# 1NC vs Texas ST

## 1NC T - Authority

#### A. Authority is the legal right to take action, power is the ability to do so

Forsythe and Hendrickson 96

[David P. Forsythe, Professor and Chair of Political Science University of Nebraska-Lincoln, Ryan C. Hendrickson, Ph.D. Candidate University of Nebraska-Lincoln. “U.S. Use of Force Abroad: What Law for the President?” Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 4]

The crisis is most precisely about authority, not power. Authority, in the legal sense, concerns ¶ the right to do something. Power refers to the capability to do something. Part of the problems ¶ in the U.S. constitutional crisis over use of force abroad is that the president has the power to ¶ make war, and to obtain congressional deference most of the time, whatever the proper under ¶ standing of authority.

Statutory restrictions are limits on authority by congress

Blacks Online Legal Dictionary 13

(2nd Edition, http://thelawdictionary.org/statutory-restriction/)

Statutory Restriction- Limits or controls that have been place on activities by its ruling legislation.

#### Judicial restrictions are court enforced interpretations of statutory restrictions

Barron ‘08

David J. Barron, Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, & Martin S. Lederman,

Visiting Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, 2008, “THE

COMMANDER IN CHIEF AT THE LOWEST EBB - FRAMING THE PROBLEM, DOCTRINE, AND

ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING,” Harvard Law Review, January, pp. LN.

4. Judicial Enforcement of Implied Statutory Restrictions. - The way the Supreme Court¶ approaches war powers generally, when combined with the increased mass of potentially¶ relevant legislative restrictions on the conduct of this military conflict, further increases the likelihood that the "lowest ebb" issue will be joined in the future. Principles of deference to executive¶ authority tend to dominate academic discussion of statutory interpretation and war powers. As we have indicated, however,¶ Hamdan, Youngstown, and other modern war powers cases demonstrate that the Court cannot be counted on to give the President¶ the benefit of the doubt. And in many war powers cases, the Court has been perfectly willing to¶ construe ambiguous statutory language against certain background rules that it presumes¶ Congress intended to honor, n84 including a presumption that the Executive must [\*719] comply with the laws of war.¶ n85 This general and longstanding judicial willingness to find implied limitations in ambiguous¶ texts concerning the use of military force and national security powers is sometimes¶ controversial. But whether justified or not, such an interpretive approach is of particular import now,¶ given the sheer mass of preexisting statutes potentially applicable to the conflict with al¶ Qaeda and the likelihood that this body of law will grow. Executive branch lawyers may be hard-pressed to advise their client¶ agencies that creative construction can overcome the apparent statutory restrictions, at least if there is a reasonable prospect of¶ judicial review (as there often will be in the war on terrorism due to its peculiar domestic connections). Instead, the prospect of¶ judicial review will impel these lawyers to advise that the courts could well construe the potentially restrictive¶ language to impose hard constraints on the Executive's preferred course of conduct - and that only¶ the assertion of a superseding constitutional power of the President could, possibly, overcome such limits. Thus, the relatively weak¶ deference the Court has long shown the President in many war powers cases, when combined with the relatively high likelihood in¶ the war on terrorism of the applicability of restrictive but ambiguous statutory language and a justiciable case to hear, make¶ constitutional assertions of preclusive executive powers a more likely occurrence than war powers scholarship typically assumes.

#### B. The aff doesn’t restrict the authority of the President statutorily or judicially. They only make the President publically justify a policy it is already engaged in.

#### C. Standards

#### Ground. Our interp allows any aff that actually restricts authority through the courts or Congress.

#### Limits and topic education. Even if their aff is predictable, it justifies a litany of unpredictable affs, unlimiting the topic

#### voter for fairness and topic education

## 1NC Tea Party DA

#### Tea Party influence low now BECAUSE of the disagreement about foreign policy - the plan reverses this

Castillo 9/5 (Dava Castillo, Sep 05th 2013, <http://www.allvoices.com/contributed-news/15460384-political-party-schisms-a-house-divided-turns-into-a-condominium>, “Political party schisms: A house divided turns into a condominium”, AB)

But then the entire question on whether to engage in Syria is unsettling for many as we find ourselves in the same camp with those whom, in most political arenas, we would be opposing. The Democrats are divided as well as the Republicans. The labels this time really are “doves” and “hawks,” literally. The Republicans, however, are divided even further by the tea party component of isolationists driven by fiscal stinginess, which in the case of fighting a war “over there,” works for me. Except now Saudi Arabia and Qatar have said they will pay for some of the expenses relegating the United States military to mercenary status. If engaging in Syria is going to be free, will the Libertarian conservatives say it’s OK or will the Republicans branch off into yet another ideological segment? The Republican Party is beginning to fracture over Syrian intervention, with the small government, isolationist tea party folk on one side and the rest of the old guard, hawkish Republicans led by Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) and Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.). Splits in major political parties are uncommon, but it has happened before.

#### Plan is a win for the Tea Party

Metzler 13

Rebekah Metzler 13 is a political writer for U.S. News & World Report. “Marco Rubio, Rand Paul Strike Out to Re-Brand Their Party: Fresh takes on foreign, domestic policies aim to shake up GOP,” February 6, 2013, http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/02/06/marco-rubio-rand-paul-strike-out-to-re-brand-their-party, DOA: 8-1-13, y2k

Paul, delivering a foreign policy speech at the conservative Heritage Foundation Wednesday, struck a balance between George W. Bush era neo-conservativism and support for nation building, and his father, former Texas Rep. Ron Paul's, unique brand of isolationism. The Kentucky senator criticized the traditional GOP stance that money should be no object when it comes to the U.S. military and its mission, and said that America should rethink its role in the world while recognizing the cost to U.S. blood and treasure. "I'd argue that a more restrained foreign policy is the true conservative foreign policy, as it includes two basic tenets of true conservatism: respect for the constitution and fiscal discipline," Paul said, reflecting libertarian ideals held by both Tea Partiers and some progressives. Congress also must be more assertive when it comes to its role in providing checks and balances to the president's war powers, he said. "We did not declare war or authorize force to begin war with Libya," Paul said. "This is a dangerous precedent. In our foreign policy, Congress has become not even a rubber stamp but an irrelevancy." A senator who at times finds himself the only member on a certain side of things—whether it's a willingness to place secret holds on nominations to get a vote on a certain amendment, or an opposition to some spending provision that most Republicans agree with—Paul was obviously striving to legitimize himself as a leader with original but appealing viewpoints. "When foreign policy has become so monolithic, so lacking in debate that Republicans and Democrats routinely pass foreign policy statements without debate and without votes, where are the calls for moderation, the calls for restraint?" he said. "Anyone who questions the bipartisan consensus is immediately castigated, rebuked and their patriotism challenged."

#### Tea Party wins snowball --- saves their influence in Congress

Cillizza 12

(Chris Cillizza, December 4, 2012, “Is the tea party dead? Or just resting?,” Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2012/12/04/whither-the-tea-party/)

And Jon Lerner, a Republican consultant who works closely with the Club For Growth, insisted that the tea party remains a major force in GOP primaries — and, as such, is something establishment Republicans should be very wary of ignoring. ”Tea Party voters represent a huge portion of all Republican voters, so while the GOP establishment sometimes finds the Tea Party inconvenient, they are much better off making peace with it than making war with it,” said Lerner.¶ True enough. But, it still seems clear that the tea party is in the midst of a sort of soul searching. For a movement that burst onto the national scene with a force almost never seen in modern American politics, there’s no obvious second act. The movement needs a next fight or, short of that, to make a decision as to whether it can live within the Republican coalition or not.¶ (That latter choice is complicated by the fact that the tea party was built as a leaderless enterprise and so the idea of such a major philosophic decision being made for the entire movement is anathema to, well, the entire movement. Rick Reed, a Republican media consultant, suggested that “there may be a couple of folks whom 10 percent of Republicans would loosely and correctly associate with [the tea party movement], but probably no more.”)¶ One senior Republican party strategist, granted anonymity to speak candidly about the future of the tea party movement, expressed concern that while the tea party was at a “low point” today, the coming legislative fights in Congress could lead to a renaissance in the movement.

#### Strong Tea Party wrecks budget compromises

Montgomery 11

(Lori, "House Republicans divided on spending cuts; for some, it's $100 billion or bust," Feb 11, [www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/10/AR2011021007091.html](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/10/AR2011021007091.html))

An already wobbly week for House Republicans turned chaotic Thursday as their unruly new majority flatly rejected a spending plan crafted by House leaders, saying its cuts fell far short of fulfilling a campaign pledge to slice $100 billion from federal programs. House leaders offered to redo the package but were struggling to identify the massive and unprecedented cuts that will be required to meet their goal. Dissatisfied conservatives, meanwhile, were pressing for even sharper reductions that could prove difficult to push through the House, much less the Democratic-controlled Senate.¶ The uprising exposed serious divisions among Republicans bent on reducing the size of government, the defining issue of the campaign that swept them back into power in the House this fall. Dozens of freshmen, fueled by tea party fervor, are demanding a rapid response to the groundswell of public anger.¶ Their single-minded focus threatens to spoil efforts by House Speaker John A. Boehner (R-Ohio) to avoid a confrontation with the White House that could trigger a government shutdown in coming months. Until this week, House leaders had anticipated relatively little trouble putting together an initial spending plan, which they had hoped would serve as an austere but responsible counterpoint to the budget request President Obama is due to submit Monday.¶ Across Washington, conservative groups fanned the flames of the rebellion Thursday. At the annual Conservative Political Action Conference, Rep. Michele Bachmann (R-Minn.), the leader of the House Tea Party Caucus, criticized GOP leaders for their first offer to cut spending and demanded more.

#### Destroys the economy --- consumer confidence, dollar strength, credit rating

Brown 13

(Abram, 1/4, "GOP's Threat to Shutdown the Government is a Dangerous Strategy," www.forbes.com/sites/abrambrown/2013/01/04/the-gop-is-already-threatneing-to-shutdown-the-government-to-win-spending-cuts/)

That Republicans are already warning the country that they will turn off the lights in D.C. is an alarming situation. Depending on what happens in the debt ceiling debate, the Treasury Department might just have trouble paying the bills on time…or the whole apparatus could cease to function. Past that, there’s a risk that the credit-rating agencies could downgrade the United States, raising the country’s borrowing costs (and making that newly approved debt more costly).¶ Not to mention the damage to the broader economy. The last debt ceiling fiasco in August 2011 dashed consumer confidence. Why shop anywhere else than bargain-centers like Wal-Mart and or a dollar store when the nation seems to be falling apart? Shortly before the nation went past the deadline in 2011, the CEOs of Bank of America, Citi, JPMorgan Chase and Goldman Sachs sent a letter to The White House that urged for a quick resolution:¶ A default on our nation’s obligations, or a downgrade of America’s credit rating, would be a tremendous blow to business and investor confidence — raising interest rates for everyone who borrows, undermining the value of the dollar, and roiling stock and bond markets — and, therefore, dramatically worsening our nation’s already difficult economic circumstances.¶ Granted, the economy is in slightly better shape today than it was in August 2011. Not so strong, though, that the consequences of a shutdown would be much different.

#### Economic collapse causes nuclear conflicts

Burrows and Harris 9

Mathew J. Burrows counselor in the National Intelligence Council and Jennifer Harris a member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis” The Washington Quarterly 32:2 https://csis.org/files/publication/twq09aprilburrowsharris.pdf

Increased Potential for Global Conflict¶ Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the¶ future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking¶ forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity.¶ Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to¶ believe that the Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be¶ drawn from that period include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and¶ multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on¶ the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in the¶ same period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the¶ twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in¶ which the potential for greater conflict could grow would seem to be even more¶ apt in a constantly volatile economic environment as they would be if change¶ would be steadier.¶ In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and¶ nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the¶ international agenda. Terrorism’s appeal will decline if economic growth¶ continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those¶ terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of¶ technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most¶ dangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a¶ combination of descendants of long established groupsinheriting¶ organizational structures, command and control processes, and training¶ procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacksand newly emergent¶ collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized,¶ particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower¶ in an economic downturn.¶ The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S.¶ military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s¶ acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed¶ Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with¶ external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own¶ nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship¶ that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge¶ naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity¶ conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an¶ unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states¶ involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals¶ combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile¶ dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in¶ achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The¶ lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile¶ flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on¶ preemption rather than defense, potentially leading to escalating crises.Types of conflict that the world continues¶ to experience, such as over resources, could¶ reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and¶ there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices.¶ Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive¶ countries to take actions to assure their future¶ access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this¶ could result in interstate conflicts if government¶ leaders deem assured access to energy resources,¶ for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of¶ their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical¶ implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval¶ buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of¶ blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed¶ turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of¶ regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and¶ counterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational¶ cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in¶ Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is¶ likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between states in a more¶ dog-eat-dog world.¶

## 1NC CMR DA

#### Civil-military relations are strong, but could be de-railed

**Ricks 9/12/13**

[Thomas, Ed. Of *Best Defense* blog at Foreign Policy, <http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/09/12/gen_scales_needs_to_learn_that_discretion_is_the_better_part_of_civil_military_valo>, mg]

An additional consequence of the public's growing distance from the armed forces is the belief that, when it comes to a decision to go to war, the opinions of servicemembers should carry extra weight because they will be the ones doing the fighting and the dying. This is a profoundly undemocratic position in a country where the civilian branches of government are explicitly empowered by the Constitution to be the sole determinants of national security policy. Gen. Scales's dismissal of the White House staff as "wannabe soldiers" reinforces the dangerous idea that only military personnel, with their unique moral authority, are qualified to comment on when and how the nation goes to war. Few commentators **today would argue that American civil-military relations are in a state of crisis. Our armed forces are** loyal, patriotic, andcommitted to the principle of civilian control of the military**. The country's civil-military relationship, however, is being subjected to a set of stressors unlike any in our history**: a decade of warfare, the institutionalization of the all-volunteer force, and political gridlock which has undermined the public trust in our elected leaders. In this atmosphere, retired general officers must resist the temptation to wade too vigorously into national security debates. As lifetime representatives of their respective services, they command an authority that can dangerously encroach on the constitutional responsibilities of elected officials. For these retired officers, sometimes discretion is the better part of valor. ¶

#### The military strongly supports Obama’s use of targeted killings; they oppose the plan

Johnson 12

[Carrie, Feb 22, <http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2012/02/22/147264637/in-speech-top-pentagon-lawyer-defends-targeted-killing-program>, mg]

**The top lawyer at the Pentagon offered a strong defense of** the **Obama** administration**'s targeted killing program** Wednesday, **arguing** the use of **lethal force against the enemy is a "long-standing and long-legal practice.**"¶ In a speech at Yale University's Law School, Jeh Johnson said there's no real difference between high tech strikes against members of al-Qaida today and the U.S. military decision to target an airplane carrying the commander of the Japanese Navy in 1943.¶ "Should we take a dimmer view of the legality of lethal force directed against individual members of the enemy, because modern technology makes our weapons more precise?" Johnson said, according to a copy of his prepared remarks.¶ Nowhere in the talk did Johnson explicitly mention the U.S. drone program, used to kill radical cleric Anwar Al-Awlaki, al-Qaida propagandist Samir Kahn, and at least one other U.S. citizen over the past year.¶ The Obama administration's legal basis for those strikes remains secret, despite ongoing lawsuits filed by the American Civil Liberties Union and The New York Times that seek more information about how the federal government decides to target its own citizens.

#### An increase in transparency sparks massive backlash from the military

Russia Times 13

[May 16, <http://rt.com/usa/terror-al-qaeda-pentagon-war-397/>, mg]

Even after cutting off the head of al-Qaeda, the United States Department of Defense doesn’t believe an end to the war on terror is in sight. On Thursday, one Pentagon official predicted the mission against al-Qaeda could continue for another two decades.¶ Speaking to the Senate Armed Services early Thursday, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Michael Sheehan said the Pentagon has no plans to pull out of its almost 12-year-old war overseas.¶ When asked for his take on how long the war on terror could go on for, Sheehan told lawmakers, “At least 10 to 20 years.”¶ According to US President Barack Obama, the last combat troops will move out of Afghanistan in 2014. If remarks from Sheehan and others are at all accurate, though, in reality the war could last through the 2030s.¶ Michael A. Sheehan, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict. (Image from defense.gov)¶ Sheehan was being grilled by members of the Senate committee on Thursday over not just the future of the war, but what rules are in play to continue the operation. Congress granted then-President George W. Bush the power to go after al-Qaeda in 2001 by signing the Authorization to Use Military Force, a legislation that essentially gave the go-ahead to use America’s might by any means necessary to avenge the attacks of 9/11. Nearly 13 years later, though, some members of the Senate saw that the overly broad powers extended to the commander-in-chief through the AUMF are being used to justify a widening war that now has soldiers targeting insurgents in venue like Yemen and Somalia.¶ The scope of America’s counterterrorism program, Sheehan said, stretches “from Boston to the FATA,” referring to the region of Pakistan considered a hotbed of terrorism. Because of that widening arena, some senators said it’s time to rewrite the law.¶ “It has spread throughout North Africa, throughout the Maghreb,” Senator John McCain (R-Arizona) said during the hearing. “The situation’s changed dramatically.¶ But while some lawmakers suggested it was time to revise the AUMF, Pentagon officials said the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act updated the law to grant the president power not just to target overseas terrorists, but suspects believed to be associated forces.¶ Robert Taylor, the acting general counsel of the Department of Defense, said that the NDAA’s update to the Bush-era bill means that even suspects born after the September 11 attacks could be targeted as warriors in the war on terror.¶ “As long as they become an associated force under the legal standard that was set out,” Taylor testified, according to Wired’s Spencer Ackermnn.¶ Sen. Angus King, an Independent from Maine, suggested the Pentagon was uninterested in changing the AUMF because they are using it to justify a war that wouldn’t otherwise be legal.¶ “This is the most disturbing hearing I’ve been to in some time,” King said. “You guys have rewritten the Constitution today.”¶ “You guys have invented this term, associated forces, that’s nowhere in this document,” King said. “It’s the justification for everything, and it renders the war powers of Congress null and void.”¶ “I assume [the AUMF] does suit you well because you’re reading it to fit everything, and it doesn’t, the general rule of war applies,” King said.¶ Even McCain, who has been by and large considered a hawkish member of the Senate, spoke out against the Pentagon’s reluctance to re-write a law that they are using to justify a war that could take US troops to all corners of the globe for the unforeseeable future.¶ “For you to come here and say, ‘We don’t need to change it,’ I think, is disturbing,” McCain said.¶ Before stepping down as secretary of defense, former Pentagon chief Leon Panetta said in late 2011, “We're winning this very tough conflict.” Osama bin Laden was executed five months later, and the Central Intelligence Agency and DoD have continuously utilized strikes to weaken al-Qaeda substantially since.

#### Global nuclear war!

Cohen ’00 (Eliot A.-, Prof. @ Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies & director of the Strategic Studies department @ Johns Hopkins, worked for Dod, taught at the U.S. Naval War College, Fall, National Interest, “Why the Gap Matters - gap between military and civilian world”, http://www.24hourscholar.com/p/articles/mi\_m2751/is\_2000\_Fall/ai\_65576871/pg\_4?pi=scl //AGupta)

At the same time, the military exercises control, to a remarkable degree, of force structure and weapons acquisition. To be sure, Congress adds or trims requests at the margin, and periodically the administration will cancel a large program, such as the navy's projected replacement of the A-6 bomber. But by and large, the services have successfully protected programs that reflect ways of doing business going back for decades. One cannot explain otherwise current plans for large purchases of short-range fighter aircraft for the air force, supercarriers and traditional surface warships for the navy, and heavy artillery pieces for the army. Civilian control has meant, in practice, a general oversight of acquisition and some degree of control by veto of purchases, but nothing on the scale of earlier decisions to, for example, terminate the draft, re-deploy fleets, or develop counterinsurgency forces. The result is a force that looks very much like a shrunken version of the Cold War military of fifteen years ago- -which, indeed, was the initial post-Cold War design known as the "base force." The strength of the military voice and the weakness of civilian control, together with sheer inertia, has meant that the United States has failed to reevaluate its strategy and force structure after the Cold War. Despite a plethora of "bottom-up reviews" by official and semiofficial commissions, the force structure remains that of the Cold War, upgraded a bit and reduced in size by 40 percent. So What? WHAT WILL be the long-term consequences of these trends? To some extent, they have become visible already: the growing politicization of the officer corps; a submerged but real recruitment and retention crisis; a collapse of junior officers' confidence in their own leaders; [7] the odd antipathy between military and civilian cultures even as the two, in some respects, increasingly overlap; deadlock in the conduct of active military operations; and stagnation in the development of military forces for a geopolitical era radically different from the past one. To be sure, such phenomena have their precedents in American history. But such dysfunction occurred in a different context--one in which the American military did not have the task of maintaining global peace or a predominance of power across continents, and in which the armed forces consumed barely noticeable fractions of economic resources and decisionmakers' time. Today, the stakes are infinitely larger. For the moment, the United States dominates the globe militarily, as it does economically and culturally. It is doubtful that such predominance will long go unchallenged; were that to be the case it would reflect a change in the human condition that goes beyond all human experience of international politics over the millennia. Already, some of the signs of those challenges have begun to appear: increased tension with the rising power of China, including threats of force from that country against the United States and its allies; the development of modes of warfare--from terrorism through the spread of weapons of mass destruction--designed to play on American weaknesses; the appearance of problems (peacemaking, broadly defined) that will resist conventional solutions. None of these poses a mortal threat to the Republic, or is likely to do so anytime soon. Yet cumulatively, the consequences have been unfortunate enough; the inept conclusion to the Gulf War, the Somalia fiasco, and dithering over American policy in Yugoslavia may all partially be attributed to the poor state of American civil-military relations. So too may the subtle erosion of morale in the American military and the defense reform deadlock, which has preserved, to far too great a degree, outdated structures and mentalities. For now, to be sure, the United States is wealthy and powerful enough to afford such pratfalls and inefficiencies. But the full consequences will not be felt for some years, and not until a major military crisis--a challenge as severe in its way as the Korean or Vietnam War--arises. Such an eventuality; difficult as it may be to imagine today, could occur in any of a number of venues: in a conflict with China over Taiwan, in a desperate attempt to shore up collapsing states in Central or South America, or in a renewed outbreak of violence--this time with weapons of mass destruction thrown into the mix-in Southwest Asia. THE PARADOX of increased social and institutional vulnerability on the one hand and increased military influence on narrow sectors of policymaking on the other is the essence of the contemporary civil-military problem. Its roots lie not in the machinations of power hungry generals; they have had influence thrust upon them. Nor do they lie in the fecklessness of civilian leaders determined to remake the military in the image of civil society; all militaries must, in greater or lesser degree, share some of the mores and attitudes of the broader civilization from which they have emerged. The problem reflects, rather, deeper and more enduring changes in politics, society and technology

## 1NC Executive Restraint CP

#### Text: The President of the United States should release the United States Department of Justice memoranda outlining the legal basis and justification for drone attacks.

#### Counterplan solves the aff – Executive action is comparatively better

Kuyers 13

(Josh Kuyers, Legal Extern at U.S. Department of State¶ Senior Research Associate at Public International Law & Policy Group¶ Research Associate at Public International Law & Policy Group, “CIA or DoD: Clarifying the Legal Framework Applicable to the Drone Authority Debate” Apr 4, 2013, <http://nationalsecuritylawbrief.com/2013/04/04/cia-or-dod-clarifying-the-legal-framework-applicable-to-the-drone-authority-debate/>, KB)

Ultimately, as many of the recent editorials note, any shift in the operational authority over drone strikes from the CIA to the DoD may have little practical effect. This posting explains that the intended increase in accountability and transparency may actually be prevented by the Title 10-Title 50 legal framework meant to provide congressional oversight over drone operations. This is because Congress’ Title 50 oversight functions are meant to provide limited, yet timely information for those operations that, if made public, would prove damaging to U.S. national security or foreign relations. In contrast, Congress’ Title 10 oversight is less stringent because did not envision the military engaging in ongoing hostilities against a global terrorist threat. Given the legal framework governing operational oversight, the Obama Administration might consider providing more transparency and accountability through regularly scheduled, voluntary briefings rather than shifting operational command and control.

## 1NC Apocalyptic Rhetoric K

#### Fiat double bind – Either the harms to the 1AC are true and they cannot solve for extinction before they control the levers of power OR their harms are constructed for the purpose of alarmism which makes them symbolic terrorists.

#### Apocalyptic predictions make serial policy failure inevitable

Kurasawa 4 – Professor of Sociology, York University of Toronto, Fuyuki, “Cautionary Tales: The Global Culture of Prevention and the Work of Foresight”, Constellations Volume 11, No 4, <http://www.yorku.ca/kurasawa/Kurasawa%20Articles/Constellations%20Article.pdf>

Up to this point, I have tried to demonstrate that transnational socio-political relations are nurturing a thriving culture and infrastructure of prevention from below, which challenges presumptions about the inscrutability of the future (II) and a stance of indifference toward it (III). Nonetheless, unless and until it is substantively ‘filled in,’ the argument is vulnerable to misappropriation since farsightedness does not in and of itself ensure emancipatory outcomes. Therefore, this section proposes to specify normative criteria and participatory procedures through which citizens can determine the ‘reasonableness,’ legitimacy, and effectiveness of competing dystopian visions in order to arrive at a socially self-instituting future. Foremost among thepossible distortions of farsightedness is alarmism, the manufacturing ofunwarranted and unfounded doomsday scenarios. State and market institutionsmay seek to produce a culture of fear by deliberately stretching interpretations of realitybeyond the limits of the plausible so as to exaggerate the prospects of impending catastrophes, or yet again, by intentionally promoting certain prognoses over others for instrumental purposes. Accordingly, regressive dystopiascan operate as Trojan horses advancing political agendasor commercial interests that would otherwise be susceptible to public scrutiny and opposition. Instances of this kind of manipulation of the dystopian imaginary are plentiful: the invasion of Iraq in the name of fighting terrorism and an imminent threat of use of ‘weapons of mass destruction’; the severe curtailing of American civil liberties amidst fears of a collapse of ‘homeland security’; the neoliberal dismantling of the welfare state as the only remedy for an ideologically constructed fiscal crisis; the conservative expansion of policing and incarceration due to supposedly spiraling crime waves; and so forth. Alarmism constructs and codes the future in particular ways, producing or reinforcing certain crisis narratives, belief structures, and rhetorical conventions. As much as alarmist ideas beget a culture of fear, the reverse is no less true. If fear-mongering is a misappropriation of preventive foresight, resignation about the future represents a problematic outgrowth of the popular acknowledgment of global perils. Some believe that the world to come is so uncertain and dangerous that we should not attempt to modify the course of history; the future will look after itself for better or worse, regardless of what we do or wish. One version of this argument consists in a complacent optimism perceiving the future as fated to be better than either the past or the present. Frequently accompanying it is a self-deluding denial of what is plausible (‘the world will not be so bad after all’), or a naively Panglossian pragmatism (‘things will work themselves out in spite of everything, because humankind always finds ways to survive’).37 Much more common, however, isthe opposite reaction, a fatalistic pessimism reconciled to the idea that the future will be necessarily worse than what preceded it. This is sustained by a tragic chronological framework according to which humanity is doomed to decay, or a cyclical one of the endless repetition of the mistakes of the past. On top of their dubious assessments of what is to come, alarmismand resignation would, if widely accepted, undermine a viable practice of farsightedness. Indeed, both of them encourage public disengagement from deliberation about scenarios for the future, a process that appears to be dangerous, pointless, or unnecessary. The resulting ‘depublicization’ of debate leaves dominant groups and institutions(the state, the market, techno-science) in charge of sorting out the future for the rest of us, thus effectively producing a heteronomous social order. How, then, can we support a democratic process of prevention from below? The answer, I think, lies in cultivating the public capacity for critical judgment and deliberation, so that participants in global civil society subject all claims about potential catastrophes to examination, evaluation, and contestation. Two normative concepts are particularly well suited to grounding these tasks: the precautionary principle and global justice.

#### **Maintaining the apocalyptic logic of the 1AC results in endless war and an ever-expanding presidency**

#### **Rana 2011** (Aziz, Assistant Professor of Law @ Cornell. “Responses to the Ten Questions.” William Mitchell Law Review, 37 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 5099)

The only way ultimately to produce lasting reform is to shift American political identity away from the national security frame shared by both the Bush and Obama administrations. In emphasizing the sense of permanent threat, this frame has not only generated an American polity continuously under arms, but it has also led to a global military footprint perhaps unparalleled in human history. As of 2009, some 516,273 military service members-not including Department of Defense civilian officials were deployed abroad, stationed across 716 reported overseas bases (the true number is likely over 1000), and present in approximatey 150 foreign states (nearly eighty percent of the world's countries). This worldwide military network is sustained by tremendous expenditures, which account for almost half of global defense spending-a number equal to the following twenty nations combined.48 Simply maintaining and protecting this global defense infrastructure has the inevitable consequence of strengthening executive power and promoting the further entrenchment of emergency rhetoric and rationales. Most troubling, in order to extend its footprint and international primacy, the United States finds itself engaging in practices that often actually promote, rather than inhibit, instability at the fringes of American power. The ever-present concern with national security means that policymakers view the United States as enjoying a right to act covertly or overtly in all parts of the world in order to quell presumed threats. Yet, in doing so, American actions have the tendency to produce their own backlashes, with the United States subject to local insurrections and new potential dangers. Rather than recognizing how the projection of American power itself participates in generating these crises, the talismanic logic of national security works to rationalize yet further territorial presence. This cycle of intervention, backlash, instability, and more intervention promotes a deep distortion in the actual meaning of local events-which oftentimes have little direct relation to American interests. It also serves as a continual justification for yet further constitutional flexibility and presidential prerogative, precisely because new dangers seem omnipresent. One clear consequence is that, as the local meaning of events disappears, the actual severity of foreign threats can often be greatly exaggerated. In 2009, only twenty-five United States civilians (sixteen at home and nine abroad) were killed in terrorist 49 attacks according to the State Department. While the fear of a terrorist attack is a legitimate concern, such numbers-which have been consistent in recent years-place the gravity of the threat in perspective and suggest the disconnect between the rhetoric of existential danger (one presumably comparable to Pearl Harbor) and the reality of relative security. Moreover, the persistent alteration of basic constitutional values to fit national security aims, regardless of objective consequences, for actual American physical safety, speaks to a profound imbalance in the United States's political priorities. It highlights just how entrenched Herring's old vision of security as pre-political (a lodestar around which to calibrate fundamental rights and collective interests) has become. Ultimately, the failure of the Obama administration to offer a meaningful legal correction is because at root the current administration-like its predecessor-remains committed to this vision of security and to the larger political framework produced by it. Thus, the question for Americans is whether there exists the public will to challenge the prevailing consensus, with its account of permanent threat and the need for a continuous projection of American power. Without such a will, there can be no substantive shift in our constitutional politics.

#### The alternative is to reject the apocalyptic frames of the 1AC

#### Even if the rational arguments in favor of the plan are logical, the representations of apocalypse colonize the debate towards pressure for fast invasion and warmongering

Goodnight 2010 (G. Thomas Goodnight is Professor and Director of Doctoral Studies at the Annenberg School for Communication, the University of Southern California in Los Angeles; "The Metapolitics of the 2002 Iraq Debate: Public Policy and the Network Imaginary", Rhetoric & Public Affairs Volume 13, Number 1, Spring 2010)

Opponents of the Democratic Party argued the risks of war, but their pragmatic policy challenges did not grab sufficient traction to slow the unreeling web of justification. Of course, there was little denial that the war would create more terrorists, generate a lower threshold for intervention, receive weak international support, and in the end leave the dangerous business of Afghanistan unfinished. But the Democrats became entangled in reflexive posturing about the effects of the debate itself—the importance of "message sending" to the United Nations and "consensus" backing for the president as negotiator-in-chief. With 9/11 not far behind, "tough" messages appeared to provide a much desired supplement to boost confidence, while pragmatism, caution, and planning took a back seat. Presidential hopefuls cut loose from this morass and took advantage of Republican-offered political cover. Republicans did appear to benefit from tough war rhetoric in the immediate election aftermath, enabling Bush to run successfully in 2004 as a wartime president. As WMD continued not to turn up, the intervention dragged on, costs mounted, political fortunes reversed—although the entanglements remained and remain. [End Page 87] The debate of 2002 found that a systematic presidential campaign—when bolstered by cherry-picked evidence—can be particularly powerful, especially when administration supporters in Congress veer shamelessly from long-held positions on policy and the leadership of the opposing party takes shelter in offered political cover. Further, the debate illustrates how the events that should prompt policy debate become colonized, in this case making common sense difficult to muster because the network imaginary laces a web of associative fears with compensatory toughness. On the whole, the debates were not the nation's finest hour. The debate of 2002 strove to convert a traumatic national event into a conservative-articulated, Republican-captured, presidentially initiated rise in power, and ended by setting the stage for congressional investigation, the rise of the Democrats, reassertion of congressional power, and a new presidency committed to public diplomacy. WMD were at the heart of the six-year-long controversy. It was hardly remembered that [WMD] weapons of mass destruction were not deployed by terrorists on September 11th. Rather, fast, anonymous, networked, modern systems of circulation were turned, through ingenuity, into first-strike weapons. Seen with fresh militancy, 9/11 suggests that the modern world remains vulnerable to mutating events that change, shock, and command attention, actions that attain expanding scope and influence by virtue of a network imaginary, where such moments self-organize and multiply in varied directions. The development of policy studies as rhetoric, then, calls attention to the disruptive events as these become situated in the restricted focus of national debate and recovered, through critique, as an unfinished metapolitics, which demands rethinking of the taken-for-granted grounds and alliances upon which post-event consensus became fabricated. In its time, the "War on Terror" was framed as a "clash of civilizations" and a new Munich. In retrospect, 9/11 should be understood as signaling a much closer, changing, entangled, future world where the complications of security spread and interlock to haunt twenty-first-century network imaginaries.

## 1NC Case - Solvency

#### Obama will inevitably use secret drone strikes regardless of oversight

CNN 13

(Eliott McLaughlin, Jamie Crawford and Joe Sterling, 05/23/13, “Obama: U.S. will keep deploying drones -- when they are only option”, http://www.cnn.com/2013/05/23/politics/obama-terror-speech, AB)

Washington (CNN) -- Drone strikes are a necessary evil, but one that must be used with more temperance as the United States' security situation evolves, President Barack Obama said Thursday.¶ America prefers to capture, interrogate and prosecute terrorists, but there are times when this isn't possible, Obama said in a speech at the National Defense University in Washington. Terrorists intentionally hide in hard-to-reach locales and putting boots on the ground is often out of the question, he said.¶ Thus, when the United States is faced with a threat from terrorists in a country where the government has only tenuous or no influence, drones strikes are the only option -- and they're legal because America "is at war with al Qaeda, the Taliban and their associated forces," Obama said.¶ He added, however, "To say a military tactic is legal, or even effective, is not to say it is wise or moral in every instance. For the same progress that gives us the technology to strike half a world away also demands the discipline to constrain that power -- or risk abusing it."¶ Increased oversight is important, but not easy, Obama said. While he has considered a special court or independent oversight board, those options are problematic, so he plans to talk with Congress to determine how best to handle the deployment of drones, he said.¶ The nation's image was a theme throughout the speech, as Obama emphasized some actions in recent years -- drone strikes and Guantanamo Bay key among them -- risk creating more threats. The nature of threats against the United States have changed since he took office -- they've become more localized -- and so, too, must efforts to combat them, he said.¶ "From our use of drones to the detention of terror suspects, the decisions that we are making now will define the type of nation and world that we leave to our children," he said.¶ Today, al Qaeda operatives in Pakistan and Afghanistan worry more about protecting their own skin than attacking America, he said, but the threat is more diffuse, extending into places such as Yemen, Iraq, Somalia and North Africa. And al Qaeda's ideology helped fuel attacks like the ones at the Boston Marathon and U.S. diplomatic compound in Benghazi.¶ Obama said the use of lethal force extends to U.S. citizens as well.¶ On Wednesday, his administration disclosed for the first time that four Americans had been killed in counterterrorist drone strikes overseas, including one person who was targeted by the United States.¶ "When a U.S. citizen goes abroad to wage war against America -- and is actively plotting to kill U.S. citizens; and when neither the United States, nor our partners are in a position to capture him before he carries out a plot -- his citizenship should no more serve as a shield than a sniper shooting down on an innocent crowd should be protected from a SWAT team," Obama said.¶ To stop terrorists from gaining a foothold, drones will be deployed, Obama said, but only when there is an imminent threat; no hope of capturing the targeted terrorist; "near certainty" that civilians won't be harmed; and "there are no other governments capable of effectively addressing the threat." Never will a strike be punitive, he said.¶ Those who die as collateral damage "will haunt us for as long as we live," the president said, but he emphasized that the targeted individuals aim to exact indiscriminate violence, "and the death toll from their acts of terrorism against Muslims dwarfs any estimate of civilian casualties from drone strikes."¶ It's not always feasible to send in Special Forces, as in the Osama bin Laden raid, to stamp out terrorism, and even if it were, the introduction of troops could mean more deaths on both sides, Obama said.¶ "The result would be more U.S. deaths, more Blackhawks down, more confrontations with local populations and an inevitable mission creep in support of such raids that could easily escalate into new wars," he said.¶ The American public is split on where and how drones should be used, according to a March poll by Gallup.¶ Although 65% of respondents said drones should be used against suspected terrorists abroad, only 41% said drones should be used against American citizens who are suspected terrorists in foreign countries.

## 1NC Case - Prolif

#### Drone arms race inevitable

USA Today 13

(1/9, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/01/08/experts-drones-basis-for-new-global-arms-race/1819091/, “Experts: Drones basis for new global arms race”, AB)

The success of U.S. drones in Iraq and Afghanistan has triggered a global arms race, raising concerns the remotely piloted aircraft could fall into unfriendly hands, military experts say. The number of countries that have acquired or developed drones expanded to more than 75, up from about 40 in 2005, according to the Government Accountability Office, the investigative arm of Congress. Iran and China are among the countries that have fielded their own systems. "People have seen the successes we've had," said Lt. Gen. Larry James, the Air Force's deputy chief of staff for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. The U.S. military has used drones extensively in Afghanistan, primarily to watch over enemy targets. Armed drones have been used to target terrorist leaders with missiles that are fired from miles away.

#### Drone prolif now AND US restrictions don’t solve

Anderson 10 (Kenneth Anderson is a law professor at Washington College of Law, American University, a research fellow of the Hoover Institution at Stanford University and a Non-Resident Visiting Fellow at the Brookings Institution, April 10th 2010, “Acquiring UAV Technology”, http://www.volokh.com/2010/04/09/acquiring-uav-technology/, AB)

I’ve noticed a number of posts and comments around the blogosphere on the spread of UAV technology. Which indeed is happening; many states are developing and deploying UAVs of various kinds. The WCL National Security Law Brief blog, for example, notes that India is now acquiring weaponized UAVs: India is reportedly preparing to have “killer” unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in response to possible threats from Pakistan and China. Until now India has denied the use of armed UAVs, but they did use UAVs that can detect incoming missile attacks or border incursions. The importance of obtaining armed UAVs grew enormously after the recent attack on paramilitary forces in Chhattisgarh that killed 75 security personnel. Sources reveal that the Indian Air Force (IAF) has been in contact with Israeli arms suppliers in New Delhi recently. The IAF is looking to operate Israeli Harop armed UAVs from 2011 onwards, and other units of the armed forces will follow. I’ve also read comments various places suggesting that increased use of drone technologies by the United States causes other countries to follow suit, or to develop or acquire similar technologies. In some cases, the dangling implication is that if the US would not get involved in such technologies, others would not follow suit. In some relatively rare cases of weapons technologies, the US refraining from undertaking the R&D, or stopping short of a deployable weapon, might induce others not to build the same weapon. Perhaps the best example is the US stopping its development of blinding laser antipersonnel weapons in the 1990s; if others, particularly the Chinese, have developed them to a deployable weapon, I’m not aware of it. The US stopped partly in relation to a developing international campaign, modeled on the landmines ban campaign, but mostly because of a strong sense of revulsion and pushback by US line officers. Moreover, there was a strong sense that such a weapon (somewhat like chemical weapons) would be not deeply useful on a battlefield – but would be tremendously threatening as a pure terrorism weapon against civilians. In any case, the technologies involved would be advanced for R&D, construction, maintenance, and deployment, at least for a while. The situation is altogether different in the case of UAVs. The biggest reason is that the flying-around part of UAVs – the avionics and control of a drone aircraft in flight – is not particularly high technology at all. It is in range of pretty much any functioning state military that flies anything at all. The same for the weaponry, if all you’re looking to do is fire a missile, such as an anti-tank missile like the Hellfire. It’s not high technology, it is well within the reach of pretty much any state military. Iran? Without thinking twice. Burma? Sure. Zimbabwe? If it really wanted to, probably. So it doesn’t make any substantial difference whether or not the US deploys UAVs, not in relation to a decision by other states to deploy their own. The US decision to use and deploy UAVs does not drive others’ decisions one way or the other. They make that decision in nearly all cases – Iran perhaps being an exception in wanting to be able to show that they can use them in or over the Iraqi border – in relation to their particular security perceptions. Many states have reasons to want to have UAVs, for surveillance as well as use of force. It is not as a counter or defense to the US use of UAVs. The real issue is not flying the plane or putting a missile on it. The question is the sensor technology (and related communication links) – for two reasons. One is the ability to identify the target; the other is to determine the level, acceptable or not, of collateral damage in relation to the target. That’s the technologically difficult part. And yet it is not something important to very many of the militaries that might want to use UAVs, because not that many are going to be worried about the use of UAVs for discrete, targeted killing. Not so discrete and not so targeted will be just fine – and that does not require super-advanced technology. China might decide that it wants an advanced assassination platform that would depend on such sensors, and in any case be interested in investing in such technology for many reasons – but that is not going to describe Iran or very many other places that are capable of deploying and using weaponized UAVs. Iran, for example, won’t have super advanced sensor technology (unless China sells it to them), but they will have UAVs. (The attached weaponry follows the same pattern. Most countries will find a Hellfire type missile just fine. The US will continue to develop smaller weapons finally capable of a single person hit. Few others will develop it, partly because they don’t care and partly because its effectiveness depends on advanced sensors that they are not likely to have.) Robots are broadly defined by three characteristics – computation, sensor inputs, and gross movement. Movement in the case of a weaponized robot includes both movement and the use of its weapon – meaning, flying the UAV and firing a weapon. The first of those, flying the UAV, is available widely; primitive weapons are available widely as well, and so is the fundamental computational power. Sensors are much, much more difficult – but only to the extent that a party cares about discretion in targeting. But it is not the case that they are making these decisions on account of US decisions about UAVs; UAVs are useful for many other reasons for many other parties, all on their own.

#### No impact to drone prolif – the US is the ONLY one that can effectively operate them

Roberts 3/22

(Kristin, news editor, National Journal, 3/22/2013, “When the Whole World Has Drones,” <http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/when-the-whole-world-has-drones-20130321>, accessed 7/12/2013, BS)

The United States is the indisputable leader in drone technology and long-range strike. Remote-piloted aircraft have given Washington an extraordinary ability to wage war with far greater precision, improved effect, and fewer unintended casualties than conventional warfare. The drones allow U.S. forces to establish ever greater control over combat areas, and the Pentagon sees the technology as an efficient and judicious force of the future. And it should, given the billions of dollars that have gone into establishing and maintaining such a capability. That level of superiority leads some national security officials to downplay concerns about other nations’ unmanned systems and to too narrowly define potential threats to the homeland. As proof, they argue that American dominance in drone warfare is due only in part to the aircraft itself, which offers the ability to travel great distances and loiter for long periods, not to mention carry and launch Hellfire missiles. The drone itself, they argue, is just a tool and, yes, one that is being copied aggressively by allies and adversaries alike. The real edge, they say, is in the unparalleled intelligence-collection and data-analysis underpinning the aircraft’s mission. “There is what I think is just an unconstrained focus on a tool as opposed to the subject of the issue, the tool of remotely piloted aircraft that in fact provide for greater degrees of surety before you employ force than anything else we use,” said retired Lt. Gen. David Deptula, the Air Force’s first deputy chief of staff for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. “I think people don’t realize that for the medium altitude aircraft—the MQ-1 [Predator] and MQ-9 [Reaper] that are generally written about in the press—there are over 200 people involved in just one orbit of those aircraft.… The majority of those people are analysts who are interpreting the information that’s coming off the sensors on the aircraft.” The analysts are part of the global architecture that makes precision strikes, and targeted killing, possible. At the front end, obviously, intelligence—military, CIA, and local—inform target decisions. But in as near-real time as technologically possible, intel analysts in Nevada, Texas, Virginia, and other locations watch the data flood in from the aircraft and make calls on what’s happening on target. They monitor the footage, listen to audio, and analyze signals, giving decision-makers time to adjust an operation if the risks (often counted in potential civilian deaths) outweigh the reward (judged by the value of the threat eliminated). “Is that a shovel or a rifle? Is that a Taliban member or is this a farmer? The way that warfare has advanced is that we are much more exquisite in our ability to discern,” Maj. Gen. Robert Otto, commander of the Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Agency, told National Journal at Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada. “We’re not overhead for 15 minutes with a fighter that’s about to run out of gas, and we have to make a decision. We can orbit long enough to be pretty sure about our target.” Other countries, groups, and even individuals can and do fly drones. But no state or group has nearly the sophisticated network of intelligence and data analysis that gives the United States its strategic advantage. Although it would be foolish to dismiss the notion that potential U.S. adversaries aspire to attain that type of war-from-afar, pinpoint-strike capability, they have neither the income nor the perceived need to do so.

#### No impact to meltdowns

Adams 12

Rod Adams 12, Former submarine Engineer Officer, Founder, Adams Atomic Engines, Inc., “Has Apocalyptic Portrayal of Climate Change Risk Backfired?”, May 2, <http://atomicinsights.com/2012/05/has-apocalyptic-portrayal-of-climate-change-risk-backfired.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+AtomicInsights+%28Atomic+Insights%29>

Not only was the discussion enlightening about the reasons why different people end up with different opinions about climate change responses when presented with essentially the same body of information, but it also got me thinking about a possible way to fight back against the Gundersens, Caldicotts, Riccios, Grossmans and Wassermans of the world. That group of five tend to use apocalyptic rhetoric to describe what will happen to the world if we do not immediately start turning our collective backs on all of the benefits that abundant atomic energy can provide. They spin tall tales of deformed children, massive numbers of cancers as a result of minor radioactive material releases, swaths of land made “uninhabitable” for thousands of years, countries “cut in half”, and clouds of “hot particles” raining death and destruction ten thousand miles from the release point. Every one of those clowns have been repeating similar stories for at least two solid decades, and continue to repeat their stories even after supposedly catastrophic failures at Fukushima have not resulted in a single radiation related injury or death. According to eminent scientists – like Dr. Robert Gale – Fukushima is unlikely to EVER result in any measurable increase in radiation related illness. One important element that we have to consider to assess cancer risks associated with an accident like Fukushima is our baseline risk for developing cancer. All of us, unfortunately, have a substantial risk of developing cancer in our lifetime. For example, a 50-year-old male has a 42% risk of developing cancer during his remaining life; it’s almost the same for a 10-year-old. This risk only decreases when we get much older and only because we are dying of other causes. It’s true that excess radiation exposure can increase our cancer risk above baseline levels; it’s clear from studies of the survivors of the 1945 atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, of people exposed to radiation in medical and occupational settings, and of people exposed to radon decay products in mines and home basements. When it comes to exposures like that of Fukushima, the question is: What is the relative magnitude of the increased risk from Fukushima compared to our baseline cancer risk? Despite our fears, it is quite small. If the nuclear industry – as small and unfocused as it is – really wanted to take action to isolate the apocalyptic antinuclear activists, it could take a page from the effective campaign of the fossil fuel lobby. It could start an integrated campaign to help the rest of us to remember that, despite the dire predictions, the sky never fell, the predicted unnatural deaths never occurred, the deformations were figments of imagination, and the land is not really irreversibly uninhabitable for generations. The industry would effectively share the story of Ukraine’s recent decision to begin repopulating the vast majority of the “dead zone” that was forcibly evacuated after the Chernobyl accident. It would put some context into the discussion about radiation health effects; even if leaders shy away from directly challenging the Linear No Threshold (LNT) dose assumption, they can still show that even that pessimistic model says that a tiny dose leads to a tiny risk. Aside: My personal opinion is that the LNT is scientifically unsupportable and should be replaced with a much better model. We deserve far less onerous regulations; there is evidence that existing regulations actually cause harm. I hear a rumor that there is a group of mostly retired, but solidly credentialed professionals who are organizing a special session at the annual ANS meeting to talk about effective ways to influence policy changes. End Aside. Most of us recognize that there is no such thing as a zero risk; repeated assertions of “there is no safe level” should be addressed by accepting “close enough” to zero so that even the most fearful person can stop worrying. The sky has not fallen, even though we have experienced complete core meltdowns and secondary explosions that did some visible damage. Nuclear plants are not perfect, there will be accidents and there will be radioactive material releases. History is telling me that the risks are acceptable, especially in the context of the real world where there is always some potential for harm. The benefits of accepting a little nuclear risk are immense and must not be marginalized by the people who market fear and trembling.

#### No Armenia-Azerbaijan war- lack of money and capability

Stratfor ‘11

[Why Russia, Turkey Look Toward Armenia and Azerbaijan” http://www.stratfor.com/geopolitical\_diary/20110331-why-russia-and-turkey-are-looking-towards-armenia-and-azerbaijan]

Though simmering hostilities have continued, there are two reasons the conflict has remained frozen. First, beginning in the mid-1990s, neither Armenia nor Azerbaijan had the resources to continue fighting. Armenia’s economy was, and is, non-existent for the most part. Without the financial means, it would be impossible for Armenia to launch a full-scale war. At the same time, Azerbaijan’s military has been too weak, thus far, to assert control over the occupied lands.

#### No regional escalation.

Maloney 7

(Suzanne, Senior Fellow – Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Steve Cook, Fellow – Council on Foreign Relations, and Ray Takeyh, Fellow – Council for Foreign Relations, “Why the Iraq War Won’t Engulf the Mideast”, International Herald Tribune, 6-28, <http://www.brookings.edu/views/op-ed/maloney20070629.htm>)

Yet, the Saudis, Iranians, Jordanians, Syrians, and others are very unlikely to go to war either to protect their own sect or ethnic group or to prevent one country from gaining the upper hand in Iraq. The reasons are fairly straightforward. First, Middle Eastern leaders, like politicians everywhere, are primarily interested in one thing: self-preservation. Committing forces to Iraq is an inherently risky proposition, which, if the conflict went badly, [and] could threaten domestic political stability. Moreover, most Arab armies are geared toward regime protection rather than projecting power and thus have little capability for sending troops to Iraq. Second, there is cause for concern about the so-called blowback scenario in which jihadis returning from Iraq destabilize their home countries, plunging the region into conflict. Middle Eastern leaders are preparing for this possibility. Unlike in the 1990s, when Arab fighters in the Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union returned to Algeria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia and became a source of instability, Arab security services are being vigilant about who is coming in and going from their countries. In the last month, the Saudi government has arrested approximately 200 people suspected of ties with militants. Riyadh is also building a 700 kilometer wall along part of its frontier with Iraq in order to keep militants out of the kingdom. Finally, there is no precedent for Arab leaders to commit forces to conflicts in which they are not directly involved. The Iraqis and the Saudis did send small contingents to fight the Israelis in 1948 and 1967, but they were either ineffective or never made it. In the 1970s and 1980s, Arab countries other than Syria, which had a compelling interest in establishing its hegemony over Lebanon, never committed forces either to protect the Lebanese from the Israelis or from other Lebanese. The civil war in Lebanon was regarded as someone else's fight.

## 1NC Case - Hegemony

#### 1. American soft power is unworkable – nations don’t believe in benevolent hegemony enough to overwhelm their resentment and fear\*\*\*

Christopher Layne (Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) 2007 “American Empire: A Debate” p 68

Doubtless, American primacy has its dimension of benevolence, but a state as powerful as the United States can never be benevolent enough to offset the fear that other states have of its unchecked power. In international politics, benevolent hegemons are like unicorns—there is no such animal. Hegemons love themselves, but others mistrust and fear them—and for good reason. In today's world, others dread both the overconcentration of geopolitical weight in America's favor and the purposes for which it may be used. After all,"Nogreat power has a monopoly on virtue and, although some may have a greatdeal more virtue than others, virtue imposed on others is not seen as such bythem. All great powers are capable of exercising a measure of self-restraint, butthey are tempted not to and the choice to practice restraint is made easier by theexistence of countervailing power and the possibility of it being exercised."While Washington's self-proclaimed benevolence is inherently ephemeral, the hard fist of American power is tangible. Others must worry constantly that ifU.S. intentions change, bad things may happen to them. In a one-superpower world, the overconcentration of power in America's hands is an omnipresent challenge to other states's ecurity, and Washington's ability to reassure others of its benevolence is limited by the very enormity of its power.

#### 1. American influence is unsustainable—3 reasons

Christopher Layne is a Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute and Mary Julia and George R. Jordan Professorship of International Affairs at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, July 26th 2011, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09557571.2011.55849, “The unipolar exit: beyond the Pax American”; hhs-ab

In this article I challenge Brooks and Wohlforth. I show that the unipolar era already is visibly drawing to a close. Three main drivers explain the impending end of the Pax Americana. First, the rise of new great powers—especially China—is transforming the international system from unipolarity to multipolarity. Second, the United States is becoming the poster child for strategic over-extension, or as Paul Kennedy (1987) dubbed it, imperial overstretch. Third, the United States’ relative economic power is declining. In particular, mounting US ﬁscal problems and the dollar’s increasingly problematic role as the international ﬁnancial system’s reserve currency are undermining US hegemony. To comprehend why the Pax Americana is ending we need to understand the linkages among these trends, and how each has feedback effects on the others. After examining how these trends undermine the Brooks and Wohlforth argument for unipolar stability and the durability of US hegemony, I conclude by arguing that over the next two decades the Pax Americana’s end presages dramatic changes in international politics—the outlines of which already are visible.

#### 2. it doesn’t solve war

Benjamin H. Friedman, Research Fellow in Defense and Homeland Security Studies @ Cato Institute, July 20, 2010, http://www.cato.org/testimony/ct-bf-07202010.html, “Military Restraint and Defense Savings”

Another argument for high military spending is that U.S. military hegemony underlies global stability. Our forces and alliance commitments dampen conflict between potential rivals like China and Japan, we are told, preventing them from fighting wars that would disrupt trade and cost us more than the military spending that would have prevented war. The theoretical and empirical foundation for this claim is weak. It overestimates both the American military's contribution to international stability and the danger that instability abroad poses to Americans. In Western Europe, U.S. forces now contribute little to peace, at best making the tiny odds of war among states there slightly more so.7 Even in Asia, where there is more tension, the history of international relations suggests that without U.S. military deployments potential rivals, especially those separated by sea like Japan and China, will generally achieve a stable balance of power rather than fight. In other cases, as with our bases in Saudi Arabia between the Iraq wars, U.S. forces probably create more unrestthan they prevent. Our force deployments can also generate instability by prompting states to develop nuclear weapons

#### 4. Hegemony causes prolif, makes collapse and war inevitable.

Jervis 9 – Professor of international politics at Columbia University, Robert, World Politics, 61.1, Jan, MUSE

Failure would not mean that the system will soon cease being unipolar, however. Only if Europe truly unites (an increasingly distant prospect) could bipolarity be restored. Barring drastic internal instability, the PRC is likely to continue to rise but cannot be a global challenger in the foreseeable future. The most likely system-changing force is proliferation, and ironically unipolarity gives many states good reasons to seek nuclear weapons. Although allies sometimes doubted the American commitment during the cold war, the very strength of the Soviet Union meant that the U.S. would pay a high price if it did not live up to its promises to defend them. The unipole has more freedom of action. Even if the unipole’s costs of protecting others are lower, those states have less reason to be confident that it will stand by them forever. The existence of a security community does not entirely displace the fear of an uncertain future that is the hallmark of international politics. American enemies like North Korea and Iran face more immediate incentives to defend themselves, incentives that were increased but not created by the overthrow of Saddam’s regime. Indeed, the U.S. has spurred proliferation by stressing the danger posed by “rogue” states with nuclear weapons, treating North Korea much more gingerly than Iraq, and indicating that it can be deterred by even a few atomic bombs. Its very efforts to stop other countries from getting nuclear weapons imply that the consequences of their succeeding will be great, a belief that is questionable but could easily be self-fulfilling. Furthermore, regional domino effects are likely: a growing North Koreannuclear force could lead Japan to develop nuclear weapons, and if Iran continues its program others in the region may follow suit. Thus both American overexpansion and the fear that it will eventually withdraw will encourage others to get nuclear weapons. This raises the question of what would remain of a unipolar system in a proliferated world. The American ability to coerce others would decrease but so would its need to defend friendly powers that would now have their own deterrents.55 The world would still be unipolar by most measures and considerations, but many countries would be able to protect themselves, perhaps even against the superpower. How they would use this increased security is far from clear, however. They might intensify conflict with neighbors because they no longer fear all-out war, or, on the contrary, they might be willing to engage in greater cooperation [End Page 212] because the risks of becoming dependent on others would be reduced. In any event, the polarity of the system may become less important. Unipolarity—at least under current circumstances—may then have within it the seeds if not of its own destruction, then at least of its modification, and the resulting world would pose interesting challenges to both scholars and national leaders. [End Page 213]

#### Nuclear prolif causes extinction

Victor A **Utgoff,** Deputy Director of Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division of Institute for Defense Analysis, Summer 20**02**, Survival, p.87-90

In sum, widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons, and that such shoot outs will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are headed towards a world that will mirror the American Wild West of the late 1800s. With most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear “six shooters” on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but every once in a while we will all gather together on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations.

#### 5.) Hegemony causes terrorism

Christopher Layne 06 Research Fellow @ the Independent Institute, Visiting Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies @ the Cato Institute (The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present, p. 190-1)

The events of 9/11 are another example of how hegemony makes the United States less secure than it would be if it followed an offshore balancing strategy. Terrorism, the RAND Corporation terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman says, is "about power: the pursuit of power, the acquisition of power, and use of power to achieve political change."86 If we step back for a moment from our horror and revulsion at the events of September 11, we can see that the attack was in keeping with the Clausewitzian paradigm of war: force was used against the United States by its adversaries to advance their political objectives. As Clausewitz observed, "War is not an act of senseless passion but is controlled by its political object."88 September 11 represented a violent counterreaction to America's geopolitical-and cultural-hegemony. As the strategy expert Richard K. Betts presciently observed in a 1998 Foreign Affairs article: It is 'hardly likely that Middle Eastern radicals would be hatching schemes like the destruction of the World Trade Center if the United States had not been identified so long as the mainstay of Israel, the shah of Iran, and conservative Arab regimes and the source of a cultural assault on Islam.89 U.S. hegemony fuels terrorist groups like al Qaeda and fans Islamic fundamentalism, which is a form of "blowback" against America's preponderance and its world role.90 As long as the United States maintains its global hegemony-and its concomitant preeminence in regions like the Persian Gulf-it will be the target of politically motivated terrorist groups like al Qaeda. After 9/11, many foreign policy analysts and pundits asked the question, "Why do they hate us?" This question missed the key point. No doubt, there are Islamic fundamentalists who do "hate" the United States for cultural, religious, and ideological reasons. And even leaving aside American neoconservatives' obvious relish for making it so, to some extent the war on terror inescapably has overtones of a "clash of civilizations:' Still, this isn't-and should not be allowed to become-a replay of the Crusades. Fundamentally 9/11 was about geopolitics, specifically about U.S. hegemony. The United States may be greatly reviled in some quarters of the Islamic world, but were the United States not so intimately involved in the affairs of the Middle East, it's hardly likely that this detestation would have manifested itself in something like 9/11. As Michael Scheurer, who headed the CIA analytical team monitoring Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda, puts it, "One of the greatest dangers for Americans in deciding how to confront the Islamist threat lies in continuing to believe-at the urging of senior U.S. leaders-that Muslims hate and attack us for what we are and think, rather than for what we do."91 It is American policies-to be precise**,** American hegernony-that makes the United States a lightning rod for Muslim anger.

#### 6. Sustaining hegemony causes war with China

Christopher Layne 07 Research Fellow @ the Independent Institute, Visiting Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies @ the Cato Institute (American Empire: A Debate, p. 72-4)

The Bush II administration has not entirely abandoned engagement with Beijing, but—more openly than the Bush I and Clinton administrations—it has embraced containment of China as an alternative to engagement. Given the influence of neoconservative foreign policy intellectuals on the administration’s grand strategy, this is unsurprising. After all, during the 1990s, leading neoconservatives were part of the so-called Blue Team of anti-China hardliners in the foreign policy community.' Containment is a strategy that emphasizes using the traditional hard power tools of statecraft to prevent China’s great power emergence and maintain American primacy!' The heart of containment, however, lies in military power and alliance diplomacy. What, specifically, do primacists mean when they call for China's containment? First, they want the United States to pledge explicitly to defend Taiwan from Chinese attack and also to help Taiwan build up its own military capabilities. Primacists believe that the United States should not back away from confronting China over Taiwan and, indeed, they would like the United States to provoke such a showdown. They also want the United States to emulate its anti-Soviet Cold War strategy by assembling a powerful alliance of states that share a common interest in curbing rising Chinese power. As part of such a strategy, the United States should tighten its security relationship with Japan and invest it with an overtly anti-Chinese mission. Needless to say, primacists are determined that the United States maintain its conventional and nuclear military superiority over China. Indeed, with respect to nuclear weapons, as Keir Lieber and Daryl Press have pointed out in an important Foreign Affairs article, the United States currently has an overwhelming nuclear first-strike capability against China, which will be augmented by the national ballistic missile defense system that the United States currently is deploying. Even if Beijing switches its military modernization priorities from its current conventional defense buildup to the enhancement of its strategic nuclear deterrent, it will take some time before China could offset the first-strike capability that the United States possesses. Advocates of containment hope that the various measures encompassed by this strategy will halt China's rise and preserve American primacy.73 However, as one leading proponent of containment argues, if these steps fail to stop China's great power emergence, "the United States should consider harsher measures."" That is, before its current military advantage over China is narrowed, the United States should launch a preventive war to forestall China's emergence as a peer competitor. Of course, in the abstract, preventive war always has been an option in great powers' strategic playbooks—typically as a strategy that declining great powers employ against rising challengers. However, it also is a strategy that also can appeal to a dominant power that still is on top of its game and is determined to squelch potential challengers before they become actual threats. In fact, preventive war (along with preemptive military strikes) is the grand strategic approach of the Bush II administration, as set out in its 2002 National Security Strategy (and reaffirmed by the administration in its 2006 National Security Strategy), and in policy statements by senior administration officials (including President George W. Bush himself). There is nothing in the logic of the administration's grand strategy doctrines of preventive war and preemptive action that suggests that it is applicable only to terrorist groups like al Qaeda and so-called rouge states (like Iran and North Korea). If anything, preventive strategies should be most appealing with respect to potential rivals like China—those who could become peer competitors of the United States. Here, the pramacists' fixation on defending Taiwan suggests that an American commitment to that island's defense is valued most because it could afford Washington a possible pretext to take on China in a preventive war. To be sure, the United States should not ignore the potential strategic ramifications of China's arrival on the world stage as a great power. After all, the lesson of history is that the emergence of new great powers in the international system leads to conflict, not peace. On this score, the notion—propagated by Beijing—that China's will be a "peaceful rise" is just as fanciful as claims by American policy-makers that China has no need to build up its military capabilities because it is unthreatened by any other state. Still, this does not mean that the United States and China inevitably are on a collision course that will culminate in the next decade or two in a war. Whether Washington and Beijing actually come to blows, however, depends largely on what strategy the United States chooses to adopt toward China, because the United States has the "last clear chance" to adopt a grand strategy that will serve its interests in balancing Chinese power without running the risk of an armed clash with Beijing. If the United States continues to aim at upholding its current primacy, however, Sino-American conflict is virtually certain.

#### China War causes Extinction

#### Straits Times, 2k (6/25, “Regional Fallout: No one gains in war over Taiwan,” lexis)

THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far and near and -- horror of horrors -- raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -- truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability, there is little hope of winning a war against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilisation. There would be no victors in such a war. While the prospect of a nuclear Armageddon over Taiwan might seem inconceivable, it cannot be ruled out entirely, for China puts sovereignty above everything else.

#### 7. Hegemony causes nuclear war with Russia

Chomsky, 2003 (Noam. Institute Professor emeritus of linguistics and philosophy at MIT. “Failed States.” Pages 14-16)

The probability of “apocalypse soon” cannot be realistically estimated, but it is surely too high for any sane person to contemplate with equanimity. While speculation is pointless, reaction to the “stark and dreadful and inescapable” choice Einstein and Russell described definitely is not. On the contrary, reaction is urgent, particularly in the United States, because of Washington’s primary role in accelerating the race to destruction by extending its historically unique military dominance. “The chances of an accidental, mistaken or unauthorized nuclear attack might be increasing,” warns former senator Sam Nunn, who has played a leading role in efforts to reduce the threat of nuclear war. “We are running an unnecessary risk of an Armageddon of our own making,” Nunn observes, as a result of policy choices that leave “America’s survival” dependent on “the accuracy of Russia’s warning systems and its command and control.” Nunn is referring to the sharp expansion of US military programs, which tilt the strategic balance in ways that make “Russia more likely to launch upon warning of an attack, without waiting to see if the warning is accurate.” The threat is enhanced by the fact that “the Russian early warning system is in serious disrepair and more likely to give a false warning of incoming missiles. US reliance on “the high-alert, hair-trigger nuclear posture… allows missiles to be launched within minutes,” forcing “our leaders to decide almost instantly whether to launch nuclear weapons once they have warning of an attack, robbing them of the time they may need to gather data, exchange information, gain perspective, discover an error and avoid a catastrophic mistake.” The risk extends beyond Russia – and also China if it pursues the same course. Strategic Bruce Blair observes that “the early warning and control problems plaguing Pakistan, India and other nuclear proliferators are even more acute.” Another serious concern, discussed in technical literature well before 9/11, is that nuclear weapons may sooner or later fall into the hands of terrorist groups, who might use these and other weapons of mass destruction with lethal effect. Those prospects are being advanced by Bush administration planners, who do not consider terrorism a high priority, as they regularly demonstrate. Their aggressive militarism has not only led Russia to expand significantly its offensive capacities, including more lethal nuclear weapons and delivery systems, but is also inducing the Russian military to transfer nuclear weapons constantly across Russia’s vast territory to counter mounting US threats. Washington planners are surely aware that Chechen rebels, who had already stolen radioactive materials from nuclear waste plants and power stations, have been casing “the railway system and special trains designed for shipping nuclear weapons across Russia.” Blair warns that “this perpetual motion [within Russia] creates a serious vulnerability, because transportation is the Achilles’ heel of nuclear weapons security,” ranking in danger right alongside maintaining strategic nuclear forces on hair-trigger alert. He estimates that every day “many hundreds of Russian nuclear weapons are moving around the countryside.” Theft of one nuclear bomb “could spell eventual disaster for an American city, [but this] is not the worst-case scenario stemming from nuclear gamesmanship.” More ominously, “the seizure of a ready-to-fire strategic long range nuclear missile or a group of missiles capable of delivering bombs to targets thousands of miles away could be apocalyptic for entire nations.” Another major threat is that terrorist hackers might break into military communication networks and transmit launch orders for missiles armed with hundreds of nuclear warheads – no fantasy, as the Pentagon learned a few years ago when serious defects were discovered in its safeguards, requiring new instructions for Trident submarine launch crews. Systems in other countries are much less reliable. All of this constitutes “an accident waiting to happen,” Blair writes; an accident that could be apocalyptic.

## 1NC Case - Terrorism

#### Disregard their studies – their manipulated for political gain

Abbas 3/31

(Hassan, Asia Society Senior Advisor and professor at the College of International Security Affairs and National Defense University, 3/31/2013, The Atlantic, “Are Drone Strikes Killing Terrorists or Creating Them?” <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/03/are-drone-strikes-killing-terrorists-or-creating-them/274499/>, accessed 7/14/2013, BS)

To say that the use of drone strikes is a polarizing topic would be a vast understatement. In U.S. policy circles, it's projected as an effective counter-terrorism tactic, whereas globally, it is often seen as tacit abuse of state sovereignty. And that's before you get to the debate over potential international law and human rights violations. Take, for example, the use of drone strikes to target al-Qaida, the Taliban and their affiliates in the restive tribal belt of Pakistan bordering Afghanistan. There are a variety of studies available regarding the accuracy, reliability and ultimate effectiveness of this tool of war, and, using the same data, analysts can come to very different conclusions depending on their particular point of view, or -- in some cases -- that of their employers. For some, the percentage of civilian deaths is the criterion, and for others, denying the terrorists sanctuary is a critical benchmark. The problem is a lack of credible data (and consensus) regarding exactly how many terrorists have been killed by drone strikes and who those terrorists are. Thus, objectivity has become another victim in the process. In my assessment, the ground realities that must be kept in mind in this analysis include: al-Qaida and its affiliates are on the run due to drone strikes -- there is a near consensus on this point among all types of analysts. Pakistan's government (both military and civilian) was fully on board, except perhaps for the past year, which means the sovereignty issue was not relevant in many cases. Mainstream and moderate Pukhtuns in Pakistan were by and large okay with drone strikes because they did what they and Pakistani security forces couldn't -- however, this is seldom expressed in public. A significant number of drone victims (likely in the 50-60 percent range by local estimates) have been civilians (including women and children) and this in turn caused higher recruitment for militant groups. The network of local spies who identify targets on ground have their own ethnic, tribal and political vendettas to settle as well, which causes "collateral damage." Anti-U.S. feelings in Pakistan increased substantially as a result of this strategy, weakening the U.S.-Pakistan counterterrorism cooperation. Some of these facts may sound contradictory, and that is because they are. The truth is we don't know whether U.S. drone strikes have killed more terrorists or produced more terrorists.

#### Drones take out key leaders and make recruiting impossible

Byman 13

(Daniel L., research director and senior fellow of foreign policy at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, July 2013, Brookings, “Why Drones Work: The Case for Washington’s Weapon of Choice,” <http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2013/06/17-drones-obama-weapon-choice-us-counterterrorism-byman>, accessed 7/14/2013, BS)

The Obama administration relies on drones for one simple reason: they work. According to data compiled by the New America Foundation, since Obama has been in the White House, U.S. drones have killed an estimated 3,300 al Qaeda, Taliban, and other jihadist operatives in Pakistan and Yemen. That number includes over 50 senior leaders of al Qaeda and the Taliban—top figures who are not easily replaced. In 2010, Osama bin Laden warned his chief aide, Atiyah Abd al-Rahman, who was later killed by a drone strike in the Waziristan region of Pakistan in 2011, that when experienced leaders are eliminated, the result is “the rise of lower leaders who are not as experienced as the former leaders” and who are prone to errors and miscalculations. And drones also hurt terrorist organizations when they eliminate operatives who are lower down on the food chain but who boast special skills: passport forgers, bomb makers, recruiters, and fundraisers. Drones have also undercut terrorists’ ability to communicate and to train new recruits. In order to avoid attracting drones, al Qaeda and Taliban operatives try to avoid using electronic devices or gathering in large numbers. A tip sheet found among jihadists in Mali advised militants to “maintain complete silence of all wireless contacts” and “avoid gathering in open areas.” Leaders, however, cannot give orders when they are incommunicado, and training on a large scale is nearly impossible when a drone strike could wipe out an entire group of new recruits. Drones have turned al Qaeda’s command and training structures into a liability, forcing the group to choose between having no leaders and risking dead leaders.

#### No nuclear terrorism –statistically insignificant cumulative probability

Mueller, 2010

(John, Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies, Mershon Center, and is professor of Political Science, at Ohio State University) 2010 “Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al Qaeda” p, 187-190

Assigning a probability that terrorists will be able to overcome each barrier is, of course, a tricky business, and any such exercise should be regarded as rather tentative and exploratory, or perhaps simply as illustrative-though it is done all the time in cost-benefit analysis. One might begin a quantitative approach by adopting probability estimates that purposely, and heavily, bias the case in the terrorists' favor. In my view, this would take place if it is assumed that the terrorists have a fighting chance of 50 percent of overcoming each of the 20 obstacles displayed in Table 13-1, though for many barriers, probably almost all, the odds against them are surely much worse than that. Even with that generous bias, the chances that a concerted effort would be successful comes out to be less than one in a million, specifically 1,048,576. Indeed, the odds of surmounting even seven of the 20 hurdles at that unrealistically, even absurdly, high presumptive success rate is considerably less than one in a hundred. If one assumes, somewhat more realistically, that their chances at each barrier are one in three, the cumulative odds they will be able to pull off the deed drop to one in well over three billion specifically 3.486,784,401. What they would be at the (still entirely realistic) level of one in ten boggles the mind. One could also make specific estimates for each of the hurdles, but the cumulative probability statistics are likely to come out pretty much the same-or even smaller. There may be a few barriers, such as numbers 13 or absolute loyalty trump the one oftechnical competence. This would increase the chances that the bomb-making enterprise would go undetected, while at the same time decreasing the likelihood that it would be successful. However, given the monumentality of the odds confronting the would-be atomic terrorist, adjustments for such issues are scarcely likely to alter the basic conclusion. That is, if one drastically slashed the one in 3.5 billion estimate a thousandfold, the odds of success would still be one in 3.5 million. Moreover, all this focuses on the effort to deliver a single bomb. If the requirement were to deliver several, the odds become, of course, even more prohibitive. Getting away from astronomical numbers for a minute, Levi points out that even if there are only ten barriers and even if there were a wildly favorable 80 percent chance of overcoming each hurdle, the chance of final success, following the approach used here, would only be 10 percent. Faced even with such highly favorable odds at each step, notes Levi, the wouldbe atomic terrorist might well decide "that a nuclear plot is too much of a stretch to seriously try." Similarly, Jenkins calculates that even if there are only three barriers and each carried a 50/50 chance of success, the likelihood of accomplishing the full mission would only be 12.5 percent.14 Odds like that are not necessarily prohibitive, of course, but they are likely to be mind-arrestingly small if one is betting just about everything on a successful outcome. Multiple Attempts The odds considered so far are for a single attempt by a single group, and there could be multiple attempts by multiple groups, of course. Although Allison considers al-Qaeda to be "the most probable perpetrator" on the nuclear front, he is also concerned about the potential atomic exploits of other organizations such as Indonesia's Jemaah Islamiyah, Chechen gangsters, Lebanon's Hezbollah, and various doomsday cults. IS However, few, if any, groups appear to have any interest whatever in striking the United States except for al-Qaeda, an issue to be discussed more fully in the next chapter. But even setting that consideration aside, the odds would remain long even with multiple concerted attempts.16 If there were a hundred such efforts over a period of time, the chance at least one of these would be successful comes in at less than one in over 10,000 at the one chance in two level. At the far more realistic level of one chance in three, it would be about one in nearly 35 million. If there were 1,000 dedicated attempts, presumably over several decades, the chance of success would be worse than one in a thousand at the SO/50 level and one in nearly 3.5 million at the one in three level.I7 Of course, attempts in the hundreds are scarcely realistic, though one might be able to envision a dozen or so. Additionally, if there were a large number of concerted efforts, policing and protecting would presumably become easier because the aspirants would be exposing themselves repeatedly and would likely be stepping all over each other in their quest to access the right stuff. Furthermore, each foiled attempt would likely expose flaws in the defense system, holes the ...,. defenders would then plug, making subsequent efforts that much more dif• ficult. For example, when the would-be peddler of a tiny amount of pur loined highly enriched uranium was apprehended in 2006, efforts were made to trace its place of origin using nuclear forensics. IS ." Also, the difficulties for the atomic terrorists are likely to increase over time because of much enhanced protective and policing efforts by ... self-interested governments. Already, for example, by all accounts Russian nuclear materials are much more adequately secured than they were 10 or ~, .-s 15 years ago.19

# 2NC

## 2NC Kritik -- Overview

#### **The modern liberal state utilizes the threat of nuclear weapons to justify invasion in the interim to prevent catastrophe. Their representations are more likely to lead to preemption than passivity.**

Massumi 07 (Brian, Communication Department of the Université de Montréal , “Potential Politics and the Primacy of Preemption”)

Fear is always a good reason to go politically conditional. Fear is the palpable action in the present of a threatening future cause. It acts just as palpably whether the threat is determinate or not. It weakens your resolve, creates stress, lowers consumer confidence, and may ultimately lead to individual and/or economic paralysis. To avoid the paralysis, which would make yourself even more of a target and carry the fear to even higher level, you must simply act. In Bush administration parlance, you "go kinetic."6 You leap into action on a level with the potential that frightens you. You do that, once again, by inciting the potential to take an actual shape you can respond to. You trigger a production of what you fear. You turn the objectively indeterminate cause into an actual effect so you can actually deal with it in some way. Any time you feel the need to act, then all you have to do is actuate a fear. The production of the effect follows as smoothly as a reflex. This affective dynamic is still very much in place, independent of Rumsfeld's individual fate. It will remain in place as long as fear and remains politically actuatable. The logic of preemption operates on this affective plane, in this proliferative or ontogenetic way: in a way that contributes to the reflex production of the specific being of the threat. You're afraid Iraq is a breeding ground for terrorists? It could have been. If it could have been, it would have been. So go ahead, make it one. "Bring 'em on," the President said, following Hollywood-trained reflex. He knew it in his "guts." He couldn't have gone wrong. His reflex was right. Because "now we can all agree" that Iraq is in actual fact a breeding ground for "terrrorists". That just goes to prove that the potential was always there. Before, there was doubt in some quarters that Saddam had to be removed from power. Some agreed he had to go, some didn't. Now we can all agree. It was right to remove him because doing so made Iraq become what it always could have been. And that's the truth. Truth, in this new world order, is by nature retroactive. Fact grows conditionally in the affective soil of an indeterminately present futurity. It becomes objective as that present reflexively plays out, as a effect of the preemptive action taken. The reality-based community wastes time studying empirical reality, the Bushites said: "we create it." And because of that, "we" the preemptors will always be right. We always will have been right to preempt, because we have objectively produced a recursive truth-effect for your judicious study. And while you are looking back studying the truth of it, we will have acted with reflex speed again, effecting a new reality. 7 We will always have had no choice but to prosecute the "war on terror," ever more vigilantly and ever more intensely on every potential front. We, preemptors, are the producers of your world. Get used to it. The War in Iraq is a success to the extent that it made the productivity of the preemptive "war on terror" a self-perpetuating movement. Even if the US were to withdraw from Iraq tomorrow, the war would have to continue on other fronts no matter who controls Congress or who is in the White House. It would have to continue in Afghanistan, for example, where the assymetrical tactics perfected in Iraq are now being applied to renew the conflict there. Or in Iran, which also always could have/would have been a terrorist breeding ground. Or it could morph and move to the Mexican-US border, itself morphed into a distributed frontline proliferating throughout the territory in the moving form of "illegal immigration". On the indefinite Homeland Security front of a protieform war, who knows what threats may be spinelessly incubating where, abetted by those who lack the "backbone" to go kinetic. Preemption is like deterrence in that it combines a proprietary epistemology with a unique ontology in such a way as to make present a future cause that sets a self-perpetuating movement into operation. Its differences from deterrence hinge on its taking objectively indeterminate or potential threat as its self-constitutive cause rather than fully formed and specified threat. It situates itself on the ground of ontogenetic potential. There, rather than deterring the feared effect, it actualizes the potential in a shape to which it hopes it can respond. It assumes a proliferation of potential threats, and mirrors that capacity in its own operation. It becomes proliferative. It assumes the objective imbalance of a far-from-equilibrium state as a permanent condition. Rather than trying to right the imbalance, it seizes it as an opportunity for itself. Preemption also sets a race in motion. But this is a race run on the edge of chaos. It is a race of movement-flushing, detection, perception, and affective actuation, run in irreparably chaotic or quasi-chaotic conditions. The race of preemption has any number of laps, each ending in the actual effecting of a threat. Each actualization of a threat triggers the next lap, as a continuation of the first in the same direction, or in another way in a different field. Deterrence revolved around an objective cause. Preemption revolves around a proliferative effect. Both are operative logics. The operative logic of deterrence, however, remained causal even as it displaced its cause's effect. Preemption is an effective operative logic rather than a causal operative logic. Since its ground is potential, there is no actual cause for it to organize itself around. It compensates for the absence of an actual cause by producing an actual effect in its place. This it makes the motor of its movement: it converts an absent or virtual cause really, directly into a taking-actual-effect. It does this affectively. It uses affect to effectively trigger a virtual causality.8 Preemption is when the futurity of unspecified threat is affectively held in the present in a perpetual state of potential emergence(y) so that a movement of actualization may be triggered that is not only self-propelling but also effectively, indefinitely, ontologically productive, because it works from a virtual cause whose potential no single actualization exhausts. Preemption's operational parameters mean that is never univocal. It operates in the element of vagueness and objective uncertainty. Due to its proliferative nature, it cannot be monolithic. Its logic cannot close in around its self-causing as the logic deterrence does. It includes an essential openness in its productive logic.9 It incites its adversary to take emergent form. It then strives to become as proteiform as its ever-emergent adversary can be. It is as shape-shifting as it is self-driving. It infiltrates across boundaries, sweeping up existing formations in its own transversal movement. Faced with gravity-bound formations too inertial for it to sweep up and carry off with its own operative logic, it contents itself with opening windows of opportunity to pass through. This is the case with the domestic legal and juridical structure in the US. It can't sweep that away. But it can build into that structure escape holes for itself. These take the form of formal provisions vastly expanding the power of the executive, in the person of the president in his role as commander-in-chief, to declare states of exception which suspend the normal legal course in order to enable a continued flow of preemptive action.10 Preemption stands for conflict unlimited: the potential for peace amended to become a perpetual state of undeclared war. This is the "permanent state of emergency" so presciently described by Walter Benjamin. In current Bush administration parlance, it has come to be called "Long War" replacing the Cold War: a preemptive war with an in-built tendency to be never-ending. Deterrence produced asymmetrical conflict as a by-product. The MADly balanced East-West bipolarity spun off a North-South sub-polarity. This was less a polarity than an axis of imbalance. The "South" was neither a second Western First nor another Eastern Second. It was an anomalous Third. In this chaotic " Third World ," local conflicts prefiguring the present "imbalance of terror" proliferated. The phrase "the war on terror" was in fact first popularized by Richard Nixon in 1972 in response to the attack at the Munich Olympics when the Israeli-Palestinian conflict spectacularly overspilled northward. Asymmetrical conflicts, however, were perceivable by the reigning logic of deterrence only as a reflection of itself. The dynamic of deterrence were overlaid upon them. Their heterogeneity was overcoded by the familiar US-Soviet duality. Globally such conflicts figured only as opportunities to reproduce the worldwide balance of terror on a reduced scale. The strategy of "containment" adopted toward them was for the two sides in the dominant dyad to operate in each local theater through proxies in such a way that their influence, on the whole, balanced out. "I decided," Nixon said after Munich , "that we must maintain a balance."11 He did not, as Bush did after 9-11, decide to skew things by going unilaterally "kinetic." The rhetoric of the "war on terror" fell into abeyance during the remainder of the 1970s, as Southern asymmetries tended to be overcoded as global rebalancings, and going kinetic was "contained" to the status of local anomaly.

## 2NC Kritik -- AT: Framework

#### The PARADOX OF RISK makes this issue NOT resolvable by weighing the plan.  If impact is calculated by multiplying probability and magnitude, any probability of an infinite impact irrationally registers as infinite

Kessler 2008 (Oliver Kessler, Sociology at University of Bielefeld, “From Insecurity to Uncertainty: Risk and the Paradox of Security Politics” *Alternatives*  33 (2008), 211-232)

The problem of the second method is that it is very difficult to  "calculate" politically unacceptable losses. If the risk of terrorism is  defined in traditional terms by probability and potential loss, then  the focus on dramatic terror attacks leads to the marginalization of  probabilities. The reason is that even the highest degree of improbability becomes irrelevant as the measure of loss goes to infinity.^o  The mathematical calculation of the risk of terrorism thus tends to  overestimate and to dramatize the danger. This has consequences  beyond the actual risk assessment for the formulation and execution  of "risk policies": If one factor of the risk calculation approaches  infinity (e.g., if a case of nuclear terrorism is envisaged), then there  is no balanced measure for antiterrorist efforts, and risk management as a rational endeavor breaks down. Under the historical con-  dition of bipolarity, the "ultimate" threat with nuclear weapons could  be balanced by a similar counterthreat, and new equilibria could be  achieved, albeit on higher levels of nuclear overkill. Under the new  condition of uncertainty, no such rational balancing is possible since  knowledge about actors, their motives and capabilities, is largely  absent.  The second form of security policy that emerges when the deter-  rence model collapses mirrors the "social probability" approach. It  represents a logic of catastrophe. In contrast to risk management  framed in line with logical probability theory, the logic of catastro- phe does not attempt to provide means of absorbing uncertainty.  Rather, it takes uncertainty as constitutive for the logic itself; uncertainty is a crucial precondition for catastrophies. In particular, cata-  strophes happen at once, without a warning, but with major impli-  cations for the world polity. In this category, we find the impact of  meteorites. Mars attacks, the tsunami in South East Asia, and 9/11.  To conceive of terrorism as catastrophe has consequences for the  formulation of an adequate security policy. Since catastrophes hap-  pen irrespectively of human activity or inactivity, no political action  could possibly prevent them. Of course, there are precautions that  can be taken, but the framing of terrorist attack as a catastrophe  points to spatial and temporal characteristics that are beyond "ratio-  nality." Thus, political decision makers are exempted from the  responsibility to provide security—as long as they at least try to pre-  empt an attack. Interestingly enough, 9/11 was framed as catastro-  phe in various commissions dealing with the question of who was  responsible and whether it could have been prevented.  This makes clear that under the condition of uncertainty, there  are no objective criteria that could serve as an anchor for measur-  ing dangers and assessing the quality of political responses. For ex-  ample, as much as one might object to certain measures by the US  administration, it is almost impossible to "measure" the success of  countermeasures. Of course, there might be a subjective assessment  of specific shortcomings or failures, but there is no "common" cur-  rency to evaluate them. As a consequence, the framework of the  security dilemma fails to capture the basic uncertainties.  Pushing the door open for the security paradox, the main prob-  lem of security analysis then becomes the question how to integrate  dangers in risk assessments and security policies about which simply  nothing is known. In the mid 1990s, a Rand study entitled "New  Challenges for Defense Planning" addressed this issue arguing that  "most striking is the fact that we do not even know who or what will  constitute the most serious future threat, "^i In order to cope with  this challenge it would be essential, another Rand researcher wrote,  to break free from the "tyranny" of plausible scenario planning. The  decisive step would be to create "discontinuous scenarios ... in  which there is no plausible audit trail or storyline from current  events"52 These nonstandard scenarios were later called "wild cards"  and became important in the current US strategic discourse. They  justified the transformation from a threat-based toward a capability-  based defense planning strategy.53  The problem with this kind of risk assessment is, however, that  even the most absurd scenarios can gain plausibility. By construct-  ing a chain of potentialities, improbable events are linked and brought into the realm of the possible, if not even the probable.  "Although the likelihood of the scenario dwindles with each step,  the residual impression is one of plausibility. "54 This so-called Oth-  ello effect has been effective in the dawn of the recent war in Iraq.   The connection between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda that the  US government tried to prove was disputed from the very begin-  ning. False evidence was again and again presented and refuted,  but this did not prevent the administration from presenting as the  main rationale for war the improbable yet possible connection  between Iraq and the terrorist network and the improbable yet  possible proliferation of an improbable yet possible nuclear  weapon into the hands of Bin Laden. As Donald Rumsfeld  famously said: "Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence."  This sentence indicates that under the condition of genuine uncer-  tainty, different evidence criteria prevail than in situations where  security problems can be assessed with relative certainty.

## 2NC Kritik -- AT: Policy Question

#### **PRIOR QUESTION: Can they justify how the 1AC constitutes policy relevant scholarship?**

#### **In particular, the 1AC appeals to a chain of internal-links— but is their way of connecting causal claims good predictive policymaking?**

#### **This paves over clashes of context and assumptions, transforming 1AC research into vacuous mush.**

#### **Berube 2000** (David M, Associate Professor of Speech Communication and Director of Debate at the University of South Carolina. Contemporary Argumentation and Debate 21: 53-73 http://www.cedadebate.org/CAD/index.php/CAD/article/viewFile/248/232)

The dead ends checked the authenticity of the extended claims by debunking especially fanciful hypotheses. Text retrieval services may have changed that. While text retrieval services include some refereed published materials, they also incorporate transcripts and wire releases that are less vigilantly checked for accuracy. The World Wide Web allows virtually anyone to set up a site and post anything at that site regardless of its veracity. Sophisticated super search engines, such as Savvy Search® help contest debaters track down particular words and phrases. Searches on text retrieval services such as Lexis-Nexis Universe® and Congressional Universe® locate words and word strings within n words of each other. Search results are collated and loomed into an extended argument. Often, evidence collected in this manner is linked together to reach a conclusion of nearly infinite impact, such as the ever-present specter of global thermonuclear war. Furthermore, too much evidence from online text retrieval services is unqualified or under-qualified. Since anyone can post a web page and since transcripts and releases are seldom checked as factual, pseudo-experts abound and are at the core of the most egregious claims in extended arguments using mini-max reasoning. In nearly every episode of fear mongering . . . people with fancy titles appeared. . . . [F]or some species of scares . . . secondary scholars are standard fixtures. . . . Statements of alarm by newscasters and glorification of wannabe experts are two telltales tricks of the fear mongers' trade. . . : the use of poignant anecdotes in place of scientific evidence, the christening of isolated incidents as trends, depictions of entire categories of people as innately dangerous. . . . (Glassner 206, 208) Hence, any warrant by authority of this ilk further complicates probability estimates in extended arguments using mini-max reasoning. Often the link and internal link story is the machination of the debater making the claim rather than the sources cited in the linkage. The links in the chain may be claims with different, if not inconsistent, warrants. As a result, contextual considerations can be mostly moot. Not only the information but also the way it is collated is suspect. All these engines use Boolean connectors (and, or, and not) and Boolean connectors are dubious by nature. Boolean logic uses terms only to show relationships - of inclusion or exclusion -among the terms. It shows whether or not one drawer fits into another and ignores the question whether there is anything in the drawers. . . . The Boolean search shows the characteristic way that we put questions to the world of information. When we pose a question to the Boolean world, we use keywords, buzzwords, and thought bits to scan the vast store of knowledge. Keeping an abstract, cybernetic distance from the source of knowledge, we set up tiny funnels. . . . But even if we build our tunnels carefully, we still remain essentially tunnel dwellers. . . . Thinking itself happens only when we suspend the inner musings of the mind long enough to favor a momentary precision, and even then thinking belongs to musing as a subset of our creative mind. . . . The Boolean reader, on the contrary, knows in advance where the exits are, the on-ramps, and the well-marked rest stops. . . . The pathways of thought, not to mention the logic of thoughts, disappear under a Boolean arrangement of freeways." (Heim 18,22-25) Heim worries that the Boolean search may encourage readers to link together nearly empty drawers of information, stifling imaginative, creative thinking and substituting empty ideas for good reasons. The problems worsen when researchers select word strings without reading its full context, a nearly universal practice among contest debaters. Using these computerized research services, debaters are easily able to build extended mini-max arguments ending in Armageddon. Outsiders to contest debating have remarked simply that too many policy debate arguments end in all-out nuclear war. consequently, they categorize the activity as foolish. How many times have educators had contest debaters in a classroom discussion who strung out an extended mini-max argument to the jeers and guffaws of their classmates? They cannot all be wrong. Frighteningly enough, most of us agree. We should not ignore Charles Richet's adage: "The stupid man is not the one who does not understand something - but the man who understands it well enough yet acts as if he didn't" (Tabori 6). Regrettably, mini-max arguments are not the exclusive domain of contest debating. "Policies driven by the consideration of low risk probabilities will, on the whole, lead to low investment strategies to prevent a hazard from being realized or to mitigate the hazard's consequences. By comparison, policies driven by the consideration of high consequences, despite low probabilities, will lead to high levels of public investment" (Nehnevajsa 521). Regardless of their persuasiveness, Bashor and others have discovered that mini-max claims are not useful in resolving complex issues. For example, in his assessment of low-probability, potentially high-consequence events such as terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction, Bashor found simple estimates of potential losses added little to contingency planning. While adding little to policy analysis, extended arguments using mini-max reasoning remain powerful determinants of resource allocation. As such, they need to be debunked. Experts agree. For example, Slovic advocates a better understanding of all risk analysis since it drives much of our public policy. "Whoever controls the definition of risk controls the rational solution to the problem at hand. If risk is defined one way, then one option will rise to the top as the most cost-effective or the safest or the best. If it is defined another way, perhaps incorporating qualitative characteristics or other contextual factors, one will likely get a different ordering of action solutions. Defining risk is thus an exercise in power" (699). When probability assessments are eliminated from risk calculi, as is the case in mini-max risk arguments, it is a political act, and all political acts need to be scrutinized with a critical lens.

#### **The method of evidence selection used by the 1AC makes effective debate impossible**

#### **Stevens 2007** (Alex Stevens, Senior Researcher-European Institute of Social Services, School of Social Policy, Sociology and Social Research, Keynes College, University of Kent, “Survival of the Ideas that Fit: An Evolutionary Analogy for the Use of Evidence in Policy” Social Policy and Society 6:1, 25–35)

The proposed evolutionary analogy goes beyond the political/tactical model by also helping to explain how evidence can be used selectively to further the interests of powerful social groups, without relying solely on the deliberate connivance of policymakers. It sees social structure, in addition to political tactics, as important in supporting selection in the use of evidence. It uses an evolutionary approach to explain the pattern of selection. It starts from the assumption that a variety of ideas come from evidence and compete for attention in policy, as genes arise and compete for survival. The ideas may be facts, findings or recommendations that have been produced by academics, journalists, think tanks, pressure groups or others. Some of these ideas fit the interests of powerful groups and some do not. Ideas that do fit will find powerful supporters. Others will not. Those ideas that fit will therefore have groups and individuals that can carry them into policy, as would a gene be reproduced if it finds a place in organisms that survive. The ideas that do not fit will tend not to be picked up by people who have the power to translate them into policy. This evolutionary advantage leads to the survival of the ideas that fit. The major advantage of this analogy is that it illuminates the biased use of evidence without relying on policy makers to be irrational, or the ability of powerful social groups to coordinate a campaign to ignore unhelpful research. Mechanisms of selection In contrast to the reproduction of genes, it is not the idea that gives its carrier the increased potential to survive. And it is not, as Dawkins suggested for memes, that the idea is ‘advantageous to itself’ (Dawkins, 1976: 200). Rather, it is the power of the carriers, and the choices they make on which bits of evidence to pick up, that confer advantage to ideas that suit the interests of powerful groups. A similarity to biological evolution is that the process of selection is complicated, messy and sometimes brutal. Powerful social groups are not monolithic. They have diverse memberships and divergent interests. They struggle over what policies will be proclaimed and implemented, and use various mechanisms to attempt to ensure that the evidence that suits their purpose comes to be recognised as legitimate. Policy makers, businesses, political parties and pressure groups may ‘trawl’: fishing for evidence, hauling in the bits that suit their needs, and throwing back those that do not. They may also ‘farm’ evidence, by, for example, commissioning research, but only publishing and using those parts of it that meet the criteria that they set for the look and flavour of the evidence produced. Repetition is a useful tool in ensuring that attention is given to useful evidence. Groups that have a voice in the policy process can repeatedly refer to bits of evidence, which may be ripped out of context and based on methodologically suspect research. Through repetition, such evidence can become part of the accepted body of knowledge in a policy area. Powerful groups can also use ‘flak’ (Chomsky and Herman, 1988) to attack, silence or discredit evidence that comes into the public arena, but is not helpful to their interests. And they may be able to impose ‘strain’ (Chambliss, 1976) on people and organisations that produce and advocate unhelpful evidence, who may find that doing so is not conducive to a successful career or to organisational survival. There are limits to the research questions that can be asked that reinforce selection. These include limits that are set by legal, professional and ideological boundaries. Different groups will also have different narratives of how social problems arise and how they should be solved. These narratives provide a frame into which evidence must fit if it is to enter policy. The extent to which social groups can impose their own narratives and frames on a debate depends on their relative legal, professional, financial and ideological power (Green, 2000; Hajer, 1993). Limits are also set by the decisions of those people who pay for research on what they are interested in buying. Those groups with the most power in society will be most able to implement these mechanisms, and so bring attention to research that suits them, and encourage the ignorance of research that does not. This does not mean that their power dominates the use of evidence entirely. Weaker social groups, including trade unions, environmental pressure groups, other campaigning bodies and self-organisations of the poor and socially marginalised may also attempt to make these mechanisms work for them. However, they have less access to the sources of research and its dissemination; they are less able to impose their interpretations of research evidence on a wider public. They have less opportunity to trawl or farm research, to create flak, to repeat favourable evidence or to impose strain on those who produce or disseminate unhelpful research. And they have less of a role in framing policy. Selection in action So far, this evolutionary analogy has not been rigorously tested against actual uses of evidence in practice. It is presented here in order to invite discussion of how it may apply to various areas of social policy. However, it is quite easy to find illustrative examples of the selective use of evidence in policy making; especially, it seems, in crime, immigration and health policies. The British Drug Treatment and Testing Orders (DTTO, a sentence for drug dependent offenders introduced in the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, since replaced by the Drug Rehabilitation Requirement) were inspired by the expansion of drug courts in the USA. A report by one of the instigators of the DTTO policy (Russell, 1994) trawls in references to evaluations of drug courts, all of which are positive, without mentioning any of the negative evaluations, or mentioning that the positive evaluations offer good examples of selection bias; basing their results solely on the proportion of people who completed the programmes, and often comparing them to those who dropped out early, in defiance of accepted methodological standards (Stevens et al., 2005). Before the DTTO was rolled-out across England and Wales, a study of three pilot areas was commissioned which concluded ‘we could hardly portray the pilot programmes as unequivocally successful’ (Turnbull et al., 2000: 87). The response in terms of policy was typical of the ‘farming’ mechanism. The negative findings were not publicised and the roll-out went ahead. A second example of selection is the use of research on the impact of asylum policies in Europe on the number of asylum seekers. This research found that direct pre-entry measures (e.g. visas, sanctions on airlines) have had the greatest impact on the number of asylum claimants. But ‘measures such as reception facilities, detention and the withdrawal of welfare benefits appear to have had much more limited impact’ (Zetter et al., 2003: xiii). Restrictive policies also have counter-effects, including increased illegal immigration and displacement of asylum flows to other countries. The official response provided examples of ‘farming’ and of ‘strain’. Publication of the research was delayed for two years, findings on the lack of effect of indirect controls and on their counter-effects were ignored and such controls continued to be tightened (e.g. in the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 and the Asylum and Immigration Act 2004). One of the authors of this research wrote in a letter to The Guardian that this was ‘part of a general and worrying trend that academic research is being used to buttress government policies in a way that is illegitimate and which depends upon an extremely partial reading of research results’ (Griffiths, 2003). So far, these examples show only that politicians and policy makers are capable of making selective use of the research that they commission. They could fit with the political/tactical view of policy-makers making irrational uses of evidence for their own purposes. However, they should be viewed within the context of argumentation over policy that occurs around as well as within the state. The people whose interests are most directly harmed by these selective uses of evidence, being drug-using offenders and would-be immigrants and asylum seekers, are among the least powerful in these arguments. On the other hand, powerful interest groups have an interest in the use of evidence to bolster such policies. Powerful social groups have, for example, long benefited from the use of migrant workers, both as cheap labour to boost profits and as scapegoats for social problems that result from inequality (Winder, 2005). As the 2005 UK general election showed, the government faces a great deal of external pressure to be seen to be tough on immigration. Opposition parties and right-wing newspapers can target a great deal of flak at politicians and researchers who make the case for immigration. A rational debate over the pros and cons of asylum policy is unlikely to occur in such a context. The reasons for this are not merely tactical, but also structural, as it is social structure which explains the relative power that groups can bring to these arguments and processes of evidence selection. External influences on the use of evidence are clearer in some examples from the field of health and food policy. In 2003, the World Health Organisation sought to create international guidelines that stated that daily intake of sugar should not exceed 10 grammes per person, based on the evidence of the damage done by excessive consumption to human health. This lead to the imposition of heavy ‘strain’ on the WHO, which faced criticism, including calls for the resignation of its Director from US officials, who were themselves pressured by the sugar corporations who are major donors to the political parties of the USA (Boseley, 2003). After these pressures had been imposed, the 10g recommended daily limit on sugar intake was not included in the final document (World Health Organization, 2003). In the UK, there is the example of the government's alcohol harm reduction strategy. The government initially commissioned a group of 17 independent experts to provide the evidence on which to base this strategy. Their considered view was that reducing alcohol-related harm should involve limiting its availability and increasing its price. This conclusion would obviously not be popular, either with many voters, or with the alcohol industry. One of the ways the alcohol industry seeks to maximise its profits is by funding the Portman Group. This was the only ‘alcohol misuse’ organisation mentioned in the government's strategy, which adopted the ideas and language of the alcohol industry. Alcohol Concern, the Medical Council on Alcohol and the National Addiction Centre were not referred to (McNeill, 2004). Eventually, the government published a strategy that bore so little relation to the evidence-based recommendations of the experts that several of them were moved to publish their own report, which contradicted the government's strategy (Academy of Medical Sciences, 2004). It seems that this is a clear example where external pressure on government by a powerful group has influenced the use of evidence in policy. Internationally, the issues of genetically modified (GM) organisms and climate change also provide examples of the use of trawling, farming, flak, strain, repetition and selective framing by actors outside the state. Much of the research on GM food is funded by the corporations who hope to profit from its application. Several researchers have found that raising questions over the safety and efficacy of GM food is not conducive to security of tenure in Universities that are funded by these corporations. For example, Dr Arpad Pusztai's research suggesting that GM potatoes may be poisonous to rats (Ewen and Pusztai, 1999) led to him losing his job, and to threats that the editor of The Lancet, which published some of this research, would also lose his. Dr Ignacia Chapela was also targeted for flak and strain when he published an article in Nature reporting contamination of native corn in Mexico by a GM variety (Quist and Chapela, 2001). He was subsequently refused tenure at the University of California, where a number of colleagues criticised his work and benefited from a multi-million dollar deal with the biotechnology company Novartis.3 Corporations that control the production of raw materials are also extremely powerful in the field of energy policy, which has the greatest effect on climate change. The material interests of these corporations are damaged by international policies such as the Kyoto protocol. Given the potential damage of Kyoto to oil company profits, it is not surprising that the tiny minority of scientists who deny the role of human activity in climate change have found ready supporters in the oil industry. More worrying is that the most powerful government on Earth has pressured its own scientists to misrepresent their own findings in order to support the oil companies’ position (Union of Concerned Scientists, 2004) and continues to dilute international efforts to combat climate change (Townsend, 2005). It should be noted that in none of these cases is the interest of any one group able fully to determine the use of evidence. Nor is it the case that evidence does not influence the terms in which these controversies are played out. Debate over DTTOs, immigration policy, GM food and global warming is alive and well. Research evidence is not absent, but crucial to the development of these debates. However, its use is not often directly linear, ideally enlightened or purely tactical. These are selected examples, but they are by no means isolated. In several fields, it is evident that structural, as well as tactical interests of powerful social groups often shape the use that is made of evidence in ways that pervert the promise of evidence-based policy making. Avoiding bias While scientific evidence may not be accepted unquestioningly as a clear, objective source, there is a body of scientific evidence. The process of scientific production makes this available for discovery and analysis through various forms of synthesis. Through open debate over the results of such reviews, some positions can be found to be false, in that they offer inadequate accounts of the phenomena they attempt to explain (Layder, 1998). Examples of propositions that the balance of scientific evidence has found to be untrue are that Saddam Hussein was storing weapons of mass destruction in Iraq in 2003 (Powell, 2003), that ‘nothing works’ in preventing criminal recidivism (Martinson, 1979), that smoking tobacco does not increase risks of cancer (Tobacco Institute Research Committee, 1954) and that human activity is not contributing to global warming (see van den Hove, le Menestrel, and de Bettignies, 2002). The existence of proponents of alternative views shows that it is possible to question the mainstream and to insert dissident positions into the debate. But acting as if these propositions are true has been and will be disastrous. If we are to have any prospect of improving the human condition, then we need to continue to develop knowledge (of which research evidence is one element) that can inform action; knowledge that we can use until superior explanations and possibilities arise. The idea of evidence-based policy is that this will happen. It often fails in practice, not only because research evidence is contested, but because its use is affected by processes of selection that make it less likely that superior explanations and solutions will be put into practice.

# 1NR

## 1NR Uniqueness Wall

#### Votes now – GOP and democrats will be enough to pass a bill.

BRUCE BARTLETT 9/13/13, The Fiscal Times, http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Columns/2013/09/13/Debt-Ceiling-Trading-Places-Budget-Debate-Directors-Cut

Clinton won the shutdown fight hands down. Republicans took all the blame for the shutdown and were forced to retreat without getting anything in return. A new CNN/ORC poll shows that Republicans would again suffer most of the blame. Republican pragmatists also know that even threatening to default on the debt is like using nuclear weapons on yourself to get your enemy to surrender. In short, it’s completely nuts. This explains why Obama and congressional Democrats are just standing there like Murphy and Aykroyd in the orange juice trading pit of the New York Mercantile Exchange, seemingly oblivious to all the action going on within the Republican Party. While they appear passive, in fact they are just waiting for the right moment to step in and save the GOP from itself. Sooner or later they expect House Speaker John Boehner to come to them, hat in hand, begging for Democratic votes to pass some sort of budget to prevent a government shutdown and raise the debt limit. Boehner probably has enough Republican votes to pass a budget and a debt limit increase together with the Democrats. But a majority of House Republicans will undoubtedly vote “no.”

#### Debt ceiling will be raised – top priority, no thumpers

Houston Chronicle 9/10 “How Long Can We Continue Without a Congress?”, <http://blog.chron.com/goplifer/2013/09/how-long-can-we-continue-without-a-congress/>, MCR

By a large margin, the **last Congress got less accomplished than any in modern history**. The current Congress may actually do less. There is almost no Congressional action too trivial or uncontroversial to catch the eye of the Tea Party watchdogs protecting us from socialism.¶ So, how long can this continue? Apart from the debt ceiling, **Congress doesn’t face** anyscheduleddo-or-die events. **Although the Tea Party is itching to force** a **doom**sday **over the debt ceiling, they are alone in their urge to wreak havoc** on global capitalism. **They will** probably **fail and the debt ceiling will be raised**.

#### Syria won’t hurt debt talks

Lerer 9/12

Lisa, “Obama Syria Reversal Sets Stage for Fights With Congress”, <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-09-12/obama-syria-reversal-sets-stage-for-fights-with-congress.html>, MCR

The White House and its allies argue that **the debate over Syria won’t hurt Obama on other issues, simply because the fight didn’t break along traditional party lines and is unlikely to resonate in the 2014 congressional elections**. A coalition of small-government Republicans wary of U.S. involvement overseas and Democrats who warned of the risk of entering another Middle Eastern war lined up against Obama’s Syria plan, likely killing its chances of passage if there had been a vote in the House.¶ Those **Democrats**, Obama supporters say, **will stick with the president on economic issues**, while many of those Republicans will always be lined up against him.

## 1NR Link Wall

#### Limiting war powers is a tea party rallying point--- also builds support from GOP establishment

Antle 2013 (W. James Antle III, Editor, The Daily Caller News Foundation, March 7, 2013, “Rand Paul speaks as parties change places on executive power,” Daily Caller, http://dailycaller.com/2013/03/07/rand-paul-speaks-as-parties-change-places-on-executive-power/)

Kentucky Republican Sen. Rand Paul has finally stopped talking, but the conversation about presidential war powers and extrajudicial killings sparked by his filibuster continues.¶ On Thursday morning, pro-Paul hashtags like #StandWithRand remain among the top trending topics on Twitter. Nearly ever major news outlet has covered Paul’s filibuster, which delayed the confirmation of President Obama’s CIA nominee John Brennan.¶ Flying death robots may be a popular concept in movies, but the issues raised by the U.S. drone program had been confined to the fringes of political debate. Paul and Utah Republican Sen. Mike Lee had been working with some of the Senate’s most liberal Democrats on civil liberties for months, starting with last year’s congressional votes on the National Defense Authorization Act and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act amendments.¶ National security reporter Eli Lake dubbed Paul and Oregon Democratic Sen. Ron Wyden the “drone odd-couple,” noting that they called themselves the “Checks and Balances Caucus.”¶ “For some time now, Wyden and Paul—along with two other senators, Republican Mike Lee of Utah and Democrat Mark Udall of Colorado—have been working together to try to curb the broad authorities the Obama administration has asserted in the war on terror,” Lake wrote.¶ There was a strange bedfellows element to Paul’s drones filibuster as well. It attracted the support of the American Civil Liberties Union and Code Pink, in addition to tea party groups like FreedomWorks. Wyden’s participation made it a bipartisan affair.¶ But the biggest development was the support from Republican senators. In addition to Lee and fellow tea partier Texas Republican Sen. Ted Cruz, Senate Minority Whip John Cornyn, Kansas Republican Sen. Jerry Moran, Pennsylvania Republican Sen. Pat Toomey, Florida Republican Sen. Marco Rubio, South Carolina Republican Sen. Tim Scott, Arizona Republican Sen. Jeff Flake, Georgia Republican Sen. Saxby Chambliss, and Wisconsin Republican Sen. Ron Johnson all joined with Paul.¶ Few of those senators had ever expressed much interest in the drone program before, and several of them voted against Paul on recent high-profile civil liberties votes, such as the indefinite detention provisions in the National Defense Authorization Act. By the end of the filibuster, even Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell had aligned himself with Paul.¶ “Frankly, it should have been answered a long time ago,” McConnell said of Paul’s question to the Obama administration about drone strikes in the United States.¶ Republican National Committee Chairman Reince Preibus urged all GOP senators to go to the floor to help Paul. The National Republican Senatorial Committee launched a fundraising effort based on Paul’s filibuster.¶ Former South Carolina Republican Sen. Jim DeMint also sent out a supportive tweet. DeMint is now president-elect of the conservative Heritage Foundation, which has frequently supported a strong executive in wartime.¶ It is likely that an outpouring of support for Paul from conservatives on social media motivated some Republicans to get involved, as criticism of executive power during the war on terror was unpopular in the party under President George W. Bush. But since Obama has been commander-in-chief, there has been a bit of a partisan role reversal.

#### Tea Party hates drones

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(David, Newsmax Washington Correspondent, "ACLU, Tea Party Align Aainst Drone Program", Feb 13, www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/aclu-drone-policy-counterterrorism/2013/02/13/id/490246 NL)

The American Civil Liberties Union is joining tea party activists in opposing the use of armed drones and other counterterrorism operations to kill suspected terrorists, even American citizens. A recently surfaced Justice Department memo revealed that drones can strike against a wider range of threats, with less evidence, than previously believed. Both the ACLU and tea party groups cite the Fifth Amendment, which says that Americans are guaranteed due process of law under the Constitution, and that the classified program circumvents that right. “Everyone has a right to know what the rules are, and that’s what’s been hidden from the American public and even Congress,” ACLU Senior Legislative Counsel Christopher Anders tells Newsmax. He joins Kentucky Sen. Rand Paul, who gave the official tea party rebuttal to President Barack Obama’s State of the Union address on Tuesday. Paul said: “We will not tolerate secret lists of American citizens who can be killed without trial.” Obama told Congress in the annual joint session that he “will continue to engage with Congress to ensure not only that our targeting, detention, and prosecution of terrorists remains consistent with our laws and systems of checks and balances, but that our efforts are even more transparent to the American people and to the world.” The remarks did little to satisfy the ACLU or tea party activists. “It’s good to have a commitment to that, but there’s no specificity to it,” the ACLU’s Anders said. “We’re not a nation of secret laws.” Eleven senators — eight Democrats and three Republicans — asked Obama earlier this month to justify the use of the drone program to lawmakers. The bipartisan group warned it might stall the nominations of John Brennan as head of the Central Intelligence Agency and former Sen. Chuck Hagel of Nebraska as Defense Secretary should Obama not provide the classified information. Currently, both the CIA and the military are authorized to remotely pilot unmanned, missile-carrying drones against terror suspects.

#### Strong arming the president increases the Tea Party’s effectiveness in Congress

Nocera 2013

(Kate Nocera, staff writer, June 3, 2013, “Tea Party Faces Future In Congress Without Clear Leader,” Buzzfeed Politics, http://www.buzzfeed.com/katenocera/tea-party-faces-future-in-congress-without-clear-leader)

Not everyone is thrilled about the tea party’s staying power. Republican Sen. John McCain has been openly critical of his colleagues for objecting to a budget conference. Spats between House leadership and conservatives are nothing new.¶ Brian Walsh, a Republican strategist and former communications director for the Senate Republican campaign arm, predicted a boost in the tea party’s effectiveness heading into the 2014 election, if they can keep their focus squarely on Democrats.

## 1NR Impact Wall

#### The best and most qualified studies prove that economic decline causes conflict

Royal 2010

(Jedediah Royal, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, 2010, “Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises,” in Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-214)

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin. 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Feaver, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner. 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write: The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002. p. 89) Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. "Diversionary theory" suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995). and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict at systemic, dyadic and national levels.5 This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.

## 1NR Impact --- Trade

#### Tea Party control destroys globalization and increases protectionism

Barry Gewen 10 has been an editor at The New York Times Book Review, "How the Tea Party is Wrec king Republican Foreign Policy," 12-4-10, www.newrepublic.com/blog/foreign-policy/79647/tea-party-wrecking-republican-foreign-policy, DOA: 8-1-13, y2k

Similar forces are at play in the case of trade. Tea Partiers are suspicious of free trade and globalization in general, because they fear a loss of American jobs. Yet the Republican Party has traditionally been the party of free trade. The Tea Partiers will find their closest allies on this issue among Democrats, especially trade unionists. We just saw what the future politics of trade will look like when President Obama had trouble concluding a free-trade pact with South Korea, originally approved by George W. Bush in 2007. A coalition of Democrats and Tea Partiers inside and outside of Congress opposed it, despite its potential to boost our economy and strengthen crucial alliances in Asia. In truth, on both immigration and trade, the Tea Partiers are in favor of more government, not less, putting them at odds with Republican Party laissez-faire instincts. However they may feel about the evil of deficits, Tea Partiers are not libertarians. By majorities of almost two-to-one, they support Social Security and Medicare. As Scott Rasmussen and Douglas Schoen write in their book Mad As Hell, “it would be a profound mistake to say that they are an adjunct of the GOP.” But it’s on questions of America’s role in the world that the divisions between Tea Partiers and standard-issue Republicans begin to look like chasms. The key figures here are the Pauls, Ron and Rand, longtime congressman and recently elected senator, father and son. Ron Paul has been called “the Tea Party’s brain,” its “intellectual godfather”; Rand Paul, by virtue of his election victory, has made himself a powerful, perhaps the most powerful, Tea Party spokesman on the hill. The Pauls’ positions on foreign policy are not identical, but the links between them are more than genetic. In a recent statement for Foreign Policy magazine, Ron Paul called for an end to “the disastrous wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.” He went on: “We cannot talk about the budget deficit and spiraling domestic spending without looking at the costs of maintaining an American empire of more than 700 military bases in more than 120 foreign countries.” And like father, like son. Rand Paul has said that “part of the reason we are bankrupt as a country is that we are fighting so many foreign wars and have so many military bases around the world.” He opposes what he calls “a blank check for the military.” These freshly invigorated voices within the Republican Party are already finding common cause with doves inside the Democratic Party. Ron Paul has joined with Barney Frank in calling for the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as from Germany, Japan, and South Korea. “We don’t need to be the world’s policeman,” Paul said, echoing the Vietnam war protesters of an earlier era. Hawkish Republicans have taken note. Casting a suspicious eye at the Tea Partiers, John McCain has said, “I worry a lot about the rise of protectionism and isolationism in the Republican Party.” There was a truce within the party until the elections, but now, as Richard Viguerie warned, “a massive, almost historic battle for the heart and soul of the Republican Party begins.” Onlookers can expect to hear a great deal of name calling in coming months as charges of “isolationist” and “imperialist” fly back and forth.

#### Protectionism lowers the threshold for all conflict – makes escalation more likely – causes a laundry list of impacts

Patrick 2009 Stewart Patrick (senior fellow and director of the Program on International Institutions and Global Governance at the Council on Foreign Relations) March 2009 “Protecting Free Trade” The National Interest http://nationalinterest.org/article/protecting-free-trade-3060

President Obama and his foreign counterparts should reflect on the lessons of the 1930s-and the insights of Cordell Hull. The longest-serving secretary of state in American history (1933-1944), Hull helped guide the United States through the Depression and World War II. He also understood a fundamental truth: "When goods move, soldiers don't." In the 1930s, global recession had catastrophic political consequences-in part because policymakers took exactly the wrong approach. Starting with America's own Smoot Hawley Tariff of 1930, the world's major trading nations tried to insulate themselves by adopting inward looking protectionist and discriminatory policies. The result was a vicious, self-defeating cycle of tit-for-tat retaliation. As states took refuge in prohibitive tariffs, import quotas, export subsidies and competitive devaluations, international commerce devolved into a desperate competition for dwindling markets. Between 1929 and 1933, the value of world trade plummeted from $50 billion to $15 billion. Global economic activity went into a death spiral, exacerbating the depth and length of the Great Depression. The economic consequences of protectionism were bad enough. The political consequences were worse. As Hull recognized, global economic fragmentation lowered standards of living, drove unemployment higher and increased poverty-accentuating social upheaval and leaving destitute populations "easy prey to dictators and desperadoes." The rise of Nazism in Germany, fascism in Italy and militarism in Japan is impossible to divorce from the economic turmoil, which allowed demagogic leaders to mobilize support among alienated masses nursing nationalist grievances. Open economic warfare poisoned the diplomatic climate and exacerbated great power rivalries, raising, in Hull's view, "constant temptation to use force, or threat of force, to obtain what could have been got through normal processes of trade." Assistant Secretary William Clayton agreed: "Nations which act as enemies in the marketplace cannot long be friends at the council table." This is what makes growing protectionism and discrimination among the world's major trading powers today so alarming. In 2008 world trade declined for the first time since 1982. And despite their pledges, seventeen G-20 members have adopted significant trade restrictions. "Buy American" provisions in the U.S. stimulus package have been matched by similar measures elsewhere, with the EU ambassador to Washington declaring that "Nobody will take this lying down." Brussels has resumed export subsidies to EU dairy farmers and restricted imports from the United States and China. Meanwhile, India is threatening new tariffs on steel imports and cars; Russia has enacted some thirty new tariffs and export subsidies. In a sign of the global mood, WTO antidumping cases are up 40 percent since last year. Even less blatant forms of economic nationalism, such as banks restricting lending to "safer" domestic companies, risk shutting down global capital flows and exacerbating the current crisis. If unchecked, such economic nationalism could raise diplomatic tensions among the world's major powers. At particular risk are U.S. relations with China, Washington's most important bilateral interlocutor in the twenty-first century. China has called the "Buy American" provisions "poison"-not exactly how the Obama administration wants to start off the relationship. U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner's ill-timed comments about China's currency "manipulation" and his promise of an "aggressive" U.S. response were not especially helpful either, nor is Congress' preoccupation with "unfair" Chinese trade and currency practices. For its part, Beijing has responded to the global slump by rolling back some of the liberalizing reforms introduced over the past thirty years. Such practices, including state subsidies, collide with the spirit and sometimes the law of open trade. The Obama administration must find common ground with Beijing on a coordinated response, or risk retaliatory protectionism that could severely damage both economies and escalate into political confrontation. A trade war is the last thing the United States needs, given that China holds $1 trillion of our debt and will be critical to solving flashpoints ranging from Iran to North Korea. In the 1930s, authoritarian great-power governments responded to the global downturn by adopting more nationalistic and aggressive policies. Today, the economic crisis may well fuel rising nationalism and regional assertiveness in emerging countries. Russia is a case in point. Although some predict that the economic crisis will temper Moscow's international ambitions, evidence for such geopolitical modesty is slim to date. Neither the collapse of its stock market nor the decline in oil prices has kept Russia from flexing its muscles from Ukraine to Kyrgyzstan. While some expect the economic crisis to challenge Putin's grip on power, there is no guarantee that Washington will find any successor regime less nationalistic and aggressive. Beyond generating great power antagonism, misguided protectionism could also exacerbate political upheaval in the developing world. As Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair recently testified, the downturn has already aggravated political instability in a quarter of the world's nations. In many emerging countries, including important players like South Africa, Ukraine and Mexico, political stability rests on a precarious balance. Protectionist policies could well push developing economies and emerging market exporters over the edge. In Pakistan, a protracted economic crisis could precipitate the collapse of the regime and fragmentation of the state. No surprise, then, that President Obama is the first U.S. president to receive a daily economic intelligence briefing, distilling the security implications of the global crisis.

## 1NR Impact --- Hegemony

#### Turns heg and military success

**Subacchi ‘8**

Dr. Paola. Head of international economics at Chatham House. “THE END OF US ECONOMIC HEGEMONY?” Foresight. October 30, 2008. Accessed 7/1/11. http://www.foresightproject.net/publications/articles/article.asp?p=3522

Large empires, from ancient Rome to Great Britain, declined at least in part as a result of economic weakness. Financial meltdown and recession in the US may act as a catalyst to the ongoing shift of the world economic order by dramatically rupturing the credibility of and respect for the American model. Such a shift has been prophesised for some time. China's rapid economic growth and the potential for other emerging market economies to expand substantially over the next three to five decades, due to their large population, strong economic expansion and integration in the world economy, seem to indicate the emergence of a new world order. New players could use their recently acquired economic might to gain influence and challenge established powers, notably the US. Can the crisis accelerate this "shift of power"? Structural weaknesses and reduced scope for policies The global financial turmoil is huge in scale, worthy of comparison to the Great Depression in the 1930s where stress in financial markets led to prolonged recession. After several weeks of market turmoil there is no doubt that the world economy is taking a "synchronised dive", the recovery from which promises to be slow. In the case of the US economy, the latest IMF outlook predicts the return to potential growth in 2010. But there are many risks that could derail the recovery: the credit crunch could be worse than feared, house prices may not climb until after 2010, a higher unemployment rate and low confidence could constrain domestic demand growth. The critical point here, and the one which could bear significant consequences, is the existence, within the US economy, of structural weaknesses that enhance the current distress and limit the scope for future policy action. The US has an almost zero national savings rate, increasing indebtedness and bloated budget deficit. In addition to the cost of the $700bn bailout (and an additional $100bn of tax provisions for businesses and the middle class), will be the rising cost of healthcare programmes that are under strain due to an increase in the ageing population. The increase in expenditure means, in the short term, limited scope for loose fiscal policy and continuous reliance on foreign lenders. In the longer term, it implies tighter fiscal policy and constraints on policy in a number of areas, from military intervention to discretionary international aid and projects.