# ROB

#### Rob is team that debates best

#### We aren’t role playing—advocate plan

#### Using pedagogical institutions to make prescriptions for change prevents docile acceptance of oppression. Evaluating the likely consequences of our prescriptions shapes successful social change.

Susan Carle, Law @ American University, 2005 (“Theorizing Agency.” 55 Am. U.L. Rev. 307 lexis)

Precisely because he believed in the power of human agency, Dewey devoted a great deal of his writing to developing prescriptions for change in response to the issues of his times. It is worth quickly surveying some of those prescriptions here because they help illuminate the relationship between Dewey’s theory of the self and his overall philosophic system. Dewey’s deliberative theory ties elegantly into his theory of democracy, which in turn displays an ascetically pleasing “fit”274 with his pedagogical vision. Dewey’s political theory is a large topic, to which he devoted much writing but to which I can give only passing attention. Suffice it to say that Dewey passionately believed in the virtues of democracy; indeed, Dewey scholars have described democracy as Dewey’s deepest preoccupation— the underlying passion that motivated him in his prolific output.275 Unlike philosophers such as John Rawls, however, Dewey uncoupled democracy from the institutions of Western capitalism, and was intensely critical of capitalism as he saw it developing in his lifetime. To Dewey, capitalism spelled economic inequality, which was anathema to his vision of democracy based in local deliberative processes.276 Dewey saw education as the process through which children would acquire the habits that would allow them to become members of a democracy, well equipped for the kind of reflective thought and deliberation that democracy required.277 Thus, education was for Dewey a fundamental method of social progress and reform.278 For this reason, Dewey, unlike most modern philosophers, gave pedagogy a central place in his philosophy. Dewey saw education as the scientific laboratory in which the ideas of pragmatism would be put to the test of experience.279 To Dewey, the ability to engage in good deliberative judgment—to exercise clear foresight on ethical as well as instrumental matters—was a habit that could and should be cultivated through education. Thus Dewey thought that education should not be a “succession of studies but the development of new attitudes towards, and new interests in, experience.”280 No relativist on matters concerning his own place and time, Dewey denounced the “inert stupid quality of current customs,” which “perverts learning into a willingness to follow where others point the way, into conformity, constriction, surrender of scepticism and experiment.”281 In lieu of teaching to new generations habits that represent such “enslavement to old ruts,”282 Dewey wanted to inculcate better habits—“flexible, sensitive” ones that could grow “more varied, more adaptable by practice and use.”283 These, in turn, were the habits Dewey identified as necessary for democracy to succeed. Here, the contrasts with Stanley Fish are stark. Fish, as we have seen, argues that teaching methods of critical analysis to students does not change practice outside the classroom.284 Practice in the world outside the classroom and the doing of theory proceed on two unrelated planes. Dewey, conversely, repudiated the separation of theory and practice as a false dualism, arguing that those who espouse theory for theory’s sake are in fact espousing “two kinds of practice.”285 Moreover, he argued, “[t]hose who wish a monopoly of social power find desirable the separation of habit and thought” because this “dualism enables them to do the thinking and planning, while others remain the docile . . . instruments of execution.”286 Thus, for Dewey, theory was a form of practice in the world that had great potential to fuel political and social change, and the decision to do and teach theory as a practice separate from political and social issues was a political decision with particular normative consequences—namely, the promotion of political disengagement and apathy.287

#### Academic debate over policy issues like the response to War Powers is critical to improve policymaking

Stephen M. Walt 11, Professor of International Affairs at Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, July 21, “International Affairs and the Public Sphere”, http://publicsphere.ssrc.org/walt-international-affairs-and-the-public-sphere/

Academics can make at least three distinct contributions to public discourse on global affairs. First, although the digital revolution has made a wealth of information from around the world accessible on a near real-time basis, most of us still lack both extensive direct data on events in far-flung areas and the background knowledge necessary to understand what new developments mean. If our town’s school district is troubled or the local economy is suffering, we can observe that for ourselves and make reasonably well-informed judgments about what might be done about it. But if the issue is the war in Afghanistan, an uprising in Yemen, a naval confrontation in the South China Sea or the prospects that some battered economy will be bailed out successfully, most of us will lack the factual knowledge or conceptual understanding to know what is really going on. Even when basic information is readily available, it may be hard for most of us to put it in the appropriate context or make sense of what it means. ¶ When citizens and leaders seek to grasp the dizzying complexity of modern world politics, therefore, they must inevitably rely upon the knowledge and insights of specialists in military affairs, global trade and finance, diplomatic/international historians, area experts, and many others. And that means relying at least in part on academic scholars who have devoted their careers to mastering various aspects of world affairs and whose professional stature has been established through the usual procedures of academic evaluation (e.g., peer review, confidential assessments by senior scholars, the give-and-take of scholarly debate, etc.). ¶ Second, and more importantly, an independent academic community is an essential counterweight to official efforts to shape public understanding of key foreign policy issues. Governments enjoy enormous information asymmetries in many areas of political life, but these advantages are especially pronounced when dealing with international affairs.[5] Much of what we know about the outside world is ultimately derived from government sources (especially when dealing with national security affairs), and public officials often go to considerable lengths to shape how that information is reported to the public. Not only do governments collect vast amounts of information about the outside world, but they routinely use secrecy laws to control public access to this information. Government officials can shape public beliefs by leaking information strategically, or by co-opting sympathetic journalists whose professional success depends in part on maintaining access to key officials.[6] Given these information asymmetries and their obvious interest in retaining public support for their preferred policies, it is hardly surprising that both democratic and non-democratic leaders use their privileged access to information to build support for specific policies, at times by telling outright lies to their own citizens.[7] ¶ This situation creates few problems when the policies being sold make good strategic sense, but the results can be disastrous when they don’t. In such cases, alternative voices are needed to challenge conventional wisdoms and official rationales, and to suggest different solutions to the problem(s) at hand. Because scholars are protected by tenure and cherish the principle of academic freedom, and because they are not directly dependent on government support for their livelihoods, they are uniquely positioned to challenge prevailing narratives and policy rationales and to bring their knowledge and training to bear on vital policy issues. If we believe that unfettered debate helps expose errors and correct missteps, thereby fostering more effective public policies, then a sophisticated, diverse and engaged scholarly community is essential to a healthy polity. ¶ Third, the scholarly world also offers a potentially valuable model of constructive political disagreement. Political discourse in many countries (and especially the United States) has become increasingly personal and ad hominem, with little attention paid to facts and logic; a trend reinforced by an increasingly competitive and loosely regulated media environment. Within academia, by contrast, even intense disputes are supposed to be conducted in accordance with established canons of logic and evidence. Ad hominem attacks and other forms of character assassination have no place in scholarly discourse and are more likely to discredit those who employ them than those who are attacked. By bringing the norms of academic discourse into the public sphere, academic scholars could help restore some of the civility that has been lost in recent years. ¶ For all of these reasons, it is highly desirable for university-based scholars to play a significant role in public discourse about key real-world issues and to engage directly with policymakers where appropriate. As I have argued elsewhere, academic research can provide policymakers with relevant factual knowledge, provide typologies and frameworks that help policymakers and citizens make sense of emerging trends, and create and test theories that leaders can use to choose among different policy instruments. Academic theories can also be useful when they help policymakers anticipate events, when they identify recurring tendencies or obstacles to success, and when they facilitate the formulation of policy alternatives and the identification of benchmarks that can guide policy evaluation. Because academic scholars are free from daily responsibility for managing public affairs, they are in an ideal position to develop new concepts and theories to help us understand a complex and changing world.[8] ¶ The picture sketched here is obviously something of an ideal type, and I am not suggesting that that the academic world consistently lives up to these expectations. As noted above, university-based scholars of international affairs—and especially the disciplines of political science and history—have increasingly focused on narrow and arcane topics and are contributing less and less to policy formation or public discourse.[9] And when academics do address topics of obvious policy relevance or public interest, the results are often presented in impenetrable, jargon-ridden prose and disseminated in venues that neither policymakers nor the public are likely to read. Even when scholars have something useful to say, in short, their tendency to “speaking in tongues” diminishes their impact on the public sphere**.** ¶Why Is There a Gap between Academia and the Public Sphere?¶ To some degree, the gap between the ivory tower and the world of policy arises because the two spheres have different agendas and operate under different incentives and constraints. Academics focus on developing generalizations and testing conjectures as rigorously as possible, while policymakers and the public are often preoccupied with individual cases (i.e., whatever is in the headlines or in a policymaker’s in-tray). Thus, scholars are delighted whenever they identify a powerful general tendency, but policymakers may be more interested in figuring out how to overcome that general tendency or worried that the case at hand might be an exception to it. Academics strive to make their work as accurate as possible, even if this takes more time, but policymakers cannot always wait until a complete analysis is possible.[10] To take a recent example, policymakers in the Obama administration had to respond to the 2011 “Arab Spring” long before anyone fully understood what was driving these events or where they might lead. Given these different agendas, it is not surprising that policymakers often find academic scholarship to be of less value than the scholars who produce it might wish.

# 2ac

#### Perm do both

#### The perm shields 100% of the link, supporting inclusion of women in combat does not mean supporting any of the military’s activity. that’s Decew

#### Support for the inclusion of women in combat and anti-militarism aren’t mutually exclusive-- We must fight two simultaneous struggles—one broad struggle against the structures of oppression and one pragmatic struggle to make existing struggles less oppressive.

Stachowitsch 13 Saskia, post-doctoral research fellow and lecturer at the Department of Political Science at the University of Vienna; “Feminism and the Current Debates on Women in Combat” *e-International Relations*; February 19, 2013; http://www.e-ir.info/2013/02/19/feminism-and-the-current-debates-on-women-in-combat/

These findings have made feminist positioning on military gender integration ever more complex. The times when standpoints could easily be separated along the lines of equality ethicists (Stiehm 1989) and peace ethicists (Ruddick 1982) are definitely over. But this is not all bad news. Acknowledging these complexities takes the pressure off to exclusively identify with either side. Feminist theory and practice, as a pluralist project, certainly has room for both and feminists will continue to do both, critically engage with military institutions and support equality for women within them.¶ Feminist disagreements over these issues will go on and likely never be settled. Meanwhile, a rights-based approach might still be the safest bet for those wishing to make a non-militaristic point for military gender integration. While some may not perceive the ‘right’ to fight, kill, and die as a desirable objective, focusing on equal access to important state institutions is preferable to arguments that women can fulfil placatory functions in the military or provide the social skills that men lack. Women should not be required to prove that they can do anything ‘better’ than men or bring any specific qualities to military and other institutions to be allowed to participate.¶ In conclusion, there is no easy, straightforward answer to journalists’ questions about the normative evaluation of women’s integration into ground-combat. In the light of feminist research in the areas of military, war, security, foreign policy, and international institutions, we can only conclude that full integration does not need to be ‘good’ for it to be right.¶

#### Double-bind, either including the alt is sufficient to solve the residual links to the aff or it can’t solve the K at all.

#### Our intersectional approach to oppression solves best

Tomlinson 13 [Barbara Tomlinson, Department of Feminist Studies, University of California, Santa Barbara, To Tell the Truth and Not Get Trapped: Desire, Distance, and Intersectionality at the Scene of Argument, Signs, Vol. 38, No. 4, Summer 2013]

Rhetorics of rejection and replacement operate as a matched set. First, rhetorics of rejection are used to argue that the old intersectionality is flawed and that in consequence it must be removed as a feminist alternative because it has not yet met feminism’s political desires. Then, rhetorics of replacement are used to offer a new site or theory to rejuvenate feminist political desire. This dual move operates according to a unifying logic, as though multiple fields of feminist antiracist analysis are not possible and as though any promising new category or analytic must be a singular path to feminist knowledge, a singular site of political investment. The rhetorics work together to suggest that developing the promise of any other kind of feminist analysis depends on clearing the deck, destroying the possibility that intersectionality might stand in the way of or compete with them for our political investments.

#### The case is a patriarchy disad to the alternative. Absent the introduction of women, the abolition of the military is a victory by men, for men. Only the affirmative challenges the patriarchal logics that undergird militarism

#### The military is too great a social force to leave to the realm of masculinity.

Enloe 13 Cynthia, Research Professor at Clark University; “Combat: The Zone of Women’s Liberation?” *The Progressive*; January 24, 2013; http://www.progressive.org/combat-the-zone-of-women-and-liberation

In a country whose popular culture is as profoundly militarized as ours (think Junior ROTC in high schools, think B-22 fly-overs at the opening of the NFL season), it is all too easy to militarize even women’s liberation.¶ Militarization happens any time that the protection of women’s rights is either justified by appealing to military necessity or measured in terms of women’s participation in war-waging.¶ Neither those women nor those men deployed in wartime combat should be imagined by the rest of us as “the real heroes” or the “real patriots.” Infantry bunkers and fighter plane cockpits should not be where genuine “first class citizens” are cultivated.¶ This feminist caveat, though, does not mean that lifting the Pentagon’s artificial ban is insignificant. The military remains one of the most powerful political and cultural institutions in contemporary America. Its influence can be seen in our lopsided federal budget, in our entertainment and sports industries, in our science and technology, in our schools and in our Congress.¶ An institution this powerful cannot be permitted to sustain its entrenched masculinized culture. This, after all, is the same institutional culture that has rewarded mid-level and senior officers for ignoring American male soldiers’ sexual assaults on their female comrades (as documented in the Oscar-nominated film “The Invisible War,” ).

#### Four reasons the plan is a prerequisite to societal demilitarization:

#### Military goals—strucutured around a patriarchal idea of the role of the soldier and the ro military. Our introduction of women into combat solves. That’s Goodell

#### Myth of Masculinity—the introduction of women into combat collapses traditional ideas of strong male warriors, solves the reasons the military becomes militaristic. **Vojdoik**

#### Decision-making—increasing the role of women in the military moves decision-making away from men. Prerequisite to changing society

1. Patriarchy is the root cause of militarism, alt fails absent the plan

Spretnak 83 Charlene, feminist and ecological activist and author; “Naming the Cultural Forces That Push Us Toward War” *Journal of Humanistic Psychology* vol. 23, no. 3 pp. 104-114; Summer, 1983; http://jhp.sagepub.com/content/23/3/104.abstract

Anthropology and archaeology have demonstrated that human societies can pass hundreds and even thousands of years in peace. Patriarchal cultures, however, go to war rather regularly. Militarism and warfare are continual features of a patriarchal society because they reflect and instill patriarchal values and fulfill essential needs of such a system. Men under patriarchy must prove dominance and control, must distance their character from that of "lowly" women, must survive the toughest violent initiation to enter full manhood, must shed the sacred blood of the hero, and must collaborate with death in order to hold it at bay. Such patriarchal pressures on men have traditionally reached resolution in ritual fashion on the battle-field. Unless peace efforts address the cultural pressures as well as the economic and political factors pushing us toward war, we will be unable to build a lasting peace.

#### Their absolutist stance is ineffective—our pragmatic challenge to war solves best

Walsh 68 Chad, professor of English, Beloit College; Episcopal Priest; “An Exchange on Resistance: Noam Chomsky debates with Chad Walsh and William X” *New York Review of Books*; February 1, 1968; http://www.chomsky.info/debates/19680201.htm

I believe that the number of persons who for pragmatic, rather than absolute moral reasons, are turning against the war is very large, and that their numbers are likely to increase. Any strategy of "dissent" or "resistance" which overlooks these potential millions of allies is very shortsighted. It may never be possible, by even the most dramatic examples of "resistance," to convince 51 percent of the American people that the war is "wrong," but I am convinced that by "patiently explaining" it may easily be possible to convince 65 percent that the war is damned foolishness.¶ I grant that anyone who categorically believes the war to be so monstrous an evil that [s]he must retain [her] his moral purity at all cost is morally justified in taking whatever measures of resistance [s]he can, in order to demonstrate the verdict of his conscience. And young men about to be drafted face this challenge in its starkest form. But I suggest only that in more general situations each person must ask himself, which is more important—to have a pure conscience, or to bring the war to an end?¶ If the second is more important, the patient effort to win over those millions who view the war in pragmatic rather than moral terms may be more significant than blocking the pathways to Dow interviewers or even than turning the flank of Pentagon soldiers. Sometimes a pure conscience

comes at too high a price, if it does not actually help put an end to war.

#### **Their pacifist stance removes them from politics—conscientious and particular rejections of militarism solve better**

Robert L. Phillips, professor of philosophy, War and Justice, 1984, p. 114-6

It conceivable that governments might grant selective objection the same legal status as it gives to pacifism? The answer, I fear, is no. And that tells us something important about pacifism. Governments are prepared to tolerate pacifism, because it poses no threat either to their political policies or to the manner in which wars are con­ducted. The pacifist objects equally to all wars waged by all governments. In this sense he opts out of the game altogether. By contrast, the selective objector will be forced to analyze both the policy decisions of the government as well as the conduct of the armed forces. He will be publicly carrying out an officially sanctioned comparison between mutually agreed just-war criteria and the actual performance of the government. That is a lot to expect of governments as we know them, but there is still more. What would be the implication of a state granting an ex­emption on selective grounds? Fundamentally, the state would be agreeing with the claim that its war policies may be reasonably interpreted as unjust. The belief that all war is wrong is a proposition which states might agree is debatable among rational men, and, therefore, claims to exemption on this basis may be allowed. It is a very dif­ferent matter, however, to grant exemption for a particular war, for here we are faced not with two philosophical theories about violence but with a factual dispute. Selec­tive objection presupposes that both the government and the claimant agree upon the criteria for undertaking a justified war and the rules for conducting it. The claimant would have to show, in order to qualify for an exemption, that his government is engaged in acts of war which a person might reasonably characterize as immoral. As such an admission is inseparable from policy questions, it is in­conceivable that any government would be willing (or po­litically able) to wage war while publicly agreeing that there is sufficient reason to doubt the morality of that war to grant exemptions from it. This is not to say that individuals should not refuse to fight in wars which they believe are immoral but to acknowledge that governments cannot be expected to institutionalize such a practice. The evenhandedness of the pacifist who objects to all wars does not threaten the particular policies of any state. In condemning them all equally, pacifism exempts itself from political reality: What is needed, then, is not a general pacifism but a discrim­inating conscientious refusal to engage in war in certain circum­stances. States have not been loath to recognize pacifism and to grant it a special status. The refusal to take part in all war under any conditions is an unworldly view bound to remain a sectarian doctrine. It no more challenges the state’s authority than the celibacy of priests challenges the sanctity of marriage. By exempting pacifists from its prescriptions the state may even seem to display a certain magnanimity. But conscientious refusal based upon the principles of justice as they apply to particular conflicts is another matter. For such refusal is an affront to the government’s pretensions, and when it becomes widespread, the continuation of an unjust war may prove impossible

#### **The plan is prerequisite to confronting militarism—the alternative is just a further silencing of women**

Burke 1994 Colleen, Associate Professor in Communication Studies, Theatre, and Art, Westminster College; “Women and Militarism” *Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom;* 1994; http://wilpf.smilla.li/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/Unknownyear\_Women\_and\_Militarism.pdf

Addressing the links between militarism and patriarchy is important for ¶ women peace activists and feminists to achieve their aims. Historically, ¶ women have been asked again and again to put off their own demands ¶ while "more pressing" problems in society are addressed. By making ¶ the condition of women a key part of the explanation of and opposition ¶ to militarism, women's oppression remains a central peace issue. For ¶ feminists, it is unwise to ignore an institution as large and influential as ¶ the military, when working against patriarchy. Women peace activists ¶ and feminists have common goals, and should educate people to see ¶ the links between institutional and personal violence and oppression. As ¶ long as the institutions of patriarchy and militarism are dominant in our ¶ societies, there will be no peace or justice.

#### Israeli strike on Iran triggers world war III.

Reuveny, 10 (Rafael Reuveny is a professor in the School of Public and Environmental Affairs at Indiana University. Con: Unilateral strike could trigger World War III, global depression, <http://gazettextra.com/news/2010/aug/07/con-unilateral-strike-could-trigger-world-war-iii-/#sthash.tGUOoSDf.dpuf>)

A unilateral Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities would likely have dire consequences, including a regional war, global economic collapse and a major power clash.¶ For an Israeli campaign to succeed, it must be quick and decisive. This requires an attack that would be so overwhelming that Iran would not dare to respond in full force.¶ Such an outcome is extremely unlikely since the locations of some of Iran’s nuclear facilities are not fully known and known facilities are buried deep underground.¶ All of these widely spread facilities are shielded by elaborate air defense systems constructed not only by the Iranians but also the Chinese and, likely, the Russians as well.¶ By now, Iran has also built redundant command and control systems and nuclear facilities, developed early warning systems, acquired ballistic and cruise missiles and upgraded and enlarged its armed forces.¶ Because Iran is well-prepared, a single, conventional Israeli strike—or even numerous strikes—could not destroy all of its capabilities, giving Iran time to respond.¶ Unlike Iraq, whose nuclear program Israel destroyed in 1981, Iran has a second-strike capability comprised of a coalition of Iranian, Syrian, Lebanese, Hezbollah, Hamas, and, perhaps, Turkish forces. Internal pressure might compel Jordan, Egypt, and the Palestinian Authority to join the assault, turning a bad situation into a regional war.¶ During the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, at the apex of its power, Israel was saved from defeat by President Nixon’s shipment of weapons and planes. Today, Israel’s numerical inferiority is greater, and it faces more determined and better-equipped opponents.¶ Despite Israel’s touted defense systems, Iranian coalition missiles, armed forces, and terrorist attacks would likely wreak havoc on its enemy, leading to a prolonged tit-for-tat.¶ In the absence of massive U.S. assistance, Israel’s military resources may quickly dwindle, forcing it to use its alleged nuclear weapons, as it had reportedly almost done in 1973.¶ An Israeli nuclear attack would likely destroy most of Iran’s capabilities, but a crippled Iran and its coalition could still attack neighboring oil facilities, unleash global terrorism, plant mines in the Persian Gulf and impair maritime trade in the Mediterranean, Red Sea and Indian Ocean.¶ Middle Eastern oil shipments would likely slow to a trickle as production declines due to the war and insurance companies decide to drop their risky Middle Eastern clients. Iran and Venezuela would likely stop selling oil to the United States and Europe.¶ The world economy would head into a tailspin; international acrimony would rise; and Iraqi and Afghani citizens might fully turn on the United States, immediately requiring the deployment of more American troops. Russia, China, Venezuela, and maybe Brazil and Turkey — all of which essentially support Iran — could be tempted to form an alliance and openly challenge the U.S. hegemony.¶ ¶ Russia and China might rearm their injured Iranian protege overnight, just as Nixon rearmed Israel, and threaten to intervene, just as the U.S.S.R. threatened to join Egypt and Syria in 1973. President Obama’s response would likely put U.S. forces on nuclear alert, replaying Nixon’s nightmarish scenario.¶ Iran may well feel duty-bound to respond to a unilateral attack by its Israeli archenemy, but it knows that it could not take on the United States head-to-head. In contrast, if the United States leads the attack, Iran’s response would likely be muted.¶ If Iran chooses to absorb an American-led strike, its allies would likely protest and send weapons, but would probably not risk using force.¶ While no one has a crystal ball, leaders should be risk-averse when choosing war as a foreign policy tool. If attacking Iran is deemed necessary, Israel must wait for an American green light. A unilateral Israeli strike could ultimately spark World War III.

# Congress Link

#### Kane evidence—Power is fluid, state is not a monolith, multiple interests, better to have on the side of women

#### The alt cedes the political n stuff

Boggs 2k (CAROL BOGGS, PF POLITICAL SCIENCE – SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, 00, THE END OF POLITICS, 250-1)

But it is a very deceptive and misleading minimalism. While Oakeshott debunks political mechanisms and rational planning, as either useless or dangerous, the actually existing power structure-replete with its own centralized state apparatus, institutional hierarchies, conscious designs, and indeed, rational plans-remains fully intact, insulated from the minimalist critique. In other words, ideologies and plans are perfectly acceptable for elites who preside over established governing systems, but not for ordinary citizens or groups anxious to challenge the status quo. Such one-sided minimalism gives carte blanche to elites who naturally desire as much space to maneuver as possible. The flight from “abstract principles” rules out ethical attacks on injustices that may pervade the status quo (slavery or imperialist wars, for example) insofar as those injustices might be seen as too deeply embedded in the social and institutional matrix of the time to be the target of oppositional political action. If politics is reduced to nothing other than a process of everyday muddling-through, then people are condemned to accept the harsh realities of an exploitative and authoritarian system, with no choice but to yield to the dictates of “conventional wisdom”. Systematic attempts to ameliorate oppressive conditions would, in Oakeshott’s view, turn into a political nightmare. A belief that totalitarianism might results from extreme attempts to put society in order is one thing; to argue that all politicized efforts to change the world are necessary doomed either to impotence or totalitarianism requires a completely different (and indefensible) set of premises. Oakeshott’s minimalism poses yet another, but still related, range of problems: the shrinkage of politics hardly suggests that corporate colonization, social hierarchies, or centralized state and military institutions will magically disappear from people’s lives. Far from it: the public space vacated by ordinary citizens, well informed and ready to fight for their interests, simply gives elites more room to consolidate their own power and privilege. Beyond that, the fragmentation and chaos of a Hobbesian civil society, not too far removed from the excessive individualism, social Darwinism and urban violence of the American landscape could open the door to a modern Leviathan intent on restoring order and unity in the face of social disintegration. Viewed in this light, the contemporary drift towards antipolitics might set the stage for a reassertion of politics in more authoritarian and reactionary guise-or it could simply end up reinforcing the dominant state-corporate system. In either case, the state would probably become what Hobbes anticipated: the embodiment of those universal, collective interests that had vanished from civil society.16 And either outcome would run counter to the facile antirationalism of Oakeshott’s Burkean muddling-through theories.

1. The American legal system and state are not inherently racist – their overly fatalistic narrative ignores massive progress and incorrectly assumes that the US uniquely represents a site of anti-blackness

Farber 98

(Daniel, Prof. of the Minnesota School of Law, “Is American Law Inherently Racist”, w/ Prof. Delgado, Berkeley Law Scholarship Repository, http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1211&context=facpubs)

Let me begin with the vision of the American legal system that Professor Delgado presented in his first twenty minutes. I do not intend to deny the reality of the dark side of American law in American legal history, and that dark side has indeed been very bad at times. Nevertheless, I think one might equally point to some more positive aspects of American legal society, and that we get only a skewed and incomplete picture if we focus only on one side of the picture: if we ignore the Thirteenth, 5 Fourteenth, 6 and Fifteenth 7 Amendments; if we ignore Brown v. Board of Education8" and the work of the Warren Court; if we ignore the Civil Rights Acts of 1964,' 9 1965,20 and 1990;2" and if we ignore or minimize the commitment to affirmative action that many American institutions, especially educational institutions, have had for the past two decades. I do not think you have to be a triumphalist to think that these are important developments-you only have to be a realist. Similarly, as serious as the problem of racial inequality remains in our society, it is also unrealistic to ignore the considerable amount of progress that has been made. Consider the emergence of the black middle class in the last generation or generation and a half, and the integration of important American institutions such as big-city police forces, which are important in the day-to-day lives of many minority people. The military has sometimes been described as the most successfully integrated institution in American society. We all know, as well, that the number of minority lawyers has risen substantially. In state and federal legislatures, there was no such thing as a black caucus in Congress thirty or forty years ago, because there would not have been enough black people present to call a caucus. And do not forget the considerable evidence of sharp changes in white attitudes over that period in a more favorable and tolerant direction. It is true that there is much in our history that we can only look back on with a feeling of shame, but there is also much to be proud of that we should not forget. I also think that the accusation that the American legal system is inherently racist lacks perspective in the sense that it seems to imply that there is something specifically American about this problem. If you look around the world, societies virtually everywhere are struggling with the problems of ethnic and cultural pluralism, and are trying to find ways to incorporate diverse groups into their governing structures. I think if you look around the world, including even countries like France which Professor Delgado referred to, it is far from clear that we are doing worse than the others. In some ways, I think we are doing considerably better than most.

#### Even if they win that the law is inherently racist, the proper response to is to fight for reforms that are necessary bulwarks against historical injustice

Delgado 98

(Richard, Jean N. Lindsley Professor of Law at the University of Colorado Law School, “Is American Law Inherently Racist”, Debate w/ Prof. Farber, Berkeley Law Scholarship Repository, http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1211&context=facpubs)

AUDIENCE: If we accept the premise that American law is inherently racist, what can be done about it? Where do we start? And related to that, how can an inherently racist law be made unracist, or are we just doomed to a perpetual battle to decrease the level of racism in our laws? PROFESSOR DELGADO: No. I don't think that it is a dispiriting or an overly pessimistic view, if one accepts the position-as I do, that American law is recurrently, inherently racist any more than, it is enervating to accept the proposition that the human body, let's say, is inherently frail. From which it follows then that one ought to take reasonable measures. One ought to wear safety belts, one ought to vaccinate children, and one does not simply give up from the recognition that something is inherently a difficulty or a problem. Vigilance is what is called for, not giving up. So no, I do not take the position that the inherent racism that seems to inflict our society requires any sort of surrender. Quite the contrary, it requires all of our efforts if we are to be the society that we can be and that we are in other respects. I will address this point later in my talk.

# Woman Warrior Lin

#### Their understanding of our aff is patriarchal—they assume that women adopt a masculinized identity when introduced into conflict. Our aff is a radical shift from this paradigm, that’s Goodell. This Is a question of choice and personal identity—don’t let the negative tell women what they should be.

#### The image of the women warrior is key to disrupt violent gender categories

Bennion-Nixon 10 Lee-Jane, Head of Programme, Film & TV Production, York University; “We (Still) Need a Woman for the Job: The Warrior Woman, Feminism and Cinema in the Digital Age” *Senses of Cinema* Issue 57; December 2010; http://sensesofcinema.com/2010/feature-articles/we-still-need-a-woman-for-the-job-the-warrior-woman-feminism-and-cinema-in-the-digital-age/

The continuing emergence of new warrior women indicates that debates about representation within feminist film and media studies remain relevant. As Hilary Neroni comments, “it is rarer to see a woman who can’t fight for herself, or help out in a fight, than one who can”. (11) For example, the advertising tag line for Elizabeth: The Golden Age (2007) reads “Woman Warrior Queen.” Below this text is an image of Elizabeth I dressed in armour. This striking image focuses the reader on the notion of a Queen at war. The film’s trailer also depicts Elizabeth (Cate Blanchett) in full armour, this time riding a white horse and addressing her army as they prepare for the battlefield. This type of advertising strategy suggests that the notion of women as national warriors is widely understood by a general audience. The figure of a violent, fighting, brave, heroic woman is not only culturally legible, it is familiar. This representation of ‘womanhood’ highlights changing ideas of what it means to be ‘woman’, marking a major shift in the way women can be portrayed in mainstream popular culture, and expanding the realms of what ‘woman’ can represent. (12)¶ The warrior woman also challenges our understanding of the conventions of gender representation. If, as Judith Halberstam argues, codes of masculinity conjure up “notions of power, legitimacy and privilege,” thereby “naturalising” relations between men and power in our western society, then the warrior woman questions this process. (13) The warrior woman offers a more progressive idea of what it is to be heroic and female to the collective imagination. She is a dynamic representation of a female figure that combines masculine and feminine traits. She is also a site of contention over what can be regarded as ‘acceptably female’. The female heroism of the warrior woman is both masculine and feminine which subverts cultural tendencies to represent gender categories in rigid, binary terms. I want to suggest that she signifies a ‘potent fusion’ (14) between feminine and masculine attributes in a female sexed body. She is recognizably female, even maternal, yet she is also a highly effective ‘soldier’ whose adept use of weaponry and technology or capacity for strategy and leadership is as good as any man’s. Furthermore, her feminine qualities do not inhibit her fighting prowess in any way, while her masculine traits do not diminish her humanity.

# Islamaphobia Link

#### Lindy England—incredibly Essentializing

Plan solves-- Islamophobia is rooted in a patriarchal mindset that sees the Orientalized Other as feminine, irrational and needing disclipline from the rational, masculine West

Wilcox 03 [Lauren, PhD in IR @ University of Minnesota, BA @ Macalester College, MA @ London School of Economics, “Security Masculinity: The Gender-Security Nexus”]

These statements give several clues as to the implications of ”barbaric‘ behavior. Terrorists are barbaric and uncivilized, and opposed to democracy. Those who commit evil acts commit attacks against civilization, therefore, being uncivilized is equivalent to being evil. Finally, terrorists fight without rules, they kill innocents and women, and they are cowards, therefore they are barbaric and uncivilized. Overall, the message is clearly that of a dichotomous world, in which there are only two choices; civilization or barbarism, us or them.

In order to understand the significance of the use of the discourse of civilization versus barbarism in the war on terror, a brief history of this discourse is helpful. Applying the label ”barbaric‘ to people from the Middle East, or any non-white peoples is hardly a new historical development. In his book Orientalism˙ Edward Said critiques the discipline of Oriental Studies in the European and American academies for reproducing stereotypes and using their privileged status to create knowledge about people in the Middle East that served to justify and increase their control and domination over these people. 63 Said describes the relationship between West and the Middle East, as seen from the West, —to be one between a strong and a weak partner,“ and adds that, —many terms were used to express the relations…The Oriental is irrational, depraved (fallen), childlike, ”different‘; thus the European is rational, virtuous, mature, ”normal.‘ “64 This relationship is gendered in that ”Orientals‘ are assigned traits associated with femininity and inferiority. This dichotomous relationship is replicated in political discourses as well as in academic and literary circles.

The discourse of civilization/barbarism was used in order to justify colonialism of non-white peoples throughout the world, and has a long history in US foreign history. A people labeled ”uncivilized‘ is considered to be unable to rule themselves, and is need of guidance from more civilized people. The use of force against ”barbarians‘ is also justified.65 Furthermore, the rules of humane and civilized warfare do not apply to wars against ”barbaric‘ peoples. Against this background, the use of the discourse of barbarism can be seen as an attempt to foretell the coming war and to persuade people of the necessity of using force against al-Qaeda and their hosts in Afghanistan. The additional measures of control, surveillance, and detention of Middle Eastern and North African men in the process of securitizing immigration served to harass, demean and subordinate this ”inferior‘ masculinity, contributing to the constructing of the hegemonic masculinity of American men. The ”special‘ registration requirements for the National Security Entry-Exit System is evidence of the gendered inside/outside, us/them distinction in regards to national identity. This program, instituted as part of the securitization of immigration, serves to support the construction and maintenance of the current articulation of hegemonic masculinity, which differentiates American men as superior to men in the Middle East. The special registration requires that men and boys over the age of fifteen with non-immigrant visas from countries in the Middle East, Northern Africa, countries with large Muslim populations such as Indonesia and Pakistan, and an outlier, North Korea, be interviewed and have their whereabouts tracked by the INS.66 These persons will be finger printed and photographed, with their fingerprints matched against fingerprints of known or suspected terrorists and used by law enforcement. They are also required to submit personal contact information, and are required to notify the Attorney General when the change addresses. These measures are in addition to the detention and questioning of thousands of men of Arab or Muslim background after the September 11 that tacks, some allegedly detained without access to attorneys or proper food.67 The INS has also recently changed its policy on asylum, as people seeking asylum from thirty-three countries, mostly in the Middle East, are now being detained pending the processing of their applications, where previously they have been released.68 By concentrating on men as the ”outsiders‘ Middle Eastern men specifically service not only as the ”other‘ that American identity is contrasted again, but a feminized ”other‘ that American masculinity is defined against.