# Iran 1ac CSUF rd. 1

### **Advantage One is Israel**

#### **The Nuclear Weapon Free Iran Act, also known as the Schumer-Menendez-Kirk Act, is being debated in congress now. In addition to a new round of sanctions, the bill includes a resolution to take part in an Israeli strike against Iran. This makes a US-backed Israeli strike on Iran inevitable.**

Perr 13 Jon, New Democrat Network; “Senate sanctions bill could let Israel take U.S. to war against Iran” *Daily Kos*; December 24, 2013; <http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/12/24/1265184/-Senate-sanctions-bill-could-let-Israel-take-U-S-to-war-against-Iran>

As 2013 draws to close, the negotiations over the Iranian nuclear program have entered a delicate stage. But in 2014, the tensions will escalate dramatically as a bipartisan group of Senators brings a new Iran sanctions bill to the floor for a vote. As many others have warned, that promise of new measures against Tehran will almost certainly blow up the interim deal reached by the Obama administration and its UN/EU partners in Geneva. But Congress' highly unusual intervention into the President's domain of foreign policy doesn't just make the prospect of an American conflict with Iran more likely. As it turns out, the Nuclear Weapon Free Iran Act essentially empowers Israel to decide whether the United States will go to war against Tehran.¶ On their own, the tough new sanctions imposed automatically if a final deal isn't completed in six months pose a daunting enough challenge for President Obama and Secretary of State Kerry. But it is the legislation's commitment to support an Israeli preventive strike against Iranian nuclear facilities that almost ensures the U.S. and Iran will come to blows. As Section 2b, part 5 of the draft mandates:¶ If the Government of Israel is compelled to take military action in legitimate self-defense against Iran's nuclear weapon program, the United States Government should stand with Israel and provide, in accordance with the law of the United States and the constitutional responsibility of Congress to authorize the use of military force, diplomatic, military, and economic support to the Government of Israel in its defense of its territory, people, and existence.¶ Now, the legislation being pushed by Senators Mark Kirk (R-IL), Chuck Schumer (D-NY) and Robert Menendez (D-NJ) does not automatically give the President an authorization to use force should Israel attack the Iranians. (The draft language above explicitly states that the U.S. government must act "in accordance with the law of the United States and the constitutional responsibility of Congress to authorize the use of military force.") But there should be little doubt that an AUMF would be forthcoming from Congressmen on both sides of the aisle. As Lindsey Graham, who with Menendez co-sponsored a similar, non-binding "stand with Israel" resolution in March told a Christians United for Israel (CUFI) conference in July:¶ "If nothing changes in Iran, come September, October, I will present a resolution that will authorize the use of military force to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear bomb."¶ Graham would have plenty of company from the hardest of hard liners in his party. In August 2012, Romney national security adviser and pardoned Iran-Contra architect Elliott Abrams called for a war authorization in the pages of the Weekly Standard. And just two weeks ago, Norman Podhoretz used his Wall Street Journal op-ed to urge the Obama administration to "strike Iran now" to avoid "the nuclear war sure to come."¶ But at the end of the day, the lack of an explicit AUMF in the Nuclear Weapon Free Iran Act doesn't mean its supporters aren't giving Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu de facto carte blanche to hit Iranian nuclear facilities. The ensuing Iranian retaliation against to Israeli and American interests would almost certainly trigger the commitment of U.S. forces anyway.¶ Even if the Israelis alone launched a strike against Iran's atomic sites, Tehran will almost certainly hit back against U.S. targets in the Straits of Hormuz, in the region, possibly in Europe and even potentially in the American homeland. Israel would face certain retaliation from Hezbollah rockets launched from Lebanon and Hamas missiles raining down from Gaza.¶ That's why former Bush Defense Secretary Bob Gates and CIA head Michael Hayden raising the alarms about the "disastrous" impact of the supposedly surgical strikes against the Ayatollah's nuclear infrastructure. As the New York Times reported in March 2012, "A classified war simulation held this month to assess the repercussions of an Israeli attack on Iran forecasts that the strike would lead to a wider regional war, which could draw in the United States and leave hundreds of Americans dead, according to American officials." And that September, a bipartisan group of U.S. foreign policy leaders including Brent Scowcroft, retired Admiral William Fallon, former Republican Senator (now Obama Pentagon chief) Chuck Hagel, retired General Anthony Zinni and former Ambassador Thomas Pickering concluded that American attacks with the objective of "ensuring that Iran never acquires a nuclear bomb" would "need to conduct a significantly expanded air and sea war over a prolonged period of time, likely several years." (Accomplishing regime change, the authors noted, would mean an occupation of Iran requiring a "commitment of resources and personnel greater than what the U.S. has expended over the past 10 years in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars combined.") The anticipated blowback?¶ Serious costs to U.S. interests would also be felt over the longer term, we believe, with problematic consequences for global and regional stability, including economic stability. A dynamic of escalation, action, and counteraction could produce serious unintended consequences that would significantly increase all of these costs and lead, potentially, to all-out regional war.¶ If this all sounds like the hypothetical scenarios of a bunch of doves in the Pentagon and the State Department, it is worth recalling the America reaction to the 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia which killed 19 U.S. servicemen and wounded hundreds of others. As former Clinton and Bush counter-terrorism chief Richard Clarke recounted in his book, Against All Enemies, President Clinton and the Joint Chiefs contemplated a massive U.S. invasion of Iran in response to the involvement of its agents:¶ In our meeting with the Pentagon in 1996, Shali was talking about al-out war. The military had a plan for almost any contingency. The plan on the shelf for war with Iran looked like it had been drawn up by Eisenhower. Several groups of Army and Marine divisions would sweep across the country over the course of several months.¶ (Ultimately, President Clinton opted against the invasion of Iran, in part because of the difficulty in proving the U.S. intelligence case against Tehran to the international community. In the end, the U.S. launched a large-scale covert action campaign against Iranian intelligence assets worldwide. Apparently, the message was received with zero distortion; Iran has not targeted United States interests since.)¶ The Pentagon's 2012 war-gaming in a simulation called "Internal Look" served to reinforce for U.S. military officials "the unpredictable and uncontrollable nature of a strike by Israel, and a counterstrike by Iran." As for the impact on the global economy, in November, the Federation of American Scientists estimated that a U.S. campaign of air strikes would cost $700 billion; a full-scale invasion could have a total impact of $1.7 trillion.¶ At the heart of the clash between Congressional hawks and President Obama is a disagreement over the so-called "red line" for Tehran. In the United States and in Israel alike, Obama has said the United States will not allow Iran to obtain an actual nuclear weapon. But most of his Republican foes and some of his Democratic allies have sided with Bibi Netanyahu in demanding Iran never possess a "nuclear weapons capability." That bottom line on Iranian nuclear know-how wouldn't just scuttle the interim deal and ongoing negotiations with Tehran, as the Obama administration and 10 Democratic Senate committee chairmen have warned. By the standard, an American war with Iran would be almost a foregone conclusion. And if Chuck Schumer, Bob Menendez, John McCain, Lindsey Graham and over 30 other Senators get their way, Israel may well have a green light to start it.

#### This is a reversal of Obama’s previous doctrine, which would refuse support to an Israeli strike

Cole 13 Juan, Richard P. Mitchell Collegiate Professor of History, University of Michigan; specializes in Modern Middle Eastern and South Asian History; “Obama will Veto new Iran Sanctions, Israel War Mandate pushed by AIPAC Senators” *Informed Comment*; December 21, 2013; http://www.juancole.com/2013/12/sanctions-mandate-senators.html?utm\_source=feedburner&utm\_medium=feed&utm\_campaign=Feed%3A+juancole%2Fymbn+%28Informed+Comment%29

The bill they crafted includes $55 bn in new sanctions on Iran and requires the United States to support Netanyahu in any war he launches on Iran. (President Obama and his officials have in the past have hinted broadly that Israel is welcome to attack Iran but is on its own if it does so.)

#### **This is plays directly into Netenyahu’s plans. Israel wants to start a war, but wouldn’t do it unless it was sure it had America’s support.**

McConnell 13 Scott, Founding Editor, The American Conservative; PhD, History, Columbia University; “Schumer-Menendez-Kirk Open the Back Door to War” *The American Conservative*; December 20, 2013; http://www.theamericanconservative.com/schumer-menendez-kirk-open-the-back-door-to-war/

Democrats Charles Schumer (N.Y.) and Robert Menendez (N.J.) have joined Republican Mark Kirk (Ill.) in placing a ticking bomb under President Obama’s Christmas tree. The bomb is an AIPAC-sponsored bill that commits the United States to stop Iran from enriching any uranium at all, and also requires the United States to “stand with Israel” in the event Netanyahu decides, for reasons of “self-defense,” to start a war with Iran. The purpose of the bill is transparent: to scuttle the P5+1 (U.S., Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and China) diplomacy with Tehran, because it is well known to everyone concerned that Iran is not going to abandon completely a nuclear energy program underway since the Shah was in power.¶ Gary Sick, the Columbia University Iran expert, has posted on his website an open letter to Schumer, noting that the bill seeks to “remove any negotiating authority from the U.S. government by specifying in advance the terms of an impossible settlement.” Further, Sick observes, the bill “outsources any decision about resort to military action to the government of Israel, by committing the United States in advance to support any military action by Israel.”¶ These are the two central points. Netanyahu wants war with Iran, but he doesn’t want to fight it by himself. Schumer, Menendez, and Kirk hope to compel the United States to step in and finish the job after Israel throws the first punch. But even if such a war were just (which it isn’t), or even if we had allies besides Israel (which we wouldn’t), the aftermath of such a war ends most likely (as the former hawk Kenneth Pollack argues in his exhaustive analysis “Unthinkable“) with an American occupation of Iran. At a cost in blood and treasure many times the invasion of Iraq.¶ There is no realistic scenario under which Iran’s government is going abandon entirely its nuclear program. Schumer, Kirk, and Menendez know this perfectly well. Their resolution is a backdoor to war. They just don’t have the courage, as yet, to say so.

#### **US support for an Israeli first strike increases Israeli aggression exponentially. Absent US support, Israel doesn’t think it can execute a strike, with US support, Israeli adventurism carries zero cost.**

Giraldi 12 Philip, executive director, Council for the National Interest; former CIA officer; PhD, European History, University of London; “Entangled With Israel” *The American Conservative*; September 3, 2012; http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/entangled-with-israel/

Israel’s attempt to steer American foreign policy has been nowhere more evident than in the sustained campaign to move the United States in the direction of war with Iran,a war that serves no American interest unless one believes that Tehran is willing to spend billions of dollars to develop a nuclear weapon only to hand off the result to a terrorist group.¶ The most recent overtures by the Israeli government have pushed the United States to make a declaration that negotiations with Iran have failed and will not be continued. For Israel, this is a necessary first step towards an American military intervention, as failed negotiations mean there is no way out of the impasse but by war, if the Iranians do not unilaterally concede on every disputed point.¶ Two recent op-eds have elaborated the argument, promoting the necessity of convincing the Israelis that the United States is absolutely serious about using military force against Iran if the Iranians seek to retain any capacity to enrich uranium. One might note in passing that this new red line, sometimes also called the abstract “capability” to create a nuclear weapon, has been achieved by moving the goal posts back considerably. At one time Iran was threatened with a military response if it actually acquired a nuclear weapon (which is still the official position of the Obama administration), but earlier benchmarks within that policy saying that enrichment should not exceed 20 percent or that the enrichment should not take place on Iranian soil have been abandoned in favor of what now amounts to zero tolerance. Those who note that Iran, which is a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and is under IAEA inspection, has a clear legal right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes have been ignored in favor of those who believe that Iran is somehow a special case.¶ On August 17, the Washington Post and The New York Times featured op-eds explaining why the United States must do more to convince Israel not to attack Iran this year. Amos Yadlin, a former head of Israel’s military intelligence who is believed to be close to the country’s political leadership, argued in the Post that Obama must basically convince the Israelis that he will use force against Iran if sanctions do not convince the country’s leadership to abandon enrichment of nuclear fuel. Over at the Times, Dennis Ross, a former senior U.S. diplomat who has been described as Israel’s lawyer, made pretty much the same arguments. Both advocated giving Israel refueling tankers and special munitions that would enable an attack on Iran to be more effective, thereby widening the window of opportunity for sanctions to work, in light of Israeli arguments that hardened Iranian sites might soon be invulnerable to attack. Ross advocates giving Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu effectively a blank check, asking him what he will need to attack Iran and granting the Israeli government commitments for a full range of U.S. military support. Both Yadlin and Ross argue that it is necessary to create the conditions for Israel to delay a possible attack until 2013. As Yadlin puts it, “if the United States wants Israel to give sanctions and diplomacy more time, Israelis must know that they will not be left high and dry if these options fail.”¶ Assuming that Ross and Yadlin are speaking for the Israeli government, which is almost certainly the case, Israel is essentially demanding a commitment from Washington to attack Iran unless the issue of Iran’s ability to enrich uranium is resolved through negotiation or through Iranian surrender of that right. In return, Israel will not attack Iran before the American election. So in effect, Washington would be promising to fight a war later if Israel does not start one now.¶ Israel knows it cannot successfully attack Iran unilaterally and must have the United States along to do the heavy lifting. It also knows that the threat to attack Iran before the election is a powerful weapon, with neither Mitt Romney nor Barack Obama welcoming such a potentially game-changing diversion from their debate on the economy and jobs.¶ Critics like Arnaud de Borchgrave have correctly noted that many former generals and intelligence officers in the United States and Israel have, in fact, decided that the basic premise is wrong. Iran does not pose a threat that could not be contained even if it does some day make the political decision to obtain a crude nuclear device. Launching a new war in the Middle East to prevent it from doing so would create “mayhem” throughout the region, guarantee a breakdown in Egypt-Israel relations, and create a perfect breeding ground for the civil war in Syria to spill out and lead to turmoil among all of its neighbors. American ships in the Persian Gulf would be attacked, unrest in Bahrain would turn to revolution, and the Palestinians would stage a new intifada. Israel would be bombarded from Lebanon and from Iran. Gas prices would soar, economic recovery would stall worldwide, and European nations now struggling to deal with unprecedented unemployment levels would watch the eurozone collapse before the rage of hundreds of thousands protesters in the streets. Americans would again become the targets of international terrorism.¶ And there is another serious objection to going along with the Israeli government’s thinking. Israel is by its own volition not an ally of the United States in any technical sense because alliances are troublesome things that require rules of engagement and reciprocity, limiting the partners’ ability to act independently. If Israel obtains a virtual commitment from the United States to go to war in 2013, it would mean enjoying the benefits of having a powerful patron to do its fighting without any obligation in return, beyond delaying unilateral military action until a more suitable time. A guarantee from Washington for Israel’s security which still permits unilateral action by Netanyahu is all too reminiscent of the entangling arrangements that led to World War I. The fact that the murder of an Austrian Archduke in the Balkans led to a world war that killed tens of millions was due to promises not unlike what Israel is demanding today.¶ If the United States commits to unconditional support for an Israeli attack on Iran, it will be a surrender of one of the defining attributes of national sovereignty: the power to choose when and where to go to war. Amos Yadlin suggests at one point that President Obama go to Congress and get approval in advance to take military action “to prevent Iran’s acquisition of a military nuclear capability.” Such a pre-approval for war certainly raises constitutional issues, but it also creates a virtual casus belli because Iran already has the “capability” to enrich uranium for potential military uses. A guarantee precludes any consideration that the United States might actually have an overriding national interest to avoid a war. It denies that the United States should be able to exercise complete sovereignty over the issue of Iran, and it also freezes the status quo, as if new ways of looking at the problem of the Iranian nuclear program could not evolve over the next few months.¶ Washington should make no commitment to anyone about what it will do vis-à-vis Iran in 2013 no matter what inducements are offered. As the 19th-century British Prime Minister Lord Palmerston put it, “We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.” Let America’s actual interests dictate U.S. foreign policy.

#### Israel doesn’t want to step on American toes. It won’t attack without US support.

Zanotti et al 12 (Jim Zanotti, Coordinator Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs. Israel: Possible Military Strike Against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities. CRS. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R42443.pdf)

Despite the reference by Defense Minister Barak to the possible need for “overt or tacit support, particularly from America” before approving an Israel strike, it is unclear to what extent Israeli decisionmakers might be influenced by the stated positions and anticipated responses of U.S. policymakers in the Obama Administration and Congress regarding an attack. Not surprisingly, Israeli leaders are extremely sensitive to U.S. views for a variety of reasons, including but not limited to: • Strong U.S.-Israel relations dating back to when the United States was the first country to recognize the provisional Jewish government as the de facto government of Israel upon its declaration of statehood in May 1948; • Robust ongoing military and security cooperation, including significant U.S. arms sales and other forms of support; and • Trade ties and important bilateral economic and scientific cooperation.141 Israeli leaders’ perspectives about the possible effects of a strike on U.S. political and material assistance to Israel, possible negative security consequences for the United States from a potential Iranian retaliation, and the probability of future U.S. military action to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran may, among other considerations, influence the Israeli decisionmaking process An Israeli journalist wrote in March 2012 that Israel did not ask permission when it acted to prevent Saddam Hussein and Bashar al Asad from obtaining nuclear weapons, but that “the [Obama] administration can credibly counter that in neither case did Israeli unilateralism threaten to draw America into an armed conflict, as it does now.”142 According to three Israeli analysts (including two former officials) mentioned above: Even after the withdrawal of its troops from Iraq, the U.S. remains extremely exposed to Iranian retaliation—either directly against its forces in the area or by Iran’s attempting to ignite a broader conflict in the region—so an Israeli strike would harm U.S. interests in the region and would place many U.S. lives at risk. And while in an election year America’s political reaction to such a strike may be mitigated by domestic political considerations, the reaction of the U.S. defense community to an Israeli military strike might be extremely negative, as such an action might be seen as representing Israeli insensitivity to and disregard of U.S. priorities and concerns.143 Some reports have speculated that an Israeli decision to attack, if it occurs, could come before the U.S. presidential election in November 2012, with one Israeli report stating, “A second-term president, not constrained by electoral necessities, will be able to apply a lot more pressure on the Israeli government not to attack.”144 Separate from the question of whether the United States might support an Israeli strike on Iran, Israeli decisionmakers might be influenced by how they anticipate the United States would respond after an attack, including in the event of retaliation by Iran and its allies. Although the United States does not have a formal treaty obligation to defend Israel in the event it is attacked, successive Administrations have either stated or implied that the United States would act to protect Israel’s security if it were endangered—including by Iran—and have worked with Congress to ensure and bolster Israel’s “qualitative military edge” over regional security threats.145

#### That triggers a massive war

Reuveny, 10 (Rafael Reuveny is a professor in the School of Public and Environmental Affairs at Indiana University. Con: Unilateral strike could trigger World War III, global depression, <http://gazettextra.com/news/2010/aug/07/con-unilateral-strike-could-trigger-world-war-iii-/#sthash.tGUOoSDf.dpuf>)

A unilateral Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities would likely have dire consequences, including a regional war, global economic collapse and a major power clash.¶ For an Israeli campaign to succeed, it must be quick and decisive. This requires an attack that would be so overwhelming that Iran would not dare to respond in full force.¶ Such an outcome is extremely unlikely since the locations of some of Iran’s nuclear facilities are not fully known and known facilities are buried deep underground.¶ All of these widely spread facilities are shielded by elaborate air defense systems constructed not only by the Iranians but also the Chinese and, likely, the Russians as well.¶ By now, Iran has also built redundant command and control systems and nuclear facilities, developed early warning systems, acquired ballistic and cruise missiles and upgraded and enlarged its armed forces.¶ Because Iran is well-prepared, a single, conventional Israeli strike—or even numerous strikes—could not destroy all of its capabilities, giving Iran time to respond.¶ Unlike Iraq, whose nuclear program Israel destroyed in 1981, Iran has a second-strike capability comprised of a coalition of Iranian, Syrian, Lebanese, Hezbollah, Hamas, and, perhaps, Turkish forces. Internal pressure might compel Jordan, Egypt, and the Palestinian Authority to join the assault, turning a bad situation into a regional war.¶ During the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, at the apex of its power, Israel was saved from defeat by President Nixon’s shipment of weapons and planes. Today, Israel’s numerical inferiority is greater, and it faces more determined and better-equipped opponents.¶ Despite Israel’s touted defense systems, Iranian coalition missiles, armed forces, and terrorist attacks would likely wreak havoc on its enemy, leading to a prolonged tit-for-tat.¶ In the absence of massive U.S. assistance, Israel’s military resources may quickly dwindle, forcing it to use its alleged nuclear weapons, as it had reportedly almost done in 1973.¶ An Israeli nuclear attack would likely destroy most of Iran’s capabilities, but a crippled Iran and its coalition could still attack neighboring oil facilities, unleash global terrorism, plant mines in the Persian Gulf and impair maritime trade in the Mediterranean, Red Sea and Indian Ocean.¶ Middle Eastern oil shipments would likely slow to a trickle as production declines due to the war and insurance companies decide to drop their risky Middle Eastern clients. Iran and Venezuela would likely stop selling oil to the United States and Europe.¶ The world economy would head into a tailspin; international acrimony would rise; and Iraqi and Afghani citizens might fully turn on the United States, immediately requiring the deployment of more American troops. Russia, China, Venezuela, and maybe Brazil and Turkey — all of which essentially support Iran — could be tempted to form an alliance and openly challenge the U.S. hegemony.¶ ¶ Russia and China might rearm their injured Iranian protege overnight, just as Nixon rearmed Israel, and threaten to intervene, just as the U.S.S.R. threatened to join Egypt and Syria in 1973. President Obama’s response would likely put U.S. forces on nuclear alert, replaying Nixon’s nightmarish scenario.¶ Iran may well feel duty-bound to respond to a unilateral attack by its Israeli archenemy, but it knows that it could not take on the United States head-to-head. In contrast, if the United States leads the attack, Iran’s response would likely be muted.¶ If Iran chooses to absorb an American-led strike, its allies would likely protest and send weapons, but would probably not risk using force.¶ While no one has a crystal ball, leaders should be risk-averse when choosing war as a foreign policy tool. If attacking Iran is deemed necessary, Israel must wait for an American green light. A unilateral Israeli strike could ultimately spark World War III.

#### And even if it doesn’t escalate, a small nuclear conflagration in the Middle East causes environmental damage significant enough to cause extinction

Beth Hoffman Staffwriter for Inside Bay Area, “'Nuclear winter' looms, experts say,” 2006 Lexis)

Researchers at the American Geophysical Union's annual meeting warned Monday that even a small regional nuclear war could burn enough cities to shroud the globe in black smoky shadow and usher in the manmade equivalent of the Little Ice Age. "Nuclear weapons represent the greatest single human threat to the planet, much more so than global warming," said Rutgers University atmospheric scientist Alan Robock. By dropping imaginary Hiroshima-sized bombs into some of the world's biggest cities, now swelled to tens of millions in population, University of Colorado researcher O. Brian Toon and colleagues found they could generate 100 times the fatalities and 100 times the climate-chilling smoke per kiloton of explosive power as all-out nuclear war between the United States and former Soviet Union. For most modern nuclear-war scenarios, the global impact isn't nuclear winter, the notion of smoke from incinerated cities blotting out the sun for years and starving most of the Earth's people. It's not even nuclear autumn, but rather an instant nuclear chill over most of the planet, accompanied by massive ozone loss and warming at the poles. That's what scientists' computer simulations suggest would happen if nuclear war broke out in a hot spot such as the Middle East, the North Korean peninsula or, the most modeled case, in Southeast Asia. Unlike in the Cold War, when the United States and Russia mostly targeted each other's nuclear, military and strategic industrial sites, young nuclear-armed nations have fewer weapons and might go for maximum effect by using them on cities, as the United States did in 1945. "We're at a perilous crossroads," Toon said. The spread of nuclear weapons worldwide combined with global migration into dense megacities form what he called "perhaps the greatest danger to the stability of society since the dawn of humanity." More than 20 years ago, researchers imagined a U.S.-Soviet nuclear holocaust would wreak havoc on the planet's climate. They showed the problem was potentially worse than feared: Massive urban fires would flush hundreds of millions of tons of black soot skyward, where -- heated by sunlight -- it would soar higher into the stratosphere and begin cooking off the protective ozone layer around the Earth. Huge losses of ozone would open the planet and its inhabitants to damaging radiation, while the warm soot would spread a pall sufficient to plunge the Earth into freezing year-round. The hundreds of millions who would starve exceeded those who would die in the initial blasts and radiation.

#### The United States should issue a statutory assurance of non-intervention to Iran.

Leverett and Leverett 08 (Flynt Leverett, senior fellow and director of the New America Foundation’s Geopolitics of Energy Initiative, served as senior director for Middle East affairs at the National Security Council. Hillary Mann Leverett, CEO of STRATEGA, a political risk consultancy, is a former Foreign Service officer who served as director for Iran, Afghanistan, and Persian Gulf affairs at the National Security Council. The Grand Bargain. http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2008/0808.leverett.html)

From an Iranian perspective, one of the essential found-ations for a U.S.-Iranian grand bargain is a clear explanation of the American position toward the Islamic Republic. The United States would need to clarify that it is not seeking a change in the nature of the Iranian regime, but rather changes in Iranian policies that Washington considers problematic. The United States would also need to emphasize its commitment to the ongoing improvement of U.S.-Iranian relations.¶ In this regard, Iran would need the following assurances from the United States:¶ 1. As part of a strategic understanding addressing all issues of concern to both sides, the United States would commit not to use force to change the borders or form of government of the Islamic Republic of Iran. This is the essential substance of a U.S. security assurance.

### Advantage Two is Entanglement

#### **The Nuclear Weapon Free Iran Act is an unprecedented sacrifice of American sovereignty, allowing foreign governments to decide whether or not we should go to war**

Sullivan 13 Andrew, former editor, The New Republic; PhD, Government, Harvard; “The Best of the Dish Today” *The Dish*; December 18, 2013; http://dish.andrewsullivan.com/2013/12/18/the-best-of-the-dish-today-115/

The Israel Lobby showed its hand today with a new sanctions bill against Iran clearly designed to ensure that no detente is ever reached with that country. AIPAC’s bill – shepherded by Chuck Schumer and Mark Kirk, two of Israel’s most devoted supporters in Congress – would rule out any final deal that allows Iran to enrich any uranium at all. That means, as Schumer knows full well, no deal at all. Then the bill goes even further. It includes¶ a non-binding provision that states that if Israel takes ‘military action in legitimate self-defense against Iran’s nuclear weapons program,’ the U.S. ‘should stand with Israel and provide, in accordance with the law of the United States and the constitutional responsibility of Congress to authorize the use of military force, diplomatic, military, and economic support to the Government of Israel in its defense of its territory, people, and existence.’¶ As usual, English is the first casualty in propaganda. Any act of “self-defense” against a mere “program” is not an act of legitimate self-defense. In international law, you are allowed to defend yourself if attacked; you do not have a right to attack another country just because you don’t like one of their military programs (which the Iranian regime has, in any case, sworn it would never use). That would be a license to shred international law and any concept of just warfare. For the US Senate to proactively bless future aggressive military action by a foreign government when it is not justified by self-defense is an appalling new low in the Israeli government’s grip on the US Congress.¶ But to proactively commit the United States as well to whatever the Netanyahu government might want to do in a war of choice against Iran is more staggering. Yes, this is non-binding language. But it’s basically endorsing the principle of handing over American foreign policy on a matter as grave as war and peace to a foreign government, acting against international law, thousands of miles away. George Washington would be turning at a rather high velocity in his grave.

#### This establishes a doctrinal shift that ensures future foreign entanglements

Giraldi 12 Philip, executive director, Council for the National Interest; former CIA officer; PhD, European History, University of London; “Entangled With Israel” *The American Conservative*; September 3, 2012;

And there is another serious objection to going along with the Israeli government’s thinking. Israel is by its own volition not an ally of the United States in any technical sense because alliances are troublesome things that require rules of engagement and reciprocity, limiting the partners’ ability to act independently. If Israel obtains a virtual commitment from the United States to go to war in 2013, it would mean enjoying the benefits of having a powerful patron to do its fighting without any obligation in return, beyond delaying unilateral military action until a more suitable time. A guarantee from Washington for Israel’s security which still permits unilateral action by Netanyahu is all too reminiscent of the entangling arrangements that led to World War I. The fact that the murder of an Austrian Archduke in the Balkans led to a world war that killed tens of millions was due to promises not unlike what Israel is demanding today.¶ If the United States commits to unconditional support for an Israeli attack on Iran, it will be a surrender of one of the defining attributes of national sovereignty: the power to choose when and where to go to war. Amos Yadlin suggests at one point that President Obama go to Congress and get approval in advance to take military action “to prevent Iran’s acquisition of a military nuclear capability.” Such a pre-approval for war certainly raises constitutional issues, but it also creates a virtual casus belli because Iran already has the “capability” to enrich uranium for potential military uses. A guarantee precludes any consideration that the United States might actually have an overriding national interest to avoid a war. It denies that the United States should be able to exercise complete sovereignty over the issue of Iran, and it also freezes the status quo, as if new ways of looking at the problem of the Iranian nuclear program could not evolve over the next few months.¶ Washington should make no commitment to anyone about what it will do vis-à-vis Iran in 2013 no matter what inducements are offered. As the 19th-century British Prime Minister Lord Palmerston put it, “We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.” Let America’s actual interests dictate U.S. foreign policy.

#### **The doctrine of entanglement established by Schumer-Kirk-Menendez risks war**

Merry 13 Robert W., Political Editor, The National Interest; “MERRY: Obama may buck the Israel lobby on Iran” *The Washington Times*; December 31, 2013; http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/dec/31/merry-obama-may-buck-the-israel-lobby-on-iran/

Further, the legislation contains language that would commit the United States to military action on behalf of Israel if Israel initiates action against Iran. This language is cleverly worded, suggesting U.S. action should be triggered only if Israel acted in its “legitimate self-defense” and acknowledging “the law of the United States and the constitutional responsibility of Congress to authorize the use of military force,” but the language is stunning in its brazenness and represents, in the view of Andrew Sullivan, the prominent blogger, “an appalling new low in the Israeli government’s grip on the U.S. Congress.”

While noting the language would seem to be nonbinding, Mr. Sullivan adds that “it’s basically endorsing the principle of handing over American foreign policy on a matter as grave as war and peace to a foreign government, acting against international law, thousands of miles away.”

That brings us back to Mr. Obama’s veto threat. The American people have made clear through polls and abundant expression (especially during Mr. Obama’s flirtation earlier this year with military action against Bashar Assad’s Syrian regime) that they are sick and weary of American military adventures in the Middle East. They don’t think the Iraq and Afghanistan wars have been worth the price, and they don’t want their country to engage in any other such wars.

That’s what the brewing confrontation between Mr. Obama and the Israel lobby comes down to — war and peace. Mr. Obama’s delicate negotiations with Iran, whatever their outcome, are designed to avert another U.S. war in the Middle East. The Menendez-Schumer-Kirk initiative is designed to kill that effort and cedes to Israel America’s war-making decision in matters involving Iran, which further increases the prospects for war. It’s not even an argument about whether the United States should come to Israel’s aid if our ally is under attack, but whether the decision to do so and when that might be necessary should be made in Jerusalem or Washington.

2014 will mark the 100th anniversary of beginning of World War I, a conflict triggered by entangling alliances that essentially gave the rulers of the Hapsburg Empire power that forced nation after nation into a war they didn’t want and cost the world as many as 20 million lives. Historians have warned since of the danger of nations delegating the power to take their people into war to other nations with very different interests.

### Plan

#### Thus the plan: The United States federal government should statutorily prohibit the introduction of United States armed forces into hostilities initiated by the State of Israel against the Islamic Republic of Iran.

### Contention Three Is Epistemology

#### Though social science is never perfect, our author’s rigorous scholarship allows us to make functioning assessments about Middle Eastern politics

Halliday 93

Fred Halliday, IR at LSE, 93, “ ‘Orientalism’ and its Critics” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 20(2) pp.145-146

The Middle East is not unique, except possibly in the content of the myths that are propagated about it, from within and without. The political, economic, social and cultural activities of the peoples of this region have their peculiarities and differences, as much between each other , as in terms of one Middle East contrasted with the outside world. Material concerns, jokes, the pleasures of good food, and the horrors of political oppression, are theirs as much as any other peoples in the world. The development of social science in general will never be completed, and each specific issue, or country, or incident, poses questions for it. But we are no more precluded by our concepts from understanding the Middle East, and no more limited in our ideas, whatever their origins, than in addressing any other area of the world. In normative terms, we have, perhaps, allowed the discussion to be too inffected by relativism and doubt as to the validity of universal standards, in the face of a mistaken, and often self-interested, critique of imperialism and Western norms. Perhaps I could sum this up by adapting a slogan: *na gharbzadegi, na sharqzadegi*, neither westoxification nor eastoxification. Let us therefore go beyond this unnecessarily polarized and in some ways methodologically impoverished debate and continue with the job of studying these societies. I have warned against the perils of tafsir, but I will end with the words from the Qur’an that can be easily and I hope not too arbitrarily interpreted to justify this enterprise, wa ja’alnakum shu’uban wa-qaba’ila li-ta’arafu. ‘And I have created peoples and trives so that they could get to know each other.’42 That could be the motto for our necessarily unfinished, and unfinishable, endavour.

#### There is no perfectly rational subject or perfectly accessible truth, but we can make reasonable predictions about international actors

Miller 2 (Katherine Miller, Prof. of Communication at Texas A&M, Communication theories: Perspectives, processes, and contexts, 2002, p 35-36)

If positivism, in its classical and logical forms, is largely rejected, what philosophical foundation should take its place as a framework for social research? Very different answers to this question have been proposed. Some social researchers argue that flaws in the positivist foundation require a radically different philosophy of sci- encee, one in which the realist ontology, objec- ive epistemology, and value-free axiology of positivism are vehemently rejected and replaced with forms of inquiry that honor nominalism, subjectivism, and omnipresent values. The posi- tions of these scholars are discussed in great detail in Chapters 4 and 5 as we consider interpretive and critical petspectives on communication theory. However, some scholars believe that a rejection of positivism does not require a total rejection of realism, objectivity, and the scientific goal of value-free inquiry. However, these scholars reject the notion of absolute truth, reject the unassailable foundation of observation, and reject the assumption of an always steady and upward accumulation of knowledge. In these rejections, scholars have forged a new philosophy of science that D. C. Phillips (1987, 1990, 1992) has called post-positivism. The metatheoretical tenets of this position are discussed in the next section. Metatheoretical Commitments Ontology In Chapter 2, we discussed three ontological positions: the realist, the nominalist, and the social constructionist. To summarize, a realist believes in a hard and solid reality of physical and social objects, a nominalist proposes that the reality of social entities exists only in the names and labels we provide for them, and a social constructionist emphasizes the ways in which social meanings are created through historical and contemporary interaction. Both the realist and the social constructionist positions make contributions to the ontology of post-positivist researchers in the communication discipline. Researchers in the post-positivist tradition can be seen as realists in that they support the position that phenomena exist independent of our perceptions and theories about them (Phillips, 1987). However, this realism is tempered by the argument that humans cannot fully apprehend that reality and that the driving mechanisms in the social and physical world cannot be fully understood. As J. D. Smith (1990, p. 171) states, "Realism is essential . . . because it poses 'at least in principle, a standard by which all human societies and their beliefs can be judged: they can all have beliefs about the world which turn out to be mistaken'" (Trigg, 1985, p. 22). Phillips argues, however, that a post-positivist ontology does not deny the notions inherent in approaches advocating a "social construction of reality" (Berger & Luckmann, 1967). Rather, Phillips (1990) draws the distinction between beliefs about the reality and the objective reality (pp. 42-43). Making this distinction allows a post-positivist scholar to appreciate (and investigate) multiple realities that are constructed by social collectives through communicative inter-action. For example, a post-positivist scholar could study the ways that beliefs about the imminent end of the world influence the behaviors of mountain survivalists, members of cults, and fundamental religious groups. However, the fact that a social group has arrived at certain beliefs about the world does not make those beliefs about the social or physical world necessarily true. As Phillips (1990) notes, "It is clear that Freudians believe in the reality of the id and superego and the rest, and they act as if these are realities; but their believing in these things does not make them real" (p. 43). It could be further argued that post-positivism is consistent with social constructionist views in two important ways. First, many post-positivists would argue that the process of social construction occurs in relatively patterned ways that are amenable to the type of social scientific investigation undertaken by post-positivists. Individuals have free will and creativity but they exercise that creativity in ways that are often (though not always, certainly) patterned and predictable. In the field of mass communication, Barbara Wilson (1994) argues convincingly for this point regarding her own study of children's responses to the mass media: I believe that children's interpretations and responses are as richly individualistic as snow-flakes. However, I also believe that there are common patterns that characterize a majority of young viewers and that those patterns are as predictable and explainable as the basic process by which all those unique snowflakes are formed from water, (p. 25) Second, many post-positivists would argue that social constructions are regularly reified and treated as objective by actors in the social world. Thus, it is reasonable to study the impact of these reified constructions on our communicative lives. Tompkins (1997) has made this argument with regard to his organizational communication research with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA): The engineers, scientists, managers, bureau-crats, and other kinds of members did not believe in a socially constructed world. They believed the rockets they made did in fact go to the moon. Moreover, they believed that NASA and the contractor firms who worked for them were real. They believed that these organizations could succeed or fail by objective criteria and that their bosses could hire or fire, reward or penalize individuals—actions with real consequences, (p. 369) Thus, a social constructionist ontology is consistent with a post-positivist position that emphasizes both the patterned nature of the social construction process and the regular and predictable effects that reified social constructions have on social actors. Thus, the ontology of post-positivism is not necessarily the belief in a hard, immutable, and unchanging social world implied in a strict realist stance. Rather, a post-positivist ontology entails a belief in regularity and pattern in our interactions with others. The ways in which these regularities and patterns are studied within post-positivist theory are considered in the next section.

#### Advocating for material rapprochement with Iran is key to challenge racist discourse that demonizes Iran

Richman 13 [Sheldon Richman is vice president and editor at The Future of Freedom Foundation in Fairfax, Va. (www.fff.org). OCTOBER 10, 2013 The War Caucus The Ongoing Demonization of Iran http://www.counterpunch.org/2013/10/10/the-ongoing-demonization-of-iran/]

So, despite overtures from the new Iranian president, Hassan Rouhani, Iran’s regime must still be demonized as a group of religious fanatics — mad mullahs — who cannot be reasoned with and who want nothing more than to lob nuclear warheads at the United States and Israel. Nonsense. Over a decade ago, Iran’s leaders made credible offers of cooperation with the United States that included peace with Israel. In fact, after the 9/11 attacks, the Iranian government tried to cooperate with the Bush administration on a number of fronts. The two sides actually began working together at the end of 2001, until hawkish American officials put a stop to it, as reporter Gareth Porter explained in 2006. Thus, Rouhani’s current efforts are not a “charm offensive” — as they are prejudicially labeled even by the media — but rather a renewal of Iran’s wish for détente. We rarely hear about the previous offers, perhaps because they conflict with the mainstream media’s dominant narrative of Iran as an implacable threat. Apparently those who want war with Iran — the neoconservatives, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, the members of Congress beholden to AIPAC, and the government of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu — make better news copy than would-be peacemakers. Too bad. War would be catastrophic. Let’s remember that the Islamic Republic of Iran arose only after a U.S.-backed despotism was overthrown in 1979. Rather than seeking to make amends for what had been inflicted on the Iranians, successive U.S. administrations worked to isolate and subvert Iran until a more pliant regime could be installed. Diplomats who favored rapprochement were ignored or marginalized — which suited the leaders of Israel, Saudi Arabia, and other Sunni Arab regimes allied with the United States. (Iran is dominated by Shi’ite Muslims, the sectarian rivals of the Sunnis.)

#### Academic debates about alternative policy strategies towards Iran are crucial to demonstrate the potential of cooperative diplomacy. The alternative cedes debates to neoconservatives who ensure continued policy failure and violence in the Middle East and beyond.

Ingram 13 [1. Paul Ingram is the Executive Director of the British American Security Information Council (BASIC), based in London and Washington (since 2007). He leads the UK Trident Commission secretariat in London, and BASIC’s work on the Middle East (Iran, Egypt, the Gulf States, and the WMD Free Zone initiative) and on NATO’s nuclear posture. He presented a peak-time weekly TV talk-show on global strategic issues on IRINN (domestic Iranian TV), for five years (2007-2012), and visited Iran several times in that period. He also taught at the UK National School of Government on their Top Management Programme (2007-2012). He has published a number of articles through BASIC, and other international media, available through the BASIC website: http://www.basicint.org/people/Paul-Ingram 2. Seyed Hossein Mousavian is a Research Scholar at the Program on Science and Global Security. He is a former diplomat who served as Iran’s Ambassador to Germany (1990-1997), head of the Foreign Relations Committee of Iran’s National Security Council (1997-2005) and as spokesman for Iran in its nuclear negotiations with the European Union (2003-5). He has taught at Islamic Azad University (Tehran), served as Vice President of Iran’s official Center for Strategic Research (Tehran) and was the editor in chief of the Tehran Times. Mousavian earned a PhD in international relations from the University of Kent in the U.K. His research focuses on options for resolving the crisis over Iran’s nuclear program through diplomacy and improving US-Iran relations. His most recent book is: The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: A Memoir, 2012, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 612 pages. A list of other recent publications are available here: http://www.princeton.edu/sgs/facultystaff/ seyed-hossein-mousavian/ Finding a way out of the nuclear dispute with Iran: back to basics Paul Ingram1 and Hossein Mousavian2 October 2013, http://www.basicint.org/sites/default/files/ingrammousavian-iranbacktobasics-2013\_1.pdf]

Conclusions: think positive Outcomes in the Middle East are dominated by pessimists who assume the worst of their competitors and more powerful external actors. We assume that because the region has been beset by conflict and bloodshed that this will always be the case. Our imagination and our optimism is stifled. Given the history and the depths of distrust, this is hardly surprising, and sometimes those assumptions are wellfounded. But every so often events can surprise us in positive ways, and Iran’s recent election should be doing just that right now. We have the freedom to escape the apparent traps we think we are in, and find new approaches that better meet our objectives to strengthen security and manage power relationships. We are not starting from scratch. Many years of diplomatic effort have gone into developing nonproliferation regimes, and a majority of states in the Middle East have ratified them. But their indefinite support cannot be taken for granted, when others in the region break those norms with impunity. It is better to work with the grain, recognize the rights that go with membership of these regimes, and cooperate with states that are developing dual-use technology to strengthen inspection and verification procedures. This is what President Rouhani is likely to be asking when he presents Iran’s package of proposals on the nuclear file, and we would do well to heed him. People view the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran with alarm. And quite right, it would be a major step backwards for everyone’s security and risk sparking a destabilizing arms race that can only lead to the use of nuclear weapons in the end, bar a miracle. But the approach taken by many members of the international community only serves to bestow upon nuclear weapons a power they do not naturally possess, and thereby unintentionally encourages this proliferation. It is time to change the tune of nuclear deterrence. This can best be done by the nuclear weapon states moving away from an ‘us-and-them’ strategy of technology denial while remaining attached to their own arsenals. Coercing Iran to give up its civilian nuclear power ambitions for fear they could be used to acquire the magic the nuclear weapon states claim for themselves will be a self-defeating strategy. If nuclear deterrence actually has the value many ascribe to it, then nuclear proliferation is inevitable, and with it, the eventual use of nuclear weapons. The U.S. intelligence community’s latest combined National Intelligence Estimate finds that Iran has no nuclear bomb, has not diverted fissile material, nor recently engaged in efforts to weaponize its capabilities, and has not yet made any decision to do so. The case against Iran is based upon fear of the possibilities rather than any legitimate proof of intention to break out of its NPT responsibilities. The same cannot be said of some other NPT members and their Treaty responsibilities. 43 years after the NPT came into force and 23 years after the end of the Cold War, the five nuclear weapon states, with over 20,000 nuclear warheads held among them, still act as if the Treaty gives them some form of indefinite legitimacy in their possession, and show little intent to engage in serious disarmament (beyond reductions in the numbers of warheads). India, Pakistan and Israel are allowed to develop their nuclear arsenals outside the NPT and thus severely undermine the Treaty, sometimes under the protection and implicit support of the United States (Israel), or where penalties are shallow and brief, only for the state to be accepted later into the nuclear club (India). It is time to open up a global cross-cultural and honest strategic dialogue about the role of nuclear deterrence in the twenty-first century, and the damage it does to the national security both of states targeted by nuclear weapons, and those engaged in the targeting. We need officials, analysts and academics to come together from the states with nuclear weapons and those with the potential capabilities to develop them to address this issue not just from a moral, legalistic or idealistic disarmament and non-proliferation angle, though this is indeed an important dimension, but also from a hardnosed military utility angle, and from an angle of safety and security. It is also important to consider the humanitarian impacts of the use of nuclear weapons, as this would serve to better underline just how unusable they are. We need to have a more honest debate around how the current strategy pursued by the international community is unintentionally driving Iranian responses that further deepen international suspicions. But we also need to discuss more openly why the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran would dramatically and directly undermine Iranian security and Iranian soft power amongst the constituencies it cares about. The possession of nuclear weapons is not a national right, whether that state is in or out of the NPT, of whatever status. The universal norm against the use of nuclear weapons has been building up over the decades, particularly since the end of the Cold War. We need to extend that norm to possession by any state. The security impact from possession and thus threat is international, and is an important but under-recognized block to the essential cooperative diplomacy required to address all the great global issues of our time – such as the management of ecosystems under pressure from growing populations and ever-increasing consumption, rising pollution, financial stress, poverty and migration.

#### Reality and law are coproductive. Changing our thinking about law helps to reconstitute the material realities that we live in.

Jane Baron, Law @ Temple – Beasley School of Law, 2003 (“Romancing the Real.” 57 U. Miami L. Rev. 573 lexis)

Yet, imagine that what Gordon said were true. There would be an easily discernable point to doing what we legal academics (and isn't Schlag one of us?) do. If legal conceptions and the social world were connected in some way, then thinking about law would also be a way of thinking about the material world, and trying to change the way we think about law - for instance, to use my earlier example, trying to convince people that property need not be modeled on ownership but on obligation - would be a way of trying to change the material world. Questioning what legal doctrine foregrounds and backgrounds, n46 revealing "nested oppositions" in legal rules, n47 and all manner of similar analyses [\*587] of the patterns and structure of standard legal argumentation, including the kinds of analyses Schlag himself has so often performed (consider The Empty Circles of Liberal Justification n48), would, or could, at least potentially be useful; if we could see and make others see how we ourselves artificially "froze" reality, we could unfreeze it. n49 At the very least, we could begin to think about changing it because we would no longer be victims of belief in reality's immutability. n50 Twenty-plus years of engaging in various versions of this practice have revealed how much more complicated all this is than it originally seemed. From Stanley Fish we learned how silly it might be to envision standing outside one's own structures of belief in order to change them. n51 From feminists and critical race theorists we learned that "we" might not be "we," but multiple intersecting and overlapping "we's" with potentially differing interests and engagements. n52 From law and society folks we learned to question whether there was any relation between lawyers' and judges' ideas about law and actual social practices; if there was little relation to begin with, changes in legal consciousness (even if "we" could actually effect such changes) would be unlikely to have much impact on everyday behaviors. n53 None of this proves that legal change and social change are impossible, only that effecting social change through law is considerably more difficult and chancy than first had been thought. One could see, however, why it might be worth trying to solve (or work around) the problems: thinking about law would still be a way - perhaps now a more nuanced, humbled way - of trying to fix what was wrong with the world. This strategy would not work, of course, if "the world" is intractably out there, isolated from and immune to thought. That is exactly as Schlag presents the world in those excerpts and in the lists culled from them. The question is why, knowing better - that is, having no illusions about a pure factuality unmediated by perspective or shaping - Schlag would choose to portray "reality" that way.

#### Academic debate over war powers is critical to contest interventionism and improve policy making

Stephen M. Walt 11, Professor of International Affairs at Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, July 21, “International Affairs and the Public Sphere”, http://publicsphere.ssrc.org/walt-international-affairs-and-the-public-sphere/

Academics can make at least three distinct contributions to public discourse on global affairs. First, although the digital revolution has made a wealth of information from around the world accessible on a near real-time basis, most of us still lack both extensive direct data on events in far-flung areas and the background knowledge necessary to understand what new developments mean. If our town’s school district is troubled or the local economy is suffering, we can observe that for ourselves and make reasonably well-informed judgments about what might be done about it. But if the issue is the war in Afghanistan, an uprising in Yemen, a naval confrontation in the South China Sea or the prospects that some battered economy will be bailed out successfully, most of us will lack the factual knowledge or conceptual understanding to know what is really going on. Even when basic information is readily available, it may be hard for most of us to put it in the appropriate context or make sense of what it means. ¶ When citizens and leaders seek to grasp the dizzying complexity of modern world politics, therefore, they must inevitably rely upon the knowledge and insights of specialists in military affairs, global trade and finance, diplomatic/international historians, area experts, and many others. And that means relying at least in part on academic scholars who have devoted their careers to mastering various aspects of world affairs and whose professional stature has been established through the usual procedures of academic evaluation (e.g., peer review, confidential assessments by senior scholars, the give-and-take of scholarly debate, etc.). ¶ Second, and more importantly, an independent academic community is an essential counterweight to official efforts to shape public understanding of key foreign policy issues. Governments enjoy enormous information asymmetries in many areas of political life, but these advantages are especially pronounced when dealing with international affairs.[5] Much of what we know about the outside world is ultimately derived from government sources (especially when dealing with national security affairs), and public officials often go to considerable lengths to shape how that information is reported to the public. Not only do governments collect vast amounts of information about the outside world, but they routinely use secrecy laws to control public access to this information. Government officials can shape public beliefs by leaking information strategically, or by co-opting sympathetic journalists whose professional success depends in part on maintaining access to key officials.[6] Given these information asymmetries and their obvious interest in retaining public support for their preferred policies, it is hardly surprising that both democratic and non-democratic leaders use their privileged access to information to build support for specific policies, at times by telling outright lies to their own citizens.[7] ¶ This situation creates few problems when the policies being sold make good strategic sense, but the results can be disastrous when they don’t. In such cases, alternative voices are needed to challenge conventional wisdoms and official rationales, and to suggest different solutions to the problem(s) at hand. Because scholars are protected by tenure and cherish the principle of academic freedom, and because they are not directly dependent on government support for their livelihoods, they are uniquely positioned to challenge prevailing narratives and policy rationales and to bring their knowledge and training to bear on vital policy issues. If we believe that unfettered debate helps expose errors and correct missteps, thereby fostering more effective public policies, then a sophisticated, diverse and engaged scholarly community is essential to a healthy polity. ¶ Third, the scholarly world also offers a potentially valuable model of constructive political disagreement. Political discourse in many countries (and especially the United States) has become increasingly personal and ad hominem, with little attention paid to facts and logic; a trend reinforced by an increasingly competitive and loosely regulated media environment. Within academia, by contrast, even intense disputes are supposed to be conducted in accordance with established canons of logic and evidence. Ad hominem attacks and other forms of character assassination have no place in scholarly discourse and are more likely to discredit those who employ them than those who are attacked. By bringing the norms of academic discourse into the public sphere, academic scholars could help restore some of the civility that has been lost in recent years. ¶ For all of these reasons, it is highly desirable for university-based scholars to play a significant role in public discourse about key real-world issues and to engage directly with policymakers where appropriate. As I have argued elsewhere, academic research can provide policymakers with relevant factual knowledge, provide typologies and frameworks that help policymakers and citizens make sense of emerging trends, and create and test theories that leaders can use to choose among different policy instruments. Academic theories can also be useful when they help policymakers anticipate events, when they identify recurring tendencies or obstacles to success, and when they facilitate the formulation of policy alternatives and the identification of benchmarks that can guide policy evaluation. Because academic scholars are free from daily responsibility for managing public affairs, they are in an ideal position to develop new concepts and theories to help us understand a complex and changing world.[8] ¶ The picture sketched here is obviously something of an ideal type, and I am not suggesting that that the academic world consistently lives up to these expectations. As noted above, university-based scholars of international affairs—and especially the disciplines of political science and history—have increasingly focused on narrow and arcane topics and are contributing less and less to policy formation or public discourse.[9] And when academics do address topics of obvious policy relevance or public interest, the results are often presented in impenetrable, jargon-ridden prose and disseminated in venues that neither policymakers nor the public are likely to read. Even when scholars have something useful to say, in short, their tendency to “speaking in tongues” diminishes their impact on the public sphere**.** ¶Why Is There a Gap between Academia and the Public Sphere?¶ To some degree, the gap between the ivory tower and the world of policy arises because the two spheres have different agendas and operate under different incentives and constraints. Academics focus on developing generalizations and testing conjectures as rigorously as possible, while policymakers and the public are often preoccupied with individual cases (i.e., whatever is in the headlines or in a policymaker’s in-tray). Thus, scholars are delighted whenever they identify a powerful general tendency, but policymakers may be more interested in figuring out how to overcome that general tendency or worried that the case at hand might be an exception to it. Academics strive to make their work as accurate as possible, even if this takes more time, but policymakers cannot always wait until a complete analysis is possible.[10] To take a recent example, policymakers in the Obama administration had to respond to the 2011 “Arab Spring” long before anyone fully understood what was driving these events or where they might lead. Given these different agendas, it is not surprising that policymakers often find academic scholarship to be of less value than the scholars who produce it might wish.

# 2ac Cards

#### To win the negative must disprove the desirability of the aff

#### Burden of rejoinder—if the negative does not disprove the desirability of the aff, they have not effectively negated us and you have no reason to vote neg

#### Using pedagogical institutions to make prescriptions for change prevents docile acceptance of oppression. Evaluating the likely consequences of our prescriptions shapes successful social change.

Susan Carle, Law @ American University, 2005 (“Theorizing Agency.” 55 Am. U.L. Rev. 307 lexis)

Precisely because he believed in the power of human agency, Dewey devoted a great deal of his writing to developing prescriptions for change in response to the issues of his times. It is worth quickly surveying some of those prescriptions here because they help illuminate the relationship between Dewey’s theory of the self and his overall philosophic system. Dewey’s deliberative theory ties elegantly into his theory of democracy, which in turn displays an ascetically pleasing “fit”274 with his pedagogical vision. Dewey’s political theory is a large topic, to which he devoted much writing but to which I can give only passing attention. Suffice it to say that Dewey passionately believed in the virtues of democracy; indeed, Dewey scholars have described democracy as Dewey’s deepest preoccupation— the underlying passion that motivated him in his prolific output.275 Unlike philosophers such as John Rawls, however, Dewey uncoupled democracy from the institutions of Western capitalism, and was intensely critical of capitalism as he saw it developing in his lifetime. To Dewey, capitalism spelled economic inequality, which was anathema to his vision of democracy based in local deliberative processes.276 Dewey saw education as the process through which children would acquire the habits that would allow them to become members of a democracy, well equipped for the kind of reflective thought and deliberation that democracy required.277 Thus, education was for Dewey a fundamental method of social progress and reform.278 For this reason, Dewey, unlike most modern philosophers, gave pedagogy a central place in his philosophy. Dewey saw education as the scientific laboratory in which the ideas of pragmatism would be put to the test of experience.279 To Dewey, the ability to engage in good deliberative judgment—to exercise clear foresight on ethical as well as instrumental matters—was a habit that could and should be cultivated through education. Thus Dewey thought that education should not be a “succession of studies but the development of new attitudes towards, and new interests in, experience.”280 No relativist on matters concerning his own place and time, Dewey denounced the “inert stupid quality of current customs,” which “perverts learning into a willingness to follow where others point the way, into conformity, constriction, surrender of scepticism and experiment.”281 In lieu of teaching to new generations habits that represent such “enslavement to old ruts,”282 Dewey wanted to inculcate better habits—“flexible, sensitive” ones that could grow “more varied, more adaptable by practice and use.”283 These, in turn, were the habits Dewey identified as necessary for democracy to succeed. Here, the contrasts with Stanley Fish are stark. Fish, as we have seen, argues that teaching methods of critical analysis to students does not change practice outside the classroom.284 Practice in the world outside the classroom and the doing of theory proceed on two unrelated planes. Dewey, conversely, repudiated the separation of theory and practice as a false dualism, arguing that those who espouse theory for theory’s sake are in fact espousing “two kinds of practice.”285 Moreover, he argued, “[t]hose who wish a monopoly of social power find desirable the separation of habit and thought” because this “dualism enables them to do the thinking and planning, while others remain the docile . . . instruments of execution.”286 Thus, for Dewey, theory was a form of practice in the world that had great potential to fuel political and social change, and the decision to do and teach theory as a practice separate from political and social issues was a political decision with particular normative consequences—namely, the promotion of political disengagement and apathy.287

#### **War turns patriarchy**

Goldstein 1

Joshua S. Goldstein (prof of IR @ American U, Wash D.C.) ‘1 War and Gender: How Gender Shapes the War System and Vice Versa. Cambridge University Press. pp. 412  
First, peace activists face a dilemma in thinking about causes of war and working for peace. Many peace scholars and activists support the approach, “if you want peace, work for justice.” Then, if one believes that sexism contributes to war, one can work for gender justice specifically (perhaps among others) in order to pursue peace. This approach brings strategic allies to the peace movement (women, labor, minorities), but rests on the assumption that injustices cause war. The evidence in this book suggests that causality runs at least as strongly the other way. War is not a product of capitalism, imperialism, gender, innate aggression, or any other single cause, although these influence wars’ outbreaks and outcomes. Rather, war has in part fueled and sustained these and other injustices. So, “if you want peace, work for peace.” Indeed, if you want justice (gender and others), work for peace. Causality does not run just upward through the levels of analysis, from types of individuals, societies, and governments up to war. It runs downward too. Enloe suggests that changes in attitudes towards war and the military may be the most important way to “reverse women’s oppression.” The dilemma is that peace work focused on justice brings to the peace movement energy, allies, and moral grounding, yet, in light of this book’s evidence, the emphasis on injustice as the main cause of war seems to be empirically inadequate.10

#### Case is a link turn—the threat of invasion is a violent politics based in gendered and orientalist assumptions about Iran and nuclear proliferation

Simon Dalby, Prof. of Geog @ Carleton Univ., 2/14/9 [Paper for presentation to the International Studies Association workshop on Arms Control, http://http-server.carleton.ca/~sdalby/papers/Critical%20Geographies%20of%20Arms%20Control.pdf]

Looking at American political relations with Tehran (see Sick 2009), it appears that this isn’t so much evangelism as a master narrative of the authoritarian pedagog. Its a matter of discipline and punishment, an insistence that Tehran submit to American dictates on nuclear matters; the recalcitrant child, banished to the corner of the classroom, is repeatedly being admonished to admit the error of his ways, and renounce his attempts to challenge the teacher’s authority. Banishment, shame and shunning, the sanctions regime, is backed by repeated threats to use force to make the errant child abandon its stubborn refusal to adjust its behaviour and submit to American authority. The cane has not (yet?) been administered, but clearly this coercive mode of biopolitics is about punishment,and about what is known in the strange world of international politics as“credibility**”.** It all presupposes American pre-eminence in an unruly world where teacher knows best, and violence remainsa last resort to discipline the errant child and coerce them into willing obedience. Not surprisingly Iranian national pride refuses to accept such attempts to discipline it, especially when its professions of nuclear innocence are so flatly rejected in Washington. In so far as the focus on Tehran and its nuclear program are part of an agenda of unilateral arms control, then given the other much more pressing issues which are not getting attention in the region in particular and more generally elsewhere this form of arms control is a distraction from the pressing priorities that need attention

#### only reformism sticks

Wright, 07 [Erik Olin, Vilas Distinguished Professor of Sociology at the University of Wisconsin, “Guidelines for Envisioning Real Utopias”, Soundings, April, [www.ssc.wisc.edu/~wright/Published%20writing/Guidelines-soundings.pdf](http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~wright/Published%20writing/Guidelines-soundings.pdf)]

5. Waystations The final guideline for discussions of envisioning real utopias concerns the importance of waystations. The central problem of envisioning real utopias concerns the viability of institutional alternatives that embody emancipatory values**,** but the practical achievability of such institutional designs often **depends upon the existence of smaller steps**, intermediate institutional innovations that move us in the right direction but only partially embody these values**.** Institutional proposals which have an **all-or-nothing quality** to them are both **less likely to be adopted in the first place, and may pose more difficult transition-cost problems** if implemented**.** The catastrophic experience of Russia in the “shock therapy” approach to market reform is historical testimony to this problem. Waystations are a difficult theoretical and practical problem because there are many instances in which partial reforms may have very different consequences than full- bodied changes. Consider the example of unconditional basic income. Suppose that a very limited, below-subsistence basic income was instituted: not enough to survive on, but a grant of income unconditionally given to everyone. One possibility is that this kind of basic income would act mainly as a subsidy to employers who pay very low wages, since now they could attract more workers even if they offered below poverty level earnings. There may be good reasons to institute such wage subsidies, but they would not generate the positive effects of a UBI, and therefore might not function as a stepping stone. What we ideally want**, therefore,** are intermediate reforms that have two main properties: **first,** they concretely demonstrate the virtues of the fuller program of transformation, so they contribute to the ideological battle of **convincing people that the alternative is credible and desirable; and second,** they **enhance the capacity for action of people**, increasing their ability to push further in the future. Waystations that increase popular participation and **bring people together in problem-solving deliberations** for collective purposes are particularly salient in this regard**.** This is what in the 1970s was called “nonreformist reforms”**:** reforms that are **possible within existing institutions** and that **pragmatically solve real problems** while at the same time empowering people in ways which **enlarge their scope of action in the future.**

#### Alt doesn’t solve-coalitional politics key

Mac Third Wave 5 “Across the Kitchen Table” *Mac Third Wave*; September 22, 2005; http://macthirdwave.blogspot.com/2005/09/across-kitchen-table.html

While lesbian separatists make up a large portion of feminists, it is a very “narrow” form of politics. “There is no way that one oppressed group is going to topple a system by itself. Forming principled coalitions around specific issues is very important” (p. 126). To Barbara, instead of it being a “radical” point of view, it is somewhat closed-minded because instead of embracing differences and joining together with other groups of oppressed peoples, they set themselves apart from the rest of the social and civil rights movement. “I feel it is radical to be dealing with race and sex and class and sexual identity all at one time…. I think there is a difference between being extreme and being radical” (p. 127).

#### Their politics is privileged and racist—makes any affront to racism impossible

Smith & Smith 83 Barbara & Beverly, sisters and black lesbian feminists; “Across the Kitchen Table A Sister-to-Sister Dialogue” *This Bridge Called My Back: Writings by Radical Women of Color* Kitchen Table: Women of Color Press; New York; 1983

Is a lesbian separatist position inherently racist? Is this position a ¶ viable political position to take? ¶ Bar: As we said in our collective statement (Combahee) I think we ¶ have real questions because separatism seems like such a narrow kind of politics and also because it seems to be only viably practiced by ¶ women who have certain kinds of privilege: white-skinned privilege, ¶ class privilege. Women who don't have those kinds of privilege have to ¶ deal with this society and with the institutions of this society. They ¶ can't go to a harbor of many acres of land, and farm, and invite the goddess. Women of color are very aware that racism is not gender specific ¶ and that it affects all people of color. We have experiences that have ¶ nothing to do with being female, but are nonetheless experiences of ¶ deep oppression. . .and even violence. Bev: Maybe the reason that white women got into lesbian separatism was because in being separatist they were separating themselves ¶ from white men, given how there is so much oppression in this world ¶ currently that white men have visited on people. In some ways they ¶ felt that they had to separate themselves from white men to even have ¶ a fighting chance. ¶ Bar: So seldom is separatism involved in making real political ¶ change, affecting the institutions in the society in any direct way. If ¶ you define certain movement issues as straight women's issues, for ¶ example reproductive rights and sterilization abuse, then these identifiable sexual/political issues are ones you are not going to bother with. ¶ We have noticed howr¶ separatists in our area, instead of doing political ¶ organizing, often do zap acts. For example they might come to a ¶ meeting or series of meetings then move on their way. It is not clear ¶ what they're actually trying to change. We sometimes think of ¶ separatism as the politics without a practice. ¶ Bev: One of the problems of separatism is that I can't see it as a philosophy that explains and analyzes the roots of all oppression and is ¶ going to go toward solving it. I think it has some validity in a more ¶ limited sphere. To begin to talk about being separate from men is ¶ viable. It has some worthwhile aspects. ¶ Bar: Many lesbians are separatists in that sense. You are very aware ¶ of the choice - that in being a lesbian you understand that you really ¶ don't need men to define your identity, your sexuality, to make your ¶ life meaningful or simply to have a good time. That doesn't necessarily ¶ mean that you have no comprehension of the oppressions that you ¶ share with men. And you see white women with class privilege don't ¶ share oppression with white men. They're in a critical and antagonistic position whereas Black women and other women of color ¶ definitely share oppressed situations with men of their race. ¶ What white lesbians have against lesbians of color is that they ¶ accuse us of being "male identified" because we are concerned with ¶ issues that affect our whole race. They express anger at us for not seeing the light. That is another aspect of how they carry on their racism. ¶ They are so narrow and adamant about that that they dismiss lesbians ¶ of color and women of color who aren't lesbians because we have ¶ some concern about what happens to the men of our race. And it's not ¶ like we like their sexism or even want to sleep with them. You can certainly be concerned as we are living here this summer in Boston when ¶ one Black man after another ends up dead.\*

That implicates their knowledge production and is a moral side constraint

Memmi 99

Albert Memmi**,** Professor Emeritus of Sociology at the University of Paris, 1999 (*Racism*, Published by the University of Minnesota Press, ISBN 0816631654, p. 163-165)

The struggle against racism will be long, difficult, without intermission, without remission, probably never achieved. Yet, for this very reason, it is a struggle to be undertaken without surcease and without concessions. One cannot be indulgent toward racism; one must not even let the monster in the house, especially not in a mask. To give it merely a foothold means to augment the bestial part in us and in other people, which is to diminish what is human. *To accept the racist universe to the slightest degree is to endorse fear, injustice, and violence*. It is to accept the persistence of the dark [end page 163] history in which we still largely live. It is to agree that the outsider will always be a possible victim (and which man is not himself an outsider relative to someone else?). Racism illustrates, in sum, the inevitable negativity of the condition of the dominated; that is, it illuminates in a certain sense the entire human condition. The anti-racist struggle, difficult though it is, and always in question, is nevertheless one of the prologues to the ultimate passage from animality to humanity. In that sense, we cannot fail to rise to the racist challenge. However, it remains true that one's moral conduct only emerges from a choice; one has to want it. It is a choice among other choices, and always debatable in its foundations and its consequences. Let us say, broadly speaking, that the choice to conduct oneself morally is the condition for the establishment of a human order, for which racism is the very negation. This is almost a redundancy. One cannot found a moral order, let alone a legislative order, on racism, because racism signifies the exclusion of the other, and his or her subjection to violence and domination. From an ethical point of view, if one can deploy a little religious language, racism is "the truly capital sin."22 It is not an accident that almost all of humanity's spiritual traditions counsel respect for the weak, for orphans, widows, or strangers. It is not just a question of theoretical morality and disinterested commandments. Such unanimity in the safeguarding of the other suggests the real utility of such sentiments. All things considered, we have an interest in [end page 164] banishing injustice, because injustice engenders violence and death. Of course, this is debatable. There are those who think that if one is strong enough, the assault on and oppression of others is permissible. But no one is ever sure of remaining the strongest. One day, perhaps, the roles will be reversed. All unjust society contains within itself the seeds of its own death. It is probably smarter to treat others with respect so that they treat you with respect. "Recall," says the Bible, "that you were once a stranger in Egypt," which means both that you ought to respect the stranger because you were a stranger yourself and that you risk becoming one again someday. It is an ethical and a practical appeal--indeed, it is a contract, however implicit it might be. In short, *the refusal of racism is the condition for all theoretical and practical morality*. Because, in the end, the ethical choice commands the political choice, a just society must be a society accepted by all. If this contractual principle is not accepted, then only conflict, violence, and destruction will be our lot. If it is accepted, we can hope someday to live in peace. True, it is a wager, but the stakes are irresistible.

#### The alt makes change impossible and leaves heterosexual women struggling with sterilization abuse and reproductive rights issues high and dry

Smith & Smith 83 Barbara & Beverly, sisters and black lesbian feminists; “Across the Kitchen Table A Sister-to-Sister Dialogue” *This Bridge Called My Back: Writings by Radical Women of Color* Kitchen Table: Women of Color Press; New York; 1983

So seldom is separatism involved in making real political ¶ change, affecting the institutions in the society in any direct way. If ¶ you define certain movement issues as straight women's issues, for ¶ example reproductive rights and sterilization abuse, then these identifiable sexual/political issues are ones you are not going to bother with. ¶ We have noticed howr¶ separatists in our area, instead of doing political ¶ organizing, often do zap acts. For example they might come to a ¶ meeting or series of meetings then move on their way. It is not clear ¶ what they're actually trying to change. We sometimes think of ¶ separatism as the politics without a practice.

#### Their ontology of gender cannot account for transbodies—makes gendered violence inevitable

Suzan 10 pioneer transsexual activist; “Naked Hatred in the Name of Radical Feminism/Lesbian Separatism” *Women Born Transsexual*; November 30, 2010; http://womenborntranssexual.com/2010/11/30/naked-hatred-in-the-name-of-radical-feminim-lesbian-separatism/

¶ Since the late 1960s/early 1970s there has been a certain faction that has self defined as radical feminist/lesbian separatists that thrives on viciously attacking women born transsexual or transgender.¶ ¶ Since 1970 I have seen one sister in particular, Beth Elliott, bear the brunt of these episodic attacks of unmitigated hatred.¶ ¶ Beth is about the same age I am. We met on a couple of occasions in the early 1970s. My impression of her was that she looked like the typical hippie chick of that era, the same way I did.¶ ¶ Thus all the smears about some sort of exaggerated fembot presentation are pretty much lie based.¶ ¶ I share something else with Beth Elliott. At different times we both were part of the Lesbian Tide Collective. She was there at the beginning, I was there at the end.¶ ¶ It is to the credit of the other women of the Tide Collective that we were judged in a way that treated us like honest human beings. We were accepted as women, feminist and lesbians.¶ ¶ Therefore I was deeply saddened by a report by Monica Roberts on TransGriot: http://transgriot.blogspot.com/2010/11/rad-fems-still-letting-transhate-flow.html that someone named BevJo is rehashing the faith based hatred expounded by Mary Daly, Janice Raymond and Sheila Jeffries.¶ ¶ Yesterday I put up a post about transsexuals who hate other transsexuals and use the same sort of language used by BevJo, which is in turn the same language used by Porno Pete La Barbera and the rest of the Christo-Fascists so aptly labeled as hate groups by Southern Poverty Law Center.¶ ¶ Some of the strangest forms of attack upon Beth in the article referenced by Ms. Roberts, which may be read at: http://tinyurl.com/2d3lyoj are the physical appearance based ad hominems based on hair length and looking like heterosexual women are supposed to look. As an aside, when I moved to Texas I found my lesbian version of gaydar was thrown out of whack by meeting a lot of women who looked like stereotypical dykes but who were heterosexual women with ranches and horses.¶ ¶ While women like BevJo are a minority within the lesbian community their hatred has a corrosive effect on those sisters targeted.¶ ¶ For one thing it makes it hard for women whose lives have been impacted by transsexualism or transgenderism to be out and honest when doing so can result in brutal hate based attacks. Therefore when we work on feminist/lesbian issues we keep our mouths shut out of fear that simply saying transsexualism/transgenderism is also a feminist issue will cause us to be subjected to the same sort of brutal attacks we have seen others receive.¶ ¶ The hatred we are subjected to is also a form of misogyny.¶ ¶ Julia Serano’s Whipping Girl: A Transsexual Woman on Sexism and the Scapegoating of Femininity offers an excellent analysis of how “transphobia” is really a form of misogyny.¶ ¶ I have seen this as being part of the reason why those of us who were assigned male at birth and transition to female are treated with far more contempt and bigotry than those who were assigned female at birth and transition to male. Those who transition to male are seen as moving up the social ladder whereas those who transition to female are viewed as moving down that same social ladder.¶ ¶ There is no room in an absolutist male/female binary paradigm for those who are outside that paradigm. This is a position that is at odds with the idea of maleness and femaleness being a preponderance of traits that results in society treating a person in a manner that socializes them into approved masculine or feminine roles.¶ ¶ Prior to coming out and telling people I was transsexual I was chastised for physical traits and ways of acting that were deemed feminine. When I came out those same aspects of my being were reinforced in a positive manner and fear of being seen as feminine was replaced with fear of being seen as masculine.¶ ¶ This isn’t a novel observation. We observed it in our groups in the early 1970 and I heard the same thing in groups 30 years later. The more one is treated as a woman by society the more woman one becomes.¶ ¶ I honestly think that what bothers these “Radical Feminists” is the way in which we disturb their theological paradigm of there being some sort of total difference between men and women rather than a continuum.¶ ¶ There is no difference between these people and the Christo-fascists who attack LGBT/TQ people as well as oppress women.¶ ¶ They are radical in the same sense their spiritual kin the Klu Klux Klan and Aryan Nation are radical and they are wrong on every level.¶ ¶ Their very arguments display the depth of their errors of thinking. They so often double bind women with transsexualism or transgenderism.¶ ¶ If we like men our motivation for getting SRS is to slavishly serve them and to seduce unsuspecting men into having sex with us and turn them gay. We can do this because we have invisible magic male chromosomes that will some how turn these men gay. Or maybe it is because our sex parts were changed from male to female and still contain male cooties even though both male and female sex parts grow from the same set of cells depending on hormone levels and their interactions with genetic switches that guide development.¶ ¶ Men use the deception excuse as rational for murdering us. Even when they meet us in trans-bars that are clearly identified as such. Or in courtroom where we were called before a judge who used our birth name.¶ ¶ This is the same mindset that labels our boyfriends as gay even when our relationships are heterogendered and the pre-op sister has the same forms of non-vaginal sex with her partner that assigned female at birth women often use. Hormone shrunken parts or surgically reassigned parts must have magical powers if they can make a straight man gay.¶ ¶ But as I said one cannot win with bigots.¶ ¶ If one is influenced by the heterosexual socialization that is used to sell clothing and insecurity to heterosexual women then one is perpetuating stereotypes and acting as a tool of the patriarchy to oppress women.¶ ¶ If we like women our motivation for getting SRS is to seduce lesbians into having sex with us and rape them with our vaginas. Because if we can get them to have sex with us our magic invisible all powerful chromosomes will make them straight. Of course our only possible motivation for changing the sex we were assigned at birth is to act as tools of the patriarchy to seduce lesbians away from the path of true lesbianism with our all powerful chromosomal cooties.¶ ¶ Now here’s where it gets strange. If we dress like our heterosexual peers we are perpetuating sexist stereotypes. But if we dress and act just like our dyke peers we are somehow infiltrating them to pollute them.¶ ¶ I won’t respect this mindset by calling it transphobia. It is hatred and bigotry pure and simple.¶ ¶ It comes out of the same ideological mind set as racism and anti-Semitism. Or the Taliban Christian mind set that demonizes gay and lesbian people.¶ ¶ But I will go one step further.¶ ¶ Bigots like BevJo can rot in their own pool of puss and hateful venom…¶ ¶ I would rather be part of the general Left. A tree hugging dyke with another WBT life partner.¶ ¶ Together we support our causes which do not include dealing with people like BevJo.¶ ¶ Generally speaking this bigotry is somewhat anachronistic. As more and more TS/TG women and men have come out people have seen how we are as varied as cis-sex/gender folks.¶ ¶ Transsexual/transgender men and women are not the enemy. Many of us, perhaps more than the general population, support feminism, anti-racism and a variety of progressive causes. But like the general public some of us do not.¶ ¶ But the most ironic thing of all is how women like BevJo sound identical in their bigotry to a group one of the frequent commentators to this blog has labeled the “transsexual sisters of purity” i.e. the Classic Transsexual/HBS” set.¶ ¶ I guess that, in and of itself, is indicative of the class of criticism spewing forth from this self appointed set of “radical lesbian feminists”. They have achieved sameness with Christo-Fascists and self-hating transsexuals who have decided they are the only real transsexuals.¶ ¶ Even more interesting is how the biggest spewer of this bigotry on the Michigan Womyn’s Music Festival Chat board (One Down) was exposed as having been born transsexual herself. She was using bigotry to throw suspicion away from herself.¶ ¶ I can only wonder how many of the other radical lesbian separatists are in fact using their bigoted rants to hide having been transsexuals themselves?¶ ¶ If the bullshit from the Classic Transsexual/HBS set is any indication I would bet there are more than a few.¶ ¶ I would also bet that like the loudest homo hating preachers are the most likely to be on the down low, that the loudest transsexual transgender hating people also have some secrets they are hiding.

Debating nuclear war good

**Pittock 84**

A. Barrie Pittock . Atmospheric Research Scientist, published over 200 articles, Climate Impact Group Chair, CSIRO Senior Scientist, Australian Public Service Medal Winner '84 Comment on Brian Martin's "Extinction politics" <http://www.uow.edu.au/~bmartin/pubs/84sanap.pdf>

It is unfortunate that Brian Martin, in *SANA Update* (May 1984) and elsewhere,uses **such emotive terms as "extinction politics" and "doomsday beliefs"**, which **display a lack of respect for, and a tendency to make categorical generalizations about, many and varied statements and positions about the effects of nuclear warheld by sincere and thoughtful people.**

It is ironic that Brian notes disapprovingly that "By the 1950's, a large number ofpeople had come to believe that the killing of much or all of the world'spopulation would result from global nuclear war", when in point of fact it was inthe mid-50's that the combined arsenals of the superpowers probably did reachthe level at which they were for the first time capable of causing a global climaticdisaster (Sagan, 1983). It is arrogant of scientists to dismiss people's gut feelingswhen scientists themselves were then, and may well still be, largely ignorant ofthe effects. In the face of scientific ignorance "common sense" is often a goodguide.

Brian quotes Nevil Shute's novel *On the Beach* as if it had no shred of scientificbasis, completely ignoring the explicit scenario which Shute drew up in whichlarge numbers of nuclear weapons coated with cobalt were exploded with thedeliberate intention of increasing nuclear fallout. Again, it is ironic that a recentstudy conducted at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (Knox, 1983)shows that fallout estimates for a major nuclear war have been under-estimatedby about a factor of five hitherto, and that attacks on nuclear power stations andfuel cycle installations could increase long-term fallout by another factor of ten orso.

Next Brian attacks Jonathan Schell for discussing the implications of humanextinction in *The Fate of the Earth.* Brian never acknowledges that Schell quiteexplicitly said that human extinction is not a certainty (see Schell p. 93), andignores the powerful arguments which Schell advances for regarding the merepossibility of human extinction as important. These are developed further inSchell's more recent articles in *The New Yorker* (Jan. 2 & 9, 1984).Brian then claims that the scientific basis of the ozone depletion problem has"almost entirely evaporated". In fact, while we now know that the nuclear wintereffect is almost certainly far more serious than ozone depletion, the ozonedepletion problem has not been dismissed except in so far as the trend to smallerwarheads may limit the quantity of oxides of nitrogen injected into thestratosphere by the nuclear explosions themselves. Ozone depletion could in factend up being more serious due to injections of combustion products, includingsmoke, into the stratosphere.

Brian claims that the impact on populations nearer the Equator, such as inIndia, "does not seem likely to be significant". Quite to the contrary, smoke cloudsare likely to spread into the tropics within a matter of weeks and would probablylead to below freezing temperatures for months on end. Populations and theecology in such regions are the least able to withstand such a climatic onslaughtand must be very seriously affected.

Then he says that major ecological destruction "remains speculative at present".Is he suggesting that a sudden and prolonged plunge to below freezingtemperatures, with insufficient light for photosynthesis, might have littleharmful effect, or is he denying the reality of "nuclear winter"?There have been a number of specific criticisms of the various published paperson nuclear winter, but after more than two years in print there has been nocriticism which has substantially altered the basic conclusions. The mostprominent criticism has come from John Maddox, editor of *Nature* (307, 121:1984), who completely failed to take account of the vital difference in opticalproperties of soot and volcanic dust (La Marche and Hirschboeck, 1984).Principal uncertainties exist as to the war scenarios, the fraction of soot in thesmoke, the height of injection of the smoke, the amount which would be removedby washout in the initial plumes, and the later rate of removal. In most cases thepublished papers made assumptions which tended to under-estimate the effects,especially with regard to the height of injection of the smoke and its lifetime. Twopossible exceptions are the war scenarios, in which the so-called "baseline" casemay be too large by a factor of 2, and perhaps the particle coagulation rates if theinitial plumes are not rapidly dispersed. My judgement now is that the initialeffects would be much as described in the published papers, even with a 2,000megatonne war, except that the lifetime of the effects could well turn out to beyears rather than months. I will discuss the technical details elsewhere.Brian goes on to suggest that the worst effects might be avoided by "migration tocoastal areas, away from the freezing continental temperatures", but fails torealise that the huge temperature gradients induced between the continents andoceans will cause violent storms to lash these coastal zones, which in any case arelikely to be subject to a strong outflow of cold air from the continental interiors.Brian then invokes the advantages of turning to grain rather than meat toextend "reserves of food". The fact is of course that in the event of a nuclearwinter any human survivors will have little choice but to eat whatever food isavailable, be it meat or grain. But where are there huge grain reserves sufficientto feed the survivors for one or more years, and will such reserves survive inconvenient proximity to the human survivors? Is Brian going to seriouslyadvocate creating grain reserves sufficient to feed a couple of thousand millionpeople for one or two years

**It is difficult to assess the motivation behind** Brian's **consistent bias towards dismissing the possibility of extinction**, but perhaps there is a hint at it in hisprotest that believing in such a possibility fosters resignation**. In my experience most people already feel rather helpless to influence thepolitical process - what they need in order to act politically is the motivation of feeling personally threatened or outraged to the point of anger, plus a sense of hope which we in the peace movement must provide**.The key political impact of nuclear winter and the possibility of extinction,however, lies in the way it forces proponents of reliance on nuclear weapons backon deterrence as the only possible rationalisation, and at the same time makesthe risks inherent in nuclear deterrence unacceptable to rational human beings.**There can in my view be no more radicalising realisation than that the logic of reliance on nuclear weapons leads to extinction, if not now, then some time in theforeseeable future. The possibility of extinction makes a qualitative difference to how we view nuclear weapons**.To sum up, I am in broad agreement with most of the positive things Brianadvocates here and elsewhere, but I disagree with the way he has, in my opinion,biased the evidence on the effects of nuclear war to fit his psychological theory asto what motivates people. I believe it is time he faced up to the grim realities ofnuclear war, worked through psychological denial, and gave other people creditfor being able to do likewise.

**State and fem**

**Rhode 94**

Deborah L. Rhode, Law Prof @ Stanford, April 1994, “Changing Images of the State,” 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1181, p ln

**Neither can the state be understood solely as an instrument of men's interests.** As a threshold matter, what constitutes those interests is not self-evident, as MacKinnon's own illustrations suggest. If, for example, policies liberalizing abortion serve male objectives by enhancing access to female sexuality, policies curtailing abortion presumably also serve male objectives by reducing female autonomy. n23 In effect, patriarchal frameworks verge on tautology. **Almost any gender-related policy can be seen as either directly serving men's immediate interests, or as compromising short-term concerns in the service of broader, long-term goals, such as "normalizing" the system and stabilizing power relations. A framework that can characterize all state interventions as directly or indirectly patriarchal offers little practical guidance in challenging the conditions it condemns.** And if women are not a homogenous group with unitary concerns, surely the same is true of men. Moreover, if **the state is best understood as a network of institutions with complex, sometimes competing agendas**, then the patriarchal model of single-minded instrumentalism seems highly implausible. **It is difficult to dismiss all the anti-discrimination initiatives of the last quarter century as purely counter-revolutionary strategies. And it is precisely these initiatives, with their appeal to "male" norms of "objectivity and the impersonality of procedure, that [have created**] [\*1186] **leverage for the representation of women's interests.**" n24 Cross-cultural research also suggests that **the status of women is positively correlated with a strong state, which is scarcely the relationship that patriarchal frameworks imply**. n25 While the "tyrannies" of public and private dependence are plainly related, many feminists challenge the claim that they are the same. As Carole Pateman notes, women do not "live with the state and are better able to make collective struggle against institutions than individuals." n26 To advance that struggle, **feminists need more concrete and contextual accounts of state institutions** than patriarchal frameworks have supplied. Lumping together police, welfare workers, and Pentagon officials as agents of a unitary patriarchal structure does more to obscure than to advance analysis. What seems necessary is a contextual approach that can account for greater complexities in women's relationships with governing institutions. Yet despite their limitations, patriarchal theories underscore an insight that generally informs feminist theorizing. As Part II reflects, governmental institutions are implicated in the most fundamental structures of sex-based inequality and in the strategies necessary to address it.

These tensions within the women's movement are, of course, by no means unique. **For any subordinate group, the state is a primary source of both repression and assistance in the struggle for equality. These constituencies cannot be "for" or "against" state involvement in any categorical sense. The questions are always what forms of involvement, to what ends, and who makes these decisions**. From some feminist perspectives, liberalism has failed to respond adequately to those questions because of deeper difficulties. In part, the problem stems from undue faith in formal rights. The priority granted to individual entitlements undermines the public's sense of collective responsibility. This critique has attracted its own share of criticism from within as well as from outside the feminist community. As many left feminists, including critical race theorists, have noted, **rights-based claims have played a crucial role in advancing group as well as individual interests. n32 Such claims can express desires not only for autonomy, but also for participation in the struggles that shape women's collective existence. The priority that state institutions place on rights is not in itself problematic.** The central difficulty is the limited scope and inadequate enforcement of currently recognized entitlements. Since rights-oriented campaigns can advance as well as restrict political struggle, evaluation of their strategic value demands historically-situated contextual analysis.

essentialism

Butler 99 (Judith Butler, Professor of Humanities, Johns Hopkins University, GENDER TROUBLE, 1999, 1)

For the most part, feminist theory has assumed that there is some existing identity, understood through the category of women, who not only initiates feminist interest and goals within discourse, but constitutes the subject for whom political representation is pursued. But politics and representation are controversial terms. On the one hand, representation serves as the operative term within a political process that seeks to extend visibility and legitimacy to women as political subjects: on the other hand, representation is the normative function of a language which is said either to reveal or to distort what is assumed to be true about the category of women. For feminist theory, the development of a language that fully or adequately represents women has seemed necessary to foster the political visibility of women. This has seemed obviously important considering the pervasive cultural condition in which all women’s lives were either misrepresented of not represented at all. Recently, this prevailing conception of the relation between feminist theory and politics has come under challenge from within feminist discourse. The very subject of women is no longer understood in stable or abiding terms. There is a great deal of material that not only questions the viability of “the subject” as the ultimate candidate for representation or, indeed, liberation, but there is very little agreement after all on what it is that constitutes, or ought to constitute, the category of women. The domains of political and linguistic “representation” set out in advance the criterion by which subjects themselves are formed, with the result that representation is extended only to what can be acknowledged as a subject. In other words, the qualifications for being a subject must first be met before representation can be extended. Foucault points out that juridical systems of power produce the subjects they subsequently come to represent. Juridical notions of power appeal to regulate political life in purely negative terms - that is, through the imitation, prohibition, regulation, control and even “protection” of individuals related to that political structure through the contingent and retractable operation of choice. - that is, through the imitation, prohibition, regulation, control and even “protection” of individuals related to that political structure through the contingent and retractable operation of choice. But the subjects regulated by such structures are, by virtue of being subjected to them, formed, defined, and reproduced in accordance with the requirements of those structures. If this analysis is right, then the juridical formation of language and politics that represents women as “the subject” of feminism is itself a distinctive formation and effect of a given version of representational politics. And the feminist subject turns out to be discursively constituted by the very political system that is supposed to facilitate its emancipation. This becomes politically problematic if that system can be shown to produce gendered subjects along a differential axis of domination or to produce subjects who are presumed to be masculine. In such cases an uncritical appeal to such a system for the emancipation of “women” will be clearly self-defeating.

#### The 1nc engages in dangerous politics of prioritizing methodology and assigning intellectual prerequisites to political strategy. Their use of the experience of oppression as the status that defines those who should guide politics harms progressive political strategies. Their particular strategy is part of a larger discourse of recapturing agency through privileging experience as the basis for politics.

Craig Ireland American Culture @ Bilkent 02 "The Appeal to Experience and its Consequences" Cultural Critique 52 Fall 2002p.87-88

" Once an arcane philosophical term, experience over the last three decades has become a general buzzword. By the 1970s, experience spilled over into the streets, so to speak, and it has since then become the stuff of programmatic manifestos and has been enlisted as the found from which microstrategies of resistance and subaltern counterhistories can be erected. But for all the blows and counterblows that have carried on tor over"\*three decades between those who appeal to the counterhegemonic potential of experience and those who see such appeals as naive voluntarism, such debates show no signs of abating. On the contrary, they have become yet more strident, as can be seen by Michael Pickering's recent attempt to rehabilitate the viability of the term "experience" for subaltern historiography by turning to E. P. Thompson and Dilthey and, more recently still, by Sonia Kruks's polemical defense of experience for subaltern inquiry by way of a reminder that poststructuralist critics of experience owe much to those very thinkers, from Sartre to Merleau-Ponty, whom they have debunked as if in oedipal rebellion against their begetters. Such debates over experience have so far gravitated around issues of epistemology and agency, pitting those who debunk experience as the stuff of an antiquated philosophy of consciousness against those who argue that subaltern experience provides an enclave against strong structural determination. Lost in such debates, however, have been the potential consequences of appeals to immediate experience as a ground for subaltern agency and specificity. And it is just such potential consequences that will be examined here, These indeed demand our attention, for more is at stake in the appeal to experience than some epistemological faux pas. By so wagering on the perceived immediacy of experience as the evidence for subaltern specificity and counterhegemonic action, appeals to immediate experience, however laudable their goal, end up unwittingly naturalizing what is in fact historical, and, in so doing, they leave the door as wide-open to a progressive politics of identity as to a retreat to neoethnic tribalism. Most alarming about such appeals to experience is not some failure of epistemological nerve – it is instead their ambiguous political and social ramifications. And these have reverberate beyond academia and found an echo in para-academia – so much so that experience has increasingly become the core concept or key word of subaltern groups and the rallying call for what Craig Calhoun calls the “new social movements” in which “experience is made the pure ground of knowledge, the basis of an essentialized standpoint of critical awareness” (468 n.64). The consequences of such appeals to experience can best be addressed not by individually considering disparate currents, but by seeking their common denominator. And in this regard, E.P. Thompson will occupy the foreground. It is safe to say that what started as an altercation between Thompson and Althusser has since spawned academic and para-academic "histories from below" and subaltern cultural inquiries that, for all their differences, share the idea that the identities and counterhistories of the disenfranchised can be buttressed by the specificity of a group's concrete experiences. Much theorizing on experience by certain cultural and historiographical trends, as many have already pointed out, has been but a variation on a persistent Thompsonian theme in which Thompson's "kind of use of experience has the same foundational status if we substitute 'women's' or 'black' or 'lesbian' or 'homosexual' for 'working class'" (Scott, 786)