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### Contention 1 is Coal

#### Clean energy is crucial to displace coal

Miller 12 (John, “Can We Replace U.S. Coal Power with Clean Energy?” 7/31, http://theenergycollective.com/jemillerep/98281/costs-replace-us-coal-power-clean-energy)

Strategy to Increase U.S. Clean Energy Supply and Reduce Carbon Emissions – The Electric Power Sector’s coal consumption accounts for 31% of total U.S. CO2 emissions. Although petroleum consumed by the Transportation Sector accounts for 33% of total U.S. CO2 emissions, the options for reducing petroleum consumption are very complex and expensive. Substantially reducing Transportation Sector petroleum consumption and associated CO2 requires replacing most of the current U.S. 200 million cars, SUV’s and trucks with much more efficient vehicles. This includes substantially increased fleet CAFE standards, including building 10’s of millions of plug-in hybrid’s and electric vehicles (EV) over the next couple decades. Rapidly expanding EV production is still challenged by needed battery technology improvements and expanded re-charging infrastructure costs. ¶ Coal accounts for 42% of total U.S. net power generation today. A very feasible strategy to quickly and substantially reducing U.S. CO2 emissions is replacing most or all of the coal consumed within the Electric Power Sector. The Power Sector consumes the vast majority of U.S. coal in about 600 power plants across the U.S. Replacing coal power with clean energy or clean power also provides an excellent synergy for reducing future Transportation Sector CO2 emissions. For future EV’s to eventually become ‘zero emission vehicles’ (ZEV’s) requires substantial reductions in fossil fuels used to generate U.S. electric power. Replacing all coal with clean power facilitates the actual development of future ZEV fleets.

#### Only solar solves

Fthenakis 8 [Vasilis Fthenakis, Ph.D., Senior Research Scientist at the Center for Life Cycle Analysis; James E. Mason, Ph.D., Director of the Renewable Energy Research Institute; Ken Zweibel, founder of the Institute for Analysis of Solar Energy at GWU, former PV R&D program manager at NREL; “The technical, geographical, and economic feasibility for solar energy to supply the energy needs of the US,” *Energy Policy*, http://www.solarplan.org/Research/F-M-Z\_Solar%20Grand%20Plan\_Energy%20Policy\_2009.pdf]

Abstract¶ So far, solar energy has been viewed as only a minor contributor in the energy mixture of the US due to cost and intermittency constraints. However, recent drastic cost reductions in the production of photovoltaics (PV) pave the way for enabling this technology to become cost competitive with fossil fuel energy generation. We show that with the right incentives, cost competitiveness with grid prices in the US (e.g., 6–10 USb/kWh) can be attained by 2020. The intermittency problem is solved by integrating PV with compressed air energy storage (CAES) and by extending the thermal storage capability in concentrated solar power (CSP). We used hourly load data for the entire US and 45-year solar irradiation data from the southwest region of the US, to simulate the CAES storage requirements, under worst weather conditions. Based on expected improvements of established, commercially available PV, CSP, and CAES technologies, we show that solar energy has the technical, geographical, and economic potential to supply 69% of the total electricity needs and 35% of the total (electricity and fuel) energy needs of the US by 2050. When we extend our scenario to 2100, solar energy supplies over 90%, and together with other renewables, 100% of the total US energy demand with a corresponding 92% reduction in energy-related carbon dioxide emissions compared to the 2005 levels.¶ 1. Introduction¶ The world faces the dual challenges of fossil fuel depletion and carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, and the main candidates for facing these challenges are coal with carbon capture and storage (CCS), nuclear, and renewable sources of energy. However, safe and economic concepts for CCS have not been proven; nuclear suffers from high cost, radioactive waste management, fuel availability, and nuclear weapon proliferation issues, and renewables have been limited by resource limits, high cost, and intermittency problems. Biomass could be a substitute for fossil fuels, but enough land or water to meet the demand and to feed the world’s growing population is not available (Perlack et al., 2005). Wind is intermittent, and the total capacity of Class 4 and higher wind resources in the US is about 1.2 Terawatt (TW) (American Wind Energy Association, 1991). Solar energy has huge potential—tens or hundreds of TWs are practical, but it suffers from intermittency. Recent drastic cost reductions in the production of photovoltaics (PV) pave the way for enabling solar technologies to become cost competitive with fossil fuel energy generation. Scaling of concentrating solar power (CSP) may also enable drastic cost reductions. In this study, we forecast future energy demand levels for the US, and then we extrapolate the deployment level of existing solar technologies, supplemented by other renewable energy sources, to prove the feasibility for solar energy to supply that energy. These technologies are (1) PV, (2) PV combined with compressed air energy storage (CAES) power plants, and (3) CSP plants with thermal storage systems. A vision for very large implementation of solar systems in desert lands of the US southwest (SW) was presented in Scientiﬁc American (Zweibel et al., 2008). The current article discusses the feasibility of this vision.

#### Continued reliance on coal kills 24,000 people every year

Stevenson 8—produces Gaia Health (Heidi, Coal Is the Worst Polluter of All, [www.gaia-health.com/articles/000032-Coal-Pollution.shtml](http://www.gaia-health.com/articles/000032-Coal-Pollution.shtml))

Image a list of the worst pollutants. Whatever is on your list almost certainly is produced by coal mining or burning, usually in greater quantities than any other polluting industry. Pollutants produced by burning coal include:¶ Carbon dioxide, the primary global warming gas.¶ Sulphur dioxide, which causes acid rain.¶ Nitrogen oxide, which creates ozone that leads to smog.¶ Hydrocarbons, which help create ozone that leads to smog.¶ Carbon monoxide, which causes headaches and is particularly harmful to people with heart disease.¶ Arsenic, which causes cancer.¶ Lead, cadmium, and other heavy metals.¶ Uranium and thorium, radioactive elements.¶ Mercury, known to cause autism and a host of other neurological and developmental disorders.¶ Coal-fired plants produce 100 times the radiation of nuclear plants to yield the same amount of energy.¶ Here's the kicker: Coal ash, the remains of the burning process, is more radioactive than nuclear waste—and we have not figured out what to do with the waste from nuclear energy production. Back in 1978, a scientist with the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) reported in Science that the amount of radiation in the bones of people who live near coal plants is 3-6 times greater than in those who live near nuclear facilities. In fact, according to ORNL Associate Lab Director Dana Christensen and the aforementioned 1978 paper, when the amount of radiation produced by the two types of power plants is compared in terms of their energy output, the story is even worse. Coal-fired plants produce 100 times the radiation of nuclear plants to yield the same amount of energy.¶ Clean coal is a myth. The technology does not exist today and no one knows when—or if—it will exist. Yet the coal companies continue to push the idea, and politicians help them. In the U.K. the Labour Party pushes the false idea of clean coal as a necessary element of dealing with climate change. In the United States, President Obama has ballyhooed the lie.¶ The term "clean coal" is misleading in two ways. First is the fact that the technology for creating it doesn't exist, and even if it did, estimates are that it would cost several trillion dollars in the U.S. alone to switch to it, making it prohibitively expensive. Worse, though, is that the term references only the production of carbon dioxide. It has nothing to do with any of the other pollutants, including radiation.¶ The Sierra Club reports that coal-fired plants in the U.S. produce 59% of sulphur dioxide pollution and 18% of nitrogen oxide.¶ The EPA has reported that coal plants produce about 40% of America's mercury pollution, more than any other source. No other industry is doing as much to poison the fish that we eat, resulting in warnings to people not to eat fish too often. Three-time Emmy award winner, Jeremy Piven, recently fell ill from eating mercury-laced sushi. It is responsible for untold numbers of babies being born with neurological problems, including autism, mental retardation, blindness, and a variety of other neurological problems. It is found in mothers' breast milk, putting children at risk even after birth. It is known to increase and worsen coronary disease in men. The EPA reports that the number of pregnant women affected by mercury poisoning is so high that as many as 630,000 children in the U.S. are born each year with a strong likelihood of developing health problems.¶ The American Lung Association says that 24,000 people die annually in the U.S. from coal plant pollution, and there are 38,000 more heart attacks and 550,000 more asthma attacks. The American Journal of Public Health reports higher rates of cardiopulmonary disease, hypertension, diabetes, and lung and kidney disease in coal mining areas.¶ Lead contamination is known to cause brain shrinkage, retardation, and violence, as documented in Lead Shrinks the Brain and Causes Violent Crime.¶ Arsenic is an insidious poison, causing convulsions, difficulty in urination and defecation, delirium, cell death, cancer, hemorrhages, and damage to the body's ability to metabolize food for energy. The general term, arsenicosis, refers to arsenic poisoning that results from long term exposure to arsenic in drinking water. As little as 0.17 parts of lead per billion in water has been shown to be harmful.¶ Climate change. Pollution. Health devastation. Mental retardation. Cancer. Devastation of food supplies. All of these can be laid at the doorstep of coal corporations. Big Coal is fighting to make us believe that coal power is the best thing since Europe was covered with forests. Continuing to use coal for energy can only destroy us. It destroys the lives of humans, animals, plants, and Gaia herself. Clean coal is a myth.

#### Recapture risk leads to clashes between tax equity investors and lenders, causing higher costs and project failure

Meister 12 [Joel holds a BA in international affairs from the George Washington University. Manager of Government Affairs at the Solar Energy Industries Association, former Outreach and Policy Assistant at the Center for Global Development, “SUNNY DISPOSITIONS: Modernizing Investment Tax Credit Recapture Rules for Solar Energy Project Finance After The Stimulus,” September 2012, http://solar.gwu.edu/Research/Meister\_Sunny\_Dispositions\_ITC\_Recapture.pdf]

The two lowest-cost options of the 1603 Treasury Program and federal loan guarantees are no longer available, which leaves commercial debt and equity from the private sector to fill the gap. Optimizing the capital structure is increasingly important for the most cost-competitive financing of renewable energy projects. 78 According to a recent analysis of financing structures by the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (“NREL”), the ability to add project-level debt can significantly decrease the levelized cost of energy (“LCOE”) for solar projects. 79 In the case of a photovoltaic (“PV”) plant, the LCOE dropped 20-50% versus equity-only financing. For a Concentrating Solar Power (“CSP”) plant, the LCOE dropped 29-35% versus equity-only financing. 80¶ Negative Impacts of Recapture Rule for Early Dispositions¶ Illiquidity Impedes the Development of a Secondary Market for Solar Assets ¶ Adding debt to a transaction, however, is easier said than done. Prior to creation of 1603, developers, lenders, and investors had yet to establish market terms to efficiently address concerns over recapture risk, and a “period of sorting out” is expected to begin in late 2012 and early 2013. 81 At the outset, “many investors have little interest in assets that cannot be sold at short notice for net asset value.” 82 Recapture “headaches” 83 from solar “credits are particularly vexing for liquidity-seekers.” 84 “There is option value in being able to sell an asset whenever you want. Frequently this is called the liquidity premium, where a more liquid property has more value.” 85 Moreover, the illiquid ITC prohibits the transfer of projects, which “limits the fungibility that is necessary for the development of a viable secondary market.” 86 For example, industry analysts predicted the sunset of stimulus-era programs would result in a robust period of mergers and acquisitions (“M&A”) in renewable energy projects as “developers look for ways to raise capital to drive development” and larger established companies with strong balance sheets look to diversify their energy holdings. 87 Interest in project sales would also be accelerated by economically distressed tax equity investors “similarly looking to exit their positions to raise cash.” 88 A 2012 industry survey reported solar PV as the most preferred sector for acquisitions among renewable energy technologies. 89 Yet with the exception of 1603 projects not subject to limits on early disposition, ITC recapture rules will prohibit the sale of solar projects already placed in service for the first five years, discouraging M&A activity in projects with successful operational histories that may be most appealing to investors. This also constrains developers who may wish to raise capital for subsequent projects and tax equity investors that need to exit their investments.¶ Inter-Creditor Friction Increases Transaction Costs¶ The profile of a tax equity investor is very similar to subordinated debt, requiring a certain return but standing second in line to the senior lender. 90 But unlike a pure subordinated lender, tax equity investors face the additional risk that foreclosure could trigger recapture of tax benefits. As a result, “The most significant cost of tax equity…is that it makes obtaining project level debt more difficult.” 91 Investors often request a forbearance agreement or ‘standstill period’ “as a practical accommodation on the part of lenders to give the tax equity participants protection and comfort to take part in the transaction.” 92 “The key element in a forbearance agreement is the lender’s covenant to forbear from foreclosing on a significant portion of its collateral if the project defaults.” 93¶ The difficulty in negotiating forbearance and inter-creditor agreement text can consume a considerable amount of time and money for all parties. Some lenders report recapture risk alone consuming approximately two to three months or more. 94 Delays often occur when the tax equity investor or legal counsel are relatively inexperienced with the ITC recapture rules. If the investor and/or counsel are not comfortable with the basic mechanics of the structuring, negotiations over recapture risk can “threaten to scuttle the entire deal,” and “the lender ends up paying for that lack of experience and bears the cost of educating the counter-party” on how the risks may be minimized. 95¶ Even if the parties understand the nature of the recapture risk, the parties may nonetheless disagree over whether forbearance terms are even appropriate for an intercreditor agreement. The tax equity investor will often request forbearance for at least the full five-year vestment period, whereas the lender providing debt on a non-recourse basis will want to retain the right to foreclose on the project assets to safeguard its security. Many lenders see forbearance “violating the premise of the debt’s pricing,” because the “grand deal for cheap debt” is a lender’s right to take control of the project in the event of default. 96 Chris Diaz of Seminole Financial Services compares the negotiating process to struggling with a Rubik’s Cube puzzle when one side’s color is properly configured but the rest of the cube is completely mis-matched: ¶ “Each party will offer recapture terms perfectly consistent with its own interests, but it will cause problems for the other sides of the transaction. The tax equity investor wants to hold the lender’s feet to the fire, but it is difficult to get a lender comfortable giving up his only remedy of foreclosure for five years. Ultimately, they must try to find a middle ground, and it is an arduous process.”¶ If a compromise is reached, costly revisions to other project documents are often necessary to conform the ultimate terms. 98 A single institution could hypothetically provide both debt and tax equity for a single project. 99 But these “combined offerings” are rare occurrences, despite the perceived “alignment” benefits from dealing with a single party. 100 In reality, it may present similar challenges, as separate business units within the company may have separate negotiating counsel and the debt portion may be structured for subsequent sale to other investors. 101 In any case, the original counter-parties must anticipate intercreditor and forbearance issues.¶ Increased Cost Threatens Optimal Capital Structuring and PPA Clearing Price¶ Like other risk factors in a transaction, the ease or difficulty with which parties address ITC recapture may determine the success or failure of the entire project. Recounting a 15 MW solar PV project that fell apart because the parties could not find agreement, one leading project finance attorney described the unfortunate consequences that developers struggle to avoid.¶ “When debt walks, optimal capital structuring has not been achieved. Unreasonable forbearance terms from either party can blow up a deal, and recapture risk causes that friction. The unfortunate alternative is relying on tax equity alone, which is more expensive, lowers the developer’s return, and ultimately increases the cost of the power contract. It is a ridiculous reason not to do a deal and holds back many quality projects from moving forward.” 102¶ Debt “significantly increases the risk profile of the transaction for the tax equity investor.” 103 Compensating for this increased risk and the illiquid nature of the investment, the tax equity investor will require a higher return with a significant yield premium that increases the cost of capital for the developer. 104 The premium charged for combining tax equity and debt is a function of the transactional “sausage-making” required to convene multiple parties with varied interests in a single transaction. 105 For the few investors that have agreed to project-level debt in the past, they charged a premium of roughly 200-300 basis points. 106 A January 2012 report estimated that tax equity investors required after-tax returns in the range of 7.5-12%, compared to 9.5-16% for a leveraged PV project. 107 Yield premiums for leveraged transactions are now around 725 basis points. 108¶ Even a 2% premium has a significant impact on the LCOE. For a hypothetical PV plant, NREL calculated the LCOE increases by $.025 per kilowatt-hour (kWh) of electricity for sale leaseback transactions and $0.05 per kWh for partnership flips. 109 In February 2012, industry leaders roughly approximated that for every 100 basis point increase in the cost of capital, the economic “clearing price” for the PPA for electricity increases by approximately $.015 per kWh, ultimately leading to higher costs for the party purchasing the power. 110

#### The plan resolves recapture problems

Meister 12 [Joel holds a BA in international affairs from the George Washington University. Manager of Government Affairs at the Solar Energy Industries Association, former Outreach and Policy Assistant at the Center for Global Development, “SUNNY DISPOSITIONS: Modernizing Investment Tax Credit Recapture Rules for Solar Energy Project Finance After The Stimulus,” September 2012, http://solar.gwu.edu/Research/Meister\_Sunny\_Dispositions\_ITC\_Recapture.pdf]

Revising Section 50 and Barriers to Recapture Modernization¶ Just as Congress focused on the desired policy outcome of the credit when revising the LIHTC in 2008, Congress should revise Section 50 for solar energy property to permit growth in the industry. The following suggested amendment to Section 50(a)(4) could serve as a starting point for legislative text:¶ For purposes of this subsection, the increase in tax under this subsection shall not apply to an energy credit claimed for qualified energy property described in Section 48(a)(3)(A)(i) solely by reason of the disposition of the energy property (or an interest therein) if it remains qualified energy property and there is no change in use as a consequence of the disposition for the remaining recapture period with respect to such energy property.¶ Refocusing the recapture rules for solar energy property to the scope of use would more closely align the credit with the policy intent of promoting the construction of solar energy property to generate electricity. This statutory construction would deter the discarding of property in asset churning schemes by requiring the taxpayer and subsequent owner to maintain the property’s status as qualifying solar energy equipment used to “generate electricity, to heat or cool (or provide hot water for use in) a structure, or to provide solar process heat” under Section 48. 260¶ In exchange for recapture modernization, Congress could apply comparable safeguards established for 1603 and the LIHTC. For example, the revised recapture rules could explicitly prohibit sale to disqualified persons as defined under 1603. 261 To address concerns over so-called straw party schemes previously envisioned in the LIHTC context, legislation could establish identical reporting requirements with an extended statute of limitations. 262 This would not be administratively infeasible for the solar industry, which already complies with more detailed reporting requirements for the 1603 Treasury Program. The taxpayer claiming a 1603 grant must certify to Treasury on an annual basis for five years under penalty of perjury that “the property has not been disposed of to a disqualified person and that the property continues to qualify as specified energy property.” 263

#### Effective federal ITC is key to stability and uniformity---the alternative is uncertainty, boom-bust cycles and industry failure

Rosten 11 [Keith Rosten, president of SolarTown LLC, attorney and former consultant on international development projects, October 20 2011, “Why the US Needs a National Solar Energy Policy,” http://www.solartown.com/blog/2011/10/why-the-us-needs-a-national-solar-energy-policy/]

The reason that the ITC has been important is that it is the only long-term commitment to renewal energy. In 2008, the Energy Improvement and Extension Act extended the ITC through the end of 2016, and in 2009, ARRA removed the $2,000 dollar cap on solar installations. The 1603 Grant, also part of ARRA, allows businesses to either take the ITC or receive a grant worth 30% of the basis of the property for solar energy instead. This has proven to be a significant stimulus for businesses to install solar energy. It is set to expire at the end of 2011, but there is a proposal to extend it one more year. PURPA was also a crucial legislation because it required public utility companies to buy energy from small-scale electricity producers, such as homeowners with solar panels installed on their property.¶ State-by-state incentives are not sustainable¶ Any additional incentives are provided on a state-by-state basis, and include Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS), Feed-in-Tariffs (FITs) and Property Assessed Clean Energy (PACE). States and local governments (and even some utilities) filled the vacuum on federal policy. The positive effect of these programs is that they incubated various approaches, and now we have much more information about programs that work and those that do not work as well.¶ The negative effect of these multifarious programs is that there is a patchwork quilt of solar incentives throughout the U.S. If the federal government chooses to implement a federal policy now, problems related to coexistence of state and federal policies need to be worked out, but a federal policy is important for the future of the solar industry.¶ We understand that there are policy challenges if the federal government were to enact a policy to support the growth of the solar energy industry. Policy coexistence can be problematic if federal and state policies overlap but are not equally stringent, which can result in leakage. Leakage is the idea that an increase in solar energy installations in the more stringent state will be offset by the decrease in installations in the rest of the country. But there are policy approaches to avoid linkage and the goal is to create a uniform structure to obviate the boom bust cycle that we have seen in various parts of the country.¶ Huge benefits to national renewable energy strategy¶ There are huge benefits to a federal renewable energy strategy: it allows for minimization of leakage, for the removal of the patchwork quilt of regional policy actions that confuse companies and make their movement throughout the country more difficult, and for renewable energy growth because of increased investment due to stability.¶ For financial and political reasons, it makes more sense for the federal government to handle incentive structures. The lack of a coherent solar energy policy undermines this fledgling industry. The one constant in successful growing industries is a stable and predictable legislative regime to allow the private sector to formulate long-term strategies dependent on this legal landscape. As states cut back on their budgets, solar support has become precarious. Underfunded and handled on a state-by-state basis, failed incentives are leaving homeowners who want to put solar panels on their homes out in the cold and the market unstable and unpredictable. There is a clear need for a stable, long-term federal incentive structure and Congress and the Administration should see that it is in the interest of the country to forge this policy sooner than later.

#### Only the plan makes solar cost-competitive---incentivizes learning by doing that brings down costs exponentially

Reichelstein and Yorston 12 [Stefan Reichelstein, PhD, Senior Fellow at the Woods Institute for the Environment, Professor of Accounting at the Stanford Graduate School of Business; Michael Yorston, Dept of Management Science and Engineering at Stanford, October 2012, “The Prospects for Cost Competitive Solar PV Power,” http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=2182828]

Solar PV modules have experienced a remarkably consistent pattern of learning-by-doing over the past thirty years. Specifically, the prices of solar cells and modules have on average come down about 20% each time the total (cumulative) capacity of solar installations has doubled. To assess the prospects for cost competitive solar PV, we posit that the industry can maintain this learning for another decade. If furthermore solar facilities are installed at a rate of about 30 GW per year, which would equal the amount of capacity added in 2011, we obtain two predictions. First, utility-scale facilities are on track to achieve cost competitiveness by 2020. Secondly, commercial-scale installations will be able to achieve grid-parity at the retail price level, that is, they will be cost competitive even if even if the preferential tax treatment of solar PV were to be discontinued at that point in time. To be sure, the current tax treatment appears essential in order to sustain the investment volume that is essential for a continued trajectory down the learning curve. Yet, we also submit that the economic viability of solar PV requires neither a ‘technological breakthrough’, nor does it seem essential to maintain the current public subsidies indefinitely.

#### The Anti-Coal movement is polycentric and coalitional – it brings together multiples agents of resistance by targeting specific coal plants like those in Chicago

Russell 9 Joshua Kahn Russell is the grassroots actions organizer at Rainforest Action Network and was an organizer on the Capitol Climate Action, May 2009, Z Magazine, <http://www.zcommunications.org/climate-justice-and-coals-funeral-procession-by-joshua-kahn-russell>

The pace of direct actions against coal has sharply increased since 2004. These campaigns have been organized and carried out by a polycentric global network of radical environmentalists, "frontline" communities (those most directly affected by injustice), student organizers, and traditional non-profits. In the United States, communities have been using non-violent direct action to confront coal at all stages of its lifecycle: finance, extraction, "cleaning" and transport, burning, and energy consumption. This trajectory began gaining momentum on November 10, 2004 with a blockade of Maryland's Dickerson Power Plant. It grew to 3 major direct actions in 2005, 2 more in 2006, 6 in 2007, 18 in 2008, and 15 in the first 3 months of 2009.¶ Similar to the anti-nuclear movement of the late 1970s and early 1980s, the anti-coal movement has targeted specific mines and plants while challenging the overall legitimacy of fossil fuel-based economies. This struggle has transcended single-issue organizing and the varied efforts to stop coal have brought together diverse stakeholders. Stemming from the people of color, working class, and women-led environmental justice movement, climate justice has become a political banner for intersecting racial justice, economic equity, community health, climate, and environmental quality struggles, of which elements of "no coal" struggles are a part. It is useful to think of campaigns against coal as one strand of a robust frontline-led climate justice movement.

### Plan

#### The United States Federal Government should make entities that enact early disposition of solar energy property eligible for the solar energy investment tax credit.

### Solvency

#### CONTENTION 2: OUR ADVOCACY IS GOOD

#### Academic debate over energy policy in the face of environmental destruction is critical to shape the direction of change and create a public consciousness shift---action now is key

Crist 4 (Eileen, Professor at Virginia Tech in the Department of Science and Technology, “Against the social construction of nature and wilderness”, Environmental Ethics 26;1, p 13-6, http://www.sts.vt.edu/faculty/crist/againstsocialconstruction.pdf)

Yet, constructivist analyses of "nature" favor remaining in the comfort zone of **zestless agnosticism** and **noncommittal meta-discourse**. As David Kidner suggests, this intellectual stance may function as a mechanism against facing the devastation of the biosphere—an undertaking long underway but gathering momentum with the imminent bottlenecking of a triumphant global consumerism and unprecedented population levels. Human-driven extinction—in the ballpark of Wilson's estimated 27,000 species per year—is so unthinkable a fact that choosing to ignore it may well be the psychologically risk-free option.¶ **Nevertheless, this is the** opportune **historical** moment **for** intellectuals in the humanities and social sciences **to join forces with** conservation **scientists** in order **to** help **create the consciousness shift and** policy changes **to stop this irreversible destruction. Given this outlook, how** students in the human sciences **are** trained **to regard scientific knowledge, and what kind of** messages percolate to the public from the academy **about the nature of scientific findings,** matter immensely. The "agnostic stance" of constructivism toward "scientific claims" about the environment—a stance supposedly mandatory for discerning how scientific knowledge is "socially assembled"[32]—is, to borrow a legendary one-liner, **striving to interpret the world at an hour that is pressingly calling us to change it.**

#### Public advocacy of environmental solutions key to change governmental policy---individual change insufficient

CAG 10—Climate Change Communication Advisory Group. Dr Adam Corner School of Psychology, Cardiff University - Dr Tom Crompton Change Strategist, WWF-UK - Scott Davidson Programme Manager, Global Action Plan - Richard Hawkins Senior Researcher, Public Interest Research Centre - Professor Tim Kasser, Psychology department, Knox College, Galesburg, Illinois, USA. - Dr Renee Lertzman, Center for Sustainable Processes & Practices, Portland State University, US. - Peter Lipman, Policy Director, Sustrans. - Dr Irene Lorenzoni, Centre for Environmental Risk, University of East Anglia. - George Marshall, Founding Director, Climate Outreach , Information Network - Dr Ciaran Mundy, Director, Transition Bristol - Dr Saffron O’Neil, Department of Resource Management and Geography, University of Melbourne, Australia. - Professor Nick Pidgeon, Director, Understanding Risk Research Group, School of Psychology, Cardiff University. - Dr Anna Rabinovich, School of Psychology, University of Exeter - Rosemary Randall, Founder and director of Cambridge Carbon Footprint - Dr Lorraine Whitmarsh, School of Psychology, Cardiff University & Visiting Fellow at the, Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research. (Communicating climate change to mass public audience, http://pirc.info/downloads/communicating\_climate\_mass\_audiences.pdf)

This short advisory paper collates a set of recommendations about how best to shape mass public communications aimed at increasing concern about climate change and motivating commensurate behavioural changes.¶ Its focus is not upon motivating small private-sphere behavioural changes on a piece-meal basis. Rather, it marshals evidence about how best to motivate the ambitious and systemic behavioural change that is necessary – including, crucially, greater public engagement with the policy process (through, for example, lobbying decision-makers and elected representatives, or participating in demonstrations), as well as major lifestyle changes. ¶ Political leaders themselves have drawn attention to the imperative for more vocal public pressure to create the ‘political space’ for them to enact more ambitious policy interventions. 1 While this paper does not dismiss the value of individuals making small private-sphere behavioural changes (for example, adopting simple domestic energy efficiency measures) it is clear that such behaviours do not, in themselves, represent a proportional response to the challenge of climate change. As David MacKay, Chief Scientific Advisor to the UK Department of Energy and Climate change writes: “Don’t be distracted by the myth that ‘every little helps’. If everyone does a little, we’ll achieve only a little” (MacKay, 2008).¶ The task of campaigners and communicators from government, business and non-governmental organisations must therefore be to motivate both (i) widespread adoption of ambitious private-sphere behavioural changes; and (ii) widespread acceptance of – and indeed active demand for – ambitious new policy interventions.¶ Current public communication campaigns, as orchestrated by government, business and non-governmental organisations, are not achieving these changes. This paper asks: how should such communications be designed if they are to have optimal impact in motivating these changes? The response to this question will require fundamental changes in the ways that many climate change communication campaigns are currently devised and implemented. ¶ This advisory paper offers a list of principles that could be used to enhance the quality of communication around climate change communications. The authors are each engaged in continuously sifting the evidence from a range of sub-disciplines within psychology, and reflecting on the implications of this for improving climate change communications. Some of the organisations that we represent have themselves at times adopted approaches which we have both learnt from and critique in this paper – so some of us have first hand experience of the need for on-going improvement in the strategies that we deploy. ¶ The changes we advocate will be challenging to enact – and will require vision and leadership on the part of the organisations adopting them. But without such vision and leadership, we do not believe that public communication campaigns on climate change will create the necessary behavioural changes – indeed, there is a profound risk that many of today’s campaigns will actually prove counter-productive. ¶ Seven Principles¶ 1. Move Beyond Social Marketing¶ We believe that too little attention is paid to the understanding that psychologists bring to strategies for motivating change, whilst undue faith is often placed in the application of marketing strategies to ‘sell’ behavioural changes. Unfortunately, in the context of ambitious pro-environmental behaviour, such strategies seem unlikely to motivate systemic behavioural change.¶ Social marketing is an effective way of achieving a particular behavioural goal – dozens of practical examples in the field of health behaviour attest to this. Social marketing is really more of a framework for designing behaviour change programmes than a behaviour change programme - it offers a method of maximising the success of a specific behavioural goal. Darnton (2008) has described social marketing as ‘explicitly transtheoretical’, while Hastings (2007), in a recent overview of social marketing, claimed that there is no theory of social marketing. Rather, it is a ‘what works’ philosophy, based on previous experience of similar campaigns and programmes. Social marketing is flexible enough to be applied to a range of different social domains, and this is undoubtedly a fundamental part of its appeal.¶ However, social marketing’s 'what works' status also means that it is agnostic about the longer term, theoretical merits of different behaviour change strategies, or the cultural values that specific campaigns serve to strengthen. Social marketing dictates that the most effective strategy should be chosen, where effective means ‘most likely to achieve an immediate behavioural goal’. ¶ This means that elements of a behaviour change strategy designed according to the principles of social marketing may conflict with other, broader goals. What if the most effective way of promoting pro-environmental behaviour ‘A’ was to pursue a strategy that was detrimental to the achievement of long term pro-environmental strategy ‘Z’? The principles of social marketing have no capacity to resolve this conflict – they are limited to maximising the success of the immediate behavioural programme. This is not a flaw of social marketing – it was designed to provide tools to address specific behavioural problems on a piecemeal basis. But it is an important limitation, and one that has significant implications if social marketing techniques are used to promote systemic behavioural change and public engagement on an issue like climate change. ¶ 2. Be honest and forthright about the probable impacts of climate change, and the scale of the challenge we confront in avoiding these. But avoid deliberate attempts to provoke fear or guilt. ¶ There is no merit in ‘dumbing down’ the scientific evidence that the impacts of climate change are likely to be severe, and that some of these impacts are now almost certainly unavoidable. Accepting the impacts of climate change will be an important stage in motivating behavioural responses aimed at mitigating the problem. However, deliberate attempts to instil fear or guilt carry considerable risk. ¶ Studies on fear appeals confirm the potential for fear to change attitudes or verbal expressions of concern, but often not actions or behaviour (Ruiter et al., 2001). The impact of fear appeals is context - and audience - specific; for example, for those who do not yet realise the potentially ‘scary’ aspects of climate change, people need to first experience themselves as vulnerable to the risks in some way in order to feel moved or affected (Das et al, 2003; Hoog et al, 2005). As people move towards contemplating action, fear appeals can help form a behavioural intent, providing an impetus or spark to ‘move’ from; however such appeals must be coupled with constructive information and support to reduce the sense of danger (Moser, 2007). The danger is that fear can also be disempowering – producing feelings of helplessness, remoteness and lack of control (O’Neill and Nicholson-Cole, 2009). Fear is likely to trigger ‘barriers to engagement’, such as denial2 (Stoll-Kleemann et al., 2001; Weber, 2006; Moser and Dilling, 2007; Lorenzoni, Nicholson-Cole & Whitmarsh, 2007). The location of fear in a message is also relevant; it works better when placed first for those who are inclined to follow the advice, but better second for those who aren't (Bier, 2001).¶ Similarly, studies have shown that guilt can play a role in motivating people to take action but can also function to stimulate defensive mechanisms against the perceived threat or challenge to one’s sense of identity (as a good, moral person). In the latter case, behaviours may be left untouched (whether driving a SUV or taking a flight) as one defends against any feelings of guilt or complicity through deployment of a range of justifications for the behaviour (Ferguson & Branscombe, 2010). ¶ Overall, there is a need for emotionally balanced representations of the issues at hand. This will involve acknowledging the ‘affective reality’ of the situation, e.g. “We know this is scary and overwhelming, but many of us feel this way and we are doing something about it”.¶ 3. Be honest and forthright about the impacts of mitigating and adapting to climate change for current lifestyles, and the ‘loss’ - as well as the benefits - that these will entail. Narratives that focus exclusively on the ‘up-side’ of climate solutions are likely to be unconvincing. While narratives about the future impacts of climate change may highlight the loss of much that we currently hold to be dear, narratives about climate solutions frequently ignore the question of loss. If the two are not addressed concurrently, fear of loss may be ‘split off’ and projected into the future, where it is all too easily denied. This can be dangerous, because accepting loss is an important step towards working through the associated emotions, and emerging with the energy and creativity to respond positively to the new situation (Randall, 2009). However, there are plenty of benefits (besides the financial ones) of a low-carbon lifestyle e.g., health, community/social interaction - including the ‘intrinsic' goals mentioned below. It is important to be honest about both the losses and the benefits that may be associated with lifestyle change, and not to seek to separate out one from the other.¶ 3a. Avoid emphasis upon painless, easy steps. ¶ Be honest about the limitations of voluntary private-sphere behavioural change, and the need for ambitious new policy interventions that incentivise such changes, or that regulate for them. People know that the scope they have, as individuals, to help meet the challenge of climate change is extremely limited. For many people, it is perfectly sensible to continue to adopt high-carbon lifestyle choices whilst simultaneously being supportive of government interventions that would make these choices more difficult for everyone. ¶ The adoption of small-scale private sphere behavioural changes is sometimes assumed to lead people to adopt ever more difficult (and potentially significant) behavioural changes. The empirical evidence for this ‘foot-in-thedoor’ effect is highly equivocal. Some studies detect such an effect; others studies have found the reverse effect (whereby people tend to ‘rest on their laurels’ having adopted a few simple behavioural changes - Thogersen and Crompton, 2009). Where attention is drawn to simple and painless privatesphere behavioural changes, these should be urged in pursuit of a set of intrinsic goals (that is, as a response to people’s understanding about the contribution that such behavioural change may make to benefiting their friends and family, their community, the wider world, or in contributing to their growth and development as individuals) rather than as a means to achieve social status or greater financial success. Adopting behaviour in pursuit of intrinsic goals is more likely to lead to ‘spillover’ into other sustainable behaviours (De Young, 2000; Thogersen and Crompton, 2009).¶ People aren’t stupid: they know that if there are wholesale changes in the global climate underway, these will not be reversed merely through checking their tyre pressures or switching their TV off standby. An emphasis upon simple and painless steps suppresses debate about those necessary responses that are less palatable – that will cost people money, or that will infringe on cherished freedoms (such as to fly). Recognising this will be a key step in accepting the reality of loss of aspects of our current lifestyles, and in beginning to work through the powerful emotions that this will engender (Randall, 2009). ¶ 3b. Avoid over-emphasis on the economic opportunities that mitigating, and adapting to, climate change may provide. ¶ There will, undoubtedly, be economic benefits to be accrued through investment in new technologies, but there will also be instances where the economic imperative and the climate change adaptation or mitigation imperative diverge, and periods of economic uncertainty for many people as some sectors contract. It seems inevitable that some interventions will have negative economic impacts (Stern, 2007).¶ Undue emphasis upon economic imperatives serves to reinforce the dominance, in society, of a set of extrinsic goals (focussed, for example, on financial benefit). A large body of empirical research demonstrates that these extrinsic goals are antagonistic to the emergence of pro-social and proenvironmental concern (Crompton and Kasser, 2009).¶ 3c. Avoid emphasis upon the opportunities of ‘green consumerism’ as a response to climate change.¶ As mentioned above (3b), a large body of research points to the antagonism between goals directed towards the acquisition of material objects and the emergence of pro-environmental and pro-social concern (Crompton and Kasser, 2009). Campaigns to ‘buy green’ may be effective in driving up sales of particular products, but in conveying the impression that climate change can be addressed by ‘buying the right things’, they risk undermining more difficult and systemic changes. A recent study found that people in an experiment who purchased ‘green’ products acted less altruistically on subsequent tasks (Mazar & Zhong, 2010) – suggesting that small ethical acts may act as a ‘moral offset’ and licence undesirable behaviours in other domains. This does not mean that private-sphere behaviour changes will always lead to a reduction in subsequent pro-environmental behaviour, but it does suggest that the reasons used to motivate these changes are critically important. Better is to emphasise that ‘every little helps a little’ – but that these changes are only the beginning of a process that must also incorporate more ambitious private-sphere change and significant collective action at a political level.¶ 4. Empathise with the emotional responses that will be engendered by a forthright presentation of the probable impacts of climate change. ¶ Belief in climate change and support for low-carbon policies will remain fragile unless people are emotionally engaged. We should expect people to be sad or angry, to feel guilt or shame, to yearn for that which is lost or to search for more comforting answers (Randall, 2009). Providing support and empathy in working through the painful emotions of 'grief' for a society that must undergo changes is a prerequisite for subsequent adaptation to new circumstances.¶ Without such support and empathy, it is more likely that people will begin to deploy a range of maladaptive ‘coping strategies’, such as denial of personal responsibility, blaming others, or becoming apathetic (Lertzman, 2008). An audience should not be admonished for deploying such strategies – this would in itself be threatening, and could therefore harden resistance to positive behaviour change (Miller and Rolnick, 2002). The key is not to dismiss people who exhibit maladaptive coping strategies, but to understand how they can be made more adaptive. People who feel socially supported will be more likely to adopt adaptive emotional responses - so facilitating social support for proenvironmental behaviour is crucial.¶ 5. Promote pro-environmental social norms and harness the power of social networks¶ One way of bridging the gap between private-sphere behaviour changes and collective action is the promotion of pro-environmental social norms. Pictures and videos of ordinary people (‘like me’) engaging in significant proenvironmental actions are a simple and effective way of generating a sense of social normality around pro-environmental behaviour (Schultz, Nolan, Cialdini, Goldstein and Griskevicius, 2007). There are different reasons that people adopt social norms, and encouraging people to adopt a positive norm simply to ‘conform’, to avoid a feeling of guilt, or for fear of not ‘fitting in’ is likely to produce a relatively shallow level of motivation for behaviour change. Where social norms can be combined with ‘intrinsic’ motivations (e.g. a sense of social belonging), they are likely to be more effective and persistent.¶ Too often, environmental communications are directed to the individual as a single unit in the larger social system of consumption and political engagement. This can make the problems feel too overwhelming, and evoke unmanageable levels of anxiety. Through the enhanced awareness of what other people are doing, a strong sense of collective purpose can be engendered. One factor that is likely to influence whether adaptive or maladaptive coping strategies are selected in response to fear about climate change is whether people feel supported by a social network – that is, whether a sense of ‘sustainable citizenship’ is fostered. The efficacy of groupbased programmes at promoting pro-environmental behaviour change has been demonstrated on numerous occasions – and participants in these projects consistently point to a sense of mutual learning and support as a key reason for making and maintaining changes in behaviour (Nye and Burgess, 2008). There are few influences more powerful than an individual’s social network. Networks are instrumental not just in terms of providing social support, but also by creating specific content of social identity – defining what it means to be “us”. If environmental norms are incorporated at this level (become defining for the group) they can result in significant behavioural change (also reinforced through peer pressure).¶ Of course, for the majority of people, this is unlikely to be a network that has climate change at its core. But social networks – Trade Unions, Rugby Clubs, Mother & Toddler groups – still perform a critical role in spreading change through society. Encouraging and supporting pre-existing social networks to take ownership of climate change (rather than approach it as a problem for ‘green groups’) is a critical task. As well as representing a crucial bridge between individuals and broader society, peer-to-peer learning circumnavigates many of the problems associated with more ‘top down’ models of communication – not least that government representatives are perceived as untrustworthy (Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2003). Peer-to-peer learning is more easily achieved in group-based dialogue than in designing public information films: But public information films can nonetheless help to establish social norms around community-based responses to the challenges of climate change, through clear visual portrayals of people engaging collectively in the pro-environmental behaviour.¶ The discourse should be shifted increasingly from ‘you’ to ‘we’ and from ‘I’ to ‘us’. This is starting to take place in emerging forms of community-based activism, such as the Transition Movement and Cambridge Carbon Footprint’s ‘Carbon Conversations’ model – both of which recognize the power of groups to help support and maintain lifestyle and identity changes. A nationwide climate change engagement project using a group-based behaviour change model with members of Trade Union networks is currently underway, led by the Climate Outreach and Information Network. These projects represent a method of climate change communication and engagement radically different to that typically pursued by the government – and may offer a set of approaches that can go beyond the limited reach of social marketing techniques.¶ One potential risk with appeals based on social norms is that they often contain a hidden message. So, for example, a campaign that focuses on the fact that too many people take internal flights actually contains two messages – that taking internal flights is bad for the environment, and that lots of people are taking internal flights. This second message can give those who do not currently engage in that behaviour a perverse incentive to do so, and campaigns to promote behaviour change should be very careful to avoid this. The key is to ensure that information about what is happening (termed descriptive norms), does not overshadow information about what should be happening (termed injunctive norms). ¶ 6. Think about the language you use, but don’t rely on language alone¶ A number of recent publications have highlighted the results of focus group research and talk-back tests in order to ‘get the language right’ (Topos Partnership, 2009; Western Strategies & Lake Research Partners, 2009), culminating in a series of suggestions for framing climate-change communications. For example, these two studies led to the suggestions that communicators should use the term ‘global warming’ or ‘our deteriorating atmosphere’, respectively, rather than ‘climate change’. Other research has identified systematic differences in the way that people interpret the terms ‘climate change’ and ‘global warming’, with ‘global warming’ perceived as more emotionally engaging than ‘climate change’ (Whitmarsh, 2009).¶ Whilst ‘getting the language right’ is important, it can only play a small part in a communication strategy. More important than the language deployed (i.e. ‘conceptual frames') are what have been referred to by some cognitive linguists as 'deep frames'. Conceptual framing refers to catchy slogans and clever spin (which may or may not be honest). At a deeper level, framing refers to forging the connections between a debate or public policy and a set of deeper values or principles. Conceptual framing (crafting particular messages focussing on particular issues) cannot work unless these messages resonate with a set of long-term deep frames.¶ Policy proposals which may at the surface level seem similar (perhaps they both set out to achieve a reduction in environmental pollution) may differ importantly in terms of their deep framing. For example, putting a financial value on an endangered species, and building an economic case for their conservation ‘commodifies’ them, and makes them equivalent (at the level of deep frames) to other assets of the same value (a hotel chain, perhaps). This is a very different frame to one that attempts to achieve the same conservation goals through the ascription of intrinsic value to such species – as something that should be protected in its own right. Embedding particular deep frames requires concerted effort (Lakoff, 2009), but is the beginning of a process that can build a broad, coherent cross-departmental response to climate change from government.¶ 7. Encourage public demonstrations of frustration at the limited pace of government action¶ Private-sphere behavioural change is not enough, and may even at times become a diversion from the more important process of bringing political pressure to bear on policy-makers. The importance of public demonstrations of frustration at both the lack of political progress on climate change and the barriers presented by vested interests is widely recognised – including by government itself. Climate change communications, including government communication campaigns, should work to normalise public displays of frustration with the slow pace of political change. Ockwell et al (2009) argued that communications can play a role in fostering demand for - as well as acceptance of - policy change. Climate change communication could (and should) be used to encourage people to demonstrate (for example through public demonstrations) about how they would like structural barriers to behavioural/societal change to be removed.

#### Simulation and institutional deliberation are valuable and motivate effective responses to environmental risks

Marx et al 7 (Sabine M, Center for Research on Environmental Decisions (CRED) @ Columbia University, Elke U. Weber, Graduate School of Business and Department of Psychology @ Columbia University, Benjamin S. Orlovea, Department of Environmental Science and Policy @ University of California Davis, Anthony Leiserowitz, Decision Research, David H. Krantz, Department of Psychology @ Columbia University, Carla Roncolia, South East Climate Consortium (SECC), Department of Biological and Agricultural Engineering @ University of Georgia and Jennifer Phillips, Bard Centre for Environmental Policy @ Bard College, “Communication and mental processes: Experiential and analytic processing of uncertain climate information”, 2007, http://climate.columbia.edu/sitefiles/file/Marx\_GEC\_2007.pdf)

Based on the observation that experiential and analytic processing systems compete and that personal experience and vivid descriptions are often favored over statistical information, we suggest the following research and policy implications.¶ Communications designed to create, recall and highlight relevant personal experience and to elicit affective responses can lead to more public attention to, processing of, and engagement with forecasts of climate variability and climate change**.** Vicarious experiential information in the **form of scenarios**, narratives, and analogies **can help** the public and **policy makers imagine the potential consequences of climate** variability and **change, amplify** or attenuate **risk perceptions, and influence** both individual behavioral intentions and **public policy preferences.** Likewise, as illustrated by the example of retranslation in the Uganda studies, **the translation of statistical information** into concrete experience **with simulated forecasts, decisionmaking and its outcomes can greatly facilitate an intuitive understanding of** both **probabilities and the** consequences of incremental change and extreme events, and **motivate contingency planning**.¶ Yet, while the engagement of experience-based, affective decision-making can make risk communications more salient and motivate behavior, experiential processing is also subject to its own biases, limitations and distortions, such as the finite pool of worry and single action bias. Experiential processing works best with easily imaginable, emotionally laden material, yet many aspects of climate variability and change are relatively abstract and require a certain level of analytical understanding (e.g., long-term trends in mean temperatures or precipitation). Ideally, communication of **climate forecasts should encourage the interactive engagement of** both analytic and experiential **processing systems in** the course of **making concrete decisions** about climate, ranging from individual choices about what crops to plant in a particular season to broad social choices about how to mitigate or adapt to global climate change.¶ One way to facilitate this interaction is through group and participatory decision-making. As the Uganda example suggests, **group processes allow individuals with a range of knowledge, skills and** personal **experience to share diverse information and perspectives and work together on a problem**. Ideally, groups should include at least one member trained to understand statistical forecast information to ensure that all sources of information—both experiential and analytic—are considered as part of the decision-making process. Communications to groups should also try to translate statistical information into formats readily understood in the language, personal and cultural experience of group members. In a somewhat iterative or cyclical process, the shared concrete information can then be re-abstracted to an analytic level that **leads to action**.¶ Risk and uncertainty are inherent dimensions of all climate forecasts and related decisions. **Analytic products like trend analysis, forecast probabilities, and ranges of uncertainty ought to be valuable contributions to stakeholder decision-making**. Yet decision makers also listen to the inner and communal voices of personal and collective experience, affect and emotion, and cultural values. Both systems—analytic and experiential—should be considered in the design of climate forecasts and risk communications. If not, many analytic products will fall on deaf ears as decision makers continue to rely heavily on personal experience and affective cues to make plans for an uncertain future. The challenge is to find innovative and creative ways to engage both systems in the process of individual and group decision-making.

#### Taking action against environmental destruction represents an opportunity to rebuild progressive politics for a more just society, but only if we set aside traditional differences founded around identity in favor of a broad-based coalition

Smith 10 Brendan, co-founder of Labor Network for Sustainability, 11-23, “Fighting Doom: The New Politics of Climate Change,” Common Dreams, http://www.commondreams.org/view/2010/11/23-1

I admit I have arrived late to the party. Only recently have I begun to realize what others have known for decades: The climate crisis is not, at its core, an environmental issue. In fact it is not an "issue" at all; it is an existential threat to every human and community on the planet. It threatens every job, every economy in the world. It threatens the health of our children. It threatens our food and water supply. Climate change will continue to alter the world our species has known for the past three thousand years. As an oyster farmer and longtime political activist, the effects of climate change on my life will be neither distant nor impersonal. Rising greenhouse gases and ocean temperatures may well force me to abandon my 60-acre farm within the next forty years. From France to Washington state, oystermen are already seeing massive die-offs of seed oysters and the thinning shells science has long predicted. I can see the storm clouds and they are foretelling doom. But my political alter ego is oddly less pessimistic. Rather than triggering gloom, the climate crisis has surprisingly stirred up more hope than I have felt in twenty years as a progressive activist. After decades of progressive retreat it is a strange feeling. But I am haunted by the suspicion that this coming crisis may be the first opportunity we have had in generations to radically re-shape the political landscape and build a more just and sustainable society. The Power of Doom The modern progressive movement in the U.S. has traditionally grounded its organizing in the politics of identity and altruism. Organize an affected group -- minorities, gays, janitors or women -- and then ask the public at large to support the cause -- prison reform, gay marriage, labor rights, or abortion -- based on some cocktail of good will, liberal guilt, and moral persuasion. This strategy has been effective at times. But we have failed to bring these mini-movements together into a force powerful enough to enact broad-based social reform. It takes a lot of people to change society and our current strategy has left us small in numbers and weak in power. The highlights of my political life -- as opposed to oystering -- have been marked by winning narrow, often temporary, battles, but perennially losing the larger war. I see the results in every direction I look: growing poverty and unemployment, two wars, the rise of the right, declining unionization, the failure of the Senate's climate legislation and of Copenhagen, the wholesale domination of corporate interests. The list goes on and on. We have lost; it's time to admit our strategy has been too tepid and begin charting anew. This time can be different. What is so promising about the climate crisis is that because it is not an "issue" experienced by one disenfranchised segment of the population, it opens the opportunity for a new organizing calculus for progressives. Except for nuclear annihilation, humanity has never faced so universal a threat where all our futures are bound inextricably together. This universality provides the mortar of common interest required for movement building. We could literally knock on every door on the planet and find someone -- whether they know it or not -- who has a vital self-interest in averting the climate crisis by joining a movement for sustainability. With all of humanity facing doom, we can finally gather under one banner and count our future members not in the thousands but in the millions, even billions. But as former White House "Green Jobs Czar" Van Jones told the New Yorker in 2009, "The challenge is making this an everybody movement, so your main icons are Joe Six-Pack, Joe the Plumber, becoming Joe the Solar Guy, or that kid on the street corner putting down his handgun, picking up a caulk gun." The climate crisis is carrying us into uncharted waters and our political strategy needs to be directed toward making the climate movement an "everybody movement." Let me use a personal example. As an oysterman on Long Island Sound my way of life is threatened by rising greenhouse gases and ocean temperatures. If the climate crisis is not averted my oysters will die and my farm will be shuttered. Saving my livelihood requires that I politically engage at some level. Normally I would gather together my fellow oyster farmers to lobby state and federal officials and hold a protest or two. Maybe I would find a few coalitions to join. But we would remain small in number, wield little power, and our complaints about job loss would fall on largely unsympathetic ears in the face of so many suffering in so many ways. And what would we even petition our government to do about the problem? Buyouts and unemployment benefits? Re-training classes? Our oysters will still die and we will still lose our farms. To save our lives and livelihood we need to burrow down to the root of the problem: halting greenhouse gas emissions. And halting emissions requires joining a movement with the requisite power to dismantle the fossil fuel economy while building a green economy. To tackle such a large target requires my support for every nook and cranny effort to halt greenhouse gases and transition to a green economy. I need to gather up my fellow oyster farmers and link arms with students blocking new coal-fired power plants while fighting for just transition for coal workers; I need to join forces with other green workers around the country to demand government funding for green energy jobs, not more bank and corporate bailouts; I need to support labor movement efforts in China and elsewhere to climb out of poverty by going "green not dirty." I have a stake in these disparate battles not out of political altruism, but because my livelihood and community depend on stopping greenhouse gases and climate change. In other words, the hidden jewel of the climate crisis is that I need others and others need me. We are bound together by the same story of crisis and struggle. Some in the sustainability movement have been taking advantage of the "power of doom" by weaving together novel narratives and alliances around climate change. Groups in Kentucky are complementing their anti-mountain top removal efforts by organizing members of rural electrical co-ops into "New Power" campaigns to force a transition from fossil fuels to renewable power -- and create jobs in the process. Police unions in Canada, recognizing their members will be first responders as climate disasters hit, have reached out to unions in New Orleans to ensure the tragedies that followed Katrina are not repeated. Artists, chefs, farmers, bike mechanics, designers, and others are coalescing into a "green artisan movement" focused on building vibrant sustainable communities. Immigrant organizers, worried about the very real possibility of ever-worsening racial tensions triggered by millions of environmental refugees flooding in from neighboring countries, are educating their membership about why the climate crisis matters. My hope is that over the coming years we will be able to catalog increasing numbers of these tributaries of the climate crisis. Our power will not stem from a long list of issue concerns or sponsors at events -- we have tried that as recently as the October 2nd Washington D.C. "One Nation Working Together" march with little impact. Nor, with the rise of do-it-yourself organizing, will our power spring from top-down political parties of decades past. Instead oystermen like me, driven by the need to save our lives and livelihood, will storm the barricades with others facing the effects of the climate crisis. We will merge our mini-movements under a banner of common crisis, common vision and common struggle. We will be in this fight together and emerge as force not to be trifled with. This Time We Have an Alternative I am also guardedly optimistic because this time we have an alternative. My generation came of age after the fall of communism, and as a result, we have been raised in the midst of one-sided debate. We recognize that neoliberalism has ravaged society, but besides nostalgic calls for socialism, what has been the alternative? As globalization swept the globe, we demanded livable wages and better housing for the poorest in our communities; we fought sweatshops in China; we lobbied for new campaign finance and corporate governance laws. But these are mere patchwork reforms that fail to add up to a full-blown alternative to our current anti-government, free-market system. Never being able to fully picture the progressive alternative left me not fully trusting that progressive answers were viable solutions. But when I hear the proposed solutions to the climate crisis, the fog lifts. I can track the logic and envision the machinery of our alternative. And it sounds surprisingly like a common sense rebuttal to the current free-market mayhem: We face a global emergency of catastrophic proportions. Market fundamentalism will worsen rather than solve the crisis. Instead we need to re-direct our institutions and economic resources toward solving the crisis by replacing our carbon-based economy with a green sustainable economy. And by definition, for an economy to be sustainable it must addresses the longstanding suffering ordinary people face in their lives, ranging from unemployment and poverty to housing and healthcare. For years I have tossed from campaign to campaign, but the framework of our new progressive answer to the climate crisis now provides a roadmap for my political strategy. It helps chart my opponents -- coal companies and their political minions, for example -- as well as my diverse range of allies. It lays out my policy agenda, ranging from creating millions of new green jobs to building affordable green housing in low-income communities. I finally feel confident enough in my bearings to set sail. The Era of Crisis Politics While building a new green economy makes sense on paper, it is hard to imagine our entrenched political system yielding even modest progressive reform, let alone the wholesale re-formatting of the carbon economy. But I suspect this will change in the coming years, with our future governed by cascading political crises, rather than political stasis. We are likely entering an era of crisis politics whereby each escalating environmental disaster -- ranging from water shortages and hurricanes to wildfires and disease outbreaks -- will expose the impotence of our existing political institutions and economic system. In the next 40 years alone, scientists predict a state of permanent drought throughout the Southwest US and climate-linked disease deaths to double. As Danny Thompson, secretary-treasurer of the Nevada AFL-CIO, told the Las Vegas Review Journal, the ever-worsening water crisis could be "the end of the world" that could "turn us upside down, and I don't know how you recover from that." As if that is not enough, these crises will be played out in the context of a global economy spiraling out of control. Each hurricane, drought or recession will send opinion polls and politicians lurching from right to left and vice versa. Think of how quickly, however momentarily, the political debate pivoted in the wake of Katrina, the BP disaster, and the financial crisis. As White House chief of staff Rahm Emanuel famously said "Never let a serious crisis go to waste...It's an opportunity to do things you couldn't do before." While addressing the climate crisis requires radical solutions that cannot be broached in today's political climate, each disaster opens an opportunity to advance alternative agendas -- both for the left and right. While politicians debate modest technical fixes, ordinary people left desperate by floods, fires, droughts and other disasters will increasingly -- and angrily -- demand more fundamental reforms. While our current policy choices appear limited by polls and election results, in an era of crisis politics what appears unrealistic and radical before a storm may well appear as common sense reform in its wake. My generation has been raised in the politics of eternal dusk. Except for a passing ray of hope during the Obama campaign, our years have been marked by the failure of every political force in society -- whether it be political elites or social movement leaders -- to address the problems we face as a nation and world. They have left us spinning towards disaster. We can forge a better future. Climate-generated disasters will bring our doomed future into focus. The failure of political elites to adequately respond to these cascading crises will transform our political landscape and seed the ground for social movements. And if we prepare for the chaos and long battle ahead, our alternative vision will become a necessity rather than an impossibility. As a friend recently said to me, "God help us, I hope you're right."

#### The state is inevitable and an indispensable part of the solution to ecological destruction

Eckersley 4 Robyn, Reader/Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Melbourne, “The Green State: Rethinking Democracy and Sovereignty”, MIT Press, 2004, Google Books, pp. 3-8

While acknowledging the basis for this antipathy toward the nation- state, and the limitations of state-centric analyses of global ecological degradation, I seek to draw attention to the positive role that states have played, and might increasingly play, in global and domestic politics. Writing more than twenty years ago, Hedley Bull (a proto-constructivist and leading writer in the English school) outlined the state's positive role in world affairs, and his arguments continue to provide a powerful challenge to those who somehow seek to "get beyond the state," as if such a move would provide a more lasting solution to the threat of armed conflict or nuclear war, social and economic injustice, or environmental degradation.10 As Bull argued, **given that the state is here to stay whether we like it or not**, then the call to get "beyond the state is a counsel of despair, at all events if it means that we have to begin by abolishing or subverting the state, rather than that there is a need to build upon it.""¶ In any event, rejecting the "statist frame" of world politics ought not prohibit an inquiry into the emancipatory potential of the **state as a crucial "node" in any future network of global ecological governance**. This is especially so, given that one can expect states to persist as major sites of social and political power for at least the foreseeable future and that **any green transformations of the present political order will, short of revolution, necessarily be state-dependent**. Thus, like it or not, those concerned about **ecological destruction must contend with existing institutions** and, where possible, seek to "rebuild the ship while still at sea." And if states are so implicated in ecological destruction, then an inquiry into the potential for their transformation even their modest reform into something that is at least more conducive to ecological sustainability would seem to be compelling.¶ Of course, it would be unhelpful to become singularly fixated on the redesign of the state at the expense of other institutions of governance. States are not the only institutions that limit, condition, shape, and direct political power, and it is necessary to keep in view the broader spectrum of formal and informal institutions of governance (e.g., local, national, regional, and international) that are implicated in global environmental change. Nonetheless, while the state constitutes only one modality of political power, it is an especially significant one because of its historical claims to exclusive rule over territory and peoples—as expressed in the principle of state sovereignty. As Gianfranco Poggi explains, the political power concentrated in the state "is a momentous, pervasive, critical phenomenon. **Together with other forms of social power, it constitutes an indispensable medium for constructing and shaping larger social realities**, for establishing, shaping and maintaining all broader and more durable collectivities."12 States play, in varying degrees, significant roles in structuring life chances, in distributing wealth, privilege, information, and risks, in upholding civil and political rights, and in securing private property rights and providing the legal/regulatory framework for capitalism**. Every one of these dimensions of state activity has, for good or ill, a significant bearing on the global environmental crisis**. Given that the green political project is one that demands far-reaching changes to both economies and societies, it is difficult to imagine how such changes might occur on the kind of scale that is needed **without the active support of states**. While it is often observed that states are too big to deal with local ecological problems and too small to deal with global ones, the state nonetheless holds, as Lennart Lundqvist puts it, "a unique position in the constitutive hierarchy from individuals through villages, regions and nations all the way to global organizations. The state is inclusive of lower political and administrative levels, and exclusive in speaking for its whole territory and population in relation to the outside world."13 In short, it seems to me inconceivable to advance ecological emancipation without also engaging with and seeking to transform state power.¶ Of course, not all states are democratic states, and the green movement has long been wary of the coercive powers that all states reputedly enjoy. Coercion (and not democracy) is also central to Max Weber's classic sociological understanding of the state as "a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory."14 Weber believed that the state could not be defined sociologically in terms of its ends\* only formally as an organization in terms of the particular means that are peculiar to it.15 Moreover his concept of legitimacy was merely concerned with whether rules were accepted by subjects as valid (for whatever reason); he did not offer a normative theory as to the circumstances when particular rules ought to be accepted or whether beliefs about the validity of rules were justified. Legitimacy was a contingent fact, and in view of his understanding of politics as a struggle for power in the context of an increasingly disenchanted world, likely to become an increasingly unstable achievement.16¶ In contrast to Weber, my approach to the state is explicitly normative and explicitly concerned with the purpose of states, and the democratic basis of their legitimacy. It focuses on the limitations of liberal normative theories of the state (and associated ideals of a just constitutional arrangement), and it proposes instead an alternative green theory that seeks to redress the deficiencies in liberal theory. Nor is my account as bleak as Weber's. The fact that states possess a monopoly of control over the means of coercion is a most serious matter, but it does not necessarily imply that they must have frequent recourse to that power. In any event, whether the use of the state's coercive powers is to be deplored or welcomed turns on the purposes for which that power is exercised, the manner in which it is exercised, and whether it is managed in public, transparent, and accountable ways—a judgment that must be made against a background of changing problems, practices, and under- standings. The coercive arm of the state can be used to "bust" political demonstrations and invade privacy. **It can also be used to prevent human rights abuses, curb the excesses of corporate power, and protect the environment.**¶ In short, although the political autonomy of states is widely believed to be in decline, **there are still few social institution that can match the** same degree of capacity and potential legitimacy that **states have to redirect societies and economies along more ecologically sustainable lines to address ecological problems** such as global warming and pollution, the buildup of toxic and nuclear wastes and the rapid erosion of the earth's biodiversity. States—particularly when they act collectively—have the capacity to curb the socially and ecologically harmful consequences of capitalism. They are also more amenable to democratization than cor- porations, notwithstanding the ascendancy of the neoliberal state in the increasingly competitive global economy. There are therefore many good reasons why green political theorists need to think not only critically but also constructively about the state and the state system. While the state is certainly not "healthy" at the present historical juncture, in this book I nonetheless join Poggi by offering "a timid two cheers for the old beast," at least as a potentially more significant ally in the green cause.17

#### Short-term market mechanisms are the only solution to environmental destruction

Bryant 12—professor of philosophy at Collin College (Levi, We’ll Never Do Better Than a Politician: Climate Change and Purity, 5/11/12, http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/05/11/well-never-do-better-than-a-politician-climate-change-and-purity/)

Somewhere or other Latour makes the remark that we’ll never do better than a politician. Here it’s important to remember that for Latour– as for myself –every entity is a “politician”. Latour isn’t referring solely to those persons that we call “politicians”, but to all entities that exist. And if Latour claims that we’ll never do better than a politician, then this is because every entity must navigate a field of relations to other entities that play a role in **what is and is not possible** in that field. In the language of my ontology, this would be articulated as the thesis that the local manifestations of which an entity is capable are, in part, a function of the relations the entity entertains to other entities in a regime of attraction. The world about entities perpetually introduces **resistances and frictions** **that play a key role** in what comes to be actualized**.** ¶ It is this aphorism that occurred to me today after a disturbing discussion with a rather militant Marxist on Facebook. I had posted a very disturbing editorial on climate change by the world renowned climate scientist James Hansen. Not only did this person completely misread the editorial, denouncing Hansen for claiming that Canada is entirely responsible for climate change (clearly he had no familiarity with Hansen or his important work), but he derided Hansen for proposing market-based solutions to climate change on the grounds that “the market is the whole source of the problem!” It’s difficult to know how to respond in this situations.¶ read on! ¶ It is quite true that it is the system of global capitalism or the market that has created our climate problems (though, as Jared Diamond shows in Collapse, **other systems of production have also produced devastating climate problems).** In its insistence on profit and expansion in each economic quarter, markets as currently structured provide no brakes for environmental destructive actions. The system is itself pathological.¶ **However**, pointing this out and **deriding market based solutions doesn’t get us very far**. In fact, such a response to proposed market-based solutions is downright dangerous and irresponsible. The fact of the matter is that **1) we** currently **live in a market based world, 2) there is not**, in the foreseeable future **an alternative system on the horizon, and 3), above all,** we need to do something now**.** **We can’t afford to reject interventions simply** because they don’t meet our ideal conceptions of how things should be. **We have to work with the world that is here, not the one that we would like to be here**. And here it’s crucial to note that pointing this out does not entail that we shouldn’t work for producing that other world. It just means that we have to grapple with the world that is actually there before us.¶ It pains me to write this post because I remember, with great bitterness, the diatribes hardcore Obama supporters leveled against legitimate leftist criticisms on the grounds that these critics were completely unrealistic idealists who, in their demand for “purity”, were asking for “ponies and unicorns”. This rejoinder always seemed to ignore that words have power and that Obama, through his profound power of rhetoric, had, at least **the power to shift public debates and frames, opening a path to making new forms of policy and new priorities possible.** **The tragedy was that he didn’t use that power,** though he has gotten better.¶ I do not wish to denounce others and dismiss their claims on these sorts of grounds. As a Marxist anarchists, I do believe that we should fight for the creation of an alternative hominid ecology or social world. I think that the call to commit and fight, to put alternatives on the table, has been one of the most powerful contributions of thinkers like Zizek and Badiou. If we don’t commit and fight for alternatives those alternatives will never appear in the world. **Nonetheless, we still have to grapple with the world we find ourselves in**. And it is here, in my encounters with some Militant Marxists, that I sometimes find it difficult to avoid the conclusion that they are unintentionally **aiding and abetting the very things they claim to be fighting**. **In their refusal to become impure, to work with situations or assemblages as we find them, to sully their hands, they end up** reproducing the very system they wish to topple and change**. Narcissistically they get to sit there, smug in their superiority and purity, while everything continues as it did before because they’ve refused to become politicians or engage in the difficult concrete work of assembling** human and nonhuman **actors to render another world possible.** As a consequence, they occupy the position of Hegel’s beautiful soul that denounces the horrors of the world, celebrate the beauty of their soul, **while depending on those horrors of the world to sustain their own position**. ¶ To engage in politics is to engage in networks or ecologies of relations between humans and nonhumans. To engage in ecologies is to descend into networks of causal relations and feedback loops that you cannot completely master and that will modify your own commitments and actions. But there’s no other way, there’s no way around this, and we do need to act now.

#### Pragmatic environmental policy is necessary

Simpson 10 (Francis, College of Engineering, Vanderbilt University, “Environmental Pragmatism and its Application to Climate Change The Moral Obligations of Developed and Developing Nations to Avert Climate Change as viewed through Technological Pragmatism”, Spring 2010 | Volume 6 | Number 1)

Pragmatism and Footprinting¶ Environmental pragmatism is a relatively new field of environmental ethics that seeks to move beyond the strictly theoretical exercises normal in philosophy and allows the environmental movement to formulate substantial new policies (Light, 1). Environmental Pragmatism was initially posited by Bryan Norton and evolved to not take a stance over the dispute between non-anthropocentric and anthropocentric ethics. Distancing himself from this dispute, he preferred to distinguish between strong and weak anthropocentricism (Light, 290-291, 298). The main philosophers involved in advancing the debate in environmental pragmatism include Eric Katz, Andrew Light, and Bryan Norton. **This particular discipline advocates moral pluralism, implying that the environmental problems being faced have multiple correct solutions.** Light argues that the urgency of ecological crises requires that action is necessary through negotiation and compromise. While theorists serve to further the field of environmental ethics and to debate the metaethical basis of various environmental philosophies**, some answers to questions are best left to private discussion rather than taking time to argue about them publically** (introduction of pragmatism). Pragmatism believes that if two theories are equally able to provide solutions to a given problem, then debate on which is more is argued that: “the commitment to solving environmental problems is the only precondition for any workable and democratic political theory” (Light, 11). While the science behind a footprint is well understood, what can the synthesis of environmental pragmatism and footprinting tell us about the moral obligation to avert climate change? How does grounding the practice of sustainability footprinting in environmental pragmatism generate moral prescriptions for averting climate change?¶ Environmental Pragmatism necessitates the need for tools in engineering to be developed and applied to avert the climate change problem, since **pragmatism** inherently **calls for bridging the gap between theory and policy/ practices**. With the theory of pragmatism in mind, further research and development of tools such as life-cycle analysis and footprinting are potential policy tools that are necessary under a pragmatist viewpoint so that informed decisions can be made by policy makers. Since the role of life-cycle analysis and footprinting attempt to improve the efficiency and decrease the overall environmental impact of a given process, good, or service, environmental pragmatism would call for the further development and usage of these tools so that we can continue to develop sustainably and fulfill our moral obligation to future generations. By utilizing footprinting and life-cycle analysis, it becomes possible to make environmentally conscious decisions not only based upon a gut instinct but additionally based on sound science. Finally, in regards to averting climate change, footprinting and life-cycle analysis offer another dimension to traditional cost-benefit analysis and can allow for our moral obligation to future generations to weigh into final decisions which will eventually result in policies and/ or a production of a good or service. Since traditional cost benefit analysis does not account for the environment explicitly, pragmatism would call for the application of these tools to ensure that the environment is adequately protected for future generations.¶ Climate change modeling inherently contains **many unknowns** in terms of future outcomes and applied simplifications, **but these factors should not be enough to hold us back from an environmental pragmatism stand point.** Rather than hiding behind a veil of uncertainty **with the science, the uncertainty of the** possible catastrophic outcomes demands action on the part of every human individual. Environmental pragmatism could also adopt a view point like the precautionary principle where a given action has great uncertainty, but also great consequence (Haller). Since we are attempting to protect human lives and prevent unnecessary suffering, **environmental pragmatism would dictate that we should take action now and** stop debating the theoretical aspects **of this problem**. A moral obligation exists to protect human life, and it becomes our obligation to avert climate change. Despite the relatively high economic costs of averting climate change, it is worth noting that the creation of green jobs and new sectors will help to stimulate the economy rather than completely hindering it. People inherently fear change, and it is my opinion that averting climate change requires a drastic change in our consumption patterns, an important reason why people are resisting averting climate change. From an environmental pragmatism viewpoint, it is humanities responsibility to avert climate change before it is too late since we have a moral obligation to protect the future of humanity and the biosphere.

#### Incentives are key to overcome inevitable self-interest---the alt fails

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Even the environmental moralist who eschews any normative use of economics may find economics valuable for other purposes. Indeed, economics is indispensable in diagnosing why society currently does not achieve the level of environmental protection desired by the moralist. **Those who turn their backs on economics and rely** instead **on ethical** [\*187] **intuition to diagnose environmental problems** are likely to **find themselves doomed to failure.**¶Economic theory suggests that flaws in economic markets and institutions are often the cause of environmental problems. Three concepts of market failure have proven **particularly robust** in analyzing environmental problems. The first is the "tragedy of the commons." n28 If a resource is open and free for multiple parties to use, the parties will tend to over-utilize the resource, even to the point of its destruction. Economists and others have used the tragedy of the commons to explain such environmental problems as over-fishing, the over-drafting of groundwater aquifers, the early and inept exhaustion of oil fields, and high levels of population growth. n29 The second, more general concept (of which the tragedy of the commons actually is a specialized instance) is the "negative externality." n30 When parties do not bear the full cost to society of environmental harms that they cause, they tend to under-invest in the elimination or correction of the harm. Externalities help explain why factories pollute, why landowners destroy ecologically valuable wetlands or other forms of habitat, and why current generations consume high levels of exhaustible resources. The final concept is the problem of "collective action." n31 If political or market actions will benefit a large group of individuals and it is impossible to exclude anyone from enjoying the benefits, each individual will have an incentive to "free ride" on the actions of others rather than acting themselves, reducing the possibility that anything will get done. This explains why the private market does not provide us with more wildlife refuges or aesthetic open space. n32¶ Although these economic explanations for environmental problems are not universal truths, accurate in all settings, **they do enjoy a robust** [\*188] **applicability**. Experimenters, for example, have found that subjects in a wide array of countries succumb to the tragedy of the commons. n33 Smaller groups sometimes have been able to overcome the tragedy of the commons and govern a resource in collective wisdom. Yet this exception appears to be the result of institutional characteristics peculiar to the group and resource that make it easier to devise a local and informal regulatory system rather than the result of cultural differences that undermine the economic precepts of the tragedy of the commons. n34¶ These economic explanations point to a vastly different approach to solving environmental problems than a focus on environmental ethics alone would suggest. To environmental moralists, the difficulty is that the population does not understand the ethical importance of protecting the environment. Although governmental regulation might be necessary in the short run to force people to do what they do not yet appreciate is proper, the long run answers are education and moral change. A principal means of enlightening the citizenry is engaging them in a discussion of environmental goals. Economic analysis, by contrast, suggests that the problem lies in our economic institutions. **The solution** under economic analysis **is to give those who might harm the environment the incentive to avoid the harm through** the imposition of taxes or regulatory fines or the awarding of environmentally beneficial **subsidies**.¶ The few studies that have tried to test the relative importance of environmental precepts and of economics in predicting environmentally relevant behavior suggest that economics trumps ethics. In one 1992 experiment designed to test whether subjects would yield to the tragedy of the commons in a simulated fisheries common, the researchers looked [\*189] to see whether the environmental attitudes of individual subjects made any difference in the subjects' behavior. The researchers measured subjects' environmental beliefs through various means. They administered questionnaires designed to elicit environmental beliefs; they asked the subjects how they would behave in various hypothetical scenarios (e.g., if someone asked them to volunteer to pick up litter on the weekend); they even tried to see how the subjects would react to real requests for environmental help (e.g., by asking them to participate in a Saturday recycling campaign). No matter how the researchers tried to measure the environmental attitudes of the subjects**, attitude failed to provide a statistically significant explanation for participants' behavior in the fishing commons. Those who appeared to have strong environmental beliefs behaved just as tragically as those who did not when fighting for the limited stock of fish**. n35¶ In another study, researchers examined domestic consumers of high amounts of electricity in Perth, Australia. After administering a survey to determine whether the consumers believed they had a personal and ethical duty to conserve energy, the researchers tried various methods for changing the behavior of those who reported that people have a conservation obligation. Informing these individuals of their high electricity usage and even supplying them with conservation tips **did not make a statistically significant difference in their energy use**. The only thing that led these individuals to reduce their electricity consumption was a letter reminding them of the earlier survey in which they had espoused a conservation duty and emphasizing the inconsistency of that view with their high electricity usage. In response to this letter, the subjects reduced their energy use. Apparently shame can be a valuable catalyst in converting ethical beliefs into action. **But the effect may be short lived.** **Within two weeks, the** Perth **subjects' energy use had risen back to its earlier levels**. n36¶ Ethical beliefs, in short, frequently fall victim to personal convenience or cost considerations. Ethical views sometimes can make a difference in how people behave. Examples include the role that ethics has played in encouraging people to recycle or to eat dolphin-free tuna. n37 But the [\*190] personal cost, if any, of recycling or of eating dolphin-free tuna is exceptionally small. For most of the environmental dilemmas that face the nation and the world today, the economic cost of changing behavior is far more significant. And **where costs are high, economics** appears to **trump** most **peoples' environmental views**. Even if ethics played a more powerful role, we do not know for certain how to create or strengthen environmental norms. n38 **In contrast, we do know how to change economic incentives**. Although environmental moralists should continue trying to promote environmental ethics, **economic analysis** currently **provides the strongest tool for diagnosing and** thus **helping to resolve environmental problems. The environmental** morali**st who ignores this tool** in trying to improve the environment **is doomed** to frustration.

#### Scientific knowledge is best because it subjects itself to constant refinement based on empirical evidence

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The introductory lecture in this series articulated the increasingly popular "postmodernist" claim that all science is ideology. Lewontin then proceeded to justify this by stating the obvious: that scientists are human like the rest of us and subject to the same biases and socio-cultural imperatives. Although he did not actually say it, his comments seemed to imply that the enterprise of scientific research and knowledge building could therefore be no different and no more reliable as a guide to action than any other set of opinions. The trouble is that, in order to reach such an conclusion, one would have to ignore all those aspects of the scientific endeavor that do in fact distinguish it from other types and sources of belief formation.¶ Indeed, if the integrity of the scientific endeavor depended only on the wisdom and objectivity of the individuals engaged in it we would be in trouble. North American agriculture would today be in the state of that in Russia today. In fact it would be much worse, for the Soviets threw out Lysenko's ideology-masquerading-as-science decades ago. Precisely because an alternative scientific model was available (thanks to the disparaged Darwinian theory) the former Eastern bloc countries have been partially successful in overcoming the destructive chain of consequences which blind faith in ideology had set in motion. This is what Lewontin's old Russian dissident professor meant when he said that the truth must be spoken, even at great personal cost. How sad that Lewontin has apparently failed to understand the fact that while scientific knowledge -- with the power it gives us -- can and does allow humanity to change the world, ideological beliefs have consequences too. By rendering their proponents politically powerful but rationally and instrumentally impotent, they throw up insurmountable barriers to reasoned and value-guided social change.¶ What are the crucial differences between ideology and science that Lewonton has ignored? Both Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn have spelled these out with great care -- the former throughout a long lifetime of scholarship devoted to that precise objective. Stephen Jay Gould has also done a sound job in this area. How strange that someone with the status of Lewontin, in a series of lectures supposedly covering the same subject, would not at least have dealt with their arguments!¶ Science has to do with the search for regularities in what humans experience of their physical and social environments, beginning with the most simple units discernible, and gradually moving towards the more complex. It has to do with expressing these regularities in the clearest and most precise language possible, so that cause-and-effect relations among the parts of the system under study can be publicly and rigorously tested. And it has to do with devising explanations of those empirical regularities which have survived all attempts to falsify them. These explanations, once phrased in the form of testable hypotheses, become predictors of future events. In other words, they lead to further conjectures of additional relationships which, in their turn, must survive repeated public attempts to prove them wanting -- if the set of related explanations (or theory) is to continue to operate as a fruitful guide for subsequent research.¶ This means that science, unlike mythology and ideology, has a self-correcting mechanism at its very heart. A conjecture, to be classed as scientific, must be amenable to empirical test. It must, above all, be open to refutation by experience. There is a rigorous set of rules according to which hypotheses are formulated and research findings are arrived at, reported and replicated. It is this process -- not the lack of prejudice of the particular scientist, or his negotiating ability, or even his political power within the relevant university department -- that ensures the reliability of scientific knowledge. The conditions established by the community of science is one of precisely defined and regulated "intersubjectivity". Under these conditions the theory that wins out, and subsequently prevails, does so not because of its agreement with conventional wisdom or because of the political power of its proponents, as is often the case with ideology. The survival of a scientific theory such as Darwin's is due, instead, to its power to explain and predict observable regularities in human experience, while withstanding worldwide attempts to refute it -- and proving itself open to elaboration and expansion in the process. In this sense only is scientific knowledge objective and universal. All this has little relationship to the claim of an absolute universality of objective "truth" apart from human strivings that Lewontin has attributed to scientists.¶ Because ideologies, on the other hand, do claim to represent truth, they are incapable of generating a means by which they can be corrected as circumstances change. Legitimate science makes no such claims. Scientific tests are not tests of verisimilitude. Science does not aim for "true" theories purporting to reflect an accurate picture of the "essence" of reality. It leaves such claims of infallibility to ideology. The tests of science, therefore, are in terms of workability and falsifiability, and its propositions are accordingly tentative in nature. A successful scientific theory is one which, while guiding the research in a particular problem area, is continuously elaborated, revised and refined, until it is eventually superseded by that very hypothesis-making and testing process that it helped to define and sharpen. An ideology, on the other hand, would be considered to have failed under those conditions, for the "truth" must be for all time. More than anything, it is this difference that confuses those ideological thinkers who are compelled to attack Darwin's theory of evolution precisely because of its success as a scientific theory. For them, and the world of desired and imagined certainty in which they live, that very success in contributing to a continuously evolving body of increasingly reliable -- albeit inevitably tentative -- knowledge can only mean failure, in that the theory itself has altered in the process.

#### Sustainability is impossible and causes extinction in the short term---market incentives are key

Barnhizer 6 -- Professor of Law, Cleveland State University. (David, Waking from Sustainability's "Impossible Dream": The Decisionmaking Realities of Business and Government, 18 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. 595, Lexis)

Medieval alchemists sought unsuccessfully to discover the process that would enable them to turn base metal into gold--assigning the name "Philosopher's Stone" to what they sought. The quest was doomed to failure. Just as a "sow's ear" cannot become a "silk purse," a base metal cannot become gold. Sustainability is impossible for the same reasons. It asks us to be something we are not, both individually and as a political and economic community. **It is impossible to convert humans into the** wise, **selfless, and** nearly **omniscient creatures** required to build and operate a system that incorporates sustainability. Even if it were ultimately possible (and it is not), **it would take** many **generations** to achieve **and we are running out of time.**¶There is an enormous gap among what we claim we want to do, what we actually want to do, and our ability to achieve our professed goals. **I admit to an absolute distrust of** cheap and easy proclamations of lofty ideals **and commitments to** voluntary or unenforceable **codes of practice**. The only thing that counts is the actor's actual behavior. For most people, that **behavior is shaped by self-interest** determined by the opportunity to benefit or to avoid harm. In the economic arena this means that if a substantial return can be had without a high risk of significant negative consequences, the decision will be made to seek the benefit. It is the reinvention of Hardin's Tragedy of the Commons. n1¶ This essay explores the nature of human decisionmaking and motivation within critical systems. These systems include business and governmental decisionmaking with a focus on environmental and social areas of emerging crisis where the consequence of acting unwisely or failing to act wisely produces large-scale harms for both human and natural systems. The analysis begins by suggesting that nothing humans create is "sustainable." Change is inevitable and [\*597] irresistible whether styled as systemic entropy, Joseph Schumpeter's idea of a regenerative "creative destruction," or Nikolai Kondratieff's "waves" of economic and social transformation. n2¶ Business entities and governmental decisionmakers play critical roles in both causing environmental and social harms and avoiding those consequences. Some have thought that the path to avoiding harm and achieving positive benefits is to develop codes of practice that by their language promise that decisionmakers will behave in ways consistent with the principles that have come to be referred to as "**sustainability**." That belief **is a delusion--an "impossible dream**." Daniel Boorstin once asked: "Have we been doomed to make our dreams into illusions?" n3 He adds: "An illusion . . . is an image we have mistaken for reality. . . . [W]e cannot see it is not fact." n4 Albert Camus warns of the inevitability of failing to achieve unrealistic goals and the need to become more aware of the limited extent of our power to effect fundamental change. He urges that we concentrate on devising **realistic strategies** and behaviors that allow us to be effective in our actions. n5¶ As companies are expected to implement global codes of conduct such as the U.N. Global Compact and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's (OECD) Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, n6 and governments [\*598] and multilateral institutions supposedly become more concerned about limiting the environmental and social impacts of business decisionmaking, it may be useful to consider actual behavior related to corporate and governmental responses to codes of practice, treaties, and even national laws. Unfortunately, business, government, and multilateral institutions have poor track records vis-a-vis conformity to such codes of practice and treaties.¶ **Despite good intentions, empty** dreams and **platitudes may be counterproductive**. This essay argues that the ideal of sustainability as introduced in the 1987 report of the Brundtland Commission and institutionalized in the form of Agenda 21 at the 1992 Rio Earth Summit is false and counterproductive. The ideal of sustainability assumes that we are almost god-like, capable of perceiving, integrating, monitoring, organizing, and controlling our world. These assumptions create an "impossible" character to the "dream" of sustainability in business and governmental decisionmaking.¶ Sustainability of the Agenda 21 kind is a utopian vision **that is the enemy of the possible and the good.** The problem is that while on paper we can always sketch elegant solutions that appear to have the ability to achieve a desired utopia, such solutions work "if only" everyone will come together and behave in the way laid out in the "blueprint." n7 Humans should have learned from such grand misperceptions as the French Enlightenment's failure to accurately comprehend the quality and limits of human nature or Marxism's flawed view of altruistic human motivation that **the "if only" is an impossibly utopian reordering of human nature we will never achieve**. n8¶ [\*599] A critical defect in the idea of sustainable development is that it continues the flawed assumptions about human nature and motivation that provided the foundational premises of Marxist collectivism and centralized planning authorities. n9 Such perspectives inject rigidity and bureaucracy into a system that requires monitoring, flexibility, adaptation, and accountability. But, in criticizing the failed Marxist-Leninist form of organization, my argument should not be seen as a defense of supposed free market capitalism. Like Marxism, a true free market capitalism does not really exist.¶ The factors of greed and self interest, limited human capacity, inordinate systemic complexity, and the power of large-scale driving forces beyond our ability to control lead to the unsustainability of human systems. **Human self-interest is an** insurmountable barrier **that can be affected** to a degree **only by effective laws, the promise of significant financial** or career **returns, or fear of consequences.** The only way to change the behavior of business and governmental decisionmakers is through the use of the "carrot" and the "stick." n10 Yet even this approach can only be achieved incrementally with limited positive effects.

# 2AC

### Coal is bad

#### Coal is terrible—it causes seizures, birth defects, neurosis, asthma, breathing problems, heart attacks—that is messed up—tens of thousands of people die every year that we can prevent

#### Their arguments on case are totally a link of omission—it says that ignoring blackness when talking about the environment in the abstract are bad—we don’t link because we do focus on the effects on the individual

#### Allowing coal pollution to continue perpetuates racist inequalities

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Everywhere we turn, the issues and impacts of climate change confront us. One of the most serious environmental threats facing the world today, climate change has moved from the minds of scientists and offices of environmentalists to the mainstream. Though the media is dominated by images of polar bears, melting glaciers, flooded lands, and arid desserts, there is a human face to this story as well. Climate change is not only an issue of the environment; it is also an issue of justice and human rights, one that dangerously intersects race and class. All over the world people of color, Indigenous Peoples and low-income communities bear disproportionate burdens from climate change itself, from ill-designed policies to prevent it, and from side effects of the energy systems that cause it. A Climate of Change explores the impacts of climate change on African Americans, from health to economics to community, and considers what policies would most harm or benefit African Americans—and the nation as a whole. African Americans are thirteen percent of the U.S. population and on average emit nearly twenty percent less greenhouse gases than non-Hispanic whites per capita. Though far less responsible for climate change, African Americans are significantly more vulnerable to its effects than non- Hispanic whites. Health, housing, economic well-being, culture, and social stability are harmed from such manifestations of climate change as storms, floods, and climate variability. African Americans are also more vulnerable to higher energy bills, unemployment, recessions caused by global energy price shocks, and a greater economic burden from military operations designed to protect the flow of oil to the U.S. Climate Justice: The Time Is Now Ultimately, accomplishing climate justice will require that new alliances are forged and traditional movements are transformed. An effective policy to address the challenges of global warming cannot be crafted until race and equity are part of the discussion from the outset and an integral part of the solution. This report finds that: Global warming amplifies nearly all existing inequalities. Under global warming, injustices that are already unsustainable become catastrophic. Thus it is essential to recognize that all justice is climate justice and that the struggle for racial and economic justice is an unavoidable part of the fight to halt global warming. Sound global warming policy is also economic and racial justice policy. Successfully adopting a sound global warming policy will do as much to strengthen the economies of low-income communities and communities of color as any other currently plausible stride toward economic justice. Climate policies that best serve African Americans also best serve a just and strong United States. This paper shows that policies well-designed to benefit African Americans also provide the most benefit to all people in the U.S. Climate policies that best serve African Americans and other disproportionately affected communities also best serve global economic and environmental justice. Domestic reductions in global warming pollution and support for such reductions in developing nations financed by polluter-pays principles provide the greatest benefit to African Americans, the peoples of Africa, and people across the Global South. A distinctive African American voice is critical for climate justice. Currently, legislation is being drafted, proposed, and considered without any significant input from the communities most affected. Special interests are represented by powerful lobbies, while traditional environmentalists often fail to engage people of color, Indigenous Peoples, and low-income communities until after the political playing field has been defined and limited to conventional environmental goals. A strong focus on equity is essential to the success of the environmental cause, but equity issues cannot be adequately addressed by isolating the voices of communities that are disproportionately impacted. Engagement in climate change policy must be moved from the White House and the halls of Congress to social circles, classrooms, kitchens, and congregations. The time is now for those disproportionately affected to assume leadership in the climate change debate, to speak truth to power, and to assert rights to social, environmental and economic justice. Taken together, these actions affirm a vital truth that will bring communities together: Climate Justice is Common Justice. African Americans and Vulnerability In this report, it is shown that African Americans are disproportionately affected by climate change. African Americans Are at Greater Risk from Climate Change and Global Warming Co-Pollutants ¶ • The six states with the highest African American population are all in the Atlantic hurricane zone, and are expected to experience more intense storms resembling Katrina and Rita in the future. ¶ • Global warming is expected to increase the frequency and intensity of heat waves or extreme heat events. African Americans suffer heat death at one hundred fifty to two hundred percent of the rate for non-Hispanic whites. ¶ • Seventy-one percent of African Americans live in counties in violation of federal air pollution standards, as compared to fifty-eight percent of the white population. Seventy-eight percent of African Americans live within thirty miles of a coal-fired power plant, as compared to fifty-six percent of non-Hispanic whites. ¶ • Asthma has strong associations with air pollution, and African Americans have a thirty-six percent higher rate of incidents of asthma than whites. Asthma is three times as likely to lead to emergency room visits or deaths for African Americans. ¶ • This study finds that a twenty-five percent reduction in greenhouse gases—similar to what passed in California and is proposed in major federal legislation—would reduce infant mortality by at least two percent, asthma by at least sixteen percent, and mortality from particulates by at least 6,000 to 12,000 deaths per year. Other estimates have run as high as 33,000 fewer deaths per year. A disproportionate number of the lives saved by these proposed reductions would be African American. African Americans Are Economically More Vulnerable to Disasters and Illnesses ¶ • In 2006, twenty percent of African Americans had no health insurance, including fourteen percent of African American children—nearly twice the rate of non-Hispanic whites. ¶ • In the absence of insurance, disasters and illness (which will increase with global warming) could be cushioned by income and accumulated wealth. However, the average income of African American households is fifty-seven percent that of non-Hispanic whites, and median wealth is only one-tenth that of non-Hispanic whites. ¶ • Racist stereotypes have been shown to reduce aid donations and impede service delivery to African Americans in the wake of hurricanes, floods, fires and other climate-related disasters as compared to non-Hispanic whites in similar circumstances. African Americans Are at Greater Risk from Energy Price Shocks ¶ • African Americans spend thirty percent more of their income on energy than non-Hispanic whites. • Energy price increases have contributed to seventy to eighty percent of recent recessions. The increase in unemployment of African Americans during energy caused recessions is twice that of non-Hispanic whites, costing the community an average of one percent of income every year. • Reducing economic dependence on energy will alleviate the frequency and severity of recessions and the economic disparities they generate. African Americans Pay a Heavy Price and a Disproportionate Share of the Cost of Wars for Oil • Oil company profits in excess of the normal rate of profit for U.S. industries cost the average household $611 in 2006 alone and are still rising. • The total cost of the war in Iraq borne by African Americans will be $29,000 per household if the resulting deficit is financed by tax increases, and $32,000 if the debt is repaid by spending cuts. This is more than three times the median assets of African American households. A Clean Energy Future Creates Far More Jobs for African Americans • Fossil fuel extraction industries employ a far lower proportion of African Americans on average compared to other industries. Conversely, renewable electricity generation employs three to five times as many people as comparable electricity generation from fossil fuels, a higher proportion of whom are African American. ¶ • Switching just one percent of total electricity generating capacity per year from conventional to renewable sources would result in an additional 61,000 to 84,000 jobs for African Americans by 2030. ¶ • A well-designed comprehensive climate plan achieving emission reductions comparable to the Kyoto Protocol would create over 430,000 jobs for African Americans by 2030, reducing the African American unemployment rate by 1.8 percentage points and raising the average African American income by 3 to 4 percent.

#### Coalition building—racial justice, economic equity, health, environmental movements all come together

#### Makes broader reforms more likely when environmentally-focused—means the aff’s advocacy solves the critique

### 2AC FW

#### Role of the ballot is political engagement over energy policy is key to reverse the monopoly on information that is controlled by right-win hacks. Aff should get to weigh the simulated effects of the plan --- their request for you to abandon your capacity to act as a subject subverts the progressive potential of civic engagement in the context of warming

#### Academic debate over energy policy in the face of environmental destruction is critical to shape the direction of change and create a public consciousness shift---action now is key to re-direct public perception and ensure they support solar power – that’s Crist – fantastic about us as students in the humanities and social sciences having to connect with scientists and spread the message through debates about government policy rather than zestless agnosticism and noncommittal meta-discourse – the CAG ev contextualizes this for the environment and says we must use the public sphere to bring pressure on policymakers to help remedy problems

#### Simulation’s good in the context of the aff – Marx says it influences policy preferences and motivates contingency planning – defends our predictions and apocalyptic rhetoric and says that’s necessary to motivate effective action

### Link

#### Perm: do both

#### The perm is the best option---combining traditional and unconventional epistemologies allows for more thorough analysis of problems---the alt alone is worse because it refuses to acknowledge its own biases

Conway 97—philosophy, Penn State (Daniel, Nietzsche and the political, 135-6)

This preference is clearly political in nature, and Haraway makes no pretense of aspiring to epistemic purity or foundational innocence. For Haraway, any epistemic privilege necessarily implies a political (i.e., situated) preference. Her postmodern orientation elides the boundaries traditionally drawn between politics and epistemology, and thus renders otiose the ideal of epistemic purity. All perspectives are partial, all standpoints situated—**including those of feminist** theorist**s**. It is absolutely crucial to Haraway's postmodern feminist project that we acknowledge her claims about situated knowledge as themselves situated within the political agenda she sets for postmodern feminism; feminist theorists must therefore accept and accommodate **the self-referential implications of their own epistemic claims**.

The political agenda of postmodern feminism thus assigns to (some) subjugated standpoints a political preference or priority. Haraway, for example, believes that some subjugated standpoints may be more immediately revealing, especially since they have been discounted and excluded for so long. They may prove especially useful in coming to understand the political and psychological mechanisms whereby the patriarchy discounts the radically situated knowledges of others while claiming for its own (situated) knowledge an illicit epistemic privilege:

The standpoints of the subjugated ... are savvy to modes of denial through repression, forgetting, and disappearing acts— ways of being nowhere while claiming to sec comprehensively. The subjugated have a decent chance to be on to the god-trick and all its dazzling—and, therefore, blinding—illuminations.34

But these subjugated standpoints do not afford feminist theorists an epistemically privileged view of the world, independent of the political agendas they have established. Reprising elements of Nietzsche's psychological profile of the "slave" type, Haraway warns against the

serious danger of romanticizing and/or appropriating the vision of the less powerful while claiming to see from their positions. To see from below is neither easily learned nor unproblematic, even if "we" "naturally" inhabit the great underground terrain of subjugated knowledges. The positionings of the subjugated are not exempt from critical re-examination, decoding, deconstruction, and interpretation; that is, from both semiological and hermeneutic modes of critical enquiry. **The standpoints of the subjugated are not "innocent" positions**.35

**A subjugated standpoint may shed new light on the ways of an oppressor, but it in no way renders superfluous** or redundant **the standpoint of the oppressor.** Because neither standpoint fully comprises the other, the aggregation of the two would move both parties (or a third party) closer to a more objective understanding of the world. If some feminists have political reasons for disavowing this project of aggregation, or for adopting it selectively, then they must pursue their political agenda at the expense of the greater objectivity that they might otherwise have gained.

#### Perm: do the alternative

#### Perm---their K should be used to as an additional lens to improve our advocacy---exclusive theoretical focus fails

Bryant 12—prof of philosophy at Collin College (Levi, RSI, Discursivity, Critique, and Politics, larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/07/18/rsi-discursivity-critique-and-politics/#more-6277)

I do think, however, that OOO can problematize our current political thought and open new avenues of political engagement and theorization. As it stands, cultural studies is dominated by a focus on the discursive. We hear endless talk about signs, signifiers, “positions” or positionality, narratives, discourses, ideology, etc. Basically we see the world as a fetishized text to be decoded and debunked. None of this should, of course, be abandoned, but I do think we’re encountering its limitations.

In the few years I’ve been writing on these issues, I’ve been surprised to discover just how hard it is to get people to sense that there is a non-discursive power of things; a form of power that is not about signs, ideology (as text), beliefs, positions, narratives, and so on. It’s as if these things aren’t on the radar for most social and political theorists. I get the sense that the reason for this has something to do with what Heidegger diagnosed in his analysis of the ready-to-hand. Heidegger argues that when the ready-to-hand is working it becomes invisible. We don’t notice it. It recedes into the background. Us academics live in worlds that work pretty well as far as material infrastructure goes. We are, for the most part, in a world where things work: food is available, electricity and water function, we have shelter, etc. As a consequence, all this disappears from view and we instead focus on cultural texts because often this is a place where things aren’t working.

In response to these remarks, I was told that 1) of course no one has the naive belief that everything is text (what a relief! of course, the question is whether this belief registers itself in theoretical practice), and 2) that, in fact, these things are all the rage in the world of theory. I’m well aware that there is a tradition of theorists that don’t fit this mold, and perpetually refer to many of these theorists in my own work. Theorists that come to mind are figures such as Haraway, Stengers, Latour, Kittler, Ong, McLuhan, Elizabeth Grosz, Jane Bennett, Stacy Alaimo, Karen Barad, Kevin Sharpe, Jennifer Andersen et al, Cathy Davidson, Braudel, DeLanda, Pickering, etc. They exist.

The point is not that they don’t exist, but that these forms of theory, I think, have been rather marginal in the academy; especially philosophy. In discussing these things, I’m not making some claim to being absolutely original or to be originating something full cloth. I’m more than happy to play some small role in bringing attention to these things; things that I believe to be neglected. I think, for example, that the new materialist feminists predate OOO/SR by 5-10 years, have many points of overlap with OOO, and have not nearly gotten the attention that they deserve. I think Latour and Stengers are almost entirely invisible in the world of philosophy conferences and departments; and I think that there are systematic reasons for this pertaining to the history of continental theory coming out of German idealism, the linguistic turn, and phenomenology. In German idealism you get a focus on spirit and the transcendental structure of mind. In the linguistic turn, you get a focus on how signifiers and signs inform our relation to reality (for example, Lacan’s famous observation that the difference between the men’s room and lady’s room results from the signifier in “The Agency of the Letter”, and Barthes’ claim that language is a primary modeling system in The Fashion System). In phenomenology you get a focus on the lived experience of the cogito, Dasein, or lived body and how it “constitutes” (Husserl’s language, not mine) the objects of its intentions.

read on!

In each instance we get a focus on the differences that humans are contributing, with a relative indifference to the differences that non-humans contribute. Material entities, as Alaimo observes in Bodily Natures, are treated as blank screens for human intentions, language, concepts, signs. The metaphor of the screen is here important, for a screen is that which contains no difference of its own beyond being a smooth and white surface, and is therefore susceptible to whatever we might wish to project upon it with a camera. This has been the dominant mode of theorizing that I’ve encountered in the last decade in my discipline of philosophy (and I have a fair background in rhetoric and literary theory as well). Phenomenology and the linguistic turn, I think, are the dominant positions represented at SPEP, for example, the main professional conference for continental philosophy (though thankfully things are beginning to change). When it is said that something is “dominant”, the claim is not that nothing different from it exists, but merely that a certain style of theorizing enjoys hegemony among that population. In media studies, I think, the situation is better. I think it’s better in geography as well. It depends on what population of theorists we’re looking at (a point entailed, incidentally, by my thesis that signifiers are material entities that must travel throughout populations).

The point is not to get rid of these modes of analysis. I believe they’ve made tremendous contributions that ought to be preserved and continued (I say as much in the introduction to The Democracy of Objects). My instinct is never to abolish or extinguish, but to integrate and see how we can have both. And. And. And. The point is that theories are frames, windows, and like all windows, they bring some things into relief and obscure other things. I can only see what is in the window and not what is outside of the window. If my theoretical practice is focused on accounting for norms and the role that norms play in binding us together, then it’s likely that I’ll ignore the role that lab equipment plays or that the real properties of rice play in binding people together in particular ways. If I spend my time interpreting cultural artifacts like movies, comic books, and clothing styles, it’s likely I’ll have a hard time seeing the importance of roads, rivers, and fiber optic cables. If I’m focused on narratives and the stories we tell, then I’ll probably have a difficult time discerning the material effects of Hurricane Katrina on the people of New Orleans. If I focus on the critique of ideology, then I’ll probably have a difficult time seeing the power that arrangements of things exercise over us. If I focus on systems of categorization in say the discourse of mental health as in the case of Foucault’s Order of Things when talking about the human sciences, then it’s likely I’ll be blind to material realities pertaining to mentality.

Theories have a cost because they always require distinctions and every distinction implies a blind spot or a thing that falls out of visibility. My desire is not to abolish critiques of ideology, analyses of signs and texts, analyses of lived experience, narrative, discursivity, etc., but to practice a sort of theoretical humility akin to what Laruelle describes under the title of “non-philosophy”. I call this alethetics. Rather than claiming to be the one framework that gets at the real, alethetics moves between different frames and windows; now discussing the way narrative informs our relation to the world, now the way our systems of categorization influence lives and nonhumans, now looking at lived experience as Sarah Ahmed does, now at the physical properties of fiber optic cables, the bubonic plague bacteria, etc. Paraphrasing Latour in the open to We Have Never Been Modern, “is it our fault [the STS theorists] that the ozone hole is simultaneously a narrative, semiotic, produced, and real?”

What we need– or what I want –is something like the Lacanian Borromean Knot. Here the Imaginary would be the way in which one entity encounters another entity. For example, the way in which mantis shrimps encounter the world about them or the way in which people of another culture encounter the world around them. Each machine or object (the two are synonyms for me), encounters the world around it in a particular way. Each discipline encounters the world around it in a particular way and is blind to other aspects of the world. There are as many phenomenologies and transcendental structures of cognition as there are types of machines. There’s even a transcendental aesthetic, analytic, and dialectic for flowers. The symbolic would be the way in which entities capable of language signify the world through narratives, signifiers, signs, texts, etc. Who knows whether this is restricted to humans? As I’ve increasingly argued, I believe aliens live among us. They go by names like “corporation”, “army”, “government”, “institution”, etc. These beings, I believe, are irreducible to humans (the influence of Niklas Luhmann on me), and perhaps have their own symbolics. Just as we don’t know the language of dolphins, we don’t know the languages of these entities. They have their own symbolic. And perhaps likewise with bees, dolphins, octopi, and birds. Finally, the real is the dimension of irreducibility of a think to how it is perceived by another being (imaginary), or symbolized by another entity. It is the irreducible difference that a road has to affect us, for example, despite being created by us.

The important caveat is 1) that there is no one borromean knot or RSI, and that 2) all three orders don’t need to be present for there to be being at work. The orders can become unglued, and in many instances some of the orders aren’t present at all. For example, I suspect that the order of the symbolic isn’t operative for bacteria (though the symbolic is at work for us when we talk about bacteria), though the order of the real and imaginary is at work for bacteria. How we work with bacteria in the symbolic, of course, does not undermine the real of bacteria or their ability to contribute differences irreducible to knowledge, signification, or belief. What’s important is that we practice something like what Bogost has call “alien phenomenology”, thinking the experiential world of nonhumans and others, and refusing to privilege one point of view on the universe.

If I get worked up about these issues, then this is because I think they’ve created serious lacuna in our political theory and practice. Suppose I focus on norms, for example. Great, I’ve developed a theory of norms and how they contribute to the social fabric. Yet while Kant claims that “ought implies can”, I’m not so sure. You’ve shown that something is unjust or that this would be the reasonable way to proceed. But at the real-material level people are caught in sticky networks that suck them into life in particular ways. They ought, for example, to drive an electric car, but what if it’s not available where they are or what if they can’t afford it? Well they should do whatever they can to get it? But what of their other obligations such as eating, sheltering themselves, taking care of their children, paying their medical bills, etc? It would be so nice if we just had mistaken beliefs or failed to recognize the right norms. Things would be so easy then. But there’s life, there’s the power of things. Sometimes the issues aren’t ones of ideology– and yes, of course, I recognize that ideology is probably involved in making electric cars expensive and hard to obtain, but not for them always –sometimes they’re simply issues of the power of things. And if we treat things as blank screens we’ll have difficulty seeing this and we’ll miss out on other opportunities for engagement.

Long ago I used to keep track of my blog. I had a map that showed me where all my visits were coming from about the world. I noticed that the interior portions of the United States were largely dark with no visits and that the coasts and cities had a high volume of traffic. Given that my blog talks about all sorts of things ranging from weather patterns to beavers to mantis shrimps to octopi (I get all these random visits from folks searching for these things), it followed that the absence of traffic from these regions of the country couldn’t be explained in terms of a lack of interest in French and continental philosophy (yes, I recognize that there are also cultural reasons folks from these reasons might shy away from such things). What then was it? I think the answer must be that there’s a lack easy and inexpensive internet access from these portions of the country. Notice also that these regions of the country are also the most conservative regions of the country.

Could there be a relation between lack of access and conservatism? I am not suggesting that lack of access is the cause of conservatism and fundamentalism. Clearly there’s a whole history in these regions and an entire set of institutions that exercise a particular inertia. I’m saying that if the only voices you hear are those in your immediate community, how much opportunity is there to think and imagine otherwise? You’re only exposed to the orthodoxy of your community and their sanctions. I am also not saying that if you give people the internet they’ll suddenly become radical leftists. Minimally, however, they’ll have a vector of deterritorialization that allows them to escape the constraints of their local social field.

All of this begs the question of who critique is for. If it can’t get to the audience that you want to change, what’s it actually doing? Who’s it addressed to? Sometimes you get the sense that the practice of radical political philosophy and critical theory is a bit like the Underpants Gnomes depicted in South Park:

The Underpants Gnomes have a plan for success: collect underwear —>; ? —->; profit. This is like our critical theorists: debunk/decipher —>; ? —->; revolution! The problem is the question mark. We’re never quite sure what’s supposed to come between collecting the underwear and profit, between debunking and revolution. This suggests an additional form of political engagement. Sometimes the more radical gesture is not to debunk and critique, but to find ways to lay fiber optic cables, roads, plumbing, etc. How, for example, can a people rise up and overturn their fundamentalist dictators if they’re suffering from typhoid and cholera as a result of bad plumbing and waste disposal? How can people overturn capitalism when they have to support families and need places to live and have no alternative? Perhaps, at this point, we need a little less critique and a little more analysis of the things that are keeping people in place, the sticky networks or regimes of attraction. Perhaps we need a little more carpentry. This has real theoretical consequences. For example, we can imagine someone writing about sovereignty, believing they’re making a blow against nationalism by critiquing Schmitt and by discussing Agamben, all the while ignoring media of communication or paths of relation between geographically diverse people as if these things were irrelevant to nationalism occurring. Ever read Anderson on print culture and nationalism? Such a person should. Yet they seem to believe nationalism is merely an incorporeal belief that requires no discussion of material channels or media. They thereby deny themselves of all sorts of modes of intervention, hitching everything on psychology, attachment, and identification. Well done!

#### Individualism link—No link—our 1ac does not devalue the individual for its labor—however the Aff’s advocacy resolves instrumental rationality—we focus on the effects of coal on the individual, not on apocalyptic rhetoric

#### Bodies link—starting politics with the body gets coopted by the nation

Shivani 2—award winning fiction writer, poet, and critic. Studied economics at Harvard (Anis, From Redistribution to Recognition: A Left Critique of Multiculturalism, http://www.counterpunch.org/shivani1019.html)

Nevertheless, isn't it curious that there really is no retrospective look at identity politics by liberals today, especially at a time when the most reactionary cultural forces seem to have gained the upper hand? If fascism is catching on so speedily in the land, surely liberalism's main cultural plank ought to be subject to review? We don't need to agree with Bloom and his followers' ideology to realize that multiculturalism as it has been practiced in America over the last few decades is seriously limited in its capacity as a cultural framework compatible with revolutionary struggle. The church of multiculturalism, among liberals, has become infallible: none dare question the catechism, except at the cost of excommunication. The icons of identity politics are beyond the pale of criticism. Identity politics sounds good on the surface, but doesn't hold up under scrutiny as a useful cultural practice. It can be argued that in the sixties there was need for historically oppressed groups to realize that there was nothing inherently inferior about them that relegated them to second-class status compared to the privileged white male. But thirty years later this valid assertion has become emptied of meaning, since it is not backed up and broadened by a range of ideas to give it content beyond the silly, self-referential declaration of identity. Today, it is the brainless cult of self-esteem which reigns supreme (even if it has to be accomplished via medication), at the cost of intellectual claims for recognition. The therapy fad bears uncanny resemblance to the lexicon of popular elitism described by Umberto Eco as one of the characteristics of ur-fascism: everyone has something worth being proud of, even if it is only one's identity. SNL's Stuart Smalley was a pretty reliable precursor to the full-blown conformist fascist personality. How many times can a minority woman get up to address a crowd, and begin with the brainless talisman of gender or racial or religious pride?: I am a woman, I am Black (or Hispanic, Asian, Muslim), I am a mother, I am a wife, I am a daughter, and I am proud to be who I am. How often can this happen without sliding into farce? How about reciting some actual, intellectual accomplishment? In this cornucopia of easily accessible self-worth, pride itself is the end**. It floats as abstraction, until it is seized by fascist forces**. If you can be proud enough to be black, why not proud enough to be white? Or citizen of the greatest empire in the history of the world? **Sooner or later this must happen**, and the minority will be crushed in its vain aspiration, even at the level of its insipid claim.

### Alternative

#### Pragmatic politics are the only way to solve coal—this should be a top-level takeout to any alternative solvency claims—

* Market incentives
* Public advocacy

#### Broad-based coalitions are key---any alternative gets coopted by the right

Clark 95—Professor of Law, Catholic University Law School. (Leroy, A Critique of Professor Derrick A. Bell's Thesis of the Permanence of Racism and His Strategy of Confrontation, 73 Denv. U.L. Rev. 23)

Lessons from the Movement: Broad Based Coalitions The civil rights movement, however, may provide some insights. The genius of that movement was its openness to involvement by as broad a spectrum of the black and white public as wished to make a contribution. Its message of mutually beneficial racial harmony changed public attitudes and the way institutions functioned. The labor movement of the 1920s and 1930s also had this character. The New Deal, which realized many labor union goals, eventually was accepted by a broad base of the public, so much so that Franklin Roosevelt was re-elected more times than any president who was not constitutionally limited to two terms. The task is more formidable today because issues are more complex and multifaceted than the straight forward propositions that blacks were entitled to equal treatment under the law, or that unions should have had a right to organize. But broad, mass-based organizing and public acceptance are the main elements needed today, and they must be revived before any significant reform is possible. This perspective renders Professor Bell's implicit endorsement of "Black Power"--the "Nobody will save us but ourselves" philosophy--particularly dysfunctional, given the current character of problems facing blacks and American society as a whole. Believing that blacks alone must free themselves is a sure route to Professor Bell's despair. n131 Solving the massive economic dislocation described above requires enlisting allegiance and support from a broad spectrum of the public. Too much emphasis on the interests of one's own group disrupts the ability to draw the American people into a sense of its true collective interests. We, as blacks, have, for many understandable reasons, contributed to the over-emphasis on black nationalism in the recent past. The Civil Rights Movement, for example, had to throw off condescending, paternalistic white leadership. However, excessive trumpeting of "Black Power," without supporting resources or strategy, destroyed some organizations, like the Student NonViolent Coordinating Committee. n132 Many whites found better things to do with their time and money when they were repeatedly told that they were not needed and that all of them were, irretrievably, the enemy. We must reverse that theme, because the right wing has profited--particularly in electoral politics--from playing out a kind of group counter-attack of "we the hard-working, family-oriented, (white) Americans" against all those irresponsible, taxeating "others." n133 Economic anxiety reinforces racial hoarding of opportunities and benefits; black progress is keyed to progress in society as a whole toward economic security.

#### Floating PIKs harm debate- two impacts-

#### a. Aff ground- Alts that can advocate the entire 1AC take away our only offense; this prevents in depth clash over the issues in the 1AC and skew the debate heavily in their favor, which undermines in depth education

#### b. Topic discussion- the Neg is bound to prove the 1AC to be bad, discussing generics reps of \_\_\_\_\_\_ both prevents in depth discussion on the plan’s merits and shifts topic specific education to generic K debates every round

#### c. Performative contradiction—they can’t say focusing on the government is bad and then also advocate the plan if their link arguments are true that they’re in fundamental contradiction

#### d. All of these warrants are reasons intrinsic or severance perms are legit against these alts- the Aff needs a mechanism to hedge against and deter the Neg’s abuse

#### Identity politics results in continual policing of difference and makes social justice impossible

Bhambra 10—U Warwick—AND—Victoria Margree—School of Humanities, U Brighton (Identity Politics and the Need for a ‘Tomorrow’, http://www.academia.edu/471824/Identity\_Politics\_and\_the\_Need\_for\_a\_Tomorrow\_)

The idea of a politics underpinned by solidarities based on “sameness” has a long history in the critical tradition. Marx’s ini-tial conceptualisation of the standpoint of the proletariat (albeit, signiﬁcantly different from those of subsequent developments of standpoint epistemology) has been used by feminist theorists as well as those arguing for a post-colonial perspective in terms of the subaltern, and, more recently, for a dalit standpoint (Hart-sock 1984, Guha 1983, Rege 1998, 2000). However, while using identity as the basis of political action has been seen to be power-ful (and effective), it has also increasingly become seen as problematic. The exclusionary politics of movements such as black power, much radical and lesbian feminism, and latterly, move-ments for ethnic purity and/or religious integrity, for example, have yielded a deep concern with the programme of separation and isolationism that such movements are often seen to be based upon. For many critics, more troubling still has been the usually accompanying claim that only women can be feminists, or only black people can work against racism, or only dalits against caste oppression, and so on. ¶ A position which states that only those who have experienced an injustice can understand and thus act effectively upon it seems to rest upon an essentialist theory of identity which assumes that the possibility of knowledge about particular situations is res-tricted to one’s possession of the relevant (seemingly) irreducible traits (being female, black, dalit, and so forth). Arguably, one consequence of these separatist tendencies is that they perpetuate the individualist fallacy that oppressive social relationships can be reformed by particular subjects without the broader agreement of others who, together, constitute the social relations within which the injustices are embedded. But even where the limitations of a purely exclusionary form of identity politics are recognised, many theorists continue, nevertheless, to argue for a form of “strategic essentialism” (Fuss 1989, Spivak 2003) sug-gesting that where structures of inequality overlap with catego-ries of identity, then a politics based on those identities is both liberatory and necessary (Bramen 2002). In our view, however, the claim for a “strategic essentialism” remains fraught with problems, for at least three reasons. First, it establishes an epistemological division between those who assert a particular identity in advancing political claims and the observer who is sympathetic to those claims but “recognises” the limitations of basing such claims on a putative identity. 1 There is something highly problematic in claiming to support a political movement from the basis of being able to “see” something that the individuals constituting the movement do not see, and in then not engaging with them with regard to this. This sets the observer up in a privileged position vis-à-vis other members of the movement and thus makes solidarity difﬁcult to achieve. 2 Second, the claim for “strategic essentialism” posits solidarity, that is, collective identiﬁcation around a particular standpoint, as a prerequisite for collective action to address perceived injus-tices. This is as against recognising that solidarities can also emerge through the actions taken to correct particular injustices and can include those who recognise the injustice as the reason for action while not directly being disadvantaged themselves. Third, the assertion of “strategic essentialism” generally occurs in the context of claiming justice through an appeal to the widercommunity but with no explanation as to why the wider commu-nity ought to honour this claim for justice, especially when it is often not deemed possible for them to constitute a part of the movement itself. There is a requirement of inclusivity then – in terms of demanding acceptance of the validity of the claims made – at the same time, as an assertion of its impossibility across what are posited as irreducible, essential traits (for a fullerdiscussion see Holmwood 1995). The arguments of this paper start out from a broad agreement that developing a politics from the basis of occupying a particular social position or having a speciﬁc (singular) identity is problem-atic for the reasons identiﬁed above, as well as for covertly legitimating – “absolving and forgiving”, in Said’s (1993: 35) words –the ignorance of those whose understanding and actions are necessary for countering social injustices. It has to be recognized that issues exist between people and are not in people: that is, problems of social injustice occur in the relationships through which subjectivities are produced and thus, all those implicated in those relationships are involved in their address. For example, sexism is not a problem for women to deal with alone, but is a problem situated in the contemporary relationships of social and material inequalities and requires mutual engagement for its address. This is an address which we consider is best served by the solidarities generated as a consequence of the activities around perceived injustices (that is, solidarities generated through the political movements of people working towards equality, justice) as opposed to those activities having to rely on assumed pre-existing solidarities (that is, being female, gay, black, dalit, etc).This is not an argument for movements against speciﬁc injusticesor inequalities to be subsumed within a wider (say, socialist)movement but, rather, an argument for movements to be conceived inclusively as movements where membership is not restricted to those presumed to suffer the injustice or inequality. As such, a question arises as to what would happen if the“identity” in “identity politics” were rethought along the lines of the solidarities that are generated around the address of injus-tices rather than the solidarity that is presumed to ensue frombeing the victim of an injustice. Defending “identity” against a variety of critiques from the academic left, Bramen (2002) assertsthat identity can also be productive in its construction of moraland other communities. Our question, however, would be why such communities – sites of resistance and the discovery of politi-cal agency – need to be constructed around essentialising rheto-ric and restricted (this is the implication) to those who suffer the injustice. Indeed, Bramen herself recognises that “identity poli-tics certainly has its limitations, primarily in terms of prescribing modes of behaviour that pressure individuals to conform to cer-tain standards of authenticity” (2002: 7-8). And this surely is areal problem; that essentialist rhetoric establishes belonging to acommunity, and thus identity, on the basis of presumed shared attributes or experiences that are imagined to be irreducible. As such, not only may the community itself become oppressive to those who do not share those attributes, or who wish to articulate experiences that differ from those expressed by the majority, but the community itself may be weakened in its resistance to other forms of oppression by the distraction of its internal policing against difference.

#### Personal experience focus shuts down deliberation and makes debate useless

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Having traced a major strand in the development of CRT, we turn now to the strands' effect on the relationships of CRATs with each other and with outsiders. As the foregoing material suggests, the central CRT message is not simply that minorities are being treated unfairly, or even that individuals out there are in pain - assertions for which there are data to serve as grist for the academic mill - but that the minority scholar **himself or herself** hurts **and hurts badly**.¶ An important problem that concerns the very definition of the scholarly enterprise now comes into focus. **What can an academic** trained to [\*694] question and to doubt n72 **possibly say to Patricia Williams when effectively she announces, "I hurt bad"?** n73 **"No, you don't hurt"? "You shouldn't hurt"?** "Other people hurt too"? Or, most dangerously - and perhaps most tellingly - "What do you expect when you keep shooting yourself in the foot?" If the majority were perceived as having the well- being of minority groups in mind, these responses might be acceptable, even welcomed. And they might lead to real conversation. But, **writes Williams, the failure by those "cushioned within the invisible privileges of race and power**... to incorporate a sense of precarious connection as a part of our **lives is... ultimately obliterating**." n74¶ "Precarious." "Obliterating." **These words will clearly invite responses only from fools and sociopaths; they will, by effectively precluding objection, disconcert and disunite others**. **"I hurt," in academic discourse, has three broad though interrelated effects**. First, it demands priority from the reader's conscience. It is for this reason that law review editors, waiving usual standards, have privileged a long trail of undisciplined - even silly n75 **-** destructive and, above all, self-destructive articles**.** n76 **Second, by emphasizing the emotional bond between those who hurt in a similar way, "I hurt" discourages fellow sufferers from** abstracting themselves **from their pain in order** to gain perspective **on their condition**. n77¶ [\*696] **Last, as we have seen,** it precludes the possibility of open and structured conversation with others. n78 [\*697] **It is because of this** conversation-stopping effect of what they insensitively call "first-person agony stories" **that Farber and Sherry deplore their use.** "The norms of academic civility hamper readers from challenging the accuracy of the researcher's account; it would be rather difficult, for example, to criticize a law review article by questioning the author's emotional stability or veracity." n79 Perhaps, a better practice would be to put the scholar's experience on the table, along with other relevant material, but to subject that experience to the same level of scrutiny.¶ If through the foregoing rhetorical strategies CRATs succeeded in limiting academic debate, why do they not have greater influence on public policy? Discouraging white legal scholars from entering the national conversation about race, n80 I suggest, has generated a kind of cynicismin white audiences which, in turn, has had precisely the reverse effect of that ostensibly desired by CRATs. **It drives the American public to the right and ensures that anything CRT offers is reflexively rejected.**¶ In the absence of scholarly work by white males in the area of race, of course, it is difficult to be sure what reasons they would give for not having rallied behind CRT. Two things, however, are certain. First, the kinds of issues raised by Williams are too important in their implications [\*698] for American life to be confined to communities of color. If the lives of minorities are heavily constrained, if not fully defined, by the thoughts and actions of the majority elements in society, it would seem to be of great importance that white thinkers and doers participate in open discourse to bring about change. Second, given the lack of engagement of CRT by the community of legal scholars as a whole, the discourse that should be taking place at the highest scholarly levels has, by default, been displaced to faculty offices and, more generally, the streets and the airwaves.

#### Narrative focus shuts down debate and is equally coercive as framework---it constrains discourse by either forcing sympathetic responses or painting the aff into the corner of attacking them personally

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The imbroglio with her editors, however, reveals the inauthenticity of Williams's invitation to her readers. n191 When readers raise doubts about the meaning created through the literary device that she selected, ostensibly to engage their assistance in the production of meaning, she censures them with accusations that only a hardy [\*1281] (perhaps, foolhardy) reader could contemplate enduring. n192 Intersubjectivity is well and good, this episode cautions, but only if readers endorse precisely the meaning Williams has in mind.

The warning this episode conveys to readers signals more than a textual incoherence or the failure of Williams's own collaborative engagement. More fundamentally, it reveals the inherent inadequacy of autobiography as a tool of social criticism. The institutional spaces where the outsider stories have their existence, including the lecture tour podium and the pages of scholarly journals, are arenas that foster, indeed, depend on, vigorous inquiry and dialectical exchange. Before we agree to reorder society along lines a group of scholars may propose, scrupulous testing of their theories seems wholly appropriate. Yet, as Williams's bitter rebuke of her editors portends, personal stories tend to pre-empt responses other than sympathy or silence, precisely because any critical commentary or desire for clarification may be dismissed as ad hominem - and any criticism necessarily is ad hominem, since the material available for criticism or clarification is the scholar's personal experience. n193 Ironically, therefore, the power of the autobiographical exchange to inspire readers' sympathy turns out to be a significant shortcoming within the context of an academy whose participants, even when sympathetic to an idea, are committed to immediate, often face-to-face, critical inquiry and debate. n194 By rejecting any critical reaction as a treacherous failure of sympathy for the author's pain, if not as the product of prejudiced ignorance[\*1282] , and dismissing criticism as a personal attack on the author's character, autobiographical rhetoric is no less coercive of readers than the legal rhetoric that the outsiders desire to supersede. n195

#### Alt can’t solve poetry any more than the aff—it wasn’t any more poetic than my construction of the 1ac

#### Anti-coal movements are coming now thanks to a decline in identity politics --- their strategy crushes those movements --- causes extinction

George Monbiot, English Writer and Environmental and Political Activist, 9-4-2008, “Identity Politics in Climate Change Hell,” http://www.celsias.com/article/identity-politics-climate-change-hell/

If you want a glimpse of how the movement against climate change could crumble faster than a summer snowflake, read Ewa Jasiewicz’s article , published on the Guardian’s Comment is Free site. It is a fine example of the identity politics that plagued direct action movements during the 1990s, and from which the new generation of activists has so far been mercifully free. Ewa rightly celebrates the leaderless, autonomous model of organising that has made this movement so effective. The two climate camps I have attended – this year and last – were among the most inspiring events I’ve ever witnessed. I am awed by the people who organised them, who managed to create, under extraordinary pressure, safe, functioning, delightful spaces in which we could debate the issues and plan the actions which thrust Heathrow and Kingsnorth into the public eye. Climate camp is a tribute to the anarchist politics that Jasiewicz supports. But in seeking to extrapolate from this experience to a wider social plan, she makes two grave errors. The first is to confuse ends and means. She claims to want to stop global warming, but she makes that task 100 times harder by rejecting all state and corporate solutions. It seems to me that what she really wants to do is to create an anarchist utopia, and use climate change as an excuse to engineer it. Stopping runaway climate change must take precedence over every other aim. Everyone in this movement knows that there is very little time: the window of opportunity in which we can prevent two degrees of warming is closing fast. We have to use all the resources we can lay hands on, and these must include both governments and corporations. Or perhaps she intends to build the installations required to turn the energy economy around - wind farms, wave machines, solar thermal plants in the Sahara, new grid connections and public transport systems - herself? Her article is a terryifying example of the ability some people have to put politics first and facts second when confronting the greatest challenge humanity now faces. The facts are as follows. Runaway climate change is bearing down on us fast. We require a massive political and economic response to prevent it. Governments and corporations, whether we like it or not, currently control both money and power. Unless we manage to mobilise them, we stand a snowball’s chance in climate hell of stopping the collapse of the biosphere. Jasiewicz would ignore all these inconvenient truths because they conflict with her politics. “Changing our sources of energy without changing our sources of economic and political power”, she asserts, “will not make a difference. Neither coal nor nuclear are the “solution”, we need a revolution.” So before we are allowed to begin cutting greenhouse gas emissions, we must first overthrow all political structures and replace them with autonomous communities of happy campers. All this must take place within a couple of months, as there is so little time in which we could prevent two degrees of warming. This is magical thinking of the most desperate kind. If I were an executive of E.On or Exxon, I would be delighted by this political posturing, as it provides a marvellous distraction from our real aims. To support her argument, Jasiewicz misrepresents what I said at climate camp. She claims that I “confessed not knowing where to turn next to solve the issues of how to generate the changes necessary to shift our sources of energy, production and consumption”. I confessed nothing of the kind. In my book Heat I spell out what is required to bring about a 90% cut in emissions by 2030. Instead I confessed that I don’t know how to solve the problem of capitalism without resorting to totalitarianism. The issue is that capitalism involves lending money at interest. If you lend at 5%, then one of two things must happen. Either the money supply must increase by 5% or the velocity of circulation must increase by 5%. In either case, if this growth is not met by a concomitant increase in the supply of goods and services, it becomes inflationary and the system collapses. But a perpetual increase in the supply of goods and services will eventually destroy the biosphere. So how do we stall this process? Even when usurers were put to death and condemned to perpetual damnation, the practice couldn’t be stamped out. Only the communist states managed it, through the extreme use of the state control Ewa professes to hate. I don’t yet have an answer to this conundrum. Does she? Yes, let us fight both corporate power and the undemocratic tendencies of the state. Yes, let us try to crack the problem of capitalism and then fight for a different system. But let us not confuse this task with the immediate need to stop two degrees of warming, or allow it to interfere with the carbon cuts that have to begin now. Ewa’s second grave error is to imagine that society could be turned into a giant climate camp. Anarchism is a great means of organising a self-elected community of like-minded people. It is a disastrous means of organising a planet. Most anarchists envisage their system as the means by which the oppressed can free themselves from persecution. But if everyone is to be free from the coercive power of the state, this must apply to the oppressors as well as the oppressed. The richest and most powerful communities on earth - be they geographical communities or communities of interest - will be as unrestrained by external forces as the poorest and weakest. As a friend of mine put it, “when the anarchist utopia arrives, the first thing that will happen is that every Daily Mail reader in the country will pick up a gun and go and kill the nearest hippy.” This is why, though both sides furiously deny it, the outcome of both market fundamentalism and anarchism, if applied universally, is identical. The anarchists associate with the oppressed, the market fundamentalists with the oppressors. But by eliminating the state, both remove such restraints as prevent the strong from crushing the weak. Ours is not a choice between government and no government. It is a choice between government and the mafia. Over the past year I have been working with groups of climate protesters who have changed my view of what could be achieved. Most of them are under 30, and they bring to this issue a clear-headedness and pragmatism that I have never encountered in direct action movements before. They are prepared to take extraordinary risks to try to defend the biosphere from the corporations, governments and social trends which threaten to make it uninhabitable. They do so for one reason only: that they love the world and fear for its future. It would be a tragedy if, through the efforts of people like Ewa, they were to be diverted from this urgent task into the identity politics that have wrecked so many movements.

#### Purely aesthetic politics lay the groundwork for fascism by relying on propoganda---focus on consequences and institutions is key to prevent style devoid of content that celebrates violence

Zamponi 12—professor of sociology, UC Santa Barbra (SIMONETTA FALASCA-ZAMPONI, The politics of aesthetics: Mussolini and fascist Italy, http://www.opendemocracy.net/simonetta-falasca-zamponi/politics-of-aesthetics-mussolini-and-fascist-italy)

This article is the first in an occasional series on ‘The Political Aesthetics of Power and Protest,’ the subject of a one-day workshop held at the University of Warwick this September. Democracy, since it does not function through command or coercion, requires instead a constant renewal of sets of symbols - symbols which appeal to people and instil in them a sense of belonging and identification. Increasing disenchantment and disillusion with the state, with political institutions, their practices and performance, makes it more important to explore the place of this aestheticisation of political language, the aesthetics of protest as well as of power. Power has forever been entwined with a symbolic apparatus in charge of representing it. From Louis the XIV in France to Queen Victoria in England, images and rituals have served to strengthen people’s connections to governing institutions; symbols and rites make power more tangible and appealing. In the eighteenth century there also emerged a whole philosophical movement that argued that beauty could articulate political morality. Beauty was supposed to motivate people’s actions with the indirect result of guiding them towards the common good. As aesthetics slowly became entangled with politics, competing interpretations of how this relationship should unfold came to the fore. Eventually beauty was conceived instrumentally, reduced to style, and devoid of content. Fascism was one of the first movements to take advantage of aesthetics’ original radical political impulse while also simplifying its moral reach. Mussolini’s approach to politics is an extreme example of the degrading process aesthetics underwent at the turn of the twentieth century, a most perniciously successful implementation of the aestheticization of politics. As several scholars have argued, the concept of autonomous, disinterested art emerged as the result of a complex historical process originating in the eighteenth century in Britain. At the time, moralists of the calibre of Addison, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Hume, and Alison set out to address the impact of egoism and instrumentality on ethical questions. Lord Shaftesbury, in particular, developed a notion of disinterestedness, at first linked to moral issues. Later disinterestedness became the core concept of modern aesthetic theory and the key methodological principle in the newly emerging discipline of aesthetics. Shaftesbury was opposed to the idea of considering ethics in terms of an action’s consequences, i.e., whether or not the action had positive effects on the common good. He argued that disinterestedness served to overcome what he considered the false choice between egoism and altruism; disinterestedness implied that moral life was not concerned with action but instead was fundamentally concerned with harmony and contemplation. Within this framework, virtuous “man” was like an art lover, and virtue was not about making the right decisions in order to reach worthy ends; rather, it stood for “no other than the love of order and beauty.” At first preoccupied with moral issues, over time Shaftesbury turned his ethical concerns into an aesthetically informed theory that emphasized the importance of beauty and contemplation when defining a virtuous person. Thus, whereas he had originally discussed disinterest in opposition to interest in practical actions, Shaftesbury later employed disinterest to refer to the “virtuous man” as a spectator keen on contemplating the beauty of both manners and morals. Disinterestedness was contrary to action and also dismissive of the desire to possess or use a thing; it emphasized the perceiving act when contemplating an object rather than the object being contemplated. Disinterestedness was connected with aesthetics rather than ethics, and emphasis was increasingly placed on the recipients’ experience and their capacity to contemplate an object. As long as one remained a spectator, one’s experience of an object would supposedly be disinterested because it was based solely on perception. The perceptual experience of beauty was then emphasized rather than the qualities that made a thing beautiful. This new perspective on experience marked the birth of aesthetics as a distinctive realm. Good taste Eventually, “good taste” was adopted as an evaluative tool and linked to the pleasure of the imagination and lack of desire for possessions. In Germany, judgment of taste became central to Kant’s influential redefinition of aesthetic essence and came to be identified by Kant with the human ability to share experiences in comparison to animals. For Kant, disinterestedness in aesthetic judgment signified that taste, though subjective because based on feelings rather than concepts, was not arbitrary or private. It involved, at least in principle, the existence of what he called a sensus communis, or common sense, intended not in the ordinary meaning of simple but rather in the sense of shared. Aesthetic judgment for Kant required consensual understanding within a collectivity. Thus, on the one hand, disinterestedness implied that the crucial factor in our experience of a beautiful object was not the object itself but the feelings of enjoyment it aroused in us. On the other hand, through reference to sensus communis, disinterestedness also implied that those feelings, being in principle communicable and inter-subjective, were not based on personal or sensual gratification and did not implicate a utilitarian dimension. Kant’s famous definition of art as “purposiveness without purpose” helped solidify the identification of the aesthetic realm with non-instrumental ends. For Kant, this did not mean that art should be disconnected from social life. In contrast, art provided an ideal space within which to envision a public forum away from concrete political or governmental action and where enlightened citizens could freely discuss political issues. Art was a self-proclaimed non-political space in which politics, however, worked as a motivational engine. In this sense, although seemingly founded on separation, modern aesthetics originated in relation to politics, domesticating the masses, with all their desires and impulses and winning them to democratic politics. Mussolini’s concept of power How is all this discussion of aesthetics connected to Mussolini and to the centrality of aesthetics in Mussolini’s conception and exercise of power? What do I mean by “conception of” power? In my view, Mussolini’s subscription to aesthetics ensured that symbols, art and rituals were all seen as contributing to a transformative, moulding power. They deeply informed how Mussolini conceived and exercised power. Mussolini subscribed to the notion of aesthetics promoted by the art for art’s sake movement, that is, the notion of art as autonomous and self-referential and detached from worldly matters. At the same time, and somewhat paradoxically, Mussolini had a great intuition about the crucial role of affect in politics, an intuition that, combined with his approach to aesthetics, gave way to the strange and lethal alchemy that we know of as fascism. Walter Benjamin was the first to associate fascism with an aesthetic approach to politics – an approach that he saw as representative of modern antinomies. The evocative and disturbing image Benjamin conjured to make his argument was the comparison of bombed-out sites in Ethiopia to blooming flowers – a comparison drawn by the leader of the Futurist avant-garde movement, Filippo Tommaso Marinetti, from the height of the flying plane dropping those bombs during Italy’s colonial war. For Benjamin, such an image implied an aestheticized view of violence and war, of destruction and pain, an artistic transfiguration that overcame bodily material reality. Benjamin argued that the deadening of sense perception reflected in the image of blooming flowers instead of mangled Ethiopian bodies paradoxically ensued from a heightened sensitivity to which modern life’s fast pace subjected its dwellers. For example, the shock experienced in combat is transformed and sublated via the remote perspective from high in the sky and out of the mechanical invention of the time, the airplane.

#### Their radical impulse to critique traditional political reform results in authoritarian violence to sculpt the perfect population---\*\*\*especially links in the context of their competition based on changing the form of speech

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For Benjamin, the paradox was that what he called ‘the age of mechanical reproduction’, rather than fulfilling its “natural” mission of freeing people from the chains of an enchanted vision of the world - one that made people feel miniscule and in awe of authority - ended up instead becoming an instrument of domination. Liberation was countered by submission. Freed from the dogma of the Church and other institutions, thanks to the availability of information and new technologies, the so-called masses were nevertheless prey to re-enchantment, especially through new charismatic styles of politics that fed off myths and rituals: the case of Mussolini’s Italy (and, of course, Nazi Germany too). This idea of “anaesthetized aesthetics,” to use an expression by Susan Buck-Morss, perfectly captures Mussolini’s approach to politics and his role in the government of the polity. How was his politics anaesthetic? In my research of Mussolini’s writings and speeches, the trope of the politician as artist emerged as one of the strongest and most frequent, and not as a mere formula or superficial reference but as a core feature of Mussolini’s own understanding of politics. In Mussolini’s view, for politics not to be a dirty word that reflected the failing political class’s capacity for endless debates and conservative behaviour, it had to play a role much more active and daring; politics was supposed to change a society’s whole way of living and thinking. The issue was not one of mere shifts in government: the old game of political compromises and formulas. With fascism, the goal was to revolutionize the meaning of politics itself in order to construct a new Italy on the ruins of the old one. Here is where the idea of the politician as artist comes in. The artist politician destroys in order to create. “Moulding,” “sculpting,” and “shaping” were terms that became familiar in Mussolini’s discourse when he referred to the masses and their transformation into ideal fascist models. Politics was an art for Mussolini, and he liked to think of himself as a sculptor who alone could render hard material into malleable constructions, pliable artifacts. Is there anything more radical in terms of disregard for people, or more opposed to the rules of democratic participation, than this approach that considers people as things? - an approach that in my opinion overlaps with and defines totalitarianism. The second element of fascism’s aesthetic politics was the expressive means employed by Mussolini, as a result of his underpinning idea of a disciplined, organized harmonious "aesthetic" form that is supposed to define the whole of Italian society under fascism - to actualize his role as artist politician. This is certainly the more familiar, visually evident, and even at times caricatured aspect of fascism’s aesthetic politics. It encompasses the plethora of rituals and symbols, which attracted the attention of many, including Hitler as well as Stalin, especially during the early years of the regime. In part the natural outcome of a movement that wanted to distinguish itself from traditional politics, in part a reflection of the youthful character of its members, and in part an expression of cultural trends of the time, fascism emerged as a semiotically rich phenomenon. Uniforms of adherents, although not colourful, were distinctive; ritualistic ceremonies and gestures identified the special nature of the group; myths framed the cultural horizon of its followers, and so on and so forth. Such semiotic excess did not merely emerge at the origins of the movement, but continued to be augmented over time with new or newly redefined symbolic means. Their importance within the regime increased, at times exponentially, such as in the case of the Roman salute or the goose step, and of course of the myth of Mussolini, which was at the centre of this highly orchestrated ritualistic apparatus. Though shifting in style and focus over the years, Mussolini’s centrality in the fascist constellation remained unchallenged, unsurpassed, and ever growing indeed, gaining traction also thanks to the ability of the media to diffuse Mussolini’s image via the printed press, cinema, and the radio. From lion tamer to rural worker, motorcyclist, father, commander, Mussolini’s figure affirmed fascism’s value and helped build fascism as a longstanding regime. Two decades – not an insignificant stretch of time. A new Italian man This leads me to the last element of my discussion: the effectiveness of Mussolini’s aesthetic approach to politics. The question is tricky because there is no exact way to know the answer. What motivates me to raise this issue is however not so much the desire to find definite answers but the need to emphasize once again that Mussolini’s deep subscription to an aestheticized understanding of politics led him to play down, or not necessarily focus on, the outcome of his approach. Mussolini believed that the goal of remaking the Italians would naturally be attained. It was not an issue of if or how. Changes in the Italians’ gestures, rituals, ways of speaking, writing, etc. would necessarily bring about the change Mussolini was pursuing: a new Italian man would be born out of this artistic endeavour. Mussolini had undeniable faith in this project and was not very rational about it, I would underline, which again demonstrates the radical nature of his subscription to an aesthetic understanding of politics. More strategic objectives often took a back seat in his agenda, something that in different ways we find typical of the other totalitarian experiments in Nazi Germany and Stalin’s Russia. Aesthetic goals were absolute and independent of any ethical issues.

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### Reform Key---Academic FW Fails

#### Incremental reform is better than pure rejection---the alternative infinitely replicates the SQ

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"Critique," however, never built anything, and liberalism, for all its shortcomings, is at least constructive. It provides broadly-accepted, reasonably well-defined principles to which political advocates may appeal in ways that transcend sheer power, with at least some hope of incremental success:26' Critical race theory would "deconstruct" this imperfect tradition, but offers nothing in its place.

An apt example of how unconstructive CRT is can be found in its approach to equality. To the extent that race-crits discuss "equality" at all, they do so less to advance tangible goals than to disparage liberalism's different approaches, including the ultimate goal of a society where race does not matter. 265 The race-crits are particularly hostile to the liberal ideal of "color blindness," expressed most eloquently by Martin Luther King's dream that his children "will one day live in a nation where they will not be judged by the color of their skin but by the content of their character."266 To the race-crits, this integrationist goal of color-blind constitutionalism is not just naive or preinature. 2"7 In Neil Gotanda's words, it "supports the supremacy of white interests and must therefore be regarded as racist." !08 Unlike King, who saw affirmative action as a color-conscious means to a more inclusive, integrated nation ,"9 race-crits consider affirmative action an end in itself, more akin to an award of permanent damages than transitional assistance:270 To the race-crits, any doctrine that gets in the way of that end, including egalitarian colorblindness, is ipso facto "racist." 271

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Critical race theory's failure to address the difficulties of administering a reparations-based, "equality of result!' system leaves one with the impression that either they really are not. serious, or their invocation of "equality" is little more than an assertion of group interests. Indeed, the more pessimistic race-crits, like Derrick Bell, would be happiest if social reformers jettisoned the goal of "equality" altogether, because that goal "merely perpetuates our disempowerment."291 Illegal doctrine is to be judged solely by how it advances the interest of racial minorities, the race-crits implicitly dismiss any vision of equality that could aid other disadvantaged groups, or that could treat disadvantaged members of the racial majority with equal concern and respect.29' To the race-crits, the proper inquiry is not how the law lives up to aspirations or principles, but how it serves the interests of a constituen cy.297

In this respect, the race-crits are more political advocates than legal scholars.2"8 There is, of course, nothing wrong with being an advocate, and disadvantaged people certainly need advocates. But legal theories—the principles and ideas that guide the determination of legal outcomes—must transcend mere factional interests if they are to aid minorities. They must win the majority's acquiescence, if not its active support. So far, race-crits have not provided such a theory. CRT is only "scholarly resistance" that lives within, and indeed depends upon, the liberal legal order. 2"" Without liberalism to "critique," critical race theory would have little meaning. In the end, critical race theory could no more supplant liberalism than the mission statement of a political action committee could replace the Constitution.