# 1NC

### 1NC

#### The affirmative attempts to isolate and understand the concept of Womyn through statistical data and universalized claims about the nature of being Womyn in the world. Even if their subjective experiences in debate are true – and we are not disputing that – their utilization of generalizable claims for the sexes flattens subjective experience and erases the haecceity between individuals.

#### Their attempt to universalize suffering is fascim that requires the obliteration of those who do not fit their predetermined script for what constitutes a womyn. Refusing the universalized claims of the 1AC is key to affirm ineffable rage

MacLure 2010 (Maggie MacLure, Manchester Metropolitan University, “Qualitative inquire: where are the ruins?” http://www.esri.mmu.ac.uk/respapers/nzareRuins.pdf)

So I want to look at the relation of language and materiality, and particularly at what happens when the body surfaces in language. I’m going to suggest that attention to the bodily entanglements of language can be put to work to perform a particular form of productive ruin - namely, the ruin of representation. This phrase echoes the title of Dorothea Olkowski’s (1999) book, ‘Gilles Deleuze and the Ruin of Representation’. What might it mean, then, to research with, and within, the ruin of representation? For Olkowski and Deleuze, representation doesn’t just refer to the mediation of reality by language. Representation is the entire logic of static hierarchy that – in Olkowski’s words - ‘subsume(s) all difference under the one, the same and the necessary’ (1999: 185). In the terminology of Deleuze and Guattari, representation is tree-like or arborescent (1987: 18). It organises life in terms of genus and species, categories and instances, and can only cope with difference through relations of identity, similarity, analogy or opposition: that is, relations based on resemblance or difference among already-formed entities. Within the schema of representation, things are frozen in the places allotted to them by the structure that comprehends them, and are not able to deviate and divide from themselves to form anything new. Olkowski wants to bring about the ruin of representation so that she can develop ‘an ontology of change and becoming’ that engages the dynamism and creative force of matter and difference without going through the deadening detour of representation (211). <<< But language is nevertheless a key element in the way representation captures difference for sameness. It’s hard to escape the ‘common language of order-words’ as Olkowski (1999: 124) puts it, citing Bergson. Order-words are those words that are always already legitimated by institutions, issuing from a ready-made self. Lyotard had something similar in mind when he compared everyday language to Orwell’s ‘newspeak’. Newspeak is the mode of the ‘already-said’ through which the status quo attempts to control the threat of difference – of that which resists or exceeds meaning (Lyotard, 1992: 107; see also MacLure, 2006). Delezue argued that there is another, non-representational dimension or tendency that subsists in language, hidden by the tremendous power of representation to cut into the flow of difference to bring forth stable referents, meanings and speaking subjects. Deleuze calls this other tendency a ‘wild discourse’ or a becoming-mad of language that slides over its referents and transcends its own limits, restoring language to the open potential of becoming (2004: 3, 4). This wild discourse does not mediate anything. It does not refer outside of itself, or build towards some higher fulfilment. And it does not emanate from, or attach itself to, an already formed, phenomenological subject.

#### Their second piece of Graham evidence claims authority over the mind of womyn, capable of explaining the relationship between all men and all womyn through hard statistical data. This evidence attempts to explain:

**- love**

**- self esteem**

**- male-female bonding**

**- respect**

#### all through abstracted statistical data. This appeal to data removes the agency of womyn over their own lives, denying the power womyn have in the status quo. The 1AC offers a series of anecdotes explained by a theory that “slide[s] home like a bolt.” This tames the unruly reality unleashed by the resolution, generating the comforts of understanding that deny otherness.

MacLure 2010 (Maggie MacLure, Manchester Metropolitan University, “Qualitative inquire: where are the ruins?” http://www.esri.mmu.ac.uk/respapers/nzareRuins.pdf)

We have tried, then, in Patti Lather’s words, to refuse ‘textual innocence’ and the comforting simplicities of ‘an untroubled realism’ (1996: 539). We have looked for alternatives to what Gillian Fuller (2000: 84) called ‘the textual politics of good intentions’ in our writing, realising that the production of the innocent Other shores up our own self-certainty and replays colonial relations. We have tried to avoid boxy theories that lock their objects into the confined space of their explanations. Nigel Thrift calls them theories that ‘slide home like a bolt’ (2008: 2). Instead, we have looked to theory to defamiliarise, complicate, pervert, obstruct, proliferate. But I want to consider the question of how successful we have been at putting theory to work in the doing, thinking and writing of research, in specific research projects and investigations. Are things as ruined as we have hoped? Is the Enlightenment project really as crumbly as we thought? I want to stress that working the ruins is an ethical and a political project as well as a methodological one, and that it is an honourable one. I am not proposing that it should be abandoned. And it is not my intention to criticise the work of particular researchers: in fact my own work has failed as much, if not more than anyone else’s in managing to be ruinous. I’m more concerned with why it has been so difficult to do research that works the ruins, and why the Enlightenment project persists. It’s important, I think, for those of us who have advocated, and tried to practice, postfoundational research, to keep on questioning how far we have brought about those ruins that we have conjured so many times. If we don’t put that question to ourselves, our ruins risk being merely decorative. A picturesque gloss on the same old edifice. So, how and where have we failed to be ruinous? For a start, it has been hard to escape interpretive mastery and narrative coherence, even though we know that this keeps research subjects in their place and reinforces our own self-certainty. It has been hard to divest ourselves of what D.A. Miller calls ‘the panoptic immunity’ of the liberal subject, who is entitled to read and survey the lives of others, while maintaining the privacy of, in his words, ‘an integrated, autonomous and “secret” self (1988: 162). It has been hard to avoid hierarchies of knowledge and linear thinking, partly because many of us are tethered by the grammar and the propositional logic of the European languages. Working the ruins is problematic when the given language speaks of levels and solid edifices – foundations, grounded theory, higher-order categories, and so on. We have argued for new forms of relationality and responsibility, yet many of our ‘field’ encounters are still regulated by liberal-humanist ethics and notions of ‘open’ dialogue. This produces only knowledge that everyone can tolerate. And by forcing everyone to speak in the bland dialect of mutual regard, it suppresses idiom, diversity, affect, and conflict. We have theorised decentred selves, partial knowledge and layered accounts. But when it comes to analysing the ‘data’ - interviews, observations, documents etc - we often end up, once again, digging up themes or stacking up categories. Or finding or enforcing innocence, literal meaning and uncomplicated goodwill. In short, poststructural theory often fails to make a difference to the mundane practices of research, and the kind of knowledge that it produces. So I want to turn now to some possible openings – if not for ruin, at least for some structural damage - to customary practices in qualitative inquiry. I think qualitative methodology firstly needs more, and more sustained, engagements with the opaque complexity of lives and things – with what would formerly have been called the empirical. As Patti Lather (2010) put it recently, perhaps we haven’t earned our theory. Often, writing on theory and methodology hangs in a discursive space that is fairly empty of examples, let alone the focus and challenge of a specific investigation or research project. Some of the reasons for this may be socio-cultural – related to conditions of employment and research funding that encourage academics to make a choice between theory work and field work. In some places, there’s a kind of division of labour in research, where those who engage with theory aren’t doing much empirical research, while people who are employed on grants or contracts for specific research projects are not allowed or encouraged to be theoretically engaged. Theory has not had enough of a chance, then, to proliferate through sustained entanglement and interference with its objects - with their details, their intransigent singularity and their perplexing otherness. It has not folded, deviated and differed from itself in trying to get to grips with ‘data’ whose complexity always exceeds its reach. It has not grappled with the vertigo of sometimes seeming to float above the ‘feckless particular’, as Rosalind Krauss (1993: 100) calls it, and at other times being dragged and dispersed among its mundane detail. It has not pierced or eroded the solid walls of common sense or received practice. It has not been ruinous.

#### Vote negative to DISCERN these implicit double turns. Welcome the rage of the 1AC, refuse the attempt to make it rational and knowable.

#### Hogeven 2006 (Bryan, Sociology at U of Alberta with Andrew Woolford Sociology at U of Manitoba “Critical Criminology and Possibility in the Neo-liberal Ethos” [Canadian Journal of Criminology and Criminal Justice](http://www.synergiescanada.org/fr/journals/utp/120324) 48.5)

Thus, it is first imperative that criminologists reflect on the powers of, and limits on, thought under neo-liberal conditions - including those that burden their discourse. Wary from the hard lessons won of past engagements with the criminal-justice field, the criminologist should now move toward a criminology of possibility (Pavlich 2001b). This involves thinking and pushing the limits of the possible, which simultaneously includes thinking the impossible. But let us not get caught up in expecting an annulment of contemporary relations of domination from attempts at mind conversion through "social" education or from a vast logotherapy (Bourdieu 1997). It is delusory to maintain that the scaffolding of tyranny can be vanquished solely with the weapons of consciousness - it is both more insidious and firmly entrenched. Altering existing relations requires that the ways of meaning making - the vision of the world and the practical means through which suppression is (re)produced - be disjoined. Critical criminological efforts should thus be directed toward jimmying open the naturalized order, and doing so "by encountering experiences that peer past thresholds into vast seas of indeterminacy" (Pavlich 2005a: 112). To break out beyond the current limits of the human condition, beaten down into doxic submission by neo-liberal conditions, commands a denouncement of the silent, arbitrary, and taken-for-granted presuppositions and institutions of repression. Critical thought must, as Wacquant has urged, tirelessly pose the question of the social costs and benefits of the policies of economic deregulation and social dismantling which are now presented as the assured road to eternal prosperity and supreme happiness under the aegis of "individual responsibility" (2004:101) Discerning the mental structures that perpetually recreate the social order and the contingent arrangements therein is a precursor to liberating thought from the weight of doxa. To push the limits of what is and reveal what may be possible, critical criminology, in the throes of neo-liberalism, must analytically extirpate criminal-justice institutions, pronouncements, discourse, policy, practice, and vocabularies in order that their contingency be revealed, their lies uncovered, and their contradictions exposed. It must tirelessly question what is and what is yet to come, so as to rethink the world instead of being bound and constrained by it. It must be a criminology of possibility that transcend the giveness of the doxic order so as to interrogate the criminal-justice "reality" that emanates from it. Creating new criminal(?)-justice meaning horizons that puncture current ontology presents itself as a potentially fruitful direction for contemporary praxis. What configuration would criminal "justice" take if it did not rely on existing discourse and doxa as its point of departure? What conduct would be censured (i.e., incivility, disregard for the environment)? What would being "just" mean under such a formulation (e.g., respect for the "other")? What ethic would guide decision making and understanding? Whatever assault on the status quo reveals itself through criminology committed to possibility, it remains, nevertheless, imperative that such calculations remain open and subject to perpetual scrutiny (Pavlich 2005a). Making the world: Our argument should not be taken as fodder for criminologists who wish to sidestep "the political." We believe that today there is an enormous amount to do in all domains where alterity is (r)ejected and the powerful dispossess the marginalized in full face of the law (indeed, employing law to this end). It is in relation to this call of the other, or the dispossessed and downtrodden - those ravaged by the neo-liberal ethos - that calls to "justice" and for responsibility emerge. However, we do not offer an ontological substitute but counter that the possibilities of alternatives should remain open, even as "[they remain] empty, living on borrowed time, awaiting the content to fill [them] in" (Zizek 2000: 324). But our purposeful refusal to advance an a priori replacement or to utter the name of "the" universal subject of humanity who will liberate the totality should not be confused with a loss of nerve. Ours is a radical proposal - especially in criminological circles. What has been taken and understood as critical engagement - particularly as it relates to politics and its supporting ideologies - has been concerned with a priori rejection of all things present and ancient, such that new dogmas may take their place (Kristeva 1999). Interventions must develop in context, rather than approaching a particular (political) problem with a ready-made grid of intelligibility to lay over it and through which to judge its ultimate success (or failure?). To do otherwise holds the distinct possibility of legitimizing all manner of calamity and oppression in the name of the revolution or the spirit of the times. Merleau-Ponty's (1946) "wager," for example, seems to suggest Stalin's show trials were defensible in light of the greater good of revolutionary ends. If not legitimizing calamity, we can certainly question upon which "universal" sensibility foundations, criteria, and judgements are founded (Pavlich 2001a). Emancipatory gestures predicated upon revolutionizing the present in accordance with axiomatic idioms are negations that contain the trace of the present and threaten to swallow the drive to be otherwise whole. That is, such and such proposals are created out of the cloth of "the what is." The present becomes the muse and the spectre of the revolution. Instead of breaking beyond the present, reactive policy is forever fettered to it. Instead of employing one or another yardstick to judge the success and failure of critical moments, it is necessary to affirm and denounce the world as it is - "not to weigh out as best one can equal amounts of submission and revolt, and always end up halfway between reform and accommodation, but to make the world into place" (Nancy 1997: 158). That is, to manifest an art of critique that involves destabilizing seemingly well-anchored relations into new patterns of being that do not pander to established social logics or rely upon reactive judgements. Taken thus, criminology would multiply, not judgements about existing policy, programs, institutions, or societal structures, but logics of being; "it would summon them, drag them from their sleep. Perhaps it would invert them sometimes - all the better" (Foucault 1997: 323). Indeed, one could conceive a criminal justice beyond criminal justice, without recourse to law(yers), institutionalization, probation, and so on, which would take social harm, incivility, and environmental destruction to task without affirming its absolute certitude. This world would never remain still but would be perpetually (re)opened to its own aporias, irrationalities, and internal contradictions. Achievements that accrue from political engagement should never be considered fait accompli, such that the criminologist can sit back and admire her or his work. There is much to do. The outcomes of complacency are evident in the discourse of multiculturalism. Canada's version may seem, on first reading, an opening to the "other" that welcomes and offers hospitality. But, as Nandana Dutta (2004) argues, this position permits complacency and smugness to creep into our relations with the other. That is, with the Multiculturalism Act in tow, Canada as a country is a priori immune from claims of racism and intolerance. In other words, multiculturalism is finally reducible to a bland "rights-for-all" or a "live and let live" state that is quite immune to the other because, instead of celebrating difference and inviting a minutely calibrated response, it simply tolerates it. (Dutta 2004: 439) Multiculturalism is, then, an alibi for the continued inequalities between dominant and other. We are in no way negating the emancipatory effects of "multiculturalism" and its corresponding ontic, but we are making the point that every emancipatory step must be followed by reflexivity and further emancipatory movement. As it stands, the Multiculturalism Act promises that "every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and benefit of the law without discrimination ... and guarantees those rights and freedoms equally to male and female persons" (Preamble). However, spending an hour in docket court or in your local remand centre will put an end to any illusion of tolerance and respect for/of the other heralded by the act. Quite simply, some groups are more equal than "others." As a result, we can never fully be aware in advance what is to be accomplished and to what ends, but the logic of intervention and investigation never closes off dialogue, debate, and critique. Rather, "each advance in politicization obliges one to reconsider, and so to reinterpret the very foundations of law such as they had previously been calculated or delimited" (Derrida 1997: 62). This mode of analysis permits us to think the political and think emancipation by granting space - even if it is cramped - to maneuver beyond the symbolic and hegemonic. But what will become of the criminal-justice field or of multiculturalism - even if they remain tied to these signs - is not something we can know in advance, and we can no longer be lulled into believing that we can predict or command the movement of the carnivorous beast. We can, however, act and intervene in a way that allows for the possibility of some illegality, the breaking of an implicit contract buttressing the established order, which, in effect, will disrupt the peaceful (symbolic) order of things. Efforts should not be directed solely toward fighting politically correct battles for inclusion that, while important in their own right, in effect maintain the foundational ontology of the neo-liberal order. Capital is expanding with increasing ruthlessness, leaving poverty, racism, homelessness, and general social misery in its wake. Attending to the latter while neglecting the former’s complicity in fostering conditions ripe for the spread of the vilest oppression diverts our attention. Thus, intervention should not fall into the trap of conceiving of programs that work well within the current ethos (Zˇ izˇek 1999). Rather, it is imperative to extend critique and thought beyond current ontological limits into the open spaces beyond criminal justice, law, and multiculturalism, using irrationality and contradictions as chaperon and source of urgency. We are certain that today’s criminal justice is spawning new and potentially more explosive contradictions. A long series of facts comes immediately to mind, including, but not limited to, the gross over-representation of Aboriginal peoples in the system, the almost exclusive targeting of the poorest segments of the population by the state’s policing arm, and the eerie absence of the most powerful from the courtroom – other than as officials whose Critical Criminology and Possibility in the Neo-liberal Ethos 695 main purpose it is to adjudicate and pass judgement upon the marginalized. The contradictions of criminal justice overflow the levies constructed to lend it the appearance of propriety, justice, fairness, blindness, and inevitability. The criminal-justice field is none of these things. It is in this realization that a criminology of possibility intervenes, unveiling the irrationalities and contradictions of the system in order to disrupt ontology and rethink the possibility of justice beyond what is.

### 1NC

#### THE DISCURSIVE CONSTRUCT OF DEHUMANIZATION/THE SUBHUMAN OPERATIONALIZES GLOBAL SPECIEST, GENDERED, RACIALIZED, AND ECONOMIC VIOLENCE. WE NEED TO REFUSE THE ATTEMPT TO PARTIALLY INCLUDE GROUPS INTO THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN AND INSTEAD REJECT HUMANIZING DISCOURSE BECAUSE IT MERELY DISPLACES THE VIOLENCE OF THE 1AC IMPACT SCENARIOS ONTO WHOM-EVER IS CONSIDERED NONHUMAN.

Deckha 2k10

[Maneesha, faculty of law, university of Victoria, “it’s time to abandon the idea of human rights”, the scavenger, dec. 10]

The category of the ‘subhuman’ is inherent in global gendered, racialized and economic violence, throwing up questions around the relevance of concepts of ‘human rights’ and ‘human dignity’ for effective theories of justice, policy and social movements. Instead of fighting dehumanization with humanization, a better strategy may be to minimize the human/nonhuman boundary altogether. A new discourse of cultural and legal protections is required to address violence against vulnerable humans in a manner that does not privilege humanity or humans, nor permit a subhuman figure to circulate as the mark of inferior beings on whom the perpetration of violence is legitimate. We need to find an alternative discourse to theorize and mobilize around vulnerabilities for “subhuman” humans, writes Maneesha Deckha. 13 December 2010 One of the organizing narratives of western thought and the institutions it has shaped is humanism and the idea that human beings are at the core of the social and cultural order. The cultural critique humanism has endured, by way of academic theory and social movements, has focused on the failure of its promise of universal equal treatment and dignity for all human beings. To address this failing, a rehabilitative approach to humanism is usually adopted with advocates seeking to undo humanism’s exclusions by expanding its ambit and transporting vulnerable human groups from “subhuman” to “human” status. Law has responded by including more and more humans under the coveted category of “personhood”. Yet, the logic of the human/subhuman binary typically survives this critique with the dependence of the coveted human status on the subhuman (and the vulnerabilities it enables) going unnoticed. This gap in analysis is evident in how most of us think about violence and its related concept of vulnerability. Some would even say that what sets us apart from nonhumans is a capacity for vulnerability. Others who address human-nonhuman relationships more closely might say that what sets human apart from nonhuman animals, if anything, is our capacity for violence. More particular still, feminists would highlight the masculinist orientation of this violence against nonhumans, animals and otherwise, noting that institutionalized violence against nonhumans primarily occurs in male-dominated industries. Yet, the discourse around (hu)man violence against animals is muted in mainstream debates about violence, vulnerability and exploitation in general. More common is a concern with violence against humans and how to eliminate it and make humans less vulnerable. This theorizing largely proceeds through affirmations of the inviolability or sanctity of human life and human dignity, establishing what it means to be human through articulation of what it means to be animal. The humanist paradigm of anti-violence discourse thus does not typically examine the human/nonhuman boundary, but often fortifies it. The failure to address this boundary and its creation and maintenance of the figure of the subhuman undermines anti-violence agendas.

#### A social justice and critical pedagogy method normalizes anthropocentric domination.

Bell and Russell 2K

(Anne C. by graduate students in the Faculty of Environmental Studies, York Universi- ty and Constance L. a graduate student at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Educa- tion, University of Toronto, Beyond Human, Beyond Words: Anthropocentrism, Critical Pedagogy, and the Poststructuralist Turn, http://www.csse-scee.ca/CJE/Articles/FullText/CJE25-3/CJE25-3-bell.pdf

It would be an all-too-common mistake to construe the task at hand as one of interest only to environmentalists. We believe, rather, that disrupting the social scripts that structure and legitimize the human domination of nonhuman nature is fundamental not only to dealing with environmental issues, but also to examining and challenging oppressive social arrangements. The exploitation of nature is not separate from the exploitation of human groups. Ecofeminists and activists for environmental justice have shown that forms of domination are often intimately connected and mutually reinforcing (Bullard, 1993; Gaard, 1997; Lahar, 1993; Sturgeon, 1997). Thus, if critical educators wish to resist various oppressions, part of their project must entail calling into question, among other things, the instrumental exploitive gaze through which we humans distance ourselves from the rest of nature (Carlson, 1995). For this reason, the various movements against oppression need to be aware of and supportive of each other. In critical pedagogy, however, the exploration of questions of race, gender, class, and sexuality has proceeded so far with little acknowledgement of the systemic links between human oppressions and the domination of nature. The more-than-human world and human relationships to it have been ignored, as if the suffering and exploitation of other beings and the global ecological crisis were somehow irrelevant. Despite the call for attention to voices historically absent from traditional canons and narratives (Sadovnik, 1995, p. 316), nonhuman beings are shrouded in silence. This silence characterizes even the work of writers who call for a rethinking of all culturally positioned essentialisms. Like other educators influenced by poststructuralism, we agree that there is a need to scrutinize the language we use, the meanings we deploy, and the epistemological frameworks of past eras (Luke & Luke, 1995, p. 378). To treat social categories as stable and unchanging is to reproduce the prevailing relations of power (Britzman et al., 1991, p. 89). What would it mean, then, for critical pedagogy to extend this investigation and critique to include taken-for-granted understandings of “human,” “animal,” and “nature”? This question is difficult to raise precisely because these understandings are taken for granted. The anthropocentric bias in critical pedagogy manifests itself in silence and in the asides of texts. Since it is not a topic of discussion, it can be difficult to situate a critique of it. Following feminist analyses, we find that examples of anthropocentrism, like examples of gender symbolization, occur “in those places where speakers reveal the assumptions they think they do not need to defend, beliefs they expect to share with their audiences” (Harding, 1986, p. 112). Take, for example, Freire’s (1990) statements about the differences between “Man” and animals. To set up his discussion of praxis and the importance of “naming” the world, he outlines what he assumes to be shared, commonsensical beliefs about humans and other animals. He defines the boundaries of human membership according to a sharp, hierarchical dichotomy that establishes human superiority. Humans alone, he reminds us, are aware and self-conscious beings who can act to fulfill the objectives they set for themselves. Humans alone are able to infuse the world with their creative presence, to overcome situations that limit them, and thus to demonstrate a “decisive attitude towards the world” (p. 90) Freire (1990, pp. 87–91) represents other animals in terms of their lack of such traits. They are doomed to passively accept the given, their lives “totally determined” because their decisions belong not to themselves but to their species. Thus whereas humans inhabit a “world” which they create and transform and from which they can separate themselves, for animals there is only habitat, a mere physical space to which they are “organically bound.” To accept Freire’s assumptions is to believe that humans are animals only in a nominal sense. We are different not in degree but in kind, and though we might recognize that other animals have distinct qualities, we as humans are somehow more unique. We have the edge over other creatures because we are able to rise above monotonous, species-determined biological existence. Change in the service of human freedom is seen to be our primary agenda. Humans are thus cast as active agents whose very essence is to transform the world – as if somehow acceptance, appreciation, wonder, and reverence were beyond the pale. This discursive frame of reference is characteristic of critical pedagogy. The human/animal opposition upon which it rests is taken for granted, its cultural and historical specificity not acknowledged. And therein lies the problem. Like other social constructions, this one derives its persuasiveness from its “seeming facticity and from the deep investments individuals and communities have in setting themselves off from others” (Britzman et al., 1991, p. 91). This becomes the normal way of seeing the world, and like other discourses of normalcy, it limits possibilities of taking up and confronting inequities (see Britzman, 1995). The primacy of the human enterprise is simply not questioned. Precisely how an anthropocentric pedagogy might exacerbate the environmental crisis has not received much consideration in the literature of critical pedagogy, especially in North America. Although there may be passing reference to planetary destruction, there is seldom mention of the relationship between education and the domination of nature, let alone any sustained exploration of the links between the domination of nature and other social injustices. Concerns about the nonhuman are relegated to environmental education. And since environmental education, in turn, remains peripheral to the core curriculum (A. Gough, 1997; Russell, Bell, & Fawcett, 2000), anthropocentrism passes unchallenged.

#### AND, this species-contingent paradigm creates unending genocidal violence against forms of life deemed politically unqualified.

KOCHI & ORDAN 2K8

[tarik and noam, queen’s university and bar llan university, “an argument for the global suicide of humanity”, vol 7. no. 4., bourderlands e-journal]

Within the picture many paint of humanity, events such as the Holocaust are considered as an exception, an aberration. The Holocaust is often portrayed as an example of ‘evil’, a moment of hatred, madness and cruelty (cf. the differing accounts of ‘evil’ given in Neiman, 2004). The event is also treated as one through which humanity comprehend its own weakness and draw strength, via the resolve that such actions will never happen again. However, if we take seriously the differing ways in which the Holocaust was ‘evil’, then one must surely include along side it the almost uncountable numbers of genocides that have occurred throughout human history. Hence, if we are to think of the content of the ‘human heritage’, then this must include the annihilation of indigenous peoples and their cultures across the globe and the manner in which their beliefs, behaviours and social practices have been erased from what the people of the ‘West’ generally consider to be the content of a human heritage. Again the history of colonialism is telling here. It reminds us exactly how normal, regular and mundane acts of annihilation of different forms of human life and culture have been throughout human history. Indeed the history of colonialism, in its various guises, points to the fact that so many of our legal institutions and forms of ethical life (i.e. nation-states which pride themselves on protecting human rights through the rule of law) have been founded upon colonial violence, war and the appropriation of other peoples’ land (Schmitt, 2003; Benjamin, 1986). Further, the history of colonialism highlights the central function of ‘race war’ that often underlies human social organisation and many of its legal and ethical systems of thought (Foucault, 2003). This history of modern colonialism thus presents a key to understanding that events such as the Holocaust are not an aberration and exception but are closer to the norm, and sadly, lie at the heart of any heritage of humanity. After all, all too often the European colonisation of the globe was justified by arguments that indigenous inhabitants were racially ‘inferior’ and in some instances that they were closer to ‘apes’ than to humans (Diamond, 2006). Such violence justified by an erroneous view of ‘race’ is in many ways merely an extension of an underlying attitude of speciesism involving a long history of killing and enslavement of non-human species by humans.Such a connection between the two histories of inter-human violence (via the mythical notion of differing human ‘races’) and interspecies violence, is well expressed in Isaac Bashevis Singer’s comment that whereas humans consider themselves “the crown of creation”, for animals “all people are Nazis” and animal life is “an eternal Treblinka” (Singer, 1968, p.750).

#### The subordination of animals provides the foundation for the violent institutionalization of racism and sexism, not the other way around

Patterson 2

Charles Patterson. 2002. Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust. P 12- 13

Karl Jacoby writes that it seems "more than coincidental that the region that yields the first evidence of agriculture, the Middle East, is the same one that yields the first evidence of slavery." Indeed, in the ancient Near East, he writes, slavery was "little more than the extension of domestication to humans.''" Most studies of human slavery have railed to emphasize how the enslavement of animals served as the model and inspiration for the enslavement of humans, but there have been notable exceptions.40 Elizabeth Fisher believes that the sexual subjugation of women, as practiced in all the known civilizations of the world, was modeled after the domestication of animals. "The domestication of women followed the initiation of animal keeping," she writes, "and it was then that men began to control women's reproductive capacity, enforcing chastity and sexual repression."41 Fisher maintains that it was the vertical, hierarchical positioning of human master over animal slave that intensified human cruelty and laid the foundation for human slavery. The violation of animals expedited the violation of human beings. In taking them in and feeding them, humans first made friends with animals and then killed them. To do so, they had to kill some sensitivity in themselves. When they began manipulating the reproduction of animals, they were even more personally involved in practices which led to cruelty, guilt, and subsequent numbness. The keeping of animals would seem to have set a model for the enslavement of humans, in particular the large-scale exploitation of women captives for breeding and labor. 42

#### Alternative: the judge should vote negative to REJECT THE HUMAN/ANIMAL DIVIDE.

#### this rejection enables an understanding of the SPECIES-BEING. that SOLVES THE ETHICAL CONTRADICTION OF THEIR SPECIES-LEVEL RACISM.

HUDSON 2K4

[Laura, The Political Animal: Species-Being and Bare Life, mediations journal, http://www.mediationsjournal.org/files/Mediations23\_2\_04.pdf]

We are all equally reduced to mere specimens of human biology, mute and uncomprehending of the world in which we are thrown. Species-being, or “humanity as a species,” may require this recognition to move beyond the pseudo-essence of the religion of humanism. Recognizing that what we call “the human” is an abstraction that fails to fully describe what we are, we may come to find a new way of understanding humanity that recuperates the natural without domination. The bare life that results from expulsion from the law removes even the illusion of freedom. Regardless of one’s location in production, the threat of losing even the fiction of citizenship and freedom affects everyone. This may create new means of organizing resistance across the particular divisions of society. Furthermore, the concept of bare life allows us to gesture toward a more detailed, concrete idea of what species-being may look like. Agamben hints that in the recognition of this fact, that in our essence we are all animals, that we are all living dead, might reside the possibility of a kind of redemption. Rather than the mystical horizon of a future community, the passage to species-being may be experienced as a deprivation, a loss of identity. Species-being is not merely a positive result of the development of history; it is equally the absence of many of the features of “humanity” through which we have learned to make sense of our world. It is an absence of the kind of individuality and atomism that structure our world under capitalism and underlie liberal democracy, and which continue to inform the tenets of deep ecology. The development of species-being requires the collapse of the distinction between human and animal in order to change the shape of our relationships with the natural world. A true species-being depends on a sort of reconciliation between our “human” and “animal” selves, a breakdown of the distinction between the two both within ourselves and in nature in general. Bare life would then represent not only expulsion from the law but the possibility of its overcoming. Positioned in the zone of indistinction, no longer a subject of the law but still subjected to it through absence, what we equivocally call “the human” in general becomes virtually indistinguishable from the animal or nature. But through this expulsion and absence, we may see not only the law but the system of capitalism that shapes it from a position no longer blinded or captivated by its spell. The structure of the law is revealed as always suspect in the false division between natural and political life, which are never truly separable. Though clearly the situation is not yet as dire as Agamben’s invocation of the Holocaust suggests, we are all, as citizens, under the threat of the state of exception. With the decline of the nation as a form of social organization, the whittling away of civil liberties and, with them, the state’s promise of “the good life” (or “the good death”) even in the most developed nations, with the weakening of labor as the bearer of resistance to exploitation, how are we to envision the future of politics and society?

### 1NC

#### We advocate the entirety of the 1AC except its use of the word “women” (WOMEN WITH AN E)

#### The aff use of ‘Women’ is patriarchal, turns the case; should replace with “Womyn” with a Y

**Hauser 05**

[Deborah, Renowned feminist author, MP: An Online Feminist Journal, <http://academinist.org/wp-content/uploads/2005/03/010205Hauser_Woman.pdf>, mg]

These creation myths, in which a daughter is "miraculously" born to Manu and¶ Eve is created from Adam's rib, are attempts to deny the reproductive power of¶ women just as **the use of the word "man" or the masculine pronouns to refer to**¶ **women are a linguistic denial of women's existence (or, at the very least, their**¶ **importance). To free women from this linguistic tyranny and to disassociate**¶ **woman from man, the alternate spelling "womyn" has been advocated.**

#### ‘Womyn’ is better than ‘Woman’; the latter spelling is masculine and conflates female identity with that of men and excludes queerness

**Franklin 11**

[Kris, <http://feminismwi10.blogspot.com/2011/01/women-vs-womyn.html>, mg]

I have placed this discussion on orgsync and our facebook group. So I also wanted to see what this class thought about this particular subject.¶ What do you think of the spelling of women? As of now the women's coalition at ASU is using the "y" spelling. Some have approached me and questioned why is women spelled wrong? As of now we are in the early stages of determing if we will change the spelling back to the "women". What are your thoughts?¶ Person A from Facebook said...¶ "I think it is up to the members of the Womyn's Coalition, but as someone who has seen the organization evolve over the past several years, I think that changing the name to "Women's Coalition" would be just one more step in a direction opposite from the path this awesome organization once was on."¶ Person B from Facebook said...¶ Personally **I like womyn because of the whole women can do it without "men" mentality** but I think what really matters is the opinion of your coalition. Still, I am not an extremist feminist but **I more easily identify with womyn** as do some other queer women.¶ PS if people think it's spelled wrong perhaps take this opportunity to educate your organizations because it is important to know why Women is spelled Womyn and why it would stay the same/ might change etc. I mean I don't want to preach to the choir or anything but **I'm sure you're aware of what "womyn" stands for and I think it's sad if people don't know what the spelling means or don't identify with it** at all. :)

### Case

#### Their feminist rage solvency evidence is about the Bedford Hills rebellion – that failed

Shaylor ‘09

Cassandra Shaylor. “Tearing down the Walls.” Fall 2009. < http://www.warresisters.org/content/resistance-behind-bars>.

**In the summer of 1974, women incarcerated at Bedford Hills** Correctional Facility in New York **held seven guards hostage** in protest of the brutal treatment of activist prisoner Carol Crooks, who had successfully sued the prison for locking people in segregation without a hearing. **State troopers and guards from men’s prisons were called in to suppress the rebellion. In the end, 25 women were injured and 24 were transferred without a hearing to the state institution for the “criminally insane.”** Despite the attention in both mainstream and activist circles to the uprising led by men at Attica prison in the same state three years earlier, **the August Rebellion at Bedford Hills went virtually unnoticed**.

#### Bedford hills was quashed by masculinist violence, and had no lasting impact because they had no engagement with traditional media.

#### In fact, the aff can’t overcome the status quo. The aff will be read through masculinist lens to paint women who express rage as insane – their author

Law ‘09

Victoria Law. “Invisibility of Prisoners’ Resistance.” November 10, 2009. < http://4strugglemag.org/2009/11/10/invisibility-of-women-prisoners%E2%80%99-resistance-by-victoria-law/>.

On the 28th of August 1974, **inmates at Bedford Hills**, an all women’s prison, **protested** the beating of a fellow inmate **by holding seven staff members hostage for two-and-a-half hours**. However, **“The August Rebellion” is virtually unknown today. All male state troopers and (male) guards from men’s prisons were called to suppress the uprising. Twenty-five women were injured and twenty-four others were transferred to Matteawan Complex for the Criminally Insane without the required commitment hearings** [3]. **This event was virtually ignored because it lasted only two-and-a-half hours, and no one was killed. The story was relegated to a paragraph buried in the back pages of The New York Times. The “August Rebellion” is seen as less significant than the Attica Rebellion. The women at Bedford Hills** also **did not have any opportunity to contact media, big-name supporters and politicians, whereas as the men incarcerated at Attica were able to gain public attention**. The “August Rebellion” is easily overlooked by those seeking information on prisoner protests and disruptions.

#### THEIR SOLVENCY CLAIMS PERFORMATIVELY REDUCES SCHOLARSHIP TO POLITICAL AGENCY. THIS PRODUCES OBLIVIOUSNESS AS TO THE STRUCTURAL ANTAGONISMS WHICH CONSTITUTE ACADEMIC WORK MEANING THEIR ATTEMPTS TO TRANSCEND THE QUAGMIRE OF THEORY AND PRAXIS ARE LINKS TO OUR CRITICISM.

Welsch 12

[scott, “coming to terms with the antagonism between rhetorical reflection and political agency”, vol 45., no. 1, 1-23, prof. communications, appallacia state university]

What does it mean to say rhetoric scholarship should be relevant to democratic¶ practice? A prevailing answer to this question insists that rhetoric scholars are participants¶ in the democratic contest for power just like all other citizens, no more¶ and no less. Drawing on the work of Slavoj Žižek, the argument of this essay is that¶ reducing scholarship to a mode of political agency not only produces an increasingly¶ uninhabitable academic identity but also draws our attention away from producing¶ results of rhetorical inquiry designed to be useful to citizens in democracy. Clinging¶ to the idea that academic practice is a mode of political action produces a fantastic¶ blindness to the antagonism between scholarly reflection and political agency that¶ structures academic purpose. While empirical barriers to the production of rhetorical¶ resources suitable for democratic appropriation undoubtedly exist, ignoring the¶ self-frustrating character of academic desire is no less of an impediment to the¶ production of democratically consequential rhetoric scholarship.¶ Now over a decade since the publication of John Michael’s Anxious Intellects¶ (2000), many rhetoric scholars are no less anxious about the relevance of¶ scholarship to public affairs. Recent exchanges concerning rhetorical criticism,¶ public intellectualism, and academic engagement continue to provide¶ evidence of a prominent felt need to prove public relevance, explain away¶ the lack of readily apparent public engagement, or adopt a more activist¶ posture. That academic work should have political consequences is broadly¶ assumed within a dominant strain of rhetorical scholarship owing to what¶ is doubtless an incontrovertible feature of reality—words have political¶ consequences. From this fact, many rhetoric scholars reason that because¶ our academic words have political consequences, even if we do not intend¶ for them to, we should deliberately pursue the consequences we most desire¶ and seek their victory in political contest.¶ Questions as to the logic underlying this relationship of fact and¶ assertion¶ aside, this article is perhaps partly reducible to the claim that¶ arguments concerning the consequences of scholarship have uncritically¶ referenced such facts. Facts, as many of the same scholars would be quick¶ to point out, do not mean anything apart from the contours our ideological¶ lenses project on them. As Kenneth Burke notes, if a martyr can find joy in¶ the receiving of torturous blows, we should expect the meanings projected¶ onto facts to range widely (1984b, 35). With this in mind, we should be no¶ less concerned with the ways, in the words of Slavoj Žižek, that we “look¶ awry” so as to notice particular facts and invest them with the meaning we¶ do (1991, 8–12).¶ What Žižek adds to Burke’s observation regarding the projection of¶ meaning onto selected events is that this act of projection occurs at the¶ intersection of subjectivity and desire. Beyond charting relationships¶ between terms that constitute an ideology in order to map rhetorically constituted¶ motives, Žižek insists that action is propelled by the insufficiency of¶ those very rhetorical relationships (2008, 103–6). Inseparable from ideology,¶ every identity is constantly haunted by the lurking antagonisms between¶ the terms that structure it. The subject’s desire circulates around the dominant¶ tensions within the language that affords one an identity, continually¶ pursuing the traumatic impossibility of coherent subjectivity or ideological¶ consistency (1989, 124–29). Whereas Burke suggests that every rhetorical¶ language has a kind of rationality that supplies identity and order, Žižek¶ suggests that it is the basic irreconcilability of the competing demands that¶ our symbols place upon us that structures our desire (Žižek 1991, 162–69;¶ Burke 1966, 44–57). We continually pursue not simply the impossible but¶ that which is made impossible by the language of our ideologically constituted¶ identities.¶ I argue that the ongoing debate in rhetorical studies about the relationship¶ between scholarly reflection and political agency is illuminated by¶ Žižek’s account of ideology, identity, and desire. In this debate, references¶ to the factual, the empirical, or the material are deployed, not incidentally,¶ to address the impossible subject position that academics inhabit. Often¶ pursuing lines of research motivated by a desire to create wholeness¶ amid¶ coming to terms with the antagonism¶ 3¶ social, cultural, political, or institutional brokenness, rhetoric¶ scholars¶ nevertheless¶ become, in the sustained act of academic investigation,¶ significantly¶ alienated¶ from motivating practical concerns. Moreover,¶ because rhetoric scholars spend a large majority of their time in faculty¶ offices, classrooms, and archives of one kind or another, by necessity, mostly¶ talking, reading, and writing about political action, the felt alienation from¶ public life can feel like hypocrisy or, even worse, complicity in the perpetuation¶ of brokenness.¶ The subject position inhabited by many rhetoric scholars is not only¶ structured by a fundamental antagonism between scholarly reflection and¶ political agency but also by an antagonism between the production of expert¶ knowledge and a democratic faith in the judgment of the people. An academic¶ produces accounts or recommendations that are intended to enlighten,¶ supplement, or replace those currently accepted by a public imagined to be,¶ at its best, democratic. At the same time, the rhetoric scholar committed¶ to democracy often imagines that the academic’s role is to resist the expert¶ control of publics. Taken together, the two antagonisms yield a deeply conflicted¶ scholarly identity: the suspension of immediate action in favor of¶ reflection can be reduced to an act of complicity in the status quo, just as¶ the act of producing expert accounts can be reduced to the demonstration¶ of a lack of trust in democratic publics. The challenge is to resist synthetically¶ resolving these antagonisms, whether in confirming or disconfirming¶ ways. Rather, as Žižek might suggest, the aim should be to “come to terms”¶ with these antagonisms by articulating academic identities less invested in¶ reparative fantasies that imagine a material resolution of them (1989, 3, 5,¶ 133; 2005, 242–43). Accounts that fail to come to terms with the impossibility¶ of closure and continue to invest in such fantasies yield either indignant¶ calls for activism or too-easy assurance of the potential consequence of one’s¶ work, neither of which is well suited to scholar-citizen engagement.¶ Coming to terms with these antagonisms, I ultimately argue, is aided¶ by a reconsideration of a number of Jürgen Habermas’s (1973, 1970) early¶ works on the relationship between theory and practice and C. Wright¶ Mills’s (2000) account of the relationship between scholarly reflection and¶ political agency in The Sociological Imagination. Turning to Giambattista¶ Vico, Habermas shows us how to keep the antagonisms clearly in view,¶ even though he does not suggest a vision of scholarship that might allow¶ academics to deliberately respond to the antagonism between scholarship¶ and political agency. It is Mills, rather, through his concept of academics¶ working¶ in support of the sociological imagination, who suggests how¶ academics¶ might do just that. Directly and indirectly returning, in a sense,¶ to classical¶ rhetorical roots, each challenges rhetoric scholars to emphasize,¶ as the aim of rhetoric scholarship, the exploration and production of¶ inventional resources suitable for appropriation by citizen-actors. Such a¶ construction of the relationship between academics and politics locates¶ political agency and the situated pursuit of practical wisdom in democratic¶ publics without absolving scholars of responsibility to them.

# 2NC

## Case

#### THE AFFIRMATIVE’S FRAMEWORK FOR DEBATE REDUCES SCHOLARLY REFLECTION FO POLITICAL AGENCY WHICH TRAPS ALL OF THEIR SOLVENCY AND CRITICISM CLAIMS WITHIN THE DOWNWARD SPIRAL OF ACADEMICS SPEAKING “TRUTH TO POWER”.

Welsch 12

[scott, “coming to terms with the antagonism between rhetorical reflection and political agency”, vol 45., no. 1, 1-23, prof. communications, appallacia state university]

Klump and Hollihan also show how complete separation between¶ scholarly reflection and political agency is attempted through aesthetic¶ conceits as well. They explain that “so strong was the social scientific image¶ [during the 1950s and 1960s] that the response to it became an artistic¶ self-¶ image—the critic’s task was to increase appreciation for the artistic use¶ of language in the rhetorical act.” They show how a subjective hermeneutic¶ of appreciation does not escape the idea of complete scholarly detachment¶ associated with supposedly objective knowledge-producing science. Klump¶ and Hollihan astutely note how “both of these self-images alienate” (92).¶ They alienate scholars from the consequences of their scholarly work. Both¶ the scientist and the aesthete refuse the antagonism between scholarly¶ reflection and political agency by insisting that the political is alien to each¶ of them. Construed as wholly distinct symbolic spheres, the reflective and¶ the political never have reason to come into contact with each other.¶ While Klump and Hollihan convincingly expose the effacement of¶ the antagonism between scholarly reflection and political agency in both¶ scientific and artistic scholarly identities, they do not recognize, however,¶ that they also efface the antagonism. They simply take the alternate route—¶ refusal by way of declaring an essential oneness between the two. Beyond¶ recognizing the fact that all choices have material consequences, whether¶ intended or not, and arguing that scholars must take them into account,¶ they go a step further and reduce scholarly reflection to a mode of political¶ agency. The reduction [of scholarly reflection to a mode of political agency] proceeds as follows: first, scholars make choices.¶ Second,¶ whether or not they make them intentionally or unintentionally,¶ they will make them nonetheless. Third, those choices will have material¶ consequences (1989, 90–91). Therefore, because our choices, or the words we¶ produce, will have material, political, consequences whether or not we intend¶ them to, we should embrace the consequences we prefer and pursue them¶ directly (the hidden premise being that intentionally pursued consequences¶ are better than unintended ones). Hence, Klump and Hollihan¶ conclude by¶ saying that “the critic that emerges—the interpreter, the teacher, the social¶ actor—is a moral participant, cognizant of the power and responsibility¶ that accompanies full critical participation in his/her society” (1989, 94).¶ scott welsh¶ 8¶ Michael Calvin McGee reduces scholarly reflection to political agency¶ in the same way. At key points, McGee, as well as Klump and Hollihan, refer¶ to Burke’s observation that “all living things are critics,” constantly interpreting¶ the signs around them (Burke 1984b, 5; McGee 1990, 281; Klumpp¶ and Hollihan 1989, 93). And because the signs around us do, in fact, produce¶ much of the social world in which we live, all speech, including academic¶ writing, is inherently political and should be embraced as such. Hence,¶ McGee challenges scholars to engage in “social surgery,” wherein they substitute¶ “new cultural imperatives” for “old taken-for-granted conventions”¶ in order to “make the world conform to their will.” Moreover, as naturalborn¶ critics, like all living things, scholars cannot help but engage in “social¶ surgery” (1990, 281–82). As with Klump and Hollihan, the only remaining¶ question is whether or not they will acknowledge and embrace their true¶ nature. This argument is repeated throughout the “critical rhetoric” literature¶ of the late 1980s and early 1990s. For example, Raymie McKerrow challenges¶ so-called critical rhetoricians to acknowledge their complicity in the¶ production of political culture and take a side. McKerrow advances a liberation¶ theology ethos oriented toward the “the critique of domination” and¶ the emancipation of the oppressed (1989, 93, 103, 106). Although ostensibly¶ responding to McKerrow, Kent Ono and John Sloop largely expand on¶ the ethos implicit or already present in McKerrow’s presentation of critical¶ rhetoric. What they add is the claim that a generalized resistance to rulingclass¶ interests is insufficient to maintain a meaningful, long-term political¶ agenda. What is required is deep investment in a particular cause “able¶ to re-form the individual” (1992, 51). And, just like the other authors, they¶ argue that because even the skeptical critic “often unconsciously commits to¶ a telos despite her attempts to resist the ever-present threat of dogmatism,”¶ critics fully embracing the moral imperative should deliberately, “at the¶ moment of placing pen to paper . . .[,] relinquish skepticism and advance¶ their argument for that moment as if the direction chosen by the critic¶ (i.e. telos) were Truth with a capital ‘T’”(53). This Truth with a capital “T”¶ is not an epistemic conclusion but an unreserved commitment to “the ideal¶ picture we have created for ourselves” of a “utopian future” (1992, 56, 59).¶ Recent contributions across a variety of published forums concerning¶ rhetorical criticism, public intellectualism, and academic engagement¶ demonstrate that this reduction of scholarly reflection to political agency¶ (through the acknowledgment of the fact of complicity) remains influential¶ among rhetoric scholars. In some quarters, it has been radicalized. In the¶ coming to terms with the antagonism¶ 9¶ recent *Western Journal of Communication* special issue on rhetorical criticism,¶ Stephen Hartnett argues, for example, that rhetoric scholars need to get to¶ the point where they “are no longer studying objects from which they hope¶ to glean some truths to be offered as tools to others.” Instead, scholars are¶ to “build projects where they are directly implicated in and work alongside¶ disadvantaged communities.” The ideal is “scholars who are activists¶ writing about their activism” (2010, 78). Hartnett folds scholarly reflection¶ into politics. The former only reemerges as a distinct kind of activity after¶ the fact in reflective accounts of one’s political efforts. Hence, the truly¶ committed “social justice scholar” needs to learn how to “speak clearly and¶ look authoritative” while repeating “mass-media-shaped tidbits” within the¶ “¶ corporate-driven cesspool of mass media” (2010, 81–83). Explicitly affirming¶ the thrust of Hartnett’s essay, Peter Simonson calls on scholars to “transport¶ their bodies outside the cloisters” and into the political field. Similarly,¶ he responds to Celeste Condit’s concern that McGee made “the rhetorical¶ scholar indistinguishable from the street rhetorician” with “I would answer¶ that passing for a street rhetorician might in fact be the ideal” (2010, 121,¶ 95). Likewise, in the recent *Quarterly Journal of Speech* forum on engaged¶ scholarship, Anna Young, Adria Battaglia, and Dana Cloud plainly state¶ that because Aristotle was right that “man is by nature a political animal”¶ we must “reframe politics as our job description” (2010, 433).¶ In the *Philosophy and Rhetoric* forum, Steve Fuller characterizes the¶ “public intellectual” as an “agent of justice.” He deems John Dewey a failed¶ public intellectual because he “refused to use all the available means of persuasion”¶ (2006, 150). His criticism of Dewey, however, is not that Dewey¶ tried and failed to be a public intellectual. Rather, it is Dewey’s alleged¶ refusal itself to be a public intellectual that draws Fuller’s criticism. This is¶ because Fuller’s vision of public intellectualism—a willingness and ability¶ to use all available means of persuasion as an agent of justice—is held up¶ not as an option for some academics in their life outside of the academy but¶ as the essential academic identity. At its best, the academy is “the custodian¶ of the nation’s spirit, the loyal opposition” of whoever holds “the reins of¶ state power at the moment” or the place from which a protected scholarly¶ class is enabled to “speak truth to power.” Using the same logic employed¶ by early critical rhetoricians, anything less is rejected as a cowardly attempt¶ to find an academic identity that “basically absolves intellectuals of any¶ responsibility for their ideas” (2006, 151, 49).

## Statistical Data

We do not have to provide alternative mechanisms to overcome the links in the 1NC - pointing out the inconsistencies and double turns of the 1AC is sufficient to open new philosophical opportunities.

Jones 2000 (Rachel, University of Warwick and Manchester Metropolitan University; Hypatia 15.2, 151-159, MUSE)

Blindspots and elisions, fissures and omissions: feminist thinkers have often had an eye for the gaps in the western philosophical tradition. They have focused on what has gone missing from philosophy, not as a way of refusing philosophical thought, but to draw attention to the gendering of supposedly universal theories and to generate philosophies capable of thinking specificity and difference. Each of the papers in this section is concerned with a particular absence in the history of philosophy. Each thinker is involved in seeking out that which disappears from view when seen from the perspective of the western philosophical canon--or which appears there only in a carefully reduced and circumscribed form. Yet this focus on absences is far from generating a negative project. Instead, for these three thinkers, philosophical absences function as potentialities, sites of productive displacement and transformation that reconfigure the possible subject matter of philosophy. The nature of the transformations effected varies according to the specific lacunæ addressed by each author. Penelope Deutscher focuses on the mysterious disappearance of womyn from the history of modern philosophy, Zoë Sofia on the absence of containers from histories and philosophies of technology, and Barbara Bolt on the way the western enlightenment perspective both obliterates a generative materiality and is itself undone by the glare of the Australian sun. The topographical locatedness of Bolt's argument indicates the importance of the specificity of each of these projects. Their grouping does not imply that they could be subsumed under one overarching framework any more than the papers in this volume could be combined to form a single new trajectory in feminist philosophy. Nonetheless, these three papers not only share a set of overlapping concerns, but also deploy a similar philosophical strategy. Each seeks to make visible that which has functioned as one of the necessary but invisible conditions sustaining western philosophical thought--be that the improperly philosophical work excluded from the canon so as to secure philosophy's self-definition; the dark matter required by the reflections of enlightened speculation and the colonizing imagination; or the technologies [End Page 151] of sustaining and containing themselves, which silently facilitate--yet consistently fail to appear in--thinking and philosophizing about technology. Yet these philosophical absences are not recuperated within the terms of the tradition--Deutscher is not arguing that neglected womyn thinkers "really were" great philosophers, for example, nor does Bolt claim that it is possible to reveal a "really pure" or "unmediated" vision of matter beyond the confines of the European gaze. And none of the papers aims simply to reverse traditional hierarchies: as Sofia emphasizes, it is not a matter of privileging "good" (feminine) container technologies over "bad" (masculine/phallic) ones. Rather, each thinker foregrounds the ways in which that which has been excluded from the western philosophical tradition simultaneously refuses to be captured by, and incorporated within, that tradition. The womyn who cannot really do philosophy, the unobtrusive activities of containment, the glare of a light that does not render matter visible: western thought deems each to be either lacking or excessive--or both--and in any case unworthy of prolonged philosophical attention. For these three thinkers, however, each becomes a site of active resistance that prolongs philosophy itself by holding open paths beyond dominant and exclusive philosophical norms. Thus, while all three papers can be seen as mobilizing absences to destabilize the philosophical canon, this is instability become productive, rather than celebrated for its own sake. Indeed, Deutscher herself has argued in her previous work that the gendering of the history of philosophy is neither effected in spite of instabilities, nor weakened or mitigated by them; instead, "contradiction, tension and instability sustain phallocentric accounts of womyn and femininity" (Deutscher, 1997, 8). By way of subverting such masculinist accounts, in her paper for this volume Deutscher herself mobilizes the unstable status of texts by womyn thinkers to sustain new philosophical thought. "Imperfect Discretion" highlights the way that womyn have often explored philosophical ideas in forms that have entailed their exclusion from the canon. Deutscher calls for a more inventive approach to the history of philosophy, one able to locate philosophical innovation within epistolary exchanges, poems, polemical essays, novels, or theological writing. Of course, it is not only womyn who have used these modes of writing to explore philosophical ideas; rather, Deutscher's point is that as womyn's engagement with philosophy has often been limited to such forms, their status as not "properly" philosophical becomes a feminist issue. Deutscher is especially interested in the alignment of philosophical writings by womyn with the space of the "not quite." She argues that the work of twentieth-century French womyn commentators tends to be positioned as "not quite" groundbreaking enough to be "real" philosophy (that is, really original philosophy), while also being seen as "not quite" faithful enough to stand as exemplary analysis of the history of philosophy. Yet if these womyn thinkers do tend to produce unconventional interpretations of philosophical texts, then their own work is not so very unoriginal after all. [End Page 152] Deutscher thus advocates reading for the originality folded into commentary, pointing to the exemplary impropriety of the philosophical writings of Sarah Kofman, whom Deutscher has elsewhere positioned as a theorist of constitutive instability (Deutscher 1997, 59-88). However, "Imperfect Discretion" draws chiefly on the methodologies employed in Nicole Loraux's and Barbara Cassin's writings on ancient philosophy, in Marie-José Mondzain's exploration of a Byzantine philosophy of visibility, and in Monique David-Ménard's psychoanalytic reading of Kant. These thinkers reveal philosophical thought to be constituted and sustained via its unstable relations to its other/s: by the femininity within masculinity, or by the slippage between theory and myth, philosophy and sophistry, thought and image, reason and desire. However, this means that the innovation generated when commentators activate the philosophical past through these instabilities, far from being improper, belongs at the very heart of philosophy. Thus Deutscher's deconstructive approach does not entail celebrating the infinite deferral of fixed definitions of philosophy. Rather, the "not quite" philosophical work of commentary "pivot[s] the question" (174): by reconfiguring perceptions of the history of philosophy, these womyn commentators rewrite that history as one in which their own work could be seen as philosophical. Deutscher's project is explicitly positioned as a response to Michèle Le Dœuff's observation that although womyn are accepted in contemporary (French) philosophy as commentators, their philosophical activity will only be adequately valued when the role of commentary itself is re-evaluated. "Imperfect Discretion" elaborates a philosophical framework enabling such revaluation in ways already hinted at in Deutscher's reading of Le Dœuff in Yielding Gender (1997, 60-69). For if Le Dœuff draws attention to the "contradictory status which womyn occupy within philosophy," where they are "present, but not really present" (1997, 63), Deutscher's current project transforms this invidious positioning into the productively subversive space of the "not quite." Deutscher's paper reinforces the significance of Le Dœuff for recent Australian feminist philosophers, reflected in the previous sections of this volume. For Deutscher, as for many of the other thinkers represented here, Le Dœuff's work can also be seen to pivot the question. As Elizabeth Grosz has put it, Le Dœuff, like Foucault, "asks not what discourses say but what they do, not as bodies of truth, but as institutionally produced and supervised practices" (Grosz 1989, 228). Moreover, like Le Dœuff (and indeed like the female commentators discussed by Deutscher), many of the thinkers represented in this volume could also be described as intervening in the history of philosophy so as to "open it up to its own lacks and inadequacies, not as a source of weakness, but as a site for its growth and development" (Grosz 1989, 228). Deutscher's paper can itself be read as taking feminist philosophy in the English-speaking world beyond its own recent history, where, despite several influential anthologies [End Page 153] which draw attention to a multiplicity of French feminist voices (see, for example, Courtivron and Marks 1980), the importance of the new French feminisms has come to be largely identified with a few key figures. Without negating the importance of Cixous, Irigaray, Kristeva, or indeed Le Dœuff--who are, after all, those rare examples of womyn thinkers deemed worthy of commentary themselves--Deutscher's project opens (feminist) philosophy to the rich resources to be found in the work of less well known French womyn philosophers.

# 1NR

### **2NR Link**

#### Mother nature– viewing the earth as our mother reifies anthropocentric violence – that’s Berman

viewing the Earth as our mother perpetuates the notion that humans can take without being expected to give back, that the Earth is limitless and for human use. This concept is reflected in our economic systems in which Nature is a natural resource

the intellect and protector of his mother and mate; he ensures her survival (Murphy 1998). This separation of man from women and Nature reinforces hierarchical dualisms and perpetuates the oppression and subordination of women and Nature.

#### The subordination of animals provides the foundation for the violent institutionalization of racism and sexism, not the other way around – proven by our attempts to control reproduction – it has set the model of enslavement – conceded that it causes endless racism – the foundation for modern enslavement – enslaved chickens in the land of Sumer which is where we developed the chains to transport bodies

Patterson 2

Charles Patterson. 2002. Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust. P 12- 13

Karl Jacoby writes that it seems "more than coincidental that the region that yields the first evidence of agriculture, the Middle East, is the same one that yields the first evidence of slavery." Indeed, in the ancient Near East, he writes, slavery was "little more than the extension of domestication to humans.''" Most studies of human slavery have railed to emphasize how the enslavement of animals served as the model and inspiration for the enslavement of humans, but there have been notable exceptions.40 Elizabeth Fisher believes that the sexual subjugation of women, as practiced in all the known civilizations of the world, was modeled after the domestication of animals. "The domestication of women followed the initiation of animal keeping," she writes, "and it was then that men began to control women's reproductive capacity, enforcing chastity and sexual repression."41 Fisher maintains that it was the vertical, hierarchical positioning of human master over animal slave that intensified human cruelty and laid the foundation for human slavery. The violation of animals expedited the violation of human beings. In taking them in and feeding them, humans first made friends with animals and then killed them. To do so, they had to kill some sensitivity in themselves. When they began manipulating the reproduction of animals, they were even more personally involved in practices which led to cruelty, guilt, and subsequent numbness. The keeping of animals would seem to have set a model for the enslavement of humans, in particular the large-scale exploitation of women captives for breeding and labor. 42

**C. TIMEFRAME: they might win some marginal timeframe argument but all of their impact calculus is a reason to vote neg because the faster the timeframe for willing extinctin, the greater the certainty of alt solvency. our probability and magnitude should be prefred for impact comparison because their timeframe comparison begins from a speciest PREFERENCE FOR THE HUMAN SUBJECT.**

**KOCHI & ORDAN 2K8**

[tarik and noam, queen’s university and bar llan university, “an argument for the global suicide of humanity”, vol 7. no. 4., bourderlands e-journal]

The aim, however, would be to not just accept one side or the other, but to re-think the basis of moral action along the lines of a dialectical, utopian anti-humanism. Importantly, though, **getting past inadequate conceptions of action, historical time and the futural promise of progress may be dependent upon radically re-comprehending the relationship between humanity and nature in such a way that the human is no longer viewed as the sole core of the subject, or the being of highest value. The human would thus need to no longer be thought of as a master that stands over the non-human. Rather, the human and the non-human need to be grasped together, with the former bearing dignity only so long as it understands itself as a part of the latter.**

**That destroys the efficacy of their claims to solve forms of violence. the affirmative attempts to include more groups into our notion of the human only EVADES THEIR “DEGRADING” CONSEQUENCES BY PUSHING THAT VIOLENCE OFF AS LEGITIMATE ONTO A DIFFERENT SET OF SUBJECTS . only rejection of their speciest claims can solve THAT VIOLENCE RATHER THAN JUST DISPLACE IT.   
Deckha 2k10**

[Maneesha, faculty of law, university of Victoria, “it’s time to abandon the idea of human rights”, the scavenger, dec. 10]

Doing away with the subhuman **If this role of contributing to contemporary manifestations of violence played by subhumanization is accurate, a pressing question presents itself: should we continue to rely on anti-violence discourses (i.e., human rights or other “human” justice campaigns) that entrench the subhuman category? In other words, human rights discourses do not instruct us to purge the subhuman category or the human/nonhuman divide from our critical repertoire. Instead, they seek to convince us that we should see all human beings as definitely human and not subhumanize them**. **This approach does not effectively achieve its aims of protecting vulnerable human groups from violence because it leaves the subhuman category intact, a category that humanized humans can always assert should convictions sway about the relative moral worth of a particular human group. The subhuman category is then poised to “animalize” or “dehumanize “the targeted group and generate corresponding justifications as to why the human group does not deserve better than “subhuman” treatment. A better strategy would be to eliminate the subhuman category from the outset by impugning the human/nonhuman boundary itself and thus the claim to human superiority**.

**their description of “dehumanization” in their graham evidence- reinforces the human/non-human binary**

Carol J. **ADAMS, 1994**. Author, former professor at Southern Methodist University, former Chairperson of the Housing Committee of the New York Governor's Commission on Domestic Violence. "Neither Man nor Beast: Feminism and the Defense of Animals." P 77-8

**It is** conventionally **said** that **oppression** **dehumanizes**, that it reduces humans to animal status. But **oppression cannot dehumanize animals. Animals exist categorically as that which is not human; they are not acknowledged as having human qualities that can then be denied. The presumption of an ontological absence of such human qualities has a priori defined animals as nonhuman. Resistance against oppression for humans involves recognizing and preserving their "humanity."** But, **it is a humanity established through a form of negating: just as white Americans knew they were free by the presence of enslaved blacks, so oppressed humans affirm their humanity by proclaiming their distance from the animals whom they are compared to, treated like, but never truly are**. A litany of protests erupt from those struggling against oppression, proclamations that assert "we are not beasts, we are humans, not animals!" Given the anthropocentric nature of Western culture's primary conceptualizations, this response is not surprising. As I indicated in the preface, this has been an assertion upon which feminists early staked their appeal for our rights and freedom. **Racist and sexist attitudes expose an elastic, mobile species definition that always advantages elite white males by positioning others as almost beasts.** Will antiracist and anti-sexist theory so conclusively accept the inescapable anthropocentricity of the human/animal divide that the result will be a fixed species definition that clearly demarcates once and for all, all humans as human beings, thus tacitly but firmly positioning all other animals as "animals"? Consider the synonyms for beast offered by The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (Third Edition): "brute, animal, brutish, brutal, beastly, beastial. These adjectives apply to what is more characteristic of lower animals than of human beings." Will oppositional movements insure that these adjectives always apply only to animals, and thus inscribe as well the hierarchy that positions animals as lower?

#### Their personification of nature as “mother earth” in their kaplow is anthropocentric and envelops motherhood into patriarchal society

Tzeporah Berman. 2001. co-director of Greenpeace International's Global Climate and Energy Program, Executive Director and Co-founder of PowerUp Canada and Co-founder and Campaign Director of ForestEthics. “The rape of the Mother Nature?” In Ecolinguistics Reader: Language, Ecology and Environment. Eds. Alwin Fill and Peter Muhlhausler. 262-3.

The use of the terms ‘Mother Earth’ and ‘Mother Nature’ in environmental discourse is widespread and generally accepted without question. Given the strength of the feminist movement in North America and widespread questioning of women’s role as primary care-givers, I find this quite surprising. I think that this cultural phenomena is indicative of the strength of the historical associations between women and Nature. In addition, I believe that the personification of the Earth as a woman, particularly as your ‘mother’ deserves critical study and is of questionable value to the environmental and feminist movements. Andree Collard notes that ‘it is precisely the projection of cultural values upon the external world that determines the treatment meted out on it’ (collard and Contrucci 1988). When we name the Earth as our mother we bring with the name our associations of motherhood and within patriarchal society our devaluation of mothering, of ‘women’s work,’ and the private sphere. This process of personification creates a way of looking at the world which sets up an object or other being (in this case, the Earth or Nature) with recognizable human characteristics. Personification allows us to ‘make sense of phenomena in the world in human terms – terms that we can understand on the basis of our motivations, goals, actions, and characteristies’ (Lakoff and Johnson 1987). From this understanding of the term ‘Mother Earth,’ two important questions arise: (1) Can we forge a new and progressive relationship with Nature given the cultural baggage we b ring with the term ‘mother?’; and (2) Is it possible to recognize the inherent value of other beings and living systems and the diversity of the natural world If we continue to represent Nature in a fundamentally anthropocentric (and I will argue androcentric) way in our language? Within patriarchal society women have been traditionally associated with motherhood, and therefore responsible for nurturing, caring and giving. Mother’s work is in turn unpaid and often unrecognized and devalued in capitalist society. In patriarchal culture it is our mother who satisfies all our needs, takes away waste, cleans and feeds us without any cost to us. While it is true that we have a certain dependence on our mother, we also have many expectations – it is unlikely that your mother will hurt you. As such, viewing the Earth as our mother perpetuates the notion that humans can take without being expected to give back, that the Earth is limitless and for human use. This concept is reflected in our economic systems in which Nature is a natural resource or an externality. Dorothy Dinnerstein notes that women are perceived as ‘a natural resource, as an asset to be owned and harnessed, harvested and mined, with no fellow-feeling for her depletion and no responsibility for her conservation or replenishment’ (Dinnerstein 1976). While we view Nature as our mother and therefore giving, kind and somehow inexhaustible we will view women as ‘Earth Mother,’ nurturing, caring and relegated to traditional roles of primary care-givers. Another prominent image of the Earth as female in environmental discourse is the revival and reinterpretation of the Greek Goddess, ‘Gaia.’ This term has become popularized through the work of James Lovelock’s Gaia hypothesis in which he postulates that the Earth is a living system. Patrick Murphy points out that in Greek mythology Gaia becomes subservient to her son-husband Uranus. He argues that the objectification of the Earth as something separate from men reinforces hierarchical dualisms. Murphy notes a telling passage in Lovelock’s early writings in which it is noted that man must attain knowledge to assure ‘her’ (Gaia’s) survival. Therefore, ‘Man’ functions as the intellect and protector of his mother and mate; he ensures her survival (Murphy 1998). This separation of man from women and Nature reinforces hierarchical dualisms and perpetuates the oppression and subordination of women and Nature.

**1. PERM LINKS MORE: IT ATTEMPTS TO DIRECT CRITICISM TOWARDS POLITICS CONDUCTED IN THE NAME OF A LIFE WHICH EXCLUDES BARE LIFE IN FAVOR OF THE VOICE OF THE CITIZEN, THE POLITICALLY QUALIFIED. THIS EXCLUDES BARE LIFE AND ESTABLISHES A REALM BEYOND OF THE MARKERS OF THE “POLITICAL” IN WHICH TO CONDUCT GENOCIDAL VIOLENCE AGAINST EXCEPTIONAL BEINGS.**

**HUDSON 2K4**

[Laura, The Political Animal: Species-Being and Bare Life, mediations journal, http://www.mediationsjournal.org/files/Mediations23\_2\_04.pdf]

The rise of environmentalism, deep ecology, and animal rights can be seen as effects of this inability of law, or the Law, to distance the “natural world” as a state outside itself. **Natural objects reappear within the political realm not as political actors but as markers of bare life.** **Sovereignty, in seeking to establish a political life separate from the state of nature, produces both political life as the life proper to the citizen (the “good life”) and bare life**, which occupies a space in between bios and zoē, evacuated of meaning. **The state of nature is not separate from political life but a state that exists alongside political life, as a necessary corollary of its existence. Political life is alienation from an imagined state of nature that we cannot access as human beings because it appears only in shadow form as bare life. The state of exception is that which defines which lives lack value, which lives can be killed without being either murdered or sacrificed.** Agamben’s examples of the inextricable link between political and bare life focus on the limit cases of humanity rather than the ideal, providing an analysis of precisely the cases that prove problematic in Ferry’s liberal humanism. The exception, as that which proves the rule, cannot be avoided. It is necessary to look to the figure of the refugee, the body of the “overcomatose” or the severely mentally impaired, and, under the Third Reich, the life of the Jew to see how the law fails in the task Ferry sets for it. **These cases demonstrate the zone of indistinction that Agamben elaborates as the zone of “life that does not deserve to live**.” The refugee demonstrates the necessity of a link between nation and subject; **refugees are no longer citizens and, as such, lack a claim to political rights: “In the system of the nation-state, the so-called sacred and inalienable rights of man show themselves to lack every protection and reality at the moment in which they can no longer take the form of rights belonging to citizens of a state**.”[15] **Confronted with the figure of the refugee, human rights are faced with their hidden ground in national origin, where, as Agamben notes, the key term is birth: men are born free, invoking the natural codes from which law was to separate us. This freedom is, in actuality, a function of citizenship and incorporation in the nation-state rather than a fact of being human: “citizenship names the new status of life as origin and ground of sovereignty and, therefore, literally identifies** … les membres du souverain, **‘the members of the sovereign.’”[16] This makes the link between that which is proper to the nation and that which is proper to the citizen the determinant of the zone of sacred life: those who do not fulfill the role of the citizen are no longer guaranteed protection or participation in political life, their so-called human rights void in the absence of national identity. The refugee or refugees as a group have a claim only to bare life, to being kept alive, but have no political voice with which to demand the rights of the citizen.** Agamben, while noting the same trend toward politicizing natural life that concerns Ferry, demonstrates that this politicization is already contained within the structure of politics itself. **This corresponds to the position of animals in human society: the exemplar of the limit case, they have always existed in the state of exception that founds the political. There is thus a connection between the plight of the refugee and that of the animal: neither participates directly in the political, though both are absolutely subject to political decisions in which they have no voice. The establishment of a realm outside the political, where lives have no value and thus may be killed, is marked by the difference between the human and the animal.**

**- PERM LINKS MORE: HOLDING OUT FOR REFORM IS WORSE BECAUSE IT DISAVOWS THE UNETHICAL VIOLENCE IN THEIR POLITICAL PARADIGM. ONLY THE ALT. SOLVES.**

**KOCHI & ORDAN 2K8**

[tarik and noam, queen’s university and bar llan university, “an argument for the global suicide of humanity”, vol 7. no. 4., bourderlands e-journal]

The banality of action hits against a central problem of social-political action within late modernity. In one sense, the ethical demand to respond to historical and present environmental destruction opens onto a difficulty within the relationship between moral intention and autonomy. While an individual might be autonomous in respect of moral conscience, their fundamental interconnection with and inter- dependence upon social, political and economic orders strips them of the power to make and act upon truly autonomous decisions. From this perspective **it is not only the modern humanist figures** such as Hawking **who perpetuate present violence and present dreams of colonial speciesist violence in the future. It is also those who might reject this violence but whose lives and actions are caught up in a certain complicity for this violence**. From a variety of political standpoints, it would seem that the issue of modern, autonomous action runs into difficulties of systematic and institutional complicity.¶ Certainly both individuals and groups are expected to give up a degree of autonomy in a modern liberal-democratic context. In this instance, **giving up autonomy (in the sense of autonomy as sovereignty) is typically done in exchange for the hope or promise of at some point having some degree of control or influence (i.e. via the electoral system) over government policy. The price of this hope or promise**, however, **is continued complicity in government-sanctioned social, political and economic actions that temporarily (or in the worst case, eternally) lie beyond the individual’s choice and control. The answer to the questions of whether such complicity might ever be institutionally overcome, and the problems of human violence against non-human species** and ongoing environmental destruction effectively dealt with**, often depends upon whether one believes that the liberal hope or promise is, either valid and worthwhile, or false and a sham**. [8]