# 1nc

### Observation One: The Role of DEBATE

#### First, our interpretation: debate is an agonistic field of play where participants must accept the constraints of agreeing to switch-sides on the topic by reading a topical affirmative when they are aff and negating the topic when they are negative.

#### Second, are our link arguments. The aff team fails to engage in this process in three ways:

#### Advocating a definitive course of action as indicated by the words ‘resolved’ and ‘should’[[1]](#footnote-1), rather they have you endorse a fluid system of constant criticism.

#### Not defending the agent of the resolution, which is the government of the United States based in D.C.[[2]](#footnote-2)

#### Not defending the direction of the resolution, which requires that American Democracy assistance be INCREASED, or made greater.[[3]](#footnote-3)

### Observation Two: The impacts

#### There are three net benefits to this interpretation of debate:

#### First, MORAL disagreement: Effective moral deliberation requires that all parties be willing to submit to a RECIPROCAL process of agonistic disagreement. Without an effective PROCESS of switch-side debate, there can be no method of dealing with the practical constraints that surround any persuasive context. EVEN IF the affirmative wins there is merit to considering their case, their abandonment of the forum of switch-side debate leaves us less able to speak to problems of power, violence and inequality because they give up on a process that is inherently valuable.

Gutmann & Thompson 96

[Amy & Dennis, President of Penn State and Professor of Political Philosophy at Harvard, Democracy and Disagreement, p. 1//wyo-tjc]

OF THE CHALLENGES that American democracy faces today, none is more formidable than the problem of moral disagreement. Neither the theory nor the practice of democratic politics has so far found an adequate way to cope with conflicts about fundamental values. We address the challenge of moral disagreement here by developing a conception of democracy that secures a central place for moral discussion in political life. Along with a growing number of other political theorists, we call this conception deliberative democracy. The core idea is simple: when citizens or their representatives disagree morally, they should continue to reason together to reach mutually acceptable decisions. But the meaning and implications of the idea are complex. Although the idea has a long history, it is still in search of a theory. We do not claim that this book provides a comprehensive theory of deliberative democracy, but we do hope that it contributes toward its future development by showing the kind of delib-eration that is possible and desirable in the face of moral disagreement in democracies. Some scholars have criticized liberal political theory for neglecting moral deliberation. Others have analyzed the philosophical foundations of deliberative democracy, and still others have begun to explore institutional reforms that would promote deliberation. Yet nearly all of them stop at the point where deliberation itself begins. None has systematically examined the substance of deliberation—the theoretical principles that should guide moral argument and their implications for actual moral disagreements about public policy. That is our subject, and it takes us into the everyday forums of democratic politics, where moral argument regularly appears but where theoretical analysis too rarely goes. Deliberative democracy involves reasoning about politics, and nothing has been more controversial in political philosophy than the nature of reason in politics. We do not believe that these controversies have to be settled before deliberative principles can guide the practice of democracy. Since on occasion citizens and their representatives already engage in the kind of reasoning that those principles recommend, deliberative democracy simply asks that they do so more consistently and comprehensively. The best way to prove the value of this kind of reasoning is to show its role in arguments about specific principles and policies, and its contribu¬tion to actual political debates. That is also ultimately the best justification for our conception of deliberative democracy itself. But to forestall pos¬sible misunderstandings of our conception of deliberative democracy, we offer some preliminary remarks about the scope and method of this book. The aim of the moral reasoning that our deliberative democracy pre-scribes falls between impartiality, which requires something like altruism, and prudence, which demands no more than enlightened self-interest. Its first principle is reciprocity, the subject of Chapter 2, but no less essential are the other principles developed in later chapters. When citizens reason reciprocally, they seek fair terms of social cooperation for their own sake; they try to find mutually acceptable ways of resolving moral disagreements. The precise content of reciprocity is difficult to determine in theory, but its general countenance is familiar enough in practice. It can be seen in the difference between acting in one's self-interest (say, taking advantage of a legal loophole or a lucky break) and acting fairly (following rules in the spirit that one expects others to adopt). In many of the controversies dis-cussed later in the book, the possibility of any morally acceptable resolution depends on citizens' reasoning beyond their narrow self-interest and considering what can be justified to people who reasonably disagree with them. Even though the quality of deliberation and the conditions under which it is conducted are far from ideal in the controversies we consider, the fact that in each case some citizens and some officials make arguments consistent with reciprocity suggests that a deliberative perspective is not Utopian. To clarify what reciprocity might demand under non-ideal conditions, we develop a distinction between deliberative and nondeliberative disa-greement. Citizens who reason reciprocally can recognize that a position is worthy of moral respect even when they think it morally wrong. They can believe that a moderate pro-life position on abortion, for example, is morally respectable even though they think it morally mistaken. (The abortion example—to which we often return in the book—is meant to be illustrative. For readers who deny that there is any room for deliberative disagreement on abortion, other political controversies can make the same point.) The presence of deliberative disagreement has important implications for how citizens treat one another and for what policies they should adopt. When a disagreement is not deliberative (for example, about a policy to legalize discrimination against blacks and women), citizens do not have any obligations of mutual respect toward their opponents. In deliberative disagreement (for example, about legalizing abortion), citizens should try to accommodate the moral convictions of their opponents to the greatest extent possible, without compromising their own moral convictions. We call this kind of accommodation an economy of moral disagreement, and believe that, though neglected in theory and practice, it is essential to a morally robust democratic life. Although both of us have devoted some of our professional life to urging these ideas on public officials and our fellow citizens in forums of practical politics, this book is primarily the product of scholarly rather than political deliberation. Insofar as it reaches beyond the academic community, it is addressed to citizens and officials in their more reflective frame of mind. Given its academic origins, some readers may be inclined to complain that only professors could be so unrealistic as to believe that moral reasoning can help solve political problems. But such a complaint would misrepresent our aims. To begin with, we do not think that academic discussion (whether in scholarly journals or college classrooms) is a model for moral deliberation in politics. Academic discussion need not aim at justifying a practical decision, as deliberation must. Partly for this reason, academic discussion is likely to be insensitive to the contexts of ordinary politics: the pressures of power, the problems of inequality, the demands of diversity, the exigencies of persuasion. Some critics of deliberative democracy show a similar insensitivity when they judge actual political deliberations by the standards of ideal philosophical reflection. Actual deliberation is inevitably defective, but so is philosophical reflection practiced in politics. The appropriate comparison is between the ideals of democratic deliberation and philosophical reflection, or between the application of each in the non-ideal circumstances of politics. We do not assume that politics should be a realm where the logical syllogism rules. Nor do we expect even the more appropriate standard of mutual respect always to prevail in politics. A deliberative perspective sometimes justifies bargaining, negotiation, force, and even violence. It is partly because moral argument has so much unrealized potential in dem-ocratic politics that we believe it deserves more attention. Because its place in politics is so precarious, the need to find it a more secure home and to nourish its development is all the more pressing. Yet because it is also already part of our common experience, we have reason to hope that it can survive and even prosper if philosophers along with citizens and public officials better appreciate its value in politics. Some readers may still wonder why deliberation should have such a prominent place in democracy. Surely, they may say, citizens should care more about the justice of public policies than the process by which they are adopted, at least so long as the process is basically fair and at least minimally democratic. One of our main aims in this book is to cast doubt on the dichotomy between policies and process that this concern assumes. Having good reason as individuals to believe that a policy is just does not mean that collectively as citizens we have sufficient justification to legislate on the basis of those reasons. The moral authority of collective judgments about policy depends in part on the moral quality of the process by which citizens collectively reach those judgments. Deliberation is the most appropriate way for citizens collectively to resolve their moral disagreements not only about policies but also about the process by which policies should be adopted. Deliberation is not only a means to an end, but also a means for deciding what means are morally required to pursue our common ends.

#### Second, ENERGY POLICY:

#### Policymaking is critical to address the overwhelming risks we face if we do not alter our energy production strategy-even if the science is uncertain, we must act to prevent the misery that will occur if we’re wrong

Schreyer 2005

[The Right Honourable Edward R. Schreyer was elected to the Manitoba Legislature in 1958, elected Leader of the Manitoba N.D.P. party in June 1969 and subsequently elected Premier of Manitoba from 1969-77. In 1979, Schreyer became Canada's 22nd Governor General, serving until 1984. He was awarded the Lester B. Pearson Peace Award in 1997. Mr. Schreyer currently serves on the Board of the International Institute for Sustainable Development and is the Chancellor of Brandon University. The Politics of Energy and the Environment, <http://www.ecclectica.ca/issues/2005/3/index.asp?Article=13>, uwyo//amp]

The politics of energy production, the politics of supply prospects and the politics of environmental protection seem to serve (or fail to serve) entirely different interest groups. Yet, the challenge is largely all of one piece. To be sure, if there were truly widespread acceptance of the contention that fossil fuel combustion with its resultant 25 billion tonnes of annual CO2 were the principal cause of global climate change and that such change was upon us, then some action would become a moral imperative in the public forum. Slowly that consensus appears to be evolving but until the politicians see a clear public trend, most will not have the stomach for earlier action. It may then become action-just-in-time (if we are lucky). There is a great deal of evidence and logic to suggest that Planet Earth's oceans and forests, are vast enough to act as an absolute sink for great tonnages of CO2 as they have in the past. Planet Earth's resources and resiliency factors are indeed—vast. But they are not infinite. The rational politics of all this suggests that there is a prudent and practical course of action. It is to adopt the precautionary principle that in the face of growing evidence, but lacking absolute certainty, the most justifiable course is to conserve and attenuate the use of nonrenewables while working hard to develop the renewables. It becomes essential to slow the rate of depletion of fossil fuels and hasten the rate of harnessing the renewables, i.e., wind and hydro. Only those who have the most unlimited greed for profit by fast track depletion should have cause to object. No one realistically wishes for a disruption in the stability of the oil and gas industry, but their product would serve better if it were extracted at half the present pace rate and therefore remain available for twice as long into the future. On that basis, Earth's natural CO2 sinks would then have a somewhat better chance in the odds of absorbing the tonnages of CO2 that would still be emitted, but at greatly reduced levels each year. However, as matters now stand, and with the prevailing attitudes, there isn't a chance that we will come through this without major disruption and consequential misery. I also hold this view as regards the political and technological problem of getting alternative energy systems in place before supply shortfalls in oil and gas drive prices even further into erratic haywire extremes. The 2004/05 price examples are merely the leading edge. In other words, we are leaving the task of redirecting our energy future dreadfully late—dangerously late. I mean this from the point of view of supply shortages that both explode price and disrupt production capacity of food, fibre and finished goods. By then, we may or may not yet, have the ultimate proof of impending climate change bringing environmental and ecological disaster. If these two prospects are linked, however, does it really matter which comes first? Ironically, the linkage of these two transcending problems extends to the political world. There is infighting, even among groups who are genuine supporters of conservation policies. There are some who are environmental activists, because of visible impacts on the landscape and others who urgently support renewable energy initiatives because of sustainability concerns. Each of these groups have, within them, numbers who are impatient; who seek urgent measures in support of one or another policy initiative sometimes to the exclusion of all other options. In this context, one can meet those who favour the solar option and downplay wind energy and/or those who favour wind energy options as capable of meeting future energy needs without any need for development of hydroelectric sites, even of the most favorable kind. All this is rather remindful of the old adage—"every duck praises its own slough". The reality is that the very scale and nature of the problem is so great that it requires the adoption of all practical efforts and renewable, sustainable alternatives. This includes promotion of the conservation ethic—use less, waste less. It includes promotion of all efforts toward greater efficiency in energy and resource use; building better, smaller and with more insulation, more allowance for solar gain, etc. These are some examples that come mind. Acceptance of new technologies that have passed tests of feasibility must be encouraged. The slow rate at which geothermal heat pumps are being installed as an alternative to gas heating is a disappointing case in point. The technology is known. The capacity to install must be encouraged and ramped up but who will do this? One potential stakeholder awaits the other and governments remain passive bystanders. So it proceeds at a snail's pace. We perceive the political problem of breaking out of inertia. We appear, these past 20 years, to be living in a time when the dominant political philosophy guiding democratic governments is one of subordination to market forces. The path followed appears to be the opposite to that followed, e.g., by President Franklin Roosevelt in formulating the New Deal as a major struggle to reduce the poverty and despair of the 1930s. It was not left to chance then. Government was used as a useful tool—as an instrument to initiate certain programs and actions to seek certain objectives. At present, however, we drift without any guiding path or principles. The Kyoto Accord to reduce CO2 emissions has, for political reasons, been signed by most countries but not by others, including the US. It is important to note that there is, in fact, very little difference in the actual deeds thus far in either set of countries (except for a few in Europe). The quantum of fossil fuel depleted each year, and the resulting CO2 emissions keep moving in the direction opposite to the Accord. If this is progress, we must be using an inverted mirror. There has been no shortage of government press releases (implying action and progress) issued since the Kyoto Accord was negotiated eight years ago, but precious little has been done. As such, all these press communiques have been used rather like Weapons of Mass Deception. Only Alice in Wonderland, who learned how to use the Mock Turtle's calculator can explain how we manage to imply we have made progress when, in fact, oil and gas depletion has accelerated in Canada as much as anywhere else and so have greenhouse gas emissions. The political climate needed for any real and concerted action is apparently not yet at hand. Wildly contradictory statements by opposing camps of experts confuse and perplex those citizens who try to make sense of it all. But wait! The most recent events of the autumn of 2005 are beginning to show an unintended consensus, but a consensus nonetheless. We have, in recent years, begun to hear more and more from those who describe oil depletion as a global problem; global in scope and disastrous in its consequence, if not urgently addressed. These "peak oil" geologists (and others of the same view) were, until about 1995, few in number and viewed with derision by the conventional wisdom, and of course, by those hyping stock market shares and grinding other axes of self-interest. But these past two years they have been and are receiving respectful attention and are being joined in their efforts to explain, inform and educate, by some numbers at least, of economists, bankers and public policy analysts. They are no longer dismissed as doomsayers except perhaps by those who engage in the conventional wishful thinking that oil and gas will be available forever. In early November 2005 the International Energy Agency, which is the agency owned by the 22 or so major oil consuming industrial nations, released an astonishing statement indicating that the world's energy consumption patterns and practices were unsustainable and urged major changes. One must pause here to have that resonate and register. Particularly so, because the IEA has, until now, always tried to put an optimistic face on global energy future prospects. One can be sure that there has been, these past six years or so, much internal stress in deciding how best to maintain the façade of a business-as-usual energy strategy. It is the IEA's own annual publication "World Energy Outlook" that each year shows projected global oil consumption and depletion fast tracking upward to 100 million barrels per day and another 60 million barrels per day of gas in oil equivalent by 2020. The consequent CO2 emissions, therefore, are shown to rise to just under 40 billion tonnes per year. Business as usual indeed. The whole notion is absurd! Moreover, in the last 30 days, after 30 years, they have changed direction. Better late than never! In other words, the IEA has done a volte-face in November 2005. But again, wait for the final note: as though to contradict the "peal oil" geologists, the IEA states "there is still enough oil—enough to last another 30 years—all it will need is $17 trillion dollars of investment in production and plant infrastructure". Yes: 17,000 billion dollars over 30 years or 500 billion dollars per year. Oh! I forgot. The IEA also said that most (almost all) of this onus for production increase would have to come from OPEC. It didn't explain why there is apparently little hope or expectation that investment, no matter how massive, in North America, Europe or in deep sea drilling will make any meaningful difference. Therefore, the "lots of oil" is "lots of oil" except in a few places. One should not expect politicians to exhort more and more spending on oil exploration in old producing territories. Few things are as nonproductive as a once depleted oil field. Who will invest in the Brooklyn Bridge? The most telling point I leave toward the end. It is that if you carefully read the statements made by those wishing to put an optimistic spin; oftentimes they confirm rather than contradict the statements made by "peak oil" analysts. For example, the IEA statement "there is oil to last for another 30 years" is hardly different from the peak oil thesis that oil will be extractable for at least another 30 to 40 years but it will not increase, but rather only decrease in relation to demand, falling short each year in meeting that demand. The shortfall will create a psychology that will drive prices into a cocked hat of spiral and uncertainty. We will either ramp up in time with tar sands, shale and nonrenewables or we will face a sharp increase in the "index of misery" as food, fibre and mobility prices escalate wildly. Concurrently, if renewables lose out in development priority to tar sands, Arctic pipelines and more and more coal, you can expect the projected 40 billion tonnes of CO2 to surge upward by a commensurate greater amount. There are other negative possibilities, of course. One example is the case where governments use renewable energy cash flow where it is working well to subsidize continued use of one or another of the fossil fuels, etc. Yes, there is the tantalizing prospect of "clean coal". But, what does it mean? Coal can be cleaned, of course. It can be washed, scrubbed of its particulates and reduced in its sulfur emissions, etc., but to hype "clean coal" as being rid of its necessity to emit carbon dioxide in the burning of it, is to return to the nonsense alchemy of the high Middle Ages. To burn coal in a modern power plant is to combine carbon and oxygen in prodigious amounts. A coal plant of 1000MW producing electricity, let's say, at 80% capacity factor, will discharge about 7 million tonnes per year of CO2 into the atmosphere. To suggest that this CO2 can somehow be all sequestered, avoided or stored away somewhere at that grand scale month after month, year after year, is to hype the most outrageous nonsense. Without oxygen meeting carbon—no combustion and no steam. And, of course, natural gas combustion discharges carbon dioxide as well—at about 60 percent the rate of coal. That is not the only point. Natural gas is in much shorter supply, especially in North America, and its depletion rate on this continent is already making itself felt! Natural gas prices have tripled (+300%) in the past three years! The effect on home heating costs and industrial processing is drastic in its impact. The implications for fertilizer production and costs are severe enough to cause 100% price increases to western farmers. The politics of natural gas can be summarized as follows. All local clean air lobbies, and many environmental lobbies, favour natural gas over coal. However, those who are concerned with "sustainability" over the long run, favor coal over gas. Many lobbied for natural gas, not only for home heating where it was obviously to be favoured but also as a preference over hydro for electricity generation. In the latter case, it is not at all to be preferred, except for peak hour relief. Yet, repeatedly, in the 1990s to 2003, gas was promoted and installed in more than 90% of all new electricity-generating plants in North America. As a direct result, in at least three provinces in Canada, hydro development was poor mouthed and postponed, while we celebrated "an environmental victory" of gas installation. It was a mass phenomenon, like lemmings moving to the sea and their own demise. The shortsightedness and irresponsibility when shown in pictorial graph(a) is stunning. But, who will be called to account?? These events were a direct "defeat" for sustainability, if truth be known. The decade is only half over and already we are looking rather nervously at multi-billion dollar Arctic gas pipelines and multi-hundred billion dollar LNG terminals and ships to bring Mideastern, North African and Russian gas to North American shores because the decision makers have been so careless. That is where the politics of the 21st Century energy provenance seems to have taken us these past five short years. Ironic this is too, because 48 years ago the Diefenbaker government enacted policy that established a National Energy Board. It was empowered to grant or withhold licences for natural gas export, unless it could be demonstrated that the depletion for export purposes was not to be allowed except in amounts that were surplus to domestic requirements of the next 20 years. That was all changed in 1990 after 30 years of successful stewardship. It was replaced by the current system, now 15 years old. That is by the politics that have recently dictated that gas production and exports shall be ratcheted up without regard for domestic needs. The cynic will be excused for noting the energy clauses of the Free Trade Agreement do not force Canada to increase exports of oil and gas to the US. What they require is that those exports cannot be reduced from the levels of preceding year(s). There is a difference. The onus is entirely ours. It is simply not right to blame Americans for decisions in Canada and the aimless policy drift that allows ratcheting. It is made-in-Canada policy. It was not made during the administrations of Messrs. Diefenbaker, Pearson or Trudeau. So two guesses as to when the National Energy Board process on gas exports was abolished. To those who argue that without those energy resource clauses, the US would not have signed the Trade Agreement, I point out that Mexico very specifically declined from signing that Agreement until those energy clauses were removed. They were removed—they then signed on—and so did the US. (If they had softwood lumber and Mad Cows, would they be treated differently than we were last year?) After all, the notion that a nation must be obliged to buy products or resources it doesn't want or need is absurd. It is equally absurd that a nation must sell off resources at a rate any faster than it wishes to extract or deplete. Almost half of the American population would like very much to build up their own energy options and preferably base their energy policy more on sustainable modalities; and reduce, at long last, their perceived over dependency on foreign oil, especially Middle East oil. This is a growing consensus among many members of Congress today. They must wonder when they see the other half of the population supporting those who appear to demand that OPEC and other countries spend and invest heavily to increase production in order to deplete more rapidly that very resource they feel they are already exploiting too heavily and too quickly. And what would be the result of increasing production—to sell 20% more volume at 20% lower price? Better to leave it in the ground an extra few years. It might appreciate in value. So goes, and so will continue to revolve, the politics of fossil fuel energy during the first two decades of the 21st Century. The essence of the energy and environmental policy dilemma is not whether we must change policy direction but rather how soon can we start. We must put practical renewable energy capacity in place. There are two reasons why we must insist that no more time should be wasted as has been wasted this entire past decade. Some may argue that almost half of world oil reserves are now depleted while optimists (forced or otherwise) may insist that almost half of ultimate reserves remain to be exploited. They both happen to be right. That is not the point. Does it really matter so much if the cup is half full or half empty? The far, far more important thing we must do is to accept the real possibility that beyond a certain point, global capacity to produce will decline and fail to meet demand. Prices will soar as supply becomes erratic and undependable month to month. We will either be ready with a rational plan of practical alternatives (that are also non-greenhouse gas emitting) or we will witness a deterioration in environmental balances and sustainability, even while misery escalates in the face of decline in the production of the necessities of life. Is it rational to ration and conserve energy or is it "merely a personal virtue but of no relevance to public policy?" (as was recently uttered by senior White House official). Or was it the Mad Hatter or the March Hare who said this? No matter. Perhaps it is up to us if these next two decades are to become the best of times instead of the very worst of times. Possibly that is oversimplifying the possible scenarios. It may be that resource constraints, limits and realities in the face of a global population growing eventually to 8 billion and beyond, will outpace the best of human ingenuity and technological innovation and defeat the best of human rational impulses and decent determination to do ultimately the right thing. However, I like many others, choose in spite of the foregoing, to be optimistic. The ethical teachings of Greco-Roman civilization and the Judeo-Christian tradition lead us to the guiding principle of moderation in all things: moderation as being the basis of right action. This may motivate us, even if late in the day, to finally do the right thing. The consequence of doing otherwise does not bear thinking about. The very scale of human consumption and impact has, in the 21st Century, caught up with the vastness of the scale of Planet Earth and her "vast resources". Now what?

#### Third, SWITCH-SIDE DEBATE: The net-benefits are both epistemic and ontological: epistemic because prepared, competitive discourse and required listening to both sides of an argument is a prerequisite for critical reasoning and interested inquiry, and ontological because it affirms a method of living that is the only antidote to the violence of the affirmative’s universalist dogma, which is root of violence and genocide

Roberts-Miller 3

[Patricia, Associate Professor of Rhetoric at UT Austin, “Fighting Without Hatred: Hannah Arendt ' s Agonistic Rhetoric”, p. asp//wyo-tjc]

Totalitarianism and the Competitive Space of Agonism Arendt is probably most famous for her analysis of totalitarianism (especially her The Origins of Totalitarianism and Eichmann in Jerusalem), but the recent attention has been on her criticism of mass culture (The Human Condition). Arendt's main criticism of the current human condition is that the common world of deliberate and joint action is fragmented into solipsistic and unreflective behavior. In an especially lovely passage, she says that in mass society people are all imprisoned in the subjectivity of their own singular experience, which does not cease to be singular if the same experience is multiplied innumerable times. The end of the common world has come when it is seen only under one aspect and is permitted to present itself in only one perspective. (Human 58) What Arendt so beautifully describes is that isolation and individualism are not corollaries, and may even be antithetical because obsession with one's own self and the particularities of one's life prevents one from engaging in conscious, deliberate, collective action. Individuality, unlike isolation, depends upon a collective with whom one argues in order to direct the common life. Self-obsession, even (especially?) when coupled with isolation from one' s community is far from apolitical; it has political consequences. Perhaps a better way to put it is that it is political precisely because it aspires to be apolitical. This fragmented world in which many people live simultaneously and even similarly but not exactly together is what Arendt calls the "social." Arendt does not mean that group behavior is impossible in the realm of the social, but that social behavior consists "in some way of isolated individuals, incapable of solidarity or mutuality, who abdicate their human capacities and responsibilities to a projected 'they' or 'it,' with disastrous consequences, both for other people and eventually for themselves" (Pitkin 79). One can behave, but not act. For someone like Arendt, a German-assimilated Jew, one of the most frightening aspects of the Holocaust was the ease with which a people who had not been extraordinarily anti-Semitic could be put to work industriously and efficiently on the genocide of the Jews. And what was striking about the perpetrators of the genocide, ranging from minor functionaries who facilitated the murder transports up to major figures on trial at Nuremberg, was their constant and apparently sincere insistence that they were not responsible. For Arendt, this was not a peculiarity of the German people, but of the current human and heavily bureaucratic condition of twentieth-century culture: we do not consciously choose to engage in life's activities; we drift into them, or we do them out of a desire to conform. Even while we do them, we do not acknowledge an active, willed choice to do them; instead, we attribute our behavior to necessity, and we perceive ourselves as determined—determined by circumstance, by accident, by what "they" tell us to do. We do something from within the anonymity of a mob that we would never do as an individual; we do things for which we will not take responsibility. Yet, whether or not people acknowledge responsibility for the consequences of their actions, those consequences exist. Refusing to accept responsibility can even make those consequences worse, in that the people who enact the actions in question, because they do not admit their own agency, cannot be persuaded to stop those actions. They are simply doing their jobs. In a totalitarian system, however, everyone is simply doing his or her job; there never seems to be anyone who can explain, defend, and change the policies. Thus, it is, as Arendt says, rule by nobody. It is illustrative to contrast Arendt's attitude toward discourse to Habermas'. While both are critical of modern bureaucratic and totalitarian systems, Arendt's solution is the playful and competitive space of agonism; it is not the rational-critical public sphere. The "actual content of political life" is "the joy and the gratification that arise out of being in company with our peers, out of acting together and appearing in public, out of inserting ourselves into the world by word and deed, thus acquiring and sustaining our personal identity and beginning something entirely new" ("Truth" 263). According to Seyla Benhabib, Arendt's public realm emphasizes the assumption of competition, and it "represents that space of appearances in which moral and political greatness, heroism, and preeminence are revealed, displayed, shared with others. This is a competitive space in which one competes for recognition, precedence, and acclaim" (78). These qualities are displayed, but not entirely for purposes of acclamation; they are not displays of one's self, but of ideas and arguments, of one's thought. When Arendt discusses Socrates' thinking in public, she emphasizes his performance: "He performed in the marketplace the way the flute-player performed at a banquet. It is sheer performance, sheer activity"; nevertheless, it was thinking: "What he actually did was to make public, in discourse, the thinking process" {Lectures 37). Pitkin summarizes this point: "Arendt says that the heroism associated with politics is not the mythical machismo of ancient Greece but something more like the existential leap into action and public exposure" (175-76). Just as it is not machismo, although it does have considerable ego involved, so it is not instrumental rationality; Arendt's discussion of the kinds of discourse involved in public action include myths, stories, and personal narratives. Furthermore, the competition is not ruthless; it does not imply a willingness to triumph at all costs. Instead, it involves something like having such a passion for ideas and politics that one is willing to take risks. One tries to articulate the best argument, propose the best policy, design the best laws, make the best response. This is a risk in that one might lose; advancing an argument means that one must be open to the criticisms others will make of it. The situation is agonistic not because the participants manufacture or seek conflict, but because conflict is a necessary consequence of difference This attitude is reminiscent of Kenneth Burke, who did not try to find a language free of domination but who instead theorized a way that the very tendency toward hierarchy in language might be used against itself (for more on this argument, see Kastely). Similarly, Arendt does not propose a public realm of neutral, rational beings who escape differences to live in the discourse of universals; she envisions one of different people who argue with passion, vehemence, and integrity. Eichmann perfectly exemplified what Arendt famously called the "banality of evil" but that might be better thought of as the bureaucratization of evil (or, as a friend once aptly put it, the evil of banality). That is, he was able to engage in mass murder because he was able not to think about it, especially not from the perspective of the victims, and he was able to exempt himself from personal responsibility by telling himself (and anyone else who would listen) that he was just following orders. It was the bureaucratic system that enabled him to do both. He was not exactly passive; he was, on the contrary, very aggressive in trying to do his duty. He behaved with the "ruthless, competitive exploitation" and "inauthen-tic, self-disparaging conformism" that characterizes those who people totalitarian systems (Pitkin 87). Arendt's theorizing of totalitarianism has been justly noted as one of her strongest contributions to philosophy. She saw that a situation like Nazi Germany is different from the conventional understanding of a tyranny. Pitkin writes, Totalitarianism cannot be understood, like earlier forms of domination, as the ruthless exploitation of some people by others, whether the motive be selfish calculation, irrational passion, or devotion to some cause. Understanding totalitarianism's essential nature requires solving the central mystery of the holocaust—the objectively useless and indeed dysfunctional, fanatical pursuit of a purely ideological policy, a pointless process to which the people enacting it have fallen captive. (87) Totalitarianism is closely connected to bureaucracy; it is oppression by rules, rather than by people who have willfully chosen to establish certain rules. It is the triumph of the social. Critics (both friendly and hostile) have paid considerable attention to Arendt's category of the "social," largely because, despite spending so much time on the notion, Arendt remains vague on certain aspects of it. Pitkin appropriately compares Arendt's concept of the social to the Blob, the type of monster that figured in so many post-war horror movies. That Blob was "an evil monster from outer space, entirely external to and separate from us [that] had fallen upon us intent on debilitating, absorb¬ing, and ultimately destroying us, gobbling up our distinct individuality and turning us into robots that mechanically serve its purposes" (4). Pitkin is critical of this version of the "social" and suggests that Arendt meant (or perhaps should have meant) something much more complicated. The simplistic version of the social-as-Blob can itself be an instance of Blob thinking; Pitkin's criticism is that Arendt talks at times as though the social comes from outside of us and has fallen upon us, turning us into robots. Yet, Arendt's major criticism of the social is that it involves seeing ourselves as victimized by something that comes from outside our own behavior. I agree with Pitkin that Arendt's most powerful descriptions of the social (and the other concepts similar to it, such as her discussion of totalitarianism, imperialism, Eichmann, and parvenus) emphasize that these processes are not entirely out of our control but that they happen to us when, and because, we keep refusing to make active choices. We create the social through negligence. It is not the sort of force in a Sorcerer's Apprentice, which once let loose cannot be stopped; on the contrary, it continues to exist because we structure our world to reward social behavior. Pitkin writes, "From childhood on, in virtually all our institutions, we reward euphemism, salesmanship, slo¬gans, and we punish and suppress truth-telling, originality, thoughtful-ness. So we continually cultivate ways of (not) thinking that induce the social" (274). I want to emphasize this point, as it is important for thinking about criticisms of some forms of the social construction of knowledge: denying our own agency is what enables the social to thrive. To put it another way, theories of powerlessness are self-fulfilling prophecies. Arendt grants that there are people who willed the Holocaust, but she insists that totalitarian systems result not so much from the Hitlers or Stalins as from the bureaucrats who may or may not agree with the established ideology but who enforce the rules for no stronger motive than a desire to avoid trouble with their superiors (see Eichmann and Life). They do not think about what they do. One might prevent such occurrences—or, at least, resist the modern tendency toward totalitarian¬ism—by thought: "critical thought is in principle anti-authoritarian" (Lectures 38). By "thought" Arendt does not mean eremitic contemplation; in fact, she has great contempt for what she calls "professional thinkers," refusing herself to become a philosopher or to call her work philosophy. Young-Bruehl, Benhabib, and Pitkin have each said that Heidegger represented just such a professional thinker for Arendt, and his embrace of Nazism epitomized the genuine dangers such "thinking" can pose (see Arendt's "Heidegger"). "Thinking" is not typified by the isolated con¬templation of philosophers; it requires the arguments of others and close attention to the truth. It is easy to overstate either part of that harmony. One must consider carefully the arguments and viewpoints of others: Political thought is representative. I form an opinion by considering a given issue from different viewpoints, by making present to my mind the standpoints of those who are absent; that is, I represent them. This process of representation does not blindly adopt the actual views of those who stand somewhere else, and hence look upon the world from a different perspective; this is a question neither of empathy, as though I tried to be or to feel like somebody else, nor of counting noses and joining a majority but of being and thinking in my own identity where actually I am not. The more people's standpoints I have present in my mind while I am pondering a given issue, and the better I can imagine how I would feel and think if I were in their place, the stronger will be my capacity for represen¬tative thinking and the more valid my final conclusions, my opinion. ("Truth" 241) There are two points to emphasize in this wonderful passage. First, one does not get these standpoints in one's mind through imagining them, but through listening to them; thus, good thinking requires that one hear the arguments of other people. Hence, as Arendt says, "critical thinking, while still a solitary business, does not cut itself off from' all others.'" Thinking is, in this view, necessarily public discourse: critical thinking is possible "only where the standpoints of all others are open to inspection" (Lectures 43). Yet, it is not a discourse in which one simply announces one's stance; participants are interlocutors and not just speakers; they must listen. Unlike many current versions of public discourse, this view presumes that speech matters.

It is not asymmetric manipulation of others, nor merely an economic exchange; it must be a world into which one enters and by which one might be changed. Second, passages like the above make some readers think that Arendt puts too much faith in discourse and too little in truth (see Habermas). But Arendt is no crude relativist; she believes in truth, and she believes that there are facts that can be more or less distorted. She does not believe that reality is constructed by discourse, or that truth is indistinguishable from falsehood. She insists tha^ the truth has a different pull on us and, consequently, that it has a difficult place in the world of the political. Facts are different from falsehood because, while they can be distorted or denied, especially when they are inconvenient for the powerful, they also have a certain positive force that falsehood lacks: "Truth, though powerless and always defe ated in a head-on clash with the powers that be, possesses a strength of its own: whatever those in power may contrive, they are unable to discover or invent a viable substitute for it. Persuasion and violence can destroy truth, but they cannot replace it" ("Truth" 259). Facts have a strangely resilient quality partially because a lie "tears, as it were, a hole in the fabric of factuality. As every historian knows, one can spot a lie by noticing incongruities, holes, or the j unctures of patched-up places" ("Truth" 253). While she is sometimes discouraging about our ability to see the tears in the fabric, citing the capacity of totalitarian governments to create the whole cloth (see "Truth" 252-54), she is also sometimes optimistic. In Eichmann in Jerusalem, she repeats the story of Anton Schmidt—a man who saved the lives of Jews—and concludes that such stories cannot be silenced (230-32). For facts to exert power in the common world, however, these stories must be told. Rational truth (such as principles of mathematics) might be perceptible and demonstrable through individual contemplation, but "factual truth, on the contrary, is always related to other people: it concerns events and circumstances in which many are involved; it is established by witnesses and depends upon testimony; it exists only to the extent that it is spoken about, even if it occurs in the domain of privacy. It is political by nature" (23 8). Arendt is neither a positivist who posits an autonomous individual who can correctly perceive truth, nor a relativist who positively asserts the inherent relativism of all perception. Her description of how truth functions does not fall anywhere in the three-part expeditio so prevalent in both rhetoric and philosophy: it is not expressivist, positivist, or social constructivist. Good thinking depends upon good public argument, and good public argument depends upon access to facts: "Freedom of opinion is a farce unless factual information is guaranteed" (238). The sort of thinking that Arendt propounds takes the form of action only when it is public argument, and, as such, it is particularly precious: "For if no other test but the experience of being active, no other measure but the extent of sheer activity were to be applied to the various activities within the vita activa, it might well be that thinking as such would surpass them all" (Human 325). Arendt insists that it is "the same general rule— Do not contradict yourself (not your self but your thinking ego)—that determines both thinking and acting" (Lectures 3 7). In place of the mildly resentful conformism that fuels totalitarianism, Arendt proposes what Pitkin calls "a tough-minded, open-eyed readiness to perceive and judge reality for oneself, in terms of concrete experience and independent, critical theorizing" (274). The paradoxical nature of agonism (that it must involve both individuality and commonality) makes it difficult to maintain, as the temptation is great either to think one's own thoughts without reference to anyone else or to let others do one's thinking.

### Observation Three: Voting Issue

#### Vote negative to reject the affirmative’s dogmatic refusal to subject themselves to the constraints of switch-side debate.

#### First, BOUNDED CREATIVITY outweighs: You should embrace a model of debate that strikes a balance between predictability and creativity—it is a PRACTICAL REALITY that preparing to debate within a common framework enhances education because it maximizes elaboration and testing of ideas. That’s also a reason to SEVERLY DISCOUNT their impact claims because those claims have not been submitted to rigorous testing but are only shallow gut-shot reactions.

Goodin 03

[Robert E. Goodin and Simon J. Niemeyer- Australian National University- 2003, When Does Deliberation Begin? Internal Reflection versus Public Discussion in Deliberative Democracy, POLITICAL STUDIES: 2003 VOL 51, 627–649, uwyo//amp]

Suppose that instead of highly polarized symbolic attitudes, what we have at the outset is mass ignorance or mass apathy or non-attitudes. There again, people's engaging with the issue – focusing on it, acquiring information about it, thinking hard about it – would be something that is likely to occur earlier rather than later in the deliberative process. And more to our point, it is something that is most likely to occur within individuals themselves or in informal interactions, well in advance of any formal, organized group discussion. There is much in the large literature on attitudes and the mechanisms by which they change to support that speculation.31 Consider, for example, the literature on ‘central’ versus ‘peripheral’ routes to the formation of attitudes. Before deliberation, individuals may not have given the issue much thought or bothered to engage in an extensive process of reflection.32 In such cases, positions may be arrived at via peripheral routes, taking cognitive shortcuts or arriving at ‘top of the head’ conclusions or even simply following the lead of others believed to hold similar attitudes or values (Lupia, 1994). These shorthand approaches involve the use of available cues such as ‘expertness’ or ‘attractiveness’ (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986) – not deliberation in the internal-reflective sense we have described. Where peripheral shortcuts are employed, there may be inconsistencies in logic and the formation of positions, based on partial information or incomplete information processing. In contrast, ‘central’ routes to the development of attitudes involve the application of more deliberate effort to the matter at hand, in a way that is more akin to the internal-reflective deliberative ideal. Importantly for our thesis, there is nothing intrinsic to the ‘central’ route that requires group deliberation. Research in this area stresses instead the importance simply of ‘sufficient impetus’ for engaging in deliberation, such as when an individual is stimulated by personal involvement in the issue.33 The same is true of ‘on-line’ versus ‘memory-based’ processes of attitude change.34 The suggestion here is that we lead our ordinary lives largely on autopilot, doing routine things in routine ways without much thought or reflection. When we come across something ‘new’, we update our routines – our ‘running’ beliefs and procedures, attitudes and evaluations – accordingly. But having updated, we then drop the impetus for the update into deep-stored ‘memory’. A consequence of this procedure is that, when asked in the ordinary course of events ‘what we believe’ or ‘what attitude we take’ toward something, we easily retrieve what we think but we cannot so easily retrieve the reasons why. That more fully reasoned assessment – the sort of thing we have been calling internal-reflective deliberation – requires us to call up reasons from stored memory rather than just consulting our running on-line ‘summary judgments’. Crucially for our present discussion, once again, what prompts that shift from on-line to more deeply reflective deliberation is not necessarily interpersonal discussion. The impetus for fixing one's attention on a topic, and retrieving reasons from stored memory, might come from any of a number sources: group discussion is only one. And again, even in the context of a group discussion, this shift from ‘on-line’ to ‘memory-based’ processing is likely to occur earlier rather than later in the process, often before the formal discussion ever begins. All this is simply to say that, on a great many models and in a great many different sorts of settings, it seems likely that elements of the pre-discursive process are likely to prove crucial to the shaping and reshaping of people's attitudes in a citizens’ jury-style process. The initial processes of focusing attention on a topic, providing information about it and inviting people to think hard about it is likely to provide a strong impetus to internal-reflective deliberation, altering not just the information people have about the issue but also the way people process that information and hence (perhaps) what they think about the issue. What happens once people have shifted into this more internal-reflective mode is, obviously, an open question. Maybe people would then come to an easy consensus, as they did in their attitudes toward the Daintree rainforest.35 Or maybe people would come to divergent conclusions; and they then may (or may not) be open to argument and counter-argument, with talk actually changing minds. Our claim is not that group discussion will always matter as little as it did in our citizens’ jury.36 Our claim is instead merely that the earliest steps in the jury process – the sheer focusing of attention on the issue at hand and acquiring more information about it, and the internal-reflective deliberation that that prompts – will invariably matter more than deliberative democrats of a more discursive stripe would have us believe. However much or little difference formal group discussions might make, on any given occasion, the pre-discursive phases of the jury process will invariably have a considerable impact on changing the way jurors approach an issue.

#### Second is your argument filter: It is OK to divorce debate from the ‘real-world’- a laboratory separate from conviction is necessary to teach methods of argumentative reasoning AND advocacy skills—You should privilege these skills even if you have to sacrifice purity of inquiry because these are the skills MOST UNIQUE to the debate forum—they can’t be garnered anywhwere else

Muir 93

[Star A., Professor of Communication Studies at George Mason, Philosophy and Rhetoric, “A Defense of the Ethics of Contemporary Debate”, p. asp//wyo-tjc]

The emphasis on method---focusing on the technique of debate as an educational end---is characteristic of the defense of debating both sides of a resolution. Interscholastic debate, many scholars reason, is different from “real world” disputation; it lacks the purposes or functions of a senate speech, a public demonstration, or a legal plea. Debate is designed to train students to construct arguments, to locate weaknesses in reasoning, to organize ideas, and to present and defend ideas effectively, not to convert the judge to a particular belief. As such, it is intended to teach debaters to see both sides of an issue and to become proficient in the exposition of argument independent of moral or ethical convictions. The debaters are to present the best case possible given the issues they have to work with. The definition of debate thus shapes a conception of its role in the development of the individual. Windes reaffirms the value of such a procedural training in his view of the activity: Academic debating is a generic term for oral contests in argumentation, held according to established rules, the purpose being to present both sides of a controversy so effectively that a decision may be reached---not on which side was right or wrong but on which side did the better job of arguing. Academic debating is gamesmanship applied to argumentation, not the trivial and amusing gamesmanship often thought of, but sober, realistic, important gamesmanship.

### K

#### THE AFFIRMATIVES FOCUS ON THE DISCURSIVE/SYMBOLIC REVEALS THE EXTENT TO WHICH THEY HAVE GIVEN UP ON ACTUALLY CHALLENGING THE STRUCTURES OF OPPRESSION. BUT FAR FROM BEING A POST-CAPITALIST AGE IN WHICH ALL SOCIAL EXPERIENCE IS TEXTUALLY OR DISCURSIVELY PRODUCED, IT IS A MATERIAL WORLD. ONLY A MATERIALIST METHOD CAN ACCOUNT FOR THE WAYS IN WHICH CERTAIN CLASSES CREATE AND DEPLOY RHETORIC TO LEGITIMIZE A CAPITALIST MODE OF SOCIAL RELATIONS

CLOUD (Prof of Comm at Texas) 2001

[Dana, “The Affirmative Masquerade”, p. online: http://www.acjournal.org/holdings/vol4/iss3/special/cloud.htm //wyo-tjc]

At the very least, however, it is clear that poststructuralist discourse theories have left behind some of historical materialism’s most valuable conceptual tools for any theoretical and critical practice that aims at informing practical, oppositional political activity on behalf of historically exploited and oppressed groups. As Nancy Hartsock (1983, 1999) and many others have argued (see Ebert 1996; Stabile, 1997; Triece, 2000; Wood, 1999), we need to retain concepts such as standpoint epistemology (wherein truth standards are not absolute or universal but arise from the scholar’s alignment with the perspectives of particular classes and groups) and fundamental, class-based interests (as opposed to understanding class as just another discursively-produced identity). We need extra-discursive reality checks on ideological mystification and economic contextualization of discursive phenomena. Most importantly, critical scholars bear the obligation to explain the origins and causes of exploitation and oppression in order better to inform the fight against them. In poststructuralist discourse theory, the "retreat from class" (Wood, 1999) expresses an unwarranted pessimism about what can be accomplished in late capitalism with regard to understanding and transforming system and structure at the level of the economy and the state. It substitutes meager cultural freedoms for macro-level social transformation even as millions of people around the world feel the global reach of capitalism more deeply than ever before. At the core of the issue is a debate across the humanities and social sciences with regard to whether we live in a "new economy," an allegedly postmodern, information-driven historical moment in which, it is argued, organized mass movements are no longer effective in making material demands of system and structure (Melucci, 1996). In suggesting that global capitalism has so innovated its strategies that there is no alternative to its discipline, arguments proclaiming "a new economy" risk inaccuracy, pessimism, and conservatism (see Cloud, in press). While a thoroughgoing summary is beyond the scope of this essay, there is a great deal of evidence against claims that capitalism has entered a new phase of extraordinary innovation, reach, and scope (see Hirst and Thompson, 1999). Furthermore, both class polarization (see Mishel, Bernstein, and Schmitt, 2001) and the ideological and management strategies that contain class antagonism (see Cloud, 1998; Parker and Slaughter, 1994) still resemble their pre-postmodern counterparts. A recent report of the Economic Policy Institute concludes that in the 1990s, inequality between rich and poor in the U.S. (as well as around the world) continued to grow, in a context of rising worker productivity, a longer work week for most ordinary Americans, and continued high poverty rates. Even as the real wage of the median CEO rose nearly 63 percent from 1989, to 1999, more than one in four U.S. workers lives at or below the poverty level. Among these workers, women are disproportionately represented, as are Black and Latino workers. (Notably, unionized workers earn nearly thirty percent more, on average, than non-unionized workers.) Meanwhile, Disney workers sewing t-shirts and other merchandise in Haiti earn 28 cents an hour. Disney CEO Michael Eisner made nearly six hundred million dollars in 1999--451,000 times the wage of the workers under his employ (Roesch, 1999). According to United Nations and World Bank sources, several trans-national corporations have assets larger than several countries combined. Sub-Saharan Africa and the Russian Federation have seen sharp economic decline, while assets of the world’s top three billionaires exceed the GNP of all of the least-developed countries and their combined population of 600 million people (Shawki and D’Amato, 2000, pp. 7-8). In this context of a real (and clearly bipolar) class divide in late capitalist society, the postmodern party is a masquerade ball, in which theories claiming to offer ways toward emancipation and progressive critical practice in fact encourage scholars and/as activists to abandon any commitment to crafting oppositional political blocs with instrumental and perhaps revolutionary potential. Instead, on their arguments, we must recognize agency as an illusion of humanism and settle for playing with our identities in a mood of irony, excess, and profound skepticism. Marx and Engels’ critique of the Young Hegelians applies equally well to the postmodern discursive turn: "They are only fighting against ‘phrases.’ They forget, however, that to these phrases they themselves are only opposing other phrases, and that they are in no way combating the real existing world when they are merely combating the phrases of this world" (1976/1932, p. 41). Of course, the study of "phrases" is important to the project of materialist critique in the field of rhetoric. The point, though, is to explain the connections between phrases on the one hand and economic interests and systems of oppression and exploitation on the other. Marxist ideology critique, understands that classes, motivated by class interest, produce rhetorics wittingly and unwittingly, successfully and unsuccessfully. Those rhetorics are strategically adapted to context and audience.

Yet Marxist theory is not naïve in its understanding of intention or individual agency. Challenging individualist humanism, Marxist ideology critics regard people as "products of circumstances" (and changed people as products of changed circumstances; Marx, 1972b/1888, p. 144).

Within this understanding, Marxist ideology critics can describe and evaluate cultural discourses such as that of racism or sexism as strategic and complex expressions of both their moment in history and of their class basis. Further, this mode of critique seeks to explain both why and how social reality is fundamentally, systematically oppressive and exploitative, exploring not only the surface of discourses but also their often-complex and multi-vocal motivations and consequences. As Burke (1969/1950) notes, Marxism is both a method of rhetorical criticism and a rhetorical formation itself (pp. 109-110). There is no pretense of neutrality or assumption of transcendent position for the critic. Teresa Ebert (1996) summarizes the purpose of materialist ideology critique: Materialist critique is a mode of knowing that inquires into what is not said, into the silences and the suppressed or missing, in order to uncover the concealed operations of power and the socio-economic relations connecting the myriad details and representations of our lives. It shows that apparently disconnected zones of culture are in fact materially linked through the highly differentiated, mediated, and dispersed operation of a systematic logic of exploitation. In sum, materialist critique disrupts ‘what is’ to explain how social differences--specifically gender, race, sexuality, and class--have been systematically produced and continue to operate within regimes of exploitation, so that we can change them. It is the means for producing transformative knowledges. (p. 7)

#### DIVORCING IDEOLOGICAL CRITIQUE FROM ITS RELATIONSHIP TO THE BASE COLLAPSES QUICKLY INTO NOTHING MORE THAN RELATIVISM—IF EVERYTHING IS CONSTRUCTED OR IDEOLOGICAL THAN THERE BECOMES NO BASIS ON WHICH TO JUDGE OR DISCREDIT THE HEGEMONIC FORMS OF CAPITALISM

CLOUD (Prof of Comm at Texas) 2001

[Dana, “The Affirmative Masquerade”, p. online: http://www.acjournal.org/holdings/vol4/iss3/special/cloud.htm //wyo-tjc]

It is difficult to overestimate the influence on critical textual practice across the humanities of poststructuralist scholars, most notably Michel Foucault (1980; see also the three-volume anthology of Foucault’s essential writings by Foucault, Rabinow, and Hurley, 1998, 1999; Foucault, Faubion, Gordon, Rabinow and Hurley, 2000.) Briefly stated, Foucault argues that power ought to be conceived as primarily constituted in discourses, unmotivated by extra-discursive economic or political interests, and emanating not from a discernable, repressive center of power (such as the state or the employer) but rather as a set of shifting discursive formations. On this view, discursive formations do not suppress or mystify social relations but rather establish in and of themselves what is real and true. In my view, Foucaultian poststructuralism is a natural outgrowth of Althusser’s (1960/1984) structuralism, which argued that ideology and its apparatuses (for example the education system, the family) were determining forces in social relations, warranting a reclassification of ideological outlets such as the church and the schools as "state apparatuses" with "relative autonomy" from economic interests and effects. This theory marked a distinctly idealist shift in Marxist thinking. Clegg (1991) argues that as Althusserian (and following him, poststructuralist) Marxists shifted attention away from economic factors and toward ideology, all previous Marxisms were discounted as crudely empiricist and economistic.

With postmodernists and post-Marxists (e.g., Baudrillard, 1975; Deleuze and Guattari, 1987; Laclau and Mouffe, 1985; Lyotard, 1984), the discursive turn is taken to its logical conclusion in arguments that reject economic interests as foundational to understanding society and motivating struggle, in favor of a politics of textuality. As Cloud (1994) has argued, these theories tend toward both idealism and relativism, negating the possibilities of demystifying a dominant ideology or establishing criteria for judgment--for example, between the competing rhetorical truths of socialism and fascism--and action. In other words, without some idea of the reality of the exploitation of workers, the oppression of women and racialized minorities, and so forth, one has no basis for declaring a progressive political program more emancipatory and faithful to the interests of ordinary people than the racist scapegoating and appeals to order and unity of a fascistic one.

#### NEXT, THE DETERMINISM OF CAPITAL IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE INSTRUMENTALIZATION OF ALL LIFE—IT IS THIS LOGIC THAT MOBILIZES AND ALLOWS FOR THE 1AC’S SCENARIOS IN THE FIRST PLACE

DYER-WITHERFORD (professor of Library and Info. Sciences at the U of Western Ontario) 1999   
[Nick. Cyber Marx: Cycles and Circuits of Struggle in High Technology Capitalism.]

For capitalism, the use of machines as organs of “will over nature” is an imperative. The great insight of the Frankfurt School—an insight subsequently improved and amplified by feminists and ecologists—was that capital’s dual project of dominating both humanity and nature was intimately tied to the cultivation of “instrumental reason” that systematically objectifies, reduces, quantifies and fragments the world for the purposes of technological control. Business’s systemic need to cheapen labor, cut the costs of raw materials, and expand consumer markets gives it an inherent bias toward the piling-up of technological power. This priority—enshrined in phrases such as “progress,” “efficiency,” “productivity,” “modernization,” and “growth”—assumes an automatism that is used to override any objection or alternative, regardless of the environmental and social consequences. Today, we witness global vistas of toxification, deforestation, desertification, dying oceans, disappearing ozone layers, and disintegrating immune systems, all interacting in ways that perhaps threaten the very existence of humanity and are undeniably inflicting social collapse, disease, and immiseration across the planet. The degree to which this project of mastery has backfired is all too obvious.

#### OBSERVATION THREE: Put the ‘Fun’ Back in Fundamentals

#### Vote Negative to validate and adopt the method of structural/historical criticism that is the 1NC.

#### THIS IS NOT THE ALTERNATIVE, BUT IN TRUTH THE ONLY OPTION— METHOD IS THE FOREMOST POLITICAL QUESTION BECAUSE ONE MUST UNDERSTAND THE EXISTING SOCIAL TOTALITY BEFORE ONE CAN ACT ON IT—GROUNDING THE SITES OF POLITICAL CONTESTATION OR KNOWLEDGE OUTSIDE OF LABOR AND SURPLUS VALUE MERELY SERVE TO HUMANIZE CAPITAL AND PREVENT A TRANSITION TO A SOCIETY BEYOND OPPRESSION

TUMINO (Prof. English @ Pitt) 2001

[Stephen, “What is Orthodox Marxism and Why it Matters Now More than Ever”, Red Critique, p. online //wyo-tjc]

Any effective political theory will have to do at least two things: it will have to offer an integrated understanding of social practices and, based on such an interrelated knowledge, offer a guideline for praxis. My main argument here is that among all contesting social theories now, only Orthodox Marxism has been able to produce an integrated knowledge of the existing social totality and provide lines of praxis that will lead to building a society free from necessity. But first I must clarify what I mean by Orthodox Marxism. Like all other modes and forms of political theory, the very theoretical identity of Orthodox Marxism is itself contested—not just from non-and anti-Marxists who question the very "real" (by which they mean the "practical" as under free-market criteria) existence of any kind of Marxism now but, perhaps more tellingly, from within the Marxist tradition itself. I will, therefore, first say what I regard to be the distinguishing marks of Orthodox Marxism and then outline a short polemical map of contestation over Orthodox Marxism within the Marxist theories now. I will end by arguing for its effectivity in bringing about a new society based not on human rights but on freedom from necessity. I will argue that to know contemporary society—and to be able to act on such knowledge—one has to first of all know what makes the existing social totality. I will argue that the dominant social totality is based on inequality—not just inequality of power but inequality of economic access (which then determines access to health care, education, housing, diet, transportation, . . . ). This systematic inequality cannot be explained by gender, race, sexuality, disability, ethnicity, or nationality. These are all secondary contradictions and are all determined by the fundamental contradiction of capitalism which is inscribed in the relation of capital and labor. All modes of Marxism now explain social inequalities primarily on the basis of these secondary contradictions and in doing so—and this is my main argument—legitimate capitalism. Why? Because such arguments authorize capitalism without gender, race, discrimination and thus accept economic inequality as an integral part of human societies. They accept a sunny capitalism—a capitalism beyond capitalism. Such a society, based on cultural equality but economic inequality, has always been the not-so-hidden agenda of the bourgeois left—whether it has been called "new left," "postmarxism," or "radical democracy." This is, by the way, the main reason for its popularity in the culture industry—from the academy (Jameson, Harvey, Haraway, Butler,. . . ) to daily politics (Michael Harrington, Ralph Nader, Jesse Jackson,. . . ) to. . . . For all, capitalism is here to stay and the best that can be done is to make its cruelties more tolerable, more humane. This humanization (not eradication) of capitalism is the sole goal of ALL contemporary lefts (marxism, feminism, anti-racism, queeries, . . . ). Such an understanding of social inequality is based on the fundamental understanding that the source of wealth is human knowledge and not human labor. That is, wealth is produced by the human mind and is thus free from the actual objective conditions that shape the historical relations of labor and capital. Only Orthodox Marxism recognizes the historicity of labor and its primacy as the source of all human wealth. In this paper I argue that any emancipatory theory has to be founded on recognition of the priority of Marx's labor theory of value and not repeat the technological determinism of corporate theory ("knowledge work") that masquerades as social theory.

#### Risk of a link means you vote negative--the process of enchantment refuses to deal with reality in a practical way and endorses forms of play. The aff risks annihilation of the subject by refusing to acknowledge the existence of what remains painful, dangerous and problematic in society.

Saraka in 2002

(Sean, doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science at York University in Toronto, Canada, Review of Jane Bennett (2001) The Enchantment of Modern Life: Attachments, Crossings, and Ethics, http://culturemachine.tees.ac.uk/Reviews/rev27.htm)

Bennett’s optimism courts complacency here and elsewhere in The Enchantment of Modern Life, and this appears to arise from a more of less fixed conception of subjectivity latent in her work. While Bennett heartily endorses encounters and crossings of all kinds, she presents these principally as forms of play. In so doing, she imputes a kind of reversibility to such choices between worldviews and ways of being that is not always the case, and this suggests - to me, at least - that latent in Bennett arguments is more or less modernist conception of the subject, an unified subject who, at base, remains somehow unchanged through life’s experiences and transformations, for whom extreme experiences of one kind or another may be often chosen at will, and always taken in stride. This subtext furnishes a sense of security that Bennett’s forbears have not always shared. As Foucault explains, ‘My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous…’ (Foucault, 1984: 343). The kind of experimentation that Bennett recommends also risks the annihilation of the subject, and this itself can form a basis for the most powerful affirmations. In conclusion, then, Bennett advances a persuasive and suggestive argument for a reassessment of the place of enchantment in modern life, one that represents an important turn in postcontemporary Anglo-American social and political thought. Yet what limits the effectiveness of Bennett’s argument is not so much her optimism as her reluctance to simultaneously affirm the existence of what remains painful, dangerous, or problematic in life and society. Bennett’s reluctance underscores the ambiguous relationship of her conception of enchantment to conventional, critical social theory, and suggests an unnecessarily limited conception of affirmation itself. Nevertheless, Bennett makes an excellent case for a new appreciation of enchantment and the broader role of emotions in contemporary social theory.

#### Fellow-feeling or compassion are impossible under a capitalist logic that monetizes all life, enabling the worst atrocities imaginable

Joel **Kovel**, Alger Hiss Professor, Social Studies, Bard College, THE ENEMY OF NATURE: THE END OF CAPITALISM OR THE END OF THE WORLD, 20**02**, p. 141.

Capital produces egoic relations, which reproduce capital. The isolated selves of the capitalist order can choose to become personifications of capital, or may have the role thrust upon them. In either case, they embark upon a pattern of non-recognition mandated by the fact that the almighty dollar interposes itself between all elements of experience: all things in the world, all other persons, and between the self and its world: nothing really exists except in and through monetization. This set-up provides an ideal culture medium for the bacillus of competition and ruthless self-maximization. Because money is all that ‘counts’, a peculiar heartlessness characterizes capitalists, a tough-minded and cold abstraction that will sacrifice species, whole continents (viz. Africa) or inconvenient sub-sets of the population (viz. black urban males) who add too little to the great march of surplus value or may be seen as standing in its way The presence of value screens out genuine fellow-feeling or compassion, replacing it with the calculus of profit-expansion. Never has a holocaust been carried out so impersonally When the Nazis killed their victims, the crimes were accom­panied by a racist drumbeat; for global capital, the losses are regrettable necessities.

# 2nc

#### Queer theory undermines capacity for social change – identity and structural focus are necessary for meaningful resistance

Max Kirsch, professor of comparative studies at Florida Atlantic University, Queer Theory and Social Change, 2000, p. 42

Because much of Queer theory confuses personal action with structural power, it asserts the primacy of the first or individual aspect, while ignoring its determinants. On an interpersonal level, we can demand and expect to be treated as equals, capable of determining our own fate. But resistance to structural power requires the more concerted energy of collective action. To analyze aspects of interpersonal power and politics in isolation from the larger structural concerns and barriers they confront denies the agency of the individual in the social. For our purposes, sexuality and gender are “site[s] of power” (Weeks, 1985: 176), and as such they need to be situated in place and time. The movements of the 1960s and 1970s located personal decision in the realm of the political. But it is in the discussion of what level of politics is being brought to the forefront that Queer theory has failed to make inroads, and this has worked against this essential element of political relationships. While certain Queer theorists celebrate difference and see the refusal to identify as a radical act (cf. esp. Butler, 1991; 1994), we can see that these assertions are supportive of the same ideal of the individual as self that capitalism has created. It attempts to take the logical effect and material consequence of the captialist system, the reified individual, and use it to rectify inequality. Queer theory needs to account for the difference between the “self” and the “individual” in much the same way that it needs to inorporate “postomodernity” into the realm of the postmodern A perception that we can reject binary systems of gender without rejecting all bases for identity, however temporary they may be, is necessary for true resistance and social change. We cannot fight alone, not against a world system with military power and the ever-present threat of force and economic destruction. If “all things queer,” then, is to become anything more than a novel digestion of difference, it must include the individual as more than the self as text. It must accommodate the individual in society.

#### Queer theories fragmentation of subjectivity works in collusion with late capitalism

Max Kirsch, PhD Florida Atlantic University, “Queer Theory, Late Capitalism and Internalized Homophobia,” Journal of Homosexuality, Harrington Park Press, Vol. 52, No. 1/2, 2006, pp. 19-45

Jameson has proposed that the concept of alienation in late capitalism has been replaced with fragmentation (1991, p.14). Fragmentation highlights the it also becomes more abstract: What we must now ask ourselves is whether it is precisely this semi-autonomy of the cultural sphere that has been destroyed by the logic of late capitalism. Yet to argue that culture is today no longer endowed with the relative autonomy is once enjoyed as one level among others in earlier moments of capitalism (let alone in precapitalist societies) is not necessarily to imply its disappearance or extinction. Quite the contrary; we must go on to affirm that the autonomous sphere of culture throughout the social realm, to the point at which everything in our social life–from economic value and state power to practices and to the very structure of the psyche itself–can be said to have become ‘cultural’ in some original and yet untheorized sense. This proposition is, however, substantially quite consistent with the previous diagnosis of a society of the image or simulacrum and a transformation of the “real” into so many pseudoevents. (Jameson, 1991, p. 48) The fragmentation of social life repeats itself in the proposal that sexuality and gender are separate and autonomous from bureaucratic state organization. If, as in Jameson’s terms, differences can be equated, then this should not pose a problem for the mobilization of resistance to inequality. However, as postmodernist and poststructuralist writers assume a position that this equation is impossible and undesirable, then the dominant modes of power will prevail without analysis or opposition. The danger, of course, is that while we concentrate on decentering identity, we succeed in promoting the very goals of global capitalism that work against the formation of communities or provide the means to destroy those that already exist, and with them, any hope for political action. For those who are not included in traditional sources of community building–in particular, kinship based groupings–the building of an “affectional community . . . must be as much a part of our political movement as are campaigns for civil rights” (Weeks, 1985, p. 176). This **building of communities requires identification**. If we cannot recognize traits that form the bases of our relationships with others, how then can communities be built? **The preoccupation** of Lyotard and Foucault, as examples, **with the overwhelming power of “master narratives,” posits a conclusion that emphasizes individual resistance and that ironically, ends up reinforcing the “narrative” itself**.

#### MICROPOLITICS CAN ALWAYS CARVE OUT MYOPIC VICTORIES IN THE MARGIN WHILE CAPITALISM GOES ON DESTROYING EVERYTHING

MESZAROS (Prof. Emeritus @ Univ. Sussex) 1995

[Istavan, Beyond Capital: Towards a Theory of Transition, p. 189 // wyo]

By the same token, to envisage the articulation and sustainable internal functioning of the capital system’s ‘microcosms’ on the basis of substantive equality is not less problematical. For to do so would require either to assume the existence of a totally different — harmonious — comprehensive socioeconomic ‘macrocosm’, or to postulate the my4sterious transformation of the hypostatized truly egalitarian ‘micro-structures’ into an antagonistic whole. Indeed the latter would bring with it the additional complication of having to explain how it is possible to secure the simultaneous reproduction of the antagonistic whole and its antagonism-free constituent parts. Isolated couples may be able to (and undoubtedly do) order their personal relationships on a truly egalitarian basis. There are in existence in contemporary society even utopian enclaves of communally interacting groups of people who can lay claim to being involved in humanly fulfilling and non-hierarchical interpersonal relations and a way of bringing up children in forms very different from the nuclear family and its splinters, But neither type of personal relations can become historically dominant within the framework of capital’s social metabolic control. For under the prevailing circumstances the ‘ubergefreindes Moment’ is that the reproductive ‘microcosms’ must be able to cohere in a comprehensive whole which cannot conceivably function on the basis of substantive equality. The smallest reproductive ‘microcosms’ must deliver without failing their share in the exercise of the overall social metabolic functions which include not only the biological reproduction of the species and the orderly transmission of property from one generation to the other. It is no less important in this respect their key role in the reproduction of the value system of the established social reproductive order which happens to be—and cannot help being —totally inimical to the principle of substantive equality. By concentrating too much on the property-transmission aspect of the family and the legal system linked to it, even Engels tends to paint a highly idealized picture of the proletarian household, discovering non-existent equality in it.

#### FOCUSING ON DISCOURSE ALONE MAKES THE CONCEPT OF RHETORIC MEANINGLESS—RHETORIC FUNCTIONS IN A LARGE CONTEXT

McGee 82,

(Michael, Prof of Rhetoric @ Univ. of Iowa, “A Materialist’s Conception of Rhetoric,” http://www.mcgees.net/fragments/essays/front%20burner/materialists01.htm)

Reconstruction *of the whole phenomenon*, it seems to me, is a *prius* to an accounting of the rhetorical, for it is the whole of "speaker/speech/audience/occasion/change" which impinges on us: to confuse rhetoric with a discourse is the same error as confounding fallout with nuclear explosion. Traditional ideal conceptions of rhetoric not only make it possible to equate the terms "rhetoric" and "discourse," they can encourage such confusion by falsely suggesting an inverse relationship between the two terms. Thus, for example, it is often said that rhetoric is a type or genre of discourse distinct from philosophy, poetry or scientific discourse. As we busy ourselves trying to locate an exclusionary principle with which generically to mark out rhetorical discourses, we too often forget that there is no type of discourse which cannot function as "speech" in a material rhetoric. If we can say that all distinguishable forms of discourse may function rhetorically, we are thereby suggesting that rhetoric is greater than a discourse; "rhetorical" is a quality of discourse derived from the discourse's presence and function within the larger phenomenon "rhetoric."

#### THE NARRATIVIZATION OF POLITICS IS INHERENTLY CONSERVATIVE—IT IS THE EMBRACE OF CAPITALIST EXCESS AND DESTROYS ANY ATTEMPT TO RESIST OR OPPOSE CAPITALISM ON ANY GROUNDS\*\*

FOSTER (Dept of Sociology at Oregon) 1997

[John Bellamy, “In Defense of History”, In Defense of History, ed. Foster & Wood //wyo-tjc]

The weaknesses of postmodernism-from an emancipatory perspective- thus far overshadow its strengths. Missing from Foucault's analysis, like that of postmodernism generally, is any conception of a counter-order to the disciplinary orders described. In the more extreme case of "textual postmodernists"-those postmodernist thinkers like Derrida, as distinct from Foucault, who deny any reality outside the text-the political and historical weaknesses from a left perspective are even more glaring. By undermining the very concept of history-in any meaningful sense beyond mere story-telling-such theorists have robbed critical analysis of what has always been its most indispensable tool.'8 The denial within postmodernist theory of the validity of historical cri- tique covers up what is really at issue: the denial of the historical critique of capitalism, leading to a convergence between left thought infected by Nietzsche and the dominant liberal "end of history" conception. The danger of such ahistorical or anti-historical views, as E.P. Thompson observed, is that one loses sight not of "reason in history" in some abstract sense, but rather of "the reasons of power and the reasons of money."9 Historical materialism at its best provides a way out of this dilemma. This is not to ignore the fact that Marxism-which has sometimes given rise to its own crude interpretations and historical travesties, as in the case of Stalinism-has frequently been identified with the kind of "totalizations" and "essentialisms" that postmodernist theorists have singled out. As Thompson pointed out in a 1977 essay on Christopher Caudwell, Marxism has sometimes relied on " `essentialist' tricks of mind," the "tendency to intellectualize the social process"-"the rapid delineation of the deep proc- ess of a whole epoch." These are things that the historian (and social scientists in general) should guard against. But to abandon theory and historical explanation entirely in order to avoid "essentialism" and "foun- dationalism" is a bit like throwing out the baby in order to keep the bathwater clean. Marx himself provided another model, actively opposing theory (even "Marxist" theory) that purported to be "suprahistorical." In his Theses on Feuerbach, he presented what still ranks as the most thorough- going critique of what he called the "essentialist" conception of human beings and nature. Indeed, historical materialism has long engaged in its own self-critique, precisely in order to expel the kinds of "essentialisms," "positivisms," and "structuralisms" that have intruded on the philosophy of praxis itself-a self-critique that has produced the insights of theorists like Gramsci, Sartre, Thompson, and Raymond Williams.20 These thinkers distanced themselves from the positivistic "official Marx- ism" that grew out of the Second International and later turned into a caricature of itself in the form of Stalinism. Yet they held firm to the critique of capitalism and their commitment to the struggles of the oppressed. Moreover, these particular examples tell us that if what has sometimes been called "the postmodern agenda"-consisting of issues like identity, culture, and language-is to be addressed at all, this can only be accomplished within a historical context. And here one might openly wonder with Foucault "what difference there could ultimately be between being a historian and being a Marxist." When placed within a more holistic historical materialist context-ani- mated by the concept of praxis-the problems raised by postmodernism look entirely different. As David McNally says, "Language is not a prison- house, but a site of struggle." What the contributions in this volume have in common is the insistence that issues like language, culture, nationality, race, gender, the environment, revolution, and history itself are only effec- tively analyzed within a context that is simultaneously historical in charac- ter, materialist (in the sense of focusing on concrete practices), and revolutionary. Such analyses do not abandon the hope of transcending capitalism, nor of the notion of human progress as a possible outcome of historical strug- gles. It is said that Nicholas I, Czar of Russia, issued an order banning the word "progress." Today we no longer believe, in a nineteenth century sense, in automatic human progress, embodying some definite content-the idea that the Czar found so threatening. But this does not mean, as the philoso- pher Michael Oakeshott contended with respect to political activity in the 1950s, that we "sail a boundless and bottomless sea" that has "neither starting-point nor appointed direction" and that our only task is "to keep afloat on an even keel." History-as centuries of struggle and indeed pro- gress suggest-is more meaningful than that. To abandon altogether the concept of progress, in the more general sense of the possibility of progres- sive human emancipation, would only be to submit to the wishes of the powers that be. Such political disengagement by intellectuals on the left in the present epoch could only mean one thing: the total obeisance to capi- tal.21 The irony of post-modernism is that while purporting to have transcended modernity, it abandons from the start all hope of transcending capitalism itself and entering a post-capitalist era. Postmodernist theory is therefore easily absorbed within the dominant cultural frame and has even given rise recently to texts such as Postmodern Marketing, which attempts to utilize the insights of thinkers like Foucault, Derrida, Lyotard, and Baudillard to market goods within a capitalist economy. Perhaps this will be the final destiny of postmodernist theory-its absorption by the vast marketing apparatus of the capitalist economy, adding irony and color to a commercial order that must constantly find new ways to insinuate itself into the every- day lives of the population. Meanwhile, historical materialism will remain the necessary intellectual ground for all those who seek, not to revel in the "carnival" of capitalist productive and market relations, but to transcend them.22

#### TWO LINKS: THEIR FRAGMENTED METHOD OF ANALYSIS AND RELIANCE ON IDENTITY, DIFFERENCE AND PARTICULARISM DESTROYS UNIVERSAL IDENTIFICATION AGAINST CAPITALISM. MORE IMPORTANTLY, THIS METHOD REFLECTS THEIR EMBRACE OF CONSUMERIST FREEDOM AND THE MARKETPLACE OF LIFESTYLES\*\*

WOOD(Editor of Monthly Review) 1997

[Ellen Meiksins, “What is the Postmodern Agenda?”, In Defense of History, ed. Foster & Wood //wyo-tjc]

How, then, does this postmodernism compare to earlier theories about the end of the "modern" era? What is immediately striking is that postmod- ernism, which seems to combine so many features of older diagnoses of epochal decline, is remarkably unconscious of its own history. In their conviction that what they say represents a radical rupture with the past, today's postmodernist intellectuals seem sublimely oblivious to everything that has been said so many times before, Even the epistemological scepti- cism, the assault on universal truths and values, the questioning of self- identity, which are so much a part of the current intellectual fashions, have a history as old as philosophy. More particularly, the postmodern sense of epochal novelty depends on ignoring, or denying, one overwhelming his- torical reality, the "totalizing" unity of capitalism which has bound together all the epochal ruptures of the twentieth century. This brings us to the most distinctive characteristic of the new postmod- ernists: despite their insistence on epochal differences and specificities, despite their claims to have exposed the historicity of all values and knowl- edges (or precisely because of their insistence on "difference" and the fragmented nature of reality and human knowledge), they are remarkably insensitive to history. This insensitivity is revealed not least in a deafness to the reactionary echoes of their attacks on "Enlightenment" values and their fundamental irrationalism. Here, then, is one major difference between the current enunciations of epochal change and all the others. Earlier theories were based-by defini- tion-on some particular conception of history, and were predicated on the importance of historical analysis. C. Wright Mills, for example, insisted that the crisis of reason and freedom which marked the onset of the postmodern age represented "structural problems, and to state them requires that we work in the classic terms of human biography and epochal history. Only in such terms can the connections of structure and milieux that affect these values today be traced and causal analysis be conducted." Mills also took it for granted, in classic Enlightenment fashion, that the whole point of such historical analysis was to mark out the space of human freedom and agency, to formulate our choices and "enlarge the scope of human decisions in the making of history." And for all his pessimism, he assumed that the limits of historical possibility were, in his time, "very broad indeed."6 This statement is in nearly every particular antithetical to current post- modernist theories, which effectively deny the very existence of structure or structural connections and the very possibility of "causal analysis." Structures and causes have been replaced by fragments and contingencies. There is no such thing as a social system (e.g. the capitalist system) with its own systemic unity and "laws of motion." There are only many different kinds of power, oppression, identity, and "discourse." Not only do we have to reject the old "grand narratives," like Enlightenment concepts of pro- gress, we have to give up any idea of intelligible historical process and causality, and with it, evidently, any idea of "making history." There are no structured processes accessible to human knowledge (or, it must be sup- posed, to human action). There are only anarchic, disconnected, and inex- plicable differences. For the first time, we have what appears to be a contradiction in terms: a theory of epochal change based on a denial of history. There is one other especially curious thing about the current postmod- ernism, one particularly notable paradox. On the one hand, the denial of history on which it is based is associated with a kind of political pessimism. Since there are no systems and no history susceptible to causal analysis, we cannot get to the root of the many powers that oppress us; and we certainly cannot aspire to some kind of united opposition, some kind of general human emancipation, or even a general contestation of capitalism, of the kind that socialists used to believe in. The most we can hope for is a lot of particular and separate resistances. On the other hand, this political pessimism appears to have its origins in a rather optimistic view of capitalist prosperity and possibility. For today's postrnodernism (typically embraced, as we have seen, by survivors of the "sixties generation" and their students), with its view of the world still rooted in the "golden age" of capitalism, the dominant feature of the capitalist system is "consumerism," the multiplicity of consumption pat- terns, and the proliferation of "life-styles." Even the postmodernist em- phasis on language and "discourse" may be traceable to an obsession with consumer capitalism and to the conviction, already prominent in the sixties, that the old political agencies (the labor movement in par- ticular) have been permanently "hegemonized" by capitalist consumer- ism. Postmodernism has simply taken to the ultimate, and often absurd, extreme the familiar attempt to replace these hegemonized agencies with new ones, by situating intellectual practice at the center of the social universe and promoting intellectuals-or, more particularly, academ- ics-to the vanguard of historical agency. Here too postmodernist intellectuals reveal their fundamental ahistori- cism. The structural crises of capitalism since the "golden" moment of the postwar boom seem to have passed them right by, or at least to have made no significant theoretical impression. For some, this means that the oppor- tunities for opposition to capitalism are severely limited. Others seem to be saying that, if we can't really change or even understand the system (or even think about it as a system at all), and if we don't, and can't, have a vantage point from which to criticize the system, let alone oppose it, we might as well lie back and enjoy it-or better still, go shopping. Exponents of these intellectual trends certainly know that all is not well; but there is very little in these fashions that helps, for example, to make sense of today's increasing poverty and homelessness, the growing class of working poor, new forms of insecure and part-time labor, and so on. Both sides of the twentieth century's ambiguous history-both its horrors and its wonders-have no doubt played a part in forming the postmodernist con- sciousness; but the horrors that have undermined the old idea of progress are less important in defining the distinctive nature of today's postmod- ernism than are the wonders of modern technology and the riches of consumer capitalism. Postmodernism sometimes looks like the ambiguities of capitalism as seen from the vantage point of those who enjoy its benefits rather more than they suffer its costs. In the final analysis, "postmodernity" for postmodernist intellectuals seems to be not a historical moment but the human condition itself, from which there is no escape. If for Mills the central problem of his age was that cheerful robots could no longer be relied on to possess an urge for freedom or a will to reason, the new postmodernists themselves display the very attitudes lamented by Mills. They even regard those threatened Enlighten- ment values as the root of modern evils and have openly rejected them as intrinsically oppressive. To put it another way, postmodernism is no longer the diagnosis. It has become the disease.

#### Risk of a link means you vote negative--the process of enchantment refuses to deal with reality in a practical way and endorses forms of play. The aff risks annihilation of the subject by refusing to acknowledge the existence of what remains painful, dangerous and problematic in society.

Saraka in 2002

(Sean, doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science at York University in Toronto, Canada, Review of Jane Bennett (2001) The Enchantment of Modern Life: Attachments, Crossings, and Ethics, http://culturemachine.tees.ac.uk/Reviews/rev27.htm)

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#### THE PROBLEMS OF GENDER VIOLENCE AND OPPRESSION ARE, AT ROOT, PRODUCTS OF CAPITAL’S OVERARCHING CONTRADICTIONS. TURNING TO THE STATE AS A MEANS OF ‘PROTECTING’ WOMEN’S CIVIL RIGHTS MERELY ABSTRACTS AND DESTROYS CONSCIOUSNESS OF VIOLENCE’S CONNECTION TO CAPITAL

COTTER 2002

[Jennifer, nqa, “War and Domestic Violence”, Red Critique, Sept/Oct, p. online //wyo-tjc]

The dominant discourses—from the Bush Administration and the corporate press, to the cultural "left" and transnational feminism—represent the root issue of freedom for women from economic inequality, social injustice, and violence to rest on matters of the "state" and whether women's relationship to it should be viewed from the standpoint of "national security" or "civil rights". Contemporary feminism has itself been consumed by these issues and feminists have become deeply divided over whether the state should be understood as a sight of "recuperation" or "resistance" for women. As evidenced in such books as Cynthia Daniels' Feminists Negotiate the State: The Politics of Domestic Violence, domestic violence in contemporary feminism is largely considered to be an issue of "state power" grounded in "protection" of individuals by the state from the conditions that enable domestic violence versus "civil citizenship" defined as "the right to bodily integrity" and a woman's right to choose (Daniels 3). The "core issues" for contemporary feminism have thus been: whether the "state" should intervene on behalf of women to protect them from domestic violence or whether this further "victimizes" women by denying them their civil rights to "individual" freedom from "state regulation". Another symptom of this logic is the current reduction, in contemporary feminism, of global violence against women to a question of the "veil" and whether, as right-wing advocates and liberal feminists alike argue, the United States has an "obligation" to free the women of Afghanistan and the Islamic diaspora from the veil or whether, as transnational feminists have argued, this denies the "resistant agency" of the women who wear the veil. What feminism has largely turned toward as a way out of this impasse is the eclectic position that Daniels offers: that is, that women must "negotiate" between "state power" and "civil citizenship" to resolve the problem of domestic violence. In short, the "state" must be read simultaneously as a site of "recuperation" and "resistant agency". However, this eclectic approach to violence against women is founded upon an increasingly problematic understanding of "rights" and the "state" which abstracts them from private ownership of the means of production. By explaining the "root problem" of violence against women, from war to domestic violence, as a matter of "state power" and not "exploitation" in private property relations, these theories serve as a most effective ally of transnational capitalism. They quietly support the existing social relations of production by seeking "solutions" in the social relations of reproduction, to the class contradictions that stem from private property in production. Moreover, by putting forward "civil citizenship" as the basis of "agency" for women against the limits of the "state", contemporary feminists suppress the need for social citizenship founded on collective ownership and control of the means of production. What an analysis of both approaches reveals, however, is that "war", "domestic violence", and their relation to each other are not, at root, a matter of "rights" and "reproduction" but of class and labor, and as such they are the effect of the social relations of production.

### 2NC A2 Permutation (General)

#### THE AFF MAY TALK A GOOD GAME ON THE PERMUTATION, BUT THEIR APROPRIATION IS MERELY AN ATTEMPT TO DISARM MARXISM OF ITS RADICAL POTENTIAL AS WELL AS MASKING THE FUNDAMENTAL CONTRADICTION OF SURPLUS-LABOR—THIS IS WHY YOU CANNOT PERMUTE A METHOD—IT STRIPS OUT ALL OF THE CONCEPTUAL THEORY THAT ALLOWS US TO BOTH UNDERSTAND THE WORLD AND TO CREATE A PRAXIS TO END OPPRESSION.

TUMINO (Prof. English @ Pitt) 2001

[Stephen, “What is Orthodox Marxism and Why it Matters Now More than Ever”, Red Critique, p. online //wyo-tjc]

Orthodox Marxism has become a test-case of the "radical" today. Yet, what passes for orthodoxy on the left—whether like Smith and Zizek they claim to support it, or, like Butler and Rorty they want to "achieve our country" by excluding it from "U.S. Intellectual life" ("On Left Conservatism"), is a parody of orthodoxy which hybridizes its central concepts and renders them into flexodox simulations. Yet, even in its very textuality, however, the orthodox is a resistance to the flexodox. Contrary to the common-sensical view of "orthodox" as "traditional" or "conformist" "opinions," is its other meaning: ortho-doxy not as flexodox "hybridity," but as "original" "ideas." "Original," not in the sense of epistemic "event," "authorial" originality and so forth, but, as in chemistry, in its opposition to "para," "meta," "post" and other ludic hybridities: thus "ortho" as resistance to the annotations that mystify the original ideas of Marxism and hybridize it for the "special interests" of various groups. The "original" ideas of Marxism are inseparable from their effect as "demystification" of ideology—for example the deployment of "class" that allows a demystification of daily life from the haze of consumption. Class is thus an "original idea" of Marxism in the sense that it cuts through the hype of cultural agency under capitalism and reveals how culture and consumption are tied to labor, the everyday determined by the workday: how the amount of time workers spend engaging in surplus-labor determines the amount of time they get for reproducing and cultivating their needs. Without changing this division of labor social change is impossible. Orthodoxy is a rejection of the ideological annotations: hence, on the one hand, the resistance to orthodoxy as "rigid" and "dogmatic" "determinism," and, on the other, its hybridization by the flexodox as the result of which it has become almost impossible today to read the original ideas of Marxism, such as "exploitation"; "surplus-value"; "class"; "class antagonism"; "class struggle"; "revolution"; "science" (i.e., objective knowledge); "ideology" (as "false consciousness"). Yet, it is these ideas alone that clarify the elemental truths through which theory ceases to be a gray activism of tropes, desire and affect, and becomes, instead, a red, revolutionary guide to praxis for a new society freed from exploitation and injustice. Marx's original scientific discovery was his labor theory of value. Marx's labor theory of value is an elemental truth of Orthodox Marxism that is rejected by the flexodox left as the central dogmatism of a "totalitarian" Marxism. It is only Marx's labor theory of value, however, that exposes the mystification of the wages system that disguises exploitation as a "fair exchange" between capital and labor and reveals the truth about this relation as one of exploitation. Only Orthodox Marxism explains how what the workers sell to the capitalist is not labor, a commodity like any other whose price is determined by fluctuations in supply and demand, but their labor-power—their ability to labor in a system which has systematically "freed" them from the means of production so they are forced to work or starve—whose value is determined by the amount of time socially necessary to reproduce it daily. The value of labor-power is equivalent to the value of wages workers consume daily in the form of commodities that keep them alive to be exploited tomorrow. Given the technical composition of production today this amount of time is a slight fraction of the workday the majority of which workers spend producing surplus-value over and above their needs. The surplus-value is what is pocketed by the capitalists in the form of profit when the commodities are sold. Class is the antagonistic division thus established between the exploited and their exploiters. Without Marx's labor theory of value one could only contest the after effects of this outright theft of social labor-power rather than its cause lying in the private ownership of production. The flexodox rejection of the labor theory of value as the "dogmatic" core of a totalitarian Marxism therefore is a not so subtle rejection of the principled defense of the (scientific) knowledge workers need for their emancipation from exploitation because only the labor theory of value exposes the opportunism of knowledges (ideology) that occult this exploitation. Without the labor theory of value socialism would only be a moral dogma that appeals to the sentiments of "fairness" and "equality" for a "just" distribution of the social wealth that does the work of capital by naturalizing the exploitation of labor under capitalism giving it an acceptable "human face."

#### FOURTH, THE PERMUTATION IS WORSE THAN THE PLAN BECAUSE IT MORE STRONGLY VALIDATES THE ABILITY OF CAPITALISM TO FIX IT’S OWN PROBLEMS—COMPROMISING OUR RADICAL POLITICS THROUGH ANY ARTICULATION OF A SPECIFIC SHORT-TERM DEMANDS COMPLETELY SHORT-CIRCUITS THE ALTERNATIVE

MESZAROS (Prof. Emeritus @ Univ. Sussex) 1995

[Istavan, Beyond Capital: Towards a Theory of Transition, 930// wyo]

THE difficulty is that the ‘moment’ of radical politics is strictly limited by the nature of the crises in question and the temporal determinations of their unfolding. The breach opened up at times of crisis cannot be left open forever and the measures adopted to fill it, from the earliest steps onwards, have their own logic and cumulative impact on subsequent interventions. Furthermore, both the existing socioeconomic structures and their corresponding framework of political institutions tend to act against radical initiatives by their very inertia as soon as the worst moment of the crisis is over and thus it becomes possible to contemplate again ‘the line of least resistance’. And no one can consider ‘radical restructuring’ the line of least resistance, since by its very nature it necessarily involves upheaval and the disconcerting prospect of the unknown. No immediate economic achievement can offer a way out of this dilemma so as to prolong the life-span of revolutionary politics, since such limited economic achievements made within the confines of the old premises — act in the opposite direction by relieving the most pressing crisis symptoms and, as a result, reinforcing the old reproductive mechanism shaken by the crisis. As history amply testifies, at the first sign of ‘recovery’, politics is pushed back Into its traditional role of helping to sustain and enforce the given socio-economic determinations. The claimed ‘recovery’ itself reached on the basis of the ‘well tried economic motivations’, acts as the self-evident ideological justification for reverting to the subservient, routine role of politics, in harmony with the dominant institutional framework. Thus, radical politics can only accelerate its own demise (and thereby shorten, instead of extending as it should, the favourable ‘moment’ of major political intervention) if it consents to define its own scope in terms of limited economic targets which are in fact necessarily dictated by the established socioeconomic structure in crisis.

#### FIFTH, DISADS TO THE PERM—

#### A) PARTICULARISM-- SINGLE ISSUE RESISTANCE IS EASILY CO-OPTED AND MARGINALIZED—LABOR IS THE ONLY ISSUE THAT CANNOT BE INTEGRATED AND DESTROYED BY CAPITAL—THIS UNIVERSAL IS KEY TO UPROOT THE ENTIRE SYSTEM\*\*

MESZAROS (Prof. Emeritus @ Univ. Sussex) 1995

[Istavan, Beyond Capital: Towards a Theory of Transition, 40// wyo]

However, historically/epochally defined non-integrability, no matter how important for the future, cannot guarantee success on its own. Switching the allegiance of disappointed socialists from the working class to so-called ‘new social movements’ (praised now in opposition to, and by discarding altogether the emancipatory potential of, labour) must be considered, therefore, far too premature and naive. Single issue movements, even if they fight for non-integrable causes, can be picked off and marginalized one by one, because they cannot lay claim to representing a coherent and comprehensive alternative to the given order as a mode of social metabolic control and system of societal reproduction. This is what makes focusing on the socialist emancipatory potential of labour more important today than ever before. For labour is not only non-integrable (in contrast to some historically specific political manifestations of labour, like reformist social democracy, which may be rightly characterized as integrable and indeed in the last few decades also completely integrated), but — precisely as the only feasible structural alternative to capital — can provide the comprehensive strategic framework within which all ‘single issue’ emancipatory movements can successfully make their common cause for the survival of humanity.

# 1nr

#### ATTEMPTING TO ESTABLISH CONVENTIONS FOR DISCOURSE IS AN ATTEMPT AT CONSENSUS-BUILDING NOT VIOLENT EXCLUSION

Mary **Dietz**, Professor, Political Science, University of Minnesota, POLITICAL THEORY AND PARTISAN POLITICS, **2K**, p. 123-124.

Habermas's distinction between "pure" communicative action and strategic action raises many difficulties, not the least of which is its adherence to an idealized model of communication that, as Habermas himself acknowledges, does not fit a great deal of everyday social interaction (McCarthy 1991,132). Machiavelli's famous riposte to those thinkers who "have imagined republics and principalities which have never been seen or known to exist in reality" (Machiavelli 1950, 56) seems pertinent here, for the idealized model that Habermas imagines and the distinction that supports it appear boldly to deny the Machia­vellian insight that "how we live is so far removed from how we ought to live, that he who abandons what is done for what ought to be done, will rather learn to bring about his own ruin than his pres­ervation" (56). I will return to this point as it relates to politics later. For now, it is important to underscore that Habermas relies upon the communicative-strategic distinction to do at least two things: first, to show that on the level of linguistics, communicative action enjoys an "originary" priority over strategic and all other modes of linguistic usage, which are themselves "parasitic" (Rasmussen 1990, 38) or "de­rivative" (McCarthy 1991, 133) upon the former.12 Second, on the level of political theory, Habermas introduces the distinction in order to limit the exercise of threats and coercion (or strategic action) by enu­merating a formal-pragmatic system of discursive accountability (or communicative action) that is geared toward human agreement and mutuality. Despite its thoroughly modern accouterments, communica­tive action aims at something like the twentieth-century discourse-equivalent of the chivalric codes of the late Middle Ages; as a normative system it **articulates the conventions of fair and honorable engage­ment between interlocutors**. To be sure, Habermas's concept of com­municative action is neither as refined nor as situationally embedded as were the protocols that governed honorable combat across Euro­pean cultural and territorial boundaries and between Christian knights; but it is nonetheless a (cross-cultural) protocol for all that. The entire framework that Habermas establishes is an attempt to limit human violence by elaborating a code of communicative conduct that is de­signed to hold power in check by channeling it into persuasion, or the "unforced" force of the better argument (Habermas 1993b, 160).^

#### TOPICALITY/FRAMEWORK IS NECESSARY TO DEBATE – WE HAVE TO LIMIT THE MEANING OF WORDS SO WE CAN HAVE EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATION

Garth **Kemerling**, Professor, Philosophy, Newberry College,19**97**, www.philosophypages.com/lg/e05.htm

We've seen that sloppy or misleading use of ordinary language can **seriously limit our ability to** create and **communicate** correct reasoning. As philosopher [John Locke](http://www.philosophypages.com/ph/lock.htm) pointed out three centuries ago, the achievement of human knowledge is often hampered by the use of words without fixed signification. Needless controversy is sometimes produced and perpetuated by an unacknowledged ambiguity in the application of key terms. We can distinguish disputes of three sorts: Genuine disputes involve disagreement about whether or not some specific proposition is true. Since the people engaged in a genuine dispute agree on the meaning of the words by means of which they convey their respective positions, each of them can propose and assess logical arguments that might eventually lead to a resolution of their differences. Merely [verbal disputes](http://www.philosophypages.com/dy/v.htm#verbal), on the other hand, arise entirely from ambiguities in the language used to express the positions of the disputants. A verbal dispute disappears entirely once the people involved arrive at an agreement on the meaning of their terms, since doing so reveals their underlying agreement in belief. Apparently verbal but really genuine disputes can also occur, of course. In cases of this sort, the resolution of every ambiguity only reveals an underlying genuine dispute. Once that's been discovered, it can be addressed fruitfully by appropriate methods of reasoning. We can save a lot of time, sharpen our reasoning abilities, and communicate with each other more effectively if we watch for disagreements about the meaning of words and **try to resolve them whenever we can**. Kinds of Definition The most common way of preventing or eliminating differences in the use of languages is by **agreeing on the** [**definition**](http://www.philosophypages.com/dy/d2.htm#def) **of our terms**. Since these explicit accounts of the meaning of a word or phrase can be offered in distinct contexts and employed in the service of different goals, it's useful to distinguish definitions of several kinds: A [lexical definition](http://www.philosophypages.com/dy/l5.htm#lexi) simply reports the way in which a term is already used within a language community. The goal here is to inform someone else of the accepted meaning of the term, so the definition is more or less correct depending upon the accuracy with which it captures that usage. In these pages, my definitions of technical terms of logic are lexical because they are intended to inform you about the way in which these terms are actually employed within the discipline of logic. At the other extreme, a [stipulative definition](http://www.philosophypages.com/dy/s9.htm#stip) freely assigns meaning to a completely new term, creating a usage that had never previously existed. Since the goal in this case is to propose the adoption of shared use of a novel term, there are no existing standards against which to compare it, and the definition is always correct (though it might fail to win acceptance if it turns out to be inapt or useless). If I now decree that we will henceforth refer to Presidential speeches delivered in French as "glorsherfs," I have made a (probably pointless) stipulative definition. Combining these two techniques is often an effective way to reduce the [vagueness](http://www.philosophypages.com/dy/v.htm#vag) of a word or phrase. These [precising definitions](http://www.philosophypages.com/dy/p7.htm#prec) begin with the lexical definition of a term but then propose to **sharpen it by stipulating more narrow limits on its use**. Here, the lexical part must be correct and the stipulative portion should appropriately reduce the troublesome vagueness. If the USPS announces that "proper notification of a change of address" means that an official form containing the relevant information must be received by the local post office no later than four days prior to the effective date of the change, it has offered a (possibly useful) precising definition.

#### THIS IS NOT A REASON TO VOTE AFFIRMATIVE - RESISTANCE TO THE CONSTRAINTS OF THE TOPIC/DEBATE IS DISCURSIVE EVASION THAT NEUTRALIZES MOST OF THE RELEVANT NEGATIVE GROUND. BY REFUSING TO TAKE A STAND FOR LIMITED DISCOURSE THEY UNDERMINE THE POINT OF JUDGING BETWEEN COMPETITORS IN THE FIRST PLACE

Ruth Lessl **Shively**, Associate Professor, Political Science, Texas A&M University, POLITICAL THEORY AND PARTISAN POLITICS, **2K**, p. 188-189.

This is why the ambiguists need to do more than call for a whole­sale resistance to categories. Because resistance to some categorizations always involves acceptance of others, they need to own up to, and justify, their own choices. If they propose that we choose their version of reality and their favored categorizations, they must give us reasons. If they think we ought to be skeptical ambiguists rather than truth- or harmony-seekers, they must make a case for this prescription. Simply being against established categories is disingenuous when the argu­ment is designed to establish new categories in replace of the old. We are brought back, then, to the issues of rational judgment and persuasion. Earlier I argued that political contest rests on certain un-contested foundations or rational conditions. Here I have added that the policy of anti-categorization rests on certain stable categories of its own. Thus, the subversives are **not free** from the responsibility of choosing and justifying the subversive categories that define and guide them. For once we recognize the inescapability of choosing categories, we see that subversion or any other political project is a matter of choosing the right categories, not of escaping them. Thus, to be truly subversive requires taking a stand: judging what is good and bad, legitimate and illegitimate, allowed and disallowed, in the best sub­versive society. The desire to avoid this sort of judgment is understandable, for it tends to be associated with intolerant and oppressive attitudes and behaviors. And the situations within which we must judge are often dauntingly complex and uncertain. Rarely can we be certain that our judgments are right. Nonetheless, judgments must be made—not only in the develop­ment of political theory, but also in confronting the decisions of every­day political life. Thus, even in the face of great uncertainty and ambiguity, we are compelled to act and, in so doing, to judge what is good and bad, reasonable and unreasonable, and so on. The ambiguity of our situation does nothing, as such, to alter the need for judgment. As John Courtney Murray writes, to say that uncertainty and complexity must keep us from judging or acting is as senseless as a surgeon in the midst of a gastroenterostomy [saying] that the highly complex situation in front of him is so full of paradox ("The patient is at once receiving blood and losing it"), and irony ("Half a stomach will be better than a whole one") and dilemma ("Not too much, nor too little, anesthesia") that all surgical solutions are necessarily am­biguous. (Murray 1960, 283) Political Theory and the Postmodern Politics of Ambiguity The point, of course, is that there is no avoiding judgment and action here, and that in political theory and politics, as in surgery, we are often compelled to deal with the complexities we meet as best we can. Thus, if we must judge, there is no point in trying to avoid the task through a policy of indiscriminate subversion. Our choice is not whether to judge, but whether to judge through open, reasoned argu­ment or not. And the point of this essay has been to say that the former option is best.

#### SSD IS NOT synonymous with saying we can advocate ANYTHING. It is the recognition that learning to argue what we do not believe is the only way to overcome ego-centric fascism in our thought—the willingness to submit yourself to this framework is a PREREQUISITE for critical inquiry

Muir 93

[Star A., Professor of Communication Studies at George Mason, Philosophy and Rhetoric, “A Defense of the Ethics of Contemporary Debate”, p. asp//wyo-tjc]

Values clarification, Stewart is correct in pointing out, does not mean that no values are developed. Two very important values---tolerance and fairness---inhere to a significant degree in the ethics of switch-side debate. A second point about the charge of relativism is that tolerance is related to the development of reasoned moral viewpoints. The willingness to recognize the existence of other views, and to grant alternative positions a degree of credibility, is a value fostered by switch-side debate: Alternately debating both sides of the same question…inculcates a deep-seated attitude of tolerance toward differing points of view. To be forced to debate only one side leads to an ego-identification with that side…the other side in contrast is seen only as something to be discredited. Arguing as persuasively as one can for completely opposing views is one way of giving recognition to the idea that a strong case can generally be made for the views of earnest and intelligent men, however such views may clash with one’s own…Promoting this kind of tolerance is perhaps one of the greatest benefits debating both sides has to offer. The activity should encourage debating both sides of a topic, reasons Thompson, because debaters are “more likely to realize that propositions are bilateral. It is those who fail to recognize this fact who become intolerant, dogmatic, and bigoted.” While Theodore Roosevelt can hardly be said to be advocating bigotry, his efforts to turn out advocates convinced of their rightness is not a position imbued with tolerance. At a societal level, the value of tolerance is more conducive to a fair and open assessment of competing ideas. John Stuart Mill eloquently states the case this way: Complete liberty of contradicting and disproving our opinion is the very condition which justifies us in assuming its truth for purposes of action; and on no other terms can a being with human faculties have any rational assurance of being right….the peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that it is robbing the human race….If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth: if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of the truth, produced by its collision with error. At an individual level, tolerance is related to moral identity via empathic and critical assessments of differing perspectives. Paul posits a strong relationship between tolerance, empathy, and critical thought. Discussing the function of argument in everyday life, he observes that in order to overcome natural tendencies to reason egocentrically and sociocentrically, individuals must gain the capacity to engage self-reflective questioning, to reason dialogically and dialectically, and to “reconstruct alien and opposing belief systems empathically.” Our system of beliefs is, by definition, irrational when we are incapable of abandoning a belief for rational reasons; that is, when we egocentrically associate our beliefs with our own integrity. Paul describes an intimate relationship between private inferential habits, moral practices, and the nature of argumentation. Critical thought and moral identity, he urges, must be predicated on discovering the insights of opposing views and the weaknesses of our own beliefs. Role playing, he reasons, is a central element of any effort to gain such insight. Only an activity that requires the defense of both sides of an issue, moving beyond acknowledgement to exploration and advocacy, can engender such powerful role playing. Reding explains that “debating both sides is a special instance of role-playing,” where debaters are forced to empathize on a constant basis with a position contrary to their own. This role playing, Baird agrees, is an exercise in reflective thinking, an engagement in problem solving that exposes weaknesses and strengths. Motivated by the knowledge that they may debate against their own case, debaters constantly pose arguments and counter-arguments for discussion, erecting defenses and then challenging these defenses with a different tact. Such conceptual flexibility, Paul argues is essential for effective critical thinking, and in turn for the development of a reasoned moral identity. A final point about relativism is that switch-side debate encourages fairness and equality of opportunity in evaluating competing values. Initially, it is apparent that a priori fairness is a fundamental aspect of games and gamesmanship. Players in the game should start out with equal advantage, and the rules should be construed throughout to provide no undue advantage to one side or the other. Both sides, notes Thompson, should have an equal about of time and a fair chance to present their arguments. Of critical importance, he insists, is an equality of opportunity. Equality of opportunity is manifest throughout many debate procedures and norms. On the question of topicality----whether the affirmative plan is an example of the stated topic----the issue of “fair ground” for debate is explicitly developed as a criterion for decision. Likewise, when a counterplan is offered against an affirmative plan, the issue of coexistence, or of the “competitiveness” of the plans, frequently turns on the fairness of the affirmative team’s suggested “permutation” of the plans. In these and other issues, the value of fairness, and of equality of opportunity, is highlighted and clarified through constant disputation. The point is simply that debate does teach values, and that these values are instrumental in providing a hearing for alternative points of view. Paying explicit attention to decision criteria, and to division of ground arguments (a function of competition), effectively renders the value structure pluralistic, rather than relativistic.

### Impact: Clash

#### DEBATING ABOUT THE PLAN PROMPTS GOOD DECISION-MAKING AND CLASH

Narahiku **Inoue**, PhD, Kyushu University, Debate—A Process of Inquiry and Advocacy, **2K**, http://www.rc.kyushu-u.ac.jp/%7Einouen/debate-text.html

There are many reasons why people debate.  The most important reason is to make a best possible decision about a plan.  How can we arrive at the best decision?  We want to hear a best possible defense of the plan and best possible attack against the plan before we decide.  If someone tries his best to find reasons for the plan and another tries her best to find reasons against the plan, we will be able to hear good information for our decision.  If they try to attack and defend each other's arguments, we will be able to hear better reasons for our decision.

### 2NC A2 “Limits=exclusion”

#### Explorations of subjectivity and inclusion rely on a safe space in which participants can trust they will be listened to within reasonable parameters-absent these limits, trust is effaced and citizens refuse to engage due to fear of chaos and violence

Glover 10

[Robert, Professor of Political Science at University of Connecticut, Philosophy and Social Criticism, “Games without Frontiers?: Democratic Engagement, Agonistic Pluralism, and the Question of Exclusion”, Vol. 36, p. asp uwyo//amp]

While dissociative agonism tends to focus on the ineradicability of power relations in democratic life as well as the enduring presence of hegemony within the political, associative agonism subtly shifts the emphasis. Contra Mouffe and others, associative agonism does accept that there will be limits to pluralism—i.e. there will be identities, practices, and democratic discourse which will have to be excluded from politics—yet they ‘ insist that we often do not know with assurance what those limits will be .’ 81 Thus, the focus shifts from the ineradicability 19 of limits to a focus on how we negotiate difference, multiplicity, and plurality. Due to this, associative agonists tend to advance a much more demanding set of agonistic virtues than the dissociative agonists. Through these virtues, we are to address the paradoxical fact that, though radical difference is unsettling and may provoke resentment, it is the very means through which we constitute our own identity.Furthermore, while recognizing that the ‘identities and identifications’ we bring topolitical life ‘are not stable…’ associative agonism recognizes that, ‘…in the absence of resistance to them, they could be stabilized.’ 82 The task becomes to create agonistic spaces in which we define our own identity, we craft our own subjectivity. Associative agonists recognize that such an un-tethered and performative political arena involves a certain trust that contentious negotiation of difference does not devolve into chaos, violence, and conflict. Above all, the associative agonistic conception seeks to imbue in agonistic citizens an ‘openness to listen to those who appear to us to be unreasonable’ while retaining a ‘willingness to question whatcounts as reasonable speech’. 83 The means by which this can be accomplished in our currentpolitical, cultural, and social milieu is the defining focus of associative agonistic theory.

1. ### “Resolved” implies a policy or legislative decision

   Jeff Parcher, former debate coach at Georgetown, Feb 2001 http://www.ndtceda.com/archives/200102/0790.html

   Pardon me if I turn to a source besides Bill. American Heritage Dictionary: Resolve: 1. To make a firm decision about. 2. To decide or express by formal vote. 3. To separate something into constiutent parts See Syns at \*analyze\* (emphasis in orginal) 4. Find a solution to. See Syns at \*Solve\* (emphasis in original) 5. To dispel: resolve a doubt. - n 1. Firmness of purpose; resolution. 2. A determination or decision. (2) The very nature of the word "resolution" makes it a question. American Heritage: A course of action determined or decided on. A formal statement of a decision, as by a legislature. (3) The resolution is obviously a question. Any other conclusion is utterly inconceivable. Why? Context. The debate community empowers a topic committee to write a topic for ALTERNATE side debating. The committee is not a random group of people coming together to "reserve" themselves about some issue. There is context - they are empowered by a community to do something. In their deliberations, the topic community attempts to craft a resolution which can be ANSWERED in either direction. They focus on issues like ground and fairness because they know the resolution will serve as the basis for debate which will be resolved by determining the policy desirablility of that resolution. That's not only what they do, but it's what we REQUIRE them to do. We don't just send the topic committee somewhere to adopt their own group resolution. It's not the end point of a resolution adopted by a body - it's the preliminary wording of a resolution sent to others to be answered or decided upon. (4) Further context: the word resolved is used to emphasis the fact that it's policy debate. Resolved comes from the adoption of resolutions by legislative bodies. A resolution is either adopted or it is not. It's a question before a legislative body. Should this statement be adopted or not. (5) The very terms 'affirmative' and 'negative' support my view. One affirms a resolution. Affirmative and negative are the equivalents of 'yes' or 'no' - which, of course, are answers to a question.

   And Should denotes an expectation of enacting a plan  
   American Heritage Dictionary 2000 (Dictionary.com)  
   should. The will to do something or have something take place: I shall go out if I feel like it [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Federal government is the central government in Washington DC  
   Encarta Online 2005,   
     
   United States (Government), the combination of federal, state, and local laws, bodies, and agencies that is responsible for carrying out the operations of the United States. The federal government of the United

   States is centered in Washington, D.C. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Merriam Webster, no date [http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/increase

   intransitive verb

   1: to become progressively greater (as in size, amount, number, or intensity)

   2 : to multiply by the production of young

   transitive verb

   1 : to make greater : augment [↑](#footnote-ref-3)