## Grid Overview

#### Failing grid is inevitable from numerous threats. Montgomery 12 isolates several scenarios which make meltdowns likely and several days long. That’s Cappiello. This duration will cause nuclear reactors in the northeast to overheat and meltdown releasing radioactive clouds. That’s Wasserman.

## Ports Overview

#### The ports are not being revitalized now per Davison, 12.

#### Two impacts-

#### Without restructuring the US will not be able to compete and food prices will rise because of faulty port facilities. That Marber and Doms. High food prices will ravage Chinese food supply per Carlson, and China will lash out and face economic collapse due to a starving population (Serewicz) causing nuclear war.

#### 

#### Insecure ports are vulnerable to terrorist attacks which are the “single most realistic proven threat vector” that’s Forbes 11. Terrorism causes lash out and nuclear extinction per Morgan, 9.

## General K Frontline 2AC

#### Their alternative is vague.

#### -They cannot articulate the specific outcome of it.

#### Without a solid alternative the neg can shift their advocacy. This creates an unfair strategy skew because the neg can just shift out of any offense the aff has. This justifies abusive permutations.

#### Vague alts also destroy aff ground. We can’t get specific dis adds to the alt when we don’t even know what the alt does. This forces us to go for generic defense against the alt destroying topic specific education. This is bad for debate.

#### The round has already been skewed from the 1NC. The only way to fix the harms the vague alt has created in the round is a Voting issue to reject the team.

#### And

#### Extinction of the species is the most horrible impact imaginable, putting rights first is putting a part of society before the whole

**Schell 1982**

(Jonathan, Professor at Wesleyan University, *The Fate of the Earth*, pages 136-137 uw//wej)

Implicit in everything that I have said so far about the nuclear predicament there has been a perplexity that I would now like to take up explicitly, for it leads, I believe, into the very heart of our response-or, rather, our lack of response-to the predicament. I have pointed out that **our species is the most important of all the things that,** as inhabitants of a common world, **we inherit from the past generations**, but it does not go far enough to point out this superior importance, as though in making our decision about extinction we were being asked to choose between, say, liberty, on the one hand, and the survival of the species, on the other. For **the species not only overarches but contains all the benefits of life in the common world, and to speak of sacrificing the species for the sake of one of these benefits involves one in the absurdity of wanting to destroy something in order to preserve one of its parts, as if one were to burn down a house in an attempt to redecorate the living room,** or to kill someone to improve his character. ,but even to point out this absurdity fails to take the full measure of the peril of extinction, for mankind is not some invaluable object that lies outside us and that we must protect so that we can go on benefiting from it; rather, it is we ourselves, without whom everything there is loses its value. To say this is another way of saying that extinction is unique not because it destroys mankind as an object but because it destroys mankind as the source of all possible human subjects, and this, in turn, is another way of saying that extinction is a second death, for one's own individual death is the end not of any object in life but of the subject that experiences all objects. Death, however, places the mind in a quandary. One of-the confounding characteristics of death-"tomorrow's zero," in Dostoevski's phrase-is that, precisely because it removes the person himself rather than something in his life, it seems to offer the mind nothing to take hold of. One even feels it inappropriate, in a way, to try to speak "about" death at all, as. though death were a thing situated somewhere outside us and available for objective inspection, when the fact is that it is within us-is, indeed, an essential part of what we are. It would be more appropriate, perhaps, to say that death, as a fundamental element of our being, "thinks" in us and through us about whatever we think about, coloring our thoughts and moods with its presence throughout our lives.

#### Utility calculus allows action, moral dogmatism freezes us into inaction

**Smart, 1973**

(J.J.C prof. of philosophy, Australian riatibual university. Utilitarianism: For and Against uw//wej)

lf we are able to take account of probabilities in our ordinary prudential decisions it seems idle to say that in the field of ethics, the field of our universal and humane attitudes, we cannot do the same thing, but must rely on some dogmatic morality, in short on some set of rules or rigid criteria, Maybe sometimes we just will be unable to say whether we prefer for humanity an improbable great advantage or a probable small advantage, and in these cases perhaps we shall have to toss a penny to decide what to do. Maybe we have not any precise methods for deciding what to do, but then our imprecise methods must just serve their turn. We need not on that account be driven into authoritarianism, dogmatism or romanticism.

#### Scenario planning is possible in a catastrophe-ridden world—it’s vital to make predictions about the future.

Kurasawa, 04

(Professor of Sociology, York University of Toronto, Fuyuki, Constellations Volume 11, No 4, 2004).

Independently of this contractualist justification, global civil society actors are putting forth a number of arguments countering temporal myopia on rational grounds. They make the case that no generation, and no part of the world, is immune from catastrophe. Complacency and parochialism are deeply flawed in that even if we earn a temporary reprieve, our children and grandchildren will likely not be so fortunate unless steps are taken today. Similarly, though it might be possible to minimize or contain the risks and harms of actions to faraway places over the short-term, parrying the eventual blowback or spillover effect is improbable. In fact, as I argued in the previous section, all but the smallest and most isolated of crises are rapidly becoming globalized due to the existence of transnational circuits of ideas, images, people, and commodities. Regardless of where they live, our descendants will increasingly be subjected to the impact of environmental degradation, the spread of epidemics, gross North-South socioeconomic inequalities, refugee flows, civil wars, and genocides. What may have previously appeared to be temporally and spatially remote risks are ‘coming home to roost’ in ever faster cycles. In a word, then, procrastination makes little sense for three principal reasons: it exponentially raises the costs of eventual future action; it reduces preventive options; and it erodes their effectiveness. With the foreclosing of long-range alternatives, later generations may be left with a single course of action, namely, that of merely reacting to large-scale emergencies as they arise. We need only think of how it gradually becomes more difficult to control climate change, let alone reverse it, or to halt mass atrocities once they are underway. Preventive foresight is grounded in the opposite logic, whereby the decision to work through perils today greatly enhances both the subsequent room for maneuver and the chances of success. Humanitarian, environmental, and techno-scientific activists have convincingly shown that we cannot afford not to engage in preventive labor. Moreover, I would contend that farsighted cosmopolitanism is not as remote or idealistic a prospect as it appears to some, for as Falk writes, “[g]lobal justice between temporal communities, however, actually seems to be increasing, as evidenced by various expressions of greater sensitivity to past injustices and future dangers.”36 Global civil society may well be helping a new generational self-conception take root, according to which we view ourselves as the provisional caretakers of our planetary commons. Out of our sense of responsibility for the well-being of those who will follow us, we come to be more concerned about the here and now.

Perm do both

Perm do the plan and then the alternative

Perm do the alt and then the plan,

#### Their ontology first args are tautologies that stifle effective politics

Graham 2k -- Graduate School of Management, Queensland (P, Heidegger’s Hippies, http://www.philgraham.net/HH\_conf.pdf)

To state their positions more succinctly: ‘Heraclitus maintained that everything changes: Parmenides retorted that nothing changes’ (Russell 1946: 66). Between them, they delineated the dialectical extremes within which the “problem of the subject” has become manifest: in the extremes of questions about ontology, the nature of “Being”, or existence, or ‘Existenz’ (Adorno 1973: 110-25). Historically, such arguments tend towards internalist hocus pocus:

The popular success of ontology feeds on an illusion: that the state of the intentio recta might simply be chosen by a consciousness full of nominalist and subjective sediments, a consciousness which self-reflection alone has made what it is. But Heidegger, of course, saw through this illusion … beyond subject and object, beyond concept and entity. Being is the supreme concept –for on the lips of him who says “Being” is the word, not Being itself –and yet it is said to be privileged above all conceptuality, by virtue of moments which the thinker thinks along with the word “Being” and which the abstractly obtained significative unity of the concept does not exhaust. (Adorno 1973: 69)

Adorno’s (1973) thoroughgoing critique of Heidegger’s ontological metaphysics plays itself out back and forth through the Heideggerian concept of a universalised identity –an essentialist, universalised being and becoming of consciousness, elided from the constraints of the social world. Adorno’s argument can be summed up thus: there can be no universal theory of “being” in and of itself because what such a theory posits is, precisely, non-identity. It obscures the role of the social and promotes a specific kind of politics –identity politics (cf. also Kennedy 1998):

Devoid of its otherness, of what it renders extraneous, an existence which thus proclaims itself the criterion of thought will validate its decrees in authoritarian style, as in political practice a dictator validates the ideology of the day. The reduction of thought to the thinkers halts the progress of thought; it brings to a standstill would thought would need to be thought, and what subjectivity would need to live in. As the solid ground of truth, subjectivity is reified … Thinking becomes what the thinker has been from the start. It becomes tautology, a regressive form of consciousness. (Adorno 1973: 128).

Identity politics - the ontological imperative - is inherently authoritarian precisely because it promotes regression, internalism, subjectivism, and, most importantly, because it negates the role of society. It is simplistic because it focuses on the thingliness of people: race, gender, ethnicity. It tries to resolve the tension of the social-individual by smashing the problem into two irreconcilable parts. Identity politics’ current popularity in sociological thought, most wellevidenced by its use and popularity in “Third Way” politics, can be traced back to a cohort I have called Heidegger’s Hippies –the failed, half-hearted, would-be “revolutionaries” of the 60s, an incoherent collection of middle-class, neo-liberal malcontents who got caught up in their own hyperbole, and who are now the administrators of a ‘totally administered’ society in which hyperbole has become both lingua franca and world currency (Adorno 1964/1973 1973).

#### Renewable energy is a necessary stepping stone toward alt solvency

**Scatena 11**--German Honors/Communication Studies Major Film Studies minor Memorial University of Newfoundland (Debora, Environment and Technology: Finding a Solution within the Modern Framework and Human Responsibilities, International Journal of Business, Humanities and Technology, 1;2; September 2011, http://www.ijbhtnet.com/journals/Vol\_1\_No\_2\_September\_2011/12.pdf)

It is possible to move past the challenge solely after a process of democratization has been put into place, specifically that example has come into being in Germany in October 2008 when the Renewable Energy Act (EEG, 28.10.2008) was approved. The act enables companies as well as private to invest in renewable energies and profit from it. However regulations are in place to preserve the quality and well being of nature as well. It is possible to see the German Renewable Energy Act, as a step that Heidegger foresaw, when discussing the impact of technology within nature. It is also possible to see the Act as an expansion of a philosophy and way of being within nature that a certain culture has developed. Moreover it is interesting to see how throughout the Act people have limitations on the use of nature they can have as well, nature is protected as it is the element can allow humanity to continue its development and sustain itself. If nature was not preserved in the Act it would be only a new energy policy but it wouldn't be able to take culture as well as people forward. Even so it is possible to see how technology as illustrated by Heidegger can move people ahead and through it the contemplative state can be achieved and captured, so that humanity actually improves thanks to technology. Nevertheless Germany is also the only country that put such regulations ahead for its citizen and its environment, so the road ahead is pretty steep unless people start realizing that those are not solely ideas, but they can be put into place. It is also possible to see a certain level of nature democratization is the Renewable Energy Act in question, since right after each way that people can use to support themselves with natural energy there are also as many rules to make sure nature is protected and not hurt in the balance.

As a manmade Act it isn't perfect, but it is a possible way to create a unity front for both people and nature, also it is a beginning of the democratization of nature too. Latour states that “due process for the discovery of the common world” (Latour, 224) can be [hard] heard to get to**, but if a stepping stone is set**, certainly **people and nature can start a discourse which benefits both.** The realm of possibilities and solutions is achievable, but if the will of moving forward does not arise it is unlikely to reach a solution. Many things can be said and done, but it is important to always move towards the best ethics within a balance for humanity as well as nature. Technology is a tool that can enable men to get closer to the aim to be reached. It is also the tool that can move knowledge of the issue ahead, as it is seen in many reports released by institutions such as NASA and various Governments. In other words the road ahead is possible but not always straightforward. Heidegger as well as Latour present possible solutions, which as seen in Germany can be achieved, but they come with a series of challenges. Technology does reveal itself as a starting point to take humanity as well as knowledge and handling of the situation people are faced with more manageable, but it isn't the solution, it is the way to reach a two step solution. Nature does deserve the same level of democratization humanity is entailed to, for this reason it is possible to see the German approach through the Renewable Energy Act as a first step. How long until the rest of the world will catch up? Not an easy question to deal with, but a stepping stone to foresee how human future can co-exist with nature, through the use of technology and a new framework in approaching life. Not likely easy but possible, and by possible it is achievable with dignity by all parties. Solutions are out there, the contemplative status can lead people to reach the goal of overcoming the climate challenge as well as many more, **but steps need to be made to get started.**

## Heiddegger

#### SPANOS’ DEMAND FOR PURITY ENSURES HIS MARGINALIZATION AND FORECLOSES ON COALITION BUILDING – ONLY THE PERM OFFERS A WAY OUT

Perkin ‘93

[J. Russell, Prof. English @ St. Mary’s, “Theorizing the Culture Wars,” *Postmodern Culture* 3: 3, 1993, Muse//uwyo]

My final criticism is that Spanos, by his attempt to put all humanists into the same category and to break totally with the tradition of humanism, isolates himself in a posture of ultraleftist purity that cuts him off from many potential political allies, especially when, as I will note in conclusion, his practical recommendations for the practical role of an adversarial intellectual seem similar to those of the liberal pluralists he attacks. He seems ill-informed about what goes on in the everyday work of the academy, for instance, in the field of composition studies. Spanos laments the "unwarranted neglect" (202) of the work of Paulo Freire, yet in reading composition and pedagogy journals over the last few years, I have noticed few thinkers who have been so consistently cited. Spanos refers several times to the fact that the discourse of the documents comprising The Pentagon Papers was linked to the kind of discourse that first-year composition courses produce (this was Richard Ohmann's argument); here again, however, Spanos is not up to date. For the last decade the field of composition studies has been the most vigorous site of the kind of oppositional practices The End of Education recommends. The academy, in short, is more diverse, more complex, more genuinely full of difference than Spanos allows, and it is precisely that difference that neoconservatives want to erase.

By seeking to separate out only the pure (posthumanist) believers, Spanos seems to me to ensure his self-marginalization. For example, several times he includes pluralists like Wayne Booth and even Gerald Graff in lists of "humanists" that include William Bennett, Roger Kimball and Dinesh D'Souza. Of course, there is a polemical purpose to this, but it is one that is counterproductive. In fact, I would even question the validity of calling shoddy and often inaccurate journalists like Kimball and D'Souza with the title "humanist intellectuals." Henry Louis Gates's final chapter contains some cogent criticism of the kind of position which Spanos has taken. Gates argues that the "hard" left's opposition to liberalism is as mistaken as its opposition to conservatism, and refers to Cornel West's remarks about the field of critical legal studies,

"If you don't build on liberalism, you build on air" (187). Building on air seems to me precisely what Spanos is recommending. Gates, on the other hand, criticizes "those massively totalizing theories that marginalize practical political action as a jejune indulgence" (192), and endorses a coalition of liberalism and the left.

#### PERM – DO BOTH

#### SPANOS ALONE ISN’T EMANCIPATORY – COMBINING THE CRITICISM WITH PROBLEM SOLVING IS OPTIMAL

Lewandowski ‘94

[John, Prof @ SUNY Binghamton, *Philosophy and Social Criticism* 20, 119]

Spanos rightly rejects the ‘textuality route in Heidegger and Criticism precisely because of its totalizing and hypostatizing tendencies. Nevertheless, he holds on to a destructive hermeneutics as disclosure. But as I have already intimated, disclosure alone cannot support a critical theory oriented towards emancipation. I think a critical theory needs a less totalizing account of language, one that articulates both the emphatic linguistic capacity to communicate, solve problems in and criticize the world. The essential task of the social critic – and any literary theory that wants to be critical – is to couple world disclosure with problem-solving, to mediate between the extra-ordinary world of ‘textuality’ and the everyday world of ‘texts’. In this alternative route, literary theory may become the kind of emancipatory oriented critical theory it can and should be.

#### Heidegger’s philosophy of rejecting all technology makes life meaningless, culminating in extinction

Hicks, Prof and Chair of philosophy @ Queens College of the CUNY, 2K3 (Steven V., “Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Foucault: Nihilism and Beyond,” *Foucault and Heidegger: Critical Encounters*, Ed. Alan Milchman and Alan Rosenberg, p. 109, Questia)

Why a “philosophical shock”? The answer, in part, may be that from Foucault's perspective, Heidegger's insightful reading of Nietzsche and the problem of nihilism is itself too ascetic. Heidegger's emphasis on “silence” as proper to Dasein's being, his frequent use of quasireligious (even Schopenhauerean) terms of “grace” and “call of conscience, ” his many references to the destiny of the German Volk, his avoidance of politics and the serious “quietistic” tone of Heideggerian Gelassenheit are all reminiscent of the life-denying **ascetic ideal Nietzsche** sought to avoid. 65 Moreover, Foucault seems to join with Derrida and other “neo-Nietzscheans” in regarding Heidegger's idea of “letting Being be”—his vision of those who have left traditional metaphysics behind and with it the obsession with mastery and technology that drives contemporary civilization—as too passive or apathetic a response to the legitimate problems of post-Nietzschean nihilism that Heidegger's own analysis uncovers. 66 Here we have arrived at a key difference between Heidegger and Foucault: for Foucault, Heidegger takes insufficient account of the playful and even irreverent elements in Nietzsche and of Nietzsche's critique of the dangers of the ascetic ideal. Foucault joins with other new Nietzscheans in promoting, as an alternative to Heideggerian Gelassenheit, the more Nietzschean vision of “playing with the text”—which in Foucault's case means promulgating active and willful images of resistance and struggle against particular practices of domination, rebellion against “micro-powers, ” and blatant disregard for tradition (cf. DP, 27). 67 This context-specific, unambiguously confrontational nature of Foucault's critique of the forms of domination and technologies of power lodged in modern institutions offers a more Nietzsche-like response than the one Heidegger offers to the nihilistic problems of Western civilization. As Foucault sees it, the lessons Heidegger would have us draw from Nietzsche throw us back to the passive “nihilism of emptiness” that Nietzsche feared. While not predicting the emergence of better times, Foucault tries to offer a better (less passive, less ascetic) model for reforming our “background practices” and for cultivating an affirmative attitude toward life that he and other neo-Nietzscheans think may be “our only chance to keep from **extinguishing life on earth altogether**.” 68

#### Technological thought inevitable

Kateb 97 (George, Prof of Philosophy @ Princeton, "Technology and Philosophy," Social Research, Fall, p. ebscohost)

But the question arises as to where a genuine principle of limitation on technological endeavor would come from. It is scarcely conceivable that Western humanity -- and by now most of humanity, because of their pleasures and interests and their own passions and desires and motives -- would halt the technological project. Even if, by some change of heart, Western humanity could adopt an altered relation to reality and human beings, how could it be enforced and allowed to yield its effects? The technological project can be stopped only by some global catastrophe that it had helped to cause or was powerless to avoid. Heidegger's teasing invocation of the idea that a saving remedy grows with the worst danger is useless. In any case, no one would want the technological project halted, if the only way was a global catastrophe. Perhaps even the survivors would not want to block its reemergence.

#### Perm do both:

#### Double bind: Heidegger simultaneously rejects technology while embracing the conveniences, this means either the perm would solve, or their alt should be rejected.

Waddington 05

(David I., Stanford University, Educational Philosophy and Theory, “A Field Guide to Heidegger: Understanding ‘The Question Concerning Technology’,” July 26, 2005, Wiley Online Library//wyo-mm)

Another significant failing of Heidegger's philosophy of technology is that the benefits of technology are not acknowledged. The hydroelectric dam across the Rhine does improve people's lives, and, as Rorty (1977, p. 302) points out, the spread of modern technology across the planet has prevented many people from dying of starvation. Yet, despite the fact that Heidegger never acknowledges the benefits of technology, he does not urge giving it up: We can say ‘yes’ to the unavoidable use of technological objects, and we can at the same time say ‘no,’ insofar as we do not permit them to claim us exclusively and thus to warp, confuse, and finally lay waste to our essence. (1966, p. 54) This smacks of having one's cake and eating it too. Under Heidegger's conception, we conveniently say ‘yes’ to the modern technologies that make our lives so comfortable, while somehow apparently saying ‘no’ to them as well.

#### Only the neg forgets Being when they engage in a totalizing account of technologization—abandoning empiricism and the traditional sciences is the only scenario for their impacts

Latour 93 -- Professor and vice-president for research at Sciences Po Paris (Bruno, We Have Never Been Modern, 66-7)

And yet - 'here too the Gods are present': in a hydroelectric plant on the banks of the Rine, in subatomic particles, in Adidas shoes as well as in the old wooden clogs hollowed out by hand, in agribusiness as well as in timeworn landscapes, in shopkeepers' calculations as well as in Holderlin's heartrending verse. But why do those philosophers no longer recognize them? Because they believe what the modern Constitution says about itself! This paradox should no longer astonish us. The moderns indeed declare that technology is nothing but pure instrumental mastery, science pure Enframing and pure Stamping [Das Ge-stell], that economics is pure calculation, that capitalism is pure reproduction, the subject pure consciousness. Purity is everywhere! They claim this, but we must be careful not to take them at their word, since what they are asserting is only half of the modern world, the work of purification that distils what the work of hybridization supplies.

Who has forgotten Being? No one, no one ever has, otherwise Nature would be truly available as a pure 'stock'. Look around you: scientific objects are circulating simultaneously as subjects objects and discourse. Networks are full of Being. As for machines, they are laden with subjects and collectives. How could a being lose its difference, its incompleteness, its mark, its trace of Being? This is never in anyone's power; otherwise we should have to imagine that we have truly been modern, we should be taken in by the upper half of the modern Constitution.

Has someone, however, actually forgotten Being? Yes: anyone who really thinks that Being has really been forgotten. SSSAs Levi-Strauss says, 'the barbarian is first and foremost the man who believe in barbarism.' (Levi-Strauss, [1952] 1987. p. 12). Those who have failed to undertake empirical studies of sciences, technologies, law, politics, economics, religion or fiction have lost the traces of Being that are distributed everywhere among beings. If, scorning empiricism, you opt out of the exact sciences, then the human sciences, then traditional philosophy, then the sciences of language, and you hunker down in your forest -- then you will indeed feel a tragic loss. But what is missing is you yourself, not the world! Heidegger's epigones have converted that glaring weakness into a strength. 'We don't know anything empirical, but that doesn't matter, since your world is empty of Being. We are keeping the little flame of Being safe from everything, and you, who have all the rest, have nothing.' On the contrary: we have everything, since we have Being, and beings, and we have never lost track of the difference between Being and beings. We are carrying out the impossible project undertaken by Heidegger, who believed what the modern Constitution said about itself without understanding that what is at issue there is only half of a larger mechanism which has never abandoned the old anthropological matrix. No one can forget Being, since there has never been a modern world, or, by the same token, metaphysics. We have always remained pre-Socratic, pre-Cartesian, pre-Kantian, pre-Nietzschean. No radical revolution can separate us from these pasts, so there is no need for reactionary counter-revolutions to lead us back to what has never been abandoned. Yes, Heraclitus is a surer guide than Heidegger: 'Einai gar kai entautha theous.'

#### Their ontology first args are tautologies that stifle effective politics

Graham 2k -- Graduate School of Management, Queensland (P, Heidegger’s Hippies, http://www.philgraham.net/HH\_conf.pdf)

To state their positions more succinctly: ‘Heraclitus maintained that everything changes: Parmenides retorted that nothing changes’ (Russell 1946: 66). Between them, they delineated the dialectical extremes within which the “problem of the subject” has become manifest: in the extremes of questions about ontology, the nature of “Being”, or existence, or ‘Existenz’ (Adorno 1973: 110-25). Historically, such arguments tend towards internalist hocus pocus:

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#### Focusing on the metaphysics of climate destroys progressive actions to solve the problem---technical fixes are key

Hayward 6—Senior Fellow, Pacific Research Institute for Public Policy (Steven, The Fate of the Earth in the Balance, http://www.aei.org/article/society-and-culture/the-fate-of-the-earth-in-the-balance/)

This small example of environmental atavism reveals a more fundamental aspect of the public discourse about climate change. At the core of environmentalist animus against nuclear power is a categorical suspicion about technology itself, which is connected to a larger philosophical pessimism about human civilization and man’s supposed separation or alienation from nature. We have seen this style of argument during the long controversy over the arms race in the late stages of the Cold War, during which the immense political and technical aspects of the problem were, for a certain cast of mind, entirely subsumed beneath a more general critique of how the arms race was merely symptomatic of a larger crisis of civilization. Unless this larger crisis was addressed, it was suggested, there would be no hope the arms race could be solved.¶ It was not but twenty years ago that the large nuclear weapons arsenals of the superpowers threatened the instantaneous destruction of civilization and perhaps human life itself. Today, climate change is said to threaten the same things, only more slowly. It is remarkable how similarly the leading advocates for these two problems understand and conceptualize them. In the case of both the arms race then and climate change today, we are told that the issue is ultimately philosophical in nature, and that wholesale changes in our philosophical perspective must necessarily precede political and policy remedies to the problem. Should this perspective be taken seriously? What can it really mean?¶ The Fate of the Earth in the Balance¶ The peculiarity of this approach to major global problems is best seen by comparing the two leading popular books on each issue, Jonathan Schell’s 1982 bestseller The Fate of the Earth, and Al Gore’s 1991 bestseller Earth in the Balance (whose main arguments reappear in truncated form in An Inconvenient Truth). It is not just the titles that are strikingly similar; a close reading reveals the two books to be identical in their overarching philosophy.[5] In both, mankind is poised on the abyss, facing, in Gore’s words, “the most serious threat that we have ever faced,”[6] or “the nearness of extinction,”[7] to use only one of Schell’s many apocalyptic formulations. (An index entry--“despair; see also futility”[8]--conveys the mood better than any quotation from the main text.) In fact, if one substitutes “global warming” for “nuclear weapons” in the text of Fate of the Earth, the result is so shockingly close to Earth in the Balance that one could almost make out a case for plagiarism on Gore’s part. Perhaps some publisher will have the wit to meld the two books into one: The Fate of the Earth in the Balance.¶ But such a combination is not necessary. The two books directly intersect in several places. Gore writes, for example, that:¶ the political will that led to mass protests against escalating the arms race during the early 1980s came from a popular awareness that civilization seemed to be pulled toward the broad lip of a downslope leading to a future catastrophe--nuclear war--that would crush human history forever into a kind of black hole. . . . This is not unlike the challenge we face today in the global environmental crisis. The potential for true catastrophe lies in the future, but the downslope that pulls us toward it is becoming recognizably steeper with each passing year.[9]¶ In this, Gore was only returning the favor to Schell, who occasionally paused long enough from his lament over nuclear catastrophe to include a few nods to ecocatastrophe. For his part, Schell mentions “global heating through an increased ‘greenhouse effect,’” adding:¶ The nuclear peril is usually seen in isolation from the threats to other forms of life and their ecosystems, but in fact should be seen as the very center of the ecological crisis--as the cloud-covered Everest of which the more immediate, visible kinds of harm to the environment are the mere foothills. Both the effort to preserve the environment and the effort to save the species from extinction by nuclear arms would be enriched and strengthened by this recognition.[10]¶ Both books display an affectation for gilding their arguments with lots of brief references to major thinkers from a wide variety of disciplines. Consider Schell on Heisenberg:¶ The famous uncertainty principle, formulated by the German physicist Werner Heisenberg, has shown that our knowledge of atomic phenomena is limited because the experimental procedures with which we must carry out our observations inevitably interfere with the phenomena that we wish to measure.¶ Schell applies Heisenberg’s scientific insight to all forms of human investigation, writing that “a limit to our knowledge is fixed by the fact that we are incarnate beings, not disembodied spirits.”[11] The supposed separation from nature implied by Heisenberg’s idea limits our appreciation for both nature and our predicament.¶ Gore follows down the same track:¶ Earlier this century, the Heisenberg Principle established that the very act of observing a natural phenomenon can change what is being observed. Although the initial theory was limited in practice to special cases in subatomic physics, the philosophical implications were and are staggering. It is now apparent that since Descartes reestablished the Platonic notion and began the scientific revolution, human civilization has been experiencing a kind of Heisenberg Principle writ large. . . . [T]he world of intellect is assumed to be separate from the physical world.[12]¶ Gore opens his hit movie and companion book An Inconvenient Truth with an homage to the famous photo of the Earth taken from the moon by the Apollo 8 astronauts in 1968. This image, he tells us, played a key role in galvanizing the world’s environmental consciousness, underscoring the fragility of the planet. As he put it fulsomely in Earth in the Balance:¶ Those first striking pictures taken by the Apollo astronauts of the earth floating in the blackness of space were so deeply moving because they enabled us to see our planet from a new perspective--a perspective from which the preciousness and fragile beauty of the earth was suddenly clear.[13]¶ Schell uses the same trope:¶ As it happens, our two roles in the nuclear predicament have been given visual representation in the photographs of the earth that we have taken with the aid of another technical device of our time, the spaceship. These pictures illustrate, on the one hand, our mastery over nature, which has enabled us to take up a position in the heavens and look back on the earth as though it were just one more celestial body, and, on the other, our weakness and frailty in the face of that mastery, which we cannot help feeling when we see the smallness, solitude, and delicate beauty of our planetary home.[14]¶ These are only a few of the many examples that can be drawn of both books’ derivative and allusive nature. Both authors offer up references to Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Francis Bacon, Einstein, Descartes, and Hannah Arendt in what might be called, to paraphrase Arendt, the banality of promiscuous allusion, all to bolster a superficial philosophical or anthropological point that is far distant from the politics and policy of either issue.¶ Most troubling is that both authors depict dissent from their point of view to be a pathology of some kind, foreclosing that there could be any rational basis for a different point of view. Gore compares dissenters to his view of our environmental predicament to garden-variety substance abusers, arguing that people who are oblivious to our “collision” with nature are “enablers” who are “helping to ensure that the addictive behavior continues. The psychological mechanism of denial is complex, but again addiction serves as a model.”[15] Elsewhere Gore compares our “dysfunctional civilization” to dysfunctional families, whose members suffer from “a serious psychological disorder.” While Gore begins this discussion by saying that family dysfunctionality is a metaphor, he ends by applying the concept literally: “The model of the dysfunctional family has a direct bearing on our ways of thinking about the environment.”[16] Schell is close aboard: “A society that systematically shuts its eyes to an urgent peril to its physical survival and fails to take any steps to save itself cannot be called psychologically well.”[17]¶ Both authors call for making their particular issue the paramount global priority in the same terms. Gore argues that “we must make the environment the central organizing principle [emphasis added] for civilization. . . . [T]he tide in this battle will turn only when the majority of people in the world become sufficiently aroused by a shared sense of urgent danger to join in an all-out effort.”[18] Schell wrote, “If we felt the peril for what it is--an urgent threat to our whole human substance--we would let it become the organizing principle [emphasis added] of our global collective existence: the foundation on which the world was built.”[19]¶ Having laid the groundwork for a wholesale change in our priorities, both Schell and Gore are surprisingly light on the social and political architecture of their alternative world. This is explicitly so in Schell’s case: “I have not sought to define a political solution to the nuclear predicament. . . . I have left to others those awesome, urgent tasks.”[20] Gore’s approach is better supported; he offers a laundry list of specific policy recommendations mostly on energy and resource use, but it falls far short of his desired “wrenching transformation” of civilization. If the broader solution to our predicament is not clear even in outline, it is because neither author fully grasps the magnitude of the critique he is making, such that a political solution--at least, a solution that is compatible with liberal democracy--is impossible. Neither man understands why.¶ The Real Source for The Fate of the Earth in the Balance¶ Despite the parade of quotes and references from Plato and Arendt, there is one thinker conspicuously absent from both Schell and Gore’s numerous citations but whose spirit is present on almost every page of both books: Martin Heidegger. Perhaps the absence of a reference to Heidegger is due to reticence or discretion, given Heidegger’s dubious and complicated association with Nazism. Nothing derails an argument faster than playing the reductio ad Hitlerum card. More likely it is the abstruse and difficult character of Heidegger’s arguments; Gore and Schell may not realize how closely the core of their argument about the technological alienation of man from nature tracks Heidegger’s more thorough account in his famous 1953 essay “The Question Concerning Technology.”[21]¶ Heidegger asks, “What is modern technology?” His understanding of technology is sometimes rendered in translation as “technicity” to convey a defective way of knowing about phenomena, and to distinguish the term from its more common usage to mean mere scientific instrumentality (think gadgets). Heidegger believed that our mode of objectifying nature alienates mankind from perceiving and contemplating pure “Being.” Whatever this may mean--and even Heidegger’s followers admit it is obscure (Heidegger himself wrote that “we are asking about something which we barely grasp”[22])--Heidegger suggests that philosophy has been asking the wrong questions since the very beginning, and the culmination of this wrong track is modern technology, which completes the alienation of man from nature. This is where Heidegger prepares the way for Gore.¶ Modern technology, according to Heidegger,¶ puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it supply energy which can be extracted and stored as such. . . . The earth now reveals itself as a coal-mining district, the soil as a mineral deposit. The field that the peasant formerly cultivated and set in order appears different from how it did when to set in order still meant to take of and maintain. . . . But meanwhile even the cultivation of the field has come under the grip of another kind of setting-in-order, which sets upon [italics in original] nature. It sets upon it in the sense of challenging it. Agriculture is now the mechanized food industry. Air is now set upon to yield nitrogen, the earth to yield ore, ore to yield uranium, for example; uranium is set upon to yield atomic energy, which can be released either for destruction or for peaceful use.[23]¶ Here are Gore’s parallel passages:¶ [O]ur civilization is holding ever more tightly to its habit of consuming larger and larger quantities every year of coal, oil, fresh air and water, trees, topsoil, and the thousand other substances we rip from the crust of the earth. . . . We seem increasingly eager to lose ourselves in the forms of culture, society, technology, the media, and the rituals of production and consumption, but the price we pay is a loss of our spiritual lives.[24]¶ And:¶ Our seemingly compulsive need to control the natural world . . . has driven us to the edge of disaster, for we have become so successful at controlling nature than we have lost our connection to it.[25]¶ It is possible to compile a long inventory of close parallels between Heidegger and Gore. For example, Heidegger told interviewers in 1966:¶ [T]echnicity increasingly dislodges man and uproots him from the earth. . . . The last 30 years have made it clearer that the planet-wide movement of modern technicity is a power whose magnitude in determining [our] history can hardly be overestimated.[26]¶ Heidegger also found the earth-from-space photos as affecting as Gore and Schell:¶ I don’t know if you were shocked, but [certainly] I was shocked when a short time ago I saw the pictures of the earth taken from the moon. We do not need atom bombs at all [to uproot us]--the uprooting of man is already here. All our relationships have become merely technical ones. It is no longer upon an earth than man lives today.[27]¶ Gore likes to cite the supposed proverb that the Chinese symbol for “crisis” also means “opportunity.” Heidegger was fond of quoting a line from the German poet Hölderlin: “Where danger lies, there too grows the chance for salvation.” And is it necessary to mention that Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle also shows up for duty in Heidegger’s essay on technology? Heidegger is often said to have advocated a return to pre-Socratic philosophy, though in fact he was skeptical that there was any philosophical solution to the problem he perceived. Gore follows Heidegger closely when he criticizes Plato and the Western philosophic tradition for preparing the ground for modern man’s estrangement from nature:¶ The strange absence of emotion, the banal face of evil so often manifested by mass technological assaults on the global environment, is surely a consequence of the belief in an underlying separation of intellect from the physical world. At the root of this belief lies a heretical understanding of humankind’s place in the world as old as Plato, as seductive in its mythic appeal as Gnosticism, as compelling as the Cartesian promise of Promethean power--and it has led to tragic results.[28]¶ Political Implications¶ Assuming for the purposes of discussion that Gore’s Heideggerian analysis is correct, can a reconnection of intellect and the physical world be accomplished through politics--or led by politicians? Heidegger did not think so, which is why he said it would be impossible for him to write an ethical or political treatise.[29] He doubted democracy offered any hope. In an interview late in life, Heidegger said, “For me today it is a decisive question as to how any political system--and which one--can be adapted to an epoch of technicity. I know of no answer to this question. I am not convinced that it is democracy.”[30] Heidegger was contem+ptuous of postwar democratic reforms--calling them “halfway measures”--including individual constitutional rights, because:¶ I do not see in them any actual confrontation with the world of technicity, inasmuch as behind them all, according to my view, stands the conception that technicity in its essence is something that man holds within his own hands.¶ Heidegger thought American democracy was the most hopeless of all, in words that sound in substance exactly like Gore’s complaint:¶ [Americans] are still caught up in a thought that, under the guise of pragmatism, facilitates the technical operation and manipulation [of things], but at the same time blocks the way to reflection upon the genuine nature of modern technicity.[31]¶ (Separately, Heidegger wrote that America epitomized “the emerging monstrousness of modern times.”[32])¶ From here it is possible to comprehend more dispassionately Heidegger’s attraction to the Nazi movement in the 1930s. He had no brief for fascism in general or National Socialism in particular, nor was he an anti-Semite.[33] What he expressed in his famous “Rector’s Address”[34] in 1934 was that the “inner truth and greatness” of the Nazi movement was its potential “encounter between technicity on the planetary level and modern man,” and that it “casts its net in these troubled waters of ‘values’ and ‘totalities,’” or, as he put it a 1948 letter to Herbert Marcuse, “a spiritual renewal of life in its entirety.”[35] In other words, the “wrenching transformation” of Germany that the Nazi revolution set in motion held the potential for reconnecting humankind with the essence of Being in a primal, pre-Socratic way. Heidegger’s moral blindness to the phenomenon in front of him exposes the hazard of an excessively abstract approach to human existence. As Heidegger’s example shows, the idea of transforming human consciousness through politics is likely an extremist--and potentially totalitarian--project.¶ Reviewing the fundamentally Heideggerian understanding of our environmental predicament in Gore’s thought throws new light on the deeper meaning of Gore’s call for a “wrenching transformation” of civilization on the level of thought. Gore would no doubt be sincerely horrified at the suggested parallel between his themes and Heidegger’s moral blindness toward political extremism, and rightly reject it as the implication of his views. He is, thankfully, too imbued with the innate American democratic tradition to embrace any such extremism.[36] But it is fair to ask whether he has fully thought through the implications of his ambitious critique. In the case of both Gore and Schell before him, the Heideggerian approach reveals a certain cast of mind: deeply pessimistic, but utopian at the same time. Our salvation demands submitting to the moral authority of their “vision” to change our “consciousness.” After all, one aspect of Plato that Heidegger approves of is the view that mankind will suffer unremitting disaster until either rulers become philosophers or philosophers become rulers. (Indeed it was the failure of intellectuals to guide the Nazi movement that led to its ruin, Heidegger thought.) Gore seems to be making a round trip, looking to end up on either end of this potentiality, envisioning himself either as a ruler who has become a philosopher or as a philosopher who may yet (again) become a ruler.¶ Is it so farfetched to suggest that this has some problematic, if unintended, political implications? One of Gore’s sound and important arguments in Earth in the Balance and An Inconvenient Truth is that it is a profound error to suppose that the earth’s environment is so robust that there is little or nothing that mankind could do to damage it seriously. He is right, as was Heidegger, to point out the immense earthshaking power of modern technology. But there is a symmetrical observation to be made of Gore’s metaphysical approach to the problem, which is that it is an equally profound error to suppose that the environment of human liberty is so robust that there is no political intervention on behalf of the environment that could not damage liberty in serious ways, especially if the environment is elevated to the central organizing principle of civilization. Implicit in this goal is downgrading human liberty as the central organizing principle of civilization. There are no index entries in Earth in the Balance for “liberty,” “freedom,” or “individualism.” Heidegger believed the liberal conceptions of these great terms were meaningless or without foundation. There is no acknowledgement in Gore’s book that this is even a serious consideration. Gore’s one discussion of the matter is not reassuring:¶ In fact, what many feel is a deep philosophical crisis in the West has occurred in part because this balance [between rights and responsibilities] has been disrupted: we have tilted so far toward individual rights and so far away from any sense of obligation that it is now difficult to muster an adequate defense of any rights vested in the community at large or the nation--much less rights properly vested in all humankind or in posterity.[37]¶ But Is It Necessary?¶ Is Gore’s high-level metaphysical analysis necessary in the first place? Do we really have to resolve or unwind the problem of Platonic idealism and Cartesian dualism to address the problem of climate change? The example of the previous case in point--the arms race--suggests an answer. The arms race did not require a revolution in human consciousness or a transformation of national and global political institutions to bring about rapid and favorable changes. The kind of grandiose, pretentious thinking exemplified in Fate of the Earth played little or no role in these shifts. The problem turned out to be much simpler. The acute problem of the superpower arms race was mostly a moral problem--not a metaphysical problem--arising from the character of the irreconcilable regimes. As was frequently pointed out, the United States never worried about British or French nuclear weapons. Once the United States and the Soviet Union were able to establish a level of trust and common interest, unwinding the arms race became a relatively easy matter. Nuclear weapons and the threat of nuclear proliferation in unsavory regimes (Iran, North Korea) is still around today, but the acute existential threat of the arms race has receded substantially.¶ In the early 1980s, The Fate of the Earth became the Bible for the nuclear freeze movement--the simplistic idea brought to you by the same people who thought Ronald Reagan was a simpleton. To his credit, then representative and later senator Gore opposed the nuclear freeze. Nowadays Gore has started to call for an immediate freeze on greenhouse-gas emissions, which he must know is unrealistic. His explanation in a recent speech shows that he missed entirely the lesson from that earlier episode:¶ An immediate freeze [on CO2 emissions] has the virtue of being clear, simple, and easy to understand. It can attract support across partisan lines as a logical starting point for the more difficult work that lies ahead. I remember a quarter century ago when I was the author of a complex nuclear arms control plan to deal with the then rampant arms race between our country and the former Soviet Union. At the time, I was strongly opposed to the nuclear freeze movement, which I saw as simplistic and naive. But, three-quarters of the American people supported it--and as I look back on those years I see more clearly now that the outpouring of public support for that very simple and clear mandate changed the political landscape and made it possible for more detailed and sophisticated proposals to eventually be adopted.[38]¶ The irony of this statement is that since the moral and political differences between the United States and the Soviet Union could not be resolved diplomatically, the way to move relations forward was to convert relations into a technical problem (i.e., negotiations over the number and specifications of weapons systems). Gore remained firmly within the technocratic arms-control community throughout this period, even as Schell and others tried to moralize the arms-control problem with the nuclear freeze proposal. But the moral confusion (some critics said the premise of moral equivalence) of the freeze idea made it a sideshow at best and a hindrance at worst. On the contrary, President Reagan’s resistance to the freeze, as well as the conventions of the arms-control process to which Gore held, were crucial to his strategy for changing the dynamic of the arms race. Having been an arms-control technocrat in the 1980s, Gore today wants to turn the primarily technical and economic problems of climate change into a moral problem.¶ Gore’s argument that climate change is a moral problem and not a political problem is not serious, since the leading prescriptions

for treating the problem all require massive applications of political power on a global scale. Skeptics and cynics might dismiss Gore’s metaphysical speculations as mere intellectual preening, as many critics did with Fate of the Earth in the 1980s. But such an approach to environmental issues may be an obstacle to many practical, incremental steps that can be taken to solve real climate-policy problems. Once one grasps the Heideggerian character of the Gore approach to thinking about environmental problems, the hesitance about nuclear power comes into better focus. Gore and others in his mold dislike large-scale technologies because they are intrinsic to mankind’s mastery of nature that is driving our supposed alienation from nature. This same premise also explains the frequently hostile reaction of many environmentalists to suggestions that adaptation to climate change should be a part of any serious climate policy, even though many leading climate scientists and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change have embraced adaptation. The suggestion that technologies for climate modification might be developed, which would be the climate policy equivalent of Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative, are greeted contemptuously for the same reason.¶ Will climate policy ultimately be guided by physicians or metaphysicians? Gore’s high-profile position on these issues tilts the balance toward metaphysicians. This is certain to generate ferocious resistance to change well beyond merely self-interested industries. Gore would be better off following the advice of Heidegger critic Stanley Rosen, and “step downward, out of the thin atmosphere of the floating island of Laputa or of the balloons in which so many of our advanced thinkers are currently suspended, back into the rich air of everyday life.”[39] That’s a fancy way of saying, “Take a deep breath, Al.”

## Security k

### Condo

**Conditionality is bad:**

**Time Skew: allows them to neutralize large chunks of 2ac time, hurting 1AR strat. The 2AC matters most because it puts out all the arguments that the aff can go.**

**Decrease Education: multiple worlds cause muddled debates that preclude consistency of education.**

**Voting issue: for ground, fairness, and education.**

#### POLICYMAKING PROVIDES A UNIQUE SPACE TO BECOME EDUCATED ABOUT CRITICAL ADVOCACY, THE ONLY ALTERNATIVE IS THE CREATION OF A NEW ELITE

Coverstone ‘95

[Alan, Princeton High School, “An Inward Glance: A Response to Mitchell’s Outward Activist Turn,” www.wfu.edu/Student-organizations/debate/MiscSites/DRGArticles/Coverstone1995China.htm, acc 3-16-05//uwyo-ajl]

Yet, Mitchell goes too far. In two important areas, his argument is slightly miscalibrated. First, Mitchell underestimates the value of debate as it is currently practiced. There is greater value in the somewhat insular nature of our present activity than he assumes. Debate's inward focus creates an unusual space for training and practice with the tools of modem political discourse. Such space is largely unavailable elsewhere in American society. Second, Mitchell overextends his concept of activism. He argues fervently for mass action along ideological lines. Such a turn replaces control by society's information elite with control by an elite all our own. More than any other group in America today, practitioners of debate should recognize the subtle issues upon which political diversity turns. Mitchell's search for broad themes around which to organize mass action runs counter to this insight. As a result, Mitchell's call for an outward activist turn threatens to subvert the very values it seeks to achieve.

#### And, Foucauldian critique denies agency by ignoring any social justice or useful human action

Cook ‘92

[Anthony, Associate Professor at Georgetown Law, NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW, Spring, 1992]

Unless we are to be trapped in this Foucaultian moment of postmodern insularity, we must resist the temptation to sever description from explanation. Instead, our objective should be to explain what we describe in light of a vision embracing values that we make explicit in struggle. These values should act as magnets that link our particularized struggles to other struggles and more global critiques of power. In other words, we must not, as Foucault seems all too willing to do, forsake the possibility of more universal narratives that, while tempered by postmodern insights, attempt to say and do something about the oppressive world in which we live. Second, Foucault's emphasis on the techniques and discourses of knowledge that constitute the human subject often diminishes, if not abrogates, the role of human agency. Agency is of tremendous importance in any theory of oppression, because individuals are not simply constituted by systems of knowledge but also constitute hegemonic and counter-hegemonic systems of knowledge as well. Critical theory must pay attention to the ways in which oppressed people not only are victimized by ideologies of oppression but the ways they craft from these ideologies and discourses counter-hegemonic weapons of liberation.

**Their K is useless in crafting policy response to Chinese action**

Joseph K. **Clifton 11**, “DISPUTED THEORY AND SECURITY POLICY: RESPONDING TO “THE RISE OF CHINA”,” 2011, http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1164&context=cmc\_theses

Criticism also exists for the epistemological basis of mainstream IR theory, positivism, resulting in provocative theoretical positions. The basic claim of post-positivists is that mainstream theory claims that knowledge as objective and immutable when all knowledge is actually subjective and contingent. A theorist cannot have objective knowledge because reality can only be observed by a subject, the theorist. Knowledge, therefore, is articulated in terms of inherently subjective discourses. 156¶ Recognizing the subjectivity of mainstream IR’s supposedly objective knowledge leads to two main conclusions. First, mainstream IR is inaccurate in its understanding of the world, so awareness of subjectivity will allow for greater explanation and engagement with reality. Second, mainstream IR knowledge hides the value judgments inherent in subjective claims by positing their objectivity. This places them beyond question, elevating their power. The reproduction of dominant IR discourses oppresses the less powerful by marginalizing their discourses. 157 For example, critical theorists argue that mainstream IR discourse is implicitly masculinized, excluding women from positions of power and from consideration of the effects of theory and policy. 158 Critical theorists attribute many if not all of negative outcomes in international politics to exclusive, dominant discourses. War, for example, often results from the reproduction of dominant discourses of statist power. 159 Consequently, the goal of critical theory is “emancipatory,” a normative attempt to resist power. Resistance is attempted through exposing subjectivity, promoting the discourses of the oppressed, and otherwise attempting to change the discursive climate to loosen the grip of dominant discourses. 160¶ While purely critical approaches may be interesting or **even more correct**, they are **basically useless for policymakers**. Robert Cox distinguishes critical theory from problemsolving theory, where the latter does not question dominant discourses and institutions but tries to get them to **“work smoothly by dealing effectively with particular sources of trouble**.” Mainstream IR theory fits this description. Critical theory tries to affect the real world as well, but it tries to enact broad social change instead of focusing on specific problems. 161 **This will not do for policymakers**, who **have to** craft responses to **specific issues like the rise of China**. 162 As Waltz argues in a response to Ashley and Cox, problem-solving theory needs to make assumptions regardless of their objectivity: “**The alternative is simply to eschew such [problemsolving] theories altogether**. Would we then know more or less about the social and the natural worlds?” 163

**This is a reason to combine approaches pragmatically via the permutation**

Joseph K. **Clifton 11**, “DISPUTED THEORY AND SECURITY POLICY: RESPONDING TO “THE RISE OF CHINA”,” 2011, http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1164&context=cmc\_theses

This brief overview of some of the different theoretical positions applied to the rise of China should give an idea of the quandary of the policymaker. The debates between different theoretical positions are complex and obscure, but the differences in prescribed policy can be enormous. For example, should the U.S. pursue economically independent trade policies with China? Isolating all other competing theoretical factors, the decision can come down to technical methodological agreements. A policymaker **has to make a choice**, and she has little way of knowing which choice is correct. And the problem is all the more serious when theorists claim that **the wrong choice could lead to great power war.** One possible option is to choose a theory and stick with it. This would make analysis and decisions straightforward. Additionally, it would establish predictability in policy behavior, reducing security concerns stemming from uncertainty. But there are two major drawbacks. First, the theory could be wrong. Dogmatically pursuing an incorrect theory would be much more disastrous than tentatively wavering between different theories. Second, some theories do not apply to every aspect of a relationship, creating indeterminate decisions. ¶ Perhaps the most sophisticated attempt to solve this problem is Peter J. Katzenstein’s case for “**analytical eclecticism**.” 173 Analytical eclecticism attempts to abandon the deep theoretical backing behind different theoretical positions, and **combine relevant elements of implemented theory in “explanatory sketches**.” 174 The benefit of the approach is that is allows flexible access to a large amount of relevant knowledge **without having to take sides in the theoretical debates**. Analytical eclecticism could be the best option, but there are four potential problems. First, it assumes complementary theoretical combinations, but the real problems are when different theories are contradictory. 175 Promoting deep economic interdependence is either a good idea or a terrible one, and combining realist and liberal understandings on trade is probably impossible. Second, it artificially elevates constructivism because constructivism’s greater compatibility with other theories. Third, it discounts theories that make few contextual claims. In particular, offensive realism’s long-term forecast of conflict between China and the U.S. will not necessarily manifest itself with any signs at this stage. Consequently, policymakers might be tempted to ignore its warnings for greater descriptive ability. My point is that this creates a systemically arbitrary criterion for theory selection, not that offensive realism ought to be followed. Fourth, it allows policymakers to pick and choose theoretical elements that fit their personal preference. This could be seen as a good way to empower policymakers, but it is also arbitrary.

#### And, FOUCAULT MISUNDERSTANDS POWER… LIBERAL SOCIETY IS SUBSTANTIVELY DIFFERENT FROM INTERNMENT

Walzer ’83

[Michael, Professor of Social Sciences at the Institute for Advanced Studies & Former Professor at Harvard, “The Politics of Michel Foucault,” Dissent, Fall]

For it is Foucault's claim, and I think he is partly right, that the discipline of a prison, say, represents a continuation and intensification of what goes on in more ordinary places-and wouldn't be possible if it didn't. So we all live to a time schedule, get up to an alarm, work to a rigid routine, live in the eye of authority, are periodically subject to examination and inspection. No one is entirely free from these new forms of social control. It has to be added, however, that subjection to these new forms is not the same thing as being in prison: Foucault tends systematically to underestimate the difference, and this criticism, which I shall want to develop, goes to the heart of his politics.

#### And, Their totalizing criticism of power prevents reform—we must use the state for incremental ends.

Faubian ‘94

[James D., professor of anthro @ Rice University, Michel Foucault: Power, Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984 Volume 3, 1994, p. xxxi-xxxii]

Foucault wanted, then, to move both the descriptive and prescriptive functions of political analysis away from the “juridico-discursive” language of legitimation. To try to put the matter as simply as possible: he does not think that all power is evil or all government unacceptable, but does think that theorems claiming to confer legitimacy on power or government are fictions; in a lecture of 1979, he expresses sympathy with the view of earlier political skeptics that “civil society is a bluff and the social contract a fairy tale.” This does not mean that the subject matter of political philosophy is evacuated, for doctrines of legitimation have been and may still act as political forces in history. But his analytic quarrel with legitimation theory is that it can divert us from considering the terms in which modern government confers rationality, and thus possible acceptability, on its activity and practice. This is the main reason why he argues political analysis is still immature, having still not cut off the king’s head.1o The deployment and application of law is, for Foucault, like everything else, not good or evil in itself, capable of acting in the framework of liberalism as an instrument for economizing and moderating the interventions of governmental power, necessary as an indispensable restraint on power in some contexts, uses, and guises; it is to be resisted as an encroaching menace in others. In his governmentality lectures, Foucault investigates the evolution, from the era of the police states through the development of parliamentary liberal government, of the ambiguous and dangerous hybridization of law with a rationality of security and with new theories of social solidarity and social defense. This historical analysis and diagnosis informs Foucault’s commentary on the civil liberties politics of seventies France, with its distinctive contemporary recrudescence of raison d’etat and the police state. But at the same time, in a way we tend not to think of as typically French, he dryly mocked and debunked the excesses of what he called “state phobia”—the image of the contemporary state as an agency of essential evil and limitless despotism. The state, he said, does not have a unitary essence or indeed the importance commonly ascribed to it: what are important to study are the multiple governmental practices that are exercised through its institutions and elsewhere. (In a lecture describing the seventeenth-century theory of raison d’etat, Foucault characterized it as a doctrine of the “permanent coup d’etat”—a piquant choice of phrase, because it had been the title of a polemical book written against de Gaulle by Francois Mitterrand. We know that Foucault did not share the view, common in the French Left, of de Gaulle’s government as an antidemocratic putsch with crypto-fascistic tendencies.” The Left, he also suggested, should expect to win elected power not by demonizing the state (never a very convincing platform for a socialist party) but by showing it possessed its own conception of how to govern.

#### OUR SPECIFIC USE OF BIOPOLITICS IS GOOD, LEADING TO LIBERAL DEMOCRACY THAT SOLVES THEIR VIOLENCE AND OPPRESSION CLAIMS

Dickinson 04

(Edward Ross is a prof @ University of Cincinnati , “Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About “Modernity,” Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, March)

In short, the continuities between early twentieth-century biopolitical discourse and the practices of the welfare state in our own time are unmistakasble. Both are instances of the “disciplinary society” and of biopolitical, regulatory, social-engineering modernity, and they share that genealogy with more authoritarian states, including the National Socialist state, but also fascist Italy, for example. And it is certainly fruitful to view them from this very broad perspective. But that analysis can easily become superficial and misleading, because it obfuscates the profoundly different strategic and local dynamics of power in the two kinds of regimes. Clearly the democratic welfare state is not only formally but also substantively quite different from totalitarianism. Above all, again, it has nowhere developed the fateful, radicalizing dynamic that characterized National Socialism (or for that matter Stalinism), the psychotic logic that leads from economistic population management to mass murder. Again, there is always the potential for such a discursive regime to generate coercive policies. In those cases in which the regime of rights does not successfully produce “health,” such a system can —and historically does— create compulsory programs to enforce it. But again, there are political and policy potentials and constraints in such a structuring of biopolitics that are very different from those of National Socialist Germany. Democratic biopolitical regimes require, enable, and incite a degree of self-direction and participation that is functionally incompatible with authoritarian or totalitarian structures. And this pursuit of biopolitical ends through a regime of democratic citizenship does appear, historically, to have imposed increasingly narrow limits on coercive policies, and to have generated a “logic” or imperative of increasing liberalization. Despite limitations imposed by political context and the slow pace of discursive change, I think this is the unmistakable message of the really very impressive waves of legislative and welfare reforms in the 1920s or the 1970s in Germany.90 Of course it is not yet clear whether this is an irreversible dynamic of such systems. Nevertheless, such regimes are characterized by sufficient degrees of autonomy (and of the potential for its expansion) for sufficient numbers of people that I think it becomes useful to conceive of them as productive of a strategic configuration of power relations that might fruitfully be analyzed as a condition of “liberty,” just as much as they are productive of constraint, oppression, or manipulation. At the very least, totalitarianism cannot be the sole orientation point for our understanding of biopolitics, the only end point of the logic of social engineering. This notion is not at all at odds with the core of Foucauldian (and Peukertian) theory. Democratic welfare states are regimes of power/knowledge no less than early twentieth-century totalitarian states; these systems are not “opposites,” in the sense that they are two alternative ways of organizing the same thing. But they are two very different ways of organizing it. The concept “power” should not be read as a universal stifling night of oppression, manipulation, and entrapment, in which all political and social orders are grey, are essentially or effectively “the same.” Power is a set of social relations, in which individuals and groups have varying degrees of autonomy and effective subjectivity. And discourse is, as Foucault argued, “tactically polyvalent.” Discursive elements (like the various elements of biopolitics) can be combined in different ways to form parts of quite different strategies (like totalitarianism or the democratic welfare state); they cannot be assigned to one place in a structure, but rather circulate. The varying possible constellations of power in modern societies create “multiple modernities,” modern societies with quite radically differing potentials.