# 1NC

### T

#### A. Interpretation

#### Substantial increase is 30% to 50%.

Hantash 06, Patent Attorneys & Engineers Lynch Kneblewski - Sâo Paulo

[Feras, 3/16, http://www.freshpatents.com/Method-for-detecting-cystic-fibrosis dt20060316ptan20060057593.php]

[0011] A substantial increase in the amount of a CFTR target segment identified means that the segment has been duplicated while a substantial decrease in the amount of a CFTR target segment identified means that the target segment has been deleted. The term "substantial decrease" or "substantial increase" means a decrease or increase of at least about 30-50%. Thus, deletion of a single CFTR exon would appear in the assay as a signal representing for example of about 50% of the same exon signal from an identically processed sample from an individual with a wildtype CFTR gene. Conversely, amplification of a single exon would appear in the assay as a signal representing for example about 150% of the same exon signal from an identically processed sample from an individual with a wildtype CFTR gene.

#### Violation- The plan increases restrictions on some of the President’s authority over armed forces into hostilities. That’s not a substantial increase of restrictions on war power authority in the area of introduction of armed forces.

#### That means the aff must restrict the President’s authority over all humans in the armed forces

Lorber 2013

[Eric, \* J.D. Candidate, University of Pennsylvania Law School, Ph.D Candidate, Duke University Department of Political Science. “COMMENT: Executive Warmaking Authority and Offensive Cyber Operations: Can Existing Legislation Successfully Constrain Presidential Power?” University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law 15 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 961

As is evident from a textual analysis, n177 an examination of the legislative history, n178 and the broad policy purposes behind the creation of the Act, n179 [\*990] "armed forces" refers to U.S. soldiers and members of the armed forces, not weapon systems or capabilities such as offensive cyber weapons. Section 1547 does not specifically define "armed forces," but it states that "the term "introduction of United States Armed Forces' includes the assignment of members of such armed forces to command, coordinate, participate in the movement of, or accompany the regular or irregular military forces of any foreign country or government." n180 While this definition pertains to the broader phrase "introduction of armed forces," the clear implication is that only members of the armed forces count for the purposes of the definition under the WPR. Though not dispositive, the term "member" connotes a human individual who is part of an organization. n181 Thus, it appears that the term "armed forces" means human members of the United States armed forces.

#### In means throughout

Words and Phrases, 1959

(p. 546 (PDNS3566))

In the Act of 1861 providing that justices of the peace shall have jurisdiction “in” their respective counties to hear and determine all complaints, **the word “in” should be construed to mean “throughout”** such counties. Reynolds v. Larkin, 14, p. 114, 117, 10 Colo. 126.

#### Prefer our interp:

#### Ground- Our interpretation employs a flexible and reasonable definition of substantially but still excludes tiny subsets of each of areas.

#### Education: Our interp ensures the entire category of targeted killings are explored, ensuring the best topic debates.

#### Topicality is a voting issue in order to ensure competitive equity.

### F/W

#### Interpretation- the aff cannot claim advantages not tied to the implementation of the plan

#### Violation – all of their offense is based on status quo discourse – the aff doesn’t solve that by passing legislation

#### Key to predictable limits- infinite number of benefits the aff could claim to their speech act our discourse- impossible to get offense against.

#### Key to education- can’t clash with portions off the aff that aren’t predicated off of affirming the resolution- clash is key to two way education

#### Voting issue for fairness and education

#### Evaluate consequences

Weiss 99

Weiss, Prof Poli Sci – CUNY Grad Center, ‘99¶ (Thomas G, “Principles, Politics, and Humanitarian Action,” Ethics and International Affairs 13.1)

Scholars and practitioners frequently employ the term “dilemma” to describe painful decision making but “quandary” would be more apt.27A dilemma involves two or more alternative courses of action with unintended but unavoidable and equally undesirable consequences. If consequences are equally unpalatable, then remaining inactive on the sidelines is an option rather than entering the serum on the field. A quandary, on the other hand, entails tough choices among unattractive options with better or worse possible outcomes. While humanitarians are perplexed, they are not and should not be immobilized. The solution is not indifference or withdrawal but rather appropriate engagement. The key lies in making a good faith effort to analyze the advantages and disadvantages of different alloys of politics and humanitarianism, and then to choose what often amounts to the lesser of evils.¶ Thoughtful humanitarianism is more appropriate than rigid ideological responses, for four reasons: goals of humanitarian action often conflict, good intentions can have catastrophic consequences; there are alternative ways to achieve ends; and even if none of the choices is ideal, victims still require decisions about outside help. What Myron Wiener has called “instrumental humanitarianism” would resemble just war doctrine because contextual analyses and not formulas are required. Rather than resorting to knee-jerk reactions to help, it is necessary to weigh options and make decisions about choices that are far from optimal.¶ Many humanitarian decisions in northern Iraq, Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda—and especially those involving economic or military sanctions— required selecting least-bad options. Thomas Nagle advises that “given the limitations on human action, it is naive to suppose that there is a solution to every moral problem. “29 Action-oriented institutions and staff are required in order to contextualized their work rather than apply preconceived notions of what is right or wrong. Nonetheless, classicists continue to insist on Pictet’s “indivisible whole” because humanitarian principles “are interlocking, overlapping and mutually supportive. . . . It is hard to accept the logic of one without also accepting the others. “30¶ The process of making decisions in war zones could be compared to that pursued by “clinical ethical review teams” whose members are on call to make painful decisions about life-and-death matters in hospitals.sl The sanctity of life is complicated by new technologies, but urgent decisions cannot be finessed. It is impermissible to long for another era or to pretend that the bases for decisions are unchanged. However emotionally wrenching, finding solutions is an operational imperative that is challenging but intellectually doable. Humanitarians who cannot stand the heat generated by situational ethics should stay out of the post-Cold War humanitarian kitchen.¶ Principles in an Unprincipled World¶ Why are humanitarians in such a state of moral and operational disrepair? In many ways Western liberal values over the last few centuries have been moving toward interpreting moral obligations as going beyond a family and intimate networks, beyond a tribe, and beyond a nation. The impalpable moral ideal is concern about the fate of other people, no matter how far away.szThe evaporation of distance with advances in technology and media coverage, along with a willingness to intervene in a variety of post–Cold War crises, however, has produced situations in which humanitarians are damned if they do and if they don’t. Engagement by outsiders does not necessarily make things better, and it may even create a “moral hazard by altering the payoffs to combatants in such a way as to encourage more intensive fighting.“33¶ This new terrain requires analysts and practitioners to admit ignorance and question orthodoxies. There is no comfortable theoretical framework or world vision to function as a compass to steer between integration and fragmentation, globalization and insularity. Michael Ignatieff observes, “The world is not becoming more chaotic or violent, although our failure to understand and act makes it seem so. “34Gwyn Prins has pointed to the “scary humility of admitting one’s ignorance” because “the new vogue for ‘complex emergencies’ is too often a means of concealing from oneself that one does not know what is going on. “3sTo make matters more frustrating, never before has there been such a bombardment of data and instant analysis; the challenge of distilling such jumbled and seemingly contradictory information adds to the frustration of trying to do something appropriate fast.¶ International discourse is not condemned to follow North American fashions and adapt sound bites and slogans. It is essential to struggle with and even embrace the ambiguities that permeate international responses to wars, but without the illusion of a one-size-fits-all solution. The trick is to grapple with complexities, to tease out the general without ignoring the particular, and still to be inspired enough to engage actively in trying to make a difference.¶ Because more and more staff of aid agencies, their governing boards, and their financial backers have come to value reflection, an earlier policy prescription by Larry Minear and me no longer appears bizarre: “Don’t just do something, stand there! “3sThis advice represented our conviction about the payoffs from thoughtful analyses and our growing distaste for the stereotypical, yet often accurate, image of a bevy of humanitarian actors flitting from one emergency to the next.

### DA

#### Tea Party influence low now BECAUSE of the disagreement about foreign policy - the plan reverses this

Castillo 9/5 (Dava Castillo, Sep 05th 2013, <http://www.allvoices.com/contributed-news/15460384-political-party-schisms-a-house-divided-turns-into-a-condominium>, “Political party schisms: A house divided turns into a condominium”, AB)

But then the entire question on whether to engage in Syria is unsettling for many as we find ourselves in the same camp with those whom, in most political arenas, we would be opposing. The Democrats are divided as well as the Republicans. The labels this time really are “doves” and “hawks,” literally. The Republicans, however, are divided even further by the tea party component of isolationists driven by fiscal stinginess, which in the case of fighting a war “over there,” works for me. Except now Saudi Arabia and Qatar have said they will pay for some of the expenses relegating the United States military to mercenary status. If engaging in Syria is going to be free, will the Libertarian conservatives say it’s OK or will the Republicans branch off into yet another ideological segment? The Republican Party is beginning to fracture over Syrian intervention, with the small government, isolationist tea party folk on one side and the rest of the old guard, hawkish Republicans led by Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) and Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.). Splits in major political parties are uncommon, but it has happened before.

#### Plan is a win for the Tea Party

Metzler 13

Rebekah Metzler 13 is a political writer for U.S. News & World Report. “Marco Rubio, Rand Paul Strike Out to Re-Brand Their Party: Fresh takes on foreign, domestic policies aim to shake up GOP,” February 6, 2013, http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/02/06/marco-rubio-rand-paul-strike-out-to-re-brand-their-party, DOA: 8-1-13, y2k

Paul, delivering a foreign policy speech at the conservative Heritage Foundation Wednesday, struck a balance between George W. Bush era neo-conservativism and support for nation building, and his father, former Texas Rep. Ron Paul's, unique brand of isolationism. The Kentucky senator criticized the traditional GOP stance that money should be no object when it comes to the U.S. military and its mission, and said that America should rethink its role in the world while recognizing the cost to U.S. blood and treasure. "I'd argue that a more restrained foreign policy is the true conservative foreign policy, as it includes two basic tenets of true conservatism: respect for the constitution and fiscal discipline," Paul said, reflecting libertarian ideals held by both Tea Partiers and some progressives. Congress also must be more assertive when it comes to its role in providing checks and balances to the president's war powers, he said. "We did not declare war or authorize force to begin war with Libya," Paul said. "This is a dangerous precedent. In our foreign policy, Congress has become not even a rubber stamp but an irrelevancy." A senator who at times finds himself the only member on a certain side of things—whether it's a willingness to place secret holds on nominations to get a vote on a certain amendment, or an opposition to some spending provision that most Republicans agree with—Paul was obviously striving to legitimize himself as a leader with original but appealing viewpoints. "When foreign policy has become so monolithic, so lacking in debate that Republicans and Democrats routinely pass foreign policy statements without debate and without votes, where are the calls for moderation, the calls for restraint?" he said. "Anyone who questions the bipartisan consensus is immediately castigated, rebuked and their patriotism challenged."

#### Tea Party wins snowball --- saves their influence in Congress

Cillizza 12

(Chris Cillizza, December 4, 2012, “Is the tea party dead? Or just resting?,” Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2012/12/04/whither-the-tea-party/)

And Jon Lerner, a Republican consultant who works closely with the Club For Growth, insisted that the tea party remains a major force in GOP primaries — and, as such, is something establishment Republicans should be very wary of ignoring. ”Tea Party voters represent a huge portion of all Republican voters, so while the GOP establishment sometimes finds the Tea Party inconvenient, they are much better off making peace with it than making war with it,” said Lerner.¶ True enough. But, it still seems clear that the tea party is in the midst of a sort of soul searching. For a movement that burst onto the national scene with a force almost never seen in modern American politics, there’s no obvious second act. The movement needs a next fight or, short of that, to make a decision as to whether it can live within the Republican coalition or not.¶ (That latter choice is complicated by the fact that the tea party was built as a leaderless enterprise and so the idea of such a major philosophic decision being made for the entire movement is anathema to, well, the entire movement. Rick Reed, a Republican media consultant, suggested that “there may be a couple of folks whom 10 percent of Republicans would loosely and correctly associate with [the tea party movement], but probably no more.”)¶ One senior Republican party strategist, granted anonymity to speak candidly about the future of the tea party movement, expressed concern that while the tea party was at a “low point” today, the coming legislative fights in Congress could lead to a renaissance in the movement.

#### Strong Tea Party wrecks budget compromises

Montgomery 11

(Lori, "House Republicans divided on spending cuts; for some, it's $100 billion or bust," Feb 11, [www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/10/AR2011021007091.html](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/10/AR2011021007091.html))

An already wobbly week for House Republicans turned chaotic Thursday as their unruly new majority flatly rejected a spending plan crafted by House leaders, saying its cuts fell far short of fulfilling a campaign pledge to slice $100 billion from federal programs. House leaders offered to redo the package but were struggling to identify the massive and unprecedented cuts that will be required to meet their goal. Dissatisfied conservatives, meanwhile, were pressing for even sharper reductions that could prove difficult to push through the House, much less the Democratic-controlled Senate.¶ The uprising exposed serious divisions among Republicans bent on reducing the size of government, the defining issue of the campaign that swept them back into power in the House this fall. Dozens of freshmen, fueled by tea party fervor, are demanding a rapid response to the groundswell of public anger.¶ Their single-minded focus threatens to spoil efforts by House Speaker John A. Boehner (R-Ohio) to avoid a confrontation with the White House that could trigger a government shutdown in coming months. Until this week, House leaders had anticipated relatively little trouble putting together an initial spending plan, which they had hoped would serve as an austere but responsible counterpoint to the budget request President Obama is due to submit Monday.¶ Across Washington, conservative groups fanned the flames of the rebellion Thursday. At the annual Conservative Political Action Conference, Rep. Michele Bachmann (R-Minn.), the leader of the House Tea Party Caucus, criticized GOP leaders for their first offer to cut spending and demanded more.

#### Destroys the economy --- consumer confidence, dollar strength, credit rating

Brown 13

(Abram, 1/4, "GOP's Threat to Shutdown the Government is a Dangerous Strategy," www.forbes.com/sites/abrambrown/2013/01/04/the-gop-is-already-threatneing-to-shutdown-the-government-to-win-spending-cuts/)

That Republicans are already warning the country that they will turn off the lights in D.C. is an alarming situation. Depending on what happens in the debt ceiling debate, the Treasury Department might just have trouble paying the bills on time…or the whole apparatus could cease to function. Past that, there’s a risk that the credit-rating agencies could downgrade the United States, raising the country’s borrowing costs (and making that newly approved debt more costly).¶ Not to mention the damage to the broader economy. The last debt ceiling fiasco in August 2011 dashed consumer confidence. Why shop anywhere else than bargain-centers like Wal-Mart and or a dollar store when the nation seems to be falling apart? Shortly before the nation went past the deadline in 2011, the CEOs of Bank of America, Citi, JPMorgan Chase and Goldman Sachs sent a letter to The White House that urged for a quick resolution:¶ A default on our nation’s obligations, or a downgrade of America’s credit rating, would be a tremendous blow to business and investor confidence — raising interest rates for everyone who borrows, undermining the value of the dollar, and roiling stock and bond markets — and, therefore, dramatically worsening our nation’s already difficult economic circumstances.¶ Granted, the economy is in slightly better shape today than it was in August 2011. Not so strong, though, that the consequences of a shutdown would be much different.

#### Economic collapse causes nuclear conflicts

Burrows and Harris 9

Mathew J. Burrows counselor in the National Intelligence Council and Jennifer Harris a member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis” The Washington Quarterly 32:2 https://csis.org/files/publication/twq09aprilburrowsharris.pdf

Increased Potential for Global Conflict¶ Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the¶ future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking¶ forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity.¶ Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to¶ believe that the Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be¶ drawn from that period include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and¶ multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on¶ the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in the¶ same period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the¶ twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in¶ which the potential for greater conflict could grow would seem to be even more¶ apt in a constantly volatile economic environment as they would be if change¶ would be steadier.¶ In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and¶ nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the¶ international agenda. Terrorism’s appeal will decline if economic growth¶ continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those¶ terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of¶ technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most¶ dangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a¶ combination of descendants of long established groupsinheriting¶ organizational structures, command and control processes, and training¶ procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacksand newly emergent¶ collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized,¶ particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower¶ in an economic downturn.¶ The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S.¶ military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s¶ acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed¶ Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with¶ external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own¶ nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship¶ that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge¶ naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity¶ conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an¶ unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states¶ involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals¶ combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile¶ dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in¶ achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The¶ lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile¶ flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on¶ preemption rather than defense, potentially leading to escalating crises.Types of conflict that the world continues¶ to experience, such as over resources, could¶ reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and¶ there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices.¶ Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive¶ countries to take actions to assure their future¶ access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this¶ could result in interstate conflicts if government¶ leaders deem assured access to energy resources,¶ for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of¶ their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical¶ implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval¶ buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of¶ blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed¶ turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of¶ regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and¶ counterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational¶ cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in¶ Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is¶ likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between states in a more¶ dog-eat-dog world.¶

### Trials

#### The United States Congress should establish a policy trial process regarding the United States federal government statutorily refusing the war powers authority of the President of the United States to engage in peacekeeping operations. The result of the policy trial should be unconditionally implemented and enforced by the United States Congress.

#### The trial solves the aff

Noone 12

(Gregory Noone, Director of the Fairmont State University National ¶ Security and Intelligence Program and an Assistant Professor of ¶ Political Science and Law, “The War Powers Resolution and Public Opinion” Volume 45 Fall 2012 Issues 1 & 2, <http://law.case.edu/journals/JIL/Documents/45CaseWResJIntlL1&2.8.Article.Noone.pdf>, KB)

IV. The Public Wants Congress to Approve¶ “Do you think the president should or should not be required to ¶ get the approval of Congress before sending United States armed ¶ forces into action outside the United States?”30 In November 1973 the ¶ response favoring congressional approval was 80% and in May 2008 it ¶ was an equally stark 79%.31 In fact, for the past thirty-five years there ¶ has been little change in this basic sentiment as an overwhelming ¶ majority of Americans believe that the president needs congressional ¶ approval before committing troops overseas. The American people ¶ want Congress to execute its constitutional duties, or in other words, ¶ do its job.¶ In February 1999, for example, 54% approved of a peacekeeping ¶ mission in Kosovo (40% disapproved), whereas 43% Americans ¶ supported airstrikes and 45% opposed.32 However, 78% of Americans ¶ wanted President Clinton to seek approval from Congress.33 In ¶ September 2002, 69% said congressional approval was necessary for an ¶ invasion of Iraq and 51% said Congress should not give unlimited ¶ authority to use military action against Iraq.34 A CBS poll from that ¶ same month found 44% believed Congress was not asking enough ¶ questions, yet 22% believed Congress was asking too many questions, ¶ 16% about right, and 18% don’t know.35¶ Beyond the basic question of obtaining congressional approval, ¶ other specific scenarios polled in May 2008 indicate the desire for ¶ congressional approval remains strong with few exceptions.

#### The CP is more rigorous and avoids the tea party disad

Buchanan, ’13

(Bruce, Professor in Government at the University of Texas at Austin, Presidential Power and Accountability: Toward a Presidential Accountability System, Routledge, p. 114-115, RSR)

Finally and most importantly, invoking the procedure signals the American people that something rare and serious is afoot. They will pay closer attention than usual to the (inevitably televised) proceedings because the news media and political elites will tell them that if history is any guide, their reaction will play a vital role in determining the outcome. In fact, on this count, there is nothing new here. Public opinion has often been highly influential, indeed decisive, in the resolutions of a wide variety of high-pro file formal congressional proceedings. Examples include the Army McCarthy hearings, the McCarthy censure, the Irvin Committee hearings on Watergate, and the Clinton impeachment and Senate trial. Public opposition to U.S. engagement in World War II led Congress to pass two Neutrality Acts (in 1935 and 1937) that prevented a frustrated President Roosevelt from helping the allies before the U.S. entry into the war. These examples suggest that policy trials would be decisive. They would be decisive because, as in the examples, they would be preceded by highly explicit “role-sending” publicity which would put the people on notice that their collective judgment about a major decision facing Congress is likely to carry great weight. If history is any guide, such role sending, particularly when followed by deliberative policy trial proceedings, would almost certainly crystallize a public consensus that is informed, coherent, and sturdy enough both to influence and politically protect members of Congress, most of whom will follow the public lead.

### PIC

**Counter Advocacy: we affirm the entirety of the 1AC with the exception of its racist components.**

**It’s competitive and fair: the 2AC can decide what the racist parts of the aff are.**

**The aff questions racism from the outside but is conspicuously silent on the potential racism of the 1AC itself. Before we can even consider the outcome of the aff we must question its potentially racist underpinnings. Refusing the 1NC position makes violence inevitable.**

**Kokontis 2011** (Kate, PhD in Performance Studies from UC-Berkeley, “Performative Returns and the Rememory of History: genealogy and performativity in the American racial state,” accessed via Proquest- SG)

On one hand, she addresses the literal politics that the theological narratives espouse. There is a long tradition of deploying the Exodus narrative toward the pursuit of social reform. That is, instead of appealing to it in a way that focuses on the next world, “[t]hrough biblical typology, particularly uses of Exodus, African Americans elevated their common experiences to biblical drama and found resources to account for their circumstances and respond effectively to them. [...] Exodus history sustained hope and a sense of possibility in the face of insurmountable evil. The analogical uses of the story enabled **a sense of agency and resistance** in persistent moments of despair and disillusionment.”64 But even these efforts have – not exclusively, but often – relied on a particular iteration of the social gospel that **presupposes a set of moral and institutional imperatives (for instance, the ideal of training racial, religious, sexual, social, or institutional “deviants” or outlyers to behave according to an ostensibly correct set of moral principles) that run counter to a radical critique of the underlying terms of the state and civil society which tend to ratify, naturalize, and invisibilize antiblackness and/or policies that adversely impact black people who are not part of the middle class, rather than to critique or subvert it**. Hartman, on the other hand, does call for, and mount, a radical critique of the terms of **the state and civil society**: for her, **they are inherently unethical rather than redeemable, having engendered centuries of black social death and historical unknowability, and thus any struggle toward freedom demands an unflinching critical analysis rather than an implicit or explicit ratification of these institutions and the terms on which they are predicated.** But more fundamentally, she addresses the political implications of the assumptive logic of a theological teleology. I interpret Hartman to posit that there is a kind of freedom that can be predicated on not-knowing: if there is no predetermined future, there is no divine imperative that might encourage an investment in the moral prescriptions of a conservative social gospel: **a toppled faith in the redemptive possibilities of the struggle has the potential to open the door to invention, speculation, refashioning, and cobbling together something from nothing, presence from absence. I interpret her to posit that a viable freedom dream necessitates the acknowledgment of loss and absence and the history of processes of dehumanizing antiblackness, the acknowledgement of the wound and its psychic, social, political, and ethical causes – as well as an acknowledgement of its persistence – rather than being deluded by tidy or optimistic but under-analyzed narratives of progress or redemption. Only then can any realistic stock be taken toward re-imagining the world and the possibilities and imperatives of a black freedom struggle**. While Haley and **Gates draw on narratives that say that** the **past**, including its **suffering, was meaningful, Hartman offers** what might appear to be **a much bleaker interpretation that insists that it is meaningless insofar as it is not folded into any sort of teleology. But in that is a kind of freedom**/dream, **because the subjects of her narrative are free from a predetermination of the terms on which liberation is possible**, the structures around its enactment. What **she calls for is a profound refashioning of the epistemology of the invisible**, which is as fundamental a component of the black freedom struggle as is an epistemology of verifiable evidence of oppression. That is, she advocates the excavation of psychic structures and historical silences to replace an implicit or explicit faith in a divine logic in the (racial) order of things. Genealogy cannot connect with the unknown, so it becomes a ghost story, an excavation. The term might then be interpreted less as a means of accessing literal ancestors, and more as a process toward understanding. **Hartman constructs**, in her text, not a genealogy of anyone’s family, but **a genealogy** of the stranger, of **the slave**; a genealogy of loss, of the lost, of searching. **Projects that make use of imaginative**, performative, quasi-fictional or poetic **devices can’t rest with not-knowing**: the imaginative devices emerge, in fact, from attempts to piece together or construct/invent evidence from its lack. They all insist on the importance of knowing, whether because of some large-scale sense of collective responsibility, or because of personal yearning, or both. **The imaginative devices don’t exist for the sake of being imaginative; they exist for the sake of survival. But in being imaginative, they allow for radical possibilities to emerge that literality forecloses**. Part of what performance might offer the study of history is a) different keys to be able to fill in the gaps, that aren’t so heavily reliant upon explicit, legible empiricism, and b) not only permission for, but encouragement of what uncertainty can yield. Genealogy, broadly understood, is what furnishes evidence: it is the key to filling in blanks that are impossible to fill. **One version of it is capable of being profoundly literal; of making reconstruction possible; it is used to fill in the blank that has been lost to us – whomever the ‘us’ is: the dispossessed, displaced, marginalized – providing an object to slip into a gaping negative space.** This I would call **genealogy** as an object. A different version **is used in order to understand the gaps, to underscore or illuminate the negative spaces and ask how they came to be, and filling in the context around the blank spaces, inheriting the loss, becomes the way to trace the relationship between the past, present, and future**. This I would call genealogy as a process. **What, then, is or could be critical or even radical in roots-seeking genealogy projects**? There is something inherently conservative about nostalgia, according to most interpretations; but not if a notion of “radical nostalgia,” such as that offered by Peter Glazer, is pursued: such an enactment of notalgia engages in worldmaking and invention; the definition takes for granted that nostalgia is for worlds and times that never existed, and that therefore it is not conservative (i.e. about returning to an idealized past), but that it is creative and always seeking something new. Performative returns are inevitably projects of yearning, of wishing for a past that was imagined to be better than the present (which has devolved in some way) or a future that has promise and potential. The mythical Aztec homeland Aztlán that was made popular during the Chicano Movement is a very elegant example: it is a wished-for, utopian space, acknowledged as being impossible to realize, but always animating the spirit of the concrete efforts of its adherents toward social justice and structural change (see Anaya and Lomelí 1991). Hartman writes: **“To believe**, as I do, that **the enslaved** are our contemporaries **is to** understand that we share their aspirations and defeats, which isn’t to say that we are owed what they were due but rather to **acknowledge that they accompany our every effort to fight against domination, to abolish the color line, and to imagine a free territory, a new commons**. It is to take to heart their knowledge of freedom. The enslaved knew that freedom had to be taken; it wasn’t something that could ever be given to you. **The kind of freedom that could be given to you could just as easily be taken back**. [...] **The demands of the slave on the present have everything to do with making good the promise of abolition, and this entails much more than the end of property in slaves. It requires the reconstruction of society, which is the only way to honor our debt to the dead. This is the intimacy of our age with theirs – an unfinished struggle. To what end does one conjure the ghost of slavery, if not to incite the hopes of transforming the present**?” (Hartman 2007, 269-270). But performative return is not necessarily critical, and part of what I demonstrate throughout this dissertation is how such projects are always more complicated than they seem; they work to challenge and bolster the racial state; they are in some ways radical and in others extremely conservative. And this question of criticality has precisely to do with normativity: do genealogical practices, the conclusions they draw and the worldmaking they do, work to undo or to reinscribe oppressive patterns, habits, worldviews, available roles of and categories for historically marginalized groups of people? All three of **these projects** **attempt to re-write** the terms of America, such that the circumstances of **African-Americans** are configured **as being integral instead of outside the dominant narrative;** constitutive rather than an aberration. **But they waver between trying to write that as a narrative of progress, in which we have left slavery behind and have ascended to a space of constitutive normativity; and trying to underline the fundamental and unending nature of slavery – a kind of rejoinder to uncritical narratives that not only attends to the subjective space of social death that it has yielded but the possibilities and necessities of invention that have flourished in its wake.** What they have in common is that they present the necessity of grappling with the past instead of ignoring it, allowing African-Americans’ movements and reinscriptions of migration to trouble the waters of complacency, forging a broader awareness of the fraught position they have historically occupied. Each contains kernels of great possibility for an inclusive vision of the future as well as more or less significant red flags. **Hartman’s vision, however, seems to espouse a particularly liberating articulation of freedom, because it does not try to deny or occlude the presence or significance of ongoing disparity and loss**: while Gates’ and **Haley’s subjects and implied audience have already succeeded, gained access to civil society, and have implicitly ratified the fundamental terms on which it is predicated, Hartman’s are still struggling to make something from nothing; they have an urgency in attending to disparities, and no investment in a status quo that excludes or violates their well-being. What she claims or advocates is not a victimized stance, but rather a staunch activist one that is inflected by a rigorous and unflinching structural analysis, and a sensitive and equally rigorous understanding of desire, yearning, and the possibilities for reinvention and reconstruction that emerge when faced with profound absence and loss**.

### Human Security

**No risk of continual war making – institutional safeguards check**

Allen **Buchanan 7**, Professor of Philosophy and Public Policy at Duke, 2007 (Preemption: military action and moral justification, pg. 128)

The intuitively plausible idea behind the 'irresponsible act' argument is that, other things being equal, the higher the stakes in acting and in particular the greater the moral risk, the higher are the *epistemic requirements* for justified action. The decision to go to war is generally a high stakes decision par excellence and the moral risks are especially great, for two reasons. First, unless one is justified in going to war, one's deliberate killing of enemy combatants will he murder, indeed mass murder. Secondly, at least in large-scale modem war, it is a virtual certainty that one will kill innocent people even if one is justified in going to war and conducts the war in such a way as to try to minimize harm to innocents. Given these grave moral risks of going to war, quite apart from often substantial prudential concerns, some types of justifications for going to war may simply be too subject to abuse and error to make it justifiable to invoke them. The 'irresponsible act' objection is not a consequentialist objection in any interesting sense. It does not depend upon the assumption that every particular act of going to war preventively has unacceptably bad consequences (whether in itself or by virtue of contributing lo the general acceptance of a principle allowing preventive war); nor does it assume that it is always wrong lo rely on a justification which, if generally accepted, would produce unacceptable consequences. Instead, the "irresponsible act' objection is more accurately described as an agent-centered argument and more particularly an argument from moral epistemic responsibility. The 'irresponsible act' objection to preventive war is highly plausible if— but only if—one assumes that the agents who would invoke the preventive-war justification are, as it were, *on their own* in making the decision to go to war preventively. In other words, the objection is incomplete unless the context of decision-making is further specified. Whether the special risks of relying on the preventive-war justification are unacceptably high will depend, *inter alia,* upon whether the decision-making process includes effective provisions for redu­cing those special risks. Because the special risks are at least in significant part epistemic—due to the inherently speculative character of the preventive war-justification—the epistemic context of the decision is crucial. Because institutions can improve the epistemic performance of agents, it is critical to know what the institutional context of the preventive-war decision is, before we can regard the 'irresponsible agent' objection as conclusive. Like the 'bad practice' argument, this second objection to preventive war is inconclusive because it does not consider— and rule out—the possibility that well-designed institutions for decision-making could address the problems that would otherwise make it irresponsible for a leader to invoke the preventive-war justification.

#### No future interventions

**Khazan 9/4/13**

[Olda, The Atlantic, <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/09/what-are-the-big-factors-determining-whether-americans-support-war/279290/>, mg]

¶

Among other findings, the book Choosing Your Battles: American Civil-Military Relations and the Use of Force, by Peter D. Feaver and Christopher Gelpi, shows that having military experience makes you less likely to be an interventionist -- perhaps because you know just what a nasty situation the country is weighing getting into. The authors find that **Americans with military experience support intervention only in situations that pose a direct threat to U.S. national security** -- a pragmatic perspective sometimes called “realpolitik.”¶ Meanwhile, “Civilian elites who have no military experience are somewhat more likely than military officers to report an ‘interventionist’ opinion, advocating foreign policy goals that do not fit within the realpolitik interstate security paradigm, including responses to human rights abuses and the internal collapse of governance in other countries, or the desire to alter a state's domestic regime.”¶ But in cases when the U.S. does intervene, veterans are more likely to support using “overwhelming” force without restraint.¶ Consequently, the authors found **that as more and more veterans join the ranks of government,** the likelihood of intervening militarily abroad decreases -- but the force used in each intervention is greater.¶ ¶ We find that **as the percentage of veterans serving in the executive branch and the legislature increases,** the probability that the United States will initiate militarized disputes declines by nearly 90 percent.

#### The task of critical theory is NOT to give advice to princes, but to challenge their authority. 1AC attempts at Critical state action reifies a flawed system of geopolitics that view nations as actors within set geopolitical boundaries. It asserts the plan as being a tool to make America a protagonist in the long struggle between nation, rather than questioning the fundamental assumptions of borders and critical geography that game relies upon. Plan links to their K vote neg.

**Dalby 08** Simon Dalby, Carleton University September 2008 – GEOPOLITICS, GRAND STRATEGY AND CRITIQUE: TWENTY YEARS AND COUNTING- online- http://www.carleton.ca/~sdalby/papers/DalbyDurham0

Recently Nick **Megoran** (2008) **has** raised the explicit issue ofthe relationships of all this to themorality of warfare**.** In the process he has **issued** what amounts to **an invitation to discuss** much more explicitly the crucial question of **violence and** how those of us who write **critical geopolitics** situate ourselves in this regard. **Focusing on** Gerard Toal's discussion of **Iraq** (Ó Tuathail 2003) and Bosnia (Ó Tuathail 2005) **he effectively poses the question of whether Toal is**, to use the phrasing from his first paper in (Ó Tuathail 1986), **"practicing geopolitics" rather than "exposing" its violence.** **The suggestion Megoran makes is that Toal effectively operates within the categories of just war theory and as such falls prey to the logics of state violence** implicit in the theory. **But if one is to venture into practical politics and take stands on particular instances of state violence these issues these pitfalls await all practitioners**. **In so far as the world is divided into spatial entities competing for power** and willing to use violence or the threat thereof to gain their ends such logics play out. **Of course as Megoran** (2008) **makes clear, spatial entities don't compete, bureaucracies, functionaries and politicians do and the reification of their actions in spatial tropes remains a powerful geographical sleight of hand** that requires continuous critical commentary from us all. Or as I put it in one of my initial formulations **“the function of a critical geopolitics is not to provide ‘advice to the prince’ in terms of using geopolitical reasoning to advise state policy-makers, but rather to investigate how geopolitical reasoning is used as an ideological device to maintain social relations of domination within contemporary global politics”** (Dalby 1990:14-15). **What Megoran** (2008) **doesn't do in his pointed raising of the possibilities of nonviolence is push his analysis of realism to the conclusion that operating within an ontology of rival spatial units arbitrated ultimately by violence is doomed to the tragedy of the eternal return of war.** The logic of clashing rival autonomous entities arbitrated by violence runs through the neo-realist approach to international relations just as much as it runs through the cultural logic of the national rifle association in the United States. These two share more than the acronym NRA, they share an ontological presupposition of competitive and potentially antagonistic autonomy. **In the world of nuclear superpowers it was quite clear two decades ago that this wasn't "realistic" as a long term mode of security for anyone on the planet.** The discussions of nuclear winter and the immediate climate change that a central nuclear war would create got attention in many places; coupled to the Chernobyl disaster it was part of the shakeup of the Soviet system in the 1980s. The Gorbachev innovations in new thinking concerning security recognized that the nuclear standoff was far too dangerous a game to play and set out to defuse the confrontation and manage international rivalries in a manner designed to remove the danger of crisis escalation (MccGwire 1991). **The tragedy is that American foreign policy makers, wedded to the ontology of clashing entities, interpreted the subsequent implosion of the Soviet Union as a victory and a confirmation of their superiority and rectitude.** In the process the wisdom showed by the Soviet leaders in recognising the necessity of defusing an impossible standoff, and thinking anew about security in a fragile biosphere, was swept aside and numerous possibilities of a politics of international cooperation were precluded in the West as the financial shocks of neo-liberalism humbled and humiliated former Russian rivals (Klein 2007). **The neo-realist school precludes the possibility of change when it reasserts the identities of the protagonists in the structural tragedies of anarchy. In this at least it reproduced some of the worst attributes of the earlier social Darwinist streams of geopolitik. But as globalization and the debate about climate change make clear, such artificial boundaries are dangerous ethical practices, not the given categories of our political being.** **Understanding this provides a powerful mode of critique but not the practical policy stances that activists facing immediate tactical decisions frequently insist of scholars when they demand that they take a stand. In so far as politics is about who decides before it is about what it is that needs deciding, the invocation of authority and threats of violence are unavoidable. Pressing necessities are deferred in the endless arguments about legitimate authority; pointing out the pernicious consequences of prioritizing rivalries over commonalities is a matter of critique too. The possibility of other political games, other modes of living together is what the nonviolence argument is about and its tied directly into challenging the assumption of clashing autonomies as the ontological condition of our times. More specifically it is precisely about disputing the assumptions of war as necessarily the ultimate arbiter of these rivalries with all the violence that goes with that assumption; this is the cartographic specification of a pervasive architecture of enmity that underlies international relations thinking. Geographical sensitivities are an especially good way into these discussions and critical geopolitics has to be about these arguments if it is to tackle the legitimations of violence that explicitly concern Megoran** (2008) and at least implicitly concern the rest of us. **My own attempt to do all these things has been to address the key that links violence, wars, strategy and identity in the discussions of security and**, over the decades, **write a series of critical essays pointing out the political choices implicit in how danger is articulated to various identities. In doing so it seems to me essential to take the geographical formulations in these arguments seriously and use these as the starting points for analyzing how these discursive formations work.** It also seems important to understand how these discussions play out in popular culture (Dalby 2008b), **the practical geopolitical reasoning of policy makers and the writings of the journalists who legitimize these practices. Geopolitics works in all these places and hence is worth tackling in many genres; this is precisely what the proliferation of critical geopolitical analyses have been** doing in this decade, and in that sense at least, this critical work has become the normal way of doing geographical scholarship. **But all this is premised on the assumption that war as either a tool of policy or a permanent social relation is unethical, that in the long run in a small biosphere that humanity is rapidly destabilizing, nuclear weapons and strategies to use them are untenable.** In Burke’s (2007) terms **we all need to start from formulations of an ethical peace** rather than from assumptions that war is just. **Doing so requires tackling the big hard questions about violence,** questions which have been made more pressing of late by the insistence by the most powerful state on the planet that it is at war, in an aggressive “long war” as part of its struggle to end tyranny on the planet.  **Its this prior condition of war that is the most important point that needs critique**, but after twenty years the contributions to this discussion are now widespread and at times somewhat inchoate, not least because war and domination sometimes get forgotten. The sub discipline looks very different now in comparison to what existed in the 1980s when this all got started (Dalby 2008a). **The current discussion of audience reception,** fandom and how popular readers and viewers extends the analysis of critical geopolitics further in another useful direction, and **offers considerable possibilities for critical engagement with the framing of larger political debates** (Dodds 2006; Dittmer and Dodds 2008). **But it seems that if we are to take Sparke's (2007) arguments about a post-foundational ethic seriously as geographers we do need to tie his concerns not only to matters of identities and spaces, but to the other major traditional theme of geography** too, matters of nature, environment and the biosphere as the home of humanity. While much of the discussion of social nature, of hybrids and cyborgs, commodity chains and animal geographies has updated these themes, at the largest scale, that of the geopolitical, matters that concern us here, much more work remains to be done on these themes (Dalby 2007). **Not least in linking war, identity, geography and ecology together much more closely in contemporary thinking while simultaneously looking to the alternatives for a more peaceful world**.

The appeal to human rights enshrines liberalism, turns the affirmative. “Humanity” orders the world into an all-encompassing one human community. Their emphasis on fellow-dwelling proves this.

William Rasch. ?uman Rights as Geopolitics: Carl Schmitt and the Legal Form of American Supremacy.Cultural Critique, 54. 2003.

Once again we see that the term "human" is not descriptive, but evaluative. To be truly human, one needs to be corrected. Regarding the relationship of difference and equality, Todorov concludes, "If it is incontestable that the prejudice of superiority is an obstacle in the road to knowledge, we must also admit that the prejudice of equality is a still greater one, for it consists in identifying the other purely and simply with one's own 'ego ideal' (or with oneself)" (1984, 165). Such identification is not only the essence of Christianity, but also of the doctrine of human rights preached by enthusiasts like Habermas and Rawls. And such identification means that the other is stripped of his otherness and made to conform to the universal ideal of what it means to be human.  
 And yet, despite?ndeed, because of?he all-encompassing embrace, the detested other is never allowed to leave the stage altogether. Even as we seem on the verge of actualizing Kant's dream, as Habermas puts it, of "a cosmopolitan order" that unites all peoples and abolishes war under the auspices of "the states of the First World" who "can afford to harmonize their national interests to a certain extent with the norms that define the halfhearted cosmopolitan aspirations of the UN" (1998, 165, 184), it is still fascinating to see how the barbarians make their functionally necessary presence felt. John Rawls, in his The Law of Peoples (1999), conveniently divides the world into well-ordered peoples and those who are not well ordered. Among the former are the "reasonable liberal peoples" and the "decent hierarchical peoples" (4). Opposed to them are the "outlaw states" and other "burdened" peoples who are not worthy of respect. Liberal peoples, who, by virtue of their history, possess superior institutions, culture, and moral character (23-25), have not only the right to deny non-well-ordered peoples respect, but the duty to extend what Vitoria called "brotherly correction" and Habermas "gentle compulsion" (Habermas 1997, 133). 13 That is, Rawls believes that the "refusal to tolerate" those states deemed to be outlaw states "is a consequence of liberalism and decency." Why? Because outlaw states violate human rights. What are human rights? "What I call human rights," Rawls states, "are ... a proper subset of the rights possessed by citizens in a liberal constitutional democratic regime, or of the rights of the members of a decent hierarchical society" (Rawls 1999, 81). Because of their violation of these liberal rights, nonliberal, nondecent societies do not even have the right "to protest their condemnation by the world society" (38), and decent peoples have the right, if necessary, to wage just wars against them. Thus, liberal societies are not merely contingently established and historically conditioned forms of organization; they become the universal standard against which other societies are judged. Those found wanting are banished, as outlaws, from the civilized world. Ironically, one of the signs of their outlaw status is their insistence on autonomy, on sovereignty. As Rawls states, "Human rights are a class of rights that play a special role in a reasonable Law of Peoples: they restrict the justifying reasons for war and its conduct, and they specify limits to a regime's internal autonomy. In this way they reflect the two basic and historically profound changes in how the powers of sovereignty have been conceived since World War II" (79). Yet, what Rawls sees as a postwar development in the notion of sovereignty?hat is, its restriction?ould not, in fact, have occurred had it not been for the unrestricted sovereign powers of the victors of that war, especially, of course, the supreme power of the United States. The limitation of (others') sovereignty is an imposed limitation, imposed by a sovereign state that has never relinquished its own sovereign power. What for Vitoria was the sovereignty of Christendom and for Scott the sovereignty of humanity becomes for Rawls the simple but uncontested sovereignty of liberalism itself.

This further eliminates any politics of dissensus. Ensures they only enshrine one static vision of politics – that is, human politics.

Prozorov ‘06

Sergei Prozorov. ?iberal Enmity: The Figure of the Foe in the Political Ontology of Liberalism.Millenium, 35. 2006.

Schmitt? concern with the liberal effacement of pluralism in the name of cosmopolitan humanity does not merely seek to unravel hypocrisy or ridicule inconsistency but has more serious implications in the context of the transcendental function of enmity that we have introduced above. For Schmitt, the pluriversal structure of international relations accords with his political ontology that affirms the ineradicability of difference, from which, as we have discussed, Schmitt infers the ever-present extreme possibility’ and the demand for the decision on the enemy. Moreover, the actual pluriversal structure of international relations satisfies the criterion of equality between the Self and the Other by precluding the emergence of a global hierarchy, whereby a particular ?oncrete orderlays a claim to represent humanity at large. While this pluralism does nothing to eliminate the ?ost extreme possibilityof violent conflict, it may be said at least to suspend it in its potentiality by retaining the possibility that the existentially different and alien might not become the enemy simply by remaining outside the concrete order of the Self and thus positing no actual existential threat. Moreover, as long as the boundary between the Self and the Other is present, there remains a possibility that whatever conflicts may ensue from the irreducible ontological alterity, they may be resolved on the basis of the mutually recognised sovereign equality of the Self and the Other in the domain of the international, which by definition is effaced by any political unification of humanity.43 Thus, for Schmitt ?t is an intellectual historical misunderstanding of an astonishing kind to want to dissolve these plural political entities in response to the call of universal and monistic representations, and to designate that as pluralist’.

However, this dissolution of actually existing pluralism is not a mere misunderstanding, a logical fallacy of presupposing the existence of the unity that is yet to be established. In an invective that we consider crucial for understanding Schmitt? critique of liberal ultra-politics, Schmitt approaches liberal monism with an almost existential trepidation: ?hat would be terrifying is a world in which there no longer existed an exterior but only a homeland, no longer a space for measuring and testing one? strength freely.5 Why is a world in which there is ?nly a homeland a Wendtian ?orld state posited as outright terrifying, rather than objectionable on a variety of political, economic, moral or aesthetic grounds? The answer is evident from the perspective of Schmitt? ontology of alterity and the affirmation of the ?xtreme possibilityof existential negation. If alterity is ontological and thus ineradicable in any empirical sense, then the establishment of a domesticated world unity, a global homeland, does nothing to diminish the danger of the advent of the Other, but, on the contrary, incorporates radical alterity within the homeland of the Self so that the ever-present possibility of violent death can no longer be externalised to the domain of the international. The monistic disavowal of alterity, of the existentially different and alien’, is thus terrifying as it enhances the most extreme possibility of killing and being killed.

Schmitt's objection to the liberal monism of the homeland of humanity is therefore two-fold. First, the effacement of ontological pluralism, which subsumes radical alterity under the universal homeland must logically entail the suppression of difference through the establishment of a world autocracy that would no longer be political due to its disavowal of the constitutive criterion of enmity. ?he day world politics comes to the earth, it will be transformed in a world police power.6 This ominous prophecy finds a perfect contemporary illustration in Wendt? argument on the effacement of political enmity in the world state: ?ince even a world state would not be a closed system, it would always be vulnerable to temporary disruptions. However, a world state would differ from anarchy in that it would constitute such disruptions as crime, not as politics or history. The possibility of crime may always be with us, but it does not constitute a stable alternative to a world state.’

Thus, struggles against hegemony or domination, which indeed have constituted politics and history as we know them, are recast as a priori criminal acts in the new order of the world state, calling for global police interventions rather than interstate war. The adversary is no longer called an enemy, but a disturber of peace and is thereby designated to be an outlaw of humanity. The exclusionary potential of universalism is evident: theoretically, we may easily envision a situation where a ?orld stateas a global police structure does not represent anything but itself; not merely anyone, but ultimately everyone may be excluded from the ?orld unitywithout any consequences for the continuing deployment of this abstract universality as an instrument of legitimation. In Zygmunt Bauman? phrase, ?he ?nternational communityhas little reality apart from the occasional military operations undertaken in its name49 Thus, for Schmitt, if the monistic project of liberalism ever succeeded, it would be at the cost of the transformation of the world into a terrifying dystopia of a self-immanent, totally administered world without an outside and hence without a possibility of flight.

At the same time, the practical implementation of such a project is hardly conceivable as encountering no resistance. The project of world unity and the effacement of exteriority is therefore bound to have its own enemies, insofar as alterity is ontologically ineradicable. Letting the Other into the global homeland does not eliminate the ?ost extreme possibilityof violent conflict but makes it impossible to manage it through the pluralistic disjunction of the Self and the Other. In the world in which there is only a homeland radical alterity has no place, both literally and figuratively. In this setting, conflict appears no longer merely possible but actually inevitable, as the Other is certain to resist its violent inclusion into the homeland of liberal humanity. Yet, having disposed of genuine political pluralism, liberalism finds itself lacking in any instruments to protect its universal homeland other than the absolute existential negation of the Other that parallels the conceptual negation of alterity in liberal monism. Thus, the universalisation of the liberal disposition to embrace the entire humanity actualises the most extreme possibility either by exposing the Self to the resentful violence of the Other or by annihilating the Other to eliminate the former existential threat. It is here that enmity, foreclosed in the symbolic register of liberalism with its monistic universalism, returns with a vengeance, since the sole consequence of the deployment of the concept of humanity as the referent of the liberal political project is the inevitable designation of the adversaries of this project in terms of the negation of humanity as, in a strict sense, inhuman beings:

When a state fights its political enemy in the name of humanity, it is not a war for the sake of humanity, but a war wherein a particular state seeks to usurp a universal concept against its military opponent. At the expense of its opponent, it tries to identify itself with humanity in the same way as one can misuse peace, justice, progress and civilisation in order to claim these as one? own and to deny the same to the enemy.

**Aff leads to private fill-in- turns the case**

**Loader and Walker 07** <Ian and Neil, professor of criminology and Director of the center for Criminology at Oxford Professor of European Law European University Institute Florence , *Civilizing Security*, pg 22-25)

**Today it cannot be assumed that the state remains pre-eminent in either authorizing or delivering** policing and **security**. **Other non-state actors now lay claim to authority and competence in this field**. In defence of the contention that what Johnston and Shearing (2003) call the ‘governance of security’ is conducted by a multiplicity of institutions, one can point to the following: • **Private security has become big business across the world.** In Britain, the USA, Canada, South Africa and beyond it has long been acknowledged that those employed by commercial security outfits outstrip the total number of public police officers. Private security operatives are hired by corporations, national and local governments, and private citizens to guard office complexes, airports, universities, housing estates, schools, hospitals, shopping centres, civic buildings, courts, even police stations. People’s access to, and conduct within, large tracts of urban space is regulated by private security guards, employed by commercial companies, enforcing property rather than criminal law. Such guards also, in some settings, engage in ‘front-line’ law enforcement and order maintenance policework (Rigakos 2002). 1 Anxious citizens, in turn, rely on the security market for an array of protective hardware (alarms, gates, locks, CCTV systems), as well as resorting to forms of self-policing — often encouraged by insurance companies and neo-liberal governments. Some have formed ‘private residential associations’ or sought security inside ‘gated communities’, withdrawing their demand and support for public provision (including policing provision) in the process. In response, the public police increasingly act as market players, contracting-out non-core ‘business’, eliciting corporate sponsorship, and marketing or even selling their services to a public disaggregated into individual ‘customers’. • **All this is happening in societies with strong, established states**. In those with weak or failing states, or undergoing political transition, the public police are not the only or main security actor, nor can they lay claim to a monopoly over legitimate force inside their territory. **Across many parts of the globe today** — in Italy, Colombia, Brazil, Northern Ireland, Russia, Afghanistan, the impacted ghettos of US and European cities **one finds alternative power centres contesting state authority, ‘shadow sovereigns’** (Nordstrom 2000) operating their own codes of behaviour and mechanisms of enforcement (Gambetta 1993; Varese 2001). In these contexts, those who can afford to have, once more, fled behind walls, venturing from their residential enclosures only to make passage to other protected work and leisure domains. **The dispossessed by contrast are left at the mercy not only of militarized, partisan police forces, but also criminal gangs, hired ‘rent-a-cops’ and urban vigilantes.** Alternatively, in some isolated pockets parts of South Africa and Argentina for instance — poor communities are striving to put in place non-violent, local capacity-building forms of non-state security governance. • Nor are these developments confined within the borders of modern states. ‘**Security’ has also become a multinational business, one that crosses territorial boundaries and further erodes the internal/external security distinction.** Several private security enterprises now trade their wares across the globe (Johnston 2006). They sell security advice, equipment and personnel to anxious citizens and warring factions in weak and failed states. They claim to be filling the ‘security gaps’ left by the fall of communist rule in the former Soviet Union and eastern Europe. And they offer to serve and protect the interests of multinationals operating in disordered, crime-ridden locations. To this, one can add the ‘privatization of violence’ occurring in many conflict and post-conflict zones around the world, as ‘private military firms’ such as MPRI and Dyncorp — dubbed by Peter Singer (2003) ‘corporate warriors’ — promote and sell military ‘know-how’, equipment and intervention to beleaguered governments and other armed groups (Avant 2005). It is a telling symbol of these trends that one of the fastest-growing industries in post- invasion Iraq is private security. **These examples** too we will flesh out in more detail below. What they serve for the moment to **illustrate** is **the existence of a pluralized — market-driven — environment where the state exists alongside, sponsors and competes against a plethora of non-state actors in a bid to promise security to citizens**. It is a field where the state is not only less and less involved in delivering policing and security on the ground — what Osborne and Gaebler (1992) call ‘rowing’ — but also often lacks the effective regulatory capacity to ‘steer’. It is a field constituted by new sites of rule and authority beyond the state, one where market power or communal ordering escapes from the forms of public will- formation that only the democratic state can supply. **Against this backdrop, the project of civilizing security is faced not only** (or even mainly) **with the task of controlling the arbitrary, discriminatory exercise of sovereign force, or with the excesses of state power. It is confronted, rather more, with a notable absence of political institutions with the capacity and legitimacy required to prevent those with ‘the loudest voices and the largest pockets’** (Johnston and Shearing 2003: 144) **from organizing their own ‘security’ in ways that impose unjustifiable burdens of insecurity upon others**. Or, to put the same point more widely: **These days, the main obstacle to social justice is not the invasive intentions or proclivities of the state, but its growing impotence,** aided and abetted daily by the officially adopted ‘there is no alternative’ creed. I suppose that **the danger we will have to fight back in the coming century won’t be totalitarian coercion, the main preoccupation of the century just ended, but the falling apart of ‘totalities’ capable of securing the autonomy of human society.** (Bauman and Tester 2001: 139)

### Solvency

#### Their evidence says the discourse surrounding intervention is bad- the plan doesn’t solve that. Even if they change discourse in the debate space, no ev says that will spillover, which makes their impacts are inevitable

#### Congress cant check the president- empirics prove

Pearlstein 13

(Deborah, Professor of Public and International Affairs at Princeton,¶ 3/26/13 http://www.slate.com/articles/news\_and\_politics/jurisprudence/2013/03/congress\_shouldn\_t\_give\_president\_obama\_ne¶ w\_power \_to\_fight\_terrorists.html)

If Congress legislates, it can establish limits on the scope of the president’s authority by setting the rules for him to exercise¶ it. The search for meaningful constraints on power is indeed the central challenge of our constitutional system. But¶ Congress has an abysmal track record of successfully reining in presidential uses of force overseas. And there is little cause¶ for hope it will succeed here. Consider the recent history. Congress decided in the days after 9/11 to authorize the use of¶ force against a limited set of targets responsible for the attacks of 9/11, and two presidents have now used that authority¶ to its fullest. But such broad congressional authority has not stopped President Obama, just like his predecessors, from¶ asserting that he retains inherent authority to use force in self‐defense under Article II of the Constitution, above and¶ beyond what Congress authorizes. Congress can authorize whatever new wars it wishes; the president can still use force¶ against imminent threats without it.

#### Obama will ignore limitations – Libya proves

Crabtree 11

(SUSAN CRABTREE, White House correspondent at The Washington Times. She was the senior editor of The Hill, “Clinton To Congress: Obama Would Ignore Your War Resolutions” MARCH 30, 2011, <http://tpmdc.talkingpointsmemo.com/2011/03/clinton-tells-house-obama-would-ignore-war-resolutions.php>, KB)

Rep. Brad Sherman (D-CA), who asked Clinton about the War Powers Act during a classified briefing, said Clinton and the administration are sidestepping the measure’s provisions giving Congress the ability to put a 60-day time limit on any military action.¶ “They are not committed to following the important part of the War Powers Act,” he told TPM in a phone interview. “She said they are certainly willing to send reports [to us] and if they issue a press release, they’ll send that to us too.”¶ The White House would forge ahead with military action in Libya even if Congress passed a resolution constraining the mission, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said during a classified briefing to House members Wednesday afternoon.¶ Clinton was responding to a question from Rep. Brad Sherman (D-CA) about the administration’s response to any effort by Congress to exercise its war powers, according to a senior Republican lawmaker who attended the briefing. ¶ The answer surprised many in the room because Clinton plainly admitted the administration would ignore any and all attempts by Congress to shackle President Obama’s power as commander in chief to make military and wartime decisions. In doing so, he would follow a long line of Presidents who have ignored the act since its passage, deeming it an unconstitutional encroachment on executive power.

**No solvency- the president will construe limits as affirmations of authority- WPR proves**

**Brecher ‘13**

[Aaron, J.D. Candidate, May 2013, University of Michigan Law School. Cyberattacks and the Covert Action Statute: ¶ Toward a Domestic Legal Framework for ¶ Offensive Cyberoperations. ETB]

But that objection ignores a long history of executive responses to ¶ statutes that seek to define presidential power. **The executive branch has a** ¶ **long-standing tradition of construing statutory definitions and limitations on** ¶ **presidential power as affirmations of authority**.136 Perverse though that logic ¶ may seem, it maps well onto the widely acknowledged constitutional ¶ significance that executive practice has when analyzing separation of powers ¶ questions.137 **One salient example is the** **W**ar **P**owers **R**esolution, **whose** ¶ **limitations have already been read so as not to apply to a wide range of** ¶ **activities**.138 **The executive** branch **has interpreted the resolution**, passed in ¶ the flurry of efforts to control executive power after Watergate and Vietnam, ¶ **as a confirmation of the president’s power to use the military in hostilities** ¶ **without specific statutory authorization**.139 **Reading the limits imposed by** ¶ the covert action **statute as an affirmation, if not a grant of power**, provided ¶ that the proper procedures are followed, **would not be a dissimilar exercise**. ¶ Moreover, because the broad language used to define covert action seems to invite such a construction, it is not nearly as objectionable as a strained ¶ interpretation of the War Powers Resolution that twists the term “hostilities” ¶ almost beyond recognition.

# 2NC

## Solvency

### AT Plan Text Solves

#### Thus the plan: the United States federal government should statutorily refuse the war powers authority of the President of the United States to engage in peacekeeping operations.

Means not T – outside of your jursidcation to vote – tanks neg ground - don’t get pres powers disads and core solvency args

#### Lack of public support checks their impacts and is a more important factor in determining intervention than congressional action

Silverleib 12

Alan Silverleib, ’12 (“Senator pushes clearer limits on presidential war powers,” CNN Congressional Producer,¶ May 23, 2012 http://www.cnn.com/2012/05/23/politics/webb‐war‐powers, acsd 5‐19‐13)

As Congress debates the size and scope of defense budgets in a looming age of austerity, one senator¶ is seeking to resolve a much older question about the president's ability to exercise military power without the consent of¶ the House and Senate. Sen. Jim Webb, D‐Virginia, has introduced legislation requiring explicit congressional¶ approval of future U.S. humanitarian or peacekeeping operations involving the military and likely hostilities. The¶ measure would not apply to instances where there's an imminent threat to the United States, U.S. allies or American¶ citizens. Under the terms of the bill, co‐sponsored by Sen. Mike Lee, R‐Utah, both chambers of Congress would be¶ required to vote within 48 hours of a presidential authorization request. "The question is simple," Webb said last¶ week. "When should the president have the unilateral authority to decide to use military force, and what is the¶ place of the Congress in that process? Year by year, skirmish by skirmish, the role of the Congress in determining where the U.S.¶ military would operate, and when the awesome power of our weapon systems would be unleashed, has diminished." Webb, a former¶ Navy secretary and assistant defense secretary, was strongly critical of President Barack Obama's decision to intervene militarily in Libya¶ in 2011 without congressional authorization. He has also expressed concern about the possibility of American intervention in the Syrian¶ crisis. Last summer, a sharply divided Congress was unable to pass any legislation explicitly endorsing or rejecting America's involvement¶ in NATO's Libyan intervention. The matter was never voted on by the full Senate. Deep congressional divisions over the mission stemmed¶ in part from a belief among some representatives and senators on both sides of the aisle that Obama violated the War Powers¶ Resolution. Passed in 1973, the law gives a president 60 days to get congressional approval for sending U.S. forces to war, followed by a¶ 30‐day extension to end hostilities. While the combined 90‐day period ended before hostilities concluded, White House officials insisted¶ the mission ‐‐ backed by the United Nations ‐‐ did not violate the War Powers Act because it failed to meet the law's definition of combat.¶ Previous administrations also resisted the law's restrictions. "The (Obama) administration, which spent well over a billion dollars of¶ taxpayer funds, dropped thousands of bombs on the country, and operated our military offshore for months, claimed that 'combat' was¶ not occurring, and rejected the notion that the War Powers Act applied to the situation," Webb recently said on the Senate floor. "I am¶ not here to debate the War Powers Act. (But) I am suggesting that other statutory language that covers these kinds of situations must be¶ enacted." Webb's proposal notwithstanding, a number of political analysts question the ultimate willingness of¶ Congress to oppose any U.S. military action ‐‐ particularly in the post‐9/11 era. "These attempts by Congress to¶ restrict the president's authority as commander‐in‐chief are almost always symbolic, because presidents rarely¶ enter conflicts without some expectation of public support," said Brown University political scientist Wendy¶ Schiller. CNN polling showed a slight majority of Americans in favor of the Libyan intervention in the spring of 2011, though¶ public sentiment quickly turned against the conflict.

#### Presidents will ignore limitations – forcing them to drawdown is politically impossible

McMahon 11

(Robert McMahon, Editor for CFR, “Balance of War Powers: The U.S. President and Congress” June 20, 2011, <http://www.cfr.org/united-states/balance-war-powers-us-president-congress/p13092>, KB)

In the case of the U.S. intervention in Libya, if the conflict persists, Congress must authorize funding. But despite this leverage, a number of experts note the factors favoring the executive branch. CFR's Matthew Waxman says Congress could legislatively force Obama to stop the operations through cessation of funding or passing a law to prohibit the military intervention, though "this is very hard to pull off politically." CFR's Lindsay notes the tough calculus involved in Congress challenging a president's ability to act militarily. Lindsay writes in his blog, The Water's Edge: "Congress can stop the president only by passing a law that commands him to do so. But that law is subject to a presidential veto. As long as a president can get thirty-four senators to back him, and almost every president can, he carries the day even if the other 501 members of Congress are opposed." Presidents can also use their bully pulpit to maintain support for a military mission.

## CP

### Evaluate CP

#### Debating over the specific merits of policies using empirical evidence is necessary to solve propagandist takeover and serial policy failure. Evaluating opportunity costs is key.

Anderson 3 – Lisa Anderson, Dean of the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia, former President of the Middle East Studies Association, November 2003, online: http://www.campus-watch.org/article/id/871

n creating constituents for the war on Iraq; the cavalier willingness to lock up terror suspects for months or years without any verifiable evidence of wrongdoing; to the deliberate efforts to create popular perceptions of links between Saddam Husayn and al-Qa'ida, we have been living in an era in which evidence plays little or no part in policymaking. Robert Reischauer reflected earlier this year on the importance of evidence in policy in a very different arena--domestic social programs--but his observations are worth pondering for a moment: Public policy in the United States in recent years has increasingly been conceived, debated, and evaluated through the lenses of politics and ideology--policies are Democratic or Republican, liberal or conservative, free market or government controlled. Discussion surrounding even much-vaunted bipartisan initiatives focuses on the politics of the compromise instead of the substance or impact of the policy. The fundamental question--will the policy work?--too often gets short shrift or is ignored altogether. As Reischauer points out, the evidence produced by scholarship and science does not create policy or guarantee its success--it merely frames the choices and identifies the costs of various alternatives--but in its absence, policies are, as he put it, "likely to fail because they may not be grounded in the economic, institutional and social reality of a problem....Politically acceptable doesn't necessarily mean effective, affordable, or otherwise viable."[[24]](http://fp.arizona.edu/mesassoc/Bulletin/Pres%20Addresses/Anderson.htm#_ftn24) Informing policy debates with the sort of evidence scholars bring to bear is an essential part of responsible policymaking in the modern world. We, as the community of scientists and scholars devoted to the production and deployment of evidence, a project we sometimes call the search for truth, must remain faithful to that purpose even, perhaps especially, when policymakers seem distracted or uninterested. We must also make that evidence accessible. This neither requires nor excludes scholars, or their students, serving on the government payroll or endorsing a particular policy position. On the contrary, particularly in a democracy, the fulfillment of what we call "national security needs" is as much about meeting an obligation to contribute to the education of citizens--voters and taxpayers--as it is assessing or adopting particular policy stances. This we can do in the private and not-for-profit sectors, in think tanks and advocacy organizations, in the media and private businesses, in classrooms and research journals--wherever our work informs open and vigorous debates about the merits of policy perspectives and proposals–as well, of course, as in government. To be responsible citizens, deploying our expertise effectively, we need not agree with a policy--or even with each other. Some of us may testify before Congress or write op-ed pieces in the newspapers or appear on television as "experts." Others will organize campus debates, seminars and demonstrations. Still others will simply equip their students with knowledge and insight enough to be better citizens of their county and the world, more knowledgeable, more critical, armed with better evidence and more refined analytical skills. To sustain the remarkable–and remarkably important–position we hold in society, as both scholars and citizens, we have two obligations. We must do what we do--proudly, confidently, and energetically. We must be constantly, restlessly open to new ideas, searching for new evidence, critical of received wisdom, old orthodoxies, and ancient bigotries, always creating and criticizing ourselves, each other and our world. This is the life of scholarship and we must embrace it for what it is and do it well. We must train our successors in this discipline and educate the broader public about the value of evidence and the various ways to critically assess it. This is how we contribute to the public good, directly and indirectly. At the same time, we must be absolutely uncompromising in upholding the rights that permit us to fulfill that first responsibility: the rights to freedom of information, expression and association, in the United States and around the world, for ourselves and our colleagues. If MESA is to accomplish its purposes in this difficult time, we as an institution must devise ways to support and defend our members both individually and as a scholarly community. We must encourage and celebrate efforts to collect evidence and to refine how we assess it, and to bring those efforts to bear in the classroom and in vigorous public debates about the policies of governments throughout the region as well as here at home. We cannot be idle when polltakers are roughed up or jailed because their findings are politically unpalatable, when students are told to report on faculty whose partisan commitments may be politically unpopular, when research is discredited not on its merits but by the sources of its funding, whether in Iran or Saudi Arabia or Egypt or the United States.

### Process Debates Good

#### Process debates are good- key to democratic engagement

Katyal 7/11/13

[Neal, <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/20130711AUMF_NATCON_transcript.pdf> ETB]

Well, let me start by just distinguishing between process ¶ and substance points. So, you know, I think that the ¶ administration, according to the news reports and other ¶ interest groups and the like, have been so afraid of ¶ reopening the AUMF discussion because they’re afraid that ¶ we might authorize longer detention or more surveillance or ¶ this and that. And, you know, I think we can have a debate ¶ about that and about kinetic, you know, technology and warmaking efforts and the like, but, you know, regardless of ¶ how that debate comes out, that’s a debate we should have. I mean, that’s the fundamental point here. I mean, we can ¶ talk about whether or not it makes sense to have a fasttrack authorization for particular organizations kind of ¶ modeled like the State Department’s Foreign Terrorist ¶ Organization that Senator Corker mentioned and the details. ¶ My guess is actually, you know, that if Congress were to ¶ engage in this debate, we wouldn’t substantively, probably,¶ wind up as far as some of the comments might have ¶ suggested. I think most surveillance technologies, most ¶ drone strikes would be authorized. They won’t necessarily ¶ be compelled, so the Presidents wouldn’t have to use them, ¶ but they could be in the toolkit. But let’s have that ¶ debate, and let’s have it authorized by Congress ¶ specifically so that, as the Senator says, there’s ¶ ownership over it. That’s the way our democracy is ¶ supposed to function.

### Avoids Solvency Takeouts

#### The risk of public alienation checks the executive

Buchanan, ’13

(Bruce, Professor in Government at the University of Texas at Austin, Presidential Power and Accountability: Toward a Presidential Accountability System, Routledge, p. 118, RSR)

Unlike formal trials (whether legal trials, impeachment trials, or the proposed policy trials) where rules of order and procedure specify what is in and out of bounds, a campaign of any sort is as noisy and as emotionally manipulative as participants feel the need to be, constrained only by the risk of alienating the public, in what is likely to be an intense effort to prevail. The serious prospect of such an unfettered campaign might itself discourage presidents without real conviction that a prospective war both serves the national interest and can be won (President Lyndon Johnson, for example, felt sure of the former but not of the latter).

#### Involvement of Congress and constituents solves oversight – provides an effective check on presidential power.

Buchanan, ‘9 (Bruce, Professor in Government at the University of Texas at Austin, “Checks, Balances and Beyond The Presidential Accountability “System””, Annual Meeting of the American Political Science

Association, RSR)

Wars of choice are military conflicts initiated by presidents without rigorous¶ congressional vetting against nations that had not attacked the United States. While other¶ presidential assertions of extra-constitutional power have won plaudits in history wars of¶ choice have yet to do so. The three most recent and most important of the optional¶ presidential wars—Korea, Vietnam and Iraq--have seemed ill-advised to many analysts. In¶ each case Congress deferred to emotionally charged presidential insistence on the need to start these wars. And in each case Congress offered no serious resistance until stirred to do¶ so by shifts in public opinion brought on by mounting costs in American blood and treasure.¶ Public opinion was a force to be reckoned with, as shown by its eventual pressuring of¶ Congress to end the wars and on the subsequent political fortunes of presidents Truman,¶ Johnson and the second Bush. Each president was held to account for a war widely¶ perceived to have failed. But citizens did not force Congress to act until it was too late to¶ influence the initial decisions to send in the troops. This process has recurred despite¶ Congress’ possession of greater power, on paper at least, than the president. The result is¶ that wars of choice have become a tradition that leaves presidents without supervision at a¶ critical stage. That suggests the need to expand the application of accountability to include¶ prospective as well as standard retrospective applications. A self-aware, flexible, and, when¶ necessary, interactive PAS able to bring Congress and the people together before rather than¶ after the fact would be better positioned to address this problem (Buchanan, 2008).

### AT Epist

**Problem-solution impact is backwards---acting with a flawed epistemology allows us to change that epistemology.**

**Harris 7** (Graham, Adjunct Prf. @ Centre for Environment University of Tasmania, Seeking Sustainability in an age of complexity p. 9-10)

1 am not going to address the global 'litany' at length here. The arguments have been well made by others, especially and most elegantly by E. O. Wilson. What 1 wish to address here is the question: 'Can we grasp the complexity of it all and, if so, what do we do about it?' Given the fundamental nature of the problem the destruction of the biosphere and its ecosystem ser- vices together with the huge changes going on in human societies and cultures driven by globalisation and technological change the precautionary principle would suggest that even if the epistemology is flawed, the data are partial and the evidence is shaky, we should pay attention to the little we know and do whatever is possible to mitigate the situation even if we fundamentally disagree about the means and the ends. The only ethical course of action is, as John Ral- ston Saul writes," based on 'a sense of the other and of inclusive responsibility'. We know enough to act. Ethics is about uncertainty, doubt, system thinking and balancing difficult choices. It is about confronting the evidence**.** Over the past two or three decades, as there has been an increasing appre- ciation of the importance of good environmental management, and as western societies have become more open and the ICT revolution has made informa- tion much more widely available there has been a growing debate between the worlds of science, industry, government and the community around environ- mental ethics and environmental issues and their management. During this period new knowledge has been gained, ideas have changed (sometimes quite fundamentally) and there have been huge changes in government and social institutions and policies. We are all on a recursive journey together: we are lit- erally 'making it up as we go along'. This is not easy and there are no optimal solutions. This is an adaptive process requiring feedback from all parts of the system. Yes, there will be surprises. This is why it is so important that when we act we constantly reflect on what we know and what we are doing about it and where it is all going. As we reach the physical limits of the global biosphere the values we place on things are changing and must change further. A new environmental ethic is required, one that is less instrumental and more embracing. Traditionally there has tended to be a schism between those who take an anthropocentric view (that the world is there for us to use) and those who take the non-anthropocentric view (those who value nature in its own right). Orthodox anthropocentrisni dictates that non-human value is instrumental to human needs and interests. In contrast, non-anthropocentrics take an objectivist view and value nature intrinsically; some may consider the source of value in non-human nature to be independent of human consciousness.45 What is required is a more complex and systems view of ethics which finds a middle ground between the instrumentalist and objectivist views. Norton '46 for example, proposes an alternative and more complex theory of value - a universal Earth ethic - which values processes and dynamics as well as entities and takes an adaptive management view of changing system properties. For sustainable development to occur, choices about values will remain within the human sphere but we should no longer regard human preferences as the only criterion of moral significance. 'Humans and the planet have entwined destinies"' and this will be increasingly true in many and complex ways as we move forward. There are calls for an Earth ethic beyond the land ethic of Aldo Leopold.45 The science of ecology is being drawn into the web .49 Ecologists are becoming more socially and culturally aware and engaged" and the 'very doing' of ecology is becoming more ethical.tm' Some scientists are beginning to see themselves more as agents in relationships with society and less as observers.

**Paradigm wars are useless – combining epistemologies is key to intellectual and political progress. Only the perm solves.**

David A. **Lake. 2011**. Jerri-Ann and Gary E. Jacobs Professor of Social Sciences and Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego. Why “isms” are Evil: Theory, Epistemology, and Academic Sects as Impediments to Understanding and Progress. International Studies Quarterly 55, 465-480.

As I began, our task as scholars is to understand better the world in which we live. Our privileged position as scholars in society rests upon this goal, or at least its pursuit. **We do not produce understanding by ﬁghting theological wars between ourselves at either the theoretical or epistemological levels.** Rather, **we achieve understanding by asking questions about important phenomena that we do not now understand well, employing appropriate theories to answer these questions, and then being honest with ourselves and others about the strengths and weaknesses of the evidence we have been able to bring to bear**. Today, **no single theoretical or epistemological approach deserves hegemony. Diversity of theory and method is necessary, at least at this stage of our intellectual development**. Intellectual monocultures are rightfully feared. But the current cacophony is not what we should aspire to. **Rather than useful debate we have turned inward to self-contained research traditions and epistemologies** and, in turn, we focus on ﬁrst principles. **Intellectual progress does not come from proclaiming ever more loudly the superiority of one’s approach to audiences who have stopped listening. Let’s end the theological crusades and seek progress in understanding real problems of world politics**. Perhaps then we will earn the privileges society has accorded us.

## Politics

### AT Neocleus

**Threats are not socially constructed- decision makers use the most objective, rational, and accurate assessments possible- there are no bureaucratic or ideological motivations to invent threats.**

**Ravenal ‘9**

[Earl C. Ravenal, distinguished senior fellow in foreign policy studies @ Cato, is professor emeritus of the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service. He is an expert on NATO, defense strategy, and the defense budget. He is the author of *Designing Defense for a New World Order.* What's Empire Got to Do with It? The Derivation of America's Foreign Policy.” *Critical Review: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Politics and Society* 21.1 (2009) 21-75]

Quite expectedly, the more doctrinaire of the non-interventionists take pains to deny any straightforward, and therefore legitimate, security motive in American foreign and military policy. In fact, this denial leads to a more sweeping rejection of any recognizably rational basis for American foreign policy, and, even, sometimes (among the more theoretical of the non-interventionists), a preference for non-rational accounts, or “models,” of virtually any nation’s foreign policy-making.4 One could call this tendency among anti-imperialists “motive displacement.” More specifically, in the cases under review here, one notes a receptivity to any reworking of history, and any current analysis of geopolitics, that denigrates “the threat”; and, along with this, a positing of “imperialism” (the almost self-referential and primitive impulse) as a sufficient explanation for the often strenuous and risky actions of great powers such as the United States. Thus, not only is “empire” taken to be a sufficient and, in some cases, a necessary condition in bringing about foreign “threats”; but, by minimizing the extent and seriousness of these threats, the anti-imperialists put themselves into the position of lacking a rational explanation for the derivation of the (pointless at best, counter-productive at worst) policies that they designate as imperialistic. A pungent example of this threat denigration and motive displacement is Eland’s account of American intervention in the Korean and Vietnam wars:

After North Korea invaded, the Truman administration intervened merely for the purpose of a demonstration to friends and foes alike. Likewise, according to eminent cold war historians, the United States did not inter- vene in Vietnam because it feared communism, which was fragmented, or the Soviet Union, which wanted détente with the West, or China, which was weak, but because it did not want to appear timid to the world. The behavior of the United States in both Korea and Vietnam is typical of imperial powers, which are always concerned about their reputation, pres- tige, and perceived resolve. (Eland 2004, 64)

Of course, the motive of “reputation,” to the extent that it exists in any particular instance, is a part of the complex of motives that characterize a great power that is drawn toward the role of hegemon (not the same thing as “empire”). Reputation is also a component of the power projec- tion that is designed to serve the interest of national security. Rummaging through the concomitants of “imperialism,” Eland (2004, 65) discovers the thesis of “threat inflation” (in this case, virtual threat invention): Obviously, much higher spending for the military, homeland security, and foreign aid are required for a policy of global intervention than for a policy of merely defending the republic. For example, after the cold war, the security bureaucracies began looking for new enemies to justify keeping defense and intelligence budgets high. Similarly, Eland (ibid., 183), in a section entitled “Imperial Wars Spike Corporate Welfare,” attributes a large portion of the U.S. defense budget—particularly the procurement of major weapons systems, such as “Virginia-class submarines . . . aircraft carriers . . . F-22 fighters . . . [and] Osprey tilt-rotor transport aircraft”—not to the systemically derived requirement for certain kinds of military capabilities, but, rather, to the imperatives of corporate pork. He opines that such weapons have no stra- tegic or operational justification; that “the American empire, militarily more dominant than any empire in world history, can fight brushfire wars against terrorists and their ‘rogue’ state sponsors without those gold- plated white elephants.”

The underlying notion of “the security bureaucracies . . . looking for new enemies” is a threadbare concept that has somehow taken hold across the political spectrum, from the radical left (viz. Michael Klare [1981], who refers to a “threat bank”), to the liberal center (viz. Robert H. Johnson [1997], who dismisses most alleged “threats” as “improbable dangers”), to libertarians (viz. Ted Galen Carpenter [1992], Vice President for Foreign and Defense Policy of the Cato Institute, who wrote a book entitled A Search for Enemies). What is missing from most analysts’ claims of “threat inflation,” however, is a convincing theory of why, say, the American government significantly (not merely in excusable rhetoric) might magnify and even invent threats (and, more seriously, act on such inflated threat estimates). In a few places, Eland (2004, 185) suggests that such behavior might stem from military or national security bureaucrats’ attempts to enhance their personal status and organizational budgets, or even from the influence and dominance of “the military-industrial complex”; viz.: “Maintaining the empire and retaliating for the blowback from that empire keeps what President Eisenhower called the military-industrial complex fat and happy.” Or, in the same section:

In the nation’s capital, vested interests, such as the law enforcement bureaucracies . . . routinely take advantage of “crises”to satisfy parochial desires. Similarly, many corporations use crises to get pet projects— a.k.a. pork—funded by the government. And national security crises, because of people’s fears, are especially ripe opportunities to grab largesse. (Ibid., 182)

Thus, “bureaucratic-politics” theory, which once made several reputa- tions (such as those of Richard Neustadt, Morton Halperin, and Graham Allison) in defense-intellectual circles, and spawned an entire sub-industry within the field of international relations,5 is put into the service of dismissing putative security threats as imaginary. So, too, can a surprisingly cognate theory, “public choice,”6 which can be considered the right-wing analog of the “bureaucratic-politics” model, and is a preferred interpretation of governmental decision- making among libertarian observers. As Eland (2004, 203) summarizes:

Public-choice theory argues [that] the government itself can develop sepa- rate interests from its citizens. The government reflects the interests of powerful pressure groups and the interests of the bureaucracies and the bureaucrats in them. Although this problem occurs in both foreign and domestic policy, it may be more severe in foreign policy because citizens pay less attention to policies that affect them less directly.

There is, in this statement of public-choice theory, a certain ambiguity, and a certain degree of contradiction: Bureaucrats are supposedly, at the same time, subservient to societal interest groups and autonomous from society in general.

This journal has pioneered the argument that state autonomy is a likely consequence of the public’s ignorance of most areas of state activity (e.g., Somin 1998; DeCanio 2000a, 2000b, 2006, 2007; Ravenal 2000a). But state autonomy does not necessarily mean that bureaucrats substitute their own interests for those of what could be called the “national society” that they ostensibly serve. I have argued (Ravenal 2000a) that, precisely because of the public-ignorance and elite-expertise factors, and especially because the opportunities—at least for bureaucrats (a few notable post-government lobbyist cases nonwithstanding)—for lucrative self-dealing are stringently fewer in the defense and diplomatic areas of government than they are in some of the contract-dispensing and more under-the-radar-screen agencies of government, the “public-choice” imputation of self-dealing, rather than working toward the national interest (which, however may not be synonymous with the interests, perceived or expressed, of citizens!) is less likely to hold. In short, state autonomy is likely to mean, in the derivation of foreign policy, that “state elites” are using rational judgment, in insulation from self-promoting interest groups—about what strategies, forces, and weapons are required for national defense.

Ironically, “public choice”—not even a species of economics, but rather a kind of political interpretation—is not even about “public” choice, since, like the bureaucratic-politics model, it repudiates the very notion that bureaucrats make truly “public” choices; rather, they are held, axiomatically, to exhibit “rent-seeking” behavior, wherein they abuse their public positions in order to amass private gains, or at least to build personal empires within their ostensibly official niches. Such sub- rational models actually explain very little of what they purport to observe. Of course, there is some truth in them, regarding the “behavior” of some people, at some times, in some circumstances, under some conditions of incentive and motivation. But the factors that they posit operate mostly as constraints on the otherwise rational optimization of objectives that, if for no other reason than the playing out of official roles, transcends merely personal or parochial imperatives.

My treatment of “role” differs from that of the bureaucratic-politics theorists, whose model of the derivation of foreign policy depends heavily, and acknowledgedly, on a narrow and specific identification of the role- playing of organizationally situated individuals in a partly conflictual “pulling and hauling” process that “results in” some policy outcome. Even here, bureaucratic-politics theorists Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow (1999, 311) allow that “some players are not able to articulate [sic] the governmental politics game because their conception of their job does not legitimate such activity.” This is a crucial admission, and one that points— empirically—to the need for a broader and generic treatment of role.

Roles (all theorists state) give rise to “expectations” of performance. My point is that virtually every governmental role, and especially national-security roles, and particularly the roles of the uniformed mili- tary, embody expectations of devotion to the “national interest”; rational- ity in the derivation of policy at every functional level; and objectivity in the treatment of parameters, especially external parameters such as “threats” and the power and capabilities of other nations.

Sub-rational models (such as “public choice”) fail to take into account even a partial dedication to the “national” interest (or even the possibility that the national interest may be honestly misconceived in more paro- chial terms). In contrast, an official’s role connects the individual to the (state-level) process, and moderates the (perhaps otherwise) self-seeking impulses of the individual. Role-derived behavior tends to be formalized and codified; relatively transparent and at least peer-reviewed, so as to be consistent with expectations; surviving the particular individual and trans- mitted to successors and ancillaries; measured against a standard and thus corrigible; defined in terms of the performed function and therefore derived from the state function; and uncorrrupt, because personal cheating and even egregious aggrandizement are conspicuously discouraged.

My own direct observation suggests that defense decision-makers attempt to “frame” the structure of the problems that they try to solve on the basis of the most accurate intelligence. They make it their business to know where the threats come from. Thus, threats are not “socially constructed” (even though, of course, some values are).

A major reason for the rationality, and the objectivity, of the process is that much security planning is done, not in vaguely undefined circum- stances that offer scope for idiosyncratic, subjective behavior, but rather in structured and reviewed organizational frameworks. Non-rationalities (which are bad for understanding and prediction) tend to get filtered out. People are fired for presenting skewed analysis and for making bad predictions. This is because something important is riding on the causal analysis and the contingent prediction. For these reasons, “public choice” does not have the “feel” of reality to many critics who have participated in the structure of defense decision-making. In that structure, obvious, and even not-so-obvious, “rent-seeking” would not only be shameful; it would present a severe risk of career termination. And, as mentioned, the defense bureaucracy is hardly a productive place for truly talented rent-seekers to operate, compared to opportunities for personal profit in the commercial world. A bureaucrat’s very self-placement in these reaches of government testi- fies either to a sincere commitment to the national interest or to a lack of sufficient imagination to exploit opportunities for personal profit.

**Threat construction is accurate – instead of rejecting securitization we should employ it to increase education and the effectiveness of policy responses**

Olav. F. **Knudsen**, Prof at Södertörn University College, **2001**

[Security Dialogue 32.3, ―Post-Copenhagen Security Studies: Desecuritizing Securitization,‖ p. 360]

Moreover, I have a problem with the underlying implication that it is unimportant whether states ‗really‘ face dangers from other states or groups. In the Copenhagen school, **threats are seen as coming mainly from the actors‘ own fears, or from what happens when the fears of individuals turn into paranoid political action**. In my view, **this emphasis on the subjective is a misleading conception of threat, in that it discounts an independent existence for what- ever is perceived as a threat**. Granted, **political life is often marked by misperceptions**, mistakes, pure imaginations, ghosts, or mirages, **but such phenomena do not occur simultaneously to large numbers of politicians,** and hardly most of the time. During the Cold War, threats – in the sense of plausible possibilities of danger – referred to ‗real‘ phenomena, and they refer to ‗real‘ phenomena now. The objects referred to are often not the same, but that is a different matter. **Threats have to be dealt with both in terms of perceptions and in terms of the phenomena which are perceived to be threatening.** The point of Weaver‘s concept of security is not the potential existence of danger somewhere but the use of the word itself by political elites. In his 1997 PhD dissertation, he writes, ‗One can view ―security‖ as that which is in language theory called a speech act: it is not interesting as a sign referring to something more real – it is the utterance itself that is the act.‘ **The deliberate disregard of objective factors is** even more explicitly **stated** **in** Buzan & **Weaver**‘s joint **article** of the same year. As a consequence, **the phenomenon of threat is reduced to a matter of pure domestic politic**s. It seems to me that the security dilemma, as a central notion in security studies, then loses its foundation. Yet I see that Weaver himself has no compunction about referring to the security dilemma in a recent article. **This discounting of the objective aspect of threats shifts security studies to insignificant concerns. What has long made ‗threats‘ and ‗threat perceptions‘ important phenomena in the study of IR is the implication that urgent action may be required.** Urgency, of course, is where Weaver first began his argument in favor of an alternative security conception, because a convincing sense of urgency has been the chief culprit behind the abuse of ‗security‘ and the consequent ‗politics of panic‘, as Weaver aptly calls it. Now, here – **in the case of urgency – another baby is thrown out with the Weaverian bathwater.** When real situations of urgency arise, those situations are challenges to democracy; they are actually at the core of the problematic arising with the process of making security policy in parliamentary democracy. But in Weaver‘s world, threats are merely more or less persuasive, and the claim of urgency is just another argument. I hold that **instead of ‗abolishing‘ threatening phenomena ‗out there‘ by reconceptualizing them,** as Weaver does, **we should continue paying attention to them, because situations with a credible claim to urgency will keep coming back and then we need to know more about how they work in the interrelations of groups and states (such as civil wars, for instance), not least to find adequate democratic procedures for dealing with them**.

### AT Raise Inev

#### No agreement on debt deal – partisanship is too high

IHT 9/14/2013

(Jonathan Weisman, “U.S. lawmakers resume fiscal standoff,” International Herald Tribune, Lexis – Kurr)

In meetings with Democratic and Republican congressional leaders on Thursday after a session with Treasury Secretary Jacob J. Lew the previous day, Mr. Boehner sought a resumption of negotiations that could keep the government running and yield a deficit-reduction deal that would persuade recalcitrant conservatives to raise the government's borrowing limit.¶ Much of the federal government will shut down as of Oct. 1 unless Congress approves new spending bills to replace expiring ones, and by mid-October, the Treasury Department will lose the borrowing authority to finance the government and pay its debts.¶ ''It's time for the president's party to show the courage to work with us to solve this problem,'' said Mr. Boehner, who argued that budget deals have been part of past agreements to raise the debt limit.¶ But a bloc of 43 House Republicans undercut the speaker's deficit-reduction focus, introducing yearlong funding legislation that would increase spending for the Pentagon and veterans and delay President Barack Obama's health care law for a year - most likely adding to the budget deficit. That bloc is large enough to thwart any compromise that does not attract Democratic support.¶ ''Obamacare is the most dangerous piece of legislation ever passed in Congress,'' said Representative John Fleming, Republican of Louisiana. ''It is the most existential threat to our economy'' that the country has seen ''since the Great Depression, so I think a little bit of additional deficit is nothing,'' he added.¶ Just five scheduled legislative days stand between the House and a government shutdown that has loomed for months. As of now, Republican leaders appear to have no idea how to stop it. House members are preparing for the worst. A 14-page fact sheet on the impact of a government shutdown, originally written in 2011 by Representative Scott Rigell, Republican of Virginia, has gone back into circulation among House members.¶ Mr. Lew and congressional Democrats held firm that they would no longer negotiate on raising the debt ceiling, which they see as the duty of the party in power in the House. And they made it clear to the speaker that they would never accept Republican demands to repeal, defund or delay Mr. Obama's signature health care law. White House officials dismissed it as ''a nonstarter.''¶ ''I had to be very candid with him and I told him directly, all these things they're doing on Obamacare are just a waste of their time,'' said Senator Harry Reid, Democrat of Nevada and the Senate majority leader.¶ ''I like John Boehner,'' Mr. Reid added. ''I do feel sorry for him.''¶ Earlier this week, Representative Eric Cantor of Virginia, the No. 2 House Republican, proposed a two-step resolution to the fiscal impasse that was temporarily pushed into the background by Mr. Obama's request, since delayed, for approval to initiate a military strike on Syria.¶ Under Mr. Cantor's plan, the House would have voted this week on a stopgap spending bill to keep the government operating through mid-December at the current level, which reflects the sharp across-the-board cuts known as sequestration. That bill would have a companion resolution to withhold all money for the health care law, but the Senate could simply ignore that resolution and approve the short-term spending bill.¶ Then the House would vote to raise the debt ceiling enough for a year of borrowing but demand a year's delay in carrying out the health care law.¶ Within 24 hours, the House's most ardent conservatives revolted, declaring the defunding resolution a gimmick that fell well short of their drive to undo the health care law. House Democrats said they would oppose not only stripping the health care law of money but also a spending level that maintains sequestration.¶ ''The continued operation of the sequester is inimical to the interest of the United States, to the government, to the people and to international security,'' said Representative Steny H. Hoyer of Maryland, the Democratic whip, who promised to hold his members against the Cantor plan.¶ It was delayed indefinitely as House Republicans resumed their search for a measure that could unite them. One group of conservatives on Thursday pressed what they called a compromise: a one-year stopgap spending bill that would raise the debt ceiling for a year, delay all aspects of the health care law for a year, and give back some of the Pentagon cuts as a sweetener.¶ Backers insisted on Thursday that it was a package Mr. Obama should be able to accept. Democrats scoffed at the Republican plans, and even some Republican leadership aides questioned how any could get to the president's desk.

#### **Won’t pass- partisanship**

Ezra 8/28/13 (Klein, Washington Post, “I’m scared of the debt ceiling. You should be, too,” <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/08/28/im-scared-of-the-debt-ceiling-you-should-be-too/>)

But perhaps it isn’t. The central fact of the next debt-ceiling fight is that the two parties’ positions are mutually exclusive. Republicans say they will raise the debt ceiling only in return for significant budget concessions. The Obama administration says it won’t offer anything in return for raising the debt ceiling. There’s only one possible outcome given those two positions: **The debt ceiling won’t be raised.** Eventually, one or both of those positions will change. No one — including me — believes that the debt ceiling will remain right where it is, forever and ever, amen. That would mean a financial crisis of epic proportions.

But here’s what scares me: No one can tell me how one or both of those positions will change before we breach the ceiling [in mid-October](http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/us-faces-mid-october-deadline-to-raise-debt-limit/2013/08/26/e38c0ad8-0e87-11e3-8cdd-bcdc09410972_story.html). The White House swears they’re giving basically no thought to the issue. “Let me reiterate what our position is, and it is unequivocal,” said press secretary Jay Carney. “We will not negotiate with Republicans in Congress over Congress’ responsibility to pay the bills that Congress has racked up, period.” House Republicans are giving more thought to the debt limit, but mainly because they’re trying to get their members excited for a fight in order to persuade them to back off of threats to shut down the government. “I’ve made it clear that we’re not going to increase the debt limit without cuts and reforms that are greater than the increase in the debt limit,” House Speaker John Boehner said Monday[during a speech in Idaho](http://www.idahostatesman.com/2013/08/26/2726580/popkey-boehner-visits-boise-still.html). “The president doesn’t think this is fair, thinks I’m being difficult to deal with. But I’ll say this: It may be unfair, but what I’m trying to do here is to leverage the political process to produce more change than what it would produce if left to its own devices. We’re going to have a whale of a fight.”

### A/T: Predictions Constructed

#### Even if predictions in the abstract are wrong, policy debates is productive, improves predictive accuracy, and solves cession of the debate to cloistered experts

Tetlock and Gardner 2011 (Philip Tetlock is a professor of organizational behavior at the Haas Business School at the University of California-Berkeley, AND Dan Gardner is a columnist and senior writer for the Ottawa Citizen and the author of The Science of Fear, received numerous awards for his writing, including the Michener Award, M.A. History from York, "OVERCOMING OUR AVERSION TO ACKNOWLEDGING OUR IGNORANCE" July 11 www.cato-unbound.org/2011/07/11/dan-gardner-and-philip-tetlock/overcoming-our-aversion-to-acknowledging-our-ignorance/)

The optimists are right that there is much we can do at a cost that is quite modest relative to what is often at stake. For example, why not build on the IARPA tournament? Imagine a system for recording and judging forecasts. Imagine running tallies of forecasters’ accuracy rates. Imagine advocates on either side of a policy debate specifying in advance precisely what outcomes their desired approach is expected to produce, the evidence that will settle whether it has done so, and the conditions under which participants would agree to say “I was wrong.” Imagine pundits being held to account. Of course arbitration only works if the arbiter is universally respected and it would be an enormous challenge to create an analytical center whose judgments were not only fair, but perceived to be fair even by partisans dead sure they are right and the other guys are wrong. But think of the potential of such a system to improve the signal-to-noise ratio, to sharpen public debate, to shift attention from blowhards to experts worthy of an audience, and to improve public policy. At a minimum, it would highlight how often our forecasts and expectations fail, and if that were to deflate the bloated confidence of experts and leaders, and give pause to those preparing some “great leap forward,” it would be money well spent. But the pessimists are right, too, that fallibility, error, and tragedy are permanent conditions of our existence. Humility is in order, or, as Socrates said, the beginning of wisdom is the admission of ignorance. The Socratic message has always been a hard sell, and it still is—especially among practical people in business and politics, who expect every presentation to end with a single slide consisting of five bullet points labeled “The Solution.” We have no such slide, unfortunately. But in defense of Socrates, humility is the foundation of the fox style of thinking and much research suggests it is an essential component of good judgment in our uncertain world. It is practical. Over the long term, it yields better calibrated probability judgments, which should help you affix more realistic odds than your competitors on policy bets panning out.

#### Our impacts aren’t constructed until they prove it.

Yudkowsky 6 – Eliezer Yudkowsky, Research Fellow at the Singularity Institute for Artificial Intelligence that has published multiple peer-reviewed papers on risk assessment. Cognitive biases potentially affecting judgment of global risks Forthcoming in Global Catastrophic Risks, eds. Nick Bostrom and Milan Cirkovic. August 31, 2006.

**Every** true **idea which discomforts you will seem to match** the pattern of at least one **psychological error**. Robert Pirsig said: “The world’s biggest fool can say the sun is shining, but that doesn’t make it dark out.” If you believe someone is guilty of a psychological error, then **demonstrate your competence by first demolishing their** **consequential factual errors. If there are no factual errors, then what matters the psychology?** The temptation of psychology is that, **knowing a little psychology, we can meddle in arguments where we** **have no** technical **expertise –** instead sagely analyzing the psychology of the disputants. If someone wrote a novel about an asteroid strike destroying modern civilization, then someone might criticize that novel as extreme, dystopian, apocalyptic; symptomatic of the author’s naive inability to deal with a complex technological society. We should recognize this as a literary criticism, not a scientific one; it is about good or bad novels, not good or bad hypotheses. To quantify the annual probability of an asteroid strike in real life, one must study astronomy and the historical record: no amount of literary criticism can put a number on it. Garreau (2005) seems to hold that a scenario of a mind slowly increasing in capability, is more mature and sophisticated than a scenario of extremely rapid intelligence increase. But that’s a technical question, not a matter of taste; no amount of psychologizing can tell you the exact slope of that curve. It’s harder to abuse heuristics and biases than psychoanalysis. Accusing someone of conjunction fallacy leads naturally into listing the specific details that you think are burdensome and drive down the joint probability. Even so, do not lose track of the real- world facts of primary interest; do not let the argument become about psychology. Despite all dangers and temptations, it is better to know about psychological biases than to not know. Otherwise we will walk directly into the whirling helicopter blades of life. But **be very careful not to have too much fun accusing others of biases**. That is the road that leads to becoming a sophisticated arguer – someone who, faced with any discomforting argument, finds at once a bias in it. The one whom you must watch above all is yourself. Jerry Cleaver said: “What does you in is not failure to apply some high-level, intricate, complicated technique. It’s overlooking the basics. Not keeping your eye on the ball.” Analyses should finally center on testable real-world assertions. Do not take your eye off the ball.

### A/T: Risk Bad

#### Our risk assessment critical to transforming the public sphere—leads to democratic decision making

Borraz, 2007 [OLIVIER BORRAZ Centre de Sociologie des Organisations, Sciences Po-CNRS, Paris, “Risk and Public Problems,” Journal of Risk Research, 10, 7, Oct 2007, 941-957]

These studies seem to suggest that risk is a way of framing a public problem in such a way as to politicize the search for solutions. This politicization entails, in particular, a widening of the range of stakeholders, a reference to broader political issues and debates, the search for new decision- making processes (either in terms of democratization, or renewed scientific expertise), and the explicit mobilization of non-scientific arguments in these processes. But if this is the case, then it could also be true that risk is simply one way of framing public problems. Studies in the 1990s, in particular, showed that a whole range of social problems (e.g., poverty, housing, unemployment) had been reframed as health issues, with the result that their management was transferred from social workers to health professionals, and in the process was described in neutral, depoliticized terms (Fassin, 1998). Studies of risk, on the contrary, seem to suggest that similar social problems could well be re-politicized, i.e., taken up by new social movements, producing and using alternative scientific data, calling for more deliberative decision-making procedures, and clearly intended to promote change in the manner in which the state protects the population against various risks (health and environment, but also social and economic). In other words, framing public problems as risks could afford an opportunity for a transformation in the political debate, from more traditional cleavages around social and economic issues, to rifts stemming from antagonistic views of science, democracy and the world order.

#### Risk framing puts pressure of policy makers to enact reforms and leads to deeper understanding of societal problems—we are a prerequisite for solving the systemic impacts they name

Borraz, ‘7 [OLIVIER BORRAZ Centre de Sociologie des Organisations, Sciences Po-CNRS, Paris, “Risk and Public Problems,” Journal of Risk Research, 10, 7, Oct 2007, 941-957]

First, risk is the result of a dynamic, haphazard, controversial and unstable process of construction. In a sense, risk is never entirely stabilized, it is associated with many uncertainties, its status like its boundaries change, following the dynamics of contention which contributed to its emergence. More than a frame, risk is thus closer to a state in the life of a public problem (Gilbert, 2003b), a state characterized by fluidity in its boundaries, struggles over the definition of the risk, debates as to who is accountable, etc. Labelling a problem as a risk exerts pressure on political authorities, in a way which tests their capacity to act. It is also an opportunity for rules and power relations to be redefined. Generally, the boundary between risk and crisis is unclear (Besanc ̧on et al., 2004). Second, risk is inseparable from wider political controversies and conflicting values, ideas and interests. Whatever the issue, be it limited in scale (sewage sludge or mobile phone masts) or on the contrary high profile (nuclear waste, global warming, asbestos, GMO), the move into the state of risk allows for links to be made with broader political, economic, social, moral, ethical or environmental issues. The risk of an activity is always more than just a health or environmental safety issue: it also questions the multiple dimensions surrounding that activity (its benefits, use, effects, etc.).

# 1NR

**CONCEDED a specific link to the aff – we are indicting Peterson’s method for change – our Wilderson evidence says the the affirmatives concentration on human rights ignores the Black Bodies position as outside of humanity. Their emphasis on broadening “human security” abjectly denies the position of the inhuman as ever being meaningful which independently turns their claims to emancipation**

**Wilderson 2010** **(Frank B., Professor of Drama @ UC Irvine- “Red, White, and Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms” pg. 9-11- SG)**

The polemic animating this research stems from (1) my reading of Native and Black American metacommentaries on Indian and Black subject positions written over the past twenty-three years and ( ) a sense of how much that work appears out of joint with intellectual protocols and political ethics which underwrite political praxis and socially engaged popular cinema in this epoch of multiculturalism and globalization. The sense of abandonment I experience when I read the metacommentaries on Red positionality (by theorists such as Leslie Silko, Ward Churchill, Taiaiake Alfred, Vine Deloria Jr., and Haunani-Kay Trask) and the metacommentaries on Black positionality (by theorists such as David Marriott, Saidiya Hartman, Ronald Judy, Hortense Spillers, Orlando Patterson, and Achille Mbembe) against the deluge of multicultural positivity is overwhelming. One suddenly realizes that, though the semantic field on which subjectivity is imagined has expanded phenomenally through the protocols of multiculturalism and globalization theory, Blackness and an unflinching articulation of Redness are more unimaginable and illegible within this expanded semantic field than they were during the height of the fbI’s repressive Counterintelligence Program (coIntelpro). On the semantic field on which the new protocols are possible, Indigenism can indeed become partially legible through a programmatics of structural adjustment (as fits our globalized era). In other words, for the Indians’ subject position to be legible, their positive registers of lost or threatened cultural identity must be foregrounded, when in point of fact the antagonistic register of dispossession that Indians “possess” is a position in relation to a socius structured by genocide. As Churchill points out, everyone from Armenians to Jews have been subjected to genocide, but the Indigenous position is one for which genocide is a constitutive element, not merely an historical event, without which Indians would not, paradoxically, “exist.”9 Regarding the Black position, some might ask why, after claims successfully made on the state by the Civil Rights Movement, do I insist on positing an operational analytic for cinema, film studies, and political theory that appears to be a dichotomous and essentialist pairing of Masters and Slaves? In other words, why should we think of today’s Blacks in the United States as Slaves and everyone else (with the exception of Indians) as Masters? One could answer these questions by demonstrating how nothing remotely approaching claims successfully made on the state has come to pass. In other words, the election of a **Black president aside,** police brutality, mass incarceration, segregated and substandard schools and housing, astronomical rates of HIV infection, and the threat of being turned away en masse at the polls still constitute the lived experience of Black life**. But such empirically based rejoinders would lead us in the wrong direction; we would find ourselves on “solid” ground, which would only mystify, rather than clarify, the question. We would be forced to appeal to “facts,” the “historical record,” and empirical markers of stasis and change, all of which could be turned on their head with more of the same. Underlying such a downward spiral into sociology, political science, history, and public policy debates would be the very rubric that I am calling into question:** the grammar of suffering known as exploitation and alienation, **the assumptive logic whereby subjective dispossession is arrived at in the calculations between those who sell labor power and those who acquire it. The Black qua the worker. Orlando Patterson has already dispelled this faulty ontological grammar in Slavery and Social Death, where he demonstrates how and why work, or forced labor, is not a constituent element of slavery. Once the “solid” plank of “work” is removed from slavery, then the conceptually coherent notion of “claims against the state”—the proposition that the state and civil society are elastic enough to even contemplate the possibility of an emancipatory project for the Black position—disintegrates into thin air.** The imaginary of the state and civil society is parasitic on the Middle Passage**. Put another way, No slave, no world. And, in addition, as Patterson argues, no slave is in the world. If,** as an ontological position, that is, as a grammar of suffering, the Slave is not a laborer but an anti-Human, a position against which Humanity establishes, maintains, and renews its coherence, **its corporeal integrity; if the Slave is, to borrow from Patterson, generally dishonored, perpetually open to gratuitous violence, and void of kinship structure, that is, having no relations that need be recognized, a being outside of relationality, then our analysis cannot be approached through the rubric of gains or reversals in struggles with the state and civil society, not unless and until the interlocutor first explains how the Slave is of the world. The onus is not on one who posits the Master/Slave dichotomy but on the one who argues there is a distinction between Slaveness and Blackness. How, when, and where did such a split occur? The woman at the gates of Columbia University awaits an answer.**

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