# 1NC

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#### 1. Interpretation: The role of the ballot is to determine if the enactment of a topical plan is better than the status quo or a competitive option. The 1ac must read and defend the implementation of such a topical plan.

#### 2. Violation:

#### A) “Resolved” implies a policy or legislative decision – means they must be resolved about a future federal government policy

Parcher 1

Jeff Parcher, former debate coach at Georgetown, Feb 2001 http://www.ndtceda.com/archives/200102/0790.html

Pardon me if I turn to a source besides Bill. American Heritage Dictionary: Resolve: 1. To make a firm decision about. 2. To decide or express by formal vote. 3. To separate something into constiutent parts See Syns at \*analyze\* (emphasis in orginal) 4. Find a solution to. See Syns at \*Solve\* (emphasis in original) 5. To dispel: resolve a doubt. - n 1. Firmness of purpose; resolution. 2. A determination or decision. (2) The very nature of the word "resolution" makes it a question. American Heritage: A course of action determined or decided on. A formal statement of a decision, as by a legislature. (3) The resolution is obviously a question. Any other conclusion is utterly inconceivable. Why? Context. The debate community empowers a topic committee to write a topic for ALTERNATE side debating. The committee is not a random group of people coming together to "reserve" themselves about some issue. There is context - they are empowered by a community to do something. In their deliberations, the topic community attempts to craft a resolution which can be ANSWERED in either direction. They focus on issues like ground and fairness because they know the resolution will serve as the basis for debate which will be resolved by determining the policy desirablility of that resolution. That's not only what they do, but it's what we REQUIRE them to do. We don't just send the topic committee somewhere to adopt their own group resolution. It's not the end point of a resolution adopted by a body - it's the preliminary wording of a resolution sent to others to be answered or decided upon. (4) Further context: the word resolved is used to emphasis the fact that it's policy debate. Resolved comes from the adoption of resolutions by legislative bodies. A resolution is either adopted or it is not. It's a question before a legislative body. Should this statement be adopted or not. (5) The very terms 'affirmative' and 'negative' support my view. One affirms a resolution.

#### B) USFG is the national government in DC

Encarta Online Encyclopedia, 2k

(http://encarta.msn.com)

“The federal government **of the U**nited **S**tates **is centered in** Washington **DC”**

#### C) Should means there is a practical reason for action

WordNet in ‘97

Princeton University, 1.6

**Should** v 1 : be expected to: “Parties should be fun” 2 : **expresses an** emotional**, practical,** or other **reason for doing something:** “You had better put on warm clothes”; “You should call your mother-in-law”; *“The State ought to repair bridges*”[syn**:** had better, ought]

#### 3. Vote Negative:

#### A) Decisionmaking - a limited topic of discussion that provides for equitable ground is key to decision-making and advocacy skills

Steinberg & Freeley 8

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Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007. Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose. Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### Discussion of specific policy-questions is crucial for skills development – it overcomes preconceived ideological notions and breaks out of traditional pedagogical frameworks by positing students as agents of decision-making

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These government or quasi-government think tank simulations often provide very similar lessons for high-level players as are learned by students in educational simulations. Government participants learn about the importance of understanding foreign perspectives, the need to practice internal coordination, and the necessity to compromise and coordinate with other governments in negotiations and crises. During the Cold War, political scientist Robert Mandel noted how crisis exercises and war games forced government officials to overcome ‘‘bureaucratic myopia,’’ moving beyond their normal organizational roles and thinking more creatively about how others might react in a crisis or conflict.6 The skills of imagination and the subsequent ability to predict foreign interests and reactions remain critical for real-world foreign policy makers. For example, simulations of the Iranian nuclear crisis\*held in 2009 and 2010 at the Brookings Institution’s Saban Center and at Harvard University’s Belfer Center, and involving former US senior officials and regional experts\*highlighted the dangers of misunderstanding foreign governments’ preferences and misinterpreting their subsequent behavior. In both simulations, the primary criticism of the US negotiating team lay in a failure to predict accurately how other states, both allies and adversaries, would behave in response to US policy initiatives.7 By university age, students often have a pre-defined view of international affairs, and the literature on simulations in education has long emphasized how such exercises force students to challenge their assumptions about how other governments behave and how their own government works.8 Since simulations became more common as a teaching tool in the late 1950s, educational literature has expounded on their benefits, from encouraging engagement by breaking from the typical lecture format, to improving communication skills, to promoting teamwork.9 More broadly, simulations can deepen understanding by asking students to link fact and theory, providing a context for facts while bringing theory into the realm of practice.10 These exercises are particularly valuable in teaching international affairs for many of the same reasons they are useful for policy makers: they force participants to ‘‘grapple with the issues arising from a world in flux.’’11 Simulations have been used successfully to teach students about such disparate topics as European politics, the Kashmir crisis, and US response to the mass killings in Darfur.12 Role-playing exercises certainly encourage students to learn political and technical facts\* but they learn them in a more active style. Rather than sitting in a classroom and merely receiving knowledge, students actively research ‘‘their’’ government’s positions and actively argue, brief, and negotiate with others.13 Facts can change quickly; simulations teach students how to contextualize and act on information.14

#### Switch-side is key - effective deliberation is crucial to the activation of personal agency and is only possible in a switch-side debate format where debaters divorce themselves from ideology to engage in political contestation – the impact is mass violence

Roberts-Miller 3

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Totalitarianism and the Competitive Space of Agonism¶ Arendt is probably most famous for her analysis of totalitarianism (especially her The Origins of Totalitarianism andEichmann in Jerusa¬lem), but the recent attention has been on her criticism of mass culture (The Human Condition). Arendt's main criticism of the current human condition is that the common world of deliberate and joint action is fragmented into solipsistic and unreflective behavior. In an especially lovely passage, she says that in mass society people are all imprisoned in the subjectivity of their own singular experience, which does not cease to be singular if the same experience is multiplied innumerable times. The end of the common world has come when it is seen only under one aspect and is permitted to present itself in only one perspective. (Human 58)¶ What Arendt so beautifully describes is that isolation and individualism are not corollaries, and may even be antithetical because obsession with one's own self and the particularities of one's life prevents one from engaging in conscious, deliberate, collective action. Individuality, unlike isolation, depends upon a collective with whom one argues in order to direct the common life. Self-obsession, even (especially?) when coupled with isolation from one' s community is far from apolitical; it has political consequences. Perhaps a better way to put it is that it is political precisely because it aspires to be apolitical. This fragmented world in which many people live simultaneously and even similarly but not exactly together is what Arendt calls the "social."¶ Arendt does not mean that group behavior is impossible in the realm of the social, but that social behavior consists "in some way of isolated individuals, incapable of solidarity or mutuality, who abdicate their human capacities and responsibilities to a projected 'they' or 'it,' with disastrous consequences, both for other people and eventually for themselves" (Pitkin 79). One can behave, butnot act. For someone like Arendt, a German-assimilated Jew, one of the most frightening aspects of the Holocaust was the ease with which a people who had not been extraordinarily anti-Semitic could be put to work industriously and efficiently on the genocide of the Jews. And what was striking about the perpetrators of the genocide, ranging from minor functionaries who facilitated the murder transports up to major figures on trial at Nuremberg, was their constant and apparently sincere insistence that they were not responsible. For Arendt, this was not a peculiarity of the German people, but of the current human and heavily bureaucratic condition of twentieth-century culture: we do not consciously choose to engage in life's activities; we drift into them, or we do them out of a desire to conform. Even while we do them, we do not acknowledge an active, willed choice to do them; instead, we attribute our behavior to necessity, and we perceive ourselves as determined—determined by circumstance, by accident, by what "they" tell us to do. We do something from within the anonymity of a mob that we would never do as an individual; we do things for which we will not take responsibility. Yet, whether or not people acknowledge responsibil¬ity for the consequences of their actions, those consequences exist. Refusing to accept responsibility can even make those consequences worse, in that the people who enact the actions in question, because they do not admit their own agency, cannot be persuaded to stop those actions. They are simply doing their jobs. In a totalitarian system, however, everyone is simply doing his or her job; there never seems to be anyone who can explain, defend, and change the policies. Thus, it is, as Arendt says, rule by nobody.¶ It is illustrative to contrast Arendt's attitude toward discourse to Habermas'. While both are critical of modern bureaucratic and totalitar¬ian systems, Arendt's solution is the playful and competitive space of agonism; it is not the rational-critical public sphere. The "actual content of political life" is "the joy and the gratification that arise out of being in company with our peers, out of acting together and appearing in public, out of inserting ourselves into the world by word and deed, thus acquiring and sustaining our personal identity and beginning something entirely new" ("Truth" 263). According to Seyla Benhabib, Arendt's public realm emphasizes the assumption of competition, and it "represents that space of appearances in which moral and political greatness, heroism, and preeminence are revealed, displayed, shared with others. This is a competitive space in which one competes for recognition, precedence, and acclaim" (78). These qualities are displayed, but not entirely for purposes of acclamation; they are not displays of one's self, but of ideas and arguments, of one's thought. When Arendt discusses Socrates' thinking in public, she emphasizes his performance: "He performed in the marketplace the way the flute-player performed at a banquet. It is sheer performance, sheer activity"; nevertheless, it was thinking: "What he actually did was to make public, in discourse, the thinking process" {Lectures 37). Pitkin summarizes this point: "Arendt says that the heroism associated with politics is not the mythical machismo of ancient Greece but something more like the existential leap into action and public exposure" (175-76). Just as it is not machismo, although it does have considerable ego involved, so it is not instrumental rationality; Arendt's discussion of the kinds of discourse involved in public action include myths, stories, and personal narratives.¶ Furthermore, the competition is not ruthless; it does not imply a willingness to triumph at all costs. Instead, it involves something like having such a passion for ideas and politics that one is willing to take risks. One tries to articulate the best argument, propose the best policy, design the best laws, make the best response. This is a risk in that one might lose; advancing an argument means that one must be open to the criticisms others will make of it. The situation is agonistic not because the participants manufacture or seek conflict, but because conflict is a necessary consequence of difference. This attitude is reminiscent of Kenneth Burke, who did not try to find a language free of domination but who instead theorized a way that the very tendency toward hierarchy in language might be used against itself (for more on this argument, see Kastely). Similarly, Arendt does not propose a public realm of neutral, rational beings who escape differences to live in the discourse of universals; she envisions one of different people who argue with passion, vehemence, and integrity.¶ Continued…¶ Eichmann perfectly exemplified what Arendt famously called the "banal¬ity of evil" but that might be better thought of as the bureaucratization of evil (or, as a friend once aptly put it, the evil of banality). That is, he was able to engage in mass murder because he was able not to think about it, especially not from the perspective of the victims, and he was able to exempt himself from personal responsibility by telling himself (and anyone else who would listen) that he was just following orders. It was the bureaucratic system that enabled him to do both. He was not exactly passive; he was, on the contrary, very aggressive in trying to do his duty. He behaved with the "ruthless, competitive exploitation" and "inauthen-tic, self-disparaging conformism" that characterizes those who people totalitarian systems (Pitkin 87).¶ Arendt's theorizing of totalitarianism has been justly noted as one of her strongest contributions to philosophy. She saw that a situation like Nazi Germany is different from the conventional understanding of a tyranny. Pitkin writes,¶ Totalitarianism cannot be understood, like earlier forms of domination, as the ruthless exploitation of some people by others, whether the motive be selfish calculation, irrational passion, or devotion to some cause. Understanding totalitarianism's essential nature requires solving the central mystery of the holocaust—the objectively useless and indeed dysfunctional, fanatical pursuit of a purely ideological policy, a pointless process to which the people enacting it have fallen captive. (87)¶ Totalitarianism is closely connected to bureaucracy; it is oppression by rules, rather than by people who have willfully chosen to establish certain rules. It is the triumph of the social.¶ Critics (both friendly and hostile) have paid considerable attention to Arendt's category of the "social," largely because, despite spending so much time on the notion, Arendt remains vague on certain aspects of it. Pitkin appropriately compares Arendt's concept of the social to the Blob, the type of monster that figured in so many post-war horror movies. That Blob was "an evil monster from outer space, entirely external to and separate from us [that] had fallen upon us intent on debilitating, absorb¬ing, and ultimately destroying us, gobbling up our distinct individuality and turning us into robots that mechanically serve its purposes" (4).¶ Pitkin is critical of this version of the "social" and suggests that Arendt meant (or perhaps should have meant) something much more complicated. The simplistic version of the social-as-Blob can itself be an instance of Blob thinking; Pitkin's criticism is that Arendt talks at times as though the social comes from outside of us and has fallen upon us, turning us into robots. Yet, Arendt's major criticism of the social is that it involves seeing ourselves as victimized by something that comes from outside our own behavior. I agree with Pitkin that Arendt's most powerful descriptions of the social (and the other concepts similar to it, such as her discussion of totalitarianism, imperialism, Eichmann, and parvenus) emphasize that these processes are not entirely out of our control but that they happen to us when, and because, we keep refusing to make active choices. We create the social through negligence. It is not the sort of force in a Sorcerer's Apprentice, which once let loose cannot be stopped; on the contrary, it continues to exist because we structure our world to reward social behavior. Pitkin writes, "From childhood on, in virtually all our institutions, we reward euphemism, salesmanship, slo¬gans, and we punish and suppress truth-telling, originality, thoughtful-ness. So we continually cultivate ways of (not) thinking that induce the social" (274). I want to emphasize this point, as it is important for thinking about criticisms of some forms of the social construction of knowledge: denying our own agency is what enables the social to thrive. To put it another way, theories of powerlessness are self-fulfilling prophecies.¶ Arendt grants that there are people who willed the Holocaust, but she insists that totalitarian systems result not so much from the Hitlers or Stalins as from the bureaucrats who may or may not agree with the established ideology but who enforce the rules for no stronger motive than a desire to avoid trouble with their superiors (see Eichmann and Life). They do not think about what they do. One might prevent such occurrences—or, at least, resist the modern tendency toward totalitarian¬ism—by thought: "critical thought is in principle anti-authoritarian" (Lectures 38).¶ By "thought" Arendt does not mean eremitic contemplation; in fact, she has great contempt for what she calls "professional thinkers," refusing herself to become a philosopher or to call her work philosophy. Young-Bruehl, Benhabib, and Pitkin have each said that Heidegger represented just such a professional thinker for Arendt, and his embrace of Nazism epitomized the genuine dangers such "thinking" can pose (see Arendt's "Heidegger"). "Thinking" is not typified by the isolated con¬templation of philosophers; it requires the arguments of others and close attention to the truth. It is easy to overstate either part of that harmony. One must consider carefully the arguments and viewpoints of others:¶ Political thought is representative. I form an opinion by considering a given issue from different viewpoints, by making present to my mind the standpoints of those who are absent; that is, I represent them. This process of representation does not blindly adopt the actual views of those who stand somewhere else, and hence look upon the world from a different perspective; this is a question neither of empathy, as though I tried to be or to feel like somebody else, nor of counting noses and joining a majority but of being and thinking in my own identity where actually I am not. The more people's standpoints I have present in my mind while I am ponder¬ing a given issue, and the better I can imagine how I would feel and think if I were in their place, the stronger will be my capacity for represen¬tative thinking and the more valid my final conclusions, my opinion. ("Truth" 241)¶ There are two points to emphasize in this wonderful passage. First, one does not get these standpoints in one's mind through imagining them, but through listening to them; thus, good thinking requires that one hear the arguments of other people. Hence, as Arendt says, "critical thinking, while still a solitary business, does not cut itself off from' all others.'" Thinking is, in this view, necessarily public discourse: critical thinking is possible "only where the standpoints of all others are open to inspection" (Lectures 43). Yet, it is not a discourse in which one simply announces one's stance; participants are interlocutors and not just speakers; they must listen. Unlike many current versions of public discourse, this view presumes that speech matters. It is not asymmetric manipulation of others, nor merely an economic exchange; it must be a world into which one enters and by which one might be changed.¶ Second, passages like the above make some readers think that Arendt puts too much faith in discourse and too little in truth (see Habermas). But Arendt is no crude relativist; she believes in truth, and she believes that there are facts that can be more or less distorted. She does not believe that reality is constructed by discourse, or that truth is indistinguishable from falsehood. She insists tha^ the truth has a different pull on us and, consequently, that it has a difficult place in the world of the political. Facts are different from falsehood because, while they can be distorted or denied, especially when they are inconvenient for the powerful, they also have a certain positive force that falsehood lacks: "Truth, though powerless and always defe ated in a head-on clash with the powers that be, possesses a strength of its own: whatever those in power may contrive, they are unable to discover or invent a viable substitute for it. Persuasion and violence can destroy truth, but they cannot replace it" ("Truth" 259).¶ Facts have a strangely resilient quality partially because a lie "tears, as it were, a hole in the fabric of factuality. As every historian knows, one can spot a lie by noticing incongruities, holes, or the j unctures of patched-up places" ("Truth" 253). While she is sometimes discouraging about our ability to see the tears in the fabric, citing the capacity of totalitarian governments to create the whole cloth (see "Truth" 252-54), she is also sometimes optimistic. InEichmann in Jerusalem, she repeats the story of Anton Schmidt—a man who saved the lives of Jews—and concludes that such stories cannot be silenced (230-32). For facts to exert power in the common world, however, these stories must be told. Rational truth (such as principles of mathematics) might be perceptible and demonstrable through individual contemplation, but "factual truth, on the contrary, is always related to other people: it concerns events and circumstances in which many are involved; it is established by witnesses and depends upon testimony; it exists only to the extent that it is spoken about, even if it occurs in the domain of privacy. It is political by nature" (23 8). Arendt is neither a positivist who posits an autonomous individual who can correctly perceive truth, nor a relativist who positively asserts the inherent relativism of all perception. Her description of how truth functions does not fall anywhere in the three-part expeditio so prevalent in bothrhetoric and philosophy: it is not expressivist, positivist, or social constructivist. Good thinking depends upon good public argument, and good public argument depends upon access to facts: "Freedom of opinion is a farce unless factual information is guaranteed" (238).¶ The sort of thinking that Arendt propounds takes the form of action only when it is public argument, and, as such, it is particularly precious: "For if no other test but the experience of being active, no other measure but the extent of sheer activity were to be applied to the various activities within the vita activa, it might well be that thinking as such would surpass them all" (Human 325). Arendt insists that it is "the same general rule— Do not contradict yourself (not your self but your thinking ego)—that determines both thinking and acting" (Lectures 3 7). In place of the mildly resentful conformism that fuels totalitarianism, Arendt proposes what Pitkin calls "a tough-minded, open-eyed readiness to perceive and judge reality for oneself, in terms of concrete experience and independent, critical theorizing" (274). The paradoxical nature of agonism (that it must involve both individuality and commonality) makes it difficult to maintain, as the temptation is great either to think one's own thoughts without reference to anyone else or to let others do one's thinking.¶ Arendt's Polemical Agonism¶ As I said, agonism does have its advocates within rhetoric—Burke, Ong, Sloane, Gage, and Jarratt, for instance—but while each of these theorists proposes a form of conflictual argument, not one of these is as adversarial as Arendt's. Agonism can emphasize persuasion, as does John Gage's textbook The Shape of Reason or William Brandt et al.'s The Craft of Writing. That is, the goal of the argument is to identify the disagreement and then construct a text that gains the assent of the audience. This is not the same as what Gage (citing Thomas Conley) calls "asymmetrical theories of rhetoric": theories that "presuppose an active speaker and a passive audience, a speaker whose rhetorical task is therefore to do something to that audience" ("Reasoned" 6). Asymmetric rhetoric is not and cannot be agonistic. Persuasive agonism still values conflict, disagreement, and equality among interlocutors, but it has the goal of reaching agreement, as when Gage says that the process of argument should enable one's reasons to be "understood and believed" by others (Shape 5; emphasis added).¶ Arendt's version is what one might call polemical agonism: it puts less emphasis on gaining assent, and it is exemplified both in Arendt's own writing and in Donald Lazere's "Ground Rules for Polemicists" and "Teaching the Political Conflicts." Both forms of agonism (persuasive and polemical) require substantive debate at two points in a long and recursive process. First, one engages in debate in order to invent one's argument; even silent thinking is a "dialogue of myself with myself (Lectures 40). The difference between the two approaches to agonism is clearest when one presents an argument to an audience assumed to be an opposition. In persuasive agonism, one plays down conflict and moves through reasons to try to persuade one's audience. In polemical agonism, however, one's intention is not necessarily to prove one's case, but to make public one' s thought in order to test it. In this way, communicability serves the same function in philosophy that replicability serves in the sciences; it is how one tests the validity of one's thought. In persuasive agonism, success is achieved through persuasion; in polemical agonism, success may be marked through the quality of subsequent controversy.¶ Arendt quotes from a letter Kant wrote on this point:¶ You know that I do not approach reasonable objections with the intention merely of refuting them, but that in thinking them over I always weave them into my judgments, and afford them the opportunity of overturning all my most cherished beliefs. I entertain the hope that by thus viewing my judgments impartially from the standpoint of others some third view that will improve upon my previous insight may be obtainable. {Lectures 42)¶ Kant's use of "impartial" here is interesting: he is not describing a stance that is free of all perspective; it is impartial only in the sense that it is not his own view. This is the same way that Arendt uses the term; she does not advocate any kind of positivistic rationality, but instead a "universal interdependence" ("Truth" 242). She does not place the origin of the "disinterested pursuit of truth" in science, but at "the moment when Homer chose to sing the deeds of the Trojans no less than those of the Achaeans, and to praise the glory of Hector, the foe and the defeated man, no less than the glory of Achilles, the hero of his kinfolk" ("Truth" 262¬63). It is useful to note that Arendt tends not to use the term "universal," opting more often for "common," by which she means both what is shared and what is ordinary, a usage that evades many of the problems associated with universalism while preserving its virtues (for a brief butprovocative application of Arendt's notion of common, see Hauser 100-03).¶ In polemical agonism, there is a sense in which one' s main goal is not to persuade one's readers; persuading one's readers, if this means that they fail to see errors and flaws in one' s argument, might actually be a sort of failure. It means that one wishes to put forward an argument that makes clear what one's stance is and why one holds it, but with the intention of provoking critique and counterargument. Arendt describes Kant's "hope" for his writings not that the number of people who agree with him would increase but "that the circle of his examiners would gradually be en¬larged" {Lectures 39); he wanted interlocutors, not acolytes.¶ This is not consensus-based argument, nor is it what is sometimes called "consociational argument," nor is this argument as mediation or conflict resolution. Arendt (and her commentators) use the term "fight," and they mean it. When Arendt describes the values that are necessary in our world, she says, "They are a sense of honor, desire for fame and glory, the spirit of fighting without hatred and 'without the spirit of revenge,' and indifference to material advantages" {Crises 167). Pitkin summarizes Arendt's argument: "Free citizenship presupposes the ability to fight— openly, seriously, with commitment, and about things that really mat¬ter—without fanaticism, without seeking to exterminate one's oppo¬nents" (266). My point here is two-fold: first, there is not a simple binary opposition between persuasive discourse and eristic discourse, the conflictual versus the collaborative, or argument as opposed to debate.¶ Second, while polemical agonismrequires diversity among interlocutors, and thus seems an extraordinarily appropriate notion, and while it may be a useful corrective to too much emphasis on persuasion, it seems to me that polemical agonism could easily slide into the kind of wrangling that is simply frustrating. Arendt does not describe just how one is to keep the conflict useful. Although she rejects the notion that politics is "no more than a battlefield of partial, conflicting interests, where nothing countfs] but pleasure and profit, partisanship, and the lust for dominion," she does not say exactly how we are to know when we are engaging in the existential leap of argument versus when we are lusting for dominion ("Truth" 263).¶ Like other proponents of agonism, Arendt argues that rhetoric does not lead individuals or communities to ultimate Truth; it leads to decisions that will necessarily have to be reconsidered. Even Arendt, who tends to express a greater faith than many agonists (such as Burke, Sloane, or Kastely) in the ability of individuals to perceive truth, insists that self-deception is always a danger, so public discourse is necessary as a form of testing (see especially Lectures and "Truth"). She remarks that it is difficult to think beyond one's self-interest and that "nothing, indeed, is more common, even among highly sophisticated people, than the blind obstinacy that becomes manifest in lack of imagination and failure to judge" ("Truth" 242).¶ Agonism demands that one simultaneously trust and doubt one' s own perceptions, rely on one's own judgment and consider the judgments of others, think for oneself and imagine how others think. The question remains whether this is a kind of thought in which everyone can engage. Is the agonistic public sphere (whether political, academic, or scientific) only available to the few? Benhabib puts this criticism in the form of a question: "That is, is the 'recovery of the public space' under conditions of modernity necessarily an elitist and antidemocratic project that can hardly be reconciled with the demand for universal political emancipa¬tion and the universal extension of citizenship rights that have accompa¬nied modernity since the American and French Revolutions?" (75). This is an especially troubling question not only because Arendt's examples of agonistic rhetoric are from elitist cultures, but also because of com¬ments she makes, such as this one from The Human Condition: "As a living experience, thought has always been assumed, perhaps wrongly, to be known only to the few. It may not be presumptuous to believe that these few have not become fewer in our time" {Human 324).¶ Yet, there are important positive political consequences of agonism.¶ Arendt' s own promotion of the agonistic sphere helps to explain how the system could be actively moral. It is not an overstatement to say that a central theme in Arendt's work is the evil of conformity—the fact that the modern bureaucratic state makes possible extraordinary evil carried out by people who do not even have any ill will toward their victims. It does so by "imposing innumerable and various rules, all of which tend to 'normalize' its members, to make them behave, to exclude spontaneous action or outstanding achievement" (Human 40). It keeps people from thinking, and it keeps them behaving. The agonistic model's celebration of achievement and verbal skill undermines the political force of conformity, so it is a force against the bureaucratizing of evil. If people think for themselves, they will resist dogma; if people think of themselves as one of many, they will empathize; if people can do both, they will resist totalitarianism. And if they talk about what they see, tell their stories, argue about their perceptions, and listen to one another—that is, engage in rhetoric—then they are engaging in antitotalitarian action.¶ In post-Ramistic rhetoric, it is a convention to have a thesis, and one might well wonder just what mine is—whether I am arguing for or against Arendt's agonism. Arendt does not lay out a pedagogy for us to follow (although one might argue that, if she had, it would lookmuch like the one Lazere describes in "Teaching"), so I am not claiming that greater attention to Arendt would untangle various pedagogical problems that teachers of writing face. Nor am I claiming that applying Arendt's views will resolve theoretical arguments that occupy scholarly journals. I am saying, on the one hand, that Arendt's connection of argument and thinking, as well as her perception that both serve to thwart totalitarian¬ism, suggest that agonal rhetoric (despite the current preference for collaborative rhetoric) is the best discourse for a diverse and inclusive public sphere. On the other hand, Arendt's advocacy of agonal rhetoric is troubling (and, given her own admiration for Kant, this may be intentional), especially in regard to its potential elitism, masculinism, failure to describe just how to keep argument from collapsing into wrangling, and apparently cheerful acceptance of hierarchy. Even with these flaws, Arendt describes something we would do well to consider thoughtfully: a fact-based but not positivist, communally grounded but not relativist, adversarial but not violent, independent but not expressivist rhetoric.

#### Decision-making outweighs – it’s the most portable skill - key to social improvements in every and all facets of life

Steinberg & Freeley 8

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After several days of intense debate, first the United States House of Representatives and then the U.S. Senate voted to authorize President George W. Bush to attack Iraq if Saddam Hussein refused to give up weapons of mass destruction as required by United Nations's resolutions. Debate about a possible military\* action against Iraq continued in various governmental bodies and in the public for six months, until President Bush ordered an attack on Baghdad, beginning Operation Iraqi Freedom, the military campaign against the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein. He did so despite the unwillingness of the U.N. Security Council to support the military action, and in the face of significant international opposition.¶ Meanwhile, and perhaps equally difficult for the parties involved, a young couple deliberated over whether they should purchase a large home to accommodate their growing family or should sacrifice living space to reside in an area with better public schools; elsewhere a college sophomore reconsidered his major and a senior her choice of law school, graduate school, or a job. Each of these\* situations called for decisions to be made. Each decision maker worked hard to make well-reasoned decisions.¶ Decision making is a thoughtful process of choosing among a variety of options for acting or thinking. It requires that the decider make a choice. Life demands decision making. We make countless individual decisions every day. To make some of those decisions, we work hard to employ care and consideration; others seem to just happen. Couples, families, groups of friends, and coworkers come together to make choices, and decision-making homes from committees to juries to the U.S. Congress and the United Nations make decisions that impact us all. Every profession requires effective and ethical decision making, as do our school, community, and social organizations.¶ We all make many decisions even- day. To refinance or sell one's home, to buy a high-performance SUV or an economical hybrid car. what major to select, what to have for dinner, what candidate CO vote for. paper or plastic, all present lis with choices. Should the president deal with an international crisis through military invasion or diplomacy? How should the U.S. Congress act to address illegal immigration?¶ Is the defendant guilty as accused? Tlie Daily Show or the ball game? And upon what information should I rely to make my decision? Certainly some of these decisions are more consequential than others. Which amendment to vote for, what television program to watch, what course to take, which phone plan to purchase, and which diet to pursue all present unique challenges. At our best, we seek out research and data to inform our decisions. Yet even the choice of which information to attend to requires decision making. In 2006, TIMI: magazine named YOU its "Person of the Year." Congratulations! Its selection was based on the participation not of ''great men" in the creation of history, but rather on the contributions of a community of anonymous participants in the evolution of information. Through blogs. online networking. You Tube. Facebook, MySpace, Wikipedia, and many other "wikis," knowledge and "truth" are created from the bottom up, bypassing the authoritarian control of newspeople. academics, and publishers. We have access to infinite quantities of information, but how do we sort through it and select the best information for our needs?¶ The ability of every decision maker to make good, reasoned, and ethical decisions relies heavily upon their ability to think critically. Critical thinking enables one to break argumentation down to its component parts in order to evaluate its relative validity and strength. Critical thinkers are better users of information, as well as better advocates.¶ Colleges and universities expect their students to develop their critical thinking skills and may require students to take designated courses to that end. The importance and value of such study is widely recognized.¶ Much of the most significant communication of our lives is conducted in the form of debates. These may take place in intrapersonal communications, in which we weigh the pros and cons of an important decision in our own minds, or they may take place in interpersonal communications, in which we listen to arguments intended to influence our decision or participate in exchanges to influence the decisions of others.¶ Our success or failure in life is largely determined by our ability to make wise decisions for ourselves and to influence the decisions of others in ways that are beneficial to us. Much of our significant, purposeful activity is concerned with making decisions. Whether to join a campus organization, go to graduate school, accept a job oiler, buy a car or house, move to another city, invest in a certain stock, or vote for Garcia—these are just a few of the thousands of decisions we may have to make. Often, intelligent self-interest or a sense of responsibility will require us to win the support of others. We may want a scholarship or a particular job for ourselves, a customer for out product, or a vote for our favored political candidate.

#### B) Dialogue – our entire negative strategy is based on the “should” question of the resolution---there are an infinite number of reasons that the scholarship of their advocacy could be a reason to vote affirmative--- these all obviate the only predictable strategies based on topical action---they overstretch our research burden and undermine preparedness for all debates making effective deliberation impossible which makes it impossible to be negative – voting issue for limits and ground

#### Effective deliberation is the lynchpin of solving all existential global problems

Lundberg 10

(Christian O., Professor of Communications @ University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill “Tradition of Debate in North Carolina” in Navigating Opportunity: Policy Debate in the 21st Century By Allan D. Louden, p311)

The second major problem with the critique that identifies a naivety in articulating debate and democracy is that it presumes that the primary pedagogical outcome of debate is speech capacities. But the democratic capacities built by debate are not limited to speech—as indicated earlier, **debate builds capacity for critical thinking**, analysis of public claims, **informed decision making**, and **better public judgment**. If the picture of modem political life that underwrites this critique of debate is a pessimistic view of increasingly labyrinthine and bureaucratic administrative politics, rapid scientific and technological change outpacing the capacities of the citizenry to comprehend them, and ever-expanding insular special-interest- and money-driven politics, it is a **puzzling solution, at best, to argue that these conditions warrant giving up on debate**. If democracy is open to rearticulation, it is open to rearticulation precisely because **as the challenges of modern political life proliferate, the citizenry's capacities can change**, which is one of the primary reasons that theorists of democracy such as Ocwey in The Public awl Its Problems place such a high premium on education (Dewey 1988,63, 154). Debate provides an indispensible form of education in the modem articulation of democracy because it **builds precisely the skills that allow the citizenry to research and be informed** about policy decisions that impact them, to son rhroueh and evaluate the evidence for and relative merits of arguments for and against a policy in an increasingly infonnation-rich environment, and to prioritize their time and political energies toward policies that matter the most to them. The merits of debate as a tool for building democratic capacity-building take on a special significance in the context of information literacy. John Larkin (2005, HO) argues that one of the primary failings of modern colleges and universities is that they have not changed curriculum to match with the challenges of a new information environment. This is a problem for the course of academic study in our current context, but perhaps more important, argues Larkin, for the future of a citizenry that will need to make evaluative choices against an increasingly complex and multimediatcd information environment (ibid-). Larkin's study tested the benefits of debate participation on information-literacy skills and concluded that in-class debate participants reported significantly higher self-efficacy ratings of their ability to navigate academic search databases and to effectively search and use other Web resources: To analyze the self-report ratings of the instructional and control group students, we first conducted a multivariate analysis of variance on all of the ratings, looking jointly at the effect of instmction/no instruction and debate topic . . . that it did not matter which topic students had been assigned . . . students in the Instnictional [debate) group were significantly more confident in their ability to access information and less likely to feel that they needed help to do so----These findings clearly indicate greater self-efficacy for online searching among students who participated in (debate).... These results constitute strong support for the effectiveness of the project on students' self-efficacy for online searching in the academic databases. There was an unintended effect, however: After doing ... the project, instructional group students also felt more confident than the other students in their ability to get good information from Yahoo and Google. It may be that the library research experience increased self-efficacy for any searching, not just in academic databases. (Larkin 2005, 144) Larkin's study substantiates Thomas Worthcn and Gaylcn Pack's (1992, 3) claim that debate in the college classroom plays a critical role in fostering the kind of **problem-solving skills** demanded by the increasingly rich media and information environment of modernity. Though their essay was written in 1992 on the cusp of the eventual explosion of the Internet as a medium, Worthcn and Pack's framing of the issue was prescient: the primary question facing today's student has changed from how to best research a topic to the crucial question of learning how to best evaluate which arguments to cite and rely upon from an easily accessible and veritable cornucopia of materials. There are, without a doubt, a number of important criticisms of employing debate as a model for democratic deliberation. But cumulatively, the evidence presented here warrants strong support for expanding debate practice in the classroom as a technology **for enhancing democratic deliberative capacities**. The unique combination of critical thinking skills, research and information processing skills, oral communication skills, and capacities for listening and thoughtful, open engagement with hotly contested issues argues for debate as a **crucial component of a rich and vital democratic life**. In-class debate practice both aids students in achieving the best goals of college and university education, and serves as an unmatched practice for creating thoughtful, engaged, open-minded and self-critical students who are open to the possibilities of **meaningful political engagement** and **new articulations of democratic life.** Expanding this practice is crucial, if only because the more we produce citizens that can actively and effectively engage the political process, the more likely we are to **produce revisions of democratic life** that are **necessary if democracy is not only to survive, but to thrive**. Democracy faces a myriad of challenges, including: domestic and international **issues of class, gender, and racial justice**; wholesale **environmental destruction** and the potential for **rapid climate change**; emerging **threats to international stability** in the form of terrorism, intervention and new possibilities for great power conflict; and increasing **challenges of rapid globalization** including an increasingly volatile global economic structure. More than any specific policy or proposal, an **informed and active citizenry that deliberates with greater skill** and sensitivity provides one of the best hopes for responsive and effective democratic governance, and by extension, one of the last best hopes for dealing with the **existential challenges** to democracy [in an] increasingly complex world.

### Immigration

#### Immigration reform has been delayed but will pass later this year – the aff pushes it off the agenda and into 2014 which derails the deal

Shear and Preston 9-8

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Congress is likely to postpone consideration of an immigration overhaul until the end of the year, if not longer, even as advocates are preparing for an all-out, urgent push this fall to win their longstanding goal of a path to citizenship for millions of immigrants here illegally.¶ In Washington, the sudden debate over military action in Syria and a looming face-off with President Obama over the budget and the nation’s borrowing limit have shot to the top of the legislative agenda, while Republican angst about losing Hispanic voters in the 2012 presidential campaign has faded.¶ In the House, where many Republicans view an overhaul bill passed by the Senate as a federal juggernaut that is too kind to immigrant lawbreakers, the legislative summer recess has done little to stoke enthusiasm for immediate action. Senior Republican aides in the House say immigration is at the back of the line, and unlikely to come up for months.¶ The prospect of a delay is generating frustration among supporters of the legislation, who felt emboldened by a summer in which conservative opposition in House districts largely fizzled and immigrant groups seized the chance to lobby lawmakers on their home turf.¶ “We believe they can walk and chew gum at the same time,” said Eliseo Medina, who leads the immigration campaign for the Service Employees International Union, referring to members of Congress. “The more they delay, the worse it will be for them.”¶ Throughout August, immigration groups organized hundreds of visits to Congressional offices, town hall-style meetings, vigils, marches and rallies, creating a constant buzz in the districts of many House lawmakers, particularly Republicans. On Wednesday, advocates delivered 600,000 petitions to the West Chester, Ohio, offices of Speaker John A. Boehner the old-fashioned way, in dozens of stacks of signed papers. On Sunday, Catholic priests around the country preached for a comprehensive immigration overhaul.¶ At a Mass devoted to immigration in Cincinnati, a mix of Catholics, including immigrants from Mexico and Central America and African-Americans, prayed for Congress to act.¶ “Families in our communities are being ripped apart by deportations, and the system is in chaos,” said Tony Stieritz, director of Catholic Social Action for the Cincinnati Archdiocese, who helped organize the Mass. “A vote for delay is a vote for crisis and disorder in the current system.”¶ José Cabrera, 18, a high school senior from Mexico who spoke at the Mass, said immigrant groups in Ohio expected to see legislation this year, adding that he and other students compared their activities to the civil rights march on Washington, recently celebrated on its 50th anniversary.¶ “We know this is the year,” said Mr. Cabrera, who came here illegally when he was 4 years old and was recently granted a deportation deferral by the Obama administration. “I have put as much effort in as I can and even more. If they just keep pushing it back and back, a lot of activists will be very frustrated.”¶ The gulf between the expectations of advocates and the reality they face in Washington is widening every day. As they feel momentum slipping away, their anger is likely to intensify this fall.¶ And time is not on their side. In June, the Senate passed a bipartisan plan to overhaul border security and grant illegal immigrants a chance to earn citizenship. If the House does not take up the immigration issue until 2014, members will face the prospect of voting on a highly contentious issue in the middle of a Congressional election year.¶ Republican primaries will begin in the spring, and many lawmakers may be reluctant to overhaul the immigration system just before facing their conservative constituents. If Congress does not complete action early next year, Congressional aides said, the issue could be delayed until after the November elections.¶ But leaders of groups supporting an immigration overhaul say they do not plan to let up.¶ The organizations plan a mobilization in early October, with rallies in at least 40 cities on Oct. 5 followed by a march and rally in Washington on Oct. 8. Convinced that a majority exists in the House for the legislation, they will press for Mr. Boehner to allow a vote before the end of the year. Leaders said the Syria debate and the fiscal fight should not become “excuses” to set aside immigration.¶ “We’re gearing up for late October — we’re going to push really hard for votes this fall and negotiations with the Senate,” said Frank Sharry, the executive director of America’s Voice, an advocacy group. “We never figured we’d have an opportunity in September because of the budget stuff and with the debt ceiling.”¶ The government’s authority to spend money under the existing budget will run out on Oct. 1 unless lawmakers reach a budget deal or agree to a temporary delay. And officials say the debt limit must be raised by mid-October or the nation will risk defaulting on its debts.¶ Many immigration advocates said they were especially pleased that conservative activists and talk radio hosts had failed to generate significant opposition to an overhaul in August.¶ At a rally in Richmond, Va., last month that was billed as a Tea Party show of strength, Representative Steve King of Iowa, a Republican who is an outspoken foe of any legal status for illegal immigrants, found himself addressing a nearly empty plaza.¶ By contrast, the Alliance for Citizenship, a coalition of pro-overhaul groups, said it logged nearly 1,200 events last month, from polite office visits to noisy street protests. Several dozen marchers walked from Sacramento to Bakersfield, Calif., hoping to evoke the farmworker protests of the 1960s. While few of the actions made national news, the groups kept up a drumbeat in Republican districts they identified as strategic. The alliance reported that 25 House Republicans had come out in favor of an overhaul including legalization during the recess.¶ Bibles, Badges and Business, a conservative coalition favoring the overhaul, dispatched representatives to more than 60 town hall-style meetings, to respond if opponents turned out in force. But Ali Noorani, a leader of the coalition, said no groundswell of rage had appeared, while support among conservatives appeared to be growing.¶ But that activity does not appear to have significantly altered the debate in Washington, in part because Syria is overshadowing other issues. Republican officials in the House say they will continue to consider a piece-by-piece approach to particular immigration issues in the weeks ahead. But the possibility of working out a comprehensive overhaul with the Senate and the president will have to wait, they say.¶ “In terms of getting anything on the floor, you’re certainly going to have to wait until something happens on the fiscal debate,” one senior Republican leadership aide said, adding that “the more contentious things you put on the schedule, the harder it is to do the thing that goes last.”¶ In that case, some immigration groups have signaled that they could become more aggressive. In Phoenix last month, young undocumented immigrants who call themselves Dreamers chained themselves to a fence at an immigration detention center and sat in front of a police bus carrying immigrants to be deported. Church and immigrant groups have promised fasts and protests in the coming weeks.¶ “We don’t control the timing. What we do control is the pressure,” said Mr. Medina, the labor leader. “They will get this done when the pressure is so great they have to act.”

#### Even the most popular detention policy causes backlash- partisans just want to keep the issue alive

Kuhn ‘10

[Walter E., Minority Chief Counsel, United States Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on the ¶ Constitution, Civil Rights and Human Rights. J.D. Duke University School of Law, 2006; ¶ B.A, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2003. “The Terrorist Detention Review Reform Act: Detention Policy and Political Reality.” Seton Hall Legislative Journal 35.2 ETB]

With terrorism policy often dominating the headlines and political ¶ discussion in Washington, the premise that Congress and the Executive ¶ have abdicated the issue to the courts may seem farfetched. Indeed, it ¶ seems there are daily newspaper articles and congressional discussions ¶ about the best way to detain, interrogate, and try terrorism suspects. ¶ Unfortunately, though, all of this talk and coverage increasingly leads to ¶ partisans retreating to their respective corners to score political points ¶ off of heated national security and civil-liberties rhetoric. While ¶ Congress and the President argue back and forth about the particular ¶ terrorism case of the day, unelected federal judges are left the ¶ unenviable, and to some judges, unwanted, task of de facto legislating ¶ lasting detention policy. ¶ If one accepts the premise that all the talk in the halls of Congress ¶ regarding detention policy is just that — talk — the question becomes, given the clear congressional interest in the issue, why the inertia on ¶ legislative progress? The transfer of power from President Bush to ¶ President Obama in 2009 gave many Obama supporters the hope that he ¶ would dramatically alter detention policy and move to a law ¶ enforcement model where all suspects would be tried or released.6¶ Much ¶ to their disappointment, President Obama has found it prudent to ¶ continue many of the detention policies of his predecessor, including ¶ indefinite detention without trial.7¶ At least with respect to the policies ¶ that President Obama has chosen to continue, there appears to be some ¶ degree of broad agreement in Congress. Congressional proponents of a ¶ “try or release” policy, for example, are now few and far between.8¶ With ¶ the universe of disagreement shrinking and federal judges asking for ¶ legislative guidance,9¶ it must be asked why there has been no action on¶ the part of Congress? ¶ Undoubtedly, for some in Congress, detention policy is worth more ¶ as a political issue than as a potential policy accomplishment. That is, ¶ even if one could wave a magic wand and instantly create a policy ¶ compromise that left all parties satisfied, some in Congress might ¶ decline in order to keep the political issue alive. While the specter of ¶ our legislative representatives playing politics with war policy is cynical ¶ and depressing, that motivation cannot be discounted. Similarly, ¶ detention issues may reemerge in the news with each foiled attack and ¶ judicial order of release, giving politicians an opportunity to demagogue ¶ and attack the other side while avoiding any responsibility for the ¶ consequences of policy decisions. In sum, by allowing the judiciary to ¶ take the lead on detention policy, Congress avoids the tough decisions ¶ and responsibility that comes therewith, while keeping a potent political ¶ issue alive.¶

#### Current immigration law endangers all innovation – reform is key

McCraw 12

McCraw, professor emeritus at Harvard Business School, 11/1/2012¶ (Thomas, “Innovative Immigrants,” <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/02/opinion/immigrants-as-entrepreneurs.html?pagewanted=all>)

SOME 70 million immigrants have come to America since the first colonists arrived. The role their labor has played in economic development is widely understood. Much less familiar is the extent to which their remarkable innovations have driven American prosperity. Indeed, while both Barack Obama and Mitt Romney have lauded entrepreneurship, innovation and “job creation,” neither candidate has made comprehensive immigration reform an issue, despite immigrants’ crucial role in those fields. Yet understanding how **immigrants have fueled innovation through history** is critical to making sure they continue to drive prosperity in the future. At the country’s beginning, the three most important architects of its financial system were immigrants: Alexander Hamilton, from St. Croix, then part of the Danish West Indies; Robert Morris, born in Liverpool, England; and Albert Gallatin of Geneva. Morris was superintendent of finance during the Revolutionary War, using every resource at his command to support the army in the field. Hamilton, as the first secretary of the Treasury, rescued the country from bankruptcy and designed its basic financial system. Gallatin paid down much of the national debt, engineered the financing of the Louisiana Purchase and remains the longest-serving Treasury secretary ever. Immigrants’ financial innovations continued through the 19th century. In 1808 Alexander Brown, from Ireland, founded the nation’s first investment bank, and his immigrant sons set up Brown Brothers. The Lehman brothers, from Germany, began as dry-goods merchants and cotton brokers in Alabama, then moved to New York just before the Civil War and eventually founded a bank. Many other immigrants, including Marcus Goldman of Goldman Sachs, followed similar paths, starting very small, traveling to new cities and establishing banks. Meanwhile, “Yankee” firms like Kidder, Peabody and Drexel, Morgan — whose partners were native-born — remained less mobile, tied by family and high society to Boston and New York. Immigrant innovators were pioneers in many other industries after the Civil War. Three examples were Andrew Carnegie (Scotland, steel), Joseph Pulitzer (Hungary, newspapers) and David Sarnoff (Russia, electronics). Each came to America young, poor and full of energy. Carnegie’s mother brought the family to Pittsburgh in 1848, when Andrew was 12. He became a bobbin-boy in a textile mill, a telegram messenger, a telegraph-key operator, a low-level manager at the Pennsylvania Railroad, a division superintendent for the same railroad and a bond salesman for the railroad in Europe. Recognizing the limitless market for the rails that carried trains, Carnegie jumped to steel. His most important innovation was “hard driving” blast furnaces, wearing them out quickly. This violated the accepted practice of “coddling” furnaces, but he calculated that his vastly increased output cut the price of steel far more than replacing the furnaces cost his company. In turn, an immense quantity of cheap steel found its way into lucrative new uses: structural steel for skyscrapers, sheet steel for automobiles. Pulitzer was the home-tutored son of a prosperous Hungarian family that lost its fortune. He came to the United States in 1864 at age 17, recruited by a Massachusetts Civil War regiment. Penniless after the war ended, he went to St. Louis, a center for German immigrants, whose language he spoke fluently. He worked as a waiter, a railroad clerk, a lawyer and a reporter for a local German newspaper, part of which he eventually purchased. In 1879, he acquired two English-language papers and merged them into The St. Louis Post-Dispatch. In 1883, he moved to New York, where he bought The New York World and began a fierce competition with other New York papers, mainly the Sun and, later, William Randolph Hearst’s New York Journal. The New York World was pro-labor, pro-immigration and, remarkably, both serious and sensationalist. It achieved a huge circulation. Sarnoff was just 9 years old when he arrived from Russia in 1901. He earned money selling Yiddish newspapers on the street and singing at a synagogue, and then worked as an office clerk, a messenger and, like Carnegie, a telegraph operator. From there he became part of the fledgling radio firm RCA and rose rapidly within its ranks. Sarnoff was among the first to see radio’s potential as “point-to-mass” entertainment, i.e., broadcasting. He devoted a huge percentage of profits to research and development, and won an epic battle with CBS over industry standards for color TV. For decades, RCA and electronics were practically synonymous. As these men show, one of the key traits of immigrant innovators is geographic mobility, both from the home country and within the United States. Consider the striking roster of 20th-century immigrants who led the development of fields like movies and information technology: the Hollywood studios MGM, Warner Brothers, United Artists, Paramount and Universal; the Silicon Valley companies Intel, eBay, Google, Yahoo and Sun Microsystems. The economist Joseph Schumpeter — yet another immigrant, and the most perceptive early analyst of innovation — considered it to be the fundamental component of entrepreneurship: “The typical entrepreneur is more self-centered than other types, because he relies less than they do on tradition and connection” and because his efforts consist “precisely in breaking up old, and creating new, tradition.” For that reason, innovators always encounter resistance from people whose economic and social interests are threatened by new products and methods. Compared with the native-born, who have extended families and lifelong social and commercial relationships, immigrants without such ties — without businesses to inherit or family property to protect — are in some ways better prepared to play the innovator’s role. A hundred academic monographs could not prove that immigrants are more innovative than native-born Americans, because each spurs the other on. Innovations by the blended population were, and still are, integral to the economic growth of the **U**nited **S**tates. But our overly complex immigration law hampers even the most obvious innovators’ efforts to become citizens. **It endangers our tradition of entrepreneurship**, and it must be repaired — soon.

#### Solves warming

Norris and Jenkins 9

\*Project Director at the Breakthrough Institute, \* Director of Energy and Climate Policy, The Breakthrough Institute,(Teryn and Jessie, “ Want to Save the World? Make Clean Energy Cheap,” Huffington Post, March 10, <http://www.thebreakthrough.org/blog/2009/03/want_to_save_the_world_make_cl.shtml>)

Whatever the cause, we have very little chance of overcoming climate change without enlisting young innovators at a drastically greater scale. Simply put, they represent one of the most important catalysts for creating a clean energy economy and achieving long-term prosperity. The reason is this: at its core, climate change is a challenge of technology innovation. Over the next four decades, global energy demand will approximately double. Most of this growth will happen in developing nations as they continue lifting their citizens out of poverty and building modern societies. But over the same period, global greenhouse gas emissions must fall dramatically to avert the worst consequences of climate change. Shortly before his untimely death in 2005, the Nobel Prize-winning physicist Richard Smalley coined this the "Terawatt Challenge": increasing global energy production from roughly 15 terawatts in 2005 to 60 terawatts annually by 2100 in a way that simultaneously confronts the challenges of global warming, poverty alleviation, and resource depletion. **The single** **greatest obstacle** to meeting the Terawatt Challenge is the "technology gap" between dirty and clean energy sources. Low-carbon energy technologies remain significantly more expensive than fossil fuels. For example, solar photovoltaic electricity costs up to three to five times that of coal electricity, and plug-in hybrid and electric vehicles can be twice as expensive as their gasoline-fueled competitors. Unless this technology gap is bridged and clean energy technologies become affordable and scalable, poor and rich nations alike will continue opposing significant prices on their carbon emissions and will continue relying primarily upon coal and other fossil fuels to power their development. This will virtually assure massive climate destabilization. So the task is clear: to avoid climate catastrophe and create a new energy economy, **we must unleash our forces of innovation** - namely, scientists, engineers and entrepreneurs- to invent a new portfolio of truly scalable clean energy technologies, chart new paths to bring these technologies to market, and ensure they are affordable enough to deploy throughout the world.

#### Extinction

Brandenberg 99

(John & Monica Paxson, Visiting Prof. Researcher @ Florida Space Institute, Physicist Ph.D., Science Writer, Dead Mars Dying Earth, Pg 232-233)

The ozone hole expands, driven by a monstrous synergy with global warming that puts more catalytic ice crystals into the stratosphere, but this affects the far north and south and not the major nations’ heartlands. The seas rise, the tropics roast but the media networks no longer cover it. The Amazon rainforest becomes the Amazon desert. Oxygen levels fall, but profits rise for those who can provide it in bottles. An equatorial high-pressure zone forms, forcing drought in central Africa and Brazil, the Nile dries up and the monsoons fail. Then inevitably, at some unlucky point in time, a major unexpected event occurs—a major volcanic eruption, a sudden and dramatic shift in ocean circulation or a large asteroid impact (those who think freakish accidents do not occur have paid little attention to life or Mars), or a **nuclear war** that starts between Pakistan and India and escalates to involve China and Russia . . . Suddenly the gradual climb in global temperatures goes on a mad excursion as the oceans warm and release large amounts of dissolved carbon dioxide from their lower depths into the atmosphere. Oxygen levels go down precipitously as oxygen replaces lost oceanic carbon dioxide. Asthma cases double and then double again. Now a third of the world fears breathing. As the oceans dump carbon dioxide, the greenhouse effect increases, which further warms the oceans, causing them to dump even more carbon. Because of the heat, plants die and burn in enormous fires, which release more carbon dioxide, and the oceans evaporate, adding more water vapor to the greenhouse. Soon, we are in what is termed a runaway greenhouse effect, as happened to Venus eons ago. The last two surviving scientists inevitably argue, one telling the other, “See! I told you the missing sink was in the ocean!” **Earth**, as we know it, **dies**. After this Venusian excursion in temperatures, the oxygen disappears into the soil, the oceans evaporate and are lost and the dead Earth loses its ozone layer completely. Earth is too far from the Sun for it to be the second Venus for long. Its atmosphere is slowly lost—as is its water—because of ultraviolet bombardment breaking up all the molecules apart from carbon dioxide. As the atmosphere becomes thin, the Earth becomes colder. For a short while temperatures are nearly normal, but the ultraviolet **sears any life** that tries to make a comeback. The carbon dioxide thins out to form a thin veneer with a few wispy clouds and dust devils. Earth becomes the second Mars—red, **desolate, with** perhaps a **few** hardy microbes surviving.

### K

#### THE WORKING CLASS MUST COALESCE IN MATERIAL ACTION AGAINST FINANCIAL EXPLOITATION. THE AFF’S NOTION OF AGENCY UNIQUELY UNDERMINES THE MATERIALIST ANTI-CAPITALIST REVOLUTIONARY KNOWLEDGE KEY TO SURVIVAL.

Callinicos 2k10

[Alex, Bonfire of Illusions: The Twin Crisis of the Liberal World, Polity, professor of European studies King’s College – London, DPhil – Oxford, p. 139-43]

There are other strong reasons to press for a break with the logic of competitive accumulation. The scientific evi-dence that the emission of greenhouse gases - most notably C02 - caused by human activity is generating profound and irreversible processes of climate change is now beyond dispute. It is also very widely agreed that preventing these processes reaching a disastrous scale requires the rapid adoption and implementation of drastic targets for cutting CO2 emissions. But while the targets, particularly since the eclipse of the Bush gang, have become more ambitious, the actual emissions have continued to rise. The most plausible explanation appeals to the logic of competition.

The problem is, yet again, one of collective action. Evi- dently it is in everyone's interest to avoid drastic climate change. But no individual capital or state is willing to shoulder the additional costs involved in moving to a low- carbon economy. In international negotiations, the leading states play a game of pass-the-parcel - the US demanding that India and China adopt tough targets, the latter asking why they should bear the burden of two centuries of industrialization mainly in the North. The EU, despite its pre- tensions to be a master of 'soft power' that has transcended bad old nationalism, is particularly ineffectual. Germany has vocally and largely successfully defended its car firms against what they regarded as excessively tough targets. And the economic crisis has provided many governments with a perfect excuse to go slow in reducing reliance on fossil fuels. The logic of competitive accumulation here threatens the future of the human species.20 The implication is that any sustainable alternative to •capitalism has to be based, not on the market, but on democratic planning. In a democratically planned economy the allocation of resources would be the outcome of a democratic political process that would set overall priori- ties for the economy. There are some models of how this could work. One is Albert's Parecon, or participatory economics. This involves an economy of workers' and consumers' councils in which individuals and enterprises submit proposals for their share of society's resources and a process of gradual adjustments (Albert calls them 'iterations') takes place while technical experts come up with a plan that would give everyone as much as possible of what they want. The main weakness of this model is that it mimics a bit too closely the workings of a market economy, in which claims on resources are driven by individual demands. Albert is an anarchist, and his commitment to decentralization here goes too far. The allocation of society's resources isn't a neutral technical issue. It's a political question that requires some sort of collective and democratic decision-making process to choose between what would often be competing views of the priorities of the society in question. From this perspective, Pat Devine offers a superior model of what he calls negotiated coordination. Here the allocation of resources is largely the outcome of discussion between producers, consumers and other affected groups, but within the framework of overall decisions about economic priorities made democratically at the national and international level.21 Plainly there is much more to be said - and, above all, to be done - about democratic planning. All the same, the importance of the kind of work being done by Albert Devine and others is that they begin to break down the prejudice against planning and to sketch out how an economy that rejected the market could manage to be both democratic and efficient. But any break with capitalism couldn't take the form of an instantaneous leap into a fully planned economy. Marx long ago argued in the 'Critique of the Gotha Programme' that a new workers' state would inherit a society deeply marked by capitalism. Initially, it would have to make compromises with the old order, and gradually move towards a society governed by the communist principle 'From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs!'22 Similarly today a government breaking with capitalism would need to make a decisive shift towards an economy in which priorities were decided democratically rather than left to the anarchy of competition. This would involve critically taking control of the financial markets, nationalizing under workers' control key sectors of the economy, and extending social provision on the basis of a progressive tax system that redistributed wealth and income from rich to poor. These measures, radical though they are, would still leave in place many aspects of a market economy. Large sectors would remain in private hands. Continuous pressure and the introduction of new mea- sures would be necessary to move the economy as a whole towards the principles of democratic planning. One key step would be to weaken the power of the capitalist labour market, which today rules our lives. In my view, the best way to do this would be to intro- duce universal direct income. In other words, every resi- dent of the country would receive, as of right, an income that met their basic needs at a relatively low but neverthe- less decent level. This would serve two goals. First, it would ensure a basic level of welfare for everyone much more efficiently than existing systems of social provision. (People with greater needs because they had children or were disabled or whatever would receive a higher basic income.) Secondly, having a guaranteed basic income would greatly reduce the pressure on individuals to accept whatever job was on offer on the labour market. One of the main presuppositions of capitalism - that workers have no acceptable alternative to wage labour - would be removed. The balance of power between labour and capital would shift towards the workers, irrespective of the nature of their employer.23 More broadly, the question of power is crucial. One obvious challenge to the kind of vision of change I have just sketched out is how to ensure that the direction of change would be towards a democratically planned economy rather than back to market capitalism or maybe to the kind of state capitalism that ended up dominating the Soviet Union. The only guarantee that counts is that levers of political power are in the hands of the workers and the poor themselves. As long as the state takes the form that it does today, of a bureaucratically organized, hierarchical set of apparatuses whose managers' interests are bound up with those of capital, any improvement in society can only be temporary and fragile. This is why the strategy of ignoring the state advocated by Holloway is so badly mistaken. If we are to move towards a democratically planned economy, then the existing state has to be confronted and broken. This task can only be achieved through the development of a different kind of power, one based on the self- organization of workers and other poor people that devel- ops out of their struggles against capital. The great revolutionary movements of the twentieth century offered some glimpses of this power - from the workers' and sol- diers' councils of the Russian Revolution of October 1917 to the workers' shoras during the Iranian Revolution of 1978-9. The self-organization displayed by the Bolivian popular movement during the insurrections of October 2003 and May-June 2005 showed that the contemporary movements against neoliberalism can generate this kind of power as well.24 A democratically planned economy would be the core of a self-managing society, one in which directly elected workplace and neighbourhood councils took responsibil- ity for their own affairs and linked together to make deci- sions for society at large. The key insight that Marx had during the Paris Commune of 1871 was that these forms of organization would develop before the new society was created, in the process of fighting the old society. The same methods of self-organization that would be the basis of a self-managing society are needed by the exploited and oppressed to resist and, ultimately, to overthrow capital itself. The overthrow of capital is itself a process. The dilemma that Albert imagines confronting a workers' cooperative in a market economy would face any society that was beginning to introduce the principles of democratic plan- ning in a world still ruled by capitalism. It was responsible for the corruption and eventual destruction of the Russian Revolution of October 1917. Any breakthrough in one part of the world could only survive by spreading and progressively overturning the logic of capital on a global scale. The globalization of capital has produced a global- ization of resistance. Struggles in different parts of the world contaminate each other. Chiapas and Seattle had global reverberations. The two European countries with the most advanced and combative social movements, France and Greece, have exerted a degree of mutual influ- ence on one another. The movements in Latin America have become a beacon to all those fighting neoliberalism. "We are still a very long way from overturning capitalism even in one country. Indeed, the more one seeks to elabo- rate on the shape of an alternative to capitalism the more one is overawed by the immensity of the task. The biggest immediate obstacle that confronts anyone seeking to address it is the chronic political weakness of the radical anticapitalist left on a global scale. Nevertheless, the present crisis has torn a huge hole in neoliberalism both as an ideology and as a mode of organizing capital- ism. The market no longer seems like a second nature unamenable to change or control. Those who are prepared to seize this moment boldly can help to ensure that the boundaries of the possible really are widened, allowing the billions of victims of capitalism finally to escape.

#### Text: VOTE NEGATIVE TO REJECT THE 1AC IN FAVOR OF MATERIALIST REVOLUTIONARY KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION AGAINST CAPITALISM.

#### AND, ECOLOGICAL CATASTROPHE NECESSITATES MATERIALIST REVOLUTIONARY DIALECTICS AGAINST CAPITALISM’S EXPLOITATION TO ENSURE SURVIVAL.

Foster 2k11

[john bellamy,  professor of sociology at the University of Oregon and also editor of Monthly Review, Since the Great Financial Crisis hit in 2008, Foster has been sought out by academics, activists, the media, and the general public as a result of his earlier prescient writings on the coming crisis. He has given numerous interviews, talks, and invited lectures, as well as written invited commentary, articles, and books on the subject]

In the twenty-first century it is customary to view the rise of planetary ecological problems as a surprising development scarcely conceivable prior to the last few decades. It is here, however, that we have the most to learn from the analysis of nineteenth-century thinkers who played a role in the development of ecology, including both early ecological scientists and classical historical materialists. Science has long warned of the negative, destructive side of the human transformation of the earth—a warning which the system, driven by its own imperatives, has continually sought to downplay. Indeed, what distinguishes our time from earlier centuries is not so much the conservation of catastrophe, which has long been recognized, but rather the accelerated pace at which such destruction is now manifesting itself, i.e., what I am calling the accumulation of catastrophe. The desertification arising in pre-capitalist times, partly through human action, manifested itself over centuries, even millennia. Today changes in the land, the atmosphere, the oceans, indeed the entire life-support system of the earth, are the product of mere decades. If in the past, Darwin was struck that in a mere three centuries after European colonization, the ecology of the island of St. Helena had been destroyed to the point that it was reduced to “desert”—today, in only two generations, we have altered the biogeochemical processes of the entire planet.28The absence of a historical perspective on the conservation, even accumulation, of catastrophe is a major barrier to needed change in our time. Many environmentalists, including some who perceive themselves as being on the left, persist in believing that we can address our immense and growing ecological problems without altering our fundamental social-production relationships. All that is necessary in this view is the combined magic of green technology and green markets. Short-term fixes are presumed to be adequate solutions, while society remains on the same essential course as before. Indeed, the dominant perspective on ecology can be characterized, I believe, as consisting of three successive stages of denial: (1) the denial altogether of the planetary ecological crisis (or its human cause); (2) the denial that the ecological crisis is fundamentally due to the system of production in which we live, namely capitalism; and (3) the denial that capitalism is constitutionally incapable of overcoming this global ecological threat—with capital now being presented instead as the savior of the environment.The first stage of ecological denial is easy to understand. This is the form of denial represented by Exxon-Mobil. Such outright denial of the destructive consequences of their actions is the automatic response of corporations generally when faced with the prospect of environmental regulations, which would negatively affect their bottom lines. It is also the form of absolute denial promoted by climate-change denialists themselves, who categorically reject the reality of human agency in global climate change. The second stage of denial, a retreat from the first, is to admit there is a problem,while dissociating it from the larger socioeconomic system. The famous IPAT formula, i.e. Environmental Impact = Population x Consumption x Technology (which amounts to saying that these are the three factors behind our environmental problems/solutions), has been used by some to suggest that population growth, the consumption habits of most individuals, and inappropriate technology carry the totality of blame for environmental degradation. The answer then is sustainable population, sustainable consumption, and sustainable technology. This approach, though seemingly matter-of-fact, and deceptively radical, derives its acceptability for the vested interests from the fact that it generally serves to disguise the more fundamental reality of the treadmill of capitalist production itself.29 The third stage of denial, a last-ditch defense, and exhibiting a greater level of desperation on the part of the established order, is, I would argue, the most dangerous of all. It admits that the environmental crisis is wrapped up with the existence of capitalism, but argues that what we need is an entirely new kind of capitalism: variously called “sustainable capitalism,” “green capitalism,” “natural capitalism,” and “climate capitalism” by thinkers as various as Al Gore, Paul Hawken, Amory and L. Hunter Lovins, and Jonathon Porritt.30 The argument here varies but usually begins with the old trope that capitalism is the most efficient economic system possible—a form of “spontaneous order” arising from an invisible hand—and that the answer to ecological problems is to make it more efficient still by internalizing costs on the environment previously externalized by the system. Aside from the presumed magic of the market itself, and moral claims as to “the greening of corporations,” this is supposed to be achieved by means of a black box of technological wonders. Implicit in all such views is the notion that capitalism can be made sustainable, without altering its accumulation or economic growth imperative and without breaking with the dominant social relations. The exponential growth of the system ad infinitum is possible, we are told, while simultaneously generating a sustainable relation to the planet. This of course runs up against what Herman Daly has called the Impossibility Theorem: If the whole world were to have an ecological footprint the size of the United States we would need multiple planets.31 The idea that such a development process can persist permanently on a single planet (and indeed that we are not at this point already confronting earthly limits) is of course an exercise in delusion, bordering on belief in the supernatural. “Capitalism,” as the great environmental economist K. William Kapp once wrote, is “an economy of unpaid costs.”32 It can persist and even prosper only insofar as it is able to externalize its costs on the mass of the population and the surrounding environment. Whenever the destruction is too severe the system simply seeks to engineer another spatial fix. Yet, a planetary capitalism is from this standpoint a contradiction in terms: it means that there is nowhere finally to externalize the social and environmental costs of capitalist destruction (we cannot ship our toxic waste into outer space!), and no external resources to draw upon in the face of the enormous squandering of resources inherent to the system (we can’t solve our problems by mining the moon!).

Market-based solutions to climate change, such as emissions trading, have been shown to promote profits, and to facilitate economic growth and financial wealth, while increasing carbon emissions. From an environmental standpoint, therefore, they are worse than nothing—since they stand in the way of effective action. Nor are the technologies most acceptable to the system (since not requiring changes in property relations) the answer. So-called “clean coal” or carbon capture and storage technologies are economically unfeasible and ecologically dubious, and serve mainly as an ideological justification for keeping coal-fired plants going. Worse still, are geoengineering schemes like dumping sulfur particles in the atmosphere or iron filings in the ocean (the first in order to deflect the sun’s rays, the second in order to promote algal growth to increase ocean absorption of carbon). These schemes carry with them the potential for even greater ecological disasters: in the first case, this could lead to a reduction of photosynthesis, in the second the expansion of dead zones. Remember the Sorcerer’s Apprentice!33 The potential for the accumulation of catastrophe on a truly planetary level as a result of geoengineering technology is so great that it would be absolute folly to proceed in this way—simply in order to avoid changes in the mode of production, i.e., a fundamental transformation of our way of life, property relations, and metabolism with nature. Science tells us that we are crossing planetary boundaries everywhere we look, from climate change, to ocean acidification, to species destruction, to freshwater shortages, to chemical pollution of air, water, soil, and humans. The latest warning sign is the advent of what is called “extreme weather”—a direct outgrowth of climate change. As Hansen says: “Global warming increases the intensity of droughts and heat waves, and thus the area of forest fires. However, because a warmer atmosphere holds more water vapor, global warming must also increase the intensity of the other extreme of the hydrologic cycle—meaning heavier rains, more extreme floods, and more intense storms driven by latent heat.” Scientists involved in the new area of climate-attribution science, where extreme weather events are examined for their climate signatures, are now arguing that we are rapidly approaching a situation where the proverbial “‘hundred-year’ flood” no longer occurs simply once a century, but every few years. Natural catastrophes are thus likely to become more severe and more frequent occurrences in the lives of all living beings. The hope of some scientists is that this will finally wake up humanity to its true danger.34 How are we to understand the challenge of the enormous accumulation of catastrophe, and the no less massive human action required to address this? In the 1930s John Maynard Keynes wrote an essay entitled “Economic Possibilities of Our Grandchildren,” aimed at defending capitalism in response to revolutionary social challenges then arising. Keynes argued that we should rely for at least a couple more generations on the convenient lie of the Smithian invisible hand—accepting greed as the basis of a spontaneous economic order. We should therefore continue the pretense that “fair is foul and foul is fair” for the sake of the greater accumulation of wealth in society that such an approach would bring. Eventually, in the time of our “grandchildren”—maybe a “hundred years” hence (i.e., by the early 2030s)—Keynes assumed, the added wealth created by these means would be great enough that we could begin to tell the truth: that foul is foul and fair is fair. It would then be necessary for humanity to address the enormous inequalities and injustices produced by the system, engaging in a full-scale redistribution of wealth, and a radical transformation of the ends of production.35 Yet, the continued pursuit of Keynes’s convenient lie over the last eight decades has led to a world far more polarized and beset with contradictions than he could have foreseen. It is a world prey to the enormous unintended consequences of accumulation without limits: namely, global economic stagnation, financial crisis, and planetary ecological destruction. Keynes, though aware of some of the negative economic aspects of capitalist production, had no real understanding of the ecological perils—of which scientists had already long been warning. Today these perils are impossible to overlook. Faced with impending ecological catastrophe, it is more necessary than ever to abandon Keynes’s convenient lie and espouse the truth: that foul is foul and fair is fair. Capitalism, the society of “après moi le déluge!” is a system that fouls its own nest—both the human-social conditions and the wider natural environment on which it depends. The accumulation of capital is at the same time accumulation of catastrophe, not only for a majority of the world’s people, but living species generally. Hence, nothing is fairer—more just, more beautiful, and more necessary—today than the struggle to overthrow the regime of capital and to create a system of substantive equality and sustainable human development; a socialism for the twenty-first century.

### Case

**Institutional checks on biopower can be effective**

Nasser **Hussain and** Melissa **Ptacek. 2000**. Department of History, University of California, Berkeley, Law And Society Review, v34 n2.

Here once again we are forced to question Agamben's teleological mode of thought. Is this sovereign power represented in the concentration camps really a constitutive feature of sovereignty tout court? Even limiting ourselves to the remarks above, we can imagine a liberal critique of this position that asks from where come the limitations that Agamben concedes previous Weimar governments had observed. Surely, **one does not have to accept in its entirety a normative liberal conception of sovereign power in order to appreciate that the demand for a factual accounting for the decision on the exception, and institutional checks upon the totalization of the space of exception, can nonetheless** - at least in certain instances - **be effective**. Indeed, one could go further and suggest that **a liberal theory of sovereign power understands full well the paradoxical relation between law and fact, norm and exception; and**, precisely in light of such an understanding **constructs an institutional system that cannot resolve the paradox but nonetheless attempts to prevent it from reaching an intensified and catastrophic conclusion**. Given that Agamben is a nuanced and fair-minded thinker, one must wonder about why he largely ignores such a system. We think that one possible answer is that, just as for Agamben the source of the problem is not the institutional operation of sovereign power, but its object - bare life - so too the solution is not a proliferation of institutional safeguards but a rethinking of that mode of being. In this regard, we find his concluding musings on Heidigger to be suggestive.

**Predictions are accurate enough and should be used as a basis for political action**

**Chernoff 2009**. Fred, Prof. IR and Dir. IR – Colgate U., European Journal of International Relations, “Conventionalism as an Adequate Basis for Policy-Relevant IR Theory”, 15:1

For these and other reasons, many social theorists and social scientists have come to the conclusion that prediction is impossible. Well-known IR reflexivists like Rick Ashley, Robert Cox, Rob Walker and Alex Wendt have attacked naturalism by emphasizing the interpretive nature of social theory. Ashley is explicit in his critique of prediction, as is Cox, who says quite simply, ‘It is impossible to predict the future’ (Ashley, 1986: 283; Cox, 1987: 139, cf. also 1987: 393). More recently, Heikki Patomäki has argued that **‘qualitative changes and emergence are possible, but predictions are not’ defective** and that the latter two presuppose an unjustifiably narrow notion of ‘prediction’.14 **A determined prediction sceptic may continue to hold that there is too great a degree of complexity of social relationships** (which comprise ‘open systems’) **to allow any prediction whatsoever.** Two very **simple examples may circumscribe and help to refute a radical variety of scepticism**. First, **we all make reliable social predictions and do so with great frequency**. We can predict with high probability that a spouse, child or parent will react to certain well-known stimuli that we might supply, based on extensive past experience. More to the point of IR prediction – scepticism, we can imagine a young child in the UK who (perhaps at the cinema) (1) picks up a bit of 19th-century British imperial lore thus gaining a sense of the power of the crown, without knowing anything of current balances of power, (2) hears some stories about the US–UK invasion of Iraq in the context of the aim of advancing democracy, and (3) hears a bit about communist China and democratic Taiwan. Although the specific term ‘preventative strike’ might not enter into her lexicon, it is possible to imagine the child, whose knowledge is thus limited, thinking that if democratic Taiwan were threatened by China, the UK would (possibly or probably) launch a strike on China to protect it, much as the UK had done to help democracy in Iraq. In contrast to the child, readers of this journal and scholars who study the world more thoroughly have factual information (e.g. about the relative military and economic capabilities of the UK and China) and hold some cause-and-effect principles (such as that states do not usually initiate actions that leaders understand will have an extremely high probability of undercutting their power with almost no chances of success). Anyone who has adequate knowledge of world politics would predict that the UK will not launch a preventive attack against China. In the real world, China knows that for the next decade and well beyond the UK will not intervene militarily in its affairs. While Chinese leaders have to plan for many likely — and even a few somewhat unlikely — future possibilities, they do not have to plan for various implausible contingencies: they do not have to structure forces geared to defend against specifically UK forces and do not have to conduct diplomacy with the UK in a way that would be required if such an attack were a real possibility. Any rational decision-maker in China may use some cause-and-effect (probabilistic) principles along with knowledge of specific facts relating to the Sino-British relationship to predict (P2) that the UK will not land its forces on Chinese territory — even in the event of a war over Taiwan (that is, the probability is very close to zero). The statement P2 qualifies as a prediction based on DEF above and counts as knowledge for Chinese political and military decision-makers. A Chinese diplomat or military planner who would deny that theory-based prediction would have no basis to rule out extremely implausible predictions like P2 and would thus have to prepare for such unlikely contingencies as UK action against China. A reflexivist theorist sceptical of ‘prediction’ in IR might argue that the China example distorts the notion by using a trivial prediction and treating it as a meaningful one. But the critic’s temptation to dismiss its value stems precisely from the fact that it is so obviously true. The value to China of knowing that the UK is not a military threat is significant. The fact that, under current conditions, any plausible cause-and-effect understanding of IR that one might adopt would yield P2, that the ‘UK will not attack China’, does not diminish the value to China of knowing the UK does not pose a military threat. A critic might also argue that DEF and the China example allow non-scientific claims to count as predictions. But we note that while physics and chemistry offer precise ‘point predictions’, other natural sciences, such as seismology, genetics or meteorology, produce predictions that are often much less specific; that is, they describe the predicted ‘events’ in broader time frame and typically in probabilistic terms. We often find predictions about the probability, for example, of a seismic event in the form ‘some time in the next three years’ rather than ‘two years from next Monday at 11:17 am’. DEF includes approximate and probabilistic propositions as predictions and is thus able to catagorize as a prediction the former sort of statement, which is of a type that is often of great value to policy-makers. **With the help of these ‘non-point predictions’ coming from the natural and the social sciences, leaders are able to choose the courses of action** (e.g. more stringent earthquake-safety building codes, or procuring an additional carrier battle group) **that are most likely to accomplish the leaders’ desired ends. So while ‘point predictions’ are not what political leaders require in most decision-making situations, critics of IR predictiveness often attack the predictive capacity of IR theory for its inability to deliver them. The critics thus commit the straw man fallacy by requiring a sort of prediction in IR (1) that few, if any, theorists claim to be able to offer, (2) that are not required by policy-makers for theory-based predictions to be valuable, and (3) that are not possible even in some natural sciences.**15 The range of theorists included in ‘reflexivists’ here is very wide and it is possible to dissent from some of the general descriptions. From the point of view of the central argument of this article, there are two important features that should be rendered accurately. One is that reflexivists reject explanation–prediction symmetry, which allows them to pursue causal (or constitutive) explanation without any commitment to prediction. The second is that almost all share clear opposition to predictive social science.16 The reflexivist commitment to both of these conclusions should be evident from the foregoing discussion.

**Discursive focus trades off with focus on structural change—it becomes a psychological substitute for action.**

**Kidner 2k** – psychology professor, David, Nature and Psyche, p 66-7

Noam Chomsky has noted that if "it's too hard to deal with real problems,' some academics tend to "go off on wild goose chases that don't matter ... [or] get involved in academic cults that are very divorced from any reality and that provide a defense against dealing with the world as it actually is." An emphasis on language can serve this sort of defensive function; for the **study of discourse enables one to stand aside** from issues **and avoid** any **commitment to a cause** or ideal, **simply** presenting all sides of a debate and **pointing out** the **discursive strategies** involved. **As the physical world** appears to **fade into** mere **discourse**, so **it comes to seem less real** than the language used to describe it; and environmental **issues lose** the dimensions of **urgency** and tragedy and become instead the proving grounds for ideas and attitudes. Rather than walking in what Aldo Leopold described as a "world of wounds," the discursive theorist can study this world dispassionately, safely insulated from the emotional and ecological havoc that is taking place elsewhere. Like experimentalism, this is a schizoid stance that exemplifies rather than challenges the characteristic social pathology of our time; and it is one that supports Melanie Klein's thesis that **the internal object world can serve as a psychotic substitute for an external "real" world that is** either absent or **unsatisfying**." Ian Craib's description of **social constructionism as a "social psychosis"** therefore **seems** entirely **apt**. But what object relations theorists such as Klein fail to point out is the other side of this dialectic that withdrawing from the external world and substituting an internal world of words or fantasies, because of the actions that follow from this state of affairs, makes the former even less satisfying and more psychologically distant, so contributing to the vicious spiral that severs the "human" from the "natural" and abandons nature to industrialism.

**Masking Disad—discursive criticism masks the problem and prevents legitimate solutions.**

**Meisner 95** (Mark, professor of environmental studies at York University, (Mark, “Resourcist Language: The Symbolic Enslavement of Nature”, Proceedings of the Conference on Communication and Our Environment, ed: David Sachsman, p. 242)

**Changing the language we use** to talk **about** non-human nature **is not a solution**. As I suggested, **language is not the problem**. Rather, **it s**eems **more like a contagious symptom of a deeper and multi-faceted problem that has yet to be fully defined**. Resourcist language is both an indicator and a carrier of the pathology of rampant ecological degradation. Further¬more, **language change alone can end up simply being a band-aid solution that gives the appearance of change and makes the problem all the less visible**. In a recent article on feminist language reform, Susan Ehrlich and Ruth King (1994) argue that because meanings are socially constructed, attempts at introducing nonsexist language are being undermined by a culture that is still largely sexist. The **words may have shifted, but the meanings and ideologies have not. The real world cure for the sick patient matters more than the treatment of a single symptom**. Consequently, **language change and cultural change must go together with social-moral change**. It is naive to believe either that language is trivial, or that it is deterministic.

**Biopower is necessary to preserve value to life**

**Ojakangas 2005.** Mika Ojakangas, Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, FOUCAULT STUDIES, 2005, p. http://www.foucault-studies.com/no2/ojakangas1.pdf

In fact, the history of modern Western societies would be quite incomprehensible without taking into account that there exists a form of power which refrains from killing but which nevertheless is capable of directing people’s lives. The effectiveness of biopower can be seen lying precisely in that it refrains and withdraws before every demand of killing, even though these demands would derive from the demand of justice. In biopolitical societies, according to Foucault, capital punishment could not be maintained except by invoking less the enormity of the crime itself than the monstrosity of the criminal: "One had the right to kill those who represented a kind of biological danger to others." However, given that the "right to kill" is precisely a sovereign right, it can be argued that the biopolitical societies analyzed by Foucault were not entirely biopolitical. Perhaps, there neither has been nor can be a society that is entirely biopolitical. Nevertheless, the fact is that present day European societies have abolished capital punishment. In them, there are no longer exceptions. It is the very "right to kill" that has been called into question. However, it is not called into question because of enlightened moral sentiments, but rather because of the deployment of biopolitical thinking and practice. For all these reasons, Agamben’s thesis, according to which the concentration camp is the fundamental biopolitical paradigm of the West, has to be corrected. **The biopolitical paradigm of the West is not the concentration camp, but, rather, the presentday welfare society** and, **instead of homo-sacer, the paradigmatic figure of the biopolitical society can be seen,** for example**, in the middle class Swedish social democrat**. Although this figure is an object – and a product of the huge biopolitical machinery, it does not mean that he is permitted to kill without committing homicide. Actually, the fact that he eventually dies, seems to be his greatest "crime" against the machinery. (In biopolitical societies, death is not only "something to be hidden away," but, also, as Foucault stresses, the most "shameful thing of all.") Therefore**, he is not exposed to an unconditional threat of death, but rather to an unconditional retreat of all dying**. In fact, **the biopolitical machinery does not want to threaten him, but to encourage him, with all its material and spiritual capacities, to live healthily, to live long and to live happily – even when, in biological terms, he "should have been dead long ago". This is because bio power is not bloody power over bare life for its own sake but pure power over all life for the sake of the living. It is not power but the living, the condition of all life – individual as well as collective – that is the measure of the success of biopower.**

# 2NC

## Disad

### AT Politics Bad

#### Predictiongs good – chernoff

#### Debating over the specific merits of policies using empirical evidence is necessary to solve propagandist takeover and serial policy failure. Evaluating opportunity costs is key.

Anderson 3 – Lisa Anderson, Dean of the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia, former President of the Middle East Studies Association, November 2003, online: http://www.campus-watch.org/article/id/871

Yet, there is far more that we must do, as an institution and as individuals. We have a special responsibility, in fostering intellectual exchange, promoting high standards of scholarship, enhancing education and encouraging public awareness of the Middle East to ensure that our academic collaborators and colleagues are not treated like enemy aliens, their religions maligned and motives impugned. Scientific and scholarly exchange should not be impeded and dissemination of ideas must be respected without regard to the national origin, political persuasion or disciplinary loyalty of their authors. We need to be able to acknowledge the failings of our work without embarrassment--remember that no bench scientist is afraid to report negative experimental results--but we must also assertively deploy our unparalleled expertise to provide unique insight and understanding of the Middle East. The Middle East Studies Association is, in fact, where people congregate who speak the languages, fathom the economies, know the histories (and the debates about the histories), appreciate the jokes, understand the insults, and recognize the aspirations in the Middle East today. What does that unique insight and understanding mean, and what relationship might it have to policy? This question is worth reflecting on carefully, for the academy and the policy world cannot afford to be mutually incomprehensible. Certainly, scholars are often dismissive of the lack of analytical rigor that typifies the conduct of public policy--the need to act before all the answers are known--while policy practitioners are bemused by the theoretical pretensions of scholars--the reluctance to act in the absence of all the answers.[[20]](http://fp.arizona.edu/mesassoc/Bulletin/Pres%20Addresses/Anderson.htm#_ftn20) Yet we have already seen how policy can shape the arena in which scholarship takes place, for good and for ill, and there is a widespread presumption that scholarship should also shape policy. On the part of policymakers, for example, Representative Pete Hoekstra in his press release announcing that the authorization of Title VI has passed the House subcommittee describes the purposes of the Title VI centers: "to advance knowledge of world regions, encourage the study of foreign languages, and train Americans to have the international expertise and understanding to fulfill pressing national security needs."[[21]](http://fp.arizona.edu/mesassoc/Bulletin/Pres%20Addresses/Anderson.htm#_ftn21) From the scholar's perspective, just last year, my predecessor as MESA President, Joel Beinin, while acknowledging that " we cannot and should not speak with one voice as authorities whose academic expertise give us exact knowledge of the best way to protect Americans from acts of terror, to remove Saddam Husayn from power, to end the Arab-Israeli conflict, or other desirable goals" nonetheless argued that "we should speak publicly about such topics because our opinions are likely to be much better informed than most citizens."[[22]](http://fp.arizona.edu/mesassoc/Bulletin/Pres%20Addresses/Anderson.htm#_ftn22) Clearly we all believe that knowledge, understanding and issues of public moment should somehow be linked. And, in fact, ever since the creation of research universities in the United States, more than a century ago, academic research, particularly but not exclusively scientific and social scientific research, has been presumed to serve important purposes for policy and policy-makers. Probably since the rise of the early modern state, and certainly since the development of the modern welfare state, it has been assumed that policy should be based on empirical, scientifically developed evidence--as opposed to religious conviction, ideology, personal whims or merely guesswork. This search for evidence in the formulation and conduct of policy led quite naturally to scholars. During the Second World War, for example, as Alexander Stille tells us, The United States, which did not even have a foreign intelligence service before the war, hired numerous professors, scholars and intellectuals of varying backgrounds to prepare reports to help them understand Germany [and Japan], including Herbert Marcuse (even though he was a well-know Marxist philosopher), the psychologist Erik Ericson, the Great German art historian Richard Krautheimer and the anthropologists Margaret Mead [and Ruth Benedict].[[23]](http://fp.arizona.edu/mesassoc/Bulletin/Pres%20Addresses/Anderson.htm#_ftn23) The ability of policy-makers to draw on university-based expertise–independent, it should be noted, of the partisan or ideological preferences of its authors--has been the rationale for government support of university-based research in the United States and around the world for the six decades since that war. What makes the disputes today so exceptionally troubling is not that they reflect debates about whether partisan preferences should be a filter or standard by which the contributions of scholarship should be evaluated, although that is often how the issue is framed. Nor is it really a question of whether scholars and policymakers even acknowledge their mutual reliance. No, far more profoundly, this debate is about whether evidence is important in policy-making at all. In the wars on terror and on Iraq, evidence has been scarce and little regarded. From the questions about "sexed-up" intelligence reports; the suggestion that claims about Weapons of Mass Destruction were really rationales of bureaucratic convenience in creating constituents for the war on Iraq; the cavalier willingness to lock up terror suspects for months or years without any verifiable evidence of wrongdoing; to the deliberate efforts to create popular perceptions of links between Saddam Husayn and al-Qa'ida, we have been living in an era in which evidence plays little or no part in policymaking. Robert Reischauer reflected earlier this year on the importance of evidence in policy in a very different arena--domestic social programs--but his observations are worth pondering for a moment: Public policy in the United States in recent years has increasingly been conceived, debated, and evaluated through the lenses of politics and ideology--policies are Democratic or Republican, liberal or conservative, free market or government controlled. Discussion surrounding even much-vaunted bipartisan initiatives focuses on the politics of the compromise instead of the substance or impact of the policy. The fundamental question--will the policy work?--too often gets short shrift or is ignored altogether. As Reischauer points out, the evidence produced by scholarship and science does not create policy or guarantee its success--it merely frames the choices and identifies the costs of various alternatives--but in its absence, policies are, as he put it, "likely to fail because they may not be grounded in the economic, institutional and social reality of a problem....Politically acceptable doesn't necessarily mean effective, affordable, or otherwise viable."[[24]](http://fp.arizona.edu/mesassoc/Bulletin/Pres%20Addresses/Anderson.htm#_ftn24) Informing policy debates with the sort of evidence scholars bring to bear is an essential part of responsible policymaking in the modern world. We, as the community of scientists and scholars devoted to the production and deployment of evidence, a project we sometimes call the search for truth, must remain faithful to that purpose even, perhaps especially, when policymakers seem distracted or uninterested. We must also make that evidence accessible. This neither requires nor excludes scholars, or their students, serving on the government payroll or endorsing a particular policy position. On the contrary, particularly in a democracy, the fulfillment of what we call "national security needs" is as much about meeting an obligation to contribute to the education of citizens--voters and taxpayers--as it is assessing or adopting particular policy stances. This we can do in the private and not-for-profit sectors, in think tanks and advocacy organizations, in the media and private businesses, in classrooms and research journals--wherever our work informs open and vigorous debates about the merits of policy perspectives and proposals–as well, of course, as in government. To be responsible citizens, deploying our expertise effectively, we need not agree with a policy--or even with each other. Some of us may testify before Congress or write op-ed pieces in the newspapers or appear on television as "experts." Others will organize campus debates, seminars and demonstrations. Still others will simply equip their students with knowledge and insight enough to be better citizens of their county and the world, more knowledgeable, more critical, armed with better evidence and more refined analytical skills. To sustain the remarkable–and remarkably important–position we hold in society, as both scholars and citizens, we have two obligations. We must do what we do--proudly, confidently, and energetically. We must be constantly, restlessly open to new ideas, searching for new evidence, critical of received wisdom, old orthodoxies, and ancient bigotries, always creating and criticizing ourselves, each other and our world. This is the life of scholarship and we must embrace it for what it is and do it well. We must train our successors in this discipline and educate the broader public about the value of evidence and the various ways to critically assess it. This is how we contribute to the public good, directly and indirectly. At the same time, we must be absolutely uncompromising in upholding the rights that permit us to fulfill that first responsibility: the rights to freedom of information, expression and association, in the United States and around the world, for ourselves and our colleagues. If MESA is to accomplish its purposes in this difficult time, we as an institution must devise ways to support and defend our members both individually and as a scholarly community. We must encourage and celebrate efforts to collect evidence and to refine how we assess it, and to bring those efforts to bear in the classroom and in vigorous public debates about the policies of governments throughout the region as well as here at home. We cannot be idle when polltakers are roughed up or jailed because their findings are politically unpalatable, when students are told to report on faculty whose partisan commitments may be politically unpopular, when research is discredited not on its merits but by the sources of its funding, whether in Iran or Saudi Arabia or Egypt or the United States.

#### Refusing to calculate masks the most totalitarian calculations. Refusal to be responsible for all the potential outcomes of our actions is the worst for violence and totally unethical

Campbell, Professor of International Politics at the University of Newcastle, 1999

(David, “The Deterritorialization of Responsibility,” Moral Spaces, Eds. Michael J. Shapiro & David Campbell, p. 45-7)

That undecidability resides within the decision, Derrida argues, "that justice exceeds law and calculation, that the unpresentable exceeds the determinable cannot and should not serve as alibi for staying out of juridico-political battles, within an institution or a state, or between institutions or states and others."91 Indeed, "incalculable justice requires us to calculate." From where does this insistence come? What is behind, what is animating, these imperatives? It is both the character of infinite justice as a heteronomic relationship to the other, a relationship that because of its undecidability multiplies responsibility, and the fact that "left to itself, the incalculable and giving *(donatrice)* idea of justice is always very close to the bad, even to the worst, for it can always be re-appropriated by the most perverse calculation."92 The necessity of calcu­lating the incalculable thus responds to a duty, a duty that inhabits the instant of madness and compels the decision to avoid "the bad," the "per­verse calculation," even "the worst." This is the duty that also dwells with deconstruction and makes it the starting point, the "at least necessary condition," for the organization of resistance to totalitarianism in all its forms. And it is a duty that responds to practical political concerns when we recognize that Derrida names the bad, the perverse, and the worst as those violences "we recognize all too well without yet having thought them through, the crimes of xenophobia, racism, anti-Semitism, religious or nationalist fanaticism."93Furthermore, the duty within the decision, the obligation that rec­ognizes the necessity of negotiating the possibilities provided by the impossibilities of justice, is not content with simply avoiding, contain­ing, combating, or negating the worst violence — though it could cer­tainly begin with those strategies. Instead, this responsibility, which is the responsibility of responsibility, commissions a "utopian" strategy. Not a strategy that is beyond all bounds of possibility so as to be con­sidered "unrealistic," but one which in respecting the necessity of cal­culation, takes the possibility summoned by the calculation as far as possible, *"must* take it as far as possible, beyond the place we find our­selves and beyond the already identifiable zones of morality or politics or law, beyond the distinction between national and international, pub­lic and private, and so on."94 As Derrida declares, "The condition of pos­sibility of this thing called responsibility is a certain experience and ex­periment of the possibility of the impossible: the testing of the aporia from which one may invent the only possible invention, the impossible inven­tion*."'1''* This leads Derrida to enunciate a proposition that many, not the least of whom are his Habermasian critics, could hardly have ex­pected: "Nothing seems to me *less* outdated than the classical emanci­patory ideal. We cannot attempt to disqualify it today, whether crudely or with sophistication, at least not without treating it too lightly and forming the worst complicities."96>

## Framework

### Overview

#### You should use your ballot to affirm a vision of debate in which the affirmative must instrumentally defend United States federal government action on increasing statutory and/or judicial restriction on presidential war powers

#### 2 disads that turn and outweigh the aff

#### A) Decision-making - those skills affects more than just debate, it is an essential component of our daily lives – it’s the only portable skill regardless of whether or not we become governmental decision makers – it teaches us to become better advocates because we learn how to sort through large amounts of information and develop the best response – means we learn how to change the messed up things in debate and in our own lives – that’s Steinberg and Freely

#### B) Dialogue – the aff’s interpretation makes it impossible to be negative by unlimiting the topic \_\_\_\_\_\_\_ - 4 impacts to this

#### 1) Unlimiting the topic makes testing the truth claims of the aff impossible which means you vote neg on presumption

#### 2) Makes the debate into an echo-chamber – destroys fairness, education, and turns the aff

Talisse 5

Professor of Philosophy @Vandy¶ Robert, Philosophy & Social Criticism, Deliberativist responses to activist challenges, 31(4) p. 429-431

The argument thus far might appear to turn exclusively upon different conceptions of what reasonableness entails. **The deliberativist view** I have sketched hold that reasonableness **involved some degree of** what we may call **epistemic modesty. On this** view, **the reasonable citizen seeks to have her beliefs reflect the best available reasons,** and so she enters into public discourse **as a way of testing her views against the objections** and questions of those who disagree; hence she implicitly hold that **her present view is open to reasonable critique** and that others who hold opposing views may be able to offer justifications for their views that are at least as strong as her reasons for her own. Thus any mode of **politics that presumes that discourse is extraneous to questions of justice and justification is unreasonable**. The activist sees no reason to accept this. Reasonableness **for the activist** consists in the ability to act on reasons that upon due reflection seem adequate to underwrite action; **discussion with those who disagree need not be involved**. **According to the activist,** there are certain cases in which he does in fact know the truth about what justice requires and in which **there is no room for reasoned objection.** Under such conditions, **the deliberativist’s demand for discussion can only obstruct justice; it is therefore irrational**. It may seem that we have reached an impasse. However, there is a further line of criticism that the activist must face. To the activist’s view that at least in certain situations he may reasonably decline to engage with persons he disagrees with (107), the deliberative democrat can raise the phenomenon that Cass Sunstein has called ‘group polarization’ (Sunstein, 2003; 2001A; ch. 3; 2001b: ch. 1). To explain: consider that political **activists cannot eschew deliberation altogether; they often engage in rallies,** demonstrations, teach-ins, workshops, and other activities in which they are called to make public the case for their views. Activists also must engage in deliberation among themselves when deciding strategy. Political movement must be organized, hence those involved must decide upon targets, methods, and tact’s; they must also decide upon the content of their pamphlets and the precise messages they most wish to convey to the press. **Often the audience in both of these deliberative contexts will be a self-selected and sympathetic group of like-minded activists**. **Group polarization** is a well-documented phenomenon that **has ‘been found all over the world** and is many diverse tasks’; it means that ‘members of a deliberating group predictably move towards a more extreme point in the direction indicated by’ predeliberation tendencies’ (Sunstein, 2003: 81-2). Importantly, **in group that ‘engage in repeated discussions’** over time, **the polarization is even more pronounced** (2003: 86). Hence discussion in a small but devoted activist enclave that meets regularly to strategize and protest ‘should produce a situation in which individuals hold positions more extreme than those of an individual member before the series of deliberations began’ (ibid.).17 The fact of group polarization is relevant to our discussion because the activist has proposed that **he may reasonably decline to engage in discussion with those with whom he disagrees** in cases in which the requirement of justice are so clear that he can be confidents that has the truth .Group polarization suggest that even deliberatively confronting those with whom we disagree is essential even we have the truth. **For even if we have the truth, if we do not engage opposing views,** but instead deliberate only with those with whom we agree, our view will shift progressively to a more extreme point, and thus we lose the truth ,In order to avoid polarization, deliberation must take place within heterogeneous ‘argument pools’ (Sunstein, 2003: 93). This of course does not mean that there should be no groups devoted to the achievement of some common political goal; it rather suggest that a engagement with those with whom one disagrees is essential to the proper pursuitof justice. Insofar as the activist denies this, he is unreasonable.

#### 3) Turns the aff because absent an agonistic interrogation of the aff people become complacent and blind to ideological tropes which necessitates the violence they criticize because they can always say “I don’t have the power to change the government” which allows violence to go unchecked – that’s Roberts-Miller ‘3

#### 4) Makes solving a laundry list of extinction level threats impossible because is sets the conditions to give up on debate which destroys the potential for change – means that class, gender, racial injustice, environmental destruction, and threats to international stability are left unchecked – that’s Lundberg 10 – also turns the aff because ceding the political sphere to elites would result in the right-wing \_\_\_\_\_\_\_

#### Framing issue for all their offense – any risk of the ability to discuss the aff and tie it to a policy proposal denies their impact turns to framework because it means our view of debate doesn’t exclude the aff

### AT CI

#### Links to our all our offense – don’t get core disads

#### RULES of DIALOGUE are key – bad T interpretations make the dialogue TERRIBLE even if it’s TECHNICALLY a dialogue

Bostad 4

<http://www.flt.uae.ac.ma/elhirech/baktine/140391690X%20-%20-%20Bakhtinian%20Perspectives%20on%20Language%20and%20Culture~%20Meaning%20in%20Language,%20Art%20and%20New%20.pdf>¶ Finn Bostad is Associate Professor of Applied Linguistics at The Norwegian¶ University of Science and Technology in the field of human communication¶ and new technology. He has run and worked on national and university¶ projects on meaning-making in Internet environments, published¶ internationally on electronic discourse, and supervised a research programme¶ on ICT and learning at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology. He is currently researching multimedia semiotics

Very often a dialogue exists only if the persons involved in the communication act observe and **respect some rules** of dialogism, and some of these main ‘rules’ or principles may be a mutual trust or reciprocity (Rommetveit 1992), a sharing of power and comprehension that gives everybody an equal opportunity to have his or her voice heard. In addition there must be a conscious effort on the part of the participants to **achieve something together** and actively participate in the process of negotiating meaning that a dialogue is. Negotiated meaning, or understanding, grows out of the response as ‘[u]nderstanding and response are dialectically merged and mutually condition each other; one is impossible without the other’ (Bakhtin 1981: 282). It is possible to generate a long catalogue of such principles, which Linell does in his work (Linell 1998). There is also a **wide range** of dialogical varieties from, at the one end, a **top-down monologue where one party dominates communication** and leaves no room for sharing and participation, to, at the other end, a communicative event where power and dominance is more or less equally shared between the participants. In this near ideal situation there is no real centre of power, but a sharing of it.

#### Resolved is irrelevant

Webster’s Guide to Grammar and Writing 2k

Use of a colon before a list or an explanation that is preceded by a clause that can stand by itself. Think of the colon as a gate, inviting one to go one…If the introductory phrase preceding the colon is very brief and the clause following the colon represents the real business of the sentence, beginning the clause after the colon with a capital letter.

#### Resolved means enact policy

Words and Phrases 1964 Permanent Edition

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

### AT Reproduces Oppresive Politics

#### They link harder – don’t effect change

#### Deliberation is key to prevent a tyrannical government – the Patriot Act proves

Kassop 3

(NANCY KASSOP, a Professor at the State University of New York at New Paltz, and former chair of the Political Science Department at the school, “The War Power and Its Limits” Presidential Studies Quarterly 33, no. 3 (September) © 2003 Center for the Study of the Presidency, KB)

The Patriot Act passed both houses of Congress with lightning speed, though not¶ fast enough for Ashcroft, who wanted it completed in a matter of days, rather than¶ weeks. It bypassed most of the usual committee process in favor of high-level, closeddoor,¶ executive-legislative negotiations, leading some to speculate that the lack of a¶ legislative paper trail may come back to haunt the law when the courts try to divine¶ “legislative intent” in the inevitable challenges to it (Palmer 2001, 2533). It did receive¶ some attention in the House Judiciary Committee, which marked it up on October 3,¶ 2001, and passed a much-modified version, 36-0, but the bill on which the full House¶ voted on October 12 contained a changed text (but same bill number) that had been¶ secretly agreed to by Speaker Dennis Hastert (R-Illinois) and the White House, without¶ any knowledge by the full committee. The Senate bill was negotiated by Judiciary Committee¶ leaders with the administration, and never came before the full committee prior¶ to the vote on the Senate floor (Palmer 2001, 2534; Brill 2003, 70). The final piece to¶ this frenzy was the order by Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle (D-South Dakota) to¶ Russ Feingold (D-Wisconsin) to withdraw his amendments and fall in line behind the¶ unanimous consent agreement, which permitted no amendments or debate (Palmer¶ 2001, 2533-55; Tepker 2002, 9-13; Brill 2003, 66-71). The bill passed the House, 357-¶ 66, on October 24, and cleared the Senate, 98-1 (Feingold against), on October 25. The¶ president signed the bill into law on October 26, 2001.

#### A limited topic over war powers authority is key to solving the harms of the 1AC – it allows for an engaged public that can expose the hypocrisy of the federal government – only focus on specific policy questions can actualize change by making it relevant to policy-makers – the aff is more likely to cause disengagement and moral quietude than actual change

Mellor 13

The Australian National University, ANU College of Asia and the Pacific, Department Of International Relations,   
“Why policy relevance is a moral necessity: Just war theory, impact, and UAVs,” European University Institute, Paper Prepared for BISA Conference 2013, DOA: 8-14-13

This section of the paper considers more generally the need for just war theorists to engage with policy debate about the use of force, as well as to engage with the more fundamental moral and philosophical principles of the just war tradition. It draws on John Kelsay’s conception of just war thinking as being a social practice,35 as well as on Michael Walzer’s understanding of the role of the social critic in society.36 It argues that the just war tradition is a form of “practical discourse” which is concerned with questions of “how we should act.”37 Kelsay argues that: [T]he criteria of jus ad bellum and jus in bello provide a framework for structured participation in a public conversation about the use of military force . . . citizens who choose to speak in just war terms express commitments . . . [i]n the process of giving and asking for reasons for going to war, those who argue in just war terms seek to influence policy by persuading others that their analysis provides a way to express and fulfil the desire that military actions be both wise and just.38 He also argues that “good just war thinking involves continuous and complete deliberation, in the sense that one attends to all the standard criteria at war’s inception, at its end, and throughout the course of the conflict.”39 This is important as it highlights the need for just war scholars to engage with the ongoing operations in war and the specific policies that are involved. The question of whether a particular war is just or unjust, and the question of whether a particular weapon (like drones) can be used in accordance with the jus in bello criteria, only cover a part of the overall justice of the war. Without an engagement with the reality of war, in terms of the policies used in waging it, it is impossible to engage with the “moral reality of war,”40 in terms of being able to discuss it and judge it in moral terms Kelsay’s description of just war thinking as a social practice is similar to Walzer’s more general description of social criticism. The just war theorist, as a social critic, must be involved with his or her own society and its practices. In the same way that the social critic’s distance from his or her society is measured in inches and not miles,41 the just war theorist must be close to and must understand the language through which war is constituted, interpreted and reinterpreted.42 It is only by understanding the values and language that their own society purports to live by that the social critic can hold up a mirror to that society to demonstrate its hypocrisy and to show the gap that exists between its practice and its values.43 The tradition itself provides a set of values and principles and, as argued by Cian O’Driscoll, constitutes a “language of engagement” to spur participation in public and political debate.44 This language is part of “our common heritage, the product of many centuries of arguing about war.”45 These principles and this language provide the terms through which people understand and come to interpret war, not in a deterministic way but by providing the categories necessary for moral understanding and moral argument about the legitimate and illegitimate uses of force.46 By spurring and providing the basis for political engagement the just war tradition ensures that the acts that occur within war are considered according to just war criteria and allows policy-makers to be held to account on this basis. Engaging with the reality of war requires recognising that war is, as Clausewitz stated, a continuation of policy. War, according to Clausewitz, is subordinate to politics and to political choices and these political choices can, and must, be judged and critiqued.47 Engagement and political debate are morally necessary as the alternative is disengagement and moral quietude, which is a sacrifice of the obligations of citizenship.48 This engagement must bring just war theorists into contact with the policy makers and will require work that is accessible and relevant to policy makers, however this does not mean a sacrifice of critical distance or an abdication of truth in the face of power. By engaging in detail with the policies being pursued and their concordance or otherwise with the principles of the just war tradition the policy-makers will be forced to account for their decisions and justify them in just war language. In contrast to the view, suggested by Kenneth Anderson, that “the public cannot be made part of the debate” and that “[w]e are necessarily committed into the hands of our political leadership”,49 it is incumbent upon just war theorists to ensure that the public are informed and are capable of holding their political leaders to account. To accept the idea that the political leadership are stewards and that accountability will not benefit the public, on whose behalf action is undertaken, but will only benefit al Qaeda,50 is a grotesque act of intellectual irresponsibility. As Walzer has argued, it is precisely because it is “our country” that we are “especially obligated to criticise its policies.”51 This paper has discussed the empirics of the policies of drone strikes in the ongoing conflict with those associate with al Qaeda. It has demonstrated that there are significant moral questions raised by the just war tradition regarding some aspects of these policies and it has argued that, thus far, just war scholars have not paid sufficient attention or engaged in sufficient detail with the policy implications of drone use. As such it has been argued that it is necessary for just war theorists to engage more directly with these issues and to ensure that their work is policy relevant, not in a utilitarian sense of abdicating from speaking the truth in the face of power, but by forcing policy makers to justify their actions according to the principles of the just war tradition, principles which they invoke themselves in formulating policy. By highlighting hypocrisy and providing the tools and language for the interpretation of action, the just war tradition provides the basis for the public engagement and political activism that are necessary for democratic politics.52

# 1NR

### A2- Pedagogy

#### THEIR GIROUX-CORROBORATED VISION OF ACADEMIC POLITICAL AGENCY IS DOOMED TO INEVITABLE FRUSTRATION PRODUCING SERIAL EPISTEMIC FAILURES – EVERY INSTANCE OF A LINK IS A REASON TO CAST ANNIHILATORY DOUBT ON THEIR SOLVENCY CLAIMS – BY LOGICAL NECESSITY, THEIR ACADEMIC KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION IS UTTERLY INCONSEQUENTIAL GIVEN THAT THE 1AC IS AN EMPTY REPETITION OF THE SPECTRE OF POLITICAL AGENCY.

Welsch 12

[scott, “coming to terms with the antagonism between rhetorical reflection and political agency”, vol 45., no. 1, 1-23, prof. communications, appallacia state university]

Similarly, Henry Giroux concludes¶ his argument about the “responsibility of intellectuals” with the¶ declaration that “if we do not want to repeat the present as the future, or10¶ even worse, become complicit in the dominant exercise of power, it is time¶ for educators to mobilize collectively their energies by breaking down the¶ illusion of unanimity that dominant power propagates while working diligently,¶ tirelessly, and collectively to reclaim the promises of a truly global,¶ democratic future” (2004, 77).¶ Giroux’s concluding words, in which scholars reclaim the promises of a¶ truly global democratic future, echo Ono and Sloop’s construction of scholarship¶ as the politically embedded pursuit of utopia, McKerrow’s academic¶ emancipation of the oppressed, McGee’s social surgery, Hartnett’s social¶ justice scholar, and Fuller’s agent of justice. Each aims to unify the competing¶ elements within the scholarly subject position—scholarly reflection¶ and political agency—by reducing the former to the latter. Žižek’s advice¶ is to consider how such attempts are always doomed to frustration, not¶ because ideals are hard to live up to but because of the impossibility of¶ resolving the antagonism central to the scholarly subject position. The titles¶ “public intellectual” and “critical rhetorician” attest to the fundamental tension.¶ “Public” and “rhetorician” both represent the aspiration to political¶ engagement, while “critical” and “intellectual” set the scholar apart from¶ noncritical, nonintellectual public rhetoric. However, rather than allowing¶ the contingently articulated terms to exist in a state of paradoxical tension,¶ these authors imagine an organic, unavoidable, necessary unity. The scholar¶ is, in one moment, wholly public and wholly intellectual, wholly critical and¶ wholly rhetorical, wholly scholar and wholly citizen—an impossible unity,¶ characteristic of the sublime, in which the antagonism vanishes (2005, 147).¶ Yet, as Žižek predicts, the sublime is the impossible. The frustration-producing¶ gap between the unity of the ideological sublime and conflicted¶ experience quickly begins to put pressure on the ideology. This is born out¶ in the shift from the exhilarated tone accompanying the birth of critical¶ rhetoric (and its liberation of rhetoric scholarship from the incoherent¶ and untenable demands of scientific objectivity) to a dispirited accounting¶ for the difficulty of actually embodying the imagined unity of scholarly¶ reflection and political agency. Simonson, for example, draws attention¶ to the gap, noting how, twenty years later, it is hard to resist the feeling¶ that “the bulk of our academic publishing is utterly inconsequential.” His¶ hope is that a true connection between scholarly reflection and political¶ agency may be possible outside of academia (2010, 95). Fuller approaches¶ this conclusion when he says that the preferred path to filling universities¶ with agents of justice is through “scaling back the qualifications needed for¶ tenure-stream posts from the doctorate to the master’s degree,” a way of¶ coming to terms with the antagonism¶ 11¶ addressing the antagonism that amounts to setting half of it afloat (2006,¶ 154). Hartnett is especially interesting because while he also insists on the¶ existence of the gap, dismissing “many” of his “colleagues” as merely dispensing¶ “politically vacuous truisms” or, worse, as serving as “tools of the¶ state” and “humanities-based journals” as “impenetrably dense” and filled¶ with “jargon-riddled nonsense,” he evinces a considerable impatience with¶ the audiences he must engage as a social justice scholar (2010, 69, 74–75). In¶ addition to reducing those populating the mass media to a cabal of “rotten¶ corporate hucksters,” Hartnett rejects vernacular criticisms of his activism¶ as “ranting and raving by fools,” and chafes at becoming “a target for yahoos¶ of all stripes” (87, 84). In other words, the gap is not only recognized on¶ the academic side of the ledger but appears on the public side as well; the¶ public (in the vernacular sense of the word) does not yield to the desire¶ of the social justice scholar. Or, as Žižek puts it, referencing Lacan, “You¶ never look at me from the place in which I see you” (1991, 126). More telling¶ still, Hartnett’s main examples of social justice scholars are either retired or¶ located outside of academia (2010, 86). As Simonson suggests, and Hartnett¶ implicitly concedes, it may well be that it really is only outside the academy¶ that there can be immediate, material, political consequences.¶ In light of Žižek’s account of antagonism, one should not be surprised,¶ however, by the conclusion that broadly effective activism is only possible¶ outside of academia. The failure to unify scholarship and politics was predestined¶ in the symbolic imagination that rendered them unified. Instead,¶ effectively coming to terms with an antagonism means finding ways to¶ keep the competing elements of the antagonism in view—and not simply¶ as “bad” academic pretensions in conflict with “good” political motives.¶ Rather, the two elements that constitute the scholarly subject position,¶ reflective investigation and the production of unavoidable consequences,¶ must be constantly present, each vying for our attention. And, insofar as¶ the two elements are not kept in tension with each other, the scholarly subject¶ position becomes increasingly unbearable, leading to the production of¶ what Žižek calls supplemental ideological fantasies or ready explanations¶ for the gap.¶ For Fuller, the gap between lived experience and the wished-for¶ embodiment of the scholar as agent of justice is explained not by the basic¶ impossibility of resolving the antagonism within the realm of the symbolic¶ itself but by the treacherous acts of colleagues of low moral character.¶ Deploying a Puritan rhetoric (Roberts-Miller 1999), Fuller blames the¶ selfishness¶ of individual scholars pursuing personal gain and “convenience ¶ 12¶ for the failure of activist scholarship to emerge (2006, 150). Other scholars¶ who fail to be agents of justice are “feckless” (2006, 149). Those resistant to¶ such a scholarly identity “simply follow the path of least intellectual resistance,”¶ preferring “easily funded research” because it offers “greater professional¶ recognition” (2006, 110, 111). Hartnett follows Fuller in explaining¶ how “theory wolves” have “learned to play the tenure game for their own¶ benefit.” Current “¶ graduate students and assistant professors” are cynical,¶ self-obsessed, and content to explore “the intricacies of representation,¶ often with psychoanalytic overtones that explicitly focus on the self or¶ psyche rather than the community or the political” (2006, 72–73).¶ Yet, fantasy, according to Žižek, is not simple delusion. In fact, how¶ much scholarly research is unrelated to the exorcism of personal demons?¶ Who among us has not shaded an argument one way or another in order to¶ please a particular audience? Who has not fecklessly decided against even¶ sending a letter to the local newspaper? Rather, a key characteristic of fantasy,¶ in Žižek’s use of Lacan, is that it accounts for a persistent failure in a¶ prevailing ideology without making reference to basic, structuring antagonisms¶ inherent to every use of symbols. In this case, the gap—the existence¶ of academic work that appears not to serve (or in reality does not serve) a¶ sublime vision of an organic unity between scholarship and citizenship—is¶ accounted for by the existence of cynical, crafty scholars of low academic¶ rank who just want to get ahead. This fantastic pathway to the palliation of¶ the identity-jeopardizing symptom suggests that without these cowardly,¶ selfish, yet strangely powerful neophytes, scholarly reflection and political¶ agency would finally consummate their symbolic union. In this new context¶ of frustration, what is now most “real” is the spiritual principle of the¶ oneness¶ of scholarly reflection and political agency, while the experienced¶ fact of failed transcendence is reduced to a mere empirical obstacle (feckless¶ or selfish individuals) to be displaced.¶ What is Žižek’s psychoanalytic advice? Identify with the symptom¶ (1989, 128). Identification with the symptom means noting how the symptom¶ is quite likely a byproduct of the ideology itself, or a consequence of¶ one’s own symbolic identity, and not a simple empirical fact to be negated.¶ In this case, the antagonism between the symbolic practices of scholarly¶ reflection and political action yields academic products that cannot be¶ reduced to disinterested science or political engagement. To be an academic¶ is to be (unsettlingly) in the political world but not of the political world. It¶ is to resist the belief that one could finally fulfill the drive to transcendence¶ structuring the academic subject position. Žižek’s “coming to terms” with¶ coming to terms with the antagonism¶ 13¶ antagonism means, in Burke’s language, learning to leave the two impulses¶ constituting this dialectical pair in “jangling relation” to each other (Žižek¶ 1989, 3, 5, 133; 2005, 242–43; Burke 1969, 187) or to fold the existence of the¶ jangling relation into a less anxiety-producing vocabulary going forward.¶ To identify with the symptom is to begin the process of inventing an identity¶ that allows one to accept and even enjoy the tension as the constitutive¶ feature of the identity (Michael 2000, 12).¶ Nevertheless, the desire to “make a difference” needs to remain in full¶ force. However, when an individual scholar wants to make a difference as¶ the thing in and of itself versus making a distinctly scholarly difference, the¶ antagonism is again repressed. In seeking to make a difference as the thing¶ in itself, scholars, in Žižek’s language, “overtake” their “desire” and become¶ an object of disgust (1991, 110). In fact, Hartnett, McKerrow, Condit, and¶ Giroux are each sensitive to this. Hartnett puts it most explicitly when¶ he warns that the “haggard activist, angry and inflamed, accusing others¶ of their transgressions while embodying anxiety, achieves little, alienates¶ many, and often succumbs to despair” (Hartnett 2010, 70–71; Condit 1990,¶ 345; Giroux 2004, 73). In his eighth and final principle of critical rhetoric¶ (“criticism is performance”), McKerrow qualifies his call to political engagement¶ by distancing himself from Phillip Wander, whom he characterizes¶ as wanting scholars to “take to the streets as practicing revolutionaries.” In¶ other words, after seventeen pages of calling for scholars to perform critical¶ rhetoric in order to liberate the oppressed from institutional and cultural¶ domination, McKerrow devotes three blushing sentences to hedging his¶ bet, explaining that he really just means that scholars should be “specific¶ intellectuals” working within the confines of the university (1989, 108).¶ All of these scholars are correct to fear that the image of activist academics¶ engaging in practices indistinguishable from politics, especially in¶ state-supported institutions, is a potentially grotesque image, even if the¶ popular image is rarely accurate (Ivie 2005, 62–68). Hartnett in particular is¶ not unaware of the significance of public perception. He claims, however,¶ that the public sees decreasing value in universities because they are populated¶ by “inane” and “depraved” scholars (theory wolves) producing publicly¶ disconnected, jargon-riddled nonsense. While this assessment may account¶ for elements within academia that refuse the antagonism by maintaining a¶ relatively thorough detachment from the communities they claim to serve,¶ reducing scholarship to “activists writing about their activism” is no more¶ responsive to the antagonism and would understandably provoke public¶ suspicion (Hartnett 2010, 75, 78).¶ scott welsh¶ 14¶ Moreover, coming to terms with the antagonism is central to academic¶ freedom. In his bracing polemic on politics in the academy, Stanley Fish¶ recognizes the antagonism between academic freedom and the freedom¶ one enjoys as a function of citizenship. Academic freedom, he argues, is¶ the freedom to “academicize” anything freely and without fear of reprisal.¶ For Fish, this means the freedom to treat any subject whatsoever as an¶ open question in need of further study, no matter how politically controversial¶ investigating some particular subject may be (2008, 87). And insofar¶ as every citizen enjoys “freedom of speech,” as Fuller also points out in¶ his reference to Dewey’s founding of the AAUP, academic freedom also¶ includes the right to actually be a citizen advancing a political agenda without¶ fear of losing one’s university employment (2006, 151). However, when¶ the citizenly role of advancing a political agenda overtakes reflective investigation¶ in the practice of the scholarly role, “academic” freedom is not at¶ stake but is, rather, put into jeopardy by the refusal to inhabit the inherently¶ conflicted scholarly subject position that justifies one’s academic immunity¶ from political reprisal in the first place. While “the academic is political” no¶ less than “the personal is political,” that does not mean that it is not useful¶ or necessary to establish a social sphere defined by the intention to resist¶ political embeddedness, even if such a distinction is unavoidably tenuous.

#### THEIR SOLVENCY CLAIMS PERFORMATIVELY REDUCES SCHOLARSHIP TO POLITICAL AGENCY. THIS PRODUCES OBLIVIOUSNESS AS TO THE STRUCTURAL ANTAGONISMS WHICH CONSTITUTE ACADEMIC WORK MEANING THEIR ATTEMPTS TO TRANSCEND THE QUAGMIRE OF THEORY AND PRAXIS ARE LINKS TO OUR CRITICISM.

Welsch 12

[scott, “coming to terms with the antagonism between rhetorical reflection and political agency”, vol 45., no. 1, 1-23, prof. communications, appallacia state university]

What does it mean to say rhetoric scholarship should be relevant to democratic¶ practice? A prevailing answer to this question insists that rhetoric scholars are participants¶ in the democratic contest for power just like all other citizens, no more¶ and no less. Drawing on the work of Slavoj Žižek, the argument of this essay is that¶ reducing scholarship to a mode of political agency not only produces an increasingly¶ uninhabitable academic identity but also draws our attention away from producing¶ results of rhetorical inquiry designed to be useful to citizens in democracy. Clinging¶ to the idea that academic practice is a mode of political action produces a fantastic¶ blindness to the antagonism between scholarly reflection and political agency that¶ structures academic purpose. While empirical barriers to the production of rhetorical¶ resources suitable for democratic appropriation undoubtedly exist, ignoring the¶ self-frustrating character of academic desire is no less of an impediment to the¶ production of democratically consequential rhetoric scholarship.¶ Now over a decade since the publication of John Michael’s Anxious Intellects¶ (2000), many rhetoric scholars are no less anxious about the relevance of¶ scholarship to public affairs. Recent exchanges concerning rhetorical criticism,¶ public intellectualism, and academic engagement continue to provide¶ evidence of a prominent felt need to prove public relevance, explain away¶ the lack of readily apparent public engagement, or adopt a more activist¶ posture. That academic work should have political consequences is broadly¶ assumed within a dominant strain of rhetorical scholarship owing to what¶ is doubtless an incontrovertible feature of reality—words have political¶ consequences. From this fact, many rhetoric scholars reason that because¶ our academic words have political consequences, even if we do not intend¶ for them to, we should deliberately pursue the consequences we most desire¶ and seek their victory in political contest.¶ Questions as to the logic underlying this relationship of fact and¶ assertion¶ aside, this article is perhaps partly reducible to the claim that¶ arguments concerning the consequences of scholarship have uncritically¶ referenced such facts. Facts, as many of the same scholars would be quick¶ to point out, do not mean anything apart from the contours our ideological¶ lenses project on them. As Kenneth Burke notes, if a martyr can find joy in¶ the receiving of torturous blows, we should expect the meanings projected¶ onto facts to range widely (1984b, 35). With this in mind, we should be no¶ less concerned with the ways, in the words of Slavoj Žižek, that we “look¶ awry” so as to notice particular facts and invest them with the meaning we¶ do (1991, 8–12).¶ What Žižek adds to Burke’s observation regarding the projection of¶ meaning onto selected events is that this act of projection occurs at the¶ intersection of subjectivity and desire. Beyond charting relationships¶ between terms that constitute an ideology in order to map rhetorically constituted¶ motives, Žižek insists that action is propelled by the insufficiency of¶ those very rhetorical relationships (2008, 103–6). Inseparable from ideology,¶ every identity is constantly haunted by the lurking antagonisms between¶ the terms that structure it. The subject’s desire circulates around the dominant¶ tensions within the language that affords one an identity, continually¶ pursuing the traumatic impossibility of coherent subjectivity or ideological¶ consistency (1989, 124–29). Whereas Burke suggests that every rhetorical¶ language has a kind of rationality that supplies identity and order, Žižek¶ suggests that it is the basic irreconcilability of the competing demands that¶ our symbols place upon us that structures our desire (Žižek 1991, 162–69;¶ Burke 1966, 44–57). We continually pursue not simply the impossible but¶ that which is made impossible by the language of our ideologically constituted¶ identities.¶ I argue that the ongoing debate in rhetorical studies about the relationship¶ between scholarly reflection and political agency is illuminated by¶ Žižek’s account of ideology, identity, and desire. In this debate, references¶ to the factual, the empirical, or the material are deployed, not incidentally,¶ to address the impossible subject position that academics inhabit. Often¶ pursuing lines of research motivated by a desire to create wholeness¶ amid¶ coming to terms with the antagonism¶ 3¶ social, cultural, political, or institutional brokenness, rhetoric¶ scholars¶ nevertheless¶ become, in the sustained act of academic investigation,¶ significantly¶ alienated¶ from motivating practical concerns. Moreover,¶ because rhetoric scholars spend a large majority of their time in faculty¶ offices, classrooms, and archives of one kind or another, by necessity, mostly¶ talking, reading, and writing about political action, the felt alienation from¶ public life can feel like hypocrisy or, even worse, complicity in the perpetuation¶ of brokenness.¶ The subject position inhabited by many rhetoric scholars is not only¶ structured by a fundamental antagonism between scholarly reflection and¶ political agency but also by an antagonism between the production of expert¶ knowledge and a democratic faith in the judgment of the people. An academic¶ produces accounts or recommendations that are intended to enlighten,¶ supplement, or replace those currently accepted by a public imagined to be,¶ at its best, democratic. At the same time, the rhetoric scholar committed¶ to democracy often imagines that the academic’s role is to resist the expert¶ control of publics. Taken together, the two antagonisms yield a deeply conflicted¶ scholarly identity: the suspension of immediate action in favor of¶ reflection can be reduced to an act of complicity in the status quo, just as¶ the act of producing expert accounts can be reduced to the demonstration¶ of a lack of trust in democratic publics. The challenge is to resist synthetically¶ resolving these antagonisms, whether in confirming or disconfirming¶ ways. Rather, as Žižek might suggest, the aim should be to “come to terms”¶ with these antagonisms by articulating academic identities less invested in¶ reparative fantasies that imagine a material resolution of them (1989, 3, 5,¶ 133; 2005, 242–43). Accounts that fail to come to terms with the impossibility¶ of closure and continue to invest in such fantasies yield either indignant¶ calls for activism or too-easy assurance of the potential consequence of one’s¶ work, neither of which is well suited to scholar-citizen engagement.¶ Coming to terms with these antagonisms, I ultimately argue, is aided¶ by a reconsideration of a number of Jürgen Habermas’s (1973, 1970) early¶ works on the relationship between theory and practice and C. Wright¶ Mills’s (2000) account of the relationship between scholarly reflection and¶ political agency in The Sociological Imagination. Turning to Giambattista¶ Vico, Habermas shows us how to keep the antagonisms clearly in view,¶ even though he does not suggest a vision of scholarship that might allow¶ academics to deliberately respond to the antagonism between scholarship¶ and political agency. It is Mills, rather, through his concept of academics¶ working¶ in support of the sociological imagination, who suggests how¶ academics¶ might do just that. Directly and indirectly returning, in a sense,¶ to classical¶ rhetorical roots, each challenges rhetoric scholars to emphasize,¶ as the aim of rhetoric scholarship, the exploration and production of¶ inventional resources suitable for appropriation by citizen-actors. Such a¶ construction of the relationship between academics and politics locates¶ political agency and the situated pursuit of practical wisdom in democratic¶ publics without absolving scholars of responsibility to them.

#### **THE AFFIRMATIVE’S ATTEMPTS TO EXTERNALIZE DEBATE’S FOCUS AND TO POLITICIZE ACADEMIC PURSUITS INSIDE OF DEBATE IS EXTERNALIZED AS AN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT BETWEEN IVORY TOWER INTELLECTUALS AND “REAL ACTIVISTS” – INSTEAD OF SUCCUMBING TO THE BROW-BEATEN OFFENSE/DEFENSE EVALUATION OF THE AFF’S NON-EXTENT CHANCE OF EFFECTUATING CHANGE ON THE THOUGHT OF OTHERS, YOU SHOULD INSTEAD ACCEPT THAT DEBATE WANTS NOTHING FROM YOU AS EITHER JUDGE OR PARTICIPANT.**

Welsch 12

[scott, “coming to terms with the antagonism between rhetorical reflection and political agency”, vol 45., no. 1, 1-23, prof. communications, appallacia state university]

In the work of scholars, like McGee, who implicitly or explicitly construe¶ the relationship between scholarly reflection and consequences for¶ democracy as academics doing politics, Nathan Crick identifies the return¶ of a hard distinction between philosophy and rhetoric. In the reduction of¶ scholarship to political agency, the academic world is ironically remapped as¶ a struggle between “ivory tower intellectuals” and those who are committed¶ to “active participation in practical life” (2006, 130). In other words, in¶ those attempts to reduce academics to politics that are characteristic of¶ critical rhetoric and certain strands of public intellectualism, the real of¶ the symbolic antagonism between scholarly reflection and political agency¶ immediately¶ returns in activist fantasies as contests between those alleged¶ to truly recognize¶ the spiritual oneness of scholarship and politics and those¶ who do not. Crick indirectly suggests that this antagonism immediately¶ returns because activist scholars, or those whom he suggests follow Antonio¶ coming to terms with the antagonism¶ 19¶ Gramsci’s vision of “organic intellectuals,” directly involved in political¶ contests for power, accept a false distinction between theory and practice¶ (2006, 129–30). Their ironic acceptance of this false distinction becomes¶ most apparent, Crick argues, when they imagine that scholars could actually¶ avoid practice in the first place. Instead, following John Dewey and¶ Richard Rorty, Crick argues that scholarly practice simply addresses itself¶ to a different rhetorical exigency, the “sociohistorical situation” or “broad¶ movements in history and culture,” and not the immediate context of political¶ winning and losing (2006, 131, 34, 37, 38). Provided that “even the most¶ abstract intellectual work can work its way into public consciousness,” it will¶ have functioned, in retrospect, as public intellectualism (Crick 2006, 135).¶ While the terms “theory” and “practice” are certainly plastic enough to¶ yield to Crick’s Rortian redescription of theory as a mode of practice, such a¶ redescription asks us to give up the ability to distinguish between these nonidentical,¶ competing impulses, as deeply intertwined as they may be (1989,¶ 325–26). In Žižek’s language, the antagonism between reflection and action¶ animating the scholarly subject position is again effaced. Reducing theory¶ to practice largely rules out the question of potential practical effects (in¶ their usual, more immediate sense) as a constituent challenge to the scholarly¶ subject position (Fuller 2006, 149). No less than McGee, McKerrow,¶ Hartnett, or Fuller, Crick also attempts to transcend, and thereby effaces,¶ the theory-practice, reflection-action antagonism, leading him, ultimately,¶ to a relatively easy assurance that practical consequences will often follow¶ from the generalized practice of scholarly reflection, even if we cannot predict¶ which instances will produce them. Rather than continuing to pursue¶ a scholarly essence that unifies the distinct impulses, the challenge should¶ be to come to terms with the antagonism between reflection and action as¶ the positive condition of scholarly subjectivity.¶ It is tempting to conclude that coming to terms with the antagonism means¶ finding a middle ground between theory and practice or reflection and¶ action. Nevertheless, this would be exactly the wrong conclusion. It would¶ be an invitation to do neither one nor the other very well. Instead, academic¶ work aiming to contribute to the rhetorical imagination entails the¶ investigation or production of inventional resources suitable for appropriation¶ by citizens aiming to affect political outcomes. It means that scholars ¶ need to investigate the assets and liabilities of words, concepts, vocabularies, ¶ moves, or maneuvers that are currently or potentially available to political¶ or cultural¶ actors. In response to the “reflection” half of the scholarly tension,¶ rhetoric scholars ought to engage in all methods of accumulation,¶ analysis, juxtaposition, and critique. In response to the “action” half of the¶ tension, they must feel pressure to produce concepts or heuristics that citizens¶ can effectively appropriate within political discourse. As Burke writes:¶ So we must keep trying anything and everything, improvising,¶ borrowing from others, developing from others, dialectically¶ using one text as comment upon another, schematizing; using the¶ incentive to new wanderings, returning from these excursions to¶ schematize¶ again, being oversubtle where the straining seems to¶ promise some further glimpse, and making amends by reduction¶ to very simple anecdotes. (1969, 265)¶ Burke leaves every method on the table. Anything and everything is¶ permitted.¶ Scholarly “wandering” is essential, yet, if the ultimate, even longterm¶ aim is not the invention of publically deployable terms or vocabularies,¶ it does not “make amends” with the action side of the antagonism.¶ It is also tempting to conclude that one could still essentially engage¶ in activist rhetorical reflection to the degree that one promotes particular¶ inventional resources over others. Nevertheless, owing to the unpredictable,¶ constantly shifting rhetorical challenges surrounding even a single issue,¶ this is also wrong. The practical effect of any argumentative form, vocabulary,¶ concept, or criticism always depends on how it is appropriated, cast,¶ recast, or responded to in a particular political moment. For example, calls¶ from critics of war rhetoric to substitute humanizing for dehumanizing¶ figures are easily co-opted by political leaders pursuing war in the name¶ of humanitarian¶ concern. Hence, in context, even “humanizing” rhetorics¶ often need to be displaced by seemingly amoral rhetorics of national¶ interest¶ if military action is to be avoided (Motter 2010, 520–22). As Terry¶ Eagleton argues, “This is not to say that theories and literary forms are¶ politically neutral.” Rather, “they are politically polyvalent, capable of generating¶ a multiplicity of sometimes quite contradictory social effects” (1990,¶ 30–31). Instead of being a limitation, however, as Eagleton implies, the¶ polyvalent quality of the products of rhetorical reflection is their most valuable¶ quality. As critical “interventions” addressed to a particular political¶ moment, the products of rhetorical reflection have a very brief shelf life,¶ often spoiling¶ before they reach market; regarded as contributions to a complex,¶ conflicted¶ rhetorical imagination, they become indefinitely valuable.¶ coming to terms with the antagonism¶ 21¶ They become available for appropriation and reappropriation by citizens,¶ who, at the “right point in time,” in the words of Michel de Certeau,¶ discover¶ an “¶ unexpected pertinence”¶ (1984, 83, 89).¶ Consequently, in shifting and unpredictable rhetorical contexts, contributions¶ to the rhetorical imagination would be especially useful if instead¶ of promoting single rhetorics they investigated the rhetorical antidote to¶ every alleged rhetorical cure. Or, as Burke also writes, if the game of investigation¶ and reflection is “cards-face-up-on-the-table,” so far as possible,¶ scholars ought to “assist” us in properly “discounting” even the most seemingly¶ promising or timely inventional resources (1984a, 260, 244). Every¶ rhetoric can be pushed to the “end of the line” where it will need to be¶ rescued from itself (Burke 1984b, 292). As students of rhetoric going back¶ to the ancient Greeks have insisted, to the extent that wisdom is possible¶ within the realm of democratic politics, it emerges within fleeting contests¶ of *competing* commonplace heuristics. Ideally, rhetorical reflection would¶ serve this practice by investigating the plastic and recombinant character of¶ the rhetorics in which political power is (or could be) won and legitimized.¶ Finally, that so many academics believe that the broader public would¶ support university professors making politics their job description is further¶ evidence of an unremitting antagonism between scholarly reflection and¶ political action. Žižek’s question, “What does the other want?” may help¶ us address this disconnect between academic and public impressions. The¶ present challenge is to resist being tormented by the academic fear that our¶ work is not wanted by the public “other” if it does not produce immediate,¶ visible, institutional results. However, the correct answer to the question¶ “What does the other want?” is, as Žižek confirms, “nothing” (2008, xix).¶ The diverse, conflicted, otherwise occupied public wants nothing from us.¶ Rather, we will always project onto the rest of society what we think they¶ should, as a whole, want from us. And what do many politically sensitive¶ academics want the public to want from us? We want them to want us, in¶ the nauseatingly heroic phrase, to “speak truth to power.” However, when¶ scholarly reflection and political action are construed as sharing a single,¶ common essence, reflection forfeits its rhetorical authority to hold politics¶ accountable to reflection. Otherwise put, directly aiming to speak truth to¶ power always entails that one will overtake one’s desire. Instead, “truth”¶ may only be “powerful” when its academic guardians come to terms with¶ the equally incommensurable and inseparable claims each makes on them.

#### THE AFFIRMATIVE’S FRAMEWORK FOR DEBATE REDUCES SCHOLARLY REFLECTION FO POLITICAL AGENCY WHICH TRAPS ALL OF THEIR SOLVENCY AND CRITICISM CLAIMS WITHIN THE DOWNWARD SPIRAL OF ACADEMICS SPEAKING “TRUTH TO POWER”.

Welsch 12

[scott, “coming to terms with the antagonism between rhetorical reflection and political agency”, vol 45., no. 1, 1-23, prof. communications, appallacia state university]

Klump and Hollihan also show how complete separation between¶ scholarly reflection and political agency is attempted through aesthetic¶ conceits as well. They explain that “so strong was the social scientific image¶ [during the 1950s and 1960s] that the response to it became an artistic¶ self-¶ image—the critic’s task was to increase appreciation for the artistic use¶ of language in the rhetorical act.” They show how a subjective hermeneutic¶ of appreciation does not escape the idea of complete scholarly detachment¶ associated with supposedly objective knowledge-producing science. Klump¶ and Hollihan astutely note how “both of these self-images alienate” (92).¶ They alienate scholars from the consequences of their scholarly work. Both¶ the scientist and the aesthete refuse the antagonism between scholarly¶ reflection and political agency by insisting that the political is alien to each¶ of them. Construed as wholly distinct symbolic spheres, the reflective and¶ the political never have reason to come into contact with each other.¶ While Klump and Hollihan convincingly expose the effacement of¶ the antagonism between scholarly reflection and political agency in both¶ scientific and artistic scholarly identities, they do not recognize, however,¶ that they also efface the antagonism. They simply take the alternate route—¶ refusal by way of declaring an essential oneness between the two. Beyond¶ recognizing the fact that all choices have material consequences, whether¶ intended or not, and arguing that scholars must take them into account,¶ they go a step further and reduce scholarly reflection to a mode of political¶ agency. The reduction [of scholarly reflection to a mode of political agency] proceeds as follows: first, scholars make choices.¶ Second,¶ whether or not they make them intentionally or unintentionally,¶ they will make them nonetheless. Third, those choices will have material¶ consequences (1989, 90–91). Therefore, because our choices, or the words we¶ produce, will have material, political, consequences whether or not we intend¶ them to, we should embrace the consequences we prefer and pursue them¶ directly (the hidden premise being that intentionally pursued consequences¶ are better than unintended ones). Hence, Klump and Hollihan¶ conclude by¶ saying that “the critic that emerges—the interpreter, the teacher, the social¶ actor—is a moral participant, cognizant of the power and responsibility¶ that accompanies full critical participation in his/her society” (1989, 94).¶ scott welsh¶ 8¶ Michael Calvin McGee reduces scholarly reflection to political agency¶ in the same way. At key points, McGee, as well as Klump and Hollihan, refer¶ to Burke’s observation that “all living things are critics,” constantly interpreting¶ the signs around them (Burke 1984b, 5; McGee 1990, 281; Klumpp¶ and Hollihan 1989, 93). And because the signs around us do, in fact, produce¶ much of the social world in which we live, all speech, including academic¶ writing, is inherently political and should be embraced as such. Hence,¶ McGee challenges scholars to engage in “social surgery,” wherein they substitute¶ “new cultural imperatives” for “old taken-for-granted conventions”¶ in order to “make the world conform to their will.” Moreover, as naturalborn¶ critics, like all living things, scholars cannot help but engage in “social¶ surgery” (1990, 281–82). As with Klump and Hollihan, the only remaining¶ question is whether or not they will acknowledge and embrace their true¶ nature. This argument is repeated throughout the “critical rhetoric” literature¶ of the late 1980s and early 1990s. For example, Raymie McKerrow challenges¶ so-called critical rhetoricians to acknowledge their complicity in the¶ production of political culture and take a side. McKerrow advances a liberation¶ theology ethos oriented toward the “the critique of domination” and¶ the emancipation of the oppressed (1989, 93, 103, 106). Although ostensibly¶ responding to McKerrow, Kent Ono and John Sloop largely expand on¶ the ethos implicit or already present in McKerrow’s presentation of critical¶ rhetoric. What they add is the claim that a generalized resistance to rulingclass¶ interests is insufficient to maintain a meaningful, long-term political¶ agenda. What is required is deep investment in a particular cause “able¶ to re-form the individual” (1992, 51). And, just like the other authors, they¶ argue that because even the skeptical critic “often unconsciously commits to¶ a telos despite her attempts to resist the ever-present threat of dogmatism,”¶ critics fully embracing the moral imperative should deliberately, “at the¶ moment of placing pen to paper . . .[,] relinquish skepticism and advance¶ their argument for that moment as if the direction chosen by the critic¶ (i.e. telos) were Truth with a capital ‘T’”(53). This Truth with a capital “T”¶ is not an epistemic conclusion but an unreserved commitment to “the ideal¶ picture we have created for ourselves” of a “utopian future” (1992, 56, 59).¶ Recent contributions across a variety of published forums concerning¶ rhetorical criticism, public intellectualism, and academic engagement¶ demonstrate that this reduction of scholarly reflection to political agency¶ (through the acknowledgment of the fact of complicity) remains influential¶ among rhetoric scholars. In some quarters, it has been radicalized. In the¶ coming to terms with the antagonism¶ 9¶ recent *Western Journal of Communication* special issue on rhetorical criticism,¶ Stephen Hartnett argues, for example, that rhetoric scholars need to get to¶ the point where they “are no longer studying objects from which they hope¶ to glean some truths to be offered as tools to others.” Instead, scholars are¶ to “build projects where they are directly implicated in and work alongside¶ disadvantaged communities.” The ideal is “scholars who are activists¶ writing about their activism” (2010, 78). Hartnett folds scholarly reflection¶ into politics. The former only reemerges as a distinct kind of activity after¶ the fact in reflective accounts of one’s political efforts. Hence, the truly¶ committed “social justice scholar” needs to learn how to “speak clearly and¶ look authoritative” while repeating “mass-media-shaped tidbits” within the¶ “¶ corporate-driven cesspool of mass media” (2010, 81–83). Explicitly affirming¶ the thrust of Hartnett’s essay, Peter Simonson calls on scholars to “transport¶ their bodies outside the cloisters” and into the political field. Similarly,¶ he responds to Celeste Condit’s concern that McGee made “the rhetorical¶ scholar indistinguishable from the street rhetorician” with “I would answer¶ that passing for a street rhetorician might in fact be the ideal” (2010, 121,¶ 95). Likewise, in the recent *Quarterly Journal of Speech* forum on engaged¶ scholarship, Anna Young, Adria Battaglia, and Dana Cloud plainly state¶ that because Aristotle was right that “man is by nature a political animal”¶ we must “reframe politics as our job description” (2010, 433).¶ In the *Philosophy and Rhetoric* forum, Steve Fuller characterizes the¶ “public intellectual” as an “agent of justice.” He deems John Dewey a failed¶ public intellectual because he “refused to use all the available means of persuasion”¶ (2006, 150). His criticism of Dewey, however, is not that Dewey¶ tried and failed to be a public intellectual. Rather, it is Dewey’s alleged¶ refusal itself to be a public intellectual that draws Fuller’s criticism. This is¶ because Fuller’s vision of public intellectualism—a willingness and ability¶ to use all available means of persuasion as an agent of justice—is held up¶ not as an option for some academics in their life outside of the academy but¶ as the essential academic identity. At its best, the academy is “the custodian¶ of the nation’s spirit, the loyal opposition” of whoever holds “the reins of¶ state power at the moment” or the place from which a protected scholarly¶ class is enabled to “speak truth to power.” Using the same logic employed¶ by early critical rhetoricians, anything less is rejected as a cowardly attempt¶ to find an academic identity that “basically absolves intellectuals of any¶ responsibility for their ideas” (2006, 151, 49).