EU's cap-and-trade system.

Romney has proposed a plan that would widen the transatlantic gap further. He proposes to accelerate the development of America's considerable on- and offshore oil and natural resources by opening up federal lands and wildlife refuges, relaxing legislation, extending tax breaks, and approving Keystone XL that would carry shale oil from Canada; to rehabilitate coal by reverting the Environmental Protection Agency's prohibitive clean air standards introduced by the current administration; and to revitalize nuclear power by streamlining the permitting procedures.

The underlying tenet of the plan is a complete disregard for the threat of climate change, a term the document does not use. Romney renounces the "myth of green jobs creation" and promotes new jobs in the oil, gas, and coal sectors instead. The plan also stipulates that renewables can compete with other resources on a "level playing field," and implies the cessation of government support for renewable energy projects.

The plan, not to mention its implementation, will cause outrage in Europe. To most European policymakers, and the general public alike, shale oil and coal are anathemas, and the "drill baby drill" mentality is considered environmentally reckless. Brussels and other European capitals already resent that President Obama has not spent enough political capital on global climate change negotiations. Europeans worry that a Romney Administration would derail the timeframe agreed to in Cancun last December.

Moreover, Europeans believe that a pursuit of US energy independence could prove both elusive and counter-productive. Even if complete self-sufficiency is achieved, oil prices are determined on the global oil market. The United States might miss breakthroughs in technologies and business opportunities that are offered by the global scramble for renewables. While global challenges to stable energy markets prevail, an illusion of energy independence might prompt a more isolationist stance in US foreign policy and a reduced commitment to strategic interests like Europe's energy security.

A transatlantic friction is looming. Would the United States and Europe ultimately be able to reconcile their visions? The transatlantic partners share strategic interests and face common threats and challenges closely linked to energy issues, such as the proliferation of nuclear weapons, a resurgent Russia, an unstable Middle East, or China’s insatiable appetite for resources and its repercussions around the globe. The United States and Europe are uniquely positioned to develop technology, leverage financing, and share experiences in legislative and regulatory developments. In times of austerity, identifying synergies and pooling resources is paramount.

There is also plenty to build upon. Owed largely to the increased use of cheap natural gas in electricity generation, to the detriment of coal and measures like enhanced vehicle fuel economy standards, last week the US Energy Information Administration reported that energy-related CO2 emissions in the first three months of the year were the lowest since 1992 (though still much higher per capita than in Europe). While Congress and the US government are paralyzed, more than thirty US states adopted renewable energy portfolio standards similar to the EU's 20 percent target by 2020. Regional emission trading schemes are on the rise in the absence of a federal one. Texas is becoming a renewable energy technology hotspot and wind and solar powerhouse. Many in Europe are willing to learn from the US how to unlock their own shale gas potential that can serve as a bridge fuel to the EU's preferred zero-carbon future as gas emits much less CO2. Conversely, the US is looking to exploit four decades of European experience in energy efficiency improvements and demand reduction. Though politically and financially tricky, both EU member states and the United States should revisit nuclear energy as an essential component in providing affordable and sustainable energy. The list goes on.

The benefits of transatlantic cooperation are beyond doubt. The consequences of a falling out between the United States and the EU after the elections are far-reaching. A continued dialogue launched in the framework of the US-EU Energy Council in 2009 would be a way to avoid that. Joint efforts to address climate change, innovation, and investment in clean energy technologies, risk sharing, and cost reduction; joint research and development and harmonized energy diplomacy should be the cornerstones. A value gap that will undermine trust within the alliance is in nobody’s interest.

#### No impact

Robert Jervis 11, Professor in the Department of Political Science and School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University, December 2011, “Force in Our Times,” Survival, Vol. 25, No. 4, p. 403-425

Even if war is still seen as evil, the security community could be dissolved if severe conflicts of interest were to arise. Could the more peaceful world generate new interests that would bring the members of the community into sharp disputes? 45 A zero-sum sense of status would be one example, perhaps linked to a steep rise in nationalism. More likely would be a worsening of the current economic difficulties, which could itself produce greater nationalism, undermine democracy and bring back old-fashioned beggar-my-neighbor economic policies. While these dangers are real, it is hard to believe that the conflicts could be great enough to lead the members of the community to contemplate fighting each other. It is not so much that economic interdependence has proceeded to the point where it could not be reversed – states that were more internally interdependent than anything seen internationally have fought bloody civil wars. Rather it is that even if the more extreme versions of free trade and economic liberalism become discredited, it is hard to see how without building on a preexisting high level of political conflict leaders and mass opinion would come to believe that their countries could prosper by impoverishing or even attacking others. Is it possible that problems will not only become severe, but that people will entertain the thought that they have to be solved by war? While a pessimist could note that this argument does not appear as outlandish as it did before the financial crisis, an optimist could reply (correctly, in my view) that the very fact that we have seen such a sharp economic down-turn without anyone suggesting that force of arms is the solution shows that even if bad times bring about greater economic conflict, it will not make war thinkable.

## 2NC

#### No impact to short-term disruption.

Lochner 11—Stefan Lochner, Caroline Dieckhoner, Institute of Energy Economics at the University of Cologne, 4/11, Civil Unrest in North Africa – Risk for Natural Gas Supply? EWI Working Paper, No. 11/01

Past supply disruptions that have affected Europe were brief and were due to either technical problems¶ or economic disputes with transit countries. Technical problems, such as that which led to the disruption of¶ the Transitgas line in Switzerland in 2010, usually affect only single infrastructure elements, so they do not¶ necessarily affect large volumes of gas. Long-lasting economic disputes harm the reputation of gas producers,¶ transit countries and natural gas in general. Therefore, such con¶ icts are not in the best interests of these¶ stakeholders, and they have typically been resolved within a relatively short time. The disputes disrupting¶ Russian gas transits via Belarus in 2006 and Ukraine in 2009 are good examples.¶ These concerns are also re¶ ected in the relevant regulations: the security of supply guideline by the¶ European Commission emphasises system resilience for supply disruptions lasting up to sixty days (European¶ Union, 2010). The situation in Libya falls into neither of those categories. Unlike technical issues (or potential¶ terrorist attacks), a war-like situation may affect whole countries, not just single infrastructure components.¶ Unlike the transit problems of the past, economic concerns regarding future gas sales are not a priority¶ in wars, which hamper most economic activity. Therefore, speedy resumption of gas deliveries in such a¶ scenario is far from certain.¶ The model results show that short-term interruptions of gas supply can be compensated for, but prolonged¶ interruptions of gas supply from North Africa in winter would pose a severe threat to security of¶ supply and cause disruption to end consumers. Therefore, a reassessment of the short-term security of¶ gas supplies might be required in which the potential for long-lasting supply disruptions, especially from¶ politically unstable countries, is taken into account.

#### No impact---super unlikely

Schneidmiller 9(Chris, Experts Debate Threat of Nuclear, Biological Terrorism, 13 January 2009, http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw\_20090113\_7105.php)

There is an "almost vanishinglysmall" likelihood that terrorists would ever be able to acquire and detonate a nuclear weapon, one expert said here yesterday (see GSN, Dec. 2, 2008). In even the most likely scenario of nuclear terrorism, there are 20 barriers between extremists and a successful nuclear strike on a major city, said John Mueller, a political science professor at Ohio State University. The process itself is seemingly straightforward but exceedingly difficult -- buy or steal highly enriched uranium, manufacture a weapon, take the bomb to the target site and blow it up. Meanwhile, variables strewn across the path to an attack would increase the complexity of the effort, Mueller argued. Terrorists would have to bribe officials in a state nuclear program to acquire the material, while avoiding a sting by authorities or a scam by the sellers. The material itself could also turn out to be bad. "Once the purloined material is purloined, [police are] going to be chasing after you. They are also going to put on a high reward, extremely high reward, on getting the weapon back or getting the fissile material back," Mueller said during a panel discussion at a two-day Cato Institute conference on counterterrorism issues facing the incoming Obama administration. Smuggling the material out of a country would mean relying on criminals who "are very good at extortion" and might have to be killed to avoid a double-cross, Mueller said. The terrorists would then have to find scientists and engineers willing to give up their normal lives to manufacture a bomb, which would require an expensive and sophisticated machine shop. Finally, further technological expertise would be needed to sneak the weapon across national borders to its destination point and conduct a successful detonation, Mueller said. Every obstacle is "difficult but not impossible" to overcome, Mueller said, putting the chance of success at no less than one in three for each. The likelihood of successfully passing through each obstacle, in sequence, would be roughly one in 3 1/2 billion, he said, but for argument's sake dropped it to 3 1/2 million. "It's a total gamble. This is a very expensive and difficult thing to do," said Mueller, who addresses the issue at greater length in an upcoming book, *Atomic Obsession*. "So unlike buying a ticket to the lottery ... you're basically putting everything, including your life, at stake for a gamble that's maybe one in 3 1/2 million or 3 1/2 billion." Other scenarios are even less probable, Mueller said. A nuclear-armed state is "exceedingly unlikely" to hand a weapon to a terrorist group, he argued: "States just simply won't give it to somebody they can't control." Terrorists are also not likely to be able to steal a whole weapon, Mueller asserted, dismissing the idea of "loose nukes." Even Pakistan, which today is perhaps the nation of greatest concern regarding nuclear security, keeps its bombs in two segments that are stored at different locations, he said (see *GSN*, Jan. 12). Fear of an "extremely improbable event" such as nuclear terrorism produces support for a wide range of homeland security activities, Mueller said. He argued that there has been a major and costly overreaction to the terrorism threat -- noting that the Sept. 11 attacks helped to precipitate the invasion of Iraq, which has led to far more deaths than the original event. Panel moderator Benjamin Friedman, a research fellow at the Cato Institute, said academic and governmental discussions of acts of nuclear or biological terrorism have tended to focus on "worst-case assumptions about terrorists' ability to use these weapons to kill us." There is need for consideration for what is probable rather than simply what is possible, he said. Friedman took issue with the finding late last year of an experts' report that an act of WMD terrorism would "more likely than not" occur in the next half decade unless the international community takes greater action. "I would say that the report, if you read it, actually offers no analysis to justify that claim**,** which seems to have been made to change policy by generating alarm in headlines." One panel speaker offered a partial rebuttal to Mueller's presentation. Jim Walsh, principal research scientist for the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, said he agreed that nations would almost certainly not give a nuclear weapon to a nonstate group, that most terrorist organizations have no interest in seeking out the bomb, and that it would be difficult to build a weapon or use one that has been stolen.

#### Terrorists don’t have the technical know-how or resources for nuclear weapons

Umana 11 – Felipe Umana is a contributor to Foreign Policy In Focus, from the Institute for Policy Studies. August 17, 2011, "Loose Nukes: Real Threat?" http://www.fpif.org/articles/loose\_nukes\_real\_threat

Actors seeking to acquire an atomic weapon – or the capability to produce one – generally do not have the essential training, knowledge, or materials. Nor do they generally have the necessary resources to achieve nuclear capabilities. In fact, for non-state actors, smuggling already-manufactured weapons or available materials is the only practical way to go nuclear. Terrorist organizations like Aum Shinrikyo (now known as Aleph) and al-Qaeda are typically **composed of men with little scientific training** and ersatz scientific knowledge, if any. Unless they steal blueprints, these actors can't construct a usable fissile weapon. Moreover, it's not easy to move such sensitive materials around. Anatoly Bulochnikov, director of the Center for Export Controls in Moscow, contrasted nuclear materials with mundane goods: “[These items are] not potatoes, not something you can keep anywhere.” Another hindrance is a lack of steady funds and resources. Non-state actors simply don't have the money to purchase bomb-grade nuclear material (in 1991, a kilogram of enriched uranium went for $700,000), the means to enrich uranium, or the storage facilities to contain the material.

### AT: Eurozone

#### No collapse

Stratfor1/18/12 “Annual Forecast 2012”, global intelligence company, http://www.stratfor.com/forecast/annual-forecast-2012

The European Union and eurozone will survive 2012, and Europe's financial crisis will stabilize, at least temporarily. However, Stratfor expects Europe to continue its long, painful slide into deepening recession. We expect accelerating capital flight out of peripheral European countries as investors in Europe and farther afield lose confidence in the European system. We expect financial support measures to be withdrawn on occasion to maintain pressure on governments to implement fiscal reforms, which will lead to financial scares.¶ However, the driving force behind developments in Europe in 2012 will be political, not economic. Germany, seeing an opportunity in the ongoing financial crisis, is using its superior financial and economic position to attempt to alter the eurozone's structure to its advantage. The core of this "reform" effort is to hardwire tight financial controls into as many European states as possible, both in a new intergovernmental treaty and in each state's national constitution. Normally, we would predict failure for such an effort: Sacrificing budgetary authority to an outside power would be the most dramatic sacrifice of state sovereignty yet in the European experiment -- a sacrifice that most European governments would strongly resist. However, the Germans have six key advantages in 2012.¶ First, there are very few scheduled electoral contests, so the general populace of most European states will not be consulted on the exercise. Of the eurozone states, only France, Slovakia and Slovenia face scheduled national elections. Out of these three, France is by far the most critical: The Franco-German partnership is the core of the European system, and any serious breach between the two would herald the end of the European Union. If Germany is to compromise on its efforts for anyone, it will be for France, and if France needs another country in order to secure its own position in Europe, it needs Germany. Consequently, the two have chosen to collaborate rather than compete thus far, and we expect their partnership to survive the year. Luckily for the German effort, French elections will be at the very beginning of the ratification process, so any possible modifications to the German plan will come early.¶ Second, Germany only needs the approval of the 17 eurozone states -- rather than the 27 members of the full European Union -- to forward its plan with credibility. That the United Kingdom has already opted out is inconvenient for those seeking a pan-European process, but it does not derail the German effort.¶ Third, the process of approving a treaty such as this will take significant time, and some aspects of the reform process can be pushed back. European leaders are expected to sign the new treaty in March, and the rest of the year and some of 2013 will be used to seek ratification by individual countries. Amending national constitutions to satisfy Germany will be the bitterest part of the process, but much of that can be put off until 2013, and judgment by European institutions over how the revision process was handled comes still later. Such delays allow political leaders the option of pushing back the most politically risky portions of the process for months or years.¶ Fourth, the Germans are willing to apply significant pressure. Nearly all EU states count Germany as the largest destination for their exports, and such exports are critical for local employment. In 2011, Germany used its superior economic and financial position as leverage to help ease the elected leaderships of Greece and Italy out of office, replacing them with unelected former EU bureaucrats who are now working to implement aspects of the German program. Similar pressures could be brought to bear against additional states in 2012.¶ Those most likely to clash with Germany are Ireland, Finland, the Netherlands and Spain. Ireland wants the terms of its bailout program to be softened and is threatening a national referendum that could derail the ratification process. Finland's laws require parliamentary approval by a two-thirds majority for some aspects of ratification. The normally pro-European government of the Netherlands is a weak coalition that can only rule with the support of other parties, one of which is strongly euroskeptic. Spain must attempt the most painful austerity efforts of any non-bailout state if the reform process is to have credibility -- and it must do so amid record-high unemployment and a shrinking economy. Also, if Greece decides to hold new elections in 2012, European stakeholders will attempt to ensure that the new government in Athens does not end its collaboration with the European Central Bank (ECB), European Commission and International Monetary Fund. None of these issues will force an automatic confrontation, but all will have to be managed to ensure successful ratification, and the Germans have demonstrated that they have many tools with which to compel other governments.¶ Fifth, the Europeans are scared, which makes them willing to do things they would not normally do -- such as implementing austerity and ratifying treaties they dislike. Agreeing to sacrifice sovereignty in principle to maintain the European economic system in practice will seem a reasonable trade. The real political crisis will not come until the sacrifice of sovereignty moves from the realm of theory to application, but that will not occur in 2012. In many ways, the political pliability of European governments now is all about staving off unbearable economic catastrophe for another day.¶ The economic deferment of that pain is the sixth German advantage. Here, the primary player is the ECB. The financial crisis has two aspects: Over-indebted European governments are lurching toward defaults that would collapse the European system, and European banks (the largest purchasers of European government debt) are broadly insolvent -- their collapse would similarly break apart the European system. In December, the ECB indicated that it was willing to put up 20 billion euros ($28 billion) a week for sovereign bond purchases on secondary markets to support struggling eurozone governments, while extending low-interest, long-term liquidity loans to European banks in unlimited volumes. The bond program is large enough to potentially purchase three-fourths of all expected eurozone government debt issuances for 2012, while the first day of the loan program extended 490 billion euros in fresh credit to ailing banks.¶ Together these two measures make a eurozone financial meltdown highly unlikely in 2012, but they will greatly degrade European competitiveness and efficiency. That will be a problem for another time, though. For now, ECB actions are buying economic and political breathing room: economic in that austerity efforts can be somewhat softer than they would otherwise need to be, and political in that there is a feeling that Germany is willing to compromise somewhat on the issues of budgetary discipline today in order to achieve its broader goals of budgetary control tomorrow. Therefore, while the financial support is not exactly buying good will from other European states, it is certainly buying time.

### AT: Econ Impact

#### No trade impact

Fletcher 11 Ian Fletcher is Senior Economist of the Coalition for a Prosperous America, former Research Fellow at the U.S. Business and Industry Council M.A. and B.A. from Columbia and U Chicago, "Avoid Trade War? We're Already In One!" August 29 2011 www.huffingtonpost.com/ian-fletcher/avoid-trade-war-were-alre\_b\_939967.html

The curious thing about the concept of trade war is that, unlike actual shooting war, it has no historical precedent. In fact, there has never been a significant trade war, "significant" in the sense of having done serious economic damage. All history records are minor skirmishes at best.¶ Go ahead. Try and name a trade war. The Great Trade War of 1834? Nope. The Great Trade War of 1921? Nope Again. There isn't one.¶ The standard example free traders give is that America's Smoot-Hawley tariff of 1930 either caused the Great Depression or made it spread around the world. But this canard does not survive serious examination, and has actually been denied by almost every economist who has actually researched the question in depth -- a group ranging from Paul Krugman on the left to Milton Friedman on the right.¶ The Depression's cause was monetary. The Fed allowed the money supply to balloon during the late 1920s, piling up in the stock market as a bubble. It then panicked, miscalculated, and let it collapse by a third by 1933, depriving the economy of the liquidity it needed to breathe. Trade had nothing to do with it.¶ As for the charge that Smoot caused the Depression to spread worldwide: it was too small a change to have plausibly so large an effect. For a start, it only applied to about one-third of America's trade: about 1.3 percent of our GDP. Our average tariff on dutiable goods went from 44.6 to 53.2 percent -- not a terribly big jump. Tariffs were higher in almost every year from 1821 to 1914. Our tariff went up in 1861, 1864, 1890, and 1922 without producing global depressions, and the recessions of 1873 and 1893 managed to spread worldwide without tariff increases.¶ As the economic historian (and free trader!) William Bernstein puts it in his book A Splendid Exchange: How Trade Shaped the World,¶ Between 1929 and 1932, real GDP fell 17 percent worldwide, and by 26 percent in the United States, but most economic historians now believe that only a miniscule part of that huge loss of both world GDP and the United States' GDP can be ascribed to the tariff wars. .. At the time of Smoot-Hawley's passage, trade volume accounted for only about 9 percent of world economic output. Had all international trade been eliminated, and had no domestic use for the previously exported goods been found, world GDP would have fallen by the same amount -- 9 percent. Between 1930 and 1933, worldwide trade volume fell off by one-third to one-half. Depending on how the falloff is measured, this computes to 3 to 5 percent of world GDP, and these losses were partially made up by more expensive domestic goods. Thus, the damage done could not possibly have exceeded 1 or 2 percent of world GDP -- nowhere near the 17 percent falloff seen during the Great Depression... The inescapable conclusion: contrary to public perception, Smoot-Hawley did not cause, or even significantly deepen, the Great Depression.¶ The oft-bandied idea that Smoot-Hawley started a global trade war of endless cycles of tit-for-tat retaliation is also mythical. Acc

ording to the official State Department report on this very question in 1931:¶ With the exception of discriminations in France, the extent of discrimination against American commerce is very slight...By far the largest number of countries do not discriminate against the commerce of the United States in any way.¶ That is to say, foreign nations did indeed raise their tariffs after the passage of Smoot, but this was a broad-brush response to the Depression itself, aimed at all other foreign nations without distinction, not a retaliation against the U.S. for its own tariff. The doom-loop of spiraling tit-for-tat retaliation between trading partners that paralyzes free traders with fear today simply did not happen.¶ "Notorious" Smoot-Hawley is a deliberately fabricated myth, plain and simple. We should not allow this myth to paralyze our policy-making in the present day.¶ There is a basic unresolved paradox at the bottom of the very concept of trade war. If, as free traders insist, free trade is beneficial whether or not one's trading partners reciprocate, then why would any rational nation start one, no matter how provoked? The only way to explain this is to assume that major national governments like the Chinese and the U.S. -- governments which, whatever bad things they may have done, have managed to hold nuclear weapons for decades without nuking each other over trivial spats -- are not players of realpolitik, but schoolchildren.¶ When the moneymen in Beijing, Tokyo, Berlin, and the other nations currently running trade surpluses against the U.S. start to ponder the financial realpolitik of exaggerated retaliation against the U.S. for any measures we may employ to bring our trade back into balance, they will discover the advantage is with us, not them. Because they are the ones with trade surpluses to lose, not us.¶ So our present position of weakness is, paradoxically, actually a position of strength.¶ Likewise, China can supposedly suddenly stop buying our Treasury Debt if we rock the boat. But this would immediately reduce the value of the trillion or so they already hold -- not to mention destroying, by making their hostility overt, the fragile (and desperately-tended) delusion in the U.S. that America and China are still benign economic "partners" in a win-win economic relationship.¶ At the end of the day, China cannot force us to do anything economically that we don't choose to. America is still a nuclear power. We can -- an irresponsible but not impossible scenario -- repudiate our debt to them (or stop paying the interest) as the ultimate counter-move to anything they might contemplate. More plausibly, we might simply restore the tax on the interest on foreign-held bonds that was repealed in 1984 thanks to Treasury Secretary Donald Regan.¶ Thus a certain amount of back-and-forth token retaliation (and loud squealing) is indeed likely if America starts defending its interests in trade as diligently as our trading partners have been defending theirs, but that's it. The rest of the world engages in these struggles all the time without doing much harm; it will be no different if we join the party.

### AT: Protectionism Impact

#### Trade doesn’t solve war

May 5**—**Professor Emeritus (Research) in the Stanford University School of Engineering and a senior fellow with the Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. Former co-director of Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation. Principal Investigator for the DHS. (Michael, “The U.S.-China Strategic Relationship,” September 2005, http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2005/Sep/maySep05.asp)

However important and beneficial this interdependence may be from an economic point of view, it is not likely to be a significant factor for strategic stability. Famously, economists before World War I sounded clear warnings that Europe had become economically interdependent to an extent that war there would ruin Europe. The war was fought nevertheless, Europe was duly ruined, and the ensuing political consequences haunted Europe to the end of World War II. Other cases exist. Modern war has been an economic disaster. Economic realities, including economic interdependence, play little role in whether a country goes to war or not. Economic myths certainly do and they usually affect strategic stability quite negatively. This is another reason why domestic perceptions matter: they determine which myths are believed.

### Relations

#### EU relations solve extinction

Maria João Rodrigues 11, Professor at the European Studies Institute-Université Libre de Bruxelles and at the Lisbon University Institute, Special Advisor on European Economic Policies, 2011, “Transatlantic cooperation for jobs and a new growth model,” in The Agenda for the EU-US strategic partnership, online: http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Transatlantic2011.pdf

The strategic priorities previously described in this chapter do not constitute a wrong or a risky choice because they might create a competitive handicap for the US and Europe. On the contrary, they can provide them with the long-term competitive advantage of being at the vanguard of setting an agenda of global priorities which will be emulated by other powers, if the planet is able to create a win-win game and thus avoid extreme fragmentation and collapse. We are assuming that countries are condemned to a certain level of strategic convergence if they want to secure the planet’s future.

Moreover, these strategic priorities can be seen as realistic as most of the required technological solutions are already known. The real difficulty is whether the political process is large and democratic enough to drive this kind of ‘grand transformation’. It is important to make the right choices when dealing with the various dilemmas that these priorities entail.

Recovering growth and jobs creation and reducing carbon emissions are not irreconcilable objectives: these goals can be achieved by refocusing investment, production, consumption and jobs creation on low-carbon solutions. It is also possible to recover growth and speed up the transition to a smarter economy by actively supporting innovation at all levels and in all companies as well as by providing people with the skills and training that will enable them to transition to the new jobs. Finally, it is possible to recover growth and reduce the public debt – which is now much higher after the massive expenditure entailed by the recent stimulus packages and the financial bail-outs – by actively supporting job creation, redirecting public expenditure to key investments and by reviewing the sources of taxation.

This active search for a new growth model, involving not only policymakers but also the relevant civil society stakeholders, urgently needs to be put higher on the agenda of transatlantic cooperation.