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#### Interpretation – restriction requires *prohibition* of an *entire* topic list area

#### Restriction means prohibition

Corpus Juris Secundum 31

Volume 54, p. 735

RESTRICT: To confine; to limit; to prevent (a person or thing) from passing a certain limit in any kind of action; to restrain; to restrain without bounds.

#### Authority is power delegated to an agent

Kelly 3 - judge for the State of Michigan

(JOSEPH ELEZOVIC, Plaintiff, and LULA ELEZOVIC, Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY and DANIEL P. BENNETT, Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellants., No. 236749, COURT OF APPEALS OF MICHIGAN, 259 Mich. App. 187; 673 N.W.2d 776; 2003 Mich. App. LEXIS 2649; 93 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 244; 92 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1557, Lexis)

Applying agency principles, a principal is responsible for the acts of its agents done within the scope of the agent's authority, "even though acting contrary to instructions." [Dick Loehr's, Inc v Secretary of State, 180 Mich. App. 165, 168; 446 N.W.2d 624 (1989)](https://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=6cbcd97524abff5644c0987b135f7517&_xfercite=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b259%20Mich.%20App.%20187%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_butType=3&_butStat=2&_origin=TOASHLX&_butNum=115&_butInline=1&_butinfo=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b180%20Mich.%20App.%20165%2cat%20168%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=136&_startdoc=101&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkAk&_md5=708331d40466e4347936b73e103c82fb). This is because, in part, an agency relationship arises where the principal [\*\*\*36]  has the right to control the conduct of the agent. [St Clair Intermediate School Dist v Intermediate Ed Ass'n/Michigan Ed Ass'n, 458 Mich. 540, 558 n 18; 581 N.W.2d 707 (1998)](https://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=6cbcd97524abff5644c0987b135f7517&_xfercite=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b259%20Mich.%20App.%20187%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_butType=3&_butStat=2&_origin=TOASHLX&_butNum=116&_butInline=1&_butinfo=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b458%20Mich.%20540%2cat%20558%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=136&_startdoc=101&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkAk&_md5=c0a63a81a484a6ce53be229bc2290a07) (citations omitted). The employer is also liable for the torts of his employee if "'the servant purported to act or to speak on behalf of the principal and there was reliance upon apparent authority, or he was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation,'" [McCann v Michigan, 398 Mich. 65, 71; 247 N.W.2d 521 (1976)](https://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=6cbcd97524abff5644c0987b135f7517&_xfercite=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b259%20Mich.%20App.%20187%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_butType=3&_butStat=2&_origin=TOASHLX&_butNum=117&_butInline=1&_butinfo=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b398%20Mich.%2065%2cat%2071%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=136&_startdoc=101&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkAk&_md5=5219d53b6a7119254f8041c911d87fd2), quoting [Restatement of Agency, 2d § 219(2)(d)](https://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=6cbcd97524abff5644c0987b135f7517&_xfercite=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b259%20Mich.%20App.%20187%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_butType=4&_butStat=0&_origin=TOASHLX&_butNum=118&_butInline=1&_butinfo=AGENCY%20SECOND%20219&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=136&_startdoc=101&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkAk&_md5=71c1bf8c001fe5ae1153be4268b8e9e9), p 481; see also [Champion v Nation Wide Security, Inc, 450 Mich. 702, 704, 712; 545 N.W.2d 596 (1996)](https://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=6cbcd97524abff5644c0987b135f7517&_xfercite=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b259%20Mich.%20App.%20187%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_butType=3&_butStat=2&_origin=TOASHLX&_butNum=119&_butInline=1&_butinfo=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b450%20Mich.%20702%2cat%20704%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=136&_startdoc=101&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkAk&_md5=3d1841dc7f4fb90804d8adb6349a6fae), citing [Restatement of Agency, 2d § 219(2)(d)](https://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=6cbcd97524abff5644c0987b135f7517&_xfercite=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b259%20Mich.%20App.%20187%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_butType=4&_butStat=0&_origin=TOASHLX&_butNum=120&_butInline=1&_butinfo=AGENCY%20SECOND%20219&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=136&_startdoc=101&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkAk&_md5=c1927abf5bf3954a85d211c044ada141), p 481 ("the master is liable for the tort of his servant if the servant 'was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation'"). In [Backus v  [\*213]  Kauffman (On Rehearing), 238 Mich. App. 402, 409; 605 N.W.2d 690 (1999)](https://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=6cbcd97524abff5644c0987b135f7517&_xfercite=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b259%20Mich.%20App.%20187%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_butType=3&_butStat=2&_origin=TOASHLX&_butNum=121&_butInline=1&_butinfo=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b238%20Mich.%20App.%20402%2cat%20409%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=136&_startdoc=101&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkAk&_md5=d9947545fee151274d489cbc14123160), this Court stated: The term "authority" is defined by Black's Law Dictionary to include "the power delegated by a principal to an agent." Black's Law Dictionary (7th ed), p [\*\*\*37]  127. "Scope of authority" is defined in the following manner: "The reasonable power that an agent has been delegated or might foreseeably be delegated in carrying out the principal's business." Id. at 1348.

#### Violations – the affirmative doesn’t prohibit full authority in the area of targeted killings – Obama is free to launch an infinite number of targeted killings as long as he tells congress why he is going to – the plan does not say congress must approve the killings or that they have veto power.

#### Standards:

#### Limits – absent prohibition of an area, every single condition or regulation acts as a functional restriction on some single process of war powers authority – dozens of tiny mechanisms and small subsets of areas create an infinite number of affs that core lit doesn’t check

#### Bidirectionality – absent a prohibition, the aff can create meaningless “conditions” that EXPAND presidential power – commission consultation proves

Wilson Center No Date

(War Powers Proposal Gives the President Even More Authority, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/war-powers-proposal-gives-the-president-even-more-authority)

A privately organized Commission on War Powers recommended last week that the 1973 War Powers Resolution be repealed and replaced by a Congressional Joint Committee on Consultation and new procedures to approve or disapprove a "significant armed conflict."¶ The 12-member, bipartisan commission, co-chaired by former Secretaries of State Warren Christopher and James Baker, said the current law is flawed. In fact, every president since Richard Nixon has refused to comply with the War Powers Resolution on the grounds that it is an unconstitutional infringement on the president's powers as commander in chief. Among other things, the current act authorizes Congress to terminate combat operations by adopting a concurrent resolution. The Supreme Court ruled in the 1983 Chadha immigration case that one-house and two-house legislative vetoes do not conform to the Constitution's lawmaking requirements of two-house passage and presentment to the president. ¶ Under the substitute law proposed by the commission, the president must, prior to committing troops to "a significant armed conflict" (one likely to last more than a week), submit a classified report to the new joint committee justifying the need for action. The president is then required to consult at least once every 60 days with the committee. ¶ Within 30 days after the conflict begins, if Congress has not enacted a declaration of war or a law authorizing the use of force, a privileged concurrent resolution approving the troop commitment must be brought to a vote in both chambers. If either chamber rejects the approval resolution, any Member can then offer a privileged joint resolution disapproving the commitment. If the joint resolution is vetoed by the president, a two-thirds override vote by both chambers would be necessary to terminate the commitment. ¶ If I were either of the current presidential candidates, I would endorse the commission proposal in a heartbeat. It proposes to vastly expand presidential powers and options beyond current practice. In the "use of force" joint resolutions for Iraq (1991 and 2002) and Afghanistan (2001), Congress was able to negotiate conditions and limitations on the use of force with the president, who then signed the resolutions into law. ¶ That will not be the case if Congress uses the concurrent resolution of approval approach. No matter how many conditions Congress might try to place on the president's use of force in such a concurrent resolution, the president would be under no legal obligation to comply because the provisions would have no force or effect outside Congress. This is because concurrent resolutions are mere sense-of-Congress expressions. (Who's going to charge the president with failing to faithfully execute a non-law?) ¶ It stands to reason that, given this option, no future president will ask for a declaration of war or use of force law when the alternative is a nonbinding sense-of-Congress resolution approving the commitment of troops to combat. Never mind that such a resolution is probably unconstitutional under the Chadha decision requiring two-house passage and presentment to the president. (It's unlikely the court would directly rule on the issue since in recent times it has sidestepped war powers disputes between the branches on the grounds that they present political questions best left to the president and Congress to resolve.) ¶ Another clear advantage to the president presented by the commission's proposed law is the unique relationship that would be established with the 20-member, bipartisan joint committee. Its members would include the Speaker of the House, Senate Majority Leader, House and Senate Minority Leaders and the chairmen and ranking members of eight key committees. Whereas the administration must currently answer to several committees for its war policies, often in public hearings, the new arrangement will give the president both the incentive and justification to deal exclusively with the joint committee in closed sessions. This is something administrations have wanted for years given the burden of officials delivering duplicative testimony in open forums before multiple committees and subcommittees. ¶ The real losers in this new arrangement, of course, will be the rest of the House and Senate and the American people, all of whom will be left in the dark about what is said and done in the closed-door committee consultations with the president. They will be left to trust the judgment of committee members on the necessity for war and its subsequent conduct. ¶ The Commission on War Powers understandably reflects the leadership and views of two former secretaries of State who no doubt see Congress as many of their predecessors have: as an ill-informed, noisy, quarrelsome and meddling micro-manager when it comes to deciding the great issues of war and peace. If the administration must accommodate Congress in some way before making such decisions, they reason, it is best done among a few power elites in Congress, behind closed doors and shielded by classified briefings and documents.





### Tea Party

#### Tea Party influence low now BECAUSE of the disagreement about foreign policy - the plan reverses this

Castillo 9/5 (Dava Castillo, Sep 05th 2013, <http://www.allvoices.com/contributed-news/15460384-political-party-schisms-a-house-divided-turns-into-a-condominium>, “Political party schisms: A house divided turns into a condominium”, AB)

But then the entire question on whether to engage in Syria is unsettling for many as we find ourselves in the same camp with those whom, in most political arenas, we would be opposing. The Democrats are divided as well as the Republicans. The labels this time really are “doves” and “hawks,” literally. The Republicans, however, are divided even further by the tea party component of isolationists driven by fiscal stinginess, which in the case of fighting a war “over there,” works for me. Except now Saudi Arabia and Qatar have said they will pay for some of the expenses relegating the United States military to mercenary status. If engaging in Syria is going to be free, will the Libertarian conservatives say it’s OK or will the Republicans branch off into yet another ideological segment? The Republican Party is beginning to fracture over Syrian intervention, with the small government, isolationist tea party folk on one side and the rest of the old guard, hawkish Republicans led by Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) and Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.). Splits in major political parties are uncommon, but it has happened before.

#### Plan is a win for the Tea Party

Metzler 13

Rebekah Metzler 13 is a political writer for U.S. News & World Report. “Marco Rubio, Rand Paul Strike Out to Re-Brand Their Party: Fresh takes on foreign, domestic policies aim to shake up GOP,” February 6, 2013, http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/02/06/marco-rubio-rand-paul-strike-out-to-re-brand-their-party, DOA: 8-1-13, y2k

Paul, delivering a foreign policy speech at the conservative Heritage Foundation Wednesday, struck a balance between George W. Bush era neo-conservativism and support for nation building, and his father, former Texas Rep. Ron Paul's, unique brand of isolationism. The Kentucky senator criticized the traditional GOP stance that money should be no object when it comes to the U.S. military and its mission, and said that America should rethink its role in the world while recognizing the cost to U.S. blood and treasure. "I'd argue that a more restrained foreign policy is the true conservative foreign policy, as it includes two basic tenets of true conservatism: respect for the constitution and fiscal discipline," Paul said, reflecting libertarian ideals held by both Tea Partiers and some progressives. Congress also must be more assertive when it comes to its role in providing checks and balances to the president's war powers, he said. "We did not declare war or authorize force to begin war with Libya," Paul said. "This is a dangerous precedent. In our foreign policy, Congress has become not even a rubber stamp but an irrelevancy." A senator who at times finds himself the only member on a certain side of things—whether it's a willingness to place secret holds on nominations to get a vote on a certain amendment, or an opposition to some spending provision that most Republicans agree with—Paul was obviously striving to legitimize himself as a leader with original but appealing viewpoints. "When foreign policy has become so monolithic, so lacking in debate that Republicans and Democrats routinely pass foreign policy statements without debate and without votes, where are the calls for moderation, the calls for restraint?" he said. "Anyone who questions the bipartisan consensus is immediately castigated, rebuked and their patriotism challenged."

#### Tea Party wins snowball --- saves their influence in Congress

Cillizza 12

(Chris Cillizza, December 4, 2012, “Is the tea party dead? Or just resting?,” Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2012/12/04/whither-the-tea-party/)

And Jon Lerner, a Republican consultant who works closely with the Club For Growth, insisted that the tea party remains a major force in GOP primaries — and, as such, is something establishment Republicans should be very wary of ignoring. ”Tea Party voters represent a huge portion of all Republican voters, so while the GOP establishment sometimes finds the Tea Party inconvenient, they are much better off making peace with it than making war with it,” said Lerner.¶ True enough. But, it still seems clear that the tea party is in the midst of a sort of soul searching. For a movement that burst onto the national scene with a force almost never seen in modern American politics, there’s no obvious second act. The movement needs a next fight or, short of that, to make a decision as to whether it can live within the Republican coalition or not.¶ (That latter choice is complicated by the fact that the tea party was built as a leaderless enterprise and so the idea of such a major philosophic decision being made for the entire movement is anathema to, well, the entire movement. Rick Reed, a Republican media consultant, suggested that “there may be a couple of folks whom 10 percent of Republicans would loosely and correctly associate with [the tea party movement], but probably no more.”)¶ One senior Republican party strategist, granted anonymity to speak candidly about the future of the tea party movement, expressed concern that while the tea party was at a “low point” today, the coming legislative fights in Congress could lead to a renaissance in the movement.

#### Strong Tea Party wrecks budget compromises

Montgomery 11

(Lori, "House Republicans divided on spending cuts; for some, it's $100 billion or bust," Feb 11, [www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/10/AR2011021007091.html](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/10/AR2011021007091.html))

An already wobbly week for House Republicans turned chaotic Thursday as their unruly new majority flatly rejected a spending plan crafted by House leaders, saying its cuts fell far short of fulfilling a campaign pledge to slice $100 billion from federal programs. House leaders offered to redo the package but were struggling to identify the massive and unprecedented cuts that will be required to meet their goal. Dissatisfied conservatives, meanwhile, were pressing for even sharper reductions that could prove difficult to push through the House, much less the Democratic-controlled Senate.¶ The uprising exposed serious divisions among Republicans bent on reducing the size of government, the defining issue of the campaign that swept them back into power in the House this fall. Dozens of freshmen, fueled by tea party fervor, are demanding a rapid response to the groundswell of public anger.¶ Their single-minded focus threatens to spoil efforts by House Speaker John A. Boehner (R-Ohio) to avoid a confrontation with the White House that could trigger a government shutdown in coming months. Until this week, House leaders had anticipated relatively little trouble putting together an initial spending plan, which they had hoped would serve as an austere but responsible counterpoint to the budget request President Obama is due to submit Monday.¶ Across Washington, conservative groups fanned the flames of the rebellion Thursday. At the annual Conservative Political Action Conference, Rep. Michele Bachmann (R-Minn.), the leader of the House Tea Party Caucus, criticized GOP leaders for their first offer to cut spending and demanded more.

#### Destroys the economy --- consumer confidence, dollar strength, credit rating

Brown 13

(Abram, 1/4, "GOP's Threat to Shutdown the Government is a Dangerous Strategy," www.forbes.com/sites/abrambrown/2013/01/04/the-gop-is-already-threatneing-to-shutdown-the-government-to-win-spending-cuts/)

That Republicans are already warning the country that they will turn off the lights in D.C. is an alarming situation. Depending on what happens in the debt ceiling debate, the Treasury Department might just have trouble paying the bills on time…or the whole apparatus could cease to function. Past that, there’s a risk that the credit-rating agencies could downgrade the United States, raising the country’s borrowing costs (and making that newly approved debt more costly).¶ Not to mention the damage to the broader economy. The last debt ceiling fiasco in August 2011 dashed consumer confidence. Why shop anywhere else than bargain-centers like Wal-Mart and or a dollar store when the nation seems to be falling apart? Shortly before the nation went past the deadline in 2011, the CEOs of Bank of America, Citi, JPMorgan Chase and Goldman Sachs sent a letter to The White House that urged for a quick resolution:¶ A default on our nation’s obligations, or a downgrade of America’s credit rating, would be a tremendous blow to business and investor confidence — raising interest rates for everyone who borrows, undermining the value of the dollar, and roiling stock and bond markets — and, therefore, dramatically worsening our nation’s already difficult economic circumstances.¶ Granted, the economy is in slightly better shape today than it was in August 2011. Not so strong, though, that the consequences of a shutdown would be much different.

#### Economic collapse causes nuclear conflicts

Burrows and Harris 9

Mathew J. Burrows counselor in the National Intelligence Council and Jennifer Harris a member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis” The Washington Quarterly 32:2 https://csis.org/files/publication/twq09aprilburrowsharris.pdf

Increased Potential for Global Conflict¶ Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the¶ future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking¶ forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity.¶ Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to¶ believe that the Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be¶ drawn from that period include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and¶ multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on¶ the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in the¶ same period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the¶ twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in¶ which the potential for greater conflict could grow would seem to be even more¶ apt in a constantly volatile economic environment as they would be if change¶ would be steadier.¶ In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and¶ nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the¶ international agenda. Terrorism’s appeal will decline if economic growth¶ continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those¶ terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of¶ technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most¶ dangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a¶ combination of descendants of long established groupsinheriting¶ organizational structures, command and control processes, and training¶ procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacksand newly emergent¶ collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized,¶ particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower¶ in an economic downturn.¶ The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S.¶ military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s¶ acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed¶ Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with¶ external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own¶ nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship¶ that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge¶ naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity¶ conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an¶ unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states¶ involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals¶ combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile¶ dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in¶ achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The¶ lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile¶ flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on¶ preemption rather than defense, potentially leading to escalating crises.Types of conflict that the world continues¶ to experience, such as over resources, could¶ reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and¶ there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices.¶ Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive¶ countries to take actions to assure their future¶ access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this¶ could result in interstate conflicts if government¶ leaders deem assured access to energy resources,¶ for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of¶ their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical¶ implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval¶ buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of¶ blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed¶ turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of¶ regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and¶ counterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational¶ cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in¶ Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is¶ likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between states in a more¶ dog-eat-dog world.¶

### CIR

#### Immigration reform has been delayed but will pass later this year – the aff pushes it off the agenda and into 2014 which derails the deal

Shear and Preston 9-8

(\*MICHAEL D. SHEAR, a White House correspondent for The New York Times, \*\*JULIA PRESTON, member of The New York Times team that won the 1998 Pulitzer Prize for reporting on international affairs, became a national correspondent covering immigration for The Times in April 2006.“Immigration Reform Falls to the Back of the Line” September 8, 2013, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/09/us/politics/immigration-reform-falls-to-the-back-of-the-line.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0>, KB)

Congress is likely to postpone consideration of an immigration overhaul until the end of the year, if not longer, even as advocates are preparing for an all-out, urgent push this fall to win their longstanding goal of a path to citizenship for millions of immigrants here illegally.¶ In Washington, the sudden debate over military action in Syria and a looming face-off with President Obama over the budget and the nation’s borrowing limit have shot to the top of the legislative agenda, while Republican angst about losing Hispanic voters in the 2012 presidential campaign has faded.¶ In the House, where many Republicans view an overhaul bill passed by the Senate as a federal juggernaut that is too kind to immigrant lawbreakers, the legislative summer recess has done little to stoke enthusiasm for immediate action. Senior Republican aides in the House say immigration is at the back of the line, and unlikely to come up for months.¶ The prospect of a delay is generating frustration among supporters of the legislation, who felt emboldened by a summer in which conservative opposition in House districts largely fizzled and immigrant groups seized the chance to lobby lawmakers on their home turf.¶ “We believe they can walk and chew gum at the same time,” said Eliseo Medina, who leads the immigration campaign for the Service Employees International Union, referring to members of Congress. “The more they delay, the worse it will be for them.”¶ Throughout August, immigration groups organized hundreds of visits to Congressional offices, town hall-style meetings, vigils, marches and rallies, creating a constant buzz in the districts of many House lawmakers, particularly Republicans. On Wednesday, advocates delivered 600,000 petitions to the West Chester, Ohio, offices of Speaker John A. Boehner the old-fashioned way, in dozens of stacks of signed papers. On Sunday, Catholic priests around the country preached for a comprehensive immigration overhaul.¶ At a Mass devoted to immigration in Cincinnati, a mix of Catholics, including immigrants from Mexico and Central America and African-Americans, prayed for Congress to act.¶ “Families in our communities are being ripped apart by deportations, and the system is in chaos,” said Tony Stieritz, director of Catholic Social Action for the Cincinnati Archdiocese, who helped organize the Mass. “A vote for delay is a vote for crisis and disorder in the current system.”¶ José Cabrera, 18, a high school senior from Mexico who spoke at the Mass, said immigrant groups in Ohio expected to see legislation this year, adding that he and other students compared their activities to the civil rights march on Washington, recently celebrated on its 50th anniversary.¶ “We know this is the year,” said Mr. Cabrera, who came here illegally when he was 4 years old and was recently granted a deportation deferral by the Obama administration. “I have put as much effort in as I can and even more. If they just keep pushing it back and back, a lot of activists will be very frustrated.”¶ The gulf between the expectations of advocates and the reality they face in Washington is widening every day. As they feel momentum slipping away, their anger is likely to intensify this fall.¶ And time is not on their side. In June, the Senate passed a bipartisan plan to overhaul border security and grant illegal immigrants a chance to earn citizenship. If the House does not take up the immigration issue until 2014, members will face the prospect of voting on a highly contentious issue in the middle of a Congressional election year.¶ Republican primaries will begin in the spring, and many lawmakers may be reluctant to overhaul the immigration system just before facing their conservative constituents. If Congress does not complete action early next year, Congressional aides said, the issue could be delayed until after the November elections.¶ But leaders of groups supporting an immigration overhaul say they do not plan to let up.¶ The organizations plan a mobilization in early October, with rallies in at least 40 cities on Oct. 5 followed by a march and rally in Washington on Oct. 8. Convinced that a majority exists in the House for the legislation, they will press for Mr. Boehner to allow a vote before the end of the year. Leaders said the Syria debate and the fiscal fight should not become “excuses” to set aside immigration.¶ “We’re gearing up for late October — we’re going to push really hard for votes this fall and negotiations with the Senate,” said Frank Sharry, the executive director of America’s Voice, an advocacy group. “We never figured we’d have an opportunity in September because of the budget stuff and with the debt ceiling.”¶ The government’s authority to spend money under the existing budget will run out on Oct. 1 unless lawmakers reach a budget deal or agree to a temporary delay. And officials say the debt limit must be raised by mid-October or the nation will risk defaulting on its debts.¶ Many immigration advocates said they were especially pleased that conservative activists and talk radio hosts had failed to generate significant opposition to an overhaul in August.¶ At a rally in Richmond, Va., last month that was billed as a Tea Party show of strength, Representative Steve King of Iowa, a Republican who is an outspoken foe of any legal status for illegal immigrants, found himself addressing a nearly empty plaza.¶ By contrast, the Alliance for Citizenship, a coalition of pro-overhaul groups, said it logged nearly 1,200 events last month, from polite office visits to noisy street protests. Several dozen marchers walked from Sacramento to Bakersfield, Calif., hoping to evoke the farmworker protests of the 1960s. While few of the actions made national news, the groups kept up a drumbeat in Republican districts they identified as strategic. The alliance reported that 25 House Republicans had come out in favor of an overhaul including legalization during the recess.¶ Bibles, Badges and Business, a conservative coalition favoring the overhaul, dispatched representatives to more than 60 town hall-style meetings, to respond if opponents turned out in force. But Ali Noorani, a leader of the coalition, said no groundswell of rage had appeared, while support among conservatives appeared to be growing.¶ But that activity does not appear to have significantly altered the debate in Washington, in part because Syria is overshadowing other issues. Republican officials in the House say they will continue to consider a piece-by-piece approach to particular immigration issues in the weeks ahead. But the possibility of working out a comprehensive overhaul with the Senate and the president will have to wait, they say.¶ “In terms of getting anything on the floor, you’re certainly going to have to wait until something happens on the fiscal debate,” one senior Republican leadership aide said, adding that “the more contentious things you put on the schedule, the harder it is to do the thing that goes last.”¶ In that case, some immigration groups have signaled that they could become more aggressive. In Phoenix last month, young undocumented immigrants who call themselves Dreamers chained themselves to a fence at an immigration detention center and sat in front of a police bus carrying immigrants to be deported. Church and immigrant groups have promised fasts and protests in the coming weeks.¶ “We don’t control the timing. What we do control is the pressure,” said Mr. Medina, the labor leader. “They will get this done when the pressure is so great they have to act.”

#### The plan is unpopular

Zengerle and Spetalnick 13 (Patricia Zengerle and Matt Spetalnick, “Obama wants to end 'war on terror' but Congress balks” May 24, 2013, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/24/us-usa-obama-speech-idUSBRE94M04Y20130524>, KB)

President Barack Obama wants to roll back some of the most controversial aspects of the U.S. "war on terror," but efforts to alter the global fight against Islamist militants will face the usual hurdle at home: staunch opposition from Republicans in Congress.¶ In a major policy speech on Thursday, Obama narrowed the scope of the targeted-killing drone campaign against al Qaeda and its allies and announced steps toward closing the Guantanamo Bay military prison in Cuba.¶ He acknowledged the past use of "torture" in U.S. interrogations, expressed remorse over civilian casualties from drone strikes, and said Guantanamo "has become a symbol around the world for an America that flouts the rule of law."¶ After launching costly wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States is tiring of conflict. While combating terrorism is still a high priority, polls show Americans' main concerns are the economy and other domestic issues such as healthcare.¶ Conservative opponents said they would try to block the closure of Guantanamo and rejected Obama's call to repeal the Authorization for Use of Military Force, passed in September 2001 and the legal basis for much of the "war on terror."¶ "We have 166 prisoners remaining (at Guantanamo) ... the meanest, nastiest people in the world. They wake up every day seeking to do harm to America and Americans. And if they are released, that's exactly what they are going to do," Republican Senator Saxby Chambliss said in an address to constituents on Friday.¶ Obama called for an end to a "boundless global war on terror" but Republicans warned against being too quick to declare al Qaeda a spent force.

#### Immigration reform key to biotech innovation

Scullion ’13

(Christine, “Manufacturers Take the Lead In STEM Education”, January 8, <http://www.shopfloor.org/2013/01/manufacturers-take-the-lead-in-stem-education/27254>, CMR)

The U.S. the leading producer of cutting-edge products such as those on display at the Consumer Electronics Show. Whether it’s in IT, biotech, aerospace, medical devices or heavy machinery, US companies will be the ones to constantly and consistently create new and better things. This future promises to be bright, but only if we have the workforce capable of pushing that leading-edge. And right now, that doesn’t look like a very good bet. The lack of a skilled workforce is a constant threat to manufacturing growth. In fact in a recent survey 82% of manufacturers reported a moderate-to-serious shortage in skilled production labor. Worker shortages abound not only among machinists and welders but also in occupations requiring expertise in the fields of science, technology, engineering and math (STEM), where the unemployment rate today lies well below 4%.¶ The US needs to refocus our workforce training resources and reform our immigration system to continue to grow and innovate. Immigration reform is a serious issue for Manufacturers not only in the High-tech arena but across manufacturing sectors. Without a skilled workforce – from the PhDs to production labor, the nation’s economy will suffer and jobs will be moved overseas. Access to the right individual with the right skills at the right time will ensure that the US remains a global innovation leader.

#### The impact is bioterror

Chyba 4

Co-Director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), Stanford Institute for International Studies, and an Associate Professor at Stanford University

[Christopher & Alex Greninger, “Biotechnology and Bioterrorism: An Unprecedented World” Survival, 46:2, Summer 2004]

In the absence of a comprehensive and effective system of global review of potential high-consequence research, we are instead trapped in a kind of offence–defence arms race. Even as legitimate biomedical researchers develop defences against biological pathogens, bad actors could in turn engineer countermeasures in a kind of directed version of the way natural pathogens evolve resistance to anti-microbial drugs. The mousepox case provides a harbinger of what is to come: just as the United States was stockpiling 300m doses of smallpox vaccine as a defence against a terrorist smallpox attack, experimental modification of the mousepox virus showed how the vaccine could possibly be circumvented. The United States is now funding research on antiviral drugs and other ways of combating smallpox that might be effective against the engineered organism. Yet there are indications that smallpox can be made resistant to one of the few known antiviral drugs. **The future has the appearance of an** eternal arms race of measures and countermeasures. The ‘arms race’ metaphor should be used with caution; it too is in danger of calling up misleading analogies to the nuclear arms race of the Cold War. First, the biological arms race is an offence–defence race, rather than a competition between offensive means. Under the BWC, only defensive research is legitimate. But more fundamentally, the driver of de facto offensive capabilities in this arms race is not primarily a particular adversary, but rather the ongoing global advance of microbiological and biomedical research. Defensive measures **are in** a race with nefarious applications of basic research, much of which is itself undertaken for protection against natural disease. In a sense, we are in an arms race with ourselves. It is hard to see how this arms race is stable – an offence granted comparable resources would seem to be necessarily favoured. As with ballistic missile defence, particular defensive measures may be defeated by offensive countermeasures. **In the biological case, implementing defensive measures will** require not only research but drug development and distribution plans. Offensive measures need not exercise this care, although fortunately they will likely face comparative resource constraints (especially if not associated with a state programme), and may find that some approaches (for example, to confer antibiotic resistance) have the simultaneous effect of inadvertently reducing a pathogen’s virulence. The defence must always guard against committing the fallacy of the last move, whereas the offence may embrace the view of the Irish Republican Army after it failed to assassinate the British cabinet in the 1984 Brighton bombing: ‘Today we were unlucky, but remember we have only to be lucky once – you will have to be lucky always’.40 At the very least, the defence will have to be vigilant and collectively smarter than the offence. **The only way for the defence to win** convincingly in the biological arms race **would** seem to **be to succeed in discovering and implementing** certain de facto last-move defences, at least on an organism-by-organism basis. Perhaps there are defences, or a web of defences, that will prove too difficult for any plausible non-state actor to engineer around. Whether **such defences** exist is unclear at this time, but their exploration **should be a long-term research goal of US biodefence** efforts. Progress might also have an important impact on international public health. One of the ‘Grand Challenges’ identified by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation in its $200m initiative to improve global health calls for the discovery of drugs that minimise the emergence of drug resistance – a kind of ‘last move’ defence against the evolutionary countermeasures of natural microbes.41 **Should** a collection of such **defensive moves prove possible**, **bioterrorism might ultimately succumb to** a kind of globalised dissuasion by denial:42 non-state groups would calculate that they could not hope to achieve dramatic results through biological programmes and would choose to direct their efforts elsewhere.

#### Extinction

Steinbruner 97

John D. Steinbruner, Brookings senior fellow and chair in international security, vice chair of the committee on international security and arms control of the National Academy of Sciences, Winter 1997, Foreign Policy, “Biological weapons: a plague upon all houses,” n109 p85(12), infotrac

Although human pathogens are often lumped with nuclear explosives and lethal chemicals as potential weapons of mass destruction, there is an obvious, fundamentally important difference: Pathogens are alive, weapons are not. Nuclear and chemical weapons do not reproduce themselves and do not independently engage in adaptive behavior; pathogens do both of these things. That deceptively simple observation has immense implications. The use of a manufactured weapon is a singular event. Most of the damage occurs immediately. The aftereffects, whatever they may be, decay rapidly over time and distance in a reasonably predictable manner. Even before a nuclear warhead is detonated, for instance, it is possible to estimate the extent of the subsequent damage and the likely level of radioactive fallout. Such predictability is an essential component for tactical military planning. The use of a pathogen, by contrast, is an extended process whose scope and timing cannot be precisely controlled. For most potential biological agents, the predominant drawback is that they would not act swiftly or decisively enough to be an effective weapon. But for a few pathogens - ones most likely to have a decisive effect and therefore the ones most likely to be contemplated for deliberately hostile use - the risk runs in the other direction. A lethal pathogen that could efficiently spread from one victim to another would be capable of initiating an intensifying cascade of disease that might ultimately threaten the entire world population. The 1918 influenza epidemic demonstrated the potential for a global contagion of this sort but not necessarily its outer limit.

### K

#### Fiat double bind – Either the harms to the 1AC are true and they cannot solve for extinction before they control the levers of power OR their harms are constructed for the purpose of alarmism which makes them symbolic terrorists.

#### Apocalyptic predictions make serial policy failure inevitable

Kurasawa 4 – Professor of Sociology, York University of Toronto, Fuyuki, “Cautionary Tales: The Global Culture of Prevention and the Work of Foresight”, Constellations Volume 11, No 4, http://www.yorku.ca/kurasawa/Kurasawa%20Articles/Constellations%20Article.pdf

Up to this point, I have tried to demonstrate that transnational socio-political relations are nurturing a thriving culture and infrastructure of prevention from below, which challenges presumptions about the inscrutability of the future (II) and a stance of indifference toward it (III). Nonetheless, unless and until it is substantively ‘filled in,’ the argument is vulnerable to misappropriation since farsightedness does not in and of itself ensure emancipatory outcomes. Therefore, this section proposes to specify normative criteria and participatory procedures through which citizens can determine the ‘reasonableness,’ legitimacy, and effectiveness of competing dystopian visions in order to arrive at a socially self-instituting future. Foremost among thepossible distortions of farsightedness is alarmism, the manufacturing ofunwarranted and unfounded doomsday scenarios. State and market institutionsmay seek to produce a culture of fear by deliberately stretching interpretations of realitybeyond the limits of the plausible so as to exaggerate the prospects of impending catastrophes, or yet again, by intentionally promoting certain prognoses over others for instrumental purposes. Accordingly, regressive dystopiascan operate as Trojan horses advancing political agendasor commercial interests that would otherwise be susceptible to public scrutiny and opposition. Instances of this kind of manipulation of the dystopian imaginary are plentiful: the invasion of Iraq in the name of fighting terrorism and an imminent threat of use of ‘weapons of mass destruction’; the severe curtailing of American civil liberties amidst fears of a collapse of ‘homeland security’; the neoliberal dismantling of the welfare state as the only remedy for an ideologically constructed fiscal crisis; the conservative expansion of policing and incarceration due to supposedly spiraling crime waves; and so forth. Alarmism constructs and codes the future in particular ways, producing or reinforcing certain crisis narratives, belief structures, and rhetorical conventions. As much as alarmist ideas beget a culture of fear, the reverse is no less true. If fear-mongering is a misappropriation of preventive foresight, resignation about the future represents a problematic outgrowth of the popular acknowledgment of global perils. Some believe that the world to come is so uncertain and dangerous that we should not attempt to modify the course of history; the future will look after itself for better or worse, regardless of what we do or wish. One version of this argument consists in a complacent optimism perceiving the future as fated to be better than either the past or the present. Frequently accompanying it is a self-deluding denial of what is plausible (‘the world will not be so bad after all’), or a naively Panglossian pragmatism (‘things will work themselves out in spite of everything, because humankind always finds ways to survive’).37 Much more common, however, isthe opposite reaction, a fatalistic pessimism reconciled to the idea that the future will be necessarily worse than what preceded it. This is sustained by a tragic chronological framework according to which humanity is doomed to decay, or a cyclical one of the endless repetition of the mistakes of the past. On top of their dubious assessments of what is to come, alarmismand resignation would, if widely accepted, undermine a viable practice of farsightedness. Indeed, both of them encourage public disengagement from deliberation about scenarios for the future, a process that appears to be dangerous, pointless, or unnecessary. The resulting ‘depublicization’ of debate leaves dominant groups and institutions(the state, the market, techno-science) in charge of sorting out the future for the rest of us, thus effectively producing a heteronomous social order. How, then, can we support a democratic process of prevention from below? The answer, I think, lies in cultivating the public capacity for critical judgment and deliberation, so that participants in global civil society subject all claims about potential catastrophes to examination, evaluation, and contestation. Two normative concepts are particularly well suited to grounding these tasks: the precautionary principle and global justice.

#### The PARADOX OF RISK makes this issue NOT resolvable by weighing the plan.  If impact is calculated by multiplying probability and magnitude, any probability of an infinite impact irrationally registers as infinite

Kessler 2008 (Oliver Kessler, Sociology at University of Bielefeld, “From Insecurity to Uncertainty: Risk and the Paradox of Security Politics” *Alternatives*  33 (2008), 211-232)

The problem of the second method is that it is very difficult to  "calculate" politically unacceptable losses. If the risk of terrorism is  defined in traditional terms by probability and potential loss, then  the focus on dramatic terror attacks leads to the marginalization of  probabilities. The reason is that even the highest degree of improbability becomes irrelevant as the measure of loss goes to infinity.^o  The mathematical calculation of the risk of terrorism thus tends to  overestimate and to dramatize the danger. This has consequences  beyond the actual risk assessment for the formulation and execution  of "risk policies": If one factor of the risk calculation approaches  infinity (e.g., if a case of nuclear terrorism is envisaged), then there  is no balanced measure for antiterrorist efforts, and risk management as a rational endeavor breaks down. Under the historical con-  dition of bipolarity, the "ultimate" threat with nuclear weapons could  be balanced by a similar counterthreat, and new equilibria could be  achieved, albeit on higher levels of nuclear overkill. Under the new  condition of uncertainty, no such rational balancing is possible since  knowledge about actors, their motives and capabilities, is largely  absent.  The second form of security policy that emerges when the deter-  rence model collapses mirrors the "social probability" approach. It  represents a logic of catastrophe. In contrast to risk management  framed in line with logical probability theory, the logic of catastro- phe does not attempt to provide means of absorbing uncertainty.  Rather, it takes uncertainty as constitutive for the logic itself; uncertainty is a crucial precondition for catastrophies. In particular, cata-  strophes happen at once, without a warning, but with major impli-  cations for the world polity. In this category, we find the impact of  meteorites. Mars attacks, the tsunami in South East Asia, and 9/11.  To conceive of terrorism as catastrophe has consequences for the  formulation of an adequate security policy. Since catastrophes hap-  pen irrespectively of human activity or inactivity, no political action  could possibly prevent them. Of course, there are precautions that  can be taken, but the framing of terrorist attack as a catastrophe  points to spatial and temporal characteristics that are beyond "ratio-  nality." Thus, political decision makers are exempted from the  responsibility to provide security—as long as they at least try to pre-  empt an attack. Interestingly enough, 9/11 was framed as catastro-  phe in various commissions dealing with the question of who was  responsible and whether it could have been prevented.  This makes clear that under the condition of uncertainty, there  are no objective criteria that could serve as an anchor for measur-  ing dangers and assessing the quality of political responses. For ex-  ample, as much as one might object to certain measures by the US  administration, it is almost impossible to "measure" the success of  countermeasures. Of course, there might be a subjective assessment  of specific shortcomings or failures, but there is no "common" cur-  rency to evaluate them. As a consequence, the framework of the  security dilemma fails to capture the basic uncertainties.  Pushing the door open for the security paradox, the main prob-  lem of security analysis then becomes the question how to integrate  dangers in risk assessments and security policies about which simply  nothing is known. In the mid 1990s, a Rand study entitled "New  Challenges for Defense Planning" addressed this issue arguing that  "most striking is the fact that we do not even know who or what will  constitute the most serious future threat, "^i In order to cope with  this challenge it would be essential, another Rand researcher wrote,  to break free from the "tyranny" of plausible scenario planning. The  decisive step would be to create "discontinuous scenarios ... in  which there is no plausible audit trail or storyline from current  events"52 These nonstandard scenarios were later called "wild cards"  and became important in the current US strategic discourse. They  justified the transformation from a threat-based toward a capability-  based defense planning strategy.53  The problem with this kind of risk assessment is, however, that  even the most absurd scenarios can gain plausibility. By construct-  ing a chain of potentialities, improbable events are linked and brought into the realm of the possible, if not even the probable.  "Although the likelihood of the scenario dwindles with each step,  the residual impression is one of plausibility. "54 This so-called Oth-  ello effect has been effective in the dawn of the recent war in Iraq.   The connection between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda that the  US government tried to prove was disputed from the very begin-  ning. False evidence was again and again presented and refuted,  but this did not prevent the administration from presenting as the  main rationale for war the improbable yet possible connection  between Iraq and the terrorist network and the improbable yet  possible proliferation of an improbable yet possible nuclear  weapon into the hands of Bin Laden. As Donald Rumsfeld  famously said: "Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence."  This sentence indicates that under the condition of genuine uncer-  tainty, different evidence criteria prevail than in situations where  security problems can be assessed with relative certainty.

#### The alternative is to reject the apocalyptic frames of the 1AC

#### Even if the rational arguments in favor of the plan are logical, the representations of apocalypse colonize the debate towards pressure for fast invasion and warmongering

Goodnight 2010 (G. Thomas Goodnight is Professor and Director of Doctoral Studies at the Annenberg School for Communication, the University of Southern California in Los Angeles; "The Metapolitics of the 2002 Iraq Debate: Public Policy and the Network Imaginary", Rhetoric & Public Affairs Volume 13, Number 1, Spring 2010)

Opponents of the Democratic Party argued the risks of war, but their pragmatic policy challenges did not grab sufficient traction to slow the unreeling web of justification. Of course, there was little denial that the war would create more terrorists, generate a lower threshold for intervention, receive weak international support, and in the end leave the dangerous business of Afghanistan unfinished. But the Democrats became entangled in reflexive posturing about the effects of the debate itself—the importance of "message sending" to the United Nations and "consensus" backing for the president as negotiator-in-chief. With 9/11 not far behind, "tough" messages appeared to provide a much desired supplement to boost confidence, while pragmatism, caution, and planning took a back seat. Presidential hopefuls cut loose from this morass and took advantage of Republican-offered political cover. Republicans did appear to benefit from tough war rhetoric in the immediate election aftermath, enabling Bush to run successfully in 2004 as a wartime president. As WMD continued not to turn up, the intervention dragged on, costs mounted, political fortunes reversed—although the entanglements remained and remain. [End Page 87] The debate of 2002 found that a systematic presidential campaign—when bolstered by cherry-picked evidence—can be particularly powerful, especially when administration supporters in Congress veer shamelessly from long-held positions on policy and the leadership of the opposing party takes shelter in offered political cover. Further, the debate illustrates how the events that should prompt policy debate become colonized, in this case making common sense difficult to muster because the network imaginary laces a web of associative fears with compensatory toughness. On the whole, the debates were not the nation's finest hour. The debate of 2002 strove to convert a traumatic national event into a conservative-articulated, Republican-captured, presidentially initiated rise in power, and ended by setting the stage for congressional investigation, the rise of the Democrats, reassertion of congressional power, and a new presidency committed to public diplomacy. WMD were at the heart of the six-year-long controversy. It was hardly remembered that [WMD] weapons of mass destruction were not deployed by terrorists on September 11th. Rather, fast, anonymous, networked, modern systems of circulation were turned, through ingenuity, into first-strike weapons. Seen with fresh militancy, 9/11 suggests that the modern world remains vulnerable to mutating events that change, shock, and command attention, actions that attain expanding scope and influence by virtue of a network imaginary, where such moments self-organize and multiply in varied directions. The development of policy studies as rhetoric, then, calls attention to the disruptive events as these become situated in the restricted focus of national debate and recovered, through critique, as an unfinished metapolitics, which demands rethinking of the taken-for-granted grounds and alliances upon which post-event consensus became fabricated. In its time, the "War on Terror" was framed as a "clash of civilizations" and a new Munich. In retrospect, 9/11 should be understood as signaling a much closer, changing, entangled, future world where the complications of security spread and interlock to haunt twenty-first-century network imaginaries.

### CP

#### **The United States Congress should establish a policy trial process regarding whether the United States Congress should statutorily require the President to release the United States Department of Justice memoranda outlining the legal basis and justification for drone strikes in the area of targeted killing. The result of the policy trial should be unconditionally implemented and enforced by the United States Congress.**

#### The trial solves the aff

Noone 12

(Gregory Noone, Director of the Fairmont State University National ¶ Security and Intelligence Program and an Assistant Professor of ¶ Political Science and Law, “The War Powers Resolution and Public Opinion” Volume 45 Fall 2012 Issues 1 & 2, <http://law.case.edu/journals/JIL/Documents/45CaseWResJIntlL1&2.8.Article.Noone.pdf>, KB)

IV. The Public Wants Congress to Approve¶ “Do you think the president should or should not be required to ¶ get the approval of Congress before sending United States armed ¶ forces into action outside the United States?”30 In November 1973 the ¶ response favoring congressional approval was 80% and in May 2008 it ¶ was an equally stark 79%.31 In fact, for the past thirty-five years there ¶ has been little change in this basic sentiment as an overwhelming ¶ majority of Americans believe that the president needs congressional ¶ approval before committing troops overseas. The American people ¶ want Congress to execute its constitutional duties, or in other words, ¶ do its job.¶ In February 1999, for example, 54% approved of a peacekeeping ¶ mission in Kosovo (40% disapproved), whereas 43% Americans ¶ supported airstrikes and 45% opposed.32 However, 78% of Americans ¶ wanted President Clinton to seek approval from Congress.33 In ¶ September 2002, 69% said congressional approval was necessary for an ¶ invasion of Iraq and 51% said Congress should not give unlimited ¶ authority to use military action against Iraq.34 A CBS poll from that ¶ same month found 44% believed Congress was not asking enough ¶ questions, yet 22% believed Congress was asking too many questions, ¶ 16% about right, and 18% don’t know.35¶ Beyond the basic question of obtaining congressional approval, ¶ other specific scenarios polled in May 2008 indicate the desire for ¶ congressional approval remains strong with few exceptions.

#### The CP is more rigorous and avoids politics

Buchanan, ’13

(Bruce, Professor in Government at the University of Texas at Austin, Presidential Power and Accountability: Toward a Presidential Accountability System, Routledge, p. 114-115, RSR)

Finally and most importantly, invoking the procedure signals the American people that something rare and serious is afoot. They will pay closer attention than usual to the (inevitably televised) proceedings because the news media and political elites will tell them that if history is any guide, their reaction will play a vital role in determining the outcome. In fact, on this count, there is nothing new here. Public opinion has often been highly influential, indeed decisive, in the resolutions of a wide variety of high-pro file formal congressional proceedings. Examples include the Army McCarthy hearings, the McCarthy censure, the Irvin Committee hearings on Watergate, and the Clinton impeachment and Senate trial. Public opposition to U.S. engagement in World War II led Congress to pass two Neutrality Acts (in 1935 and 1937) that prevented a frustrated President Roosevelt from helping the allies before the U.S. entry into the war. These examples suggest that policy trials would be decisive. They would be decisive because, as in the examples, they would be preceded by highly explicit “role-sending” publicity which would put the people on notice that their collective judgment about a major decision facing Congress is likely to carry great weight. If history is any guide, such role sending, particularly when followed by deliberative policy trial proceedings, would almost certainly crystallize a public consensus that is informed, coherent, and sturdy enough both to influence and politically protect members of Congress, most of whom will follow the public lead.

## Drone Prolif

### 1NC Drone Prolif Inevitable

#### Drone arms race inevitable

USA Today 13

(1/9, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/01/08/experts-drones-basis-for-new-global-arms-race/1819091/, “Experts: Drones basis for new global arms race”, AB)

The success of U.S. drones in Iraq and Afghanistan has triggered a global arms race, raising concerns the remotely piloted aircraft could fall into unfriendly hands, military experts say. The number of countries that have acquired or developed drones expanded to more than 75, up from about 40 in 2005, according to the Government Accountability Office, the investigative arm of Congress. Iran and China are among the countries that have fielded their own systems. "People have seen the successes we've had," said Lt. Gen. Larry James, the Air Force's deputy chief of staff for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. The U.S. military has used drones extensively in Afghanistan, primarily to watch over enemy targets. Armed drones have been used to target terrorist leaders with missiles that are fired from miles away.

### 1NC No Modeling

#### Drone prolif now AND US restrictions don’t solve

Anderson 10 (Kenneth Anderson is a law professor at Washington College of Law, American University, a research fellow of the Hoover Institution at Stanford University and a Non-Resident Visiting Fellow at the Brookings Institution, April 10th 2010, “Acquiring UAV Technology”, http://www.volokh.com/2010/04/09/acquiring-uav-technology/, AB)

I’ve noticed a number of posts and comments around the blogosphere on the spread of UAV technology. Which indeed is happening; many states are developing and deploying UAVs of various kinds. The WCL National Security Law Brief blog, for example, notes that India is now acquiring weaponized UAVs: India is reportedly preparing to have “killer” unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in response to possible threats from Pakistan and China. Until now India has denied the use of armed UAVs, but they did use UAVs that can detect incoming missile attacks or border incursions. The importance of obtaining armed UAVs grew enormously after the recent attack on paramilitary forces in Chhattisgarh that killed 75 security personnel. Sources reveal that the Indian Air Force (IAF) has been in contact with Israeli arms suppliers in New Delhi recently. The IAF is looking to operate Israeli Harop armed UAVs from 2011 onwards, and other units of the armed forces will follow. I’ve also read comments various places suggesting that increased use of drone technologies by the United States causes other countries to follow suit, or to develop or acquire similar technologies. In some cases, the dangling implication is that if the US would not get involved in such technologies, others would not follow suit. In some relatively rare cases of weapons technologies, the US refraining from undertaking the R&D, or stopping short of a deployable weapon, might induce others not to build the same weapon. Perhaps the best example is the US stopping its development of blinding laser antipersonnel weapons in the 1990s; if others, particularly the Chinese, have developed them to a deployable weapon, I’m not aware of it. The US stopped partly in relation to a developing international campaign, modeled on the landmines ban campaign, but mostly because of a strong sense of revulsion and pushback by US line officers. Moreover, there was a strong sense that such a weapon (somewhat like chemical weapons) would be not deeply useful on a battlefield – but would be tremendously threatening as a pure terrorism weapon against civilians. In any case, the technologies involved would be advanced for R&D, construction, maintenance, and deployment, at least for a while. The situation is altogether different in the case of UAVs. The biggest reason is that the flying-around part of UAVs – the avionics and control of a drone aircraft in flight – is not particularly high technology at all. It is in range of pretty much any functioning state military that flies anything at all. The same for the weaponry, if all you’re looking to do is fire a missile, such as an anti-tank missile like the Hellfire. It’s not high technology, it is well within the reach of pretty much any state military. Iran? Without thinking twice. Burma? Sure. Zimbabwe? If it really wanted to, probably. So it doesn’t make any substantial difference whether or not the US deploys UAVs, not in relation to a decision by other states to deploy their own. The US decision to use and deploy UAVs does not drive others’ decisions one way or the other. They make that decision in nearly all cases – Iran perhaps being an exception in wanting to be able to show that they can use them in or over the Iraqi border – in relation to their particular security perceptions. Many states have reasons to want to have UAVs, for surveillance as well as use of force. It is not as a counter or defense to the US use of UAVs. The real issue is not flying the plane or putting a missile on it. The question is the sensor technology (and related communication links) – for two reasons. One is the ability to identify the target; the other is to determine the level, acceptable or not, of collateral damage in relation to the target. That’s the technologically difficult part. And yet it is not something important to very many of the militaries that might want to use UAVs, because not that many are going to be worried about the use of UAVs for discrete, targeted killing. Not so discrete and not so targeted will be just fine – and that does not require super-advanced technology. China might decide that it wants an advanced assassination platform that would depend on such sensors, and in any case be interested in investing in such technology for many reasons – but that is not going to describe Iran or very many other places that are capable of deploying and using weaponized UAVs. Iran, for example, won’t have super advanced sensor technology (unless China sells it to them), but they will have UAVs. (The attached weaponry follows the same pattern. Most countries will find a Hellfire type missile just fine. The US will continue to develop smaller weapons finally capable of a single person hit. Few others will develop it, partly because they don’t care and partly because its effectiveness depends on advanced sensors that they are not likely to have.) Robots are broadly defined by three characteristics – computation, sensor inputs, and gross movement. Movement in the case of a weaponized robot includes both movement and the use of its weapon – meaning, flying the UAV and firing a weapon. The first of those, flying the UAV, is available widely; primitive weapons are available widely as well, and so is the fundamental computational power. Sensors are much, much more difficult – but only to the extent that a party cares about discretion in targeting. But it is not the case that they are making these decisions on account of US decisions about UAVs; UAVs are useful for many other reasons for many other parties, all on their own.

### 1NC No Meltdown Impact

#### No impact to meltdowns – plant explosion is impossible.

Morris, 2K

PhD in Science Education and retired Environmental Consultant, 2k (Robert, The Environmental Case for Nuclear Power, 2000, pg 16-7)

In the 1970s, a number of anti-nuclear power organizations spread the idea that the chain reaction in a nuclear power plant might increase so rapidly that the reactor could explode, as the atomic bomb did. However, for a nuclear power reactor to undergo a nuclear explosion is, and has always been, a complete impossibility. To begin with, nuclear power reactors contain only 3 percent U235. Nuclear bombs must contain over 90 percent U235, or they don’t satisfy the first of several physical conditions which must be met before a nuclear explosion can occur. (Nor is it possible for a reactor which uses plutonium to explode as did the atomic bomb.) For those readers who might be thinking, “What about the Russian nuclear power plant at Chernobyl? Didn’t it explode?” The explosion at Chernobyl was a chemical or steam explosion, not a nuclear explosion. The fact that only two people were killed by the initial explosion is ample proof that a nuclear explosion did not occur at Chernobyl; a nuclear explosion would have killed thousands. Even at a primitive nuclear power plant like Chernobyl, a nuclear explosion is an impossibility. For the time being, suffice it to say that Chernobyl was such an unsafe design that it could never have been licensed to generate electricity in the U.S., or in any of the Western European nations. (More about Chernobyl appears in a later chapter.)

### 1NC No Armenia-Azerbaijan War

#### No Armenia-Azerbaijan war- lack of money and capability

Stratfor ‘11

[Why Russia, Turkey Look Toward Armenia and Azerbaijan” http://www.stratfor.com/geopolitical\_diary/20110331-why-russia-and-turkey-are-looking-towards-armenia-and-azerbaijan]

Though simmering hostilities have continued, there are two reasons the conflict has remained frozen. First, beginning in the mid-1990s, neither Armenia nor Azerbaijan had the resources to continue fighting. Armenia’s economy was, and is, non-existent for the most part. Without the financial means, it would be impossible for Armenia to launch a full-scale war. At the same time, Azerbaijan’s military has been too weak, thus far, to assert control over the occupied lands.

### 1NC No Middle East War

#### No middle east escalation

Fettweis 7

Asst Prof Poli Sci – Tulane, Asst Prof National Security Affairs – US Naval War College, 7

(Christopher, “On the Consequences of Failure in Iraq,” *Survival*, Vol. 49, Iss. 4, December, p. 83 – 98)

Without the US presence, a second argument goes, nothing would prevent Sunni-Shia violence from sweeping into every country where the religious divide exists. A Sunni bloc with centres in Riyadh and Cairo might face a Shia bloc headquartered in Tehran, both of which would face enormous pressure from their own people to fight proxy wars across the region. In addition to intra-Muslim civil war, cross-border warfare could not be ruled out. Jordan might be the first to send troops into Iraq to secure its own border; once the dam breaks, Iran, Turkey, Syria and Saudi Arabia might follow suit. The Middle East has no shortage of rivalries, any of which might descend into direct conflict after a destabilising US withdrawal. In the worst case, Iran might emerge as the regional hegemon, able to bully and blackmail its neighbours with its new nuclear arsenal. Saudi Arabia and Egypt would soon demand suitable deterrents of their own, and a nuclear arms race would envelop the region. Once again, however, none of these outcomes is particularly likely.Wider war No matter what the outcome in Iraq, the region is not likely to devolve into chaos. Although it might seem counter-intuitive, by most traditional measures the Middle East is very stable. Continuous, uninterrupted governance is the norm, not the exception; most Middle East regimes have been in power for decades. Its monarchies, from Morocco to Jordan to every Gulf state, have generally been in power since these countries gained independence. In Egypt Hosni Mubarak has ruled for almost three decades, and Muammar Gadhafi in Libya for almost four. The region's autocrats have been more likely to die quiet, natural deaths than meet the hangman or post-coup firing squads. Saddam's rather unpredictable regime, which attacked its neighbours twice, was one of the few exceptions to this pattern of stability, and he met an end unusual for the modern Middle East. Its regimes have survived potentially destabilising shocks before, and they would be likely to do so again. The region actually experiences very little cross-border warfare, and even less since the end of the Cold War. Saddam again provided an exception, as did the Israelis, with their adventures in Lebanon. Israel fought four wars with neighbouring states in the first 25 years of its existence, but none in the 34 years since. Vicious civil wars that once engulfed Lebanon and Algeria have gone quiet, and its ethnic conflicts do not make the region particularly unique. The biggest risk of an American withdrawal is intensified civil war in Iraq rather than regional conflagration. Iraq's neighbours will likely not prove eager to fight each other to determine who gets to be the next country to spend itself into penury propping up an unpopular puppet regime next door. As much as the Saudis and Iranians may threaten to intervene on behalf of their co-religionists, they have shown no eagerness to replace the counter-insurgency role that American troops play today. If the United States, with its remarkable military and unlimited resources, could not bring about its desired solutions in Iraq, why would any other country think it could do so?17 Common interest, not the presence of the US military, provides the ultimate foundation for stability. All ruling regimes in the Middle East share a common (and understandable) fear of instability. It is the interest of every actor - the Iraqis, their neighbours and the rest of the world - to see a stable, functioning government emerge in Iraq. If the United States were to withdraw, increased regional cooperation to address that common interest is far more likely than outright warfare.

#### Middle East conflict won’t escalate – local conflicts do not spillover

Cook, Takeyh, and Maloney 7

Steven A. Cook (fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations) Ray Takeyh (fellows at the Council on Foreign Relations) and Suzanne Maloney (senior fellow at Saban Center) June 28 2007 “Why the Iraq war won't engulf the Mideast”, International Herald Tribune

Finally, there is no precedent for Arab leaders to commit forces to conflicts in which they are not directly involved. The Iraqis and the Saudis did send small contingents to fight the Israelis in 1948 and 1967, but they were either ineffective or never made it. In the 1970s and 1980s, Arab countries other than Syria, which had a compelling interest in establishing its hegemony over Lebanon, never committed forces either to protect the Lebanese from the Israelis or from other Lebanese. The civil war in Lebanon was regarded as someone else's fight. Indeed, this is the way many leaders view the current situation in Iraq. To Cairo, Amman and Riyadh, the situation in Iraq is worrisome, but in the end it is an Iraqi and American fight. As far as Iranian mullahs are concerned, they have long preferred to press their interests through proxies as opposed to direct engagement. At a time when Tehran has access and influence over powerful Shiite militias, a massive cross-border incursion is both unlikely and unnecessary. So Iraqis will remain locked in a sectarian and ethnic struggle that outside powers may abet, but will remain within the borders of Iraq. The Middle East is a region both prone and accustomed to civil wars. But given its experience with ambiguous conflicts, the region has also developed an intuitive ability to contain its civil strife and prevent local conflicts from enveloping the entire Middle East.

## Heg

### 1NC AT Alliances

#### Alliances don’t solve anything – Gulf War proves that countries will hate us no matter what.

Krauthammer, ‘3

(Charles, The National Interest, Winter 2002/2003)

A third critique comes from what might be called pragmatic realists, who see the new unilateralism I have outlined as hubristic, and whose objections are practical. They are prepared to engage in a pragmatic multilateralism. They value great power concert. They seek Security Council support not because it confers any moral authority, but because it spreads risk. In their view, a single hegemon risks far more violent resentment than would a power that consistently acts as primus inter pares, sharing rule-making functions with others.12 I have my doubts. The United States made an extraordinary effort in the Gulf War to get un support, share decision-making, assemble a coalition and, as we have seen, deny itself the fruits of victory in order to honor coalition goals. Did that diminish the anti-American feeling in the region? Did it garner support for subsequent Iraq policy dictated by the original acquiescence to the coalition? The attacks of September 11 were planned during the Clinton Administration, an administration that made a fetish of consultation and did its utmost to subordinate American hegemony and smother unipolarity. The resentments were hardly assuaged. Why? Because the extremist rage against the United States is engendered by the very structure of the international system, not by the details of our management of it.

### 1NC Alt Causes

#### Wiretapping tanks soft power

Arkedis 2013

(Jim Arkedis, Senior Fellow at the Progressive Policy Institute and was a DOD counter-terrorism analyst, “PRISM Is Bad for American Soft Power”, Jun 19 2013, The Atlantic, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/06/prism-is-bad-for-american-soft-power/277015/)

The lack of public debate, shifting attitudes towards civil liberties, insufficient disclosure, and a decreasing terrorist threat demands that collecting Americans' phone and Internet records must meet the absolute highest bar of public consent. It's a test the Obama administration is failing. This brings us back to Harry Truman and Jim Crow. Even though PRISM is technically legal, the lack of recent public debate and support for aggressive domestic collection is hurting America's soft power. The evidence is rolling in. The China Daily, an English-language mouthpiece for the Communist Party, is having a field day, pointing out America's hypocrisy as the Soviet Union did with Jim Crow. Chinese dissident artist Ai Wei Wei made the link explicitly, saying "In the Soviet Union before, in China today, and even in the U.S., officials always think what they do is necessary... but the lesson that people should learn from history is the need to limit state power." Even America's allies are uneasy, at best. German Chancellor Angela Merkel grew up in the East German police state and expressed diplomatic "surprise" at the NSA's activities. She vowed to raise the issue with Obama at this week's G8 meetings. The Italian data protection commissioner said the program would "not be legal" in his country. British Foreign Minister William Hague came under fire in Parliament for his government's participation. If Americans supported these programs, our adversaries and allies would have no argument. As it is, the next time the United States asks others for help in tracking terrorists, it's more likely than not that they will question Washington's motives.

### 1NC No Soft Power Impact

#### Soft power is a false concept—only wealth and power affect influence

Doctorow 2013

(Gilbert, Research Fellow of the American University in Moscow, May 20, "Soft power is largely an American PR gimmick", http://english.ruvr.ru/2013\_05\_20/Soft-power-is-largely-an-American-PR-gimmick/)

There is not much in all of this for the Kremlin to use in furtherance of its foreign policy objectives. But then the fact that Hilary Clinton chose Nye as the State Department’s house philosopher during her tenure did not change the substance of Obama’s foreign policy even if it may have influenced the sound bites. And it could not be otherwise, because soft power is largely a public relations gimmick.¶ Since Nye is an idealist rather than a realist, he systematically fails to understand that soft power is above all a by-product of wealth and success. America’s undisputed power of attraction to peoples around the world (when it is not invading hapless countries) has more to do with its per capita GDP than with any other factor. This explains the passion of ambitious people everywhere to send their children to American colleges, whatever their ratings. It explains the popularity of Hollywood and pop culture and much more. There is nothing wrong with this; it is all understandable in human terms. But it has relatively little to do with vibrant civil society or any beacon of human rights radiating from Washington, D.C. In this respect, the best thing that Russia or China can do to further their soft power is to get richer quick.

### 1NC No Heg Impact

#### Hegemony isn’t key to peace

Fettweis, 11   
Christopher J. Fettweis, Department of Political Science, Tulane University, 9/26/11, Free Riding or Restraint? Examining European Grand Strategy, Comparative Strategy, 30:316–332, EBSCO

It is perhaps worth noting that there is no evidence to support a direct relationship between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. In fact, the limited data we do have suggest the opposite may be true. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990.51 To internationalists, defense hawks and believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities,” argued Kristol and Kagan, “doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace.”52 On the other hand, if the pacific trends were not based upon U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the U**nited** S**tates** cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable United States military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums, no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races, and no regional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. Most of all, the United States and its allies were no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped the spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a connection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. Once again, one could presumably argue that spending is not the only or even the best indication of hegemony, and that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was significantly altered during this period, instability should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. However, even if it is true that either U.S. commitments or relative spending account for global pacific trends, then at the very least stability can evidently be maintained at drastically lower levels of both. In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in the alternative for a moment and suppose that there is in fact a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand strategist would still recommend cutting back on engagement and spending until that level is determined. Grand strategic decisions are never final; continual adjustments can and must be made as time goes on. Basic logic suggests that the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment. And if the current era of stability is as stable as many believe it to be, no increase in conflict would ever occur irrespective of U.S. spending, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation. It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that their expectations had been fulfilled. If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as proof of the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the only evidence we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained United States suggests that the current peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. military spending. Evidently the rest of the world can operate quite effectively without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone.

#### Heg is unsustainable Layne 10 (Christopher Layne, Professor and Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security at Texas A&M's George H.W. Bush School of Government & Public Service. "Graceful decline: the end of Pax Americana". The American Conservative. May 2010. http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_7060/is\_5\_9/ai\_n5422359

China's economy has been growing much more rapidly than the United States' over the last two decades and continues to do so, maintaining audacious 8 percent growth projections in the midst of a global recession. Leading economic forecasters predict that it will overtake the U.S. as the world's largest economy, measured by overall GDP, sometime around 2020. Already in 2008, China passed the U.S. as the world's leading manufacturing nation--a title the United States had enjoyed for over a century--and this year China will displace Japan as the world's second-largest economy. Everything we know about the trajectories of rising great powers tells us that China will use its increasing wealth to build formidable military power and that it will seek to become the dominant power in East Asia. Optimists contend that once the U.S. recovers from what historian Niall Ferguson calls the "Great Repression"--not quite a depression but more than a recession--we'll be able to answer the Chinese challenge. The country, they remind us, faced a larger debt-GDP ratio after World War II yet embarked on an era of sustained growth. They forget that the postwar era was a golden age of U.S. industrial and financial dominance, trade surpluses, and persistent high growth rates. Those days are gone. The United States of 2010 and the world in which it lives are far different from those of 1945. Weaknesses in the fundamentals of the American economy have been accumulating for more than three decades. In the 1980s, these problems were acutely diagnosed by a number of writers--notably David Calleo, Paul Kennedy, Robert Gilpin, Samuel Huntington, and James Chace--who predicted that these structural ills would ultimately erode the economic foundations of America's global preeminence. A spirited late-1980s debate was cut short, when, in quick succession, the Soviet Union collapsed, Japan's economic bubble burst, and the U.S. experienced an apparent economic revival during the Clinton administration. Now the delayed day of reckoning is fast approaching. Even in the best case, the United States will emerge from the current crisis with fundamental handicaps. The Federal Reserve and Treasury have pumped massive amounts of dollars into circulation in hope of reviving the economy. Add to that the $1 trillion-plus budget deficits that the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) predicts the United States will incur for at least a decade. When the projected deficits are bundled with the persistent U.S. current-account deficit, the entitlements overhang (the unfunded future liabilities of Medicare and Social Security), and the cost of the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is reason to worry about the United States' fiscal stability. As the CBO says, "Even if the recovery occurs as projected and the stimulus bill is allowed to expire, the country will face the highest debt/GDP ratio in 50 years and an increasingly unsustainable and urgent fiscal problem**."** The dollar's vulnerability is the United States' geopolitical Achilles' heel. Its role as the international economy's reserve currency ensures American preeminence, and if it loses that status, hegemony will be literally unaffordable. As Cornell professor Jonathan Kirshner observes, the dollar's vulnerability "presents potentially significant and underappreciated restraints upon contemporary American political and military predominance." Fears for the dollar's long-term health predated the current financial and economic crisis. The meltdown has amplified them and highlighted two new factors that bode ill for continuing reserve-currency status. First, the other big financial players in the international economy are either military rivals (China) or ambiguous allies (Europe) that have their own ambitions and no longer require U.S. protection from the Soviet threat. Second, the dollar faces an uncertain future because of concerns that its value will diminish over time. Indeed, China, which has holdings estimated at nearly $2 trillion, is worried that America will leave it with huge piles of depreciated dollars. China's vote of no confidence is reflected in its recent calls to create a new reserve currency. In coming years, the U.S. will be under increasing pressure to defend the dollar by preventing runaway inflation. This will require it to impose fiscal self-discipline through some combination of budget cuts, tax increases, and interest-rate hikes**.** Given that the last two options could choke off renewed growth, there is likely to be strong pressure to slash the federal budget. But it will be almost impossible to make meaningful cuts in federal spending without deep reductions in defense expenditures. Discretionary non-defense domestic spending accounts for only about 20 percent of annual federal outlays. So the United States will face obvious "guns or butter" choices. As Kirshner puts it, the absolute size of U.S. defense expenditures are "more likely to be decisive in the future when the U.S. is under pressure to make real choices about taxes and spending. When borrowing becomes more difficult, and adjustment more difficult to postpone, choices must be made between raising taxes, cutting non-defense spending, and cutting defense spending." Faced with these hard decisions, Americans will find themselves afflicted with hegemony fatigue.

## Terrorism

### 1NC Solve Terror

#### Drones are effective- eliminate important terrorist human capital and prevent communication and training

Byman 2013

(Daniel L., Research Director of Saban Center for Middle East Policy, “Why Drones Work: The Case for Washington's Weapon of Choice”, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2013, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2013/06/17-drones-obama-weapon-choice-us-counterterrorism-byman>)

The Obama administration relies on drones for one simple reason: they work. According to data compiled by the New America Foundation, since Obama has been in the White House, U.S. drones have killed an estimated 3,300 al Qaeda, Taliban, and other jihadist operatives in Pakistan and Yemen. That number includes over 50 senior leaders of al Qaeda and the Taliban—top figures who are not easily replaced. In 2010, Osama bin Laden warned his chief aide, Atiyah Abd al-Rahman, who was later killed by a drone strike in the Waziristan region of Pakistan in 2011, that when experienced leaders are eliminated, the result is “the rise of lower leaders who are not as experienced as the former leaders” and who are prone to errors and miscalculations. And drones also hurt terrorist organizations when they eliminate operatives who are lower down on the food chain but who boast special skills: passport forgers, bomb makers, recruiters, and fundraisers.¶ Drones have also undercut terrorists’ ability to communicate and to train new recruits. In order to avoid attracting drones, al Qaeda and Taliban operatives try to avoid using electronic devices or gathering in large numbers. A tip sheet found among jihadists in Mali advised militants to “maintain complete silence of all wireless contacts” and “avoid gathering in open areas.” Leaders, however, cannot give orders when they are incommunicado, and training on a large scale is nearly impossible when a drone strike could wipe out an entire group of new recruits. Drones have turned al Qaeda’s command and training structures into a liability, forcing the group to choose between having no leaders and risking dead leaders.

### 1NC Strikes Low

#### Drone strikes are less utilized in the status quo, and are killing record low levels of civilians

Cahall 13

(Bailey, research associate with the National Security Studies Program at the New America Foundation, July 2nd 2013, New report says CIA drone strikes in Pakistan at an all-time low, afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/07/02/report\_cia\_drone\_strikes\_in\_pakistan\_at\_all\_time\_low

A new report released by the Bureau of Investigative Journalism on Monday notes that the number of reported civilian deaths caused by the CIA's drone campaign in Pakistan is at an all-time low (ET). The drone strikes are at their lowest level since early 2008, and the average number of people killed in each strike has also fallen sharply over the last few years. Similar data from the New America Foundation shows that, to date, there have been 13 drone strikes in Pakistan and 82 people have been killed, down from the record 122 strikes and 849 people killed in 2010. Peter Bergen and Jennifer Rowland have written repeatedly about the sharply falling civilian casualty rate for the past year on CNN.com.

### 1NC AT Recruitment

#### Overall levels of violence may increase, but the effectiveness and impact of those attacks goes way down. Prefer our comparative evidence here—violence has to be evaluated in terms of frequency and magnitude.

Wilner 10

(Alex S. Wilner, Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, Targeted Killings in Afghanistan: Measuring Coercion and Deterrence in Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 33 No. 4, 09 Mar 2010, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10576100903582543)

Generally, overall violence increased following the targeted eliminations (Figure 2). This was especially so with the Dadullah case. On the surface, these are unanticipated developments.74 The literature on targeted killings suggests that eliminations should result in a general diminishment of violence. In their quantitative analysis of Israel’s campaign of targeted killings between 2000 and 2004, Mohammed Hafez and Joseph Hatfield provide similar findings. They conclude that “targeted assassinations have no significant impact on rates of Palestinian violence.”75 That both this and the Hafez/Hatfield study find trends that contradict theoretical expectations would suggest that certain components of the literature on targeted killings need to be substantially revised. However, a closer examination of the Afghan data does corroborate the literature’s most basic theoretical principle: targeted killings influence the type of violence terrorists are capable of planning effectively and forces them to conduct less-preferred forms of activity.¶ Violent, non-state organizations have coercive preferences. The Taliban is no exception. The type of violence they engage in rests as much on the impact they are trying to have as it does on their capacity and capability to muster efforts toward particular goals. To that end, suicide attacks are the Taliban’s preferred tactic—they are the most effective form of violence, provide the greatest consequence (both in kill ratios and psychological effect), can be directed against hard targets, are difficult to detect, stop, and mitigate, and have a proven track record of killing Coalition and Afghan soldiers. Suicide bombings are also the most sophisticated type of violence to plan, the most difficult to organize effectively, and take a considerable amount of time, energy, and expertise to mount successfully. Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) are the Taliban’s second most preferred tactic—they have proven deadly against Afghan National Police (ANP) and other lightly armored ISAF/NATO and Afghan National Army (ANA) personnel carriers, they are cheaply constructed, and provide a deadly concentrated explosive blast. IEDs are also less sophisticated than suicide bombs and are easier to organize effectively. They offer less control, however, cannot be consistently directed against particular targets, can be detected and diffused more easily than suicide bombs, their detonation can be mitigated with proper armor, and they are all too often triggered by civilians. Small arms and rocket fire (SA/R) is the Taliban’s least preferred tactic—it is most effective against soft targets, Afghan and international officials, lightly armed ANP forces, and when used in complex ambushes. However, SA/R attacks against security forces can be easily mitigated and usually result in a disproportionately high rate of Taliban casualties. Likewise, Taliban SA/R attacks are usually successfully repelled and the heavy concentration of gunmen in one location can be easily attacked with aerial support. Furthermore, Taliban rocket fire is crude, uncontrolled, and ineffective. In sum, SA/R attacks are the least sophisticated type of violence and the easiest to organize yet provide the worst results.¶ With these Taliban preferences in mind, the aggregate data on overall levels of violence reveal a number of expected findings. After the targeted killings, for instance, suicide bombings dropped by over 30 percent, from a total of 43 before, to 29 after, the targeted eliminations. This is in keeping with the degree of difficulty, amount of time and expertise, and level of leadership that is required to coordinate effective suicide bombings. It is also plausible that the decrease in suicide attacks spurred a rise in less-sophisticated forms of violence, with IEDs increasing by 6 percent and SA/R attacks by roughly 15 percent following the four targeted attacks.76 As leaders and facilitators were eliminated, the Taliban began using less-sophisticated forms of violence that required less energy, expertise, and time to organize effectively. This shift resonates with elements outlined in the literature on targeted killings: as organizations succumb to the effects of a protracted campaign of elimination, their overall ability to operate at a high level of sophistication decreases and the selection and use of less formidable forms of violence increases.¶ Overall levels of violence, however, are only a minor part of the analysis. The data also reveal changes in Taliban professionalism following the targeted killings. For the two most sophisticated forms of violence (IEDs and suicide attacks), the aggregate data suggest a decrease in professionalism and an increase in failure rates. After the eliminations, IED failure rates rose precipitously from 20 to roughly 35 percent. This is a considerable change in proficiency. Suicide bombing success rates also dropped (by a less impressive though no less important five percentage points) following the strikes. Both are theoretically expected findings (Figure 3). Finally, the data also suggest that the targeted killings influenced the selection of targets. For instance, in terms of known target selection for suicide bombers, the aggregate data reveal that following the eliminations, soft targets were more often selected (as a percentage of all target selection) after the leadership strikes (Figure 4). As leaders where killed, remaining forces selected less formidable targets to attack, like Afghan government officials, civil-society actors, and off-duty police commanders, rather than hardened, military actors.

### 1NC No Terror

#### No threat – weak leadership and no recent attacks

Zenko and Cohen 12

\*Fellow in the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations, \*Fellow at the Century Foundation, (Micah and Michael, "Clear and Present Safety," March/April, Foreign Affairs, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137279/micah-zenko-and-michael-a-cohen/clear-and-present-safety

NONE OF this is meant to suggest that the United States faces no major challenges today. Rather, the point is that the problems confronting the country are manageable and pose minimal risks to the lives of the overwhelming majority of Americans. None of them -- separately or in combination -- justifies the alarmist rhetoric of policymakers and politicians or should lead to the conclusion that Americans live in a dangerous world.¶ Take terrorism. Since 9/11, no security threat has been hyped more. Considering the horrors of that day, that is not surprising. But the result has been a level of fear that is completely out of proportion to both the capabilities of terrorist organizations and the United States' vulnerability. On 9/11, al Qaeda got tragically lucky. Since then, the United States has been preparing for the one percent chance (and likely even less) that it might get lucky again. But al Qaeda lost its safe haven after the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, and further military, diplomatic, intelligence, and law enforcement efforts have decimated the organization, which has essentially lost whatever ability it once had to seriously threaten the United States.¶ According to U.S. officials, al Qaeda's leadership has been reduced to two top lieutenants: Ayman al-Zawahiri and his second-in-command, Abu Yahya al-Libi. Panetta has even said that the defeat of al Qaeda is "within reach." The near collapse of the original al Qaeda organization is one reason why, in the decade since 9/11, the U.S. homeland has not suffered any large-scale terrorist assaults. All subsequent attempts have failed or been thwarted, owing in part to the incompetence of their perpetrators. Although there are undoubtedly still some terrorists who wish to kill Americans, their dreams will likely continue to be frustrated by their own limitations and by the intelligence and law enforcement agencies of the United States and its allies.

#### No chance of a terrorist attack

Mueller 8-2

IR prof at Ohio State. PhD in pol sci from UCLA (2 August 2011, John, The Truth about Al Qaeda, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68012/john-mueller/the-truth-about-al-qaeda?page=show)

As a misguided Turkish proverb holds, "If your enemy be an ant, imagine him to be an elephant." The new information unearthed in Osama bin Laden's hideout in Abbottabad, Pakistan, suggests that the United States has been doing so for a full decade. Whatever al Qaeda's threatening rhetoric and occasional nuclear fantasies, its potential as a menace, particularly as an atomic one, has been much inflated.¶ The public has now endured a decade of dire warnings about the imminence of a terrorist atomic attack. In 2004, the former CIA spook Michael Scheuer proclaimed on television's 60 Minutes that it was "probably a near thing," and in 2007, the physicist Richard Garwin assessed the likelihood of a nuclear explosion in an American or a European city by terrorism or other means in the next ten years to be 87 percent. By 2008, Defense Secretary Robert Gates mused that what keeps every senior government leader awake at night is "the thought of a terrorist ending up with a weapon of mass destruction, especially nuclear." Few, it seems, found much solace in the fact that an al Qaeda computer seized in Afghanistan in 2001 indicated that the group's budget for research on weapons of mass destruction (almost all of it focused on primitive chemical weapons work) was some $2,000 to $4,000.¶ In the wake of the killing of Osama bin Laden, officials now have more al Qaeda computers, which reportedly contain a wealth of information about the workings of the organization in the intervening decade. A multi-agency task force has completed its assessment, and according to first reports, it has found that al Qaeda members have primarily been engaged in dodging drone strikes and complaining about how cash-strapped they are. Some reports suggest they've also been looking at quite a bit of pornography.

## Solvency

### 1NC Squo Solves

#### Squo solves drone strikes justified – leaking of white paper

Garrison ‘13

(Dr. Arthur H. Garrison, Assistant Professor of Criminal Justice at Kutztown University. Dr. Garrison received a B.A. from Kutztown University, M.S. from West Chester University, and a Doctorate of Law and Policy from Northeastern University. “ARTICLE: THE HISTORY OF EXECUTIVE BRANCH LEGAL OPINIONS ON THE POWER OF THE PRESIDENT AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF FROM WASHINGTON TO OBAMA” 2012 - 2013¶ Cumberland Law Review¶ 43 Cumb. L. Rev. 375 Lexis, TSW)

Admitting that Due Process requires some level of oversight n417 General Holder explained that with proper notification to Congress regarding its counterterrorism activities, which include the procedures in operation that dictate what circumstances would warrant the use of lethal force against a U.S. citizen who is a leader of A1 Qaeda, n418 "these circumstances are sufficient under the Constitution [\*487] the United States to use lethal force." n419 The use of drones was a significant issue before the leaking of the white paper, for Congress had already held hearings on the legality and use of predator drones by domestic law enforcement for public safety and surveillance purposes. n420 But after the leaking of the white paper, the question was raised whether the President could order a drone strike or other use of deadly force on an American citizen on American soil. n421 Controversy occurred when Attorney General Holder was unclear during his testimony before the Senate Judiciary committee n422 as to the answer. n423¶ [\*490] After an almost thirteen hour verbal filibuster on the Obama Administration's nomination of the CIA director by Senator Rand Paul n424 on March 6, 2013, the White House released a letter the following day from General Holder stating that a President does not [\*491] have the power to kill an American citizen involved in terrorism on American soil who does not pose an imminent threat. n425¶ Leaving aside the issues raised in the debate of using drones to target U.S. citizens who are terrorists in the United States, politically raised as they were; n426 what is significant in the Justice Depart-But [\*493] ment white paper, General Holder's testimony, speech and letters is that throughout them all, the WPR is not mentioned. While the WPR is not mentioned in these documents, the President's power to order lethal force on a specific American citizen who is allied with A1 Qaeda is supported in the following respects: both the white paper and General Holder's speech n427 claim military history, the Supreme Court and its decisions on the meaning and applicability of the Due Process Clause to governmental action, the limitations on the use of force in war under international law, both Congressional action n428 and judicial recognition that the U.S. is engaged in a military conflict with A1-Qaeda, n429 and federal laws prohibiting murder and assassination. However, the proposition that the WPR has any impact on the President is not addressed because it is not even considered to be true that the WPR places a limit on the Commander-in-Chief power in the implementation of war prior to congressional approval.

### 1NC Obama Ignores

#### Obama refuses to release the memo due to classified information – even with congressional pressure

Hirsh and Roberts 13 <[MICHAEL HIRSH, chief correspondent for National Journal AND KRISTIN ROBERTS](http://www.theatlantic.com/michael-hirsh-and-kristin-roberts/), news editor for National Journal., Why the Drone Memos Are Still Secret, FEB 22 2013, <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/02/why-the-drone-memos-are-still-secret/273436/>>#SPS

Despite President Obama's pledge in his State of the Union address to make the drone program "even more transparent to the American people and to the world," his administration continues to resist efforts by Congress, even from fellow Democrats, to obtain the full range of classified legal memos justifying "targeted killing."¶ A key reason for that reticence, according to two sources who have read the memos or are aware of their contents, is that the documents contain secret protocols with foreign governments, including Pakistan and Yemen, as well as "case-specific" details of strikes.¶ A legal expert outside the government who is intimately familiar with the contents of the memos said the government-to-government accords on the conduct of drone strikes are an important element not contained in the Justice Department "white paper" [revealed recently by NBC News](http://openchannel.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/02/04/16843014-justice-department-memo-reveals-legal-case-for-drone-strikes-on-americans?lite). He said it is largely in order to protect this information that the targeted-killing memos drafted by Justice's Office of Legal Counsel are not being released, and that even the Senate and House Intelligence committees have been allowed to examine only four of the nine OLC memos. "That is what is missing from the white paper but forms a core part of the memos," the expert told National Journal, speaking on condition of anonymity because the information is classified. He said the administration believes that the protocols would almost certainly leak to the public if they were shared with Congress.

### 1NC Secrecy

#### CIA keeps drone info secret and courts won’t enforce – signature strikes prove

Marsden 13

(William, journalist, The Montreal Gazette, 2/2/2013, “Drone warfare comes under increasing attack; Controversial U.S. program cloaked in frayed veil of secrecy,” Lexis, accessed 7/6/2013, BS)

Both for political reasons and because of the questionable legality of it, the U.S. drone program is cloaked in a frayed veil of secrecy. While U.S. courts have refused to order the government to release information about a program that officially doesn't exist, the administration of President Barack Obama leaks when it benefits Obama's image. It's hard to keep Hellfire air-to-surface missile attacks secret. Pre-election concerns that Obama was appearing weak resulted in a series of New York Times stories in which unnamed administration sources depicted him as tough enough to make the weekly drone-kill decisions. Obama became the moral man saddled with a troubling but necessary drone war to keep America safe. This article was followed by a speech last June by Obama's "high priest" of killer drones, John Brennan, who at the time, was his lead terrorism adviser and is now his nominee to head the CIA. He said that "in order to prevent terrorist attacks on the United States and to save American lives, the United States government conducts targeted strikes against specific al-Qaida terrorists, sometimes using remotely piloted aircraft, often referred to publicly as 'drones.' " The killer drone program began under former president George H.W. Bush in 2002. Fifty strikes occurred under his administration. Obama has accelerated the program sevenfold with 350 strikes, says Zenko and other experts. Estimates vary as to how many "terrorists" and how many "civilians" have been killed. Of the 32 al-Qaida leaders on Obama's kill list, 22 have been killed, 21 by drones, Zenko said. The total number of people killed is much higher - more than 3,000, according to some accounts. How many of these were civilians depends on how "civilian" is defined. The administration says civilian deaths are minimal. Nongovernment organizations say the figure is more than 2,000. Naureen Shah, association director of the counterterrorism and human rights project at Columbia Law School, said the criteria for a drone strike fall into two categories. So-called "personality" attacks means that the government knows the identity of the person targeted. "Signature" attacks target people whose identities are unknown but whose behaviour gives a terrorist signature. For example, they could be seen carrying a weapon or transporting, say, fertilizer that could be used in improvised explosive devices. Or they could be simply giving first aid to a victim of a drone strike. "The U.S. has never acknowledged that they conduct signature strikes," Zenko said. "When John Brennan was asked the question specifically, he refused to answer. And the reason is it gets into a lot of sort of international legal problems."

# 2NC

## DA

### 2NC Overview

#### Disad turns and outweighs the aff – bioterror causes extinction – pathogens rapidly reproduce and intensify which spreads – that’s Steinbrunner - CIR boosts the biotech industry which allows us to develop counter-response measures which deters and solves the impact to an attack – that’s Chyba and Scullion

#### That comparatively outweighs case

Singer 1

[Clifford Singer, Director of the Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security at the University of Illinois at Urbana—Champaign. “Will Mankind Survive the Millennium?” The Bulletin of the Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 13.1, <http://www.acdis.uiuc.edu/> research/S&Ps/2001-Sp/S&P\_ XIII/Singer.htm Published Spring 2001]

In recent years the fear of the apocalypse (or religious hope for it) has been in part a child of the Cold War, but its seeds in Western culture go back to the Black Death and earlier. Recent polls suggest that the majority in the United States that believe man would survive into the future for substantially less than a millennium was about 10 percent higher in the Cold War than afterward. However fear of annihilation of the human species through nuclear warfare was confused with the admittedly terrifying, but much different matter of destruction of a dominant civilization. The destruction of a third or more of much of the globe’s population through the disruption from the direct consequences of nuclear blast and fire damage was certainly possible. There was, and still is, what is now known to be a rather small chance that dust raised by an all-out nuclear war would cause a so called nuclear winter, substantially reducing agricultural yields especially in temperate regions for a year or more. As noted above mankind as a whole has weathered a number of mind-boggling disasters in the past fifty thousand years even if older cultures or civilizations have sometimes eventually given way to new ones in the process. Moreover the fear that radioactive fallout would make the globe uninhabitable, publicized by widely seen works such as “On the Beach,” was a metaphor for the horror of nuclear war rather than reality. The epidemiological lethal results of well over a hundred atmospheric nuclear tests are barely statistically detectable except in immediate fallout plumes. The increase in radiation exposure far from the combatants in even a full scale nuclear exchange at the height of the Cold War would have been modest compared to the variations in natural background radiation doses that have readily been adapted to by a number of human populations. Nor is there any reason to believe that global warming or other insults to our physical environment resulting from currently used technologies will challenge the survival of mankind as a whole beyond what it has already handily survived through the past fifty thousand years. There are, however, two technologies currently under development that may pose a more serious threat to human survival. The first and most immediate is biological warfare combined with genetic engineering. Smallpox is the most fearsome of natural biological warfare agents in existence. By the end of the next decade, global immunity to smallpox will likely be at a low unprecedented since the emergence of this disease in the distant past, while the opportunity for it to spread rapidly across the globe will be at an all time high. In the absence of other complications such as nuclear war near the peak of an epidemic, developed countries may respond with quarantine and vaccination to limit the damage. Otherwise mortality there may match the rate of 30 percent or more expected in unprepared developing countries. With respect to genetic engineering using currently available knowledge and technology, the simple expedient of spreading an ample mixture of coat protein variants could render a vaccination response largely ineffective, but this would otherwise not be expected to substantially increase overall mortality rates. With development of new biological technology, however, there is a possibility that a variety of infectious agents may be engineered for combinations of greater than natural virulence and mortality, rather than just to overwhelm currently available antibiotics or vaccines. There is no a priori known upper limit to the power of this type of technology base, and thus the survival of a globally connected human family may be in question when and if this is achieved.

#### DA turns the aff – in the event of a crisis (IE the DA impact) Congress would give Obama unfettered authority to respond

### Defense

#### Counterforce targeting checks their impact

Mueller, ‘9

Professor Political Science Ohio State U¶ (John, Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies and Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University. “Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al-Qaeda” p. 8)

To begin to approach a condition that can credibly justify applying such extreme characterizations as societal annihilation, a full-out attack with hundreds, probably thousands, of thermonuclear bombs would be required. Even in such extreme cases, the area actually devastated by the bombs' blast and thermal pulse effects would be limited: 2,000 I-MT explosions with a destructive radius of 5 miles each would directly demolish less than 5 percent of the territory of the United States, for example. Obviously, if major population centers were targeted, this sort of attack could inflict massive casualties. Back in cold war days, when such devastating events sometimes seemed uncomfortably likely, a number of studies were conducted to estimate the consequences of massive thermonuclear attacks. One of the most prominent of these considered several possibilities. The most likely scenario--one that could be perhaps be considered at least to begin to approach the rational-was a "counterforce" strike in which well over 1,000 thermonuclear weapons would be targeted at America's ballistic missile silos, strategic airfields, and nuclear submarine bases in an effort to destroy the country's strategic ability to retaliate. Since the attack would not directly target population centers, most of the ensuing deaths would be from radioactive fallout, and the study estimates that from 2 to 20 million, depending mostly on wind, weather, and sheltering, would perish during the first month.

#### No great power wars

**Ikenberry 9**

[\*Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins AND \*\*Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, Jan/Feb, 2009, Daniel Deudney and John Ikenberry, “The Myth of the Autocratic Revival: Why Liberal Democracy Will Prevail,” *Foreign Affairs*]

This bleak outlook is based on an exaggeration of recent developments and ignores powerful countervailing factors and forces. Indeed, contrary to what the revivalists describe, **the most striking features of the contemporary international landscape are the intensification of economic globalization, thickening institutions, and shared problems of interdependence. The overall structure** of the international system today **is** quite **unlike that of the nineteenth century. Compared to older orders, the contemporary liberal-centered international order provides a set of constraints and opportunities-of pushes and pulls-that reduce the likelihood of severe conflict while creating strong imperatives for cooperative problem solving.** Those invoking the nineteenth century as a model for the twenty-first also fail to acknowledge the extent to which **war as a path to conflict resolution and great-power expansion has become largely obsolete.** Most important, **nuclear weapons have transformed great-power war** from a routine feature of international politics **into an exercise in national suicide. With all of the great powers possessing nuclear weapons** and ample means to rapidly expand their deterrent forces, **warfare among these states has truly become an option of last resort. The prospect** of such great losses **has instilled in the great powers a level of caution and restraint that effectively precludes major revisionist efforts**. Furthermore, **the diffusion of small arms and the near universality of nationalism have severely limited the ability of great powers to conquer and occupy territory** inhabited by resisting populations (as Algeria, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and now Iraq have demonstrated). Unlike during the days of empire building in the nineteenth century, **states today cannot translate great asymmetries of power into effective territorial control**; at most, they can hope for loose hegemonic relationships that require them to give something in return. Also unlike in the nineteenth century, today **the density of trade, investment, and production networks across international borders raises even more the costs of war. A Chinese invasion of Taiwan, to take one of the most plausible cases of a future interstate war, would pose for the Chinese communist regime daunting economic costs, both domestic and international.** Taken together, **these changes in the economy of violence mean that the international system is far more primed for peace** than the autocratic revivalists acknowledge.

### AT No Pass - Syria

#### Syria doesn’t doom passage - immigration is on the backburner but passage is still possible

Lee 9-9

(ESTHER YU-HSI LEE, immigration Reporter/Blogger for ThinkProgress, “House Republicans Stall On Immigration Reform, Blaming Other Priorities” SEPTEMBER 9, 2013, <http://thinkprogress.org/immigration/2013/09/09/2588011/immigration-reform-burner/>, KB)

August recess is over and Congressional leaders have their hands full with an agenda that includes a short-term spending bill, a potential government shutdown, and Syria. Immigration reform has become something of a back burner focus for House Republicans.¶ The Senate introduced their bipartisan bill in April and passed their bill two months later. Before the August recess, House members said that they would take up a reform bill in the fall. Key House members met secretly for years at night in the Capitol complex to discuss an immigration overhaul.¶ But now conservative commentators and politicians alike are pointing to Syria as a new reason that immigration reform may be crowded out of a chance of being considered in 2013. Sen. Jeff Flake (R-AZ) said, “It’s just one more thing drawing attention and calendar time away from immigration. So it doesn’t help. It doesn’t necessarily doom it, but it’s certainly not helpful.”¶ Rep. Raul Labrador (R-ID), a key member of the House immigration team, said on Sunday that immigration reform wouldn’t be considered until 2015. And the chances of budging on reform during an election year is likely slim, but necessary given that the Senate immigration bill, a key momentum driver, will expire in 2014. Sen. John McCain (R-AZ) recognized the danger of pushing a contentious bill during an election year, saying, “It will be a very critical time in the life or death of this legislation. It’s very important that we try and act before the end of this year, as we move into next year and an election season.”¶ As much as House Republicans are aiming to push immigration reform off the slate for another year, there is no clear reason as to why reform cannot be taken up simultaneously with any of the other issues. House Judiciary Committee Chairman Bob Goodlatte (R-VA), who has called the 2010 DREAM Act “unfair” and “ripe for fraud,” recently called the Senate immigration bill, “unconstitutional” and would allow “dangerous criminals to be released back onto our streets.”¶ He was around in 2010 when two other politically sensitive issues were simultaneously brought before Congress at the end of the calendar year. In 2010, Democrats and Republicans had an ongoing power struggle, but Congressional members still allowed the DREAM Act and Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell (DADT) to come to a vote, during an election year no less. House members brought DADT to a vote four days before the end of the Congressional calendar and the DREAM Act to a vote eight days beforehand. This time around, House members have 38 full days and the backing of at least 25 Republicans who support a pathway to citizenship.¶ Proponents have indicated that immigration reform can be taken up alongside other pressing issues because it can help with the budget deficit issue. Marshall Fitz of the Center for American progress explains:¶ [...]while the House grapples with budget questions this Fall, immigration reform presents a golden opportunity for them to show their seriousness about growing the economy and reducing deficits. There is broad bipartisan consensus – now formally endorsed by the nonpartisan CBO – that immigration reform will trigger strong economic growth while significantly reducing the deficit. Passing immigration reform is not only popular, it is fiscally prudent.

### 2NC Will Pass

#### Immigration reform will pass – that’s Shear and Preston – support groups are gaining momentum and will pressure Boehner to bring it to a vote in October – they are outpacing opposition

#### The support exists – House republicans came out in favor of including legalization during the recess

#### Immigration will pass in the fall – massive push

Davis 9-8

(Susan Davis, reporter for USA today, “Congress returns with long to-do list, short timetable” September 8, 2013, <http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/09/08/congress-syria-fall-agenda-debt-shutdown-immigration/2777765/>, KB)

Cantor said the House may consider legislation aimed at addressing immigration concerns this fall, but he offered no timetable. The Senate has passed a comprehensive bill that provides a path to citizenship for the 11 million undocumented immigrants living in the USA.¶ Frank Sharry, the executive director of America's Voice, which supports a comprehensive immigration bill, refutes the view that immigration cannot pass the House. "We still think we have a shot this fall," he said, citing the broad coalition behind the legislation ranging from Silicon Valley to evangelical groups and the political reality that Republicans are unlikely to ignore the issue before the midterm elections. "We actually think our fundamentals are stronger than their (Congress') dysfunction," he said.

#### Timing is goldilocks

Matthews 13

(Laura Matthews, International Business Times, September 06 2013, <http://www.ibtimes.com/2013-immigration-reform-house-dems-sell-overhaul-bill-deficit-reduction-1403139>, “2013 Immigration Reform: House Dems To Sell Overhaul Bill As Deficit Reduction”, AB)

The Republican focus on deficit reduction may be just what immigration advocates need to get a reform bill passed in the House -- at least, that's what prominent pro-immigration Democrat Rep. Xavier Becerra of California is claiming. Becerra is a member of the House’s “Gang of Seven,” which is working on a comprehensive immigration overhaul bill it hopes to introduce in October. Becerra believes his party's immigration reform plan tackles two big issues that will be before Congress this fall with a single strike. The congressman tried this tactic before in previous deficit reduction discussions with little effect, but he thinks the timing for reintroducing them is better now due to the momentum Congress has gained in its pursuit of immigration reform and the close deadline Congress faces to raise the debt limit and prevent a government shutdown. “Each issue is looking for some locomotion, and I certainly think any time you can add a trillion dollars of deficit reduction to fiscal negotiations, that’s pretty big,” Becerra told Roll Call. “And any time you can also give a jump-start to the reluctance of some on the Republican side to move on fixing the economy at the same time, I think that’s gotta help.”

#### Momentum overwhelms opposition

Fox News 9-9

(Fox News Latino “With Syria Latest Obstacle, Immigrant Advocates Step Up Pressure For Reform Bill” September 09, 2013, <http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/politics/2013/09/09/with-syria-latest-obstacle-immigrant-advocates-step-up-pressure-for-reform-bill/>, KB)

With members of Congress back from summer recess, and the Syrian crisis eclipsing most other issues, those pushing for an immigration reform measure to pass this year are giving their effort a final strong push.¶ Advocates are worried about the talk among many members of Congress about how the odds are increasingly stacked against passage of an immigration reform bill – not just because of Syria, but because of the few legislative days left for the year.¶ The talks mark quite a change from earlier this year, when – with Latino voters said to have been fed up over some in the GOP taking a hard line on immigration, and President Obama vowing to make it a priority in his second term – a sweeping reform bill seemed to be nearing a reality.¶ “These actions will show support for our neighbors and co-workers who are facing firsthand the devastating consequences of federal inaction on comprehensive immigration reform, two-thirds of whom have been here more than 10 years,” said a statement released by the Quaker organization, American Friends Service Committee, explaining the objective of the vigil and 40-day fast.¶ The group said it would also pray for “courageous leadership in Washington to act now on immigration reform.”¶ Of particular urgency to advocates of a more lenient immigration system is a reform bill that would provide a pathway to legalization for many of the estimated 11 million undocumented immigrants living in the United States. ¶ A bipartisan measure that passed in the Senate in late June included such a provision, as well as enhanced border security, expanded visas for high-tech and agricultural workers, and mandatory participation for employers in a federal system that would determine a prospective employee’s eligibility to work in this country.¶ Many advocates are concerned that immigration reform – which is now in the House of Representatives – will just be left to die by conservative Republicans who firmly oppose a pathway to legalization for undocumented immigrants. Republicans have a majority in the House.¶ “What are House leaders afraid of?” Frank Sharry, executive director of America’s Voice, said in a statement. “As August recess demonstrated, the anti-immigrant movement has no juice and the pro-reform movement is on fire. The House leaders know what’s at stake: If they block reform, the GOP will lose seats in 2014 and lose the White House in 2016.”¶ Even before the revelation that the Syrian government appeared to be behind an Aug. 21 chemical weapons attack on its people that left nearly 1,500 dead, momentum in Congress to overhaul the immigration system had slowed to a crawl.¶ Shortly after the Senate passed the immigration reform bill, House Republicans vowed not to rubber-stamp the Senate version, and said they instead would adopt a separate, piecemeal approach with various bills instead of an all-encompassing one.¶ Moreover, lawmakers are facing other divisive issues on the agenda – the debt ceiling and the budget, what to do about funding for Obama’s controversial Affordable Care Act, and the Voting Rights Act, parts of which were dropped by the U.S. Supreme Court.¶ Last week, Rep. Luis Gutierrez, an Illinois Democrat who is one of Congress’ most vocal proponents of a pathway to legal status for undocumented immigrants, spoke of protests that will be held nationwide on Oct. 5 to keep the issue on the congressional radar.¶ "October 5 is the start of concerted action in the country to keep alive the hope of an immigration reform,” Gutierrez said. “We will not accept that Congress doesn't approve the immigration reform.”¶ The protests are planned for 60 cities and are expected to include religious, labor and civil rights groups, according to published reports.¶ Conservative taxpayer groups who typically fund GOP primary challenges have remained largely silent on immigration. Anti-immigration activists have failed to organize large-scale demonstrations or generate the kind of public backlash that killed Congress' last attempt to remake immigration policy, in 2007.¶ Many House Republicans come from swing districts with sizable Hispanic populations that could make a difference in next year's elections, tipping the balance of power in the GOP-controlled House. The lawmakers also feel the pressure from business interests that rely on immigrant labor.¶ "Congress people who may have been on the fence are realizing it's safe to get in the water," said Ana Navarro, a GOP strategist who led Hispanic outreach for Sen. John McCain's presidential campaign in 2008. "There is safety in numbers."

### 2NC Link

#### Plan creates congressional fights – Zengerle and Spetalnick evidence says that the republicans would backlash because Obama would be seen as weak on the war on terror

#### Link outweighs the turns – pro-drones sentiment stronger than the opposition.

Peter Weber 2/6/13, http://theweek.com/article/index/239716/will-congress-curb-obamas-drone-strikes

It's interesting to watch conservatives show (or at least feign) outrage over a policy that "would have been met with right-wing hosannas under Bush/Cheney," says Steve M. at No More Mister Nice Blog. But even with the grumbling from the Left and Right, "I don't think any of this is going to stop the drone strikes." I can't really see righties and lefties banding together to do something upliftingly democratic and bipartisan like forcing a reconsideration of the policy via combined public pressure (when was the last time something like that happened in America?) — there are too many people in office, from both parties, who like what's being done by the administration. [No More Mister Nice Blog]

#### Obama fights the plan.

Peter Weber 2/6/13, http://theweek.com/article/index/239716/will-congress-curb-obamas-drone-strikes

One problem for lawmakers, says The New York Times in an editorial, is that when it comes to drone strikes, the Obama team "utterly rejects the idea that Congress or the courts have any right to review such a decision in advance, or even after the fact." Along with citing the law authorizing broad use of force against al Qaeda, the white paper also "argues that judges and Congress don't have the right to rule on or interfere with decisions made in the heat of combat." And most troublingly, Obama won't give Congress the classified document detailing the legal justification used to kill American al Qaeda operative Anwar al-Awlaki. Going forward, he should submit decisions like this one to review by Congress and the courts. If necessary, Congress could create a special court to handle this sort of sensitive discussion, like the one it created to review wiretapping. This dispute goes to the fundamental nature of our democracy, to the relationship among the branches of government and to their responsibility to the public. [New York Times]

#### Plan fractures Republicans – half the party hates the plan.

Kapur 13 (Sahil, TPM, “Rand Paul’s Drone Filibuster Sparks GOP Civil War” 3/7/13 http://tpmdc.talkingpointsmemo.com/2013/03/rand-paul-filibuster-gop-civil-war.php)

Sen. Rand Paul’s (R-KY) epic 13-hour filibuster of John Brennan for CIA director finally came to an amicable resolution Thursday, but not before sparking a battle within the Republican Party hierarchy — the latest in a series of internal struggles the party has faced since the election.¶ On Paul’s side is the right-wing apparatus and their darlings in Congress — notably Sens. Mike Lee (R-UT) and Ted Cruz (R-TX), who joined the filibuster. They were delighted by Paul’s highly public confrontation with the White House and cheered him on until the very end.¶ On the other side are the GOP foreign policy hawks, led by Sens. John McCain (R-AZ) and Lindsey Graham (R-SC), who are Washington’s chief guardians of broad executive power when it comes to dealing with the country’s enemies.¶ They were furious with Paul’s attacks on President Obama’s drone policy.¶ “To somehow allege or infer that the President of the United States is going to kill somebody like Jane Fonda, or somebody who disagrees with the policies, is a stretch of imagination which is, frankly, ridiculous,” McCain said Thursday morning on the Senate floor.¶ He read from a scathing Wall Street Journal editorial declaring that “if Mr. Paul wants to be taken seriously he needs to do more than pull political stunts that fire up impressionable libertarian kids in their college dorms. He needs to know what he’s talking about.”¶ That angered the wealthy conservative activist group FreedomWorks, which called McCain’s remarks “rude and out of line,” and slammed him for “schmoozing with President Obama over dinner” while Paul was mounting his “courageous filibuster.”¶ FreedomWorks was among the biggest cheerleaders of Paul’s filibuster and, along with the Heritage Foundation, helped light up news and social media with their passionate support. The intensity of the push was noticed by Reince Priebus, the chairman of the Republican National Committee, who urged all Republican senators to “please go to the floor and help out” Paul. Fourteen of them went, including Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY).¶ Infuriated by McCain’s remarks the following morning, FreedomWorks proceeded to issue an action alert calling on its members to demand an apology from McCain. It encouraged its proclaimed 4 million members to send a letter to McCain.¶ “Your criticism of Sen. Paul’s brave filibuster is shameful,” the draft letter read. “No American statesman would support the assassination of an American without proper due process. The President can’t just suspend the Bill of Rights and the Constitution. Our founding fathers would not approve of President Obama’s unprecedented authority grab and neither should you.”¶ Graham backed up McCain, accusing his fellow Republicans of hypocrisy. “But to my Republican colleagues,” he said, “I don’t remember any of you coming down here suggesting that President Bush was going to kill anybody with a drone.”¶ The National Republican Senatorial Committee boasted Thursday afternoon that Paul’s filibuster had already helped the group raise over $75,000.¶ FreedomWorks’ gripes were echoed by conservative radio host Laura Ingraham, who accused Graham of being too cozy with Obama on not just drones but budget issues and immigration. She called the choice between Graham and Paul “[a] line in the sand.”¶ Conn Carroll, a writer for the conservative Washington Examiner, dubbed him “Lindsey Grahamnesty” — a reference to his support for normalizing the status of illegal immigrants.¶ Paul fired back at McCain and Graham during an appearance on Fox News, saying they “think the whole world is a battlefield, including America.” “That’s not my understanding of the way America works,” he said, arguing that the Bill of Rights guarantees due process.¶ In the afternoon, Paul received what he deemed a satisfactory answer to his question from the Obama administration on the parameters of its drone powers, and said that as a result, he would let Brennan’s nomination move forward. But Carroll liked what he saw of the internal Republican battle unfolding before him.

### Risk High

#### Risk of attack is high – only counter-measures solve

Glassman ’12

(James, “Expert: U.S. unprepared for bioterrorism attack”, April 5, <http://www.bioprepwatch.com/us_bioterror_policy/expert-u-s-unprepared-for-bioterrorism-attack/323620/>)

A recent essay published in Forbes magazine supports the contention that the United States remains woefully unprepared, if not uninterested, in the chances that it will face an attack using biological weapons.¶ James Glassman, a former undersecretary of state for public affairs and public diplomacy and the founder of the George W. Bush Institute, said that the United States remains vulnerable to an attack that could potentially kill hundreds of thousands of people because it lacks a means of producing needed medical countermeasures, according to Forbes.¶ Three years ago, a Congressional commission concluded that there is 50 percent chance that there will be an attack using a weapon of mass destruction somewhere in the world by 2013. The Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism declared that the weapon used would more likely be biological than nuclear.¶ Regardless, Glassman said that the public has heard little about bioterrorism since the anthrax attacks in 2001, despite the considerable risk.¶ “Terrorists could spray Bacillus anthracis from crop-dusters over football stadiums,” Glassman wrote, Forbes reports. “Or they could send intentionally infected fanatics out to spread the smallpox virus through a crowded city, doing far more damage than a brigade of suicide bombers.”¶ Glassman pointed to last October’s Bio-Response Report Card study, issued last year by the Bipartisan WMD Terrorism Research Center, as proof that the country needs to do more to confront the threat of bioterrorism. The report card gave the United States a “D” grade for its detection and diagnosis capability and for the availability of medical countermeasures.¶ Glassman said that larger biopharmaceutical firms have done little to develop countermeasures, but small firms have filled the gap with mixed success.

### Yes Extinction

#### It will cause extinction – their ev is outdated

Sandberg 8

Anders Sandberg et al., James Martin Research Fellow, Future of Humanity Institute, Oxford University, "How Can We Reduce the Risk of Human Extinction?" BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, 9-9-08, http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/how-can-we-reduce-the-risk-of-human-extinction, accessed 5-2-10.

The risks from anthropogenic hazards appear at present larger than those from natural ones. Although great progress has been made in reducing the number of nuclear weapons in the world, humanity is still threatened by the possibility of a global thermonuclear war and a resulting nuclear winter. We may face even greater risks from emerging technologies. Advances in synthetic biology might make it possible to engineer pathogens capable of extinction-level pandemics. The knowledge, equipment, and materials needed to engineer pathogens are more accessible than those needed to build nuclear weapons. And unlike other weapons, pathogens are self-replicating, allowing a small arsenal to become exponentially destructive. Pathogens have been implicated in the extinctions of many wild species. Although most pandemics "fade out" by reducing the density of susceptible populations, pathogens with wide host ranges in multiple species can reach even isolated individuals. The intentional or unintentional release of engineered pathogens with high transmissibility, latency, and lethality might be capable of causing human extinction. While such an event seems unlikely today, the likelihood may increase as biotechnologies continue to improve at a rate rivaling Moore's Law.

## Drone Prolif

### 2NC No Modeling

#### Aff doesn’t solve prolif - nations are developing drones now which should have triggered their impacts EVEN IF they create a model to limit the SPREAD of tech, our Anderson evidence indicates that countries have such high political incentives to use drone tech that nothing the US does will affect the use of them

#### Zero chance of precedent setting – other countries don’t act based on the United States policy

Wright 12

(Robert Wright, finalist for the Pulitzer Prize, former writer and editor at The Atlantic, “The Incoherence of a Drone-Strike Advocate” NOV 14 2012, <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/11/the-incoherence-of-a-drone-strike-advocate/265256/>, KB)

Naureen Shah of Columbia Law School, a guest on the show, had raised the possibility that America is setting a dangerous precedent with drone strikes. If other people start doing what America does--fire drones into nations that house somebody they want dead--couldn't this come back to haunt us? And haunt the whole world? Shouldn't the U.S. be helping to establish a global norm against this sort of thing? Host Warren Olney asked Boot to respond.¶ Boot started out with this observation:¶ I think the precedent setting argument is overblown, because I don't think other countries act based necessarily on what we do and in fact we've seen lots of Americans be killed by acts of terrorism over the last several decades, none of them by drones but they've certainly been killed with car bombs and other means.¶ That's true--no deaths by terrorist drone strike so far. But I think a fairly undeniable premise of the question was that the arsenal of terrorists and other nations may change as time passes. So answering it by reference to their current arsenal isn't very illuminating. In 1945, if I had raised the possibility that the Soviet Union might one day have nuclear weapons, it wouldn't have made sense for you to dismiss that possibility by noting that none of the Soviet bombs dropped during World War II were nuclear, right?¶ As if he was reading my mind, Boot immediately went on to address the prospect of drone technology spreading. Here's what he said:¶ You know, drones are a pretty high tech instrument to employ and they're going to be outside the reach of most terrorist groups and even most countries. But whether we use them or not, the technology is propagating out there. We're seeing Hezbollah operate Iranian supplied drones over Israel, for example, and our giving up our use of drones is not going to prevent Iran or others from using drones on their own. So I wouldn't worry too much about the so called precedent it sets..."

### 2NC Drone Prolif Inevitable

#### New technology makes drone proliferation by state and non-state actors inevitable

Wood 12

(David, American Drones Ignite New Arms Race From Gaza To Iran To China, Huffington Post, 27 November 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/27/american-drones\_n\_2199193.html, da 8-2-13) PC

Obama administration officials have said they are weighing various options to codify the use of armed U.S. drones, because the increased use of drones has been driven more by perceived necessity than by deliberative policy. But that effort is complicated by the wildfire spread of drone technology: how could the U.S. restrict its use of armed drones if others do not?¶ Already, the Pentagon is worried that China not only is engaged in an "alarming" effort to develop and field high-tech drones, but it intends to sell drone technology abroad, according to the Pentagon report.¶ Indeed, the momentum of the drone wars seems irresistible. "The increasing worldwide focus on unmanned systems highlights how U.S. military success has changed global strategic thinking and spurred a race for unmanned aircraft," the Pentagon study reported.¶ Modern drones were first perfected by Israel, but the U.S. Air Force took the first steps in 2001 to mount sophisticated drones with precision weapons. Today the U.S. fields some 8,000 drones and plans to invest $36.9 billion to boost its fleet by 35 percent over the next eight years.¶ Current research on next-generation drones seems certain to exacerbate the drone arms race. The U.S. and other countries are developing "nano" drones, tiny weapons designed to attack in swarms. Both the U.S. and China are working to incorporate "stealth" technology into micro drones. The Pentagon is fielding a new weapon called the Switchblade, a 5.5-pound precision-attack drone that can be carried and fired by one person -- a capability sure to be envied by terrorists.¶ "This is a robotics revolution, but it's not just an American revolution -- everyone's involved, from Hezbollah to paparazzi," Singer, the Brookings Institution expert, told The Huffington Post. "This is a revolution in which billions and trillions of dollars will be made. To stop it you'd have to first stop science, and then business, and then war."

### AT Lendman

**Disregard Lendman - he thinks the illuminati are in a war to end the world**

Lendman Your Meltodwn author ’11

Stephen, “Media Manipulation of 9/11 Truth,”

**9/11 was an inside job. It was planned by the Illuminist** shadow government **and executed via the** Mossad and **CIA. It was to move the world towards their Satanic World War 3 Plan**. The Global War on Terrorism is an Illuminist HOAX!¶ -¶ Satanic World War 3 Plan¶ “**The Third World War must be fomented by taking advantage of the differences caused by the “agentur” of the “Illuminati” between the political Zionists and the leaders of Islamic World**. The war must be conducted in such a way that Islam (the Moslem Arabic World) and political Zionism (the State of Israel) mutually destroy each other.¶ -¶ Meanwhile the other nations, once more divided on this issue will be constrained to fight to the point of complete physical, moral, spiritual and economical exhaustion…We shall unleash the Nihilists and the atheists, and we shall provoke a formidable social cataclysm which in all its horror will show clearly to the nations the effect of absolute atheism, origin of savagery and of the most bloody turmoil.¶ -¶ Then everywhere, the citizens, obliged to defend themselves against the world minority of revolutionaries, will exterminate those destroyers of civilization, and the multitude, disillusioned with Christianity, whose deistic spirits will from that moment be without compass or direction, anxious for an ideal, but without knowing where to render its adoration, will receive the true light through the universal manifestation of the pure doctrine of Lucifer, brought finally out in the public view. This manifestation will result from the general reactionary movement which will follow the destruction of Christianity and atheism, both conquered and exterminated at the same time

#### Impact is inevitable- their author

Lendman 11   
– Research Associate of the Centre for Research on Globalization (Stephen, 03/ 13, “Nuclear Meltdown in Japan,” http://www.thepeoplesvoice.org/TPV3/Voices.php/2011/03/13/nuclear-meltdown-in-japan)

Further, the combined effects of allowable radiation exposure, uranium mining, milling operations, enrichment, and fuel fabrication can be devastating to those exposed. Besides the insoluble waste storage/disposal problem, nuclear accidents happen and catastrophic ones are inevitable. Inevitable Meltdowns Caldicott and other experts agree they're certain in one or more of the hundreds of reactors operating globally, many years after their scheduled shutdown dates unsafely. Combined with human error, imprudently minimizing operating costs, internal sabotage, or the effects of a high-magnitude quake and/or tsunami, an eventual catastrophe is certain. Aging plants alone, like Japan's Fukushima facility, pose unacceptable risks based on their record of near-misses and meltdowns, resulting from human error, old equipment, shoddy maintenance, and poor regulatory oversight. However, under optimum operating conditions, all nuclear plants are unsafe. Like any machine or facility, they're vulnerable to breakdowns, that if serious enough can cause enormous, possibly catastrophic, harm.

### 2NC No Armenia-Azerbaijan War

#### Russia and Turkey check escalation

Stratfor ‘11

[Why Russia, Turkey Look Toward Armenia and Azerbaijan” <http://www.stratfor.com/geopolitical_diary/20110331-why-russia-and-turkey-are-looking-towards-armenia-and-azerbaijan> ETB]

The involvement of Turkey and Russia is the main cause of deterrence that is holding the two sides back. Both Ankara and Moscow know that any Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict would not remain contained within the region. Each power would be expected by Baku and Yerevan to defend their respective ally — whether they actually would is unclear. Therefore, the standoff has become more about Moscow and Ankara holding back each side and not allowing the instability to become exacerbated to the extent of an open conflict or war.

### 2NC No War/Esc

#### No Middle East escalation – our Feittweis evidence indicates that there is little cross-border warfare, civil war tensions have decreased, and regimes fear instability – cooperation is more likely than conflict

**Middle East conflict won’t escalate – local conflicts do not spillover**

**Cook, Takeyh, and Maloney 7**

Steven A. **Cook** (fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations) Ray **Takeyh** (fellows at the Council on Foreign Relations) **and** Suzanne **Maloney** (senior fellow at Saban Center) June 28 **2007** “Why the Iraq war won't engulf the Mideast”, International Herald Tribune

Finally, **there is no precedent for Arab leaders to commit forces to conflicts in which they are not directly involved**. The Iraqis and the Saudis did send small contingents to fight the Israelis in 1948 and 1967, but they were either ineffective or never made it. In the 1970s and 1980s, **Arab countries** other than Syria, which had a compelling interest in establishing its hegemony over Lebanon, **never committed forces either to protect the Lebanese from the Israelis or from other Lebanese. The civil war in Lebanon was regarded as someone else's fight**. Indeed, this is the way many leaders view the current situation in Iraq. To Cairo, Amman and Riyadh, the situation in Iraq is worrisome, but in the end it is an Iraqi and American fight. As far as Iranian mullahs are concerned, they have long preferred to press their interests through proxies as opposed to direct engagement. At a time when Tehran has access and influence over powerful Shiite militias, a massive cross-border incursion is both unlikely and unnecessary. So Iraqis will remain locked in a sectarian and ethnic struggle that outside powers may abet, but will remain within the borders of Iraq. **The Middle East is a region** both prone and **accustomed to civil wars. But given its experience with ambiguous conflicts, the region has also developed an intuitive ability to contain its civil strife and prevent local conflicts from enveloping the entire Middle East**.

## Heg

## Terrorism

### Aff No Solve

#### Just about strikes in general -

Stanford 12 (Stanford and NYU Law, International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic of Stanford Law School and the Global Justice Clinic of the NYU Law School, September 2012, “Living Under Drones: Death, Injury and Trauma to Civilians from US Drone Practices in Pakistan” http://www.livingunderdrones.org/report/)

The central justification for US drone strikes is that they are necessary to make the US safer by disrupting militant activity. Proponents argue that they are an effective, accurate, and precise tool to that end. However, serious questions have been raised about the accuracy and efficacy of strikes, and the publicly available evidence that they have made the US safer overall is ambiguous at best. Considerable costs also have been documented. The under-accounted-for harm to civilians–injuries, killings, and broad impacts on daily life, education, and mental health–was analyzed in detail above, and must be factored as a severe cost of the US program.[[687]](http://www.livingunderdrones.org/report/#_ftn687)In addition, it is clear that US strikes in Pakistan foster anti-American sentiment and undermine US credibility not only in Pakistan but throughout the region. There is strong evidence to suggest that US drone strikes have facilitated recruitment to violent non-state armed groups, and motivate attacks against both US military and civilian targets. Further, current US targeted killing and drone strike practices may set dangerous global legal precedents, erode the rule of law, and facilitate recourse to lethal force.

A significant rethinking of current policies, in light of all available evidence, the concerns of various stakeholders, and short and long-term costs and benefits, is long overdue.

### 2NC Solve Terror

#### Transparency guts drone effectiveness

Alston ‘11

[Philip Alston , John Norton Pomeroy Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. The author was UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions from 2004 until 2010. “The CIA and Targeted Killings Beyond Borders.” 2 Harv. Nat'l Sec. J. 283 ETB]

There is thus compelling evidence that both applicable bodies of law require transparency and accountability. Nevertheless, in view of the tendency of those advocating the use of targeted killings to suggest that counter-terrorism requires different rules or that intelligence agencies must operate on a different basis, it is appropriate to consider whether there are circumstances that would warrant the adoption of significantly less demanding standards of accountability. In relation to terrorism, it is often argued that there are unavoidable tradeoffs between security and respect for human rights as well as between security and transparency. In other words, secrecy and limits on rights are part of the price that must be paid for security in a world subject to terrorist threats. While these claims have been thoroughly canvassed in other contexts n97 they call for two particular responses in the present setting. The first is to acknowledge that, in relation [\*315] to targeted killing operations, there are major security and effectiveness concerns that require a strong element of secrecy, rather than disclosure. For example, disclosing the identity of an intelligence source or putting an informant at risk of retaliation will limit the extent to which the information justifying a given targeting decision can be publicly divulged. Similarly, it might be argued that significant disclosure would eliminate the fear or uncertainty factor that is designed to constrain the activities of groups who might conclude from published criteria that they were unlikely to be subject to drone attacks. n98 There will thus be certain limits as to how much transparency can be required.

### 1NC AT Recruitment

#### Overall levels of violence may increase, but the effectiveness and impact of those attacks goes way down. Prefer our comparative evidence here—violence has to be evaluated in terms of frequency and magnitude.

Wilner 10

(Alex S. Wilner, Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, Targeted Killings in Afghanistan: Measuring Coercion and Deterrence in Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 33 No. 4, 09 Mar 2010, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10576100903582543)

Generally, overall violence increased following the targeted eliminations (Figure 2). This was especially so with the Dadullah case. On the surface, these are unanticipated developments.74 The literature on targeted killings suggests that eliminations should result in a general diminishment of violence. In their quantitative analysis of Israel’s campaign of targeted killings between 2000 and 2004, Mohammed Hafez and Joseph Hatfield provide similar findings. They conclude that “targeted assassinations have no significant impact on rates of Palestinian violence.”75 That both this and the Hafez/Hatfield study find trends that contradict theoretical expectations would suggest that certain components of the literature on targeted killings need to be substantially revised. However, a closer examination of the Afghan data does corroborate the literature’s most basic theoretical principle: targeted killings influence the type of violence terrorists are capable of planning effectively and forces them to conduct less-preferred forms of activity.¶ Violent, non-state organizations have coercive preferences. The Taliban is no exception. The type of violence they engage in rests as much on the impact they are trying to have as it does on their capacity and capability to muster efforts toward particular goals. To that end, suicide attacks are the Taliban’s preferred tactic—they are the most effective form of violence, provide the greatest consequence (both in kill ratios and psychological effect), can be directed against hard targets, are difficult to detect, stop, and mitigate, and have a proven track record of killing Coalition and Afghan soldiers. Suicide bombings are also the most sophisticated type of violence to plan, the most difficult to organize effectively, and take a considerable amount of time, energy, and expertise to mount successfully. Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) are the Taliban’s second most preferred tactic—they have proven deadly against Afghan National Police (ANP) and other lightly armored ISAF/NATO and Afghan National Army (ANA) personnel carriers, they are cheaply constructed, and provide a deadly concentrated explosive blast. IEDs are also less sophisticated than suicide bombs and are easier to organize effectively. They offer less control, however, cannot be consistently directed against particular targets, can be detected and diffused more easily than suicide bombs, their detonation can be mitigated with proper armor, and they are all too often triggered by civilians. Small arms and rocket fire (SA/R) is the Taliban’s least preferred tactic—it is most effective against soft targets, Afghan and international officials, lightly armed ANP forces, and when used in complex ambushes. However, SA/R attacks against security forces can be easily mitigated and usually result in a disproportionately high rate of Taliban casualties. Likewise, Taliban SA/R attacks are usually successfully repelled and the heavy concentration of gunmen in one location can be easily attacked with aerial support. Furthermore, Taliban rocket fire is crude, uncontrolled, and ineffective. In sum, SA/R attacks are the least sophisticated type of violence and the easiest to organize yet provide the worst results.¶ With these Taliban preferences in mind, the aggregate data on overall levels of violence reveal a number of expected findings. After the targeted killings, for instance, suicide bombings dropped by over 30 percent, from a total of 43 before, to 29 after, the targeted eliminations. This is in keeping with the degree of difficulty, amount of time and expertise, and level of leadership that is required to coordinate effective suicide bombings. It is also plausible that the decrease in suicide attacks spurred a rise in less-sophisticated forms of violence, with IEDs increasing by 6 percent and SA/R attacks by roughly 15 percent following the four targeted attacks.76 As leaders and facilitators were eliminated, the Taliban began using less-sophisticated forms of violence that required less energy, expertise, and time to organize effectively. This shift resonates with elements outlined in the literature on targeted killings: as organizations succumb to the effects of a protracted campaign of elimination, their overall ability to operate at a high level of sophistication decreases and the selection and use of less formidable forms of violence increases.¶ Overall levels of violence, however, are only a minor part of the analysis. The data also reveal changes in Taliban professionalism following the targeted killings. For the two most sophisticated forms of violence (IEDs and suicide attacks), the aggregate data suggest a decrease in professionalism and an increase in failure rates. After the eliminations, IED failure rates rose precipitously from 20 to roughly 35 percent. This is a considerable change in proficiency. Suicide bombing success rates also dropped (by a less impressive though no less important five percentage points) following the strikes. Both are theoretically expected findings (Figure 3). Finally, the data also suggest that the targeted killings influenced the selection of targets. For instance, in terms of known target selection for suicide bombers, the aggregate data reveal that following the eliminations, soft targets were more often selected (as a percentage of all target selection) after the leadership strikes (Figure 4). As leaders where killed, remaining forces selected less formidable targets to attack, like Afghan government officials, civil-society actors, and off-duty police commanders, rather than hardened, military actors.

### 1NC No Terror

#### No threat – weak leadership and no recent attacks

Zenko and Cohen 12

\*Fellow in the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations, \*Fellow at the Century Foundation, (Micah and Michael, "Clear and Present Safety," March/April, Foreign Affairs, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137279/micah-zenko-and-michael-a-cohen/clear-and-present-safety

NONE OF this is meant to suggest that the United States faces no major challenges today. Rather, the point is that the problems confronting the country are manageable and pose minimal risks to the lives of the overwhelming majority of Americans. None of them -- separately or in combination -- justifies the alarmist rhetoric of policymakers and politicians or should lead to the conclusion that Americans live in a dangerous world.¶ Take terrorism. Since 9/11, no security threat has been hyped more. Considering the horrors of that day, that is not surprising. But the result has been a level of fear that is completely out of proportion to both the capabilities of terrorist organizations and the United States' vulnerability. On 9/11, al Qaeda got tragically lucky. Since then, the United States has been preparing for the one percent chance (and likely even less) that it might get lucky again. But al Qaeda lost its safe haven after the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, and further military, diplomatic, intelligence, and law enforcement efforts have decimated the organization, which has essentially lost whatever ability it once had to seriously threaten the United States.¶ According to U.S. officials, al Qaeda's leadership has been reduced to two top lieutenants: Ayman al-Zawahiri and his second-in-command, Abu Yahya al-Libi. Panetta has even said that the defeat of al Qaeda is "within reach." The near collapse of the original al Qaeda organization is one reason why, in the decade since 9/11, the U.S. homeland has not suffered any large-scale terrorist assaults. All subsequent attempts have failed or been thwarted, owing in part to the incompetence of their perpetrators. Although there are undoubtedly still some terrorists who wish to kill Americans, their dreams will likely continue to be frustrated by their own limitations and by the intelligence and law enforcement agencies of the United States and its allies.

## Solvency

### 1NC Obama Ignores

#### Obama refuses to release the memo due to classified information – even with congressional pressure

Hirsh and Roberts 13 <[MICHAEL HIRSH, chief correspondent for National Journal AND KRISTIN ROBERTS](http://www.theatlantic.com/michael-hirsh-and-kristin-roberts/), news editor for National Journal., Why the Drone Memos Are Still Secret, FEB 22 2013, <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/02/why-the-drone-memos-are-still-secret/273436/>>#SPS

Despite President Obama's pledge in his State of the Union address to make the drone program "even more transparent to the American people and to the world," his administration continues to resist efforts by Congress, even from fellow Democrats, to obtain the full range of classified legal memos justifying "targeted killing."¶ A key reason for that reticence, according to two sources who have read the memos or are aware of their contents, is that the documents contain secret protocols with foreign governments, including Pakistan and Yemen, as well as "case-specific" details of strikes.¶ A legal expert outside the government who is intimately familiar with the contents of the memos said the government-to-government accords on the conduct of drone strikes are an important element not contained in the Justice Department "white paper" [revealed recently by NBC News](http://openchannel.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/02/04/16843014-justice-department-memo-reveals-legal-case-for-drone-strikes-on-americans?lite). He said it is largely in order to protect this information that the targeted-killing memos drafted by Justice's Office of Legal Counsel are not being released, and that even the Senate and House Intelligence committees have been allowed to examine only four of the nine OLC memos. "That is what is missing from the white paper but forms a core part of the memos," the expert told National Journal, speaking on condition of anonymity because the information is classified. He said the administration believes that the protocols would almost certainly leak to the public if they were shared with Congress.

# 1NR

### A/T Policy Education

Our criticism proves the plan is a bad idea. The modern liberal state utilizes the threat of nuclear weapons to justify invasion in the interim to prevent catastrophe. Their representations are more likely to lead to preemption than passivity.

Massumi 07 (Brian, Communication Department of the Université de Montréal , “Potential Politics and the Primacy of Preemption”)

Fear is always a good reason to go politically conditional. Fear is the palpable action in the present of a threatening future cause. It acts just as palpably whether the threat is determinate or not. It weakens your resolve, creates stress, lowers consumer confidence, and may ultimately lead to individual and/or economic paralysis. To avoid the paralysis, which would make yourself even more of a target and carry the fear to even higher level, you must simply act. In Bush administration parlance, you "go kinetic."6 You leap into action on a level with the potential that frightens you. You do that, once again, by inciting the potential to take an actual shape you can respond to. You trigger a production of what you fear. You turn the objectively indeterminate cause into an actual effect so you can actually deal with it in some way. Any time you feel the need to act, then all you have to do is actuate a fear. The production of the effect follows as smoothly as a reflex. This affective dynamic is still very much in place, independent of Rumsfeld's individual fate. It will remain in place as long as fear and remains politically actuatable. The logic of preemption operates on this affective plane, in this proliferative or ontogenetic way: in a way that contributes to the reflex production of the specific being of the threat. You're afraid Iraq is a breeding ground for terrorists? It could have been. If it could have been, it would have been. So go ahead, make it one. "Bring 'em on," the President said, following Hollywood-trained reflex. He knew it in his "guts." He couldn't have gone wrong. His reflex was right. Because "now we can all agree" that Iraq is in actual fact a breeding ground for "terrrorists". That just goes to prove that the potential was always there. Before, there was doubt in some quarters that Saddam had to be removed from power. Some agreed he had to go, some didn't. Now we can all agree. It was right to remove him because doing so made Iraq become what it always could have been. And that's the truth. Truth, in this new world order, is by nature retroactive. Fact grows conditionally in the affective soil of an indeterminately present futurity. It becomes objective as that present reflexively plays out, as a effect of the preemptive action taken. The reality-based community wastes time studying empirical reality, the Bushites said: "we create it." And because of that, "we" the preemptors will always be right. We always will have been right to preempt, because we have objectively produced a recursive truth-effect for your judicious study. And while you are looking back studying the truth of it, we will have acted with reflex speed again, effecting a new reality. 7 We will always have had no choice but to prosecute the "war on terror," ever more vigilantly and ever more intensely on every potential front. We, preemptors, are the producers of your world. Get used to it. The War in Iraq is a success to the extent that it made the productivity of the preemptive "war on terror" a self-perpetuating movement. Even if the US were to withdraw from Iraq tomorrow, the war would have to continue on other fronts no matter who controls Congress or who is in the White House. It would have to continue in Afghanistan, for example, where the assymetrical tactics perfected in Iraq are now being applied to renew the conflict there. Or in Iran, which also always could have/would have been a terrorist breeding ground. Or it could morph and move to the Mexican-US border, itself morphed into a distributed frontline proliferating throughout the territory in the moving form of "illegal immigration". On the indefinite Homeland Security front of a protieform war, who knows what threats may be spinelessly incubating where, abetted by those who lack the "backbone" to go kinetic. Preemption is like deterrence in that it combines a proprietary epistemology with a unique ontology in such a way as to make present a future cause that sets a self-perpetuating movement into operation. Its differences from deterrence hinge on its taking objectively indeterminate or potential threat as its self-constitutive cause rather than fully formed and specified threat. It situates itself on the ground of ontogenetic potential. There, rather than deterring the feared effect, it actualizes the potential in a shape to which it hopes it can respond. It assumes a proliferation of potential threats, and mirrors that capacity in its own operation. It becomes proliferative. It assumes the objective imbalance of a far-from-equilibrium state as a permanent condition. Rather than trying to right the imbalance, it seizes it as an opportunity for itself. Preemption also sets a race in motion. But this is a race run on the edge of chaos. It is a race of movement-flushing, detection, perception, and affective actuation, run in irreparably chaotic or quasi-chaotic conditions. The race of preemption has any number of laps, each ending in the actual effecting of a threat. Each actualization of a threat triggers the next lap, as a continuation of the first in the same direction, or in another way in a different field. Deterrence revolved around an objective cause. Preemption revolves around a proliferative effect. Both are operative logics. The operative logic of deterrence, however, remained causal even as it displaced its cause's effect. Preemption is an effective operative logic rather than a causal operative logic. Since its ground is potential, there is no actual cause for it to organize itself around. It compensates for the absence of an actual cause by producing an actual effect in its place. This it makes the motor of its movement: it converts an absent or virtual cause really, directly into a taking-actual-effect. It does this affectively. It uses affect to effectively trigger a virtual causality.8 Preemption is when the futurity of unspecified threat is affectively held in the present in a perpetual state of potential emergence(y) so that a movement of actualization may be triggered that is not only self-propelling but also effectively, indefinitely, ontologically productive, because it works from a virtual cause whose potential no single actualization exhausts. Preemption's operational parameters mean that is never univocal. It operates in the element of vagueness and objective uncertainty. Due to its proliferative nature, it cannot be monolithic. Its logic cannot close in around its self-causing as the logic deterrence does. It includes an essential openness in its productive logic.9 It incites its adversary to take emergent form. It then strives to become as proteiform as its ever-emergent adversary can be. It is as shape-shifting as it is self-driving. It infiltrates across boundaries, sweeping up existing formations in its own transversal movement. Faced with gravity-bound formations too inertial for it to sweep up and carry off with its own operative logic, it contents itself with opening windows of opportunity to pass through. This is the case with the domestic legal and juridical structure in the US. It can't sweep that away. But it can build into that structure escape holes for itself. These take the form of formal provisions vastly expanding the power of the executive, in the person of the president in his role as commander-in-chief, to declare states of exception which suspend the normal legal course in order to enable a continued flow of preemptive action.10 Preemption stands for conflict unlimited: the potential for peace amended to become a perpetual state of undeclared war. This is the "permanent state of emergency" so presciently described by Walter Benjamin. In current Bush administration parlance, it has come to be called "Long War" replacing the Cold War: a preemptive war with an in-built tendency to be never-ending. Deterrence produced asymmetrical conflict as a by-product. The MADly balanced East-West bipolarity spun off a North-South sub-polarity. This was less a polarity than an axis of imbalance. The "South" was neither a second Western First nor another Eastern Second. It was an anomalous Third. In this chaotic " Third World ," local conflicts prefiguring the present "imbalance of terror" proliferated. The phrase "the war on terror" was in fact first popularized by Richard Nixon in 1972 in response to the attack at the Munich Olympics when the Israeli-Palestinian conflict spectacularly overspilled northward. Asymmetrical conflicts, however, were perceivable by the reigning logic of deterrence only as a reflection of itself. The dynamic of deterrence were overlaid upon them. Their heterogeneity was overcoded by the familiar US-Soviet duality. Globally such conflicts figured only as opportunities to reproduce the worldwide balance of terror on a reduced scale. The strategy of "containment" adopted toward them was for the two sides in the dominant dyad to operate in each local theater through proxies in such a way that their influence, on the whole, balanced out. "I decided," Nixon said after Munich , "that we must maintain a balance."11 He did not, as Bush did after 9-11, decide to skew things by going unilaterally "kinetic." The rhetoric of the "war on terror" fell into abeyance during the remainder of the 1970s, as Southern asymmetries tended to be overcoded as global rebalancings, and going kinetic was "contained" to the status of local anomaly.

### Link

**The rhetoric of the 1AC turns the case – ensures overstretch, blowback, and rollback of the plan**

**Rana 2011** (Aziz, Assistant Professor of Law @ Cornell. “Responses to the Ten Questions.” William Mitchell Law Review, 37 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 5099)

Many of today's **defenders of this national security constitution**-imagined by Herring and given institutional and legal form in the 1940s and 1950s-often **present these changes as simple responses to unavoidable conditions of objective threat**. Just as Pearl Harbor presented a physical attack on the homeland justifying a new framework, **the American position in the world since has been one of continuous insecurity in the face of new, equally objective dangers**. According to this view, **the reason for continuity between Obama and Bush is the straightforward consequence of the persistence of these externally generated crises.** Yet, from its inception, **supporters of the national security framework also have noted the link between the idea of insecurity and American's post-World War II role of global primacy, one that has only expanded following the Cold War**. In 1961, none other than Senator James William Fulbright declared that the imperatives of national security meant that "our basic constitutional machinery, admirably suited to the needs of a remote agrarian republic in the 18th century," was no longer "adequate" for the "20th-century nation."3 For Fulbright, **at the heart of this national security vision was the importance of sustaining the country's "preeminence in political and military power**."5 Moreover, Fulbright held that **greater executive action and war-making powers were necessary precisely because the United States found itself "burdened with all the enormous responsibilities that accompany such power.**" Fulbright felt that the United States had both a right and a duty to suppress those forms of chaos and disorder, which existed at the edges of American authority. Thus, **rather than being purely objective, the American condition of permanent external threat was itself deeply tied to political calculations about** national identity and **the value of global primacy. What generated the condition of continual danger was** not only technological change, but also **the belief that the United States'** own sense of national **security rested on the successful projection of power into the internal affairs of foreign states**.

### A2 Impact Turn

**This worst case storytelling causes social paralysis and serial policy failure.**

**Furedi 10** – Professor of sociology at the University of Kent, Frank, “This shutdown is about more than volcanic ash”, Spiked, 4/19, http://www.spiked-online.com/index.php/site/article/8607/

Whatever the risks posed by the eruption of a volcano in Iceland, it seems clear that the shutting down of much of Europe’s air space is not just about the threat posed by clouds of ash to flying passengers. We live in an era where problems of **uncertainty andrisk are** continually **amplified,** and where our fearful **imaginations** can **make** these **problems seem like existential threats.** Consequently, unexpected natural events are rarely treated simply as unexpected natural events – instead they are swiftly dramatised and transformed into ‘threats to human survival’. This becomes most clear in the tendency to dramatise the forecasting of the weather. Once upon a time, weather forecasts were those boring moments on the radio or TV when most of us got up to make a snack. However, with the invention of concepts such as ‘extreme weather’, routine events like storms, smog or unexpected snowfall have become compellingly entertaining. Ours is a world where a relatively ordinary technical problem like the so-called Millennium Bug can be interpreted as a threat of apocalyptic proportions – and where a flu epidemic is turned by officials into a kind of plot line from a Hollywood disaster flick. When the World Health Organisation can warn that the entire human species is threatened by swine flu, it’s pretty clear that cultural prejudice rather than sober risk assessment influences much of official thinking today. I am not a natural scientist, and I claim no authority to say anything of value about the risks posed by volcanic ash clouds to flying aircraft. However, as a sociologist interested in the process of decision-making, it is evident to me that the reluctance to lift the ban on air traffic in Europe is motivated by worst-case thinking rather than rigorous risk assessment. Risk assessment is based on an attempt to calculatethe probability of different outcomes. **Worst-case thinking** –these days known as ‘precautionary thinking’ – is based on an act of imagination. It **imagines the worst-case scenario** and **then takes action on that basis.** In the case of the Icelandic volcano, fears that particles in the ash cloud could cause aeroplane engines to shut down automatically mutated into a conclusion that this wouldhappen. So it seems to me to be the fantasy of the worst-case scenario rather than risk assessment that underpins the current official ban on air traffic. Many individuals associated with the air-travel industry are perturbed by what they perceive to be a one-dimensional overreaction. Ulrich Schulte-Strathaus, secretary-general of the Association of European Airlines, observed that ‘verification flights undertaken by several of our airlines have revealed no irregularities at all’. He believes that ‘this confirms our requirement that other options should be deployed to determine genuine risk’. Giovanni Bisignani, director-general of the International Air Transport Association, describes the ban as a ‘European embarrassment’ and a ‘European mess’. Also, individuals associated with Europe’s air-control authorities have conceded that they have been interpreting international guidelines ‘more rigorously’ than, say, their American counterparts. British forecasters claimed the volcanic ash cloud could hit the eastern Canadian coast. Whatever the risks of flying in the wake of the volcano, it seems clear that it is not evidence but speculation that is fuelling the current flight ban. The reluctance actually to weigh up the evidence and act on the basis of probabilities is motivated by fear of making a wrong decision. Of course when lives are at stake it is essential to weigh up the evidence carefully – but at the end of the day, our leaders have a responsibility to make decisions and live with the consequences. The slowness with which EU ministers responded to this crisis indicates that worst-case thinking discourages responsible decision-making. Yet as Giovanni Bisignani said, the decision to close airspace ‘has to be based on facts and supported by risk assessment’, not on the politics of decision-avoidance. Tragically, this failure of nerve in relation to the volcanic ash is the inevitable outcome of the institutionalisation of worst-case policymaking. This approach, based on the unprecedented sensitivity of contemporary Western society to uncertainty and unknown dangers, has led to a radically new way of perceiving and managing risks. As a result, the traditional association of risk with probabilities is now under fire from a growing body of opinion, which claims that humanity lacks the knowledge to calculate risks in any meaningful way. Sadly, critics of traditional probabilistic risk-assessments have more faith in speculative computer models than they do in science’s capacity to use knowledge to transform uncertainties into calculable risks. The emergence of a speculative approach towards risk is paralleled by the growing influence of ‘possibilistic thinking’ rather than probabilistic thinking, which actively invites speculation about what could possibly go wrong. In today’s culture of fear, **frequently ‘what could possiblygo wrong’ is confused with ‘what is likely to happen’.**Numerous critics of old forms of probabilistic thinking call for a radical break with past practices on the grounds that we simply lack the information to calculate probabilities. **This** rejection of probabilities **is motivated by a belief** that the **dangers we face are** just **too overwhelming** and catastrophic – the Millennium Bug, international terrorism, swine flu, climate change, etc – **and we** simply **cannot wait until we have all the information** before we calculate their possible destructive effects. ‘Shut it down!’ is the default response. In any case, it is argued, since so many of the threats are ‘unknown’ there is little information on which a realistic calculation of probabilities can be made. One of the many regrettable consequences of this outlook is that policies designed to deal with threats are increasingly based on feelings and intuition rather than on evidence or facts. **Worst-case thinking encourages society to adopt fear as**of one of **the key principles around which the public**, the government **and**various **institutions should organise**their lives. It institutionalises insecurity and fosters a mood of confusion and powerlessness. Through popularising the belief that worst cases are normal, it also encourages people to feel defenceless and vulnerable to a wide range of future threats. In all but name, **it is an invitation to social paralysis**. The eruption of a volcano in Iceland poses technical problems, for which responsible decision-makers should swiftly come up with sensible solutions. But instead, Europe has decided to turn a problem into a drama. In 50 years’ time, historians will be writing about our society’s reluctanceto act when practical problems arose**.** It is no doubt difficult to face up to a natural disaster – but in this case **it is**the all-too-apparent manmade disaster brought on by indecision and a reluctance to engage with uncertainty that represents **the real threat to our future.**