# 1NC

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#### 1. Interpretation: The role of the ballot is to determine if the enactment of a topical plan is better than the status quo or a competitive option. The 1ac must read and defend the implementation of such a topical plan.

#### 2. Violation:

#### A) “Resolved” implies a policy or legislative decision – means they must be resolved about a future federal government policy

Parcher 1

Jeff Parcher, former debate coach at Georgetown, Feb 2001 http://www.ndtceda.com/archives/200102/0790.html

Pardon me if I turn to a source besides Bill. American Heritage Dictionary: Resolve: 1. To make a firm decision about. 2. To decide or express by formal vote. 3. To separate something into constiutent parts See Syns at \*analyze\* (emphasis in orginal) 4. Find a solution to. See Syns at \*Solve\* (emphasis in original) 5. To dispel: resolve a doubt. - n 1. Firmness of purpose; resolution. 2. A determination or decision. (2) The very nature of the word "resolution" makes it a question. American Heritage: A course of action determined or decided on. A formal statement of a decision, as by a legislature. (3) The resolution is obviously a question. Any other conclusion is utterly inconceivable. Why? Context. The debate community empowers a topic committee to write a topic for ALTERNATE side debating. The committee is not a random group of people coming together to "reserve" themselves about some issue. There is context - they are empowered by a community to do something. In their deliberations, the topic community attempts to craft a resolution which can be ANSWERED in either direction. They focus on issues like ground and fairness because they know the resolution will serve as the basis for debate which will be resolved by determining the policy desirablility of that resolution. That's not only what they do, but it's what we REQUIRE them to do. We don't just send the topic committee somewhere to adopt their own group resolution. It's not the end point of a resolution adopted by a body - it's the preliminary wording of a resolution sent to others to be answered or decided upon. (4) Further context: the word resolved is used to emphasis the fact that it's policy debate. Resolved comes from the adoption of resolutions by legislative bodies. A resolution is either adopted or it is not. It's a question before a legislative body. Should this statement be adopted or not. (5) The very terms 'affirmative' and 'negative' support my view. One affirms a resolution.

#### B) USFG is the national government in DC

Encarta Online Encyclopedia, 2k

(http://encarta.msn.com)

“The federal government **of the U**nited **S**tates **is centered in** Washington **DC”**

#### C) Should means there is a practical reason for action

WordNet in ‘97

Princeton University, 1.6

**Should** v 1 : be expected to: “Parties should be fun” 2 : **expresses an** emotional**, practical,** or other **reason for doing something:** “You had better put on warm clothes”; “You should call your mother-in-law”; *“The State ought to repair bridges*”[syn**:** had better, ought]

#### 3. Vote Negative:

#### A) Decisionmaking - a limited topic of discussion that provides for equitable ground is key to decision-making and advocacy skills

Steinberg & Freeley 8

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Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007. Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose. Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### Switch-side is key - effective deliberation is crucial to the activation of personal agency and is only possible in a switch-side debate format where debaters divorce themselves from ideology to engage in political contestation – the impact is mass violence

Roberts-Miller 3

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Totalitarianism and the Competitive Space of Agonism¶ Arendt is probably most famous for her analysis of totalitarianism (especially her The Origins of Totalitarianism andEichmann in Jerusa¬lem), but the recent attention has been on her criticism of mass culture (The Human Condition). Arendt's main criticism of the current human condition is that the common world of deliberate and joint action is fragmented into solipsistic and unreflective behavior. In an especially lovely passage, she says that in mass society people are all imprisoned in the subjectivity of their own singular experience, which does not cease to be singular if the same experience is multiplied innumerable times. The end of the common world has come when it is seen only under one aspect and is permitted to present itself in only one perspective. (Human 58)¶ What Arendt so beautifully describes is that isolation and individualism are not corollaries, and may even be antithetical because obsession with one's own self and the particularities of one's life prevents one from engaging in conscious, deliberate, collective action. Individuality, unlike isolation, depends upon a collective with whom one argues in order to direct the common life. Self-obsession, even (especially?) when coupled with isolation from one' s community is far from apolitical; it has political consequences. Perhaps a better way to put it is that it is political precisely because it aspires to be apolitical. This fragmented world in which many people live simultaneously and even similarly but not exactly together is what Arendt calls the "social."¶ Arendt does not mean that group behavior is impossible in the realm of the social, but that social behavior consists "in some way of isolated individuals, incapable of solidarity or mutuality, who abdicate their human capacities and responsibilities to a projected 'they' or 'it,' with disastrous consequences, both for other people and eventually for themselves" (Pitkin 79). One can behave, butnot act. For someone like Arendt, a German-assimilated Jew, one of the most frightening aspects of the Holocaust was the ease with which a people who had not been extraordinarily anti-Semitic could be put to work industriously and efficiently on the genocide of the Jews. And what was striking about the perpetrators of the genocide, ranging from minor functionaries who facilitated the murder transports up to major figures on trial at Nuremberg, was their constant and apparently sincere insistence that they were not responsible. For Arendt, this was not a peculiarity of the German people, but of the current human and heavily bureaucratic condition of twentieth-century culture: we do not consciously choose to engage in life's activities; we drift into them, or we do them out of a desire to conform. Even while we do them, we do not acknowledge an active, willed choice to do them; instead, we attribute our behavior to necessity, and we perceive ourselves as determined—determined by circumstance, by accident, by what "they" tell us to do. We do something from within the anonymity of a mob that we would never do as an individual; we do things for which we will not take responsibility. Yet, whether or not people acknowledge responsibil¬ity for the consequences of their actions, those consequences exist. Refusing to accept responsibility can even make those consequences worse, in that the people who enact the actions in question, because they do not admit their own agency, cannot be persuaded to stop those actions. They are simply doing their jobs. In a totalitarian system, however, everyone is simply doing his or her job; there never seems to be anyone who can explain, defend, and change the policies. Thus, it is, as Arendt says, rule by nobody.¶ It is illustrative to contrast Arendt's attitude toward discourse to Habermas'. While both are critical of modern bureaucratic and totalitar¬ian systems, Arendt's solution is the playful and competitive space of agonism; it is not the rational-critical public sphere. The "actual content of political life" is "the joy and the gratification that arise out of being in company with our peers, out of acting together and appearing in public, out of inserting ourselves into the world by word and deed, thus acquiring and sustaining our personal identity and beginning something entirely new" ("Truth" 263). According to Seyla Benhabib, Arendt's public realm emphasizes the assumption of competition, and it "represents that space of appearances in which moral and political greatness, heroism, and preeminence are revealed, displayed, shared with others. This is a competitive space in which one competes for recognition, precedence, and acclaim" (78). These qualities are displayed, but not entirely for purposes of acclamation; they are not displays of one's self, but of ideas and arguments, of one's thought. When Arendt discusses Socrates' thinking in public, she emphasizes his performance: "He performed in the marketplace the way the flute-player performed at a banquet. It is sheer performance, sheer activity"; nevertheless, it was thinking: "What he actually did was to make public, in discourse, the thinking process" {Lectures 37). Pitkin summarizes this point: "Arendt says that the heroism associated with politics is not the mythical machismo of ancient Greece but something more like the existential leap into action and public exposure" (175-76). Just as it is not machismo, although it does have considerable ego involved, so it is not instrumental rationality; Arendt's discussion of the kinds of discourse involved in public action include myths, stories, and personal narratives.¶ Furthermore, the competition is not ruthless; it does not imply a willingness to triumph at all costs. Instead, it involves something like having such a passion for ideas and politics that one is willing to take risks. One tries to articulate the best argument, propose the best policy, design the best laws, make the best response. This is a risk in that one might lose; advancing an argument means that one must be open to the criticisms others will make of it. The situation is agonistic not because the participants manufacture or seek conflict, but because conflict is a necessary consequence of difference. This attitude is reminiscent of Kenneth Burke, who did not try to find a language free of domination but who instead theorized a way that the very tendency toward hierarchy in language might be used against itself (for more on this argument, see Kastely). Similarly, Arendt does not propose a public realm of neutral, rational beings who escape differences to live in the discourse of universals; she envisions one of different people who argue with passion, vehemence, and integrity.¶ Continued…¶ Eichmann perfectly exemplified what Arendt famously called the "banal¬ity of evil" but that might be better thought of as the bureaucratization of evil (or, as a friend once aptly put it, the evil of banality). That is, he was able to engage in mass murder because he was able not to think about it, especially not from the perspective of the victims, and he was able to exempt himself from personal responsibility by telling himself (and anyone else who would listen) that he was just following orders. It was the bureaucratic system that enabled him to do both. He was not exactly passive; he was, on the contrary, very aggressive in trying to do his duty. He behaved with the "ruthless, competitive exploitation" and "inauthen-tic, self-disparaging conformism" that characterizes those who people totalitarian systems (Pitkin 87).¶ Arendt's theorizing of totalitarianism has been justly noted as one of her strongest contributions to philosophy. She saw that a situation like Nazi Germany is different from the conventional understanding of a tyranny. Pitkin writes,¶ Totalitarianism cannot be understood, like earlier forms of domination, as the ruthless exploitation of some people by others, whether the motive be selfish calculation, irrational passion, or devotion to some cause. Understanding totalitarianism's essential nature requires solving the central mystery of the holocaust—the objectively useless and indeed dysfunctional, fanatical pursuit of a purely ideological policy, a pointless process to which the people enacting it have fallen captive. (87)¶ Totalitarianism is closely connected to bureaucracy; it is oppression by rules, rather than by people who have willfully chosen to establish certain rules. It is the triumph of the social.¶ Critics (both friendly and hostile) have paid considerable attention to Arendt's category of the "social," largely because, despite spending so much time on the notion, Arendt remains vague on certain aspects of it. Pitkin appropriately compares Arendt's concept of the social to the Blob, the type of monster that figured in so many post-war horror movies. That Blob was "an evil monster from outer space, entirely external to and separate from us [that] had fallen upon us intent on debilitating, absorb¬ing, and ultimately destroying us, gobbling up our distinct individuality and turning us into robots that mechanically serve its purposes" (4).¶ Pitkin is critical of this version of the "social" and suggests that Arendt meant (or perhaps should have meant) something much more complicated. The simplistic version of the social-as-Blob can itself be an instance of Blob thinking; Pitkin's criticism is that Arendt talks at times as though the social comes from outside of us and has fallen upon us, turning us into robots. Yet, Arendt's major criticism of the social is that it involves seeing ourselves as victimized by something that comes from outside our own behavior. I agree with Pitkin that Arendt's most powerful descriptions of the social (and the other concepts similar to it, such as her discussion of totalitarianism, imperialism, Eichmann, and parvenus) emphasize that these processes are not entirely out of our control but that they happen to us when, and because, we keep refusing to make active choices. We create the social through negligence. It is not the sort of force in a Sorcerer's Apprentice, which once let loose cannot be stopped; on the contrary, it continues to exist because we structure our world to reward social behavior. Pitkin writes, "From childhood on, in virtually all our institutions, we reward euphemism, salesmanship, slo¬gans, and we punish and suppress truth-telling, originality, thoughtful-ness. So we continually cultivate ways of (not) thinking that induce the social" (274). I want to emphasize this point, as it is important for thinking about criticisms of some forms of the social construction of knowledge: denying our own agency is what enables the social to thrive. To put it another way, theories of powerlessness are self-fulfilling prophecies.¶ Arendt grants that there are people who willed the Holocaust, but she insists that totalitarian systems result not so much from the Hitlers or Stalins as from the bureaucrats who may or may not agree with the established ideology but who enforce the rules for no stronger motive than a desire to avoid trouble with their superiors (see Eichmann and Life). They do not think about what they do. One might prevent such occurrences—or, at least, resist the modern tendency toward totalitarian¬ism—by thought: "critical thought is in principle anti-authoritarian" (Lectures 38).¶ By "thought" Arendt does not mean eremitic contemplation; in fact, she has great contempt for what she calls "professional thinkers," refusing herself to become a philosopher or to call her work philosophy. Young-Bruehl, Benhabib, and Pitkin have each said that Heidegger represented just such a professional thinker for Arendt, and his embrace of Nazism epitomized the genuine dangers such "thinking" can pose (see Arendt's "Heidegger"). "Thinking" is not typified by the isolated con¬templation of philosophers; it requires the arguments of others and close attention to the truth. It is easy to overstate either part of that harmony. One must consider carefully the arguments and viewpoints of others:¶ Political thought is representative. I form an opinion by considering a given issue from different viewpoints, by making present to my mind the standpoints of those who are absent; that is, I represent them. This process of representation does not blindly adopt the actual views of those who stand somewhere else, and hence look upon the world from a different perspective; this is a question neither of empathy, as though I tried to be or to feel like somebody else, nor of counting noses and joining a majority but of being and thinking in my own identity where actually I am not. The more people's standpoints I have present in my mind while I am ponder¬ing a given issue, and the better I can imagine how I would feel and think if I were in their place, the stronger will be my capacity for represen¬tative thinking and the more valid my final conclusions, my opinion. ("Truth" 241)¶ There are two points to emphasize in this wonderful passage. First, one does not get these standpoints in one's mind through imagining them, but through listening to them; thus, good thinking requires that one hear the arguments of other people. Hence, as Arendt says, "critical thinking, while still a solitary business, does not cut itself off from' all others.'" Thinking is, in this view, necessarily public discourse: critical thinking is possible "only where the standpoints of all others are open to inspection" (Lectures 43). Yet, it is not a discourse in which one simply announces one's stance; participants are interlocutors and not just speakers; they must listen. Unlike many current versions of public discourse, this view presumes that speech matters. It is not asymmetric manipulation of others, nor merely an economic exchange; it must be a world into which one enters and by which one might be changed.¶ Second, passages like the above make some readers think that Arendt puts too much faith in discourse and too little in truth (see Habermas). But Arendt is no crude relativist; she believes in truth, and she believes that there are facts that can be more or less distorted. She does not believe that reality is constructed by discourse, or that truth is indistinguishable from falsehood. She insists tha^ the truth has a different pull on us and, consequently, that it has a difficult place in the world of the political. Facts are different from falsehood because, while they can be distorted or denied, especially when they are inconvenient for the powerful, they also have a certain positive force that falsehood lacks: "Truth, though powerless and always defe ated in a head-on clash with the powers that be, possesses a strength of its own: whatever those in power may contrive, they are unable to discover or invent a viable substitute for it. Persuasion and violence can destroy truth, but they cannot replace it" ("Truth" 259).¶ Facts have a strangely resilient quality partially because a lie "tears, as it were, a hole in the fabric of factuality. As every historian knows, one can spot a lie by noticing incongruities, holes, or the j unctures of patched-up places" ("Truth" 253). While she is sometimes discouraging about our ability to see the tears in the fabric, citing the capacity of totalitarian governments to create the whole cloth (see "Truth" 252-54), she is also sometimes optimistic. InEichmann in Jerusalem, she repeats the story of Anton Schmidt—a man who saved the lives of Jews—and concludes that such stories cannot be silenced (230-32). For facts to exert power in the common world, however, these stories must be told. Rational truth (such as principles of mathematics) might be perceptible and demonstrable through individual contemplation, but "factual truth, on the contrary, is always related to other people: it concerns events and circumstances in which many are involved; it is established by witnesses and depends upon testimony; it exists only to the extent that it is spoken about, even if it occurs in the domain of privacy. It is political by nature" (23 8). Arendt is neither a positivist who posits an autonomous individual who can correctly perceive truth, nor a relativist who positively asserts the inherent relativism of all perception. Her description of how truth functions does not fall anywhere in the three-part expeditio so prevalent in bothrhetoric and philosophy: it is not expressivist, positivist, or social constructivist. Good thinking depends upon good public argument, and good public argument depends upon access to facts: "Freedom of opinion is a farce unless factual information is guaranteed" (238).¶ The sort of thinking that Arendt propounds takes the form of action only when it is public argument, and, as such, it is particularly precious: "For if no other test but the experience of being active, no other measure but the extent of sheer activity were to be applied to the various activities within the vita activa, it might well be that thinking as such would surpass them all" (Human 325). Arendt insists that it is "the same general rule— Do not contradict yourself (not your self but your thinking ego)—that determines both thinking and acting" (Lectures 3 7). In place of the mildly resentful conformism that fuels totalitarianism, Arendt proposes what Pitkin calls "a tough-minded, open-eyed readiness to perceive and judge reality for oneself, in terms of concrete experience and independent, critical theorizing" (274). The paradoxical nature of agonism (that it must involve both individuality and commonality) makes it difficult to maintain, as the temptation is great either to think one's own thoughts without reference to anyone else or to let others do one's thinking.¶ Arendt's Polemical Agonism¶ As I said, agonism does have its advocates within rhetoric—Burke, Ong, Sloane, Gage, and Jarratt, for instance—but while each of these theorists proposes a form of conflictual argument, not one of these is as adversarial as Arendt's. Agonism can emphasize persuasion, as does John Gage's textbook The Shape of Reason or William Brandt et al.'s The Craft of Writing. That is, the goal of the argument is to identify the disagreement and then construct a text that gains the assent of the audience. This is not the same as what Gage (citing Thomas Conley) calls "asymmetrical theories of rhetoric": theories that "presuppose an active speaker and a passive audience, a speaker whose rhetorical task is therefore to do something to that audience" ("Reasoned" 6). Asymmetric rhetoric is not and cannot be agonistic. Persuasive agonism still values conflict, disagreement, and equality among interlocutors, but it has the goal of reaching agreement, as when Gage says that the process of argument should enable one's reasons to be "understood and believed" by others (Shape 5; emphasis added).¶ Arendt's version is what one might call polemical agonism: it puts less emphasis on gaining assent, and it is exemplified both in Arendt's own writing and in Donald Lazere's "Ground Rules for Polemicists" and "Teaching the Political Conflicts." Both forms of agonism (persuasive and polemical) require substantive debate at two points in a long and recursive process. First, one engages in debate in order to invent one's argument; even silent thinking is a "dialogue of myself with myself (Lectures 40). The difference between the two approaches to agonism is clearest when one presents an argument to an audience assumed to be an opposition. In persuasive agonism, one plays down conflict and moves through reasons to try to persuade one's audience. In polemical agonism, however, one's intention is not necessarily to prove one's case, but to make public one' s thought in order to test it. In this way, communicability serves the same function in philosophy that replicability serves in the sciences; it is how one tests the validity of one's thought. In persuasive agonism, success is achieved through persuasion; in polemical agonism, success may be marked through the quality of subsequent controversy.¶ Arendt quotes from a letter Kant wrote on this point:¶ You know that I do not approach reasonable objections with the intention merely of refuting them, but that in thinking them over I always weave them into my judgments, and afford them the opportunity of overturning all my most cherished beliefs. I entertain the hope that by thus viewing my judgments impartially from the standpoint of others some third view that will improve upon my previous insight may be obtainable. {Lectures 42)¶ Kant's use of "impartial" here is interesting: he is not describing a stance that is free of all perspective; it is impartial only in the sense that it is not his own view. This is the same way that Arendt uses the term; she does not advocate any kind of positivistic rationality, but instead a "universal interdependence" ("Truth" 242). She does not place the origin of the "disinterested pursuit of truth" in science, but at "the moment when Homer chose to sing the deeds of the Trojans no less than those of the Achaeans, and to praise the glory of Hector, the foe and the defeated man, no less than the glory of Achilles, the hero of his kinfolk" ("Truth" 262¬63). It is useful to note that Arendt tends not to use the term "universal," opting more often for "common," by which she means both what is shared and what is ordinary, a usage that evades many of the problems associated with universalism while preserving its virtues (for a brief butprovocative application of Arendt's notion of common, see Hauser 100-03).¶ In polemical agonism, there is a sense in which one' s main goal is not to persuade one's readers; persuading one's readers, if this means that they fail to see errors and flaws in one' s argument, might actually be a sort of failure. It means that one wishes to put forward an argument that makes clear what one's stance is and why one holds it, but with the intention of provoking critique and counterargument. Arendt describes Kant's "hope" for his writings not that the number of people who agree with him would increase but "that the circle of his examiners would gradually be en¬larged" {Lectures 39); he wanted interlocutors, not acolytes.¶ This is not consensus-based argument, nor is it what is sometimes called "consociational argument," nor is this argument as mediation or conflict resolution. Arendt (and her commentators) use the term "fight," and they mean it. When Arendt describes the values that are necessary in our world, she says, "They are a sense of honor, desire for fame and glory, the spirit of fighting without hatred and 'without the spirit of revenge,' and indifference to material advantages" {Crises 167). Pitkin summarizes Arendt's argument: "Free citizenship presupposes the ability to fight— openly, seriously, with commitment, and about things that really mat¬ter—without fanaticism, without seeking to exterminate one's oppo¬nents" (266). My point here is two-fold: first, there is not a simple binary opposition between persuasive discourse and eristic discourse, the conflictual versus the collaborative, or argument as opposed to debate.¶ Second, while polemical agonismrequires diversity among interlocutors, and thus seems an extraordinarily appropriate notion, and while it may be a useful corrective to too much emphasis on persuasion, it seems to me that polemical agonism could easily slide into the kind of wrangling that is simply frustrating. Arendt does not describe just how one is to keep the conflict useful. Although she rejects the notion that politics is "no more than a battlefield of partial, conflicting interests, where nothing countfs] but pleasure and profit, partisanship, and the lust for dominion," she does not say exactly how we are to know when we are engaging in the existential leap of argument versus when we are lusting for dominion ("Truth" 263).¶ Like other proponents of agonism, Arendt argues that rhetoric does not lead individuals or communities to ultimate Truth; it leads to decisions that will necessarily have to be reconsidered. Even Arendt, who tends to express a greater faith than many agonists (such as Burke, Sloane, or Kastely) in the ability of individuals to perceive truth, insists that self-deception is always a danger, so public discourse is necessary as a form of testing (see especially Lectures and "Truth"). She remarks that it is difficult to think beyond one's self-interest and that "nothing, indeed, is more common, even among highly sophisticated people, than the blind obstinacy that becomes manifest in lack of imagination and failure to judge" ("Truth" 242).¶ Agonism demands that one simultaneously trust and doubt one' s own perceptions, rely on one's own judgment and consider the judgments of others, think for oneself and imagine how others think. The question remains whether this is a kind of thought in which everyone can engage. Is the agonistic public sphere (whether political, academic, or scientific) only available to the few? Benhabib puts this criticism in the form of a question: "That is, is the 'recovery of the public space' under conditions of modernity necessarily an elitist and antidemocratic project that can hardly be reconciled with the demand for universal political emancipa¬tion and the universal extension of citizenship rights that have accompa¬nied modernity since the American and French Revolutions?" (75). This is an especially troubling question not only because Arendt's examples of agonistic rhetoric are from elitist cultures, but also because of com¬ments she makes, such as this one from The Human Condition: "As a living experience, thought has always been assumed, perhaps wrongly, to be known only to the few. It may not be presumptuous to believe that these few have not become fewer in our time" {Human 324).¶ Yet, there are important positive political consequences of agonism.¶ Arendt' s own promotion of the agonistic sphere helps to explain how the system could be actively moral. It is not an overstatement to say that a central theme in Arendt's work is the evil of conformity—the fact that the modern bureaucratic state makes possible extraordinary evil carried out by people who do not even have any ill will toward their victims. It does so by "imposing innumerable and various rules, all of which tend to 'normalize' its members, to make them behave, to exclude spontaneous action or outstanding achievement" (Human 40). It keeps people from thinking, and it keeps them behaving. The agonistic model's celebration of achievement and verbal skill undermines the political force of conformity, so it is a force against the bureaucratizing of evil. If people think for themselves, they will resist dogma; if people think of themselves as one of many, they will empathize; if people can do both, they will resist totalitarianism. And if they talk about what they see, tell their stories, argue about their perceptions, and listen to one another—that is, engage in rhetoric—then they are engaging in antitotalitarian action.¶ In post-Ramistic rhetoric, it is a convention to have a thesis, and one might well wonder just what mine is—whether I am arguing for or against Arendt's agonism. Arendt does not lay out a pedagogy for us to follow (although one might argue that, if she had, it would lookmuch like the one Lazere describes in "Teaching"), so I am not claiming that greater attention to Arendt would untangle various pedagogical problems that teachers of writing face. Nor am I claiming that applying Arendt's views will resolve theoretical arguments that occupy scholarly journals. I am saying, on the one hand, that Arendt's connection of argument and thinking, as well as her perception that both serve to thwart totalitarian¬ism, suggest that agonal rhetoric (despite the current preference for collaborative rhetoric) is the best discourse for a diverse and inclusive public sphere. On the other hand, Arendt's advocacy of agonal rhetoric is troubling (and, given her own admiration for Kant, this may be intentional), especially in regard to its potential elitism, masculinism, failure to describe just how to keep argument from collapsing into wrangling, and apparently cheerful acceptance of hierarchy. Even with these flaws, Arendt describes something we would do well to consider thoughtfully: a fact-based but not positivist, communally grounded but not relativist, adversarial but not violent, independent but not expressivist rhetoric.

#### B) Dialogue – our entire negative strategy is based on the “should” question of the resolution---there are an infinite number of reasons that the scholarship of their advocacy could be a reason to vote affirmative--- these all obviate the only predictable strategies based on topical action---they overstretch our research burden and undermine preparedness for all debates making effective deliberation impossible which makes it impossible to be negative – voting issue for limits and ground

### 1NC

#### THE 1AC IGNORES THAT RACISM IS MERELY ONE AMONGST MANY TOOLS OF AXIOLOGICAL ANTHROPOCENTRISM WHEREBY VIOLENCE CAN ALWAYS BE JUSTIFIED WHEN APPLIED TO RACIALLY INFERIOR GROUPS. ONLY A CRITIQUE WHICH FOCUSES ON REJECTING SUBHUMAN THINKING CAN CONTEST THE MYRIAD FORMS OF RACISM.

Deckha 2k10

[Maneesha, faculty of law, university of Victoria, “it’s time to abandon the idea of human rights”, the scavenger, dec. 10]

While the intersection of race and gender is often acknowledged in understanding the etiology of justificatory narratives for war, the presence of species distinctions and the importance of the subhuman are less appreciated. Yet, the race (and gender) thinking that animates Razack’s argument in normalizing violence for detainees (and others) is also centrally sustained by the subhuman figure. As Charles Patterson notes with respect to multiple forms of exploitation: Throughout the history of our ascent to dominance as the master species, our victimization of animals has served as the model and foundation for our victimization of each other. The study of human history reveals the pattern: first, humans exploit and slaughter animals; then, they treat other people like animas and do the same to them. Patterson emphasizes how the human/animal hierarchy and our ideas about animals and animality are foundational for intra-human hierarchies and the violence they promote. The routine violence against beings designated subhuman serves as both a justification and blueprint for violence against humans. For example, in discussing the specific dynamics of the Nazi camps, Patterson further notes how techniques to make the killing of detainees resemble the slaughter of animals were deliberately implemented in order to make the killing seem more palatable and benign. That the detainees were made naked and kept crowded in the gas chambers facilitated their animalization and, in turn, their death at the hands of other humans who were already culturally familiar and comfortable with killing animals in this way. Returning to Razack’s exposition of race thinking in contemporary camps, one can see how subhuman thinking is foundational to race thinking. One of her primary arguments is that race thinking, which she defines as “the denial of a common bond of humanity between people of European descent and those who are not”, is “a defining feature of the world order” today as in the past. In other words, it is the “species thinking” that helps to create the racial demarcation. As Razack notes with respect to the specific logic infusing the camps, they “are not simply contemporary excesses born of the west’s current quest for security, but instead represent a more ominous, permanent arrangement of who is and is not a part of the human community”. Once placed outside the “human” zone by race thinking, the detainees may be handled lawlessly and thus with violence that is legitimated at all times. Racialization is not enough and does not complete their Othering experience. Rather, they must be dehumanized for the larger public to accept the violence against them and the increasing “culture of exception” which sustains these human bodily exclusions. Although nonhumans are not the focus of Razack’s work, the centrality of the subhuman to the logic of the camps and racial and sexual violence contained therein is also clearly illustrated in her specific examples. In the course of her analysis, to determine the import of race thinking in enabling violence, Razack quotes a newspaper story that describes the background mentality of Private Lynndie England, the white female soldier made notorious by images of her holding onto imprisoned and naked Iraqi men with a leash around their necks. The story itself quotes a resident from England’s hometown who says the following about the sensibilities of individuals from their town: To the country boys here, if you’re a different nationality, a different race, you’re sub-human. That’s the way that girls like Lynndie England are raised. Tormenting Iraqis, in her mind, would be no different from shooting a turkey. Every season here you’re hunting something. Over there they’re hunting Iraqis. Razack extracts this quote to illustrate how “race overdetermined what went on”, but it may also be observed that species “overdetermined what went on”. Race has a formative function, to be sure, but it works in conjunction with species difference to enable the violence at Abu Ghraib and other camps. Dehumanization promotes racialization, which further entrenches both identities. It is an intertwined logic of race, sex, culture and species that lays the foundation for the violence.

#### AND, this species-contingent paradigm creates unending genocidal violence against forms of life deemed politically unqualified.

KOCHI & ORDAN 2K8

[tarik and noam, queen’s university and bar llan university, “an argument for the global suicide of humanity”, vol 7. no. 4., bourderlands e-journal]

Within the picture many paint of humanity, events such as the Holocaust are considered as an exception, an aberration. The Holocaust is often portrayed as an example of ‘evil’, a moment of hatred, madness and cruelty (cf. the differing accounts of ‘evil’ given in Neiman, 2004). The event is also treated as one through which humanity comprehend its own weakness and draw strength, via the resolve that such actions will never happen again. However, if we take seriously the differing ways in which the Holocaust was ‘evil’, then one must surely include along side it the almost uncountable numbers of genocides that have occurred throughout human history. Hence, if we are to think of the content of the ‘human heritage’, then this must include the annihilation of indigenous peoples and their cultures across the globe and the manner in which their beliefs, behaviours and social practices have been erased from what the people of the ‘West’ generally consider to be the content of a human heritage. Again the history of colonialism is telling here. It reminds us exactly how normal, regular and mundane acts of annihilation of different forms of human life and culture have been throughout human history. Indeed the history of colonialism, in its various guises, points to the fact that so many of our legal institutions and forms of ethical life (i.e. nation-states which pride themselves on protecting human rights through the rule of law) have been founded upon colonial violence, war and the appropriation of other peoples’ land (Schmitt, 2003; Benjamin, 1986). Further, the history of colonialism highlights the central function of ‘race war’ that often underlies human social organisation and many of its legal and ethical systems of thought (Foucault, 2003). This history of modern colonialism thus presents a key to understanding that events such as the Holocaust are not an aberration and exception but are closer to the norm, and sadly, lie at the heart of any heritage of humanity. After all, all too often the European colonisation of the globe was justified by arguments that indigenous inhabitants were racially ‘inferior’ and in some instances that they were closer to ‘apes’ than to humans (Diamond, 2006). Such violence justified by an erroneous view of ‘race’ is in many ways merely an extension of an underlying attitude of speciesism involving a long history of killing and enslavement of non-human species by humans. Such a connection between the two histories of inter-human violence (via the mythical notion of differing human ‘races’) and interspecies violence, is well expressed in Isaac Bashevis Singer’s comment that whereas humans consider themselves “the crown of creation”, for animals “all people are Nazis” and animal life is “an eternal Treblinka” (Singer, 1968, p.750).

#### Alternative: the judge should vote negative to REJECT THE HUMAN/ANIMAL DIVIDE.

#### this rejection enables an understanding of the SPECIES-BEING. that SOLVES THE ETHICAL CONTRADICTION OF THEIR SPECIES-LEVEL RACISM.

HUDSON 2K4

[Laura, The Political Animal: Species-Being and Bare Life, mediations journal, http://www.mediationsjournal.org/files/Mediations23\_2\_04.pdf]

We are all equally reduced to mere specimens of human biology, mute and uncomprehending of the world in which we are thrown. Species-being, or “humanity as a species,” may require this recognition to move beyond the pseudo-essence of the religion of humanism. Recognizing that what we call “the human” is an abstraction that fails to fully describe what we are, we may come to find a new way of understanding humanity that recuperates the natural without domination. The bare life that results from expulsion from the law removes even the illusion of freedom. Regardless of one’s location in production, the threat of losing even the fiction of citizenship and freedom affects everyone. This may create new means of organizing resistance across the particular divisions of society. Furthermore, the concept of bare life allows us to gesture toward a more detailed, concrete idea of what species-being may look like. Agamben hints that in the recognition of this fact, that in our essence we are all animals, that we are all living dead, might reside the possibility of a kind of redemption. Rather than the mystical horizon of a future community, the passage to species-being may be experienced as a deprivation, a loss of identity. Species-being is not merely a positive result of the development of history; it is equally the absence of many of the features of “humanity” through which we have learned to make sense of our world. It is an absence of the kind of individuality and atomism that structure our world under capitalism and underlie liberal democracy, and which continue to inform the tenets of deep ecology. The development of species-being requires the collapse of the distinction between human and animal in order to change the shape of our relationships with the natural world. A true species-being depends on a sort of reconciliation between our “human” and “animal” selves, a breakdown of the distinction between the two both within ourselves and in nature in general. Bare life would then represent not only expulsion from the law but the possibility of its overcoming. Positioned in the zone of indistinction, no longer a subject of the law but still subjected to it through absence, what we equivocally call “the human” in general becomes virtually indistinguishable from the animal or nature. But through this expulsion and absence, we may see not only the law but the system of capitalism that shapes it from a position no longer blinded or captivated by its spell. The structure of the law is revealed as always suspect in the false division between natural and political life, which are never truly separable. Though clearly the situation is not yet as dire as Agamben’s invocation of the Holocaust suggests, we are all, as citizens, under the threat of the state of exception. With the decline of the nation as a form of social organization, the whittling away of civil liberties and, with them, the state’s promise of “the good life” (or “the good death”) even in the most developed nations, with the weakening of labor as the bearer of resistance to exploitation, how are we to envision the future of politics and society?

### 1NC

#### The 1AC finds its value in futurity – a political stance in structural and ontological opposition to the queer – attempts at political assimilation merely displace queerness onto others – the alternative is queer negativity – only this oppositional resistance to the enslavement of the future can contest infinite anti-queer violence

\*\*\*Read blue

Edelman 4

(Lee Edelman, a professor of English at Tufts University, “NO FUTURE: Queer Theory and the Death Drive” Duke University Press, Durham and London, 2004, KB)

By denying our identification with the negativity of this drive, and¶ hence our disidentification from the promise of futurity, those of us inhabiting¶ the, place of the queer may be able to cast off that queerness¶ and enter the properly political sphere, but only by shifting the figural¶ burden of queerness to someone else. The structural position of queerness,¶ after all, and the need to fill it remain. By choosing to accept that position,¶ however, by assuming the " truth" of our queer capacity to figure the¶ undoing of the Symbolic, and of the Symbolic subject as well, we might¶ undertake the impossible project of imagining an oppositional political¶ stance exempt from the imperative to reproduce the politics of signification (the politics aimed at closing the gap opened up by the signifier itself), which can only return us, by way of the Child, to the politics of¶ reproduction. For the liberal's view of society, which seems to accord the¶ queer a place, endorses no more than the conservative right's the queerness¶ of resistance to futurism and thus the queerness of the queer. While¶ the right wing imagines the elimination of queers (or of the need to confront¶ their existence), the left would eliminate queerness by shining the¶ cool light of reason upon it, hoping thereby to expose it as merely a mode¶ of sexual expression free of the all-pervasive coloring, the determining¶ fantasy formation, by means of which it can seem to portend, and not¶ for the right alone, the undoing of the social order and its cynosure, the¶ Child. Queerness thus comes to mean nothing for both: for the right wing¶ the nothingness always at war with the positivity of civil society; for the¶ left, nothing more than a sexual practice in need of demystification.¶ But this is where reason must fail. Sexuality refuses demystification¶ as the Symbolic refuses the queer; for sexuality and the Symbolic become¶ what they are by virtue of such refusals. Ironically - but irony, as I've argued,¶ always characterizes queer theory-the demystification of queerness¶ and so, by extension, of sexuality itself, the demystification inherent¶ in the position of liberal rationality, could achieve its realization only by¶ traversing the collective fantasy that invests the social order with meaning by way of reproductive futurism. Taken at its word, that is, liberalism's¶ abstract reason, rescuing queerness for sociality, dissolves, like¶ queerness, the very investments on which sociality rests by doing away¶ with its underlying and sustaining libidinal fantasies. Beyond the resonance¶ of fantasy, after all, lies neither law nor reason. In the beyond of demystification,¶ in that neutral, democratic literality that marks the futurism¶ of the left, one could only encounter a queer dismantling of futurism¶ itself as fantasy and a derealization of the order of meaning that futurism¶ reproduces. Intent on the end, not the ends, of the social, queerness¶ insists that the drive toward that end, which liberalism refuses to¶ imagine, can never be excluded from the structuring fantasy of the social¶ order itself. The sacralization of the Child thus necessitates the sacrifice¶ of the queer.¶ Bernard Law, the former cardinal of Boston, mistaking (or maybe¶ understanding too well) the degree of authority bestowed on him by¶ the signifier of his patronymic, denounced in 1996 proposed legislation¶ giving health care benefits to Same-sex partners of municipal employ-¶ ees. He did so by proclaiming, in a noteworthy instance of piety in the¶ sky, that bestowing such access to health care would profoundly diminish¶ the marital bond. "Society," he opined, "has a special interest in the¶ protection, care and upbringing of children. Because marriage remains¶ the principal, and the best, framework for the nurture, education and¶ socialization of children, the state has a special interest in marriage." 31¶ With this fatal embrace of a futurism so blindly committed to the figure¶ of the Child that it will justify refusing health care benefits to the adults¶ that some children become, Law lent his voice to the mortifying mantra¶ of a communal jouissance that depends on the fetishization of the Child¶ at the expense of whatever such fetishization must inescapably queer.¶ Some seven years later, after Law had resigned for his failure to protect¶ Catholic children from sexual assault by pedophile priests, Pope John¶ Paul II returned to this theme, condemning state􀄬recognized same-sex¶ unions as parodic versions of authentic families, "based on individual¶ egoism" rather than genuine love. Justifying that condemnation, he observed,¶ "Such a 'caricature' has no future and cannot give future to any¶ society." 32 Queers must respond to the violent force of such constant¶ provocations not only by insisting on our equal right to the social order's¶ prerogatives, not only by avowing our capacity to promote that order's¶ coherence and integrity, but also by saying explicitly what Law and the¶ Pope and the whole of the Symbolic order for which they stand hear anyway¶ in each and every expression or manifestation of queer sexuality:¶ Fuck the social order and the Child in whose name we're collectively¶ terrorized; fuck Annie; fuck the waif from Les Mis; fuck the poor, innocent¶ kid on the Net; fuck Laws both with capital Is and with small; fuck the whole network of Symbolic relations and the future that serves as¶ its prop.¶ We might like to believe that with patience, with work, with generous¶ contributions to lobbying groups or generous participation in activist¶ groups or generous doses of legal savvy and electoral sophistication, the¶ future will hold a place for us - a place at the political table that won't¶ have to come at the cost of the places we seek in the bed or the bar or the¶ baths. But there are no queers in that future as there can be no future for queers, chosen as they are to bear the bad tidings that there can be no¶ future at all,: that the future, as Annie's hymn to the hope of "Tomorrow"¶ understands, is "always/ A day/ Away." Like the lovers on Keats's Grecian¶ urn, forever "near the goal" of a union they'll never in fact achieve, we're¶ held in thrall by a future continually deferred by time itself, constrained to¶ pursue the dream of a day when today and tomorrow are one. That future¶ is nothing but kid stuff, reborn each day to screen out the grave that gapes¶ from within the lifeless letter, luring us into, ensnaring us in, reality's¶ gossamer web. Those queered by the social order that projects its death¶ drive onto them are no doubt positioned to recognize the structuring fantasy¶ that so defines them. But they're positioned as well to recognize the¶ irredudbility of that fantasy and the cost of construing it as contingent to¶ the logic of social organization as such. Acceding to this figural identification¶ with the undoing of identity, which is also to say with the disarticulation¶ of social and Symbolic form, might well be described, in John¶ Brenkman's words, as "politically self-destructive." But politics (as the¶ social elaboration of reality) and the self (as mere prosthesis maintain- ;¶ ing the future for the figural Child), are what queerness, again as figure, "¶ necessarily destroys -necessarily insofar as this "self" is the agent of reproductive¶ futurism and this "politics" the means of its promulgation¶ as the order of social reality. But perhaps, as Lacan's engagement with¶ Antigone in Seminar 7 suggests, political self-destruction inheres in the¶ only act that counts as one: the act of resisting enslavement to the future,¶ in the name of having a life.¶ If the fate of the queer is to figure the fate that cuts the thread of¶ futurity, if the jouissance, the corrosive enjoyment, intrinsic to queer¶ (non)identity annihilates the fetishistic jouissance that works to consolidate¶ identity by allowing reality to coagulate around its ritual reproduction,¶ then the only oppositional status to which our queerness could ever¶ lead would depend on our taking seriously the place of the death drive¶ ',we're called on to figure and insisting, against the cult of the Child and¶ the political order it enforces, that we, as Guy Hocquenghem made dear,¶ are "not the signifier of what might become a new form of 'social organisation,'¶ " that we do not intend a new politics, a better society, a brighter¶ tomorrow, since all of these fantasies reproduce the past, through displacement,¶ in the form of the future. We choose, instead, not to choose¶ the Child, as disciplinary image of the Imaginary past or as site of a projective¶ identification with an always impossible future. The queerness we¶ propose, in Hocquenghem's words, 14 is unaware of the passing of generations¶ as stages on the road to better living. It knows nothing about¶ 'sacrifice now for the sake of future generations' . . . [it] knows that¶ civilisation alone is mortal." 34 Even more: it delights in that mortality¶ as the negation of everything that would define itself, moralistically, as¶ pro-life. It is we "who must bury the subject in the tomb-like hollow of¶ the signifier, pronouncing at last the words for which we're condemned¶ should we speak them or not: that we are the advocates of abortion; that¶ the Child as futurity’s emblem must die; that the future is mere repetition¶ and just as lethal as the past. Our queerness has nothing to offer a¶ Symbolic that lives by denying that nothingness except an insistence on¶ the haunting excess that this nothingness entails, an insistence on the¶ negativity that pierces the fantasy Screen of futurity, shattering narrative¶ temporality with irony's always explosive force. And so what is queerest¶ about us, queerest within us, and queerest despite us is this willingness¶ to insist intransitively-to insist that the future stop here.

#### Native studies are the exemplar of futurity – the 1AC appeals to the state prior to the indefinite detainment of Native peoples, merely masking power relations through evoking lost origins –the footnoting of queerness sacrifices the queer for an indefinitely postponed postcolonial future

Smith 10

(Andrea Smith, “Queer Theory and Native Studies: The Heteronormativity of Settler Colonialism” GLQ: A JOURNAL OF LESBIAN and GAY STUDIES, 2010, Duke University Press, KB)

Within Native studies, many intellectual projects call on Native peoples to¶ “decolonize” the academy as well as society at large.18 As I discuss below, the¶ project of decolonization makes an important intervention into queer theory. But¶ in this section, I look at how decolonizing political and intellectual work can benefit from a subjectless critique. Already, Native feminist works have complicated¶ the politics of decolonization by noting that Native women are often marginalized¶ within these projects.19 But the subjectless critique of queer theory further interrogates¶ some of the problematic logics within much decolonization discourse by¶ revealing how this discourse often reinstantiates rather than challenges colonial¶ formations and ideologies. Lauren Berlant demonstrates how decolonization projects can become¶ unwittingly implicated in perpetuating colonization in her theorization of the¶ “infantile citizen.”20 She argues that U.S. politics is often directed toward protecting¶ the future incipient citizen, such as the child or the fetus. By directing our¶ energies toward the future citizen, we then feel justified in instituting repressive¶ policies that oppress today’s citizens because these policies will supposedly protect the innocent citizens of the future. An example Berlant points to is the criminalization¶ of abortion that oppresses women today in order to protect tomorrow’s¶ children. This idea of reproductive continuity as homophobia is further taken up¶ by Lee Edelman, who articulates the Child as the anchor for reproductive futurity.¶ “For politics, however radical the means by which specific constituencies attempt¶ to produce a more desirable social order, remains, at its core, conservative insofar¶ as it works to affirm a structure, to authenticate social order, which it then intends¶ to transmit to the future in the form of its inner Child. That Child remains the perpetual¶ horizon of every acknowledged politics, the fantasmatic beneficiary of every¶ political intervention.”21 He contends that “queerness names the side of those not¶ ‘fighting for the children,’ the side outside the consensus by which all politics confirms¶ the absolute value of reproductive futurism.”22 Edelman makes an important¶ critique of how the investment in the future justifies contemporary oppression.¶ Fighting for the future can impel us to reproduce the current social order as it is.¶ Thus Edelman is offering a potentially radical critique of organizing that can be¶ akin to a revolution without guarantees: an antinormativizing of political struggle¶ that challenges how social norms are being reproduced at every turn.¶ This analysis could cohere with Judith Butler’s critique of origin stories.¶ Butler demonstrates how the past is mobilized to support contemporary oppressive¶ political regimes in the way the future is similarly mobilized under Edelman’s¶ framework. Butler critiques theorists who posit a naturalized prediscursive¶ sexed body as the foundation by which to critique contemporary heteropatriarchal¶ practices. She argues that theorizing a prediscursive body necessarily means that¶ the body cannot be prediscursive, since its account takes place within a discursive¶ economy, and hence its account cannot be made outside prevailing power¶ relations within its discursive economy. But positing the body as prediscursive¶ allows the theorist to disavow her or his political investments because the theorist¶ is supposedly rendering an account of the body prior to power relations. Butler’s¶ critique could then be more broadly applied to a critique of “origin stories.” That¶ is, when we critique a contemporary context through an appeal to a prior state¶ before “the fall,” we are necessarily masking power relations through evoking lost¶ origins. “The self-justification of a repressive . . . law almost always grounds itself¶ in a story about what it was like before the advent of the law. . . . The fabrication¶ of those origins . . . thereby justifies, the Constitution of the law . . . making the¶ constitution of the law appear as a historical inevitability.”23 Butler’s analysis of¶ “origin stories,” in conversation with Jennifer Denetdale’s critique of Native tradition,¶ demonstrates how the appeal to “tradition” often serves as the origin story¶ that buttresses heteropatriarchy and other forms of oppression with Native communities while disavowing its political investments.24 In her critique of antiblack¶ racism, homophobia, and U.S. patriotism within Native communities, Denetdale¶ argues that Native communities often support Christian Right ideologies in the¶ name of tradition. Edelman’s critique of futurity could add to Denetdale’s critique¶ of tradition by assessing how organizing for the “seventh generation” coalesces¶ with uncritical uses of tradition to ensure that Native communities reproduce the¶ colonial status quo with its attendant heteropatriarchy.¶ Thus normative futurity depends on an “origin story.” The future is legitimated¶ as a continuation of the past. Here I am reminded of how I have often heard¶ Native activists say, “Let us not work on domestic or other forms of gender violence¶ now, we must work on survival issues first.”25 Of course, since Native women are¶ the women most likely to be killed by acts of gender violence in the United States,¶ they are clearly not surviving. The many works on Native women and feminism¶ that say that we are “American Indian women in that order,” that position gender¶ justice as something to be addressed after decolonization, all speak to how this¶ politics of futurity sacrifices the lives of women and those who are not gender normative¶ for the indefinitely postponed postcolonial future. As Denetdale notes, the¶ Native nationhood that becomes articulated under this strategy of futurity is one¶ that supports heteropatriarchy, U.S. imperialism, antiblack racism, and capitalism.¶ As Edelman states: “Political programs are programmed to reify difference¶ and thus to secure in the form of the future, the order of the same.”26 Edelman¶ calls us to queer “social organization as such” to show how our efforts to secure a¶ better future for our children lead us to excuse injustice in the present.27

#### Futurism maintains itself by constantly creating new threats that risk destroying it in order to uphold the system itself – this creates real violence against the queer body in the name of saving humanity

Edelman 4

(Lee Edelman, a professor of English at Tufts University, “NO FUTURE: Queer Theory and the Death Drive” Duke University Press, Durham and London, 2004, KB)

On October 12, 1998—the evening of the death of Matthew Shepard, a twenty-one-year-old gay man then enrolled at the University of¶ Wyoming who was lured from a bar by two straight men and taken in the¶ dark to a deserted spot where he was savagely beaten, pistol-whipped, and then tied to a wooden fence and abandoned to the brutal cold of¶ the night (from which he would not be rescued until some eighteen¶ hours later, when he was discovered, already comatose, by a bicyclist who¶ thought the limp, bloody body lashed to a post was a scarecrow)—on¶ that evening of Matthew Shepard’s death a hospital spokesman, “voice¶ choked with emotion,” made the following statement to the national¶ press: “Matthew’s mother said to me, ‘Please tell everybody who’s listening to go home and give your kids a hug and don’t let a day go by without telling them you love them.’” These words of a grieving mother, widely reported on the news, produced a mimetic outpouring of grief from¶ people across the country, just as they had from the spokesman whose¶ own voice choked as he pronounced them. But these words, which even¶ on the occasion of a gay man’s murder defined the proper mourners as those who had children to go home to and hug, specified the mourning it encouraged as mourning for a threatened familial futurity—a threat that¶ might, for many, take the form of Matthew Shepard’s death, but a threat¶ that must also, for others, take the opposite form: of Shepard’s life.5¶ Thus, even as mourners gathered to pray at the bier of a mother’s slain¶ child, others arrived at his funeral to condemn a “lifestyle” that made¶ Matthew Shepard, for them, a dangerous bird of preys. An article printed¶ in the New York Times speculated that the symbolic significance, for the¶ killers, of leaving his body strung up on a fence might be traced to “the¶ Old West practice of nailing a dead coyote to a ranch fence as a warning to¶ future intruders.”6 The bicyclist who mistook him for a scarecrow, then,¶ would not have been far from the mark; for his killers, by posing Shep¶ ard’s body this way, could be understood to be crowing about the lengths¶ to which they would go to scare away other birds of his feather: birds that¶ may seem to be more or less tame—flighty, to be sure, and prone to a¶ narcissistic preening of their plumage; amusing enough when confined¶ to the space of a popular film like The Birdcage(1996) or when, outside the¶ movies, caged in the ghettos that make them available for ethnographic¶ display or the closets that enact a pervasive desire to make them all disappear—but birds that the cognoscenti perceive as never harmless at all?¶ For whatever apparent difference in species may dupe the untrained eye,¶ inveterate bird-watchers always discern the telltale mark that brands¶ each one a chicken-hawk first and last¶ in an atmosphere all atwitter with the cries that echo between those¶ who merely watch and those who hunt such birds, what matter who killed¶ Cock Robin? The logic of sínthomosexuality justifies that violent fate in advance by insisting that what such a cock had been robbing was always,¶ in some sense, a cradle. And that cradle must endlessly rock, we’ve been¶ told, even if the rhythm it rocks to beats out, with every blow of the beating delivered to Matthew Shepard’s skull, a counterpoint to the melody’s¶ sacred hymn to the meaning of life. That meaning, continuously affirmed¶ as it is both in and as cultural narrative, nonetheless never can rest secure and, in consequence, never can rest. The compulsive need for its repetition, for the drumbeat by which it pounds into our heads (and not¶ always, though not infrequently, by pounding in a Matthew Shepard’s) that the cradle bears always the meaning of futurity and the futurity of¶ meaning, testifies to something exceeding the meaning it means thereby¶ to assure: to a death drive that carries, on full-fledged wings, into the¶ inner sanctum of meaning, into the reproductive mandate inherent in¶ the logic of futurism itself, the burden of the radically negative force that¶ sinthomosexuality names.

#### Our alternative is to embrace queer negativity in opposition to futurity and of the Child as the emblem of politics – only this act can contest infinite anti-queer violence which exceeds the calculability of the political

Edelman 4

(Lee Edelman, a professor of English at Tufts University, “NO FUTURE: Queer Theory and the Death Drive” Duke University Press, Durham and London, 2004, KB)

To make such a claim I examine in this book the pervasive invocation of the Child as the emblem of futurity's unquestioned value and propose¶ against it the impossible project of a queer oppositionality that would¶ oppose itself to the structural determinants of politics as such, which¶ is also to say, that would oppose itself to the logic of opposition. This¶ paradoxical formulation suggests a refusal - the appropriately perverse¶ refusal that characterizes queer theory - of every substantialization of¶ identity, which is always oppositionally defined,' and, by extension, of¶ history as linear narrative (the poor man's teleology) in which meaning¶ succeeds in revealing itself-as itself-through time. Far from partaking¶ of this narrative movement toward a viable political future, far from perpetuating¶ the fantasy of meaning's eventual realization, the queer comes to figure the bar to every realization of futurity, the resistance, internal , to the social, to every social structure or form.¶ Rather than rejecting, with liberal discourse, this ascription of negativity¶ to the queer, we might, as I argue, do better to consider accepting¶ and even embracing it. Not in the hope of forging thereby some more perfect¶ social order - such a hope, after all, would only reproduce the constraining¶ mandate of futurism, just as any such order would equally occasion¶ the negativity of the queer-but rather to refuse the insistence of ¶ hope itself as affirmation, which is always affirmation of an order whose¶ refusal will register as unthinkable, irresponsible, inhumane. And the¶ trump card of affirmation? Always the question: If not this, what? Always¶ the demand to translate the insistence, the pulsive force, of negativity into "¶ some determinate stance or "position" whose determination would thus:¶ negate it: always the imperative to immure it in some stable and positive¶ form. When I argue, then, that we might do well to attempt what¶ is surely impossible-to withdraw our allegiance, however compulsory,¶ from a reality based on the Ponzi scheme of reproductive futurism -I do¶ not intend to propose some "good" that will thereby be assured. To the¶ contrary, I mean to insist that nothing, and certainly not what we call the¶ "good," can ever have any assurance at all in the order of the Symbolic.¶ Abjuring fidelity to a futurism that's always purchased at our expense,¶ though bound, as Symbolic subjects consigned to figure the Symbolic's¶ undoing, to the necessary contradiction of trying to turn its intelligibility¶ against itself, we might rather, figuratively, cast our vote for "none¶ of the above," for the primacy of a constant no in response to the law¶ of the Symbolic, which would echo that law's foundational act, its self-constituting¶ negation. The structuring optimism of politics to which the¶ order of meaning commits us, installing as it does the perpetual hope¶ of reaching meaning through signification, is always, I would argue, a¶ negation of this primal, constitutive, and negative act. And the various¶ positivities produced in its wake by the logic of political hope depend¶ on the mathematical illusion that negated negations might somehow escape,¶ and not redouble, such negativity. My polemic thus stakes its fortunes¶ on a truly hopeless wager: that taking the Symbolic's negativity to¶ the very letter of the law, that attending to the persistence of something¶ internal to reason that reason refuses, that turning the force of queerness¶ against all subjects, however queer, can afford an access to the jouissance¶ that at once defines and negates us. Or better: can expose the constancy,¶ the inescapability, of such access to jouissance in the social order itself,¶ even if that order can access its constant access to jouissance only in the¶ process of abjecting that constancy of access onto the queer.¶ In contrast to what Theodor Adorno describes as the "grimness with which a man clings to himself, as to the immediately sure and substantial," the queerness of which I speak would deliberately sever us from ourselves, from the assurance, that is, of knowing ourselves and hence of tommag our "good."" Such queerness proposes, in place of the good, something I want to call "better," though it promises, in more than one sense of the phrase, absolutely nothing. I connect this something better with I.acan's characterization of what he calls "truth," where truth does not assure happiness, or even, as Lacan makes clear, the good.3 Instead, it names only the insistent particularity of the subject, impossible fully to articulate and "tend[ing] toward the real."1- Lacan, therefore, can write of this truth: The quality that best characterizes it is that of being the true, which was at the origin of an aberrant or atypical behavior. We encounter this with its particular, irreducible character as a modification that presupposes no other form of normalization than that of an experience of pleasure or of pain, but of a final experience from whence it springs and is subsequently preserved in the depths of the subject in an irreducible form. The Wumch does not have the character of a universal law but, on the contrary, of the most particular of laws—even if it is universal that this particularity is to be found in every human being.7¶ Truth, like queerness, irreducibly linked to the "aberrant or atypical," to what chafes against "normalization," finds its value not in a good susceptible to generalization, but only in the stubborn particularity that voids every notion of a general good. The embrace of queer negativity, then, can have no justification if justification requires it to reinforce some positive social value; its value, instead, resides in its challenge to value as defined by the social, and thus in its radical challenge to the very value of the social itself." Ror by figuring a refusal of the coercive belief in the paramount value of futurity, while refusing as well any backdoor hope for dialectical access to meaning, the queer dispossesses the social order of the ground on which it rests: a faith in the consistent reality of the social —and by extension, of the social subject; a faith that politics, whether of the left or of the right, implicitly affirms. Divesting such politics of its thematic trappings, bracketing the particularity of its various proposals for social organization, the queer insists that politics is always a politics of the signifier, or even of what Lacan will often refer to as "the letter." It serves to shore up a reality always unmoored by signification and lacking any guarantee. To say as much is not, of course, to deny the experiential violence that frequently troubles social reality or the apparent consistency with which it bears —and thereby bears down on—us all. It is, rather, to suggest that queerness exposes the obliquity of our relation to what we experience in and as social reality, alerting us to the fantasies structurally necessary in order to sustain it and engaging those fantasies through the figural logics, the linguistic structures, that shape them. If it aims effectively to intervene in the reproduction of such a reality —an intervention that may well take the form of figuring chat reality's abortion — then queer theory must always insist on its connection to the vicissitudes of the sign, to the tension between the signifier’s collapse into the letter's cadaveiOUS materiality and its participation in a system of reference wherein it generates meaning itself. As a particular story, in other words, of why storytelling fails, one that takes both the value and the burden of that failure upon itself, queer theory, as I construe it, marks the "other" side of politics: the "side" where narrative realization and derealization overlap, where the energies of virilization ceaselessly turn against themselves: the "side" outside all political sides, committed as they are, on every side, to futurism's unquestioned good. The rest of this book anempls lo explain the implications of this assertion, but first, let me sketch some connections between politics and the politics of the sign by establishing the psychoanalytic context within which my argument takes shape.¶ Like the network of signifying relations that forms the Lacanian Symbolic—the register of the speaking subject and the order of the law — politics may function as rhe framework within which we experience social reality, but only insofar as ir compels us to experience that reality in tile form of a fantasy: the fantasy, precisely, of form as such, of an order, an organization, that assures the stability of our identities as subjects and the coherence of the Imaginary totalizations through which those identities appear to us in recognizable form. Though the material conditions of human experience may indeed be at stake in the various conflicts by means of which differing political perspectives vie for the power to name, and by naming to shape, our collective reality, the cease- less conflict of their social visions conceals their common will to install, and toinstall as reality itself, one libidinally subtended fantasy or another intended to screen out the emptiness that rhe signifier embeds at the core of the Symbolic. Politics, to put this another way, names the space in which Imaginary relations, relations that hark back to a misrecogni- tion of the self as enjoying some originary access to presence (a presence retroactively posited and therefore lost, one might say, from the start), compete for Symbolic fulfillment, for actualization in the realm of the language to which subjectification subjects us all. Only the mediation of the signifier allows us ro nrtitulute those Imaginary relations, lliough always at the price of introducing the distance that precludes their realization: the distance inherent in the chain of ceaseless deferrals and substitutions to which language as a system of differences necessarily gives birth.I he signifier, as alienating and meaningless token ofuur Symbolic constitution as subjects (as token, 'hat is, of our subjectification through subjection to the prospect of meaning); the signifier, by means of which we always inhabit the order of the Other, the order of a social and linguistic reality articulated from somewhere else; the signifier, which calls us imo meaning by seeming to call us to ourselves: this signifier only bestows a sort of identity, one with which we can never succeed in fully coinciding because we, as subjects of the signifier, can only be significis ourselves, can only ever aspire to catch up to whatever it is we might signify by closing the gap that divides us and, paradoxically, makes us subjects through that ail of ciiuiiion iituw. This structural inability of the subject to merge with the self for which it sees itself as a signifier in the eyes of the Other necessitates various strategies designed to suture tile subject in the space of meaning where Symbolic and Imaginary overlap. Politics names the social enactment of the subject's attempt to establish the conditions fur this impossible consolidation by identifying with something outside itself in order to enter the presence, deferred perpetually, of itself. Politics, that is, names the struggle to effect a fantasmatic order of reality in which the subject's alienation would vanish into the seamlessness of identity at the endpoint of the endless chain of signifiers lived as history.

# 2NC

### AT Narratives

#### 3 – Narratives - you cannot view their affirmative as separable from its heteronormative institutions – to do so serves to privatize queer violence by viewing it as excess, rather than endemic to a system that works towards the death of all queer life

Stanley 11

(Eric Stanley, Professor Emeritus at Pembroke College, Oxford University, “Near Life, Queer Death: Overkill and Ontological Capture” Social Text 107, Vol. 29, No. 2, Summer 2011, KB)

Thinking violence as individual acts versus epistemic force works to support the normative and normalizing structuring of public pain. In¶ other words, privatizing antiqueer violence is one of the ways in which¶ the national body and its trauma are heterosexualized, or in which the¶ relegation of antiqueer violence, not unlike violence against women, racist¶ violence, violence against animals (none of which are mutually exclusive),¶ casts the national stage of violence and its ways of mourning as always¶ human, masculinist, able-bodied,¶ white, gender-conforming,¶ and heterosexual.¶ For national violence to have value it must be produced through the tangled exclusion of bodies whose death is valueless. To this end, as¶ mainstream LGBT groups clamber for dominant power through attachment¶ of a teleological narrative of progress, they too reproduce the argument that antiqueer violence is something out of the ordinary.22

### Futurity

This is particularly true of their insistence on mestiza, which perversely destroys native identity by de-linking it from its negativity.

Grande No date.

“In summary, insofar as American Indian identities continue to be defined and shaped in interdependence with place, the transgressive mestizaje functions as a potentially homogenizing force that presumes the continued exile of tribal peoples and their enduring absorption into the American "democratic" Whitestream. The notion of mestizaje as absorption is particularly problematic for the Indigenous peoples of Central and South America, where the myth of the mestizaje (belief that the continent's original cultures and inhabitants no longer exist) has been used for centuries to force the integration of Indigenous communities into the national mestizo model (Van Cott, 1994). According to Rodolfo Stavenhagen (1992), the myth of mestizaje has provided the ideological pretext for numerous South American governmental laws and policies expressly designed to strengthen the nationstate through incorporation of all "non-national" (read "Indigenous") elements into the mainstream. Thus, what Valle and Torres (1995) previously describe as "the continent' s unfinished business of cultural hybridization" (p. 141), Indigenous peoples view as the continents' long and bloody battle to absorb their existence into the master narrative of the mestizo.”[[1]](#footnote-1)

### Identity

The aff both operates in and sustains the fantasy upon which our identities are found – the aff is an attempt to confront the emptiness in the symbolic reality, an attempt to close the gap between how our identity is defined and how we want it to look – this is a vision rooted in an imaginary past that serves to reproduce the status quo that works toward the death of all queer life

Edelman 98

(Lee Edelman, a professor of English at Tufts University, “The Future Is Kid Stuff: Queer Theory, Disidentification, and the Death Drive” Narrative, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Jan., 1998), Ohio State University Press, KB)

In what follows I want to interrogate the politics that informs the pervasive¶ trope of the child as figure for the universal value attributed to political futurity and¶ to pose against it the impossible project of a queer oppositionality that would oppose¶ itself to the structural determinants of politics as such, which is also to say, that would¶ oppose itself to the logic of opposition. This paradoxical formulation suggests the¶ energy of resistance-the characteristically perverse resistance informing the work¶ of queer theory-to the substantialization of identities, especially as defined through¶ opposition, as well as to the political fantasy of shaping history into a narrative in¶ which meaning succeeds in revealing itself, as itself, through time. By attempting to¶ resist that coercive faith in political futurity, while refusing as well any hope for the¶ sort of dialectical access to meaning that such resistance, as quintessential political¶ gesture, holds out, I mean to insist that politics is always a politics of the signifier, and that queer theory's interventions in the reproduction of dominant cultural logics¶ must never lose sight of its figural relation to the vicissitudes of signification. Queer theory, as a particular story of where storytelling fails, one that takes the value and burden of that failure upon itself, occupies, I want to suggest, the impossible "other" side where narrative realization and derealization overlap. The rest of this paper aspires to explain the meaning and implications of that assertion, but to do so it must¶ begin by tracing some connections between politics and the politics of the sign.¶ Like the network of signifying relations Lacan described as the symbolic, politics may function as the register within which we experience social reality, but only¶ insofar as it compels us to experience that reality in the form of a fantasy: the fantasy,¶ precisely, of form as such, of an order, an organization, assuring the stability of our¶ identities as subjects and the consistency of the cultural structures through which¶ those identities are reflected back to us in recognizable form. Though the material¶ conditions of human experience may indeed be at stake in the various conflicts by¶ means of which differing political perspectives vie for the power to name, and by¶ naming to shape, our collective reality, the ceaseless contestation between and¶ among their competing social visions expresses a common will to install as reality itself one libidinally-subtended fantasy or another and thus to avoid traumatically confronting the emptiness at the core of the symbolic "reality" produced by the order of¶ the signifier. To put this otherwise: politics designates the ground on which imaginary relations, relations that hark back to a notion of the self misrecognized as enjoying an originary fullness-an undifferentiated presence that is posited retroactively and therefore lost, one might say, from the start-compete for symbolic¶ fulfillment within the dispensation of the signifier. For the mediation of the signifier alone allows us to articulate these imaginary relations, though always at the price of introducing the distance that precludes their realization: the distance inherent in the¶ chain of ceaseless deferrals and mediations to which the very structure of the lin¶ guistic system must give birth. The signifier, as alienating and meaningless token of¶ our symbolic construction as subjects, as token, that is, of our subjectification¶ through subjection to the prospect of meaning; the signifier, by means of which we¶ always inhabit the order of the Other, the order of a social and linguistic reality artic¶ ulated from somewhere else; the signifier, which calls us into meaning by seeming to¶ call us to ourselves, only ever confers upon us a sort of promissory identity, one with¶ which we never succeed in fully coinciding because we, as subjects of the signifier,¶ can only be signifiers ourselves: can only ever aspire to catch up to-to close the gap¶ that divides and by dividing calls forth-ourselves as subjects. Politics names those¶ processes, then, through which the social subject attempts to secure the conditions of¶ its consolidation by identifying with what is outside it in order to bring it into the¶ presence, deferred perpetually, of itself.¶ Thus, if politics in the symbolic is always a politics *of* the symbolic, operating¶ in the name, and in the direction, of a future reality, the vision it hopes to realize is¶ rooted in an imaginary past. This not only means that politics conforms to the temporality of desire, to what we might call the inevitable historicity of desire-the successive displacements forward of figures of meaning as nodes of attachment, points¶ of intense metaphoric investment, produced in the hope, however vain, of filling the¶ gap within the subject that the signifier installs-but also that politics is a name for¶ the temporalization of desire, for its translation into a narrative, for its teleological¶ representation. Politics, that is, by externalizing and configuring in the fictive form of a narrative, allegorizes or elaborates sequentially those overdeterminations of libidinal positions and inconsistencies of psychic defenses occasioned by the in¶ tractable force of the drives unassimilable to the symbolic's logic of interpretation¶ and meaning-production, drives that carry the destabilizing force of what insists outside or beyond, because foreclosed by, signification. These drives hold the place of¶ what meaning misses in much the same way that the signifier, in its stupidity, its intrinsic meaninglessness, preserves at the heart of the signifying order the irreducible¶ void that order as such undertakes to conceal. Politics, in short, gives us history as¶ the staging of a dream of self-realization through the continuous negotiation and re¶ construction of reality itself; but it does so without acknowledging that the future to¶ which it appeals marks the impossible place of an imaginary past exempt from the¶ deferrals intrinsic to the symbolic's signifying regime.

# 1NR

### Perm

**1. PERM LINKS MORE: IT ATTEMPTS TO DIRECT CRITICISM TOWARDS POLITICS CONDUCTED IN THE NAME OF A LIFE WHICH EXCLUDES BARE LIFE IN FAVOR OF THE VOICE OF THE CITIZEN, THE POLITICALLY QUALIFIED. THIS EXCLUDES BARE LIFE AND ESTABLISHES A REALM BEYOND OF THE MARKERS OF THE “POLITICAL” IN WHICH TO CONDUCT GENOCIDAL VIOLENCE AGAINST EXCEPTIONAL BEINGS.**

**HUDSON 2K4**

[Laura, The Political Animal: Species-Being and Bare Life, mediations journal, http://www.mediationsjournal.org/files/Mediations23\_2\_04.pdf]

The rise of environmentalism, deep ecology, and animal rights can be seen as effects of this inability of law, or the Law, to distance the “natural world” as a state outside itself. **Natural objects reappear within the political realm not as political actors but as markers of bare life.** **Sovereignty, in seeking to establish a political life separate from the state of nature, produces both political life as the life proper to the citizen (the “good life”) and bare life**, which occupies a space in between bios and zoē, evacuated of meaning. **The state of nature is not separate from political life but a state that exists alongside political life, as a necessary corollary of its existence. Political life is alienation from an imagined state of nature that we cannot access as human beings because it appears only in shadow form as bare life. The state of exception is that which defines which lives lack value, which lives can be killed without being either murdered or sacrificed.** Agamben’s examples of the inextricable link between political and bare life focus on the limit cases of humanity rather than the ideal, providing an analysis of precisely the cases that prove problematic in Ferry’s liberal humanism. The exception, as that which proves the rule, cannot be avoided. It is necessary to look to the figure of the refugee, the body of the “overcomatose” or the severely mentally impaired, and, under the Third Reich, the life of the Jew to see how the law fails in the task Ferry sets for it. **These cases demonstrate the zone of indistinction that Agamben elaborates as the zone of “life that does not deserve to live**.” The refugee demonstrates the necessity of a link between nation and subject; **refugees are no longer citizens and, as such, lack a claim to political rights: “In the system of the nation-state, the so-called sacred and inalienable rights of man show themselves to lack every protection and reality at the moment in which they can no longer take the form of rights belonging to citizens of a state**.”[15] **Confronted with the figure of the refugee, human rights are faced with their hidden ground in national origin, where, as Agamben notes, the key term is birth: men are born free, invoking the natural codes from which law was to separate us. This freedom is, in actuality, a function of citizenship and incorporation in the nation-state rather than a fact of being human: “citizenship names the new status of life as origin and ground of sovereignty and, therefore, literally identifies** … les membres du souverain, **‘the members of the sovereign.’”[16] This makes the link between that which is proper to the nation and that which is proper to the citizen the determinant of the zone of sacred life: those who do not fulfill the role of the citizen are no longer guaranteed protection or participation in political life, their so-called human rights void in the absence of national identity. The refugee or refugees as a group have a claim only to bare life, to being kept alive, but have no political voice with which to demand the rights of the citizen.** Agamben, while noting the same trend toward politicizing natural life that concerns Ferry, demonstrates that this politicization is already contained within the structure of politics itself. **This corresponds to the position of animals in human society: the exemplar of the limit case, they have always existed in the state of exception that founds the political. There is thus a connection between the plight of the refugee and that of the animal: neither participates directly in the political, though both are absolutely subject to political decisions in which they have no voice. The establishment of a realm outside the political, where lives have no value and thus may be killed, is marked by the difference between the human and the animal.**

### Impact

**Animal oppression= rc of racism, sexism, warfare, and genocide. This makes animal liberation a radical challenge to all forms of hierarchy**

Steven **Best**, Chair of Philosophy at UT-EP, **2007**

[*JCAS* 5.2]

While a welcome advance over the anthropocentric conceit that only humans shape human actions, the environmental determinism approach typically fails to emphasize the crucial role that *animals* play in human history, as well as how the human *exploitation of animals* is a key cause of hierarchy, social conflict, and environmental breakdown. A core thesis of what I call “animal standpoint theory” is that animals have been *key driving and shaping forces of human thought, psychology, moral and social life, and history* overall. More specifically, animal standpoint theory argues that *the oppression of human over human has deep roots in the oppression of human over animal*.¶ In this context, Charles Patterson’s recent book, *The Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust*, articulates the animal standpoint in a powerful form with revolutionary implications. The main argument of *Eternal Treblinka* is that the human domination of animals, such as it emerged some ten thousand years ago with the rise of agricultural society, was the first hierarchical domination and laid the groundwork for patriarchy, slavery, warfare, genocide, and other systems of violence and power. A key implication of Patterson’s theory is that human liberation is implausible if disconnected from animal liberation, and thus humanism -- a *speciesist* philosophy that constructs a hierarchal relationship privileging superior humans over inferior animals and reduces animals to resources for human use -- collapses under the weight of its logical contradictions. ¶ Patterson lays out his complex holistic argument in three parts. In Part I, he demonstrates that animal exploitation and speciesism have direct and profound connections to slavery, colonialism, racism, and anti-Semitism. In Part II, he shows how these connections exist not only in the realm of ideology – as conceptual systems of justifying and underpinning domination and hierarchy – but also in systems of technology, such that the tools and techniques humans devised for the rationalized mass confinement and slaughter of animals were mobilized against human groups for the same ends. Finally, in the fascinating interviews and narratives of Part III, Patterson describes how personal experience with German Nazism prompted Jewish to take antithetical paths: whereas most retreated to an insular identity and dogmatic emphasis on the singularity of Nazi evil and its tragic experience, others recognized the profound similarities between how Nazis treated their human captives and how humanity as a whole treats other animals, an epiphany that led them to adopt vegetarianism, to become advocates for the animals, and develop a far broader and more inclusive ethic informed by universal compassion for all suffering and oppressed beings.¶ **The Origins of Hierarchy**¶ "As long as men massacre animals, they will kill each other" –Pythagoras¶ It is little understood that the first form of oppression, domination, and hierarchy involves human *domination over animals* Patterson’s thesis stands in bold contrast to the Marxist theory that the *domination over nature* is fundamental to the domination over other humans. It differs as well from the social ecology position of Murray Bookchin that *domination over humans* brings about alienation from the natural world, provokes hierarchical mindsets and institutions, and is the root of the long-standing western goal to “dominate” nature. In the case of Marxists, anarchists, and so many others, theorists typically don’t even mention human domination of animals, let alone assign it causal primacy or significance. In Patterson’s model, however, the human subjugation of animals is the first form of hierarchy and it paves the way for all other systems of domination such as include patriarchy, racism, colonialism, anti-Semitism, and the Holocaust.As he puts it, “the exploitation of animals was the model and inspiration for the atrocities people committed against each other, slavery and the Holocaust being but two of the more dramatic examples.”¶ Hierarchy emerged with the rise of agricultural society some ten thousand years ago. In the shift from nomadic hunting and gathering bands to settled agricultural practices, humans began to establish their dominance over animals through “domestication.” In animal domestication (often a euphemism disguising coercion and cruelty), humans began to exploit animals for purposes such as obtaining food, milk, clothing, plowing, and transportation. As they gained increasing control over the lives and labor power of animals, humans bred them for desired traits and controlled them in various ways, such as castrating males to make them more docile. To conquer, enslave, and claim animals as their own property, humans developed numerous technologies, such as pens, cages, collars, ropes, chains, and branding irons.¶ The domination of animals paved the way for the domination of humans. The sexual subjugation of women, Patterson suggests, was modeled after the domestication of animals, such that men began to control women’s reproductive capacity, to enforce repressive sexual norms, and to rape them as they forced breeding in their animals. Not coincidentally, Patterson argues, slavery emerged in the same region of the Middle East that spawned agriculture, and, in fact, developed as an extension of animal domestication practices. In areas like Sumer, slaves were managed like livestock, and males were castrated and forced to work along with females. ¶ In the fifteenth century, when Europeans began the colonization of Africa and Spain introduced the first international slave markets, the metaphors, models, and technologies used to exploit animal slaves were applied with equal cruelty and force to human slaves. Stealing Africans from their native environment and homeland, breaking up families who scream in anguish, wrapping chains around slaves’ bodies, shipping them in cramped quarters across continents for weeks or months with no regard for their needs or suffering, branding their skin with a hot iron to mark them as property, auctioning them as servants, breeding them for service and labor, exploiting them for profit, beating them in rages of hatred and anger, and killing them in vast numbers – all these horrors and countless others inflicted on black slaves were developed and perfected centuries earlier through animal exploitation. ¶ As the domestication of animals developed in agricultural society, humans lost the intimate connections they once had with animals. By the time of Aristotle, certainly, and with the bigoted assistance of medieval theologians such as St. Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, western humanity had developed an explicitly hierarchical worldview – that came to be known as the “Great Chain of Being” – used to position humans as the end to which all other beings were mere means. ¶ Patterson underscores the crucial point that the domination of human over human and its exercise through slavery, warfare, and genocide typically begins with the denigration of victims. But the means and methods of dehumanization are derivative, for *speciesism provided the conceptual paradigm that encouraged, sustained, and justified western brutality toward other peoples*. “Throughout the history of our ascent to dominance as the master species,” Patterson writes, “our victimization of animals has served as the model and foundation for our victimization of each other. The study of human history reveals the pattern: first, humans exploit and slaughter animals; then, they treat other people like animals and do the same to them.” Whether the conquerors are European imperialists, American colonialists, or German Nazis, western aggressors engaged in *wordplay before swordplay*, vilifying their victims – Africans, Native Americans, Filipinos, Japanese, Vietnamese, Iraqis, and other unfortunates – with opprobrious terms such as “rats,” “pigs,” “swine,” “monkeys,” “beasts,” and “filthy animals.” ¶ Once perceived as brute beasts or sub-humans occupying a lower evolutionary rung than white westerners, subjugated peoples were treated accordingly; once characterized as animals, they could be hunted down like animals. The first exiles from the moral community, animals provided a convenient discard bin for oppressors to dispose the oppressed. The connections are clear: “For a civilization built on the exploitation and slaughter of animals, the `lower’ and more degraded the human victims are, the easier it is to kill them.” Thus, colonialism, as Patterson describes, was a “natural extension of human supremacy over the animal kingdom. For just as humans had subdued animals with their superior intelligence and technologies, so many Europeans believed that the white race had proven its superiority by bringing the “lower races” under its command. ¶ There are important parallels between speciesism and sexism and racism in the elevation of white male rationality to the touchstone of moral worth. The arguments European colonialists used to legitimate exploiting Africans – that they were less than human and inferior to white Europeans in ability to reason – are the very same justifications humans use to trap, hunt, confine, and kill animals. Once western norms of rationality were defined as the essence of humanity and social normality, by first using non-human animals as the measure of alterity, it was a short step to begin viewing odd, different, exotic, and eccentric peoples and types as non- or sub-human. Thus, the same criterion created to exclude animals from humans was also used to ostracize blacks, women, and numerous other groups from “humanity.” The oppression of blacks, women, and animals alike was grounded in an argument that biological inferiority predestined them for servitude. In the major strain of western thought, alleged rational beings (i.e., elite, white, western males) pronounce that the Other (i.e., women, people of color, animals) is deficient in rationality in ways crucial to their nature and status, and therefore are deemed and treated as inferior, subhuman, or nonhuman. Whereas the racist mindset creates a hierarchy of superior/inferior on the basis of skin color, and the sexist mentality splits men and women into greater and lower classes of beings, the speciesist outlook demeans and objectifies animals by dichotomizing the biological continuum into the antipodes of humans and animals. As racism stems from a hateful white supremacism, and sexism is the product of a bigoted male supremacism, so speciesism stems from and informs a violent *human supremacism* -- namely, the arrogant belief that humans have a natural or God-given right to use animals for any purpose they devise or, more generously, within the moral boundaries of welfarism and stewardship, which however was Judaic moral baggage official Chistianithy left behind.

### A2 Unix

Civ/non civ divide is extension of species level raciam

**KOCHI 2K9**

[tarik, lecturer in law and international security @ U of Sussex, Doctorate in Law from Griffith, “species war: law, violence, and animals”, ‘law, culture, and the humanities’, 353-359]

**This reflection need not be seen as carried out by every individual on a daily basis but rather as that which is drawn upon from time to time within public life as humans inter-subjectively coordinate their actions in accordance with particular enunciated ends and plan for the future**.21 In this respect, the violence and killing of species war is not simply a question of survival or bare life, instead, it is bound up with a consideration of the good. For most modern humans in the West the “good life” involves the daily killing of animals for dietary need and for pleasure.

At the heart of the question of species war, and all war for that matter, resides a question about the legitimacy of violence linked to a philosophy of value.22 The question of war-law sits within a wider history of decision making about the relative values of different forms of life. **“Legitimate” violence is under-laid by cultural, religious, moral, political and philosoph- ical conceptions about the relative values of forms of life. Playing out through history are distinctions and hierarchies of life-value that are exten- sions of the original human-animal distinction**. Distinctions that can be thought to follow from the human-animal distinction are those, for example, drawn between: **Hellenes and barbarians; Europeans and Orientals; whites and blacks; the “civilized” and the “uncivilized”; Nazis and Jews; Israeli’s and Arabs; colonizers and the colonized**. Historically **these** practices and **regimes of violence have been** culturally, politically and legally **normal- ized in a manner that replicates the normalization of** the **violence** carried out **against non-human animals. Unpacking, criticizing and challenging the forms of violence, which in different historical moments appear as “normal,” is one of the ongoing tasks of any critic who is concerned with the question of what war does to law and of what law does to war? The critic of war is thus a critic of war’s normalization.**

1. Sandy Grande. “American Indian Geographies of Power: At the Crossroads of Indigena and Mestizaje.” Harvard Educational Review, 70:4. Winter 2000. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)