### T---Energy

1. **Interpretation --- the resolution only allows the aff to increase oil, natural gas, nuclear, coal, solar, or wind**
2. **Violation --- OTEC is a water based power. It doesn’t directly harness the power of any of the energies.**
3. **Vote negative --- they explode limits by allow the aff to use any energy source because all energy comes from the sun. They also kill all disad links as well because they’re a completely different energy**

### 1NC---T Restrictions

#### Restrictions on production must mandate a decrease in the quantity produced

Anell 89 Lars is the Chairman of the WTO panel adopted at the Forty-Fifth Session of Contracting Parties on December 5, 1989. Other panel members: Mr. Hugh Bartlett and Mrs. Carmen Luz Guarda. “Canada – Import Restrictions on Ice Cream and Yoghurt,” http://www.wto.org/english/tratop\_e/dispu\_e/88icecrm.pdf

The United States argued that Canada had failed to demonstrate that it effectively restricted domestic production of milk. The differentiation between "fluid" and "industrial" milk was an artificial one for administrative purposes; with regard to GATT obligations, the product at issue was raw milk from the cow, regardless of what further use was made of it. The use of the word "permitted" in Article XI:2(c)(i) required that there be a limitation on the total quantity of milk that domestic producers were authorized or allowed to produce or sell. The provincial controls on fluid milk did not restrict the quantities permitted to be produced; rather dairy farmers could produce and market as much milk as could be sold as beverage milk or table cream. There were no penalties for delivering more than a farmer's fluid milk quota, it was only if deliveries exceeded actual fluid milk usage or sales that it counted against his industrial milk quota. At least one province did not participate in this voluntary system, and another province had considered leaving it. Furthermore, Canada did not even prohibit the production or sale of milk that exceeded the Market Share Quota. The method used to calculate direct support payments on within-quota deliveries assured that most dairy farmers would completely recover all of their fixed and variable costs on their within-quota deliveries. The farmer was permitted to produce and market milk in excess of the quota, and perhaps had an economic incentive to do so. 27. The United States noted that in the past six years total industrial milk production had consistently exceeded the established Market Sharing Quota, and concluded that the Canadian system was a regulation of production but not a restriction of production**.** Proposals to amend Article XI:2(c)(i) to replace the word "restrict" with "regulate" had been defeated; what was required was the reduction of production. The results of the econometric analyses cited by Canada provided no indication of what would happen to milk production in the absence not only of the production quotas, but also of the accompanying high price guarantees which operated as incentives to produce. According to the official publication of the Canadian Dairy Commission, a key element of Canada's national dairy policy was to promote self-sufficiency in milk production. The effectiveness of the government supply controls had to be compared to what the situation would be in the absence of all government measures.

#### Vote negative:

#### Including regulations is a limits disaster---undermines preparedness for all debates

Doub 76 William is a principal in the law firm of Doub and Muntzing. Previously he was a partner in LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby, and MacRae. He was a member of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (1971-1974). He served as a member of the Executive Advisory Committee to the Federal Power Commission (1968-1971) and was appointed by the President to the President’s Air Quality Advisory Board. He is a past chairman of the U.S. National Committee of the World Energy Conference. “Energy Regulation: A Quagmire for Energy Policy,” http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev.eg.01.110176.003435

FERS began with the recognition that federal energy policy must result from concerted efforts in all areas dealing with energy, not the least of which was the manner in which energy is regulated by the federal government. Energy self sufficiency is improbable, if not impossible, without sensible regulatory processes, and effective regulation is necessary for public confidence. Thus, the President directed that "a comprehensive study be undertaken, in full consultation with Congress, to determine the best way to organize all energy-related regulatory activities of the government." An interagency task force was formed to study this question. With 19 different federal departments and agencies contributing, the task force spent seven months deciphering the present organizational makeup of the federal energy regulatory system, studying the need for organizational improvement, and evaluating alternatives. **More than 40 agencies were found to be involved** with making regulatory decisions on energy. Although only a few deal exclusively with energy, most of the 40 could **significantly affect** the **availability and/or cost of energy**. For example, in the field of gas transmission, there are five federal agencies that must act on siting and land-use issues, seven on emission and effluent issues, five on public safety issues, and one on worker health and safety issues-all before an onshore gas pipeline can be built. The complexity of energy regulation is also illustrated by the case of Standard Oil Company (Indiana), which reportedly must file about 1000 reports a year with 35 different federal agencies. Unfortunately, this example is the rule rather than the exception.

#### And precision---only direct prohibition is a restriction---key to predictability

Sinha 6 S.B. Sinha is a former judge of the Supreme Court of India. “Union Of India & Ors vs M/S. Asian Food Industries,” Nov 7, http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/437310/

We may, however, notice that this Court in State of U.P. and Others v. M/s. Hindustan Aluminium Corpn. and others [AIR 1979 SC 1459] stated the law thus: "It appears that a distinction between regulation and restriction or prohibition has always been drawn, ever since Municipal Corporation of the City of Toronto v. Virgo. Regulation promotes the freedom or the facility which is required to be regulated in the interest of all concerned, whereas prohibition obstructs or shuts off, or denies it to those to whom it is applied. The Oxford English Dictionary does not define regulate to include prohibition so that if it had been the intention to prohibit the supply, distribution, consumption or use of energy, the legislature would not have contented itself with the use of the word regulating without using the word prohibiting or some such word, to bring out that effect."

### 1NC---Courts

#### The United States Supreme Court should rule restrictions on Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion produced in the United States that are imposed by entities other than the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration unconstitutional.

#### Courts can effectively rule to invalidate restrictions on all forms of energy production

Simon 7 [Christopher A. Simon - Director, Master of Public Administration, Political Science Department, University of Utah, Professor, Political Science, “Alternative Energy: Political, Economic, and Social Feasibility”]

**THE COURTS**

The institutional power of the federal courts regarding energy policy is not ex- plicit in Article III. The role of energy and the intra- and interstate transporta- tion of fuels and electricity in the United States is, for the most part, a late nine- teenth- and early twentieth-century phenomenon. Early energy policy-related cases were argued within the confines of the judiciary’s narrowly defined enu- merated powers. In the late nineteenth century, the court system remained timid in terms of taking energy and material related cases. Post-Loehner (1905). the judiciary showed itself more willing to enter into disputes between state government and citizens. Although the case had nothing to do with en- ergy policy**, the Supreme Court—**by taking the case—opened the doors to the expansion of one of its enumerated Article III powers in a way that more **di- rectly scrunitized policymaking** at the state and local levels and de facto ex- panded the notion that federal court decisions were linked to the national gov- ernment’s supremacy. The 1937 case West Coast Hotel u Parrish confirmed the judiciary’s interest in scrutinizing public policy at all levels of government. Constitutionally, legal theory was now open to an enlarged analysis of the in- terchange between national regulatory powers and policymaking authority and state and local powers. In essence, the Court more fully disclosed acceptance of judicial positivism in method and decision making rather than a strict con- structionist approach.

Over the years, **the courts have had a significant role in energy policy.** The Court has been particularly interested in regulation of safety with regard to energy policy, as safety issues are central to the public good aspect of energy. While not directly related to energy policy. New Jersey Steam Navigation Company v. Merchants' Bank of Boston 47 U.S. 344 (1848) does illustrate the Court's particular and early interest in issues related to energy safety. The case involved the destruction by fire of a steam-operated commercial boat. In the end, the Court sided with the plaintiffs and the decision of a lower court to award damages. The case ultimately turned on the issue of fuel safety as the boat was fitted for wood-burning energy production, but was burning a much hotter “modem” fuel for boats of the time—anthracite coal. Although other deficiencies had been noted in terms of safety equipment that ultimately tied to the issue of the federal court's “admirality jurisdiction,” the case provides early evidence that the Court saw a role for itself in re- viewing aspects of energy safety, particularly in terms of transportation safety—albeit tangentially and quite possibly with little emphasis beyond the nature of the case.

The Court, however, tightened its level of scrutiny in term of energy- related safety issues in Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Commission of Oklahoma et al. 286 U.S. 210 (1932). In this case, one of the earliest cases involving the regulation of safety issues **related to petroleum refinement**, the Court dismissed broadly defined environmental restrictions on the extraction and refining of petroleum. In essence, the Court demonstrated that an early state-level effort to protect the environment from the impact of oil drilling and processing could only occur if statutes were written narrowly and were essentially based on scientific principles related to environmental safety. One could argue that by taking the case and deciding it, the Court opened further the door to national regulation of environmental policy as is most di- rectly **related to the issue of energy resource development, processing, and distribution.**

The 1970s, a decade in which the petroleum-based energy paradigm expe- rienced a major shock, saw the Court dealing with two prominent cases re- lated to energy safety issues. In Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat- ural Resources Defense Council, Inc., et alia 435 U.S. 519 (1978), the Court dealt with questions related to “the proper scope of judicial review of the Atomic Energy Commission’s procedures with regards to the licensing of nu- clear power plants.” In lower court decisions, **the commission's rule-making procedures related to nuclear energy fuel management and safety issues were overturned through court decision**. In essence, this would have **opened the door to further court scrutiny of the nuclear energy process** in terms of safety. In a unanimous decision, the late William Rehnquist wrote that the Court of Appeals has improperly developed its own conception of safe reactor process and remanded the case to a lower court to scrutinize the commission’s regu- latory clarity. The case is significant because it effectively maintained nuclear energy policy as viable as long as rule making and regulatory processes gov- erning this form of alternative energy were rationally constructed and com- plete. The Court looked to administrative solutions to any lack of clarity or completeness first but was fairly definitive in removing the judicial system from the process or filling in areas of vagueness or rewriting significant por- tions of regulation and process-related nuclear energy policy.

In the same year, **the Court decided the so-called trans-Alaska pipeline** rate **case**s. The Court sought to clarify rate change **policies related to the shipment of crudc oil and natural gas**. In essence, the Court solidified the authority of Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) in its efforts to manage the pipeline. The commission’s ability to adjust rates for rational economic reasons and to require pipeline operators to refund excess rate charges to customers was rec- ognized by the Court. The pipeline cases were critical to the legitimacy of the commission’s authority over the transportation of petroleum from Alaska**. In a broader sense, the Court established precedence** of the ICC **to regulate pe- troleum transportation.** Appellate court decision has further solidified its po- sition on pipeline rates in BP West Coast Products, LLC v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 376 F. 3d 1223 (2004). The Court was careful to bal- ance this decision in relation to the states’ power to regulate intrastate energy policy issues.

In Exxon Corp. et alia v. Governor of Maryland et alia 437 U.S. 117 (1978), the Court recognized the power of state government to regulate gaso- line markets within its borders. The Court found that neither the interstate commerce clause nor the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment were violated by Maryland's regulations on petroleum producers’ ability to establish gas stations and policy efforts to ensure equity within the gasoline market across various corporate concerns operating fueling station in-state. In essence, the Court established a balance between the interests of the national government in regulating energy transportation and use and the interests of the state in advancing goals not inconsistent with national constitutional in- terpretation and national policy priorities.

#### It’s competitive --- doesn’t reduce restrictions, just rules them unenforceable

Treanor & Sperling 93 William - Prof Law at Fordham. Gene - Deputy Assistant to President for Economic Policy. “PROSPECTIVE OVERRULING AND THE REVIVAL OF "UNCONSTITUTIONAL" STATUTES,” Columbia Law Review, Dec 93, lexis

Unlike the Supreme Court, several state courts have explicitly addressed the revival issue. The relevant state court cases have concerned the specific issue of whether a statute that has been held unconstitutional is revived when the invalidating decision is overturned. n42 With one exception, they have concluded that such **statutes are immediately enforceable.**

The most noted instance in which **the revival issue was resolved** by a court involved the District of Columbia minimum wage statute pronounced unconstitutional in Adkins. After the Court reversed Adkins in West Coast Hotel, President Roosevelt asked Attorney General Homer [\*1913] Cummings for an opinion on the status of the District of Columbia's statute. The Attorney General responded,

The decisions are practically in accord in holding that the courts have no power to repeal or abolish a statute, and that notwithstanding a decision holding it unconstitutional a statute continues to remain on the statute books; and that if a statute be declared unconstitutional and the decision so declaring it be subsequently overruled the statute will then be held valid from the date it became effective. n43

Enforcement of the statute followed without congressional action. n44

When this enforcement was challenged, the Municipal Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Jawish v. Morlet n45 held that the decision in West Coast Hotel had had the effect of making the statute enforceable. The court observed that previous opinions addressing the revival issue proceed on the principle that **a statute declared unconstitutional is void in the sense that it is inoperative or unenforceable,** but not void in the sense that it is repealed or abolished; that so long as the decision stands the statute is dormant but not dead; and that **if the decision is reversed the statute is valid from its first effective date**. n46

The court declared this precedent sound since the cases were "in accord with the principle "that a decision of a court of appellate jurisdiction overruling a former decision is retrospective in its operation, and the effect is not that the former decision is bad law but that it never was the law.' " n47 Adkins was thus, and had always been, a nullity. The court acknowledged that, after Adkins, it had been thought that the District of Columbia's minimum wage statute was unconstitutional. As the court put it, " "Just about everybody was fooled.' " n48 Nonetheless, the court's view was that since **the** minimum wage **law had always been valid,** although for a period judicially unenforceable, **there was no need to reenact it. n49**

Almost **all other courts that have addressed the issue of whether a statute that has been found unconstitutional can be revived have reached the same result** as the Jawish court, using a similar formalistic [\*1914] analysis. n50 The sole decision in which a court adopted the nonrevival position is Jefferson v. Jefferson, n51 a poorly reasoned decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court. The plaintiff in Jefferson sought child support and maintenance from her husband. She prevailed at the trial level; he filed his notice of appeal one day after the end of the filing period established by the Louisiana Uniform Rules of the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals rejected his appeal as untimely, even though the Louisiana Supreme Court had previously found that the applicable section of the Uniform Rules violated the state constitution. One of Ms. Jefferson's arguments before the state Supreme Court was that that court's previous ruling had been erroneous and that the rules should therefore be revived. In rejecting this claim and in finding for the husband, the Court stated:

Since we have declared the uniform court rule partially unconstitutional, it appears to be somewhat dubious that we have the right to reconsider this ruling in the instant case as counsel for the respondent judges urges us to do. For a rule of court, like a statute, has the force and effect of law and, when a law is stricken as void, it no longer has existence as law; the law cannot be resurrected thereafter by a judicial decree changing the final judgment of unconstitutionality to constitutionality as this would constitute a reenactment of the law by the Court - an assumption of legislative power not delegated to it by the Constitution. n52

The Louisiana Court thus took a mechanical approach to the revival question. According to its rationale, when a statute is found unconstitutional, it is judicially determined never to have existed. Revival therefore entails judicial legislation and thereby violates constitutionally mandated separation of powers: because the initial legislative passage [\*1915] of the bill has no legitimacy, the bill's force is considered to be purely a creature of judicial decision-making.

**Jefferson has little analytic appeal**. Its view of the separation of powers doctrine is too simplistic. Contrary to the Jefferson rationale, a "revived" law is not the pure product of judicial decision-making. It is, instead, a law that once gained the support of a legislature and that has never been legislatively repealed. Its legitimacy rests on its initial legislative authorization. Moreover, the view that a statute that has been found unconstitutional should be treated as if it never existed may have had some support in the early case law, but it has been clearly rejected by the Supreme Court. Instead of treating all statutes that it has found unconstitutional as if they had never existed, the Court has recognized a range of circumstances in which people who rely on an overturned decision are protected. Indeed, as will be developed, the doctrine of prospective overruling evolved to shield from harm those who relied on subsequently overruled judicial decisions. n53 In short, the one case in which there was a holding that a statute did not revive does not offer a convincing rationale for nonrevival.

### Feescal Cleef --- Econ Impact

#### Fiscal cliff compromise will pass but political capital is key

Kimberly Atkins 11-8, Boston Herald columnist, “Prez returns to D.C. with more clout,” 11/8/12, http://bostonherald.com/news/columnists/view/20221108prez\_returns\_to\_dc\_with\_more\_clout

When President Obama returned yesterday to the White House, he brought with him political capital earned in a tough re-election fight as well as a mandate from voters — which means bold changes and bruising fights could lie ahead. ¶ The first agenda item is already waiting for him: reaching an agreement with lawmakers to avert the looming fiscal cliff. GOP lawmakers have previously shot down any plan involving tax increases. Obama’s win — based in part on a message of making the wealthiest Americans pay more — may already be paying dividends.¶ In remarks at the Capitol yesterday, House Speaker John Boehner seemed to acknowledge the GOP has to take a different tack than the obstructionism that has marred progress in the past.¶ “The president has signaled a willingness to do tax reform with lower rates. Republicans have signaled a willingness to accept new revenue if it comes from growth and reform,” Boehner said. “Let’s start the discussion there.” ¶ Obama’s fresh political clout could extend to longer term fiscal policies beyond the fiscal cliff, though don’t expect GOP pushback to vanish. House Republicans still have plenty of fight in them. ¶ Comprehensive immigration reform — designed to smooth the path to citizenship while also strengthening the nation’s borders — also will be high on the president’s priority list. But unlike in his first term, when such a plan got little more than lip service in the face of staunch GOP opposition, Obama’s 3-to-1 support from Latinos on Election Day gives him the incentive to get it done. It also robs Republicans, who learned firsthand that dwindling support from Hispanics and other minority groups is costing them dearly, of any reason to stand in the way. ¶ An influx of new female voices in the Senate could also make Obama’s next four years the “Term of the Woman,” putting a new focus on equal pay and reproductive rights. ¶ U.S. Sen. Patty Murray of Washington state, who chairs the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, told reporters yesterday that having a historically high 20 women in the Senate in January won’t just mean more attention to women’s issues. She said the Senate will function better overall with “great women who have really strong voices” on board, such as U.S. Sen.-elect Elizabeth Warren. “There is no stronger advocate for middle-class Americans,” Murray said of Warren. ¶ None of this, of course, will be a cakewalk, but unlike his first term, Obama will have more power to push back.

#### Even bipartisan renewable energy legislation is massively controversial

McEntee 8/15 Christine is the Executive Director and CEO at the American Geophysical Union. “Science, Politics and Public Opinion,” 2012, http://energy.nationaljournal.com/2012/08/finding-the-sweet-spot-biparti.php

We know that objective scientific knowledge is needed to inform good policy decisions---and that objective knowledge exists---but all too often we are allowing politics and ideology to take precedence over, or be pitted against, science. This not only risks the legitimacy of the science, but also the strength of the policy and its ability to protect the security, health and welfare of the American people, and support a healthy and thriving economy. The current rhetoric on climate change is a perfect example.¶ We also know that the biggest obstacles to passage of energy and environmental legislation are disagreements about the extent to which the federal government can and should regulate business, and reluctance to launch new initiatives that will add to the deficit. The science tells us that small initiatives that require only nominal investments can't begin to address the environmental and energy challenges we face; and legislation big enough to achieve significant results will cost more than Congress is willing to spend.¶ Environmental legislation is also held prisoner to partisan gridlock, with far less bipartisan support than many energy proposals. **Even environmental legislation that saves many times its cost** in medical and health care savings **cannot advance in the current Congress.** One recent example is the defeat of legislation to limit the release of airborne particulates proven to adversely affect the respiratory health of children and seniors.¶ Dissonance about the role of federal regulation, its cost-effectiveness, and potential to impose costs on private sector that might adversely impact economic recovery further complicate energy/environmental legislative calculus. For these reasons, it is difficult for Congress to pass new energy and/or environmental initiatives, **even where there is wide bipartisan support for a given bill**.¶ Lastly, we know that Congress is not likely to make much real progress on either energy or environmental issues until voters demand such action. Research shows that most voters, including Independents in swing states, do not list energy and environmental issues as a major determinant of how they vote, despite their significant impact on local, state and national economies, public health and national security. This needs to change.

#### Going over the fiscal cliff causes a second great depression

Morici 8/7 Peter, PhD, is a "recognized expert on economic policy and international economics." He is a Professor of International Business at the R.H. Smith School of Business at the University of Maryland. "Fix fiscal cliff now or face next Great Depression," 2012, http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2012/08/07/fix-fiscal-cliff-now-or-face-next-great-depression/

President Obama and Republicans are engaging in dangerous brinksmanship. Putting off a political solution to the looming “fiscal cliff” until after the election **risks a** second Great Depression.¶ Without a compromise by January, $400 billion in mandatory spending cuts and more than $100 billion in tax increases will immediately go into effect. **With our economy only growing by only $300 billion annually, such a shock would thrust it into a prolonged contraction.**

#### Global economic crisis causes nuclear great-power war

Mead 9 – Walter Russell Mead, the Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow in U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, 2-4, 2009, “Only Makes You Stronger,” The New Republic, http://www.tnr.com/politics/story.html?id=571cbbb9-2887-4d81-8542-92e83915f5f8&p=2

If current market turmoil seriously damaged the performance and prospects of India and China, the current crisis could join the Great Depression in the list of economic events that changed history, even if the recessions in the West are relatively short and mild. The United States should stand ready to assist Chinese and Indian financial authorities on an emergency basis--and work very hard to help both countries escape or at least weather any economic downturn. It may test the political will of the Obama administration, but the United States must avoid a protectionist response to the economic slowdown. U.S. moves to limit market access for Chinese and Indian producers could poison relations for years. For billions of people in nuclear-armed countries to emerge from this crisis believing either that the United States was indifferent to their well-being or that it had profited from their distress could damage U.S. foreign policy far more severely than any mistake made by George W. Bush.¶ It's not just the great powers whose trajectories have been affected by the crash. Lesser powers like Saudi Arabia and Iran also face new constraints. The crisis has strengthened the U.S. position in the Middle East as falling oil prices reduce Iranian influence and increase the dependence of the oil sheikdoms on U.S. protection. Success in Iraq--however late, however undeserved, however limited--had already improved the Obama administration's prospects for addressing regional crises. Now, the collapse in oil prices has put the Iranian regime on the defensive. The annual inflation rate rose above 29 percent last September, up from about 17 percent in 2007, according to Iran's Bank Markazi. Economists forecast that Iran's real GDP growth will drop markedly in the coming months as stagnating oil revenues and the continued global economic downturn force the government to rein in its expansionary fiscal policy.¶ All this has weakened Ahmadinejad at home and Iran abroad. Iranian officials must balance the relative merits of support for allies like Hamas, Hezbollah, and Syria against domestic needs, while international sanctions and other diplomatic sticks have been made more painful and Western carrots (like trade opportunities) have become more attractive. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia and other oil states have become more dependent on the United States for protection against Iran, and they have fewer resources to fund religious extremism as they use diminished oil revenues to support basic domestic spending and development goals. None of this makes the Middle East an easy target for U.S. diplomacy, but thanks in part to the economic crisis, the incoming administration has the chance to try some new ideas and to enter negotiations with Iran (and Syria) from a position of enhanced strength. ¶ Every crisis is different, but there seem to be reasons why, over time, financial crises on balance reinforce rather than undermine the world position of the leading capitalist countries. Since capitalism first emerged in early modern Europe, the ability to exploit the advantages of rapid economic development has been a key factor in international competition. Countries that can encourage--or at least allow and sustain--the change, dislocation, upheaval, and pain that capitalism often involves, while providing their tumultuous market societies with appropriate regulatory and legal frameworks, grow swiftly. They produce cutting-edge technologies that translate into military and economic power. They are able to invest in education, making their workforces ever more productive. They typically develop liberal political institutions and cultural norms that value, or at least tolerate, dissent and that allow people of different political and religious viewpoints to collaborate on a vast social project of modernization--and to maintain political stability in the face of accelerating social and economic change. The vast productive capacity of leading capitalist powers gives them the ability to project influence around the world and, to some degree, to remake the world to suit their own interests and preferences. This is what the United Kingdom and the United States have done in past centuries, and what other capitalist powers like France, Germany, and Japan have done to a lesser extent. In these countries, the social forces that support the idea of a competitive market economy within an appropriately liberal legal and political framework are relatively strong.¶ But, in many other countries where capitalism rubs people the wrong way, this is not the case. On either side of the Atlantic, for example, the Latin world is often drawn to anti-capitalist movements and rulers on both the right and the left. Russia, too, has never really taken to capitalism and liberal society--whether during the time of the czars, the commissars, or the post-cold war leaders who so signally failed to build a stable, open system of liberal democratic capitalism even as many former Warsaw Pact nations were making rapid transitions. Partly as a result of these internal cultural pressures, and partly because, in much of the world, capitalism has appeared as an unwelcome interloper, imposed by foreign forces and shaped to fit foreign rather than domestic interests and preferences, many countries are only half-heartedly capitalist. When crisis strikes, they are quick to decide that capitalism is a failure and look for alternatives.¶ So far, such half-hearted experiments not only have failed to work; they have left the societies that have tried them in a progressively worse position, farther behind the front-runners as time goes by. Argentina has lost ground to Chile; Russian development has fallen farther behind that of the Baltic states and Central Europe. Frequently, the crisis has weakened the power of the merchants, industrialists, financiers, and professionals who want to develop a liberal capitalist society integrated into the world. Crisis can also strengthen the hand of religious extremists, populist radicals, or authoritarian traditionalists who are determined to resist liberal capitalist society for a variety of reasons. Meanwhile, the companies and banks based in these societies are often less established and more vulnerable to the consequences of a financial crisis than more established firms in wealthier societies.¶ As a result, developing countries and countries where capitalism has relatively recent and shallow roots tend to suffer greater economic and political damage when crisis strikes--as, inevitably, it does. And, consequently, financial crises often reinforce rather than challenge the global distribution of power and wealth. This may be happening yet again.¶ None of which means that we can just sit back and enjoy the recession. History may suggest that financial crises actually help capitalist great powers maintain their leads--but it has other, less reassuring messages as well. If financial crises have been a normal part of life during the 300-year rise of the liberal capitalist system under the Anglophone powers, so has war. The wars of the League of Augsburg and the Spanish Succession; the Seven Years War; the American Revolution; the Napoleonic Wars; the two World Wars; the cold war: The list of wars is almost as long as the list of financial crises.¶ Bad economic times can breed wars. Europe was a pretty peaceful place in 1928, but the Depression poisoned German public opinion and helped bring Adolf Hitler to power. If the current crisis turns into a depression, what rough beasts might start slouching toward Moscow, Karachi, Beijing, or New Delhi to be born?¶ The United States may not, yet, decline, but, if we can't get the world economy back on track, we may still have to fight.

### Chinese Renewables

#### China’s ahead in clean tech development now and it’s zero sum with US development---key to their economic growth

Bennhold 10 Katrin is a writer for the New York Times. “Race Is on to Develop Green, Clean Technology,” Jan 29, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/30/business/global/30davos.html?dbk&\_r=0

DAVOS, SWITZERLAND — It is shaping up to be **the Great Game of the 21st century**. To top officials and business executives here at the World Economic Forum, Topic A this year was the race to develop greener, cleaner technology, which is emerging as one of the critical factors in reshaping the world economy as emerging powers snap at the heels of battered Western economies. With the United States and China sizing each other up across the Pacific and Europe seeking to maintain its economic stature, it is a battle for potentially millions of jobs and trillions of dollars in export revenues. The outcome — which pits a venture capital-driven market approach relying on government subsides against a top-down system of state capitalism — has the potential to influence how economic and political systems evolve. Concern that China may be edging ahead in potentially lucrative growth sectors like renewable energy was palpable here, where senior officials from the United States and Europe warned that the West could not afford to be complacent. “Six months ago my biggest worry was that an emissions deal would make American business less competitive compared to China,” said Senator Lindsay Graham, a Republican from South Carolina who has been deeply involved in climate change issues in Congress. “Now my concern is that every day that we delay trying to find a price for carbon is a day that China uses to dominate the green economy.” He added: “China has made a long-term strategic decision and **they are going gang-busters**.” Christine Lagarde, the French finance minister, agreed. “**It’s a race and whoever wins that race will dominate economic development**,” she said. “The emerging markets are well-placed.”

#### Chinese clean tech leadership is key to their economy, internal stability, and solves extinction

Paul Denlinger 10, consultant specializing in the China market who is based in Hong Kong, 7/20/10, “Why China Has To Dominate Green Tech,” http://www.forbes.com/sites/china/2010/07/20/why-china-has-to-dominate-green-tech/

On the policy level, the Chinese government has to perform a delicate balancing act, it has to balance the desire of many Chinese to live a Western lifestyle, together with its high energy consumption and waste, with the need to preserve the environment, since China, and the world, would suffer enormous damage if 1.3 billion people got all their energy needs from coal and oil, the two most widely used fossil fuels. China’s political and social stability depends on finding the right balance, since the party has an implicit mandate: it will deliver economic growth to the Chinese people.

This is why the Chinese government has chosen to invest in developing new green energy technology.

The country is very fortunate in that most of the discovered deposits of rare earths used in the development of new technologies are found in China. While these deposits are very valuable, up until recently, the industry has not been regulated much by the Chinese central government. But now that Beijing is aware of their importance and value, it has come under much closer scrutiny. For one, Beijing wants to consolidate the industry and lower energy waste and environmental damage. (Ironically, the rare earth mining business is one of the most energy-wasteful and highly polluting industries around. Think Chinese coal mining with acid.)

At the same time, Beijing wants to cut back rare earth exports to the rest of the world, instead encouraging domestic production into wind and solar products for export around the world. With patents on the new technology used in manufacturing, China would control the intellectual property and licensing on the products that would be used all over the world. If Beijing is able to do this, it would control the next generation of energy products used by the world for the next century.

That is the plan. It would be like if the oil-producing nations in the 1920s and 1930s said that they didn’t need Western oil exploration firms and refineries to distribute oil products; they would do all the processing themselves, and the Western countries would just order the finished oil products from them. This is how China obviously plans to keep most of the value-added profits within China’s borders.

Before any Western readers snap into “evil Chinese conspiracy to take over the world” mode, it’s worth pointing out that Chinese rare earth experts and government officials have repeatedly warned Western visitors that this policy change would be introduced. Unfortunately, these warnings have gone largely unheeded and ignored by the Western media and politicians who, it seems, have been largely preoccupied by multiple financial crises and what to do about the West’s debt load.

The debt crisis in the West means that it is very hard for Western green energy companies to find financing for their technologies, then to market them as finished products. New energy technologies are highly risky, and initial investments are by no means guaranteed. Because they are considered high-risk and require high capital expenditure (unlike Internet technologies which are very cheap and practically commoditized), banks are reluctant to finance them unless they are able to find government-secured financing. Because most U.S. banks are recapitalizing their businesses after the debt bubble burst, there are very few, if any western banks who will finance new green energy technologies.

This has opened a window of opportunity for the Chinese government to finance, and for Chinese technology companies to develop, then manufacture these new green products. But just making these technologies is not enough; they need to be competitive against traditional fossil fuels. When it comes to the amount of energy released when coal or oil is burned, the new green technologies are still way behind. This means that, at least in the early stages of adoption, Chinese businesses will still be reliant on coal and oil to bridge that energy chasm before the new energy technologies become economically competitive. Much depends on how much the Chinese government is willing to spend to promote and incentivize these new technologies, first in China, then overseas.

Because of China’s growing energy demands, we are in a race for survival. The 21st century will be remembered as the resurgent coal and oil century, or as the century humanity transitioned to green technologies for energy consumption. While China is investing heavily now in green tech, it is still consuming ever larger amounts of coal and oil to drive its economic growth. Right now, we all depend on China’s success to make the transition to green energy this century.

For all practical purposes, we’re all in the same boat.

#### China’s economic rise is good --- they’re on the brink of collapse --- causes CCP instability and lashout --- also tubes the global economy, US primacy, and Sino relations

Mead 9 Walter Russell Mead, Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow in U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, “Only Makes You Stronger,” The New Republic, 2/4/9, http://www.tnr.com/story\_print.html?id=571cbbb9-2887-4d81-8542-92e83915f5f8

The greatest danger both to U.S.-China relations and to American power itself is probably not that China will rise too far, too fast; it is that the current crisis might end China's growth miracle. In the worst-case scenario, the turmoil in the international economy will plunge China into a major economic downturn. The Chinese financial system will implode as loans to both state and private enterprises go bad. Millions or even tens of millions of Chinese will be unemployed in a country without an effective social safety net. The collapse of asset bubbles in the stock and property markets will wipe out the savings of a generation of the Chinese middle class. The political consequences could include dangerous unrest--and a bitter climate of anti-foreign feeling that blames others for China's woes. (Think of Weimar Germany, when both Nazi and communist politicians blamed the West for Germany's economic travails.) Worse, instability could lead to a vicious cycle, as nervous investors moved their money out of the country, further slowing growth and, in turn, fomenting ever-greater bitterness. Thanks to a generation of rapid economic growth, China has so far been able to manage the stresses and conflicts of modernization and change; nobody knows what will happen if the growth stops.

#### Chinese lashout goes nuclear

The Epoch Times, Renxing San, 8/4/2004, 8/4, http://english.epochtimes.com/news/5-8-4/30931.html

Since the Party’s life is “above all else,” it would not be surprising if the CCP resorts to the use of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons in its attempt to extend its life. The CCP, which disregards human life, would not hesitate to kill two hundred million Americans, along with seven or eight hundred million Chinese, to achieve its ends. These speeches let the public see the CCP for what it really is. With evil filling its every cell the CCP intends to wage a war against humankind in its desperate attempt to cling to life. That is the main theme of the speeches. This theme is murderous and utterly evil. In China we have seen beggars who coerced people to give them money by threatening to stab themselves with knives or pierce their throats with long nails. But we have never, until now, seen such a gangster who would use biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons to threaten the world, that all will die together with him. This bloody confession has confirmed the CCP’s nature: that of a monstrous murderer who has killed 80 million Chinese people and who now plans to hold one billion people hostage and gamble with their lives.

### Oil DA

#### Oil dependence key to middle east engagement and Saudi relations

Gonzalez 12 Angel Gonzalez is Houston Bureau Chief for Dow Jones Newswires, "Expanded Oil Drilling Helps U.S.Wean Itself From Mideast" June 27, 2012 online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304441404577480952719124264.html

Still, growing domestic energy production could allow the U.S. to lessen its focus on the unpredictable region over time. Dependence on Middle East oil has shaped American foreign, national-security and defense policies for most of the last half century. It helped drive the U.S. into active participation in the search for Arab-Israeli peace; drove Washington into close alignments with the monarchies of the Persian Gulf states; compelled it to side with Iraq during its war with Iran; prompted it to then turn against Iraq after its invasion of Kuwait, bringing about the first Persian Gulf war; and prompted Washington to then build up and sustain its military presence in the region.

#### That accesses all impacts---terrorism, econ, iran, middle eastern war

Cordesman 11 (Anthony Cordesman - Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at CSIS, national security analyst for ABC News, served as director of intelligence assessment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and as civilian assistant to the deputy secretary of defense, "Understanding Saudi Stability and Instability – Cordesman" Saudi-US Relations Information Service, March 1, 2011www.susris.com/2011/03/01/understanding-saudi-stability-and-instability-cordesman/)

History scarcely means we can take Saudi stability for granted. Saudi Arabia is simply too critical to US strategic interests and the world. Saudi petroleum exports play a critical role in the stability and growth of a steadily more global economy, and the latest projections by the Department of Energy do not project any major reductions in the direct level of US dependence on oil imports through 2025.

Saudi Arabia is as important to the region’s security and stability as it is to the world’s economy. It is the key to the efforts of the Gulf Cooperation Council to create local defenses, and for US strategic cooperation with the Southern Gulf states. It plays a critical role as a counterbalance to a radical and more aggressive Iran, it is the source of the Arab League plan for a peace with Israel, and it has become a key partner in the war on terrorism. The US strategic posture in the Middle East depends on Saudi Arabia having a friendly and moderate regime.

#### Iranian aggression goes nuclear

**Chossudovsky, 10** - Professor of Economics at the University of Ottawa and Director of the Centre for Research on Globalization (Michael, August 13, 2010, “Towards a World War III Scenario? The Role of Israel in Triggering an Attack on Iran” http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.phpcontext=va&aid=20584)

For several years now Iran has been conducting its own war drills and exercises. While its Air force has weaknesses, its intermediate and long-range missiles are fully operational. Iran's military is in a state of readiness. Iranian troop concentrations are currently within a few kilometers of the Iraqi and Afghan borders, and within proximity of Kuwait. The Iranian Navy is deployed in the Persian Gulf within proximity of US and allied military facilities in the United Arab Emirates. It is worth noting that in response to Iran's military build-up, the US has been transferring large amounts of weapons to its non-NATO allies in the Persian Gulf including Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. While Iran's advanced weapons do not measure up to those of the US and NATO, Iranian forces would be in a position to inflict substantial losses to coalition forces in a conventional war theater, on the ground in Iraq or Afghanistan. Iranian ground troops and tanks in December 2009 crossed the border into Iraq without being confronted or challenged by allied forces and occupied a disputed territory in the East Maysan oil field. Even in the event of an effective Blitzkrieg, which targets Iran's military facilities, its communications systems, etc. through massive aerial bombing, using cruise missiles, conventional bunker buster bombs and tactical nuclear weapons, a war with Iran, once initiated, could eventually lead into a ground war. This is something which US military planners have no doubt contemplated in their simulated war scenarios. An operation of this nature would result in significant military and civilian casualties, particularly if nuclear weapons are used. The expanded budget for the war in Afghanistan currently debated in the US Congress is also intended to be used in the eventuality of an attack on Iran. Within a scenario of escalation, Iranian troops could cross the border into Iraq and Afghanistan. In turn, military escalation using nuclear weapons could lead us into a World War III scenario, extending beyond the Middle East Central Asian region. In a very real sense, this military project, which has been on the Pentagon's drawing board for more than five years, threatens the future of humanity. Our focus in this essay has been on war preparations. The fact that war preparations are in an advanced state of readiness does not imply that these war plans will be carried out. The US-NATO-Israel alliance realizes that the enemy has significant capabilities to respond and retaliate. This factor in itself has been crucial over the last five years in the decision by the US and its allies to postpone an attack on Iran.

#### They kills U.S.-EU energy cooperation---that’s key to overall relations which solve prolif, Russian expansion, Middle East stability and a peaceful Chinese rise

David Koranyi 9-4 is the deputy director of the Atlantic Council's Dinu Patriciu Eurasia Center, 9/4/12, “An Emerging Transatlantic Rift on Energy?” http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/romney-energy-policy-emerging-transatlantic-rift-on-energy

Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney recently unveiled his energy plans for the United States, which promises to fulfill the country’s four-decades’-old dream of energy independence. It has the potential to do so. But the price could ultimately be high: a breakdown in global climate negotiations and a rift in relations with Europe.

American and European energy markets are on a diverging path. The US has edged closer to self-sufficiency with respect to fossil fuels, due mostly to the extensive development of its unconventional resources. From 60 percent in 2005, net petroleum imports were down to 45 percent of the US supply last year. By 2020, this rate could be further reduced close to zero, excluding Canada and Mexico. Shale gas made the United States the number one natural gas producer in the world, overtaking Russia, and revitalized manufacturing and the chemical industry.

Meanwhile, climate-conscious Europe's already high energy import dependence continues to grow. Use of renewable resources mandated by the European Union are spreading dynamically, but will take time to mature. Indigenous unconventional gas faces mixed reactions in some member states. In the wake of the Fukushima accident, nuclear energy is on decline in most countries. Ironically, coal use has increased lately in Germany, due to the nuclear power plant closures and flaws in the EU's cap-and-trade system.

Romney has proposed a plan that would widen the transatlantic gap further. He proposes to accelerate the development of America's considerable on- and offshore oil and natural resources by opening up federal lands and wildlife refuges, relaxing legislation, extending tax breaks, and approving Keystone XL that would carry shale oil from Canada; to rehabilitate coal by reverting the Environmental Protection Agency's prohibitive clean air standards introduced by the current administration; and to revitalize nuclear power by streamlining the permitting procedures.

The underlying tenet of the plan is a complete disregard for the threat of climate change, a term the document does not use. Romney renounces the "myth of green jobs creation" and promotes new jobs in the oil, gas, and coal sectors instead. The plan also stipulates that renewables can compete with other resources on a "level playing field," and implies the cessation of government support for renewable energy projects.

The plan, not to mention its implementation, will cause outrage in Europe. To most European policymakers, and the general public alike, shale oil and coal are anathemas, and the "drill baby drill" mentality is considered environmentally reckless. Brussels and other European capitals already resent that President Obama has not spent enough political capital on global climate change negotiations. Europeans worry that a Romney Administration would derail the timeframe agreed to in Cancun last December.

Moreover, Europeans believe that a pursuit of US energy independence could prove both elusive and counter-productive. Even if complete self-sufficiency is achieved, oil prices are determined on the global oil market. The United States might miss breakthroughs in technologies and business opportunities that are offered by the global scramble for renewables. While global challenges to stable energy markets prevail, an illusion of energy independence might prompt a more isolationist stance in US foreign policy and a reduced commitment to strategic interests like Europe's energy security.

A transatlantic friction is looming. Would the United States and Europe ultimately be able to reconcile their visions? The transatlantic partners share strategic interests and face common threats and challenges closely linked to energy issues, such as the proliferation of nuclear weapons, a resurgent Russia, an unstable Middle East, or China’s insatiable appetite for resources and its repercussions around the globe. The United States and Europe are uniquely positioned to develop technology, leverage financing, and share experiences in legislative and regulatory developments. In times of austerity, identifying synergies and pooling resources is paramount.

There is also plenty to build upon. Owed largely to the increased use of cheap natural gas in electricity generation, to the detriment of coal and measures like enhanced vehicle fuel economy standards, last week the US Energy Information Administration reported that energy-related CO2 emissions in the first three months of the year were the lowest since 1992 (though still much higher per capita than in Europe). While Congress and the US government are paralyzed, more than thirty US states adopted renewable energy portfolio standards similar to the EU's 20 percent target by 2020. Regional emission trading schemes are on the rise in the absence of a federal one. Texas is becoming a renewable energy technology hotspot and wind and solar powerhouse. Many in Europe are willing to learn from the US how to unlock their own shale gas potential that can serve as a bridge fuel to the EU's preferred zero-carbon future as gas emits much less CO2. Conversely, the US is looking to exploit four decades of European experience in energy efficiency improvements and demand reduction. Though politically and financially tricky, both EU member states and the United States should revisit nuclear energy as an essential component in providing affordable and sustainable energy. The list goes on.

The benefits of transatlantic cooperation are beyond doubt. The consequences of a falling out between the United States and the EU after the elections are far-reaching. A continued dialogue launched in the framework of the US-EU Energy Council in 2009 would be a way to avoid that. Joint efforts to address climate change, innovation, and investment in clean energy technologies, risk sharing, and cost reduction; joint research and development and harmonized energy diplomacy should be the cornerstones. A value gap that will undermine trust within the alliance is in nobody’s interest.

#### EU relations solve extinction

Maria João Rodrigues 11, Professor at the European Studies Institute-Université Libre de Bruxelles and at the Lisbon University Institute, Special Advisor on European Economic Policies, 2011, “Transatlantic cooperation for jobs and a new growth model,” in The Agenda for the EU-US strategic partnership, online: http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Transatlantic2011.pdf

The strategic priorities previously described in this chapter do not constitute a wrong or a risky choice because they might create a competitive handicap for the US and Europe. On the contrary, they can provide them with the long-term competitive advantage of being at the vanguard of setting an agenda of global priorities which will be emulated by other powers, if the planet is able to create a win-win game and thus avoid extreme fragmentation and collapse. We are assuming that countries are condemned to a certain level of strategic convergence if they want to secure the planet’s future.

Moreover, these strategic priorities can be seen as realistic as most of the required technological solutions are already known. The real difficulty is whether the political process is large and democratic enough to drive this kind of ‘grand transformation’. It is important to make the right choices when dealing with the various dilemmas that these priorities entail.

Recovering growth and jobs creation and reducing carbon emissions are not irreconcilable objectives: these goals can be achieved by refocusing investment, production, consumption and jobs creation on low-carbon solutions. It is also possible to recover growth and speed up the transition to a smarter economy by actively supporting innovation at all levels and in all companies as well as by providing people with the skills and training that will enable them to transition to the new jobs. Finally, it is possible to recover growth and reduce the public debt – which is now much higher after the massive expenditure entailed by the recent stimulus packages and the financial bail-outs – by actively supporting job creation, redirecting public expenditure to key investments and by reviewing the sources of taxation.

This active search for a new growth model, involving not only policymakers but also the relevant civil society stakeholders, urgently needs to be put higher on the agenda of transatlantic cooperation.

#### Prolif’s extinction

Martin Hellman 8, Prof Emeritus of Engineering @ Stanford, “Defusing the Nuclear Threat: A Necessary First Step,” http://www.nuclearrisk.org/statement.php

Nuclear deterrence has worked for over fifty years, while attempts at nuclear disarmament have borne very limited fruit. The success of deterrence combined with the failure of disarmament has fostered the belief that, repulsive as nuclear deterrence might be, it is the only strategy we can depend on for the indefinite future. Given the **horrific consequences of even a single failure**, the real question is whether deterrence will work until it is no longer needed. Anything less is a modern day version of Neville Chamberlain’s infamous 1938 statement promising “Peace in our time,” implicitly leaving the problem and likely destruction to our children’s generation. And, as occurred to Chamberlain’s Britain, devastation could come much sooner than anticipated. The danger increases with each new entrant into the nuclear weapons club and more new members, including terrorist groups, are likely in the near future. Given that the **survival of humanity is at stake**, it is surprising that risk analysis studies of nuclear deterrence are incomplete. A number of studies have estimated the cost of a failure, with estimates ranging from megadeaths for a limited exchange or terrorist act, through possible **human extinction** for a full-scale nuclear war. But there is a lack of studies of an equally important component of the risk, namely the failure rate of deterrence.

#### Russian expansion is nuke war

Blank 9 – Dr. Stephen Blank , Research Professor of National Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, March 2009, “Russia And Arms Control: Are There Opportunities For The Obama Administration?,” online: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub908.pdf

Proliferators or nuclear states like China and Russia can then deter regional or intercontinental attacks either by denial or by threat of retaliation.168 Given a multipolar world structure with little ideological rivalry among major powers, it is unlikely that they will go to war with each other. Rather, like Russia, they will strive for exclusive hegemony in their own “sphere of influence” and use nuclear instruments towards that end. However, wars may well break out between major powers and weaker “peripheral” states or between peripheral and semiperipheral states given their lack of domestic legitimacy, the absence of the means of crisis prevention, the visible absence of crisis management mechanisms, and their strategic calculation that asymmetric wars might give them the victory or respite they need.169 Simultaneously,

The states of periphery and semiperiphery have far more opportunities for political maneuvering. Since war remains a political option, these states may find it convenient to exercise their military power as a means for achieving political objectives. Thus international crises may increase in number. This has two important implications for the use of WMD. First, they may be used deliberately to offer a decisive victory (or in Russia’s case, to achieve “intra-war escalation control”—author170) to the striker, or for defensive purposes when imbalances in military capabilities are significant; and second, crises increase the possibilities of inadvertent or accidental wars involving WMD.171

Obviously nuclear proliferators or states that are expanding their nuclear arsenals like Russia can exercise a great influence upon world politics if they chose to defy the prevailing consensus and use their weapons not as defensive weapons, as has been commonly thought, but as offensive weapons to threaten other states and deter nuclear powers. Their decision to go either for cooperative security and strengthened international military-political norms of action, or for individual national “egotism” will critically affect world politics. For, as Roberts observes,

But if they drift away from those efforts [to bring about more cooperative security], the consequences could be profound. At the very least, the effective functioning of inherited mechanisms of world order, such as the special responsibility of the “great powers” in the management of the interstate system, especially problems of armed aggression, under the aegis of collective security, could be significantly impaired. Armed with the ability to defeat an intervention, or impose substantial costs in blood or money on an intervening force or the populaces of the nations marshaling that force, the newly empowered tier could bring an end to collective security operations, undermine the credibility of alliance commitments by the great powers, [undermine guarantees of extended deterrence by them to threatened nations and states] extend alliances of their own, and perhaps make wars of aggression on their neighbors or their own people.172

# Fish

### Overfishing

#### Solving for overfishing in SQ

Environment and Energy News, 6-20-2006, “FISHERIES: One of four U.S. stocks 'overfished,' NMFS says”, lexis, FZ

NMFS noted that the majority of assessed fish stocks are not depleted and that overfishing levels improved slightly from last year. "We continue to make progress in rebuilding overfished stocks and ending overfishing, but this report also signals the need for additional management tools from Congress for us to be more effective stewards of our oceans," NMFS director Bill Hogarth said in a statement. The report comes as Congress considers bills that could change requirements for when fishing councils must act to stop overfishing and rebuild depleted stocks. The Senate approved its fishery legislation yesterday, and a bill from Resources Committee Chairman Richard Pombo (R-Calif.) is expected in the House next month. "I look forward to the passage of a robust bill to reauthorize the Magnuson-Stevens Act with provisions that give NOAA and the regional fishery management councils stronger legal mandates to end overfishing more quickly, which in turn will accelerate the rebuilding of overfished stocks," Hogarth said.

#### No solvency—plan doesn’t end subsidies, which are key to solving overfishing

Charles Clover, author and environment editor of The Daily Telegraph, 4-3-2007, The Globe and Mail, “We are fishing our oceans to death; Want to make a real difference? End fisheries subsidies, says CHARLES CLOVER”, lexis, FZ

A new study by the Fisheries Centre at the University of British Columbia found that, worldwide, fisheries subsidies total more than $30-billion. At least $20-billion directly support fishing operations, including the boats, equipment, and other costs that would otherwise be borne by the industry. These subsidies have produced a global fishing fleet that is more than twice as large as what is needed to fish at sustainable levels. And, as fish stocks are found farther and farther away, fuel subsidies are increasingly doled out to cover the cost of the high seas trawling fleets. We are fishing our oceans to death at taxpayers' expense. In the wake of this unprecedented crisis, trade ministers made a historic move and included fisheries subsidies on the agenda of the current World Trade Organization's Doha round of trade talks. This represents the first time that conservation concerns, specifically the problem of global overfishing and its implications on economic development and world trade, have resulted in the launch of a specific negotiation. The fisheries subsidies negotiations are at a critical point and a draft fisheries subsidies agreement could be produced within months. A broad group of developed and developing countries, including New Zealand, Australia, and the United States are leading the charge in the WTO to strengthen trade rules to effectively curtail market-distorting and ecology-damaging subsidies to the fishing sector. As historic as the negotiations themselves is the broad support for these talks from free traders, environmentalists, business, and consumer interests. Canada, an advanced nation that prides itself on its green and pro-environment outlook, would be the perfect advocate for eliminating these destructive subsidies. So the question is: Why isn't Canada a leader on something it knows so well? After all, Canada has had its own experience with overfishing nightmares. The Grand Banks disaster off of Newfoundland demonstrated just how badly fisheries policies can go wrong when the largest cod population in the world was destroyed by overfishing, inaccurate science and other factors. In 1992, Canada's Department of Fisheries and Oceans declared an indefinite moratorium on cod fishing and the world was shaken out of its complacent assumption that the sea's resources are limitless. Fifteen years later, why has support for fisheries subsidies persisted in Canada? Four words: Fishermen vote, fish don't. This might be easier to accept if the ramifications were not so great, but we are not just talking about a regional development issue. Fear ought not to prevent us from achieving the largest single action we can take to protect the world's fisheries and the long-term health of the communities that depend on them. This is not about Canadian fishing subsidies, which are mere change compared to the big players in the subsidies racket. Japan, China, and the European Union, the world's top subsidizers, give out billions each year and their impact can be seen around the world, including in the overfishing problems in North American waters. This is about levelling the playing field for all fishermen, particularly Canada's and those of other countries who play fair.

### Food Shortages

#### No food shortages

Goklany 9**—**Worked with federal and state governments, think tanks, and the private sector for over 35 years. Worked with IPCC before its inception as an author, delegate and reviewer. Negotiated UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. Managed the emissions trading program for the EPA. Julian Simon Fellow at the Property and Environment Research Center, visiting fellow at AEI, winner of the Julian Simon Prize and Award. PhD, MS, electrical engineering, MSU. B.Tech in electrical engineering, Indian Institute of Tech. (Indur, “Have increases in population, affluence and technology worsened human and environmental well-being?” 2009, http://www.ejsd.org/docs/HAVE\_INCREASES\_IN\_POPULATION\_AFFLUENCE\_AND\_TECHNOLOGY\_WORSENED\_HUMAN\_AND\_ENVIRONMENTAL\_WELL-BEING.pdf, AMiles)

Although global population is no longer growing exponentially, it has quadrupled since 1900. Concurrently, affluence (or GDP per capita) has sextupled, global economic product (a measure of aggregate consumption) has increased 23-fold and carbon dioxide has increased over 15-fold (Maddison 2003; GGDC 2008; World Bank 2008a; Marland et al. 2007).4 But contrary to Neo- Malthusian fears, average human well-being, measured by any objective indicator, has never been higher. Food supplies, Malthus’ original concern, are up worldwide. Global food supplies per capita increased from 2,254 Cals/day in 1961 to 2,810 in 2003 (FAOSTAT 2008). This helped reduce hunger and malnutrition worldwide. The proportion of the population in the developing world, suffering from chronic hunger declined from 37 percent to 17 percent between 1969–71 and 2001–2003 despite an 87 percent population increase (Goklany 2007a; FAO 2006).

#### No risk of resource wars---historical evidence all concludes neg---cooperation is way more likely and solves

Jeremy Allouche 11 is currently a Research Fellow at the Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex. "The sustainability and resilience of global water and food systems: Political analysis of the interplay between security, resource scarcity, political systems and global trade" Food PolicyVolume 36, Supplement 1, January 2011, Pages S3-S8 Accessed via: Science Direct Sciverse

Water/food resources, war and conflict

The question of resource scarcity has led to many debates on whether scarcity (whether of food or water) will lead to conflict and war. The underlining reasoning behind most of these discourses over food and water wars comes from the Malthusian belief that there is an imbalance between the economic availability of natural resources and population growth since while food production grows linearly, population increases exponentially. Following this reasoning, neo-Malthusians claim that finite natural resources place a strict limit on the growth of human population and aggregate consumption; if these limits are exceeded, social breakdown, conflict and wars result. Nonetheless, it seems that most empirical studies do not support any of these neo-Malthusian arguments. Technological change **and greater inputs of capital** have **dramatically increased labour productivity in agriculture.** More generally, the neo-Malthusian view has suffered because during the last two centuries **humankind has breached many resource barriers that seemed unchallengeable**.

Lessons from history: alarmist scenarios, resource wars and international relations

In a so-called age of uncertainty, a number of alarmist scenarios have linked the increasing use of water resources and food insecurity with wars. The idea of water wars (perhaps more than food wars) is a dominant discourse in the media (see for example Smith, 2009), NGOs (International Alert, 2007) and within international organizations (UNEP, 2007). In 2007, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon declared that ‘water scarcity threatens economic and social gains and is a potent fuel for wars and conflict’ (Lewis, 2007). Of course, this type of discourse has an **instrumental purpose**; security and conflict are here used for raising water/food as key policy priorities at the international level.

In the Middle East, presidents, prime ministers and foreign ministers have also used this bellicose rhetoric. Boutrous Boutros-Gali said; ‘the next war in the Middle East will be over water, not politics’ (Boutros Boutros-Gali in Butts, 1997, p. 65). The question is not whether the sharing of transboundary water sparks political tension and alarmist declaration, but rather to what extent water has been a principal factor in international conflicts. The evidence seems quite weak. Whether by president Sadat in Egypt or King Hussein in Jordan, none **of these declarations have been followed up by military action**.

The governance of transboundary water has gained increased attention these last decades. This has a direct impact on the global food system as water allocation agreements determine the amount of water that can used for irrigated agriculture. The likelihood of conflicts over water is an important parameter to consider in assessing the stability, sustainability and resilience of global food systems.

None **of the** various and extensive databases on the causes of war show water as a casus belli. Using the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) data set and supplementary data from the University of Alabama on water conflicts, Hewitt, Wolf and Hammer found only seven disputes where water seems to have been at least a partial cause for conflict (Wolf, 1998, p. 251). In fact, about 80% of the incidents relating to water were limited purely to governmental rhetoric intended for the electorate (Otchet, 2001, p. 18).

As shown in The Basins At Risk (BAR) water event database, **more than two-thirds of over 1800 water-related ‘events’ fall on the ‘cooperative’ scale** (Yoffe et al., 2003). Indeed, if one takes into account a much longer period, the following figures clearly demonstrate this argument. According to studies by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), organized political bodies signed between the year 805 and 1984 more than 3600 water-related treaties, and approximately 300 treaties dealing with water management or allocations in international basins have been negotiated since 1945 ([FAO, 1978] and [FAO, 1984]).

The fear around water wars have been driven by a Malthusian outlook which equates scarcity with violence, conflict and war. There is however **no direct correlation between water scarcity and transboundary conflict**. Most specialists now tend to agree that the major issue is not scarcity per se but rather the allocation of water resources between the different riparian states (see for example [Allouche, 2005], [Allouche, 2007] and [Rouyer, 2000]). Water rich countries have been involved in a number of disputes with other relatively water rich countries (see for example India/Pakistan or Brazil/Argentina). The perception of each state’s estimated water needs really constitutes the core issue in transboundary water relations. Indeed, whether this scarcity exists or not in reality, perceptions of the amount of available water shapes people’s attitude towards the environment (Ohlsson, 1999). In fact, some water experts have argued that scarcity drives the process of co-operation among riparians ([Dinar and Dinar, 2005] and [Brochmann and Gleditsch, 2006]).

In terms of international relations, the threat of water wars due to increasing scarcity **does not make much sense in the light of the recent** historical record. Overall, the water war rationale expects conflict to occur over water, and appears to suggest that violence is a viable means of securing national water supplies, an argument which is highly contestable.

The debates over the likely impacts of climate change have again popularised the idea of water wars. The argument runs that climate change will precipitate worsening ecological conditions contributing to resource scarcities, social breakdown, institutional failure, mass migrations and in turn cause greater political instability and conflict ([Brauch, 2002] and [Pervis and Busby, 2004]). In a report for the US Department of Defense, Schwartz and Randall (2003) speculate about the consequences of a worst-case climate change scenario arguing that water shortages will lead to aggressive wars (Schwartz and Randall, 2003, p. 15). Despite growing concern that climate change will lead to instability and violent conflict, **the evidence base to substantiate the connections is thin** ([Barnett and Adger, 2007] and [Kevane and Gray, 2008]).

### Oceans

#### Climate change proves Oceans and marine bioD are resilient – alarmist predictions empirically denied

Taylor 10 [James M. Taylor is a senior fellow of The Heartland Institute and managing editor of Environment & Climate News., “Ocean Acidification Scare Pushed at Copenhagen,” Feb 10 http://www.heartland.org/publications/environment%20climate/article/26815/Ocean\_Acidification\_Scare\_Pushed\_at\_Copenhagen.html]

With global temperatures continuing their decade-long decline and United Nations-sponsored global warming talks falling apart in Copenhagen, alarmists at the U.N. talks spent considerable time claiming carbon dioxide emissions will cause catastrophic ocean acidification, regardless of whether temperatures rise. The latest scientific data, however, show no such catastrophe is likely to occur. Food Supply Risk Claimed The United Kingdom’s environment secretary, Hilary Benn, initiated the Copenhagen ocean scare with a high-profile speech and numerous media interviews claiming ocean acidification threatens the world’s food supply. “The fact is our seas absorb CO2. They absorb about a quarter of the total that we produce, but it is making our seas more acidic,” said Benn in his speech. “If this continues as a problem, then it can affect the one billion people who depend on fish as their principle source of protein, and we have to feed another 2½ to 3 billion people over the next 40 to 50 years.” Benn’s claim of oceans becoming “more acidic” is misleading, however. Water with a pH of 7.0 is considered neutral. pH values lower than 7.0 are considered acidic, while those higher than 7.0 are considered alkaline. The world’s oceans have a pH of 8.1, making them alkaline, not acidic. Increasing carbon dioxide concentrations would make the oceans less alkaline but not acidic. Since human industrial activity first began emitting carbon dioxide into the atmosphere a little more than 200 years ago, the pH of the oceans has fallen merely 0.1, from 8.2 to 8.1. Following Benn’s December 14 speech and public relations efforts, most of the world’s major media outlets produced stories claiming ocean acidification is threatening the world’s marine life. An Associated Press headline, for example, went so far as to call ocean acidification the “evil twin” of climate change. Studies Show CO2 Benefits Numerous recent scientific studies show higher carbon dioxide levels in the world’s oceans have the same beneficial effect on marine life as higher levels of atmospheric carbon dioxide have on terrestrial plant life. In a 2005 study published in the Journal of Geophysical Research, scientists examined trends in chlorophyll concentrations, critical building blocks in the oceanic food chain. The French and American scientists reported “an overall increase of the world ocean average chlorophyll concentration by about 22 percent” during the prior two decades of increasing carbon dioxide concentrations. In a 2006 study published in Global Change Biology, scientists observed higher CO2 levels are correlated with better growth conditions for oceanic life. The highest CO2 concentrations produced “higher growth rates and biomass yields” than the lower CO2 conditions. Higher CO2 levels may well fuel “subsequent primary production, phytoplankton blooms, and sustaining oceanic food-webs,” the study concluded. Ocean Life ‘Surprisingly Resilient’ In a 2008 study published in Biogeosciences, scientists subjected marine organisms to varying concentrations of CO2, including abrupt changes of CO2 concentration. The ecosystems were “surprisingly resilient” to changes in atmospheric CO2, and “the ecosystem composition, bacterial and phytoplankton abundances and productivity, grazing rates and total grazer abundance and reproduction were not significantly affected by CO2-induced effects.” In a 2009 study published in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, scientists reported, “Sea star growth and feeding rates increased with water temperature from 5ºC to 21ºC. A doubling of current [CO2] also increased growth rates both with and without a concurrent temperature increase from 12ºC to 15ºC.” Another False CO2 Scare “Far too many predictions of CO2-induced catastrophes are treated by alarmists as sure to occur, when real-world observations show these doomsday scenarios to be highly unlikely or even virtual impossibilities,” said Craig Idso, Ph.D., author of the 2009 book CO2, Global Warming and Coral Reefs. “The phenomenon of CO2-induced ocean acidification appears to be no different.

# Oil

### Cyberterror

#### Their impacts are all hype

Walt 10 – Stephen M. Walt 10 is the Robert and Renée Belfer Professor of international relations at Harvard University "Is the cyber threat overblown?" March 30 walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/03/30/is\_the\_cyber\_threat\_overblown

Am I the only person -- well, besides Glenn Greenwald and Kevin Poulson -- who thinks the "cyber-warfare" business may be overblown? It’s clear the U.S. national security establishment is paying a lot more attention to the issue, and colleagues of mine -- including some pretty serious and level-headed people -- are increasingly worried by the danger of some sort of "cyber-Katrina." I don't dismiss it entirely, but this sure looks to me like a classic opportunity for threat-inflation.

Mind you, I'm not saying that there aren't a lot of shenanigans going on in cyber-space, or that various forms of cyber-warfare don't have military potential. So I'm not arguing for complete head-in-the-sand complacency. But here’s what makes me worry that the threat is being overstated.

First, the whole issue is highly esoteric -- you really need to know a great deal about computer networks, software, encryption, etc., to know how serious the danger might be. Unfortunately, details about a number of the alleged incidents that are being invoked to demonstrate the risk of a "cyber-Katrina," or a cyber-9/11, remain classified, which makes it hard for us lay-persons to gauge just how serious the problem really was or is. Moreover, even when we hear about computers being penetrated by hackers, or parts of the internet crashing, etc., it’s hard to know how much valuable information was stolen or how much actual damage was done. And as with other specialized areas of technology and/or military affairs, a lot of the experts have a clear vested interest in hyping the threat, so as to create greater demand for their services. Plus, we already seem to have politicians leaping on the issue as a way to grab some pork for their states.

Second, there are lots of different problems being lumped under a single banner, whether the label is "cyber-terror" or "cyber-war." One issue is the use of various computer tools to degrade an enemy’s military capabilities (e.g., by disrupting communications nets, spoofing sensors, etc.). A second issue is the alleged threat that bad guys would penetrate computer networks and shut down power grids, air traffic control, traffic lights, and other important elements of infrastructure, the way that internet terrorists (led by a disgruntled computer expert) did in the movie Live Free and Die Hard. A third problem is web-based criminal activity, including identity theft or simple fraud (e.g., those emails we all get from someone in Nigeria announcing that they have millions to give us once we send them some account information). A fourth potential threat is “cyber-espionage”; i.e., clever foreign hackers penetrate Pentagon or defense contractors’ computers and download valuable classified information. And then there are annoying activities like viruses, denial-of-service attacks, and other things that affect the stability of web-based activities and disrupt commerce (and my ability to send posts into FP).

This sounds like a rich menu of potential trouble, and putting the phrase "cyber" in front of almost any noun makes it sound trendy and a bit more frightening. But notice too that these are all somewhat different problems of quite different importance, and the appropriate response to each is likely to be different too. Some issues -- such as the danger of cyber-espionage -- may not require elaborate technical fixes but simply more rigorous security procedures to isolate classified material from the web. Other problems may not require big federal programs to address, in part because both individuals and the private sector have incentives to protect themselves (e.g., via firewalls or by backing up critical data). And as Greenwald warns, there may be real costs to civil liberties if concerns about vague cyber dangers lead us to grant the NSA or some other government agency greater control over the Internet.

Third, this is another issue that cries out for some comparative cost-benefit analysis. Is the danger that some malign hacker crashes a power grid greater than the likelihood that a blizzard would do the same thing? Is the risk of cyber-espionage greater than the potential danger from more traditional forms of spying? Without a comparative assessment of different risks and the costs of mitigating each one, we will allocate resources on the basis of hype rather than analysis. In short, my fear is not that we won't take reasonable precautions against a potential set of dangers; my concern is that we will spend tens of billions of dollars protecting ourselves against a set of threats that are not as dangerous as we are currently being told they are.

### Warming

#### Asia pollution offsets any US action – global warming is inevitable

Knappenberger 12 – Mr. Paul Knappenberger is the Assistant Director of the Cato Institute’s Center for the Study of Science. He holds an M.S. degree in Environmental Sciences (1990) from the University of Virginia as well as a B.A. degree in Environmental Sciences (1986) from the same institution.His over 20 years of experience as a climate researcher have included 10 years with the Virginia State Climatology Office and 13 years with New Hope Environmental Services, Inc. June 7th, 2012, "Asian Air Pollution Warms U.S More than Our GHG Emissions (More futility for U.S. EPA)" www.masterresource.org/2012/06/asian-air-pollution-warming/

“The whims of foreign nations, not to mention Mother Nature, can completely offset any climate changes induced by U.S. greenhouse gas emissions reductions…. So, what’s the point of forcing Americans into different energy choices?”¶ A new study provides evidence that air pollution emanating from Asia will warm the U.S. as much or more than warming from U.S. greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The implication? **Efforts by the** U.S. **Environmental Protection Agency** (and otherwise) **to mitigate anthropogenic climate change is** moot.¶ If the future temperature rise in the U.S. is subject to the whims of Asian environmental and energy policy, then what sense does it make for Americans to have their energy choices regulated by efforts aimed at mitigating future temperature increases across the country—efforts which will have less of an impact on temperatures than the policies enacted across Asia?¶ Maybe **the EPA should reconsider the perceived effectiveness of its greenhouse gas emission regulations**—at least when it comes to impacting temperatures across the U.S.¶ New Study¶ A new study just published in the scientific journal Geophysical Research Letters is authored by a team led by Haiyan Teng from the National Center for Atmospheric Research, in Boulder, Colorado. The paper is titled “Potential Impacts of Asian Carbon Aerosols on Future US Warming.”¶ Skipping the details of this climate modeling study and cutting to the chase, here is the abstract of the paper:¶ This study uses an atmosphere-ocean fully coupled climate model to investigate possible remote impacts of Asian carbonaceous aerosols on US climate change. We took a 21st century mitigation scenario as a reference, and carried out three sets of sensitivity experiments in which the prescribed carbonaceous aerosol concentrations over a selected Asian domain are increased by a factor of two, six, and ten respectively during the period of 2005–2024.¶ The resulting enhancement of atmospheric solar absorption (only the direct effect of aerosols is included) over Asia induces tropospheric heating anomalies that force large-scale circulation changes which, averaged over the twenty-year period, **add as much as an** additional 0.4°C warming **over the eastern US during winter** and over most of the US during summer. Such remote impacts are confirmed by an atmosphere stand-alone experiment with specified heating anomalies over Asia that represent the direct effect of the carbon aerosols.¶ Usually, when considering the climate impact from carbon aerosol emissions (primarily in the form of black carbon, or soot), the effect is thought to be largely contained to the local or regional scale because the atmospheric lifetime of these particulates is only on the order of a week (before they are rained out). Since Asia lies on the far side of the Pacific Ocean—a distance which requires about a week for air masses to navigate—we usually aren’t overly concerned about the quality of Asian air or the quantity of junk that they emit into it. By the time it gets here, it has largely been naturally scrubbed clean.¶ But in the Teng et al. study, the authors find that, according to their climate model, the local heating of the atmosphere by the Asian carbon aerosols (which are quite good at absorbing sunlight) can **impart changes to the character of the larger-scale atmospheric circulation patterns.** And these changes to the broader atmospheric flow produce an effect on the weather patterns in the U.S. and thus induce a change in the climate here characterized by “0.4°C [surface air temperature] warming on average over the eastern US during winter and over almost the entire US during summer” averaged over the 2005–2024 period.¶ While most of the summer warming doesn’t start to kick in until Asian carbonaceous aerosol emissions are upped in the model to 10 times what they are today, the winter warming over the eastern half of the country is large (several tenths of a °C) even at twice the current rate of Asian emissions.¶ Now let’s revisit just how much “global warming” that stringent U.S. greenhouse gas emissions reductions may avoid averaged across the country.¶ In my Master Resource post “Climate Impacts of Waxman-Markey (the IPCC-based arithmetic of no gain)” I calculated that a more than 80% reduction of greenhouse gas emissions in the U.S. by the year 2050 would result in a reduction of global temperatures (from where they otherwise would be) of about 0.05°C. Since the U.S. is projected to warm slightly more than the global average (land warms faster than the oceans), a 0.05°C of global temperature reduction probably amounts to about 0.075°C of temperature “savings” averaged across the U.S., by the year 2050.¶ Comparing the amount of warming in the U.S. saved by reducing our greenhouse gas emissions by some 80% to the amount of warming added in the U.S. by increases in Asian black carbon (soot) aerosol emissions (at least according to Teng et al.) and there is no clear winner. Which points out the anemic effect that U.S. greenhouse gas reductions will have on the climate of the U.S. and **just how easily the whims of foreign nations, not to mention Mother Nature, can completely offset any climate changes induced by our greenhouse gas emissions reductions**.¶ And even if the traditional form of air pollution (e.g., soot) does not increase across Asia (a slim chance of that), greenhouse gases emitted there certainly will. For example, at the current growth rate, new greenhouse gas emissions from China will completely subsume an 80% reduction in U.S. greenhouse gas emission in just over a decade. Once again, pointing out that a reduction in domestic greenhouse gases is for naught, at least when it comes to mitigating climate change.¶ So, what’s the point, really, of forcing Americans into different energy choices? As I have repeatedly pointed out, nothing we do here (when it comes to greenhouse gas emissions) will make any difference either domestically, or globally, when it comes to influences on the climate. What the powers-that-be behind emissions reduction schemes in the U.S. are hoping for is that 1) it doesn’t hurt us too much, and 2) that China and other large developing nations will follow our lead.¶ Both outcomes seem dubious at time scales that make a difference.

#### We’re already past the tipping point

Guterl 9 – Fred Guterl 9, Executive Editor of Scientific American, Will Climate Go Over The Edge?, 2009 http://www.newsweek.com/id/185822

Since the real world is so messy, climate scientists Gerard Roe and Marcia Baker turned for insight to the distinctly neater world of mathematics. Last year, they published an analysis in the journal Science arguing that climate models were skewed in the direction of underestimating the warming effect of carbon. The report reasoned that carbon emissions have the potential to trigger many changes that amplify the warming effect—water absorbs more sunlight than ice, humidity traps more heat, and so on—but few that would mitigate it. The odds, they figure, are about one in three that temperatures will rise by 4.5 degrees C (the top of the IPCC's range), but there's little chance at all that they'll rise by less than 2 degrees C. "We've had a hard time eliminating the possibility of very large climate changes," says Roe. The answer is still couched in probabilities, but they've shifted in a worrying direction.¶ What can be done? Can a diplomatic miracle in Copenhagen save the planet from the dreaded tipping point? Sea ice in the Antarctic was supposed to last for 5,000 years until scientists found that the melting was proceeding at a faster pace than expected. Now it will all be gone in a mere 850 years. Bringing it back would require something like 10,000 years of cooler temperatures. Is there any way to halt the process before it goes too far?¶ No, says Susan Solomon, a climate scientist at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration in Boulder, Colorado. In a recent study in the Proceedings of the National Academies of Science, she found that most of the carbon we've already released into the atmosphere will hang around for another 1,000 years. Even if world leaders somehow managed to persuade everybody to stop driving cars and heating their homes—bringing carbon emissions down to zero immediately—the Earth would continue to warm for centuries. The effect of rising temperatures on rainfall patterns is also irreversible, says Solomon. Parts of the world that tend to be dry (Mexico, north Africa, southern Europe and the western parts of Australia and the United States) will continue to get drier, while wet areas (the South Pacific islands, the horn of Africa) will keep getting wetter. "You have to think of it as being like a dial that can only turn one way," she says. "We've cranked up the dial, and we don't get to crank it back." The point of a climate treaty, then, isn't so much to roll things back as to keep them from getting a whole lot worse—a worthy and important goal, if not a particularly inspiring one.

#### No impact – warming will take centuries and adaptation solves

Mendelsohn 9 – Robert O. Mendelsohn 9, the Edwin Weyerhaeuser Davis Professor, Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, Yale University, June 2009, “Climate Change and Economic Growth,” online: http://www.growthcommission.org/storage/cgdev/documents/gcwp060web.pdf

These statements are largely alarmist and misleading. Although climate change is a serious problem that deserves attention, society’s immediate behavior has an extremely low probability of leading to catastrophic consequences. The science and economics of climate change is quite clear that emissions over the next few decades will lead to only mild consequences. The severe impacts predicted by alarmists require a century (or two in the case of Stern 2006) of no mitigation. Many of the predicted impacts assume there will be no or little adaptation. The net economic impacts from climate change over the next 50 years will be small regardless. Most of the more severe impacts will take more than a century or even a millennium to unfold and many of these “potential” impacts will never occur because people will adapt. It is not at all apparent that immediate and dramatic policies need to be developed to thwart long‐range climate risks. What is needed are long‐run balanced responses.

#### Warming does not cause extinction – their models are flawed

Stockwell 11 – David Stockwell 11, Researcher at the San Diego Supercomputer Center, Ph.D. in Ecosystem Dynamics from the Australian National University, developed the Genetic Algorithm for Rule-set Production system making contributions modeling of invasive species, epidemiology of human diseases, the discovery of new species, and effects on species of climate change, April 21, 2011, “Errors of Global Warming Effects Modeling,” online: <http://landshape.org/enm/errors-of-global-warming-effects-modeling/>

Predictions of massive species extinctions due to AGW came into prominence with a January 2004 paper in Nature called Extinction Risk from Climate Change by Chris Thomas et al.. They made the following predictions: ¶ “we predict, on the basis of mid-range climate-warming scenarios for 2050, that 15â€“37% of species in our sample of regions and taxa will be â€˜committed to extinctionâ€™.¶ Subsequently, three communications appeared in Nature in July 2004. Two raised technical problems, including one by the eminent ecologist Joan Roughgarden. Opinions raged from “Dangers of Crying Wolf over Risk of Extinctions” concerned with damage to conservationism by alarmism, through poorly written press releases by the scientists themselves, and Extinction risk [press] coverage is worth the inaccuracies stating “we believe the benefits of the wide release greatly outweighed the negative effects of errors in reporting”.¶ Among those believing gross scientific inaccuracies are not justified, and such attitudes diminish the standing of scientists, I was invited to a meeting of a multidisciplinary group of 19 scientists, including Dan Bodkin from UC Santa Barbara, mathematician Matt Sobel, Craig Loehle and others at the Copenhagen base of BjÃ¸rn Lomborg, author of The Skeptical Environmentalist. This resulted in Forecasting the Effects of Global Warming on Biodiversity published in 2007 BioScience. We were particularly concerned by the cavalier attitude to model validations in the Thomas paper, and the field in general: ¶ Of the modeling papers we have reviewed, only a few were validated. Commonly, these papers simply correlate present distribution of species with climate variables, then replot the climate for the future from a climate model and, finally, use one-to-one mapping to replot the future distribution of the species, without any validation using independent data. Although some are clear about some of their assumptions (mainly equilibrium assumptions), readers who are not experts in modeling can easily misinterpret the results as valid and validated. For example, Hitz and Smith (2004) discuss many possible effects of global warming on the basis of a review of modeling papers, and in this kind of analysis the unvalidated assumptions of models would most likely be ignored.¶ The paper observed that few mass extinctions have been seen over recent rapid climate changes, suggesting something must be wrong with the models to get such high rates of extinctions. They speculated that species may survive in refugia, suitable habitats below the spatial scale of the models.¶ Another example of an unvalidated assumptions that could bias results in the direction of extinctions, was described in chapter 7 of my book Niche Modeling.¶ When climate change shifts a species’ niche over a landscape (dashed to solid circle) the response of that species can be described in three ways: dispersing to the new range (migration), local extirpation (intersection), or expansion (union). Given the probability of extinction is correlated with range size, there will either be no change, an increase (intersection), or decrease (union) in extinctions depending on the dispersal type. Thomas et al. failed to consider range expansion (union), a behavior that predominates in many groups. Consequently, the methodology was inherently biased towards extinctions.¶ One of the many errors in this work was a failure to evaluate the impact of such assumptions.¶ The prevailing view now, according to Stephen Williams, coauthor of the Thomas paper and Director for the Center for Tropical Biodiversity and Climate Change, and author of such classics as “Climate change in Australian tropical rainforests: an impending environmental catastrophe”, may be here.¶ Many unknowns remain in projecting extinctions, and the values provided in Thomas et al. (2004) should not be taken as precise predictions. … Despite these uncertainties, Thomas et al. (2004) believe that the consistent overall conclusions across analyses establish that anthropogenic climate warming at least ranks alongside other recognized threats to global biodiversity. ¶ So how precise are the figures? Williams suggests we should just trust the beliefs of Thomas et al. — an approach referred to disparagingly in the forecasting literature as a judgmental forecast rather than a scientific forecast (Green & Armstrong 2007). These simple models gloss over numerous problems in validating extinction models, including the propensity of so-called extinct species quite often reappear. Usually they are small, hard to find and no-one is really looking for them.

#### **Removing the restrictions does not affect global warming**

Loris 8-29 – Nicolas D. Loris is the Herbert and Joyce Morgan Fellow in the Thomas A. Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation, August 29th, 2012, "Hydraulic Fracturing: Critical for Energy Production, Jobs, and Economic Growth," www.thecuttingedgenews.com/index.php?article=75622&pageid=&pagename=

In April 2012, the EPA announced its first air-emission rules for hydraulic fracturing. Rather than being aimed at fracking itself, this is a backdoor global warming regulation: The rule highlights the supposed environmental benefits of reducing emission of methane, a greenhouse gas. The EPA’s rule miserably fails the cost-benefit test; the agency’s own analysis projects **$745 million in** annual **costs and just $11 million** to $19 million **in environmental benefits**. Moreover, the EPA has **grossly overestimated methane emissions** from the wells. The rule also fails to quantify any benefits from reducing volatile organic compounds (VOC) and hazardous air pollutants (HAP). While the rule asserts that benefits exist, the draft also says that “with the data available, we [the EPA] are not able to provide credible health benefit estimates for the reduction in exposure to [hazardous air pollutants], ozone and [particulate matter] (2.5 microns and less) (PM2.5) for these rules.” .”¶ Congress: Prevent Federal Overreach on Fracking¶ The states' effective regulation underscores the need for Members of Congress to prevent federal intervention that would unnecessarily stall the oil and gas boom and drive up costs for producers (and thus consumers). The states with tremendous oil and natural gas reserves have the most to gain economically, and have the greatest incentive to protect their environments. States have qualified experts to handle the regulatory requirements surrounding hydraulic fracturing. To that end, Congress should:¶ Prevent any federal agency from adding new regulations to hydraulic fracturing. The proposed federal regulations are unnecessary and duplicative.¶ Prohibit federal regulators from using any statute to regulate greenhouse gas emissions. Greenhouse gas regulations would drive up the cost of energy for no meaningful change in the Earth’s temperature.

#### 1% risk framing causes policy paralysis – short term and high probability impacts outweigh

Lomborg 8 – Bjorn Lomborg 8, adjunct professor at the Copenhagen Business School, where he founded and directs its Copenhagen Consensus Center, August 25, 2008, “A warming theory that has melted away,” The Guardian, online: http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/aug/25/climatechange.scienceofclimatechange

But it is interesting to assess Weitzman's argument (My arguments are partly indebted to Professor Nordhaus (pdf)). Tickell (and many other campaigners) fancies Weitzman, because his economic argument seems to support draconian climate policies. While very technical, it relies on a fairly straightforward gist. All risks you can think of – even catastrophic ones – have non-zero risk. Thus, it is possible (if not very likely) that global warming will not only increase the planet's temperature by 4C, but 10C. Heck, it might even increase beyond 20C – which Weitzman with armchair climatology, suggests might have a probability of 1%. Since evidence for or against such extremes is scarce, accumulating evidence can only slowly close us in on their true probability. Yet, for any given amount of evidence, there will always be sufficiently outrageous risks (think 30C) that are sufficiently unbound by evidence and sufficiently close to negative infinite utility that the total net utility is negative infinity. Thus, we should be willing to spend all our money to avoid it.¶ Now, in principle all economists would agree that non-trivial risks should be included in the model, and for example, Nordhaus has done that analytically in cost-benefit models (they still show that large emission cuts are not warranted). However, the Weitzman result curiously means that the more speculative and fuzzy the extreme event, the more it counts in the total utility.¶ This is an argument driven by a technicality – essentially a claim that we are willing to pay an infinite amount to avoid even an infinitesimal risk of annihilation. Yet we demonstratively aren't – and shouldn't be. Civilization-ending asteroids hit the earth once every 100m years, but at present we only spend $4m per year to track them. Maybe we should pay $1bn. But we shouldn't spend everything.¶ This underscores the fatal flaw in the Weitzman argument. When we allow all scary, fuzzy concerns onto centre stage, there is no end to where we should spend all our money. Every conceivable policy measure has a non-zero risk of catastrophe and so should be avoided at any cost. Biotechnology, strangelets, runaway computer systems, nuclear proliferation, rogue weeds and bugs, pandemics, and asteroids are just a small sample of the areas each of which we should spend all our money on.¶ Tickell doesn't deal with these arguments at all. As with Stern, he simply picks Weitzman because the policy conclusion fits. Tickell then claims that spending $2tn annually on large-scale emissions cuts will provide the best insurance for mankind. But this ignores that investments in energy R&D will probably long-term cut 11 times more CO2. Moreover, if our goal is not just to cut CO2 but to help people and the planet, we can do even more good by **focusing on simple solutions** such as investing in nutrition, health and agricultural technologies. Instead of avoiding a couple of thousand extra malaria deaths in a century cases through expensive CO2 cuts, maybe we should avoid a million malaria deaths now through low-cost health policies.¶ Tickell's reply clearly shows what happens when policy drives the search for suitable facts. The IPCC is simply ignored, Stern is praised for his policy usefulness, Weitzman embraced irrespective of his analysis essentially leading to policy paralysis, driven by extreme and pervasive speculative risks. Not surprisingly, Tickell ends by saying – without a shred of evidence – that his policy would be the best solution, "even without the threat of global warming".

# Hegemony

### China Rise

#### China structurally cannot be revisionist

Ikenberry 11—Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton, Ph.D. from the University of Chicago (John, May/ June 2011, “The Future of the Liberal World Order,” Foreign Affairs)

REASON FOR REASSURANCE

RISING POWERS will discover another reason to embrace the existing global rules and institutions: doing so will reassure their neighbors as they grow more powerful. A stronger China will make neighboring states potentially less secure, especially if it acts aggressively and exhibits revisionist ambitions. Since this will trigger a balancing backlash, Beijing has incentives to signal restraint. It will find ways to do so by participating in various regional and global institutions. If China hopes to convince its neighbors that it has embarked on a "peaceful rise," it will need to become more integrated into the international order.

#### Multiple factors ensure cooperation

Zhu ’12 – professor in the School of International Studies and the deputy director of the Center for International and Strategic Studies at Beijing University (Zhu Feng, “No One Wants a Clash,” May 3, New York Times, <http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/05/02/are-we-headed-for-a-cold-war-with-china/no-one-wants-a-cold-war-between-the-us-and-china>)

However there is little worry that the two powers will collide into a “new cold war.” First of all, China’s authoritarian system has been tremendously mobilized for international integration. Beijing has been pretty conservative and doesn’t welcome democratization. But it does not strictly adhere to traditional communism either. Any new confrontation like the cold war would risk a huge backlash in China by greatly damaging the better-off Chinese people. Such a conflict could ultimately undermine the Communist Party’s ruling legitimacy.

Second, the power disparity between Washington and China hasn’t significantly narrowed, regardless of Chinese achievements in the past decades. My view is that Beijing remains an adolescent power, and should learn how to be a great power rather than unwisely rushing to any confrontation. Though some Chinese want the nation to assert itself more forcefully, the huge disparity in power should keep China in place. China is in no position to challenge the U.S. But China will be more enthusiastic and straightfoward about addressing and safeguarding its legal interests. Competition between Washington and Beijing will intensify, but that does not automatically mean that the relationship will be unmanageable.

Lastly, the cycle of action and reaction has mostly turned out to be fruitful for the U.S. and China. Further competition is promising. The U.S. doesn’t want to put China in a corner, or force Beijing to stand up desperately. The dealings over many thorny issues have respond? The country’s cold war experience offers a useful strategy. The stalemate imposed by “mutually assured destruction” that prevented the US-Soviet conflict from igniting created a sense of stability. Today, the US and China are locked in a new form of “proved that each side wants to handle the conflict, not escalate it. Chen Guangcheng’s departure from the U.S. Embassy is telling evidence. Neither side wants diplomatic confrontation. Rather, it seems that both sides are struggling to react constructively.

In the years to come, China-U.S. relations will continue to be very complicated, but also very important. The glue to keep these two nations together is not pragmatism only, but mutual interest — especially in trade.

### Rare Earths

#### Domestic production and recycling make the Chinese monopoly irrelevant

[ALREADY IN AT: NATURAL GAS DA]

Kaye 11 – Leon Kaye 12-6, editor of GreenGoPost and contributor to The Guardian’s Sustainable Business section, December 6, 2011, “Conflicted Rare Earth Minerals Prices to Decline,” online: http://www.triplepundit.com/2011/12/rare-earth-minerals-prices/

Now various reports suggest that prices for these materials will start trending downward.¶ Global demand for rare earth minerals will increase over seven percent a year, and their market value will triple from its current value to US$9.2 billion by 2015. Prices should peak in 2013, but by then improved processes and increased research and development in rare earth mineral refining technologies will have a role in pushing those prices down.¶ Molycorp is one reason why rare earths’ prices should stabilize and even decrease. The Colorado-based company owns California’s Mountain Pass Mine, which once supplied most of the world’s rare earth minerals when they were used in color televisions. The mine was shuttered in 2002 because of cheaper minerals from China and growing environmental concerns. But the Mountain Pass facility is due to reopen soon, and companies in Japan including Sumitomo and Mitsubishi have already signed agreements to purchase these minerals from Molycorp. Another company, Simbol Materials, extracts rare earths from California’s Salton Sea and promises a more sustainable process to produce lithium in addition to other minerals.¶ Another factor in decreasing rare earth mineral costs will be the increased and improved recycling of electronics. These conflict minerals are technically not rare. They are, however, widely dispersed in minuscule amounts, and therefore a massive volume of ore is required to extract just a few ounces of that valuable neodymium that keeps wind turbines swirling and the latest Prius models humming. One start-up, BioMine, envisions electronic waste smelters throughout North America that will gather unwanted computers and electronic gadgets and salvage rare earths in addition to expensive metals like gold and copper. E-waste actually has a much higher concentration of rare earths than virgin ore; more efficient recycling will help keep prices down while lessening their environmental impact. Recycling regulations like those in Japan that puts the responsibility for recycling on everyone, from consumers to retailers to manufacturers, will also help the collection of electronic waste, the treasure of the 21st century.¶ As battery, electromagnets and other technologies improve, watch for increased efficiency from batteries, wind turbines and yes, even smartphones. Dystopian fear that we are unsustainably sourcing materials for “sustainable” technologies will be replaced by optimism from more innovative products that will benefit all of us in the long run.

#### Market solves monopoly

Lee 12—runs the Asian affairs website China Matters which provides continuing critical updates on China and Asia-Pacific policies. (Peter, The China-US rare earth games, 3/24/12, www.atimes.com/atimes/China/NC24Ad01.html)

**However, beyond the 97% number, the story gets a little thin**. **China only accounts for around 30% of world rare earth reserves**, begging the question of how vital the WTO complaint is the protection of Western interests. After all, shouldn't Adam Smith's invisible handyman be busy knocking holes in the Chinese monopoly? ¶ In fact, **the market is responding pretty much as one would expect,** with a certain, surprising, amount of help from China. ¶ In addition to enforcement of the export quota system, China's widely reported measures to consolidate production, decrease pollution, and shut down the wildcatters and their inefficient, polluting mines have pushed up global rare earth prices. ¶ In response, there are at least two major rare earth plays going ahead: the Mountain Pass mine in the United States and the Lynas project (mine & concentration in Australia; refining to metal powder in Malaysia). ¶ Mountain Pass, in California's Mojave Desert, **is the biggest rare earth mine in the world, once responsible for half of global output.** It ceased operation in 2002, shuttered by a flood of inexpensive Chinese product. **Now** owned by Molycorp and **flush with IPO money, the mine is reopening**. It recently purchased

### Hegemony

#### Unipolarity causes policy failure---they can’t access any impact

Charles L. Glaser 11, professor in the Elliott School of International Affairs and the Department of Political Science at the George Washington University and the director of the Elliott School’s Institute for Security and Conﬂict Studies, June 2011, “Why unipolarity doesn’t matter (much),” Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 24, No. 2, p. 135-147

A still different type of argument holds that unipolar powers tend to adopt expanded interests and associated goals that unipolarity then enables them to achieve. To the extent that these goals are actually in the unipole’s true interest, unipolarity is good for the unipole. In broad terms, this argument follows the claim that states’ interests and goals grow with their power. 19¶ These expanded goals can be attributed to three different types of factors. 20 The ﬁrst is a permissive structure, which allows the state to pursue more ambitious goals. The state’s interests do not change, but its increased ability to pursue them results in a redeﬁnition of its goals. A state could have goals that were previously unachievable at acceptable cost; by lowering the costs, unipolarity places these goals within reach, enabling the state to make itself better off. A unipole’s desire for a higher degree of security can be an example of this type of expanded goal, reﬂecting the means that it can wield. Second, the state can acquire new interests, which are generated by the unipole’s greater territorial and institutional reach. For example, a state that controls more territory may face new threats and, as a result, conclude that it needs to control still more territory, acquire still more power, and/or restructure international institutions to further protect its interests. Third, the unipole’s goals can be inﬂuenced by what is commonly described as human nature and by psychology. A unipolar state will be inclined to lose track of how secure it is and consequently pursue inappropriate policies that are designed to increase its security but turn out to be too costly and/or to have a high probability of backﬁring. One variant of this type of argument expects unipolar powers to conclude that they need to spread their type of governance or political ideology to be secure. These dangers can be reinforced by a tendency for a unipolar power to see its new interests, which are optional, as necessary ones.¶ The ﬁrst two types of expanded interests and goals can make the unipole better off. The question here is whether the interests the United States might ﬁnd within its reach due to its unipolar position are very valuable. With respect to security, the answer is ‘no’. For the reasons summarized above, the United States can be very secure in bipolarity, and unipolarity is important only in an extreme and unlikely case. Other US goals, for example, spreading democracy and free markets, do not depend on unipolarity, at least not its military dimension. Instead, whether these liberal systems spread will depend most heavily on their own effectiveness. Regarding the down side, there does not appear to be an overwhelming reason that the United States cannot avoid the dangers of unipolar overreach. The Bush administration certainly proved itself vulnerable to these dangers and the United States is continuing to pay for its ﬂawed judgments. Arguably, strands of overreach can be traced back to the Clinton administration’s emphasis on democratic enlargement, although the means that it chose were much more in line with US interests. 21 And the Obama administration’s decision to escalate the war in Afghanistan may well be an example of striving for too much security. Nevertheless, none of the basic arguments about unipolarity explain why these errors are unavoidable. The overreach claim is more an observation about the past than a well-supported prediction about the future. We do not have strong reasons for concluding that the United States will be unable to beneﬁt from analyses of its grand strategy options, learning to both appreciate how very secure it is and at the same time to respect the limits of its power.¶ In sum, then, under current conditions, unipolarity does little to enable the United States to increase its security. Given the limited beneﬁts of unipolarity and the not insigniﬁcant dangers of unipolar overreach, the United States will have to choose its policies wisely if it is going to be better off in a unipolar world than a bipolar one.

#### Retrenchment doesn’t cause conflict, lashout, or draw-in---all their studies are wrong

Paul K. MacDonald 11, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College, and Joseph M. Parent, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami, Spring 2011, “Graceful Decline?: The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment,” International Security, Vol. 35, No. 4, p. 7-44

How do great powers respond to acute decline? The erosion of the relative power of the United States has scholars and policymakers reexamining this question. The central issue is whether prompt retrenchment is desirable or probable. Some pessimists counsel that retrenchment is a dangerous policy, because it shows weakness and invites attack. Robert Kagan, for example, warns, "A reduction in defense spending . . . would unnerve American allies and undercut efforts to gain greater cooperation. There is already a sense around the world, fed by irresponsible pundits here at home, that the United States is in terminal decline. Many fear that the economic crisis will cause the United States to pull back from overseas commitments. The announcement of a defense cutback would be taken by the world as evidence that the American retreat has begun."1 Robert Kaplan likewise argues, "Husbanding our power in an effort to slow America's decline in a post-Iraq and post-Afghanistan world would mean avoiding debilitating land entanglements and focusing instead on being more of an offshore balancer. . . . While this may be in America's interest, the very signaling of such an aloof intention may encourage regional bullies. . . . [L]essening our engagement with the world would have devastating consequences for humanity. The disruptions we witness today are but a taste of what is to come should our country flinch from its international responsibilities."2 The consequences of these views are clear: retrenchment should be avoided and forward defenses maintained into the indefinite future.3¶ Other observers advocate retrenchment policies, but they are pessimistic [End Page 7] about their prospects.4 Christopher Layne, for instance, predicts, "Even as the globe is being turned upside down by material factors, the foreign policies of individual states are shaped by the ideas leaders hold about their own nations' identity and place in world politics. More than most, America's foreign policy is the product of such ideas, and U.S. foreign-policy elites have constructed their own myths of empire to justify the United States' hegemonic role."5 Stephen Walt likewise advocates greater restraint in U.S. grand strategy, but cautions, "The United States . . . remains a remarkably immature great power, one whose rhetoric is frequently at odds with its conduct and one that tends to treat the management of foreign affairs largely as an adjunct to domestic politics. . . . [S]eemingly secure behind its nuclear deterrent and oceanic moats, and possessing unmatched economic and military power, the United States allowed its foreign policy to be distorted by partisan sniping, hijacked by foreign lobbyists and narrow domestic special interests, blinded by lofty but unrealistic rhetoric, and held hostage by irresponsible and xenophobic members of Congress."6 Although retrenchment is a preferable policy, these arguments suggest that great powers often cling to unprofitable foreign commitments for parochial reasons of national culture or domestic politics.7¶ These arguments have grim implications for contemporary international politics. With the rise of new powers, such as China, the international pecking order will be in increasing flux in the coming decades.8 Yet, if the pessimists are correct, politicians and interests groups in the United States will be unwilling or unable to realign resources with overseas commitments. Perceptions of weakness and declining U.S. credibility will encourage policymakers to hold on to burdensome overseas commitments, despite their high costs in blood and treasure.9 Policymakers in Washington will struggle to retire from profitless military engagements and restrain ballooning current accounts and budget deficits.10 For some observers, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan represent the ill-advised last gasps of a declining hegemon seeking to bolster its plummeting position.11¶ In this article, we question the logic and evidence of the retrenchment pessimists. To date there has been neither a comprehensive study of great power retrenchment nor a study that lays out the case for retrenchment as a practical or probable policy. This article fills these gaps by systematically examining the relationship between acute relative decline and the responses of great powers. We examine eighteen cases of acute relative decline since 1870 and advance three main arguments.¶ First, we challenge the retrenchment pessimists' claim that domestic or international constraints inhibit the ability of declining great powers to retrench. In fact, when states fall in the hierarchy of great powers, peaceful retrenchment is the most common response, even over short time spans. Based on the empirical record, we find that great powers retrenched in no less than eleven and no more than fifteen of the eighteen cases, a range of 61-83 percent. When international conditions demand it, states renounce risky ties, increase reliance on allies or adversaries, draw down their military obligations, and impose adjustments on domestic populations.¶ Second, we find that the magnitude of relative decline helps explain the extent of great power retrenchment. Following the dictates of neorealist theory, great powers retrench for the same reason they expand: the rigors of great power politics compel them to do so.12 Retrenchment is by no means easy, but [End Page 9] necessity is the mother of invention, and declining great powers face powerful incentives to contract their interests in a prompt and proportionate manner. Knowing only a state's rate of relative economic decline explains its corresponding degree of retrenchment in as much as 61 percent of the cases we examined.¶ Third, we argue that the rate of decline helps explain what forms great power retrenchment will take. How fast great powers fall contributes to whether these retrenching states will internally reform, seek new allies or rely more heavily on old ones, and make diplomatic overtures to enemies. Further, our analysis suggests that great powers facing acute decline are less likely to initiate or escalate militarized interstate disputes. Faced with diminishing resources, great powers moderate their foreign policy ambitions and offer concessions in areas of lesser strategic value. Contrary to the pessimistic conclusions of critics, retrenchment neither requires aggression nor invites predation. Great powers are able to rebalance their commitments through compromise, rather than conflict. In these ways, states respond to penury the same way they do to plenty: they seek to adopt policies that maximize security given available means. Far from being a hazardous policy, retrenchment can be successful. States that retrench often regain their position in the hierarchy of great powers. Of the fifteen great powers that adopted retrenchment in response to acute relative decline, 40 percent managed to recover their ordinal rank. In contrast, none of the declining powers that failed to retrench recovered their relative position.

#### Hegemony isn’t key to peace

Fettweis 11 Christopher J. Fettweis, Department of Political Science, Tulane University, 9/26/11, Free Riding or Restraint? Examining European Grand Strategy, Comparative Strategy, 30:316–332, EBSCO

It is perhaps worth noting that **there is** no evidence **to support a direct relationship between** the relative level of **U.S. activism and** international stability. In fact, the limited data we do have suggest the opposite may be true. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990.51 To internationalists, defense hawks and believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities,” argued Kristol and Kagan, “doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace.”52 On the other hand, if the pacific trends were not based upon U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: **The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces.** No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable United States military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums, no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races, and no regional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. Most of all, the United States and its allies were no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped the spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a connection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. Once again, one could presumably argue that spending is not the only or even the best indication of hegemony, and that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was significantly altered during this period, instability should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. However, even if it is true that either U.S. commitments or relative spending account for global pacific trends, then at the very least stability can evidently be maintained at drastically lower levels of both. In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in the alternative for a moment and suppose that there is in fact a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand strategist would still recommend cutting back on engagement and spending until that level is determined. Grand strategic decisions are never final; continual adjustments can and must be made as time goes on. Basic logic suggests that the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment. And if the current era of stability is as stable as many believe it to be, no increase in conflict would ever occur irrespective of U.S. spending, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation. It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that their expectations had been fulfilled. If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as proof of the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the only evidence we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained United States suggests that the current **peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S.** military spending. Evidently the rest of the world can operate quite effectively without the presence of a **global policeman.** Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone.

#### No U.S. lashout---retrenchment causes caution and restraint---reduces the risk of war

Paul K. MacDonald 11, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College, and Joseph M. Parent, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami, Spring 2011, “Graceful Decline?: The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment,” International Security, Vol. 35, No. 4, p. 7-44

With regard to militarized disputes, declining great powers demonstrate more caution and restraint in the use of force: they were involved in an average of 1.7 fewer militarized disputes in the five years following ordinal change compared with other great powers over similar periods.67 Declining great powers also initiated fewer militarized disputes, and their disputes tended to escalate to lower levels of hostility than the baseline category (see figure 2).68 These findings suggest the need for a fundamental revision to the pessimist's argument regarding the war proneness of declining powers.69 Far from being more likely to lash out aggressively, declining states refrain from initiating and escalating military disputes. Nor do declining great powers appear more vulnerable to external predation than other great powers. This may be because external predators have great difficulty assessing the vulnerability of potential victims, or because retrenchment allows vulnerable powers to effectively recover from decline and still deter potential challengers.

### Heg Bad

#### Hegemonic retrenchment’s key to avoid great power war---maintaining unipolarity’s self-defeating which internal link-turns their offense

Nuno P. Monteiro 12, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University, “Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity is Not Peaceful,” International Security, Winter 2012, Vol. 36, No. 3, p. 9-40

From the perspective of the overall peacefulness of the international system, then, no U.S. grand strategy is, as in the Goldilocks tale, “just right.”116 In fact, each strategic option available to the unipole produces significant conflict. Whereas offensive and defensive dominance will entangle it in wars against recalcitrant minor powers, disengagement will produce regional wars among minor and major powers. Regardless of U.S. strategy, conflict will abound. Indeed, if my argument is correct, the significant level of conflict the world has experienced over the last two decades will continue for as long as U.S. power remains preponderant.

From the narrower perspective of the unipole’s ability to avoid being involved in wars, however, disengagement is the best strategy. A unipolar structure provides no incentives for conflict involving a disengaged unipole. Disengagement would extricate the unipole’s forces from wars against recalcitrant minor powers and decrease systemic pressures for nuclear proliferation. There is, however, a downside. Disengagement would lead to heightened conflict beyond the unipole’s region and increase regional pressures for nuclear proliferation. As regards the unipole’s grand strategy, then, the choice is between a strategy of dominance, which leads to involvement in numerous conflicts, and a strategy of disengagement, which allows conflict between others to fester.

In a sense, then, strategies of defensive and offensive dominance are self-defeating. They create incentives for recalcitrant minor powers to bolster their capabilities and present the United States with a tough choice: allowing them to succeed or resorting to war in order to thwart them. This will either drag U.S. forces into numerous conflicts or result in an increasing number of major powers. In any case, U.S. ability to convert power into favorable outcomes peacefully will be constrained.117

This last point highlights one of the crucial issues where Wohlforth and I differ—the benefits of the unipole’s power preponderance. Whereas Wohlforth believes that the power preponderance of the United States will lead all states in the system to bandwagon with the unipole, I predict that states engaged in security competition with the unipole’s allies and states for whom the status quo otherwise has lesser value will not accommodate the unipole. To the contrary, these minor powers will become recalcitrant despite U.S. power preponderance, displaying the limited pacifying effects of U.S. power.

What, then, is the value of unipolarity for the unipole? What can a unipole do that a great power in bipolarity or multipolarity cannot? My argument hints at the possibility that—at least in the security realm—unipolarity does not give the unipole greater influence over international outcomes.118 If unipolarity provides structural incentives for nuclear proliferation, it may, as Robert Jervis has hinted, “have within it the seeds if not of its own destruction, then at least of its modification.”119 For Jervis, “[t]his raises the question of what would remain of a unipolar system in a proliferated world. The American ability to coerce others would decrease but so would its need to defend friendly powers that would now have their own deterrents. The world would still be unipolar by most measures and considerations, but many countries would be able to protect themselves, perhaps even against the superpower. . . . In any event, the polarity of the system may become less important.”120

At the same time, nothing in my argument determines the decline of U.S. power. The level of conflict entailed by the strategies of defensive dominance, offensive dominance, and disengagement may be acceptable to the unipole and have only a marginal effect on its ability to maintain its preeminent position. Whether a unipole will be economically or militarily overstretched is an empirical question that depends on the magnitude of the disparity in power between it and major powers and the magnitude of the conflicts in which it gets involved. Neither of these factors can be addressed a priori, and so a theory of unipolarity must acknowledge the possibility of frequent conflict in a nonetheless durable unipolar system.

Finally, my argument points to a “paradox of power preponderance.”121 By putting other states in extreme self-help, a systemic imbalance of power requires the unipole to act in ways that minimize the threat it poses. Only by exercising great restraint can it avoid being involved in wars. If the unipole fails to exercise restraint, other states will develop their capabilities, including nuclear weapons—restraining it all the same.122 Paradoxically, then, more relative power does not necessarily lead to greater influence and a better ability to convert capabilities into favorable outcomes peacefully. In effect, unparalleled relative power requires unequaled self-restraint.

#### Hegemonic retrenchment’s key to prevent war with Russia and China---defuses Georgia, Taiwan and the South China Seas

Paul K. MacDonald 11, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College, and Joseph M. Parent, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami, November/December 2011, “The Wisdom of Retrenchment: America Must Cut Back to Move Forward,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 90, No. 6

Curbing the United States' commitments would reduce risks, but it cannot eliminate them. Adversaries may fill regional power vacuums, and allies will never behave exactly as Washington would prefer. Yet those costs would be outweighed by the concrete benefits of pulling back. A focus on the United States' core interests in western Europe would limit the risk of catastrophic clashes with Russia over ethnic enclaves in Georgia or Moldova by allowing the United States to avoid commitments it would be unwise to honor. By narrowing its commitments in Asia, the United States could lessen the likelihood of conflict over issues such as the status of Taiwan or competing maritime claims in the South China Sea. Just as the United Kingdom tempered its commitments and accommodated U.S. interests in the Western Hemisphere at the turn of the last century, the United States should now temper its commitments and cultivate a lasting compromise with China over Taiwan.

#### U.S. involvement in Georgia means conflict goes nuclear

Guldseth 9, Adviser in Strategic Communication. Post graduate in "Media, Communication and ICT" Russia's new military doctrine opens for first strike nuclear attacks in "local or regional wars", Eistein Guldseth, 10-14-2009

http://writern.blogspot.com/2009/10/russia-might-open-for-first-strike.html

The Russian newspaper Izvestia reports that Cremlin is working on a new military doctrine on first strike use of nuclear arms against “aggressors”. That must include Georgia according to President Medvedev’s statement after the war in Georgia in 2008: “The aggressor has been punished”.

Patrushev: “Nuclear weapons could be used in case of a nuclear attack, but also in 'regional or even local wars.”

According to Izvestia, “Russia will insist on the right to pre-emptive nuclear strikes against aggressor countries in its new military doctrine”, the head of the country's Security Council, Nikolai Patrushev, said.

A greater threat to Russia's neighboring countries

This new doctrine is contrary to US nuclear military policy, which do not allow for first strike attacks. This leads us once more to seriously wonder what’s going on in the Cremlin. Such an aggressive move means a further treat to Russia’s bordering countries and serves no civilized purpose. As we have seen the later period, US’ reset has had no impact on the hawks in Moscow when it comes to serious cooperation on for instance Iran. Judging from this doctrine, one could on the contrary be led to believe that Russia today poses a significant greater danger to civilization than Iran: The combination of Putins restoration of Stalin as "a great leader", Russia claiming a priveledged sphere of influence in the former Soviet space, and now the suggested doctrine of first strike use of nuclear arms against local/regional wars and "agressors" should really start to worry all governments in the modern world.

Who's the target?

Georgia certainly will have to seriously consider it self as a prime target for a nuclear attack from Russia. The latest Russian accusations of Georgia supporting and aiding Al Quaeda operations in Russia is a reminder of the fact that the war is not over. Russia uses all means available to portray Georgia as an aggressor, and thus threatens Georgia with first strike use of nuclear arms if neccessary. Judging by Russia’s willingness to use excessive force in the attack on Georgia in 2008, this represents a real threat to Georgia and also Ukraine, where the situation on the Crimean peninsula is gradually heating up. In fact the whole of North Caucasus might be targeted due to uprise and intensivated terrorist attacs in several regions.

#### Extinction

Nick Bostrom 2, winner of the Gannon Award, March, Existential Risks: Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios and Related Hazards, Journal of Evolution and Technology, p. http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html

A much greater existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and the USSR. An all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with consequences that might have been persistent enough to qualify as global and terminal. There was a real worry among those best acquainted with the information available at the time that a nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it might annihilate our species or permanently destroy human civilization.[4] Russia and the US retain large nuclear arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation, either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a risk that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals. Note however that a smaller nuclear exchange, between India and Pakistan for instance, is not an existential risk, since it would not destroy or thwart humankind’s potential permanently. Such a war might however be a local terminal risk for the cities most likely to be targeted. Unfortunately, we shall see that nuclear Armageddon and comet or asteroid strikes are mere preludes to the existential risks that we will encounter in the 21st century.

#### U.S. involvement makes conflict over Taiwan go nuclear and destroys U.S.-China relations

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THE PROSPECTS for avoiding intense military competition and war may be good, but growth in China's power may nevertheless require some changes in U.S. foreign policy that Washington will find disagreeable--particularly regarding Taiwan. Although it lost control of Taiwan during the Chinese Civil War more than six decades ago, China still considers Taiwan to be part of its homeland, and unification remains a key political goal for Beijing. China has made clear that it will use force if Taiwan declares independence, and much of China's conventional military buildup has been dedicated to increasing its ability to coerce Taiwan and reducing the United States' ability to intervene. Because China places such high value on Taiwan and because the United States and China--whatever they might formally agree to--have such different attitudes regarding the legitimacy of the status quo, the issue poses special dangers and challenges for the U.S.-Chinese relationship, placing it in a different category than Japan or South Korea.

A crisis over Taiwan could fairly easily escalate to nuclear war, because each step along the way might well seem rational to the actors involved. Current U.S. policy is designed to reduce the probability that Taiwan will declare independence and to make clear that the United States will not come to Taiwan's aid if it does. Nevertheless, the United States would find itself under pressure to protect Taiwan against any sort of attack, no matter how it originated. Given the different interests and perceptions of the various parties and the limited control Washington has over Taipei's behavior, a crisis could unfold in which the United States found itself following events rather than leading them.

Such dangers have been around for decades, but ongoing improvements in China's military capabilities may make Beijing more willing to escalate a Taiwan crisis. In addition to its improved conventional capabilities, China is modernizing its nuclear forces to increase their ability to survive and retaliate following a large-scale U.S. attack. Standard deterrence theory holds that Washington's current ability to destroy most or all of China's nuclear force enhances its bargaining position. China's nuclear modernization might remove that check on Chinese action, leading Beijing to behave more boldly in future crises than it has in past ones. A U.S. attempt to preserve its ability to defend Taiwan, meanwhile, could fuel a conventional and nuclear arms race. Enhancements to U.S. offensive targeting capabilities and strategic ballistic missile defenses might be interpreted by China as a signal of malign U.S. motives, leading to further Chinese military efforts and a general poisoning of U.S.-Chinese relations.

#### SCS conflict causes WW3

Arthur Waldron 97, “HOW NOT TO DEAL WITH CHINA”, Commentary, 00102601, Mar1997, Vol. 103, Issue 3, EBSCO

Then there is Southeast Asia, which, having weathered the Vietnam war and a variety of domestic insurgencies, and having moved onto the track of prosperity, shows no desire to complicate matters with political headaches. Fault lines nevertheless remain, and not least between the numerous and disproportionately successful ethnic Chinese and other inhabitants. And here again China is a looming worry. Beijing's claim of "unquestionable sovereignty" over the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea and its recent seizure of one of them, Mischief Reef, also claimed by the Philippines, have alarmed Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei, and rattled Indonesia, which asserts its right to gas fields nearby.

India and South Asia, long preoccupied with their own internal rivalries and content with their rates of growth, now look with envy and some concern as East Asia opens an ever-increasing lead in economics, military power, and general global clout. Indian and Chinese forces still face each other in the high mountains of their disputed border, as they have done since their war in 1962. Pakistan to the west is a key Chinese ally, and beyond, in the Middle East, China is reportedly supplying arms to Syria, Iraq, and Iran. To the north, Tibet (whose government-in-exile has been based in India since 1959) is currently the object of a vicious Chinese crackdown. And a new issue between India and China is Beijing's alliance with Rangoon and its reported military or intelligence-gathering presence on offshore Burmese territories near the Indian naval base in the Andaman Islands.

Finally there is Russia, which has key interests in Asia. Sidelined by domestic problems, but only temporarily, Moscow has repeatedly faced China in this century, both in the northeast and along the Mongolian border. The break-up of the Soviet Union has added a potentially volatile factor in the newly independent states of Central Asia and Chinese-controlled Xinjiang (Sinkiang), where Beijing is currently fighting a low-level counter insurgency.

MAKING THESE flash-points all the more volatile has been a dramatic increase in the quantity and quality of China's weapons acquisitions. An Asian arms race of sorts was already gathering steam in the post-cold-war era, driven by national rivalries and the understandable desire of newly rich nation-states to upgrade their capacities; but the Chinese build-up has intensified it. In part a payoff to the military for its role at Tiananmen Square in 1989, China's current build-up is part and parcel of the regime's major shift since that time away from domestic liberalization and international openness toward repression and irredentism.

Today China buys weapons from European states and Israel, but most importantly from Russia. The latest multibillion-dollar deal includes two Sovremenny-class destroyers equipped with the much-feared SS-N-22 cruise missile, capable of defeating the Aegis anti-missile defenses of the U.S. Navy and thus sinking American aircraft carriers. This is in addition to the Su-27 fighter aircraft, quiet Kilo-class submarines, and other force-projection and deterrent technologies. In turn, the Asian states are buying or developing their own advanced aircraft, missiles, and submarines--and considering nuclear options.

The sort of unintended escalation which started two world wars could arise from any of the conflicts around China's periphery. It nearly did so in March 1996, when China, in a blatant act of intimidation, fired ballistic missiles in the Taiwan Straits. It could arise from a Chinese-Vietnamese confrontation, particularly if the Vietnamese should score some unexpected military successes against the Chinese, as they did in 1979, and if the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), of which they are now a member, should tip in the direction of Hanoi. It could flare up from the smoldering insurgencies among Tibetans, Muslims, or Mongolians living inside China. Chains of alliance or interest, perhaps not clearly understood until the moment of crisis itself, could easily draw in neighboring states--Russia, or India, or Japan--or the United States.

#### Goes nuclear---only if the U.S. is involved

Nikkei Weekly, 95 (7-3, Lexis)

Mahathir sees Asia developing in three possible ways in future. In his worst-case scenario, Asian countries would go to war against each other, possibly over disputes such as their conflicting claims on the Spratly Islands. China might then declare war on the U.S., leading to full-scale, even nuclear, war.