### AT: Topic Education DA

#### They say “Topic education”:

This argument is circular and un-decidable—they say the core of the topic is [Insert Aff]/we say it is conversion—you should determine what the topic should be based on this T debate—if we win that their conception of the resolution is bad then [Insert Aff] isn't topical and the education they provide isn't topic education.

### AT: Reasonability

Reasonability is a function the quality of their counter-interpretation—standards prove they are unreasonable.

Competing interpretations creates a race to the top—creates a competitive incentive to find the most defensible definitions, creates a stable topic.

#### This is infinitely regressive—

There is no bright line for determining what is and isn’t “reasonable.” The combination of all “reasonable” interpretations would saddle the neg with a massive research burden. The term “reasonable” is vague and arbitrary.

Stone 1923—Justice in the Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit [Sussex Land & Live Stock Co. v. Midwest Refining Co., 294 F. 597; 1923 U.S. App. LEXIS 2531; 34 A.L.R. 249, No. 6192; No. 6193, Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, December 5, Available Online via Lexis-Nexis]

Where the use of land affects others, the use must be "reasonable" to escape liability for resultant damage to others. What is "reasonable" depends upon a variety of considerations and circumstances. It is an elastic term which is of uncertain value in a definition. It has been well said that "reasonable," means with regard to all the interest affected, his own and his neighbor's and also having in view public policy. But, elastic as this rule is, both reason and authority have declared certain limitations beyond which it cannot extend. One of these limitations is that it is "unreasonable" and unlawful for one owner to physically invade the land of another owner. There can be no damnum absque injuria where there is such a trespass.

Worst case this should function as impact defense to limits—not a framework for evidence evaluation.

### 2NC Framing / Overview

#### Consensus votes neg

Ofira Seliktar, Poly Sci Prof @ Gratz, 2011, “Assessing Iran’s Nuclear Rationality,” The ‘Eye of the Beholder’ Problem,” J. of the ME and Africa, v. 2, iss. 2, p. t&f

Nuclear optimists have outranked nuclear pessimists both numerically and in most discursive venues. A majority of noted IR professors (such as John Mearsheimer, Steven Walt, Robert Jervis, Robert Betts, and Francis Gavin) are in the former category. Most top-ranking Iran experts (such as Ray Takeyh, Karim Sadjapour, Abbas Milani, Kenneth Pollack, and Daniel Byman) have also embraced nuclear optimism. Prestigious think tanks—such as the Brookings Institution, the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), the Carnegie Endowment for Peace, and the International Crisis Group)—have published reports based on the assumption that Iran has the required nuclear rationality. Foreign Affairs (published by CFR), Foreign Policy (published by Carnegie), Middle East Journal (published by the Middle East Institute), and the Middle East Policy Journal (published by Middle East Policy Center) have likewise embraced nuclear optimism. 57 Invoking the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran, the intelligence community seems inclined to adopt nuclear optimism. The NIE regards Tehran as a rational actor, whose “decisions are guided by a cost/benefit approach rather than a rush to weapons.” 58

#### The risk of their offense is really slim

Sechser 8—assist. prof, pol sci, UVA. PhD, pol sci, Stanford (Todd, The Stabilizing Effects of Nuclear Proliferation, http://faculty.virginia.edu/tsechser/Sechser-Haas-2009.pdf)

A final objection to this critique holds that the nuclear age has not yet provided enough data to test theories of proliferation. In other words, it is simply too early to evaluate the theories’ predictions (see Sagan 1993, 12). This argument is unpersuasive. The nuclear age is now more than sixty years old, and more than a dozen nations have possessed nuclear weapons at one time or another. If we imagine that every operational nuclear warhead in existence provides, say, one “disaster opportunity” per year, then since 1945 **there have been** nearly **two million opportunities** for an accidental explosion**,** preemptive nuclear strike, nuclear terrorist attack, or preventive war against an emerging proliferator. At the very least, the fact that none of these scenarios has yet occurred should suggest that **the risk is low enough to warrant a** plausible **costbenefit case against** universal **nonproliferation**. Of course, the absence of a nuclear catastrophe to date does not “prove” that proliferation pessimism is wrong. But it is important that we recognize the sharp limits to the inferential leverage that near-misses provide. Each year that passes without a preemptive nuclear attack, preventive war against an aspiring nuclear power, nuclear accident, or act of nuclear terrorism must cast additional doubt on the theory. Ultimately, proliferation pessimism remains burdened by the contrast between the ubiquity of organizational pathologies and the absence of the disastrous nuclear outcomes it expects them to cause. This gap should make us skeptical of its claims.

#### Role of the ballot is to make history-based judgments

Graham 94 – professor emeritus of history, California (Otis, Losing Time, p 4)

Yet the status quo, defended by no one, prevailed. Years of vigorous dis­cussion led only to policy paralysis. Many explanations for this outcome arise in the recounting. But a major agent of mischief was misuse of history, in many forms. Distorted versions of history inflated the important potential of industrial policies; onslaughts of counter-history lessons equally distorted what Industrial Policy was about. Together, these played a large role in preventing the de­gree of policy rationalization that was intellectually within reach. Our policy system might perhaps have done worse, and people who think so might wish to leave well enough alone. I write front a more hopeful persuasion that if history was allowed its limited but **invaluable uses**, and if misuses of it were curbed, **our policy system could improve** upon this outcome. Hence this effort to build on and extend the growing body of research and thought that would discourage the policy misuses while charting the way to judicious policy uses of the past. The debate over these matters did not end in 1990. This book is written in that hazard-filled zone between the beginning and the end of things. I was encouraged in this risk by an observation by two commentators on Britain in the early stages of Thatcherism, that "books generally come to an end before the problems they describe." Historians usually reverse that dictum to read: "problems had best come to an end before books are written to describe them," but this book is directed less to historians than to **the** **policy community**—from voting periphery to the presidential cen­ter—who **must make history-based judgments** with or without expert advice. The past misunderstood guarantees future intellectual trouble. Policymakers are fated soon to reengage the Industrial Policy issue. This time error and delay may well exact a much higher price than the first time around, in the 1980-1990 indian summer of America's economic leadership.

#### Aff’s spin is biased

Betts 2k – Prof and the Dir., Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia (Richard, The Coming Crisis, ed Utgoff, 64-5)

The Waltz argument cannot be brushed off, but surprisingly few academic strategists besides Scott Sagan have refuted it in detail. Although most intellectuals as well as normal people oppose proliferation, writings arguing the benefits are more obtrusive in the literature of international relations theory. Why this difference between conventional wisdom and some currents of academic fashion? One reason is that outside of political science departments, people in the United States **do not approach the question as detached analysts** shorn of national identity. They do not abstract themselves from the policy interests of the United States, and do not care nearly as much about resolving the security anxieties of non-nuclear countries as they do about minimizing the chances that nuclear weapons will ever be used anywhere. The world is an uncertain place, where parsimonious theories about stability may or may not prove correct, but where our own country would have less to worry about if we were the only ones to have weapons of mass destruction. It is easier for officials than for analysts to apply shameless double standards and recommend policies that are better for the United States than for other countries that want strategic independence.

#### Err neg

Sechser 5**—**Todd Sechser, Assistant Professor of Politics at the University of Virginia, April 7, 2005, How Organizational Pathologies Could Make Nuclear Proliferation Safer, <http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/8/4/9/1/p84918_index.html?type=info&PHPSESSID=7be2c602236d1ae8317a4375fd2608c2>

A second counterargument to the optimist position is the claim that even if proliferation optimism enjoys greater theoretical tenability than previously thought, this does not make its position practically viable. Betts (1999: 65-66) writes that policy makers “do not marvel at all the cases where nuclear weapons will make the world safer, but worry about the exceptions where things will go wrong. . . one exception to the rule may be too many.”13 Likewise, Feaver (1993: 162) argues that even 99.5% prognostic accuracy would be insufficient for proliferation optimism to mount a persuasive case: “At best, rational deterrence theory can predict that nuclear deterrence should assure peace most of the time. Most is not all.” And Sagan (2003b: 184) contends that until military organizations are “perfect,” there is sufficient reason to be pessimistic about the effects of proliferation.14 As long as there is a chance that proliferation might entail some negative effects, the argument holds, then why not play it safe? **This staggering burden of proof is flawed** for two reasons. First, obscures the cost-benefit analysis inherent in any policy deliberation. The appropriate question is not whether the spread of nuclear weapons will result in any nuclear disasters, but whether a world with proliferation would on balance be more peaceful and more stable than a world without it. The issue is whether the benefits are likely to outweigh the costs. If one believes, for example, that nuclear proliferation would eventually result in a preventive war somewhere but that it would also deter numerous conventional wars, then the net overall benefit might justify a more relaxed nonproliferation policy. **Second, the argument obscures the fact that proliferation pessimism** to date **does not possess a “99.5%” record of accuracy – rather, its record stands at 100%.** Of course, the absence of nuclear catastrophe in the past does not assure its absence in the future. But theories ultimately aim to predict outcomes, and despite unearthing a trove of nuclear near-misses, the theory of proliferation pessimism has not succeeded in accomplishing this task. Existing research has successfully shown that the theory’s predicted causal mechanisms have operated in organizations that handle nu-clear weapons, but this is not the same as showing that these mechanisms generate the theory’s predicted outcomes. Even a major counterforce strike against a new nuclear power would not immediately vindicate pessimism – at least not until case study researchers were able to show that the causal mechanisms they specified (that is, preventive war pressures triggered by military biases) were indeed in operation.

### 2NC Stability Turn

#### Prolif key to peace – Shen says that they stabilize relations between states – proliferation de-escalates conflicts and forces responsibility on all sides – more nuclear actors can only cause more stability – it’s empirically proven – Tepperman says despite some near misses, leaders always come to the same conclusion that peace is better than extinction – the Kargil crisis, Cuban missile crisis, etc… all prove

#### Indo-Pak proves nukes moderate actors

David J. Karl, Pres. Asia Strategy Initiative, August 2011, “Proliferation Optimism and Pessimism Revisited,” J. of Strat. Studies, t&f

¶ Yet events over the past decade also lend credence to the optimists' side of the debate. First, despite the severity of the Kargil and Twin Peaks crises, peace nonetheless continued to hold, however uneasily and in circumstances that in the past would almost certainly have led to general war.¶ Second, despite the deep mutual mistrust both crises created, India and Pakistan undertook an intensive back-channel peace process in 2004–07 that may have come tantalizingly close to fruition. Even more extraordinary is that General Pervez Musharraf, the very man regarded as the instigator of the Kargil crisis, was the prime mover behind the diplomatic negotiations that reportedly were on the verge of defusing the perennially inflamed dispute over Kashmir. 9 It is unclear what role, if any, the security confidence created by nuclear deterrence played in motivating Islamabad's involvement in the dialogue, but the process serves as a significant counterpoint to arguments that the nuclearization process in South Asia has only served to foment greater tension and conflict.¶ Third, contrary to pessimists' predictions that the region's conflictual strategic milieu would impel India and Pakistan to adopt time-urgent force postures, they continue to refrain from deploying fully assembled nuclear weapons.¶ Finally, given the preceding two previous crises, there were several large dogs that surprisingly remained silent. Lashkar-e-Taiba, a Pakistan-based militant group formed in close association with that country's security establishment, carried out twin terrorist attacks in Mumbai, India's largest city and premier economic hub – the first in July 2006 that killed over 200 and the second in November 2008 that resulted in more than 160 fatalities – that were more horrific and brazen than the one that triggered the Twin Peaks crisis. Yet instead of a new military confrontation or the retaliatory offensives envisioned in the Cold Start doctrine, New Delhi reacted with remarkable quiescence in each case, a development that some attribute to wariness caused by the specter of nuclear escalation.

#### Prolif leads to assured security—takes away incentive for war

Kenneth **Waltz**, Emeritus Professor of Political Science at UC Berkeley and Adjunct Senior Research Scholar at Columbia University, **2003**, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed, p. 6-8

First, war can be fought in the face of deterrent threats, but the higher the steaks and the closer a country moves toward winning them, the more surely that country invites retaliation and risks its own destruction. States are not likely to run major risks for minor gains. War between nuclear states may escalate as the loser uses larger and larger warheads. Fearing that, states will want to draw back. Not escalation but **de-escalation becomes likely**. War remains possible, but victory in war is too dangerous to fight for. If states can score only small gains, because large ones risk retaliation, they have little incentive to fight.

Second, states act with less care if the expected costs of war are low and with more care if they are high. In 1853 and 1854 Britain and France expected to win an easy victory if they went to war against Russia. Prestige abroad and political popularity at home would be gained, if not much else. The vagueness of their expectation was matched by the carelessness of their actions. In blundering into the Crimean War, they acted hastily on scant information, pandered to their people’s frenzy for war, showed more concern for an ally’s whim that for the adversary’s situation, failed to specify the changes in behavior that threats were supposed to bring , and inclined towards testing strength first and bargaining second. 2 In sharp contrast, the presence of nuclear weapons makes states exceedingly cautious. Think of Kennedy and Khrushchev in the Cuban missile crisis. Why fight if you can’t win much and might lose everything

Third, the deterrent deployment of nuclear weapons contributes more to a country’s security than does conquest of territory. A country with a deterrent strategy does not need territory as much as a country relying on conventional defense. A deterrent strategy makes it unnecessary for a country to fight for the sake of increasing its security, and thus **removes a major cause of war**.

Fourth, deterrent effect depends both on capabilities and the will to use them. The will of the attacked, striving to preserve its own territory, can be presumed to be stronger the will of the attacker, striving to annex someone else’s territory. Knowing this, the would-be attacker is further inhibited. 4

Fifth, certainly about the relative strength of adversaries also makes war less likely. From the late nineteenth century onward, the speed of technological innovation increased the difficulty of estimating relative strengths and predicting the course of campaigns. Since World War II, technological advance had been even faster, but short of a ballistic missile defense breakthrough, this has not mattered. It did not disturb the American-Soviet military equilibrium, because one side’s missiles were not made obsolete by improvements in the other side’s missiles. In 1906, the British Dreadnought, with the greater range and firepower of its guns, made older battleships obsolete. This does not happen to missiles. As Bernard Brodie put it, “Weapons that do not have to fight their like do not become useless because of the advent of newer and superior types.”5 They may have to survive their like, but that is a much simpler problem to solve.

### 2NC Impact Calc

#### Conventional wars outweigh—WMDS have only killed 210,000 people in history, but World War Two alone killed 62 million—conventional wars are inevitable absent deterrence, which means our impacts are guaranteed, while their offense is predicated on a tiny risk of accidents and miscalculation that is so miniscule, it makes policymaking impossible because there’s always a risk – proves you should vote neg on presumption because there’s an equal chance that their impact actually causes extinction

#### It’s comparatively worse

Bueno and Riker 82(Bruce de Mesquita and William H, Prof. Political science at the University of Rochester, June 1982, Journal of Conflict resolution, vl. 26 No, 2, p. 3.2)

One might object further. Conceding that the likelihood of miscalculation does diminish as proliferation occurs, one might still contend that the costs of such a miscalculation are so large that they cannot conceivably justify even the diminished risk of war. If the expected costs from nuclear wars arising out of miscalculation or irrational acts exceed the expected costs from wars that could be prevented by proliferation, then, indeed, proliferation is a very dangerous thing. There is, of course, no precise way to measure these expected costs, but we do have some basis for estimating them. Using expected utility calculations similar to the one suggested here, one of us (Bueno de Mesquita 1981b) found that 65 of approximately 70,000 opportunities to initiate war rationally were seized in the period 1816 to 1974, with hundreds of other opportunities being used to threaten war. In that same study it was also found that only 1 of nearly 500,000 opportunities to initiate war were seized in violation of the expectations arising from the expected utility framework. In other words, the ratio of seemingly rational and correct calculations irrational calculations or miscalculations that have led to war is over **40 to 1.** This implies that through symmetry-producing nuclear proliferation, we may expect to prevent approximately 40 conventional or one-sided nuclear wars for every one miscalculated or irrational bilateral nuclear exchange. Using the 40 most recent wars as a crude indicator, this analysis implies that a single miscalculated or irrational nuclear exchange in the third world would have to kill several tens of millions of people before some proliferation would be unjustified by yielding a higher expected loss of life, It seems to us unlikely that one such miscalculated or irrational act among third world countries, each with a very few warheads, could produce this level of loss.

#### Same effect as nuclear war

Jianguo 95—Major General, frmr assoc. prof and Dean of the Antichemical Warfare Academy (Wu, Nuclear Shadows on High-Tech Warfare, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/jianguo.htm)

What merits our attention is that in a high-tech conventional war, a nuclear environment may still emerge even if nuclear weapons are not used. The more society advances, the greater the demands for energy will be. In order to satisfy the demands for energy, nuclear power stations were built. According to the data released by the International Atomic Energy Agency in March 1994, at the end of 1993 there were 430 nuclear power plants with a total installed capacity of approximately 345 million kw operating in various places throughout the world; these accounted for more than 17 percent of the world's gross power generation. It is predicted that by 2001, there will be 558 nuclear power generating units with a total installed capacity of approximately 460 million kw all worldwide, which will account for 24 percent of the world's gross power generation. The peaceful utilization of nuclear energy is a piece of joyous news to mankind. Meanwhile, the extensive use of nuclear energy also constitutes a latent threat to peace and the existence of human beings. The accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant that occurred in April 1986 inflicted air pollution on 16 Russian oblasts and victimized 250,000 people. In Ukraine, 370,000 people suffered injuries in varying degrees as land covering 40,000 square meters was polluted, and more than 2,000 residential areas were evacuated. In future high-tech warfare, if an enemy intentionally or unintentionally attacks nuclear power plants or other facilities using nuclear energy with high-tech conventional weapons, the secondary nuclear radiation produced and the nuclear environment brought about would likewise do harm. In June 1981, Israel dispatched four aircraft to launch a sudden attack on an Iraqi nuclear reactor southeast of the capital Baghdad, dropping 16 tons of bombs in two minutes and hitting all the targets. Fortunately, the reactor was not yet operational; otherwise the attack would have resulted in very serious consequences.

#### Prolif won’t cause extinction

Nyquist 99—frmr DIA analyst (J.R., Defense Analyst, Worldnetdaily.com, May 20, 1999)

I patiently reply to these correspondents that nuclear war would not be the end of the world. I then point to studies showing that "nuclear winter" has no scientific basis, that fallout from a nuclear war would not kill all life on earth. Surprisingly, few of my correspondents are convinced. They prefer apocalyptic myths created by pop scientists, movie producers and journalists. If Dr. Carl Sagan once said "nuclear winter" would follow a nuclear war, then it must be true. If radiation wipes out mankind in a movie, then that's what we can expect in real life. But Carl Sagan was wrong about nuclear winter. And the movie "On the Beach" misled American filmgoers about the effects of fallout. It is time, once and for all, to lay these myths to rest. Nuclear war would not bring about the end of the world, though it would be horribly destructive. The truth is, many prominent physicists have condemned the nuclear winter hypothesis. Nobel laureate Freeman Dyson once said of nuclear winter research, "It's an absolutely atrocious piece of science, but I quite despair of setting the public record straight." Professor Michael McElroy, a Harvard physics professor, also criticized the nuclear winter hypothesis. McElroy said that nuclear winter researchers "stacked the deck" in their study, which was titled "Nuclear Winter: Global Consequences of Multiple Nuclear Explosions" (Science, December 1983). Nuclear winter is the theory that the mass use of nuclear weapons would create enough smoke and dust to blot out the sun, causing a catastrophic drop in global temperatures. According to Carl Sagan, in this situation the earth would freeze. No crops could be grown. Humanity would die of cold and starvation. In truth, natural disasters have frequently produced smoke and dust far greater than those expected from a nuclear war. In 1883 Krakatoa exploded with a blast equivalent to 10,000 one-megaton bombs, a detonation **greater than the combined nuclear arsenals of planet earth**. The Krakatoa explosion had negligible weather effects. Even more disastrous, going back many thousands of years, a meteor struck Quebec with the force of 17.5 million one-megaton bombs, creating a crater 63 kilometers in diameter. But the world did not freeze. Life on earth was not extinguished. Consider the views of Professor George Rathjens of MIT, a known antinuclear activist, who said, "Nuclear winter **is the worst example of misrepresentation of science** to the public in my memory." Also consider Professor Russell Seitz, at Harvard University's Center for International Affairs, who says that the nuclear winter hypothesis has been discredited. Two researchers, Starley Thompson and Stephen Schneider, debunked the nuclear winter hypothesis in the summer 1986 issue of Foreign Affairs. Thompson and Schneider stated: "the global apocalyptic conclusions of the initial nuclear winter hypothesis can now be relegated to a **vanishingly low level of probability."** OK, so nuclear winter isn't going to happen. What about nuclear fallout? Wouldn't the radiation from a nuclear war contaminate the whole earth, killing everyone? The short answer is: absolutely not. Nuclear fallout is a problem, but we should not exaggerate its effects. As it happens, there are two types of fallout produced by nuclear detonations. These are: 1) delayed fallout; and 2) short-term fallout. According to researcher Peter V. Pry, "Delayed fallout will not, contrary to popular belief, gradually kill billions of people everywhere in the world." Of course, delayed fallout would increase the number of people dying of lymphatic cancer, leukemia, and cancer of the thyroid. "However," says Pry, "these deaths would probably be far fewer than deaths now resulting from ... smoking, or from automobile accidents." The real hazard in a nuclear war is the short-term fallout. This is a type of fallout created when a nuclear weapon is detonated at ground level. This type of fallout could kill millions of people, depending on the targeting strategy of the attacking country. But short-term fallout rapidly subsides to safe levels in 13 to 18 days. It is not permanent. People who live outside of the affected areas will be fine. Those in affected areas can survive if they have access to underground shelters. In some areas, staying indoors may even suffice. Contrary to popular misconception, there were no documented deaths from short-term or delayed fallout at either Hiroshima or Nagasaki. These blasts were low airbursts, which produced minimal fallout effects. Today's thermonuclear weapons are even "cleaner." If used in airburst mode, these weapons would produce few (if any) fallout casualties.

### 2NC Prolif Slow

#### Prolif will be slow—controversy surrounding acquisition and their cost means that few countries will go through the process of acquiring them—that’s Tepperman—empirically proven—India and Pakistani development didn’t cause mass domino’s—their ev is all based on false hype—that’s Alagappa

#### This resolves a majority of their offense—slow prolif means countries learn their limits and prevent their destabilizing effects.

#### Also, only countries that need them for deterrence will acquire them—only a risk of our offense because prolif isn’t like domino’s falling, it’s caused by security concerns—most states don’t want or need nukes

Waltz 7 (Kenneth, Prof. Emeritus of Pol. Sci. – Berkeley, Journal of International Affairs, "A Nuclear Iran: Promoting Stability or Courting Diseaster", 60:2, Proquest)

I don't notice that many religiously-oriented people act in ways that will result in the massacre of thousands of people. I think people are people. I don't think heavenly rewards motivate very many people. So I don't worry about those who have nuclear weapons. I don't want too many countries to have them, but there has been no headlong rush to acquire nuclear weapons. And why not? Most countries don't need them. And if a country doesn't need them, it doesn't want them, because they are a pain in the neck. Scott is right-they are hard to take care of, and it is very important to take care of them very, very carefully. We should be careful not to give other countries reason to believe that their security requires their having nuclear weapons.

#### Alarmist predictions empirically denied

Potter 8—Prof of Nonproliferation Studies and Dir of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies—AND—Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova (William, Divining Nuclear Intentions, International Security, Vol 33, Num 1, Summer 2008, MUSE)

Today it is hard to find an analyst or commentator on nuclear proliferation who is not pessimistic about the future. It is nearly as difficult to and one who predicts the future without reference to metaphors such as proliferation chains, cascades, dominoes, waves, avalanches, and tipping points.42 The lead author of this essay also has been guilty of the same tendency, and initially named an ongoing research project on forecasting proliferation he directs “21st Century Nuclear Proliferation Chains and Trigger Events.” As both a thors proceeded with research on the project, however, and particularly after reading the books by Hymans and Solingen, we became convinced that the metaphor is inappropriate and misleading, as it implies a process of nuclear decisionmaking and a pace of nuclear weapons spread that are unlikely to transpire. The current alarm about life in a nuclear-armed crowd has many historical antecedents and can be found in classified National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) as well as in scholarly analyses. The 1957 NIE, for example, identified a list of ten leading nuclear weapons candidates, including Canada, Japan, and Sweden.43 Sweden, it predicted, was “likely to produce its first weapons in about 1961,” while it was estimated that Japan would “probably seek to de- velop weapons production programs within the next decade.”44 In one of the most famous forecasts, President John Kennedy in 1963 expressed a nightmarish vision of a future world with afteen, twenty, or twenty-ave nuclear weap- ons powers.45 A number of the earliest scholarly projections of proliferation also tended to exaggerate the pace of nuclear weapons spread. A ourry of studies between 1958 and 1962, for example, focused on the “Nth Country Problem” and identified as many as twelve candidates capable of going nuclear in the near future.46 Canada, West Germany, Italy, Japan, Sweden, and Switzerland were among the states most frequently picked as near-term proliferators. The “peaceful nuclear explosion” by India in 1974 was seen by many ana- lysts of the time as a body blow to the young NPT that would set in motion a new wave of proliferation. Although the anticipated domino effect did not transpire, the Indian test did precipitate a marked increase in scholarship on proliferation, including an innovative study developed around the concept— now in vogue—of proliferation chains. Rarely cited by today’s experts, the 1976 monograph on Trends in Nuclear Proliferation, 1975–1995, by Lewis Dunn and Herman Kahn, set forth fifteen scenarios for nuclear weapons spread, each based on the assumption that one state’s acquisition of nuclear weapons would prompt several other states to follow suit, which in turn would trigger a succession of additional nuclearization decisions.47 Although lacking any single theoretical underpinning and accepting of the notion that proliferation de- cisions are likely to be attributed to security needs, the Dunn-Kahn model rejected the exclusive focus by realists on security drivers and sought to probe beneath the rhetoric to identify the possible presence of other pressures and constraints. To their credit, Dunn and Kahn got many things right and advanced the study of proliferation. Their **forecasts**, however, **were** almost **without excep- tion wildly off the mark**. Why, one may inquire, were their pessimistic projec- tions about nuclear weapons spread—and those of their past and subsequent counterparts in the intelligence community—so often divorced from reality? Although Hymans and Solingen appear not to have been familiar with the re- search by Dunn and Kahn on proliferation trends at the time of their books’ publications, their national leadership and domestic political survival models offer considerable insight into that dimension of the proliferation puzzle.48

#### History proves most predictions don’t come close

Gavin 10—IR, UT. Dir, Center for International Security, UT. Frmr National Security Fellow, Harvard. PhD, diplomatic history, UPenn. (Francis, Same As It Ever Was: Nuclear Alarmism, Proliferation, and the Cold War, International Security, Vol 34, Num 3, Winter 2009/10, MUSE)

One of the greatest fears of nuclear alarmists is that if a key state acquires nuclear weapons, others will follow. This idea of a nuclear tipping point, chain reaction, or "domino" effect, however, is by no means new. Consider this headline—"Many Nations Ready to Break into Nuclear Club"—from a front-page article in the Washington Post from June 1981.39 Articles with similar titles can be found from almost **every year since** at least **the** early 19**60s**. Fears of a tipping point were especially acute in the aftermath of China's 1964 detonation of an atomic bomb: it was predicted that India, Indonesia, and Japan might follow, with consequences worldwide, as "Israel, Sweden, Germany, and other potential nuclear countries far from China and India would be affected by proliferation in Asia."40 A U.S. government document identified "at least eleven nations (India, Japan, Israel, Sweden,West Germany, Italy, Canada, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Rumania, and Yugoslavia)" with the capacity to go nuclear, a number that would soon "grow substantially" to include "South Africa, the United Arab Republic, Spain, Brazil and Mexico."41 A top-secret, blue-ribbon committee established to craft the U.S. response contended that "the [1964] Chinese nuclear explosion has increased the urgency [End Page 17] and complexity of this problem by creating strong pressures to develop independent nuclear forces, which, in turn, could strongly influence the plans of other potential nuclear powers."42 These predictions were largely wrong. In 1985 the National Intelligence Council noted that for "almost thirty years the Intelligence Community has been writing about which nations might next get the bomb." All of these estimates based their largely pessimistic and ultimately incorrect estimates on factors such as the increased "access to fissile materials," improved technical capabilities in countries, the likelihood of "chain reactions," or a "scramble" to proliferation when "even one additional state demonstrates a nuclear capability." The 1985 report goes on, "The most striking characteristic of the present-day nuclear proliferation scene is that, despite the alarms rung by past Estimates, no additional overt proliferation of nuclear weapons has actually occurred since China tested its bomb in 1964." Although "some proliferation of nuclear explosive capabilities and other major proliferation-related developments have taken place in the past two decades," they did not have "the damaging, systemwide impacts that the Intelligence community generally anticipated they would."43 In his analysis of more than sixty years of failed efforts to accurately predict nuclear proliferation, analyst Moeed Yusuf concludes that "the pace of proliferation has been much slower than anticipated by most." The majority of countries suspected of trying to obtain a nuclear weapons capability "**never even came close** to crossing the threshold. In fact, most did not even initiate a weapons program." If all the countries that were considered prime suspects over the past sixty years had developed nuclear weapons, "the world would have at least 19 nuclear powers today."44 As Potter and Mukhatzhanova argue, government and academic experts frequently "exaggerated the scope and pace of nuclear weapons proliferation."45 Nor is there compelling evidence that a nuclear proliferation chain reaction will ever occur. Rather, the pool of potential proliferators has been shrinking. Proliferation pressures were far greater during the Cold War. In the 1960s, at least twenty-one countries either had or were considering nuclear weapons research [End Page 18] programs. Today only nine countries are known to have nuclear weapons. Belarus, Brazil, Kazakhstan, Libya, South Africa, Sweden, and Ukraine have dismantled their weapons programs. Even rogue states that are/were a great concern to U.S. policymakers—Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea—began their nuclear weapons programs before the Cold War had ended.46 As far as is known, no nation has started a new nuclear weapons program since the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991.47 Ironically, by focusing on the threat of rogue states, policymakers may have underestimated the potentially far more destabilizing effect of proliferation in "respectable" states such as Germany, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.

#### This is conclusive for the debate – historical inaccuracy of their predictions means strongly err neg

Moeed **Yusuf**, Fellow, Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future at Boston University, January **2009**, “Predicting Proliferation: The History of the Future of Nuclear Weapons,” Brookings Policy Paper No. 11, online: http://www.pugwash.org/01\_nuclear\_proliferation\_yusuf.pdf

Overall, estimates from the intelligence community and, even more so, from academic sources **exaggerated concerns** regarding nuclear weapons. Although all states that have crossed the nuclear threshold to date were mentioned as Nth states, the accuracy, or lack thereof, of the projections **ought to be judged** by the fact **out of an extremely large pool** of states on the suspect list **only eight** actually went nuclear. Moreover, as already mentioned, the pace of proliferation was miscalculated for most states. By the same token, while the optimism-pessimism debate still continues, the stance of the **optimists** seems to **have been vindicated** thus far given that no nuclear strike has taken place in the reviewed period despite modest proliferation. Intelligence sources and a majority of the scholars were largely correct in predicting the inability of the Nth powers to challenge the superpowers. Academic sources were also correct in highlighting the potential for new kinds of threats to the U.S. and the concern about non-state actors in the post-Cold War period. Although much of the focus remained on Russia, nuclear black markets had been correctly projected in the 1990s.

### 2NC Bioweapons Impact Calc

#### That outweighs – Ochs says bioweapons will get out of control easily because there will be no cures and outweigh nuclear war – preventing their further development is key to stop extinction

#### Outweighs nuke war

Singer 1—Clifford Singer, Spring 2001. Director of the Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security at the University of Illinois at Urbana—Champaign. “Will Mankind Survive the Millennium?” The Bulletin of the Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 13.1, <http://www.acdis.uiuc.edu/research/S&Ps/2001-Sp/S&P_XIII/Singer.htm>.

In recent years the fear of the apocalypse (or religious hope for it) has been in part a child of the Cold War, but its seeds in Western culture go back to the Black Death and earlier. Recent polls suggest that the majority in the United States that believe man would survive into the future for substantially less than a millennium was about 10 percent higher in the Cold War than afterward. However fear of annihilation of the human species through nuclear warfare was confused with the admittedly terrifying, but much different matter of destruction of a dominant civilization. The destruction of a third or more of much of the globe’s population through the disruption from the direct consequences of nuclear blast and fire damage was certainly possible. There was, and still is, what is now known to be a rather small chance that dust raised by an all-out nuclear war would cause a socalled nuclear winter, substantially reducing agricultural yields especially in temperate regions for a year or more. As noted above mankind as a whole has weathered a number of mind-boggling disasters in the past fifty thousand years even if older cultures or civilizations have sometimes eventually given way to new ones in the process. Moreover the fear that radioactive fallout would make the globe uninhabitable, publicized by widely seen works such as “On the Beach,” was a metaphor for the horror of nuclear war rather than reality. The epidemiological lethal results of well over a hundred atmospheric nuclear tests are barely statistically detectable except in immediate fallout plumes. The increase in radiation exposure far from the combatants in even a full scale nuclear exchange at the height of the Cold War would have been modest compared to the variations in natural background radiation doses that have readily been adapted to by a number of human populations. Nor is there any reason to believe that global warming or other insults to our physical environment resulting from currently used technologies will challenge the survival of mankind as a whole beyond what it has already handily survived through the past fifty thousand years. There are, however, two technologies currently under development that may pose a more serious threat to human survival. The first and most immediate is biological warfare combined with genetic engineering. Smallpox is the most fearsome of natural biological warfare agents in existence. By the end of the next decade, global immunity to smallpox will likely be at a low unprecedented since the emergence of this disease in the distant past, while the opportunity for it to spread rapidly across the globe will be at an all time high. In the absence of other complications such as nuclear war near the peak of an epidemic, developed countries may respond with quarantine and vaccination to limit the damage. Otherwise mortality there may match the rate of 30 percent or more expected in unprepared developing countries. With respect to genetic engineering using currently available knowledge and technology, the simple expedient of spreading an ample mixture of coat protein variants could render a vaccination response largely ineffective, but this would otherwise not be expected to substantially increase overall mortality rates. With development of new biological technology, however, there is a possibility that a variety of infectious agents may be engineered for combinations of greater than natural virulence and mortality, rather than just to overwhelm currently available antibiotics or vaccines. There is no a priori known upper limit to the power of this type of technology base, and thus the survival of a globally connected human family may be in question when and if this is [[1]](#footnote-1)achieved.

### 2NC Crisis Instability

#### Crisis don’t change anything—nuclear strategies are thought out long in advance before crisis, which means leaders will know the costs beforehand

#### Crisis improves decision-making

Harvey 97 (Frank, Associate Prof. Pol. Sci. – Dalhousie U., “The Future’s Back: Nuclear Rivalry, Deterrence Theory, and Crisis Stability after the Cold War”, p. 12-13)

The most important criticism of the political psychology school, however, comes from a body of empirical evidence that paints a radically different picture of leaders in times of crises. The research agenda for a series of studies under the direction of Michael Brecher began with the following question: what is the impact of changing stress, derived from changes in perception of threats, time pressure, and the probability of war, on the processes and mechanisms through which leaders cope with crises and on their choices?8 The objective of the International Crisis Behaviour (ICB) project was to evaluate empirically many of the claims coming out of the Stanford studies on World War 1 (1914) and the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 (Holsti, North, and Brody 1968), and to offer an alternative image of decision making from that put forward by proponents of political psychology (see, for example, Jervis, Lebow, and Stein 1985; Lebow and Stein 1989a,b, 1990). **Evidence from ICB case studies suggested that information processing and judgment actually improve during crisis situations**. Each case offered a "**resounding disconfirmation**" of the "consensus" findings generated by the Stanford group and other psychological research (Richardson 1988): **none of the ICB case studies showed an increase in cognitive rigidity**; although leaders used lessons from the past as analogues to formulate policy, there was no evidence that this adversely affected the decision; in the Berlin blockade (1948) and two cases involving Israel (1967, 1973), the onset of crises actually led to an increased search for information and a more comprehensive evaluation of alternatives; there was no tendency to overlook options, and when fewer were considered it was due to time constraints or the availability of options at the point of decision. Additional support for this model can be found in several other studies not connected with ICB research (for example, Snyder and Diesing 1977; Bueno de Mesquita 1981; Huth and Russett 1984, 1988; Herek, Janis, and Huth 1987, 1989; Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992).9 In their evaluation of decision making in nineteen military- security crises since 1945, Herek, Janis, and Huth (1987, 1989) explored the relationship between ,seven decision-making pathologies and crisis outcomes. They found that in almost every case the quality of the decision (measured in terms of the favourableness of the outcome) was directly related to the vigilance displayed by officials during the crisis. More specifically, careful consideration of alternatives and objectives reduced the number of "avoidable" errors — for example, gross omissions in the evaluation of relevant information, of the costs and risks of preferred choices, of warnings, and so on. **Their findings appeared** to be **consistent with expectations underlying rational choice theory**.

#### Empirically denied

Rauchhaus 7[Robert W. \* Assistant Professor Department of Political Science University of California, Santa Barbara, “Evaluating The Nuclear Peace Hypothesis: A Quantitative Approach”, http://iicas.ucsd.edu/papers/PIA/rauchhaus\_paper.pdf]

From the early days of the nuclear revolution, proponents of nuclear deterrence have argued that atomic weapons have the capacity to reduce the probability of conventional war (Brodie 1946, 1947). Reflecting on the Cold War, some scholars argue that this is indeed what happened: despite dozens of crises and several proxy wars, the United States and USSR avoided a direct military conflict because each feared that matters might escalate to nuclear war (Gaddis 1986, 1987; Waltz 1990, 1993, 2000). Unlike conventional deterrence in previous eras, nuclear deterrence is **extremely robust** because even irrational or unintelligent leaders are likely to recognize the exceedingly high cost of nuclear war. Thus, proponents of nuclear deterrence claim with a high degree of confidence that “the probability of major war among states having nuclear weapons approaches zero” (Waltz 1990, 740). Scholars who are critical of nuclear deterrence have generally avoided questioning whether nuclear weapons make war less likely. Instead, they usually take one of two approaches. “Safety critics” warn that the nuclear weapons pose a danger because of accidental detonations and inadvertent escalation (Sagan 1993). In contrast, “moral critics” argue that nuclear weapons should be eliminated because they violate international law, are immoral, or both (Falk and Lifton 1991). Oddly enough, neither safety critics nor moral critics tend to question whether nuclear weapons deter war. To the contrary, some critics have assumed that nuclear weapons do indeed reduce the chance of conflict, but argue instead that their deterrent value is outweighed by safety concerns and the prospects of more proliferation (Sagan 1994). The theoretical underpinnings of nuclear deterrence have received considerable treatment over the years. Using game theory and other formal methods, scholars have examined crisis stability, various deterrent strategies, the credibility of threats, and the consequences of proliferation (Berkowitz 1985; Brito and Intriligator 1996; Bueno de Mesquita and Riker 1982; Harvey and James 1996; Intriligator and Brito 1981; Nalebuff 1988; Powell 1985, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990; Schelling 1960, 1966; Wagner 1991). Others have scrutinized the psychological underpinnings of deterrence and the assumption of rationality (Jervis 1984; 1989; Jervis, Lebow, and Stein 1985). Despite the potential problems associated with nuclear deterrence, their pacifying effects are seldom challenged. The concern is generally for deterrence *failure* and other safety or moral concerns, not the *irrelevance* of nuclear deterrence. John Mueller remains one of the few scholars to categorically reject the deterrent value of nuclear weapons (Mueller 1988, 1989). Unlike the proliferation of both formal and informal analytic work on nuclear deterrence, there are only a few efforts to evaluate statistically the nuclear peace hypothesis. Considering the importance of this question, the availability of new datasets and modern statistical software, and the trends in other areas of international relations and political science, it is surprising that this literature has generally not transitioned to more rigorous forms of empirical analysis.

#### More likely to cause conventional war—this is offense for us

Preston 9—assoc prof, IR, Wash State U (Thomas, From Lambs to Lions, 42)

What are the implications of policy maker sensitivity to context for deterrence? Firstly, it clearly relates to how receptive policy makers will be to threats made by opponents. For example, De Rivera (1968, 53) suggests that the signal-to-noise ratio (the strength of the signal relative to the strength of confusing background stimuli), the rewards and costs associated with recognizing (or not) the signals, and the general expectations of the observer play a role in whether initiator or defender threats are heard by the other. Secondly, for sensitive leaders (those high in complexity), they are highly unlikely to make rapid, impulsive decisions in even a conventional crisis, let alone a nuclear one. Such leaders are known for having extremely slow, deliberative, and cautious decision processes that seek out tremendous amounts of information for consideration prior to making decisions (Preston 2001). As a result, such policy makers would be exceedingly unlikely to "rush to judgment" and misperceive the relatively simple cost/loss equation created by nuclear weapons. They also would be highly attentive to signaling from potential adversaries in such a nuclear deterrence environment. In contrast, for insensitive leaders (those low in complexity), they would be far more likely to "rush to judgment," miss warning signals from potential adversaries, and pay little attention to information or feedback from the external environment. Such leaders would be far more vulnerable to the psychological malfunctions of selective perception, use of stereotypes and faulty analogies, and groupthinktype malfunctions (see Janis 1972; Janis and Mann 1977; 't Hart 1994; 't Hart, Stern, and Sundelius 1997). Hence, the risk of miscalculation or challenges to deterrence from such leaders would undoubtedly be greater than would be the case for sensitive leaders. At the same time, the fact that such leaders also view the world in simple, black-and-white terms and do not necessarily tune into nuances suggests they would be far more likely to accept the quite simplistic, black-and-white cost/loss benefit equation nuclear weapons thrust upon security relationships. Historically, American presidents scoring both high and low in complexity, sensitive ones like Eisenhower and Kennedy, as well as less sensitive ones such as Truman, Johnson, and Reagan, have all (despite their rhetoric) shown great caution when making foreign policy decisions that could in any way provoke a true nuclear response from an opponent. Indeed, Truman and Johnson (in Korea and Vietnam respectively) both recognized the serious constraints which the Soviet possession of nuclear weapons posed on the unlimited exercise of American power in both conflicts (see Preston 2001). The reactions of policy makers under the immense stress of nuclear crises has also been pointed to by deterrence skeptics as likely leading to greater chances for decisional pathologies (e.g., misperception, motivated misperceptions, avoidance of value trade-offs, groupthink) to impact decision making and lead to deterrence failure (Janis 1972; Janis and Mann 1977; Jervis 1976; Lebow 1981, 1987; Lebow and Stein 1989, 1990). And while such dangers are clearly of concern, their application to nuclear confrontations has historically not resulted in these kinds of malfunctions. In fact, **it is only in cases of conventional deterrence relationships—characterized by far less clear-cut and ambiguous cost/benefit equations—that one routinely sees these kinds of decisional pathologies.** Even Janis (1972) cites the handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis, his lone nuclear crisis, as being an example of good group decision making and avoidance of groupthink. Similarly, George (1991) de scribes the Cuban Missile Crisis as an example of excellent crisis management (see also Preston 2001). And Blight (1992) notes that for policy makers, the fear of nuclear war (a "shattered crystal ball") served as an "adaptive device" preventing JFK and the ExComm from taking reckless actions and seeking every possible means to avoid a nuclear exchange. Nevertheless, a substantial literature in political psychology (Janis and Mann 1977; Hermann 1979; Hermann and Hermann 1990; "t Hart 1994) warns that policy makers reactions and decision making patterns under intense stress deteriorate and become less effective as the levels increase—an element that can never be fully removed from considerations of the resilience of nuclear deterrence under severe crises conditions.

### 2NC Heg---War Defense

#### No impact to hegemony – that’s Maher

#### 1) Free-riding---withdrawal results in stable regional power balancers---regional powers are more adept to solve conflicts in their own neighborhood---no reason the US military is more effective than others

#### 2) Exaggeration---because they have an interest in maintaining the status quo, preeminent states blow up tiny risks as huge threats to global stability---be skeptical of their scenarios

#### 3) No offense---hegemony causes overstretch of priorities which prevents our ability to resolve conflicts---none of their evidence assumes the ever-expanding nature of the United States’ priorities---multipolarity would increase allies dependence on the US and solve war because they would be scared of other great powers

#### They should have to provide a specific scenario – generic heg ‘solves all war’ arguments are pure rhetoric that would be thrown out in academia

#### Empirically proven

Geller 99**---**Geller and Singer, 99 – \*Chair of the Department of Political Science @ Wayne State University (Daniel S and Joel David, Nations at war: a scientific study of international conflict, p. 116-117)

**Note – Hopf = Visiting Professor of Peace Research, The Mershon Center, Ohio State University PhD in pol sci from Columbia.**

**Levy = Board of Governors’ Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University and an Affiliate at the Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University. Past president of the International Studies Association and of the Peace Science Society. Has held tenured positions at the UT Austin, and U Minnesota, and visiting positions at Stanford, Harvard, Yale University, Columbia, Tulane, and NYU. Received the American Political Science Association’s Award for the best dissertation in IR as well as the Distinguished Scholar Award from the Foreign Policy Analysis Section of the International Studies Association. PhD**

Hopf (1991) and Levy (1984) examine the frequency, magnitude and severity of wars using polarity (Hopf) and “system size” (Levy) as predictors. Hopf’s database includes warfare in the European subsystems for the restricted temporal period of 1495–1559. The system is classified as multipolar for the years 1495–1520 and as bipolar for the years 1521–1559. Hopf reports that the amount of warfare during those two periods was essentially equivalent. He concludes that polarity has little relationship to patterns of war for the historical period under examination. Levy (1984) explores a possible linear association between the number of great powers (system size) and war for the extended temporal span of 1495 – 1974. His findings coincide with those of Hopf; he reports that the frequency, magnitude and severity of war in the international system is unrelated to the number of major powers in the system.

#### Prefer our ev

Layne 6**---**pol sci prof, A&M (Christopher, The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present, Cornell University Press, p. 185-186)

The fundamental problem with all these scenarios, both historical and hypothetical, is that distant peer competitors have never been able to do the one thing they would need to do to challenge the United States in its own neighborhood: move freely across the sea. Since the beginning of the twentieth century, the United States has been able to generate more than enough naval (and strategic air) power to stop dead in the water any distant rival that might attempt to take on the United States over here. And, if anything, since 1945 nuclear weapons have made America's regional primacy all but unassailable.83 Rather than detracting from U.S. security, nuclear weapons enhanced it significantly. These overblown notions of American vulnerability to a Eurasian hegemon reflect an underlying worldview shared by U.S. policy-makers and popularized by Wilson and FDR: that in the modern world, the United States lives perpetually under the shadow of war. This grand strategic narrative rests on two key assumptions. First, because of advances in modern military technology, others can acquire the means to inflict grave damage on the United States. Second, the world is shrinking. As a result, the argument goes, the United States itself is at risk and must involve itself in the security affairs of distant regions to ward off threats to the American homeland. These arguments have a very familiar ring, because they have been invoked by the Bush II administration to justify expanding the war on terror and the invasion of Iraq. Although a straight line connects the administration's grand strategic narrative with those of Wilson and FDR, the conception of American security embodied in these narratives always has been based on a deeply flawed premise. For, far from shrinking the world grand strategically, for the United States, modern weaponry naval and strategic airpower, intercontinental delivery systems, and nuclear weapons has widened it. Proponents of offshore balancing are sensitive to the fact that the threat posed by potential Eurasian hegemons has often been exaggerated deliberately and used as a pretext for intervening in conflicts where America's security clearly has not been at risk. When policymakers use arguments about technology and a shrinking world to warn of American vulnerability, they are, as Michael S. Sherry notes, doing a lot more than simply depicting reality. They are trying to shape public perceptions and to create a new reality, which is why this narrative of U.S. national security is "an ideological construction, not merely a perceptual reaction."84 To be blunt, U.S. officials often have invoked the specter of a Eurasian hegemon to rationalize the pursuit of America's own hegemonic, Open Door-driven ambitions. Although it is always possible that the threat of a Eurasian hegemon justifiably might compel U.S. intervention, whenever this argument is made to justify a specific intervention, red lights should flash and it should be scrutinized very carefully, because U.S. officials have cried wolf way too many times in the past.

#### Their scenario happened in the 90s – no war resulted

Fettweis, 11 Christopher J. Fettweis, Department of Political Science, Tulane University, 9/26/11, Free Riding or Restraint? Examining European Grand Strategy, Comparative Strategy, 30:316–332, EBSCO

It is perhaps worth noting that there is no evidence to support a direct relationship between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. In fact, the limited data we do have suggest the opposite may be true. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990.51 To internationalists, defense hawks and believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities,” argued Kristol and Kagan, “doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace.”52 On the other hand, if the pacific trends were not based upon U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable United States military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums, no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races, and no regional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. Most of all, the United States and its allies were no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped the spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a connection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. Once again, one could presumably argue that spending is not the only or even the best indication of hegemony, and that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was significantly altered during this period, instability should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. However, even if it is true that either U.S. commitments or relative spending account for global pacific trends, then at the very least stability can evidently be maintained at drastically lower levels of both. In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in the alternative for a moment and suppose that there is in fact a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand strategist would still recommend cutting back on engagement and spending until that level is determined. Grand strategic decisions are never final; continual adjustments can and must be made as time goes on. Basic logic suggests that the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment. And if the current era of stability is as stable as many believe it to be, no increase in conflict would ever occur irrespective of U.S. spending, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation. It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that their expectations had been fulfilled. If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as proof of the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the only evidence we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained United States suggests that the current peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. military spending. Evidently the rest of the world can operate quite effectively without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone.

#### Their evidence ignores free-riding

Wilkinson 10---frmr Cato fellow. MA in philosophy, Northern Illinois U. (Hands off the warfare state!, 4 October 2010, http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2010/10/military\_spending)

But not so fast! According to AEI's Arthur Brooks, Heritage's Ed Feulner, and the Weekly Standard's Bill Kristol, any attempt to shrink the big government of garrisons and guns will "make the world a more dangerous place, and ... impoverish our future." Whose side are you on, tea partiers? Messrs Brooks, Feulner, and Kristol assert that military spending "is neither the true source of our fiscal woes, nor an appropriate target for indiscriminate budget-slashing in a still-dangerous world". They aver that "anyone seeking to restore our fiscal health should look at entitlements first, not across-the-board cuts aimed at our men and women in uniform". This is bogus. Sure, Medicare and Social Security cost more, but spending on war and its infrastructure remains a titanic expense. The path from debt, whether for governments or families, is to cut back across the board. If you're in the red and you spend a ridiculous amount of your income on your porcelain egret collection, the fact that you spend even more on rent and student loan payments is obviously no excuse not to cut back on egret miniatures. And, in fact, America's martial profligacy is a "true source of our fiscal woes". According to Joseph Stiglitz and Linda Bilmes: There is no question that the Iraq war added substantially to the federal debt. This was the first time in American history that the government cut taxes as it went to war. The result: a war completely funded by borrowing. U.S. debt soared from $6.4 trillion in March 2003 to $10 trillion in 2008 (before the financial crisis); at least a quarter of that increase is directly attributable to the war. And that doesn't include future health care and disability payments for veterans, which will add another half-trillion dollars to the debt.As a result of two costly wars funded by debt, our fiscal house was in dismal shape even before the financial crisis---and those fiscal woes compounded the downturn. Perhaps because they see the wrong-headedness of their line of defence, Messrs Brooks, Feulner, and Kristol retreat to the claim that in order to make money, America has to spend money: Furthermore, military spending is not a net drain on our economy. It is unrealistic to imagine a return to long-term prosperity if we face instability around the globe because of a hollowed-out U.S. military lacking the size and strength to defend American interests around the world. Global prosperity requires commerce and trade, and this requires peace. But the peace does not keep itself. Again: completely shabby. The real question at issue here is how much military spending is necessary to keep the trade routes open, and how much of that the United States must kick in. By asserting, rather audaciously, that America's level of military spending is not a "net drain" on the economy, they imply the return on the marginal trillion is positive. I doubt it. The return on the three trillion blown on the war on Iraq, for example, is certainly much, much, much less than zero once the cost of removing financial and human capital from productive uses is taken into account. Also, if prosperity requires peace, it's utterly mysterious how starting expensive wars is supposed to help. When thinking about peace as a global public good, it can help to recall that the United States is not the only country that benefits from it. Suppose the United States were to cut its military budget in half to something like the size of the combined budgets of the next five or six countries. This might not suffice if you're itching to invade Yeman, Iran, and who knows what else Mr Kristol's got his eye on. But if the argument is that the purpose of military spending is to secure a calm climate conducive to global trade, it's hard to believe $350 billion per annum will not suffice. But let's say it doesn't, for the sake of argument. Will nations with an equally strong interest in keeping the peace simply faint on their divans whenever a commerce-threatening war breaks out? Of course not. Even the French are perfectly capable of keeping the sea lanes open. The reality is that much of the world is free-riding off the security provided by American military dominance. Were American taxpayers to refuse to bear so much of the burden of keeping the world safe for Danish container ships, other countries would surely step up. Furthermore, considerations of basic distributive fairness suggest they should.

#### No escalation

Haas 8 - Richard (president of the Council on Foreign Relations, former director of policy planning for the Department of State, former vice president and director of foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institution, the Sol M. Linowitz visiting professor of international studies at Hamilton College, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a lecturer in public policy at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, and a research associate at the International Institute for Strategic Studies) April 2008 “Ask the Expert: What Comes After Unipolarity?” http://www.cfr.org/publication/16063/ask\_the\_expert.html

Does a non polar world increase or reduce the chances of another world war? Will nuclear deterrence continue to prevent a large scale conflict? Sivananda Rajaram, UK Richard Haass: I believe the chance of a world war, i.e., one involving the major powers of the day, is remote and likely to stay that way. This reflects more than anything else the absence of disputes or goals that could lead to such a conflict. Nuclear deterrence might be a contributing factor in the sense that no conceivable dispute among the major powers would justify any use of nuclear weapons, but again, I believe the fundamental reason great power relations are relatively good is that all hold a stake in sustaining an international order that supports trade and financial flows and avoids large-scale conflict. The danger in a nonpolar world is not global conflict as we feared during the Cold War but smaller but still highly costly conflicts involving terrorist groups, militias, rogue states, etc.

#### No impact to hegemony

Friedman 10—research fellow in defense and homeland security, Cato. PhD candidate in pol sci, MIT (Ben, Military Restraint and Defense Savings, 20 July 2010, http://www.cato.org/testimony/ct-bf-07202010.html)

Another argument for high military spending is that U.S. military hegemony underlies global stability. Our forces and alliance commitments dampen conflict between potential rivals like China and Japan, we are told, preventing them from fighting wars that would disrupt trade and cost us more than the military spending that would have prevented war. The theoretical and empirical foundation for this claim is weak. It overestimates both the American military's contribution to international stability and the danger that instability abroad poses to Americans. In Western Europe, U.S. forces now contribute little to peace, at best making the tiny odds of war among states there slightly more so.7 Even in Asia, where there is more tension, the history of international relations suggests that without U.S. military deployments potential rivals, especially those separated by sea like Japan and China, will generally achieve a stable balance of power rather than fight. In other cases, as with our bases in Saudi Arabia between the Iraq wars, U.S. forces probably create more unrestthan they prevent. Our force deployments can also generate instability by prompting states to develop nuclear weapons. Even when wars occur, their economic impact is likely to be limited here.8 By linking markets, globalization provides supply alternatives for the goods we consume, including oil. If political upheaval disrupts supply in one location, suppliers elsewhere will take our orders. Prices may increase, but markets adjust. That makes American consumers less dependent on any particular supply source, undermining the claim that we need to use force to prevent unrest in supplier nations or secure trade routes.9 Part of the confusion about the value of hegemony comes from misunderstanding the Cold War. People tend to assume, falsely, that our activist foreign policy, with troops forward supporting allies, not only caused the Soviet Union's collapse but is obviously a good thing even without such a rival. Forgotten is the sensible notion that alliances are a necessary evil occasionally tolerated to balance a particularly threatening enemy. The main justification for creating our Cold War alliances was the fear that Communist nations could conquer or capture by insurrection the industrial centers in Western Europe and Japan and then harness enough of that wealth to threaten us — either directly or by forcing us to become a garrison state at ruinous cost. We kept troops in South Korea after 1953 for fear that the North would otherwise overrun it. But these alliances outlasted the conditions that caused them. During the Cold War, Japan, Western Europe and South Korea grew wealthy enough to defend themselves. We should let them. These alliances heighten our force requirements and threaten to drag us into wars, while providing no obvious benefit.

### 2NC Resource Wars—No War

#### Resource wars won’t escalate

Dombrowski 4 – associate professor, US Naval War College's Strategic Research Department (Peter, Naval War College Review, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_m0JIW/is\_1\_57/ai\_113755359/print, AG)

Unfortunately, Klare barely pauses to consider the possibility that diplomatic, economic, and political developments might ease potential resource conflicts before they escalate into armed conflicts. After all, countries fighting over access to water or oil could simply negotiate arrangements or allow market forces to dictate outcomes; the author himself notes examples and cases where diplomatic solutions have succeeded in the past. In fact, the absence of economic reasoning in this book is startling. After all, economists from cranks to countless mainstream professionals have demonstrated how market forces can help **manage the worst aspects** of resource shortages. Thus energy shortages that lead to price increases in turn encourage consumers to conserve; consumption is reduced, as well as overall dependence. Hence, despite tremendous economic growth, Western Europe, Japan, and even the United States have become much more energy efficient since the oil shock of the 1970s.

#### Zero statistical data backs their args

Ole Theisen 8 PhD Poli Sci at NTNU candidate, Master in Political Science NTNU 2006, "Blood and Soil? Resource Scarcity and Internal Armed Conflict Revisited" Journal of Peace Research ,vol. 45, no. 6, 2008, pp. 801–818, SAGE

Faulty Theory or Poor Testing?

The preceding analyses have demonstrated that those who foresee doom, because of the relationship between resource scarcity and violent internal conflict, have very little support in the large-N literature. The study that has provided most support to the scarcity argument turns out to be non-replicable. What stones remain to be turned? I first discuss some methodological challenges before turning to more substantive theoretical issues.

The complexity of especially HomerDixon’s model of conflict makes it hard to test the environmental security arguments in a large-N design. The number of feedback loops and contingent arguments has left Homer-Dixon and associates doubting their own conclusions. In the case of the ‘Reef Township War’ in South Africa, HomerDixon & Blitt (1998: 136) acknowledge that they could not know whether violence would have erupted in a counterfactual situation, where access to renewable resources was not decreasing. Thus, the most prominent proponent of the scarcity perspective is unable to demonstrate that environmental and demographic factors are the most important factors in bringing about conflict. One reason for this might be that Homer-Dixon’s theory is based on case studies selected on the dependent variable (King, Keohane & Verba, 1994; Gleditsch, 1998). In defense of Homer-Dixon, this might be the most feasible research design at the beginning of a research programme (Schwartz, Deligiannis & Homer-Dixon, 2001). Bächler is not affected by this critique, as he includes both conflict and non-conflict cases. Thus, while Homer-Dixon concludes that ‘environmental scarcities are already contributing to violent conflicts’ (Homer-Dixon, 1994: 5), Bächler (1999) is somewhat more reserved in his statements, although he claims to have evidence for a correlation between dry-land and conflict.

The environmental security literature has also been criticized for its assessments of environmental degradation. Benjaminsen (2008) criticizes both Kahl (2006) and Bächler (1999) for emphasizing desertification in African drylands as a main driver of civil violence, since there is no evidence for a broad process of desertification in the Sahel. He also criticizes the eco-scarcity literature for a simple-minded concept of environmental degradation. In Benjaminsen’s view, degradation is a highly subjective concept. Conflicting views might hold starkly different positions on how the land should be used, resulting in different assessments as to whether an area is considered degraded or not. The uncritical reference to the GLASOD measure is a case in point.

Apart from the study of particular cases, how can we look for possible sources of more general support for the environmental security argument? The data used in such studies are mostly national aggregates, which involve us in the risk of committing ecological fallacies. Disaggregated data improve our ability to assess how scarcities affect internal conflict. So far, Raleigh & Urdal’s (2007) study is the only global cross-national study testing environmental security claims with subnational data.

This is also the study that finds the most support for the eco-scarcity argument, although not uniformly so. More geographically detailed information on resources has special merit in the study of resources and conflict as some (especially Suliman, 1999) claim that scarcities are most important for smaller and more local conflicts in which the state is not an active part, for instance herder–farmer clashes in Nigeria or Darfur (prior to the escalation). Given the peripheral status of such groups relative to the state, these conflicts are less likely than full-scale civil wars to be influenced by factors common to the country as a whole. Thus, further research should employ new tools, such as Geographic Information Systems (GIS), to test ecoscarcity arguments. That being said, nationallevel aggregates should still reveal some of the dynamics that eco-scarcity scholars are concerned with, as indicated by the fact that both Homer-Dixon (1999) and Kahl (2006) cite Hauge & Ellingsen (1998) in support of their own causal claims.

Moreover, acquiring better data will not, on its own, improve the empirical veracity of the theory. Most of the empirical studies mentioned above control for other factors relevant for conflict. But generally, they do not attempt to test causal arguments other than direct causation between scarcity and internal conflict, with the exception of Urdal (2005, 2008) and Raleigh & Urdal (2007).

This is critical, since few eco-scarcity scholars argue that there is a strong direct link between scarcity and organized violence. Thus, the contexts in which scarcity translates into conflict should be investigated more closely. Conventional statistical techniques run into problems when the relationships to be investigated are of a complex and interactive kind, which is exactly the case for eco-scarcity theory. Alternative techniques, such as Qualitative Comparative Analysis strategies (Ragin, 1987), which allow for complex interactions, might be applied in the investigation of the link between scarcity and violence, in order to meet the demand for generalizability while also allowing for causal complexity.

Quite a few of the eco-scarcity conflict models emphasize the interplay between absolute scarcity and the distribution of resources. This has led Fairhead (2001) to question the utility of such models. The resource base per capita might be increasing while its distribution is becoming increasingly skewed. Thus, scarcity would be increasing according to an eco-scarcity model, while resource optimists would be more likely to focus on the increasing average. Disentangling absolute scarcity from the question of distribution, therefore, becomes an important point in future studies. Furthermore, if the distributionist argument is central, how local is the cause of the scarcity and to what extent is it related to ethnic identities, as emphasized especially by Kahl (2006) and Suliman (1997)? Finally, the role of political institutions and their role in ending or exacerbating low-intensity conflicts need to be investigated. Salehyan (2008) argues that exclusive emphasis on the role of resource scarcity tends to let governments off the hook. For instance, blaming the violence in Darfur on climate change also means overlooking the destructive role of the Sudanese government.

Concluding Remarks

Environmental security conflict models rest, to a large extent, on the assumptions of relative deprivation theory, implying that renewable resource scarcity will give rise to socio-economic grievances that, in turn, spill over into conflict. The statistical results presented here offer little support for this theory, at least for several common and physically observable scarcities. Rule (1988: 221) and Lichbach (1989: 464) conclude that relative deprivation, as measured by economic inequality or poor economic growth, is neither necessary nor sufficient for internal conflict and that violence results from more general political attitudes (political alienation). They implicitly make the case for studies of the rebels’ subjective assessment of their situation rather than objectively observable patterns. Collier (2001) argues that genuine justice-driven rebellions are much less common than one would think from the stated reasons given by the insurgents themselves. In fact, any group that challenges another group or the state will try to portray their fight as just. My own results are more supportive of a rational choice interpretation rather than one building on relative deprivation, since proxies for development, state strength and institutional instability all turn out to be much more robust predictors of conflict than scarce resources**.**

### 2NC No Extinction

#### The aff doesn’t solve world wide – epicenters for diseases are in developing countries—makes the impact inevitable—also proves you should be skeptical of their evidence because every year there are new claims of some “deadly new mutation” but every year they are wrong

#### And, No extinction—that’s Posner. We have survived every disease in the last 200,000 years and none have come close—natural selections means that diseases that pose too big of a threat burn out.

#### Infectious diseases can’t cause extinction – population density mitigates virulence through resistance

Wynne Parry 11, 2/2/11, Live Science Staff Writer, “Article: Theory About Mammals and Fungus Explains Bat Plague”, <http://www.livescience.com/11705-theory-mammals-fungus-explains-bat-plague.html>

Even highly virulent infectious disease does not cause extinctions – because as population density decreases, so does transmission, and the remaining individuals are more resistant. In addition, at the end of the Cretaceous, dinosaurs weren't the only ones to be decimated. Marine animals were affected, as were many species of flowering plant, according to Douglas Robertson, of the Cooperative Institute for Research in Environmental Sciences at the University of Colorado. "It is not even vaguely plausible that all these extinctions, let alone just the various dinosaur species extinctions, were all caused by some pathogen," Robertson wrote in an e-mail.

#### Global pandemics unlikely and don’t cause extinction

Ridley 8/17/12 [Matt Ridley, columnist for The Wall Street Journal and author of *The Rational Optimist: How Prosperity Evolves,* “Apocalypse Not: Here’s Why You Shouldn’t Worry About End Times,” http://www.wired.com/wiredscience/2012/08/ff\_apocalypsenot/all/]

The emergence of AIDS led to a theory that other viruses would spring from tropical rain forests to wreak revenge on humankind for its ecological sins. That, at least, was the implication of Laurie Garrett’s 1994 book, The Coming Plague: Newly Emerging Diseases in a World Out of Balance. The most prominent candidate was Ebola, the hemorrhagic fever that starred in Richard Preston’s The Hot Zone, published the same year. Writer Stephen King called the book “one of the most horrifying things I’ve ever read.” Right on cue, Ebola appeared again in the Congo in 1995, but it soon disappeared. Far from being a harbinger, HIV was the only new tropical virus to go pandemic in 50 years.¶ In the 1980s British cattle began dying from mad cow disease, caused by an infectious agent in feed that was derived from the remains of other cows. When people, too, began to catch this disease, predictions of the scale of the epidemic quickly turned terrifying: Up to 136,000 would die, according to one study. A pathologist warned that the British “have to prepare for perhaps thousands, tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands, of cases of vCJD [new variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, the human manifestation of mad cow] coming down the line.” Yet the total number of deaths so far in the UK has been 176, with just five occurring in 2011 and none so far in 2012.¶ In 2003 it was SARS, a virus from civet cats, that ineffectively but inconveniently led to quarantines in Beijing and Toronto amid predictions of global Armageddon. SARS subsided within a year, after killing just 774 people. In 2005 it was bird flu, described at the time by a United Nations official as being “like a combination of global warming and HIV/AIDS 10 times faster than it’s running at the moment.” The World Health Organization’s official forecast was 2 million to 7.4 million dead. In fact, by late 2007, when the disease petered out, the death toll was roughly 200. In 2009 it was Mexican swine flu. WHO director general Margaret Chan said: “It really is all of humanity that is under threat during a pandemic.” The outbreak proved to be a normal flu episode.¶ The truth is, a new global pandemic is growing less likely, not more. Mass migration to cities means the opportunity for viruses to jump from wildlife to the human species has not risen and has possibly even declined, despite media hype to the contrary. Water- and insect-borne infections—generally the most lethal—are declining as living standards slowly improve. It’s true that casual-contact infections such as colds are thriving—but only by being mild enough that their victims can soldier on with work and social engagements, thereby allowing the virus to spread. Even if a lethal virus does go global, the ability of medical science to sequence its genome and devise a vaccine or cure is getting better all the time.

1. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)