# 2AC

## Case

### Terror Talk

#### The alt breeds more terrorism and violence – defining terrorism is key to a stable response

Begorre-Bret, Professor of Philosophy at the University de Reims Institut des Hauts Etudes sur la Justice, ’6 (Cyrille, March, “Symposium: Terrorism, Globalization And The Rule Of Law: The Definition Of Terrorism And The Challenge Of Relativism” 27 Cardozo L. Rev. 1987, Cardozo Law Review, lexis)

B. The Consequences of "Definitional Abstention" The lack or the blurriness of the definition of terrorism has several consequences that even those who refuse to define it are not ready to accept. The first of these consequences is of a cognitive nature. When one excludes the possibility of such a definition, one consequently considers the word "terrorism" as a mere flatus vocis. Since the term cannot have any determined referent and any non-indexical significance, one must accept terrorism as unknowable and one must be satisfied by a complete ignorance of terrorism. If one does not know what terrorism is, one cannot recognize what acts, what organizations, and what persons are terrorist. One can object that terrorism cannot be known, understood, or studied but must be fought and eradicated. Even if this is the case, one nonetheless has to admit that a minimal knowledge of terrorism is necessary to fight it. How could we protect ourselves from terrorism and strike back against it if we are unable to identify it? Even from a relativist point of view, one must know what terrorism is. 22 Moreover, the effects of terrorism are increased by such ignorance and uncertainty. To fight against terrorism, we need to weaken its psychological effects by promoting knowledge of its nature - trying to define it. [\*1994] The second consequence is of a normative nature. Such attitude strengthens the "culture of the excuse" denounced by Walzer. 23 Since terrorism is only the violence of my enemy, and since my enemy calls my own violence "terrorism," all acts are equivalent from the point of view of a third party. To put it in a nutshell and to paraphrase Dostoyevsky, if terrorism does not itself exist, everything is allowed. But it is precisely this consequence that is not accepted by the very states who claim that it is impossible to define terrorism. In spite of their "non-definition position," those states continue to insist that other countries declare that their enemy's violence is "terrorism." The case of the Russian Federation is a very good example of this inconsistent relativism whereby a state is not ready to accept the consequences and responses to its actions. Russia declares that every act of violence against the state is a terrorist act, so that the terrorists are always "them." But Russia never accepts that it could be the terrorist of anybody. That is why the Russian Federation, along with other states, prevents the UN from elaborating an international definition of terrorism. However, a definition of terrorism is necessary if one wants to be able to legitimately condemn certain acts of violence. The third and last consequence of the "definitional abstention" is of a political and practical nature. If everyone is allowed to define terrorism the way they want, violence will continue indefinitely. Everyone will delimit terrorism in such a way that his own violence cannot be described as illegitimate. If one wants to break the vicious circle that leads from violence to retaliation and from the latter to the former, one needs an objective point of view and therefore a definition. The definition of terrorism is thus far from being just a theoretical issue. That definition is the condition to the creation of a political community. Indeed, as Aristotle points out, 24 any community is founded on common conceptions, namely the conception of what is just and what is unjust. In consequence, we need a definition in order to establish a minimal international community. One can see it clearly a contrario in the UN report In Larger Freedom. 25 The persistent disagreement on the definition of terrorism brought the UN into disrepute and ruined its efforts to contain terrorism. The definition of terrorism is of the utmost importance even for those who think it is impossible to define terrorism without justifying oppression. It remains to be seen if such a definition is possible.

**1. No link:**

**2. Reps don’t shape reality—focusing on them obscures material and political analysis which turns the criticism**

**Tuathail 96** (Gearoid, Department of Georgraphy at Virginia Polytechnic Institute, Political Geography, 15(6-7), p. 664, science direct)

While theoretical debates at academic conferences are important to academics, the discourse and concerns of foreign-policy decision- makers are quite different, so different that they constitute a distinctive problem- solving, theory-averse, policy-making subculture. **There is a danger that academics assume that the discourses they engage are more significant** in the practice of foreign policy and **the exercise of power than they really are**. This is not, however, to minimize the obvious importance of academia as a general institutional structure among many that sustain certain epistemic communities in particular states. In general, I do not disagree with Dalby’s fourth point about politics and discourse except to note that his statement-‘Precisely because reality could be represented in particular ways political decisions could be taken, troops and material moved and war fought’-evades the important question of agency that I noted in my review essay. **The assumption that it is representations that make action possible is inadequate by itself.** **Political, military and economic structures, institutions, discursive networks and leadership are all crucial in explaining social action and should be theorized together with representational practices**. Both here and earlier, Dalby’s reasoning inclines towards a form of idealism. In response to Dalby’s fifth point (with its three subpoints), it is worth noting, first, that his book is about the CPD, not the Reagan administration. He analyzes certain CPD discourses, root the geographical reasoning practices of the Reagan administration nor its public-policy reasoning on national security. Dalby’s book is narrowly textual; the general contextuality of the Reagan administration is not dealt with. Second, let me simply note that I find that the distinction between critical theorists and post- structuralists is a little too rigidly and heroically drawn by Dalby and others. Third, Dalby’s interpretation of the reconceptualization of national security in Moscow as heavily influenced by dissident peace researchers in Europe is highly idealist, an interpretation that ignores the structural and ideological crises facing the Soviet elite at that time. Gorbachev’s reforms and his new security discourse were also strongly self- interested, an ultimately futile attempt to save the Communist Party and a discredited regime of power from disintegration. The issues raised by Simon Dalby in his comment are important ones for all those interested in the practice of critical geopolitics. While I agree with Dalby that questions of discourse are extremely important ones for political geographers to engage**there is a danger of fetishizing this concern with discourse so that we neglect the institutional and the sociological, the materialist and the cultural, the political and the geographical contexts within which particular discursive strategies become significant**,. Critical geopolitics, in other words, should not be a prisoner of the sweeping ahistorical cant that sometimes accompanies ‘poststructuralism nor convenient reading strategies like the identity politics narrative; it needs to always be open to the patterned mess that is human history.

**3. Masking Disad—discursive criticism masks the problem and prevents legitimate solutions.**

**Meisner 95** (Mark, professor of environmental studies at York University, (Mark, “Resourcist Language: The Symbolic Enslavement of Nature”, Proceedings of the Conference on Communication and Our Environment, ed: David Sachsman, p. 242)

**Changing the language we use** to talk **about** non-human nature **is not a solution**. As I suggested, **language is not the problem**. Rather, **it s**eems **more like a contagious symptom of a deeper and multi-faceted problem that has yet to be fully defined**. Resourcist language is both an indicator and a carrier of the pathology of rampant ecological degradation. Further¬more, **language change alone can end up simply being a band-aid solution that gives the appearance of change and makes the problem all the less visible**. In a recent article on feminist language reform, Susan Ehrlich and Ruth King (1994) argue that because meanings are socially constructed, attempts at introducing nonsexist language are being undermined by a culture that is still largely sexist. The **words may have shifted, but the meanings and ideologies have not. The real world cure for the sick patient matters more than the treatment of a single symptom**. Consequently, **language change and cultural change must go together with social-moral change**. It is naive to believe either that language is trivial, or that it is deterministic.

**4. Their focus on rhetoric stifles debate about social and political structures in favor of discussions on the minutia of terminology.**

**Best and Kellner 91** ( Stephen Best and Douglas Kellner, UT-Austin, 1991, Postmodern Theory: Critical Interrogations, p. 259-60)

Postmodern **theorists** do not do social theory per se, but rather **eclectically combine fragments of sociological analysis,** literary and cultural readings, historical theorizations, **and philosophical critiques. They tend to privilege cultural and philosophical analysis over social theory and thereby fail to confront the most decisive determinants of our social world. Yet** we believe - against much postmodern theory - **that the project of social theory** itself **continues to be a valuable one**. Just as individuals need cognitive maps of their cities to negotiate their spatial environment, they also need maps of their society to intelligently analyze, discuss, and intervene in social processes. For us, **social theories provide mappings of contemporary society: its organization**; its constitutive social relations, practices, discourses, and institutions; its integrated and interdependent features**; its conflictual and fragmenting features; and its structures of power and modes of oppression and domination**. Social theories analyze how these elements fit together to constitute specific societies, and how societies work or fail to function

### Apoc. Rhetoric

#### Cyberwar is probable- multiple IR theories prove

Junio ‘13

[Timothy J. Junio (Tim)is a doctoral candidate of political science at the¶ University of Pennsylvania and a predoctoral fellow at the Center for¶ International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) at Stanford University.¶ He also develops new cyber capabilities at the Defense Advanced¶ Research Projects Agency (DARPA). How Probable is Cyber War? Bringing¶ IR Theory Back In to the Cyber Conflict Debate, Journal of Strategic Studies, 36:1,¶ 125-133. ETB]

Two recent articles in the pages of this journal contribute to an¶ important debate about how information technology (IT) inﬂuences¶ international politics.1¶ Thomas Rid and Adam Liff argue that cyber¶ ‘war’ has never happened and probably will not happen. A fundamental¶ problem with these articles is that Rid and Liff do not commit to a¶ theoretical framework regarding the causes of war. Doing so yields an¶ opposite conclusion: international relations theory identiﬁes many¶ mechanisms that may cause violent escalation with cyber weapons.¶ This brief response article explains why cyber war is sufﬁciently¶ probable to merit serious attention from scholars and practitioners,¶ and proposes a theoretical research agenda. First, domestic political¶ factors – such as states’ command and control over cyber operations –¶ must be problematized. The principal-agent approach demonstrates¶ how variation in incentives and preferences may make militaries more¶ likely to favor cyber attack than other kinds of bureaucracies. This¶ matters in societies with poor civilian control over the military. Second,¶ the unique material qualities of IT must be evaluated alongside¶ traditional mechanisms that cause war. For instance, the attribution¶ problem and computational complexity in modeling cyber operations¶ may increase the odds of inadvertent cyber war by causing states to¶ retaliate against the wrong targets or miscalculate the potential costs¶ and gains of attacking.

**There is likely a near-zero chance of nuclear war, but protective and defensive counter-measures like the aff are still necessary**

**Matheny, ‘7** [Jason G. Matheny, “Reducing the Risk of Human Extinction” Risk Analysis, Vol. 27, No. 5, 2007]

It is possible for humanity (or its descendents) to survive a million years or more, but we could succumb to extinction as soon as this century. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, U.S. President Kennedy estimated the probability of a nuclear holocaust as “somewhere be- tween one out of three and even” (Kennedy, 1969, p. 110). John von Neumann, as Chairman of the U.S. Air Force Strategic Missiles Evaluation Committee, pre- dicted that it was “absolutely certain (1) that there would be a nuclear war; and (2) that everyone would die in it” (Leslie, 1996, p. 26). More recent predictions of human extinction are little more optimistic. In their catalogs of extinction risks, Britain’s Astronomer Royal, Sir Martin Rees (2003), gives humanity 50-50 odds on surviving the 21st century; philosopher Nick Bostrom argues that it would be “misguided” to assume that the probability of extinction is less than 25%; and philosopher John Leslie (1996) assigns a 30% probability to extinction during the next five centuries. The “Stern Review” for the U.K. Treasury (2006) assumes that the probability of human extinction during the next century is 10%. And some explanations of the “Fermi Paradox” imply a high probability (close to 100%) of extinction among technological civilizations (Pisani, 2006).4 **Estimating the probabilities of unprecedented events is subjective**, so we should treat these numbers skeptically. Still, even if the probability of extinction is several orders lower, because the stakes are high, it could be wise to invest in extinction countermeasures.

**Our impacts aren’t constructed until they prove it.**

**Yudkowsky 6** – Eliezer Yudkowsky, Research Fellow at the Singularity Institute for Artificial Intelligence that has published multiple peer-reviewed papers on risk assessment. Cognitive biases potentially affecting judgment of global risks Forthcoming in Global Catastrophic Risks, eds. Nick Bostrom and Milan Cirkovic. August 31, 2006.

Every **true** idea which discomforts you will seem to match **the pattern of at least one** psychological error. Robert Pirsig said: “The world’s biggest fool can say the sun is shining, but that doesn’t make it dark out.” **If you believe someone is guilty of a psychological error, then** demonstrate your competence by first demolishing theirconsequential factual errors. If there are no factual errors, then what matters the psychology? **The temptation of psychology is that,** knowing a little psychology, we can meddle in arguments where wehave no **technical** expertise – **instead sagely analyzing the psychology of the disputants**. **If someone wrote a novel about an asteroid strike destroying modern civilization,** then **someone might criticize that novel as** extreme, dystopian, **apocalyptic**; symptomatic of the author’s naive inability to deal with a complex technological society. **We should recognize this as a literary criticism, not a scientific one**; it is about good or bad novels, not good or bad hypotheses. **To quantify the annual probability of an asteroid strike in real life, one must study astronomy and the historical record: no amount of literary criticism can put a number on it.** Garreau (2005) seems to hold that a scenario of a mind slowly increasing in capability, is more mature and sophisticated than a scenario of extremely rapid intelligence increase. But that’s a technical question, not a matter of taste; no amount of psychologizing can tell you the exact slope of that curve. It’s harder to abuse heuristics and biases than psychoanalysis. **Accusing someone of conjunction fallacy leads naturally into listing the specific details that you think are burdensome and drive down the joint probability. Even so, do not lose track of the real- world facts of primary interest; do not let the argument become about psychology**. Despite all dangers and temptations, it is better to know about psychological biases than to not know. Otherwise we will walk directly into the whirling helicopter blades of life. **But** be very careful not to have too much fun accusing others of biases**. That is the road that leads to becoming a sophisticated arguer – someone who, faced with any discomforting argument, finds at once a bias in it**. The one whom you must watch above all is yourself. Jerry Cleaver said: “What does you in is not failure to apply some high-level, intricate, complicated technique. It’s overlooking the basics. Not keeping your eye on the ball.” Analyses should finally center on testable real-world assertions. Do not take your eye off the ball.

**Nuclear Reps Good**

**Images of nuclear apocalypse are necessary to problematize their usage**

James **Foard. 1997**. Associate Professor of Religion, Arizona State, “Imagining Nuclear Weapons: Hiroshima, Armageddon, and the Annihilation of the Students of Ichijo School,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion, http://jaar.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/LXV/1/1.pdf TBC 7/1/10)

**This ambivalence about Hiroshima has been partially ameliorated by displacing it with Armageddon in our imagination of nuclear weapons** In America **the images of the atomic bomb**, particularly after the Soviet Union's successful test in 1949 (Boyer.341), **were pressed into the service of apocalyptic speculations**, both scientific and otherwise, a process which has until recently assigned the horror that Hiroshima represented to a superpower war in an imagined future (cf. Pease'562). Specifically, **images of a nuclear Armageddon have helped us perform two sorts of cultural tasks fundamental for imagining nuclear weapons**: those involving difference and those involving representation. By "difference" I mean both **the articulation of what makes nuclear weapons different from other weapons and the consequent reflection on the different human situation engendered by them**. By "representation" I mean **the expressions which seek to describe the use of nuclear weapons and incorporate that description into structures of meaning Armageddon permits us to define the difference of nuclear weapons by their capacity to destroy the human species** in a war that no one will win. It also has suggested to many, particularly literary critics but also some nuclear strategists, that nuclear war is but an imaginary event, divorced from reality, such that all representations are, to use the most famous phrase, "fabulously textual" (Derrida'23).

**Only representing the devastation of nuclear war can we challenge nuclearism**

James **Foard. 1997**. Associate Professor of Religion, Arizona State, “Imagining Nuclear Weapons: Hiroshima, Armageddon, and the Annihilation of the Students of Ichijo School,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion, http://jaar.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/LXV/1/1.pdf TBC 7/1/10)

Despite their deep suspicion of the adequacy of any expressions, the survivors relate their narratives in formal ritual and pilgrimage settings in which their repetition and redundancy seem appropriate. (These are, of course, the public rather than the traditional settings ) They justify their attention to story and place in terms of preserving memory, not because their stories can ever be fully understood, but "to bring peace " **Without any clear understanding of what political mechanisms might be required, they claim that the telling of stories itself can, in fact, help do thi**s The experience of the Ichijo people, then, suggests that **nuclear talk can neither be fully denied nor fully accommodated into our sense of community over time. The only representation possible, then, strives not to domesticate the experience of the bomb into human memory, but to use the memory of its reality for apotropaic purposes** **The reality of the bomb is asserted**—indeed must be asserted—**only so that it can be refused a permanent place in human history.**

### Economic Rationality

**Economic rationality is ethical and solves war – self-interest motivates individuals to sacrifice some autonomy to produce security and protect the rights of others**

**Aasland ‘9**

(Dag, Prof. of Economics @ U of Agder, Norway, Ethics and Economy: After Levinas, pgs. 65-66)

Business ethics, in the sense of ethics *for* business, illustrates this: its perspective is that of an ‘enlightened self-interest’ where the constraints that are put on the individual, thanks to the ability to see the unfortunate consequences for oneself, postpone the ‘war’, in a direct or metaphoric sense of the word (*ibid.*: 70-71). This enlightened self-interest forms the base not only of the market economy, but also of a social organization and manifestation of human rights, and even of some ethical theories. It is a calculated and voluntary renunciation of one’s own freedom in order to obtain in return security and other common goals (*ibid.*: 72). The fact that economic, political and legal theories appeal to enlightened self-interest does not imply, however, that we should discard them. Nor should we reject proclamations of human rights, legal constraints of individual freedom and, for that matter, business ethics, even if they are based on an enlightened self-interest. It is rather the opposite: such institutions and knowledge are indispensable because the primary quality of the enlightened self-interest is that it restricts egocentricity. Our *practical reason* (which was Kant’s words for the reason that governs our acts, where the moral law is embedded as a principle) includes the knowledge that it can be rational to lay certain restrictions on individual freedom. In this way practical reason may postpone (for an indefinite time) violence and murder among people. This has primarily been the raison-d’être of politics and the state, but it is today taken over more and more by corporate organizations, as expressed in the new term for business ethics, as *corporate social responsibility* and *corporate citizenship* (see chapter 2). Thanks to this ‘postponement of violence’ provided by politics and economic rationality, people may unfold their freedom within the laws

### Heg

**Only reforming hegemony can overcome the legacy of empire – it is necessary to create a new form of cosmopolitanism and stop ethnic conflict, poverty and the death of all planetary life – resistance alone fails**

Michael J. **Thompson, 2003** – Founder and Editor of Logos and Teaches Political Theory @ Hunter College (CUNY, Fall 2003 (“Iraq, Hegemony, and the Question of American Empire” – Logos, Vol. 2, Issue 4) http://www.logosjournal.com/thompson\_iraq.htm

It is rare that political debates typically confined to the left will burst into the mainstream with any degree of interest, let alone profundity. But this has not been the case with the question of American empire and the recent military campaigns in places such as Iraq and Afghanistan. **For many on the left**, this was a political question with a cut and dried answer: **the American-led military campaign was a clear expression of its imperial policies and motives, the object of which is economic global dominance**. But in some ways, **such assumptions** voiced by much of the American and European left, specifically among its more dogmatic and sectarian strains, **mischaracterize and even misunderstand the reality of American global power and the possible contributions of the western political tradition** more broadly. With each passing day the events in Iraq deliberately evoke the question of American empire, and not without good reason. The neoconservative position on this has been to see American policies and its position in the world as that of a hegemon: a nation which seeks to lead the constellation of world nations into the end of history itself where the fusion of "free" markets and liberal democracy is seen to be the institutional panacea for the world's ills and with this the enlargement of capital's dominion. But the deepening morass of the occupation of Iraq belies such intentions. Paul Bremer's statement that "we dominate the scene [in Iraq] and we will continue to impose our will on this country," is a concise statement betraying not America's imperial motives, but, rather, the way that its hegemonic motives have ineluctably been pushed into a logic of imperial control. America has, in other words, become an empire by default, not by intention, and the crucial question now is: how are we to respond? **But the charge of America-as-empire is not as obvious as many have assumed even though many superficial elements of its history point to that conclusion.** Students of American political history know of the dual policies of American empire from the late 19th and early 20th centuries. "Gunboat Diplomacy" was the imperial policy of backing up all foreign territorial policies with direct military force. From the Philippines to Cuba, Grenada and Haiti, this was an effective policy, copied from the British and their acts in the Opium War, which allowed the United States to extend itself as a colonial power. "Dollar Diplomacy" was America's effort, particularly under President William Howard Taft, to further its foreign policy aims in Latin America and the Far East through the use of economic power. Theodore Roosevelt laid the groundwork for this approach in 1905 with his Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, maintaining that if any nation in the Western Hemisphere appeared politically or fiscally so unstable as to be vulnerable to European control, the United States had the right and obligation to intervene. Taft continued and expanded this policy, starting in Central America, where he justified it as a means of protecting the Panama Canal. In 1909 he attempted unsuccessfully to establish control over Honduras by buying up its debt to British bankers. In Nicaragua, American intervention included funding the country's debts to European bankers. In addition, the State Department persuaded four American banks to refinance Haiti's national debt, setting the stage for further intervention in the future. Both policies were imperial to the extent that they wanted to manipulate and use other countries as geographical means for domestic economic and political ends. To expand markets were meant, during the late 19th century and early 20th, as a means for displacing excess domestic industrial productivity, the cause of most cyclical recessions during that period. Goods produced in excess could be unloaded in more local foreign markets and there was also the return of agricultural goods and natural resources, too. We could probably say that America is once again becoming an empire of sorts, but this is something that is more recent than some may in fact think. The Cold War was a battle of hegemons, between the U.S. and the Soviets, and this has, since the latter's collapse and the ascendancy of neoconservatives to positions of influence and power in Washington, turned into a political situation where American interests are pursued unilaterally without the intervening countervailing tendencies of international institutions such as the UN. And it is here that the moment of empire begins to eclipse that of hegemony: when a single nation begins to hold direct control over foreign territory for its own interests. The Iraqi oil fields were up and running not long after the fall of Baghdad where, even now, electricity and clean water are in short supply if even existent. (An Iraqi friend in Baghdad tells me that they have power for about one hour a day.) When I visited Baghdad in January of 2003, several of my colleagues and I were fortunate enough to be able to have a private conversation with several members of the faculty from the College of Political Science at Baghdad University. For them, the consensus for political change in Iraq was clear: the ousting of Saddam Hussein was necessary for the Iraqi people and any semblance of political freedom, but it was his regime that was the problem and it was the regime, they felt, that should be the focus of UN sanctions and pressure, not the total annihilation of state institutions that the Ba'athists had inhabited and, in part, created. (See the interview in Logos, Winter 2003: 2.1 at www.logosjournal.com/issue\_2.1.pdf) **Hegemony in international terms without some kind of competing force,** such as the Soviets, **can clearly lead to the abuse of power and a unilateralist flaunting of international institutions that do not serve at the imperium's whim. But this should not mean that hegemony itself is a negative concept.** Although empire is something rightfully reviled, **hegemony may not be as bad as** **everyone thinks**. **We need to consider what is progressive and transformative in the ideas and values of the western republican and liberal traditions. We need to advocate not an anti-hegemonic stance in form, but an anti-hegemonic and anti-imperialist stance in content,** one **that advocates the particular interests of capital of the market in more broad terms rather than the universal political interests of others**. **Rather than choose between western hegemony on the one hand and political and cultural relativism on the other, we need to approach this problem with an eye toward cosmopolitanism and** what the political theorist Stephen Eric Bronner has called "**planetary life**." **Simple resistance to American "imperial" tendencies is no longer enough for a responsible, critical and rational left./// Not only does it smack of tiers-mondisme but at the same time it rejects the realities of globalization which are inexorable and require a more sophisticated political response**. The real question I am putting forth is simply this: is it the case that **hegemony** is in itself inherently bad? Or, is it possible to consider that, **because it can, at least in theory, consist of the diffusion of western political ideas, values and institutions, it could be used as a progressive force in transforming those nations and regions that have been unable to deal politically with the problems of economic development, political disintegration and ethnic strife**? It is time that we begin to consider the reality that **western political thought provides us with unique answers to the political, economic and social problems of the world and this includes reversing the perverse legacies of western imperialism itself**. And **it is time that the left begins to embrace the ideas of the Enlightenment and its ethical impulse for freedom, democracy, social progress and human dignity on an international scale**. This is rhetorically embraced by neoconservatives, but it turns out to be more of a mask for narrower economic motives and international realpolitik, and hence their policies and values run counter to the radical impulses of Enlightenment thought. Western ideas and institutions can find affinities in the rational strains of thought in almost every culture in the world, from 12th century rationalist Islamic philosophers like Alfarabi, Avicenna (Ibn Sinna) and Averroes (Ibn Rushd) to India's King Akbar and China's Mencius. The key is to find these intellectual affinities and push them to their concrete, political conclusions. Clearly, the left's problem with the idea of the spread of western political ideas and institutions is not entirely wrong. There was a racist and violent precedent set by the French and English imperial projects lasting well into the 20th century. **The problem is in separating the form from the content of western hegemonic motives and intentions. And it is even more incorrect to see the occupation of Iraq as a symptom of western ideas and Enlightenment rationalism. Nothing could be further from the case and the sooner this is realized, the more the left will be able to carve out new paths of critique and resistance to a hegemony that is turning into empire**. and it is precisely for this reason why, in institutional terms, the UN needs to be brought back in. although there are clearly larger political and symbolic reasons for this, such as the erosion of a unilateralist framework for the transition from Hussein's regime, there is also the so-called "effect of empire" where Iraq is being transformed into an instrument of ideological economics. The current U.S. plan for Iraq, one strongly supported by Bremer as well as the Bush administration, will remake its economy into one of the most open to trade, capital flows and foreign investment in the world as well as being the lowest taxed. Iraq is being transformed into an neo-liberal utopia where American industries hooked up to the infamous "military-industrial complex" will be able to gorge themselves on contracts for the development of everything from infrastructure to urban police forces. As time moves on, we are seeing that Iraq provides us with a stunning example of how hegemony becomes empire. It is an example of how the naïve intention of "nation building" is unmasked and laid bare, seen for what it truly is: the forceful transformation of a sovereign state into a new form suited to narrow western (specifically American) interests. Attempts to build a constitution have failed not from the lack of will, but from the lack of any political discourse about what form the state should take and about what values should be enshrined in law. Ruling bodies have become illegitimate almost immediately upon their appointment because there exists almost complete social fragmentation, and the costs of knitting it together are too great for America to assume. In the end, America has become, with its occupation of Iraq and its unilateralist and militaristic posture, an empire in the most modern sense of the term. But **we should be careful about distinguishing empire from a hegemon and the implications of each**. And **since**, as Hegel put it, **we are defined by what we oppose, the knee-jerk and ineffectual response from the modern left has been to produce almost no alternative at all to the imperatives that drive American empire as seen in places such as Iraq. To neglect the military, economic and cultural aspects of American power is to ignore the extent to which it provokes violent reaction and counter-reaction**. But at the same time**, to ignore the important contributions of western political ideas and institutions and their power and efficacy in achieving peace and mutual cooperation, whether it be between ethnic communities or whole nations themselves, is to ignore the very source of political solutions for places where poverty, oppression and dictatorships are the norm and remain stubbornly intact.** **Western hegemony will not be seen as problematic once the values of the western political tradition and specifically those of the Enlightenment, from the liberal rule of law, the elimination of the arbitrary exercise of power and the value of political and social equality, are set in a cosmopolitan global framework**. Only then will the words of Immanuel Kant take on any kind of concrete meaning for people the world over. "To think of oneself as a member of a cosmopolitan society in compliance with state laws is the most sublime idea that man can have about his predicament and which cannot be thought of without enthusiasm."

**Us intervention is inevitable – the plan prevents ineffective forms of engagement**

Robert **Kagan 2011**. Contributing editor to The Weekly Standard and a senior fellow in foreign policy at the Brookings Institution. "The Price of Power" Jan 24 Vol 16 No18 www.weeklystandard.com/articles/price-power\_533696.html?page=3

**In theory, the United States could refrain from intervening abroad. But, in practice, will it? Many assume today that the American public has had it with interventions, and** Alice **Rivlin** certainly **reflects a strong current of opinion when she says that “much of the public does not believe that we need to go in and take over other people’s countries.” That sentiment has often been heard after interventions**, especially those with mixed or dubious results. **It was heard after the four-year-long war in the Philippines, which cost 4,000 American lives and untold Filipino casualties. It was heard after Korea and after Vietnam. It was heard after Somalia. Yet the reality has been that after each intervention, the sentiment against foreign involvement has faded, and the United States has intervened again. Depending on how one chooses to count, the United States has undertaken roughly 25 overseas interventions since 1898:** Cuba, 1898 The Philippines, 1898-1902 China, 1900 Cuba, 1906 Nicaragua, 1910 & 1912 Mexico, 1914 Haiti, 1915 Dominican Republic, 1916 Mexico, 1917 World War I, 1917-1918 Nicaragua, 1927 World War II, 1941-1945 Korea, 1950-1953 Lebanon, 1958 Vietnam, 1963-1973 Dominican Republic, 1965 Grenada, 1983 Panama, 1989 First Persian Gulf war, 1991 Somalia, 1992 Haiti, 1994 Bosnia, 1995 Kosovo, 1999 Afghanistan, 2001-present Iraq, 2003-present**That is one intervention every 4.5 years on average. Overall, the United States has intervened or been engaged in combat somewhere in 52 out of the last 112 years**, or roughly 47 percent of the time. **Since the end of the Cold War, it is true, the rate of U.S. interventions has increased, with an intervention roughly once every 2.5 years** and American troops intervening or engaged in combat in 16 out of 22 years, or over 70 percent of the time, since the fall of the Berlin Wall. **The argument for returning to “normal” begs the question: What is normal for the United States? The historical record of the last century suggests that it is not a policy of nonintervention**. This record ought to raise doubts about the theory that American behavior these past two decades is the product of certain unique ideological or doctrinal movements, whether “liberal imperialism” or “neoconservatism.” Allegedly “realist” presidents in this era have been just as likely to order interventions as their more idealistic colleagues. George H.W. Bush was as profligate an intervener as Bill Clinton. He invaded Panama in 1989, intervened in Somalia in 1992—both on primarily idealistic and humanitarian grounds—which along with the first Persian Gulf war in 1991 made for three interventions in a single four-year term. Since 1898 the list of presidents who ordered armed interventions abroad has included William McKinley, Theodore Roose-velt, William Howard Taft, Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush. **One would be hard-pressed to find a common ideological or doctrinal thread among them—unless it is the doctrine and ideology of a mainstream American foreign policy that leans more toward intervention than many imagine or would care to admit.** **Many don’t want to admit it, and the only thing as consistent as this pattern of American behavior has been the claim by contemporary critics that it is abnormal and a departure from American traditions**. The anti-imperialists of the late 1890s, the isolationists of the 1920s and 1930s, the critics of Korea and Vietnam, and the critics of the first Persian Gulf war, the interventions in the Balkans, and the more recent wars of the Bush years have all insisted that the nation had in those instances behaved unusually or irrationally. And yet the behavior has continued.To note this consistency is not the same as justifying it. The United States may have been wrong for much of the past 112 years. Some critics would endorse the sentiment expressed by the historian Howard K. Beale in the 1950s, that “the men of 1900” had steered the United States onto a disastrous course of world power which for the subsequent half-century had done the United States and the world no end of harm. **But whether one lauds or condemns this past century of American foreign policy—and one can find reasons to do both—the fact of this consistency remains. It would require not just a modest reshaping of American foreign policy priorities but a sharp departure from this tradition to bring about the kinds of changes that would allow the United States to make do with a substantially smaller force structure**. Is such a sharp departure in the offing**? It is no doubt true that many Americans are unhappy with the on-going warfare in Afghanistan and to a lesser extent in Iraq, and that, if asked, a majority would say the United States should intervene less frequently in foreign nations, or perhaps not at all.** **It may also be true that the effect of long military involvements in Iraq and Afghanistan may cause Americans and their leaders to shun further interventions at least for a few years**—as they did for nine years after World War I, five years after World War II, and a decade after Vietnam. This may be further reinforced by the difficult economic times in which Americans are currently suffering. The longest period of nonintervention in the past century was during the 1930s, when unhappy memories of World War I combined with the economic catastrophe of the Great Depression to constrain American interventionism to an unusual degree and produce the first and perhaps only genuinely isolationist period in American history. **So are we back to the mentality of the 1930s? It wouldn’t appear so. There is no great wave of isolationism sweeping the country.** There is not even the equivalent of a Patrick Buchanan, who received 3 million votes in the 1992 Republican primaries. Any isolationist tendencies that might exist are severely tempered by continuing fears of terrorist attacks that might be launched from overseas. Nor are the vast majority of Americans suffering from economic calamity to nearly the degree that they did in the Great Depression. **Even if we were to repeat the policies of the 1930s, however, it is worth recalling that the unusual restraint of those years was not sufficient to keep the United States out of war.** On the contrary, the United States took actions which ultimately led to the greatest and most costly foreign intervention in its history. Even the most determined and in those years powerful isolationists could not prevent it. **Today there are a number of obvious possible contingencies that might lead the United States to substantial interventions overseas, notwithstanding the preference of the public and its political leaders to avoid them. Few Americans want a war with Iran, for instance. But it is not implausible that a president—indeed, this president—might find himself in a situation where military conflict at some level is hard to avoid**. The continued success of the international sanctions regime that the Obama administration has so skillfully put into place, for instance, might eventually cause the Iranian government to lash out in some way—perhaps by attempting to close the Strait of Hormuz. Recall that Japan launched its attack on Pearl Harbor in no small part as a response to oil sanctions imposed by a Roosevelt administration that had not the slightest interest or intention of fighting a war against Japan but was merely expressing moral outrage at Japanese behavior on the Chinese mainland. Perhaps in an Iranian contingency, the military actions would stay limited. But perhaps, too, they would escalate. One could well imagine an American public, now so eager to avoid intervention, suddenly demanding that their president retaliate. **Then there is the possibility that a military exchange between Israel and Iran, initiated by Israel, could drag the United States into conflict with Iran. Are such scenarios so farfetched that they can be ruled out by Pentagon planners? Other possible contingencies include a war on the Korean Peninsula**, where the United States is bound by treaty to come to the aid of its South Korean ally; **and possible interventions in Yemen or Somalia,** should those states fail even more than they already have and become even more fertile ground for al Qaeda and other terrorist groups. And what about those “humanitarian” interventions that are first on everyone’s list to be avoided? Should another earthquake or some other natural or man-made catastrophe strike, say, Haiti and present the looming prospect of mass starvation and disease and political anarchy just a few hundred miles off U.S. shores, with the possibility of thousands if not hundreds of thousands of refugees, **can anyone be confident that an American president will not feel compelled to send an intervention force to help?Some may hope that a smaller U.S. military, compelled by the necessity of budget constraints, would prevent a president from intervening. More likely, however, it would simply prevent a president from intervening effectively. This, after all, was the experience of the Bush administration in Iraq and Afghanistan**. Both because of constraints and as a conscious strategic choice, **the Bush administration sent too few troops to both countries. The results were lengthy, unsuccessful conflicts, burgeoning counterinsurgencies, and loss of confidence in American will and capacity**, as well as large annual expenditures. Would it not have been better, and also cheaper, to have sent larger numbers of forces initially to both places and brought about a more rapid conclusion to the fighting? **The point is, it may prove cheaper in the long run to have larger forces that can fight wars quickly and conclusively**, as Colin Powell long ago suggested, than to have smaller forces that can’t. Would a defense planner trying to anticipate future American actions be wise to base planned force structure on the assumption that the United States is out of the intervention business? Or would that be the kind of penny-wise, pound-foolish calculation that, in matters of national security, can prove so unfortunate? **The debates over whether and how the United States should respond to the world’s strategic challenges will and should continue. Armed interventions overseas should be weighed carefully, as always**, with an eye to whether the risk of inaction is greater than the risks of action. And as always, these judgments will be merely that: judgments, made with inadequate information and intelligence and no certainty about the outcomes. No foreign policy doctrine can avoid errors of omission and commission. But **history has provided some lessons, and for the United States the lesson has been fairly clear: The world is better off, and the United States is better off, in the kind of international system that American power has built and defended.**

## Off Case

### 2ac- Regs Not Restrict

#### W/M- aff restricts president’s authority to use preemptive OCO’s.

#### Restrict and regulate are synonymous

Paust ’08 (Mike & Teresa Baker Law Center Professor, University of Houston)

Jordan 14 U.C. Davis J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 205

The primacy of customary international law is also evident in an opinion by Justice Chase in 1800. In Bas v. Tingy, Justice Chase recognized that "if a general war is declared [by Congress], its extent and operations are only restricted and regulated by the jus belli, forming a part of the law of nations ... ." n47 Therefore, the law of nations (and, in particular, the law of war) necessarily restricts and regulates congressional authorization of war's extent and operations. n48 In 1798, Albert Gallatin had recognized similarly: "By virtue of ... [the war power], Congress could ... [act], provided it be according to the laws of nations and to treaties." n49 And in 1804, counsel had argued before the Supreme Court that "as far as Congress have thought proper to legislate us into a state of war, the law of nations in war is to apply." n50 The restrictive role of the laws of war [\*221] apparently formed the basis for Justice Story's statement in 1814 that conduct under a relevant act of Congress "was absorbed in the more general operation of the law of war" and was permissible "under the jus gentium" or law of nations. n51 Although there was no clash between the act and the laws of war, the laws of war recognizably had a higher, "more general" absorbing effect.

#### Counter-interp: Statutory restrictions are legislative limits

Law dictionary No Date

http://thelawdictionary.org/statutory-restriction/

STATUTORY RESTRICTION?

Limits or controls that have been place on activities by its ruling legislation

#### Prefer our interp:

1. **Their interp limits out heart of the topic affs like amending the War Powers Resolution, which undercuts education and means there are functionally zero aff’s because prohibitions are solved by the XO- lack of solvency means the topic is already tiny and neg biased, and it limits the proliferation of smaller affs**
2. **Only 1 aff exists on the topic means no limits explosion and no ground loss.**

#### Neg interp impossible: Congress CANNOT prohibit

Colella ‘88

Frank SPRING, 1988 54 Brooklyn L. Rev. 131

Because the subsequent versions of the amendment sought to deny the executive any latitude in supporting the Contras, they seem to be examples of congressional overreaching. Congress may regulate aspects of "foreign covert action," but it cannot totally bar the president from carrying them out. n151 One commentator incisively observes, "[C]ongress cannot deny the President the capacity to function effectively in this area any more than it could deny the courts the capacity to carry out their independent constitutional duties." n152 The restrictions contained in later versions of the amendments n153 make it apparent that Congress prevented effective execution of the president's policy objectives.

#### Counter-interp- the plan text is a restriction

#### Default to reasonability to prevent a race to the most limiting interp.

**Humans Good/Human Extinction Bad**

**Human life has inherent value – arguing otherwise is a slippery slope to slavery and eugenics**

Melinda **Penner** (Director of Operations – STR, Stand To Reason) **2005** “End of Life Ethics: A Primer”, Stand to Reason, http://www.str.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=5223

Intrinsic value is very different. Things with intrinsic value are valued for their own sake. They don’t have to achieve any other goal to be valuable. They are goods in themselves. Beauty, pleasure, and virtue are likely examples. Family and friendship are examples. Something that’s intrinsically valuable might also be instrumentally valuable, but even if it loses its instrumental value, its intrinsic value remains. **Intrinsic value is what people mean when they use the phrase "the sanctity of life." Now when someone argues that someone doesn’t have "quality of life" they are arguing that life is only valuable as long as it obtains something else with quality, and when it can’t accomplish this, it’s not worth anything anymore. It's only instrumentally valuable. The problem with this view is that it is entirely subjective and changeable with regards to what might give value to life**. Value becomes a completely personal matter, and, as we all know, our personal interests change over time. **There is no grounding for objective human value and human rights if it’s not intrinsic value. Our legal system is built on the notion that humans have intrinsic value**. The Declaration of Independence: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that each person is endowed by his Creator with certain unalienable rights...." **If human beings only have instrumental value, then slavery can be justified because there is nothing objectively valuable that requires our respect. There is nothing other than intrinsic value that can ground the unalienable equal rights we recognize because there is nothing about all human beings that is universal and equal. Intrinsic human value is what binds our social contract of rights. So if human life is intrinsically valuable, then it remains valuable even when our capacities are limited. Human life is valuable even with tremendous limitations. Human life remains valuable because its value is not derived from being able to talk, or walk, or feed yourself, or even reason at a certain level. Human beings don’t have value only in virtue of states of being (e.g., happiness) they can experience. The "quality of life" view is a poison pill because once we swallow it, we’re led down a logical slippery slope**. The exact same principle can be used to take the life of human beings in all kinds of limited conditions because I wouldn't want to live that way. Would you want to live the life of a baby with Down’s Syndrome? No? Then kill her. Would you want to live the life of an infant with cerebral palsy? No? Then kill him. Would you want to live the life of a baby born with a cleft lip? No? Then kill her. (In fact, they did.) **Once we accept this principle, it justifies killing every infant born with a condition that we deem a life we don’t want to live. There’s no reason not to kill every handicapped person who can’t speak for himself — because I wouldn’t want to live that way.** This, in fact, is what has happened in Holland with the Groningen Protocol. Dutch doctors euthanize severely ill newborns and their society has accepted it.

**Preventing the extinction of future generations is a moral imperative – human extinction is normatively bad**

**Cohen and Lee 1986**. Avner, Professor of International Law and Practice – Princeton University and Steven, Professor of Philosophy – Hobart and William Smith Colleges, Nuclear Weapons and the Future of Humanity: The Fundamental Questions, p. 332-333

I shall reinforce this conclusion with several arguments for the claim that, **while preventing the existence of future generations would not be against their interests, it is nevertheless of the utmost moral importance not to prevent their existence.** One such argument appeals to the fact that **our lives would be impoverished by the expectation that we will be the final generation.** At present our lives are enriched by the assumption that they will be linked in various ways with the lives of future people. **We rely on future generations for the furtherance and completion of projects we have begun or taken over from our ancestors; we depend on them to preserve and enrich our culture**, and to help fulfill our ideals; and we hope that they will benefit from and appreciate our works, providing us with posthumous recognition. If we were to suppose that there would be no future generations, **many of our present activities would be robbed of much of their meaning.** These are undoubtedly important reasons for ensuring the existence of future generations. Again, however, if the force of these points is only that it would be worse for existing people if there were to be no future generations, then these points will contribute nothing to the argument against nuclear deterrence that is not already provided by premises 1b and 1c. It is, however, equally plausible to suppose that **there is independent value in, say, the evolution of our culture, so that it is important for our culture to continue to develop quite apart from the fact that our lives would be impoverished by the belief that the evolution of our culture were at an end**. If this further claim is accepted, **we have a reason for ensuring the existence for future generations that is independent of the interests of existing people**. Another and perhaps stronger argument for the claim that it is morally important to ensure the existence of future generations also makes no appeal to the interests of existing people. This argument moves from the claim that there is a principle of non-malfeasance that provides a moral reason not to bring a person into existence if his life would be worse than no life at all, or "worth not living," to the claim that there is a principle of beneficence that provides a moral reason to bring a person into existence if his life would, on balance, be worth living. The argument takes as its first premise the claim that it would be wrong, other things being equal, to bring a person into existence if his life would predictably be worth not living. This seems uncontroversial. But how can we best explain why it would be wrong? It is tempting to appeal to side-effects, to the fact that it is normally worse for existing people if a person who is utterly wretched comes to exist. But this explanation is excluded by the ceteris paribus clause. And in any case the appeal to side-effects could provide only a partial explanation of why it would be wrong to bring a miserable person into existence. For **it is only contingently true that it is worse for existing people when miserable people come into existence. There could be cases in which this would be better for existing people.**

**Humans are unique – innovation is innate to humans**

Murray **Bookchin**, **1995**. philosophy – Institute for Social Ecology.

http://lamiae.meccahosting.com/~a0004f7f/StudiesInAnti-Capitalism/Documents\_TWO\_files/SocialAnarchismOrLifestyleAnarchism.pdf)

What is of crucial importance is that the regression to primitivism among lifestyle anarchists denies the most salient attributes of humanity as a species and the potentially emancipatory aspects of Euro-American civilization. **Humans are vastly different from other animals in that they do more than merely adapt to the world around them; they innovate and create a new world, not only to discover their own powers as human beings but to make the world around them more suitable for their own development, both as individuals and as a species**. Warped as this capacity is by the present irrational society, **the ability to change the world is a natural endowment, the product of human biological evolution -- not simply a product of technology, rationality, and civilization. That people who call themselves anarchists should advance a primitivism that verges on the animalistic**, with its barely concealed message of adaptiveness and passivity, **sullies centuries of revolutionary thought,** ideals, and practice, indeed defames the memorable efforts of humanity to free itself from parochialism, mysticism, and superstition and change the world.

**Humans are morally distinct**

**Linker, ‘5** – Damon, Animal Rights: Contemporary Issues (Compilation), Thompson-Gale, p. 23-25.

That such arguments have found an audience at this particular cultural moment is not so hard to explain. Our popular and elite media are saturated with scientific and quasi-scientific reports claiming to prove the basic thesis of the animal-rights movement. Having once believed ourselves to be made in the image of God, we now learnfrom the human genome project, the speculations of evolutionary psychologists, and numerous other sources-that humankind, too, is determined by genetic predispositions and the drive to reproduce. We are cleverer than other animals, to be sure, but the difference is one of degree, not of kind. As Verlyn Klinkenborg wrote on the editorial page of the New York Times, "Again and again, after starting from an ancient premise of radical differences between humans and other creatures, scientists have discovered profound similarities." But have they? Genetics and evolutionary biology may be, indeed, extremely effective at identifying the traits we share with other species. But chemistry, for its part, can tell us about the ways in which we resemble chunks of charcoal, and physics can point to fundamental similarities between a man and all the matter in the universe. The problem with these observations is not that they are untrue. It is that they shed no light whatsoever on, or rather they are designed to obfuscate, what makes humanity unique as a species-the point on which an answer to the likes of Peter Singer and Steven Wise must hinge. For his part, Singer commits the same error that John Stuart Mill found in the system of Jeremy Bentham: he makes no distinction among kinds of pleasure and pain. That animals feel emotions can hardly be doubted; but human beings experience life, even at its most "animalistic" level, in a way that fundamentally differs from other creatures. Thus, Singer can account for the pain that humans and animals alike experience when they are hungry and the pleasure they feel when they eat, but he cannot explain, for example, a person's choice to starve himself for a cause. He understands that human beings, like animals, derive pleasure from sex and sometimes endure pangs of longing when they are deprived of it, but he cannot explain how or why, unlike animals, some choose to embrace celibacy for the sake of its noble purity. He is certainly attuned to the tendency we share with animals to fear and avoid pain and bodily harm, but he is incapable of understanding a man's willingness to face certain death on the battlefield when called upon to do so by his country. Still less can he explain why stories of such sacrifice sometimes move us to tears. In much the same way, the evidence adduced by Steven Wise to suggest that primates are capable of forming rudimentary plans and expectations fails to demonstrate they are equal to human beings in any significant sense. Men and women use their "autonomy" in a world defined not by the simple imperatives of survival but by ideas of virtue and vice, beauty and ugliness, right and wrong. Modern scientific methods, including those of evolutionary psychology, have so far proved incapable of detecting and measuring this world, but that does not make any less real the experience that takes place within it. Western civilization has tended to regard animals as resembling things more than human beings precisely because, like jnanimate objects, and unlike the authors of the real Magna Carta, animals have no perception of morality. Until the day when a single animal stands up and, led by a love of justice and a sense of self-worth, insists that the world recognize and respect its dignity, all the philosophical gyrations of the activists will remain so much sophistry. Putting Human Interests First **None of this**, of course, **exempts human beings from behaving decently toward animals**, but it does provide a foundation, when necessary, for giving pride of place to the interests of human beings. This has particular relevance for biomedical research. Among the most vociferous critics of the USDA's capitulation to the animal-rights movement were the nation's leading centers of medical science. The National Association for BiOlnedical Research estimated that the new regulations would cost universities alone as much as $280 million a year. Nor is the issue simply one of dollars. As Estelle Fishbein, counsel for Johns Hopkins University, recently argued in the SHOULD ANIMALS HAVE THE SAME STATUS AS PEOPLE? Journal of the American Medical Association, Genetic research promises to bring new therapies to alleviate human suffering from the acquired immunodeficiency syndrome, Parkinson's disease and other neurological diseases, and virtually all other human and animal diseases. However, the promise of this new era of medical research is highly dependent on the ready availability of mice, rats, and birds. 2S Far from being a mere administrative hassle, she concluded, the new regulations would "divert scarce grant funds from actual research use, distract researchers from their scientific work, and overload them with documentation requirements. II Serious as this threat is, a still more troubling one is the effect that the arguments of animal-rights proponents may have, in the long term, on our regard for human life itself. Peter Singer's apPOintment at Princeton caused a stir not because of his writings about animals but because of his endorsement of euthanasia, unrestricted abortion, and, in some instances, infanticide. But all of his views, as he himself maintains, are of a piece. The idea that "human infants and retarded adults II are superior to animaLs can only be based, he writes, on "a bare-faced-and morally indefensible-prejudice for members of our own species. II In much the same way, Steven Wise urges us to reject absolute demarcations between species and instead focus on the capacities of individual humans and individual apes. If we do that, we will find that many adult chimpanzees and bonobos are far more "human" than newborn and mentally disabled human beings, and thus just as worthy of being recognized as IIpersons." Though Wise's inference is the opposite of Singer's-he does not wish to deprive underdeveloped humans of rights so much as to extend those rights to primates-he is playing the same game of baitand- switch: in this case projecting the noblest human attributes onto animals while quietly limiting his sample of human beings to newborns and the mentally disabled. When raising animals to our level proves to be impossible, as it inevitably must, equal consideration can only be won by attempting to lower us to theirs.

**Humans Good – Ethics**

**Humanism is key to ethics, and rejecting secular humanism leads to fill-in by religious humanism and moral relativism.**

**CHS – 2011,** Council for Secular Humanism, What Are Secular Humanist Values?, 2011 http://www.secularhumanism.org/index.php?section=main&page=values

“… the moral consequences of believing the universe not to be guided by a personal god to whom petitionary prayer can be addressed are huge. That is why it is so inadequate to call oneself solely an atheist; one needs some sort of description for what motivates one's behavior afterwards.” — Bill Cooke, Secular humanist author and activist --- Far from living in a moral vacuum, secular humanists “wish to encourage wherever possible the growth of moral awareness.” (The quote comes from “A Secular Humanist Declaration,” the Council for Secular Humanism’s founding document, authored by Paul Kurtz.) **Secular humanists believe human values should express a commitment to improve human welfare in this world**. (Of course, **human welfare is understood in the context of our interdependence upon the environment** and other living things.) **Ethical principles should be evaluated by their consequences for people,** not by how well they conform to preconceived ideas of right and wrong. **Secular humanism denies that meaning, values, and ethics are imposed from above**. In that it echoes simple atheism. But secular humanism goes further, challenging humans to develop their own values. **Secular humanism maintains that through a process of value inquiry, reflective men and women can** reach rough agreement concerning values, and **craft ethical systems that deliver desirable** //results under most circumstances. Indeed, say secular humanists, **the basic components of effective morality are universally recognized**. Paul Kurtz has written of the “common moral decencies”—qualities including **integrity, trustworthiness, benevolence, and fairness**. These qualities **are celebrated by** almost **every** human **religion, not because God ordained them, but because human beings cannot thrive in communities where these values are ignored.** Secular humanism offers a nonreligious template that may one day guide much of humanity in pursuing fulfilling and humane lives—lives that are rich intellectually, ethically, and emotionally, without reliance on religious faith.

**Preventing human extinction is key to ethics.**

Nick **Bostrom**, Professor in the Faculty of Philosophy & Oxford Martin School, Director of the Future of Humanity Institute, and Director of the Programme on the Impacts of Future Technology at the University of Oxford, recipient of the 2009 Eugene R. Gannon Award for the Continued Pursuit of Human Advancement, holds a Ph.D. in Philosophy from the London School of Economics, **2011** (“The Concept of Existential Risk,” Draft of a Paper published on ExistentialRisk.com, Available Online at <http://www.existentialrisk.com/concept.html>, Accessed 07-04-2011)

We have thus far considered existential risk from the perspective of utilitarianism (combined with several simplifying assumptions). We may briefly consider how the issue might appear when viewed through the lenses of some other ethical outlooks. For example, the philosopher Robert Adams outlines a different view on these matters. I believe **a better basis for ethical theory** in this area **can be found in** quite a different direction—in **a commitment to the future of humanity as a vast project, or network of overlapping projects, that is generally shared by the human race. The aspiration for a better society**—more just, more rewarding, and more peaceful—**is a part of this project. So are the potentially endless quests for scientific knowledge and philosophical understanding, and the development of artistic and other cultural traditions. This includes** the particular cultural traditions to which we belong, in all their accidental historic and ethnic diversity. It also includes **our interest in the lives of our children and grandchildren, and the hope that they will be able**, in turn, **to have the lives of their children and grandchildren as projects. To the extent that a policy or practice seems likely to be favorable or unfavorable to the carrying out of this complex of projects in the nearer or further future, we have reason to pursue or avoid it**. … **Continuity is as important to our commitment to the project of the future of humanity as it is to our commitment to the projects of our own personal futures. Just as the shape of my whole life, and its connection with my present and past, have an interest that goes beyond that of any isolated experience, so too the shape of human history over an extended period of the future, and its connection with the human present and past, have an interest that goes beyond that of the** (total or average) **quality of life of a population-at-a-time, considered in isolation from how it got that way**. **We owe**, I think, some **loyalty to this project of the human future. We** also **owe it a respect that we would owe it even if we were not of the human race ourselves**, but beings from another planet who had some understanding of it. (28: 472-473) **Since an existential catastrophe would either put an end to the project of the future of humanity or drastically curtail its scope for development, we** would seem to **have a strong prima facie reason to avoid it**, in Adams’ view. We also note that **an existential catastrophe would entail the frustration of many strong preferences**, suggesting that from a preference-satisfactionist perspective it would be a bad thing. In a similar vein, **an ethical view emphasizing that public policy should be determined through informed democratic deliberation by all stakeholders would favor existential-risk mitigation if we suppose**, as is plausible, **that a majority of the world’s population would come to favor such policies upon reasonable deliberation** (even if hypothetical future people are not included as stakeholders). **We might also have custodial duties to preserve the inheritance of humanity passed on to us by our ancestors and convey it safely to our descendants**.[24] **We do not want to be the failing link in the chain of generations, and we ought not to delete or abandon the great epic of human civilization that humankind has been working on for thousands of years, when it is clear that the narrative is far from having reached a natural terminus**. Further, **many theological perspectives deplore naturalistic existential catastrophes, especially ones induced by human activities**: If God created the world and the human species, one would imagine that He might be displeased if we took it upon ourselves to smash His masterpiece (or if, through our negligence or hubris, we allowed it to come to irreparable harm).[25]

**Anthropocentric values are the only way to think about life on earth. – thinking about the beauty of the cosmos fails to account for life.**

**Grey 93** — William Grey, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Queensland, 1993 (“Anthropocentrism and Deep Ecology,” *Australiasian Journal of Philosophy*, Volume 71, Number 4, Available Online at http://www.uq.edu.au/~pdwgrey/pubs/anthropocentrism.html, Accessed 07-27-2011)

This passage is revealing. Note the characterization of the Age of Mammals as "richer" than the Age of Reptiles. As mammal chauvinists we might agree, but it is not clear on what grounds Callicott can justify the claim. **It is** also **easy to agree that our demise, and the demise of the ecosystem which currently supports us, would be a matter of regret. But clearly it would be regrettable because of a decidedly anthropocentric set of values, interests and perceptions—if Callicott really eschews such concerns entirely, the grounds on which his regret is based are deprived of any foundation. There are various levels of description for any natural system, and the level which we adopt is inevitably interest relative. From a perspective which ascribes special value to living systems, Venus and Mars are pretty disappointing planets. However from a purely physical point of view it may be that they are, like Earth, complex equilibrium systems with energy cycles operating through the energy flux of our local star. The reason that the purely physical descriptions are unhelpful for characterizing what makes this planet better than the others in some important respects is that it is the wrong level of organization for explaining what conditions** <473> **are conducive to the flourishing of creatures like us. It is, once again, interest relative. Conceivably a silicon-based life form would find the temperature and atmosphere of Venus congenial, and of Earth execrable. As carbon chauvinists we should feel free to dissent from that judgement**.

### 2ac- Security

**FRAMEWORK—The aff is a normative statement. Vote aff if plan is a good idea, neg if it isn’t.**

**A. Solves their offense –the impact of the K is a reason the aff is bad.**

**B.** **Aff choice – they arbitrarily steal 9 minutes of offense, destroys the aff’s only advantage.**

**c.** Vague alts are a voting issue – skews 2AC offense and creates a form of sandbagging which unfairly privileges the time benefits of the block

#### Alt cant result in plan action- otherwise it moots the 1ac, forces us to debate against ourselves, and kills clash- voter for fairness and education

#### perm do both

#### Permutation: do the alternative – justified because floating PIKs moot the 1AC and constantly shift through the debate making it impossible for the aff to generate offense.

#### Case impacts prove why security logic is good- key to prevent multiple scenarios for extinction- aff is an impact turn to the K. Outweighs- prefer proximate short-term extinction scenarios over their vacuous impact claims.

**Life should be valued as apriori – it precedes the ability to value anything else**

Amien **Kacou. 2008**. WHY EVEN MIND? On The A Priori Value Of “Life”, Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy, Vol 4, No 1-2 (2008) cosmosandhistory.org/index.php/journal/article/view/92/184

Furthermore, that manner of **finding things good** that is in pleasure **can certainly not exist in any world without consciousness (i.e., without “life,”** as we now understand the word)—slight analogies put aside. In fact, we can begin to develop a more sophisticated definition of the concept of “pleasure,” in the broadest possible sense of the word, as follows: it is the common psychological element in all psychological experience of goodness (be it in joy, admiration, or whatever else). In this sense, pleasure can always be pictured to “mediate” all awareness or perception or judgment of goodness: there is pleasure in all consciousness of things good; pleasure is the common element of all conscious satisfaction. In short, it is simply the very experience of liking things, or the liking of experience, in general. In this sense, **pleasure is, not only uniquely characteristic of life but also, the core expression of goodness in life—the most general sign or phenomenon for favorable conscious valuation**, in other words. This does not mean that “good” is absolutely synonymous with “pleasant”—what we value may well go beyond pleasure. (The fact that we value things needs not be reduced to the experience of liking things.) However, what we value beyond pleasure remains a matter of speculation or theory. Moreover, we note that a variety of things that may seem otherwise unrelated are correlated with pleasure—some more strongly than others. In other words, there are many things the experience of which we like. For example: the admiration of others; sex; or rock-paper-scissors. But, again, what they are is irrelevant in an inquiry on a priori value—what gives us pleasure is a matter for empirical investigation. Thus, we can see now that, in general, **something primitively valuable is attainable in living—that is, pleasure itself.** And it seems equally clear that we have a priori logical reason to pay attention to the world in any world where pleasure exists. Moreover, **we can now also articulate a foundation for a security interest in our life: since the good of pleasure can be found in living** (to the extent pleasure remains attainable),[17] **and only in living, therefore, a priori, life ought to be continuously (and indefinitely) pursued at least for the sake of preserving the possibility of finding that good.** However, this platitude about the value that can be found in life turns out to be, at this point, insufficient for our purposes. It seems to amount to very little more than recognizing that our subjective desire for life in and of itself shows that life has some objective value. For what difference is there between saying, “living is unique in benefiting something I value (namely, my pleasure); therefore, I should desire to go on living,” and saying, “I have a unique desire to go on living; therefore I should have a desire to go on living,” whereas the latter proposition immediately seems senseless? In other words, “life gives me pleasure,” says little more than, “I like life.” Thus, we seem to have arrived at the conclusion that **the fact that we already have some (subjective) desire for life shows life to have some (objective) value.** But, if that is the most we can say, then it seems our enterprise of justification was quite superficial, and the subjective/objective distinction was useless—for all we have really done is highlight the correspondence between value and desire. Perhaps, our inquiry should be a bit more complex.

#### Cyberwar is probable- multiple IR theories prove

Junio ‘13

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Two recent articles in the pages of this journal contribute to an¶ important debate about how information technology (IT) inﬂuences¶ international politics.1¶ Thomas Rid and Adam Liff argue that cyber¶ ‘war’ has never happened and probably will not happen. A fundamental¶ problem with these articles is that Rid and Liff do not commit to a¶ theoretical framework regarding the causes of war. Doing so yields an¶ opposite conclusion: international relations theory identiﬁes many¶ mechanisms that may cause violent escalation with cyber weapons.¶ This brief response article explains why cyber war is sufﬁciently¶ probable to merit serious attention from scholars and practitioners,¶ and proposes a theoretical research agenda. First, domestic political¶ factors – such as states’ command and control over cyber operations –¶ must be problematized. The principal-agent approach demonstrates¶ how variation in incentives and preferences may make militaries more¶ likely to favor cyber attack than other kinds of bureaucracies. This¶ matters in societies with poor civilian control over the military. Second,¶ the unique material qualities of IT must be evaluated alongside¶ traditional mechanisms that cause war. For instance, the attribution¶ problem and computational complexity in modeling cyber operations¶ may increase the odds of inadvertent cyber war by causing states to¶ retaliate against the wrong targets or miscalculate the potential costs¶ and gains of attacking.

#### Nietzsche requires that we act to change the world in ways that we find personally life-affirming. For us, that means the aff.

Alenka Zupancic and Friedrich Nietzsche. The Shortest Shadow. 2003. Page 134-136.

To put it differently: the logic of a possible change or break-through in relation to nihilism does not depend upon the power of negation being so radical as to finally negate itself too, thus opening the way for affirmation. To wait for this to happen is, literally, to wait for Nothing. As Gilles Deleuze has pointed out, in order for a force to become active, it is not enough that it goes to the limit of what it can do; it must make what it can do an object of affirmation. In other words, although negation is capable of negating itself, it is not capable of affirming this capacity. The negation that goes to its limit also stays at this limit, is stuck at the limit, and the only affirmation it produces is a *reaction* to its own radicality, to its own capacity to – as Nietzsche puts it – “deny life truly, actively.” The affirmation as reaction to the force of negation is not and cannot be active in the strict sense of the word; it can only take the form of a *tranquilizer* trying to counterbalance the *excitation* involved in the force of the will of negation. The affirmation in which we say “yes” to everything (accepting things as they are, readily welcoming even what we don't like, always being “positive” in life) is an “ass-like” affirmation, characteristic of the “spirit of gravity.” As Nietzsche puts it in the chapter “On the Spirit of Gravity” in *Zarathustra*:

Verily, I also do not like those who consider everything good and this world the best. Such men I call the omni-satisfied. Omni-satisfaction, which knows how to taste everything, that is not the best taste. I honor the recalcitrant choosy tongues and stomachs, which have learned to say “I” and “yes” and “no.” But to chew and digest everything – that is truly the swine's manner. Always to bray Yea-Yuh – that only the ass has learned, and whoever is of his spirit.

This, indeed, is passive nihilism, and Nietzsche's description of it in this passage also helps us to define the ultimate deadlock of nihilism. Nihilism refers to the configuration in which the active force is entirely on the side of negation (but has its limit: it cannot affirm this activity), and affirmation is always *reactive* (or passive). “Passive nihilism” is Nietzsche's name for reactive affirmation. This means that nihilism is not simply a reactive state; it still involves a struggle between active and reactive forces, but a struggle wherein the “active” is strictly on the side of negation, while the only form of affirmation is a reactive one.

This is why one of the major fronts of Nietzsche's philosophy is a fight against the “spirit of gravity”: against affirmation as acceptance (of responsibility), as “shouldering,” taking upon oneself, facing up to whatever comes along. Once again (and as Deleuze has shown), Nietzsche's target here is the conception of affirmation that sees it as a simple function, a function of being or of what is. For Nietzsche, a true affirmation can only be an agent, an “activist of becoming,” so to speak, not a function of being. “To affirm is not to take responsibility for, to take on the burden of what is, but to release, to set free what lives.” This is why a Dionysian “Yes” is a Yes that knows how to say “No,” and can put negation in the service of the force of affirmation. But in order for this to happen, in order for the negation itself to become a mode of affirmation, two affirmations are needed: the affirmation itself has to be redoubled; the affirmation itself needs to be affirmed. Affirmation itself has to become the object of affirmation. This is the Nietzschean theory of double affirmation, a theory that endeavors to mobilize Nothing(ness) or negativity in the form of Nothing(ness) as *interval* or *minimal difference* of the same.

Only the plan affirms life – embracing the struggle against our genetic predisposition towards violence through resisting nuclear war is key

Barash and Lipton, 1985

David P., Professor of Psychology at the University of Washington (Seattle) and Judith Eve, psychiatrist at the Swedish Medical Center in Washington, “The Caveman and the Bomb” p.261-267

Fortunately, whatever genetic imperatives operate in Homo sapiens, they are unlikely to extend directly to nuclear weapons, any more than a tendency for body adornment necessarily leads to a Christian Dior necktie or a New Guinea penis sheath. The general patterns that char­acterize today's nuclear Neanderthal are, in fact, general, nonspecific. They may incline us to a degree of saber rattling that seems likely to trouble the world in one way or another as long as we and the world persist, but these patterns don't require that the saber be nuclear. On this level the nuclear Neanderthal doesn't even have to play "as if": We are called on to behave not as if we had free will regarding the renun­ciation of nuclear weapons and nuclear war, but to act in accord with that free will, which we assuredly have. That is honest empowerment indeed. Teilhard de Chardin wrote about the "Omega point" at which human beings become conscious of their own evolution and, hence, of them­selves. He called for a recognition of unity and connectedness, with our speciesborn on this planet and spread over its entire surface, coming gradually to form around its earthly matrix a single, major organic unity, enclosed upon itself; a single, hypercomplex, hyperconcentrated, hyperconscious arch-molecule, coextensive with the heavenly body on which it is born.9 In overcoming the Neanderthal mentality we could finally become hu­man, or perhaps even more than this, at last able to answer affirmatively the question: Is there intelligent life on earth? As poet and novelist Nikos Kazantzakis pleaded, "Let us unite, let us hold each other tightly, let us merge our hearts, let us create for Earth a brain and a heart, let us give a human meaning to the superhuman struggle."'° Something has spoken to me in the night, burning the tapers of the waning year; something has spoken in the night, and told me I shall die, I know not where. Saying: "To lose the earth you know, for greater knowing; to lose the life you have, for greater life; to leave the friends you loved, for greater loving; to find a land more kind than home, more large than earth—Whereupon the pillars of this earth are founded, toward which the conscience of the world is tending—a wind is rising and the rivers flow." THOMAS WOLFE 11 For the existentialists the essence of humanity is in saying no—no to injustice, to murder, to the absurd and dehumanizing universe itself But the ultimate existential tragedy is that in the long run, saying no cannot succeed. Each of us will eventually die, and this looming inevitability makes our lives absurd. By our very aliveness we are therefore embarked on a hopeless campaign, which may yield some victories, but only tem­porary ones. Like a cosmic poker game, we are playing against the house, but in this game the house never loses; even if we are briefly ahead, we cannot cash in our chips and go home winners. There is no other place to go. At the close of The Plague, Albert Camus lets us inside the thoughts of Dr. Rieux, who had courageously battled a typhoid epidemic in a North African city. Just as the plague has finally been overcome, and the survivors were celebrating in the streets, Dr. Rieux understood that the tale he had to tell could not be one of a final victory. It could be only the record of what had had to be done, and what assuredly would have to be done again in the never-ending fight against terror and its relentless onslaughts, despite their personal afflictions, by all who, while unable to be saints but refusing to bow down to pestilences, strive their utmost to be healers. And, indeed, as he listened to the cries of joy rising from the town, Rieux remembered that such joy is always imperiled. He knew what those jubilant crowds did not know but could have learned from books: that the plague bacillus never dies or disappears for good; that it can lie dormant for years and years in furniture and linen-chests; that it bides its time in bedrooms, cellars, trunks, and bookshelves; and that perhaps the day would come when, for the bane and the enlightening of men, it would rouse up its rats again and send them forth to die in a happy city.12 But effectiveness per se is not the issue. The rats may come again, and with them the plague, just as every person now alive must some day die. The real question—for would-be post-Neanderthals no less than for existential thinkers—concerns the obligation of human beings in the face of such a world. "In everlasting terms—those of eternity," wrote Thomas Wolfe, "there is no greater wisdom than the wisdom of Ecclesiastes, no acceptance finally so true as the stern fatalism of the rock. Man was born to live, to suffer, and to die, and what befalls him is a tragic lot. There is no denying this in the final end." Nonetheless, he concludes, we must "deny it all along the way." Although admitting the "stern lesson of acceptance," which calls for acknowledging the "tragic under-weft of life into which man is born, through which he must live, out of which he must die," Wolfe described his intention, "having accepted it, to try to do what was before me, what I could do, with all my might."13 Camus went farther. According to Greek mythology, Sisyphus had been condemned to spend eternity rolling an enormous rock up a steep hill; when the rock neared the top, it would roll back down, and Sisyphus would have to start again. In "The Myth of Sisyphus," Sisyphus serves not only as a metaphor for humanity but, as Camus sees it, as a model as well. His struggle is not only self-defining, but also ennobling. More­over, Camus concludes that Sisyphus is happy. There are some important differences between Sisyphus and Dr. Rieux, and the post-Neanderthal. For one thing, Dr. Rieux could afford to lose many battles and even many patients, just as Sisyphus can tolerate the constant victory of gravity. Sisyphus, after all, is crushed neither mentally nor literally by his stone; no matter how many people die from a plague, some survive. Dr. Rieux will never eradicate the plague; his glory comes from his fighting on in the face of that knowledge. Sisyphus will never succeed in his labor; his happiness comes from his self-defi­nition, knowing his futility. Unlike them, however, we are not doomed to failure. Before beginning their combat the Roman gladiators used to face the spectators in the Coliseum and announce, "We who are about to die salute you." Two thousand years later the poet W. H. Auden updated their credo: "We who are about to die demand a miracle." Like the gladiators, Auden was concerned about the end of his life, what Kurt Vonnegut calls "plain old death." And to overcome plain old personal death, nothing less than a bona fide miracle in the theological sense will do. We can say no to personal death and an absurd universe all we like, but in the end, like Rieux and Sisyphus, we are bound to lose. The good news, however, is that the other kind of death—the mass, meaningless annihilation that would come with nuclear war—is not inevitable. Unlike the overturning of personal death, no divine intervention is required. Unlike the eruption of a volcano or the brewing of a hurricane, nuclear war is a man-made problem, with man- and woman-made solutions. Unlike Auden and the gladiators, we have a precious and unique op­portunity: We can say no to our Neanderthal mentality, to our genes. We are the only creatures on earth who can do this. We have this op­portunity because our genes whisper to us, they do not shout. They can be stubborn, but they can be persuaded, cajoled, bribed, or, if necessary, simply overruled and strong-armed into submission. Dr. Rieux learned in a time of pestilence that "there are more things to admire in men than to despise." Similarly, the whole can be greater than the sum of its parts, if we choose to be. We can be greater than the sum of our genes. If that is our decision, evolution can't do a thing about it. Making that decision is the supreme test of our humanity, our greatest challenge and our most sublime opportunity. Nonetheless, war touches a deep chord in most human beings, and the decision to say no will not be an easy one. Sigmund Freud com­mented that prohibitions and taboos by their very existence strongly suggest a preexisting desire to perform the prohibited act, otherwise there would be no need for the prohibition: "What no human soul desires, there is no need to prohibit; it is automatically excluded. The very em­phasis of the commandment Thou Shalt Not Kill makes it certain that we spring from an endless ancestry of murderers, with whom the lust for killing was in the blood, as possibly it is to this day with ourselves." He also emphasized that wars occur because nations, like individuals, "still obey their immediate passions far more readily than their inter­ests,"14 a succinct summary of the plight of today's Neanderthal. Prior to World War I especially, the making of war was generally considered a laudable activity. Admiration and often adulation flowed to such men as Alexander, Achilles, Caesar, Charlemagne, Frederick the Great, Napoleon, and Robert E. Lee. The first masterpiece of Western literature (Homer's Iliad) and the first histories (Herodotus' account of the Persian Wars, and Thucydides' study of the Peloponnesian War) focused on war. Western culture is by no means unique in its glorification of war, as witness the cultures of ancient Africa, Mexico, and Fiji. Ac­cordingly, "the war against war," as William James pointed out, "is going to be no holiday excursion or camping party."15 The fact is that war and sanctified violence have had a powerful and persistent appeal cross‑culturally, although not in all cultures, and throughout human history. Thus, as James said, war has come to be seen as "preserving our ideals of hardihood," a supreme test of human effectiveness, the most de­manding and, hence, for many people, the most rewarding activity of which they are capable. It is revealing that whereas "war" exists in the plural, "peace" is conceived only in the singular. (A similar pattern obtains in other lan­guages as well.) We have the War of the Roses, the Napoleonic wars, the Maori wars, World Wars I and II, and so on, but only one peace, despite the fact that there must have been as many different kinds of peace as different kinds of wars. As with the Eskimos, who are said to have eleven words for what in English we simply call "snow," or the Bedouin, who have more than one hundred words for "camel," human beings distin­guish carefully among whatever is important to them. For countless generations the human Neanderthal has been obsessed with war, and indifferent to peace, even slightly bored with it. When and if peace becomes as appealing as war, perhaps then we shall focus on it, identi­fying its varieties and nuances. Words signifying normalcy, like "peace," "health," and "sanity," have lagged behind their pathological counter­parts; thus, we know more about diseases than about wellness. Yet, as the holistic health movements are demonstrating, in order to practice preventive medicine, it is necessary to define, describe, and validate the state of wellness before one can act effectively to preserve it. Much of war's appeal, according to William James, comes from its aura of extremis, embodying the most dangerous and strenuous of human struggles, and hence becoming strangely ennobling despite (or in part, because of) its extraordinary horror. The contemplation of war, the prep­aration for war, and in many cases even the fighting of war is something that most Neanderthals find compelling, exciting, and even fun. Accord­ing to James, this gut-level attraction "cannot be met effectively by mere counter-insistency on war's expensiveness and horror. The horror makes the thrill; and when the question is of getting the extremist and supremist out of human nature, talk of expense sounds ignominious." He therefore proposed a "substitute for war's disciplinary function"—his now-famous Moral Equivalent of War, suggesting a peacetime conscription which would not so much overcome the Neanderthal mentality as bypass it with a bit of social ju jitsu, sublimating dangerous human urges into constructive activity.16 In a sense, the Peace Corps was a practical example of James's con­ception; but a real peace corps can be fashioned only when peacemaking becomes recognized as an acceptable and active verb, and when peace takes its rightful place at our own core. Ironically, in a world society that is increasingly intolerant of personal violence, that forbids murder, assault, even the threat of physical abuse, and in which fistfights and even bullying are grossly out of place, in diplomatic parlors, war and the threat of war remain acceptable. Rather than finding a moral equivalent of war, we have collectively made war itself into a morally acceptable form of violence such that societies can contemplate and plan actions that would be unacceptable if undertaken by its individual members. Those old Neanderthal cravings are still alive and well, running just beneath the surface, needing only the slightest provocation to erupt, even in the most sophisticated and presumably civilized societies. Just let some Americans be taken hostage in Iran, or a Korean airliner violate Soviet airspace, and suddenly the cavemen are at it again and the old predictable tribal bellowing resumes. Homo, called sapiens, is all but drowned in an atavistic avalanche of anger, distrust, and intolerance. The structures of peace, built up with such care and needing such nurturance, seem woefully delicate and fragile before the crude, easily evoked Neanderthal onslaught. But here we note Theodore Roethke's observation, "In a dark time, the eye begins to see." Perhaps by thinking, feeling, and believing, we can see through our Neanderthal mentality, and forge a new awareness where we confront our limitations and our strengths, able to bend, but nonetheless to resist and not to break. A major impediment to this awareness has been our ignorance that the Neanderthal mentality even exists. There is also the double irony of pessimism—the assumption that the Neanderthal mentality, under the alias of "human nature," is un­changeable. Insofar as it succeeds, this assumption is a triumph for the Neanderthal mentality and, moreover, a self-fulfilling prophecy. It is also seductive; it leaves each of us free to go ahead with his or her own little life, all the while treading on unstable slopes, heedless of the danger. "The challenge to humans in our time is whether they can become aroused not just over small but over larger dangers," observed Norman Cousins. "Whether they can perceive universal problems as well as per­sonal ones, whether they can become as concerned over their survival as a species as they are over their jobs."" This arousal is growing, in part because the overriding universal problem is increasingly perceived as an intensely personal one, because it threatens the deepest personal values of every human being, and also because it demands a committed personal response. Perhaps we shall have the final laugh after all, and perhaps the laugh will be on evolution. In giving so much autonomy to the bodies they create, the genes of Homo sapiens have unwittingly sewn the seeds of their own overthrow (not the seeds of their destruction, for that would mean our own demise as well). It is precisely—and only—by overthrowing our genes, by taking the unprecedented step and saying no to their dangerous and insistent whisperings, that we can preserve them, along with everything else. By saying no to that aspect of our genes, we say yes to life, to love, and to hope, and even to the continuation of those troublesome genes themselves. There is no better time. "At this moment," wrote Albert Camus, when each of us must fit an arrow to his bow and enter the lists anew, to reconquer, within history and in spite of it, that which he owns already, the thin yield of his fields, the brief love of this earth, at this moment when at last a man is born, it is time to forsake our age and its adolescent furies. The bow bends; the wood complains. At the moment of supreme tension, there will leap into flight an unswerving arrow, a shaft that is inflexible and free.18 Maybe in the long run we shall all laugh together, as through our negation of the Neanderthal mentality we arrive at a new affirmation, a higher level of life, its most exalted accomplishment. This will be the point at which, while unable to be saints but refusing to bow down to universal murder, we resolve to overcome the Neanderthal mentality and thereby transcend, if not overcome, our biology itself.

Even though the universe probably will not accept our attempts at control, there is beauty in the struggle to shape our small part of it

Dienstag 4

Joshua Foa, Associate Professor of Politics at the University of Virginia. Tragedy, Pessimism, Nietzsche. New Literary History 34:1 Project Muse

Tragic art is the organization of a small portion of an otherwise meaningless world that gives purpose to an individual existence (WP 585). It is the attempt to impose a temporary form on the inevitable transformation of the world. Since the world must acquire some particular forms in its metamorphoses, art is "repeating in miniature, as it were, the tendency of the whole" (WP 617)-only now by an effort of will. Thus, art is not really an attempt to fight the pattern of existence, but rather to shape that pattern into something recognizable, "to realize in oneself the eternal joy of becoming-that joy which also encompasses joy in destruction" (TI 110). When art assumes this shape, it becomes "the great seduction to life, the great stimulant to life" (WP 853). This is not to say, however, that such art must be "uplifting" in the conventional sense. Since joy in destruction may be a stimulant to life, even depictions of the most miserable things may be included: "The things they display are ugly: but that they display them comes from their pleasure in the ugly . . . How liberating is Dostoevsky!" (WP 821). If we can understand why an artist like Dostoyevsky, who knows that art is devoid of metaphysical value, would still want to write, then we can understand why Nietzsche thinks pessimism can result in a creative pathos. Similarly, if we can see how tragedy, the "repetition in miniature" of worldly chaos, can represent the liberating "joy of becoming," then we can get a sense for the political productivity of a pessimistic ethic. The normal situation of an architect, I think, helps us to get some purchase on this: any sane architect must know that no building lasts forever. Built in opposition to nature but using the unstable materials of nature (as, to some extent, every human structure must be), every edifice will be attacked by nature (by wind, by water, by gravity, and so forth) the moment it is completed. Whatever the purpose for which it is initially designed, that purpose will someday be superseded. However beautiful it may seem when erected, it will someday, to another set of eyes, appear ugly. Yet, knowing all this, architects pursue their craft. Knowing that the universe will ultimately not tolerate their work, they continue to organize a small portion of that same universe for local purposes. The lack of an objective or metaphysical meaning for the work is no obstacle; indeed, architects often think of the generation of locally meaningful environments out of natural waste to be a particular goal, a spur to activity. Dionysian pessimism, then, is an ethos of a similar kind, an art of living. In recommending it as a life-practice, Nietzsche is, in some sense, thereby recommending the practice of life. But since, as he was fond of pointing out, there is really no perspective from which to view life as a whole (whether to deny or affirm it), such an assent can only be a kind of gamble or risk-taking. It is an affirmation in the dark, an approval given in ignorance. Above all, in keeping with the emphasis on the centrality of temporal experience, it is a decision to welcome the unknown future and accept the unseen past, rather than clinging to a familiar present. While other pessimisms (such as Schopenhauer's) also conclude that the universe has no order and human history no progress, Dionysian pessimism is the one that can find something to like about this situation: "My new way to 'yes.' My new version of pessimism as a voluntary quest for fearful and questionable aspects of beings. . . . A pessimist such as that could in that way lead to a Dionysian yes-saying to the world as it is: as a wish for its absolute return and eternity: with which a new ideal of philosophy and sensibility would be given" (KGW 8.2.121).

#### Threat inflation thesis is wrong

Ravenal ‘9

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Quite expectedly, the more doctrinaire of the non-interventionists take pains to deny any straightforward, and therefore legitimate, security motive in American foreign and military policy. In fact, this denial leads to a more sweeping rejection of any recognizably rational basis for American foreign policy, and, even, sometimes (among the more theoretical of the non-interventionists), a preference for non-rational accounts, or “models,” of virtually any nation’s foreign policy-making.4 One could call this tendency among anti-imperialists “motive displacement.” More specifically, in the cases under review here, one notes a receptivity to any reworking of history, and any current analysis of geopolitics, that denigrates “the threat”; and, along with this, a positing of “imperialism” (the almost self-referential and primitive impulse) as a sufficient explanation for the often strenuous and risky actions of great powers such as the United States. Thus, not only is “empire” taken to be a sufficient and, in some cases, a necessary condition in bringing about foreign “threats”; but, by minimizing the extent and seriousness of these threats, the anti-imperialists put themselves into the position of lacking a rational explanation for the derivation of the (pointless at best, counter-productive at worst) policies that they designate as imperialistic. A pungent example of this threat denigration and motive displacement is Eland’s account of American intervention in the Korean and Vietnam wars:¶ After North Korea invaded, the Truman administration intervened merely for the purpose of a demonstration to friends and foes alike. Likewise, according to eminent cold war historians, the United States did not inter- vene in Vietnam because it feared communism, which was fragmented, or the Soviet Union, which wanted détente with the West, or China, which was weak, but because it did not want to appear timid to the world. The behavior of the United States in both Korea and Vietnam is typical of imperial powers, which are always concerned about their reputation, pres- tige, and perceived resolve. (Eland 2004, 64)¶ Of course, the motive of “reputation,” to the extent that it exists in any particular instance, is a part of the complex of motives that characterize a great power that is drawn toward the role of hegemon (not the same thing as “empire”). Reputation is also a component of the power projec- tion that is designed to serve the interest of national security. Rummaging through the concomitants of “imperialism,” Eland (2004, 65) discovers the thesis of “threat inflation” (in this case, virtual threat invention): Obviously, much higher spending for the military, homeland security, and foreign aid are required for a policy of global intervention than for a policy of merely defending the republic. For example, after the cold war, the security bureaucracies began looking for new enemies to justify keeping defense and intelligence budgets high. Similarly, Eland (ibid., 183), in a section entitled “Imperial Wars Spike Corporate Welfare,” attributes a large portion of the U.S. defense budget—particularly the procurement of major weapons systems, such as “Virginia-class submarines . . . aircraft carriers . . . F-22 fighters . . . [and] Osprey tilt-rotor transport aircraft”—not to the systemically derived requirement for certain kinds of military capabilities, but, rather, to the imperatives of corporate pork. He opines that such weapons have no stra- tegic or operational justification; that “the American empire, militarily more dominant than any empire in world history, can fight brushfire wars against terrorists and their ‘rogue’ state sponsors without those gold- plated white elephants.”¶ The underlying notion of “the security bureaucracies . . . looking for new enemies” is a threadbare concept that has somehow taken hold across the political spectrum, from the radical left (viz. Michael Klare [1981], who refers to a “threat bank”), to the liberal center (viz. Robert H. Johnson [1997], who dismisses most alleged “threats” as “improbable dangers”), to libertarians (viz. Ted Galen Carpenter [1992], Vice President for Foreign and Defense Policy of the Cato Institute, who wrote a book entitled A Search for Enemies). What is missing from most analysts’ claims of “threat inflation,” however, is a convincing theory of why, say, the American government significantly (not merely in excusable rhetoric) might magnify and even invent threats (and, more seriously, act on such inflated threat estimates). In a few places, Eland (2004, 185) suggests that such behavior might stem from military or national security bureaucrats’ attempts to enhance their personal status and organizational budgets, or even from the influence and dominance of “the military-industrial complex”; viz.: “Maintaining the empire and retaliating for the blowback from that empire keeps what President Eisenhower called the military-industrial complex fat and happy.” Or, in the same section:¶ In the nation’s capital, vested interests, such as the law enforcement bureaucracies . . . routinely take advantage of “crises”to satisfy parochial desires. Similarly, many corporations use crises to get pet projects— a.k.a. pork—funded by the government. And national security crises, because of people’s fears, are especially ripe opportunities to grab largesse. (Ibid., 182)¶ Thus, “bureaucratic-politics” theory, which once made several reputa- tions (such as those of Richard Neustadt, Morton Halperin, and Graham Allison) in defense-intellectual circles, and spawned an entire sub-industry within the field of international relations,5 is put into the service of dismissing putative security threats as imaginary. So, too, can a surprisingly cognate theory, “public choice,”6 which can be considered the right-wing analog of the “bureaucratic-politics” model, and is a preferred interpretation of governmental decision- making among libertarian observers. As Eland (2004, 203) summarizes:¶ Public-choice theory argues [that] the government itself can develop sepa- rate interests from its citizens. The government reflects the interests of powerful pressure groups and the interests of the bureaucracies and the bureaucrats in them. Although this problem occurs in both foreign and domestic policy, it may be more severe in foreign policy because citizens pay less attention to policies that affect them less directly.¶ There is, in this statement of public-choice theory, a certain ambiguity, and a certain degree of contradiction: Bureaucrats are supposedly, at the same time, subservient to societal interest groups and autonomous from society in general.¶ This journal has pioneered the argument that state autonomy is a likely consequence of the public’s ignorance of most areas of state activity (e.g., Somin 1998; DeCanio 2000a, 2000b, 2006, 2007; Ravenal 2000a). But state autonomy does not necessarily mean that bureaucrats substitute their own interests for those of what could be called the “national society” that they ostensibly serve. I have argued (Ravenal 2000a) that, precisely because of the public-ignorance and elite-expertise factors, and especially because the opportunities—at least for bureaucrats (a few notable post-government lobbyist cases nonwithstanding)—for lucrative self-dealing are stringently fewer in the defense and diplomatic areas of government than they are in some of the contract-dispensing and more under-the-radar-screen agencies of government, the “public-choice” imputation of self-dealing, rather than working toward the national interest (which, however may not be synonymous with the interests, perceived or expressed, of citizens!) is less likely to hold. In short, state autonomy is likely to mean, in the derivation of foreign policy, that “state elites” are using rational judgment, in insulation from self-promoting interest groups—about what strategies, forces, and weapons are required for national defense.¶ Ironically, “public choice”—not even a species of economics, but rather a kind of political interpretation—is not even about “public” choice, since, like the bureaucratic-politics model, it repudiates the very notion that bureaucrats make truly “public” choices; rather, they are held, axiomatically, to exhibit “rent-seeking” behavior, wherein they abuse their public positions in order to amass private gains, or at least to build personal empires within their ostensibly official niches. Such sub- rational models actually explain very little of what they purport to observe. Of course, there is some truth in them, regarding the “behavior” of some people, at some times, in some circumstances, under some conditions of incentive and motivation. But the factors that they posit operate mostly as constraints on the otherwise rational optimization of objectives that, if for no other reason than the playing out of official roles, transcends merely personal or parochial imperatives.¶ My treatment of “role” differs from that of the bureaucratic-politics theorists, whose model of the derivation of foreign policy depends heavily, and acknowledgedly, on a narrow and specific identification of the role- playing of organizationally situated individuals in a partly conflictual “pulling and hauling” process that “results in” some policy outcome. Even here, bureaucratic-politics theorists Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow (1999, 311) allow that “some players are not able to articulate [sic] the governmental politics game because their conception of their job does not legitimate such activity.” This is a crucial admission, and one that points— empirically—to the need for a broader and generic treatment of role.¶ Roles (all theorists state) give rise to “expectations” of performance. My point is that virtually every governmental role, and especially national-security roles, and particularly the roles of the uniformed mili- tary, embody expectations of devotion to the “national interest”; rational- ity in the derivation of policy at every functional level; and objectivity in the treatment of parameters, especially external parameters such as “threats” and the power and capabilities of other nations.¶ Sub-rational models (such as “public choice”) fail to take into account even a partial dedication to the “national” interest (or even the possibility that the national interest may be honestly misconceived in more paro- chial terms). In contrast, an official’s role connects the individual to the (state-level) process, and moderates the (perhaps otherwise) self-seeking impulses of the individual. Role-derived behavior tends to be formalized and codified; relatively transparent and at least peer-reviewed, so as to be consistent with expectations; surviving the particular individual and trans- mitted to successors and ancillaries; measured against a standard and thus corrigible; defined in terms of the performed function and therefore derived from the state function; and uncorrrupt, because personal cheating and even egregious aggrandizement are conspicuously discouraged.¶ My own direct observation suggests that defense decision-makers attempt to “frame” the structure of the problems that they try to solve on the basis of the most accurate intelligence. They make it their business to know where the threats come from. Thus, threats are not “socially constructed” (even though, of course, some values are).¶ A major reason for the rationality, and the objectivity, of the process is that much security planning is done, not in vaguely undefined circum- stances that offer scope for idiosyncratic, subjective behavior, but rather in structured and reviewed organizational frameworks. Non-rationalities (which are bad for understanding and prediction) tend to get filtered out. People are fired for presenting skewed analysis and for making bad predictions. This is because something important is riding on the causal analysis and the contingent prediction. For these reasons, “public choice” does not have the “feel” of reality to many critics who have participated in the structure of defense decision-making. In that structure, obvious, and even not-so-obvious, “rent-seeking” would not only be shameful; it would present a severe risk of career termination. And, as mentioned, the defense bureaucracy is hardly a productive place for truly talented rent-seekers to operate, compared to opportunities for personal profit in the commercial world. A bureaucrat’s very self-placement in these reaches of government testi- fies either to a sincere commitment to the national interest or to a lack of sufficient imagination to exploit opportunities for personal profit.

#### Ignoring the threat causes panic – worse than fear, stops solvency, turns their state power arguments

**Sandman and Lanard, 2003**

Peter M. PhD in Communications and Professor at Rutgers specializing in crisis communication; Jody, Psychiatrist, 28 April, “Fear Is Spreading Faster than SARS — And So It Should!”

China is universally condemned for covering up SARS and putting the world at risk. **Covering up an epidemic is about as bad a communication strategy as we can imagine**. Among its outcomes: **China actually does face a panic problem, as its people confront not just a raging epidemic but a government that lies to them about it. The West’s “soft cover-up” is much gentler and less dishonest** — a cover-up of over-reassurance and minimization rather than of lies. **But if SARS does keep getting worse in the West**, as it has in China, **the soft cover-up will also fail ... and may also provoke panic. Public anxiety can lead to genuine panic or to astonishing resilience**. The paradox is that efforts **to squelch the anxiety** (“allay the public’s fear” is the usual phrase) **can actually induce the panic it aims to prevent. Resilience is likelier when authorities ally with the anxiety, harness it,** and steer it instead of trying to prevent it. Of course even superb handling of the public’s fears may not prevent panic if the epidemic gets bad enough. There has often been some panic during the great epidemics of the past. But **panic will be likelier and more widespread if the authorities have been minimizing the risk than if they have been acknowledging it candidly** and compassionately.

Rejecting ethical norms means the will-to-power reigns supreme – guarantees extinction

Fasching 1993 (Darrell J., Professor of Religious Studies at University of South Florida, The Ethical Challenge of Auschwitz and Hiroshima, Pp. 28-29)

Our modern technological civilization offers us seemingly infi­nite utopian opportunities to recreate ourselves (e.g., genetic engi­neering, behavioral engineering) and our societies (social engineer­ing) and our world (chemical engineering, atomic engineering). But having transcended all limits and all norms, **we seem bereft of a** normative **vision to govern** the use of **our utopian techniques. This normlessness threatens us with demonic self-destruction.** It is this dark side of technical civilization that was **revealed to us** not only **at Auschwitz and** but also at **Hiroshima.** Auschwitz represents a severe challenge to the religious traditions of the West: to Christians, because of the complicity of Christian‑ity in the anti-Judaic path that led to Auschwitz renders its theological categories ethically suspect; to Jews, because their victim status presses faith in the God of history and in humanity to the breaking  
point. But the path to Auschwitz, and from Auschwitz to Hiroshima, represents a challenge, equally severe, for the scientific and technical, secular culture of the Enlightenment. We do not seem to have fared any better under a secular ethic than we did under a religious one. Indeed we have fared worse. **Genocide** it seems **is a unique product of the modern secular world and its technically competent barbarians.** Auschwitz stands for a demonic period in modern Western civi‑lization in which the religious, political and technological develop‑ments converged to create a society whose primary purpose was the most efficient organization of that entire society for the purpose of exterminating all persons who were regarded as aliens and strangers—especially the Jews. **The Nazi vision** of the pure Aryan society **repre‑sents a utopian vision of demonic proportions**—a vision that inspired an apocalyptic revolutionary program of genocide. **It reveals at once both a time of "The Death of God" in the Nietzschean sense and yet the resurgence of religion**, that is, **a demonic religiosity that creates a new public order in which all pluralism is eliminated** from the public square and in which virtually nothing is sacred—not even human life. **The period of the Holocaust stands as prophetic warning to a technological civilization that has no other norm than the will to power.** If Auschwitz embodies the demonic use of technology against targeted populations to commit genocide, Hiroshima and Nagasaki represent the last such use of technology. For with the coming of Nuclear warfare, technology has outstripped human intentionality so that if the bomb is ever used again, **genocide will be transformed into collective** suicide or **omnicide—the destruction of all life.** Having ene­mies is a luxury no community on the face of the earth can any longer afford. If there is a next time, it will not matter who is right and who is wrong, we shall all perish in the flames. Auschwitz and Hiroshima suggest that the millennium which brought us the utopian age of progress threatens to bring itself to an abrupt apocalyptic conclusion. The age of the bomb seems to have shattered and restructured the millennial myth. No longer can we imagine that apocalypse will be followed by utopia. The myth of unfolding stages seems to have broken apart into an absolute Either-Or: either Apocalypse or Utopia. Not wishing to face the terror of the first option we enthusiastically (although uneasily) embrace the second. Through a somewhat forced utopian euphoria we try to repress the prophetic warnings of Ausch­witz and Hiroshima which remind us that a normless world will inevitably end in apocalyptic self-destruction.

**The alt results in more securitization and intervention**

Tara **McCormack, 2010**, is Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Leicester and has a PhD in International Relations from the University of Westminster. 2010, (Critique, Security and Power: The political limits to emancipatory approaches, page 127-129)

The following section will briefly raise some questions about the rejection of the old security framework as it has been taken up by the most powerful institutions and states. Here we can begin to see the political limits to critical and emancipatory frameworks. In an international system which is marked by great power inequalities between states, the **rejection of the** old narrow national interest-based **security framework** by major international institutions, and the adoption of ostensibly emancipatory policies and policy rhetoric, **has the consequence of problematising weak or unstable states and allowing international institutions or major states a more interventionary role, yet without establishing mechanisms by which the citizens of states being intervened in might have any control over the agents or agencies of their emancipation**. Whatever the problems associated with the pluralist security framework **there were at least formal and clear demarcations. This has the consequence of entrenching international power inequalities and allowing for a shift towards a hierarchical international order in which the citizens in weak or unstable states may arguably have even less freedom or power than before**. Radical critics of contemporary security policies, such as human security and humanitarian intervention, argue that we see an assertion of Western power and the creation of liberal subjectivities in the developing world. For example, see Mark Duffield’s important and insightful contribution to the ongoing debates about contemporary international security and development. Duffield attempts to provide a coherent empirical engagement with, and theoretical explanation of, these shifts. Whilst these shifts, away from a focus on state security, and the so-called merging of security and development are often portrayed as positive and progressive shifts that have come about because of the end of the Cold War, Duffield argues convincingly that these shifts are highly problematic and unprogressive. For example, the rejection of sovereignty as formal international equality and a presumption of nonintervention has eroded the division between the international and domestic spheres and led to an international environment in which Western NGOs and powerful states have a major role in the governance of third world states. Whilst for supporters of humanitarian intervention this is a good development, Duffield points out the depoliticising implications, drawing on examples in Mozambique and Afghanistan. Duffield also draws out the problems of the retreat from modernisation that is represented by sustainable development. The Western world has moved away from the development policies of the Cold War, which aimed to develop third world states industrially. Duffield describes this in terms of a new division of human life into uninsured and insured life. Whilst we in the West are ‘insured’ – that is we no longer have to be entirely self-reliant, we have welfare systems, a modern division of labour and so on – sustainable development aims to teach populations in poor states how to survive in the absence of any of this. **Third world populations must be taught to be self-reliant, they will remain uninsured. Self-reliance of course means the condemnation of millions to a barbarous life of inhuman bare survival.** Ironically, although sustainable development is celebrated by many on the left today, by leaving people to fend for themselves rather than developing a society wide system which can support people, sustainable development actually leads to a less human and humane system than that developed in modern capitalist states. Duffield also describes how many of these problematic shifts are embodied in the contemporary concept of human security. For Duffield, we can understand these shifts in terms of Foucauldian biopolitical framework, which can be understood as a regulatory power that seeks to support life through intervening in the biological, social and economic processes that constitute a human population (2007: 16). Sustainable development and human security are for Duffield technologies of security which aim to *create* self-managing and self-reliant subjectivities in the third world, which can then survive in a situation of serious underdevelopment (or being uninsured as Duffield terms it) without causing security problems for the developed world. For Duffield this is all driven by a neoliberal project which seeks to control and manage uninsured populations globally. Radical critic Costas Douzinas (2007) also criticises new forms of cosmopolitanism such as human rights and interventions for human rights as a triumph of American hegemony. Whilst we are in agreement with critics such as Douzinas and Duffield that **these new security frameworks cannot be empowering, and ultimately lead to more power for powerful states,** we need to understand why these frameworks have the effect that they do. We can understand that these frameworks have political limitations without having to look for a specific plan on the part of current powerful states. **In new security frameworks such as human security we can see the political limits of the framework proposed by critical and emancipatory theoretical approaches**.

#### Privileging ontology and epistemology guarantees policy failure because of theoretical reductionism, and isn’t relevant to the truth value of our arguments.

**Owen 2** (university of Southampton, David Owen, Reader of Political Theory at the Univ. of Southampton, Millennium Vol 31 No 3 2002 p. 655-7)

Commenting on the ‘philosophical turn’ in IR, Wæver remarks that ‘[a] frenzy for words like “epistemology” and “ontology” often signals this philosophical turn’, although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn. The first danger with the philosophical turn is that it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology over explanatory and/or interpretive power as if the latter two were merely a simple function of the former. But while the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is not wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, wholly dependent on these philosophical commitments. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness—but this does not undermine the point that, for a certain class of problems, rational choice theory may provide the best account available to us. In other words, while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it is not the only or even necessarily the most important kind. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that because prioritisation of ontology and epistemology promotes theory-construction from philosophical first principles, it cultivates a theory-driven rather than problem-driven approach to IR. Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action, event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, ‘theory-driven work is part of a reductionist program’ in that it ‘dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory’.5 The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since ‘whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for social-scientific inquiry, not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry’.6 Moreover, this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of empirical validity. The third danger is that the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR—what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) ‘the Highlander view’—namely, an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because the turn to, and prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things right, namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so a potentially vicious circle arises.

#### Risk framing motivates new social movements and re-democratizes politics

**Borraz, ‘7** [Olivier Borraz, Centre de Sociologie des Organisations, Sciences Po-CNRS, Paris, Risk and Public Problems, Journal of Risk Research Vol. 10, No. 7, 941–957, October 2007, p. 951]

**These studies** seem to **suggest** that **risk is a way of framing a public problem in such a way as to politicize the search for solutions. This politicization entails**, in particular, **a widening of** the range of **stakeholders, a reference to broader political issues** and debates, **the search for new decision- making processes** (either **in terms of democratization**, or renewed scientific expertise), and the explicit mobilization of non-scientific arguments in these processes. But if this is the case, then it could also be true that risk is simply one way of framing public problems. Studies in the 1990s, in particular, showed that a whole range of social problems (e.g., poverty, housing, unemployment) had been reframed as health issues, with the result that their management was transferred from social workers to health professionals, and in the process was described in neutral, depoliticized terms (Fassin, 1998). **Studies of risk**, on the contrary, seem to **suggest that similar social problems could well be re-politicized**, i.e., **taken up by new social movements**, producing and using alternative scientific data, calling for more deliberative decision-making procedures, and clearly intended to promote change in the manner in which the state protects the population against various risks (health and environment, but also social and economic). In other words, **framing public problems as risks could afford an opportunity for a transformation in the political debate**, from more traditional cleavages around social and economic issues, to rifts stemming from antagonistic views of science, democracy and the world order.

#### Lack of empirical ground isn’t sufficient reason to reject the aff- the 1ac contributes to a better understanding of cyber war even without data

**Liff ‘12**

[Adam P. Liff, Doctoral Candidate, Department of Politics,¶ Princeton University, USA. “Cyberwar: A New ‘Absolute Weapon’? The¶ Proliferation of Cyberwarfare Capabilities and Interstate War,” Journal of Strategic¶ Studies, 35:3, 401-428. ETB]

Theorizing about a kind of warfare that has not occurred necessitates¶ a major caveat: the chief contribution of this article is theoretical and its¶ conclusions should be treated as preliminary. It does not – and cannot –¶ provide empirical tests.5¶ It suggests and examines several hypotheses in¶ order to try to make what we know more intelligible and challenge¶ some of the more extreme claims about cyberwarfare. While the author¶ believes that the logic underpinning his analysis is sound, this article is¶ merely a ﬁrst cut at a complex and evolving issue. As manifest in the¶ major contributions to our understanding of nuclear weapons and¶ strategy by Brodie and his contemporaries a paucity of data is not a¶ sound rationale for neglecting a topic with possible major implications¶ for national security. The hope is that this article will serve as a¶ foundation for further scholarly work on the implications of the¶ proliferation of cyberwarfare capabilities for interactions between¶ states.

[continues in footnote]

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The data that would be necessary for an empirical study either do not exist or are¶ highly classiﬁed. Governments, militaries, and private corporations have strong¶ incentives not to reveal information about attacks. Furthermore, as will become clear¶ in the ‘deﬁning cyberwarfare’ section below, there is no example of an event in the real¶ world that can indisputably be cited as an occurrence of cyberwarfare.

**Problem-solution impact is backwards---acting with a flawed epistemology allows us to change that epistemology.**

**Harris 7** (Graham, Adjunct Prf. @ Centre for Environment University of Tasmania, Seeking Sustainability in an age of complexity p. 9-10)

1 am not going to address the global 'litany' at length here. The arguments have been well made by others, especially and most elegantly by E. O. Wilson. What 1 wish to address here is the question: 'Can we grasp the complexity of it all and, if so, what do we do about it?' Given the fundamental nature of the problem the destruction of the biosphere and its ecosystem ser- vices together with the huge changes going on in human societies and cultures driven by globalisation and technological change the precautionary principle would suggest that even if the epistemology is flawed, the data are partial and the evidence is shaky, we should pay attention to the little we know and do whatever is possible to mitigate the situation even if we fundamentally disagree about the means and the ends. The only ethical course of action is, as John Ral- ston Saul writes," based on 'a sense of the other and of inclusive responsibility'. We know enough to act. Ethics is about uncertainty, doubt, system thinking and balancing difficult choices. It is about confronting the evidence**.** Over the past two or three decades, as there has been an increasing appre- ciation of the importance of good environmental management, and as western societies have become more open and the ICT revolution has made informa- tion much more widely available there has been a growing debate between the worlds of science, industry, government and the community around environ- mental ethics and environmental issues and their management. During this period new knowledge has been gained, ideas have changed (sometimes quite fundamentally) and there have been huge changes in government and social institutions and policies. We are all on a recursive journey together: we are lit- erally 'making it up as we go along'. This is not easy and there are no optimal solutions. This is an adaptive process requiring feedback from all parts of the system. Yes, there will be surprises. This is why it is so important that when we act we constantly reflect on what we know and what we are doing about it and where it is all going. As we reach the physical limits of the global biosphere the values we place on things are changing and must change further. A new environmental ethic is required, one that is less instrumental and more embracing. Traditionally there has tended to be a schism between those who take an anthropocentric view (that the world is there for us to use) and those who take the non-anthropocentric view (those who value nature in its own right). Orthodox anthropocentrisni dictates that non-human value is instrumental to human needs and interests. In contrast, non-anthropocentrics take an objectivist view and value nature intrinsically; some may consider the source of value in non-human nature to be independent of human consciousness.45 What is required is a more complex and systems view of ethics which finds a middle ground between the instrumentalist and objectivist views. Norton '46 for example, proposes an alternative and more complex theory of value - a universal Earth ethic - which values processes and dynamics as well as entities and takes an adaptive management view of changing system properties. For sustainable development to occur, choices about values will remain within the human sphere but we should no longer regard human preferences as the only criterion of moral significance. 'Humans and the planet have entwined destinies"' and this will be increasingly true in many and complex ways as we move forward. There are calls for an Earth ethic beyond the land ethic of Aldo Leopold.45 The science of ecology is being drawn into the web .49 Ecologists are becoming more socially and culturally aware and engaged" and the 'very doing' of ecology is becoming more ethical.tm' Some scientists are beginning to see themselves more as agents in relationships with society and less as observers.

#### There’s no one root cause of war

**Sharp 8** – senior associate deputy general counsel for intelligence at the US Department of Defense, Dr. Walter, “Democracy and Deterrence”, Air Force University Press, May, http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil/Books/sharp/Sharp.pdf

**While classical liberals focused on political structures, socialists analyzed the socioeconomic system** of states as the primary factor in determining the propensity of states to engage in war. Socialists such as Karl Marx attributed war to the class structure of society; Marx believed that war resulted from a clash of social forces created by a capitalist mode of production that develops two antagonistic classes, rather than being an instrument of state policy. Thus capitalist states would engage in war because of their growing needs for raw materials, markets, and cheap labor. **Socialists believed replacing capitalism with socialism could prevent war, but world events have proven socialists wrong as well**.32 **These** two **schools of thought**—war is caused by innate biological drives or social institutions—**do not demonstrate any meaningful correlation with the occurrence or nonoccurrence of war. There are many variables not considered** by these two schools: for example, the influence of **national special interest groups such as the military or defense contractors** that **may seek glory through victory, greater resources, greater domestic political power, or justification for their existence.** Legal scholar Quincy **Wright** has conducted one of the “most thorough studies of the nature of war”33 and **concludes that there “is no single cause of war**.”34 In *A Study of War*, he concludes that **peace is an equilibrium of four complex factors: military and industrial technology, international law governing the resort to war, social and political organization at the domestic and international level, and the distribution of attitudes and opinions concerning basic values.** War is likely when controls on any one level are disturbed or changed.35 Similarly, **the 1997 US National Military Strategy identifies the root causes of conflict as political, economic, social, and legal conditions.**36 **Moore** has **compiled the following list of conventional explanations for war: specific disputes; absence of dispute settlement mechanisms; ideological disputes; ethnic and religious differences; communication failures; proliferation of weapons and arms races; social and economic injustice; imbalance of power; competition for resources; incidents, accidents, and miscalculation; violence in the nature of man; aggressive national leaders; and economic determination**. He has concluded, however, that these causes or motives for war explain specific conflicts but fail to serve as a central paradigm for explaining the cause of war.37

# 1AR

### Case

**Only representing the devastation of nuclear war can we challenge nuclearism**

James **Foard. 1997**. Associate Professor of Religion, Arizona State, “Imagining Nuclear Weapons: Hiroshima, Armageddon, and the Annihilation of the Students of Ichijo School,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion, http://jaar.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/LXV/1/1.pdf TBC 7/1/10)

Despite their deep suspicion of the adequacy of any expressions, the survivors relate their narratives in formal ritual and pilgrimage settings in which their repetition and redundancy seem appropriate. (These are, of course, the public rather than the traditional settings ) They justify their attention to story and place in terms of preserving memory, not because their stories can ever be fully understood, but "to bring peace " **Without any clear understanding of what political mechanisms might be required, they claim that the telling of stories itself can, in fact, help do thi**s The experience of the Ichijo people, then, suggests that **nuclear talk can neither be fully denied nor fully accommodated into our sense of community over time. The only representation possible, then, strives not to domesticate the experience of the bomb into human memory, but to use the memory of its reality for apotropaic purposes** **The reality of the bomb is asserted**—indeed must be asserted—**only so that it can be refused a permanent place in human history.**

### J

**Preventing human extinction is key to ethics.**

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We have thus far considered existential risk from the perspective of utilitarianism (combined with several simplifying assumptions). We may briefly consider how the issue might appear when viewed through the lenses of some other ethical outlooks. For example, the philosopher Robert Adams outlines a different view on these matters. I believe **a better basis for ethical theory** in this area **can be found in** quite a different direction—in **a commitment to the future of humanity as a vast project, or network of overlapping projects, that is generally shared by the human race. The aspiration for a better society**—more just, more rewarding, and more peaceful—**is a part of this project. So are the potentially endless quests for scientific knowledge and philosophical understanding, and the development of artistic and other cultural traditions. This includes** the particular cultural traditions to which we belong, in all their accidental historic and ethnic diversity. It also includes **our interest in the lives of our children and grandchildren, and the hope that they will be able**, in turn, **to have the lives of their children and grandchildren as projects. To the extent that a policy or practice seems likely to be favorable or unfavorable to the carrying out of this complex of projects in the nearer or further future, we have reason to pursue or avoid it**. … **Continuity is as important to our commitment to the project of the future of humanity as it is to our commitment to the projects of our own personal futures. Just as the shape of my whole life, and its connection with my present and past, have an interest that goes beyond that of any isolated experience, so too the shape of human history over an extended period of the future, and its connection with the human present and past, have an interest that goes beyond that of the** (total or average) **quality of life of a population-at-a-time, considered in isolation from how it got that way**. **We owe**, I think, some **loyalty to this project of the human future. We** also **owe it a respect that we would owe it even if we were not of the human race ourselves**, but beings from another planet who had some understanding of it. (28: 472-473) **Since an existential catastrophe would either put an end to the project of the future of humanity or drastically curtail its scope for development, we** would seem to **have a strong prima facie reason to avoid it**, in Adams’ view. We also note that **an existential catastrophe would entail the frustration of many strong preferences**, suggesting that from a preference-satisfactionist perspective it would be a bad thing. In a similar vein, **an ethical view emphasizing that public policy should be determined through informed democratic deliberation by all stakeholders would favor existential-risk mitigation if we suppose**, as is plausible, **that a majority of the world’s population would come to favor such policies upon reasonable deliberation** (even if hypothetical future people are not included as stakeholders). **We might also have custodial duties to preserve the inheritance of humanity passed on to us by our ancestors and convey it safely to our descendants**.[24] **We do not want to be the failing link in the chain of generations, and we ought not to delete or abandon the great epic of human civilization that humankind has been working on for thousands of years, when it is clear that the narrative is far from having reached a natural terminus**. Further, **many theological perspectives deplore naturalistic existential catastrophes, especially ones induced by human activities**: If God created the world and the human species, one would imagine that He might be displeased if we took it upon ourselves to smash His masterpiece (or if, through our negligence or hubris, we allowed it to come to irreparable harm).[25]

**Life should be valued as apriori – it precedes the ability to value anything else**

Amien **Kacou. 2008**. WHY EVEN MIND? On The A Priori Value Of “Life”, Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy, Vol 4, No 1-2 (2008) cosmosandhistory.org/index.php/journal/article/view/92/184

Furthermore, that manner of **finding things good** that is in pleasure **can certainly not exist in any world without consciousness (i.e., without “life,”** as we now understand the word)—slight analogies put aside. In fact, we can begin to develop a more sophisticated definition of the concept of “pleasure,” in the broadest possible sense of the word, as follows: it is the common psychological element in all psychological experience of goodness (be it in joy, admiration, or whatever else). In this sense, pleasure can always be pictured to “mediate” all awareness or perception or judgment of goodness: there is pleasure in all consciousness of things good; pleasure is the common element of all conscious satisfaction. In short, it is simply the very experience of liking things, or the liking of experience, in general. In this sense, **pleasure is, not only uniquely characteristic of life but also, the core expression of goodness in life—the most general sign or phenomenon for favorable conscious valuation**, in other words. This does not mean that “good” is absolutely synonymous with “pleasant”—what we value may well go beyond pleasure. (The fact that we value things needs not be reduced to the experience of liking things.) However, what we value beyond pleasure remains a matter of speculation or theory. Moreover, we note that a variety of things that may seem otherwise unrelated are correlated with pleasure—some more strongly than others. In other words, there are many things the experience of which we like. For example: the admiration of others; sex; or rock-paper-scissors. But, again, what they are is irrelevant in an inquiry on a priori value—what gives us pleasure is a matter for empirical investigation. Thus, we can see now that, in general, **something primitively valuable is attainable in living—that is, pleasure itself.** And it seems equally clear that we have a priori logical reason to pay attention to the world in any world where pleasure exists. Moreover, **we can now also articulate a foundation for a security interest in our life: since the good of pleasure can be found in living** (to the extent pleasure remains attainable),[17] **and only in living, therefore, a priori, life ought to be continuously (and indefinitely) pursued at least for the sake of preserving the possibility of finding that good.** However, this platitude about the value that can be found in life turns out to be, at this point, insufficient for our purposes. It seems to amount to very little more than recognizing that our subjective desire for life in and of itself shows that life has some objective value. For what difference is there between saying, “living is unique in benefiting something I value (namely, my pleasure); therefore, I should desire to go on living,” and saying, “I have a unique desire to go on living; therefore I should have a desire to go on living,” whereas the latter proposition immediately seems senseless? In other words, “life gives me pleasure,” says little more than, “I like life.” Thus, we seem to have arrived at the conclusion that **the fact that we already have some (subjective) desire for life shows life to have some (objective) value.** But, if that is the most we can say, then it seems our enterprise of justification was quite superficial, and the subjective/objective distinction was useless—for all we have really done is highlight the correspondence between value and desire. Perhaps, our inquiry should be a bit more complex.

#### Case impacts prove why security logic is good- key to prevent multiple scenarios for extinction- aff is an impact turn to the K. Outweighs- prefer proximate short-term extinction scenarios over their vacuous impact claims.

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#### They read a whole slew of Fear Ignoring the threat causes panic – worse than fear, stops solvency, turns their state power arguments

**Sandman and Lanard, 2003**

Peter M. PhD in Communications and Professor at Rutgers specializing in crisis communication; Jody, Psychiatrist, 28 April, “Fear Is Spreading Faster than SARS — And So It Should!”

China is universally condemned for covering up SARS and putting the world at risk. **Covering up an epidemic is about as bad a communication strategy as we can imagine**. Among its outcomes: **China actually does face a panic problem, as its people confront not just a raging epidemic but a government that lies to them about it. The West’s “soft cover-up” is much gentler and less dishonest** — a cover-up of over-reassurance and minimization rather than of lies. **But if SARS does keep getting worse in the West**, as it has in China, **the soft cover-up will also fail ... and may also provoke panic. Public anxiety can lead to genuine panic or to astonishing resilience**. The paradox is that efforts **to squelch the anxiety** (“allay the public’s fear” is the usual phrase) **can actually induce the panic it aims to prevent. Resilience is likelier when authorities ally with the anxiety, harness it,** and steer it instead of trying to prevent it. Of course even superb handling of the public’s fears may not prevent panic if the epidemic gets bad enough. There has often been some panic during the great epidemics of the past. But **panic will be likelier and more widespread if the authorities have been minimizing the risk than if they have been acknowledging it candidly** and compassionately.

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