# Iran 1ac CSUF rd. 3

### **Contention One is Israel**

#### **The Iran bill is being debated in congress now and will likely pass. In addition to a new round of sanctions, it includes a war mandate to support any Israeli strike against Iran. This makes a US-backed Israeli strike on Iran inevitable**

Perr 13 Jon, New Democrat Network; “Senate sanctions bill could let Israel take U.S. to war against Iran” *Daily Kos*; December 24, 2013; <http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/12/24/1265184/-Senate-sanctions-bill-could-let-Israel-take-U-S-to-war-against-Iran>

As 2013 draws to close, the negotiations over the Iranian nuclear program have entered a delicate stage. But in 2014, the tensions will escalate dramatically as a bipartisan group of Senators brings a new Iran sanctions bill to the floor for a vote. As many others have warned, that promise of new measures against Tehran will almost certainly blow up the interim deal reached by the Obama administration and its UN/EU partners in Geneva. But Congress' highly unusual intervention into the President's domain of foreign policy doesn't just make the prospect of an American conflict with Iran more likely. As it turns out, the Nuclear Weapon Free Iran Act essentially empowers Israel to decide whether the United States will go to war against Tehran.¶ On their own, the tough new sanctions imposed automatically if a final deal isn't completed in six months pose a daunting enough challenge for President Obama and Secretary of State Kerry. But it is the legislation's commitment to support an Israeli preventive strike against Iranian nuclear facilities that almost ensures the U.S. and Iran will come to blows. As Section 2b, part 5 of the draft mandates:¶ If the Government of Israel is compelled to take military action in legitimate self-defense against Iran's nuclear weapon program, the United States Government should stand with Israel and provide, in accordance with the law of the United States and the constitutional responsibility of Congress to authorize the use of military force, diplomatic, military, and economic support to the Government of Israel in its defense of its territory, people, and existence.¶ Now, the legislation being pushed by Senators Mark Kirk (R-IL), Chuck Schumer (D-NY) and Robert Menendez (D-NJ) does not automatically give the President an authorization to use force should Israel attack the Iranians. (The draft language above explicitly states that the U.S. government must act "in accordance with the law of the United States and the constitutional responsibility of Congress to authorize the use of military force.") But there should be little doubt that an AUMF would be forthcoming from Congressmen on both sides of the aisle. As Lindsey Graham, who with Menendez co-sponsored a similar, non-binding "stand with Israel" resolution in March told a Christians United for Israel (CUFI) conference in July:¶ "If nothing changes in Iran, come September, October, I will present a resolution that will authorize the use of military force to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear bomb."¶ Graham would have plenty of company from the hardest of hard liners in his party. In August 2012, Romney national security adviser and pardoned Iran-Contra architect Elliott Abrams called for a war authorization in the pages of the Weekly Standard. And just two weeks ago, Norman Podhoretz used his Wall Street Journal op-ed to urge the Obama administration to "strike Iran now" to avoid "the nuclear war sure to come."¶ But at the end of the day, the lack of an explicit AUMF in the Nuclear Weapon Free Iran Act doesn't mean its supporters aren't giving Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu de facto carte blanche to hit Iranian nuclear facilities. The ensuing Iranian retaliation against to Israeli and American interests would almost certainly trigger the commitment of U.S. forces anyway.¶ Even if the Israelis alone launched a strike against Iran's atomic sites, Tehran will almost certainly hit back against U.S. targets in the Straits of Hormuz, in the region, possibly in Europe and even potentially in the American homeland. Israel would face certain retaliation from Hezbollah rockets launched from Lebanon and Hamas missiles raining down from Gaza.¶ That's why former Bush Defense Secretary Bob Gates and CIA head Michael Hayden raising the alarms about the "disastrous" impact of the supposedly surgical strikes against the Ayatollah's nuclear infrastructure. As the New York Times reported in March 2012, "A classified war simulation held this month to assess the repercussions of an Israeli attack on Iran forecasts that the strike would lead to a wider regional war, which could draw in the United States and leave hundreds of Americans dead, according to American officials." And that September, a bipartisan group of U.S. foreign policy leaders including Brent Scowcroft, retired Admiral William Fallon, former Republican Senator (now Obama Pentagon chief) Chuck Hagel, retired General Anthony Zinni and former Ambassador Thomas Pickering concluded that American attacks with the objective of "ensuring that Iran never acquires a nuclear bomb" would "need to conduct a significantly expanded air and sea war over a prolonged period of time, likely several years." (Accomplishing regime change, the authors noted, would mean an occupation of Iran requiring a "commitment of resources and personnel greater than what the U.S. has expended over the past 10 years in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars combined.") The anticipated blowback?¶ Serious costs to U.S. interests would also be felt over the longer term, we believe, with problematic consequences for global and regional stability, including economic stability. A dynamic of escalation, action, and counteraction could produce serious unintended consequences that would significantly increase all of these costs and lead, potentially, to all-out regional war.¶ If this all sounds like the hypothetical scenarios of a bunch of doves in the Pentagon and the State Department, it is worth recalling the America reaction to the 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia which killed 19 U.S. servicemen and wounded hundreds of others. As former Clinton and Bush counter-terrorism chief Richard Clarke recounted in his book, Against All Enemies, President Clinton and the Joint Chiefs contemplated a massive U.S. invasion of Iran in response to the involvement of its agents:¶ In our meeting with the Pentagon in 1996, Shali was talking about al-out war. The military had a plan for almost any contingency. The plan on the shelf for war with Iran looked like it had been drawn up by Eisenhower. Several groups of Army and Marine divisions would sweep across the country over the course of several months.¶ (Ultimately, President Clinton opted against the invasion of Iran, in part because of the difficulty in proving the U.S. intelligence case against Tehran to the international community. In the end, the U.S. launched a large-scale covert action campaign against Iranian intelligence assets worldwide. Apparently, the message was received with zero distortion; Iran has not targeted United States interests since.)¶ The Pentagon's 2012 war-gaming in a simulation called "Internal Look" served to reinforce for U.S. military officials "the unpredictable and uncontrollable nature of a strike by Israel, and a counterstrike by Iran." As for the impact on the global economy, in November, the Federation of American Scientists estimated that a U.S. campaign of air strikes would cost $700 billion; a full-scale invasion could have a total impact of $1.7 trillion.¶ At the heart of the clash between Congressional hawks and President Obama is a disagreement over the so-called "red line" for Tehran. In the United States and in Israel alike, Obama has said the United States will not allow Iran to obtain an actual nuclear weapon. But most of his Republican foes and some of his Democratic allies have sided with Bibi Netanyahu in demanding Iran never possess a "nuclear weapons capability." That bottom line on Iranian nuclear know-how wouldn't just scuttle the interim deal and ongoing negotiations with Tehran, as the Obama administration and 10 Democratic Senate committee chairmen have warned. By the standard, an American war with Iran would be almost a foregone conclusion. And if Chuck Schumer, Bob Menendez, John McCain, Lindsey Graham and over 30 other Senators get their way, Israel may well have a green light to start it.

#### This is a reversal of Obama’s previous doctrine, which refused support for an Israeli strike

Cole 13 Juan, Richard P. Mitchell Collegiate Professor of History, University of Michigan; specializes in Modern Middle Eastern and South Asian History; “Obama will Veto new Iran Sanctions, Israel War Mandate pushed by AIPAC Senators” *Informed Comment*; December 21, 2013; http://www.juancole.com/2013/12/sanctions-mandate-senators.html?utm\_source=feedburner&utm\_medium=feed&utm\_campaign=Feed%3A+juancole%2Fymbn+%28Informed+Comment%29

The bill they crafted includes $55 bn in new sanctions on Iran and requires the United States to support Netanyahu in any war he launches on Iran. (President Obama and his officials have in the past have hinted broadly that Israel is welcome to attack Iran but is on its own if it does so.)

#### **The war mandate in the Iran bill encourages Israel to provoke war – it’s a signal of US backing**

McConnell 13 Scott, Founding Editor, The American Conservative; PhD, History, Columbia University; “Schumer-Menendez-Kirk Open the Back Door to War” *The American Conservative*; December 20, 2013; http://www.theamericanconservative.com/schumer-menendez-kirk-open-the-back-door-to-war/

Democrats Charles Schumer (N.Y.) and Robert Menendez (N.J.) have joined Republican Mark Kirk (Ill.) in placing a ticking bomb under President Obama’s Christmas tree. The bomb is an AIPAC-sponsored bill that commits the United States to stop Iran from enriching any uranium at all, and also requires the United States to “stand with Israel” in the event Netanyahu decides, for reasons of “self-defense,” to start a war with Iran. The purpose of the bill is transparent: to scuttle the P5+1 (U.S., Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and China) diplomacy with Tehran, because it is well known to everyone concerned that Iran is not going to abandon completely a nuclear energy program underway since the Shah was in power.¶ Gary Sick, the Columbia University Iran expert, has posted on his website an open letter to Schumer, noting that the bill seeks to “remove any negotiating authority from the U.S. government by specifying in advance the terms of an impossible settlement.” Further, Sick observes, the bill “outsources any decision about resort to military action to the government of Israel, by committing the United States in advance to support any military action by Israel.”¶ These are the two central points. Netanyahu wants war with Iran, but he doesn’t want to fight it by himself. Schumer, Menendez, and Kirk hope to compel the United States to step in and finish the job after Israel throws the first punch. But even if such a war were just (which it isn’t), or even if we had allies besides Israel (which we wouldn’t), the aftermath of such a war ends most likely (as the former hawk Kenneth Pollack argues in his exhaustive analysis “Unthinkable“) with an American occupation of Iran. At a cost in blood and treasure many times the invasion of Iraq.¶ There is no realistic scenario under which Iran’s government is going abandon entirely its nuclear program. Schumer, Kirk, and Menendez know this perfectly well. Their resolution is a backdoor to war. They just don’t have the courage, as yet, to say so.

#### **US support for a first strike increases Israeli aggression exponentially. Absent US support, Israel won’t risk an attack**

Giraldi 12 Philip, executive director, Council for the National Interest; former CIA officer; PhD, European History, University of London; “Entangled With Israel” *The American Conservative*; September 3, 2012; http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/entangled-with-israel/

Israel’s attempt to steer American foreign policy has been nowhere more evident than in the sustained campaign to move the United States in the direction of war with Iran,a war that serves no American interest unless one believes that Tehran is willing to spend billions of dollars to develop a nuclear weapon only to hand off the result to a terrorist group.¶ The most recent overtures by the Israeli government have pushed the United States to make a declaration that negotiations with Iran have failed and will not be continued. For Israel, this is a necessary first step towards an American military intervention, as failed negotiations mean there is no way out of the impasse but by war, if the Iranians do not unilaterally concede on every disputed point.¶ Two recent op-eds have elaborated the argument, promoting the necessity of convincing the Israelis that the United States is absolutely serious about using military force against Iran if the Iranians seek to retain any capacity to enrich uranium. One might note in passing that this new red line, sometimes also called the abstract “capability” to create a nuclear weapon, has been achieved by moving the goal posts back considerably. At one time Iran was threatened with a military response if it actually acquired a nuclear weapon (which is still the official position of the Obama administration), but earlier benchmarks within that policy saying that enrichment should not exceed 20 percent or that the enrichment should not take place on Iranian soil have been abandoned in favor of what now amounts to zero tolerance. Those who note that Iran, which is a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and is under IAEA inspection, has a clear legal right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes have been ignored in favor of those who believe that Iran is somehow a special case.¶ On August 17, the Washington Post and The New York Times featured op-eds explaining why the United States must do more to convince Israel not to attack Iran this year. Amos Yadlin, a former head of Israel’s military intelligence who is believed to be close to the country’s political leadership, argued in the Post that Obama must basically convince the Israelis that he will use force against Iran if sanctions do not convince the country’s leadership to abandon enrichment of nuclear fuel. Over at the Times, Dennis Ross, a former senior U.S. diplomat who has been described as Israel’s lawyer, made pretty much the same arguments. Both advocated giving Israel refueling tankers and special munitions that would enable an attack on Iran to be more effective, thereby widening the window of opportunity for sanctions to work, in light of Israeli arguments that hardened Iranian sites might soon be invulnerable to attack. Ross advocates giving Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu effectively a blank check, asking him what he will need to attack Iran and granting the Israeli government commitments for a full range of U.S. military support. Both Yadlin and Ross argue that it is necessary to create the conditions for Israel to delay a possible attack until 2013. As Yadlin puts it, “if the United States wants Israel to give sanctions and diplomacy more time, Israelis must know that they will not be left high and dry if these options fail.”¶ Assuming that Ross and Yadlin are speaking for the Israeli government, which is almost certainly the case, Israel is essentially demanding a commitment from Washington to attack Iran unless the issue of Iran’s ability to enrich uranium is resolved through negotiation or through Iranian surrender of that right. In return, Israel will not attack Iran before the American election. So in effect, Washington would be promising to fight a war later if Israel does not start one now.¶ Israel knows it cannot successfully attack Iran unilaterally and must have the United States along to do the heavy lifting. It also knows that the threat to attack Iran before the election is a powerful weapon, with neither Mitt Romney nor Barack Obama welcoming such a potentially game-changing diversion from their debate on the economy and jobs.¶ Critics like Arnaud de Borchgrave have correctly noted that many former generals and intelligence officers in the United States and Israel have, in fact, decided that the basic premise is wrong. Iran does not pose a threat that could not be contained even if it does some day make the political decision to obtain a crude nuclear device. Launching a new war in the Middle East to prevent it from doing so would create “mayhem” throughout the region, guarantee a breakdown in Egypt-Israel relations, and create a perfect breeding ground for the civil war in Syria to spill out and lead to turmoil among all of its neighbors. American ships in the Persian Gulf would be attacked, unrest in Bahrain would turn to revolution, and the Palestinians would stage a new intifada. Israel would be bombarded from Lebanon and from Iran. Gas prices would soar, economic recovery would stall worldwide, and European nations now struggling to deal with unprecedented unemployment levels would watch the eurozone collapse before the rage of hundreds of thousands protesters in the streets. Americans would again become the targets of international terrorism.¶ And there is another serious objection to going along with the Israeli government’s thinking. Israel is by its own volition not an ally of the United States in any technical sense because alliances are troublesome things that require rules of engagement and reciprocity, limiting the partners’ ability to act independently. If Israel obtains a virtual commitment from the United States to go to war in 2013, it would mean enjoying the benefits of having a powerful patron to do its fighting without any obligation in return, beyond delaying unilateral military action until a more suitable time. A guarantee from Washington for Israel’s security which still permits unilateral action by Netanyahu is all too reminiscent of the entangling arrangements that led to World War I. The fact that the murder of an Austrian Archduke in the Balkans led to a world war that killed tens of millions was due to promises not unlike what Israel is demanding today.¶ If the United States commits to unconditional support for an Israeli attack on Iran, it will be a surrender of one of the defining attributes of national sovereignty: the power to choose when and where to go to war. Amos Yadlin suggests at one point that President Obama go to Congress and get approval in advance to take military action “to prevent Iran’s acquisition of a military nuclear capability.” Such a pre-approval for war certainly raises constitutional issues, but it also creates a virtual casus belli because Iran already has the “capability” to enrich uranium for potential military uses. A guarantee precludes any consideration that the United States might actually have an overriding national interest to avoid a war. It denies that the United States should be able to exercise complete sovereignty over the issue of Iran, and it also freezes the status quo, as if new ways of looking at the problem of the Iranian nuclear program could not evolve over the next few months.¶ Washington should make no commitment to anyone about what it will do vis-à-vis Iran in 2013 no matter what inducements are offered. As the 19th-century British Prime Minister Lord Palmerston put it, “We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.” Let America’s actual interests dictate U.S. foreign policy.

#### Israel won’t attack without US support – extremely sensitive to US concerns

Zanotti et al 12 (Jim Zanotti, Coordinator Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs. Israel: Possible Military Strike Against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities. CRS. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R42443.pdf)

Despite the reference by Defense Minister Barak to the possible need for “overt or tacit support, particularly from America” before approving an Israel strike, it is unclear to what extent Israeli decisionmakers might be influenced by the stated positions and anticipated responses of U.S. policymakers in the Obama Administration and Congress regarding an attack. Not surprisingly, Israeli leaders are extremely sensitive to U.S. views for a variety of reasons, including but not limited to: • Strong U.S.-Israel relations dating back to when the United States was the first country to recognize the provisional Jewish government as the de facto government of Israel upon its declaration of statehood in May 1948; • Robust ongoing military and security cooperation, including significant U.S. arms sales and other forms of support; and • Trade ties and important bilateral economic and scientific cooperation.141 Israeli leaders’ perspectives about the possible effects of a strike on U.S. political and material assistance to Israel, possible negative security consequences for the United States from a potential Iranian retaliation, and the probability of future U.S. military action to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran may, among other considerations, influence the Israeli decisionmaking process An Israeli journalist wrote in March 2012 that Israel did not ask permission when it acted to prevent Saddam Hussein and Bashar al Asad from obtaining nuclear weapons, but that “the [Obama] administration can credibly counter that in neither case did Israeli unilateralism threaten to draw America into an armed conflict, as it does now.”142 According to three Israeli analysts (including two former officials) mentioned above: Even after the withdrawal of its troops from Iraq, the U.S. remains extremely exposed to Iranian retaliation—either directly against its forces in the area or by Iran’s attempting to ignite a broader conflict in the region—so an Israeli strike would harm U.S. interests in the region and would place many U.S. lives at risk. And while in an election year America’s political reaction to such a strike may be mitigated by domestic political considerations, the reaction of the U.S. defense community to an Israeli military strike might be extremely negative, as such an action might be seen as representing Israeli insensitivity to and disregard of U.S. priorities and concerns.143 Some reports have speculated that an Israeli decision to attack, if it occurs, could come before the U.S. presidential election in November 2012, with one Israeli report stating, “A second-term president, not constrained by electoral necessities, will be able to apply a lot more pressure on the Israeli government not to attack.”144 Separate from the question of whether the United States might support an Israeli strike on Iran, Israeli decisionmakers might be influenced by how they anticipate the United States would respond after an attack, including in the event of retaliation by Iran and its allies. Although the United States does not have a formal treaty obligation to defend Israel in the event it is attacked, successive Administrations have either stated or implied that the United States would act to protect Israel’s security if it were endangered—including by Iran—and have worked with Congress to ensure and bolster Israel’s “qualitative military edge” over regional security threats.145

#### Israel strikes would trigger a massive Middle Eastern war

Reuveny, 10 (Rafael Reuveny is a professor in the School of Public and Environmental Affairs at Indiana University. Con: Unilateral strike could trigger World War III, global depression, <http://gazettextra.com/news/2010/aug/07/con-unilateral-strike-could-trigger-world-war-iii-/#sthash.tGUOoSDf.dpuf>)

A unilateral Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities would likely have dire consequences, including a regional war, global economic collapse and a major power clash.¶ For an Israeli campaign to succeed, it must be quick and decisive. This requires an attack that would be so overwhelming that Iran would not dare to respond in full force.¶ Such an outcome is extremely unlikely since the locations of some of Iran’s nuclear facilities are not fully known and known facilities are buried deep underground.¶ All of these widely spread facilities are shielded by elaborate air defense systems constructed not only by the Iranians but also the Chinese and, likely, the Russians as well.¶ By now, Iran has also built redundant command and control systems and nuclear facilities, developed early warning systems, acquired ballistic and cruise missiles and upgraded and enlarged its armed forces.¶ Because Iran is well-prepared, a single, conventional Israeli strike—or even numerous strikes—could not destroy all of its capabilities, giving Iran time to respond.¶ Unlike Iraq, whose nuclear program Israel destroyed in 1981, Iran has a second-strike capability comprised of a coalition of Iranian, Syrian, Lebanese, Hezbollah, Hamas, and, perhaps, Turkish forces. Internal pressure might compel Jordan, Egypt, and the Palestinian Authority to join the assault, turning a bad situation into a regional war.¶ During the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, at the apex of its power, Israel was saved from defeat by President Nixon’s shipment of weapons and planes. Today, Israel’s numerical inferiority is greater, and it faces more determined and better-equipped opponents.¶ Despite Israel’s touted defense systems, Iranian coalition missiles, armed forces, and terrorist attacks would likely wreak havoc on its enemy, leading to a prolonged tit-for-tat.¶ In the absence of massive U.S. assistance, Israel’s military resources may quickly dwindle, forcing it to use its alleged nuclear weapons, as it had reportedly almost done in 1973.¶ An Israeli nuclear attack would likely destroy most of Iran’s capabilities, but a crippled Iran and its coalition could still attack neighboring oil facilities, unleash global terrorism, plant mines in the Persian Gulf and impair maritime trade in the Mediterranean, Red Sea and Indian Ocean.¶ Middle Eastern oil shipments would likely slow to a trickle as production declines due to the war and insurance companies decide to drop their risky Middle Eastern clients. Iran and Venezuela would likely stop selling oil to the United States and Europe.¶ The world economy would head into a tailspin; international acrimony would rise; and Iraqi and Afghani citizens might fully turn on the United States, immediately requiring the deployment of more American troops. Russia, China, Venezuela, and maybe Brazil and Turkey — all of which essentially support Iran — could be tempted to form an alliance and openly challenge the U.S. hegemony.¶ ¶ Russia and China might rearm their injured Iranian protege overnight, just as Nixon rearmed Israel, and threaten to intervene, just as the U.S.S.R. threatened to join Egypt and Syria in 1973. President Obama’s response would likely put U.S. forces on nuclear alert, replaying Nixon’s nightmarish scenario.¶ Iran may well feel duty-bound to respond to a unilateral attack by its Israeli archenemy, but it knows that it could not take on the United States head-to-head. In contrast, if the United States leads the attack, Iran’s response would likely be muted.¶ If Iran chooses to absorb an American-led strike, its allies would likely protest and send weapons, but would probably not risk using force.¶ While no one has a crystal ball, leaders should be risk-averse when choosing war as a foreign policy tool. If attacking Iran is deemed necessary, Israel must wait for an American green light. A unilateral Israeli strike could ultimately spark World War III.

#### Nuclear war

**Russell 9** (James, Senior Lecturer in the Department of National Security Affairs – Naval Postgraduate School, “Strategic Stability Reconsidered: Prosepects for Nuclear War and Escalation in the Middle East,” Online)

Strategic stability in the region is thus undermined by various factors: (1) asymmetric interests in the bargaining framework that can introduce unpredictable behavior from actors; (2) the presence of non-state actors that introduce unpredictability into relationships between the antagonists; (3) incompatible assumptions about the structure of the deterrent relationship that makes the bargaining framework strategically unstable; (4) perceptions by Israel and the United States that its window of opportunity for military action is closing, which could prompt a preventive attack; (5) the prospect that Iran’s response to pre-emptive attacks could involve unconventional weapons, which could prompt escalation by Israel and/or the United States; (6) the lack of a communications framework to build trust and cooperation among framework participants. These systemic weaknesses in the coercive bargaining framework all suggest that escalation by any the parties could happen either on purpose or **as a result of miscalculation** or the pressures of wartime circumstance. Given these factors, it is disturbingly easy to imagine scenarios under which a conflict could **quickly escalate** in which the regional antagonists would consider the use of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. It would be a mistake to believe the nuclear taboo can somehow magically keep nuclear weapons from being used in the **context of an unstable strategic framework**. Systemic asymmetries between actors in fact suggest a certain increase in the probability of war – a war in which escalation could happen quickly and from a variety of participants. Once such a war starts, events would likely develop a momentum all their own and decision-making would consequently be shaped in unpredictable ways. The international community must take this possibility seriously, and muster every tool at its disposal to prevent such an outcome, which would be an unprecedented disaster for the peoples of the region, with **substantial risk for the entire world.**

#### And even if it doesn’t escalate, a small nuclear conflagration in the Middle East causes environmental damage significant enough to cause extinction

Beth Hoffman Staffwriter for Inside Bay Area, “'Nuclear winter' looms, experts say,” 2006 Lexis)

Researchers at the American Geophysical Union's annual meeting warned Monday that even a small regional nuclear war could burn enough cities to shroud the globe in black smoky shadow and usher in the manmade equivalent of the Little Ice Age. "Nuclear weapons represent the greatest single human threat to the planet, much more so than global warming," said Rutgers University atmospheric scientist Alan Robock. By dropping imaginary Hiroshima-sized bombs into some of the world's biggest cities, now swelled to tens of millions in population, University of Colorado researcher O. Brian Toon and colleagues found they could generate 100 times the fatalities and 100 times the climate-chilling smoke per kiloton of explosive power as all-out nuclear war between the United States and former Soviet Union. For most modern nuclear-war scenarios, the global impact isn't nuclear winter, the notion of smoke from incinerated cities blotting out the sun for years and starving most of the Earth's people. It's not even nuclear autumn, but rather an instant nuclear chill over most of the planet, accompanied by massive ozone loss and warming at the poles. That's what scientists' computer simulations suggest would happen if nuclear war broke out in a hot spot such as the Middle East, the North Korean peninsula or, the most modeled case, in Southeast Asia. Unlike in the Cold War, when the United States and Russia mostly targeted each other's nuclear, military and strategic industrial sites, young nuclear-armed nations have fewer weapons and might go for maximum effect by using them on cities, as the United States did in 1945. "We're at a perilous crossroads," Toon said. The spread of nuclear weapons worldwide combined with global migration into dense megacities form what he called "perhaps the greatest danger to the stability of society since the dawn of humanity." More than 20 years ago, researchers imagined a U.S.-Soviet nuclear holocaust would wreak havoc on the planet's climate. They showed the problem was potentially worse than feared: Massive urban fires would flush hundreds of millions of tons of black soot skyward, where -- heated by sunlight -- it would soar higher into the stratosphere and begin cooking off the protective ozone layer around the Earth. Huge losses of ozone would open the planet and its inhabitants to damaging radiation, while the warm soot would spread a pall sufficient to plunge the Earth into freezing year-round. The hundreds of millions who would starve exceeded those who would die in the initial blasts and radiation.

#### The existential risk of nuclear war warrants the effort to avoid it

Rivers 2 Dennis Rivers, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation and the Peacemaker Community Revised March 30, 2002

Six Arguments for Abolishing Nuclear Weapons <http://nonukes.org/cd18_sixarg.htm>

Reason One: The entire world would be more secure if the planet were free of nuclear weapons.

Nuclear weapons are the only type of weapon in existence that have the capacity to annihilate the human species and countless other species.

The very existence of nuclear weapons leaves open the possibility that a nuclear exchange might take place. This could happen intentionally, inadvertently (as in the Cuban Missile Crisis when the U.S. and USSR almost blundered into nuclear war), or by an accidental launch. The list of historical false alarms is long; for instance, in 1979 someone fed a war game simulation into a North American Air Defense computer. Thinking that the alert was real, fighter planes were scrambled and nuclear bombers were readied before the error was discovered.

### Plan

#### The United States federal government should statutorily prohibit the introduction of United States armed forces into hostilities initiated by the State of Israel against the Islamic Republic of Iran.

### Contention Two Is Epistemology

#### Though social science is never perfect, our author’s rigorous scholarship allows us to make functioning assessments about Middle Eastern politics

Halliday 93

Fred Halliday, IR at LSE, 93, “ ‘Orientalism’ and its Critics” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 20(2) pp.145-146

The Middle East is not unique, except possibly in the content of the myths that are propagated about it, from within and without. The political, economic, social and cultural activities of the peoples of this region have their peculiarities and differences, as much between each other , as in terms of one Middle East contrasted with the outside world. Material concerns, jokes, the pleasures of good food, and the horrors of political oppression, are theirs as much as any other peoples in the world. The development of social science in general will never be completed, and each specific issue, or country, or incident, poses questions for it. But we are no more precluded by our concepts from understanding the Middle East, and no more limited in our ideas, whatever their origins, than in addressing any other area of the world. In normative terms, we have, perhaps, allowed the discussion to be too inffected by relativism and doubt as to the validity of universal standards, in the face of a mistaken, and often self-interested, critique of imperialism and Western norms. Perhaps I could sum this up by adapting a slogan: *na gharbzadegi, na sharqzadegi*, neither westoxification nor eastoxification. Let us therefore go beyond this unnecessarily polarized and in some ways methodologically impoverished debate and continue with the job of studying these societies. I have warned against the perils of tafsir, but I will end with the words from the Qur’an that can be easily and I hope not too arbitrarily interpreted to justify this enterprise, wa ja’alnakum shu’uban wa-qaba’ila li-ta’arafu. ‘And I have created peoples and trives so that they could get to know each other.’42 That could be the motto for our necessarily unfinished, and unfinishable, endavour.

#### There is no perfectly rational subject or perfectly accessible truth, but we can make reasonable predictions about international actors

Miller 2 (Katherine Miller, Prof. of Communication at Texas A&M, Communication theories: Perspectives, processes, and contexts, 2002, p 35-36)

If positivism, in its classical and logical forms, is largely rejected, what philosophical foundation should take its place as a framework for social research? Very different answers to this question have been proposed. Some social researchers argue that flaws in the positivist foundation require a radically different philosophy of sci- encee, one in which the realist ontology, objec- ive epistemology, and value-free axiology of positivism are vehemently rejected and replaced with forms of inquiry that honor nominalism, subjectivism, and omnipresent values. The posi- tions of these scholars are discussed in great detail in Chapters 4 and 5 as we consider interpretive and critical petspectives on communication theory. However, some scholars believe that a rejection of positivism does not require a total rejection of realism, objectivity, and the scientific goal of value-free inquiry. However, these scholars reject the notion of absolute truth, reject the unassailable foundation of observation, and reject the assumption of an always steady and upward accumulation of knowledge. In these rejections, scholars have forged a new philosophy of science that D. C. Phillips (1987, 1990, 1992) has called post-positivism. The metatheoretical tenets of this position are discussed in the next section. Metatheoretical Commitments Ontology In Chapter 2, we discussed three ontological positions: the realist, the nominalist, and the social constructionist. To summarize, a realist believes in a hard and solid reality of physical and social objects, a nominalist proposes that the reality of social entities exists only in the names and labels we provide for them, and a social constructionist emphasizes the ways in which social meanings are created through historical and contemporary interaction. Both the realist and the social constructionist positions make contributions to the ontology of post-positivist researchers in the communication discipline. Researchers in the post-positivist tradition can be seen as realists in that they support the position that phenomena exist independent of our perceptions and theories about them (Phillips, 1987). However, this realism is tempered by the argument that humans cannot fully apprehend that reality and that the driving mechanisms in the social and physical world cannot be fully understood. As J. D. Smith (1990, p. 171) states, "Realism is essential . . . because it poses 'at least in principle, a standard by which all human societies and their beliefs can be judged: they can all have beliefs about the world which turn out to be mistaken'" (Trigg, 1985, p. 22). Phillips argues, however, that a post-positivist ontology does not deny the notions inherent in approaches advocating a "social construction of reality" (Berger & Luckmann, 1967). Rather, Phillips (1990) draws the distinction between beliefs about the reality and the objective reality (pp. 42-43). Making this distinction allows a post-positivist scholar to appreciate (and investigate) multiple realities that are constructed by social collectives through communicative inter-action. For example, a post-positivist scholar could study the ways that beliefs about the imminent end of the world influence the behaviors of mountain survivalists, members of cults, and fundamental religious groups. However, the fact that a social group has arrived at certain beliefs about the world does not make those beliefs about the social or physical world necessarily true. As Phillips (1990) notes, "It is clear that Freudians believe in the reality of the id and superego and the rest, and they act as if these are realities; but their believing in these things does not make them real" (p. 43). It could be further argued that post-positivism is consistent with social constructionist views in two important ways. First, many post-positivists would argue that the process of social construction occurs in relatively patterned ways that are amenable to the type of social scientific investigation undertaken by post-positivists. Individuals have free will and creativity but they exercise that creativity in ways that are often (though not always, certainly) patterned and predictable. In the field of mass communication, Barbara Wilson (1994) argues convincingly for this point regarding her own study of children's responses to the mass media: I believe that children's interpretations and responses are as richly individualistic as snow-flakes. However, I also believe that there are common patterns that characterize a majority of young viewers and that those patterns are as predictable and explainable as the basic process by which all those unique snowflakes are formed from water, (p. 25) Second, many post-positivists would argue that social constructions are regularly reified and treated as objective by actors in the social world. Thus, it is reasonable to study the impact of these reified constructions on our communicative lives. Tompkins (1997) has made this argument with regard to his organizational communication research with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA): The engineers, scientists, managers, bureau-crats, and other kinds of members did not believe in a socially constructed world. They believed the rockets they made did in fact go to the moon. Moreover, they believed that NASA and the contractor firms who worked for them were real. They believed that these organizations could succeed or fail by objective criteria and that their bosses could hire or fire, reward or penalize individuals—actions with real consequences, (p. 369) Thus, a social constructionist ontology is consistent with a post-positivist position that emphasizes both the patterned nature of the social construction process and the regular and predictable effects that reified social constructions have on social actors. Thus, the ontology of post-positivism is not necessarily the belief in a hard, immutable, and unchanging social world implied in a strict realist stance. Rather, a post-positivist ontology entails a belief in regularity and pattern in our interactions with others. The ways in which these regularities and patterns are studied within post-positivist theory are considered in the next section.

#### Advocating for material rapprochement with Iran is key to challenge racist discourse that demonizes Iran

Richman 13 [Sheldon Richman is vice president and editor at The Future of Freedom Foundation in Fairfax, Va. (www.fff.org). OCTOBER 10, 2013 The War Caucus The Ongoing Demonization of Iran http://www.counterpunch.org/2013/10/10/the-ongoing-demonization-of-iran/]

So, despite overtures from the new Iranian president, Hassan Rouhani, Iran’s regime must still be demonized as a group of religious fanatics — mad mullahs — who cannot be reasoned with and who want nothing more than to lob nuclear warheads at the United States and Israel. Nonsense. Over a decade ago, Iran’s leaders made credible offers of cooperation with the United States that included peace with Israel. In fact, after the 9/11 attacks, the Iranian government tried to cooperate with the Bush administration on a number of fronts. The two sides actually began working together at the end of 2001, until hawkish American officials put a stop to it, as reporter Gareth Porter explained in 2006. Thus, Rouhani’s current efforts are not a “charm offensive” — as they are prejudicially labeled even by the media — but rather a renewal of Iran’s wish for détente. We rarely hear about the previous offers, perhaps because they conflict with the mainstream media’s dominant narrative of Iran as an implacable threat. Apparently those who want war with Iran — the neoconservatives, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, the members of Congress beholden to AIPAC, and the government of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu — make better news copy than would-be peacemakers. Too bad. War would be catastrophic. Let’s remember that the Islamic Republic of Iran arose only after a U.S.-backed despotism was overthrown in 1979. Rather than seeking to make amends for what had been inflicted on the Iranians, successive U.S. administrations worked to isolate and subvert Iran until a more pliant regime could be installed. Diplomats who favored rapprochement were ignored or marginalized — which suited the leaders of Israel, Saudi Arabia, and other Sunni Arab regimes allied with the United States. (Iran is dominated by Shi’ite Muslims, the sectarian rivals of the Sunnis.)

#### Academic debates about alternative policy strategies towards Iran are crucial to demonstrate the potential of cooperative diplomacy. The alternative cedes debates to neoconservatives who ensure continued policy failure and violence in the Middle East and beyond.

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Conclusions: think positive Outcomes in the Middle East are dominated by pessimists who assume the worst of their competitors and more powerful external actors. We assume that because the region has been beset by conflict and bloodshed that this will always be the case. Our imagination and our optimism is stifled. Given the history and the depths of distrust, this is hardly surprising, and sometimes those assumptions are wellfounded. But every so often events can surprise us in positive ways, and Iran’s recent election should be doing just that right now. We have the freedom to escape the apparent traps we think we are in, and find new approaches that better meet our objectives to strengthen security and manage power relationships. We are not starting from scratch. Many years of diplomatic effort have gone into developing nonproliferation regimes, and a majority of states in the Middle East have ratified them. But their indefinite support cannot be taken for granted, when others in the region break those norms with impunity. It is better to work with the grain, recognize the rights that go with membership of these regimes, and cooperate with states that are developing dual-use technology to strengthen inspection and verification procedures. This is what President Rouhani is likely to be asking when he presents Iran’s package of proposals on the nuclear file, and we would do well to heed him. People view the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran with alarm. And quite right, it would be a major step backwards for everyone’s security and risk sparking a destabilizing arms race that can only lead to the use of nuclear weapons in the end, bar a miracle. But the approach taken by many members of the international community only serves to bestow upon nuclear weapons a power they do not naturally possess, and thereby unintentionally encourages this proliferation. It is time to change the tune of nuclear deterrence. This can best be done by the nuclear weapon states moving away from an ‘us-and-them’ strategy of technology denial while remaining attached to their own arsenals. Coercing Iran to give up its civilian nuclear power ambitions for fear they could be used to acquire the magic the nuclear weapon states claim for themselves will be a self-defeating strategy. If nuclear deterrence actually has the value many ascribe to it, then nuclear proliferation is inevitable, and with it, the eventual use of nuclear weapons. The U.S. intelligence community’s latest combined National Intelligence Estimate finds that Iran has no nuclear bomb, has not diverted fissile material, nor recently engaged in efforts to weaponize its capabilities, and has not yet made any decision to do so. The case against Iran is based upon fear of the possibilities rather than any legitimate proof of intention to break out of its NPT responsibilities. The same cannot be said of some other NPT members and their Treaty responsibilities. 43 years after the NPT came into force and 23 years after the end of the Cold War, the five nuclear weapon states, with over 20,000 nuclear warheads held among them, still act as if the Treaty gives them some form of indefinite legitimacy in their possession, and show little intent to engage in serious disarmament (beyond reductions in the numbers of warheads). India, Pakistan and Israel are allowed to develop their nuclear arsenals outside the NPT and thus severely undermine the Treaty, sometimes under the protection and implicit support of the United States (Israel), or where penalties are shallow and brief, only for the state to be accepted later into the nuclear club (India). It is time to open up a global cross-cultural and honest strategic dialogue about the role of nuclear deterrence in the twenty-first century, and the damage it does to the national security both of states targeted by nuclear weapons, and those engaged in the targeting. We need officials, analysts and academics to come together from the states with nuclear weapons and those with the potential capabilities to develop them to address this issue not just from a moral, legalistic or idealistic disarmament and non-proliferation angle, though this is indeed an important dimension, but also from a hardnosed military utility angle, and from an angle of safety and security. It is also important to consider the humanitarian impacts of the use of nuclear weapons, as this would serve to better underline just how unusable they are. We need to have a more honest debate around how the current strategy pursued by the international community is unintentionally driving Iranian responses that further deepen international suspicions. But we also need to discuss more openly why the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran would dramatically and directly undermine Iranian security and Iranian soft power amongst the constituencies it cares about. The possession of nuclear weapons is not a national right, whether that state is in or out of the NPT, of whatever status. The universal norm against the use of nuclear weapons has been building up over the decades, particularly since the end of the Cold War. We need to extend that norm to possession by any state. The security impact from possession and thus threat is international, and is an important but under-recognized block to the essential cooperative diplomacy required to address all the great global issues of our time – such as the management of ecosystems under pressure from growing populations and ever-increasing consumption, rising pollution, financial stress, poverty and migration.

#### Reality and law are coproductive. Changing our thinking about law helps to reconstitute the material realities that we live in.

Jane Baron, Law @ Temple – Beasley School of Law, 2003 (“Romancing the Real.” 57 U. Miami L. Rev. 573 lexis)

Yet, imagine that what Gordon said were true. There would be an easily discernable point to doing what we legal academics (and isn't Schlag one of us?) do. If legal conceptions and the social world were connected in some way, then thinking about law would also be a way of thinking about the material world, and trying to change the way we think about law - for instance, to use my earlier example, trying to convince people that property need not be modeled on ownership but on obligation - would be a way of trying to change the material world. Questioning what legal doctrine foregrounds and backgrounds, n46 revealing "nested oppositions" in legal rules, n47 and all manner of similar analyses [\*587] of the patterns and structure of standard legal argumentation, including the kinds of analyses Schlag himself has so often performed (consider The Empty Circles of Liberal Justification n48), would, or could, at least potentially be useful; if we could see and make others see how we ourselves artificially "froze" reality, we could unfreeze it. n49 At the very least, we could begin to think about changing it because we would no longer be victims of belief in reality's immutability. n50 Twenty-plus years of engaging in various versions of this practice have revealed how much more complicated all this is than it originally seemed. From Stanley Fish we learned how silly it might be to envision standing outside one's own structures of belief in order to change them. n51 From feminists and critical race theorists we learned that "we" might not be "we," but multiple intersecting and overlapping "we's" with potentially differing interests and engagements. n52 From law and society folks we learned to question whether there was any relation between lawyers' and judges' ideas about law and actual social practices; if there was little relation to begin with, changes in legal consciousness (even if "we" could actually effect such changes) would be unlikely to have much impact on everyday behaviors. n53 None of this proves that legal change and social change are impossible, only that effecting social change through law is considerably more difficult and chancy than first had been thought. One could see, however, why it might be worth trying to solve (or work around) the problems: thinking about law would still be a way - perhaps now a more nuanced, humbled way - of trying to fix what was wrong with the world. This strategy would not work, of course, if "the world" is intractably out there, isolated from and immune to thought. That is exactly as Schlag presents the world in those excerpts and in the lists culled from them. The question is why, knowing better - that is, having no illusions about a pure factuality unmediated by perspective or shaping - Schlag would choose to portray "reality" that way.

#### Academic debate over war powers is critical to contest interventionism and improve policy making

Stephen M. Walt 11, Professor of International Affairs at Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, July 21, “International Affairs and the Public Sphere”, http://publicsphere.ssrc.org/walt-international-affairs-and-the-public-sphere/

Academics can make at least three distinct contributions to public discourse on global affairs. First, although the digital revolution has made a wealth of information from around the world accessible on a near real-time basis, most of us still lack both extensive direct data on events in far-flung areas and the background knowledge necessary to understand what new developments mean. If our town’s school district is troubled or the local economy is suffering, we can observe that for ourselves and make reasonably well-informed judgments about what might be done about it. But if the issue is the war in Afghanistan, an uprising in Yemen, a naval confrontation in the South China Sea or the prospects that some battered economy will be bailed out successfully, most of us will lack the factual knowledge or conceptual understanding to know what is really going on. Even when basic information is readily available, it may be hard for most of us to put it in the appropriate context or make sense of what it means. ¶ When citizens and leaders seek to grasp the dizzying complexity of modern world politics, therefore, they must inevitably rely upon the knowledge and insights of specialists in military affairs, global trade and finance, diplomatic/international historians, area experts, and many others. And that means relying at least in part on academic scholars who have devoted their careers to mastering various aspects of world affairs and whose professional stature has been established through the usual procedures of academic evaluation (e.g., peer review, confidential assessments by senior scholars, the give-and-take of scholarly debate, etc.). ¶ Second, and more importantly, an independent academic community is an essential counterweight to official efforts to shape public understanding of key foreign policy issues. Governments enjoy enormous information asymmetries in many areas of political life, but these advantages are especially pronounced when dealing with international affairs.[5] Much of what we know about the outside world is ultimately derived from government sources (especially when dealing with national security affairs), and public officials often go to considerable lengths to shape how that information is reported to the public. Not only do governments collect vast amounts of information about the outside world, but they routinely use secrecy laws to control public access to this information. Government officials can shape public beliefs by leaking information strategically, or by co-opting sympathetic journalists whose professional success depends in part on maintaining access to key officials.[6] Given these information asymmetries and their obvious interest in retaining public support for their preferred policies, it is hardly surprising that both democratic and non-democratic leaders use their privileged access to information to build support for specific policies, at times by telling outright lies to their own citizens.[7] ¶ This situation creates few problems when the policies being sold make good strategic sense, but the results can be disastrous when they don’t. In such cases, alternative voices are needed to challenge conventional wisdoms and official rationales, and to suggest different solutions to the problem(s) at hand. Because scholars are protected by tenure and cherish the principle of academic freedom, and because they are not directly dependent on government support for their livelihoods, they are uniquely positioned to challenge prevailing narratives and policy rationales and to bring their knowledge and training to bear on vital policy issues. If we believe that unfettered debate helps expose errors and correct missteps, thereby fostering more effective public policies, then a sophisticated, diverse and engaged scholarly community is essential to a healthy polity. ¶ Third, the scholarly world also offers a potentially valuable model of constructive political disagreement. Political discourse in many countries (and especially the United States) has become increasingly personal and ad hominem, with little attention paid to facts and logic; a trend reinforced by an increasingly competitive and loosely regulated media environment. Within academia, by contrast, even intense disputes are supposed to be conducted in accordance with established canons of logic and evidence. Ad hominem attacks and other forms of character assassination have no place in scholarly discourse and are more likely to discredit those who employ them than those who are attacked. By bringing the norms of academic discourse into the public sphere, academic scholars could help restore some of the civility that has been lost in recent years. ¶ For all of these reasons, it is highly desirable for university-based scholars to play a significant role in public discourse about key real-world issues and to engage directly with policymakers where appropriate. As I have argued elsewhere, academic research can provide policymakers with relevant factual knowledge, provide typologies and frameworks that help policymakers and citizens make sense of emerging trends, and create and test theories that leaders can use to choose among different policy instruments. Academic theories can also be useful when they help policymakers anticipate events, when they identify recurring tendencies or obstacles to success, and when they facilitate the formulation of policy alternatives and the identification of benchmarks that can guide policy evaluation. Because academic scholars are free from daily responsibility for managing public affairs, they are in an ideal position to develop new concepts and theories to help us understand a complex and changing world.[8] ¶ The picture sketched here is obviously something of an ideal type, and I am not suggesting that that the academic world consistently lives up to these expectations. As noted above, university-based scholars of international affairs—and especially the disciplines of political science and history—have increasingly focused on narrow and arcane topics and are contributing less and less to policy formation or public discourse.[9] And when academics do address topics of obvious policy relevance or public interest, the results are often presented in impenetrable, jargon-ridden prose and disseminated in venues that neither policymakers nor the public are likely to read. Even when scholars have something useful to say, in short, their tendency to “speaking in tongues” diminishes their impact on the public sphere**.** ¶Why Is There a Gap between Academia and the Public Sphere?¶ To some degree, the gap between the ivory tower and the world of policy arises because the two spheres have different agendas and operate under different incentives and constraints. Academics focus on developing generalizations and testing conjectures as rigorously as possible, while policymakers and the public are often preoccupied with individual cases (i.e., whatever is in the headlines or in a policymaker’s in-tray). Thus, scholars are delighted whenever they identify a powerful general tendency, but policymakers may be more interested in figuring out how to overcome that general tendency or worried that the case at hand might be an exception to it. Academics strive to make their work as accurate as possible, even if this takes more time, but policymakers cannot always wait until a complete analysis is possible.[10] To take a recent example, policymakers in the Obama administration had to respond to the 2011 “Arab Spring” long before anyone fully understood what was driving these events or where they might lead. Given these different agendas, it is not surprising that policymakers often find academic scholarship to be of less value than the scholars who produce it might wish.

#### Humans lack the cognitive capacity to calculate and imagine large impacts – you should prefer death of 1 million people over 1 in front of you

Yudkowsky 6 [ Cognitive biases potentially affecting judgment of global risks Eliezer Yudkowsky (yudkowsky@singinst.org) Forthcoming in Global Catastrophic Risks, eds. Nick Bostrom and Milan Cirkovic Draft of August 31, 2006. Singularity Institute for Artificial Intelligence Palo Alto, CA http://singinst.org/ourresearch/publications/cognitive-biases.pdf]

Fetherstonhaugh et. al. (1997), in a paper entitled "Insensitivity to the Value of Human Life: A Study of Psychophysical Numbing", found evidence that our perception of human deaths, and valuation of human lives, obeys Weber's Law - meaning that we use a logarithmic scale. And indeed, studies of scope neglect in which the quantitative variations are huge enough to elicit any sensitivity at all, show small linear increases in Willingness-To-Pay corresponding to exponential increases in scope. Kahneman et. al. (1999) interpret this as an additive effect of scope affect and prototype affect - the prototype image elicits most of the emotion, and the scope elicits a smaller amount of emotion which is added (not multiplied) with the first amount. Albert Szent-Györgyi said: "I am deeply moved if I see one man suffering and would risk my life for him. Then I talk impersonally about the possible pulverization of our big cities, with a hundred million dead. I am unable to multiply one man's suffering by a hundred million." Human emotions take place within an analog brain. The human brain cannot release enough neurotransmitters to feel emotion a thousand times as strong as the grief of one funeral. A prospective risk going from 10,000,000 deaths to 100,000,000 deaths does not multiply by ten the strength of our determination to stop it. It adds one more zero on paper for our eyes to glaze over, an effect so small that one must usually jump several orders of magnitude to detect the difference experimentally.

#### Extinction should be weighed first

Nick Bostrom, Department of Philosophy, Yale University, 2002, “Existential Risks: Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios and Related Hazards,” [http://www.transhumanist.com/volume9/risks.html //](http://www.transhumanist.com/volume9/risks.html%20//) vkoneru

Our approach to existential risks cannot be one of trial-and-error. There is no opportunity to learn from errors. The reactive approach – see what happens, limit damages, and learn from experience – is unworkable. Rather, we must take a proactive approach. This requires foresight to anticipate new types of threats and a willingness to take decisive preventive action and to bear the costs (moral and economic) of such actions. We cannot necessarily rely on the institutions, moral norms, social attitudes or national security policies that developed from our experience with managing other sorts of risks. Existential risks are a different kind of beast. We might find it hard to take them as seriously as we should simply because we have never yet witnessed such disasters.[5] Our collective fear-response is likely ill calibrated to the magnitude of threat. Reductions in existential risks are global public goods [13] and may therefore be undersupplied by the market [14]. Existential risks are a menace for everybody and may require acting on the international plane. Respect for national sovereignty is not a legitimate excuse for failing to take countermeasures against a major existential risk. If we take into account the welfare of future generations, the harm done by existential risks is multiplied by another factor, the size of which depends on whether and how much we discount future benefits [15,16].

Nuclear policy should be debated

**Hamilton, 09**

Lee Hamilton, Director of the Center on Congress at Indiana University and Director of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington. He was a member of the U.S. House of Rep for 34 years.)

February 9, 2009 U.S. can set the stage for global nuclear security

http://www.centeroncongress.org/radio\_commentaries/ia\_us\_can\_set\_stage\_for\_global\_nuclear\_security.php

One of candidate Barack Obama's statements during the presidential campaign really caught my attention. He said: "We'll make the goal of eliminating all nuclear weapons a central element in our nuclear policy." It was noteworthy because **nuclear strategy has not featured prominently in our strategic discourse since the end of the Cold War.**

My immediate reaction to Obama's statement was "good luck," but we should not be so cavalier. **Securing nuclear weapons should be the paramount concern of U.S. foreign policy. No threat risks graver repercussions than the detonation of a nuclear weapon on U.S. soil.**

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# Case

### Momentum

NTI 1-7 Nuclear Threat Initiative; “Iran-Sanctions Bill Gains Steam in Senate” *Nuclear Threat Initiative*; January 7, 2014; http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/iran-sanctions-bill-gains-steam-senate/?mgs1=8226ehMsHV

Insiders say a new Iran-sanctions proposal has picked up more backing since its introduction in the Senate last month, Reuters reports.¶ Forty-eight senators are now co-sponsoring the Nuclear Weapon-Free Iran Act, up from the initial 26 who backed the bill before Congress broke for its holiday recess, a staffer in the chamber said on Monday.¶ "Expect that number [of sponsors] to keep growing over [the] next couple of days as folks who were out of town and staff get back in," the source said.

### Vote Count

#### Vote count—48 and growing

Gardner 1-6 Timothy, Energy & Environment Correspondent, Reuters; “Iran sanctions bill opposed by Obama gains Senate backers” *Reuters*; January 6, 2014; http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/01/06/uk-usa-sanctions-iran-idUKBREA0516J20140106

The "Nuclear Weapon Free Iran Act" had about 48 co-sponsors in the 100-member Senate on Monday, up from 26 when the bill was introduced on December 19, an Senate aide said.¶ "Expect that number to keep growing over next couple of days as folks who were out of town and staff get back in," the aide said. The bill was introduced by Robert Menendez, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Mark Kirk, a Republican from Illinois.¶ "We expect several Democrats to kind of cross the picket line and come on board this week," the aide said.

### Voting Records

#### **Veto will be overridden, voting records prove**

Dreyfuss 1-3 Bob, managing editor, foreign policy and defense reporter, The Nation; “Don't Wreck the Iran-P5+1 Accord With Tougher Sanctions” *The Nation*; January 3, 2014; http://www.thenation.com/blog/177766/dont-wreck-iran-p51-accord-tougher-sanctions#

But that hasn’t stopped key members of Congress, including Senators Mark Kirk (R-IL) and Robert Menendez (D-NJ), from drafting a wrecking-ball piece of legislation, cosponsored by twenty-six senators, to intensify sanctions. Menendez, a top Democrat and chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, is being opposed by a phalanx of other Democrats, who’ve urged Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid not to allow the Menendez-Kirk “Nuclear Weapon Free Iran Act” to come to a vote. (The November interim accord explicitly forbids new sanctions during the talks, and President Obama is certain to veto such legislation, although anti-Iran bills over pass with overwhelming, veto-proof majorities.) In their letter, however, ten Democratic Senate committee chairs told Reid, “At this time, as negotiations are ongoing, we believe that new sanctions would play into the hands of those in Iran who are most eager to see the negotiations fail.”

# Anthro

#### Condo bad

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#### Perm do both

Eric Katz, Science, Technology, and Society Program, Department of Humanities and Social Sciences,

New Jersey Institute of Technology, Winter 99, [“A Pragmatic Reconsideration of Anthropocentrism,” ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS Vol. 21, <http://www.mv.helsinki.fi/home/mekoskim/Eric%20Katz%20EE.pdf>] E. Liu

As a final point, it should be noted that a shift toward the inclusion of anthropocentric arguments in this particular case is not damaging to the basic principles of nonanthropocentrism. One can view the anthropocentric arguments for the replenishment of the beach and the preservation of Fire Island as a type of covert nonanthropocentric argument for the preservation of the natural system that lies within the hybrid artifactual/natural system. More specifically, environmentalists who are primarily concerned with the wilderness areas of Fire Island (such as the Sunken Forest) and the threatened and endangered species that live on the island can endorse the beach replenishment plan as an anthropocentric argument that achieves the nonanthropocentric goal of wilderness and species preservation. If the beach (an artifact of human) development) is not replenished, then the relatively undisturbed wilderness area that lies landward of the dunes and beach will be destroyed. IV Let me conclude with two brief comments. First, a conceptual and linguistic clarification. As a pragmatist, I have to remember that John Dewey argued relentlessly against the reification of false dualisms. In this essay, I have tended to accentuate two pairs of dualisms—anthropocentrism vs. nonanthropocentrism, and the natural vs. the artifactual. Let me stress that I do not see these concepts as clearly demarcated dualistic ideals. I believe that we are actually dealing with a spectrum of possibilities, that arguments can be more or less anthropocentric or nonanthropocentric, that systems can be more or less natural or artifactual. Indeed, it is because of the existence of these concepts along a spectrum that the evaluation and justification of environmental policies requires a flexible and pluralistic outlook. But sometimes in the course of philosophical analysis, our language tends to emphasize the distinctions between conceptual pairs, distinctions that may not purely exist in reality. This is just another example of the poverty of our conceptual language in dealing with the richness and complexity of the world.

#### Us military interventions are bad for animals

Kim Scipes, Ph.D., is an Assistant Professor of Sociology at Purdue University North Central in Westville, Indiana, 2009, http://countercurrents.org/scipes291209.htm

As a US military veteran—USMC, 1969-73, who turned around while on active duty—I have been incredibly frustrated at the impotence of the anti-war movement in the United States to stop the wars in particularly Iraq, Afghanistan and, increasingly, Pakistan. I am, obviously, not alone. Many other people—veterans, as well as many more civilians—also share this frustration. Barry Sanders’ new book, The Green Zone, takes a different angle than any I’ve seen before, and I believe it’s an approach I believe we all need to consider: Sanders focuses on the environmental costs of militarism, particularly those from the US military. Sanders recognizes the incredible threat by greenhouse gases to the worlds’ peoples well-being and, in fact, to our very survival. [Percentage of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere has risen from 280 parts per million (ppm) before the industrial revolution started in 1750 to where the latest readings are 392 ppm—should it reach 450, the accompanying temperature rise would lead to uncontrollable melting of the tundra across Russia and Canada, and the release of untold amounts of methane: methane has 20 times greater impact on the atmosphere than carbon dioxide. James Hansen of NASA believes we must go below 350 ppm to prevent serious environmental damage worldwide—KS.] Sanders also knows the environment is not just threatened by greenhouse gasses, but recognizes pollution of the water, air and soil as joining with greenhouse gases to imperil us all. Yet he makes an incredibly important point, trying to put things into perspective and to focus our attention: “… here’s the awful truth: even if every person, every automobile, and every factory suddenly emitted zero emissions, the Earth would still be headed head first and at full speed toward total disaster for one major reason. The [US] military—that voracious vampire—produces enough greenhouse gases, by itself, to place the entire globe, with all its inhabitants large and small, in the most immanent danger of extinction” (p, 22). To put it plain language, that social institution that is said to protect Americans is, in fact, hastening our very extermination along with all the other people of the planet. Sanders addresses the military’s affects on the environment in many ways. He starts off with trying to figure out how much (fossil) fuel the military uses, with their resulting greenhouse emissions there from. Despite diligent efforts, he cannot find out specific numbers, so he is forced to estimate. After carefully working through different categories, he comes to what he calls a conservative estimate of 1 million barrels of oil a day, which translates to almost 20 million gallons each and every day! He puts this number into international perspective: “If that indeed turns out to be the case, the United States military would then rank in fuel consumption with countries like Iran, Indonesia and Spain. It is truly an astonishing accomplishment, especially when one considers … that the military has only about 1.5 million troops on active duty, and Iran has a population of 66 million, Indonesia a whopping 235 million” (54) The cost, incidentally, is also quite high. He quotes a US Army General as estimating that the cost of this fuel averages $300 a gallon! (55) Yet, how does this contribute to global warming? He reports that the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) estimates that “each gallon of gasoline produces 19.4 pounds of CO 2” (carbon dioxide). If his estimate of 1 million barrels of oil a day is correct, he writes, “then the combined armed forces sends into the atmosphere about 400 million pounds of greenhouse gases a day, or 200,000 tons. That totals 146 billion pounds a year—or 73 million tons of carbon a year” (67-68). And that’s just regarding fuel use. Sanders further discusses the military’s impact on the environment. He talks about the impact of exploding bombs, cluster bombs, napalm, cannon rounds, depleted uranium, etc. He points out that the US military estimates they need about 1.5 billion rounds for their M-16 rifles a year. He talks about the impact of US military bases around the world, including in the Philippines and Puerto Rico. To me, the most sickening chapter was the one on depleted uranium or DU. He explains, “Depleted uranium is essentially U-238, the isotope after the fissionable isotope, U-235, has been extracted from uranium ore.” DU has a half-life of 4.7 billion years. He continues: “… a good deal of the country of Iraq, both its deserts and cities, hums with radioactivity. For since 1991, the US has been manufacturing ‘just about all [of its] bullets, tank shells, missiles, dumb bombs, smart bombs, and 500- and 2000-pound bombs, and everything else engineered to help our side in the war of Us against Them, [with] depleted uranium in it. Lots of depleted uranium. A single cruise missile, which weighs 3,000 pounds, carries within its casing 800 pounds of depleted uranium.’ Recall that the Air Force dropped 800 of these bombs in just the first two days of the war. The math: 800 bombs multiplied by 800 pounds of depleted uranium equal 640,000 pounds, or 320 tons of radioactive waste dumped on that country in just the first two days of devastation” (83). The impact is devastating. When DU hits something, it ignites, reaching temperatures between 3,000-5,000 degrees Celsius (5,432-9,032 degrees F). It goes through metal like a hot knife through butter, making it a superb military weapon. But is also releases radiation upon impact, poisoning all around it. Its tiny particles can be inhaled—people don’t have to touch irradiated materials. Thus, Iraqis are being poisoned by simply breathing the air! And, once inhaled, DU hardens, turning into insoluble pellets than cannot be excreted. DU poisoning is a literal death sentence. It not only kills, however, but it can damage human DNA—it’s the gift that keeps on giving, to generations and generations. Yet, radiation is an equal opportunity destroyer: it also poisons those in occupying armies. Evidence from the Gulf War I (“Desert Storm”) shows the impact on American troops. Sanders quotes Arthur Bernklau, who has extensively studied the problem: “Of the 580,400 soldiers who served in Gulf War I, 11,000 are now dead. By the year 2000, there were 325,000 on permanent medical disability. More than a decade later, more than half (56 percent) who served in Gulf War I have permanent medical problems.” Bernklau then points out that the disability rate for soldiers in Vietnam was 10 percent (87). Yet the impact is not just on Iraqis, or the soldiers who fought there. Sanders points out that, according to the London Sunday Times, radiation sensors in Britain reported a four-fold increase in airborne uranium just a few days after George W. Bush launched the March 19, 2003 attack on Iraq. That sounds bad enough, that the uranium can travel the approximately 2500 miles from Baghdad to London. But what Sanders does not note is that global weather does not travel east to west: it travels west to east. In other words, this uranium had to cross North America to get from Iraq to Britain! There is much more detailed information included in this small, highly accessible book. AK Press deserves our respect and support for publishing such a worthy volume: and this is one we each should purchase and urge others to do so as well. The biggest strength of this book is Sanders’ clarity: this man is, if you will permit, “on target.” He sees the problem being not just the illegal and immoral wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, etc. He sees the US military as being an essential part of the US Empire, along with the major multinational corporations. He sees the military as an institution as a threat to global environmental survival. He recognizes that politicians won’t address the problem; they are too incorporated in the US Empire. It says it is up to us, individually and collectively, in the US (primarily) and together with people around the world. Basically, his argument is this: the US military can continue to launch wars and continue killing people (including Americans) around the world, or we can end war, and devote resources to the well-being of people in this country and others around the world. The choice is our’s. But we also need to realize that if we let the US military continue on its path of continual war with its on-going quest for global domination, it will destroy all the humans, animals and vegetation on the planet. Your move, good people.

#### Biology and thought make anthropocentric understanding inevitable

LEE F. WERTH, Associate Professor of Philosophy at Cleveland State University, 1998, “The Anthropocentric Predicament and the Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence (The Universe as Seen Through Our Eyes Darkly)”, Journal of Applied Philosophy, Vol 15, No. 1 //ZY

There is something of a paradox involved in the account which follows; evolutionary biology will be used as the basis for claiming that we are hopelessly locked in an anthropocentric predicament, that is, we must conceive of the universe in human terms, Yet this very argument, if successful, will undermine itself. It will explain why we can not recognize E.T.L, but in so doing it also condemns us to a biologically based perspective which by its own canons of reasoning entails limitations\* The biologically grounded perspective of our place in the universe ultimately stultifies itself by being a product of the very conceptual limitations it can explicate! Nietzsche, perhaps more than other philosophers, understood the problem[3]. Our brains have been programmed by the selection pressures of our environment. We are land animals who live on a planet of cyclical changes, but changes which are sufficiently erratic to preclude a simple algorithm which would allow land organisms such as ourselves to rely wholly upon instinct for our survival, so-called instinct being a biologically programmed information processing system which requires neither consciousness nor the capacity to learn diverse responses to a changing environment. Our bodies and brains obviously evolved together, but it is a helpful thought experiment to consider how a body such as ours could survive without our indigenous human conceptual capacities. If Nietzsche recognized the 'prejudices of philosophers1 and the problem of understanding perspectives only from the perspective of a perspective, Immanuel Kant can be credited with discerning those patterns of information processing, which being human, we can not transcend\* In his Critique of Pure Reason^ Kant clarified not only what he called the categories of the human understanding, but the manner in which human experience is inextricably presented spatially and temporally, or in terms which Kant called the pure forms of outer and inner intuition[4]. It hardly matters whether time and space (space-time) exist independently of our minds. What is relevant to the present problem is a Kantian insight, that is> that the categories we use to experience things and events are hopelessly anthropocentric; biological selection pressures have determined the categories we use to construct and thereby experience objects and events: quantity; quality; causality; possibility; necessity; real; unreal; etc. Without presenting either an organized list nor a comprehensive one, it should be clear that to experience anything and to recognize that we are experiencing it> we must employ such categories and concepts. Are they universal to all rational creatures? Even judged from within the perspective of biological evolution it becomes depressingly obvious that such categories and relationships are of utility to land creatures who live in the quasi-cyclical environment which Earth provides\* an environment of changing conditions both on land and sea> changes primarily due to the tilt of Earth's axis, other changes resulting from plate tectonics, etc. And yet it will be argued that other planets are sufficiently Earthlike for E.T.I. A closer look is in order

#### They see humans as above nature, turns the K

David Pepper, Professor of Geography at Oxford Brookes University 04, [“Environmentalism: Critical Concepts,”http://books.google.com/books?id=zwzOs\_IHCYQC&pg=PA44&dq=anthropocentrism+is&ei= yKZjSu6EKYSmkATst9nKDg]

Overcoming anthropocentrism has meant appreciating that 'Man\* is not the center of the universe or the measure of all things: that it is less tenable to think of humans as made in the image of God. as the purpose of creation, than as one of the products of natural evolution. Humans are just a part of the natural order This cognitive displacement of human beings from center stage in the greater scheme of things has been made possible, above all. by developments in modern science. This detached view of humans has been made possible by just that kind of objectivizing knowledge which more recently has been held to lie at the root of an attitude toward the natural world to be condemned as anthropocentric. For what the rise of objcciivat-ing science has done is bring with it the idea that humans can in some ways stand apart from the rest of nature: the achievement of objectivity carries with it an enhanced view of the power and autonomy of subjectivity; and this is at the heart of a set of attitudes which privilege human faculties, capacities and interests over those of nonhuman entities. There thus appears to be a paradox: the overcoming of anthropocentrism so far has been brought about by just those developments which are now seen by many as lying at the root of unacceptably anthropocentric attitudes and values.1 If the overcoming of anthropocentrism is to be deemed a good thing, therefore, this paradox should alert us to how it is also a rather complex thing.

#### All valuation of nature is anthropocentric

Luc Ferry, Philosophy @ Sorbonne, 1995 (*The New Ecological Order* p. 130-132 Trans. Carol Volk)

The first leads us back to a paradox which, though simple in appearance, is nonetheless difficult to surmount: while the deep-ecology program rests entirely on the rejection of anthropocentrism (Cartesian or utilitarian) in the name of the rights of the ecosphere, the logic of their own reasoning causes them to fall back on one of the most absurd forms of *anthropomorphism*. Phillip Elder, one of the supporters of a “superificial” and “environmentalist” ecology, has formulated this major difficulty in amusing, but fundamentally incontestable, terms: discussing Stone’s theses on the rights of trees “populating” the valley of Mineral King, he mentions that his staunchest adversaries “always suppose that the interests of objects (mountains, lakes, and other natural things) are opposed to development. But how do we know? After all, isn’t it possible that Mineral King would be inclined to welcome a ski slope after having remained idle for millions of years? …Aren’t the deep ecologists acting ‘anthropocentrically’ themselves when they claim to know what is best for the natural environment?”

Indeed: to say that animals have “interests” is already debatable, even if we recognize in them the same capacity to feel pleasure and pain. But doesn’t claiming the same for trees, rocks, or the biosphere as a whole lean toward an animism comparable to that which informed the medieval trials of grasshoppers or weevils? There is an insurmountable logical error at the very foundation of fundamentalist reasoning. This error has a name: “performative contradiction,” the model for which is furnished by the following type of proposition: “I was on a boat that sank and there were no survivors.” The *content* of the statement contradicts to conditions of its enunciatrion. This discordance can be found in the legal arguments of deep ecologists: imagining that good is inscribed within the very being of thins, they forget that all valorization, including that of nature, is the deed of ~~man~~, and that, consequently, all normative ethic is in some sense humanist and anthropocentrist. Man can decide togrant a certain respect to non-human entitites, to animals, national parks, monuments, or cultural works: whether we like it or not, the latter always remain *objects and not subjects of law*. In other words, the idea of creating a normative, antihumanist ethics is a contradiction in terms. In wishing to maintain the idea of value yet suppressing the conditions under which it becomes possible, the fundamentalists fall into the performative contradiction: they forget that it is they, as human beings, who value nature, and not the reverse, that it is impossible to disregard this subject or humanist moment and project onto the universe itself an “intrinsic value.” No doubt there are aspects of nature that move us – a phenomenon which deserves to be described and analyzed against a certain Cartesianism – but that doesn’t mean that it is possiuble to disregard the “us.” On the contrary, it is precisely by attempting to disregard subjectivity that the philosophy of nature leads to the illusions of anthropomorphism. In opposition to Jonas’s thought, we must remember that if the end wishes to be “moral,” it ca never “reside in nature,” that while the “biological foundation is necessary,” as Ricoeur reminds us, it “ceases to be sufficient” when it comes to determining the conditions, not of the simple survival of men on earth, but of a good life – which is an entirely different matter.

One may object that the idea of a law of nature is just a literary metaphor, destined to arrest the attention of a public sunk in lethargy. Does this mean Michel Serres does not seriously consider that man and nature can enter into a genuine “contract” together, in which they would consider themselves, as he suggests, equals? Perhaps. But what is the point of such poetic license if one must immediately discount its philosophical weight? What relationship remains between the social contract and its counterpart in nature if the latter is not a true pact but a short article appended to the first, a hastily added frill? Why use such a strong image if its meaning must then be negated, if it does not represent a genuine concern for transforming the beings of nature into legal suvjects? And what difference then remains between this supposedly new vision of our relationship to nature and that of the “superficial” ecologists and “anthropocentrists?”

**Prefer consequences – Their moral tunnel vision is complicit with the evil they criticize.**

**Issac 2**

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As a result, the most important political questions are simply not asked. It is assumed that U.S. military intervention is an act of "aggression," but no consideration is given to the aggression to which intervention is a response. The status quo ante in Afghanistan is not, as peace activists would have it, peace, but rather terrorist violence abetted by a regime--the Taliban--that rose to power through brutality and repression. This requires us to ask a question that most "peace" activists would prefer not to ask: What should be done to respond to the violence of a Saddam Hussein, or a Milosevic, or a Taliban regime? What means are likely to stop violence and bring criminals to justice? Calls for diplomacy and international law are well intended and important; they implicate a decent and civilized ethic of global order. But they are also vague and empty, because they are not accompanied by any account of how diplomacy or international law can work effectively to address the problem at hand. The campus left offers no such account. To do so would require it to contemplate tragic choices in which moral goodness is of limited utility. Here what matters is not purity of intention but the intelligent exercise of power. Power is not a dirty word or an unfortunate feature of the world. It is the core of politics. Power is the ability to effect outcomes in the world. Politics, in large part, involves contests over the distribution and use of power. To accomplish anything in the political world, one must attend to the means that are necessary to bring it about. And to develop such means is to develop, and to exercise, power. To say this is not to say that power is beyond morality. It is to say that power is not reducible to morality. As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one's intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with "good" may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of "good" that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one's goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

#### Identifying root cause is not only incorrect, but destructive. Justifies atrocities and solution failures.

Morson 07 (Gary, Professor of Slavic Studies, Russian Literature and History at Northwestern, “Anna Karenina In Our Time: Seeing More Wisely,” P. 152-4)

If Levin resembled so may intellectuals in his time and ours, he might seek “root cause” (as we would call it today) of all these failures. Much as the generals an historians satirized in War and Peace mistakenly seek the cause of historical events in a single decision, an much as revolutionaries often reduce the complexities of social ills to a single conspiracy or institution, so intellectuals often view complexity as a delusion to be explained away by a few simple underlying laws. It is just this habit of thought that feeds utopianism, because if the diversity of evil an misery had a single cause, then one could eliminate it by changing only one thing What could be easier? Abolish private property, alter the way children are educated, pass laws to regulate morals according to a given code, and evil will disappear or, at least, radically diminish. Behold, I make all new things But Levin learns that there is no single cause for what has gone wrong. Looking back on the twentieth century, we may wonder whether the root cause of the worst human misery is the belief that there is a root cause of human misery. In fact, many things happen contingently, just “for some reason.” Friction When l.evin attends the elections, he tries to handle some business for his sister, but discovers that somehow it cannot be done. In Dostoevsky, the reason would be "administrative ecstasy," the sheer delight bureaucrats take in making petitioners cringe, plead, or wait. But nothing of the sort happens here, and the problem is not one of intent at all. No one has any interest in thwarting Levin, so he cannot understand what goes wrong. When conspiracy theorists find they cannot accomplish something as easily as expected, they typically ask cut bono? (who benefits?) ro discover the obstacle. Some person or group must have caused the failure. Defeat means sabotage. This way of thinking presumes that behind every action there must be an intent, whether conscious or unconscious. Such a view rules out the possibility that mere contingency or friction accounts for the difficulty. flic military theorist Carl von Clauscwitz deemed friction, in this special metaphorical sense, an essential concept in understanding armies. Without using this word, Tolstoy regarded the same phenomenon as pertaining not just to war but to everything social. "If one has never personally experienced war," Clauscwitz explains, one cannot understand in what difficulties constantly mentioned really consist. . . . Everything looks simple; the knowledge required docs not look remarkable, the strategic options are so obvious that by comparison the simplest problem of higher mathematics has an impressive scientific dignity. Once war has actually been seen the difficulties become clear; but it is extremely difficult to describe the unseen, all-pervading element that brings about this change of perspective. Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult. 'Die difficulties accumulate and end by producing a kind of friction that is inconceivable unless one has experienced war. (Clausewitz, 119) The unseen, all-pervading element: For Tolstoy, similar difficulties arise when dealing with bureaucracy, introducing changes in agriculture, and implementing reforms. A Tolstoyan perspective is easily imagined today. Social problems look so simple: people in underdeveloped countries are poor, so give their governments foreign aid; workers arc unemployed, so hire them to perform needed government services; schools do not educate, so raise teachers' salaries; the state regulatory commission keeps energy prices too high, so partially privatize the system: answers seem so obvious, but in practice reforms rarely have the intended effect. They produce unintended consequences, which themselves have consequences; and, as Isaiah Berlin liked to point our, no one can foresee the consequences of consequences of consequences. Experience may teach one to expect certain kinds of difficulties, but some can never be anticipated, lhcrc is always friction: "Countless minor incidents —the kind you can never really foresee—combine to lower the general level of performance, so that one always falls far short of the intended goal" (Clauscwitz, 119). No one is deliberately impeding Levin's efforts for his sister. By the same token, no one is trying to thwart his agricultural reforms. Sabotage is out of the question. "All this happened not because anyone felt ill will toward Levin or his farm; on the contrary, he knew that they [rhe peasants] liked him [and] thought him a simple gentleman (their highest praise)" (340). Friction defeats the reforms. But where does this friction come from and how might one best deal with it? TTic Elemental Force 'Ihe bailiff and peasants recognize in advance when a plan is bound to fail, and at lasr l.evin, instead of growing angry, pays artention to what they say: The bailiff listened attentively, and obviously made an effort to approve of his employer's projects. But still he had that look Levin knew so well that always irritated him, a look of hopelessness and despondency. That look said: " Ihat's all very well, but as God wills." Nothing mortified Levin so much as that tone. But it was common to all the bailiffs he had ever had. They had all taken up that attitude toward his plans, and so now he was not angered by it but mortified, and felr all the more roused ro struggle against this, as it seemed, elemental force continually ranged against him, for which he could find no other expression than "as God wills." (165) Ihe elementalforce: this concept is central to both Tolstoy's great novels. Tolstoy uses a few similar terms for it. In War and Peace, he refers to an elemental force shaping individual lives (W&P, 648) and to "the elemental life of the swarm" constituting the cumulative effect of countless people's small actions governed by no overarching law. In Anna Karentna, he calls the elemental force a "brutal force" when its outcome is cruel. Ihe rough equivalent of friction for Clause-witz, the elemental force applies more widely. Clauscwitz's explanation stops at friction, but Tolstoy takes the elemental force as a starting point for understanding why some plans arc more likely to fail than others. In order to grasp the course of events more easily, we tend to reduce the countless infinitesimal forces making up the elemental force to a single cause. After all, it is impossible to enumerate innumerable actions. And so historians and social scientists naturally look for some super-cause that sums up all those small actions. They may presume laws or postulate narrative neatness. Tolstoy relentlessly exposed the logical fallacies in both forms of simplification, which, at some point, either assume what is to be proven or proceed as if it were already proven. Historians, social theorists, and biographers favor generalizations or symmetries permitting a clear analysis or simple story. They find what they seek, their success demonstrates not that complexity has been adequately explained but that when a discipline demands a certain sort of explanation it is bound to be “discovered.” In disciplines pretending to be social sciences, it is repeatedly discovered that things are not as complex as they appear.

# Risk

### Role of the Ballot

#### The role of the ballot is to vote for the team that does the better debating. Role of the ballot arguments are really just questions of impact comparison. Anything else is arbitrary—everybody can create a self-serving role of the ballot.

### Weigh Aff

#### To win the negative must disprove the desirability of the aff

#### Burden of rejoinder—if the negative does not disprove the desirability of the aff, they have not effectively negated us and you have no reason to vote neg

#### Using pedagogical institutions to make prescriptions for change prevents docile acceptance of oppression. Evaluating the likely consequences of our prescriptions shapes successful social change.

Susan Carle, Law @ American University, 2005 (“Theorizing Agency.” 55 Am. U.L. Rev. 307 lexis)

Precisely because he believed in the power of human agency, Dewey devoted a great deal of his writing to developing prescriptions for change in response to the issues of his times. It is worth quickly surveying some of those prescriptions here because they help illuminate the relationship between Dewey’s theory of the self and his overall philosophic system. Dewey’s deliberative theory ties elegantly into his theory of democracy, which in turn displays an ascetically pleasing “fit”274 with his pedagogical vision. Dewey’s political theory is a large topic, to which he devoted much writing but to which I can give only passing attention. Suffice it to say that Dewey passionately believed in the virtues of democracy; indeed, Dewey scholars have described democracy as Dewey’s deepest preoccupation— the underlying passion that motivated him in his prolific output.275 Unlike philosophers such as John Rawls, however, Dewey uncoupled democracy from the institutions of Western capitalism, and was intensely critical of capitalism as he saw it developing in his lifetime. To Dewey, capitalism spelled economic inequality, which was anathema to his vision of democracy based in local deliberative processes.276 Dewey saw education as the process through which children would acquire the habits that would allow them to become members of a democracy, well equipped for the kind of reflective thought and deliberation that democracy required.277 Thus, education was for Dewey a fundamental method of social progress and reform.278 For this reason, Dewey, unlike most modern philosophers, gave pedagogy a central place in his philosophy. Dewey saw education as the scientific laboratory in which the ideas of pragmatism would be put to the test of experience.279 To Dewey, the ability to engage in good deliberative judgment—to exercise clear foresight on ethical as well as instrumental matters—was a habit that could and should be cultivated through education. Thus Dewey thought that education should not be a “succession of studies but the development of new attitudes towards, and new interests in, experience.”280 No relativist on matters concerning his own place and time, Dewey denounced the “inert stupid quality of current customs,” which “perverts learning into a willingness to follow where others point the way, into conformity, constriction, surrender of scepticism and experiment.”281 In lieu of teaching to new generations habits that represent such “enslavement to old ruts,”282 Dewey wanted to inculcate better habits—“flexible, sensitive” ones that could grow “more varied, more adaptable by practice and use.”283 These, in turn, were the habits Dewey identified as necessary for democracy to succeed. Here, the contrasts with Stanley Fish are stark. Fish, as we have seen, argues that teaching methods of critical analysis to students does not change practice outside the classroom.284 Practice in the world outside the classroom and the doing of theory proceed on two unrelated planes. Dewey, conversely, repudiated the separation of theory and practice as a false dualism, arguing that those who espouse theory for theory’s sake are in fact espousing “two kinds of practice.”285 Moreover, he argued, “[t]hose who wish a monopoly of social power find desirable the separation of habit and thought” because this “dualism enables them to do the thinking and planning, while others remain the docile . . . instruments of execution.”286 Thus, for Dewey, theory was a form of practice in the world that had great potential to fuel political and social change, and the decision to do and teach theory as a practice separate from political and social issues was a political decision with particular normative consequences—namely, the promotion of political disengagement and apathy.287

#### Perm do both—there is nothing mutually exclusive between a questioning of our knowledge claims and an affirmation that the plan is a fundamentall good idea.

#### Nothing about this kritik is a reason for them to win this debate. We always start from a point of uncertainty. No knowledge claim is absolute, but we can still make functioning, provisional claims about the world. “Gaps in the 1ac” are not a reason to reject the aff. That’s our 1ac Halliday and Miller cards.

#### The net benefit is being able to do anything at all. Their attempts at epistemic purity—rejecting any knowledge with gaps-- make any action impossible—this is multiplied by the time-sensitive nature of the plan

Kratochwil, professor of international relations – European University Institute, 2008 (Friedrich, “The Puzzles of Politics,” pg. 200-213)

The lesson seems clear. Even at the danger of “fuzzy boundaries”, when we deal with “practice” ( just as with the “pragmatic turn”), we would be well advised to rely on the use of the term rather than on its reference (pointing to some property of the object under study), in order to draw the bounds of sense and understand the meaning of the concept. My argument for the fruitful character of a pragmatic approach in IR, therefore, does not depend on a comprehensive mapping of the varieties of research in this area, nor on an arbitrary appropriation or exegesis of any specific and self-absorbed theoretical orientation. For this reason, in what follows, I will not provide a rigidly specified definition, nor will I refer exclusively to some prepackaged theoretical approach. Instead, I will sketch out the reasons for which a pragmatic orientation in social analysis seems to hold particular promise. These reasons pertain both to the more general area of knowledge appropriate for praxis and to the more specific types of investigation in the field. The follow- ing ten points are – without a claim to completeness – intended to engender some critical reflection on both areas. Firstly, a pragmatic approach does not begin with objects or “things” (ontology), or with reason and method (epistemology), but with “acting” (prattein), thereby preventing some false starts. Since, **as historical beings placed in a** specific situations**, we do not have the luxury** of deferring decisions **until we have** found the “truth”, **we have to act and must do so always under time pressures and in the face of incomplete information.** Pre- cisely because the social world is characterised by strategic interactions, what a situation “is”, is hardly ever clear ex ante, because it is being “produced” by the actors and their interactions, and the multiple possibilities are rife with incentives for (dis)information. This puts a premium on quick diagnostic and cognitive shortcuts informing actors about the relevant features of the situ- ation, and on leaving an alternative open (“plan B”) in case of unexpected difficulties. Instead of relying on certainty and universal validity gained through abstraction and controlled experiments, we know that completeness and attentiveness to detail, rather than to generality, matter. To that extent, likening practical choices to simple “discoveries” of an already independently existing “reality” which discloses itself to an “observer” – or relying on optimal strategies – is somewhat heroic. These points have been made vividly by “realists” such as Clausewitz in his controversy with von Bülow, in which he criticised the latter’s obsession with a strategic “science” (Paret et al. 1986). While Clausewitz has become an icon for realists, only a few of them (usually dubbed “old” realists) have taken seriously his warnings against the misplaced belief in the reliability and use- fulness of a “scientific” study of strategy. Instead, most of them, especially “neorealists” of various stripes, have embraced the “theory”-building based on the epistemological project as the via regia to the creation of knowledge. A pragmatist orientation would most certainly not endorse such a position. Secondly, since acting in the social world often involves acting “for” someone, special responsibilities arise that aggravate both the incompleteness of knowledge as well as its generality problem. Since we owe special care to those entrusted to us, for example, as teachers, doctors or lawyers, we cannot just rely on what is generally true, but have to pay special attention to the particular case. Aside from avoiding the foreclosure of options, we cannot refuse to act on the basis of incomplete information or insufficient know- ledge, and the necessary diagnostic will involve typification and comparison, reasoning by analogy rather than generalization or deduction. Leaving out the particularities of a case, be it a legal or medical one, in a mistaken effort to become “scientific” would be a fatal flaw. Moreover, **there still remains the crucial element of “timing” –** of knowing when to act. Students of crises have always pointed out the importance of this factor but, in attempts at building a general “theory” of international politics analogously to the natural sci- ences, such elements are neglected on the basis of the “continuity of nature” and the “large number” assumptions. Besides, “timing” seems to be quite recalcitrant to analytical treatment.

#### Even a small risk of extinction is enough to justify action, our 1ac Bostrom evidence says there is a cognitive bias against believing in extinction events. Extinction is qualitatively and quantitatively great enough to necessitate endorsing action.

#### Expect the unexpected—black swan events like the 2009 financial crisis have proven over and over to be impossible to predict but not impossible. The risk of massive suffering should be enough to motivate action

1. Epistemological Critique Doesn’t Justify Ignoring Consequences of Mass Death –Intuition Gives Us Justifications for Offsetting Violent Nuclear Practices

Tyler Cowen, Prof. of Econ @ George Mason, ‘4 [November 2, The Epistemic Problem Does Not Refute Consequentialism, <http://www.gmu.edu/centers/publicchoice/faculty%20pages/Tyler/Epistemic2.pdf>]

Lenman’s example assumes that **we know literally nothing about** the major consequences of our acts; we know only the minor consequence concerning the dog. In contrast, the windstorm example assumes that we know a small amount about the major consequences of our acts, albeit not very much. Once we know a small amount about major consequences, however, the case for counting **consequences appears more robust**. And in most real world cases, no matter how great our uncertainty, we do know at least a small amount about major consequences, if only in stochastic terms. So **the epistemic critique does not** much **weaken consequentialism** when we have some information about some consequences of major importance.8 Now the epistemic critique may be relying on “Knightian uncertainty” rather than Bayesian estimates. But even in these cases we still have degrees of uncertainty. I may have “no idea” about my forthcoming birthday surprise, but this uncertainty is not comparable to my “no idea” about intelligent life on other planets. Background social context will give us some expectations, **even if we cannot assign definite numbers** to probability forecasts. We are back to the likelihood that we often will have some idea, **however slight**, or however non-quantifiable, as to which beach is better for the invasion. The epistemic critique relies heavily **on a complete lack of information** about initial circumstances. **This is not** a plausible general assumption, although it may sometimes be true. The critique may give the impression of relying more heavily on a more plausible assumption, namely a high variance for the probability distribution of our estimates concerning the future. But simply increasing the level of variance or uncertainty does not add much force to the epistemic argument. To see this more clearly, consider another case of a high upfront benefit. Assume that the United States has been hit with a bioterror attack and one million children have contracted smallpox. We also have two new experimental remedies, both of which offer some chance of curing smallpox and restoring the children to perfect health. If we know for sure which remedy works, obviously we should apply that remedy. But imagine now that we are uncertain as to which remedy works. The uncertainty is so extreme that each remedy may cure somewhere between three hundred thousand and six hundred thousand children. Nonetheless **we have a slight idea** that one remedy is better than the other. That is, one remedy is slightly more likely to cure more children, with no other apparent offsetting negative effects or considerations. **Despite the greater uncertainty, we still have the** intuition that we should try to save as many children as possible. We should apply the remedy that is more likely to cure more children. **We do not say: “We are now so uncertain about what will happen. We should pursue some goal** other than trying to cure as many children as possible.” Nor would we cite greater uncertainty about longer-run events as an argument against curing the children. We have a definite good in the present (more cured children), balanced against a radical remixing of the future on both sides of the equation. The definite upfront good still stands firm. Alternatively, let us assume that our broader 14 future suddenly became less predictable (perhaps genetic engineering is invented, which creates new and difficult-to-forecast possibilities). That still would not diminish the force of our reason for saving more children. The variance of forecast becomes larger on both sides of the equation – whether we save the children or not – and the value of the upfront lives remains. A higher variance of forecast might increase the required size of the upfront benefit (to overcome the Principle of Roughness), but it would not refute the relevance of consequences more generally. We could increase the uncertainty more, but consequentialism still will not appear counterintuitive. The remedies, rather than curing somewhere in the range of three to six hundred thousand children, might cure in the broader range of zero to all one million of the children. By all classical statistical standards, this new cure scenario involves more uncertainty than the previous case, such as by having a higher variance of possible outcomes. Yet this higher uncertainty lends little support for the view that curing the children becomes less important. We still have an imperative to apply the remedy that appears best, and is expected the cure the greater number of children. This example may appear excessively simple, but it points our **attention to the non-generality** of the epistemic critique. The critique appears strongest **only when we have absolutely** no idea about the **future; this is a special rather than a general case.** Simply boosting the degree of background generic uncertainty **should not stop us from pursuing large upfront benefits of obvious importance.**