# 1nc

# 1

#### First the links, Production focus to problems fails—the only solutions it engenders are more production, this only contributes to environmental problems and neoliberal market based solutions

Princen et al, 2002

[Thomas, Ph.D., Political Economy and Government, 1988, Harvard University and Associate professor at the Univ. of Michigan school of natural resources and environment, Michael Maniates, Professor of Political and Environmental Science at Allegheny College, and Ken Conca, Program Director the School of Global Environmental Politics at American University, Confronting Consumption, “Confronting Consumption.” Pg. 1-20. Published by The MIT press] /Wyo-MB

Combining the elements of socially embedded consumers and linked chains of resource-use decisions leads to a third theme of our provisional framework: that ‘‘consuming’’ occurs all along the chain, not just at the downstream node of consumer demand. Nodes of raw-material extraction and manufacturing, for example, represent not just production and value added, but also consumption and value subtracted. Producers are consumers; production is consumption. An important implication of this idea is that what is being consumed at each node is not obvious. At the node of primary resource extraction it might be the tree or the fish, or it might be the ecosystem integrity of the forest or the fishery. At the node of final purchase it might be an apple, or a person’s attention, or a community’s social fabric. Another implication of this view is that responsibility shifts from the individuated consumers-as-final-demanders to actors at all nodes of the chain. Producers may add value as they satisfy downstream demand, but they also risk value depletion; they consume value by producing. In using up resources both natural and social, they impose costs on the environment and on people— be they purchasers, workers, caregivers, neighbors, or citizens. This consumption angle on resource use offers a corrective to the production-centered perspective that dominates contemporary discussions of economic affairs, including environmental protection. In that perspective, raw materials feed manufacturing and distribution to produce what people want. It follows that, because goods are good and would not be produced if people did not want them, more goods— and more production— must be better. A productive economy is, as a result, one that produces more goods for a given input (thus increasing the economy’s ‘‘productivity’’), yields more choices for consumers, and increases output. When production creates problems such as pollution, the productive answer is to produce correctives such as scrubbers, filters, and detoxifiers. So goes the logic of production, productiveness, productivity, and products— construing all things economic as producing, as adding value, as, indeed, progress. The consumption angle turns this around to self-consciously construe economic activity as consuming, as depleting value, as risking ecological overshoot, as stressing social capacity.

#### The impact to the mass consumption politics of the affirmative is planetary destruction, loss of value to life, and mass poverty and dehumanization—the alternative’s criticism of consumption is key to ethical engagement with the planet

Alexander, 2011

[Samuel, University of Melbourne Office for Environmental Programs and Simplicity Institute, Voluntary Simplicity as an Aesthetics of Existence, Online] /Wyo-MB

As noted in the introduction, consumption presents itself as an area of ethical concern in at least three ways: first, because Western-­‐style consumption is putting an immense and unsustainable burden on the planet’s ecosystems, so much so that contemporary cultures of consumption are diminishing the capacity of the planet to support life as we know it in the future;50 second, because the high consumption, resource-­‐intensive lifestyles enjoyed by most people in the richest nations coexist in a world where great multitudes live lives oppressed by material deprivation;51 and thirdly, because there is a large and growing body of sociological and psychological literature indicating that once our basic material needs for food, shelter, clothing, etc. are met, the limitless pursuit of more money and possessions neither produces any lasting happiness nor satisfies the human need for meaning.52 Far from representing the peak of civilization, cultures of mass consumption are showing distinct signs of widespread social, even spiritual, malaise.53 Any one of these issues, it could be argued, would be sufficient for consumption to become a proper subject for ethical engagement, in the Foucauldian sense of ethics as ‘the self engaging the self.’ When the three issues are considered together, the case for ethical engagement is compelling. At once, however, we are confronted with a strange incongruity, even a contradiction, of sorts, one that seems to tear the present analysis apart. In an age when the facts of ecological degradation, extreme poverty, and consumer malaise lie quite plainly before our eyes, one might have thought that First World consumption practices were already a subject of widespread ethical engagement. That is, one might have expected consumption practices to be a domain of constant and dedicated ethical attention, given that overconsumption seems to be driving several of the world’s most pressing problems (including the problem of consumer malaise). And yet, it can hardly be denied that any ethical engagement that takes place within consumer cultures does not, as a rule, seek to reduce or moderate consumption but rather encourage, glorify, and increase consumption – and increase it without apparent limit.54 And here is the contradiction: consumption is at once an extremely obvious realm for ethical engagement, for the three reasons stated above, and, at the same time, engaging the self by the self for the purpose of deliberately reducing or moderating consumption seems to be more or less unthinkable within modern consumer societies. Indeed, there seems to be an almost unquestioned assumption throughout consumer societies that consumption practices are somehow ‘beyond ethics,’ in the sense that how much we consume does not really need to inform the answer we give to the question of ‘how one ought to live.’ On the contrary, it is presumed that everyone is justified seeking as high a material standard of living as possible, a pursuit that is limited, it would seem, only by the laws of a free market economy.

#### The alternative is to reject the production based approach of the affirmative in favor of the 1NC criticism of consumption.

#### The purpose of debate should be to fashion ourselves, the alternative opens up space for ethical engagement with the problem of consumption and the embrace of voluntary simplicity, this changes our subjectivity as consumers

Alexander, 2011

[Samuel, University of Melbourne Office for Environmental Programs and Simplicity Institute, Voluntary Simplicity as an Aesthetics of Existence, Online] /Wyo-MB

The aim of this paper, however, is not to present a thorough analysis of Foucault’s notion of an aesthetics of existence. Several such analyses have appeared in recent times (after years of unfortunate scholarly neglect), and much of this emerging commentary is very probing and insightful.12 But this is not the time to focus on furthering that critical discussion or even providing a comprehensive literature review of it. Instead, after providing a brief exposition of Foucault’s ethics, this paper will undertake to actually apply the idea of an aesthetics of existence to a particular subject of ethical concern, namely, to our role as ‘consumers’ in the context of First World overconsumption. This is an area that raises ethical questions concerning how we ought to live for two main reasons: firstly, due to the impact Western-­‐style consumers are having on the natural environment; and secondly, due to the continued existence of poverty amidst plenty. There is, however, another perspective to consider also. A large body of sociological and psychological literature now exists indicating that Western-­‐style consumption practices are often failing to provide meaning and fulfillment, even to those who have ‘succeeded’ in attaining a high material standard of living.13 These three consumption-­‐related issues – ecological degradation, poverty amidst plenty, and consumer malaise – provide ample grounds for thinking that consumption is a proper subject for ethical engagement, in the Foucauldian sense of ethics as ‘the self engaging the self.’ If it is the case that our individual identities have been shaped, insidiously perhaps, by a social system that celebrates and encourages consumption without apparent limit – and it would not be unfair to describe consumer societies in these terms14 – then it may be that ethical practice today calls for a rethinking of our assumptions and attitudes concerning consumption, which might involve a deliberate reshaping of the self by the self. This paper will explore the possibility of such an ethics of consumption in the following ways. First, by explaining how neoclassical economics, which is arguably the most influential paradigm of thought in the world today, conceptualizes consumption as something that benefits both ‘self’ and ‘other’ and, therefore, as something that should be maximized. To the extent that modern consumers have internalized this conception of consumption, an ethics of consumption might involve engaging the self for the purpose of changing the self and creating something new. The second way an ethics of consumption will be explored will be through an examination of the theory and practice of ‘voluntary simplicity,’ a term that refers to an oppositional living strategy or ‘way of life’ with which people, somewhat paradoxically, perhaps, seek an increased quality of life through a reduction and restraint of one’s level of consumption.15 The paradox, so-­‐ called, consists in the attempt to live ‘more with less.’ Since voluntarily living simply means heading in the opposite direction to where most people in consumer societies (and increasingly elsewhere) seem to want to go, one would expect living simply to require a fundamentally creative engagement with life and culture, especially in contemporary consumer societies that seem to be predicated on the assumption that ‘more consumption is always better.’ This need for a fundamentally creative engagement with life is what prompted the present attempt to elucidate the idea of ‘voluntary simplicity as aesthetics of existence,’ and it is this attempt to infuse Foucauldian ethics with an emerging post-­‐consumerist philosophy of life that constitutes the original contribution of this paper. It is hoped that this practical application of Foucault’s ethics might also prompt others to consider how ethical engagement might produce new ways of being that are freer, more fulfilling, and yet less resource-­‐intensive and damaging than the modes of being which are dominant in consumer societies today. Could it be, for example, that the ‘Death of Man,’ to use Foucault’s phrase, was actually the first (and a necessary) phase in the demise of what one might call ‘homo consumicus’? And what forms of life, what modes of being, would or could materialize with the voluntary emergence of ‘homo post-­‐consumicus’? These are the large questions that motivated this study and in the following pages a preliminary attempt is made to grapple with them. The aim, however, is not to legitimate ‘what is already known,’16 since that would not be a very Foucauldian endeavor; rather, the aim is to explore whether or to what extent it is possible to ‘free thought from what it silently thinks,’17 in the hope that this might open up space to ‘think differently,’18 to think otherwise.

# 2

#### TEXT: The United States Department of Defense should establish a power purchase agreement for the expansion of small modular reactors in the United States.

#### DOD is crucial – plan doesn’t spur investment because tech is still not ready

Andres et al 11

[Richard Andres, Professor of National Security Strategy at the National War College and, Hanna L. Breetz, doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science at The Massachusetts Institute of Technology, “Small Nuclear Reactors for Military Installations: Capabilities, Costs, and Technological Implications,”http://www.ndu.edu/inss/docuploaded/SF%20262%20Andres.pdf, \\wyo-bb]

The preceding analysis suggests that DOD should seriously consider taking a leadership role on small reactors. This new technology has the potential to solve two of the most serious energy-related problems faced by the department today. Small reactors could island domestic military bases and nearby communities, thereby protecting them from grid outages. They could also drastically reduce the need for the highly vulnerable fuel convoys used to supply forward operating bases abroad. The technology being proposed for small reactors (much of which was originally developed in U.S. Government labs) is promising. A number of the planned designs are self-contained and highly mobile, and could meet the needs of either domestic or forward bases. Some promise to be virtually impervious to accidents, with design characteristics that might allow them to be if DOD does not support the U.S. small reactor industry, the industry could be dominated by foreign companies10 SF No. 262 www.ndu.edu/inss used even in active operational environments. These reactors are potentially safer than conventional light water reactors. The argument that this technology could be useful at domestic bases is virtually unassailable. The argument for using this technology in operational units abroad is less conclusive; however, because of its potential to save lives, it warrants serious investigation. Unfortunately, the technology for these reactors is, for the most part, caught between the drawing board and production. Claims regarding the field utility and safety of various reactors are plausible, but authoritative evaluation will require substantial investment and technology demonstration. In the U.S. market, DOD could play an important role in this area. In the event that the U.S. small reactor industry succeeds without DOD support, the types of designs that emerge might not be useful for the department since some of the larger, more efficient designs that have greater appeal to private industry would not fit the department’s needs. Thus, there is significant incentive for DOD to intervene to provide a market, both to help the industry survive and to shape its direction. Since the 1970s, in the United States, only the military has overcome the considerable barriers to building nuclear reactors. This will probably be the case with small reactors as well. If DOD leads as a first mover in this market—initially by providing analysis of costs, staffing, reactor lines, and security, and, when possible, by moving forward with a pilot installation—the new technology will likely survive and be applicable to DOD needs. If DOD does not, it is possible the technology will be unavailable in the future for either U.S. military or commercial use.

# 3

#### Republicans will make deals on sequester now, calculus has changed post Obama’s reelection, but his political capital is key

Kaletsky, 1/23

[Anatole, Economist and journalist, “Cooperation isn’t coming to Washington – it’s already arrived,” Reuters, January 23, 2013, <http://blogs.reuters.com/anatole-kaletsky/2013/01/23/cooperation-isnt-coming-to-washington-its-already-arrived/> //uwyo-baj]

Before the election, Republicans and their business backers had two overriding reasons to obstruct any deals with Obama on borrowing, spending or taxes. First, most Republicans genuinely expected to win the presidential election and therefore had every incentive to defer important decisions until their man was in power. Secondly, they calculated that any collateral damage inflicted on the economy through fiscal warfare would harm the incumbent president, whose Achilles’ heel was economic policy. Once the election was over, this calculus completely changed. Having failed to unseat Obama, Republicans were suddenly in a situation where sabotaging the economy was no longer in their interests. As I argued immediately after the election, and again during the fiscal cliff negotiations, the GOP had few incentives after Nov. 7 to just thwart Obama. Republicans now had to persuade voters that their policies would promote jobs and growth — and would do so immediately, not in some distant future when budgets would have to balance or else the United States would turn into Greece. The election also changed motivations for the Republicans’ business supporters. Instead of viewing Washington gridlock as a weapon for defeating Obama, American businesses after the election had to accept the inevitable. They would have to live with Obama and his policies, however much they disliked them. For most U.S. businesses, the primary political consideration was no longer the ideological debate over taxing and spending, but a purely economic issue: How would the economic policies negotiated between the White House and Congress affect business conditions in the four years leading to 2016? This gestalt shift implies that Republicans are unlikely to press very hard for large-scale spending cuts, government layoffs or fiscal tightening that could be seen as harming economic recovery. Instead the focus should move to long-term budget reforms, designed to take effect only after the economy has largely recovered in 2015 or so – conveniently beyond the next congressional elections. The president will have strong incentives to cooperate with such gradual fiscal consolidation, with major budget cuts backloaded to the last years of his administration and beyond. He would rather go down in history as the man who delivered universal healthcare, saved the U.S. economy from its worst crisis since the Great Depression, and put U.S. fiscal policy on a sustainable footing than waste his entire second term haggling over budgets – especially since achieving fiscal austerity does not require any major cuts or austerity, except in the very long term. In fact, the White House has already said it will offer some long-term entitlement reforms as part of the bipartisan budget deal that now looks eminently attainable. This may infuriate left-wing Democrats, but Obama is unlikely to care much, now that he has been reelected. In any case, grassroots Democratic voters will probably care more about presidential efforts on gun control, immigration and climate change than about wonkish arguments over Chained CPI and Medicare spending caps in the next decade. Why then has there been little discussion of this change in political dynamics? Probably because the media mostly see it as their role to magnify political drama rather than to analyze how they are likely to be resolved. The same applies to many professional politicians. Extreme statements from both parties will always attract the most media attention. The congressional arithmetic, however, means that the views of radicals, highlighted by the media, are no longer very important. In the House, the minority Democrats can pass important votes, such as a budget compromise, with just 20 votes from moderate Republicans eager to compromise. The same applies in the Senate, where the Democrats can lose several of their left-wing caucuses but still easily pass a compromise bill. What matters in this situation is not how most Republicans vote but whether 20 moderates can be found to back a bill to raise taxes, passed mainly by the Democrats. Most likely the Republican leadership would tacitly even encourage and support this handful of defectors, who would allow their party to foster an image of reasonableness and compromise while forcing the Democrats to carry the entire responsibility for higher taxes.

#### Obama will prevail on sequestration now but his political capital is finite- it is key to both keep dems in line and prevent a unified GOP opposition

Tobin, 1/18

[Jonathan S., senior online editor of Commentary magazine, “Time-Out May Be the GOP’s Best Option,” Commentary, January 18, 2013, <http://www.commentarymagazine.com/2013/01/18/time-out-may-be-the-gop-best-option-debt-ceiling/> //uwyo-tjc]

The top news out of the House Republican retreat in Williamsburg, Virginia is that the party is considering a short-term extension of the debt limit in order to give the party more time to try and convince their Democratic antagonists to start cutting spending. The proposal, which according to the New York Times, is being floated by Rep. Paul Ryan, could wind up connecting the debt ceiling issue with the deadline for the implementation of sequestration that would mandate devastating across-the-board spending cuts. That would theoretically give the GOP some room to maneuver in order to avoid a confrontation with President Obama that few think they would win. But it is hard to avoid the impression that the main object of a delay would be to deal with the Republicans’ biggest problems: a lack of unity. Like a sports team in disarray, the GOP needs a time out where they can catch their breath and somehow get on the same page with each other. As the votes over House Speaker John Boehner’s Plan B and then the final fiscal cliff deal revealed, the party is badly split between those who don’t want to give an inch on spending and taxes, those who think that compromise with the president is inevitable and those who believe the best the party can do is to speak out for its principles and oppose tactics that will blow up the economy and help demonize the party. But the problem for the Republican leadership is that even if they can buy themselves some more time to get their fractious caucus in line, the likelihood that a confident and aggressive President Obama will either accept a short-term extension or deal honestly with them on the issues. The argument for a time out is that in its current condition with a leadership that can’t count on its members to agree to back a unified strategy on fiscal issues, Republicans are doomed to defeat no matter what option they choose. The president is counting on the GOP splintering into warring factions and has done his best to help that process along by goading his opponents whenever possible including his stunning attack on them even as the two sides were negotiating a deal to prevent the nation from going over the fiscal cliff earlier this month. As Robert Costa and Andrew Stiles noted in their sum up from the retreat, even though Republicans remain in control of the House, the tone of the gathering was that of a defeated party searching for answers. Given the shock felt by many in the party over the president’s re-election and the beatings they’ve received over the debt ceiling and the fiscal cliff, that’s understandable. But Bill Kristol’s advice to them to “suck it up,” is exactly what they need to hear. I think those Republicans who want to make a stand on the debt ceiling are right. Even though the odds are against them prevailing in such a battle, the party can’t simply stand by and let President Obama off the hook without at least trying to stop him by whatever means are at their disposal. That sort of surrender would split the GOP and make it harder for them to recover at the next midterm. But the one given in this equation is that without a united caucus, House Republicans haven’t a prayer of doing anything effective to halt the country’s drift toward insolvency and to head off new taxes. For all of their pessimism, the GOP still controls the power of the purse. President Obama may have the wind at his back right now but his political capital is finite. So is his time. If conservatives can use the coming weeks to agree on a strategy to exploit his weaknesses — such as the division among Democrats and the president’s refusal to deal with entitlement reform — their position could be stronger than they think. The question is do Boehner, Eric Cantor or even Paul Ryan have the ability to convince their colleagues that if they don’t hang together, their hopes of stopping Obama from worsening the nation’s problems are nonexistent.

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#### Nuclear power has significant opposition – public and congressional

Andrew Freedman, Editor and Senior Science writer for Climate Central, “Feds Approve First Nuclear Reactors Since 1970s”, Climatecentral.org, February 9th, 2012.

By a v ote of 4 to 1 , the Nuclear Regulatory Commission approv ed the construction of the first new nuclear reactors to be built in the United States since 1 97 8. The reactors would be built at the Vogtle power plant near Way nesboro, Ga., which is a nuclear power plant operated by the Southern Company . As The Hill's E-2 Wire blog noted, the lone dissenting v ote was cast by NRC Chairman Gregory Jaczko. The nuclear industry has faced numerous obstacles, most recently the backlash following the Fukushima nuclear disaster in Japan, in its efforts to build new nuclear plants in the U.S., and the Commission has issued recommendations on how to better protect U.S. reactors from earthquakes and floods. The country currently operates 1 04 nuclear reactors, but all were approv ed at least three decades ago. “This is a historic day ,” said Marv in Fertel, president of the Nuclear Energy Institute, the industry ’s trade group in a statement. “Today ’s licensing action sounds a clarion call to the world that the United States recognizes the importance of expanding nuclear energy as a key component of a low-carbon energy future that is central to job creation, div ersity of electricity supply and energy security .” Andrew Restuccia, writing for The Hill, noted the project still needs to ov ercome public opposition to nuclear power that may result in a lawsuit against the project, and congressional opposition to a hefty $8.3 billion federal conditional loan guarantee for reactor construction. "Some Democrats in Congress — noting that the loan guarantee is more than 1 5 times the size of the one granted to the failed solar firm Soly ndra — hav e called on Obama not to finalize the loan." “Ithink we are putting our taxpay er money at unnecessary risk giv en the unresolv ed safety issues and the lessons that hav e been learned from Fukushima,” Rep. Edward Markey (D-Mass.), a senior Democrat on the House Energy and Commerce Committee and a v ocal critic of nuclear power, told The Hill Wednesday . The Obama administration has supported the dev elopment of new nuclear power plants as a way to reduce greenhouse gas emissons and cut the use of fossil fuels.

#### Sequestration devastates the economy, collapses heg, and culminates in Middle Eastern war

Hutchison 9/21

[Kay Bailey Hutchison,, U.S. Senator from the great state of Texas, 9/21/2012 “A Looming Threat to National Security,” States News Service, Lexis]

Despite warnings of the dire consequences, America is teetering at the edge of a fiscal cliff, with January 1st, 2013 as the tipping point. On that date, unless Congress and the White House can reach agreement on how to cut the federal deficit, all taxpayers will be hit with higher taxes and deep cuts - called "sequestration" - will occur in almost all government spending, disrupting our already weak economy and putting our national security at risk. According to the House Armed Services Committee, if sequestration goes into effect, it would put us on course for more than $1 trillion in defense cuts over the next 10 years. What would that mean? A huge hit to our military personnel and their families; devastating cuts in funding for critical military equipment and supplies for our soldiers; and a potentially catastrophic blow to our national defense and security capabilities in a time of increasing violence and danger. All Americans feel a debt of gratitude to our men and women who serve in uniform. But Texas in particular has a culture that not only reveres the commitment and sacrifice they make to protect our freedom, we send a disproportionate number of our sons and daughters to serve. The burden is not borne solely by those who continue to answer the call of duty, but by their families as well, as they endure separation and the anxiety of a loved one going off to war. These Americans have made tremendous sacrifices. They deserve better than to face threats to their financial security and increased risks to their loved ones in uniform, purely for political gamesmanship. Sequestration would also place an additional burden on our economy. In the industries that support national defense, as many as 1 million skilled workers could be laid off. With 43 straight months of unemployment above 8 percent, it is beyond comprehension to add a virtual army to the 23 million Americans who are already out of work or under-employed. Government and private economic forecasters warn that sequestration will push the country back into recession next year. The recent murder of our Ambassador to Libya and members of his staff, attacks on US embassies and consulates and continued riots across the Middle East and North Africa are stark reminders that great portions of the world remain volatile and hostile to the US. We have the mantle of responsibility that being the world's lone super-power brings. In the absence of U.S. military leadership, upheaval in the Middle East would be worse. As any student of history can attest, instability does not confine itself to national borders. Strife that starts in one country can spread like wildfire across a region. Sequestration's cuts would reduce an additional 100,000 airmen, Marines, sailors and soldiers. That would leave us with the smallest ground force since 1940, the smallest naval fleet since 1915 and the smallest tactical fighter force in the Air Force's history. With the destabilization in the Middle East and other areas tenuous, we would be left with a crippled military, a diminished stature internationally and a loss of technological research, development and advantage - just as actors across the globe are increasing their capabilities. Sequestration can still be avoided. But that will require leadership from the President that has thus far been missing. Congress and the White House must reach a long-term agreement to reduce $1 trillion annual budget deficits, without the harsh tax increases that could stall economic growth and punish working families.

#### Middle East goes nuclear

Russell 9

[James A. Russell, Senior Lecturer, National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, ‘9 (Spring) “Strategic Stability Reconsidered: Prospects for Escalation and Nuclear War in the Middle East” IFRI, Proliferation Papers, #26, http://www.ifri.org/downloads/PP26\_Russell\_2009.pdf]

Strategic stability in the region is thus undermined by various factors: (1) asymmetric interests in the bargaining framework that can introduce unpredictable behavior from actors; (2) the presence of non-state actors that introduce unpredictability into relationships between the antagonists; (3) incompatible assumptions about the structure of the deterrent relationship that makes the bargaining framework strategically unstable; (4) perceptions by Israel and the United States that its window of opportunity for military action is closing, which could prompt a preventive attack; (5) the prospect that Iran’s response to pre-emptive attacks could involve unconventional weapons, which could prompt escalation by Israel and/or the United States; (6) the lack of a communications framework to build trust and cooperation among framework participants. These systemic weaknesses in the coercive bargaining framework all suggest that escalation by any the parties could happen either on purpose or as a result of miscalculation or the pressures of wartime circumstance. Given these factors, it is disturbingly easy to imagine scenarios under which a conflict could quickly escalate in which the regional antagonists would consider the use of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. It would be a mistake to believe the nuclear taboo can somehow magically keep nuclear weapons from being used in the context of an unstable strategic framework. Systemic asymmetries between actors in fact suggest a certain increase in the probability of war – a war in which escalation could happen quickly and from a variety of participants. Once such a war starts, events would likely develop a momentum all their own and decision-making would consequently be shaped in unpredictable ways. The international community must take this possibility seriously, and muster every tool at its disposal to prevent such an outcome, which would be an unprecedented disaster for the peoples of the region, with substantial risk for the entire world.

# Solvency

#### Plan takes 10 years to solve

King 11

[Marcus King, Project Director and Research Analyst for the Environment and Energy Team at Center for Naval Analyses, LaVar Huntzinger, Thoi Nguyen, "Feasibility of Nuclear Power on U.S. Military Installations", March 11, <http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/Nuclear%20Power%20on%20Military%20Installations%20D0023932%20A5.pdf>, \\wyo-bb]

The time required to obtain design certification, license, and build the next generation of nuclear plants is about 9 to 10 years. After the first plants are built it may be possible to reduce the time required for licensing and construction to approximately 6 years [45].

#### Small reactors cause same problems as larger plants and it is a fantasy they could be competitive

Lovins, 2009

[Amory, Chairman and Chief Scientist of Rocky Mountain Research Institute, “"New" Nuclear Reactors, Same Old Story.” Online, http://www.rmi.org/Knowledge-Center/Library/2009-07\_NuclearSameOldStory] /Wyo-MB

In short, the notion that different or smaller reactors plus wholly new fuel cycles (and, usually, new competitive conditions and political systems) could overcome nuclear energy’s inherent problems is not just decades too late, but fundamentally a fantasy. Fantasies are all right, but people should pay for their own. Investors in and advocates of small-reactor innovations will be disappointed. But in due course, the aging advocates of the half-century-old reactor concepts that never made it to market will retire and die, their credulous young devotees will relearn painful lessons lately forgotten, and the whole nuclear business will complete its slow death of an incurable attack of market forces. Meanwhile, the rest of us shouldn’t be distracted from getting on with the winning investments that make sense, make money, and really do solve the energy, climate, and proliferation problems, led by business for profit.

# China

#### Exports fail, the best tech can’t be exported because of fears of proliferation

NEI, 12

“U.S. Nuclear Export Rules Hurt Global Competitiveness” <http://www.nei.org/resourcesandstats/publicationsandmedia/insight/insightwinter2012/us-nuclear-export-rules-hurt-global-competitiveness/>, accessed 11/4/12,WYO/JF

“The U.S. nuclear export regime is the most complex and restrictive in the world and the least efficient,” said Jones. “Furthermore, it is poorly focused on items and technologies that pose little or no proliferation concern. By trying to protect too much, we risk diminishing the focus on sensitive technologies and handicapping U.S. exports.”

**asian war unlikely despite multiple flashpoints**

**Bitzinger and Desker 8**

Richard and Barry, PhD from UCLA and Senior Fellow @ International Studies Perspectives, Dean of the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Why East Asian War is Unlikely, [Survival](http://www.informaworld.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/smpp/title~content=t713659919~db=all), Volume [50](http://www.informaworld.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/smpp/title~content=t713659919~db=all~tab=issueslist~branches=50#v50), Issue [6](http://www.informaworld.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/smpp/title~content=g906414492~db=all) December 2008 , pages 105 – 12

**The Asia-Pacific region can be regarded as a zone of both relative insecurity and strategic stability. It contains some of the world's most significant flashpoints** - the Korean peninsula, the Taiwan Strait, the Siachen Glacier - where tensions between nations could escalate to the point of major war. It is replete with unresolved border issues; is a breeding ground for transnational terrorism and the site of many terrorist activities (the Bali bombings, the Manila superferry bombing); and contains overlapping claims for maritime territories (the Spratly Islands, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands) with considerable actual or potential wealth in resources such as oil, gas and fisheries. Finally, the Asia-Pacific is an area of strategic significance with many key sea lines of communication and important chokepoints. **Yet despite all these potential crucibles of conflict, the Asia-Pacific, if not an area of serenity and calm, is certainly more stable than one might expect.** To be sure, there are separatist movements and internal struggles, particularly with insurgencies, as in Thailand, the Philippines and Tibet. Since the resolution of the East Timor crisis, however, the region has been relatively free of open armed warfare. Separatism remains a challenge, **but the break-up of states is unlikely. Terrorism is a nuisance, but its impact is contained**. The **North Korean nuclear issue**, while not fully resolved, **is at least moving toward** a conclusion with the likely **denuclearisation** of the peninsula. **Tensions between China and Taiwan**, while always just beneath the surface, **seem unlikely to erupt in open conflict** any time soon, especially given recent Kuomintang Party victories in Taiwan and efforts by Taiwan and China to re-open informal channels of consultation as well as institutional relationships between organisations responsible for cross-strait relations. And **while in Asia there is no strong supranational political entity like the European Union, there are many multilateral organisations and international initiatives dedicated to enhancing peace and stability, including** the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation **(APEC)** forum, the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation. In Southeast Asia, countries are united in a common geopolitical and economic organisation - the Association of Southeast Asian Nations **(ASEAN)** - which is dedicated to peaceful economic, social and cultural development, and to the promotion of regional peace and stability. ASEAN has played a key role in conceiving and establishing broader regional institutions such as the East Asian Summit, **ASEAN+3 (China, Japan and South Korea) and the ASEAN Regional Forum. All this suggests that war in Asia - while not inconceivable - is unlikely.**

#### interdependence prevents conflict

Desker , 10

(Barry, Dean of S.Rjaratnum Shool of IR, Int. Studies, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/worldhotnews/30076709/Why, AD: 7/8/10) jl

Nevertheless, the Asia-Pacific region is more stable than one might believe.  Separatism remains a challenge but the break-up of states is unlikely. Terrorism is a nuisance but its impact is contained.  The North Korean nuclear issue, while not fully resolved, is at least moving toward a conclusion with the likely denuclearization of the peninsula.  Tensions between China and Taiwan, while always just beneath the surface, seem unlikely to erupt in open conflict (especially after the KMT victories in Taiwan).  The region also possesses significant multilateral structures such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the nascent Six Party Talks forum and, in particular, ASEAN, and institutions such as the East Asian Summit, [Asean](http://www.nationmultimedia.com/search/adsearch.php?keyword=+Asean+) + 3 (which brings together the [Asean](http://www.nationmultimedia.com/search/adsearch.php?keyword=+Asean+) 10 with China, Japan and South Korea) and the [Asean](http://www.nationmultimedia.com/search/adsearch.php?keyword=+Asean+) Regional Forum which [Asean](http://www.nationmultimedia.com/search/adsearch.php?keyword=+Asean+) has conceived.

# Workforce

#### No escalation—empirics and no border tension

Chicago Tribune, 10/15/04

China and Russia settled the last of their decades-old border disputes Thursday during a visit to Beijing by President Vladimir Putin, signing an agreement fixing their 2,700-mile-long border for the first time. The struggle over border areas resulted in violent clashes in the 1960s and 1970s, when strained Sino-Soviet relations were at their most acrimonious, feeding fears abroad that the conflict could erupt into nuclear war. Beijing and Moscow had reached agreements on individual border sections as relations warmed in the past decade. But a stretch of river and islands along China's northeastern border with Russia's Far East had remained in dispute.

#### Fear of escalation deters

Moriarty (Tom, military analyst for the US air force, 9.22.4, *World Affairs*) ET

However, the Soviet Union ultimately chose to forgo a preemptive attack and attempted to defuse tensions through diplomatic channels. Numerous reasons led Soviet leaders to decide against preemptive attack. The main reason was the Soviet Union's fear that even if they could destroy all of China's nuclear weapons capability (which, in itself, was a big assumption), they feared a conventional attack by China. Like the United States during the Cuban missile crisis, the Soviet Union understood that they would lose the ability to prevent the crisis from escalating into a full-blown war. Soviet leaders grew concerned that China would respond with a prolonged people's war against the Soviet Union. Knowing that a prolonged war against a country with more than one billion people and a proven resiliency would exhaust the Soviet Union and would require forces to be withdrawn from Eastern Europe, Soviet leaders chose to ignore the Chinese provocations and let the confrontation defuse naturally. (12)

#### SMRs are a new way for terrorist to obtain nuclear material

MacPerson 2012 (writer for nuclear news online, “Small Modular Reactors – the way to making South Carolina the nation’s nuclear waste dump?” <http://nuclear-news.info/2012/07/21/small-modular-reactors-the-way-to-making-south-carolina-the-nations-nuclear-waste-dump/>) JA

The technology for the mini-reactors still is in its infancy. If South Carolina gets the green light to develop them, the state would be the testing ground for the rest of the nation. the project is not without substantial risk. Before South Carolina fully embraces this untested technology, we need answers to questions about possible accidents and their consequences, the potential for a terrorist strike or theft of nuclear material – but mostly about the waste.

**Even if they wanted to – chances of success are about 1 in 3 billion**

**Mueller 2008**

[John Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies, Mershon Center Professor of Political Science Department of Political Science, Ohio State University. THE ATOMIC TERRORIST: ASSESSING THE LIKELIHOOD Prepared for presentation at the Program on International Security Policy, University of Chicago, January 15, 2008 ]

Evaluating the likelihood **Even if there is some desire** for the bomb by terrorists (something assessed more fully below), **fulfillment** of that desire is obviously **another matter**. Even alarmists Bunn and Wier contend that the **atomic terrorists' task "would clearly be among the most difficult types of attack to carry out**" or "one of the most difficult missions a terrorist group could hope to try" (2006, 133-34, 147). But, stresses George Tenet, a terrorist atomic bomb is "possible" or "not beyond the realm of possibility" (Tenet and Harlow 2007, 266, 279). **It might be useful to take a stab at estimating just how "difficult" or "not impossible" their task is, or how distant the "realm of possibility" might be**. After all, lots of things are "not impossible." As I recall, there is a James Bond movie out there someplace in which Our Hero leaps from a low-flying plane or helicopter and lands unruffled in the back seat of a speeding convertible next to a bemused blonde. Although this impressive feat is "not impossible," it may not have ever been accomplished--or perhaps more importantly, ever attempted--in real life. **Or it is entirely "not impossible"** that **a** colliding meteor or **comet could destroy the earth**, that Vladimir Putin or **the British could** decide one morning to **launch a few nuclear weapons at Massachusetts**, George Bush could decide to bomb Hollywood, that an underwater volcano could erupt to cause a civilization-ending tidal wave, **or that Osama bin Laden could convert to Judaism**, declare himself to be the Messiah, and fly in a gaggle of mafioso hit men from Rome to have himself publicly crucified.20 In all this, Brodie's cautionary comment in the 1970s about the imaginative alarmists in the defense community holds as well for those in today's terrorism community, both of which are inhabited by people of a wide range of skills and sometimes of considerable imagination. All sorts of notions and propositions are churned out, and often presented for consideration with the prefatory works: "It is conceivable that..." Such words establish their own truth, for the fact that someone has conceived of whatever proposition follows is enough to establish that it is conceivable. Whether it is worth a second thought, however, is another matter (1978, 83). At any rate, **experience thus far cannot be too encouraging** to the would-be atomic terrorist. One group that tried, in the early 1990s, to pull off the deed was **the** Japanese **apocalyptic group, Aum Shinrikyo**. Unlike al-Qaeda, it was **not under siege,** and it **had money, expertise, a remote and secluded haven** in which **to set up shop, even a private uranium mine.** But it **made dozens of mistakes** in judgment, planning, and execution (Linzer 2004). **Chagrined, it turned to biological weapons which,** as it happened**, didn't work** either, and **finally to chemical ones, resulting** eventually **in a** somewhat **botched release of** sarin **gas** in a Tokyo subway **that managed to kill** a total of 12 people. Appraising the barriers. As noted earlier, **most discussions** of atomic terrorism **deal** rather **piecemeal** with the subject--focusing separately on individual tasks such as procuring HEU or assembling a device or transporting it. But, as the Gilmore Commission, a special advisory panel to the President and Congress, stresses, building a nuclear device capable of producing mass destruction presents "Herculean challenges" and requires that a whole series of steps be accomplished. The process requires obtaining enough fissile material, designing a weapon"that will bring that mass together in a tiny fraction of a second, before the heat from early fission blows the material apart," and **f**iguring out some way to deliver the thing. And it emphasizes that these merely constitute "the minimum requirements." If each is not fully met, the result is not simply a less powerful weapon, but one that can't produce any significant nuclear yield at all or can't be delivered (Gilmore 1999, 31, emphasis in the original). Following this perspective, an approach that seems appropriate is to catalogue **the barriers that must be overcome** by a terrorist group in order to carry out the task of producing, transporting, and then successfully detonating Allison's "large, cumbersome, unsafe, unreliable, unpredictable, and inefficient" improvised nuclear device. Table 1 attempts to do this, and it **arrays some 20** of these--all of which must be surmounted by the atomic aspirant. Actually, it would be quite possible to come up with a longer list: in the interests of keeping the catalogue of hurdles down to a reasonable number, some of the entries are actually collections of tasks and could be divided into two or three or more. For example, number 5 on the list requires that heisted highly-enriched uranium be neither a scam nor part of a sting nor of inadequate quality due to insider incompetence; but this hurdle could as readily be rendered as three separate ones. In assembling the list, I sought to make the various barriers independent, or effectively independent, from each other, although they are, of course, related in the sense that they are sequential. However, while the terrorists must locate an inadequately-secured supply of HEU to even begin the project, this discovery will have little bearing on whether they will be successful at securing an adequate quantity of the material, even though, obviously, they can't do the second task before accomplishing the first. Similarly, assembling and supplying an adequately equipped machine shop is effectively an independent task from the job of recruiting a team of scientists and technicians to work within it. Moreover, members of this group must display two qualities that, although combined in hurdle 9, are essentially independent of each other: they must be both technically skilled and absolutely loyal to the project. Assessing the probabilities. 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s even though for many barriers, probably almost all, the odds against them are much worse than that. Even with that generous bias, the chances they could successfully pull off the mission come out to be worse than one in a million, specifically they are one in 1,048,567. Indeed, the odds of surmounting even seven of the twenty hurdles at that unrealistically, even absurdly, high presumptive success rate is considerably less than one in a hundred. **If one assumes**, somewhat **more realistically**, that their chances at each barrier are one in three**,** the cumulative oddsthey will be able to pull off the deed drop to one in well over three billion--specifically 3,486,784,401. What they would be at the (entirely realistic) level one in ten boggles the mind. One could also make specific estimates for each of the hurdles, but the cumulative probability statistics are likely to come out pretty much the same--or even smaller. For example there may be a few barriers, such as number 13, where one might plausibly conclude the terrorists' chances are better than 50/50. However, there are many in which the likelihood of success is almost certainly going to be exceedingly small--for example, numbers 4, 5, 9, and 12, and, increasingly, the (obviously) crucial number 1. Those would be the odds for a single attempt by a single group, and there could be multiple attempts by multiple groups, of course. Although Allison considers al-Qaeda to be "the most probable perpetrator" on the nuclear front (2004, 29), he is also concerned about the potential atomic exploits of other organizations such as Indonesia's Jemaah Islamiyah, Chechen gangsters, Lebanon's Hezbollah, and various doomsday cults (2004, 29-42).21 Putting aside the observation that few, if any, of these appear to have interest in hitting the United States except for al-Qaeda (to be discussed more fully below), the odds would remain long even with multiple attempts. If there were a hundred determined efforts over a period of time, the chance at least one of these would be successful comes in at less than one one-hundredth of one percent at the one chance in two level. At the far more realistic level of one chance in three it would be about one in 50 million. If there were 1000 dedicated attempts, presumably over several decades, the chance of success would be less than one percent at the 50/50 level and about one in 50,000 at the one in three level.22

# 2nc

# case

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# Ptx

#### Middle East CBW conflict – causes extinction

Ochs 2

Richard, June 9, pg. <http://www.freefromterror.net/other_articles/abolish.html>.

Of all the weapons of mass destruction, the genetically engineered biological weapons, many without a known cure or vaccine, are an extreme danger to the continued survival of life on earth. Any perceived military value or deterrence pales in comparison to the great risk these weapons pose just sitting in vials in laboratories. While a "nuclear winter," resulting from a massive exchange of nuclear weapons, could also kill off most of life on earth and severely compromise the health of future generations, they are easier to control. Biological weapons, on the other hand, can get out of control very easily, as the recent anthrax attacks has demonstrated. There is no way to guarantee the security of these doomsday weapons because very tiny amounts can be stolen or accidentally released and then grow or be grown to horrendous proportions. The Black Death of the Middle Ages would be small in comparison to the potential damage bioweapons could cause. Abolition of chemical weapons is less of a priority because, while they can also kill millions of people outright, their persistence in the environment would be less than nuclear or biological agents or more localized. Hence, chemical weapons would have a lesser effect on future generations of innocent people and the natural environment. Like the Holocaust, once a localized chemical extermination is over, it is over. With nuclear and biological weapons, the killing will probably never end. Radioactive elements last tens of thousands of years and will keep causing cancers virtually forever. Potentially worse than that, bio-engineered agents by the hundreds with no known cure could wreck even greater calamity on the human race than could persistent radiation. AIDS and ebola viruses are just a small example of recently emerging plagues with no known cure or vaccine. Can we imagine hundreds of such plagues? HUMAN EXTINCTION IS NOW POSSIBLE.

### U

#### Sequestration top of the docket

Raju and Bresnahan, 1/23

[Manu Raju senior congressional reporter, and John Bresnahan capitol bureau chief, “Next up: Sequester, budget resolution,” Politico, January 23, 2013, <http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=9704108B-031B-4811-8E96-B0988299DBEF> //uwyo-baj]

Now that the debt ceiling fight has been delayed until May, the next big fiscal drama deadline is March 1, when the spending cuts of the sequester take effect.

### L

#### SMR debates are polarizing

Carper and Schmid 11

[Ross Carper (rosscarper@gmail.com), a writer based in Washington state, is the founding editor of the creative nonfiction project BeyondtheBracelet.com. Sonja Schmid (sschmid@vt.edu) is an assistant professor in Science and Technology Studies at Virginia Tech. “The Little Reactor That Could?” Issues in Science and Technology, <http://www.issues.org/27.4/carper.html>]

Historically, nuclear energy has been entangled in one of the most polarizing debates in this country. Promoters and adversaries of nuclear power alike have accused the other side of oversimplification and exaggeration. For today’s industry, reassuring a wary public and nervous government regulators that small reactors are completely safe might not be the most promising strategy. People may not remember much history, but they usually do remember who let them down before. It would make more sense to admit that nuclear power is an inherently risky technology, with enormous benefits that might justify taking these risks. So instead of framing small reactors as qualitatively different and “passively safe,” why not address the risks involved head-on? This would require that the industry not only invite the public to ask questions, but also that they respond, even—or perhaps especially—when these questions cross preestablished boundaries. Relevant historical experience with small compact reactors in military submarines, for example, should not be off limits, just because information about them has traditionally been classified.

### Grants-Generic

#### The administration hasn’t announced the recipients of the DOE grants or begun handing them out precisely because of the link to politics

Nelson 2012

[Gabriel Nelson 9-24, E&E Reporter, and Hannah Northey, 9/24/12, “DOE funding for small reactors languishes as parties clash on debt,” http://www.eenews.net/public/Greenwire/2012/09/24/3]

DOE received four bids before the May 21 deadline from veteran reactor designers Westinghouse Electric Co. and Babcock & Wilcox Co., as well as relative newcomers Holtec International Inc. and NuScale Power LLC. Now the summer has ended with no announcement from DOE, even though the agency said it would name the winners two months ago. As the self-imposed deadline passed, companies started hearing murmurs that a decision could come in September, or perhaps at the end of the year. To observers within the industry, it seems that election-year calculations may have sidelined the contest. "The rumors are a'flying," said Paul Genoa, director of policy development at the Nuclear Energy Institute, in an interview last week. "All we can imagine is that this is now caught up in politics, and the campaign has to decide whether these things are good for them to announce, and how." Small modular reactors do not seem to be lacking in political support. The nuclear lobby has historically courted both Democrats and Republicans and still sees itself as being in a strong position with key appropriators on both sides of the aisle. Likewise, top energy officials in the Obama administration have hailed the promise of the new reactors, and they haven't shown any signs of a change of heart. DOE spokeswoman Jen Stutsman said last week that the department is still reviewing applications, but she did not say when a decision will be made. "This is an important multiyear research and development effort, and we want to make sure we take the time during the review process to get the decision right," she wrote in an email. That the grants haven't been given out during a taut campaign season, even as President Obama announces agency actions ranging from trade cases to creating new national monuments to make the case for his re-election, may be a sign that the reactors are ensnared in a broader feud over energy spending. Grant recipients would develop reactor designs with an eye toward eventually turning those into pilot projects -- and the loan guarantees that these first-of-a-kind nuclear plants are using today to get financing would be blocked under the "No More Solyndras" bill that passed the House last week (Greenwire, Sept. 14).

### w/w

#### Obama doesn’t win from winning- each push saps his political capital

Eberly 1.21

[Todd, Assistant Professor of Political Science and Coordinator of Public Policy Studies, Barack Obama is discovering that modern presidents have difficulty amassing political capital, which hinders their ability to enact a robust agenda , Baltimore Sun, p. <http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2013-01-21/news/bs-ed-political-capital-20130121_1_political-system-party-support-public-opinion> //wyo-tjc]

Barack Obama's election in 2008 seemed to signal a change. Mr. Obama's popular vote majority was the largest for any president since 1988, and he was the first Democrat to clear the 50 percent mark since Lyndon Johnson. The president initially enjoyed strong public approval and, with a Democratic Congress, was able to produce an impressive string of legislative accomplishments during his first year and early into his second, capped by enactment of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. But with each legislative battle and success, his political capital waned. His impressive successes with Congress in 2009 and 2010 were accompanied by a shift in the public mood against him, evident in the rise of the tea party movement, the collapse in his approval rating, and the large GOP gains in the 2010 elections, which brought a return to divided government.

president's mind today as he takes his second oath of office.

### hagel

### A2 Hagel Thumper

#### Republican opposition doesn’t matter, democrats have the votes to confirm Hagel

Cassata, 1/25/13

[Donna, Political Editor at Associated Press, “Democratic support for Hagel grows,” Yahoo News, <http://news.yahoo.com/democratic-support-hagel-grows-232254328--politics.html> //uwyo-baj]

Democrats hold a 55-45 edge in the Senate and would have the votes to confirm Hagel. "Chuck is a combat veteran and foot soldier who has a unique understanding of the challenges faced by our men and women in uniform, and a practical leader who understands the need for common sense in military spending and national security strategy," Manchin said in a statement. Coons said he believes Hagel "will be a strong and effective secretary of defense, and I will be proud to vote for his confirmation." Sen. Kirsten Gillibrand, D-N.Y., who met with Hagel on Thursday, said he had satisfied her concerns and she felt his responses were sincere. A member of the Armed Services Committee, she said she would reserve judgment until after the hearing but described Hagel as well-qualified for the job. Their statements came shortly after Sen. John Kerry, the president's choice for secretary of state, found himself defending Hagel at his confirmation hearing.

#### Schumer will support Hagel nomination, key to Senate confirmation

Timm, 1/15

[Jane C., staff writer, “Schumer says he’ll back Hagel, Senate approval now likely,” msnbc, January 15, 2013, <http://tv.msnbc.com/2013/01/15/schumer-endorses-hagel-senate-approval-now-likely/> //uwyo-baj]

A key senator in the approval process, Sen. Chuck Schumer, D-N.Y., said Tuesday he’ll support former Senator Chuck Hagel to be the next defense secretary; the former Nebraska Senator is now likely to receive Senate approval for the job.

# 1nr

# Solvency

#### Nuclear can’t be quickly ramped up

Lovering et al 12

Jessica Lovering, Ted Nordhaus, chairman, Michael Shellenbergerare president of the Breakthrough Institute, Breakthrough Institute Energy and Climate Program policy analyst, 9-7-12, “Outofthe Nuclear Closet,” <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/09/07/out_of_the_nuclear_closet?page=full>, \\wyo-bb]

As long as nuclear technology is characterized by enormous upfront capital costs, it is likely to remain just a hedge against overdependence on lower-cost coal and gas, not the wholesale replacement it needs to be to make a serious dent in climate change. Developing countries need large plants capable of bringing large amounts of new power to their fast-growing economies. But they also need power to be cheap. So long as coal remains the cheapest source of electricity in the developing world, it is likely to remainking. The most worrying threat to the future of nuclear isn't the political fallout from Fukushima -- it's economic reality. Even as new nuclear plants are built in the developing world, old plants are being retired in the developed world. For example, Germany's plan to phase out nuclear simply relies on allowing existing plants to be shut down when they reach the ends of their lifetime. Given the size and cost of new conventional plants today, those plants are unlikely to be replaced with new ones. As such, the combined political and economic constraints associated with current nuclear energy technologies mean that nuclear energy's share of global energy generation is unlikely to grow in the coming decades, as global energy demand is likely to increase faster than new plants can be deployed.

#### Waste management, security, quality control and more expensive than large reactors

Wood 11

[Wood, James. Star – Phoenix Correspondent, “Small reactors raise alarms; Environment group wary of gov't initiative”, 27 Jan 2011, Academic Onefile, \\wyo-bb]

The stumbling blocks around nuclear power don't go away just because a reactor is small, says the province's most prominent environmental group. Premier Brad Wall recently announced the Saskatchewan Party government would fire up its nuclear agenda, including striking a deal with a private-sector company to research the feasibility of small-scale reactors for supplying power around the world and in Saskatchewan. Small-scale reactors produce less than 500 megawatts of power. In 2009, the Sask. Party government closed the door on a proposal to build two 1,000-megawatt reactors, saying they were too costly and too large for Saskatchewan's power grid. Ann Coxworth of the Saskatchewan Environmental Society said if Saskatchewan looks at small reactors, it should do so in the context of a badly needed overall energy strategy. "I think it's unlikely that it would be selected as one of the favourable options both from the point of view of economics and environmental impact. The costs of nuclear power production will not shrink in proportion to the size of the facility," she said in an interview this week. "You're still going to have to deal with the issues of waste management and security and product quality control whether it's a small reactor or a large reactor. I think that electricity produced from a small power reactor is still going to end up being more expensive than most of the other options."

# K

#### Reformism produces marginal tinkering and improvements that trade-off with broader changes to the system of consumption

Princen, 2002

[Thomas, Ph.D., Political Economy and Government, 1988, Harvard University and Associate professor at the Univ. of Michigan school of natural resources and environment, Confronting Consumption, “Consumption and its externalities: where economy meets ecology.” Pg. 23-42. Published by The MIT press] /Wyo-MB

Analytic and policy approaches to environmental problems can be roughly grouped into two categories. There are those that take current resource-use practices as given and look for marginal improvements. And there are those that presume current practices are unsustainable, possibly catastrophic if pursued to their logical conclusions, and that look for alternative forms of social organization. Research within the economic strands of social science disciplines such as political science, sociology, and anthropology has been preponderantly in the first category, what might be termed environmental improvement. Pollution control, environmental movements, and environmental organizations are common topics. At the same time that social science has focused on environmental improvement, those who chart biophysical trends say marginal change is not enough. Every time a ‘‘state of the environment’’ report comes out, authors across the ideological spectrum call for a fundamental shift in how humans relate to the natural world. Some call for global citizenship, others for spiritual awakening. But nearly all call for a drastic overhaul of the economic system, a system that is inherently and uncontrollably expansionist, that depends on ever-increasing throughput of material and energy, and that risks life-support systems for humans and other species. And then the best prescriptions these analysts, who are not students of human behavior for the most part, come up with are changes in taxes— classic marginal tinkering. If the social sciences are going to make a contribution commensurate with the severity of biophysical trends, it must do better than analyze environmental improvement measures. Social scientists must develop analytic tools for the analyst (biophysical and social alike) and an effective vocabulary for the policymaker and activist that allow, indeed encourage, an escape from well-worn prescriptions that result in marginal change at best.

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