### Hegemony

U.S. doesn’t know where all of China’s nuclear weapons are --- don’t hang your hat on faulty intelligence.

Bin, 2008 (Li, Director of the Arms Control Program and Professor of the Institute of International Studies @ Tsinghua University, Paper Tiger with Whitened Teeth, China Security, p. chinasecurity.us/index.php?option=com\_content&view=article&id=213&Itemid=8) drc

Using their models, Lieber and Press concluded that zero Russian long-range nuclear weapons would survive in a surprise U.S. nuclear strike. The sensitivity analysis in this paper suggests that the resulting “zero” target survivability is very robust. That is, reductions in the accuracy and reliability of U.S. nuclear weapons as well as a further hardening of Russian silos would still not alter the expected zero survivability. As for China, which has far fewer nuclear weapons than Russia, the United States would be able to eliminate all of China’s nuclear weapons with even greater certainty in a surprise nuclear strike. Furthermore, the authors contend that America has a distinct technical edge over Russia and China in nuclear weaponry, ensuring that zero target survivability will be unchangeable for the foreseeable future. On the other hand, the uncertainties raised in their thesis are minor; suggesting for instance that a U.S. submarine commander might not receive, or might not believe, his launch orders. However, they conclude with the warning that it would be unwise for Russia and China to pin their hopes on enemy weapons platforms underperforming. The authors’ calculations are not surprising. Basic arithmetic alone will certify that thousands of nuclear missiles should be able to destroy a couple dozen immobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). But this calculus has existed for a long time. The authors would have done better to question why they are the first to discuss China’s vulnerability to zero target survivability. The Chinese leaders do not feel a sense of panic about the scarcity of Chinese immobile ICBMs and do not rush to increase their number when in fact they have the capability and the means to do so. Why, the authors might have asked themselves, does China remain comfortable with its small and low-alert nuclear arsenal? As Lieber and Press state in their paper: “…[China’s] strategic arsenal is growing at a glacial pace. China has only 18 ICBMs, a number that has remained essentially unchanged for more than a decade. In addition, these missiles are kept un-fueled, and their warheads are stored separately.” Rather than exploring why China chooses to do so, Lieber and Press use this fact as evidence to support their point on U.S. nuclear primacy.3 If the authors paid more heed to China’s choice of a small and low-alert nuclear arsenal they would find their deductions faulty, including technical problems in their calculations. All the calculations in their paper, including the sensitivity analyses, focus on the hardness of the targets as well as strike capabilities, which are determined by the lethal distance, accuracy, and reliability of U.S. nuclear weapons. However, the calculations in the paper are based on a **fundamentally unrealistic assumption**: that is, the United States can detect and locate all Russian and Chinese long-range nuclear weapons. The authors never state this assumption in their paper – perhaps unknowingly so, as most former calculations do not discuss the issue of target detection. In other previous studies, where the numbers of surviving nuclear weapons in a calculation are much larger than zero, it may be alright to ignore the factor of intelligence. But, if such a calculation gives a result of almost zero surviving targets in a nuclear exchange, the intelligence factor becomes highly salient and therefore cannot be ignored. The authors understand that “… one surviving mobile ICBM might destroy a U.S. city …” So their sensitivity analysis tries to prove that no single Russian long-range nuclear weapon can survive even if the U.S. nuclear weapons are not as effective as assumed. However, the real problem is that if the United States does not know where some nuclear weapons are in Russia or China, the United States cannot destroy them even with superior numbers and performance of nuclear weapons. It is instructive to know that once the Soviet Union (and later, Russia) felt that it had a sufficient number of nuclear weapons to survive a first U.S. nuclear strike, it chose to sign the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START) I and II that entail on-site inspections to verify the numbers and locations of the Russian long-range nuclear weapons. If Russia feels that not a single one of its nuclear weapons can survive a first strike by the United States, it may consider not revealing all its nuclear weapons to the United States. In fact, unlike the START treaties, the new Moscow Treaty does not require similar on-site inspections. It is evident, even more so in **China**’s case, that it **has** **never declared the number or location of its nuclear weapons**. Naturally, the United States relies on its intelligence to identify and locate China’s nuclear weapons and then uses this information to decipher which objects and how many objects appear to be nuclear weapons and where they are located. The calculations in their paper do prove that the United States can destroy all the objects that have been identified by U.S. intelligence as nuclear weapons. However, the paper misses the central point of whether the entirety of Chinese long-range nuclear weapons have been identified and located by U.S. intelligence or whether all the objects that are identified in China are real nuclear weapons. The paper simply omits possible deficiencies of intelligence. Furthermore, the performance of U.S. intelligence in the first Iraq war and the Kosovo war suggests that the United States may miss more than just a few large military targets. Technically speaking, it is a relatively simple countermeasure for China to conceal a few actual ICBMs and to deploy decoy missiles – given the large size of the Chinese territory. No matter how the United States increases the number, accuracy, and reliability of its nuclear weapons, even if used in a surprise attack, it has no means of destroying those Chinese ICBMs that its intelligence has not found. Thus, there is no method or model by which Lieber and Press can determine with any certainty that the number of surviving Chinese ICBMs after a surprise U.S. strike (equal to the number of undetected Chinese ICBMs) will be zero, and **it** **seems** far more **likely survivability would be greater than zero**. The definitive conclusion that the surviving Chinese ICBMs must be zero is technically wrong as it omits the intelligence deficiency.

Any risk of failure means you vote neg --- probability dictates.

Yarynich and Starr, 2007 (Valery, Professor of the Academy of Military Sciences, Colonel, and Visiting Professor of Cal State U, and Steven, Associate member of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, 3-4, "Nuclear Primacy" is a Fallacy, Global Research, p. www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=4991) drc

It is extremely important to note that the method of “fixed” assessment of results used by Leiber and Press is essentially incorrect. They contradict themselves. On the one hand, they discuss a “95 percent confidence interval” for all these calculations. On the other hand, they say nothing about “non-typical” results within the remaining 5%. However, these “non-typical” results are far more important for a correct assessment of a risk of a first strike than all others listed in Table 4 (Model Results) and in Figures 1-3. Usually, for ordinary studies of a process with an accidental nature, it is correct to utilize the most probable results for assessment, and ignore the non-typical ones. Lieber and Press transmit this correct rule to their modeling of a nuclear war. This is a serious methodological mistake. **The absolutely unique consequences of nuclear war dictate the need for a quite opposite approach: we are obliged to estimate a risk through the most unacceptable results**, even if they are non-typical. Lieber and Press must study this 5% in the first place, but instead they ignore them! This calculation involves the death of many millions of people and quite possibly the destruction of civilization — it cannot be made lightly. They write, “some probability of nuclear retaliation far below 100 percent should deter almost any prospective attacker. They [critics] err, however, by assuming that any level of first-strike uncertainty will create a powerful deterrent effect. There is no deductive reason to believe that a country with a 95 percent chance of successfully destroying its enemy's nuclear force on the ground will act as cautiously as a country that only has a 10 percent chance of success.” In our view, this is the main error of Lieber and Press. The decisive factor is the EXISTENCE ITSELF of unacceptable results of retaliation, **independent of** their **probability and size**. This is because the individual probability of unacceptable results among all possible results of modeling does not play the decisive role; ANY of the calculated results IS possible if a real nuclear war occurs; i.e., IS, but not ARE, because a real nuclear war is possible only one time.

### 2ac-Counter-Plan

Conditionality is a voting issue-It divides the last speech for offense into multiple worlds that we can’t access in the 2AR when they kick everything. Also destroys argument responsibility, which internal link-turns their strategic thinking arguments and limits real world skill level. Don’t buy counter interpretations they’re self serving & reject the team.

Permutation do the Counter-Plan

The Plan says to reduce restrictions NOT to eliminate them

Our evidence is avout the Green River formation

No environment impact

Ben Ridder 8, Phd School of Geography and Environmental Studies, University of Tasmania, “Questioning the ecosystem services argument for biodiversity conservation” Biodiversity and conservation yr:2008 vol:17 iss:4 pg:781

\*ES = environmental services

The low resilience assumption

Advocates of the conservation of biodiversity tend not to acknowledge the distinction between resilient and sensitive ES. This ‘low resilience assumption’ gives rise to, and is reinforced by the almost ubiquitous claim within the conservation literature that ES depend on biodiversity.

An extreme example of this claim is made by the Ehrlichs in Extinction. They state that “all [ecosystem services] will be threatened if the rate of extinctions continues to increase” then observe that attempts to artificially replicate natural processes “are no more than partially successful in most cases. Nature nearly always does it better. When society sacrifices natural services for some other gain… it must pay the costs of substitution” (Ehrlich and Ehrlich 1982, pp. 95–96). This assertion—that the only alternative to protecting every species is a world in which all ES have been substituted by artificial alternatives—is an extreme example of the ‘low resilience assumption’. Paul Ehrlich revisits this flawed logic in 1997 i nhis response (with four co-authors) to doubts expressed by Mark Sagoff regarding economic arguments for species conservation (Ehrlich et al. 1997, p. 101).

The claim that ES depend on biodiversity is also notably present in the controversial Issues in Ecology paper on biodiversity and ecosystem functioning (Naeem et al. 1999) that sparked the debate mentioned in the introduction. This appears to reflect a general tendency among authors in this field (e.g., Hector et al. 2001; Lawler et al. 2002; Lyons et al. 2005). Although such authors may not actually articulate the low resilience assumption, presenting such claims in the absence of any clarification indicates its influence.

That the low resilience assumption is largely false is apparent in the number of examples of species extinctions that have not brought about catastrophic ecosystem collapse and decline in ES, and in the generally limited ecosystem influence of species on the cusp of extinction. These issues have been raised by numerous authors, although given the absence of systematic attempts to verify propositions of this sort, the evidence assembled is usually anecdotal and we are forced to trust that an unbiased account of the situation has been presented. Fortunately a number of highly respected people have discussed this topic, not least being the prominent conservation biologist David Ehrenfeld. In 1978 he described the ‘conservation dilemma’, which “arises on the increasingly frequent occasions when we encounter a threatened part of Nature but can find no rational reason for keeping it” (Ehrenfeld 1981, p. 177). He continued with the following observation: Have there been permanent and significant ‘resource’ effects of the extinction, in the wild, of John Bartram’s great discovery, the beautiful tree Franklinia alatamaha, which had almost vanished from the earth when Bartram first set eyes upon it? Or a thousand species of tiny beetles that we never knew existed before or after their probable extermination? Can we even be certain than the eastern forests of the United States suffer the loss of their passenger pigeons and chestnuts in some tangible way that affects their vitality or permanence, their value to us? (p. 192) Later, at the first conference on biodiversity, Ehrenfeld (1988) reflected that most species “do not seem to have any conventional value at all” and that the rarest species are “the ones least likely to be missed… by no stretch of the imagination can we make them out to be vital cogs in the ecological machine” (p. 215). The appearance of comments within the environmental literature that are consistent with Ehrenfeld’s—and from authors whose academic standing is also worthy of respect—is uncommon but not unheard of (e.g., Tudge 1989; Ghilarov 1996; Sagoff 1997; Slobodkin 2001; Western 2001).

The low resilience assumption is also undermined by the overwhelming tendency for the protection of specific endangered species to be justified by moral or aesthetic arguments, or a basic appeal to the necessity of conserving biodiversity, rather than by emphasising the actual ES these species provide or might be able to provide humanity. Often the only services that can be promoted in this regard relate to the ‘scientific’ or ‘cultural’ value of conserving a particular species, and the tourism revenue that might be associated with its continued existence. The preservation of such services is of an entirely different order compared with the collapse of human civilization predicted by the more pessimistic environmental authors**.** The popularity of the low resilience assumption is in part explained by the increased rhetorical force of arguments that highlight connections between the conservation of biodiversity, human survival and economic profit. However, it needs to be acknowledged by those who employ this approach that a number of negative implications are associated with any use of economic arguments to justify the conservation of biodiversity.

Oceans resilient – they can’t kill off the microbes key to ecosystem functions.

Kunzig 7 – Award Winning Scientific Journalist Specializing in Oceans, Robert, Sweeping The Ocean Floor, Discover, Vol. 28

For all its unplumbed depths, **the ocean is** a rather **simple** machine. Light from the sun comes in at the top. **Nutrients**, primarily nitrogen and phosphorus, are brought from the land by rivers and are stirred up from the bottom mud by upwelling currents. Floating single-celled plants, the **phytoplankton**, **take** the **sunlight and** the **nutrients and combine them with carbon** dioxide **to make organic matter**. The single-celled plants are eaten by Zooplankton, which are then eaten by larger things, and so on, up to the familiar tuna and nurse sharks and gray whales. Floating in the water among all these things are myriad bacteria — there are perhaps a billion cells in every liter. These **bacteria degrade dead** **plankton and fish** excrement, **recycling** the carbon, nitrogen, phosphorus, and other **elements** back into the water. Census scientists estimate that more than **90 percent of** the 145 billion tons of life in **the sea consists of** microbes, **either phytoplankton or bacteria**. Some of the dead matter escapes the degrading microbes and sinks into the deeper, darker layers of the ocean. On the way down, it nourishes another population of animals — some fish, but also a huge array of gooey gelatinous things, known to their few scientific friends as jellies. Jellyfish proper, the medusae, are just one kind. They are familiar because they often venture into the shallows where humans paddle about. There are also the ctenophores, or comb jellies, with their eight rows of tiny rippling paddles; cylindrical salps that swim by jet propulsion; and floating snails that catch their food by casting large nets of mucus. Many of these animals are able to light up like fireflies — whether to scare off predators or attract a mate is not entirely clear. Descending in a submersible from the sunlit surface waters into the deep and utter dark of the abyss, one sees these bioluminescent flickers, like flashbulbs in a darkened concert hall. Then there is the bottom. The seafloor is not a single place; its topography is every bit as varied as that of dry land. A rugged chain of volcanic mountains, the midocean ridge, runs down the center of the Atlantic, around Africa into the Indian Ocean, between Australia and Antarctica, and across the South Pacific, then up the East Pacific to California, where it becomes the San Andreas Fault. The ridge rises as high as 15,000 feet above the surrounding abyssal plains. Here and there, those hilly plains are interrupted by underwater mountains called seamounts. In certain places along the rim of the oceans, especially the Pacific Rim, the seafloor descends abruptly into deep trenches. The most extreme, the Mariana Trench near the Philippines, plunges nearly seven miles, far deeper than Everest is tall. In 1960 Swiss explorer Jacques Piccard and American Navy lieutenant Don Walsh landed on its bottom in a primitive submarine, the Trieste, and looked out their tiny porthole for a few minutes. They saw a fish, or maybe it was a sea cucumber. There is life everywhere in the ocean, on every patch of ground, in every ounce of water. The deep seafloor is perfectly dark — sunlight is completely extinguished at a depth of 3,000 feet — and so it has no plants. Life there is sustained by the intermittent rain of dead organic matter from the surface waters. In places like the North Atlantic, where plankton bloom lushly in the spring, oceanographers find patches of green stuff on the ocean bed, a mile or two below. Sea cucumbers, one of the most common deep-sea animals, crawl through the stuff and vacuum it up. When a fish corpse reaches the bottom, every bit of flesh and bone is slowly scavenged by eel-like hagfish, starfish, and swarms of tiny crustaceans called amphipods. Even where the food is not so rich, the seafloor is not lifeless; everywhere it is churned by bristle worms and nematodes and pill-bug-like isopods. Life at the bottom may be sparse, but it is thorough. Every particle of mud passes through a worm gut several times at least. For more than a century, after deep-sea studies got going in earnest in the 1870s with the round-the-world expedition of the British ship Challenger, biologists thought that was all there was to it. Then in 1977, two geochemists — Jack Cortiss and John Edmond, diving in the submersible Alvin — discovered the first hydrothermal vent, or volcanic hot spring, on the ocean floor. They saw an astonishing scene around the vent. Clustered there, on the midocean ridge near the Galapagos Islands, were giant clams and mussels and six-foot-long tube worms, anchored to the ground and sticking upright. The tubes were white as ivory, with scarlet plumes at their tips that retracted as the sub approached. None of these species had ever been documented before. The strange organisms of the Galapagos rift turned out to be a whole new type of ecosystem. The base of their food chain was not plants that captured the energy of the sun but chemosynthetic bacteria that captured the energy of the volcano. Similar hydrothermal vent communities were eventually found at dozens of other points on the midocean ridge. Biologists, including some who had never thought much about the deep before, descended on them with fascination — and relief. It didn't take much work to convince the public and the funding agencies that these weird beasts were worth studying, so out-of-reach money suddenly became available. But in the ensuing rush, it was easy to forget that there was still a vast, cold, unknown ocean out there. Fred Grassle never forgot He had been one of the first scientists to get a good look at the Galapagos hot springs. A biologist from Rutgers University in New Jersey specializing in polychaetes — tiny caterpillar-like things, also known as bristle worms — he found himself staring out Alvin's porthole at tube worms almost as tall as he was. He was as amazed as anyone, but he soon went back to the larger problem of studying all the rest of the ocean. In the 1980s, he and his colleague Nancy Maciolek of Battelle Ocean Sciences in Massachusetts used a simple device called a box corer to collect undisturbed square-foot samples of seafloor mud. Judging from how many new species they found each time they lowered their device 7,000 feet onto the continental slope off New Jersey, Grassle and Maciolek estimated that there were up to 10 million animal species living on the ocean floor. If so, the deep was as diverse as the tropical rain forest. Grassle tried hard to get people excited about his work. He did not have much luck until he went to see Jesse Ausubel, who calls himself an environmental scientist and systems analyst but whose real talent is that he is a big-picture man, an organizer, and a congenital optimist. Early in his career he began studying environmental problems. "I'm going to be doing this for 40 years," he decided, "and I don't want to just go around saying Terrible things could happen.'" Terrible things are in fact happening to the ocean, as Grassle told Ausubel when they met. It was July 2, 1996, and they spent most of the day together in Woods Hole, Massachusetts, where Grassle had once worked at the Oceanographic Institution and where Ausubel has a summer office. A hundred miles to the east, on Georges Bank, the codfish stock had recently collapsed, as had the much larger one on the Grand Banks off Newfoundland; regulators had been forced to close both of those rich and historic fisheries. The amount we know about the marine species we depend on, Grassle told Ausubel, is minimal. The amount we don't know about the rest of the ocean, on the other hand, is astronomical. Ausubel took that as a challenge. The Sloan Foundation had recently sponsored a Digital Sky Survey — a systematic census of the stars. What did Grassle think, Ausubel asked, about doing a census of the fishes? Grassle thought it was a splendid idea, as long as it didn't get diverted into something strictly utilitarian — a census of seafood — and as long as it included all the other things that lived in the ocean, including obscure but biologically important organisms like polychaetes. The Census of Marine Life was born in 2000. "It is what it says it is," Ausubel says. "If you pick up any textbook, there isn't one that can tell you what lives in the ocean. From microbes to mammals, from near the shore to the open ocean, from the bottom to the top — what lives there. It's a very simple idea." Finding out what lives there doesn't just mean finding new species; it also means tracking the species we already know to find out where they go. Even highly visible marine animals lead invisible lives, far from shore or underwater or both. Stanford University biologist Barbara Block and her colleagues on a census project called Tagging of Pacific Pelagics are using microchips and satellite transmitters to penetrate those secrets. So far the researchers have tagged 2,400 animals belonging to 23 species. Some tags pop to the surface at a preset time, like a flare, and radio the animal's position back to the team via satellite. Other animals — sharks, elephant seals, whales, leatherback turtles — are equipped with tags that phone home each time the creatures surface. The tracking project's Web site contains a map of those animals' movements, a tangled mesh of colored lines that is updated daily. Such maps have revealed astonishing migrations. Bluefin tuna born in the Mediterranean cross the Atlantic to feed for a few years up and down the east coast of North America, mingling there with bluefins born in the Gulf of Mexico. Bluefins in the Pacific, on the other hand, feed off California for a few years before crossing the ocean to their breeding grounds off Japan — where a single one can fetch $175,000 on the Tokyo market. And white sharks, once thought to spend most of their time hunting seals and surfers off the California coast, actually head west in winter, to the open sea. For a few months, the sharks hang out in a patch of ocean near Hawaii that is low on food and any other obvious attraction. "My students call it the White Shark Café," Block says. But **most** of the ocean's **diversity** probably isn't hiding; it **is** teeming everywhere, **undiscovered** simply **because it is so small.** That is why Mitchell Sogin of the Marine Biological Laboratory in Woods Hole is directing the Census of Marine Microbes. The old way to search for microbial life in the ocean, he explains, was to isolate individual species by growing them in laboratory cultures. Biologists have identified around 5,000 species that way. But over the past 15 years or so, researchers have begun to realize that those 5,000 are just the hardy few that happen to be easy to keep alive in the lab. A newer, far less selective way of plumbing the ocean's microscopic diversity is to isolate individual genes, not individual microbes. Researchers use a small piece of the gene for ribosomal RNA, or rRNA — a gene that is distinct in every species — to grab all the rRNA genes that are present in a liter of seawater. Then they determine the sequence of as many of those genes as their grant money will, allow — typically around a thousand, coming from a thousand bacterial cells — and use that information to estimate how many different kinds of bacteria are present in the sample. Sogin is now supercharging this approach. By using faster sequencing machines and targeting only one highly variable part of the rRNA gene, he and his team can sequence 200,000 pieces of DNA from a single liter. As a result, the amount of diversity they find has soared. In one sample from the deep North Atlantic Ocean, they have found more than 60,000 kinds of bacteria. One intriguing discovery, Sogin says, is that in each sample he has studied so far **there are always a few dominant** kinds of **microbes but** also **thousands** more **that are rare.** Moreover, at each station — or even at different depths at the same station — there is a different suite of rare microbes. The **large number of rare** microbial **species suggests** that **they** have an important role in the oceanic ecosystem. Sogin suggests these rare species might **function as a genetic archive**, a **fail-safe against** **environmental disaster.** Over many millions of years, he explains, **Earth has undergone repeated** **environmental cataclysms**. "**Global warming, asteroid impact**, or whatever it is — those **events** **threaten** the survival of the **microorganisms**. This might be a way for them to cope," Sogin says. If there are tens of thousands of rare microbes floating in the water, all with different genes and correspondingly different abilities, **there will always be a few** that are **adapted to the new environment**. The dominant might become rare, the rare might become dominant, but **the kingdom as a whole persists**, albeit **with an altered mix of** **species**, which in turn alters the elemental cycles that determine the basic life chemistry of the sea.

### 2ac—Policy Simulation

The Role of the Ballot is Policy Simulation— effective energy choices depend on technical political literacy

Hodson 10 Derek, professor of education – Ontario Institute for Studies @ University of Toronto, “Science Education as a Call to Action,” Canadian Journal of Science, Mathematics and Technology Education, Vol. 10, Issue 3, p. 197-206

\*\*note: SSI = socioscientific issues

The final (fourth) level of sophistication in this issues-based approach is concerned with students findings ways of putting their values and convictions into action, helping them to prepare for and engage in responsible action, and assisting them in **developing the skills**, attitudes, and values **that will enable them to** take control of their lives, **cooperate with others to bring about change**, and work toward a more just and sustainable world in which power, wealth, and resources are more equitably shared. Socially and environmentally responsible behavior will not necessarily follow from knowledge of key concepts and possession of the “right attitudes.” As Curtin (1991) reminded us, it is important to distinguish between caring about and caring for. It is almost always much easier to proclaim that one cares about an issue than to do something about it. Put simply, our values are worth nothing until we live them. Rhetoric and espoused values will not bring about social justice and will not save the planet. We must change our actions. A politicized ethic of care (caring for) entails active involvement in a local manifestation of a particular problem or issue, exploration of the complex sociopolitical contexts in which the problem/issue is located, and attempts to resolve conflicts of interest. FROM STSE RHETORIC TO SOCIOPOLITICAL ACTION Writing from the perspective of environmental education, Jensen (2002) categorized the **knowledge** that is **likely to promote sociopolitical action** and encourage pro-environmental behavior into four dimensions: (a) **scientific and technological knowledge** that informs the issue or problem; (b) knowledge about the underlying social, political, and economic issues, conditions, and structures and how they contribute to creating social and environmental problems; (c) knowledge about how to bring about changes in society through direct or indirect action; and (d) knowledge about the likely outcome or direction of possible actions and the **desirability of those outcomes.** Although formulated as a model for environmental education, it is reasonable to suppose that Jensen's arguments are applicable to all forms of SSI-oriented action. Little needs to be said about dimensions 1 and 2 in Jensen's framework beyond the discussion earlier in the article. With regard to dimension 3, students need knowledge of actions that are likely to have positive impact and knowledge of how to engage in them. **It is essential** that they gain robust knowledge of the social, legal, and **political system(s)** that prevail in the communities in which they live and develop a clear understanding of how **decisions** are **made within** local, regional, and **national government** and within industry, commerce, and the military. Without knowledge of where and with whom power of decision making is located and awareness of the **mechanisms by which decisions are reached**, **intervention is not possible.** Thus, the curriculum I propose requires a concurrent program designed to achieve a measure of political literacy, including knowledge of how to engage in collective action with individuals who have different competencies, backgrounds, and attitudes but share a common interest in a particular SSI. Dimension 3 also includes knowledge of likely sympathizers and potential allies and strategies for encouraging cooperative action and group interventions. What Jensen did not mention but would seem to be a part of dimension 3 knowledge is the nature of science-oriented knowledge that would enable students to appraise the statements, reports, and arguments of scientists, politicians, and journalists and to present their own supporting or opposing arguments in a coherent, robust, and convincing way (see Hodson [2009b] for a lengthy discussion of this aspect of science education). Jensen's fourth category includes awareness of how (and why) others have sought to bring about change and entails formulation of a vision of the kind of world in which we (and our families and communities) wish to live. It is important for students to explore and develop their ideas, dreams, and aspirations for themselves, their neighbors and families and for the wider communities at local, regional, national, and global levels—a clear overlap with futures studies/education. An essential step in cultivating the critical scientific and technological literacy on which **sociopolitical action depends** is the application of a social and political critique capable of challenging the notion of technological determinism. We can control technology and its environmental and social impact. More significantly, we can control the controllers and redirect technology in such a way that adverse environmental impact is substantially reduced (if not entirely eliminated) and issues of freedom, equality, and justice are kept in the forefront of discussion during the **establishment of policy**.

### 2ac—Prior Questions

Prior questions are irrelevant and debilitate action—

Owen 2 (university of Southampton, David Owen, Reader of Political Theory at the Univ. of Southampton, Millennium Vol 31 No 3 2002 p. 655-7)

Commenting on the ‘philosophical turn’ in IR, Wæver remarks that ‘[a] frenzy for words like “epistemology” and “ontology” often signals this philosophical turn’, although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn. The first danger with the philosophical turn is that it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology over explanatory and/or interpretive power as if the latter two were merely a simple function of the former. But while the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is not wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, wholly dependent on these philosophical commitments. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory to recognisethatit can provide powerful accounts of certainkinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness—but this does not undermine the point that, for a certain class of problems, rational choice theory may provide the best account available to us. In other words, while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it is not the only or even necessarily the most important kind. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that because prioritisation of ontology andepistemology promotes theory-construction from philosophical first principles, it cultivates a theory-driven rather than problem-driven approach to IR. Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action, event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, ‘theory-driven work is part of a reductionist program’ in that it ‘dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory’.5 The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since ‘whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomenais a question for social-scientific inquiry, not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry’.6 Moreover, this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of empirical validity. The third danger is that the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR—what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) ‘the Highlander view’—namely, an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because the turn to, and prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things right, namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so a potentially vicious circle arises.

### 2ac—Util

Evaluate these impacts – consequences matter

Isaac, 2002 (Jeffrey C., James H. Rudy professor of Political Science and director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life at Indiana University, Bloomington, “Ends, Means and politics,” *Dissent*, Spring)

As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli,Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and HannahArendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility.The concern may be morally laudable, reflectinga kind of personal integrity, but it suffersfrom three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make commoncause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics—as opposed to religion—pacifism is alwaysa potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiatingviolence, it refuses in principle tooppose certain violent injustices with any effect;and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with “good”may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of “good” that generates evil. This is thelesson of communism in the twentieth century:it is not enough that one’s goals be sincere oridealistic; it is equally important, always, to askabout the effects of pursuing these goals andto judge these effects in pragmatic and historicallycontextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

### 2ac—Kritik Impacts

Their impacts are over-determined nonsense—democracy checks.

O’Kane 97 (“Modernity, the Holocaust, and politics”, Economy and Society, February, ebsco)

Chosen policies cannot be relegated to the position of immediate condition (Nazis in power) in the explanation of the Holocaust. Modern bureaucracy is not ‘intrinsicallycapable of genocidalaction’ (Bauman 1989: 106). Centralized state coercion has no natural move to terror. In the explanation of modern genocides it is chosen policies which play the greatest part, whether in effecting bureaucratic secrecy, organizing forced labour, implementing a system of terror, harnessing science and technology or introducing extermination policies, as means and as ends. As Nazi Germany and Stalin’s USSR have shown, furthermore, those chosen policies of genocidal government turned away from and not towards modernity. The choosing of policies, however, is not independent of circumstances. An analysis of the history of each case plays an important part in explaining where and how genocidal governments come to power and analysis of political institutions and structures also helps towards an understanding of the factors which act as obstacles to modern genocide. But it is not just political factors which stand in the way of another Holocaust in modern society. Modern societies have not only pluralist democratic political systems but also economic pluralism where workers are free to change jobs and bargain wages and where independent firms, each with their own independent bureaucracies, exist in competitionwith state-controlled enterprises. In modern societies this economic pluralism both promotes and is served by the open scientific method. By ignoring competition and the capacity for people to move between organizations whether economic, political, scientific or social, Bauman overlooks crucial but also very ‘ordinary and common’ attributes of truly modern societies. It is thesevery ordinary and common attributes of modernitywhich stand in the way of modern genocides.

Things are getting better now because of hegemony—intensity and number of wars are at the lowest in history

Drezner 5—Professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, Daniel, “Gregg Easterbrook, war, and the dangers of extrapolation”, Blog @ Danieldrezner.com, 5/25, <http://www.danieldrezner.com/archives/002087.html>

Daily explosions in Iraq, massacres in Sudan, the Koreas staring at each other through artillery barrels, a Hobbesian war of all against all in eastern Congo--combat plagues human society as it has, perhaps, since our distant forebears realized that a tree limb could be used as a club. But here is something you would never guess from watching the news: War has entered a cycle of decline. Combat in Iraq and in a few other places is an exception to a significant global trend that has gone nearly unnoticed--namely that, for about 15 years, there have been steadily fewer armed conflicts worldwide. In fact, it is possible that a person's chance of dying because of war has, in the last decade or more, become the lowest in human history. Is Easterbrook right? He has a few more paragraphs on the numbers: The University of Maryland studies find the number of wars and armed conflicts worldwide peaked in 1991 at 51, which may represent the most wars happening simultaneously at any point in history. Since 1991, the number has fallen steadily. There were 26 armed conflicts in 2000 and 25 in 2002, even after the Al Qaeda attack on the United States and the U.S. counterattack against Afghanistan. By 2004, Marshall and Gurr's latest study shows, the number of armed conflicts in the world had declined to 20, even after the invasion of Iraq. All told, there were less than half as many wars in 2004 as there were in 1991. Marshall and Gurr also have a second ranking, gauging the magnitude of fighting. This section of the report is more subjective. Everyone agrees that the worst moment for human conflict was World War II; but how to rank, say, the current separatist fighting in Indonesia versus, say, the Algerian war of independence is more speculative. Nevertheless, the Peace and Conflict studies name 1991 as the peak post-World War II year for totality of global fighting, giving that year a ranking of 179 on a scale that rates the extent and destructiveness of combat. By 2000, in spite of war in the Balkans and genocide in Rwanda, the number had fallen to 97; by 2002 to 81; and, at the end of 2004, it stood at 65. This suggests the extent and intensity of global combat is now less than half what it was 15 years ago. Easterbrook spends the rest of the essay postulating the causes of this -- the decline in great power war, the spread of democracies, the growth of economic interdependence, and even the peacekeeping capabilities of the United Nations. Easterbrook makes a lot of good points -- most people are genuinely shocked when they are told that even in a post-9/11 climate, there has been a steady and persistent decline in wars and deaths from wars. That said, what bothers me in the piece is what Easterbrook leaves out. First, he neglects to mention the biggest reason for why war is on the decline -- there's a global hegemon called the United States right now. Easterbrook acknowledges that "the most powerful factor must be the end of the cold war" but he doesn't understand why it's the most powerful factor. Elsewhere in the piece he talks about the growing comity among the great powers, without discussing the elephant in the room: the reason the "great powers" get along is that the United States is much, much more powerful than anyone else. If you quantify power only by relative military capabilities, the U.S. is a great power, there are maybe ten or so middle powers, and then there are a lot of mosquitoes. [If the U.S. is so powerful, why can't it subdue the Iraqi insurgency?--ed. Power is a relative measure -- the U.S. might be having difficulties, but no other country in the world would have fewer problems.] Joshua Goldstein, who knows a thing or two about this phenomenon, made this clear in a Christian Science Monitor op-ed three years ago: We probably owe this lull to the end of the cold war, and to a unipolar world order with a single superpower to impose its will in places like Kuwait, Serbia, and Afghanistan. The emerging world order is not exactly benign – Sept. 11 comes to mind – and Pax Americana delivers neither justice nor harmony to the corners of the earth. But a unipolar world is inherently more peaceful than the bipolar one where two superpowers fueled rival armies around the world. The long-delayed "peace dividend" has arrived, like a tax refund check long lost in the mail. The difference in language between Goldstein and Easterbrook highlights my second problem with "The End of War?" Goldstein rightly refers to the past fifteen years as a "lull" -- a temporary reduction in war and war-related death. The flip side of U.S. hegemony being responsible for the reduction of armed conflict is what would happen if U.S. hegemony were to ever fade away. Easterbrook focuses on the trends that suggest an ever-decreasing amount of armed conflict -- and I hope he's right. But I'm enough of a realist to know that if the U.S. should find its primacy challenged by, say, a really populous non-democratic country on the other side of the Pacific Ocean, all best about the utility of economic interdependence, U.N. peacekeeping, and the spread of democracy are right out the window. UPDATE: To respond to a few thoughts posted by the commenters: 1) To spell things out a bit more clearly -- U.S. hegemony important to the reduction of conflict in two ways. First, U.S. power can act as a powerful if imperfect constraint on pairs of enduring rivals (Greece-Turkey, India-Pakistan) that contemplate war on a regular basis. It can't stop every conflict, but it can blunt a lot ofthem. Second, and more important to Easterbrook's thesis, U.S. supremacy in conventional military affairs prevents other middle-range states -- China, Russia, India, Great Britain, France, etc. -- from challenging the U.S. or each other in a war. It would be suicide for anyone to fight a war with the U.S., and if any of these countries waged a war with each other, the prospect of U.S. intervention would be equally daunting.

Reject the infinite number of root causes that debilitate action—Focus on strategic deterrence and democracy are key to adverting crisis escalation—

John Moore 4 chaired law prof, UVA. Frm first Chairman of the Board of the US Institute of Peace and as the Counselor on Int Law to the Dept. of State, Beyond the Democratic Peace, 44 Va. J. Int'l L. 341, Lexis

[\*393] If major interstate war is predominantly a product of a synergy between a potential nondemocratic aggressor and an absence of effective deterrence, what is the role of the many traditional "causes" of war? Past, and many contemporary, theories of war have focused on the role of specific disputes between nations, ethnic and religious differences, arms races, poverty and social injustice, competition for resources, incidents and accidents, greed, fear, perceptions of "honor," and many other factors. Such factors may well play a role in motivating aggression or generating fear and manipulating public opinion. The reality, however, is that while some of these factors may have more potential to contribute to war than others, there may well be an infinite set of motivating factors, or human wants, motivating aggression. It is not the independent existence of such motivating factors for war but rather the circumstances permitting or encouraging high-risk decisions leading to war that is the key to more effectively controlling armed conflict. And the same may also be true of democide. The early focus in the Rwanda slaughter on "ethnic conflict," as though Hutus and Tutsis had begun to slaughter each other through spontaneous combustion, distracted our attention from the reality that a nondemocratic Hutu regime had carefully planned and orchestrated a genocide against Rwandan Tutsis as well as its Hutu opponents. n158 Certainly if we were able to press a button and end poverty, racism, religious intolerance, injustice, and endless disputes, we would want to do so. Indeed, democratic governments must remain committed to policies that will produce a better world by all measures of human progress. The broader achievement of democracy and the rule of law will itself assist in this progress. No one, however, has yet been able to demonstrate the kind of robust correlation with any of these "traditional" causes of war that is reflected in the "democratic peace." Further, given the difficulties in overcoming many of these social problems, an approach to war exclusively dependent on their solution may doom us to war for generations to come. [\*394] A useful framework for thinking about the war puzzle is provided in the Kenneth Waltz classic Man, the State and War, n159 first published in 1954 for the Institute of War and Peace Studies, in which he notes that previous thinkers about the causes of war have tended to assign responsibility at one of the three levels of individual psychology, the nature of the state, or the nature of the international system. This tripartite level of analysis has subsequently been widely copied in the study of international relations. We might summarize my analysis in this classical construct by suggesting that the most critical variables are the second and third levels, or "images," of analysis. Government structures, at the second level, seem to play a central role in levels of aggressiveness in high-risk behavior leading to major war. In this, the "democratic peace" is an essential insight. The third level of analysis, the international system, or totality of external incentives influencing the decision to go to war, is also critical when government structures do not restrain such high-risk behavior on their own. Indeed, nondemocratic systems may not only fail to constrain inappropriate aggressive behavior, they may even massively enable it by placing the resources of the state at the disposal of a ruthless regime elite. It is not that the first level of analysis, the individual, is unimportant - I have already argued that it is important in elite perceptions about the permissibility and feasibility of force and resultant necessary levels of deterrence. It is, instead, that the second level of analysis, government structures, may be a powerful proxy for settings bringing to power those who are disposed to aggressive military adventures and in creating incentive structures predisposed to high-risk behavior. We might also want to keep open the possibility that a war/peace model focused on democracy and deterrence might be further usefully refined by adding psychological profiles of particular leaders as we assess the likelihood of aggression and levels of necessary deterrence. Nondemocracies' leaders can have different perceptions of the necessity or usefulness of force and, as Marcus Aurelius should remind us, not all absolute leaders are Caligulas or Neros. Further, the history of ancient Egypt reminds us that not all Pharaohs were disposed to make war on their neighbors. Despite the importance of individual leaders, however, the key to war avoidance is understanding that major international war is critically an interaction, or synergy, of certain characteristics at levels two and three - specifically an absence of [\*395] democracy and an absence of effective deterrence. Yet another way to conceptualize the importance of democracy and deterrence in war avoidance is to note that each in its own way internalizes the costs to decision elites of engaging in high-risk aggressive behavior. Democracy internalizes these costs in a variety of ways including displeasure of the electorate at having war imposed upon it by its own government. And deterrence either prevents achievement of the objective altogether or imposes punishing costs making the gamble not worth the risk. n160

The alt can’t accomplish this—

Harvard Nuclear Studies Group, 1983 (Albert Carnesale, Professor of Public Policy and Academic Dean of Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, Paul Doty, Director of the Center for Science and International Affairs and Mallinckrodt Professor of Biochemistry at Harvard, Stanley Hoffmann, Chairman of the Center for European Studies and Douglass Dillon Professor of the Civilization of France at Harvard, Samuel P. Huntington, Director of the Center for International Affairs and Clarence Dillon Professor of International Affairs at Harvard, Joseph S. Nye Jr., Professor of Government at Harvard, and Scott D. Sagan, Living with Nuclear Weaposn, pp. 18-19)

In the nuclear age, the dangers the United States faces are both numerous and enormous. It would be best if all these dangers could be eliminated, but in interna­tional relations as in all of politics, the goal is to relate the desirable to the possible. The impossibility of achieving perfect solutions should not, however, breed discourage­ment. It should only strengthen determination to persevere. When facing enormous problems, there is a special attraction to the assumption that only radical answers can suffice. Hence, the strong pull of utopian visions of both the extreme left and the extreme right: the ideas that only a world government can solve all our problems or that sheer military muscle is all that America needs. Both prescribe all-purpose solutions, but each ignores the real world. In the real world, packed with huge nuclear arsenals, mere military muscle, unless built and exercised with re­straint and skill, will not ensure American security. In the real world of sovereign states, a world government is a dream for the distant future, not a practical goal for current policymakers. The danger of focusing on utopian objectives is that they can take attention away from practical and positive steps that can be taken now. Such actions may only pro­duce incremental progress toward the goal of national security. But incremental steps matter. It would be a tragedy if opportunities for practical progress toward nuclear peace were missed because our goals were set too high, beyond the reach of what is possible. In his book The Fate of the Earth, Jonathan Schell has reminded people of the dangers of nuclear war, but his "solution" is precisely such an impossible goal. "The task," he wrote, "is nothing less than to reinvent politics: to reinvent the world."5 In reality, however, neither politics nor the world were invented by men, nor can either politics or the world be reinvented. Rather, these arrangements evolved through trial and error, through sacrifice and occasional gifted leadership, to an organization of life on earth that has reached unprecedented attainments. The nature of human­ity, the complex mosaic of civilizations, the web of rela­tions that unite so many nations cannot be taken apart and reinvented in the future. They can, we hope, continue to evolve. We are left, therefore, with our imperfect selves, im­perfect nations, and imperfect relations among them. And it is upon this imperfect structure that the capability of waging infinitely destructive nuclear war has descended. Humanity has no alternative but to hold this threat at bay and to learn to live with politics, to live in the world we know: a world of nuclear weapons, international rivalries, recurring conflicts, and at least some risk of nuclear crisis. The challenge we face is not to escape to a fictional utopia where such problems do not exist. It is to learn how to live with nuclear weapons in ways that are successively safer and in which the freedoms won by men and women are kept secure and can grow. Yet even this imperfect solution will not be achieved if we ignore the incremental steps that are possible today or if discouragement breeds despair. Indeed, that may be the greatest danger of all.

Knowledge production claims don’t assume that academics arbitrarily blame capitalism for everything, markets solve their impact claims

Carden, 2004 (Art, graduate student in economics at Washington University in St. Louis, “Mistaken Identity,” The Free Market, Volume 24, Number 6, http://mises.org/freemarket\_detail.aspx?control=497)

It is always the fashion among many intellectuals to blame society’s ills on the free market. One college newspaper recently argued that the market is "The God That Sucked." The course summaries in my university’s catalog, the themes of the lecture series, and the editorial content of the student newspapers suggest that many students and faculty would agree.Popular contempt for the market is distressing. Few institutions are so universally reviled, and perhaps fewer institutions are so universally misunderstood. This misunderstanding can be dangerous: the radicals who protest so vehemently against the workings of the free market rarely understand that they advocate strangling the goose that lays the golden eggs.To borrow from Robert Frost, we should consider how the heavens go before we try to change the world. In other words, we must consider what is before we talk about what ought to be.Many disagreements have their genesis in misunderstanding and equivocation. So let’s define the term "free market." Dictionary.com defines a "market" as "an opportunity to buy or sell" and a "free market" as "an economic market in which supply and demand are not regulated or are regulated with only minor restrictions." "Free markets" and "capitalism" are practically synonymous, and George Reisman defines capitalism eloquently:"Capitalism is a social system based on private ownership of the means of production. It is characterized by the pursuit of material self-interest under freedom and it rests on a foundation of the cultural influence of reason. Based on its foundations and essential nature, capitalism is further characterized by saving and capital accumulation, exchange and money, financial self-interest and the profit motive, the freedoms of economic competition and economic inequality, the price system, economic progress, and a harmony of the material self-interests of all the individuals who participate in it."Thus, we can define a "free market" as a social system based on the voluntary exchange of property rights. And yet the "free market" is almost universally reviled within the academy.Many popular criticisms of the market are so common as to warrant the charge of cliché (critics of capitalism might say "axiom"). They can be distilled into a few broad propositions, which we consider here. They are: the market is antisocial; the market tramples human rights; the market is the enemy of the environment; and the market is the weapon of the rich against the poor. Let’s consider each in turn.One of the more popular myths about the market economy is that it necessarily entails a Hobbesian "war of all against all," a man-eat-man world in which we all compete in a zero-sum scramble for resources. A recent op-ed in the Washington University Student Life posited that the "apocryphal idea of [the market’s] reality . . . may lead the entire species to self destruction." That’s scary stuff. It follows, then, that the market must be warlike: if resources are finite and everyone lives to consume, conflict—and war—must be the natural result.But conflict and war are the very antithesis of free-market principles. The essence of market exchange is cooperation: two parties exchange goods and services, and both are enriched as a result. You pay Wal-Mart for a necktie. Wal-Mart buys the necktie from the manufacturer. The manufacturer pays for the labor and capital necessary to produce the necktie. Everybody wins.The reader should also note that people never start wars of subjugation to extend the voluntary exchange of goods and services. In fact, many wars occur for fundamentally anticapitalist reasons: namely, trade disputes. We would do well to consider the wisdom of FrédéricBastiat, who noted that when goods don’t cross borders, armies will.Another popular criticism of the free market is that it tramples human rights. Slavery, racism, sexism, and "sweatshops" are the children of capitalism; therefore, the market economy should be overthrown post haste.First, slavery is anti-market by definition: free markets are guided by the principle of voluntarism. Second, racism and sexism are difficult to sustain in competitive markets: no matter how much a certain employer hates blacks, women, Jews, homosexuals, etc., consumersare rarely willing to pay the price premium that would be necessary to allow them to indulge their taste for discrimination. The market has been profoundly benevolent to even the most oppressed minorities. In his masterful Competition and Coercion: Blacks in the American Economy 1865–1914, Robert Higgs chronicled the spectacular gains the sons and daughters of slaves made when they were allowed to participate in the market economy.Third, we have to ask two questions when we consider the plight of "sweatshop" laborers. First, why are working conditions so wretched? Second, what are these workers’ next best alternatives? Working conditions in the third world are wretched precisely because many third-world countrieshave only recently begun to adopt the institutions that characterize the market economies of the west. Workers’ next best alternatives are often appalling: many children leave lives of crime, prostitution, and starvation to work in sweatshops.If we close the sweatshops, they will likely return to crime, prostitution, and starvation.It is also popular to charge that the market is the enemy of the environment. This is also untrue; environmental degradation occurs when property rights are poorly specified or enforced. If anyone or anything has failed in this respect, it is the state. There is ample evidence for this in former communist countries: many lakes and streams in the former Soviet Union are so polluted as to be unusable.The market economy is also accused of being the ultimate weapon of rich against poor. Capitalist "meritocracy" is responsible for widespread poverty, rampant inequality, and Big Business’ choke-hold on the world. While these challenges to capitalist institutions make for intriguing rhetoric, they are also false.Today’s poor countries were poor long before modern liberal market economies developed in Europe and North America; therefore, we cannot blame capitalism for poverty. Many critics also point to the unequal distribution of wealth in the United States as evidence of capitalism’s evils, but this overlooks two crucial points.The first is income mobility: someone born into poverty in the US stands a very good chance of moving up in the world. Second, while the distribution of money incomes is relatively unequal, the distribution of access to goods of similar technological composition has narrowed considerably. For most of world history, the difference between rich and poor was the difference between who ate and who starved. In today’s market econ-omies, the difference between the super-rich and the poor is the difference between who drives a Dodge Viper and who drives an ‘87 Chevy Cavalier.The reader should note that the power of "big business" is overstated. A unique feature of capitalism is that the greatest rewards go to those who cater to the common man. Consider Wal-Mart, a favorite whipping boy among left-wing intellectuals: Wal-Mart’s clientele consists almost exclusively of the middle- and lower-class. Capitalism generates fantastic wealth, and the benefits accrue almost entirely to the least of these among us.Ludwig von Mises put it succinctly in a series of lectures which were published posthumously as Economic Policy: Thoughts for Today and Tomorrow. He notes that "this is the fundamental principle of capitalism as it exists today in all those countries in which there is a highly developed system of mass production: Big business . . . produces almost exclusively to satisfy the wants of the masses." The "power relationship"of which Marxists are so fondis precisely the opposite of that which is most often supposed: consumers, not producers, are the masters of the dance.Nonetheless, enemies of the market argue that the only reason people put up with market economies is because they are forced to. The evidence of twentieth-century immigration doesn’t support the hypothesis. Thousands died trying to cross into free West Germany and South Korea, and there was very little traffic in the opposite direction. Similarly, thousands of Cubans have risked life and limb to come to America. Few—if any—have braved the ocean on a homemade raft to seek a better way of life in Cuba.Finally, it is deficient scholarship to merely point out the litany of crimes that the market (supposedly) commits and suggest that it has "failed" in any meaningful way. One must propose a superior alternative. In this case, both theory and history are firmly on the side of the free market. Mises and Hayek demonstrated that rational calculation is impossible without private ownership of the means of production. This isn’t to say that a "socialist economy" is inefficient—it is quite literally an oxymoron. Our experience with radical revolutions and planned economies in the twentieth century is hardly encouraging: in the name of "the people," Che Guevara killed thousands, Hitler millions, Stalin and Mao tens of millions.It may be fashionable to blame the market economy for all of society’s ills, but this blame is undeserved and many scholars’ faith in alternatives to the market is misplaced. No socialist regime has ever held a free election, and no free market has ever produced a death camp. Popular academic opinions to the contrary, the market works. And we can take that to the bank.

The only way to transcend the state is to strengthen its positive elements in the short term against a conservative rollback

**Chomsky, 1997**  (Noam, Canadian Dimension, 5/14, Factiva)

By visions, I mean the conception of a future society that animates what we actually do, a society in which a decent human being might want to live. By goals, I mean the choices and tasks that are within reach, that we will pursue one way or another guided by a vision that may be distant and hazy.  On all such matters, our knowledge and understanding are shallow; as in virtually every area of human life, we proceed on the basis of intuition and experience, hopes and fears. Goals involve hard choices with very serious human consequences. Goals and visions can appear to be in conflict, and often are. There's no contradiction in that, as I think we all know from ordinary experience. Let me take my own case, to illustrate what I have in mind. My personal visions are fairly traditional anarchist ones. According to this anarchist vision, any structure of hierarchy and authority carries a heavy burden of justification, whether it involves personal relations or a larger social order. If it cannot bear the burden - sometimes it can - then it is illegitimate and should be dismantled.  I share that vision, though it runs directly counter to my goals. My short-term goals are to defend and even strengthen elements of state authority which, though illegitimate in fundamental ways, are critically necessary right now to impede the dedicated efforts to 'roll back' the progress that has been achieved in extending democracy and human rights. State authority is now under severe attack in the more democratic societies, but not because it conflicts with the libertarian vision. Rather the opposite: because it offers (weak) protection to some aspects of that vision. In today's world, I think, the goals of a committed anarchist should be to defend some state institutions from the attack against them, while trying at the same time to pry them open to more meaningful public participation - and ultimately, to dismantle them in a much more free society; if the appropriate circumstances can be achieved.

Refusing to use the state empowers its worst aspects

**Barbrook, 97-** professor at the Hypermedia Research Centre at the University of Westminster, 1997  (Richard, message to a list serve, http://www.nettime.org/Lists-Archives/nettime-l-9706/msg00034.html)

I thought that this position is clear from my remarks about the ultra-left posturing of the 'zero-work' demand. In Europe, we have real social problems of deprivation and poverty which, in part, can only be solved by state action. This does not make me a statist, but rather an anti-anti-statist. By opposing such intervention because they are carried out by the state, anarchists are tacitly lining up with the neo-liberals. Even worse, refusing even to vote for the left, they acquiese to rule by neo-liberal parties.   I deeply admire direct action movements. I was a radio pirate and we provide server space for anti-roads and environmental movements. However, this doesn't mean that I support political abstentionism or, even worse, the mystical nonsense produced by Hakim Bey. It is great for artists and others to adopt a marginality as a life style choice, but most of the people who are economically and socially marginalised were never given any choice. They are excluded from society as a result of deliberate policies of deregulation, privatisation and welfare cutbacks carried out by neo-liberal governments. During the '70s, I was a pro-situ punk rocker until Thatcher got elected. Then we learnt the hard way that voting did change things and lots of people suffered if state power was withdrawn from certain areas of our life, such as welfare and employment. Anarchism can be a fun artistic pose. However, human suffering is not.

### AT—Israeli Strikes on Iran

Negotiations now—

Slavin, 3/23/12 [Barbara, Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council, Washington, D.C, “ Iran, Israel and U.S. moves from war rhetoric back to diplomacy,” <http://womennewsnetwork.net/2012/03/23/iran-israel-us-war-rhetoric/>]

After months of sabre-rattling rhetoric by Iran, Israel and the United States, there seems to be a collective, and welcome, time out. Since President Barack Obama’s 4 March speech to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), all sides have been stressing non-military means to try to resolve the crisis over Iran’s nuclear program. While asserting that he is determined to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons, Obama spent much of his AIPAC address decrying what he called “loose talk” of war. He spoke eloquently of the costs of military conflict for a nation that has fought two wars in the last decade. His message to visiting Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was clear: I am not going to start another war and you are not going to drag me into one. Netanyahu, for his part, appeared to bow to several realities. A savvy politician, he is recalculating the odds that Obama will be re-elected for another four-year term. The Israeli leader also knows that most of Israel’s defense and intelligence establishment – as well as a majority of the Israeli people – oppose a unilateral strike on Iran that could spark massive retaliation without significantly setting back the Iranian nuclear program. Former Mossad chief Meir Dagan has called such a strike “stupid”. Obama argues that economic sanctions are having a major impact on the Iranian economy and should be given more time to work. Evidence bears this out. U.S. banking sanctions and the threat of a European oil embargo have reduced the value of Iran’s currency by half, increased inflation and unemployment and depressed oil production. The International Energy Agency reported last week that Iran is pumping only 3.3 million barrels a day – down from 3.8 million barrels last year – and Iran’s oil exports may drop by as much as 50 per cent this summer. While denying that sanctions are a factor, Iranian leaders have agreed to come back to negotiations with the so-called P5+1 – the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany. Talks – the first since January 2011 – are expected to take place after the Iranian New Year holiday. In advance, the Islamic Republic has been conducting a charm offensive. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei on 8 March reaffirmed a 1995 fatwa that building nuclear weapons would be a “great sin”. He also praised Obama for criticising war talk. “Such remarks are good and indicate a step out of delusions”, Khamenei said. On 15 March, Mohammad Javad Larijani, a U.S.-educated physicist and adviser to Khamenei, told CNN’s Christiane Amanpour that Iran would provide “full transparency” for its nuclear program in return for acceptance of Iran’s right to peaceful nuclear energy under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Larijani also denied that Iran had any intention of attacking Israel, saying that Iran would defend itself against aggression but would not strike another country first. The Iranians have signaled their interest in dialogue with the United States in other ways. On 5 March, Iran’s Supreme Court ordered a retrial for an Iranian American former U.S. Marine who had been sentenced to death as a CIA spy. On 13 March, the U.S. deported back to Iran an Iranian arms dealer arrested in 2007 in a sting operation in the Republic of Georgia. Taken together, these steps improve the atmosphere for negotiations. However, it remains unclear whether the Obama administration and its partners will put forward proposals that could provide Iran a face-saving way to reduce tensions.

US can’t stop it if Israel really wanted to—They already fear lack of commitment

Feehery 12 (John, Reporter – The Hill, "October Surprise", The Hill – Pundit’s Blog, 8-28, http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/presidential-campaign/245965-october-surprise)

What will this election’s October Surprise be?

According to Mike Rogers, the House Intelligence Committee chairman, it could be an Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear capabilities.

Rogers (R-Mich.) was speaking to a breakfast group organized by The Hill, where he was asked point-blank by the moderator, A.B. Stoddard, about the likelihood of such an event.

The chairman had just returned from the Middle East and had been briefed by the highest levels of the Israeli government.

For Israel, the idea of allowing the Iranians, whose stated policy is to wipe the Jewish State off the map, a nuclear weapon is unacceptable.

For the Obama administration, there seems to be a good deal more leeway.

One thing we know for certain is that the Israelis don’t believe that the Obama administration has their back. They also believe that Team Obama has engaged in a systematic campaign of leaks to put the Israeli government in a box, to make it more difficult for them to take care of their national-security needs.

Ambassador Mark Green, a former member of Congress, made an important point during the panel discussion. He quoted one of his old international relations professors, saying that the worst thing a superpower like the United States can be is mysterious when it comes to its intentions. The whole international foreign policy system needs the stability that comes from America acting with clarity and purpose. When the world knows exactly what America will do in a given situation, then it knows what its role is supposed to be. When ambiguity rules, chaos reigns.

That is the situation we face with Israel and Iran. Nobody knows exactly how the Americans will react should Israel decide to move forward on an attack on Iran’s nuclear capabilities. Will the president support the Israelis? Will the president condemn them? Will we work together, or at cross-purposes?

Nobody really knows, which raises the stakes in an October Surprise.

Can the Israelis wait until the election? They would like to, because they don’t necessarily want to do anything to make it easier for the president to win reelection.

But they don’t necessarily want to wait so long to make it impossible to turn back the clock on Iran’s nuclear program.

How does a war in the Middle East play for the president? That too is hard to predict. It would immediately increase gas prices, which can’t be good. Traditionally, when the nation goes to war, it brings America together, helping the president’s popularity.

But if the president does not move to support Israel, and America stays out of the conflict, it is not at all easy to predict how that would play out. Israel is one of our closest allies, but America is sick and tired of war. It could be disaster for the president, or it could play well for him.

These are some of the questions that sprang from the discussion hosted by The Hill this morning. A lot can happen between now and November, including a big-time October Surprise.

No green light or strikes and US commitment is irrelevant.

Fedyashin 8-30-12—Andrey, Will Israel attack Iran if Romney becomes US president?, Voice of Russia, http://english.ruvr.ru/2012\_08\_30/Will-Israel-attack-Iran-if-Romney-becomes-US-president/

As a rule most of the Republicans have always been inclined to back Israel’s military position in comparison with the Democrats. However, the Democrats did not always oppose the military scenario either. As for Obama he is ready to give the green light to Israel’s preventive strike on Iran’s “unborn” bomb only if the global community runs out of all political tools. But so far not all political tools have been used.

Even if Mitt Romney is elected US president there is no guarantee that the White House will immediately give the green light to Israel to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities. Whatever tough position the presidential candidates stick to during the election campaigns they become much more moderate when they enter the White House. The military right wing rhetoric is one thing and the real foreign policy is another. Israel’s strike on Iran would pull the US into the conflict on the Middle East with unpredictable consequences. And this is not the most important thing here. Russian experts do not think that such a strike is possible. More than that - Washington is interested more than the rest in preventing this attack, Vladimir Anokhin, Vice President of the Russian Academy of Geopolitical Studies says:

"I think there won’t be any strike on Iran. First, it is not beneficial for anyone. If there is a real threat to Iran, the US will have to be the first to protect Iran. Because Iran is a great excuse for the US to deploy its anti-missile defense system against Russia in Europe. The standoff against Iran consolidates the Arab states located in the area of the Persian Gulf such as Qatar, United Arab Emirates and other monarchies. Under the disguise of fighting Iran they unite and create good conditions for the US’ presence in that region."

### 2ac-Putin

Putin control of Russia is inevitable.

Mifthah 11 (Mohideen, Writer @ Reuters, Russia's Putin eyes riddle of 2012 Kremlin return, February 26th, Accessed Online @ The Sunday Times, http://sundaytimes.lk/index.php/analysis/5077-russias-putin-eyes-riddle-of-2012-kremlin-return)

MOSCOW, Feb 25 (Reuters) - No matter who runs for president in Russia's 2012 election, Vladimir Putin will still be in charge. Prime Minister Putin has less than a year to decide whether to use the March 2012 presidential election to return to the Kremlin or to let his protege, President Dmitry Medvedev, run for another term. Whatever Putin decides, officials and diplomats say he will remain paramount leader, tying Russia's fate to the destiny of one man for years to come. “Vladimir Vladimirovich is Russia's national leader, the national leader with capital letters, and he will remain so,” a senior Russian official said on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the situation.

Putin cannot capitalize on high oil prices.

Tsvetkova 11 (Maria, Russia Analyst @ Reuters, Putin's approval rating falls to lowest since 2005, March 24th, http://in.reuters.com/article/2011/03/24/idINIndia-55846320110324)

Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's approval rating fell in March to the lowest level since mid 2005 on perceptions of economic stagnation a year before Russia's presidential vote, the Levada-Center pollster said on Thursday. Putin remains Russia's most popular politician but his rating fell to 69 percent from 73 percent in February while President Dmitry Medvedev's rating fell to 66, the lowest since he took office in 2008, from 69 percent. The declines in approval are likely to perturb the Kremlin's political managers ahead of the March 2012 presidential election. Putin and Medvedev have said they will decide later this year on which of them will stand in the election. Levada-Center's deputy director, Alexei Grazhdankin, said the poll ratings were falling on perceptions that vast revenues from high oil prices were not reaching the population and that Russia's leadership lacked ambitious economic aims.

### 2ac-Russia DA

No war—

Weitz 11 (Richard, senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and a World Politics Review senior editor 9/27/2011, “Global Insights: Putin not a Game-Changer for U.S.-Russia Ties,” <http://www.scribd.com/doc/66579517/Global-Insights-Putin-not-a-Game-Changer-for-U-S-Russia-Ties>)

Fifth, there will inevitably be areas of conflict between Russia and the United States regardless of who is in the Kremlin. Putin and his entourage can never be happy with having NATO be Europe's most powerful security institution, since Moscow is not a member and cannot become one. Similarly, the Russians will always object to NATO's missile defense efforts since they can neither match them nor join them in any meaningful way. In the case of Iran, Russian officials genuinely perceive less of a threat from Tehran than do most Americans, and Russia has more to lose from a cessation of economic ties with Iran -- as well as from an Iranian-Western reconciliation. On the other hand, these conflicts can be managed, since they will likely remain limited and compartmentalized. Russia and the West do not have fundamentally conflicting vital interests of the kind countries would go to war over. And as the Cold War demonstrated, nuclear weapons are a great pacifier under such conditions. Another novel development is that Russia is much more integrated into the international economy and global society than the Soviet Union was, and Putin's popularity depends heavily on his economic track record. Beyond that, there are objective criteria, such as the smaller size of the Russian population and economy as well as the difficulty of controlling modern means of social communication, that will constrain whoever is in charge of Russia.

High oil prices hurt the Russian economy – demand destruction, inflation, and market volatility.

Hulbert 11 (Matthew, Senior fellow at the Center for Security Studies in Zurich, The Downside of High Oil Prices, February 2nd, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/the-downside-of-high-oil-prices/430204.html)

This cuts to the crux of the problem. The misperception of political risk can be just as potent as the actual risks themselves for the market. If the Egyptian crisis is anything to go by, then geopolitical factors have not been properly priced in. The initial $6 price increase from the chaos in Cairo over the past few days will look like pocket change compared with where oil prices could go if the geopolitical situation in the Middle East explodes. High prices might sound like good news for producers like Russia that want to replenish state coffers and boost political egos, but they carry two major risks. The first is potential demand destruction. The assumption in 2008 that demand was inelastic was a grave miscalculation. Most leading oil producers were lucky to survive. Whether $100 per barrel will break the bank again remains to be seen, but with anemic growth in the West and inflationary pressures in the East, it would be foolhardy to assume that anything higher than $100 per barrel would be positive for the global economy. The second risk is that producers will rapidly lose control of the market if geopolitics starts dictating benchmark prices beyond fundamentals. Price hawks such as Iran, Algeria, Nigeria and Venezuela probably have no problem with that since they don’t have excess supply to put on the market anyway. But that’s not what Russia wants or needs right now. Market stability to increase upstream investment and arrest depletion rates should be the priority of the day, not adding more oil, so to speak, to the geopolitical fire. It remains to be seen whether Saudi Arabia will agree to put more oil on the market or continue to appease price hawks by maximizing receipts. Price signals have been deafeningly silent so far — blaming speculation over fundamentals is the line coming out of Riyadh. No doubt that’s partially true, but that’s the point. Speculators like nothing more than the risk of geopolitical calamity to make a killing. Egypt has sent a clear signal to producers — quell the market now, or it will politically emasculate you later. The last thing Moscow needs is heightened market volatility. The priority should be to stabilize the market, attract consistent upstream investment and arrest depletion to keep production above 10 million bpd. Russia should take note: Take the politics out of oil, or it will surely take its vengeance out on you.

High prices cause Russian nationalism—

Hudson 11 (John, Writer @ the Atlantic, Do Oil Prices Explain Russian Authoritarianism?, January 4th, http://www.theatlanticwire.com/global/2011/01/do-oil-prices-explain-russian-authoritarianism/18086/)

The "resource curse," as it's called, has long been a popular phenomenon in international relations scholarship. Applied broadly, the theory can be pretty persuasive: countries with massive endowments of natural resources (especially certain ones, like oil or mineral reserves) tend to have worse, more corrupt governments. Take a quick glance at certain regimes in the Middle East, South America and Africa, and it starts to make sense. Today, The Washington Post's Anne Applebaum applies the resource curse more narrowly in her examination of the Kremlin. Applebaum posits that since the '70s, declines in oil prices have directly resulted in less authoritarian behavior from the Russian government. Conversely, an uptick in oil prices has recently emboldened the Kremlin to abuse civil liberties, wage wars and suppress dissent. Right now the price of oil is $90 a barrel and rising. Here's what Applebaum sees happening in Russia: The blocking of corruption investigations; the expressions of support for the brutal and violent "elections" in neighboring Belarus; the deaths of journalists; all of these seem designed to contradict the distinctly friendlier, reformist language that the Russian president, Dmitry Medvedev, was using until recently. Why the change of tone? Why now? Many complex theories have been hatched to explain it. This being Russia, none can be proved. But perhaps the explanation is very simple: Oil is once again above $90 a barrel--and the price is rising. And if that's the reason, it's nothing new. In fact, if one were to plot the rise and fall of Soviet and Russian foreign and domestic reforms over the past 40 years on a graph, it would match the fall and rise of the international oil price (for which domestic crude oil prices are a reasonable proxy) with astonishing precision. She goes on to attribute the increase in oil prices in the '70s to the Soviet Union's war in Afghanistan and resistance to democratic reforms domestically. When prices dropped in 1986, then-Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev loosened the Kremlin’s grip, enacting the perestroika and glasnost reforms. With oil prices still low in '89, the Berlin Wall fell, Central European states were freed and the Cold War ended. Then prices rose again in 1999, Vladimir Putin took over and launched the second Chechen war. Coincidence? Applebaum thinks not. She ends her piece on a foreboding, yet indecisive note: Now it is 2011, Putin is very much in the foreground, and Khodorkovsky has just been sentenced by a kangaroo court. As I write these words, oil is at $92.25 a barrel. Is this analysis too simplistic? Sure it is. But I haven't yet heard a better explanation.

Corruption makes your impacts inevitable—Pressure on oil revenues is key to diversification which solves your impact—

Åslund 8 Anders Åslund is a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute and an adjunct professor at Georgetown University, July 2008, “An Assessment of Putin's Economic Policy”, http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm?ResearchID=974

In 2004, the international oil prices took off, filling the Russian state treasury and boosting its international reserves. Russian exports started skyrocketing, mainly because of the rising commodity prices. The consequence in Russia, however, was not a higher growth rate but aggravated repression, corruption, renationalization, and all economic reforms stalled. For Putin, the high international oil prices became a license to be as authoritarian and corrupt as he really wanted to be. During his last five years in office, President Putin has not undertaken any reform worth mentioning.

Putin has effectively condoned corruption among his friends, and it is hardly an exaggeration to say that everything is for sale in Russia. People pay bribes to enter university, to escape military service, to stay out of prison, and to land a good job. Until the late 1990s, the selling of top offices was not an issue, but by 2004 it had become endemic.

Until October 2007, Putin maintained impressive fiscal discipline with budget surpluses every year from 2000. Then, all of a sudden, he seems to have lost his nerve. In the midst of rising inflation, he abandoned that achievement as well, boosting public expenditures. By May, inflation had surged to 15 percent. The Russian government needs to return to its prior excellent fiscal policies to cool the economy down. In addition, the Central Bank needs to adopt inflation targeting, allowing the exchange rate to appreciate with the large currency inflows.

When Putin became president in 2000, he promised that Russia would join the World Trade Organization by 2003, but it is not likely to join even in 2008 because Putin has allowed various protectionist interests to override Russia's national interest. This stands out as one of his most spectacular failures.

No less than Time magazine praised Putin as their man of the year 2007 for the stability he had brought to the country, but what stability? Russia's murder rate has been higher under Putin than under Yeltsin and is currently four times higher than in the United States. The change is real but only in its presentation thanks to the ubiquitous censorship that Putin has imposed. What remains of Putin's economic legacy is only that he was lucky to reap the benefits of the arduous but productive reforms his predecessor instigated in the 1990s (Milov and Nemtsov 2008).

Russia: No longer normal

In 2004, Foreign Affairs published a seminal article by Andrei Shleifer and Daniel Treisman. They argued that Russia was a "normal country": "Russia was in 1990, and is today, a middle-income country with GDP per capita comparable to Argentina in 1991 and Mexico in 1999. Almost all democracies in this income range are rough around the edges: their governments suffer from corruption, their judiciaries are politicized, and their press is almost never entirely free. They have high income inequality, concentrated corporate ownership, and turbulent macroeconomic performance. In all these regards, Russia is quite normal." Steven Fish (2005, 130) noted that Russia was "just as corrupt as one would expect it to be, given the prominence of natural resources in its exports." The oil revenues are obviously a cause of Russia's authoritarianism and corruption, but both have become quite extraordinary.

Russia has gone through three major developments in the last eight years. First, Russia's GDP has grown by 27 percent a year measured in current US dollars. Second, the country has moved from being partially democratic to authoritarian rule by Freedom House (2007) standards. Third, it has stayed equally corrupt according to the measurements by the World Bank (2007), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (2007) and Transparency International (2007), while corruption has abated elsewhere (see also Anderson and Gray 2006). In these regards, Russia is no longer normal but extreme. Many draw parallels between Russia and China, but even today, after 30 years of high economic growth, China's GDP per capita at current exchange rates is merely one quarter of Russia's. Unlike Russia, China is still a developing country. It is more authoritarian than Russia, but according to Transparency International' assessment, it is less corrupt.

By the measures of the outstanding political sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset (1959), Russia is too rich, too educated, and too open to be so authoritarian. The faster Russia grows, the greater this contradiction becomes between an increasingly obsolete political system and a swiftly modernizing economy and society. This contradiction is likely to be untenable in the medium term. No modern society can function without reasonable information or checks and balances. A Russian president cannot make decisions of high quality about everything, after having abolished all feedback and concentrated so much decision making in his own hands. During President Vladimir Putin's reign, the Russian regime became too rigid and centralized to handle crises, which always occur. Therefore, this regime can hardly be very stable.

Russia has become an outlier. At present, Russia's GDP per capita measured in purchasing power parties, that is, standard of living, is a respectable one-third of that of the European Union. Only eight countries in the world are richer than Russia and still not democratic, namely Singapore and seven small oil states (World Bank 2007; Freedom House 2007). Authoritarian rule is usually a means of the rulers to hide and sustain their corruption. According to Transparency International (2007), the only country that is both richer and more corrupt than Russia is Equatorial Guinea. That is hardly a standard worthy of a great, historic European nation.

Russia has long distanced itself from the upper middle- income countries, Argentina and Mexico, with which Shleifer and Treisman (2004) associated it. Russia has grown faster, but it has become more authoritarian and corrupt. The conclusion is not that authoritarianism and corruption are good for development, but that Putin has been lucky. He has been drowned in oil money, so that he could make Russia as authoritarian and corrupt as he really wanted to. No large state with an educated population has managed to maintain authoritarian rule or stay so corrupt at Russia's level of economic development. Therefore, it seems natural for Russia's dictatorship to collapse in the near future, as happened even in countries with strong authoritarian traditions, such as Taiwan and South Korea.

The structural reasons to expect such a change in Russia in the near future are many. First, opinion polls show that Russians are as upset as any other nation about corruption and they have more of it. Information about corruption is abundant. Only fools do not believe that the government aims at the promotion of corruption. Second, the mismanagement of the large state corporations and apparent kickbacks of up to 50 percent on major infrastructure projects are outrageous. Russia's corruption might be the greatest in world history in terms of the absolute amount individuals receive and the relative share of the kickbacks. Claims that Putin and his close friends have stolen billions of dollars from the state or private businessmen abound, but so far Putin has never reacted, which is evidence that he approves of such activities (Milov and Nemtsov 2008). Third, incredibly but fortuitously, Putin decided to resign as president, although he stays as prime minister, which grants Russia an ambiguous dual power structure. But in Russia, power rests in the Kremlin, where the president sits. Not surprisingly, President Dmitri Medvedev has started his term by launching an anti-corruption campaign.

A state that is as corrupt as Russia is not strong but dysfunctional and thus weak. Corruption poses a systemic threat to the Russian state, notably the quality of education and health care. Is the Russian state able to carry out any major infrastructure project? The country suffers a desperate shortage of qualified labor because much of the education has been debased by corruption, and the government has made no attempt to clean it up. Russia can no longer afford this corruption that contributes to the current inflation crisis.

High oil prices won’t solve decline—

Grinkevich 12 Vlad Grinkevich, RIA Novosti economic commentator, "High Oil Prices Open “Window of Opportunity” for Russian Economy" 1/27 en.rian.ru/analysis/20120127/170994608.html

Nikolayev point to an alarming fact – the pace of economic growth is slowing despite high oil prices. “At $70-$75 per barrel we were growing at 7%-8% annually four years ago. Now our growth rates are much slower despite the higher oil prices.”

The expert noted that this year the Russian government was aiming for 4% GDP growth given that oil price stands at $75 per barrel, but this growth rate would have required an average annual price of $109. There were several reasons for this – the budget was overburdened with social commitments, military spending and massive public projects. Moreover, Kagarlitsky observes, during the last five years there was a decline in the effectiveness of government management in many spheres. Meanwhile, the key sectors of the Russian economy, such as the fuel and energy complex, are under government control. Nikolayev sums up: “Expensive oil is no longer enough. We are approaching the point where it will no longer guarantee relatively stable economic development.”

10 alternative causes

ASLUND 8 (Anders, senior fellow of the Peterson Institute for International Economics, ""10 reasons why the economy will falter" St Petersburg Times http://www.sptimes.ru/index.php?action\_id=2&story\_id=27038)

Moscow’s current economic dilemma is that the old sources of growth will soon be exhausted. Undoubtedly, some capitalist convergence will continue, but it is bound to slow down. Unfortunately, it is easy to compile 10 reasons why Russia is likely to have lower growth in the near future than it has had for the last nine years. 1. Internationally, one of the greatest booms of all times is finally coming to an end. Demand is falling throughout the world, and soon Russia will also be hit. This factor alone has brought the Western world to stagnation. 2. Russia’s main problem is its enormous corruption. According to Transparency International, only Equatorial Guinea is richer than Russia and more corrupt. Since the main culprit behind Russia’s aggravated corruption is Putin, no improvement is likely as long as he persists. 3. Infrastructure, especially roads, has become an extraordinary bottleneck, and the sad fact is that Russia is unable to carry out major infrastructure projects. When Putin came to power in 2000, Russia had 754,000 kilometers of paved road. Incredibly, by 2006 this figure has increased by only 0.1 percent, and the little that is built costs at least three times as much as in the West. Public administration is simply too incompetent and corrupt to develop major projects. 4. Renationalization is continuing and leading to a decline in economic efficiency. When Putin publicly attacked Mechel, investors presumed that he had decided to nationalize the company. Thus, they rushed to dump their stock in Mechel, having seen what happened to Yukos, Russneft, United Heavy Machineries and VSMP-Avisma, to name a few. In a note to investors, UBS explains diplomatically that an old paradigm of higher political risk has returned to Russia, so it has reduced its price targets by an average of 20 percent, or a market value of $300 billion. Unpredictable economic crime is bad for growth. 5. The most successful transition countries have investment ratios exceeding 30 percent of GDP, as is also the case in East Asia. But in Russia, it is only 20 percent of GDP, and it is likely to fall in the current business environment. That means that bottlenecks will grow worse. 6. An immediate consequence of Russia’s transformation into a rogue state is that membership in the World Trade Organization is out of reach. World Bank and Economic Development Ministry assessments have put the value of WTO membership at an additional growth of 0.5 to 1 percentage points a year for the next five years. Now, a similar deterioration is likely because of increased protectionism, especially in agriculture and finance. 7. Minimal reforms in law enforcement, education and health care have been undertaken, and no new attempt is likely. The malfunctioning public services will become an even greater drag on economic growth. 8. Oil and commodity prices can only go down, and energy production is stagnant, which means that Russia’s external accounts are bound to deteriorate quickly. 9. Because Russia’s banking system is dominated by five state banks, it is inefficient and unreliable, and the national cost of a poor banking system rises over time. 10. Inflation is now 15 percent because of a poor exchange rate and monetary policies, though the current capital outflow may ease that problem. In short, Russia is set for a sudden and sharp fall in its economic growth. It is difficult to assess the impact of each of these 10 factors, but they are all potent and negative. A sudden, zero growth would not be surprising, and leaders like Putin are not prepared to face reality. Russia’s economic situation looks ugly. For how long can Russia afford such an expensive prime minister?

Doomsday predictions about Russian collapse are always wrong

STENT 3 (Angela. professor of government at Georgetown and director of the Center for Russian Studies, "Russian and America: How Close and Embrace?" World Policy Journal XX: $, Winter, http://www.worldpolicy.newschool.edu/journal/articles/wpj03-4/stent.html)

Using extensive interviews with participants in all three administrations, and memoirs by former officials, they paint a compelling picture of officials often overwhelmed by the challenge of an entirely new reality. The unexpected collapse of communism and of the Soviet Union, coming just after the Gulf War, left them with no road map to understand how Russia and other post-Soviet states might develop. Nightmare scenarios suggested themselves: nuclear war between Russia and Ukraine; weapons proliferation on a terrifying scale; Yugoslav-type ethnically based civil war on the territory of the former Soviet Union; mass starvation; economic collapse—the ominous possibilities were endless. That these “dogs did not bark” is testimony to the unwillingness of people in the post-Soviet space to engage in armed conflict and to Western assistance that staved off famine and economic collapse. The failure of catastrophic scenarios to come about is one indicator of success—but if one were to measure America’s contribution to transforming Russia in more positive ways, the evidence is more mixed. If a minimalist definition of success was the absence of catastrophe, the maximalist definition was the creation of a fully functioning democracy in Russia with a transparent market economy and the rule of law. That has not happened yet, and it is unclear when it will. So far, there is no consensus about what would constitute a realistic timetable for Russia’s democratic development.