## 1AC

### Plan

#### The United States Federal Government should substantially reduce restrictions on production of crude oil by entities that wish to engage in joint crude oil production with Cuban energy-producing entities in the area of the Gulf of Mexico’s Eastern Gap included in the United States’ Outer Continental Shelf Planning Areas.

### 1AC Relations

#### Chavez’s death means now is key to solve Cuban relations---that’s key to broader Latin America relations

Tisdall 3-5 – Simon Tisdall, writer for the Guardian, March 5th, 2013, "Death of Hugo Chávez brings chance of fresh start for US and Latin America" [www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/mar/05/hugo-chavez-dead-us-latin-america/print](http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/mar/05/hugo-chavez-dead-us-latin-america/print)

Hugo **Chávez's departure furnishes Barack Obama with an** opportunity to repair US ties with Venezuela**, but also with** other Latin American states **whose relations with Washington were adversely affected by Chávez's politics of polarisation and the Bush administration's viscerally unintelligent reaction**.¶ In particular, **the change of leadership in Caracas could** unlock the deadlock over Cuba, if the White House can summon the requisite political will.¶ Possibly anticipating a transition, Washington quietly engineered a diplomatic opening with Caracas last November after a lengthy standoff during which ambassadors were withdrawn.¶ Roberta Jacobson, assistant secretary of state for western hemisphere affairs, telephoned Nicolás Maduro, Venezuela's vice-president and Chávez's preferred successor, and discussed, among other things, the restoration of full diplomatic relations.¶ "According to US officials, the Venezuelan vice-president offered to exchange ambassadors on the occasion of the beginning of President Barack Obama's second term. Jacobson, in turn, is said to have proposed a step-by-step approach to improve bilateral relations, starting with greater co-operation in counter-narcotics, counter-terrorism and energy issues," Andres Oppenheimer reported in the Miami Herald.¶ There is much ground to make up. "Relations between the United States and Venezuela have ranged from difficult to hostile since Chávez took office in 1999 and began to implement what he calls 21st-century socialism," wrote a former US ambassador to Caracas, Charles Shapiro.¶ "Chávez blamed a failed 2002 coup against him on the United States (not true), nationalised US companies, insulted the president of the United States and blamed 'the empire' – his term for the United States – for every ill … In foreign affairs, the government actively supports the Assad regime in Syria, rejects sanctions on Iran and generally opposes the US at every turn."¶ Despite such strains, economic self-interest always prevented a complete rupture. The US remained Venezuela's most important trading partner throughout Chávez's presidency, buying nearly half its oil exports. Caracas is the fourth largest supplier of oil to the US.¶ In fact, the US imports more crude oil annually from Mexico and Venezuela than from the entire Persian Gulf. This shared commerce now provides a formidable incentive and a launch platform for a fresh start.¶ Whether the opportunity is grasped depends partly on Maduro, a Chávez loyalist but a reputed pragmatist with close ties to Raúl Castro in Cuba.¶ Yet **it depends even more on Obama, whose first term, after a promising start, ended up perpetuating Washington's historical neglect of Latin America**. **He now has a chance to do better**.¶ **The political climate seems propitious.** Economic and cultural ties are also strengthening dramatically. Trade between the US and Latin America grew by 82% between 1998 and 2009. In 2011 alone, exports and imports rose by a massive 20% in both directions.¶ "We do three times more business with Latin America than with China and twice as much business with Colombia [as] with Russia," an Obama official told Julia Sweig of the US Council on Foreign Relations. Latinos now comprise 15% of the US population; the US is the world's second largest Spanish-speaking country (after Mexico).¶ Despite this convergence, high-level US strategic thinking about the region has continued to lag, Sweig argued.¶ "For the last two decades, US domestic politics have too often driven Washington's Latin America agenda – whether on issues of trade, immigration, drugs, guns or that perennial political albatross, Cuba, long driven by the supposedly crucial 'Cuban vote' in Florida," she said.¶ Obama could change this dynamic if he tried and **one way to do it would be to unpick** the Cuban problem**, which continues to** colour the way Latin Americans view Washington.¶ "Having won nearly half of the Cuban American vote in Florida in 2012, a gain of 15 percentage points over 2008, Obama can move quickly on Cuba. If he were to do so, he would find a cautious but willing partner in Raúl Castro, who needs rapprochement with Washington to advance his own reform agenda," Sweig said.

#### The plan is key to US-Cuban energy cooperation---solves overall relations, regional stability, and drug trafficking

Benjamin 10 – Jonathan Benjamin-Alvadaro, Report for the Cuban Research Institute, Florida International University, PhD, Professor of Political Science at University of Nebraska at Omaha, Director of the Intelligence Community Centers of Academic Excellence Program at UNO, Treasurer of the American Political Science Association, 2010, Brookings Institution book, “Cuba’s Energy Future: Strategic Approaches to Cooperation”

Conclusion and Recommendations

Oil exploration is an inherently risky enterprise; there are always trade-offs between negatives and positives relating to energy security, environmental integrity, and geostrategic considerations. The consensus arising from the studies and the analyses in this book is that the creation of mutually beneficial trade and investment opportunities between the United States and Cuba is long overdue. Throughout most of the twentieth century, Cuban infrastructure and economic development were direct beneficiaries of commercial relations with the United States. This relationship was instrumental in providing Cuba with access to advanced technologies and the signs of modernity that were unparalleled in Latin America and far beyond.¶ Once again, the United States is presented with an opportunity that might serve as the basis of a new relationship between the United States and Cuba. It holds out the possibility of enhancing the stability and development of a region that is wrestling with questions of how and when it too might benefit from engagement with a global economic development model. The question is whether the United States chooses to be at the center, or to leave Cuba to seek some alternate path toward its goals.¶ Ironically, Cuban officials have invited American oil companies to participate in developing their offshore oil and natural gas reserves. American oil, oil equipment, and service companies possess the capital, technology, and operational know-how to explore, produce, and refine these resources in a safe and responsible manner. Yet they remain on the sidelines because of our almost five-decades-old unilateral political and economic embargo. The United States can **end this impasse by licensing American oil companies to participate in the development of Cuba’s energy resources**. By seizing the initiative on Cuba policy, the United States will **be strategically positioned to play an important role** in the future of the island, thereby giving Cubans a better chance for a stable, prosperous, and democratic future. The creation of stable and transparent commercial relations in the energy sector will bolster state capacity in Cuba while enhancing U.S. geostrategic interests, and can help Cuba’s future leaders avoid illicit business practices, minimize the influence of narcotrafficking enterprises, and stanch the outflow of illegal immigrants to the United States.¶ If U.S. companies are allowed to contribute to the development of Cuba’s hydrocarbon reserves, as well as the development of alternative and renewable energy (solar, wind, and biofuels), it will give the United States the opportunity to **engage Cuba’s future leaders to carry out long-overdue** economic reforms and development that will perhaps pave the way to a **more open and representative society** while helping to promote Cuba as a stable partner and leader in the region and beyond.¶ Under no circumstances is this meant to suggest that the United States should come to dominate energy development policy in Cuba. The United States certainly has a role to play, but unlike its past relationship with Cuba, its interaction and cooperation will be predicated on its ability to accept, at a minimum, that Cuba will be the dominant partner in potential commercial ventures, **and an equal partner in future diplomatic and interstate relations**. Without a doubt Cuban government actors are wary of the possibility of being dominated by the “colossus of the North,” but as Cuba’s energy policymakers face the daunting reality of their nation’s energy future, it is abundantly clear that they possess the willingness and the capacity to assiduously pursue sound policy objectives and initiatives that begin to address the island’s immediate and long-term challenges. In the end, this course of action will have **direct and tangible benefits for the people of Cuba, it neighbors, and beyond.**

#### Plan shores up US-Cuban relations---that solves US influence in Latin America and prevents Chinese expansion

Benjamin-Alvadaro 6 (Jonathan, Report for the Cuban Research Institute, Florida International University, PhD, Professor of Political Science at University of Nebraska at Omaha, Director of the Intelligence Community Centers of Academic Excellence Program at UNO, Treasurer of the American Political Science Association, “The Current Status and Future Prospects for Oil Exploration in Cuba: A Special,” http://cri.fiu.edu/research/commissioned-reports/oil-cuba-alvarado.pdf)

Given that there are no formal diplomatic of economic relations between the governments of the United States and Cuba, the level of interest has grown significantly in the 3 years due primarily to three reasons in the following interest areas: energy security interests; broader regional strategic; and purely economic interests. First, the energy security interests in the potential of Cuban oil – although it really would not minimize the immediacy of an American energy crisis – is seen as possible if only partial remedy to energy supply concerns. Second, as Cuba, in part because of the increasing number of oil partnerships furthers its diplomatic and economic ties to with countries like Venezuela, China, Brazil and members of the European Union it may prove to provide Cuba for a sufficient buffer against U.S. opposition as it solidifies it economic and diplomatic role in the region. This is important inasmuch as there is a de facto trend in the Americas that clearly disavows and attempts to minimize the influence of the United States in the region, and with the growing demands on the world economy by China, it stands to reason that Cuba may assume an increasing stature that almost potentially lessens the presence of American influence in Cuban and hence regional affairs. Finally, and as demonstrated by the presence of American oil interests in the February 2006 U.S.- Cuban Energy Summit in Mexico City, there may be interest in cooperating in joint venture projects, and by extension assisting in the long-term development in Cuba’s oil industry. ¶ To accomplish this task the report seeks to lay out some national security policy considerations applying strategic thought to what I will term “Post-Oil” Cuba – a Cuba that has a small but vibrant and growing oil and gas production capacity with extensive relations with a number of partners, and an increasingly positive outlook toward addressing energy and economic development questions that have plagued the Castro regime since the Cuban Revolution.3¶ The primary consideration is to determine the present state of Cuban energy and what possibilities exist that would be available to American foreign policy decision makers and business interests as the relations with Cuba evolve over the coming years.4 This is important because any realistic appraisal of how Cuba is to take advantage of its oil bonanza involves the United States. Previous research in this area has clearly laid out the scope and objectives of Cuban energy development schemes in the period since the demise of Cuba’s favorable trade arrangements with the former Soviet Union. Recently, and as a result of the oil discovery and Cuba’s energy arrangement with the government of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela there is renewed interest in Havana’s energy policies. Most of that analysis has been focused on concrete possibilities where there can be cooperation in the energy field between these two neighbors. Specifically, the work has looked at areas for the convergence of energy interests as they apply to the near- and long-term energy development scenarios facing both countries. Myers Jaffe and Soligo have addressed this possibility by looking at the potential to increase diversification and dispersion of energy resources. This is an important consideration when one takes into consideration that well over one-third of all oil refining capacity resides on or near the Houston shipping channel. The potential negative impact on America’s refining capacity following Hurricane Rita5 made a significant impression on oil industry analysts for the necessity of diversifying the location of these vital national resources. The potential of viewing Cuba as a “staging area” for American oil storage and refining is plausible because of the proximity of the island. The also becomes more attractive because of the growing climatic concerns over the uncertain security of oil resources in the Gulf region as clearly demonstrated by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005. While it is true that Venezuela has initiated an investment of $1 billion dollars to bring the Cienfuegos refinery online, there are still many other possibilities open and available to American companies, as well as a growing number of foreign firms.6 Additionally, Venezuela remains the fourth largest importer of oil to the United States and one can surmise that the existing trade arrangements between the U.S. and Venezuela will remain intact, the evolution of the Bolivarian revolution under Chavez and a growing Chinese presence in the region notwithstanding. Additionally, pursuing such a path would allow United States policymakers to take advantage of what Cuba has to offer in the following areas: domestic technical capabilities; continuing human capital development; strategic positioning in the Caribbean, and an improved diplomatic stature. Cuba, by any measure, possesses a largely untapped technical capacity owing to advanced training and education in the core mathematic and scientific areas. This was clearly demonstrated by its attempt to develop a nuclear energy capability in the 1980s and 1990s whereby thousands of Cubans pursued highly technical career paths leaving Cuba with among the highest ratios of scientists and engineers to the general population in all of the Americas. Moreover, the foundation of Cuba’s vaunted public education system remains intact and increased investment under various scenarios suggests that Cuba will continue to produce a welleducated workforce that will be critical to its future economic vitality. This raises an important consideration that being the role that Cuba will play in the region in the 21st century. It suffices to say that Cuba remains the strategically important state by virtue of its geographical location alone, in efforts against drug and human trafficking and related national and regional security matters. The extent to which a stable Cuban government has cooperated with the U.S. in drug interdiction efforts in the past suggests that the results from improved diplomatic relations between neighbors would have the effect of improving national security concerns related to terrorist activity, illicit weapons transfers and the like. Ultimately, a successful normalization of relations between the U.S. and Cuba in these areas may well enhance and stabilize regional relations that could possibly lessen (or at a minimum, balancing) fears of a Chinese incursion in hemispheric affairs. To lessen those fears it may be useful to review the present structure of joint-venture projects in the energy sector in Cuba to ascertain the feasibility and possible success of such an undertaking become available to American firms. Moreover, it is interesting to note that U.S. firms in the agriculture sector have successfully negotiated and consummated sales to Cuba totaling more than $1 billion dollars over the past four years under conditions that are less than optimal circumstances but have well-served the commercial interests of all parties involved.

#### China’s expanding into Latin America---US influence is key to crowd them out

Dowd 12 (Alan, Senior Fellow with the American Security Council Foundation, “Crisis in the America's,” http://www.ascfusa.org/content\_pages/view/crisisinamericas)

Focused on military operations in the Middle East, nuclear threats in Iran and North Korea, and the global threat of terrorism, U.S. policymakers have neglected a growing challenge right here in the Western Hemisphere: the expanding influence and reach of China.¶ Eyeing energy resources to keep its economy humming, China is engaged in a flurry of investing and spending in Latin America.¶ In Costa Rica, China is funding a $1.24-billion upgrade of the country’s oil refinery; bankrolling an $83-million soccer stadium; backing infrastructure and telecommunications improvements; and pouring millions into a new police academy.¶ In Colombia, China is planning a massive “dry canal” to link the country’s Pacific and Atlantic coasts by rail. At either terminus, there will be Chinese ports; in between, there will be Chinese assembly facilities, logistics operations and distribution plants; and on the Pacific side, there will be dedicated berths to ship Colombian coal outbound to China.¶ In mid-January, a Chinese-built oil rig arrived in Cuba to begin drilling in Cuba’s swath of the Gulf of Mexico. Reuters reports that Spanish, Russian, Malaysian and Norwegian firms will use the rig to extract Cuban oil. For now, China is focusing on onshore oil extraction in Cuba.¶ New offshore discoveries will soon catapult Brazil into a top-five global oil producer. With some 38 billion barrels of recoverable oil off its coast, Brazil expects to pump 4.9 million barrels per day by 2020, as the Washington Times reports, and China has used generous loans to position itself as the prime beneficiary of Brazilian oil. China’s state-run oil and banking giants have inked technology-transfer, chemical, energy and real-estate deals with Brazil. Plus, as the Times details, China came to the rescue of Brazil’s main oil company when it sought financing for its massive drilling plans, pouring $10 billion into the project. A study in Joint Force Quarterly (JFQ) adds that Beijing plunked down $3.1 billion for a slice of Brazil’s vast offshore oil fields.¶ The JFQ study reveals just how deep and wide Beijing is spreading its financial influence in Latin America: $28 billion in loans to Venezuela; a $16.3-billion commitment to develop Venezuelan oil reserves; $1 billion for Ecuadoran oil; $4.4 billion to develop Peruvian mines; $10 billion to help Argentina modernize its rail system; $3.1 billion to purchase Argentina’s petroleum company outright. The New York Times adds that Beijing has lent Ecuador $1 billion to build a hydroelectric plant.¶ There is good and bad to Beijing’s increased interest and investment in the Western Hemisphere. Investment fuels development, and much of Latin America is happily accelerating development in the economic, trade, technology and infrastructure spheres. But China’s riches come with strings.¶ For instance, in exchange for Chinese development funds and loans, Venezuela agreed to increase oil shipments to China from 380,000 barrels per day to one million barrels per day. It’s worth noting that the Congressional Research Service has reported concerns in Washington that Hugo Chavez might try to supplant his U.S. market with China. Given that Venezuela pumps an average of 1.5 million barrels of oil per day for the U.S.—or about 11 percent of net oil imports—the results would be devastating for the U.S.¶ That brings us to the security dimension of China’s checkbook diplomacy in the Western Hemisphere.¶ Officials with the U.S. Southern Command conceded as early as 2006 that Beijing had “approached every country in our area of responsibility” and provided military exchanges, aid or training to Ecuador, Jamaica, Bolivia, Cuba, Chile and Venezuela.¶ The JFQ study adds that China has “an important and growing presence in the region’s military institutions.” Most Latin American nations, including Mexico, “send officers to professional military education courses in the PRC.” In Ecuador, Venezuela and Bolivia, Beijing has begun to sell “sophisticated hardware…such as radars and K-8 and MA-60 aircraft.” The JFQ report concludes, ominously, that Chinese defense firms “are likely to leverage their experience and a growing track record for their goods to expand their market share in the region, with the secondary consequence being that those purchasers will become more reliant on the associated Chinese logistics, maintenance, and training infrastructures that support those products.”¶ Put it all together, and the southern flank of the United States is exposed to a range of new security challenges.¶ To be sure, much of this is a function of China’s desire to secure oil markets. But there’s more at work here than China’s thirst for oil. Like a global chess match, China is probing Latin America and sending a message that just as Washington has trade and military ties in China’s neighborhood, China is developing trade and military ties in America’s neighborhood.¶ This is a direct challenge to U.S. primacy in the region—a challenge that must be answered.¶ First, Washington needs to relearn an obvious truth—that China’s rulers do not share America’s values—and needs to shape and conduct its China policy in that context.¶ Beijing has no respect for human rights. Recall that in China, an estimated 3-5 million people are rotting away in laogai slave-labor camps, many of them “guilty” of political dissent or religious activity; democracy activists are rounded up and imprisoned; freedom of speech and religion and assembly do not exist; and internal security forces are given shoot-to-kill orders in dealing with unarmed citizens. Indeed, Beijing viewed the Arab Spring uprisings not as an impetus for political reform, but as reason “to launch its harshest crackdown on dissent in at least a decade,” according to Director of National Intelligence James Clapper.¶ In short, the ends always justify the means in Beijing. And that makes all the difference when it comes to foreign and defense policy. As Reagan counseled during the Cold War, “There is no true international security without respect for human rights.”¶ Second, the U.S. must stop taking the Western Hemisphere for granted, and instead must reengage in its own neighborhood economically, politically and militarily.¶ That means no more allowing trade deals—and the partners counting on them—to languish. Plans for a hemispheric free trade zone have faltered and foundered. The trade-expansion agreements with Panama and Colombia were left in limbo for years, before President Obama finally signed them into law in 2011.¶ Reengagement means reviving U.S. diplomacy. The Wall Street Journal reports that due to political wrangling in Washington, the State Department position focused on the Western Hemisphere has been staffed by an interim for nearly a year, while six Western Hemisphere ambassadorial posts (Uruguay, Venezuela, Ecuador, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Barbados) remain empty.¶ Reengagement means reversing plans to slash defense spending. The Joint Forces Command noted in 2008 that China has “a deep respect for U.S. military power.” We cannot overstate how important this has been to keeping the peace. But with the United States in the midst of massive military retrenchment, one wonders how long that reservoir of respect will last.¶ Reengagement also means revitalizing security ties. A good model to follow might be what’s happening in China’s backyard. To deter China and prevent an accidental war, the U.S. is reviving its security partnerships all across the Asia-Pacific region. Perhaps it’s time to do the same in Latin America. We should remember that many Latin American countries—from Mexico and Panama to Colombia and Chile—border the Pacific. Given Beijing’s actions, it makes sense to bring these Latin American partners on the Pacific Rim into the alliance of alliances that is already stabilizing the Asia-Pacific region.¶ Finally, all of this needs to be part of a revived Monroe Doctrine.¶ Focusing on Chinese encroachment in the Americas, this “Monroe Doctrine 2.0” would make it clear to Beijing that the United States welcomes China’s efforts to conduct trade in the Americas but discourages any claims of control—implied or explicit—by China over territories, properties or facilities in the Americas. In addition, Washington should make it clear to Beijing that the American people would look unfavorably upon the sale of Chinese arms or the basing of Chinese advisors or military assets in the Western Hemisphere.¶ In short, what it was true in the 19th and 20th centuries must remain true in the 21st: There is room for only one great power in the Western Hemisphere.

#### Chinese influence in Latin America causes Taiwan war

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Taiwan – domestic, or foreign policy?¶ China’s goals in the region amount to more than the capture of natural resources. Although the People’s Republic of China considers resolution of the Taiwan issue to be a domestic issue, it is with some irony that one of China’s main foreign policy goals is to isolate Taipei internationally. The PRC and the ROC compete directly for international recognition among all the states in the world. . Nowhere is this more evident than in Latin America, where 12 of the 23 nations that still have official diplomatic relations with the ROC reside.¶ The historical background¶ Following the mainland Communist victory in the Chinese Civil War in 1949, the nationalist Kuomintang retreated to the island of Formosa (Taiwan) where it continued to claim to be the legitimate government of all of China. In June 1950 the United States intervened by placing its 7th fleet in the Taiwan straits to stop a conclusive military resolution to the civil war and slowly the battlefield became primarily political, concerned with legitimacy.¶ When the United Nations was formed in 1945, the Republic of China (ROC) became one of the five permanent members of the Security Council. This gave the ROC a de facto advantage over the PRC in attaining recognition from other nation states; particularly as the diplomatic clout of the hegemonic United States supported its position as the true representative of the Chinese people, until the rapprochement of the 1970s, when the Nixon administration wished to improve ties with the de facto rulers of China in order to exploit the Sino-Soviet split. UN Resolution 2758 granted the ’China seat’ to the PRC at the expense of the ROC who were in effect exiled from the organization, and the famous 1972 visit of President Nixon to China further added legitimacy to the communist regime. All this resulted in a thawing of world opinion, and gradually as the durability and permanence of the PRC regime became ingrained, countries began switching their diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing.¶ The economics of international recognition¶ In the Americas, the PRC had international recognition and longstanding support from ideological allies such as Cuba. However, the ROC has maintained more diplomatic support in the Americas than any other region, mainly due to the small nature of the states involved and the importance of Taiwanese aid to their economies. Li notes that “from the late 1980s to the early 1990s, roughly 10 percent of Taiwan’s direct foreign investment (FDI) went to Latin America and the Caribbean,” [51] highlighting the concerted effort made in the region. Economic solidarity is increasingly important to the formation of the Taiwan-Latin America relationship, for two reasons. The first is that for Latin American states, the decision of which China to support is less ideological and political than it ever has been; which makes the decision a straight up economic zero-sum choice. The second is that Latin America is home to natural resources which are of great significance to the hungry growing economies of the PRC and the ROC regardless of international recognition.¶ However, while the decision is not political for Latin American countries, for Taiwan, every country which switches its recognition to the PRC damages its legitimacy as a nation state in the international arena. The Table below shows the designation of diplomatic recognition in the region in 2008.¶ Countries Recognising the PRC (China)Countries Recognising the ROC (Taiwan)Central AmericaMexico, Costa RicaEl Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, PanamaCaribbeanAntigua & Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Cuba, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Suriname, Trinidad & TobagoBelize, Dominican Republic, Haiti, St Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent & the GrenadinesSouth AmericaArgentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay, VenezuelaParaguay¶ On the other hand, for the PRC, every state which withdraws its support for the ROC takes it one step closer to being in a position where it can resolve the ‘Taiwan issue’ unilaterally. Subsequently, undermining Taiwan is of the utmost importance to China, and it has taken to ‘outbidding’ Taiwan in offers of foreign aid, a strategy made possible by the decline in aid from the defunct Soviet Union, and the West, which is pre occupied with terrorism and the Middle East. Li notes that “the region’s leaders have turned to Asia for help to promote trade and financial assistance, and consequently played the PRC and Taiwan against each other.” [53] Despite its smaller size, Taiwan has fared remarkably well in this bidding war; focusing its aid investments on infrastructure such as stadiums in St Kitts & Nevis for the Cricket World Cup in 2007.¶ However, even Taiwan‘s economy can be put under strain by the seemingly relentless stream of foreign aid which has brought only debateable and mild gains to the Taiwanese cause. This has contributed to the PRC picking off the few remaining supporters of the ROC – take for example, the Dominican case.¶ In early 2004, Commonwealth of Dominica asked Taipei for a $58 million aid, which is unrelated to public welfare. The Caribbean nation had relied on Taiwan to develop its agriculture-based economy since 1983. Diplomatic relationship was soon broken after Taipei turned down the request. [54]¶ This incident showcased the fact that in economic terms, the PRC is winning the battle for Latin America.¶ Political strategies of the PRC¶ In political terms too; the PRC is in an advantageous position, thanks in part again to its position within the UN. While it can be argued that China “provides incentives but does not threaten harm to induce countries to defect from recognizing Taiwan,” [55] the reality is that the use of force and direct harm are not the only means available to an economic entity as powerful as China. It refuses to maintain official relations with any state that recognises the ROC; an action which can be quite prohibitive to the country being able to take advantage of the growing Chinese market. Although Domínguez suggests that the PRC “has not been punitive toward those states that still recognize the Republic of China (Taiwan),” [56] the legitimacy of this claim has to be brought into question – for example “in June 1996, China fought the extension of the UN mission in Haiti, to punish the Caribbean nation for its appeal for UN acceptance of Taiwan.” [57] This incident showed that China is prepared to use its global clout to play spoiler and apply indirect pressure on countries to adopt its position. Similarly, China’s experience with one-party rule has taught it the importance of party-to-party relations in addition to state-to-state relations, further cementing the PRC by establishing a relationship based on goodwill and common understanding. Indeed by the start of 1998 “the CCP had established relations with almost all major political parties in the countries that were Taiwan’s diplomatic allies in Latin America,” [58] further isolating the ROC.¶ The effect on American interests¶ Were the ROC to be deserted by its remaining allies in Latin America, the USA would be disadvantaged in attempting to maintain the status quo across the Taiwan Strait. A Taiwan that was not recognised by any state from the Americas, or Europe (with the exception of the Vatican) would not be seen as a genuine sovereign entity whose defence would be more important than the upkeep of good relations between China and the West. As China’s economic and political position in the world improves vis-à-vis both America and Taiwan, so might its ambitions. The U.S.A might find itself in a position where it could no longer withstand the diplomatic pressure to allow the PRC to conclude a settlement on Taiwan, perhaps by force.

#### Taiwan crisis is likely this year---draws in the U.S.

Michael Mazza 1-3, research fellow in foreign and defense policy at the American Enterprise Institute, 1/3/13, “Four Surprises That Could Rock Asia in 2013,” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/01/03/four\_surprises\_that\_could\_rock\_asia\_in\_2012?page=full

Since President Ma Ying-jeou came to power in 2008, Taipei and Beijing have improved ties and deepened their economic integration: cross-strait trade reached $127.6 billion in 2011, an increase of more than 13 percent from 2010. Some national security experts misinterpret this trend, thinking that growing economic interdependence will overwhelm factors pushing the two sides apart, and that interdependence will provide Beijing with leverage it can use to compel unification. But while Taiwan's businesspeople enjoy closer ties with China, the average Taiwanese voter continues to move toward independence. Over the last 20 years, the portion of citizens of Taiwan identifying as "Taiwanese" has increased from 17.6 percent of those polled in 1992 to a whopping 53.7 percent today; those identifying as "Chinese" has declined over the same period from 25.5 percent to just 3.1 percent today. Support for independence has nearly doubled over the last two decades, from 11.1 percent to 19.6 percent. Support for immediate or eventual unification, meanwhile, has more than halved, from 20 percent in 1992 to 9.8 percent in 2012.¶ Economic integration is apparently failing to halt what Beijing sees as a troubling trend. With a cross-strait trade agreement and a slew of other, easier deals already on the books, Beijing now expects Ma to discuss political issues. But Ma doesn't have the domestic political support to pursue political talks -- in March 2012, two months after his reelection, 45 percent of those polled said the pace of cross-strait exchanges was "just right," but the share of respondents answering "too fast" had increased to 32.6 percent, from 25.7 percent before the election. Any Chinese shift toward a more strident Taiwan policy could portend a new crisis in the Taiwan Strait sooner than many expect, as a lack of progress on these issues may buttress hawks in the new Xi Jinping administration. And America would surely be dragged in: Even low-level coercive measures against Taiwan -- a top 10 U.S. trading partner and security ally -- could throw U.S.-China relations into a tailspin.

#### Taiwan escalates and goes nuclear---no defense

William Lowther 3-16, Taipei Times, citing a report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 3/16/13, “Taiwan could spark nuclear war: report,” <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2013/03/16/2003557211>

Taiwan is the most likely potential crisis that could trigger a nuclear war between China and the US, a new academic report concludes.¶ “Taiwan remains the single most plausible and dangerous source of tension and conflict between the US and China,” says the 42-page report by the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).¶ Prepared by the CSIS’ Project on Nuclear Issues and resulting from a year-long study, the report emphasizes that Beijing continues to be set on a policy to prevent Taiwan’s independence, while at the same time the US maintains the capability to come to Taiwan’s defense.¶ “Although tensions across the Taiwan Strait have subsided since both Taipei and Beijing embraced a policy of engagement in 2008, the situation remains combustible, complicated by rapidly diverging cross-strait military capabilities and persistent political disagreements,” the report says.¶ In a footnote, it quotes senior fellow at the US Council on Foreign Relations Richard Betts describing Taiwan as “the main potential flashpoint for the US in East Asia.”¶ The report also quotes Betts as saying that neither Beijing nor Washington can fully control developments that might ignite a Taiwan crisis.¶ “This is a classic recipe for surprise, miscalculation and uncontrolled escalation,” Betts wrote in a separate study of his own.¶ The CSIS study says: “For the foreseeable future Taiwan is the contingency in which nuclear weapons would most likely become a major factor, because the fate of the island is intertwined both with the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party and the reliability of US defense commitments in the Asia-Pacific region.”¶ Titled Nuclear Weapons and US-China Relations, the study says disputes in the East and South China seas appear unlikely to lead to major conflict between China and the US, but they do “provide kindling” for potential conflict between the two nations because the disputes implicate a number of important regional interests, including the interests of treaty allies of the US.¶ The danger posed by flashpoints such as Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula and maritime demarcation disputes is magnified by the potential for mistakes, the study says.¶ “Although Beijing and Washington have agreed to a range of crisis management mechanisms, such as the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement and the establishment of a direct hotline between the Pentagon and the Ministry of Defense, the bases for miscommunication and misunderstanding remain and draw on deep historical reservoirs of suspicion,” the report says.¶ For example, it says, it is unclear whether either side understands what kinds of actions would result in a military or even nuclear response by the other party.¶ To make things worse, “neither side seems to believe the other’s declared policies and intentions, suggesting that escalation management, already a very uncertain endeavor, could be especially difficult in any conflict,” it says.¶ Although conflict “mercifully” seems unlikely at this point, the report concludes that “it cannot be ruled out and may become increasingly likely if we are unwise or unlucky.”¶ The report says: “With both sides possessing and looking set to retain formidable nuclear weapons arsenals, such a conflict would be tremendously dangerous and quite possibly devastating.”

#### Cuba engagement is key to Obama’s credibility---reverses the perceived decline of US influence---solves multilateralism

Dickerson 10 – Lieutenant Colonel Sergio M. Dickerson, 2010, "United States Security Strategy Towards Cuba," Strategy Research Project, [www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA518053](http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA518053)

**Conclusion**¶ Today, 20 years have passed since the fall of the Berlin Wall – it’s time to chip away at the diplomatic wall that still remains between U.S. and Cuba. As we seek a new foreign policy with Cuba it is imperative that we take into consideration that distrust will characterize negotiations with the Cuban government. On the other hand, consider that loosening or lifting the embargo could also be mutually beneficial. Cuba’s need and America’s surplus capability to provide goods and services could be profitable and eventually addictive to Cuba. Under these conditions, diplomacy has a better chance to flourish.¶ If the Cuban model succeeds **President** Obama will be seen as a true leader for multilateralism**.** **Success in Cuba could afford the international momentum and** credibility to solve other seemingly “wicked problems” like the Middle East and Kashmir. President Obama could leverage this international reputation with other rogue nations like Iran and North Korea **who might associate their plight with Cuba. 35 The U.S. could begin to lead again and** reverse its perceived decline **in the greater global order bringing true peace for years to come.**

#### Obama weakness causes global conflict

Coes 11 – Ben Coes 11, a former speechwriter in the George H.W. Bush administration, managed Mitt Romney’s successful campaign for Massachusetts Governor in 2002 & author, “The disease of a weak president”, The Daily Caller, http://dailycaller.com/2011/09/30/the-disease-of-a-weak-president/

The disease of a weak president usually begins with the Achilles’ heel all politicians are born with — the desire to be popular. It leads to pandering to different audiences, people and countries and creates a sloppy, incoherent set of policies. Ironically, it ultimately results in that very politician losing the trust and respect of friends and foes alike.¶ In the case of Israel, those of us who are strong supporters can at least take comfort in the knowledge that Tel Aviv will do whatever is necessary to protect itself from potential threats from its unfriendly neighbors. While it would be preferable for the Israelis to be able to count on the United States, in both word and deed, the fact is right now they stand alone. Obama and his foreign policy team have undercut the Israelis in a multitude of ways. Despite this, I wouldn’t bet against the soldiers of Shin Bet, Shayetet 13 and the Israeli Defense Forces.¶ But Obama’s weakness could — in other places — have implications far, far worse than anything that might ultimately occur in Israel. The triangular plot of land that connects Pakistan, India and China is held together with much more fragility and is built upon a truly foreboding foundation of religious hatreds, radicalism, resource envy and nuclear weapons.¶ If you can only worry about preventing one foreign policy disaster, worry about this one. Here are a few unsettling facts to think about:¶ First, Pakistan and India have fought three wars since the British de-colonized and left the region in 1947. All three wars occurred before the two countries had nuclear weapons. Both countries now possess hundreds of nuclear weapons, enough to wipe each other off the map many times over.¶ Second, Pakistan is 97% Muslim. It is a question of when — not if — Pakistan elects a radical Islamist in the mold of Ayatollah Khomeini as its president. Make no mistake, it will happen, and when it does the world will have a far greater concern than Ali Khamenei or Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and a single nuclear device.¶ Third, China sits at the northern border of both India and Pakistan. China is strategically aligned with Pakistan. Most concerning, China covets India’s natural resources. Over the years, it has slowly inched its way into the northern tier of India-controlled Kashmir Territory, appropriating land and resources and drawing little notice from the outside world.¶ In my book, Coup D’Etat, I consider this tinderbox of colliding forces in Pakistan, India and China as a thriller writer. But thriller writers have the luxury of solving problems by imagining solutions on the page. In my book, when Pakistan elects a radical Islamist who then starts a war with India and introduces nuclear weapons to the theater, America steps in and removes the Pakistani leader through a coup d’état.¶ I wish it was that simple.¶ The more complicated and difficult truth is that we, as Americans, must take sides. We must be willing to be unpopular in certain places. Most important, we must be ready and willing to threaten our military might on behalf of our allies. And our allies are Israel and India.¶ There are many threats out there — Islamic radicalism, Chinese technology espionage, global debt and half a dozen other things that smarter people than me are no doubt worrying about. But the single greatest threat to America is none of these. The single greatest threat facing America and our allies is a weak U.S. president. It doesn’t have to be this way. President Obama could — if he chose — develop a backbone and lead. Alternatively, America could elect a new president. It has to be one or the other. The status quo is simply not an option.

#### Engagement is inevitable, it’s a question of effectiveness---Obama’s credibility solves South China Seas conflict and Russia resurgence

Ghitis 13 (Frida, world affairs columnist for The Miami Herald and World Politics Review. A former CNN producer and correspondent, she is the author of *The End of Revolution: A Changing World in the Age of Live Television*. “World to Obama: You can't ignore us,” 1/22, http://www.cnn.com/2013/01/22/opinion/ghitis-obama-world)

President Obama made it very clear: The second term is all about the domestic agenda. If only the world would cooperate.¶ Obama outlined his goals for the next four years, sketching above all [a progressive vision](http://www.chieftain.com/president-obama-opens-second-term-with-emphasis-on-equality/article_1a670fe0-63f6-11e2-a22a-001a4bcf887a.html) of a country with less inequality and more justice. And, judging by his inaugural speech, he plans to put his shoulder to the wheel. After all, much of the first term was consumed with averting a national economic catastrophe. Now he can get on with building a legacy, reviving that hope and change he promised back during the 2008 campaign.¶ But the most subtly striking part of [Obama's inauguration speech](http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2013/01/21/obama-it-is-now-our-generations-task-to-carry-on-what-pioneers-began/?hpt=hp_t1) was how it largely ignored the rest of the globe. In his 20-minute address, he dedicated perhaps one minute to foreign policy.¶ America, he said, will "try and resolve our differences with other nations peacefully." He vowed the country "will remain the anchor of strong alliances" and it will support democracy. He also declared the United States "must be a source of hope for the poor, the sick, the marginalized, the victims of prejudice..." and stand for "human dignity and justice."¶ Beyond that, he did not spare a single word for tens of thousands killed by dictators, as they have been in Syria; nothing about the struggle for liberal democratic rights in places like Egypt, which sets the tone for the Middle East. Nothing about repression and thwarting of freedom of expression, the rollback of democratic rights, or the push to destroy existing democracies, statements that could have come as welcome words of encouragement for people who share American values of freedom and justice in places like Egypt, China, Iran, Russia or Mali.¶ The president should keep in mind that millions around the world yearn to know they have the backing of the most powerful country on Earth. As he surely knows, even his words make a big difference.¶ And while Obama plans to dedicate his efforts to the domestic agenda, a number of brewing international crises are sure to steal his attention and demand his time. Here are a few of the foreign policy issues that, like it or not, may force Obama to divert his focus from domestic concerns in this new term.¶ Syria unraveling: The United Nations says more than 60,000 people have already died in [a civil war t](http://www.cnn.com/2013/01/02/world/meast/syria-civil-war/index.html)hat the West has, to its shame, done little to keep from spinning out of control. Washington[has warned](http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/04/world/middleeast/nato-prepares-missile-defenses-for-turkey.html?_r=0) that the use of chemical or biological weapons might force its hand. But the regime [may have already used them](http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/19/us-syria-chemical-newspaper-idUSBRE90I0JV20130119). The West has failed to nurture a moderate force in the conflict. Now Islamist extremists are growing [more powerful](http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/01/fighter-syria-aleppo-turkey.html) within the opposition. The chances are growing that worst-case scenarios will materialize. Washington will not be able to endlessly ignore this dangerous war.¶ Egypt and the challenge of democracy: What happens in Egypt strongly influences the rest of the Middle East -- and hence world peace -- which makes it all the more troubling to see liberal democratic forces lose battle after battle for political influence against Islamist parties, and to hear blatantly [anti-Semitic speech](http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/15/world/middleeast/egypts-leader-morsi-made-anti-jewish-slurs.html) coming from the mouth of Mohammed Morsy barely two years before he became president.¶ Iran's nuclear program: Obama took office promising a new, more conciliatory effort to persuade Iran to drop its nuclear enrichment program. Four years later, he has succeeded in implementing international sanctions, but Iran has continued enriching uranium, leading [United Nations inspectors](http://news.yahoo.com/un-credible-evidence-iran-working-nuke-weapons-153544271.html) to find "credible evidence" that Tehran is working on nuclear weapons. Sooner or later the moment of truth will arrive. If a deal is not reached, Obama will have to decide if he wants to be the president on whose watch a nuclear weapons race was unleashed in the most dangerous and unstable part of the world.¶ North Africa terrorism: A much-neglected region of the world is becoming increasingly difficult to disregard. In recent days, [Islamist extremists](http://edition.cnn.com/2013/01/18/opinion/ghitis-algeria-hostage-crisis/index.html?hpt=op_t1) took American and other hostages in Algeria and France sent its military to fight advancing Islamist extremists in Mali, a country that once represented optimism for democratic rule in Africa, now overtaken by militants who are potentially turning it into a staging ground for international terrorism.¶ Russia repression: As Russian President Vladimir Putin succeeds in [crushing opposition](http://www.france24.com/en/20121027-russian-opposition-leaders-detained-protest-navalny-udaltsov-vladimir-putin) to his [increasingly authoritarian](http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2013/russia)rule, he and his allies are making anti-American words and policies their favorite theme. A recent ban on adoption of Russian orphans by American parents is only the most vile example. But Washington needs Russian cooperation to achieve its goals at the U.N. regarding Iran, Syria and other matters. It is a complicated problem with which Obama will have to wrestle.¶ Then there are the long-standing challenges that could take a turn for the worse, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Obama may not want to wade into that morass again, but events may force his hand.¶ And there are the so-called "black swans," events of low probability and high impact. [There is talk](http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21569757-armed-clashes-over-trivial-specks-east-china-sea-loom-closer-drums-war) that China and Japan could go to war over a cluster of disputed islands.¶ A war between two of the world's largest economies could prove devastating to the global economy, just as a sudden and dramatic reversal in the fragile Eurozone economy could spell disaster. Japan's is only the hottest of many territorial disputes between China and its Asian neighbors. Then there's North Korea with its nuclear weapons.¶ We could see regions that have garnered little attention come back to the forefront, such as Latin America, where conflict could arise in a post-Hugo Chavez Venezuela.¶ The president -- and the country -- could also benefit from unexpectedly positive outcomes. Imagine a happy turn of events in Iran, a breakthrough between Israelis and Palestinians, the return of prosperity in Europe, a successful push by liberal democratic forces in the Arab uprising countries, which could create new opportunities, lowering risks around the world, easing trade, restoring confidence and improving the chances for the very agenda Obama described in his inaugural speech.¶ The aspirations he expressed for America are the ones he should express for our tumultuous planet. Perhaps in his next big speech, the State of the Union, he can remember America's leadership position and devote more attention to those around the world who see it as a source of inspiration and encouragement.¶ After all, in this second term Obama will not be able to devote as small a portion of his attention to foreign policy as he did during his inaugural speech.¶ International disengagement is not an option. As others before Obama have discovered, history has a habit of toying with the best laid, most well-intentioned plans of American presidents.

#### South China Sea conflict causes nuclear war

Wittner 11 (Lawrence S. Wittner, Emeritus Professor of History at the State University of New York/Albany, Wittner is the author of eight books, the editor or co-editor of another four, and the author of over 250 published articles and book reviews. From 1984 to 1987, he edited Peace & Change, a journal of peace research., 11/28/2011, "Is a Nuclear War With China Possible?", www.huntingtonnews.net/14446)

While nuclear weapons exist, there remains a danger that they will be used. After all, for centuries national conflicts have led to wars, with nations employing their deadliest weapons. The current deterioration of U.S. relations with China might end up providing us with yet another example of this phenomenon. The gathering tension between the United States and China is clear enough. Disturbed by China’s growing economic and military strength, the U.S. government recently challenged China’s claims in the South China Sea, increased the U.S. military presence in Australia, and deepened U.S. military ties with other nations in the Pacific region. According to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the United States was “asserting our own position as a Pacific power.” But need this lead to nuclear war? Not necessarily. And yet, there are signs that it could. After all, both the United States and China possess large numbers of nuclear weapons. The U.S. government threatened to attack China with nuclear weapons during the Korean War and, later, during the conflict over the future of China’s offshore islands, Quemoy and Matsu. In the midst of the latter confrontation, President Dwight Eisenhower declared publicly, and chillingly, that U.S. nuclear weapons would “be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else.” Of course, China didn’t have nuclear weapons then. Now that it does, perhaps the behavior of national leaders will be more temperate. But the loose nuclear threats of U.S. and Soviet government officials during the Cold War, when both nations had vast nuclear arsenals, should convince us that, even as the military ante is raised, nuclear saber-rattling persists. Some pundits argue that nuclear weapons prevent wars between nuclear-armed nations; and, admittedly, there haven’t been very many—at least not yet. But the Kargil War of 1999, between nuclear-armed India and nuclear-armed Pakistan, should convince us that such wars can occur. Indeed, in that case, the conflict almost slipped into a nuclear war. Pakistan’s foreign secretary threatened that, if the war escalated, his country felt free to use “any weapon” in its arsenal. During the conflict, Pakistan did move nuclear weapons toward its border, while India, it is claimed, readied its own nuclear missiles for an attack on Pakistan. At the least, though, don’t nuclear weapons deter a nuclear attack? Do they? Obviously, NATO leaders didn’t feel deterred, for, throughout the Cold War, NATO’s strategy was to respond to a Soviet conventional military attack on Western Europe by launching a Western nuclear attack on the nuclear-armed Soviet Union. Furthermore, if U.S. government officials really believed that nuclear deterrence worked, they would not have resorted to championing “Star Wars” and its modern variant, national missile defense. Why are these vastly expensive—and probably unworkable—military defense systems needed if other nuclear powers are deterred from attacking by U.S. nuclear might? Of course, the bottom line for those Americans convinced that nuclear weapons safeguard them from a Chinese nuclear attack might be that the U.S. nuclear arsenal is far greater than its Chinese counterpart. Today, it is estimated that the U.S. government possesses over five thousand nuclear warheads, while the Chinese government has a total inventory of roughly three hundred. Moreover, only about forty of these Chinese nuclear weapons can reach the United States. Surely the United States would “win” any nuclear war with China. But what would that “victory” entail? A nuclear attack by China would immediately slaughter at least 10 million Americans in a great storm of blast and fire, while leaving many more dying horribly of sickness and radiation poisoning. The Chinese death toll in a nuclear war would be far higher. Both nations would be reduced to smoldering, radioactive wastelands. Also, radioactive debris sent aloft by the nuclear explosions would blot out the sun and bring on a “nuclear winter” around the globe—destroying agriculture, creating worldwide famine, and generating chaos and destruction.

#### Russia resurgence causes nuclear war

Blank 9 (Dr. Stephen, Research Professor of National Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, March, “Russia And Arms Control: Are There Opportunities For The Obama Administration?,” http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub908.pdf)

Proliferators or nuclear states like China and Russia can then deter regional or intercontinental attacks either by denial or by threat of retaliation.168 Given a multipolar world structure with little ideological rivalry among major powers, it is unlikely that they will go to war with each other. Rather, like Russia, they will strive for exclusive hegemony in their own “sphere of influence” and use nuclear instruments towards that end. However, wars may well break out between major powers and weaker “peripheral” states or between peripheral and semiperipheral states given their lack of domestic legitimacy, the absence of the means of crisis prevention, the visible absence of crisis management mechanisms, and their strategic calculation that asymmetric wars might give them the victory or respite they need.169 Simultaneously,¶ The states of periphery and semiperiphery have far more opportunities for political maneuvering. Since war remains a political option, these states may find it convenient to exercise their military power as a means for achieving political objectives. Thus international crises may increase in number. This has two important implications for the use of WMD. First, they may be used deliberately to offer a decisive victory (or in Russia’s case, to achieve “intra-war escalation control”—author170) to the striker, or for defensive purposes when imbalances in military capabilities are significant; and second, crises increase the possibilities of inadvertent or accidental wars involving WMD.171¶ Obviously nuclear proliferators or states that are expanding their nuclear arsenals like Russia can exercise a great influence upon world politics if they chose to defy the prevailing consensus and use their weapons not as defensive weapons, as has been commonly thought, but as offensive weapons to threaten other states and deter nuclear powers. Their decision to go either for cooperative security and strengthened international military-political norms of action, or for individual national “egotism” will critically affect world politics. For, as Roberts observes,¶ But if they drift away from those efforts [to bring about more cooperative security], the consequences could be profound. At the very least, the effective functioning of inherited mechanisms of world order, such as the special responsibility of the “great powers” in the management of the interstate system, especially problems of armed aggression, under the aegis of collective security, could be significantly impaired. Armed with the ability to defeat an intervention, or impose substantial costs in blood or money on an intervening force or the populaces of the nations marshaling that force, the newly empowered tier could bring an end to collective security operations, undermine the credibility of alliance commitments by the great powers, [undermine guarantees of extended deterrence by them to threatened nations and states] extend alliances of their own, and perhaps make wars of aggression on their neighbors or their own people.172

### 1AC Economy

#### Cuban oil dependence on Venezuela is unsustainable---Venezuela will cut off supplies

Keppel 3/16 (Stephen, ABC News, “What Chávez's Death Means for Cuba, Venezuela and the U.S.” http://abcnews.go.com/ABC\_Univision/chavezs-death-means-cuba-venezuela-us/story?id=18669003)

Upon hearing news of the death of Hugo Chávez, scores of Venezuelans gathered in cautious celebration in Doral, a South Florida community with the highest concentration of Venezuelans outside Venezuela. They are hoping that Chávez's passing will bring about change in their homeland.¶ Others in the region were not as happy.¶ Sure Chávez was politically influential in Latin America, but in many ways his economic influence was even greater — especially with friendly countries like Cuba, Nicaragua, Ecuador, Argentina, Bolivia and a score of Caribbean nations that benefited from Venezuela's oil-discount program, PetroCaribe.¶ In the name of "economic solidarity," Chávez was extremely generous with these friends, offering oil at discounted rates and with flexible lending conditions. Nicaragua, for example, was known to pay for Venezuelan oil with shipments of beef, sugar, coffee, milk and even 19,000 pairs of pants.¶ According to figures from the state-owned oil company PDVSA, in 2011 Venezuela sent 243,500 barrels of oil a day (or around 8 percent of its production) to 16 countries across Latin America.¶ Yet the absence of Chávez and the potential drawdown of economic support would have the biggest impact on Cuba. That country receives more than 100,000 barrels of discounted oil per day and billions of dollars each year in exchange for Cuban medical personnel, technology experts, political consultants and other "professionals."¶ That's because Chávez had a special relationship with Cuba and the Castros. His relationships with other presidents were also often very personal. That approach may be difficult to sustain in his absence. Even if Nicolas Maduro, Chávez's chosen replacement, wins the upcoming election, he will be more susceptible to domestic pressure to reduce Venezuela's foreign aid, given all the economic challenges at home.¶ The Cubans have bad memories of the ending of Soviet patronage in the 1990s and are right to be worried about what the death of Chávez may bring.¶ Where will Cuba turn this time if Venezuelan aid dries up? Maybe the United States. That doesn't mean the U.S. government, however. Rather, Cuba would likely turn to the nearly two million Cubans living in this country. They are already sending around $2 billion a year back to the island in remittances. Already, Raul Castro seems to have been preparing to make the Cuban economy a little bit more flexible and open to investment, and the Obama administration has made it easier for Cubans in the U.S. to send money back home.¶ Which brings us to Venezuela's financial situation. The truth is the economic state there has been uncertain and chaotic ever since Chavez got sick, and that is unlikely to change in the short term. There is supposed to be a new election, and it appears that Maduro will win. But he will face a tough economic situation. Plus, he lacks the charisma of Chávez and may not be able to maintain popularity if things get tougher.

#### Oil’s key to Cuba’s economy

Benjamin-Alvadaro 10 (Jonathan, Report for the Cuban Research Institute, Florida International University, PhD, Professor of Political Science at University of Nebraska at Omaha, Director of the Intelligence Community Centers of Academic Excellence Program at UNO, Treasurer of the American Political Science Association, “Cuba’s Energy Future: Strategic Approaches to Cooperation”)

The power and hydrocarbon sectors are inextricably linked, as Cuba produces about 85 percent of its power using liquid fuels, a very high percentage compared with other countries.3 The total value of the energy consumed in Cuba has been estimated at 14 percent of GDP, compared with a world average of about 10 percent. In 2007, domestic production of crude oil accounted for about 40 percent of total consumption and the rest was imported from Venezuela. About 50 percent of the total supply of fuel oil is applied to power generation and 50 percent for transportation and other uses; this is consistent with the usage breakdown seen in other countries.

#### US-Cuban oil cooperation is key to revitalize their domestic oil sector

Benjamin-Alvadaro 6 (Jonathan, Report for the Cuban Research Institute, Florida International University, PhD, Professor of Political Science at University of Nebraska at Omaha, Director of the Intelligence Community Centers of Academic Excellence Program at UNO, Treasurer of the American Political Science Association, “The Current Status and Future Prospects for Oil Exploration in Cuba: A Special,” http://cri.fiu.edu/research/commissioned-reports/oil-cuba-alvarado.pdf)

Why is it important to clarify the current status of Cuban energy in the face of a continuing opposition by the United States to anything resembling what can be construed as “good news” for the Castro regime? Obviously, because up until this point it hasn’t cost the United States much if anything. The current policy continues to clearly place at the forefront the sanctity and utility of a comprehensive economic and political embargo in the hopes that it helps to foment a change in regime and a peaceful transition to a democratic system of governance and a complimentary market economy. As energy security concerns continue to percolate up to an increasingly important status in the realm of national security objectives we may begin to see the erosion of the hard position against the Cuban regime regardless of its leadership.¶ The overview of the Cuban energy developments clearly and unambiguously reveals that the Castro regime has every intention of continuing to promote, design and implement energy development policies that will benefit Cuba for generations to come. Cuba is sparing no effort by instituting bottom-up and top-down policy initiatives to meet this challenge. It has significantly increased its international cooperation in the energy sector and continues to enhance its efforts to ensure energy security in these most uncertain of times. But it stands to reason that no matter how successful these efforts are, they will come up short. Two factors may alter this present situation. First, Cuba may indeed realize a bonanza from the offshore tracts that will allow it to possibly address its many energy challenges, from increasing oil production and refining capacity, to improving the nation’s energy infrastructure, ensuring a stable energy future. Second, and no less significant, is the possibility of normalization of trade relations with the United States. This is important not only because it will allow direct foreign investment, technology transfer and information sharing between these neighboring states but it possibly enhances the energy security of both states, and hence, the region, realized through a division of labor and dispersion of resources that serve as a hedge against natural disaster and market disruptions. Moreover, all states could derive benefit from the public information campaigns to promote energy efficiency and conservation presently being promoted in Cuba in the face of diminishing energy stocks and uncertain global markets. Ultimately, and only after normalization, the task still falls to the Cuban government, but the cost will necessarily be spread through a number of sources that are predominately American because of strategic interests, proximity and affinity. It suffices to say that the requisite investment and assistance will have a distinct American tinge to it, inasmuch as American corporations, U.S. government agencies, and international financial institutions, of which the U.S. is a major contributor, will play important roles in the funding of the effort to revitalize the Cuban energy sector. Cuban officials are not averse and perhaps would prefer that the U.S. be its major partner in this effort owing to the fact that most if not all of the cutting-edge technology in energy, oil and gas comes from the United States. It is remarkable that the Cuban energy sector is as vibrant as it presently is, absent the type of infrastructural investment that is available to most developing states, in large part because of the American economic embargo. ¶ Finally, the cost is significant and it stands to reason that the longer one waits to address the challenge at hand the higher the cost of modernizing the energy sector. For this reason alone, the American role in assisting Cuba in this effort will be significant and every day that the task is put off, it increases the long-term cost of the effort. This should serve as an obvious point of entry into cooperation with the Cuban government and perhaps can serve as a catalyst for promoting confidence, trust and cooperation in this critical issue area across the region.

#### The plan solves Cuban dependence on Venezuela---revenues lead to political reforms that create stability

Pinon 11 – Jorge R. Piñón is a visiting research fellow at the Latin American and Caribbean Center’s Cuban Research Institute at FIU. Spring 2011, "Why the United States and Cuba Collaborate (and What Could Happen If They Don't)"casgroup.fiu.edu/pages/docs/2157/1306356964\_Hemisphere\_Vol.\_20.pdf

If Cuba’s suspected but yet undiscovered hydrocarbon reserves are proven real, it will take between three and five years to develop them fully. Production volumes would have to reach more than 200,000 barrels per day to have the same positive economic impact currently derived from foreign oil subsidies. If this occurs, **significant revenues from oil, natural gas and sugarcane ethanol would integrate Cuba into global and regional markets within the next five years.**¶ International oil companies such as Spain’s Repsol, Norway’s Statoil Norsk Hydro and Brazil’s Petrobras are actively exploring Cuba’s Gulf of Mexico waters. Cuban authorities have invited United States oil companies to participate in developing the island’s offshore oil and natural gas resources, but US law does not allow this.¶ Although US oil, oil equipment and service companies have the capital, technology and operational knowhow to explore, produce and refine Cuba’s potential reserves in a safe and responsible manner, the almost five-decade old unilateral political and economic embargo keeps them on the sidelines.¶ Cuba currently **relies on heavily subsidized oil from Venezuela** for two-thirds of its petroleum needs. This supply **contributes to the Cuban government’s ability to maintain a** politically antagonistic and belligerent position **towards the US**.¶ The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 made Cuba aware of the political and economic risks and consequences of depending on a single source of imported oil. **Only when Cuba diversifies suppliers and develops its offshore hydrocarbon resources**, estimated by the United States Geological Survey at 5.5 million barrels of oil and 9.8 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, will it have the economic independence to consider political and economic reforms. It is in the US interest to develop a new policy toward the island based on constructive engagement to support the emergence of a Cuban state in which Cubans themselves can determine the political and economic future of their country through democratic means. Cuba is about to embark on an 18-month oil exploration drilling program to validate the presence of recoverable hydrocarbon reserves.¶ US support of such endeavors would be beneficial in the framework of a constructive engagement policy. The Deepwater Horizon drilling semi-submersible incident and the resulting catastrophic oil spill demonstrate the urgency of developing a policy of energy and environmental cooperation between the United States and Cuba. As Cuba develops its deepwater oil and natural gas potential, the possible consequences of a spill call for proactive planning by both countries to minimize or avoid an environmental disaster.¶ To respond effectively to an oil-related marine accident, any company operating in Cuba would require immediate access to US oil services companies for the nearinstant technology and know-how needed to halt and limit damage to the marine environment. Obviously, the establishment of working relations between the US and Cuba in the area of marine environmental protection would assist enormously in the contingency planning and cooperation necessary for an early and effective response to an oil spill.¶ The United States and Cuba are already parties to a number of multilateral oil pollution agreements, such as the 1973 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) and the 1983 Convention for the protection and Development of the Marine Environment in the Wider Caribbean Region (Cartagena Convention). Both agreements address prevention of pollution of the marine environment by ships from operational or accidental causes. The 1990 International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation also offers a precedent for cooperation. The convention is designed to encourage and facilitate international cooperation and mutual assistance in preparing for and responding to major oil pollution incidents. Signatory nations are tasked with developing and maintaining adequate capabilities to deal with such an emergency. In the case of Cuba and the United States, the capabilities must be transnational, as there is no barrier to the movement of oil from one country’s waters to another’s. The United States, therefore, must develop appropriate regulatory and procedural frameworks for the free movement of equipment, personnel and expertise between the two countries as part of any oil spill response.¶ The 1980 Agreement of Cooperation between the United States and Mexico Regarding Pollution of the Marine Environment by Discharges of Hydrocarbons and Other Hazardous Substances (MEXUS Plan) provides the foundation for a similar protocol with Cuba. This would include the establishment of joint response teams, coordinating roles, rapid incident notification mechanisms, joint operations centers and communication procedures, along with regular exercises and meetings. The United States government, irrespective of the current embargo, has the power to license the sale, lease or loan of emergency relief and reconstruction equipment and the travel of expert personnel to Cuba following an oil spill.¶ Cuba’s long-term energy challenges will be a consequence of its future economic growth and rising standard of living within a market environment. This anticipated growth will depend largely on the development of a competitively priced, readily available and environmentally sound long-term energy plan. Cuban energy policy should embrace energy conservation, modernization of the energy infrastructure, and balance in sourcing oil/gas supplies and renewable energy sources that protect the island’s environment. **The country would benefit from the guidance of a variety of partners, including the United States.**

#### Cuban instability collapse causes Latin American instability, terrorism, democratic backsliding, and distracts the US from critical hotspots including Africa, the Caucus, and North Korea

Gorrell 5 (Tim, Lieutenant Colonel, “CUBA: THE NEXT UNANTICIPATED ANTICIPATED STRATEGIC CRISIS?” 3/18, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA433074)

Regardless of the succession, under the current U.S. policy, Cuba’s problems of a post Castro transformation only worsen. In addition to Cubans on the island, there will be those in exile who will return claiming authority. And there are remnants of the dissident community within Cuba who will attempt to exercise similar authority. A power vacuum or absence of order will create the conditions for instability and civil war. Whether Raul or another successor from within the current government can hold power is debatable. However, that individual will nonetheless extend the current policies for an indefinite period, which will only compound the Cuban situation. When Cuba finally collapses anarchy is a strong possibility if the U.S. maintains the “wait and see” approach. The U.S. then must deal with an unstable country 90 miles off its coast. In the midst of this chaos, thousands will flee the island. During the Mariel boatlift in 1980 125,000 fled the island.26 Many were criminals; this time the number could be several hundred thousand fleeing to the U.S., creating a refugee crisis.¶ Equally important, by adhering to a negative containment policy, the U.S. may be creating its next series of transnational criminal problems. Cuba is along the axis of the drug-trafficking flow into the U.S. from Columbia. The Castro government as a matter of policy does not support the drug trade. In fact, Cuba’s actions have shown that its stance on drugs is more than hollow rhetoric as indicated by its increasing seizure of drugs – 7.5 tons in 1995, 8.8 tons in 1999, and 13 tons in 2000.27 While there may be individuals within the government and outside who engage in drug trafficking and a percentage of drugs entering the U.S. may pass through Cuba, the Cuban government is not the path of least resistance for the flow of drugs. If there were no Cuban restraints, the flow of drugs to the U.S. could be greatly facilitated by a Cuba base of operation and accelerate considerably.¶ In the midst of an unstable Cuba, the opportunity for radical fundamentalist groups to operate in the region increases. If these groups can export terrorist activity from Cuba to the U.S. or throughout the hemisphere then the war against this extremism gets more complicated. Such activity could increase direct attacks and disrupt the economies, threatening the stability of the fragile democracies that are budding throughout the region. In light of a failed state in the region, the U.S. may be forced to deploy military forces to Cuba, creating the conditions for another insurgency. The ramifications of this action could very well fuel greater anti-American sentiment throughout the Americas. A proactive policy now can mitigate these potential future problems.¶ U.S. domestic political support is also turning against the current negative policy. The Cuban American population in the U.S. totals 1,241,685 or 3.5% of the population.28 Most of these exiles reside in Florida; their influence has been a factor in determining the margin of victory in the past two presidential elections. But this election strategy may be flawed, because recent polls of Cuban Americans reflect a decline for President Bush based on his policy crackdown. There is a clear softening in the Cuban-American community with regard to sanctions. Younger Cuban Americans do not necessarily subscribe to the hard-line approach. These changes signal an opportunity for a new approach to U.S.-Cuban relations. (Table 1)¶ The time has come to look realistically at the Cuban issue. Castro will rule until he dies. The only issue is what happens then? The U.S. can little afford to be distracted by a failed state 90 miles off its coast. The administration, given the present state of world affairs, does not have the luxury or the resources to pursue the traditional American model of crisis management. The President and other government and military leaders have warned that the GWOT will be long and protracted. These warnings were sounded when the administration did not anticipate operations in Iraq consuming so many military, diplomatic and economic resources. There is justifiable concern that Africa and the Caucasus region are potential hot spots for terrorist activity, so these areas should be secure. North Korea will continue to be an unpredictable crisis in waiting. We also cannot ignore China. What if China resorts to aggression to resolve the Taiwan situation? Will the U.S. go to war over Taiwan? Additionally, Iran could conceivably be the next target for U.S. pre-emptive action. These are known and potential situations that could easily require all or many of the elements of national power to resolve. In view of such global issues, can the U.S. afford to sustain the status quo and simply let the Cuban situation play out? The U.S. is at a crossroads: should the policies of the past 40 years remain in effect with vigor? Or should the U.S. pursue a new approach to Cuba in an effort to facilitate a manageable transition to post-Castro Cuba?

#### Caucus instability causes nuclear war

Blank 2k – MacArthur Professor of Research @ The Strategic Studies Institute @ US Army War College (Stephen, “U.S. MILITARY ENGAGEMENT WITH TRANSCAUCASIA AND CENTRAL ASIA,” June, <http://www.bits.de/NRANEU/docs/Blank2000.pdf>)

In 1993 Moscow even threatened World War III to deter Turkish intervention on behalf of Azerbaijan. Yet the new Russo-Armenian Treaty and Azeri-Turkish treaty suggest that Russia and Turkey could be dragged into a confrontation to rescue their allies from defeat. 72 Thus Many of the conditions for conventional war or protracted ethnic conflict in which third parties intervene are present in the Transcaucasus. For example, many Third World conflicts generated by local structural factors have a great potential for unintended escalation. Big powers often feel obliged to rescue their lesser proteges and proxies. One or another big power may fail to grasp the other side's stakes, since interests here are not as clear as in Europe. Hence commitments involving the use of nuclear weapons to prevent a client's defeat are not well established or clear as in Europe. Clarity about the nature of the threat could prevent the kind of rapid and almost uncontrolled escalation we saw in 1993 when Turkish noises about intervening on behalf of Azerbaijan led Russian leaders to threaten a nuclear war in that case. Precisely because Turkey is a NATO ally but probably could not prevail in a long war against Russia - or if it could, would trigger a potential nuclear blow (not a small possibility given the erratic nature of Russia's declared nuclear strategies) - the danger of major war is higher here than almost everywhere else. As Richard Betts has observed, The greatest danger lies in areas where (1) the potential for serious instability is high; (2) both superpowers perceive vital interests; (3) neither recognizes that the other’s perceived interest or commitment is as great as its own; (4) both have the capability to inject conventional forces; and, (5) neither has willing proxies capable of settling the situation.74

#### Korean instability causes nuclear war

Chol 11 Kim Myong Chol is author of a number of books and papers in Korean, Japanese and English on North Korea, including Kim Jong-il's Strategy for Reunification. He has a PhD from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's Academy of Social Sciences "Dangerous games" Aug 20 www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/MH20Dg01.html

The divided and heavily armed Korean Peninsula remains the most inflammable global flashpoint, with any conflict sparked there likely to become a full-blown thermonuclear war involving the world's fourth-most powerful nuclear weapons state and its most powerful. ¶ Any incident in Korea by design, accident, or miscalculation could erupt into a devastating DPRK-US war, with the Metropolitan US serving as a main war theater. ¶ Rodong Sinmun warned on August 16: "The Korean Peninsula is faced with the worst crisis ever. An all-out war can be triggered by any accident." ¶ Recent incidents illustrate the real danger of miscalculation leading to a total shooting war, given the volatile situation on the Land of Morning Calm. ¶ 1. The most recent case in point is the August 10 shelling of North Korea by the South. Frightened South Korea marines on Yeonpyeong Island mistook three noises from a North Korean construction site across the narrow channel for artillery rounds, taking an hour to respond with three to five artillery rounds. ¶ The episode serves as a potent reminder to the world that the slightest incident can lead to war. A reportedly malfunctioning firefinder counter-artillery radar system seems to partly account for the panicky South Korean reaction. ¶ South Korean conservative newspaper the Joong Ang Daily reported August 17: ¶ "A military source said that radar installed to detect hostile fire did not work last week when North Korea fired five shots toward the Northern Limit Line (NLL), the disputed maritime border, on Aug 10. ¶ "'We must confirm the location of the source of the firing through the ARTHUR (Artillery Hunting Radar) and HALO (hostile artillery location) systems, but ARTHUR failed to operate, resulting in a failure to determine the source of the fire,' said the source." ¶ BBC reported on November 25 last year the aggressive nature of troops on the South Korea-held five islands in North Korean waters. ¶ "Seen in this sense, they (five islands including Yeonpyeong Island) could provide staging bases for flanking amphibious attacks into North Korea if South Korea ever takes the offensive." ¶ 2. An almost catastrophic incident took place at dawn on June 17 near Inchon. South Korean marines stationed on Gyodong Island near Inchon Airport fired rifles at a civilian South Korean jetliner Airbus A320 with 119 people aboard as it was descending to land, after mistaking it for a North Korean military aircraft. ¶ The Asiana Airlines flight was carrying 119 people from the Chinese city of Chengdu. ¶ About 600 civilian aircraft fly near the island every day, including those flying across the NLL, but they face a perennial risk of being misidentified as a hostile warplane. ¶ It is nothing short of a miracle that the Airbus A320 was not hit and nobody harmed. ¶ 3. On March 26, 2010, the high-tech South Korean corvette Sokcho fired 130 rounds at flocks of birds, mistaking them for a hostile flying object. The innocent birds looked like a North Korean warplane just at a time when an alleged North Korean midget submarine had managed to escape with impunity after torpedoing the hapless Cheonan deep inside security-tight South Korean waters. ¶ The South Korean military's habit of firing at the wrong target increases the risk of an incident running out of control. ¶ CNN aired a story December 16, headlined: "General: South Korea Drill Could Cause Chain Reaction." ¶ F/A-18 pilot-turned Marine Corp General James Cartwright told the press in the Pentagon, "What we worry about, obviously, is if that it [the drill] is misunderstood or if it's taken advantage of as an opportunity. ¶ "If North Korea were to react to that in a negative way and fire back at those firing positions on the islands, that would start potentially a chain reaction of firing and counter-firing. ¶ "What you don't want to have happen out of that is ... for us to lose control of the escalation. That's the concern." ¶ Agence France-Presse on December 11 quoted former chief of US intelligence retired admiral Dennis Blair as saying that South Korea "will be taking military action against North Korea". ¶ New Korean war differs from other wars¶ Obama and the Americans seem to be incapable of realizing that North Korea is the wrong enemy, much less that a new Korean War would be fundamentally different from all other wars including the two world wars. ¶ Two things will distinguish a likely American Conflict or DPRK-US War from previous wars. ¶ The first essential difference is that the US mainland will become the main theater of war for the first time since the US Civil War (1861-1865), giving the Americans an opportunity to know what it is like to have war fought on their own land, not on faraway soil. ¶ The US previously prospered by waging aggressive wars on other countries. Thus far, the Americans could afford to feel safe and comfortable while watching TV footage of war scenes from Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan and Libya as if they were fires raging across the river. ¶ The utmost collateral damage has been that some American veterans were killed or returned home as amputees, with post traumatic stress disorder, only to be left unemployed and homeless. ¶ However, this will no longer be the case. ¶ At long last, it is Americans' turn to have see their homeland ravaged.¶ An young North Korea in 1950-53 was unable to carry the war all the way across the Pacific Ocean to strike back, but the present-day North Korea stands out as a fortress nuclear weapons state that can withstand massive American ICBM (Intercontinental ballistic missile) attacks and launch direct retaliatory transpacific strikes on the Metropolitan USA. ¶ The second essential difference is that the next war in Korea, that is, the American Conflict or the DPRK-USA War would be the first actual full-fledged nuclear, thermonuclear war that mankind has ever seen, in no way similar to the type of nuclear warfare described in science fiction novels or films. ¶ North Korea is unique among the nuclear powers in two respects: One is that the Far Eastern country, founded by legendary peerless hero Kim Il-sung, is the first country to engage and badly maul the world's only superpower in three years of modern warfare when it was most powerful, after vanquishing Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. ¶ The other is that North Korea is fully ready to go the length of fighting [hu]mankind's first and last nuclear exchange with the US. ¶ The DPRK led by two Kim Il-sungs - the ever-victorious iron-willed brilliant commander Kim Jong-il and his heir designate Kim Jong-eun - is different from Russia under Nikita Khrushchev which backed down in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. ¶ Khrushchev and his company never fought the Americans in war. As a rule, most countries are afraid to engage the Americans. As the case is with them, North Korea is the last to favor war with the Americans. ¶ However, it is no exaggeration to say that the two North Korean leaders are just one click away from ordering a retaliatory nuclear strike on the US military forces in Guam, Hawaii and metropolitan centers on the US mainland. ¶ On behalf of Supreme Leader Kim Jong-il, Kim Jong-eun will fire highly destructive weapons of like Americans have never heard of or imagined to evaporate the US. ¶ The North Koreans are too proud of being descendents of the ancient civilizations of Koguryo 2,000 years ago and Dankun Korea 5,000 years ago, to leave the Land of morning Calm divided forever with the southern half under the control of the trigger-happy, predatory US. The North Koreans prefer to fight and die in honor rather than kowtow to the arrogant Americans. ¶ At the expense of comforts of a better life, North Koreans have devoted more than half a century to preparing for nuclear war with the Americans. All available resources have been used to convert the whole country into a fortress, including arming the entire population and indigenously turning out all types of nuclear thermonuclear weapons, and developing long-range delivery capabilities and digital warfare assets. ¶ An apocalyptic Day After Tommorow-like scenario will unfold throughout the US, with the skyscrapers of major cities consumed in a sea of thermonuclear conflagration. The nuclear exchange will begin with retaliatory North Korean ICBMs detonating hydrogen bombs in outer space far above the US mainland, leaving most of the country powerless. ¶ New York, Washington, Chicago, San Francisco and major cities should be torched by ICBMs streaking from North Korea with scores of nuclear power stations exploding, each spewing as much radioactive fallout as 150-180 H-bombs.

#### Caribbean terrorism leads to attack on the US---they’ll use bioweapons

Bryan 1 (Anthony T. Bryan, director of the North-South Center’s Caribbean Program, 10-21-2001. CFR, Terrorism, Porous Borders, and Homeland Security: The Case for U.S.-Caribbean Cooperation, p.  
http://www.cfr.org/publication/4844/terrorism\_porous\_borders\_and%20\_homeland\_%20security.html)

Terrorist acts can take place anywhere. The Caribbean is no exception. Already the linkages between drug trafficking and terrorism are clear in countries like Colombia and Peru, and such connections have similar potential in the Caribbean. The security of major industrial complexes in some Caribbean countries is vital. Petroleum refineries and major industrial estates in Trinidad, which host more than 100 companies that produce the majority of the world’s methanol, ammonium sulphate, and 40 percent of U.S. imports of liquefied natural gas (LNG), are vulnerable targets. Unfortunately, as experience has shown in Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America, terrorists are likely to strike at U.S. and European interests in Caribbean countries. Security issues become even more critical when one considers the possible use of Caribbean countries by terrorists as bases from which to attack the United States. An airliner hijacked after departure from an airport in the northern Caribbean or the Bahamas can be flying over South Florida in less than an hour. Terrorists can sabotage or seize control of a cruise ship after the vessel leaves a Caribbean port. Moreover, terrorists with false passports and visas issued in the Caribbean may be able to move easily through passport controls in Canada or the United States. (To help counter this possibility, some countries have suspended "economic citizenship" programs to ensure that known terrorists have not been inadvertently granted such citizenship.) Again, Caribbean countries are as vulnerable as anywhere else to the clandestine manufacture and deployment of biological weapons within national borders.

#### Risk of bioterror is high---extinction

Matheny 7 Jason is a research associate at Oxford University’s Future of Humanity Institute. He previously worked at the Center for Biosecurity and holds an MBA from Duke University. “Reducing the Risk of Human Extinction,” Risk Analysis Vol. 27, No. 5, http://users.physics.harvard.edu/~wilson/pmpmta/Mahoney\_extinction.pdf

Of current extinction risks, the most severe may be bioterrorism.The knowledge needed to engineer a virus is modest compared to that needed to build a nuclear weapon; the necessary equipment and materials are increasingly accessible and because biological agents are self-replicating, a weapon can have an exponential effect on a population (Warrick, 2006; Williams, 2006). 5 Current U.S. biodefense efforts are funded at $5 billion per year to develop and stockpile new drugs and vaccines, monitor biological agents and emerging diseases, and strengthen the capacities of local health systems to respond to pandemics (Lam, Franco, & Shuler, 2006).

#### Latin American democracy solves environmental destruction

Callejas 10 (Danny, Professor of Economics at the Universidad de Antioquia, Colombia, “Democracy and Environmental Quality in Latin America: A Panel System of Equations Approach, 1995-2008,” November)

Democracy has a positive effect on environmental quality. The theory suggests that democracy sustains and encourages freedom of speech, freedom of press, political participation and social awareness. These elements provide a conduit for social demands. As urban population and income grow, citizens increase their demand for higher environmental standards and quality. The enactment of new policies and regulations that incentive individuals and firms may lead to a reduction in pollution, environmental degradation and deforestation; therefore, leading to a higher level of environmental quality.¶ This study analyzed 19 Latin America countries for the period 1995-2008. A panel data system of equations estimates suggest that a 10% increase in democracy may reduce CO2 emissions per capita in 0.48% or 0.60% in Latin America. Similarly, a 10% increase in education may reduce emissions in 0.71% or 0.73%. These results suggest that democracy and education have a positive effect on environmental quality.

#### Extinction

Takacs 96 (David, Philosophies of Paradise, The Johns Hopkins Univ. Pr., Baltimore)

"Habitat destruction and conversion are eliminating species at such a frightening pace that extinction of many contemporary species and the systems they live in and support ... may lead to ecological disaster and severe alteration of the evolutionary process," Terry Erwin writes." And E. 0. Wilson notes: "The question I am asked most frequently about the diversity of life: if enough species are extinguished, will the ecosystem collapse, and will the extinction of most other species follow soon afterward? The only answer anyone can give is: possibly. By the time we find out, however, it might be too late. One planet, one experiment."" So biodiversity keeps the world running. It has value in and for itself, as well as for us. Raven, Erwin, and Wilson oblige us to think about the value of biodiversity for our own lives. The Ehrlichs' rivet-popper trope makes this same point; by eliminating rivets, we play Russian roulette with global ecology and human futures: "It is likely that destruction of the rich complex of species in the **Amazon basin could trigger rapid changes** in global climate patterns. Agriculture remains heavily dependent on **stable climate**, and human beings remain heavily dependent on food. By the end of the century the **extinction** of perhaps a million species in the Amazon basin could have entrained famines in which a billion human beings perished. And if our species is very unlucky, the famines could **lead to a** thermonuclear war, which could extinguish civilization.""

1AC Solvency

#### The Secretary of the Treasury can modify the embargo to allow drilling

Huddleston 9 (Vicki Huddleston, deputy assistant secretary of defense for Africa at the Department of Defense, visiting fellow at Brookings and co-director of the Brookings Project on U.S. Policy Toward a Cuba in Transition from 2007 to 2009, Carlos Pascual, U.S. ambassador to Mexico, He was vice president and director of Foreign Policy at Brookings from 2006 to 2009, “Use "Smart Power" to Help Cubans,” http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2009/02/24-cuba-huddleston)

Executive authority¶ Again and again we hear that the embargo can't be changed because the Helms-Burton law codified it. Nothing could be further from the truth. Whether you agree or disagree with the current commercial embargo, the president can effectively dismantle it by using his executive authority. Helms-Burton codified the embargo regulation, but those regulations provide that ``all transactions are prohibited except as specifically authorized by the Secretary of the Treasury by means of regulations, rulings, instructions, and licenses.''¶ This means that the president's power remains unfettered. He can instruct the secretary to extend, revise or modify embargo regulations. The proof of this statement is that President Bill Clinton issued new regulations for expanded travel and remittances in order to help individuals and grow civil society.¶ Obama will have to modify Office of Foreign Assets Control regulations to fulfill his campaign promise to increase Cuban-American travel and remittances. If he wants to reproduce the more open conditions in Cuba that led to the ''Cuban Spring'' of 2002 and Oswaldo Payá's Varela Project, he could reinstate people-to-people and educational travel. By a simple rule change, he could also speed the entry of life-saving medicines from Cuba, rather than subjecting them to delays from cumbersome OFAC licensing procedures.¶ Since 1992, U.S. law -- the Cuban Democracy Act -- has sought to expand access to ideas, knowledge and information by licensing telecommunications goods and services. Yet, in practice, regulations are so strictly interpreted that the United States in effect is imposing a communications embargo on Cuba. To lift it, the president can authorize a general license for the donation and sale of radios, televisions and computers. In addition, rather than helping Cuban state security keep Yoani Sánchez and others off the Internet, the Obama administration could make Internet technology readily available so that any barriers to communications would be clearly the fault of the Cuban government, and not ours.¶ Environmental concerns rate high with the Obama administration. So it might open bilateral discussions, exchange information and license the provision of scientific equipment to improve the health of the ocean and success of commercial fisheries.¶ The United States Geological Survey estimates that the North Cuba Basin holds 5.5 billion barrels of oil and 9.8 trillion cubic feet of natural gas reserves. If the president wishes, he can instruct the secretary of the treasury to license U.S. companies to explore, exploit and transport these resources that we and the region so badly need.¶ Failed policy¶ After a half-century of failed policy, there is enormous support in the Cuban-American community for initiatives that will improve the well being and independence of the Cuban people. What they didn't know -- but know now -- is that there is no reason they can't reach out to the Cuban people and still retain the embargo as symbol of their concern about the Cuban government's failure to live up to international norms of human rights, democracy and transparency.

#### The plan allows for US-Cuban oil cooperation

Benjamin 10 – Jonathan Benjamin-Alvadaro, Report for the Cuban Research Institute, Florida International University, PhD, Professor of Political Science at University of Nebraska at Omaha, Director of the Intelligence Community Centers of Academic Excellence Program at UNO, Treasurer of the American Political Science Association, 2010, Brookings Institution book, “Cuba’s Energy Future: Strategic Approaches to Cooperation”

Conclusion and Recommendations

Undoubtedly, after fifty years of enmity, there is a significant lack of trust and confidence between the United States and Cuba. This is plain from the almost quaint maintenance of a sanctions regime that seeks to isolate Cuba economically and politically but hardly reflects the dramatic changes that have occurred on the island since 1991, not to mention since 2008,when Fidel Castro officially stepped aside as Cuba’s president. Now, the opportunity to advance relations in the energy arena appears to be ripe. Since 2004, representatives from American companies, trade organizations, universities, and think tanks have had the opportunity to meet with Cuban energy officials. The scope and objectives of Cuban energy development schemes have been disseminated, dissected, and discussed across a number of settings where the interested parties are now familiar with and well versed in the agendas and opportunities that exist in this arena. In public discussions, Cuban energy authorities have made it clear that their preferred energy development scenario includes working closely with the U.S. oil and gas industry and using state-of-the- art U.S. oil technologies. The **assessment from U.S. energy experts on the technical acumen and capability of Cuban energy officials has been overwhelmingly positive**.9 Should the U.S. government and the Obama administration see fit to shift its policy so as to allow broader participation of American academics and practitioners in the energy field to attend conferences and meet with Cuban energy officials, it may pave the way to **establishing much-needed familiarity and confidence across these communities**.¶ The United States and Cuba will have a unique opportunity to employ a highly educated and competent cadre of Cuban engineers and technicians to work in critical areas of the energy sector. This will deploy an underused segment of the Cuban workforce, and allow U.S. oil, construction, and engineering firms to subcontract work to an emerging class of Cuban firms specializing in these areas. **The Cubans have accumulated experience and training from past energy cooperation projects and exchanges in Cuba, Mexico, Venezuela, and other countries in the region**. Anecdotal evidence suggests that these contacts and exchanges have been wildly successful because of the Cubans’ high level of competence and strong work ethic. The Cubans have gained invaluable knowledge and experience through the operation and construction of energy facilities in collaboration with their joint-venture partners on the island.¶ The United States possesses few options when it comes to balancing the various risks to U.S. energy security and satisfying energy demand, because U.S. energy independence is not attainable, the policy tools available to deal with energy supply disruptions are increasingly inadequate, and the United States needs to articulate a new vision of how best to manage international energy interdependence. In particular, even if the United States were to choose to exploit all of its domestic energy resources, it would remain dependent on oil imports to meet its existing and future demand. The critical need to improve the integrity of the U.S. energy supply requires a much broader, more flexible view on the quest for resources—a view that does not shun a source from a potential strategic partner for purely political reasons. U.S. decisionmakers must look dispassionately at potential energy partners in terms of the role they might play in meeting political, economic, and geostrategic objectives of U.S. energy security. The Obama administration has signaled that it wants to reinvigorate inter-American cooperation and integration; a movement toward energy cooperation and development with Cuba is consistent with, and may be central to, that objective. ¶ The energy-security environment for the United States is at a critical juncture. The productive capacity of two of the United States’ largest oil suppliers, Mexico and Venezuela, has declined, and the supporting energy infrastructure in both countries is in need of significant revitalization. The vagaries of the politics in the region, the variability of weather patterns, and the overall dismal state of the global economy create a setting of instability and uncertainty that requires close attention to the national security interests of the United States vis-à-vis energy. Cuba’s energy infrastructure, too, is in need of significant repair and modernization (its many energy projects notwithstanding); the price tag is estimated to be in the billions of dollars. Delaying work on many of these projects increases costs, because deterioration of the infrastructure continues and eventually pushes up the cost of renovation and replacement. It also stands to reason that the lion’s share of the financial burden of upgrading Cuba’s energy infrastructure will fall to the United States, directly and indirectly. **Changes in U.S. policy to allow investment and assistance in Cuba’s energy sector are a** precondition for international entities to make significant investments, yet this change implies a large American footprint. Trade and investment in the energy sector in Cuba have been severely constrained by the conditions of the embargo placed on the Cuban regime. These constraints also affect foreign firms seeking to do business in Cuba because of the threat of penalties if any of these firms use technology containing more than 10 percent of proscribed U.S. technologies needed for oil and gas exploration and production. American private investment and U.S. government assistance will constitute a large portion of the needed investment capital to undertake this colossal effort. **The longer that work is delayed, the higher the cost to all the investors, which will then potentially cut into the returns from such undertakings**.¶ U.S. cooperation with Cuba in energy just may create an opportunity for the United States to improve its relations with Venezuela, if it can demonstrate that it can serve as a partner (or at a minimum, a supporter) of the Petrocaribe energy consortium. The United States could provide much-needed additional investment capital in the development of upstream, downstream, and logistical resources in Cuba that simultaneously addresses Petrocaribe objectives, diversifies regional refining capacity, and adds storage and transit capabilities while enhancing regional cooperation and integration modalities. **This does not mean that the United States has to dismantle the nearly fifty-year-old embargo against Cuba, but the United States will have to make special provisions** that create commercial and trade openings for energy development that serve its broad geostrategic and national security goals, as it has in the case of food and medicine sales to Cuba.¶ This discussion is intended to help distill understanding of U.S. strategic energy policy under a set of shifting political and economic environmental conditions in Cuba and its implications for U.S. foreign policy for the near and long term. Because the policies can be considered works-in-progress, an understanding of possible outcomes is **important to those crafting future policy** and making changes in the policymaking milieu.

## 2AC

### Certainty

#### Wrecks solvency

MarEx 11 (Maritime Executive, “Gas-Only Drilling in Offshore Moratorium Areas Suggested”, 1/19, http://www.maritime-executive.com/article/2005-10-20gas-only-drilling-in-offshore-moratori)

Oil and gas industry groups are criticizing a provision in House offshore drilling legislation that would allow the government to offer "natural gas-only" leases in areas that are currently off-limits to new production. The criticism is included in wider comments by petroleum producers to the Minerals Management Service (MMS), which has begun collecting public comments as it begins preparing an outer continental shelf leasing plan for 2007-2012. MMS asked for comment on the gas-only concept. Gas-only leasing was included in a bill by House Resources Committee Chairman Richard Pombo (R-CA.) that allows states to "opt-out" of offshore leasing bans. States exercising the option could allow gas-only leasing, or oil and gas leasing. Senate legislation by Senator Lamar Alexander (R-TN.) -- and supported by chemical companies and other industries that rely on the costly fuel -- also accepts the idea. However, the American Petroleum Institute (API), in comments this week to MMS, says gas-only and gas-preference leasing would offer the "false promise" of future supplies**.** The group says the concept would create uncertainties that could dampen investment, since it is impossible to predict with certainty what types of resources will be in an area. "A company might spend up to $80 million to buy a lease, conduct seismic testing, obtain the necessary permits, and drill a well(s) to determine whether any resources are present in amounts that make the prospect economic," the group says. "A company is unlikely to know if it had met the gas only or gas preference requirement until the capital investment had been made. Companies will be reluctant to spend tens of millions of dollars to explore for and develop a prospect, only to be forced to abandon the resource, stranding substantial investments."

#### Certainty key

Hamilton 12 Amelia Hamilton is a writer for Freedom Works, August 23, 2012, “Government Regulation Slowing Energy Jobs and Economic Growth”, http://www.freedomworks.org/blog/ameliahamilton/government-regulation-slowing-energy-jobs-and-econ

Kathleen Sgamma of The Western Energy Alliance testified earlier this month before the House Energy and Commerce Committee, Subcommittee on Energy and Power. In this testimony, Sgamma discussed how oil and gas producers are affected by restricted access to federal lands. Drilling is up on private and state lands, but down on federal lands because “federal governmental policies make it extremely difficult to operate on public lands.” She then went on to detail specific situations in which development on federal lands was made so difficult that it had an adverse effect on exploration and drilling which, in turn, stalled potential investment, growth, and employment. In closing, Sgamma said “In all these cases, the general public loses out in terms of energy all Americans own and return to the American taxpayer. Small businesses, the engines of our economy, are prevented from creating jobs and economic growth.”¶ Our government doesn’t seem to understand the widespread issues caused by their actions. Energy problems are adding insult to economic injury as more Americans are hit in the pocketbook. While an oil refinery hasn’t been built in this country since 1976, our government has loaned billions to help build and improve a refinery in Cartagena, Columbia. That money could be better invested in the American economy.¶ The issue of overregulation is neither new nor unique to the western states. Things like offshore drilling or drilling in ANWR would open up vast reserves, giving our economy a much-needed boost. Jack Gerard of the American Petroleum Institute said that “We need to see more than lip service from Washington about ending this stranglehold on economic growth. And this is what people are paying attention to, and this uncertainty is having a detrimental effect on investment in the economy and investment in American workers.”

## 2AC United States T

#### We meet—plan text says in the US---we only remove restrictions on topical areas

#### We meet---the Eastern Gap is US territory

MMS 6 – Minerals Management Service, now known as the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, February 2006, “Report to Congress: Comprehensive Inventory of U.S. OCS Oil and Natural Gas Resources,” http://www.boem.gov/uploadedFiles/BOEM/Oil\_and\_Gas\_Energy\_Program/Resource\_Evaluation/Resource\_Assessment/2006-FinalInventoryReportDeliveredToCongress.pdf

2. Restrictions on Access to the OCS for Oil and Gas Exploration and Development: International Boundary Issues ¶ The United States needs international boundary agreements with neighboring countries—with Cuba and Mexico for the Eastern Gap, or with Canada for portions of the eastern Beaufort Sea and southern Gulf of Alaska— before any oil and gas leasing and development can occur in these areas. ¶ In order to gain access to any disputed areas, the United States would have to enter into discussions with Mexico and Cuba, or Canada, to forge a continental shelf boundary agreement similar to what was done by Mexico and the United States for the Western Gap area in the GOM. The process would involve the Department of the Interior (DOI) and the Department of State (DOS), and the U.S. Congress would have to ratify any agreement. ¶ Eastern Gap: The Eastern Gap is an area of the GOM OCS that is bordered by, but beyond, the Exclusive Economic Zones of Mexico, Cuba and the United States. The northern portion of the Eastern Gap is included in the Central and Eastern GOM OCS Planning Areas. Unlike the situation with the Western Gap between Mexico and the United States, the three nations adjacent to the Eastern Gap have not agreed on a continental shelf boundary in this area. In the absence of such a boundary agreement, the MMS has not offered any blocks in the northern portion of the Eastern Gap, not even those located in the Central GOM Planning Area, which is offered for areawide leasing annually. In fact, this area was excluded from the multi-sale Call for Information and Nominations for GOM sales in the 5-Year Program for 2002-2007, making it unavailable for any sales in the current program. Industry interest in this area is expressed through their bidding activity on blocks within ten miles of the Eastern Gap. Resources in the Eastern Gap are expected to reflect the geologic plays that extend into this area. Data for the Eastern Gap is minimal and additional information is needed to evaluate the potential.

#### Counter-interp---in the U.S. means under federal jurisdiction---we meet

MMS 6 – Minerals Management Service, now known as the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, February 2006, “Report to Congress: Comprehensive Inventory of U.S. OCS Oil and Natural Gas Resources,” http://www.boem.gov/uploadedFiles/BOEM/Oil\_and\_Gas\_Energy\_Program/Resource\_Evaluation/Resource\_Assessment/2006-FinalInventoryReportDeliveredToCongress.pdf

This report first summarizes the results of the Minerals Management Service (MMS) 2006 assessment of the technically recoverable resources for the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf (OCS). Technically recoverable resources are hydrocarbons potentially amenable to conventional production regardless of the size, accessibility, and economics of the accumulations assessed. The OCS comprises the portion of the submerged seabed whose mineral estate is subject to Federal jurisdiction (see figure 1). The MMS and the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) have previously completed several assessments of oil and gas resources of the OCS. The 2006 assessment represents a comprehensive appraisal that considered relevant data and information available as of January 1, 2003, and incorporated improved assessment methodologies. No new government-sponsored geological or geophysical data acquisition was undertaken for this inventory.

#### Counter-interp: “in the U.S.” includes the extended OCS---this is how the fed gov interprets its jurisdiction ---proven by how we offer leases in the Western Gap now

Steven Groves 12, the Bernard and Barbara Lomas Fellow in the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom at The Heritage Foundation, 6/14/12, testimony, Hearing before the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations On The Law of the Sea Convention (Treaty Doc. 103-39), http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Groves%20prepared%20testimony%20for%20UNCLOS%20hearing%20(final).pdf

However, pursuant to long-standing law and policy the United States already enjoys and exercises full jurisdiction and control over its ECS. In addition to the 1945 Truman Proclamation, in which President Harry S. Truman declared that the United States “regards the 5 natural resources of the subsoil and sea bed of the continental shelf beneath the high seas but contiguous to the coasts of the United States as appertaining to the United States, subject to its jurisdiction and control,” in 1953 Congress passed the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, which defined the outer continental shelf as “all submerged lands lying seaward and outside of the area of lands beneath navigable waters…and of which the subsoil and seabed appertain to the United States and are subject to its jurisdiction and control.”¶ After the adoption of UNCLOS in 1982, the U.S. affirmed its jurisdiction over its entire continental shelf, including the ECS. Specifically, in November 1987 a U.S. government interagency group issued a policy statement declaring its intent to delimit the U.S. ECS in conformity with Article 76 of UNCLOS (which provides a formula for measuring the extent of a coastal state’s ECS). That statement read, in pertinent part, “The United States has exercised and shall continue to exercise jurisdiction over its continental shelf in accordance with and to the full extent permitted by international law as reflected in Article 76, paragraphs (1), (2) and (3).” Indeed, the United States has already demarcated areas of its ECS in the Gulf of Mexico, the Bering Sea and the Arctic Ocean via bilateral treaties with Mexico and Russia. In the Gulf, for example, the U.S. and Mexico have negotiated a series of treaties to delimit their maritime and continental shelf boundaries, including areas of abutting ECS:¶ In November 1970, the U.S. and Mexico signed a treaty to maintain the Rio Grande and Colorado River as the agreed international boundary between the two nations. As part of the treaty, the two nations demarcated their maritime boundaries in the Gulf of Mexico and the Pacific Ocean out to 12 nm. ¶ In May 1978, building on the 1970 treaty, the two nations signed a treaty delimiting their maritime boundaries in the Gulf and in the Pacific out to 200 nm. The treaty demarcated boundary lines in the Gulf where their respective 200 nm exclusive economic zones (EEZ) abutted, leaving a “doughnut hole” of approximately 5,092 square nm (now known as the “western gap”) where their 200 nm boundary lines did not meet. A second doughnut hole was created in the eastern Gulf where the EEZ of the U.S., Mexico, and Cuba fail to intersect (the “eastern gap”). ¶ In June 2000, the U.S. and Mexico signed a treaty dividing the area of ECS within the western gap. Of the 5,092 square nm of ECS in the western gap, 1,913 (38 percent) went to the United States and 3,179 (62 percent) went to Mexico. The treaty established a drilling moratorium over a narrow strip along the boundary within the western gap due to the possibility that transboundary hydrocarbon reservoirs are located along the boundary. ¶ In February 2012, the U.S. and Mexico signed a treaty regarding the exploitation of transboundary reservoirs located along the continental shelf boundary shared by the two nations in the Gulf, including along the ECS boundary within the western gap. The treaty has not yet been transmitted to the U.S. Senate for its advice and consent. ¶ Collectively, these treaties between the United States and Mexico, particularly the June 2000 ECS delimitation treaty, demarcated an area of U.S. ECS—the 1,913 square nm of submerged continental shelf in the northern portion of the western gap. There is no evidence that the “international community” does not or will not recognize the ECS in the northern portion of the western gap and its resources as being subject to the jurisdiction and control of the United States. ¶ The United States exercises jurisdiction and control over its ECS as evidenced by the fact that the Department of the Interior has made the western gap in the Gulf of Mexico available for hydrocarbon development since August 2001. Specifically, the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) offered the northern portion of the western gap for lease almost immediately after the 2000 U.S.–Mexico ECS delimitation treaty was ratified. That treaty entered into force on January 17, 2001. Seven months later, on August 22, BOEM offered the 7 area of U.S. ECS in the western gap in Lease Sale 180. In that lease sale, three U.S. companies (Texaco, Hess, and Burlington Resources Offshore) and one foreign company (Petrobras) submitted bids totaling more than $2 million for seven lease blocks in the western gap.

#### Aff ground---The topic is stale---international affs key to innovation and rebalancing sides

#### Neg ground---They get unique relations DAs, say No arguments, etc.

#### Education---joint ventures are important in a globalizing world

#### No limits impact---we only allow coop affs in the US---that’s Cuba and Mexico at most

#### Predictability---international agreements are normal parts of drilling policy

Curry L. Hagerty 11, Specialist in Energy and Natural Resources Policy, Congressional Research Service, 5/6/11, “Outer Continental Shelf Moratoria on Oil and Gas Development,” http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41132.pdf

Congress sets policy for OCS activity and determines legislative incentives and restrictions for OCS development. Congress enacted OCS moratoria provisions annually between 1982 and 2008 in Department of the Interior appropriations acts. Outside of the annual appropriations process, Congress also enacts legislation and approves treaties that affect leasing, exploring for, developing, or producing oil and gas in OCS areas. For example, Congress designates national marine sanctuaries and enacts other laws that may restrict or encourage development in certain areas of the OCS.

#### Precision---US code is most predictable---turns limits because stable ground is key to negative research

#### Reasonability---prevents a race to the bottom to exclude the aff arbitrarily---no way for the aff to get offense

## 2AC Restrictions T

#### We meet---the Eastern Gap is restricted from oil production now

MMS 6 – Minerals Management Service, now known as the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, February 2006, “Report to Congress: Comprehensive Inventory of U.S. OCS Oil and Natural Gas Resources,” http://www.boem.gov/uploadedFiles/BOEM/Oil\_and\_Gas\_Energy\_Program/Resource\_Evaluation/Resource\_Assessment/2006-FinalInventoryReportDeliveredToCongress.pdf

2. Restrictions on Access to the OCS for Oil and Gas Exploration and Development: International Boundary Issues ¶ The United States needs international boundary agreements with neighboring countries—with Cuba and Mexico for the Eastern Gap, or with Canada for portions of the eastern Beaufort Sea and southern Gulf of Alaska— before any oil and gas leasing and development can occur in these areas. ¶ In order to gain access to any disputed areas, the United States would have to enter into discussions with Mexico and Cuba, or Canada, to forge a continental shelf boundary agreement similar to what was done by Mexico and the United States for the Western Gap area in the GOM. The process would involve the Department of the Interior (DOI) and the Department of State (DOS), and the U.S. Congress would have to ratify any agreement. ¶ Eastern Gap: The Eastern Gap is an area of the GOM OCS that is bordered by, but beyond, the Exclusive Economic Zones of Mexico, Cuba and the United States. The northern portion of the Eastern Gap is included in the Central and Eastern GOM OCS Planning Areas. Unlike the situation with the Western Gap between Mexico and the United States, the three nations adjacent to the Eastern Gap have not agreed on a continental shelf boundary in this area. In the absence of such a boundary agreement, the MMS has not offered any blocks in the northern portion of the Eastern Gap, not even those located in the Central GOM Planning Area, which is offered for areawide leasing annually. In fact, this area was excluded from the multi-sale Call for Information and Nominations for GOM sales in the 5-Year Program for 2002-2007, making it unavailable for any sales in the current program. Industry interest in this area is expressed through their bidding activity on blocks within ten miles of the Eastern Gap. Resources in the Eastern Gap are expected to reflect the geologic plays that extend into this area. Data for the Eastern Gap is minimal and additional information is needed to evaluate the potential.

#### The embargo is a restriction on oil production

Edward J. Markey 11, Ranking Member, House Committee on Natural Resources, 11/2/11, “NORTH AMERICAN OFFSHORE ENERGY: MEXICO AND CANADA BOUNDARY TREATIES AND NEW DRILLING BY CUBA AND BAHAMAS,” http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg71116/html/CHRG-112hhrg71116.htm

But who are the companies that are planning to drill in the waters off of Cuba, a mere 80 miles from Florida? They are the state-owned oil companies of Malaysia, Vietnam, Venezuela, and China.¶ Because of a relic of the cold war, the Cuban embargo, American oil companies cannot drill in this area that could contain as much as 5 billion barrels of oil. ¶ The Majority has been so focused on a make-believe moratorium on drilling in the Gulf, that they've apparently missed the actual decades-long moratorium on American companies drilling off of Cuba that is the result of the embargo.

#### We meet---it’s FUNCTIONALLY a total ban---no companies can drill with US tech---that’s Benjamin

#### Counter-interp---restrictions are conditions on action

Plummer 29 J., Court Justice, MAX ZLOZOWER, Respondent, v. SAM LINDENBAUM et al., Appellants Civ. No. 3724COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA, THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT100 Cal. App. 766; 281 P. 102; 1929 Cal. App. LEXIS 404September 26, 1929, Decided, lexis

The word "restriction," when used in connection with the grant of interest in real property, is construed as being the legal equivalent of "condition." Either term may be used to denote a limitation upon the full and unqualified enjoyment of the right or estate granted. The words "terms" and "conditions" are often used synonymously when relating to legal rights. "Conditions and restrictions" are that which limits or modifies the existence or character of something; a restriction or qualification. It is a restriction or limitation modifying or destroying the original act with which it is connected, or defeating, terminating or enlarging an estate granted; something which defeats or qualifies an estate; a modus or quality annexed by him that hath an estate, or interest or right to the same, whereby an estate may be either defeated, enlarged, or created upon an uncertain event; a quality annexed to land whereby an estate may be defeated; a qualification or restriction annexed to a deed or device, by virtue of which an estate is made to vest, to be enlarged or defeated upon the happening or not happening of a particular event, or the performance or nonperformance of a particular act.

#### No limits distinction---no way to distinguish outright ban affs and affs that restrict production AND include the chance of total prohibition

#### Aff ground outweighs---the neg has generics and Ks--- bad affs with no lit set the ground for a bad debate

#### Education---they prevent holistic energy education---they destroy natural gas and coal affs because they are all based on EPA emissions restrictions

#### Topic meaning---no direct federal prohibitions---only we can give meaning to every topic word; resolutional language is the only non-arbitrary way to set predictable limits

#### Reasonability---prevents a race to the bottom to exclude the aff arbitrarily---no way for the aff to get offense

## Look Back CP

### Process CP

#### No solvency---no international perception---regulations would be on the books

#### No certainty

#### Kills obama’s cred---makes new energy policy subservient to domestic politics

### 2AC Look Back CP

#### Perm do the counterplan as the mechanism of the USFG doing the plan and guarantee the plan gets passed---competition is based on mandates NOT likely outcomes---they just change normal means

#### Process counterplans are a voting issue---these make aff offense impossible, kill topic focus

#### Perm do both

#### Perm do the counterplan

#### Should is not mandatory

Atlas Collaboration 99

Use of shall, should, may can,” <http://rd13doc.cern.ch/Atlas/DaqSoft/sde/inspect/shall.html> ¶ In the expression of the requirements, shall describes something that is mandatory ; should is weaker. It describes something that might not be satisfied in the final product, but that is desirable enough that any non−compliance shall be explicitly justified ; may grants permission to do something, and makes only a weak statement.

#### Perm do the counterplan, then the plan

#### Massive delays --- their evidence’s based on outdated wishful thinking

Selmi 5 – Daniel Selmi 5, Prof Law at Loyola, 35 Envtl. L. 415, lexis

1. Time as a False Indicator¶ An ongoing point of contention in the literature is whether regulatory negotiation saves time in comparison to traditional rulemaking. Such savings were originally cited as a principal justification for undertaking the negotiation process. 253 **Recently, however**, critics have contended that time savings do not occur. 254 Moreover, observations made by participants in negotiated rulemakings **confirm that negotiations require a** greater time **commitment** than anticipated at their outset. 255¶ The metal-finishing rulemaking **unquestionably fit the time-consuming pattern**. During negotiations, both industry and environmentalists requested a sufficiently slow pace to allow for the compilation of additional technical information. 256 If a negotiation includes a process to facilitate data exchanges and resolve outstanding technical issues, as this negotiation did, parties must expect that negotiations will lengthen substantially.

#### Reg neg involves thousands of parties---prevents consensus and implementation

Camacho 5 – Alejandro Camacho 5, Associate Prof of Law at Notre Dame, 24 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 269, lexis

Though achieving collaboration and consensus is certainly possible in administrative regulatory contexts, the prospect of achieving a multilateral, participatory agreement on a proposed national rule **can be daunting**. 220 Because of their scope, federal administrative rules tend to be made over long periods of time, involve many negotiating sessions, 221 and impact hundreds if notthousands of parties from different regionsof the country. Simply notifying all of these parties that a given issue is being considered for a potential rulemaking is in **itself a logistical challenge**. Even if all relevant parties become involved, the interests affected by the rule may **be too numerous** or varied for the multilateral process to be manageable or for participation to be meaningful. Furthermore, participating in a long-term, nationwide forum can be **time consuming and expensive**, especially for smaller, poorer, or less organized parties. 222 Indeed, some of the parties with the biggest stakes in the outcome of national administrative law are large but diffuse groups (**such as consumers in a product safety rulemaking**) that frequently are poorly represented in the negotiation process. Even some proponents of federal regulatory negotiation concede that it may be under-inclusive because the most active stakeholder groups tend not to be representative of the general consumer or median voter. 223 Finally, the wide spectrum of interests and concerns at stake increases the risk of gridlock, [\*324] making agreement formation and implementation that **much more difficult.**

#### Agencies will circumvent implementing the reg neg

Harter 97 – Phillip J. Harter 97, expert in administrative law at Univ. of Vermont, April 1997, 46 Duke L.J. 1389

A negotiated rulemaking forces the parties to bring an enormous amount of practical information to the table and hence expands the data base on which to build a regulation. The practical insight contributed by those with first-hand experience also allows agency staff to focus resources on areas with the greatest potential payback. While these may seem to be considerable benefits of the process, a fair number of agency personnel feel it is inconsistent with their prerogative to share the decision with others around the table. 104 For example, the Steel Erection Negotiated Rulemaking Advisory Committee (SENRAC) at OSHA developed a rule addressing the erection of steel buildings and other structures. 105 When the rulemaking started, the primary, indeed virtually the only issue in contention was how high an ironworker could climb before having to be secured or otherwise protected from falls. It became clear as the negotiations progressed that many other factors would contribute significantly to a safer work place. Although the fall protection scheme in SENRAC's recommendation is based on an earlier standard developed by OSHA itself, and in many ways is more stringent than that standard for comparable work, the standard has been opposed internally by OSHA staff. This opposition has arisen despite the fact that OSHA had representatives on the committee (one formally, the other as counsel) through whom its staff could have voiced its concerns, and despite the fact that senior officials and committee members who strongly advocated safety concurred in the standard. The staff has delayed adoption of the standard by 18 months, just as they did in OSHA's previous reg neg on MDA. This is certainly not an example of the staff's being frozen out of the decisionmaking process, since it could have fully participated both in internal caucuses and in the negotiating sessions.

#### CP creates MORE uncertainty

Coglianese 1 – Cary Coglianese 1, associate professor of public policy at Harvard & chair of the Regulatory Policy Program at the Center for Business and Government, “Assessing The Advocacy of Negotiated Rulemaking: A Response to Philip Harter”, Kennedy School of Government Faculty Research Working Paper Series, May, http://www.hks.harvard.edu/m-rcbg/research/c.coglianese\_new.york\_assessing.advocacy.pdf

Despite nearly twenty years of experimentation, negotiated rulemaking has yet to achieve a demonstrable reduction in the time it takes to develop regulations nor in the frequency or intensity of subsequent litigation over those regulations. Indeed, the empirical record shows that negotiated rulemaking actually demands more effort and results in more litigation than other comparable rulemaking processes. Had it not been for several decades worth of enthusiastic advocacy of negotiated rulemaking. these results would probably neither be surprising nor contested. After all, it is bound to take an **intensive effort** to develop a consensus among multiple interests on a proposed rule, even for those rules that agencies find more predisposed to success and which are for that reason selected for negotiation in the first place. It is similarly unrealistic to expect that negotiation will stave off subsequent litigation, especially when negotiated processes themselves raise expectations and **generate conflicts over who participates** in the negotiation **and over what the terms** (and silences) in the negotiated agreements **mean.**¶ The finding that negotiated rulemaking neither reduces rulemaking time nor prevents litigation could conceivably be viewed as somewhat less of a failure if it could be shown that negotiated rulemaking systematically led to significantly better quality rules. Harter makes such an assertion, but it too is unsupported by the available body of empirical research. The results of the Langbein and Kerwin study cited by Harter are not easy to interpret. but at best they can be said to show only that participants in negotiated rulemakings tend to perceive the conventional rulemaking process in terms better than those who file comments perceive the conventional rulemaking process. Perceptions on the part of participants in negotiated rulemaking, formed as they are after involvement in quite intensive processes, are likely explained by factors other than genuine, underlying policy improvements. Indeed, there are good reasons to doubt that negotiated rulemaking will in fact lead to any systematic improvement at all in regulatory policy. Making consensus a precondition for policymaking will only likely exacerbate problems such as ambiguity. lowest common denominator results. and an undue emphasis on tractability. More significantly, whatever benefits negotiated rulemaking might presumably hold in terms [\*447]of generating information and dialogue over regulatory policy, these benefits appear to be just as achievable through alternative processes that encourage public participation but which do not demand consensus. Negotiated rulemaking's failure to achieve its goals of reducing rulemaking time and preventing litigation is simply not offset by any demonstrated improvements in the quality of regulatory policy when compared with other ways of developing regulations.

### Perms

#### OIRA wouldn’t recommend the aff---wants to get rid of red tape, which is not the embargo

## SEP CP

### 2AC SEP

#### Perm do the counterplan as the mechanism of the USFG doing the plan and guarantee the plan gets passed---competition is based on mandates NOT likely outcomes---they just change normal means

#### Process counterplans are a voting issue---these make aff offense impossible, kill topic focus

#### Perm do both

#### Perm do the counterplan

#### The counterplan is a reduction – if it’s on paper but not enforced it is NOT a restriction

Berger 1 Justice Opinion, INDUSTRIAL RENTALS, INC., ISAAC BUDOVITCH and FLORENCE BUDOVITCH, Appellants Below, Appellants, v. NEW CASTLE COUNTY BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT and NEW CASTLE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF LAND USE, Appellees Below, Appellees. No. 233, 2000SUPREME COURT OF DELAWARE776 A.2d 528; 2001 Del. LEXIS 300April 10, 2001, Submitted July 17, 2001, Decided lexis

We disagree. Statutes must be read as a whole and all the words must be given effect. 3 The word "restriction" means "a limitation (esp. in a deed) placed on the use or enjoyment of property." 4 If a deed restriction has been satisfied, and no longer limits the use or enjoyment of the property, then it no longer is a deed restriction -- even though the paper on which it was written remains. [\*\*6] Thus, the phrase "projects containing deed restrictions requiring phasing…," in Section 11.130(A)(7) means presently existing deed restrictions. As of June 1988, the Acierno/Marta Declaration contained no remaining deed restrictions requiring phasing to coincide with improvements to the transportation system. As a result, the Acierno/Marta projects should not have been included in the scope of the Budovitches' TIS.

#### Perm do the plan by adding the alternate penalty option of the counterplan and providing exemptions [adding an alternate penalty option allowing violators to choose penalization solely through entry into a Supplemental Environmental Program requiring payment of 1% of revenue from all violating activities to an Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion Trust Fund managed by dedicated non-profit organizations, conducted in co-ordination with, and with oversight by, the Department of Energy, to support the development and commercialization of Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion, with an initial focus on providing financing for a 10 megawatt pilot project demonstration plant. Implementation of the Supplemental Environmental Program should provide a shield from additional legal penalties stemming from the violating action, including citizen suits and penalties under state law.  Any conflicting federal laws and regulations should be modified to provide a narrow exemption for the above act.]

#### No one will take the exemption, and the SEP is not enough money to fund OTEC

Brown 11 – Mr. Brown holds an MBA from New York University and a BA from Brown University. Matthew Brown is President of InterEnergy Solutions, a consulting firm that focuses on clean energy policy and finance. 2011, "Brief #1: Funding Mechanisms for Energy Efficiency"ase.org/resources/brief-1-funding-mechanisms-energy-efficiency

Funds are not predictable because they depend on fines that state environmental agencies issue, as well as on the interest that industry may or may not have in paying for a particular project. Companies sometimes view SEPs as a cumbersome alternative **to simply paying a fine and moving on with business operations.¶** **Not likely to provide large amounts of funding.**

#### Perm do the plan and conduct SEPs on other issues

#### The SEP will not be approved – their author

Bonorris 7 – Steven Bonorris, Editor, The Public Law Research Institute University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2007, [http://www.ecy.wa.gov/services/enforce/settlements/ABAHastingsSEPreport.pdf](http://www.ecy.wa.gov/services/enforce/settlements/ABAHastingsSEPreport.pdf-http://www.ecy.wa.gov/services/enforce/settlements/ABAHastingsSEPreport.pdf)

Legal Principles¶ 1. A SEP will not be approved if the violator is otherwise legally required to perform¶ the proposed activity.¶ 2. SEPs should have a clear relationship to the violation. This relationship exists if the project reduces the overall environmental or public health impacts or risks to¶ which the violation contributes, or is designed to reduce the likelihood of similar violations in the future. A SEP may not be directly related to the violation if the¶ project is either: ¶ a. A pollution prevention project that provides significant environmental benefit; or¶ b. Some other multi-media or facility-wide activity that provides widespread¶ environmental benefit.

#### The EPA will not approve the SEPs

Bonorris 7 – Steven Bonorris 7, Associate Director for Research, Public Law Research Institute, UC Hastings College of the Law, 1/25/7, “Supplemental Environmental Projects: A Fifty State Survey with Model Practices,” <http://www.ecy.wa.gov/services/enforce/settlements/ABAHastingsSEPreport.pdf>

In addition, the allowance of a SEP as part of an enforcement action is a discretionary decision left up to the regulatory agency. 183 Under most SEP policies, if the agency believes that a proposed project would fail to provide a sufficient deterrent effect, then the agency will not permit the project and instead, demand the full payment of the civil penalty. 184 For example, if the proposed project primarily benefits the violator, rather than the environment or the public health, then it will not be approved as a SEP. 185 Similarly, if a project is approved but the agency finds that it still benefits the violator, those benefits will often be given a monetary value which the agency will then deduct from the mitigation amount of the SEP. 186

#### No solvency --- causes regulatory uncertainty

Steven Bonorris 7, Associate Director for Research, Public Law Research Institute, UC Hastings College of the Law, 1/25/7, “Supplemental Environmental Projects: A Fifty State Survey with Model Practices,” <http://www.ecy.wa.gov/services/enforce/settlements/ABAHastingsSEPreport.pdf>

The capacity for underdeterrence is particularly acute as the SEP cost itself is a new source of regulatory uncertainty: usually, SEP costs are assessed and reported by the violator, and the regulator has no mechanism for confirming the reported figures. 187 Opportunistic violators may overestimate SEP costs in order to receive greater relief from the calculated penalty, or they may underreport the business benefits of SEPs. 188 In order to track SEP implementation, many state SEP policies require the submission of detailed cost estimates and certifications of progress, as well as provide for stipulated penalties for SEPs that end up costing less than estimated. However, the literature has not quantified the efficacy of these measures against opportunistic violators. 189

#### Companies won’t implement SEPs

Kristl 7 – Kenneth T. Kristl 7, Associate Professor of Law and Director of the Environmental and Natural Resources Law Clinic, Widener University School of Law, “MAKING A GOOD IDEA EVEN BETTER: RETHINKING THE LIMITS ON SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROJECTS,” Vermont Law Review, Vol. 31, 2007, <http://lawreview.vermontlaw.edu/files/2012/02/kristl.pdf>

A second potential impediment to wider SEP usage lies in the clear “second rate” status that dollars spent on SEPs suffer under the EPA’s later SEP Policies. While the 1991 SEP Policy recognized that the penalty reduction afforded by an SEP could be as high as 100% of the value of the SEP, 224 with a wide variety of percentages used, 225 since the 1995 SEP Policy EPA has capped the mitigation percentage at 80%, 226 and in practice sought much lower percentages. 227 EPA’s approach presents defendants with an unusual choice: simply pay a penalty (so that each dollar paid reduces the penalty owed by $1) OR pay a smaller amount of penalty cash and cover the rest with an SEP in which the defendant must spend $1.25 or more to reduce the penalty amount by a dollar. Assuming a rational economic actor (which EPA must assume in order for the deterrence of substantial civil penalties to work 228 ), the SEP Policies create a built-in economic disincentive to undertake SEPs by making the dollars spent on SEPs less valuable than dollars simply paid as penalties. This SEP dollar “discount” could explain why only 12% of settlements involve SEPs: it is cheaper for most defendants to avoid undertaking an SEP. Given this obvious disincentive, why would EPA want to cap the mitigation percentage (and hence the value of an SEP dollar) at 80%?

### Soil Defense

#### No impact to soil erosion - all hype - your authors agree

Simon 97 Julian L. Simon teaches business at the University of Maryland and is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute. "Digging Deeper Into the Soil Erosion Scam," June 3, CATO, https://www.google.com/search?sugexp=chrome,mod=13&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8&q=Digging+Deeper+Into+the+Soil+Erosion+Scam

This program is part-and-parcel of the most conclusive discredited environmental-political fraud of recent times, the National Agricultural Lands Study (NALS) set up in 1980 by the Agriculture Department. This organization created a huge media scare about farmland being ruined by two supposedly related forces, urbanization of farmland and the erosion of fields.

Both scares were quickly disproven. The amazing part is that the assertions were eventually acknowledged to be false by the U.S. Department of Agriculture. That is, even the original purveyors of the false facts about the "vanishing farmland crisis" ended up agreeing that the widely reported scare was without foundation. But the scares did not die, and are back with us again.

Here is the saga: Headlines like these began to appear in the newspapers about 1980: "The peril of vanishing farmlands" (the New York Times). "Farmland losses could end U.S. food exports" (Chicago Tribune). "Vanishing farmlands: selling out the soil" (Saturday Review), and "As world needs food, U.S. keeps losing soil to land developers" (Wall Street Journal). The stories claimed that the urbanization-of-farmland rate had jumped from the 1960s to the 1970s from less than 1 million acres per year to 3 million acres per year. This assertion was wholly untrue as we shall see.

Then in a Jan. 11, 1983, speech President Reagan said, "I think we are all aware of the need to do something about soil erosion." The headline on a June 4, 1984, Newsweek "My Turn" article typified how the issue was presented: "A step away from the Dust Bowl." More recently, we have such statements as that of Vice President Al Gore about how "8 acres' worth of prime topsoil floats past Memphis every hour," and that Iowa "used to have an average of 16 inches of the best topsoil in the world. Now it is down to 8 inches "

These are the scam-busting facts: The long-run trend in the decades up to 1970 was about 1 million acres of total land urbanized per year. The Soil Conservation Service in conjunction with NALS asserted that the rate then jumped to 3 million acres yearly from 1967 to 1975 or 1977. Scholars at several universities and think tanks found that the 3 million-acres-a-year rate was most implausible in light of data from other sources. And we found that the survey on which the NALS based its claim employed a faulty polling technique and had amazing huge errors in arithmetic.

The soil erosion claims were **equally** ridiculous. According to the USDA, only a tiny proportion of cropland--3 percent--is so erosive that no management practices can help much. Seventy-seven percent of cropland erodes at rates below 5 tons per acre each year, the equilibrium rate at which new soil is formed below the surface; that is, most cropland erodes less than the "no net loss rate." Just 15 percent of U.S. cropland "is moderately erosive and eroding about a 5-ton tolerance. Erosion on the land could be reduced with improved management practices," though this does not necessarily mean the land is in danger or is being managed uneconomically.

In short, the aggregate data on the condition of farm and the rate of erosion do not support the concern about soil erosion. What's more, the data suggest that the condition of cropland has been improving rather than worsening. Theodore W. Schultz, the only agricultural economist to win a Nobel Prize, and Leo V. Mayer of the USDA, both wrote very forcefully that the danger warnings were false. Mr. Schultz cited not only research but also his own lifetime recollections starting as a farm boy in the Dakotas in the 1930s.

But even a Nobel laureate's efforts could not slow the public-relations juggernaut that successfully co-opted the news media, won the minds of the American public, and were used to justify the USDA giveaways.

So far, the story is unremarkable--another environmental scare disproven. But in this case there was a remarkable development: In 1984, the USDA's own Soil Conservation Service issued a paper by Susan Lee that completely reversed the earlier scare figures and confirmed the estimates by the independent scholars.

And the accompanying press release made it clear that the former estimates were now being retracted. "[T]he acreage classified as urban and built-up land was 46.6 million acres in 1982, compared to 64.7 million acres reported in 1977." Please read that again. It means that whereas in 1977 the SCS had declared that 64.7 million acres had been "lost" to built-up land, just five years later SCS admitted that the actual total was 46.6 million acres. That is, the 1977 estimate was admitted to be fully 50 percent too high, a truly amazing error for something so easy to check toughly as the urbanized acreage of the U.S.

With unusual candor, the USDA press release added, "The 1977 estimate thus appears to have been markedly overstated."

The USDA press release of April 10,1984, contained a second bombshell: "The average annual rate of soil erosion on cultivated cropland dropped from 5.1 tons per acre to 4.8 tons per acre." That is, erosion was lessening rather than getting worse, exactly the opposite of what NALS claimed. And this finding undercuts the new USDA program being proposed now.

## Immigration DA

### No DA

#### Obama’s pursuing energy policy through agencies which doesn’t cost PC, doesn’t trade off with immigration, and pounds the disad

Amy Harder 2-6, Energy and Environment Correspondent, National Journal, 2/6/13, “In Washington, Energy and Climate Issues Get Shoved in the Closet,” http://www.nationaljournal.com/columns/power-play/in-washington-energy-and-climate-issues-get-shoved-in-the-closet-20130206

While Obama maneuvers for a big legislative win on immigration, he’s moving on a parallel track toward another win on climate change through Environmental Protection Agency rules controlling greenhouse-gas emissions, which don’t require congressional approval. Fresh off a strong reelection victory, Obama has more freedom to move unilaterally with EPA.¶ “He doesn't have to expend political capital or ask Democrats to extend their necks on this issue,” said Kevin Book, an energy analyst at the Washington-based consulting firm ClearView Energy Partners. “He already won. He can control the issue and move as fast or slow as he wants.”¶ The EPA action will only further polarize efforts, such as those by Murkowski on the Senate Energy panel, to move through Congress smaller bits of energy and environmental policy.

### High-Skilled Inev

#### Loss of PC still results in high-skill reform

Yglesias 1/15 Matthew, Slate, 2013, How the GOP Can Roll Obama on Immigration, www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2013/01/15/immigration\_reform\_will\_obama\_get\_rolled.html

Of the major policy issues under discussion in Washington, "immigration reform" stands out for having unusually undefined content. For the major immigration-advocacy groups, the goal is clear, a comprehensive bill that includes a path to citizenship for the overwhelming majority of unauthorized migrants already living in the United States. But many other aspects of immigration law are in the mix as part of a proposed deal, and it seems to me that there's a fair chance that a nimble Republican Party could essentially roll the Democratic coalition and pass an "immigration reform" bill that doesn't offer the path Latino advocacy groups are looking for.¶ Elise Foley has the key line from her briefing on the administration's thinking about immigration, namely that a piecemeal approach "could result in passage of the less politically complicated pieces, such as an enforcement mechanism and high-skilled worker visas, while leaving out more contentious items such as a pathway to citizenship for undocumented immigrants."¶ And indeed it could. But how can they stop it? The last House GOP effort to split the high-tech visas question from the path to citizenship question was an absurd partisan ploy. If Republicans want to get serious about it they should be able to make it work. The centerpiece would be something on increased immigration of skilled workers. That's something the tech industry wants very much, it's a great idea on the merits, and few influential people have any real beef with it. High tech visas will easily generate revenue to pay for some stepped-up enforcement. Then instead of adding on a poison pill so Democrats will block the bill, you need to add a sweetener. Not the broad path to citizenship, but something small like the DREAM Act. Now you've got a package that falls massively short of what Latino groups are looking for, but that I think Democrats will have a hard time actually blocking. After all, why would they block it? It packages three things—more skilled immigration, more enforcement, and help for DREAMers—they say they want. Blocking it because it doesn't also do the broad amnesty that liberals want and conservatives hate would require the kind of fanaticism that is the exact opposite of Obama's approach to politics.

#### No high skilled worker shortage

Richard B. Freeman 6 holds the Herbert Ascherman Chair in Economics at Harvard University IS A GREAT LABOR SHORTAGE COMING? REPLACEMENT DEMAND IN THEGLOBAL ECONOMY" Sept 06 www.law.harvard.edu/programs/lwp/2006September.pdf

The most plausible reason is that older workers tend to be concentrated in older economic sectors, from which demand is shifting toward newer areas. It is this factor that induces the BLS to give different replacement demands for growing and declining occupations. In the 1990s there were many workers of retirement age in the railroad industry and in heavy manufacturing, but few in the new computer software and e-economy sectors where employment was growing. If labor economists had a model that fully accounted for changes in employment due to all factors, replacement demand would inevitably have a positive impact on employment of younger persons, but absent such a model, the effects of replacement demand are so dwarfed by changes in market conditions as to produce the negative relations in table 6. The message is that economic forecasters should not count on replacement demand for retiring baby boomers to create a labor shortage in the occupations with lots of boomers.18

demography and labor market developments

Implicit in the fears that the US will face a great labor shortage in the next decade or two is a belief that demographic forces have a powerful predictable impact on economic outcomes. In the past, this has not been the case. Changes in behavior due to changing market incentives often overwhelm demographic factors. In the 1950s and 1960s analysts projected much smaller growth in labor supply than actually occurred because they failed to foresee the changing labor force behavior of women in response to improved employment opportunities and wages. In the late 1960s-early 1970s, when the baby boom generation reached the job market, the earnings and employment of young persons worsened relative to the earnings and employment of older workers due to the demographically driven shift in labor supplies. Indeed, this shift was an econometrician’s dream exogenous shock for estimating the elasticity of the wages of young persons relative to older persons to changes in relative supplies (Freeman, 1979; Welch 1979).

### No Impact

#### Obama will XO immigration reforms

Lillis 2-16 – Mike Lillis, February 16th, 2013, "Dems: Obama can act unilaterally on immigration reform" thehill.com/blogs/regwatch/administration/283583-dems-recognize-that-obama-can-act-unilaterally-on-immigration-reform

President Obama can – and will – take steps on immigration reform in the event Congress doesn't reach a comprehensive deal this year, according to several House Democratic leaders.¶ While the Democrats are hoping Congress will preclude any executive action by enacting reforms legislatively, they say the administration has the tools to move unilaterally if the bipartisan talks on Capitol Hill break down. Furthermore, they say, **Obama stands poised to use them.**¶ **"I don't think the president will be hands off on immigration for any moment in time**," Rep. Xavier Becerra (D-Calif.), the head of the House Democratic Caucus, told reporters this week. "**He's ready to move forward if we're not**."¶ Rep. Joseph Crowley (N.Y.), vice chairman of the Democratic Caucus, echoed that message, saying Obama is "not just beating the drum," for immigration reform, "he's actually the drum major."¶ "There are limitations as to what he can do with executive order," Crowley said Wednesday, "but he did say that if Congress continued to fail to act that he would take steps and measures to enact common-sense executive orders to move this country forward."¶ Rep. Raul Grijalva (D-Ariz.), who heads the Congressional Progressive Caucus, said there are "plenty" of executive steps Obama could take if Congress fails to pass a reform package. "The huge one," Grijalva said, is "**the waiving of deportation**" in order to keep families together.¶ "Four million of the undocumented [immigrants] are people who overstayed their visas to stay with family," he said Friday. "So that would be, I think, an area in which … there's a great deal of executive authority that he could deal with."¶ The administration **could also waive visa caps**, Grijalva said, to ensure that industries like agriculture have ample access to low-skilled labor.¶ "Everybody's for getting the smart and the talented in, but there's also a labor flow issue," he said.

#### Timeframe is more than 10 years

Navarrette 2-19 – Ruben Navarrette, CNN Contributor, February 19th, 2013, "Guest worker issue may kill immigration reform" [www.cnn.com/2013/02/19/opinion/navarrette-immigration-reform/index.html](http://www.cnn.com/2013/02/19/opinion/navarrette-immigration-reform/index.html)

How long? The undocumented could immediately apply for a special protective status to avoid deportation, but it would take them about eight years to get legal permanent residency (a green card) and another four or five years to become a U.S. citizen.

### AT: Economy

#### No chance of war from economic decline---best and most recent data

Daniel W. Drezner 12, Professor, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, October 2012, “The Irony of Global Economic Governance: The System Worked,” <http://www.globaleconomicgovernance.org/wp-content/uploads/IR-Colloquium-MT12-Week-5_The-Irony-of-Global-Economic-Governance.pdf>

The final outcome addresses a dog that hasn’t barked: the effect of the Great Recession on cross-border conflict and violence. During the initial stages of the crisis, multiple analysts asserted that the financial crisis would lead states to increase their use of force as a tool for staying in power.37 Whether through greater internal repression, diversionary wars, arms races, or a ratcheting up of great power conflict, there were genuine concerns that the global economic downturn would lead to an increase in conflict. Violence in the Middle East, border disputes in the South China Sea, and even the disruptions of the Occupy movement fuel impressions of surge in global public disorder.

The aggregate data suggests otherwise, however. The Institute for Economics and Peace has constructed a “Global Peace Index” annually since 2007. A key conclusion they draw from the 2012 report is that “The average level of peacefulness in 2012 is approximately the same as it was in 2007.”38 Interstate violence in particular has declined since the start of the financial crisis – as have military expenditures in most sampled countries. Other studies confirm that the Great Recession has not triggered any increase in violent conflict; the secular decline in violence that started with the end of the Cold War has not been reversed.39 Rogers Brubaker concludes, “the crisis has not to date generated the surge in protectionist nationalism or ethnic exclusion that might have been expected.”40

None of these data suggest that the global economy is operating swimmingly. Growth remains unbalanced and fragile, and has clearly slowed in 2012. Transnational capital flows remain depressed compared to pre-crisis levels, primarily due to a drying up of cross-border interbank lending in Europe. Currency volatility remains an ongoing concern. Compared to the aftermath of other postwar recessions, growth in output, investment, and employment in the developed world have all lagged behind. But the Great Recession is not like other postwar recessions in either scope or kind; expecting a standard “V”-shaped recovery was unreasonable. One financial analyst characterized the post-2008 global economy as in a state of “contained depression.”41 The key word is “contained,” however. Given the severity, reach and depth of the 2008 financial crisis, the proper comparison is with Great Depression. And by that standard, the outcome variables look impressive. As Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff concluded in This Time is Different: “that its macroeconomic outcome has been only the most severe global recession since World War II – and not even worse – must be regarded as fortunate.”42

### 2AC Immigration

#### Won’t pass---and gun control and budget pounds

Altman 3/20 [Alex Altman, Washington correspondent for TIME, “Four Hurdles That Could Block Immigration Reform,” http://swampland.time.com/2013/03/20/four-hurdles-that-could-block-immigration-reform/]

The next few months offer the best chance in a generation for the two parties to solve a problem that has bedeviled Congress like few others. Both sides agree the U.S. immigration system is broken. Both would seem to gain from a deal that clears a pathway out of legal oblivion for the nation’s 11 million illegal immigrants. Support is building for a landmark pact. But while negotiations are progressing in both the House and Senate, an agreement is a long way off. As the talks grow more detailed, obstacles to a deal may begin to emerge:¶ Problem #1: The Gang of Eight¶ The first snag lurks in the Senate, where the so-called Gang of Eight has huddled privately since the election in hopes of hammering out a bill. Members have crafted a set of measures that would create a pathway to citizenship for the nation’s estimated 11 million undocumented immigrants within about 13 years while requiring them to register with federal authorities, pay back taxes and fines, learn English and undergo background checks. The deal, both sides agree, would also beef up border security and determine how the future flow of immigrants will be regulated to match the needs of the economy.¶ The Gang’s closed conclaves have been marked by Vatican-style secrecy, often a sign of progress in a town where silence is rare. The Gang’s members – Republicans Marco Rubio, Lindsey Graham, John McCain and Jeff Flake, and Democrats Chuck Schumer, Dick Durbin, Bob Menendez and Michael Bennet – have, by all accounts, developed a rapport. “You can tell by the tone of their voices,” says an elected Democrat briefed on the progress of the private talks.¶ But the broad themes are the easy part. The full bill will stretch to hundreds of pages, each peppered with detailed provisions that could spike it. Members bring clashing political imperatives and ideologies to the talks. Rubio, for example, is trying to repair the GOP’s tattered image with Hispanic voters without sparking a backlash among the movement conservatives he’d need in a presidential bid. Graham, who faces a probable primary challenge in 2014, has a habit of basking in the bipartisan spotlight before bolting when negotiations intensify. The measure of the Gang of Eight’s success isn’t whether they are aligned at the start of their talks. It’s whether they are all aligned at the end.¶ Problem #2: The Lobbyists¶ A few years ago, an impasse between the leaders of the Chamber of Commerce and the AFL-CIO helped scupper an immigration-reform bill backed by President George W. Bush. At that time, business and labor could not agree on how many visas to grant low skilled workers who make the construction, agriculture and hotel and restaurant industries hum. The Chamber wanted cheap labor, but didn’t want workers to stay; unions were concerned about protecting citizens’ jobs. Soon after, reform collapsed.¶ This time the two groups have nurtured an unlikely alliance. “There has been a sea change,” says a labor source close to the discussions. Nudged by Graham and Schumer, the two lobbies released a set of shared principles, including one stating that Americans should get “first crack” at available jobs and that businesses should have the flexibility to hire to meet the demands of the market. But history could repeat itself again. The two sides call for a new federal agency charged with setting visa levels, but they have yet to agree on who’s eligible or how the new bureau will work. The issue of future flow has been a stubborn sticking point before. And it is as easy to imagine conservatives balking at efforts to create a new government agency as it is to foresee unions drawing a line at a small number of foreign workers.¶ Problem #3: House Republicans¶ Even if Senate negotiators can come up with a package to get 60 votes in the upper chamber, “the question continues to be, how does it get through the House?” says Frank Sharry, an expert on immigration reform. As in the Senate, a bipartisan cluster of eight representatives from across the ideological spectrum have been secretly meeting for months. Congressman Luis Gutierrez, an Illinois Democrat who has long been a leader on immigration reform, is full of praise for the new tack taken by his Republican counterparts. But, he acknowledges, “You still have to put those votes on the board, and that’s going to be a real, real test in the House of Representatives.”¶ For their part, Republicans say the party’s old dogma, which held that illegal immigrants should self-deport and then go to the back of the line, is not viable policy. Even many immigration hard-liners say they want to help shape comprehensive reform. “It’s time for us to belly up to the bar,” says Ted Poe, the Texas Republican who chairs the House immigration reform caucus. But for conservatives, amnesty remains a dirty word. “A bill that’s basically amnesty, that says you’re here and you’re going to be a citizen — those two things are not going to come out of this conservative House,” says Poe. Even citizenship is charged enough that Republican Senator Rand Paul, who gave a speech March 19 backing a path to legalization for undocumented immigrants, avoided using the term. Many House Republicans, including several in the Judiciary Committee through which a bill must pass, have a long history of antipathy to amnesty, and only a grassroots rebellion to fear as next year’s primaries approach.¶ Then there is the reality that even if Republicans were to be widely supportive of amnesty, very few of those new citizens are likely to abandon the Democratic Party anytime soon. “Republicans face a choice: do they ditch their principles and go all out in a failing attempt to outpander Democrats?” asks Rosemary Jenks, director of government relations at NumbersUSA, which advocates for lower immigration levels. “It’s becoming very clear to Republicans in Congress that this is not going to get them the Hispanic vote.”¶ Problem #4: The Democrats¶ Little discussed but also looming is the possibility that Democrats drag their feet on reform. Liberals will balk if the path to citizenship is too long or too onerous, or if enforcement provisions are too rigid. Many conservatives also suspect that Democratic power brokers, despite their daily hammering of Republicans to get moving on immigration reform, would privately prefer to keep the issue as a cudgel than actually pass a law. Barack Obama “wants to make a bill come out of the Senate that is so far out there that it would never pass, so that he can blame us for not being compassionate and use the issue to take back the House in 2014,” says a House Republican. Even some liberals see this as a plausible scenario. “There’s always a lingering doubt in my mind,” admits one House Democrat. Obama knows that putting his fingerprints on the deal is an easy way to kill it; when a draft of his proposal leaked in the press, he called Republican negotiators individually to apologize. But if negotiations in Congress bog down, he may not be so hands off.¶ By all accounts, negotiators are making genuine progress toward a landmark deal that builds on a foundation laid during its last fumbled attempts. But lawmakers still have to thread a bill through a thicket of obstacles in a bitterly divided Congress. Sources close to the negotiations say they expect both chambers to introduce legislation in early April, giving Congress several months to haggle out a pact before members scatter for their summer recess. It sounds like plenty of time, but it’s not. Immigration will have to jockey for attention this spring with gun control, budgets and a potential grand bargain on tax and entitlement reform. Meanwhile, the human cost of the political stalemate is high. Each day, 1,400 undocumented immigrants are deported.

#### No spillover

Judson Berger 3-4, 2013, “Recurring budget crises could put squeeze on Obama's second-term priorities,” Fox News, <http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/03/04/recurring-budget-crises-could-put-squeeze-on-obama-second-term-priorities/#ixzz2OknXmt3G>

Rep. Luis Gutierrez, D-Ill., a vocal advocate for immigration reform, voiced confidence Monday that the administration and Congress could handle the busy agenda. ¶ "The spirit of bipartisan cooperation that is keeping the immigration issue moving forward has not been poisoned by the sequester and budget stalemate, so far," he said in a statement. "The two sets of issues seem to exist in parallel universes where I can disagree with my Republican colleagues strenuously on budget matters, but still work with them effectively to eventually reach an immigration compromise. ... I remain extremely optimistic that immigration reform is going to happen this year." ¶ Immigration reform efforts are still marching along despite the budget drama. Obama met last week on the issue with Sens. John McCain, R-Ariz., and Lindsey Graham, R-S.C., who both are part of a bipartisan group crafting legislation.

#### Infrastructure pounds---it’s top of the agenda

Lederman 3-29 – Josh Lederman, Associated Press, March 29th, 2013, "Obama pitches public works spending to create jobs" www.usnews.com/news/politics/articles/2013/03/29/obama-to-pitch-infrastructure-investments-in-miami

MIAMI (AP) — Trying to show that the economy remains a top priority, President Barack Obama promoted a plan Friday to create construction and other jobs by attracting private money to help rebuild roads, bridges and other public works projects.¶ Obama fleshed out the details during a visit to a Miami port that's undergoing $2 billion in upgrades paid for with government and private dollars. The quick trip was designed to show that the economy and unemployment are top priorities for a president who also is waging high-profile campaigns on immigration reform and gun control.¶ Obama said the unemployment rate among construction workers was the highest of any industry, despite being cut nearly in half over the past three years.¶ "There are few more important things we can do to create jobs right now and strengthen our economy over the long haul than rebuilding the infrastructure that powers our businesses and economy," Obama said. "As president, **my top priority** is to make sure we are doing everything we can to reignite the true engine of our economic growth — and that is a rising, thriving middle class**."**¶ **Among the proposals Obama called for, which require approval from Congress, are:**¶—$4 billion in new spending on two infrastructure programs that award loans and grants.¶ —Higher caps on "private activity bonds" to encourage more private spending on highways and other infrastructure projects. State and local governments use the bonds to attract investment.¶ —Giving foreign pension funds tax-exempt status when selling U.S. infrastructure, property or real estate assets. U.S. pension funds are generally tax exempt in those circumstances. The administration says some international pension funds cite the tax burden as a reason for not investing in American infrastructure.¶ —A renewed call for a $10 billion national "infrastructure bank."¶ Arriving at the expansive port in Miami, Obama stood inside a double-barreled, concrete-laced hole in the ground, touring a tunnel project that will connect the port to area highways. The project has received loans and grants under the programs Obama touted and is expected to open next summer.¶ The president made private-sector infrastructure investment a key part of the economic agenda he rolled out in his State of the Union address last month. In the speech, he also called for a "Fix-It-First" program that would spend $40 billion in taxpayer funds on urgent repairs.¶ Congressional approval is not a sure bet, considering that House Republicans have shown little appetite for Obama's spending proposals. In fact, the infrastructure bank is an idea Obama called for many times in the past, but it gained little traction during his first term.¶ Obama's focus on generating more private-sector investment underscores the tough road new spending faces on Capitol Hill, where **Republican lawmakers often threaten to** block new spending unless it's paid for by cutting taxes or other spending. "These are projects that are helpful to the economy and shouldn't break down on partisan lines," said White House spokesman Josh Earnest.¶ But **Florida Republicans, including Gov. Rick Scott, faulted Obama for being "late to the party."** Before Obama arrived in Florida, **Scott argued that state taxpayers have had to pick up too much of the tab for this and other port projects because the president was slow to support them**.¶ Alan Krueger, chairman of the White House Council of Economic Advisers, told reporters traveling with Obama that the initiatives discussed Friday will cost $21 billion, not including the $40 billion for "Fix-It-First." Krueger said any increased spending associated with the proposals would not add to the deficit.¶ Krueger said details of how the programs would be paid for would be included in the budget Obama is scheduled to release on April 10.

#### Obama not key

The Link, 3/30/13, “US To Pass New Immigration Bill By This Summer”, <http://thelinkpaper.ca/?p=27900>

While overhauling America’s patchwork immigration laws is a top second term priority for the president, he has ceded the negotiations almost entirely to Congress. He and his advisers have calculated that a bill crafted by Congress stands a better chance of winning Republican support than one overtly influenced by the president.¶ In his interviews Wednesday, Obama tried to stay out of the prickly policy issues that remain unfinished in the Senate talks, though he said a split between business and labor on wages for new low-skilled workers was unlikely to “doom” the legislation.¶ “This is a resolvable issue,” he said.¶ The president also spoke Wednesday with Univision. His interviews followed a citizenship ceremony conducted Monday at the White House where he pressed Congress to “finish the job” on immigration, an issue that has vexed Washington for years.¶ The president made little progress in overhauling fractured U.S. immigration laws in his first term, but he redoubled his efforts after winning re-election. The November contest also spurred some Republicans to drop their opposition to immigration reform, given that Hispanics overwhelmingly backed Obama.¶ In an effort to keep Republicans at the negotiation table, Obama has stayed relatively quiet on immigration over the last month.

### Cuba

#### Only drilling in U.S. waters link-turns politics---the possibility of revenues being shared with states is key to bipart

Coral Davenport 13, energy & environment correspondent, National Journal, 2/5/13, “Breakthrough Nears on Tapping Offshore Energy Supply,” http://www.nationaljournal.com/congress/breakthrough-nears-on-tapping-offshore-energy-supply-20130205

In a season of political gridlock, a breakthrough could be near on legislation to promote energy production off the nation’s coastlines.¶ A bipartisan energy bill now being crafted in the Senate could hit a sweet spot between expanding offshore oil and gas drilling, which many Republicans want, and creating incentives for new offshore wind and tidal power, which many Democrats want. **It could also create a** new source of revenue **for the nation’s 24 coastal states—a** tempting prospect **for many cash-strapped state governments**.¶ The bill is being written by Sen. Lisa Murkowski of Alaska, the top Republican on the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee, along with Democratic Sens. Mary Landrieuof Louisiana and Ron Wyden of Oregon, the new chairman the Senate Energy panel.¶ Energy has emerged in recent years as a hot-button political and economic issue, as the nation suffered from record-high gasoline prices in 2008, reeled from the Gulf of Mexico oil spill in 2010, and clashed over how to tackle the controversial problem of climate change. But it’s been five years since Congress has actually passed a comprehensive energy bill. Indeed, the high-profile politicization of energy issues has often appeared to make it more difficult to actually write and pass energy policy.¶ The Murkowski-Landrieu-Wyden bill has the potential break that logjam—and to allow both Democrats and Republicans to actually claim that they are moving an “all-of-the-above” energy bill. Both sides spent 2012 touting that energy slogan on the campaign trail.¶ The new bill relies on an old idea with some fresh tweaks. **Its central proposal is to allow coastal states to receive a share of the money generated when energy—of any kind—is produced in federally owned waters off their shores.** Currently, with one exception, when an oil or gas company drills offshore in federal waters, it must pay a hefty 18.75 percent of the value of the fuel that it produces to the federal government. Last year, offshore drilling royalties sent $5.2 billion flowing to the Treasury.¶ In 2006, Landrieu sponsored a bill that would have opened up new portions of the Gulf of Mexico for drilling and sent 37.5 percent of the money set aside for the U.S. government to Gulf Coast states instead of the Treasury. The idea was that the money would be used to help the Gulf Coast rebuild and restore its coastal wetlands after the devastation of Hurricane Katrina.¶ Now Landrieu and Murkowski, whose own home state also relies heavily on the oil industry, **want to apply that revenue-sharing formula to the entire U.S. coastline.** The idea is that it would create an alluring incentive for states to open up their coasts for drilling, knowing that along with oil and gas rigs, they’d get a new revenue stream — as much as an estimated $500 million a year. There has actually long been strong bipartisan support in Congress for the idea of revenue-sharing. In 2006, Landrieu’s bill passed the Senate on an overwhelming vote of 71-25.¶ For years, the biggest obstacle to revenue-sharing legislation was former Senate Energy and Natural Resources Chairman Jeff Bingaman, D-N.M., who retired from Congress last year. Bingaman fiercely opposed revenue-sharing as a concept that would divert much-needed federal revenue to state coffers.¶ But Wyden, the new Energy chairman, hails from a coastal state that could benefit from the proposal. His idea is to write the bill in such a way that it would also promote renewable energy and environmental conservation. It would allow states to take in a percentage of revenue from generating electricity with offshore wind farms, and it would set aside a portion of that money for environmental restoration and conservation.¶ **“There’s an opportunity to** knit together a coalition **of people interested in federal lands and federal waters, of people interested in job creation and protecting the environment**,” Wyden told National Journal.

#### oil loves the plan and lobby for it---determines Congressional sentiment

Sadowski 11 – Richard Sadowski 11, J.D., Hofstra University School of Law, Fall 2011, “IN THIS ISSUE: NATURAL RESOURCE CONFLICT: CUBAN OFFSHORE DRILLING: PREPARATION AND PREVENTION WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE UNITED STATES' EMBARGO,” Sustainable Development Law & Policy, 12 Sustainable Dev. L. & Pol'y 37, p. lexis

A U.S. Geological Survey estimates that Cuba's offshore oil fields hold at least four and a half billion barrels of recoverable oil and ten trillion cubic feet of natural gas. n29 Cupet, the state-owned Cuban energy company, insists that actual reserves are double that of the U.S. estimate. n30 One estimate indicates that Cuba could be producing 525,000 barrels of oil per day. n31 Given this vast resource, Cuba has already leased offshore oil exploration blocks to operators from Spain, Norway, and India. n32 Offshore oil discoveries in Cuba are placing increasing pressure for the United States to end the embargo. First, U.S. energy companies are eager to compete for access to Cuban oil reserves. n33 [\*38] Secondly, fears of a Cuban oil spill are argued to warrant U.S. investment and technology. n34 Finally, the concern over Cuban offshore drilling renews cries that the embargo is largely a failure and harms human rights.¶ ECONOMICS: U.S. COMPANIES WANT IN¶ For U.S. companies, the embargo creates concern that they will lose out on an opportunity to develop a nearby resource. n35 Oil companies have a long history of utilizing political pressure for self-serving purposes. n36 American politicians, ever fearful of high energy costs, are especially susceptible to oil-lobby pressures. n37 This dynamic was exemplified in 2008, when then-Vice President Dick Cheney told the board of directors of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce that "oil is being drilled right now sixty miles off the coast of Florida. But we're not doing it, the Chinese are, in cooperation with the Cuban government. Even the communists have figured out that a good answer to high prices is more supply" n38¶ This pressure for U.S. investment in oil is exacerbated by America's expected increase in consumption rates. n39 Oil company stocks are valued in large part on access to reserves. n40 Thus, more leases, including those in Cuban waters, equal higher stock valuation. n41 "The last thing that American energy companies want is to be trapped on the sidelines by sanctions while European, Canadian and Latin American rivals are free to develop new oil resources on the doorstep of the United States." n42

## Drilling Bad DA

#### Link ev is about North Atlantic---not where plan drills

#### Spills are inevitable---regulations fail

Nerurkar & Sullivan 11 (Neelesh Nerurkar, Specialist in Energy Policy, Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs, Congressional Research Service, “Cuba’s Offshore Oil Development: Background and U.S. Policy Considerations,” http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41522.pdf)

Oil Spill Risks29

The Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the U.S. Gulf of Mexico heightened concerns over the potential of an oil spill in Cuban waters and the risk such a spill could affect Florida’s waters and coastal areas.30 As noted above, Repsol’s current plans for drilling in Cuba fall within about 55 to 60 miles south of Key West, Florida. Were an oil spill to occur in these areas, it could have environmental impacts in the United States. Oil can be spilled from acute exploration and production accidents, through longer-term discharge from operations, or through transportation accidents, such as a tanker collision or pipeline rupture. ¶ Risks of a Spill in Cuban Waters ¶ The U.S. agency in charge of enforcing safety and environmental regulations on the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf, including oil spill response, is the Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE). In addition, several statutes, including the Clean Water Act and the Oil Pollution Act, establish a liability regime for oil spills. Offshore exploration and production operations in non-U.S. waters may not be governed by analogous regulations or fall under a liability structure that creates an incentive to minimize oil spills. Since the Repsol project is only the second deepwater well to be drilled in Cuba’s EEZ, Cuban officials are in the process of developing and implementing up-to-date regulations to prevent offshore drilling accidents and contingency plans to address accidents if they do occur.31 They have pledged to follow the highest international environmental and safety standards, and have expressed a strong willingness to cooperate with the United States and other countries on safety measures.32 However, as the recent U.S. experience in the Gulf of Mexico illustrates, even the long-time existence of regulations and regulator may not always prevent an oil spill.

#### Tons of offshore drilling now

Michael Conathan 12, Director of Ocean Policy at the Center for American Progress, spent five years staffing the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation’s Subcommittee on Oceans, Atmosphere, Fisheries, and Coast Guard, master’s degree in marine affairs from the University of Rhode Island, 2/29/12, “More Drilling Won’t Lower Gas Prices,” <http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/news/2012/02/29/11091/more-drilling-wont-lower-gas-prices/>

As fundamental as the law of supply and demand might be to macroeconomic theory, the on-the-ground reality is that more drilling will not lower gas prices. Here’s why:

It hasn’t worked yet. There are currently more oil rigs operating on U.S. lands and waters than in the rest of the world combined, production is at an eight-year high, and the most recent “Short-Term Energy Outlook” from the Energy Information Administration projects production to continue growing at least through 2013 based on current activity. By the end of President Obama’s recently issued five-year drilling plan, fully 75 percent of our undiscovered, technically recoverable offshore reserves will be open to drilling. All that additional activity hasn’t stemmed the recent gas price spike.

#### Oceans resilient

Kennedy 2 - Environmental science prof, Maryland. Former Director, Cooperative Oxford Laboratory. PhD. (Victor, Coastal and Marine Ecosystems and Global Climate Change, http://www.pewclimate.org/projects/marine.cfm)

There is evidence that marine organisms and ecosystems are resilient to environmental change. Steele (1991) hypothesized that the biological components of marine systems are tightly coupled to physical factors, allowing them to respond quickly to rapid environmental change and thus rendering them ecologically adaptable. Some species also have wide genetic variability throughout their range, which may allow for adaptation to climate change.

#### Marine life resilient

Dulvy 3 – Professor of Marine Science and Technology, Newcastle (Nicholas, Extinction vulnerability in marine populations, Fish and Fisheries 4.1)

Marine fish populations are more variable and resilient than terrestrial populations Great natural variability in population size is sometimes invoked to argue that IUCN Red List criteria, as one example, are too conservative for marine fishes (Hudson and Mace1996; Matsuda et al.1997; Musick 1999; Powles et al. 2000; Hutchings 2001a). For the (1996) IUCN list, a decline of 20% within 10 years or three generations (whichever is longer) triggered a classification of 'vulnerable', while declines of 50 and 80% led to classifications of 'endangered' and 'critically endangered', respectively. These criteria were designed to be applied to all animal and plant taxa, but many marine resource biologists feel that for marine fishes 'one size does not fit all' (see Hutchings 2001a). They argue that percent decline criteria are too conservative compared to the high natural variability of fish populations. Powles et al. (2000) cite the six-fold variation of the Pacific sardine population (Sardinopssagax, Clupeidae) and a nine-fold variation in northern anchovy (Engraulis mordax, Clupeidae) over the past two millennia to suggest that rapid declines and increases of up to 10-fold are relatively common inexploitedfish stocks. It should, however, be borne in mind that the variation of exploited populations must be higher than unexploited populations because recruitment fluctuations increasingly drive population fluctuations when there are few adults (Pauly et al. 2002).

#### Cuban drilling is inevitable—only the plan allows for safe drilling that prevents spills

Stephens et al 11 (Sarah, Executive Director of the Center for Democracy in the Americas, “As Cuba plans to drill in the Gulf of Mexico, U.S. policy poses needless risks to our national interest,” http://democracyinamericas.org/pdfs/Cuba\_Drilling\_and\_US\_Policy.pdf)

This year Cuba and its foreign partners will begin drilling for oil in the Gulf of Mexico. Drilling will take place as close as 50 miles from Florida and in sites deeper than BP’s Macondo well, where an explosion in April 2010 killed 11 workers and created the largest oil spill ever in American waters. Undiscovered reserves of approximately 5 billion barrels of oil and 9 trillion cubic feet of natural gas lie beneath the Gulf of Mexico in land belonging to Cuba, according to the U.S. Geological Survey, although Cuba’s estimates contain higher figures. The amount actually recoverable remains to be seen.¶ Finding oil in commercially viable amounts would be transformative for Cuba. Revenues from natural resource wealth have the potential to provide long-sought stability for Cuba’s economy and are likely to significantly alter its relations with Venezuela and the rest of Latin America, Asia and other leading energy producing and consuming nations. Discoveries of commercially viable resources would also have an enormous impact upon the Gulf environment shared by Cuba and the United States. ¶ The U.S. embargo against Cuba, a remnant of the Cold War, is an obstacle to realizing and protecting our interests in the region. Not only does it prohibit U.S. firms from joining Cuba in efforts to extract its offshore resources, thus giving the competitive advantage to other foreign firms, but it also denies Cuba access to U.S. equipment for drilling and environmental protection—an especially troubling outcome in the wake of the disastrous BP spill. The embargo compels Cuba’s foreign partners to go through contortions—such as ordering a state of the art drilling rig built in China and sailing it roughly 10,000 miles to Cuban waters—to avoid violating the content limitations imposed by U.S. law. ¶ Most important, due to the failed policy of isolating Cuba, the United States cannot engage in meaningful environmental cooperation with Cuba while it develops its own energy resources. Our government cannot even address the threat of potential spills in advance from the frequent hurricane activity in the Gulf or from technological failures, either of which could put precious and environmentally sensitive U.S. coastal assets—our waters, our fisheries, our beaches—at great peril. ¶ The risks begin the moment the first drill bit pierces the seabed, and increase from there. Yet, our policy leaves the Obama administration with limited options: ¶ • It could do nothing. ¶ • It could try to stop Cuba from developing its oil and natural gas, an alternative most likely to fail in an energy-hungry world, or¶ • It could agree to dialogue and cooperation with Cuba to ensure that drilling in the Gulf protects our mutual interests. ¶ Since the 1990s, Cuba has demonstrated a serious commitment to protecting the environment, building an array of environmental policies, some based on U.S. and Spanish law. But it has no experience responding to major marine-based spills and, like our country, Cuba has to balance economic and environmental interests. In this contest, the environmental side will not always prevail. ¶ Against this backdrop, cooperation and engagement between Cuba and the United States is the right approach, and there is already precedent for it.¶ During the BP crisis, the U.S. shared information with Cuba about the spill. The administration publicly declared its willingness to provide limited licenses for U.S. firms to respond to a catastrophe that threatened Cuba. It also provided visas for Cuban scientists and environmental officials to attend an important environmental conference in Florida. For its part, Cuba permitted a vessel from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration to look for damage in Cuban waters. But these modest measures, however welcome, are not sufficient, especially in light of Cuba’s imminent plans to drill. ¶ Under the guise of environmental protection, Reps. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen and Vern Buchanan, Members of the U.S. Congress from Florida, introduced bills to impose sanctions on foreign oil companies and U.S. firms that help Cuba drill for oil, and to punish those foreign firms by denying them the right to drill in U.S. waters. This legislation would penalize U.S. firms and anger our allies, but not stop Cuba from drilling, and will make the cooperation to protect our mutual coastal environment more difficult should problems occur.¶ Energy policy and environmental protection are classic examples of how the embargo is an abiding threat to U.S. interests. It should no longer be acceptable to base U.S. foreign policy on the illusion that sanctions will cause Cuba’s government to collapse, or to try to stop Cuba from developing its oil resources. Nor should this policy or the political dynamic that sustains it prevent the U.S. from addressing both the challenges and benefits of Cuba finding meaningful amounts of oil in the Gulf of Mexico. ¶ The path forward is clear. The Obama administration should use its executive authority to guarantee that firms with the best equipment and greatest expertise are licensed in advance to fight the effects of an oil spill. The Treasury Department, which enforces Cuba sanctions, should make clear to the private sector that efforts to protect drilling safety will not be met with adverse regulatory actions. The U.S. government should commit to vigorous information sharing with Cuba, and open direct negotiations with the Cuban government for environmental agreements modeled on cooperation that already exists with our Canadian and Mexican neighbors.¶ Most of all, the administration should replace a policy predicated on Cuba failing with a diplomatic approach that recognizes Cuba’s sovereignty. Only then will our nation be able to respond effectively to what could become a new chapter in Cuba’s history and ours.¶ There is little time and much to do before the drilling begins.

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### Say No

#### DOT wouldn’t follow on

Birns & Strain 10 - Larry Birns, Director of the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, and Kelsey Strain, Research Associate at the COHA, November 18, 2010, "The Mid-Term Elections: An Easy Prediction for the Future of U.S.-Cuba Relations," online: http://www.coha.org/the-mid-term-elections-an-easy-prediction-for-the-future-of-u-s-cuba-relations/

As former U.S. Ambassador to Cuba, Wayne Smith, explains, “There is a small minority blocking the sensible will of the majority.” Despite such a forceful push for reform across the globe, Washington has repeatedly failed to show a willingness to alter its Cuban policy. A misreading of the conciliatory attitude from Miami’s Cuban community has kept timorous Washington politicians from daring to think boldly when it comes to Cuba. In spite of a new congressional make-up and a desk filled with challenges coming from around the world, President Obama’s commitment to “new relations” with the island should be seen through. Given the new environment in which he will be working, a normalization of U.S.-Cuban relations will only happen if Obama makes it a primary objective, should he decide that it is worth the political investment.

### Solvency

#### Fails---gridlock

Camacho 5 – Alejandro Camacho 5, Associate Prof of Law at Notre Dame, 24 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 269, lexis

Though achieving collaboration and consensus is certainly possible in administrative regulatory contexts, the prospect of achieving a multilateral, participatory agreement on a proposed national rule **can be daunting**. 220 Because of their scope, federal administrative rules tend to be made over long periods of time, involve many negotiating sessions, 221 and impact hundreds if not **thousands of parties from different regions** of the country. Simply notifying all of these parties that a given issue is being considered for a potential rulemaking is in **itself a logistical challenge**.

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Even if all relevant parties become involved, the interests affected by the rule may **be too numerous** or varied for the multilateral process to be manageable or for participation to be meaningful. Furthermore, participating in a long-term, nationwide forum can be **time consuming and expensive**, especially for smaller, poorer, or less organized parties. 222 Indeed, some of the parties with the biggest stakes in the outcome of national administrative law are large but diffuse groups (**such as consumers in a product safety rulemaking**) that frequently are poorly represented in the negotiation process. Even some proponents of federal regulatory negotiation concede that it may be under-inclusive because the most active stakeholder groups tend not to be representative of the general consumer or median voter. 223 Finally, the wide spectrum of interests and concerns at stake **increases the risk of gridlock**, [\*324] making agreement formation and implementation that **much more difficult.**

## Economy

### No Impact

#### The fact that it worked well in response to 2008 means it’ll work even better next time

Daniel W. Drezner 12, Professor, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, October 2012, “The Irony of Global Economic Governance: The System Worked,” <http://www.globaleconomicgovernance.org/wp-content/uploads/IR-Colloquium-MT12-Week-5_The-Irony-of-Global-Economic-Governance.pdf>

It is equally possible, however, that a renewed crisis would trigger a renewed surge in policy coordination. As John Ikenberry has observed, “the complex interdependence that is unleashed in an open and loosely rule-based order generates some expanding realms of exchange and investment that result in a growing array of firms, interest groups and other sorts of political stakeholders who seek to preserve the stability and openness of the system.”103 The post-2008 economic order has remained open, entrenching these interests even more across the globe. Despite uncertain times, the open economic system that has been in operation since 1945 does not appear to be closing anytime soon.

### AT: Mexico

#### Squo solves

Porter 2-5 – Eduardo Porter, writer for the New York Times, February 5th, 2013, "Immigration Reform Issue: The Effect on the Budget" [www.nytimes.com/2013/02/06/business/immigration-reform-issue-the-effect-on-the-budget.html?pagewanted=all&pagewanted=print](http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/06/business/immigration-reform-issue-the-effect-on-the-budget.html?pagewanted=all&pagewanted=print)

Yet immigration reform today means something quite different than it did in 2007. Notably, the elements needed to stop the flow of illegal immigrants north are much less important to the enterprise. The Obama administration has already spent huge amounts of money on border enforcement. Today, border policing costs about $18 billion a year — nearly 50 percent more than it did in 2006. And deportations have soared. What’s more, **illegal immigration has slowed to a trickle**, as Mexico has grown more robustly than the United States. The illegal immigrant population has even been **shrinking** in the last few years. And it may continue to do so as the Mexican population of prime migration-age people stops growing.¶ Also, **many employers have already gotten some of what they wanted: the number of workers entering the United States on temporary visas for low-end jobs in agriculture and other industries has increased sharply.**¶ “The discussion is in a different environment,” said Gordon H. Hanson, an **expert on the economics of immigration at the University of California**, **San Diego.** “**The flow of new immigrants is not the story anymore.”**

### Energy Key

#### Obama PC fails now---action on OCS drilling’s a key olive branch that generates GOP support for other priorities like immigration

CSM 1-20 – Christian Science Monitor, 1/20/13, “Obama’s second term: Can he work with Congress? (+video),” http://www.csmonitor.com/layout/set/print/USA/DC-Decoder/2013/0120/Obama-s-second-term-Can-he-work-with-Congress-video

“The president has been criticized by many people for his inability or unwillingness to spend a lot of time stroking members of Congress,” says Ross Baker, a congressional historian at Rutgers University who is writing a book on bipartisanship in the US Senate. “I think a lot of this is based upon the widely-accepted theory [that the] power of a presidency is the power to persuade – which is perfectly plausible, and it was certainly plausible in the 1950s.... The problem is, there are no persuadables" today. ¶ But by focusing on issues of common ground with the GOP, Washington could generate some bipartisan successes in the next four years. ¶ Immigration and Energy¶ For one, the president could team up with Republican moderates and much of the party’s leadership on immigration reform. ¶ “We believe that immigration reform is different in that it has a past, present, and future of bipartisan support,” said Ali Noorani, executive director of the National Immigration Forum. “What we’ve seen over the last two years is conservatives, moderates, and liberals want this president and this Congress to act, and that’s different from any other issue.” ¶ And the president could perhaps turn down the bellicosity on the Hill by working with some of his loudest critics (though risking the ire of environmentalists in his political base) in one area that the deeply-red right and the president could agree: energy policy.

#### MARKED

¶ “We were encouraged by President Obama’s 2012 campaign comments supporting an all-of-the-above agenda on energy, and his statements outlining support for oil and natural gas,” said Jack Gerard, president of the American Petroleum Institute, the oil and gas industry’s powerful trade association, in his annual State of American Energy address in Washington earlier this month. ¶ But Republicans rage about a disconnect between what the president and members of his administration say they favor and what Republicans say is foot-dragging in building the Keystone XL pipeline, exporting natural gas, or freeing up more offshore areas for energy exploration. If the president were to get behind any of these initiatives he’d likely have plenty of GOP support – but that remains a large “if.”