### Economy

Even a 4% increase in global supply can swing prices and employment –

Morris 12— former adviser to President Clinton, Dick, Gas prices to cost Obama, Politico, 2-28, http://thehill.com/opinion/columnists/dick-morris/213159-gas-prices-to-cost-obama

Obama proudly points to the fact that we are producing more oil domestically than we have for some years. True. But that’s because Bush issued permits for a massive expansion in offshore drilling and exploration on federal lands. And it’s because private and state land is being used for horizontal drilling and fracking despite the increasing objections of Obama’s EPA.

Obama says that more domestic drilling is not the answer. But it is. Even with his stubborn refusal to issue deep-water drilling permits, American oil production is slated to rise by 2 million barrels of oil per day — an increase of about 25 percent — over the next two years. Canadian production will rise by 1 million barrels, assuming we can get it to the United States over Obama’s objections.

Globally, a 3 million-barrel increase in oil production would be huge — about a 4 percent increase in global supply. Those 3 million new North American barrels will make it possible for the United States to cut off all imports from the nations that hate us: Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Russia, Algeria.

By 2020, we can be the new Saudi Arabia — providing the world’s oil needs — if only Obama would get out of the way.

Peter Morici, professor at the Smith School of Business, University of Maryland School, and former chief economist at the U.S. International Trade Commission, points out that domestic oil production lowers prices in the United States. He points out, for example, that Texas oil is selling for $17 less than oil from the North Sea off the United Kingdom. He says “this indicates the U.S. market is becoming somewhat separate and less wholly determined by global conditions; hence, more domestic production and increased access to Canadian oil would lower U.S. oil and prices — more drilling in the Gulf and elsewhere in North America, and the Keystone pipeline, would significantly affect gas prices and employment.”

### Heg

Heg decline causes US lash-out

Goldstein, 2007 (Avery, Professor of Global Politics and International Relations @ University of Pennsylvania, “Power transitions, institutions, and China's rise in East Asia: Theoretical expectations and evidence,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Volume 30, Issue 4 & 5 August)

Two closely related, though distinct, theoretical arguments focus explicitly on the consequences for international politics of a shift in power between a dominant state and a rising power. In War and Change in World Politics, Robert Gilpin suggested that peace prevails when a dominant state’s capabilities enable it to ‘govern’ an international order that it has shaped. Over time, however, as economic and technological diffusion proceeds during eras of peace and development, other states are empowered. Moreover, the burdens of international governance drain and distract the reigning hegemon, and challengers eventually emerge who seek to rewrite the rules of governance. As the power advantage of the erstwhile hegemon ebbs, it may become desperate enough to resort to the ultima ratio of international politics, force, to forestall the increasingly urgent demands of a rising challenger. Or as the power of the challenger rises, it may be tempted to press its case with threats to use force. It is the rise and fall of the great powers that creates the circumstances under which major wars, what Gilpin labels ‘hegemonic wars’, break out.13 Gilpin’s argument logically encourages pessimism about the implications of a rising China. It leads to the expectation that international trade, investment, and technology transfer will result in a steady diffusion of American economic power, benefiting the rapidly developing states of the world, including China. As the US simultaneously scurries to put out the many brushfires that threaten its far-flung global interests (i.e., the classic problem of overextension), it will be unable to devote sufficient resources to maintain or restore its former advantage over emerging competitors like China. While the erosion of the once clear American advantage plays itself out, the US will find it ever more difficult to preserve the order in Asia that it created during its era of preponderance. The expectation is an increase in the likelihood for the use of force – either by a Chinese challenger able to field a stronger military in support of its demands for greater influence over international arrangements in Asia, or by a besieged American hegemon desperate to head off further decline. Among the trends that alarm those who would look at Asia through the lens of Gilpin’s theory are China’s expanding share of world trade and wealth (much of it resulting from the gains made possible by the international economic order a dominant US established); its acquisition of technology in key sectors that have both civilian and military applications (e.g., information, communications, and electronics linked with the ‘revolution in military affairs’); and an expanding military burden for the US (as it copes with the challenges of its global war on terrorism and especially its struggle in Iraq) that limits the resources it can devote to preserving its interests in East Asia.14 Although similar to Gilpin’s work insofar as it emphasizes the importance of shifts in the capabilities of a dominant state and a rising challenger, the power-transition theory A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler present in The War Ledger focuses more closely on the allegedly dangerous phenomenon of ‘crossover’– the point at which a dissatisfied challenger is about to overtake the established leading state.15 In such cases, when the power gap narrows, the dominant state becomes increasingly desperate to forestall, and the challenger becomes increasingly determined to realize the transition to a new international order whose contours it will define. Though suggesting why a rising China may ultimately present grave dangers for international peace when its capabilities make it a peer competitor of America, Organski and Kugler’s power-transition theory is less clear about the dangers while a potential challenger still lags far behind and faces a difficult struggle to catch up. This clarification is important in thinking about the theory’s relevance to interpreting China’s rise because a broad consensus prevails among analysts that Chinese military capabilities are at a minimum two decades from putting it in a league with the US in Asia.16 Their theory, then, points with alarm to trends in China’s growing wealth and power relative to the United States, but especially looks ahead to what it sees as the period of maximum danger – that time when a dissatisfied China could be in a position to overtake the US on dimensions believed crucial for assessing power. Reports beginning in the mid-1990s that offered extrapolations suggesting China’s growth would give it the world’s largest gross domestic product (GDP aggregate, not per capita) sometime in the first few decades of the twentieth century fed these sorts of concerns about a potentially dangerous challenge to American leadership in Asia.17 The huge gap between Chinese and American military capabilities (especially in terms of technological sophistication) has so far discouraged prediction of comparably disquieting trends on this dimension, but inklings of similar concerns may be reflected in occasionally alarmist reports about purchases of advanced Russian air and naval equipment, as well as concern that Chinese espionage may have undermined the American advantage in nuclear and missile technology, and speculation about the potential military purposes of China’s manned space program.18 Moreover, because a dominant state may react to the prospect of a crossover and believe that it is wiser to embrace the logic of preventive war and act early to delay a transition while the task is more manageable, Organski and Kugler’s powertransition theory also provides grounds for concern about the period prior to the possible crossover.19

Hege prevents nuclear war – no alternative.

Kagan 11 - Senior fellow in foreign policy at the Brookings Institution, Robert, “The Price of Power”, Weekly Standard, 1-24, http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/price-power\_533696.html?page=3

• **American forces** deployed in East Asia and the Western Pacific have for decades **prevented** the outbreak of major **war**, provided stability, **and kept open** international **trading routes, making** **possible** an **unprecedented** era of **growth** and prosperity for Asians and Americans alike. Now the United States faces a new challenge and potential threat from **a rising China** which seeks eventually to push the U.S. military’s area of operations back to Hawaii **and** exercise hegemony over the world’s most rapidly growing economies. Meanwhile, a **nuclear**-armed **North Korea threatens war** with South Korea and fires ballistic missiles over Japan that will someday be capable of reaching the west coast of the United States. Democratic nations in the region, worried that the United States may be losing influence, turn to Washington for reassurance that the U.S. security guarantee remains firm. **If the U**nited **S**tates **cannot** **provide** that **assurance** because it is cutting back its military capabilities, **they will have to** **choose between** accepting **Chinese dominance** and striking out on their own, possibly by building nuclear weapons. **In the Middle East, Iran seeks to build its own nuclear arsenal**, supports armed radical Islamic groups in Lebanon and Palestine, and has linked up with anti-American dictatorships in the Western Hemisphere. The prospects of new instability in the region grow every day as a decrepit regime in Egypt clings to power, crushes all moderate opposition, and drives the Muslim Brotherhood into the streets. A nuclear-armed Pakistan seems to be ever on the brink of collapse into anarchy and radicalism. Turkey, once an ally, now seems bent on an increasingly anti-American Islamist course. The prospect of war between Hezbollah and Israel grows, and with it the possibility of war between Israel and Syria and possibly Iran. There, too, **nations** in the region increasingly look to Washington for reassurance, and if they decide the United States cannot be relied upon they **will** **have to decide whether to succumb** to Iranian influence **or build** their own **nuclear weapons** to resist it. In the 1990s, after the Soviet Union had collapsed and the biggest problem in the world seemed to be ethnic conflict in the Balkans, it was at least plausible to talk about cutting back on American military capabilities. In the present, increasingly dangerous international environment, in which terrorism and great power rivalry vie as the greatest threat to American security and interests, cutting military capacities is simply reckless. Would we increase the risk of strategic failure in an already risky world, despite the near irrelevance of the defense budget to American fiscal health, just so we could tell American voters that their military had suffered its “fair share” of the pain? The nature of the risk becomes plain when one considers the nature of the cuts that would have to be made to have even a marginal effect on the U.S. fiscal crisis. Many are under the illusion, for instance, that if the United States simply withdrew from Iraq and Afghanistan and didn’t intervene anywhere else for a while, this would have a significant impact on future deficits. But, in fact, projections of future massive deficits already assume the winding down of these interventions.Withdrawal from the two wars would scarcely make a dent in the fiscal crisis. Nor can meaningful reductions be achieved by cutting back on waste at the Pentagon—which Secretary of Defense Gates has already begun to do and which has also been factored into deficit projections. If the United States withdrew from Iran and Afghanistan tomorrow, cut all the waste Gates can find, and even eliminated a few weapons programs—all this together would still not produce a 10 percent decrease in overall defense spending. In fact, the only way to get significant savings from the defense budget—and by “significant,” we are still talking about a tiny fraction of the cuts needed to bring down future deficits—is to cut force structure: fewer troops on the ground; fewer airplanes in the skies; fewer ships in the water; fewer soldiers, pilots, and sailors to feed and clothe and provide benefits for. To cut the size of the force, however, requires reducing or eliminating the missions those forces have been performing. Of course, there are any number of think tank experts who insist U.S. forces can be cut by a quarter or third or even by half and still perform those missions. But this is snake oil. Over the past two decades, the force has already been cut by a third. Yet no administration has reduced the missions that the larger force structures of the past were designed to meet. To fulfill existing security commitments, to remain the “world’s power balancer of choice,” as Leslie Gelb puts it, to act as “the only regional balancer against China in Asia, Russia in eastern Europe, and Iran in the Middle East” requires at least the current force structure, and almost certainly more than current force levels. Those who recommend doing the same with less are only proposing a policy of insufficiency, where the United States makes commitments it cannot meet except at high risk of failure. The only way to find substantial savings in the defense budget, therefore, is to change American strategy fundamentally. The Simpson-Bowles commission suggests as much, by calling for a reexamination of America’s “21st century role,” although it doesn’t begin to define what that new role might be. Others have. For decades “realist” analysts have called for a strategy of “offshore balancing.” Instead of the United States providing security in East Asia and the Persian Gulf, it would withdraw its forces from Japan, South Korea, and the Middle East and let the nations in those regions balance one another. If the balance broke down and war erupted, the United States would then intervene militarily until balance was restored. In the Middle East and Persian Gulf, for instance, Christopher Layne has long proposed “passing the mantle of regional stabilizer” to a consortium of “Russia, China, Iran, and India.” In East Asia offshore balancing would mean letting China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and others manage their own problems, without U.S. involvement—again, until the balance broke down and war erupted, at which point the United States would provide assistance to restore the balance and then, if necessary, intervene with its own forces to restore peace and stability. Before examining whether this would be a wise strategy, it is important to understand that this really is the only genuine alternative to the one the United States has pursued for the past 65 years. To their credit, Layne and others who support the concept of offshore balancing have eschewed halfway measures and airy assurances that we can do more with less, which are likely recipes for disaster. They recognize that either the United States is actively involved in providing security and stability in regions beyond the Western Hemisphere, which means maintaining a robust presence in those regions, or it is not. Layne and others are frank in calling for an end to the global security strategy developed in the aftermath of World War II, perpetuated through the Cold War, and continued by four successive post-Cold War administrations. At the same time, it is not surprising that none of those administrations embraced offshore balancing as a strategy. The idea of **relying on Russia, China, and Iran to** jointly “**stabilize**” the Middle East and Persian Gulf **will not strike many as** an **attractive** proposition. Nor is U.S. withdrawal from East Asia and the Pacific likely to have a stabilizing effect on that region. The **prospects of** a **war** on the Korean Peninsula would **increase**. Japan and other nations in the region would face the choice of succumbing to Chinese hegemony or taking unilateral steps for self-defense, which in Japan’s case would mean the rapid creation of a formidable nuclear arsenal. Layne and other **offshore balancing** enthusiasts, like John Mearsheimer, point to two notable occasions when the United States allegedly practiced this strategy. One was the Iran-Iraq war, where the United States supported Iraq for years against Iran in the hope that the two would balance and weaken each other. The other was American policy **in the** 1920s and 19**30s**, when the United States allowed the great European powers to balance one another, occasionally providing economic aid, or military aid, as in the Lend-Lease program of assistance to Great Britain once war broke out. Whether this was really American strategy in that era is open for debate—most would argue the United States in this era was trying to stay out of war not as part of a considered strategic judgment but as an end in itself. Even if the United States had been pursuing offshore balancing in the first decades of the 20th century, however, would we really call that strategy a success? The United States **wound up** intervening with millions of troops, first in Europe, and then in Asia and Europe simultaneously, **in the** two **most dreadful wars in** human **history**. It was with the memory of those two wars in mind, and in the belief that American strategy in those interwar years had been mistaken, that American statesmen during and after World War II determined on the new global strategy that the United States has pursued ever since. Under Franklin Roosevelt, and then under the leadership of Harry Truman and Dean Acheson, American leaders determined that the safest course was to build “situations of strength” (Acheson’s phrase) in strategic locations around the world, to build a “preponderance of power,” and to create an international system with American power at its center. They left substantial numbers of troops in East Asia and in Europe and built a globe-girdling system of naval and air bases to enable the rapid projection of force to strategically important parts of the world. They did not do this on a lark or out of a yearning for global dominion. They simply rejected the offshore balancing strategy, and they did so because they believed it had led to great, destructive wars in the past and would likely do so again. They believed their new global strategy was more likely to deter major war and therefore be less destructive and less expensive in the long run. Subsequent administrations, from both parties and with often differing perspectives on the proper course in many areas of foreign policy, have all agreed on this core strategic approach. From the beginning this strategy was assailed as too ambitious and too expensive. At the dawn of the Cold War, Walter Lippmann railed against Truman’s containment strategy as suffering from an unsustainable gap between ends and means that would bankrupt the United States and exhaust its power. Decades later, in the waning years of the Cold War, Paul Kennedy warned of “imperial overstretch,” arguing that American decline was inevitable “if the trends in national indebtedness, low productivity increases, [etc.]” were allowed to continue at the same time as “massive American commitments of men, money and materials are made in different parts of the globe.” Today, we are once again being told that this global strategy needs to give way to a more restrained and modest approach, even though the indebtedness crisis that we face in coming years is not caused by the present, largely successful global strategy. Of course it is precisely the success of that strategy that is taken for granted. The enormous benefits that this strategy has provided, including the financial benefits, somehow never appear on the ledger. They should. We might begin by asking about the global security order that the United States has sustained since Word War II—the prevention of major war, the support of an open trading system, and promotion of the liberal principles of free markets and free government. How much is that order worth? What would be the cost of its collapse or transformation into another type of order? Whatever the nature of the current economic difficulties, the past six decades have seen a greater increase in global prosperity than any time in human history. Hundreds of millions have been lifted out of poverty. Once-backward nations have become economic dynamos. And the American economy, though suffering ups and downs throughout this period, has on the whole benefited immensely from this international order. One price of this success has been maintaining a sufficient military capacity to provide the essential security underpinnings of this order. But has the price not been worth it? In the first half of the 20th century, the United States found itself engaged in two world wars. In the second half, this global American strategy helped produce a peaceful end to the great-power struggle of the Cold War and then 20 more years of great-power peace. Looked at coldly, simply in terms of dollars and cents, the benefits of that strategy far outweigh the costs. The danger, as always, is that we don’t even realize the benefits our strategic choices have provided. Many assume that the world has simply become more peaceful, that great-power conflict has become impossible, that nations have learned that military force has little utility, that economic power is what counts. This belief in progress and the perfectibility of humankind and the institutions of international order is always alluring to Americans and Europeans and other children of the Enlightenment. It was the prevalent belief in the decade before World War I, in the first years after World War II, and in those heady days after the Cold War when people spoke of the “end of history.” It is always tempting to believe that the international order the United States built and sustained with its power can exist in the absence of that power, or at least with much less of it. This is the hidden assumption of those who call for a change in American strategy: that the United States can stop playing its role and yet all the benefits that came from that role will keep pouring in. This is a great if recurring illusion, the idea that you can pull a leg out from under a table and the table will not fall over. Much of the present debate, it should be acknowledged, is not about the defense budget or the fiscal crisis at all. It is only the latest round in a long-running debate over the nature and purposes of American foreign policy. At the tactical level, some use the fiscal crisis as a justification for a different approach to, say, Afghanistan. Richard Haass, for instance, who has long favored a change of strategy from “counterinsurgency” to “counterterrorism,” now uses the budget crisis to bolster his case—although he leaves unclear how much money would be saved by such a shift in strategy. At the broader level of grand strategy, the current debate, though revived by the budget crisis, can be traced back a century or more, but its most recent expression came with the end of the Cold War. In the early 1990s, some critics, often calling themselves “realists,” expressed their unhappiness with a foreign policy—first under George H.W. Bush and then under Bill Clinton—that cast the United States as leader of a “new world order,” the “indispensable nation.” As early as 1992, Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson assailed President Bush for launching the first Persian Gulf war in response to Saddam Hussein’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait. They charged him with pursuing “a new world role .  .  . required neither by security need nor by traditional conceptions of the nation’s purpose,” a role that gave “military force” an “excessive and disproportionate .  .  . position in our statecraft.” Tucker and Hendrickson were frank enough to acknowledge that, pace Paul Kennedy, the “peril” was not actually “to the nation’s purse” or even to “our interests” but to the nation’s “soul.” This has always been the core critique of expansive American foreign policy doctrines, from the time of the Founders to the present—not that a policy of extensive global involvement is necessarily impractical but that it is immoral and contrary to the nation’s true ideals. Today this alleged profligacy in the use of force is variously attributed to the influence of “neoconservatives” or to those Mearsheimer calls the “liberal imperialists” of the Clinton administration, who have presumably now taken hold of the Obama administration as well. But the critics share a common premise: that if only the United States would return to a more “normal” approach to the world, intervening abroad far less frequently and eschewing efforts at “nation-building,” then this would allow the United States to cut back on the resources it expends on foreign policy. Thanks to Haass’s clever formulation, there has been a great deal of talk lately about “wars of choice” as opposed to “wars of necessity.” Haass labels both the war in Iraq and the war in Afghanistan “wars of choice.” Today, many ask whether the United States can simply avoid such allegedly optional interventions in the future, as well as the occupations and exercises in “nation-building” that often seem to follow. Although the idea of eliminating “wars of choice” appears sensible, the historical record suggests it will not be as simple as many think. The problem is, almost every war or intervention the United States has engaged in throughout its history has been optional—and not just the Bosnias, Haitis, Somalias, or Vietnams, but the Korean War, the Spanish-American War, World War I, and even World War II (at least the war in Europe), not to mention the many armed interventions throughout Latin America and the Caribbean over the course of the past century, from Cuba in 1898 to Panama in 1989. A case can be made, and has been made by serious historians, that every one of these wars and interventions was avoidable and unnecessary. To note that our most recent wars have also been wars of choice, therefore, is not as useful as it seems. In theory, the United States could refrain from intervening abroad. But, in practice, will it? Many assume today that the American public has had it with interventions, and Alice Rivlin certainly reflects a strong current of opinion when she says that “much of the public does not believe that we need to go in and take over other people’s countries.” That sentiment has often been heard after interventions, especially those with mixed or dubious results. It was heard after the four-year-long war in the Philippines, which cost 4,000 American lives and untold Filipino casualties. It was heard after Korea and after Vietnam. It was heard after Somalia. Yet the reality has been that **after each intervention**, the **sentiment** **against foreign involvement** has **faded**, and the United States has intervened again. Depending on how one chooses to count, the United States has undertaken roughly 25 overseas interventions since 1898: Cuba, 1898 The Philippines, 1898-1902 China, 1900 Cuba, 1906 Nicaragua, 1910 & 1912 Mexico, 1914 Haiti, 1915 Dominican Republic, 1916 Mexico, 1917 World War I, 1917-1918 Nicaragua, 1927 World War II, 1941-1945 Korea, 1950-1953 Lebanon, 1958 Vietnam, 1963-1973 Dominican Republic, 1965 Grenada, 1983 Panama, 1989 First Persian Gulf war, 1991 Somalia, 1992 Haiti, 1994 Bosnia, 1995 Kosovo, 1999 Afghanistan, 2001-present Iraq, 2003-present That is **one** **intervention every 4.5 years on average**. Overall, the United States has intervened or been engaged in combat somewhere in 52 out of the last 112 years, or roughly 47 percent of the time. Since the end of the Cold War, it is true, the rate of U.S. interventions has increased, with an intervention roughly once every 2.5 years and American troops intervening or engaged in combat in 16 out of 22 years, or over 70 percent of the time, since the fall of the Berlin Wall. The argument for returning to “normal” begs the question: What is normal for the United States? The historical record of the last century suggests that it is not a policy of nonintervention. This record ought to raise doubts about the theory that American behavior these past two decades is the product of certain unique ideological or doctrinal movements, whether “liberal imperialism” or “neoconservatism.” Allegedly “realist” presidents in this era have been just as likely to order interventions as their more idealistic colleagues. George H.W. Bush was as profligate an intervener as Bill Clinton. He invaded Panama in 1989, intervened in Somalia in 1992—both on primarily idealistic and humanitarian grounds—which along with the first Persian Gulf war in 1991 made for three interventions in a single four-year term. Since 1898 the list of presidents who ordered armed interventions abroad has included William McKinley, Theodore Roose-velt, William Howard Taft, Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush. One would be hard-pressed to find a common ideological or doctrinal thread among them—unless it is the doctrine and ideology of a mainstream American foreign policy that leans more toward intervention than many imagine or would care to admit. Many don’t want to admit it, and the only thing as consistent as this pattern of American behavior has been the claim by contemporary critics that it is abnormal and a departure from American traditions. The anti-imperialists of the late 1890s, the isolationists of the 1920s and 1930s, the critics of Korea and Vietnam, and the critics of the first Persian Gulf war, the interventions in the Balkans, and the more recent wars of the Bush years have all insisted that the nation had in those instances behaved unusually or irrationally. And yet the behavior has continued. To note this consistency is not the same as justifying it. The United States may have been wrong for much of the past 112 years. Some critics would endorse the sentiment expressed by the historian Howard K. Beale in the 1950s, that “the men of 1900” had steered the United States onto a disastrous course of world power which for the subsequent half-century had done the United States and the world no end of harm. But whether one lauds or condemns this past century of American foreign policy—and one can find reasons to do both—the fact of this consistency remains. It would require not just a modest reshaping of American foreign policy priorities but a sharp departure from this tradition to bring about the kinds of changes that would allow the United States to make do with a substantially smaller force structure. Is such a sharp departure in the offing? It is no doubt true that many Americans are unhappy with the on-going warfare in Afghanistan and to a lesser extent in Iraq, and that, if asked, a majority would say the United States should intervene less frequently in foreign nations, or perhaps not at all. It may also be true that the effect of long military involvements in Iraq and Afghanistan may cause Americans and their leaders to shun further interventions at least for a few years—as they did for nine years after World War I, five years after World War II, and a decade after Vietnam. This may be further reinforced by the difficult economic times in which Americans are currently suffering. The longest period of nonintervention in the past century was during the 1930s, when unhappy memories of World War I combined with the economic catastrophe of the Great Depression to constrain American interventionism to an unusual degree and produce the first and perhaps only genuinely isolationist period in American history. So are we back to the mentality of the 1930s? It wouldn’t appear so. There is no great wave of **isolationism** sweeping the country. There is not even the equivalent of a Patrick Buchanan, who received 3 million votes in the 1992 Republican primaries. Any isolationist tendencies that might exist are severely **tempered by** continuing **fears of terrorist attacks** that might be launched from overseas. Nor are the vast majority of Americans suffering from economic calamity to nearly the degree that they did in the Great Depression. Even if we were to repeat the policies of the 19**30s**, however, it is worth recalling that the unusual **restraint** of those years **was not sufficient to keep the U**nited **S**tates **out of war**. On the contrary, the United States took actions which ultimately led to the greatest and most costly foreign intervention in its history. Even the most determined and in those years powerful isolationists could not prevent it. Today there are a number of obvious possible contingencies that might lead the United States to substantial interventions overseas, notwithstanding the preference of the public and its political leaders to avoid them. Few Americans want a war with Iran, for instance. But it is not implausible that a president—indeed, this president—might find himself in a situation where military conflict at some level is hard to avoid. The continued success of the international sanctions regime that the Obama administration has so skillfully put into place, for instance, might eventually cause the Iranian government to lash out in some way—perhaps by attempting to close the Strait of Hormuz. Recall that Japan launched its attack on Pearl Harbor in no small part as a response to oil sanctions imposed by a Roosevelt administration that had not the slightest interest or intention of fighting a war against Japan but was merely expressing moral outrage at Japanese behavior on the Chinese mainland. Perhaps in an Iranian contingency, the military actions would stay limited. But perhaps, too, they would escalate. One could well imagine an American public, now so eager to avoid intervention, suddenly demanding that their president retaliate. Then there is the possibility that a military exchange between Israel and Iran, initiated by Israel, could drag the United States into conflict with Iran. Are such scenarios so farfetched that they can be ruled out by Pentagon planners? Other possible contingencies include a war on the Korean Peninsula, where the United States is bound by treaty to come to the aid of its South Korean ally; and possible interventions in Yemen or Somalia, should those states fail even more than they already have and become even more fertile ground for al Qaeda and other terrorist groups. And what about those “humanitarian” interventions that are first on everyone’s list to be avoided? Should another earthquake or some other natural or man-made catastrophe strike, say, Haiti and present the looming prospect of mass starvation and disease and political anarchy just a few hundred miles off U.S. shores, with the possibility of thousands if not hundreds of thousands of refugees, can anyone be confident that an American president will not feel compelled to send an intervention force to help? Some may hope that a **smaller** U.S. **military**, compelled by the necessity of budget constraints, would prevent a president from intervening. More likely, however, it **would simply prevent** a president from **intervening effectively**. This, after all, was the experience of the Bush administration in Iraq and Afghanistan. Both because of constraints and as a conscious strategic choice, the Bush administration sent too few troops to both countries. The results were lengthy, unsuccessful conflicts, burgeoning counterinsurgencies, and loss of confidence in American will and capacity, as well as large annual expenditures. Would it not have been better, and also cheaper, to have sent larger numbers of forces initially to both places and brought about a more rapid conclusion to the fighting? The point is, it may prove cheaper in the long run to have larger forces that can fight wars quickly and conclusively, as Colin Powell long ago suggested, than to have smaller forces that can’t. Would a defense planner trying to anticipate future American actions be wise to base planned force structure on the assumption that the United States is out of the intervention business? Or would that be the kind of penny-wise, pound-foolish calculation that, in matters of national security, can prove so unfortunate?

### Iran Diplomacy Add-On

Plan solves Iranian hegemony—

Miller et al 12—Rich Miller, Asjylyn Loder and Jim Polson, Americans Gaining Energy Independence With U.S. As Top Producer, Bloomberg, 2-6, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-07/americans-gaining-energy-independence-with-u-s-as-top-producer.html

Higher U.S. output lessens the ability of countries like Iran and Russia to use “energy diplomacy” as a means of strengthening their influence, Amy Myers Jaffe, director of the Baker Institute Energy Forum at Rice University, and her colleagues wrote in a report last year.

While the U.S. will still have to pay attention to issues such as Israel’s security and Islamic fundamentalism in the Mideast, which could affect oil prices, it won’t have to be as worried about its supplies.

Positive ‘Shock’

Carlos Pascual, special envoy and coordinator for international energy affairs at the State Department, suggested at a Council on Foreign Relations conference in December that the increased production in the U.S. and elsewhere gives Washington more “maneuverability” in using sanctions to deal with Iran and its nuclear aspirations.

The increased U.S. production of oil and natural gas is a “positive supply shock” for the economy and for national security, said Philip Verleger, a former director of the office of energy policy at the Treasury Department and founder of PKVerleger LLC, a consulting firm in Aspen, Colorado.

Solves Nuke War—

Ben-Meir 7 - Professor of international relations at the Center for Global Affairs at NYU. He teaches courses in international negotiation and Middle Eastern studies, Alon, “Realpolitik: Ending Iran's defiance”, UPI, 2/6, http://www.upi.com/Business\_News/Security-Industry/2007/02/06/Realpolitik-Ending-Irans-defiance/UPI-69491170778058/

NEW YORK, Feb. 6 (UPI) -- That Iran stands today able to challenge or even defy the United States in every sphere of American influence in the Middle East attests to the dismal failure of the Bush administration's policy toward it during the last six years. Feeling emboldened and unrestrained, Tehran may, however, miscalculate the consequences of its own actions, which could precipitate a catastrophic regional war. The Bush administration has less than a year to rein in Iran's reckless behavior if it hopes to prevent such an ominous outcome and achieve, at least, a modicum of regional stability. By all assessments, Iran has reaped the greatest benefits from the Iraq war. The war's consequences and the American preoccupation with it have provided Iran with an historic opportunity to establish Shiite dominance in the region while aggressively pursuing a nuclear weapon program to deter any challenge to its strategy. Tehran is fully cognizant that the successful pursuit of its regional hegemony has now become intertwined with the clout that a nuclear program bestows. Therefore, it is most unlikely that Iran will give up its nuclear ambitions at this juncture, unless it concludes that the price will be too high to bear. That is, whereas before the Iraq war Washington could deal with Iran's nuclear program by itself, now the Bush administration must also disabuse Iran of the belief that it can achieve its regional objectives with impunity. Thus, while the administration attempts to stem the Sunni-Shiite violence in Iraq to prevent it from engulfing other states in the region, Washington must also take a clear stand in Lebanon. Under no circumstances should Iranian-backed Hezbollah be allowed to topple the secular Lebanese government. If this were to occur, it would trigger not only a devastating civil war in Lebanon but a wider Sunni-Shiite bloody conflict. The Arab Sunni states, especially, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan, are terrified of this possible outcome. For them Lebanon may well provide the litmus test of the administration's resolve to inhibit Tehran's adventurism but they must be prepared to directly support U.S. efforts. In this regard, the Bush administration must wean Syria from Iran. This move is of paramount importance because not only could Syria end its political and logistical support for Hezbollah, but it could return Syria, which is predominantly Sunni, to the Arab-Sunni fold. President Bush must realize that Damascus' strategic interests are not compatible with Tehran's and the Assad regime knows only too well its future political stability and economic prosperity depends on peace with Israel and normal relations with the United States. President Bashar Assad may talk tough and embrace militancy as a policy tool; he is, however, the same president who called, more than once, for unconditional resumption of peace negotiation with Israel and was rebuffed. The stakes for the United States and its allies in the region are too high to preclude testing Syria's real intentions which can be ascertained only through direct talks. It is high time for the administration to reassess its policy toward Syria and begin by abandoning its schemes of regime change in Damascus. Syria simply matters; the administration must end its efforts to marginalize a country that can play such a pivotal role in changing the political dynamic for the better throughout the region. Although ideally direct negotiations between the United States and Iran should be the first resort to resolve the nuclear issue, as long as Tehran does not feel seriously threatened, it seems unlikely that the clergy will at this stage end the nuclear program. In possession of nuclear weapons Iran will intimidate the larger Sunni Arab states in the region, bully smaller states into submission, threaten Israel's very existence, use oil as a political weapon to blackmail the West and instigate regional proliferation of nuclear weapons' programs. In short, if unchecked, Iran could plunge the Middle East into a deliberate or inadvertent nuclear conflagration. If we take the administration at its word that it would not tolerate a nuclear Iran and considering these regional implications, Washington is left with no choice but to warn Iran of the severe consequences of not halting its nuclear program.

### Counter-Plan

NOT Competitive- The plan reduces restrictions it doesn’t remove them—The first line of their normal means evidence is “OPENING ALL FEDERAL LANDS”

### AT—Artic Damage

**New tech & Regulation solves ecosystem disruption –**

Horton ‘8. Jennifer Horton, ba in environmental studies @ emory. “What would happen to the environment if U.S. federal lands were open to oil drilling?” [http://science.howstuffworks.com/environmental/green-science/federal-land-oil-drilling.htm] [MG]

Oil companies have cleaned up their act over the past several decades: Drilling pads now take up 80 percent less space than they did 30 years ago, and thanks to adv­anced discovery and drilling techniques, the same amount of oil can be recovered each year with 22,000 fewer wells [source: U.S. Department of Energy].

While failures like the one at Kenai may haunt the industry for years to come, drilling has its success stories, too. At the Alpine Field in Alaska, for instance, workers travel on ice roads instead of gravel roads that could damage the tundra. When the ice melts, they use helicopters to transport equipment. To minimize disturbances to wildlife, pipelines are placed at least 5 feet (1.5 meters) above the ground.

In addition, new satellite, aerial and other oil locator technologies precisely pinpoint oil deposits and reduce the need for drilling repeated holes, while horizontal and directional drilling techniques enable access to multiple wells from a single drill pad. Special computer-guided flexible pipes can move horizontally underground for up to 5 miles (8 kilometers). All told, the entire Alpine Field drilling operation takes up 100 acres of the 40,000-acre site [source: Satchell].

Such positive steps aren't isolated to the Alpine Field, either. Elsewhere, prospectors are eliminating their production of toxic wastes by reusing drilling fluids or using environmentally friendly substances to stimulate oil flow. They may also use lined waste pits to prevent toxic leaks or ship their waste offsite.

The improved measures extend to the drilling's aftermath as well. Instead of capping wells at the surface, many companies now plug them up below ground and restore areas to near original condition. Many offshore drilling platforms, for example, are now artificial reefs teeming with marine life. Wildlife doesn't have to wait to return until after the show is over, though. At some active sites like the Rainey Preserve in Louisiana -- the largest wildlife sanctuary owned by the Audubon Society -- species like the endangered Attwater prairie chicken continue about their business undisturbed.

### AT—Spills

Gulf disaster has catalyzed substantial reforms to spill prevention– Their cards are gross exaggerations –

API ‘12. “The State of American Energy.” American Petroleum Institute. [http://www.api.org/newsroom/upload/soae-2012-report-layout-mechanical.pdf]

Since the Gulf oil spill, the industry has raised the bar on offshore safety. The industry continues to work with BOEM and BSEE to ensure that enhanced operations and effective regulations are in place so that the nation’s oil and natural gas resources can be developed in a safe and environmentally responsible manner.

API and its member companies created the Center for Offshore Safety, an independent, industry-funded body that brings together the best minds and expertise to help operators strive for and maintain the highest levels of safety performance. The Center draws on lessons learned from successful and existing safety programs, applying the best elements of these programs to accommodate the unique challenges of offshore oil and natural gas operations.

In response to the Gulf spill, the industry moved quickly to apply the lessons learned. Since early 2011, two companies—the Marine Well Containment Corporation and the Helix Well Containment Group—have had the containment technology and response capability in place to address the challenges of capping a well if it were releasing oil thousands of feet below the water’s surface. Additionally, the industry continues to sponsor projects to study and enhance technologies for responding to the possibility of an oil spill.

Responses will be rapid, effective, and are constantly being reassessed –

API ‘12. “The State of American Energy.” American Petroleum Institute. [http://www.api.org/newsroom/upload/soae-2012-report-layout-mechanical.pdf]

Electronic navigation and physical oceanographic systems also help safeguard our environment and are a large part of the reason why 97 percent of oil delivered by tankers during the last decade reached its U.S. destination without incident.161

New technologies and better training demonstrate the industry is a global leader in spill prevention. Spills are rare, but if they do happen, the oil and natural gas industry and the U.S. government work together to employ the world’s leading response capabilities and minimize environmental harm.

Under federal law, all companies with offshore facilities must file oil spill contingency plans with BSEE and emergency response plans with the U.S. Coast Guard. Federal and state agencies regularly conduct drills and inspections to ensure response capabilities are maintained at a high level.

The industry funds Oil Spill Response Organizations (OSROs) that rapidly deploy spill response vessels, skimmers, booms and dispersants should a spill occur. OSROs maintain an extensive inventory of owned response equipment that is stored and maintained at pre-position sites across the United States. These entities have increased their resources and capabilities since the Gulf spill, and along with individual companies, they continue to ensure spill response equipment is available and properly maintained and that employees are adequately trained.

IER 12—Obama Policies Making US More Dependent on Persian Gulf Oil, Institute for Energy Research, 8-28, [http://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/2012/08/28/u-s-oil-imports-from-the-persian-gulf-and-saudi-arabia-grow-in-2012-and-administration-policies-may-be-to-blame/]

Open More Federal Lands to Oil Leasing, Drilling and Production. Currently, the federal government leases less than 2.2 percent of federal offshore areas and less than 6 percent of federal onshore lands for oil and natural gas production. Areas that the federal government could open to oil development include:

10.4 billion barrels of oil in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge

86 billion barrels of oil in the outer continental shelf of the lower 48 states

500 million barrels of oil in the Naval Petroleum Reserve-Alaska

25 billion barrels of oil in the outer continental shelf of Alaska

90 billion barrels of oil in the geologic provinces north of the Arctic circle

982 billion barrels of oil shale in the Green River Formation in Colorado, Utah, and Wyoming

And, as staggering as those numbers are, the truth is that unless we are allowed to look for energy, we will not know the full extent of our resources.

China can’t balance—regional balancing and internal problems.

Singh 8 – School of Politics and Sociology, Birkbeck College, University of London , Robert, “The Exceptional Empire: Why the United States Will Not Decline — Again”, International Politics (2008) 45, 571–593. doi:10.1057/ip.2008.25

But, like the EU, **China's** continued **rise is not inevitable**. Some analysts assume that, with a military that does not approximate America's and an overarching interest in economic growth, Beijing's dominant incentive is to avoid conflict. As the appeal of communism ebbs still further into the distance, however, the attraction of nationalism as a last unifying force suggests potential dangers and conflict, not least given the salience of on-going territorial disputes with Japan, Russia, India and Vietnam. The possibility of war over Taiwan is also a constant (Bush and O'Hanlon, 2007). The **likelihood** that **China, Japan and India expend more** **energies** and resources **preoccupied with their own rivalry,** rather **than** in **challenging** or constraining **the US**, **is** one **accorded too little attention** by proponents of American decline (Emmott, 2008). Asia is as much divided against itself as against the West or America. In addition, **an aging population**, an acute **gender imbalance** caused by the ‘one child’ policy, declining birth rates, **corruption, high energy costs, epidemics** like SARS and HIV/AIDS, and the **fragility of its financial system** together **pose major challenges to the Chinese state** and society. A simple **linear rise in Beijing's geo-political heft is** possible but **far from foreordained**.

### AT—Alternative Energy Trade Off

No Link—Alternatives won’t make significant enough gains in transportation or demand and only 1% of generation requires oil.

IER ‘11. Institute for Energy Research “Fracking Will Enable North Dakota to Overtake California as a Major Oil Producer” 10-19-11. [http://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/2011/10/19/11042/ ] [MG]

The Path the United States Should Take

What should the United States do to decrease future heating oil prices and emulate the economic and employment success of North Dakota? Obviously, oil imports from overseas add to the cost of energy in this country as the RAC costs above indicate. But, oil imports could be eliminated eventually just by taking steps to increase domestic production of oil off our coasts and on public lands in the lower 48 states and in Alaska, develop our shale oil resources, and increase the capability to import oil from Canada. Those oil development strategies have been continually blocked by the Obama Administration in preference to increasing renewable energy and continuing our dependence on oil overseas. Because most renewable energy pertains to the electric generation sector and because less than 1 percent of our generation is produced by petroleum, renewable policies do little to reduce our oil demand. That’s because most oil is used in the transportation sector where few alternatives are economic or desired by the American public. As a result, the United States will be dependent on oil for many, many decades to come. Traditionally, oil demand has been reduced by economic recessions and its growth has occurred during periods of economic recovery.

Oil is a bridge fuel-fast transition only results in backlash and faster warming—

LeVine 12 Steve LeVine is a writer for Foreign Policy, JUNE 5, 2012, “Can We Survive the New Golden Age of Oil?”, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/06/05/can\_we\_survive\_the\_new\_golden\_age\_of\_oil?page=0,0

Where the oil-age theorists seem likely to experience almost no pushback is in the revolution in natural gas, with a flood of the fuel already flowing or on its way from Australia, Mozambique, Qatar, Tanzania, the United States, and elsewhere. In both China and the United States, this gas glut is leading utilities to convert coal-fired power plants to natural gas fueling, which burns far cleaner. "We're already seeing coal being pushed out due to low gas prices, which is undoubtedly having a positive impact on greenhouse gas emissions," says Paul Faeth, a senior fellow at CNA, a Washington think tank. Stacy VanDeveer, a professor at the University of New Hampshire, told me that both the gas and oil could be viewed as net positives by climate change groups to the degree that they serve as bridge fuels "to a much more efficient and mostly renewable energy future."

Ultimately, we can expect a middle ground -- neither unfettered development of every hydrocarbon asset on the planet, nor a shackling of the most prized reserves in the service of climate change targets. John Hofmeister, former president of Shell Oil Co., is an unapologetic golden-age proponent, but also argues for emissions reductions. The cutbacks, he told me, must happen over multiple decades, and not faster -- any quicker pace would invite a backlash.

"The proponents of dramatic reduction in greenhouse gases too soon and faster than economies can absorb will actually create a more severe and longer lasting and more difficult future for the environment because of the negative reaction they will create, leading to prolonged adherence to carbon fuels for political reasons," he says.

### AT—Green Jobs

Your empirics are constructed prove nothing–

Furchtgott-Roth 9-13-12. Diana Furchtgott-Roth, senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute and a columnist for RealClearMarkets.com.. Stimulated by Solyndra? : Hope and change is gas and oil. Interview w/ National Review [http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/316710/stimulated-solyndra-interview?pg=1] [MG]

FURCHTGOTT-ROTH: For several years the public has been told that “green energy” will create jobs in America, lots of jobs. And that the federal government must subsidize green energy to make them exist. Many of the 3.1 million so-called green jobs counted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics are jobs that already existed, but have been relabeled as “green.” For instance, someone working in a Salvation Army store sorting used clothes has a green job. A trash collector who picks up recycled materials has a green job. These are not necessarily new jobs.

Authentically green jobs, those that conserve energy, reduce toxic residue, or diminish carbon emissions, often are costly. Mandating the use of renewables, such as wind and solar, means that production of wind turbines and solar panels is increasing overseas, in countries with lower labor costs such as China, and not here.

The jobs actively slowdown economic activity–[ utility, transportation, and tax waste. ]

Furchtgott-Roth 9-13-12. Diana Furchtgott-Roth, senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute and a columnist for RealClearMarkets.com.. Stimulated by Solyndra? : Hope and change is gas and oil. Interview w/ National Review [http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/316710/stimulated-solyndra-interview?pg=1] [MG]

You’re right — in uncertain economic times, most people, in America and elsewhere, just want a job, any job. They do not care if it is green, red, white, or blue. The problem with the focus on counting or creating green jobs is that this activity is a waste of taxpayer dollars. It can slow our economy, because renewable energy is more expensive than natural gas, coal, or oil. People pay more for electricity generated by renewables. So requiring this type of fuel, with the associated green jobs, is like imposing a tax on the economy.

LOPEZ: How are green jobs raising utility bills?

FURCHTGOTT-ROTH: Electricity generated by wind, solar, and biomass is more expensive than energy generated by natural gas. States that require a certain percentage of electricity to be generated by renewables are imposing higher energy costs on their residents. California has the strictest requirements — 33 percent by 2020 — and Colorado is not far behind, with 30 percent by 2020. The burden falls most heavily on low- and middle-income households, whose utility bills are highest as a share of their income.

Green-jobs policies also raise the cost of transportation. Higher corporate-fuel-economy standards make cars more expensive, and requiring multiple blends of gasoline raises the price of gasoline. These higher costs hurt the poor.

Your studies are fallacious –

Furchtgott-Roth 9-13-12. Diana Furchtgott-Roth, senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute and a columnist for RealClearMarkets.com.. Stimulated by Solyndra? : Hope and change is gas and oil. Interview w/ National Review [http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/316710/stimulated-solyndra-interview?pg=1] [MG]

FURCHTGOTT-ROTH: Green-energy studies that show the benefits of green technologies turn logic on its head by concluding that more expensive, mandated technology will increase economic growth and job creation. Such studies have many flaws, including a failure to account for the economic activity displaced through investment in the new, green world; failure to account for the economic costs of higher energy prices; using multiple erroneous assumptions; falsely claiming the development of new industries; and falsely claiming higher numbers of well-paying jobs.

### AT—Climate Change

No extinction—

Stampf 7—Olaf Stampf, Not the End of the World as We Know It, Der Spiegel, 5-7, http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,481684,00.html

The truth is probably somewhere between these two extremes. Climate change will undoubtedly have losers -- but it will also have winners. There will be a reshuffling of climate zones on earth. And there is something else that we can already say with certainty: The end of the world isn't coming any time soon.

Largely unnoticed by the public, climate researchers are currently embroiled in their own struggle over who owns the truth. While some have always seen themselves as environmental activists aiming to shake humanity out of its complacency, others argue for a calmer and more rational approach to the unavoidable.

One member of the levelheaded camp is Hans von Storch, 57, a prominent climate researcher who is director of the Institute for Coastal Research at the GKSS Research Center in Geesthacht in northern Germany. "We have to take away people's fear of climate change," Storch told DER SPIEGEL in a recent interview. "Unfortunately many scientists see themselves too much as priests whose job it is to preach moralistic sermons to people."

Keeping a cool head is a good idea because, for one thing, we can no longer completely prevent climate change. No matter how much governments try to reduce carbon dioxide emissions, it will only be possible to limit the rise in global temperatures to about 2 degrees Celsius (3.6 degrees Fahrenheit) by the end of the century. But even this moderate warming would likely have far fewer apocalyptic consequences than many a prophet of doom would have us believe.

For one thing, the more paleontologists and geologists study the history of the earth's climate, the more clearly do they recognize just how much temperatures have fluctuated in both directions in the past. Even major fluctuations appear to be completely natural phenomena.

Additionally, some environmentalists doubt that the large-scale extinction of animals and plants some have predicted will in fact come about. "A warmer climate helps promote species diversity," says Munich zoologist Josef Reichholf.

Also, more detailed simulations have allowed climate researchers to paint a considerably less dire picture than in the past -- gone is the talk of giant storms, the melting of the Antarctic ice shield and flooding of major cities.

Improved regionalized models also show that climate change can bring not only drawbacks, but also significant benefits, especially in northern regions of the world where it has been too cold and uncomfortable for human activity to flourish in the past. However it is still a taboo to express this idea in public.

For example, countries like Canada and Russia can look forward to better harvests and a blossoming tourism industry, and the only distress the Scandinavians will face is the guilty conscience that could come with benefiting from global warming.

Palm Trees in Germany

There is no doubt that there will be droughts in other parts of the world, especially in subtropical regions. But the widespread assumption that it is developing countries -- that is, the world's poor -- who will, as always, be the ones to suffer is incorrect. According to current predictions, precipitation in large parts of Africa will hardly decrease at all, except in the southern part of the continent. In fact, these same forecasts show the Sahel, traditionally a region beset by drought and famine, actually becoming wetter.

By contrast, some wealthy industrialized nations -- in fact, those principally responsible for climate change -- will likely face growing problems related to drought. The world's new drought zones lie in the southern United States and Australia, but also in Mediterranean countries like Spain, Italy and Greece.

All of this will lead to a major shift within Europe, potentially leading to tough times for southern Spain's mega-resorts and boom times for hotels along the North Sea and Baltic Sea coasts. While the bulk of summer vacationers will eventually lose interest in roasting on Spain's Costa del Sol, Mediterranean conditions could prevail between the German North Sea island of Sylt and Bavaria's Lake Starnberg. The last few weeks of spring in Germany offered a taste of what's to come, as sun-loving crowds packed Berlin's urban beach bars and Munich's beer gardens.

The predicted temperature increase of 3 degrees Celsius would mean that summers in Hamburg, not far from the North Sea coast, would be as warm as they are today in the southwestern city of Freiburg, while conditions in Freiburg would be more like those in Marseille today. Germany will undoubtedly be one of the beneficiaries of climate change. Perhaps palm trees will be growing on the island of Helgoland in the North Sea soon, and German citizens will be saving billions in heating costs -- which in turn would lead to a reduction in CO2 emissions.

But climate change will also have its drawbacks. While German summers will be less rainy, fall and winter rainfall in the country's north will increase by up to 30 percent -- and snow will be a thing of the past. Heavy downpours will also become more common. To avoid flooding, steps will have to be taken to provide better drainage for fields and farmlands, as well as to restore natural flood plains.

Meanwhile, the Kiel Institute for World Economics warns that higher temperatures could mean thousands of heat-related deaths every year. But the extrapolations that lead to this dire prediction are based on the mortality rate in the unusually hot summer of 2003, for which Germans were wholly unprepared. But if hot summer days do become the norm, people will simply adjust by taking siestas and installing air-conditioning.

The medical benefits of higher average temperatures have also been ignored. According to Richard Tol, an environmental economist, "warming temperatures will mean that in 2050 there will be about 40,000 fewer deaths in Germany attributable to cold-related illnesses like the flu.”

Another widespread fear about global warming -- that it will cause super-storms that could devastate towns and villages with unprecedented fury -- also appears to be unfounded. Current long-term simulations, at any rate, do not suggest that such a trend will in fact materialize.

"According to our computer model, neither the number nor intensity of storms is increasing," says Jochem Marotzke, director of the Hamburg-based Max Planck Institute for Meteorology, one of the world's leading climate research centers. "Only the boundaries of low-pressure zones are changing slightly, meaning that weather is becoming more severe in Scandinavia and less so in the Mediterranean."

According to another persistent greenhouse legend, massive flooding will strike major coastal cities, raising horrific scenarios of New York, London and Shanghai sinking into the tide. However this horror story is a relic of the late 1980s, when climate simulations were far less precise than they are today. At the time, some experts believed that the Antarctic ice shield could melt, which would in fact lead to a dramatic 60-meter (197-foot) rise in sea levels. The nuclear industry quickly seized upon and publicized the scenario, which it recognized as an argument in favor of its emissions-free power plants.

But it quickly became apparent that the horrific tale of a melting South Pole was nothing but fiction. The average temperature in the Antarctic is -30 degrees Celsius. Humanity cannot possibly burn enough oil and coal to melt this giant block of ice. On the contrary, current climate models suggest that the Antarctic will even increase in mass: Global warming will cause more water to evaporate, and part of that moisture will fall as snow over Antarctica, causing the ice shield to grow. As a result, the total rise in sea levels would in fact be reduced by about 5 cm (2 inches).

It's a different story in the warmer regions surrounding the North Pole. According to an American study published last week, the Arctic could be melting even faster than previously assumed. But because the Arctic sea ice already floats in the water, its melting will have virtually no effect on sea levels.

'We Still Have Enough Time to React'

Nevertheless, sea levels will rise worldwide as higher temperatures cause the water in the oceans to expand. In addition, more water will flow into the ocean with the gradual thawing of the Greenland ice sheet. All things considered, however, in the current IPCC report climatologists are predicting a rise in sea levels of only about 40 centimeters (16 inches) -- compared with the previous estimate of about one meter (more than three feet). A 40-centimeter rise in sea levels will hardly result in more catastrophic flooding. "We have more computer models and better ones today, and the prognoses have become more precise as a result," explains Peter Lemke of the Alfred Wegener Institute for Polar and Marine Research in the northern German port city of Bremerhaven.

Some researchers do, however, estimate that regional effects could produce an 80-centimeter (31-inch) rise in the sea level along Germany's North Sea coast. This will lead to higher storm surges -- a problem the local population, already accustomed to severe weather, could easily address by building taller dikes.

Another comforting factor -- especially for poorer countries like Bangladesh -- is that none of these changes will happen overnight, but gradually over several decades. "We still have enough time to react," says Storch.

In short, the longer researchers allow their supercomputers to crunch the numbers, the more does the expected deluge dissipate. A rise in sea levels of several meters could only occur if Greenland were largely ice-free, but this is something scientists don't expect to happen for at least a few more centuries or even millennia. This lengthy timeframe raises the question of whether the current prognoses are even reliable.

Too late to solve—

Gelbspan 7— American writer and activist. He has written two books relating to global warming, Ross, It’s too late to stop climate change, argues Ross Gelbspan — so what do we do now?, Grist, 12-11, http://grist.org/article/beyond-the-point-of-no-return/

But even assuming the wildest possible success of their initiatives — that humanity decided tomorrow to replace its coal- and oil-burning energy sources with noncarbon sources — it would still be too late to avert major climate disruptions. No national energy infrastructure can be transformed within a decade.

All these initiatives address only one part of the coming reality. They recall the kind of frenzied scrambling that is characteristic of trauma victims — a frantic focus on other issues, any other issues — that allows people to avoid the central take-home message of the trauma: in this case, the overwhelming power of inflamed nature.

Within the last two years, a number of leading scientists — including Rajendra Pachauri, head of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), British ecologist James Lovelock, and NASA scientist James Hansen — have all declared that humanity is about to pass or already has passed a “tipping point” in terms of global warming. The IPCC, which reflects the findings of more than 2,000 scientists from over 100 countries, recently stated that it is “very unlikely” that we will avoid the coming era of “dangerous climate change.”

### AT—Food Security

No food shortages.

Samuelson, 2011 (Robert, “The Great food crunch,” March 14, Washington Post Writers Group, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2011/03/14/the\_great\_food\_crunch\_109208.html)

Can the world raise food production that much? Well-known environmentalist Lester Brown doubts it. Declining water tables, climate change and eroding topsoil limit the possibilities. Writing in Scientific American, he warned that pervasive food scarcities will lead to more failed states -- nations unable to guarantee food security for their people -- that become breeding grounds for global terrorism and epidemics. He cited Somalia's pirates as prototypes. By contrast, Thompson and other experts are less gloomy. Astonishing technological advances are one reason, as the table below shows. It provides U.S. production of wheat and corn, measured as bushels per acre ("yield"), since 1900. CORN WHEAT Bushels Per Acre 1900 28 12 1950 38 17 1970 72 31 2010 153 46 Corn yields quintupled and wheat yields quadrupled. Improved seeds, more fertilizer, irrigation and better farming practices created huge gains. Optimists argue that these will continue, driven heavily by the biotechnology. It involves the insertion of specific genes into seeds that make crops more resistant to weeds, bugs and drought. In effect, they're smart seeds. "In about 10 years, we've gone from selling corn seed with one biotech trait to eight," says Robert Fraley, chief technology officer for Monsanto, a major seed producer. By 2030, Fraley thinks U.S. yields for corn, cotton and soybeans can roughly double. Biotech seeds are also spreading to Latin America, China and India. The other reason for optimism is that farm practices in some parts of the world -- sub-Saharan Africa, for one -- lag so far behind state-of-the-art that there are immense opportunities for catch-up. Economist Thompson says that the gap on corn yields between successful American farmers and their struggling African counterparts is sometimes 10-to-1.

No war—

Salehyan, 2007 (Idean, assistant professor of political science at the University of North Texas, “The New myth about climate change,” August, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story\_id=3922)

These **claims** generally boil down to an argument **about** resource **scarcity**. Desertification, sea-level rise, more-frequent severe weather events, an increased geographical range of tropical disease, and shortages of freshwater will lead to violence over scarce necessities. Friction between haves and have-nots will increase, and governments will be hard-pressed to provide even the most basic services. In some scenarios, mass migration will ensue, whether due to desertification, natural disasters, and rising sea levels, or as a consequence of resource wars. Environmental refugees will in turn spark political violence in receiving areas, and countries in the “global North” will erect ever higher barriers to keep culturally unwelcome—and hungry—foreigners out. The number of failed states, meanwhile, will increase as governments collapse in the face of resource wars and weakened state capabilities, and transnational terrorists and criminal networks will move in. International wars over depleted water and energy supplies will also intensify. The basic need for survival will supplant nationalism, religion, or ideology as the fundamental root of conflict. Dire scenarios like these may sound convincing, but they **are misleading**. Even worse, they are irresponsible, for they shift liability for wars and human rights abuses away from oppressive, corrupt governments. Additionally, focusing on climate change as a security threat that requires a military response diverts attention away from prudent adaptation mechanisms and new technologies that can prevent the worst catastrophes. First, aside from a few anecdotes, **there is little** systematic empirical **evidence that** resource **scarcity** and changing environmental conditions **lead to conflict**. In fact, several **studies have shown that** an **abundance** of natural resources **is more likely to contribute to conflict**. Moreover, **even as the planet has warmed, the number of civil wars** and insurgencies has decreased dramatically. Data collected by researchers at Uppsala University and the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo shows a steep decline in the number of armed conflicts around the world. Between 1989 and 2002, some 100 armed conflicts came to an end, including the wars in Mozambique, Nicaragua, and Cambodia. If global warming causes conflict, we should not be witnessing this downward trend. Furthermore, if famine and drought led to the crisis in Darfur, why have scores of environmental catastrophes failed to set off armed conflict elsewhere? For instance, the U.N. World Food Programme warns that **5 million people in Malawi have been experiencing** chronic **food shortages** for several years. **But** famine-wracked **Malawi has yet to experience a** major civil **war**. Similarly, the Asian tsunami in 2004 killed hundreds of thousands of people, generated millions of environmental refugees, and led to severe shortages of shelter, food, clean water, and electricity. Yet the tsunami, one of the most extreme catastrophes in recent history, did not lead to an outbreak of resource wars. Clearly then, **there is much more to armed conflict than resource scarcity** and natural disasters.

### AT—Farm Bill

**Farm bill won’t pass and other lame-duck issues crowd it out—**

**Pottoroff, 10/22**/2012 (Rich, “D.C. Watch: Fiscal cliff threat to dominate lame-duck session,” Drovers, <http://www.cattlenetwork.com/cattle-news/latest/DC-Watch-Fiscal-cliff-to-dominate-lame-duck-session-175271241.html>)

The threat of the fiscal cliff is expected to dominate the lame-duck session of Congress crowding out other issues, like the farm bill. While the provisions of the Senate passed bill and the version approved by the House Agriculture Committee are generally accepted by the farm sector, there are very diverse views about the food and nutrition program provisions. House Majority Leader Eric Cantor, who controls the House schedule, says the farm bill will have to be changed before it can be approved and with the very short time frame scheduled for the lameduck session, it would be nearly impossible to get a bill approved in the House, have a House-Senate Conference Committee work out differences, and then get the House and Senate to re-vote on the final version. It looks like the passage of the farm bill will be pushed off into the next session of Congress and the final package may look a lot different from what is currently being discussed.

**Not a priority—**

**Radelat, 10/2**/2012 (Ana, “Dairymen: If milk prices skyrocket, Congress is to blame,” <http://www.ctmirror.org/story/17626/dairymen-say-if-milk-prices-skyrocket-congress-blame>)

House Speaker John Boehner has indicated there may be a vote on a farm bill in the lame duck session of Congress. But he did not say whether it would be a one-year extension of the current farm bill or a new, multi-year authorization that includes the new dairy program. Courtney said Boehner "didn't even try" to muster enough votes for a farm bill in the regular session. A vote on a farm bill will add to an already busy agenda that's expected in a post-election session. The lame duck Congress will likely work on a deal on a series of expiring tax cuts and a bill to offset a scheduled $110 billion in cuts that would disproportionately affect the defense budget.

Obama not key – Cantor controls the vote

Bloomberg Business Week, 10/26, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-10-26/new-agriculture-law-to-be-considered-in-lame-duck-cantor-says

House Majority Leader Eric Cantor promised to bring stalled agriculture-policy legislation to the House floor during Congress’s lame-duck session after the Nov. 6 election. The last farm bill expired Sept. 30. “I’m committed to bring the issue to the floor and then to see a way forward so we can get the votes” to approve a bill, the Virginia Republican told reporters yesterday while campaigning for Representative Raul Labrador in Boise, Idaho, according to the Idaho Statesman newspaper. Cantor provided no other details, spokesman Douglas Heye said today in an e-mail.

### AT—Lame Duck

No lame duck focus link—plan happens immediately—key to aff and neg ground—immediate implementation is the only basis for predictable research and preparation—AND—the lame duck session is a special session—means by their standard the plan would be done in 2013 post-the disad, or another immediate special session is fair game

**Tax cuts and sequestration will dominate the session—**

**Washington Insight, 10/9**/2012 (“Washington Insight Focuses on Lame Duck,” <http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/washington-insight-focuses-on-lame-duck-87085/>)

With about 30 days left until the election, we take a look at various scenarios for when Congress returns for the lame duck session in November. Much will depend on the election results - both in the Congress and the White House. In the Senate, it appears that Democrats have at least a 50-50 chance of retaining their majority status. Regardless of the final outcome, neither party will have the super-majority of 60 votes to overcome potential filibusters. In the House, the current wisdom is that Democrats face steep odds of retaking the majority. The largest prize, of course, is the White House. While recent polling is trending in a positive direction for the President, if the old adage still rings true - that a day is a lifetime in politics - then 40 days are certainly several eternities. Regardless of the election results, what won’t change is the crowded legislative agenda that was pushed off into a lame duck session. How that agenda gets addressed, if at all, will in large part depend on who wins the White House. Topping the list will be two major items - the expiration of the Bush tax cuts and the looming sequestration. Commonly referred to as “the fiscal cliff,” both parties until now have seemed content to defer addressing the issues in order to avoid taking a stand that could alienate portions of the electorate as well as use the time to gauge public sentiment coming out of the election.

**Security bill—**

**The Hill, 10/13**/2012 (Alexander Bolton, “Central component of 9/11 reform targeted in lame duck session,” <http://thehill.com/blogs/on-the-money/1005-trade/261767-central-component-of-911-reform-targeted-in-lame-duck-session>)

The U.S. Chamber of Commerce and other business groups want Congress to overhaul a rule that all cargo shipped to the United States from foreign ports be scanned for security. The groups argue the requirement, a key element of the 2007 law implementing the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, will raise costs for businesses by slowing international trade and could raise havoc on the U.S. economy. They also argue security measures already in place make the scanning unnecessary. Requiring 100 percent scanning would do little to increase security but could cripple trade, the groups contend. Supporters of the mandate say it is the best safeguard against the nightmare scenario of a ship sailing into the Globe Marine Terminal in Jersey City or another busy port with a dirty bomb or other devastating weapon. It passed Congress overwhelmingly five years ago: 85 to 8 in the Senate and 371 to 40 in the House. When Congress approved the 9/11 Commission bill, it had hoped that the Department of Homeland Security would already be meeting the 100 percent scanning requirement. But DHS isn’t close to meeting the goal. As of the end of June, customs officials had scanned less than 5 percent of the millions of containers shipped to the United States. It is difficult to imagine DHS meeting the new goal anytime soon, thought the 2007 law sets it out as a marker. The business groups are backing legislation sponsored by Sen. Susan Collins (Maine), the ranking Republican on the Senate Homeland Security Committee, and Sen. Patty Murray (D-Wash.) that would grant the Homeland Security secretary the power to waive the 100-percent scanning requirement if certain conditions are met. The panel has tentatively scheduled a mark-up of the legislation for November, according to a source tracking it. Leslie Phillips, a spokeswoman for the panel, said the markup schedule has not been set but added that Homeland Security Chairman Joe Lieberman (I-Conn.) supports the bill and it is on a list of legislation that may be ready for consideration in the lame-duck session. Those backing the 100 percent scanning requirement fear the Collins-Murray bill will be quietly added to must-past legislation in the lame-duck, and that hopes of meeting the stringent requirement will be lost for good. “We believe there are people that are in opposition to the mandate and have been working to have it repealed or significantly neutered. It’s a variety of people. They argue the technology does not exist and that it’s not affordable. We believe we’ve answered all three of those questions,” said Stanton Sloane, CEO of Decision Sciences International Corporation. Sloane’s company claims it has developed technology that can scan cargo containers in 30 to 35 seconds without kicking off the damaging radiation of x-rays. If so, it could be in line to make heavy profits if the 100 percent scanning requirement remains. Approving the 9/11 Commission recommendations was a part of the House Democrats “six in 2006” campaign after they won the House, and remains politically important with key members of the party, including Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.), chairwoman of the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Subcommittee, and Rep. Edward Markey (D-Mass.). In a statement commemorating the 11th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, Markey pledged to work with his colleagues to urge the homeland security department to “stop its delay sand meet the 100-percent scanning mandate consistent with the law.” While Collins and Murray both voted for the 100 percent scanning requirement in 2007, it has opponents throughout Washington — including Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano. “We have experienced first-hand the array of diplomatic, financial, and logistical challenges associated with even a limited scanning regime,” she wrote in a letter to Congress in May. “We conclude that the specific approach established under current legislation is neither the most efficient nor a cost-effective way to secure our nation and global supply chains against nuclear terrorism.” The Chamber supports a multi-layered security approach, which would not depend on all cargo meeting a scanning requirement. “The Chamber is a strong supporter of the multi-layered, risk-based approach as it is the most effective way to secure the country and facilitate legitimate trade,” said Adam Salerno, director of national security and emergency preparedness at the U.S. Chamber. “This approach includes supply chain security programs, risk-based targeting, scanning of high-risk containers and a series of other programs that both government and the private sector work together on.” “The 100-percent scanning mandate abandons the risk-based model, and diverts critical resources away from programs that provide far greater security,” he added. The National Retail Federation also supports language in the Collins-Murray bill allowing the department of homeland security to waive the scanning mandate if other security requirements are met. “We’ve had a problem with it ever since it was introduced. We don’t think it adds to the multilayered risk based approach that the department of homeland security has established,” Jonathan Gold, vice president of supply chain and customs policy at the National Retail Federation, said of the scanning requirement. “The pilot program has shown that it is wrought with problems. There are issues dealing with the technology itself, the implementation, the cost factor it’s going to have on the global supply chain,” he said. A European Commission staff working paper estimates the scanning requirement could cost the European Union and the United States about 10 billion euros annually. Sloane said he is aware of concerns that the U.S. Chamber and its allies may try to repeal and replace the scanning requirement in the lame duck. “That’s something I have heard. It seems strange to me that anyone would like to do something to reduce the safety and security of the United States,” he said.

Focus impossible—

Jake Sherman, Politico, 9/24, Hill braces for lame-duck frenzy, dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=3B5A05C4-0674-471F-8B0D-AFDFF7748AD8

Tax rates, spending cuts and the deficit will dominate the Capitol this fall, but lawmakers and lobbyists are quietly maneuvering to use the lame-duck session to clean up a whole mess of other issues that Congress has been unable — or unwilling — to handle.

First there’s the United States Postal Service, which will default on $11 billion worth of health care retirement payments in August. Negotiations are under way to patch its finances during the lame-duck session.

K Street and Capitol Hill are also moving closer than ever before to a deal to legalize online gaming — something that’s long simmered on the back burner but that may pass in the lame duck. Congress also may extend parts of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which expire at the end of 2012.

Welfare programs are also on the block: Extending parts of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families may not get done until after the election, even though some programs expire at the end of September. This diffuse set of bills and expiring deadlines has created a behind-the-scenes frenzy as lobbyists and lawmakers try to set in motion a few deals despite the gridlock that has dominated the 112th Congress.

The action may extend to other fronts, like the Dodd-Frank financial law — lawmakers and lobbyists have spotted opportunity to repeal a provision in the law that forces banks to transfer derivatives trades out of their shops.

Most of the movement is so preliminary that few key players are willing to talk about it on the record. Many of these items could be slipped into larger legislation, outside public view while Washington deals with the frenzy of finding compromise on tax rates for every American. Much hinges on the election — the landscape for legislative victories will change significantly depending on the outcome of November.

But inside the Capitol, there’s an increasing desire to pick off a bunch of legislative wins. Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio) can hardly make his way across the House floor these days without being bombarded by Republicans who want their priority pushed before the 112th Congress ends.

But House leaders are warning that they can’t do everything that’s punted to a lame duck. Aides in both chambers say Congress will be swamped at the end of the year — making each issue an uphill climb.