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## Contention One is Israel

#### **The Iran bill is being debated in congress now and will likely pass. In addition to a new round of sanctions, it includes a war mandate to support any Israeli strike against Iran. This makes a US-backed Israeli strike on Iran inevitable**

Perr 13 Jon, New Democrat Network; “Senate sanctions bill could let Israel take U.S. to war against Iran” *Daily Kos*; December 24, 2013; <http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/12/24/1265184/-Senate-sanctions-bill-could-let-Israel-take-U-S-to-war-against-Iran>

As 2013 draws to close, the negotiations over the Iranian nuclear program have entered a delicate stage. But in 2014, the tensions will escalate dramatically as a bipartisan group of Senators brings a new Iran sanctions bill to the floor for a vote. As many others have warned, that promise of new measures against Tehran will almost certainly blow up the interim deal reached by the Obama administration and its UN/EU partners in Geneva. But Congress' highly unusual intervention into the President's domain of foreign policy doesn't just make the prospect of an American conflict with Iran more likely. As it turns out, the Nuclear Weapon Free Iran Act essentially empowers Israel to decide whether the United States will go to war against Tehran.¶ On their own, the tough new sanctions imposed automatically if a final deal isn't completed in six months pose a daunting enough challenge for President Obama and Secretary of State Kerry. But it is the legislation's commitment to support an Israeli preventive strike against Iranian nuclear facilities that almost ensures the U.S. and Iran will come to blows. As Section 2b, part 5 of the draft mandates:¶ If the Government of Israel is compelled to take military action in legitimate self-defense against Iran's nuclear weapon program, the United States Government should stand with Israel and provide, in accordance with the law of the United States and the constitutional responsibility of Congress to authorize the use of military force, diplomatic, military, and economic support to the Government of Israel in its defense of its territory, people, and existence.¶ Now, the legislation being pushed by Senators Mark Kirk (R-IL), Chuck Schumer (D-NY) and Robert Menendez (D-NJ) does not automatically give the President an authorization to use force should Israel attack the Iranians. (The draft language above explicitly states that the U.S. government must act "in accordance with the law of the United States and the constitutional responsibility of Congress to authorize the use of military force.") But there should be little doubt that an AUMF would be forthcoming from Congressmen on both sides of the aisle. As Lindsey Graham, who with Menendez co-sponsored a similar, non-binding "stand with Israel" resolution in March told a Christians United for Israel (CUFI) conference in July:¶ "If nothing changes in Iran, come September, October, I will present a resolution that will authorize the use of military force to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear bomb."¶ Graham would have plenty of company from the hardest of hard liners in his party. In August 2012, Romney national security adviser and pardoned Iran-Contra architect Elliott Abrams called for a war authorization in the pages of the Weekly Standard. And just two weeks ago, Norman Podhoretz used his Wall Street Journal op-ed to urge the Obama administration to "strike Iran now" to avoid "the nuclear war sure to come."¶ But at the end of the day, the lack of an explicit AUMF in the Nuclear Weapon Free Iran Act doesn't mean its supporters aren't giving Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu de facto carte blanche to hit Iranian nuclear facilities. The ensuing Iranian retaliation against to Israeli and American interests would almost certainly trigger the commitment of U.S. forces anyway.¶ Even if the Israelis alone launched a strike against Iran's atomic sites, Tehran will almost certainly hit back against U.S. targets in the Straits of Hormuz, in the region, possibly in Europe and even potentially in the American homeland. Israel would face certain retaliation from Hezbollah rockets launched from Lebanon and Hamas missiles raining down from Gaza.¶ That's why former Bush Defense Secretary Bob Gates and CIA head Michael Hayden raising the alarms about the "disastrous" impact of the supposedly surgical strikes against the Ayatollah's nuclear infrastructure. As the New York Times reported in March 2012, "A classified war simulation held this month to assess the repercussions of an Israeli attack on Iran forecasts that the strike would lead to a wider regional war, which could draw in the United States and leave hundreds of Americans dead, according to American officials." And that September, a bipartisan group of U.S. foreign policy leaders including Brent Scowcroft, retired Admiral William Fallon, former Republican Senator (now Obama Pentagon chief) Chuck Hagel, retired General Anthony Zinni and former Ambassador Thomas Pickering concluded that American attacks with the objective of "ensuring that Iran never acquires a nuclear bomb" would "need to conduct a significantly expanded air and sea war over a prolonged period of time, likely several years." (Accomplishing regime change, the authors noted, would mean an occupation of Iran requiring a "commitment of resources and personnel greater than what the U.S. has expended over the past 10 years in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars combined.") The anticipated blowback?¶ Serious costs to U.S. interests would also be felt over the longer term, we believe, with problematic consequences for global and regional stability, including economic stability. A dynamic of escalation, action, and counteraction could produce serious unintended consequences that would significantly increase all of these costs and lead, potentially, to all-out regional war.¶ If this all sounds like the hypothetical scenarios of a bunch of doves in the Pentagon and the State Department, it is worth recalling the America reaction to the 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia which killed 19 U.S. servicemen and wounded hundreds of others. As former Clinton and Bush counter-terrorism chief Richard Clarke recounted in his book, Against All Enemies, President Clinton and the Joint Chiefs contemplated a massive U.S. invasion of Iran in response to the involvement of its agents:¶ In our meeting with the Pentagon in 1996, Shali was talking about al-out war. The military had a plan for almost any contingency. The plan on the shelf for war with Iran looked like it had been drawn up by Eisenhower. Several groups of Army and Marine divisions would sweep across the country over the course of several months.¶ (Ultimately, President Clinton opted against the invasion of Iran, in part because of the difficulty in proving the U.S. intelligence case against Tehran to the international community. In the end, the U.S. launched a large-scale covert action campaign against Iranian intelligence assets worldwide. Apparently, the message was received with zero distortion; Iran has not targeted United States interests since.)¶ The Pentagon's 2012 war-gaming in a simulation called "Internal Look" served to reinforce for U.S. military officials "the unpredictable and uncontrollable nature of a strike by Israel, and a counterstrike by Iran." As for the impact on the global economy, in November, the Federation of American Scientists estimated that a U.S. campaign of air strikes would cost $700 billion; a full-scale invasion could have a total impact of $1.7 trillion.¶ At the heart of the clash between Congressional hawks and President Obama is a disagreement over the so-called "red line" for Tehran. In the United States and in Israel alike, Obama has said the United States will not allow Iran to obtain an actual nuclear weapon. But most of his Republican foes and some of his Democratic allies have sided with Bibi Netanyahu in demanding Iran never possess a "nuclear weapons capability." That bottom line on Iranian nuclear know-how wouldn't just scuttle the interim deal and ongoing negotiations with Tehran, as the Obama administration and 10 Democratic Senate committee chairmen have warned. By the standard, an American war with Iran would be almost a foregone conclusion. And if Chuck Schumer, Bob Menendez, John McCain, Lindsey Graham and over 30 other Senators get their way, Israel may well have a green light to start it.

#### The Israel lobby wants to delay a vote on the bill until it has the votes, but the bill will ultimately pass

The Algemeiner 14 “AIPAC Clarifies Position on Iran Sanctions Bill in Letter to Supporters”  *The Algemeiner*; February 7, 2014; http://www.algemeiner.com/2014/02/07/aipac-clarifies-position-on-iran-sanctions-bill-in-letter-to-supporters/

In a letter to supporters on Friday, AIPAC President Michael Kassen clarified the group’s position on the Nuclear Weapon Free Iran Act, currently awaiting a Senate vote. The statement follows AIPAC’s sharp about turn on Thursday calling for a vote on the bill to be delayed after lobbying hard for it.¶ In the communique, Kassen said that AIPAC’s position had been mischaracterized in the press and that the lobby has not abandoned its support for the bill.¶ Following a speech by Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Robert Menendez (D-N.J.) on Thursday, calling on both sides of the Iran sanctions debate to soften their positions, AIPAC said, “We agree with the Chairman that stopping the Iranian nuclear program should rest on bipartisan support and that there should not be a vote at this time on the measure.”¶ Last November, when details of an interim deal between Iran and world powers were first revealed, AIPAC and other Jewish groups criticized the agreement as giving up too much for too little, and vowed to push hard in Congress for new sanctions.¶ The Obama administration strongly opposed the effort, leaning on lawmakers to tow its line. In his “State of the Union” address last Tuesday, Obama said, “Let me be clear: if this Congress sends me a new sanctions bill now that threatens to derail these talks, I will veto it.”¶ On Monday, The New York Times claimed that AIPAC’s influence in the Senate had been “blunted,” pointing to slow progress with the bill.¶ Earlier Friday, in an email to supporters, the Republican Jewish Coalition claimed that the Obama Administration “enlisted Democratic members of non-partisan pro-Israel organizations to work from within to undermine the push” for the bill.¶ The full text of Kassen’s statement is posted below:¶ I am writing today to correct some mischaracterizations in the press regarding our position on the Senate Iran bill. Some have suggested that by not calling for an immediate vote on the legislation, we have abandoned our support for the bill. Nothing could be further from the truth.¶ In fact, we remain strongly committed to the passage of the Nuclear Weapon Free Iran Act. This legislation is one important part of a broad strategy that we have pursued over many years to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability. As negotiations for a final agreement with Iran begin, we must—and will—continue our efforts on every front to ensure that any deal with Iran guarantees the dismantlement of its nuclear infrastructure and blocks its path to a bomb.¶ Yesterday, Senator Menendez—who along with Senator Kirk is the lead sponsor of the legislation—delivered a forceful speech on the Senate floor, in which he outlined what such a deal must include. In response, we issued a statement applauding Chairman Menendez’s leadership. We strongly support his assessment of the threat, his commitment to the critical role Congress must play, and his path to passage of the legislation, which includes building broad bipartisan support.¶ I want to thank you for your hard work thus far in earning the support of 59 senators for the Menendez-Kirk bill. We still have much work to do over the coming months. It will be a long struggle, but one that we are committed to fighting.¶ We will continue to work closely with friends on both sides of the aisle, in both the House and Senate, to ensure that everything is done to prevent a nuclear weapons-capable Iran.

#### **The war mandate in the Iran bill encourages Israel to provoke war – it’s a signal of US backing**

McConnell 13 Scott, Founding Editor, The American Conservative; PhD, History, Columbia University; “Schumer-Menendez-Kirk Open the Back Door to War” *The American Conservative*; December 20, 2013; http://www.theamericanconservative.com/schumer-menendez-kirk-open-the-back-door-to-war/

Democrats Charles Schumer (N.Y.) and Robert Menendez (N.J.) have joined Republican Mark Kirk (Ill.) in placing a ticking bomb under President Obama’s Christmas tree. The bomb is an AIPAC-sponsored bill that commits the United States to stop Iran from enriching any uranium at all, and also requires the United States to “stand with Israel” in the event Netanyahu decides, for reasons of “self-defense,” to start a war with Iran. The purpose of the bill is transparent: to scuttle the P5+1 (U.S., Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and China) diplomacy with Tehran, because it is well known to everyone concerned that Iran is not going to abandon completely a nuclear energy program underway since the Shah was in power.¶ Gary Sick, the Columbia University Iran expert, has posted on his website an open letter to Schumer, noting that the bill seeks to “remove any negotiating authority from the U.S. government by specifying in advance the terms of an impossible settlement.” Further, Sick observes, the bill “outsources any decision about resort to military action to the government of Israel, by committing the United States in advance to support any military action by Israel.”¶ These are the two central points. Netanyahu wants war with Iran, but he doesn’t want to fight it by himself. Schumer, Menendez, and Kirk hope to compel the United States to step in and finish the job after Israel throws the first punch. But even if such a war were just (which it isn’t), or even if we had allies besides Israel (which we wouldn’t), the aftermath of such a war ends most likely (as the former hawk Kenneth Pollack argues in his exhaustive analysis “Unthinkable“) with an American occupation of Iran. At a cost in blood and treasure many times the invasion of Iraq.¶ There is no realistic scenario under which Iran’s government is going abandon entirely its nuclear program. Schumer, Kirk, and Menendez know this perfectly well. Their resolution is a backdoor to war. They just don’t have the courage, as yet, to say so.

#### **US support for a first strike increases Israeli aggression exponentially. Absent US support, Israel won’t risk an attack**

Giraldi 12 Philip, executive director, Council for the National Interest; former CIA officer; PhD, European History, University of London; “Entangled With Israel” *The American Conservative*; September 3, 2012; http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/entangled-with-israel/

Israel’s attempt to steer American foreign policy has been nowhere more evident than in the sustained campaign to move the United States in the direction of war with Iran,a war that serves no American interest unless one believes that Tehran is willing to spend billions of dollars to develop a nuclear weapon only to hand off the result to a terrorist group.¶ The most recent overtures by the Israeli government have pushed the United States to make a declaration that negotiations with Iran have failed and will not be continued. For Israel, this is a necessary first step towards an American military intervention, as failed negotiations mean there is no way out of the impasse but by war, if the Iranians do not unilaterally concede on every disputed point.¶ Two recent op-eds have elaborated the argument, promoting the necessity of convincing the Israelis that the United States is absolutely serious about using military force against Iran if the Iranians seek to retain any capacity to enrich uranium. One might note in passing that this new red line, sometimes also called the abstract “capability” to create a nuclear weapon, has been achieved by moving the goal posts back considerably. At one time Iran was threatened with a military response if it actually acquired a nuclear weapon (which is still the official position of the Obama administration), but earlier benchmarks within that policy saying that enrichment should not exceed 20 percent or that the enrichment should not take place on Iranian soil have been abandoned in favor of what now amounts to zero tolerance. Those who note that Iran, which is a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and is under IAEA inspection, has a clear legal right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes have been ignored in favor of those who believe that Iran is somehow a special case.¶ On August 17, the Washington Post and The New York Times featured op-eds explaining why the United States must do more to convince Israel not to attack Iran this year. Amos Yadlin, a former head of Israel’s military intelligence who is believed to be close to the country’s political leadership, argued in the Post that Obama must basically convince the Israelis that he will use force against Iran if sanctions do not convince the country’s leadership to abandon enrichment of nuclear fuel. Over at the Times, Dennis Ross, a former senior U.S. diplomat who has been described as Israel’s lawyer, made pretty much the same arguments. Both advocated giving Israel refueling tankers and special munitions that would enable an attack on Iran to be more effective, thereby widening the window of opportunity for sanctions to work, in light of Israeli arguments that hardened Iranian sites might soon be invulnerable to attack. Ross advocates giving Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu effectively a blank check, asking him what he will need to attack Iran and granting the Israeli government commitments for a full range of U.S. military support. Both Yadlin and Ross argue that it is necessary to create the conditions for Israel to delay a possible attack until 2013. As Yadlin puts it, “if the United States wants Israel to give sanctions and diplomacy more time, Israelis must know that they will not be left high and dry if these options fail.”¶ Assuming that Ross and Yadlin are speaking for the Israeli government, which is almost certainly the case, Israel is essentially demanding a commitment from Washington to attack Iran unless the issue of Iran’s ability to enrich uranium is resolved through negotiation or through Iranian surrender of that right. In return, Israel will not attack Iran before the American election. So in effect, Washington would be promising to fight a war later if Israel does not start one now.¶ Israel knows it cannot successfully attack Iran unilaterally and must have the United States along to do the heavy lifting. It also knows that the threat to attack Iran before the election is a powerful weapon, with neither Mitt Romney nor Barack Obama welcoming such a potentially game-changing diversion from their debate on the economy and jobs.¶ Critics like Arnaud de Borchgrave have correctly noted that many former generals and intelligence officers in the United States and Israel have, in fact, decided that the basic premise is wrong. Iran does not pose a threat that could not be contained even if it does some day make the political decision to obtain a crude nuclear device. Launching a new war in the Middle East to prevent it from doing so would create “mayhem” throughout the region, guarantee a breakdown in Egypt-Israel relations, and create a perfect breeding ground for the civil war in Syria to spill out and lead to turmoil among all of its neighbors. American ships in the Persian Gulf would be attacked, unrest in Bahrain would turn to revolution, and the Palestinians would stage a new intifada. Israel would be bombarded from Lebanon and from Iran. Gas prices would soar, economic recovery would stall worldwide, and European nations now struggling to deal with unprecedented unemployment levels would watch the eurozone collapse before the rage of hundreds of thousands protesters in the streets. Americans would again become the targets of international terrorism.¶ And there is another serious objection to going along with the Israeli government’s thinking. Israel is by its own volition not an ally of the United States in any technical sense because alliances are troublesome things that require rules of engagement and reciprocity, limiting the partners’ ability to act independently. If Israel obtains a virtual commitment from the United States to go to war in 2013, it would mean enjoying the benefits of having a powerful patron to do its fighting without any obligation in return, beyond delaying unilateral military action until a more suitable time. A guarantee from Washington for Israel’s security which still permits unilateral action by Netanyahu is all too reminiscent of the entangling arrangements that led to World War I. The fact that the murder of an Austrian Archduke in the Balkans led to a world war that killed tens of millions was due to promises not unlike what Israel is demanding today.¶ If the United States commits to unconditional support for an Israeli attack on Iran, it will be a surrender of one of the defining attributes of national sovereignty: the power to choose when and where to go to war. Amos Yadlin suggests at one point that President Obama go to Congress and get approval in advance to take military action “to prevent Iran’s acquisition of a military nuclear capability.” Such a pre-approval for war certainly raises constitutional issues, but it also creates a virtual casus belli because Iran already has the “capability” to enrich uranium for potential military uses. A guarantee precludes any consideration that the United States might actually have an overriding national interest to avoid a war. It denies that the United States should be able to exercise complete sovereignty over the issue of Iran, and it also freezes the status quo, as if new ways of looking at the problem of the Iranian nuclear program could not evolve over the next few months.¶ Washington should make no commitment to anyone about what it will do vis-à-vis Iran in 2013 no matter what inducements are offered. As the 19th-century British Prime Minister Lord Palmerston put it, “We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.” Let America’s actual interests dictate U.S. foreign policy.

#### Israel won’t attack without US support – extremely sensitive to US concerns

Zanotti et al 12 (Jim Zanotti, Coordinator Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs. Israel: Possible Military Strike Against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities. CRS. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R42443.pdf)

Despite the reference by Defense Minister Barak to the possible need for “overt or tacit support, particularly from America” before approving an Israel strike, it is unclear to what extent Israeli decisionmakers might be influenced by the stated positions and anticipated responses of U.S. policymakers in the Obama Administration and Congress regarding an attack. Not surprisingly, Israeli leaders are extremely sensitive to U.S. views for a variety of reasons, including but not limited to: • Strong U.S.-Israel relations dating back to when the United States was the first country to recognize the provisional Jewish government as the de facto government of Israel upon its declaration of statehood in May 1948; • Robust ongoing military and security cooperation, including significant U.S. arms sales and other forms of support; and • Trade ties and important bilateral economic and scientific cooperation.141 Israeli leaders’ perspectives about the possible effects of a strike on U.S. political and material assistance to Israel, possible negative security consequences for the United States from a potential Iranian retaliation, and the probability of future U.S. military action to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran may, among other considerations, influence the Israeli decisionmaking process An Israeli journalist wrote in March 2012 that Israel did not ask permission when it acted to prevent Saddam Hussein and Bashar al Asad from obtaining nuclear weapons, but that “the [Obama] administration can credibly counter that in neither case did Israeli unilateralism threaten to draw America into an armed conflict, as it does now.”142 According to three Israeli analysts (including two former officials) mentioned above: Even after the withdrawal of its troops from Iraq, the U.S. remains extremely exposed to Iranian retaliation—either directly against its forces in the area or by Iran’s attempting to ignite a broader conflict in the region—so an Israeli strike would harm U.S. interests in the region and would place many U.S. lives at risk. And while in an election year America’s political reaction to such a strike may be mitigated by domestic political considerations, the reaction of the U.S. defense community to an Israeli military strike might be extremely negative, as such an action might be seen as representing Israeli insensitivity to and disregard of U.S. priorities and concerns.143 Some reports have speculated that an Israeli decision to attack, if it occurs, could come before the U.S. presidential election in November 2012, with one Israeli report stating, “A second-term president, not constrained by electoral necessities, will be able to apply a lot more pressure on the Israeli government not to attack.”144 Separate from the question of whether the United States might support an Israeli strike on Iran, Israeli decisionmakers might be influenced by how they anticipate the United States would respond after an attack, including in the event of retaliation by Iran and its allies. Although the United States does not have a formal treaty obligation to defend Israel in the event it is attacked, successive Administrations have either stated or implied that the United States would act to protect Israel’s security if it were endangered—including by Iran—and have worked with Congress to ensure and bolster Israel’s “qualitative military edge” over regional security threats.145

#### Israel strikes would trigger a massive Middle Eastern war

Reuveny, 10 (Rafael Reuveny is a professor in the School of Public and Environmental Affairs at Indiana University. Con: Unilateral strike could trigger World War III, global depression, <http://gazettextra.com/news/2010/aug/07/con-unilateral-strike-could-trigger-world-war-iii-/#sthash.tGUOoSDf.dpuf>)

A unilateral Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities would likely have dire consequences, including a regional war, global economic collapse and a major power clash.¶ For an Israeli campaign to succeed, it must be quick and decisive. This requires an attack that would be so overwhelming that Iran would not dare to respond in full force.¶ Such an outcome is extremely unlikely since the locations of some of Iran’s nuclear facilities are not fully known and known facilities are buried deep underground.¶ All of these widely spread facilities are shielded by elaborate air defense systems constructed not only by the Iranians but also the Chinese and, likely, the Russians as well.¶ By now, Iran has also built redundant command and control systems and nuclear facilities, developed early warning systems, acquired ballistic and cruise missiles and upgraded and enlarged its armed forces.¶ Because Iran is well-prepared, a single, conventional Israeli strike—or even numerous strikes—could not destroy all of its capabilities, giving Iran time to respond.¶ Unlike Iraq, whose nuclear program Israel destroyed in 1981, Iran has a second-strike capability comprised of a coalition of Iranian, Syrian, Lebanese, Hezbollah, Hamas, and, perhaps, Turkish forces. Internal pressure might compel Jordan, Egypt, and the Palestinian Authority to join the assault, turning a bad situation into a regional war.¶ During the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, at the apex of its power, Israel was saved from defeat by President Nixon’s shipment of weapons and planes. Today, Israel’s numerical inferiority is greater, and it faces more determined and better-equipped opponents.¶ Despite Israel’s touted defense systems, Iranian coalition missiles, armed forces, and terrorist attacks would likely wreak havoc on its enemy, leading to a prolonged tit-for-tat.¶ In the absence of massive U.S. assistance, Israel’s military resources may quickly dwindle, forcing it to use its alleged nuclear weapons, as it had reportedly almost done in 1973.¶ An Israeli nuclear attack would likely destroy most of Iran’s capabilities, but a crippled Iran and its coalition could still attack neighboring oil facilities, unleash global terrorism, plant mines in the Persian Gulf and impair maritime trade in the Mediterranean, Red Sea and Indian Ocean.¶ Middle Eastern oil shipments would likely slow to a trickle as production declines due to the war and insurance companies decide to drop their risky Middle Eastern clients. Iran and Venezuela would likely stop selling oil to the United States and Europe.¶ The world economy would head into a tailspin; international acrimony would rise; and Iraqi and Afghani citizens might fully turn on the United States, immediately requiring the deployment of more American troops. Russia, China, Venezuela, and maybe Brazil and Turkey — all of which essentially support Iran — could be tempted to form an alliance and openly challenge the U.S. hegemony.¶ ¶ Russia and China might rearm their injured Iranian protege overnight, just as Nixon rearmed Israel, and threaten to intervene, just as the U.S.S.R. threatened to join Egypt and Syria in 1973. President Obama’s response would likely put U.S. forces on nuclear alert, replaying Nixon’s nightmarish scenario.¶ Iran may well feel duty-bound to respond to a unilateral attack by its Israeli archenemy, but it knows that it could not take on the United States head-to-head. In contrast, if the United States leads the attack, Iran’s response would likely be muted.¶ If Iran chooses to absorb an American-led strike, its allies would likely protest and send weapons, but would probably not risk using force.¶ While no one has a crystal ball, leaders should be risk-averse when choosing war as a foreign policy tool. If attacking Iran is deemed necessary, Israel must wait for an American green light. A unilateral Israeli strike could ultimately spark World War III.

#### even if it doesn’t escalate, a small nuclear conflagration in the Middle East causes enough environmental damage to cause extinction

Beth Hoffman Staffwriter for Inside Bay Area, “'Nuclear winter' looms, experts say,” 2006 Lexis)

Researchers at the American Geophysical Union's annual meeting warned Monday that even a small regional nuclear war could burn enough cities to shroud the globe in black smoky shadow and usher in the manmade equivalent of the Little Ice Age. "Nuclear weapons represent the greatest single human threat to the planet, much more so than global warming," said Rutgers University atmospheric scientist Alan Robock. By dropping imaginary Hiroshima-sized bombs into some of the world's biggest cities, now swelled to tens of millions in population, University of Colorado researcher O. Brian Toon and colleagues found they could generate 100 times the fatalities and 100 times the climate-chilling smoke per kiloton of explosive power as all-out nuclear war between the United States and former Soviet Union. For most modern nuclear-war scenarios, the global impact isn't nuclear winter, the notion of smoke from incinerated cities blotting out the sun for years and starving most of the Earth's people. It's not even nuclear autumn, but rather an instant nuclear chill over most of the planet, accompanied by massive ozone loss and warming at the poles. That's what scientists' computer simulations suggest would happen if nuclear war broke out in a hot spot such as the Middle East, the North Korean peninsula or, the most modeled case, in Southeast Asia. Unlike in the Cold War, when the United States and Russia mostly targeted each other's nuclear, military and strategic industrial sites, young nuclear-armed nations have fewer weapons and might go for maximum effect by using them on cities, as the United States did in 1945. "We're at a perilous crossroads," Toon said. The spread of nuclear weapons worldwide combined with global migration into dense megacities form what he called "perhaps the greatest danger to the stability of society since the dawn of humanity." More than 20 years ago, researchers imagined a U.S.-Soviet nuclear holocaust would wreak havoc on the planet's climate. They showed the problem was potentially worse than feared: Massive urban fires would flush hundreds of millions of tons of black soot skyward, where -- heated by sunlight -- it would soar higher into the stratosphere and begin cooking off the protective ozone layer around the Earth. Huge losses of ozone would open the planet and its inhabitants to damaging radiation, while the warm soot would spread a pall sufficient to plunge the Earth into freezing year-round. The hundreds of millions who would starve exceeded those who would die in the initial blasts and radiation.

#### The existential risk of nuclear war warrants the effort to avoid it

Rivers 2 Dennis Rivers, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation and the Peacemaker Community Revised March 30, 2002

Six Arguments for Abolishing Nuclear Weapons <http://nonukes.org/cd18_sixarg.htm>

Reason One: The entire world would be more secure if the planet were free of nuclear weapons.

Nuclear weapons are the only type of weapon in existence that have the capacity to annihilate the human species and countless other species.

The very existence of nuclear weapons leaves open the possibility that a nuclear exchange might take place. This could happen intentionally, inadvertently (as in the Cuban Missile Crisis when the U.S. and USSR almost blundered into nuclear war), or by an accidental launch. The list of historical false alarms is long; for instance, in 1979 someone fed a war game simulation into a North American Air Defense computer. Thinking that the alert was real, fighter planes were scrambled and nuclear bombers were readied before the error was discovered.

#### The US should issue a security guarantee to Iran – key foundation for improved relations

Leverett and Leverett 08 (Flynt Leverett, senior fellow and director of the New America Foundation’s Geopolitics of Energy Initiative, served as senior director for Middle East affairs at the National Security Council. Hillary Mann Leverett, CEO of STRATEGA, a political risk consultancy, is a former Foreign Service officer who served as director for Iran, Afghanistan, and Persian Gulf affairs at the National Security Council. The Grand Bargain. http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2008/0808.leverett.html)

From an Iranian perspective, one of the essential found-ations for a U.S.-Iranian grand bargain is a clear explanation of the American position toward the Islamic Republic. The United States would need to clarify that it is not seeking a change in the nature of the Iranian regime, but rather changes in Iranian policies that Washington considers problematic. The United States would also need to emphasize its commitment to the ongoing improvement of U.S.-Iranian relations.¶ In this regard, Iran would need the following assurances from the United States:¶ 1. As part of a strategic understanding addressing all issues of concern to both sides, the United States would commit not to use force to change the borders or form of government of the Islamic Republic of Iran. This is the essential substance of a U.S. security assurance.

## Plan

#### The United States federal government should statutorily prohibit the introduction of United States armed forces into hostilities against the Islamic Republic of Iran.

## Contention Two is Epistemology

#### Though social science is never perfect, our author’s rigorous scholarship allows us to make functioning assessments about Middle Eastern politics

Halliday 93

Fred Halliday, IR at LSE, 93, “ ‘Orientalism’ and its Critics” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 20(2) pp.145-146

The Middle East is not unique, except possibly in the content of the myths that are propagated about it, from within and without. The political, economic, social and cultural activities of the peoples of this region have their peculiarities and differences, as much between each other , as in terms of one Middle East contrasted with the outside world. Material concerns, jokes, the pleasures of good food, and the horrors of political oppression, are theirs as much as any other peoples in the world. The development of social science in general will never be completed, and each specific issue, or country, or incident, poses questions for it. But we are no more precluded by our concepts from understanding the Middle East, and no more limited in our ideas, whatever their origins, than in addressing any other area of the world. In normative terms, we have, perhaps, allowed the discussion to be too inffected by relativism and doubt as to the validity of universal standards, in the face of a mistaken, and often self-interested, critique of imperialism and Western norms. Perhaps I could sum this up by adapting a slogan: *na gharbzadegi, na sharqzadegi*, neither westoxification nor eastoxification. Let us therefore go beyond this unnecessarily polarized and in some ways methodologically impoverished debate and continue with the job of studying these societies. I have warned against the perils of tafsir, but I will end with the words from the Qur’an that can be easily and I hope not too arbitrarily interpreted to justify this enterprise, wa ja’alnakum shu’uban wa-qaba’ila li-ta’arafu. ‘And I have created peoples and trives so that they could get to know each other.’42 That could be the motto for our necessarily unfinished, and unfinishable, endavour.

#### There is no perfectly rational subject or perfectly accessible truth, but we can make reasonable predictions about international actors

Miller 2 (Katherine Miller, Prof. of Communication at Texas A&M, Communication theories: Perspectives, processes, and contexts, 2002, p 35-36)

If positivism, in its classical and logical forms, is largely rejected, what philosophical foundation should take its place as a framework for social research? Very different answers to this question have been proposed. Some social researchers argue that flaws in the positivist foundation require a radically different philosophy of sci- encee, one in which the realist ontology, objec- ive epistemology, and value-free axiology of positivism are vehemently rejected and replaced with forms of inquiry that honor nominalism, subjectivism, and omnipresent values. The posi- tions of these scholars are discussed in great detail in Chapters 4 and 5 as we consider interpretive and critical petspectives on communication theory. However, some scholars believe that a rejection of positivism does not require a total rejection of realism, objectivity, and the scientific goal of value-free inquiry. However, these scholars reject the notion of absolute truth, reject the unassailable foundation of observation, and reject the assumption of an always steady and upward accumulation of knowledge. In these rejections, scholars have forged a new philosophy of science that D. C. Phillips (1987, 1990, 1992) has called post-positivism. The metatheoretical tenets of this position are discussed in the next section. Metatheoretical Commitments Ontology In Chapter 2, we discussed three ontological positions: the realist, the nominalist, and the social constructionist. To summarize, a realist believes in a hard and solid reality of physical and social objects, a nominalist proposes that the reality of social entities exists only in the names and labels we provide for them, and a social constructionist emphasizes the ways in which social meanings are created through historical and contemporary interaction. Both the realist and the social constructionist positions make contributions to the ontology of post-positivist researchers in the communication discipline. Researchers in the post-positivist tradition can be seen as realists in that they support the position that phenomena exist independent of our perceptions and theories about them (Phillips, 1987). However, this realism is tempered by the argument that humans cannot fully apprehend that reality and that the driving mechanisms in the social and physical world cannot be fully understood. As J. D. Smith (1990, p. 171) states, "Realism is essential . . . because it poses 'at least in principle, a standard by which all human societies and their beliefs can be judged: they can all have beliefs about the world which turn out to be mistaken'" (Trigg, 1985, p. 22). Phillips argues, however, that a post-positivist ontology does not deny the notions inherent in approaches advocating a "social construction of reality" (Berger & Luckmann, 1967). Rather, Phillips (1990) draws the distinction between beliefs about the reality and the objective reality (pp. 42-43). Making this distinction allows a post-positivist scholar to appreciate (and investigate) multiple realities that are constructed by social collectives through communicative inter-action. For example, a post-positivist scholar could study the ways that beliefs about the imminent end of the world influence the behaviors of mountain survivalists, members of cults, and fundamental religious groups. However, the fact that a social group has arrived at certain beliefs about the world does not make those beliefs about the social or physical world necessarily true. As Phillips (1990) notes, "It is clear that Freudians believe in the reality of the id and superego and the rest, and they act as if these are realities; but their believing in these things does not make them real" (p. 43). It could be further argued that post-positivism is consistent with social constructionist views in two important ways. First, many post-positivists would argue that the process of social construction occurs in relatively patterned ways that are amenable to the type of social scientific investigation undertaken by post-positivists. Individuals have free will and creativity but they exercise that creativity in ways that are often (though not always, certainly) patterned and predictable. In the field of mass communication, Barbara Wilson (1994) argues convincingly for this point regarding her own study of children's responses to the mass media: I believe that children's interpretations and responses are as richly individualistic as snow-flakes. However, I also believe that there are common patterns that characterize a majority of young viewers and that those patterns are as predictable and explainable as the basic process by which all those unique snowflakes are formed from water, (p. 25) Second, many post-positivists would argue that social constructions are regularly reified and treated as objective by actors in the social world. Thus, it is reasonable to study the impact of these reified constructions on our communicative lives. Tompkins (1997) has made this argument with regard to his organizational communication research with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA): The engineers, scientists, managers, bureau-crats, and other kinds of members did not believe in a socially constructed world. They believed the rockets they made did in fact go to the moon. Moreover, they believed that NASA and the contractor firms who worked for them were real. They believed that these organizations could succeed or fail by objective criteria and that their bosses could hire or fire, reward or penalize individuals—actions with real consequences, (p. 369) Thus, a social constructionist ontology is consistent with a post-positivist position that emphasizes both the patterned nature of the social construction process and the regular and predictable effects that reified social constructions have on social actors. Thus, the ontology of post-positivism is not necessarily the belief in a hard, immutable, and unchanging social world implied in a strict realist stance. Rather, a post-positivist ontology entails a belief in regularity and pattern in our interactions with others. The ways in which these regularities and patterns are studied within post-positivist theory are considered in the next section.

#### Advocating for material rapprochement with Iran is key to challenge racist discourse that demonizes Iran

Richman 13 [Sheldon Richman is vice president and editor at The Future of Freedom Foundation in Fairfax, Va. (www.fff.org). OCTOBER 10, 2013 The War Caucus The Ongoing Demonization of Iran http://www.counterpunch.org/2013/10/10/the-ongoing-demonization-of-iran/]

So, despite overtures from the new Iranian president, Hassan Rouhani, Iran’s regime must still be demonized as a group of religious fanatics — mad mullahs — who cannot be reasoned with and who want nothing more than to lob nuclear warheads at the United States and Israel. Nonsense. Over a decade ago, Iran’s leaders made credible offers of cooperation with the United States that included peace with Israel. In fact, after the 9/11 attacks, the Iranian government tried to cooperate with the Bush administration on a number of fronts. The two sides actually began working together at the end of 2001, until hawkish American officials put a stop to it, as reporter Gareth Porter explained in 2006. Thus, Rouhani’s current efforts are not a “charm offensive” — as they are prejudicially labeled even by the media — but rather a renewal of Iran’s wish for détente. We rarely hear about the previous offers, perhaps because they conflict with the mainstream media’s dominant narrative of Iran as an implacable threat. Apparently those who want war with Iran — the neoconservatives, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, the members of Congress beholden to AIPAC, and the government of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu — make better news copy than would-be peacemakers. Too bad. War would be catastrophic. Let’s remember that the Islamic Republic of Iran arose only after a U.S.-backed despotism was overthrown in 1979. Rather than seeking to make amends for what had been inflicted on the Iranians, successive U.S. administrations worked to isolate and subvert Iran until a more pliant regime could be installed. Diplomats who favored rapprochement were ignored or marginalized — which suited the leaders of Israel, Saudi Arabia, and other Sunni Arab regimes allied with the United States. (Iran is dominated by Shi’ite Muslims, the sectarian rivals of the Sunnis.)

#### Academic debates about alternative policy strategies towards Iran are crucial to demonstrate the potential of cooperative diplomacy. The alternative cedes debates to neoconservatives who ensure continued policy failure and violence in the Middle East and beyond.

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Conclusions: think positive Outcomes in the Middle East are dominated by pessimists who assume the worst of their competitors and more powerful external actors. We assume that because the region has been beset by conflict and bloodshed that this will always be the case. Our imagination and our optimism is stifled. Given the history and the depths of distrust, this is hardly surprising, and sometimes those assumptions are wellfounded. But every so often events can surprise us in positive ways, and Iran’s recent election should be doing just that right now. We have the freedom to escape the apparent traps we think we are in, and find new approaches that better meet our objectives to strengthen security and manage power relationships. We are not starting from scratch. Many years of diplomatic effort have gone into developing nonproliferation regimes, and a majority of states in the Middle East have ratified them. But their indefinite support cannot be taken for granted, when others in the region break those norms with impunity. It is better to work with the grain, recognize the rights that go with membership of these regimes, and cooperate with states that are developing dual-use technology to strengthen inspection and verification procedures. This is what President Rouhani is likely to be asking when he presents Iran’s package of proposals on the nuclear file, and we would do well to heed him. People view the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran with alarm. And quite right, it would be a major step backwards for everyone’s security and risk sparking a destabilizing arms race that can only lead to the use of nuclear weapons in the end, bar a miracle. But the approach taken by many members of the international community only serves to bestow upon nuclear weapons a power they do not naturally possess, and thereby unintentionally encourages this proliferation. It is time to change the tune of nuclear deterrence. This can best be done by the nuclear weapon states moving away from an ‘us-and-them’ strategy of technology denial while remaining attached to their own arsenals. Coercing Iran to give up its civilian nuclear power ambitions for fear they could be used to acquire the magic the nuclear weapon states claim for themselves will be a self-defeating strategy. If nuclear deterrence actually has the value many ascribe to it, then nuclear proliferation is inevitable, and with it, the eventual use of nuclear weapons. The U.S. intelligence community’s latest combined National Intelligence Estimate finds that Iran has no nuclear bomb, has not diverted fissile material, nor recently engaged in efforts to weaponize its capabilities, and has not yet made any decision to do so. The case against Iran is based upon fear of the possibilities rather than any legitimate proof of intention to break out of its NPT responsibilities. The same cannot be said of some other NPT members and their Treaty responsibilities. 43 years after the NPT came into force and 23 years after the end of the Cold War, the five nuclear weapon states, with over 20,000 nuclear warheads held among them, still act as if the Treaty gives them some form of indefinite legitimacy in their possession, and show little intent to engage in serious disarmament (beyond reductions in the numbers of warheads). India, Pakistan and Israel are allowed to develop their nuclear arsenals outside the NPT and thus severely undermine the Treaty, sometimes under the protection and implicit support of the United States (Israel), or where penalties are shallow and brief, only for the state to be accepted later into the nuclear club (India). It is time to open up a global cross-cultural and honest strategic dialogue about the role of nuclear deterrence in the twenty-first century, and the damage it does to the national security both of states targeted by nuclear weapons, and those engaged in the targeting. We need officials, analysts and academics to come together from the states with nuclear weapons and those with the potential capabilities to develop them to address this issue not just from a moral, legalistic or idealistic disarmament and non-proliferation angle, though this is indeed an important dimension, but also from a hardnosed military utility angle, and from an angle of safety and security. It is also important to consider the humanitarian impacts of the use of nuclear weapons, as this would serve to better underline just how unusable they are. We need to have a more honest debate around how the current strategy pursued by the international community is unintentionally driving Iranian responses that further deepen international suspicions. But we also need to discuss more openly why the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran would dramatically and directly undermine Iranian security and Iranian soft power amongst the constituencies it cares about. The possession of nuclear weapons is not a national right, whether that state is in or out of the NPT, of whatever status. The universal norm against the use of nuclear weapons has been building up over the decades, particularly since the end of the Cold War. We need to extend that norm to possession by any state. The security impact from possession and thus threat is international, and is an important but under-recognized block to the essential cooperative diplomacy required to address all the great global issues of our time – such as the management of ecosystems under pressure from growing populations and ever-increasing consumption, rising pollution, financial stress, poverty and migration.

#### Reality and law are coproductive. Changing our thinking about law helps to reconstitute the material realities that we live in.

Jane Baron, Law @ Temple – Beasley School of Law, 2003 (“Romancing the Real.” 57 U. Miami L. Rev. 573 lexis)

Yet, imagine that what Gordon said were true. There would be an easily discernable point to doing what we legal academics (and isn't Schlag one of us?) do. If legal conceptions and the social world were connected in some way, then thinking about law would also be a way of thinking about the material world, and trying to change the way we think about law - for instance, to use my earlier example, trying to convince people that property need not be modeled on ownership but on obligation - would be a way of trying to change the material world. Questioning what legal doctrine foregrounds and backgrounds, n46 revealing "nested oppositions" in legal rules, n47 and all manner of similar analyses [\*587] of the patterns and structure of standard legal argumentation, including the kinds of analyses Schlag himself has so often performed (consider The Empty Circles of Liberal Justification n48), would, or could, at least potentially be useful; if we could see and make others see how we ourselves artificially "froze" reality, we could unfreeze it. n49 At the very least, we could begin to think about changing it because we would no longer be victims of belief in reality's immutability. n50 Twenty-plus years of engaging in various versions of this practice have revealed how much more complicated all this is than it originally seemed. From Stanley Fish we learned how silly it might be to envision standing outside one's own structures of belief in order to change them. n51 From feminists and critical race theorists we learned that "we" might not be "we," but multiple intersecting and overlapping "we's" with potentially differing interests and engagements. n52 From law and society folks we learned to question whether there was any relation between lawyers' and judges' ideas about law and actual social practices; if there was little relation to begin with, changes in legal consciousness (even if "we" could actually effect such changes) would be unlikely to have much impact on everyday behaviors. n53 None of this proves that legal change and social change are impossible, only that effecting social change through law is considerably more difficult and chancy than first had been thought. One could see, however, why it might be worth trying to solve (or work around) the problems: thinking about law would still be a way - perhaps now a more nuanced, humbled way - of trying to fix what was wrong with the world. This strategy would not work, of course, if "the world" is intractably out there, isolated from and immune to thought. That is exactly as Schlag presents the world in those excerpts and in the lists culled from them. The question is why, knowing better - that is, having no illusions about a pure factuality unmediated by perspective or shaping - Schlag would choose to portray "reality" that way.

#### Using pedagogical institutions to make prescriptions for change prevents docile acceptance of oppression. Evaluating the likely consequences of our prescriptions shapes successful social change.

Susan Carle, Law @ American University, 2005 (“Theorizing Agency.” 55 Am. U.L. Rev. 307 lexis)

Precisely because he believed in the power of human agency, Dewey devoted a great deal of his writing to developing prescriptions for change in response to the issues of his times. It is worth quickly surveying some of those prescriptions here because they help illuminate the relationship between Dewey’s theory of the self and his overall philosophic system. Dewey’s deliberative theory ties elegantly into his theory of democracy, which in turn displays an ascetically pleasing “fit”274 with his pedagogical vision. Dewey’s political theory is a large topic, to which he devoted much writing but to which I can give only passing attention. Suffice it to say that Dewey passionately believed in the virtues of democracy; indeed, Dewey scholars have described democracy as Dewey’s deepest preoccupation— the underlying passion that motivated him in his prolific output.275 Unlike philosophers such as John Rawls, however, Dewey uncoupled democracy from the institutions of Western capitalism, and was intensely critical of capitalism as he saw it developing in his lifetime. To Dewey, capitalism spelled economic inequality, which was anathema to his vision of democracy based in local deliberative processes.276 Dewey saw education as the process through which children would acquire the habits that would allow them to become members of a democracy, well equipped for the kind of reflective thought and deliberation that democracy required.277 Thus, education was for Dewey a fundamental method of social progress and reform.278 For this reason, Dewey, unlike most modern philosophers, gave pedagogy a central place in his philosophy. Dewey saw education as the scientific laboratory in which the ideas of pragmatism would be put to the test of experience.279 To Dewey, the ability to engage in good deliberative judgment—to exercise clear foresight on ethical as well as instrumental matters—was a habit that could and should be cultivated through education. Thus Dewey thought that education should not be a “succession of studies but the development of new attitudes towards, and new interests in, experience.”280 No relativist on matters concerning his own place and time, Dewey denounced the “inert stupid quality of current customs,” which “perverts learning into a willingness to follow where others point the way, into conformity, constriction, surrender of scepticism and experiment.”281 In lieu of teaching to new generations habits that represent such “enslavement to old ruts,”282 Dewey wanted to inculcate better habits—“flexible, sensitive” ones that could grow “more varied, more adaptable by practice and use.”283 These, in turn, were the habits Dewey identified as necessary for democracy to succeed. Here, the contrasts with Stanley Fish are stark. Fish, as we have seen, argues that teaching methods of critical analysis to students does not change practice outside the classroom.284 Practice in the world outside the classroom and the doing of theory proceed on two unrelated planes. Dewey, conversely, repudiated the separation of theory and practice as a false dualism, arguing that those who espouse theory for theory’s sake are in fact espousing “two kinds of practice.”285 Moreover, he argued, “[t]hose who wish a monopoly of social power find desirable the separation of habit and thought” because this “dualism enables them to do the thinking and planning, while others remain the docile . . . instruments of execution.”286 Thus, for Dewey, theory was a form of practice in the world that had great potential to fuel political and social change, and the decision to do and teach theory as a practice separate from political and social issues was a political decision with particular normative consequences—namely, the promotion of political disengagement and apathy.287

#### Academic debate over war powers is critical to contest interventionism and improve policy making

Stephen M. Walt 11, Professor of International Affairs at Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, July 21, “International Affairs and the Public Sphere”, http://publicsphere.ssrc.org/walt-international-affairs-and-the-public-sphere/

Academics can make at least three distinct contributions to public discourse on global affairs. First, although the digital revolution has made a wealth of information from around the world accessible on a near real-time basis, most of us still lack both extensive direct data on events in far-flung areas and the background knowledge necessary to understand what new developments mean. If our town’s school district is troubled or the local economy is suffering, we can observe that for ourselves and make reasonably well-informed judgments about what might be done about it. But if the issue is the war in Afghanistan, an uprising in Yemen, a naval confrontation in the South China Sea or the prospects that some battered economy will be bailed out successfully, most of us will lack the factual knowledge or conceptual understanding to know what is really going on. Even when basic information is readily available, it may be hard for most of us to put it in the appropriate context or make sense of what it means. ¶ When citizens and leaders seek to grasp the dizzying complexity of modern world politics, therefore, they must inevitably rely upon the knowledge and insights of specialists in military affairs, global trade and finance, diplomatic/international historians, area experts, and many others. And that means relying at least in part on academic scholars who have devoted their careers to mastering various aspects of world affairs and whose professional stature has been established through the usual procedures of academic evaluation (e.g., peer review, confidential assessments by senior scholars, the give-and-take of scholarly debate, etc.). ¶ Second, and more importantly, an independent academic community is an essential counterweight to official efforts to shape public understanding of key foreign policy issues. Governments enjoy enormous information asymmetries in many areas of political life, but these advantages are especially pronounced when dealing with international affairs.[5] Much of what we know about the outside world is ultimately derived from government sources (especially when dealing with national security affairs), and public officials often go to considerable lengths to shape how that information is reported to the public. Not only do governments collect vast amounts of information about the outside world, but they routinely use secrecy laws to control public access to this information. Government officials can shape public beliefs by leaking information strategically, or by co-opting sympathetic journalists whose professional success depends in part on maintaining access to key officials.[6] Given these information asymmetries and their obvious interest in retaining public support for their preferred policies, it is hardly surprising that both democratic and non-democratic leaders use their privileged access to information to build support for specific policies, at times by telling outright lies to their own citizens.[7] ¶ This situation creates few problems when the policies being sold make good strategic sense, but the results can be disastrous when they don’t. In such cases, alternative voices are needed to challenge conventional wisdoms and official rationales, and to suggest different solutions to the problem(s) at hand. Because scholars are protected by tenure and cherish the principle of academic freedom, and because they are not directly dependent on government support for their livelihoods, they are uniquely positioned to challenge prevailing narratives and policy rationales and to bring their knowledge and training to bear on vital policy issues. If we believe that unfettered debate helps expose errors and correct missteps, thereby fostering more effective public policies, then a sophisticated, diverse and engaged scholarly community is essential to a healthy polity. ¶ Third, the scholarly world also offers a potentially valuable model of constructive political disagreement. Political discourse in many countries (and especially the United States) has become increasingly personal and ad hominem, with little attention paid to facts and logic; a trend reinforced by an increasingly competitive and loosely regulated media environment. Within academia, by contrast, even intense disputes are supposed to be conducted in accordance with established canons of logic and evidence. Ad hominem attacks and other forms of character assassination have no place in scholarly discourse and are more likely to discredit those who employ them than those who are attacked. By bringing the norms of academic discourse into the public sphere, academic scholars could help restore some of the civility that has been lost in recent years. ¶ For all of these reasons, it is highly desirable for university-based scholars to play a significant role in public discourse about key real-world issues and to engage directly with policymakers where appropriate. As I have argued elsewhere, academic research can provide policymakers with relevant factual knowledge, provide typologies and frameworks that help policymakers and citizens make sense of emerging trends, and create and test theories that leaders can use to choose among different policy instruments. Academic theories can also be useful when they help policymakers anticipate events, when they identify recurring tendencies or obstacles to success, and when they facilitate the formulation of policy alternatives and the identification of benchmarks that can guide policy evaluation. Because academic scholars are free from daily responsibility for managing public affairs, they are in an ideal position to develop new concepts and theories to help us understand a complex and changing world.[8] ¶ The picture sketched here is obviously something of an ideal type, and I am not suggesting that that the academic world consistently lives up to these expectations. As noted above, university-based scholars of international affairs—and especially the disciplines of political science and history—have increasingly focused on narrow and arcane topics and are contributing less and less to policy formation or public discourse.[9] And when academics do address topics of obvious policy relevance or public interest, the results are often presented in impenetrable, jargon-ridden prose and disseminated in venues that neither policymakers nor the public are likely to read. Even when scholars have something useful to say, in short, their tendency to “speaking in tongues” diminishes their impact on the public sphere**.** ¶Why Is There a Gap between Academia and the Public Sphere?¶ To some degree, the gap between the ivory tower and the world of policy arises because the two spheres have different agendas and operate under different incentives and constraints. Academics focus on developing generalizations and testing conjectures as rigorously as possible, while policymakers and the public are often preoccupied with individual cases (i.e., whatever is in the headlines or in a policymaker’s in-tray). Thus, scholars are delighted whenever they identify a powerful general tendency, but policymakers may be more interested in figuring out how to overcome that general tendency or worried that the case at hand might be an exception to it. Academics strive to make their work as accurate as possible, even if this takes more time, but policymakers cannot always wait until a complete analysis is possible.[10] To take a recent example, policymakers in the Obama administration had to respond to the 2011 “Arab Spring” long before anyone fully understood what was driving these events or where they might lead. Given these different agendas, it is not surprising that policymakers often find academic scholarship to be of less value than the scholars who produce it might wish.

#### Working with policy is good – Extra-legalism creates the “myth of activism” – eroding any possibility for actual reform

Orly Lobel ‘7 -- Professor of Law @ University of San Diego, “The Paradox of Extralegal Activism Critical Legal Consciousness and Transformative Politics” Harvard Law Review, Vol. 120, 2007

At this point, the paradox of extralegal activism unfolds. While public interest thinkers increasingly embrace an axiomatic rejection of law as the primary form of progress, their preferred form of activism presents the very risks they seek to avoid. The rejected “myth of the law” is replaced by a “myth of activism” or a “myth of exit,” romanti- cizing a distinct sphere that can better solve social conflict. Yet these myths, like other myths, come complete with their own perpetual perils. The myth of exit exemplifies the myriad concerns of cooptation. For feminist agendas, for example, the separation of the world into distinct spheres of action has been a continuous impediment to meaning- ful reform. Efforts to create better possibilities for women to balance work and family responsibilities, including relaxing home work rules and supporting stay-at-home parents through federal child care legisla- tion, have been couched in terms of support for individual choice and private decisionmaking.173 Indeed, recent initiatives in federal child care legislation to support stay-at-home parents have been clouded by preconceptions of the separation of spheres and the need to make one- or-the-other life choices. Most importantly, the emergence of a sphere- oriented discourse abandons a critical perspective that distinguishes between valuing traditional gender-based characteristics and celebrat- ing feminine difference in a universalist and essentialist manner.174 Not surprisingly then, some feminist writers have responded to civil society revivalism with great skepticism, arguing that efforts to align feminine values and agendas with classic republican theory of civil so- ciety activism should be understood, at least in part, as a way of le- gitimizing historical social structures that subordinated women.175 The feminist lesson on the law/exit pendulum reveals a broader pattern. In a classic example of cooptation, activists should be con- cerned about the infusion (or indeed confusion) of nonlegal strategies with conservative privatization agendas. Indeed, in significant social policy contexts, legal scholarship oriented toward the exploration of ex- tralegal paths reinforces the exact narrative that it originally resisted — that the state cannot and should not be accountable for sustaining and improving the lifeworld of individuals in the twenty-first-century economy and that we must seek alternative ways to bring about social reform. Whether using the terminology of a path-dependent process, an inevitable downward spiral, a transnational prisoner’s dilemma, or a global race to the bottom, current analyses often suggest a lack of control over the forces of new economic realities. Rather than counter- ing the story of lack of control, pointing to the ongoing role of gov- ernment and showing the contradictions between that which is being kept regulated and that which is privatized, alternative extralegal scholarship accepts these developments as natural and inevitable. Similar to the arguments developed in relation to the labor movement — in which focusing on a limited right to collective bargaining demo- bilized workers and stripped them of their voice, participation, and de- cisionmaking power — contemporary extralegal agendas are limited to very narrow and patterned sets of reforms.

#### Reforms of the state are achievable – only way to get others on board

Wright, 07 [Erik Olin, Vilas Distinguished Professor of Sociology at the University of Wisconsin, “Guidelines for Envisioning Real Utopias”, Soundings, April, [www.ssc.wisc.edu/~wright/Published%20writing/Guidelines-soundings.pdf](http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~wright/Published%20writing/Guidelines-soundings.pdf)]

5. Waystations The final guideline for discussions of envisioning real utopias concerns the importance of waystations. The central problem of envisioning real utopias concerns the viability of institutional alternatives that embody emancipatory values**,** but the practical achievability of such institutional designs often depends upon the existence of smaller steps, intermediate institutional innovations that move us in the right direction but only partially embody these values**.** Institutional proposals which have an all-or-nothing quality to them are both less likely to be adopted in the first place, and may pose more difficult transition-cost problems if implemented**.** The catastrophic experience of Russia in the “shock therapy” approach to market reform is historical testimony to this problem. Waystations are a difficult theoretical and practical problem because there are many instances in which partial reforms may have very different consequences than full- bodied changes. Consider the example of unconditional basic income. Suppose that a very limited, below-subsistence basic income was instituted: not enough to survive on, but a grant of income unconditionally given to everyone. One possibility is that this kind of basic income would act mainly as a subsidy to employers who pay very low wages, since now they could attract more workers even if they offered below poverty level earnings. There may be good reasons to institute such wage subsidies, but they would not generate the positive effects of a UBI, and therefore might not function as a stepping stone. What we ideally want, therefore, are intermediate reforms that have two main properties: first, they concretely demonstrate the virtues of the fuller program of transformation, so they contribute to the ideological battle of convincing people that the alternative is credible and desirable; **and second,** they enhance the capacity for action of people, increasing their ability to push further in the future. Waystations that increase popular participation and bring people together in problem-solving deliberations for collective purposes are particularly salient in this regard**.** This is what in the 1970s was called “nonreformist reforms”**:** reforms that are possible within existing institutions and that pragmatically solve real problems while at the same time empowering people in ways which enlarge their scope of action in the future.

#### The votes are there

Rubin 2-7 Jennifer, columnist, Washington Post; “Sanctions hypocrisy” *Washington Post*; February 7, 2014; http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/right-turn/wp/2014/02/07/sanctions-hypocrisy/

There are 59 co-sponsors on the Kirk-Menendez sanctions bill and 77 likely yes votes.

Foreign Affairs Chairman Robert Menendez (D-N.J.) took to the Senate floor to denounce the interim deal and urge a bipartisan approach to sanctions, which he warned will not be effective if we wait six months.¶ The American Israel Public Affairs Committee sent out a letter commending Menendez, which the media characterized as AIPAC reversing itself on sanctions.¶ AIPAC made no attempt to clarify its position. But it is still sending out e-mails urging members to call senators to move the bill. [Update: Under fire, AIPAC has clarified its position.]¶ Meanwhile, 42 Republicans sent Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nev.) a letter demanding a vote on sanctions. (Sens. Rand Paul, Bob Corker and Jeff Flake did not sign the letter.)¶ So let’s be clear — the problem is not lack of bipartisanship. The problem is the White House, the Senate majority leader and the Senate Democrats who are carrying water for the administration. Reid and the Democrats quite simply won’t cross their president on a vital issue of national security because when the chips are down they will place — what does the president say? — party above country. Menendez’s speech in this regard was grossly hypocritical; he can bring sanctions to the floor any time and pass it overwhelmingly.

#### The bill is far from dead

Collinson 1-29 Stephen, White House Correspondent, AFP; “Obama repels new Iran sanctions push... for now” *Agence France Presse*; January 29, 2014; http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iLYQB2l0GsZJ6h1hk4tltDoDjjgw?docId=42882c19-00c8-4b0a-a44a-3a3b329f041c

Those behind the anti-sanctions campaign though privately concede they may have won a battle, not a war.¶ 'A crucial victory'¶ The push for new sanctions will flare again ahead of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee's (AIPAC) annual conference in March, which Netanyahu is expected to address.¶ It could also recur if the talks with Iran on a final pact extend past the six-month window set by the interim deal.¶ But for now, groups that supported the push against sanctions are jubilant.¶ "This is a major victory, a crucial victory for the American public who don't want to see a war," said Kate Gould of the Friends Committee on National Legislation.¶ But she warned: "There'll be other efforts to try and sabotage the process."¶ The liberal pro-Israel lobby group J Street played a major role in the anti-sanctions push.¶ Vice president Alan Elsner said the group "continues to work hard to persuade lawmakers not to take action that risks sabotaging the negotiations with Iran.¶ "We're happy that more and more senators are seeing the logic of our argument," he added.¶ Republican Senator Mark Kirk, who helped write the sanctions law, pledged to fight on.¶ "The American people- Democrats and Republicans alike overwhelmingly want Iran held accountable during any negotiations," said Kirk.

# 2ac

Modernity isn’t the problem

Ken BOOTH IR @ Aberystwyth ‘7 Theory of World Security p. 132-133

Daryl Glaser. a scholar from South Africa, and therefore somebody directly familiar with life in a state that was once committed to institutionalised racism, has offered an important counter to the Bauman thesis and the simplistic interhnkinil by postmodern writers of the Holocaust and modernimJ°" In a book written a decade after Mandela's release, Glaser argued that it was not the surveillance, statistics, and regulation that were the aspects of Nazi behaviour demanding attention. Nor was it the 'lawfulness, planning, bureaucratic regulation or the professionalisation of knowledge' that fed into Nazi racial policies. That is, Glaser claimed that the features of modernity showcased by the Bauman thesis were not what demanded attention; rather, it was the 'institutionalisation of a racial hierarchy of wealth, status and power, enforced by repressive, often arbitrary state authority, assisted by bad laws'. What was wrong in Nazi Germany (and in apartheid South Africa) was not 'modernity', but laws and politics that served ideas of racial superiority - a prejudice that was directly contrary to 'modern ideals like social justice'. Modernity for Glaser delivered ideas of social justice to South Africa, while its modalities in the form of statistics and regulation, and so on constituted the very means by which illiteracy could be overcome, and the health of the disadvantaged improved.

Rejecting the logic and political implications of the Bauman thesis, Glaser advocated 'more and better law, effectively enforced, and more "scientific" information about the condition of the people, not less of these "modern" goods'. His view was that the people(s) of post- apartheid South Africa were in a better position than in the recent past albeit still a perilous one, because the oppressed had identified with modernity's ideas of tolerance and equality, and had found solidarity in the global human rights supporters. Social development (improved literacy and better health), he stressed, requires planning, profession- alised knowledge, and other modalities of modernity - not their rejection. What Glaser called the 'organisational machinery of "modernity" to give effect to "modern" ideas like social justice' 107 does not guarantee the security and hence prospects for emancipation for South Africa's peoples, but it does give them hope.105

The idea of progress is not what it was, but is more useful as a result. It should never be considered as part of nature's plan for history, or pursued with hubris, but always with reflexivity The ideals of emancipation that inform progressive politics are guides for judgement and action; without them societies will replicate structural and other oppressions, and humanity will never be what it might become.

#### Without specific detailed description of how the alt can work towards solutions you should be highly skeptical of their critique

**Bryant 12** ( levi, prof of philosophy at Collins college, Critique of the Academic Left, http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/11/11/underpants-gnomes-a-critique-of-the-academic-left/)

The problem as I see it is that **this is the worst sort of abstraction** (in the Marxist sense) **and wishful thinking**. Within a Marxo-Hegelian context, a thought is abstract when it ignores all of the mediations in which a thing is embedded. For example, I understand a robust tree abstractly when I attribute its robustness, say, to its genetics alone, ignoring the complex relations to its soil, the air, sunshine, rainfall, etc., that also allowed it to grow robustly in this way. This is the sort of critique we’re always leveling against the neoliberals. They are abstract thinkers. In their doxa that individuals are entirely responsible for themselves and that they completely make themselves by pulling themselves up by their bootstraps, neoliberals ignore all the mediations belonging to the social and material context in which human beings develop that play a role in determining the vectors of their life. They ignore, for example, that George W. Bush grew up in a family that was highly connected to the world of business and government and that this gave him opportunities that someone living in a remote region of Alaska in a very different material infrastructure and set of family relations does not have. To think concretely is to engage in a cartography of these mediations, a mapping of these networks, from circumstance to circumstance (what I call an “onto-cartography”). It is to map assemblages, networks, or ecologies in the constitution of entities.¶ **Unfortunately, the academic left falls prey to its own form of abstraction**. **It’s good at carrying out critiques that denounce various social formations, yet very poor at proposing any sort of realistic constructions of alternatives**. This because it thinks abstractly in its own way, ignoring how networks, assemblages, structures, or regimes of attraction would have to be **remade to create a workable alternative**. Here I’m reminded by the “underpants gnomes” depicted in South Park:¶ The underpants gnomes have a plan for achieving profit that goes like this:¶ Phase 1: Collect Underpants¶ Phase 2: ?¶ Phase 3: Profit!¶ They even have a catchy song to go with their work:¶ Well this is sadly how it often is with the academic left. **Our plan seems to be as follows:¶ Phase 1: Ultra-Radical Critique¶ Phase 2: ?¶ Phase 3: Revolution and complete social transformation!¶** Our problem is that **we seem perpetually stuck at phase 1 without ever explaining what is to be done at phase 2. Often the critiques** articulated at phase 1 **are right**, **but there are nonetheless all sorts of problems** with those critiques nonetheless. In order to reach phase 3, we have to produce new collectives. **In order for new collectives to be produced, people need to be able to hear and understand the critiques developed at phase 1.** Yet **this is where everything begins to fall apart.** **Even though these critiques are often right, we express them in ways that only an academic with a PhD in critical theory** and post-structural theory **can understand**. How exactly is Adorno to produce an effect in the world if only PhD’s in the humanities can understand him? **Who are these things for?** We seem to always ignore these things and then look down our noses with disdain at the Naomi Kleins and David Graebers of the world. To make matters worse, we publish our work in expensive academic journals that only universities can afford, with presses that don’t have a wide distribution, and **give our talks at expensive hotels at academic conferences attended only by other academics**. Again, who are these things for? **Is it an accident that so many activists look away from these things with contempt, thinking their more about an academic industry** and tenure, **than producing change in the world? If a tree falls in a forest and no one is there to hear it, it doesn’t make a sound! Seriously dudes** and dudettes, **what are you doing?¶** But finally, and worst of all, us Marxists and anarchists all too often act like assholes. We denounce others, we condemn them, we berate them for not engaging with the questions we want to engage with, and we vilify them when they don’t embrace every bit of the doxa that we endorse. **We are every bit as off-putting and unpleasant as the fundamentalist minister or the priest of the inquisition** (have people yet understood that Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus was a critique of the French communist party system and the Stalinist party system, and the horrific passions that arise out of parties and identifications in general?). This type of “revolutionary” **is the greatest friend of the reactionary and capitalist because they do more to drive people into the embrace of reigning ideology than to undermine reigning ideology. These are the people that keep Rush Limbaugh in business.** Well done!¶ But this isn’t where our most serious shortcomings lie. **Our most serious shortcomings are to be found at phase 2. We** almost **never make concrete proposals for how things ought to be restructured, for what new material infrastructures and semiotic fields need to be produced**, and when we do, our critique-intoxicated cynics and skeptics immediately jump in with an analysis of all the ways in which these things contain dirty secrets, ugly motives, and are doomed to fail. **How**, I wonder, **are we to do anything at all when we have no concrete proposals?** **We live on a planet of 6 billion people. These 6 billion people are dependent on a certain network of production and distribution to meet the needs of their consumption.** That network of production and distribution does involve the extraction of resources, the production of food, the maintenance of paths of transit and communication, the disposal of waste, the building of shelters, the distribution of medicines, etc., etc., etc.¶ **What are your proposals? How will you meet these problems?** How will you navigate the existing mediations or semiotic and material features of infrastructure? Marx and Lenin had proposals. Do you? Have you even explored the cartography of the problem? Today we are so intellectually bankrupt on these points that we even have theorists speaking of events and acts and talking about a return to the old socialist party systems, ignoring the horror they generated, their failures, and not even proposing ways of avoiding the repetition of these horrors in a new system of organization. Who among our critical theorists is thinking seriously about how to build a distribution and production system that is responsive to the needs of global consumption, avoiding the problems of planned economy, ie., who is doing this in a way that gets notice in our circles? Who is addressing the problems of micro-fascism that arise with party systems (there’s a reason that it was the Negri & Hardt contingent, not the Badiou contingent that has been the heart of the occupy movement). At least the ecologists are thinking about these things in these terms because, well, they think ecologically. Sadly we need something more, a melding of the ecologists, the Marxists, and the anarchists. We’re not getting it yet though, as far as I can tell. Indeed, folks seem attracted to yet another critical paradigm, Laruelle.¶ I would love, just for a moment, to hear a radical environmentalist talk about his ideal high school that would be academically sound. How would he provide for the energy needs of that school? How would he meet building codes in an environmentally sound way? How would she provide food for the students? What would be her plan for waste disposal? And most importantly, how would she navigate the school board, the state legislature, the federal government, and all the families of these students? **What is your plan? What is your alternative?** I think there are alternatives. I saw one that approached an alternative in Rotterdam. **If you want to make a truly revolutionary contribution, this is where you should start. Why should anyone even bother listening to you if you aren’t proposing real plans?** But we haven’t even gotten to that point. Instead we’re like underpants gnomes, saying “revolution is the answer!” **without addressing any of the infrastructural questions of just how revolution is to be produced, what alternatives it would offer, and how we would concretely go about building those alternatives.** Masturbation.**¶** **“Underpants gnome” deserves to be a category in critical theory; a sort of synonym for self-congratulatory masturbation**. We need less critique not because critique isn’t important or necessary– it is –but because we know the critiques, we know the problems. **We’re intoxicated with critique because it’s easy and safe. We best every opponent with critique. We occupy a position of moral superiority with critique. But do we really do anything with critique?** What we need today, more than ever, is composition or carpentry. **Everyone knows something is wrong. Everyone knows this system is destructive and stacked against them.** Even the Tea Party knows something is wrong with the economic system, despite having the wrong economic theory. **None of us, however, are proposing alternatives. Instead we prefer to shout and denounce. Good luck with that.**

#### Endorsing one state action doesn’t legitimize the state

Mervyn **Frost**, U of Kent, **1996**, Ethics in Int’l Relations, p. 90-1

A first objection which seems inherent in Donelan’s approach is that utilizing the modern state domain of discourse in effect sanctifies the state: it assumes that people will always live in states and that it is not possible within such a language to consider alternatives to the system. This objection is not well founded, by having recourse to the ordinary language of international relations I am not thereby committed to argue that the state system as it exists is the best mode of human political organization or that people ought always to live in states as we know them. As I have said, my argument is that whatever proposals for piecemeal or large-scale reform of the state system are made, they must of necessity be made in the language of the modern state. Whatever proposals are made, whether in justification or in criticism of the state system, will have to make use of concepts which are at present part and parcel of the theory of states. Thus,for example. any proposal for a new global institutional arrangement superseding the state system will itself have to be justified, and that justification will have to include within it reference to a new and good form of individual citizenship, reference to a new legislative machinery equipped with satisfactory checks and balances, reference to satisfactory law enforcement procedures, reference to a satisfactory arrangement for distributing the goods produced in the world, and so on. All of these notions are notions which have been developed and finely honed within the theory of the modern state. It is not possible to imagine a justification of a new world order succeeding which used, for example, feudal, or traditional/tribal, discourse. More generally there is no worldwide language of political morality which is not completely shot through with state-related notions such as citizenship, rights under law, representative government and so on.

#### Acting as if we can change things good

**Sparer ‘84**

[Ed, Prof. Law and Soc Welfare @ Pennsylvania, “Fundamental Human Rights, Legal Entitlements, and the Social Struggle: A Friendly Critique of the Critical Legal Studies Movement,” 36 Stan. L. Rev. 509, January, ln// ]

From this background, Gordon traces an emerging "interpretative" Critical legal theory that emphasizes the role of legal doctrine in "belief-systems that people have externalized and allowed to rule their lives." n121 It is "belief systems" that count, even though "many constraints on human social activity," such as finite resources, do exist. Given these belief systems, not even the "organization of the working class or capture of the state apparatus will automatically" produce conditions which lead to "the utopian possibilities of social life." He then concludes:

Of course, this does not mean that people should stop trying to organize the working class or to influence the exercise of state power; it means only that they have to do so pragmatically and experimentally, with full knowledge that there are no deeper logics of historical necessity. . . . Yet, if the real enemy is us -- all of us, the structures we carry around in our heads, the limits on our imagination -- where can we even begin? Things seem to change in history when people break out of their accustomed ways of responding to domination, by acting as if the constraints on their improving their lives were not real and that they could change things; and sometimes they can, though not always in the way they had hoped or intended; but they never knew they could change them at all until they tried. n122

Gordon's conclusion is profound. But it contradicts the view that a negative attack on liberal legal doctrine is the key path to a liberated future. n123 People break out of their accustomed ways of responding to [\*558] domination by **acting as if they could change things**. "Acting as if they could change things" does not mean confining scholarly endeavor to negative doctrinal analysis, even though negative doctrinal analysis may be one helpful step towards acting. Acting means struggling for and living a different way, even if only "experimentally," and this requires praxis, theory which guides and is in turn influenced by action. n124 Yet the whole of Gordon's piece, until his conclusion, is an exposition which becomes a polemic -- almost an apology -- for the negative Critical analysis which constitutes virtually the sole response to the practitioners' yearning for helpful theory.

Condo

Feldheim (Prof of Philosophy @ SUNY) 8

(Andrew, REPLY TO WARD CHURCHILL, dspace.sunyconnect.suny.edu, GoogleScholar)

Churchill’s assumption that, when a nonviolent group becomes a viable threat to an oppressive government, this group would be destroyed or become self-eliminating, does not match the evidence, since both Dr. King’s movement in the United States and Gandhi’s movement in India survived their successes. In many of the cases under discussion, violent resistance simply does not make good practical sense, and would result in unacceptable losses, while contributing relatively little to the overall cause. One reason for the inappropriateness of violent action in these circumstances is stressed repeatedly by Sharp and others. Implicit in almost all the situations under discussion is the assumption that the group doing the oppressing has more weapons, soldiers and all the other necessary ingredients for violent action than the group being oppressed. In such cases, if the subjugated group insisted on using violent means as their primary mode of operation, their movements would effectively amount to suicide, and the actual benefit to their cause would probably be negligible. It may be objected at this point that some groups and individuals protesting in this way, and willingly giving their lives, could inspire others through their martyrdom. Their sacrifice could possibly elicit the sympathy of other groups that may be willing to help their cause. In answer to this, one only has to consider the response that people are likely to elicit using this method in a nonviolent, as opposed to a violent, way. The Buddhist monks who immolated themselves in protest during the Vietnam War, and the followers of Gandhi who were beaten and killed, represent this method done nonviolently. They sacrificed their lives while making sure to harm no one else. In contrast, consider the suicide bomber who kills herself in the middle of a crowded marketplace, taking as many people as possible along with her. She is representative of martyrdom conducted violently. Both are types of martyrdom; but to the former, we assign virtue, while, to the latter, condemnation. The nonviolent variation is far more likely to elicit the support of other groups and even nations. It is practically superior. There is also something to be said about the difference in results that are obtained when a dictatorship is overthrown through violent means, as opposed to nonviolent means. Gene Sharp notes that, essential to the removal of a dictatorship and the establishment of democracy, is a fundamental redistribution of the governmental power structure. Violence may be less conducive towards this goal. According to Sharp, A military coup d’ etat against a dictatorship might appear to be relatively one of the easiest and quickest ways to remove a particularly repugnant regime. However, there are very serious problems with that technique. Most importantly, it leaves in place the existing maldistribution of power between the population and the elite in control of the government and its military forces. The removal of particular persons and cliques from the government positions most likely will merely make it possible for another group to take their place. (Sharp, 2002, p. 5) Sharp feels that, unless the dictatorial power structure is changed to a more democratically oriented power structure, the stage is set for another tyrannical group to simply take the place of the deposed one. At this point, in order to avoid the same reliance on absolutes that I find inappropriate in Churchill’s argument, it is important to recognize the crucial role that the uniqueness of every situation has in determining the proper methods to be employed on behalf of an oppressed or subjugated group. There are kernels of truth in Churchill’s contentions that have more or less import in accordance with the specific situation. There are cases, both historical and theoretical, for which violent action seems the only logical alternative. The extermination of the European Jews during World War II seems like such an instance. One important difference between this example and the oppression of Indians by the English, or African-Americans by the United States, is that, in the case of the Nazis, it was not an instance of the same type of repression. They did not wish to subjugate or exploit the Jews; they simply wished to kill them. Fortunately, however, the Nazi example is the exception rather than the rule. Most cases of oppression stem from a wish to subjugate a population in order to profit unfairly from their labors, or to usurp their property. To give Mr. Churchill his due, even in cases such as these, there may be factors, specific to particular situations, which call for violent resistance or a mixture of violent and nonviolent resistance. Each situation must be evaluated on its own merits. My contention is not that there is no truth in Churchill’s position. Rather, it is his use of absolutes, his insistence that violence or the threat of violence is always necessary, that demands a refutation. Churchill presents his contention, that violence or the threat of violence is a necessary constituent of successful resistance to tyranny, in a way that makes it unfalsifiable. This, however, does not add to its merit. To potential counterexamples, Churchill simply relies on the presence of groups which may be potentially violent. The very nature of tyranny, however, naturally encourages feelings of resentment and hostility on the part of the oppressed. If one looked hard enough, he could always find some indication of potential violence, even if not overt. Churchill’s argument will, in this sense, always be true, but gives us no more actual information than a tautology. Also, since Churchill supposes a causal relationship between violent resistance and the defeat of dictatorships, and this construct is placed within an historical context, we can never know what would have happened if there had been no violence or the threat of violence, but only nonviolent resistance. While it may not be possible to prove Churchill’s argument unsound, its very nature makes it of limited utility.

#### The immediate impact of the alternative would be an increase in anti-black and anti-red violence

Fire Rider (advocate from the Northern Ontario Ojibwe and American Indian Movement) 5  
(Marty, Why Churchill Political Agenda is Wrong for Indians, February 2005, http://aimfireca.tripod.com/id44.html)

I think we can agree that Churchill's political philosophy is liberal socialism regarding foreign policy. If that is his position he is entitled to that. In describing his fellow Americans, for instance, Churchill cannot refrain from using the language of spite. The victims of the Sept. 11 attacks he compares to Nazis; even middle-class Americans he disparages as vapid hedonists too engrossed in materialism to care about the sufferings of "brown-skinned" people overseas. Basically, he advocates that America is the evil empire of the world and needs to be replaced or severely weakened. But if America was to collapse as a legal government does Churchill or anyone believe that in a chaotic world with no laws that Indians would fair any better. It would be a world of unchecked Indian racism and discrimination by all hate groups be it left or right. If the September 11th victims are technocrats supporting the evil economic empire of America as Churchill professes, then is not he a hypocrite by educating American youth who will graduate with degrees to enter the technocratic economy of America? But what does the U.S. foreign policy have to do with a starving Indian on the Reservation or urban living? What has Churchill done for the poor Indian. Our AIM organization has helped to repair Indian elders homes; provide reservation security to protect the people against police abuse and tribal goons; written legal constitutions for reservations; legal research for tribes and individuals; feeding and clothing Indians; having the local Bureau of Indian Affairs office investigated for incompetence and complacency by the Inspector Generals Office, including other agencies as well, or advising Tribal governments. Further, our national Indian radio talk show is effective in educating and empowering our people. In other words we are in the field fighting daily for our people. We are AIM and we would lay our lives down in defense of our people, but only if attacked. If violence was the only Indian way we as a people would have been exterminated a long time ago. We in AIM do not support, nor condone violence. We do not need someone making noisy speeches about foreign policy, we need leaders fighting for and helping our people on domestic issues, that is the real AIM. Sadly, there is much discrimination in the world regarding indigenous people. But American Indians have problems nearly as equal such as third world living conditions on many reservations. Churchill's foreign policy speeches using the September 11th victims to make his political point only reflects negatively on all Indians and harms the good name of the American Indian Movement and it true leaders. Unfortunately, Churchill is causing division in Indian country. Indian strength lies in our unity, not disunity. And his actions and words only leads to Indian disunity. That was the same strategy used by non Indians to divide and conquer Indian people to take our lands. If ones walks the Red Path they remain balanced in the middle thus avoiding the political extremes of left or right. Remember being Indian is not a democrat or republican, liberal or conservative. Being Indian is following the traditional ways of tolerance, accepting all races and culture, spirituality with respect for all life. Taking of any life was only for defense, not taking a life for a political belief or to make a statement. Churchill's ways of advocating violence against innocent lives makes a mockery of the Great Spirits teachings that all life is sacred. If you are going to be an Indian activist you have to do more than beat the drum to make a lot of noise. You have feel the drum beat in your heart. Times have changed, and people like Churchill can stand outside the government while make all the noise, however very little has changed in 30 years for American Indians. Our future success will come through not only our unity, but by Indians learning the American political and legal landscape while working from within the system to change the system for Indian justice and sovereignty. We need to remove the path of ignorance, apathy and hatred to build a bridge of respect and honor of those who have walked before us. We need to never lose site of our culture by staying spiritually strong. Eventually the changes can be positive for our people. But advocating the overthrow of the American government is irresponsible resulting in a destabilizing political environment where Indians would be subject to further violence, racism and discriminating.

Without the state authority warlords will take control -- they use violence, exploit the people, and replicate the worst aspects of the state structure

Jackson 3 Paul Jackson, International Development Department of the University of Birmingham, UK (2003):

Warlords as alternative forms of Governance, Small Wars & Insurgencies, 14:2, 131-150 Tandfonline

Use of Violence to Reassert Local Power

With the complete breakdown of moral authority and the law, let alone any means of enforcement, the only recourse is to establish rule through force.

The violence associated with warlords is the most publicised aspect of their activity, and its seeming randomness is undoubtedly one of the most horrific characteristics of warlords. The casual nature of violence within areas held by warlords is symptomatic of the gang culture outlined by Lary in China, but equally resonant of earlier cultures of violence.

Replacement of Formal Structures with Gang Mentality

The collapse of formal structures and norms, including formal military structures, lead warlords to develop their own internal structures. In particular, the replacement of hierarchical structures with gang cultures, with the warlord and close associates at the core of the gang. This gang culture manifests itself in particular ways, not least of which is the fact that gangs act as a spur to further violence by subgroups. In other words, the replacement of formal structures by ad hoc, primitive and personalised control leads to a behavioural logic based on the licensing of gratuitous violence.

The gang culture has a further element of interest: the development of subgroups. These subgroups may be smaller gangs, or alternatively part of the larger group aiming to progress up the pecking order. One of the features of all periods of warlord rule has been the behaviour of smaller groups of armed men on the periphery of the gang, which adds a further element of randomness into the violence. We will return to this below.

#### Invisibility supports the status quo—their politics excludes the oppressed

McKay 11 Iain, editor, Anarchist FAQ; review of *The Coming Insurrection* by the Invisible Committee; *Anarcho-Syndicalist Review* vol. 55, 39-41; Winter, 2011; http://search.proquest.com/docview/848641456

The Coming Insurrection is firmly part of that world. While I would like to think fellow workers crossing my picket lines was really an expression of their (unconscious) contempt for reformism, a more realistic assessment would suggest 30 years of ruling-class victories (neo-liberalism) have eroded even basic levels of class consciousness. While things are somewhat different in France, reading The Coming Insurrection on my way to work made me wonder at times whether it was an elaborate hoax or satire. One thing is true, it does not describe the world as I know it. While this may be a reflection on me, I doubt it. I'm not sure that many people would recognize the world it describes. But perhaps I'm just past it, as the text proclaims there "remains scarcely any doubt that youth will be the first to savagely confront power." (17) Still, my age does allow me to remember that "I AM WHAT I AM" is not "marketing's latest offering to the world," the "final stage" in its development (29) but a hit single from the early '80s and, half a century before, Popeye's catchphrase. To proclaim this as "a military campaign, a war cry directed against everything that exists between being" (32) seems to be clutching at straws, seeking meaning in the meaningless. Not the best way to start a book on the current crisis we face. Still, good points are often made, along with the imaginative turns of phrase we come to expect of social protest in France. They note that work under capitalism is based on both exploitation and participation (45), something all too often glossed over. On ecology, it correctly notes that capitalists "hired our parents to destroy this world, and now they'd like to put us to work rebuilding it, and - to add insult to injury - at a profit." (75-6) So bits and pieces, rarely developed, are of interest, but over all the work is lacking in real analysis and strategy. No attempt is made to synthesize the proclamation that work has developed to the level "that they have almost reduced to zero the quantity of living labor necessary in the manufacture of any product" by means of, amongst others, "outsourcing" and rising productivity. (46) Work is still being done, just in other countries. As for raising productivity, they seem to forget they denounced that as the cause of "[sjickness, fatigue, depression" so making France "the land of anxiety pills ... the paradise of anti-depressants, the Mecca of neurosis." (33) Still, we are "living the paradox of a society of workers without work," (46) so we get stressed being over-worked to produce things we don't really need. Yet is this that new? Much labor under capitalism has been wasteful, related purely to the needs of the profit system, rather than meeting human needs. Similarly, the "flexible, undifferentiated workforce" hardly produces "the worker who is no longer a worker, who no longer has a trade" (the temp) (48), but rather the 19th century wage-slave returned. Is there a quantitative difference to suggest a new era and so radically new tactics and strategies? Destruction is a theme of the book. Thus a "day will come when" Paris and "its horrible concretion of power will lie in majestic ruins, but it will be at the end of a process that will be far more advanced everywhere else." (132) It talks about "sabotaging the social machine" and ponders "[h]ow can a TGV line or an electrical network be rendered useless?" (112) That sort of irresponsible rhetoric will, undoubtedly, be quoted by the Interior Minister, but that does not stop it being stupid. What of the people dependent on said train-line and electricity? Unlike a strike, such infrastructure cannot be easily repaired once destroyed. This is a recurring theme, ultra-revolutionary rhetoric (with the occasional suggestion which will keep the Interior Minister happy for selective quotes) and a remarkably reformist and quietisi practice. The book presents the vision of dropping-out and tending your allotment. It urges us to organize "apprenticeship, and for multiple, massive experiments" including "understand plankton biology" and "soil composition; study the way plants interact." (107) Such comments do provoke thoughts of a sophisticated satire. We also discover that the commune "needs money" and that they will "have their black markets. They are plenty of hustles." (103) Yet people fiddling welfare are less likely to cause trouble simply to avoid the state taking too great an interest in their goings on.

#### Their critique is based on a bad reading of Deleuze. The arborescent and the rhizomatic are not either/or. The affirmative exists as a rhizome within an arborescent structure-- a space of relationality and equality WITHIN the state. Their total rejection of the arborescent makes the alt ineffective.

-*The Coming Insurrection* is the book all their Invisible Committee cards come from. TIC=The Invisible Committee

Trott 11 Ben, Department of Philosophy and Humanities, Freie Universität Berlin; “Just Do It? A Review of The Coming Insurrection” *Social Movement Studies* vol. 10 no. 1 pp. 113-118; January, 2011

The Coming Insurrection is a call for the revolutionary transformation of society. The proliferation of ‘communes’ is advocated as the basis for launching an ‘insurrectionary’ effort – the rather broad deﬁnition of which only appears at the very end of the book (pp. 117–132) and is certainly not limited to the call to take up (undeﬁned) ‘arms’ highlighted by Glenn Beck. By communes, the authors do not just mean spaces for collective living and working, but something that is formed ‘every time a few people, freed from their individual straitjackets, decide to rely on themselves and measure their strength against reality’ (p. 102). They provide a few concrete examples: ‘Every wildcat strike is a commune; every building occupied collectively and on a clear basis is a commune. The action committees of 1968 were communes, as were the slave maroons in the United States, or Radio Alice in Bologna in 1977’ (pp. 102). Communes are distinguished from ‘organisations’ and ‘milieus’. There would, superﬁcially, appear to be a correlation in form between organisations and what Deleuze & Guattari (2004, 3–28) describe as ‘arborescent root structures’ in the introduction to A Thousand Plateaus, as well as between communes and the ‘rhizome’. Organisations have ‘a head ofﬁce, a name, resources, a leader, a strategy and a discourse’ (pp. 99–100). Communes, in contrast, are deﬁned less in terms of an inside and an out,

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and more by ‘the density of the ties’ (p. 102). By seeking ‘to be its own base’ (p. 102), the commune is, implicitly, far ﬂatter a structure. While arborescent forms are hierarchical and their constituent parts are connected through their single core, the rhizome is decentred, horizontal and characterised by many-to-many connections. The cycles of struggle which have erupted in the post-1968 world – from Italian Autonomia, to the identity politics of the 1980s, and the alter-globalisation movement of the turn of the century – have all been characterised (to varying degrees) by a celebration of the rhizomatic and rejection of the arborescent form. However, whilst Deleuze and Guattari’s work is riddled with paired concepts – major/minor, macropolitics/micropolitics and arborescent/rhizomatic – they are neither simple opposites nor mutually exclusive. If we think of the structure of social relations within organisations as generally arborescent in form, and those of what TIC describes as the commune as, generally, rhizomatic – and this does seem like a helpful way of partly grasping the distinction – we should consider following Deleuze and Guattari a little further. We should recognise that rhizomes also appear within arborescent structures and vice versa. The problem with The Coming Insurrection’s conception of the commune is that it overlooks its existence (as a density of creative and potentially subversive horizontal connections) within organisations. Moreover, it fetishises the commune’s pure form to the extent that it feels always already destined to become a milieu– which should then be ﬂed.

#### **Don’t trust their unwarranted assertions—the alt fails and invisible resistance isn’t key**

Trott 11 Ben, Department of Philosophy and Humanities, Freie Universität Berlin; “Just Do It? A Review of The Coming Insurrection” *Social Movement Studies* vol. 10 no. 1 pp. 113-118; January, 2011

--*The Coming Insurrection* is the book their Invisible Committee Cards come from

The eagerness of the authors of The Coming Insurrection to remake the world shines through in the text which freely (and often elegantly) appropriates from a wide body of philosophical, political and sociological thought. However, it likely creates a number of obstacles to actually remaking the world in almost equal measure. The lack of anchoring of its analysis and proposed strategy in a conception of classes in contemporary capitalism, the radical dismissal of forms of struggle that begin to take the forms of milieus or organisations rather than communes and the implication that certain forms of (irrecoupable) ‘insurrectionary’ activity simply need to be deployed, each point towards an underlying voluntarism. Whilst the book carefully deconstructs Reebok’s ‘I am what I am’, it leaves the reader with the impression that the strategy for rebellion against a world that creates atomised subjects is Nike’s ‘Just do it’.

#### The threat of war fractures feminist movements in Iran

Sahimi 12 Muhammad, Professor of Chemical Engineering and Materials Science, USC; , translating feminist activists in Iran “Iranian Women Raise Voices against War and Sanctions” *PBS*; March 13, 2012; http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2012/03/perspectives-iranian-women-raises-voices-against-war-and-sanctions.html

Over the past several months the drumbeats urging war against Iran have become very loud, a subject that I first [discussed](http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/Tehranbureau/2010/07/the-drumbeats-of-war-with-iran-are-getting-louder.html) in July 2010 and [revisited](http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2011/10/analysis-the-push-for-war-with-iran.html) this past October. Speculation about possible military attacks on Iran is now a constant in the media. While some pundits dismiss the possibility of war, at least in the near future, and others think that it is likely, the tough economic sanctions that have been imposed on Iran by the United States and its allies have contributed significantly to the everyday distress of the Iranian people. On March 8, International Women's Day, Campaign activists raised their strong and eloquent voices to oppose any war with Iran under any excuse. The following statement was posted on the Campaign's official website, where it is [accompanied by 13 video clips](http://1million4equality.info/spip.php?article9323), each with an individual member speaking out against war. -- Muhammad Sahimi¶ \*\*\*¶ War does not happen overnight. War does not necessarily happen when bombs are dropped on our cities. Even the shadow of the war is terrifying. The war shadow also changes the lives of us, the women. Every day that we may live in a war, or in warlike conditions, we would be concerned about the death of the achievements in our struggle for equality. To us, war means destructive violence against women and children, means more crackdown, means silencing our demands and our civil protests.... We still have not cleansed ourselves from the dust of the eight-year war between Iran and Iraq, and our nation is being threatened with another war.¶ War is not just bombs and destroyed homes. Today, even before the war, the lives of women have become more difficult. War is staring at us women and is getting closer step by step.¶ We do not want to be the victims of this monster. On this day, March 8, 2012, without having any opportunity for joy or expressing our demands on streets, we use this day as our occasion to declare that we are opposed to war, and each of us expresses [in the accompanying clips] the reason why. Join us to have a stronger and louder voice against those who use any excuse to greet the war with a smile.

#### Divorcing the struggle against reproductive futurism from the political sphere makes a fatal mistake—their reading of politics and heteronormativity is backwards—their description only characterizes the Christian right which is best fought politically

Brenkman 2002 (John Brenkman, Distinguished Professor of English and Comparative Literature at the CUNY Graduate Center and Baruch College, 2002, Narrative, Vol. 10, No. 2, p. 190-191)

I have not tried to offer a more optimistic (or futurist) assessment of the gay struggle than Edelman, though he has construed my remarks in that way; his essay very pointedly conveyed a sense of the ongoing ordeal of gays in American society and a pessimism regarding inaction on the AIDS crisis, domestic partner rights, and anti-gay violence and the persistence of repressive restrictions on sexual freedom. I have also not challenged his criticism of the figure of the child as futurity, because I find it is very persuasive. So, too, Edelman offers a compelling interpretation of homophobia in his delineation of how this discourse figures the child as future in order to make the queer the figure of the death and jouissance, of the negativity, that haunts all (normalizing) fantasies of the sexual relation and sexual identity. What I have challenged is the claim that this discourse defines, or even dominates, the political realm as such. It is the discourse of conservative Catholicism and Christian fundamentalism, and even though it resonates in strands of liberal discourse, it represents an intense reaction, backlash, against changes that have already taken place in American the gay and lesbian movement. society, many of them as the direct result of feminism and the gay and lesbian movement. It is indeed important not to underestimate the depth and danger of this reaction, but it is a reactionary, not a foundational, discourse. The uncoupling of sexuality and reproduction is ubiquitous in American culture today as a result of multiple developments beyond the expansion of gay rights and the right to abortion, including birth control, divorce, and changing patterns of family life, as well as consumerism and mass culture; it may well be that the sheer scope, and irreversibility, all of these developments also intensifies the targeting of gays by conservative ideology and Christian fundamentalist movements. But that is all the more reason to recognize that the deconstruction of the phobic figuration of the queer is a struggle to be pursued inside as well as outside politics.

#### Edelman’s metaphysic is grounded in Lacanian non-sense—their explanation of the social is baseless and there is no way to enact the alt

Bateman 2006 (R Benjamin Bateman, doctoral candidate in English at the University of Virginia, Spring 2006, The Minnesota Review, online: <http://www.theminnesotareview.org/journal/ns6566/bateman_r_benjamin_ns6566_stf1.shtml>) Blue=reader’s digest version of Edelman

But his book falters as it comes increasingly to rely upon arcane appeals to Lacanian psychoanalysis (conspicuously absent from this book is a single reference to Foucault). Edelman's argument runs something like this: a stubborn kernel of non-meaning resides at the core of language, forcing each signifier to find its meaning in the next ad infinitum, thus preventing signification from ever completing itself or establishing meaning once and for all. This internal limit subtends and makes possible all meaning-making while simultaneously disrupting it. An unbridgeable gap, it marks the place of a recalcitrant, functionless, and socially corrosive jouissance—an excessive enjoyment over which language, society, and the future stumble. Heterosexual culture, anxious to name and contain this minatory abyss, casts homosexuals as it and into it. They are "…the violent undoing of meaning, the loss of identity and coherence, the unnatural access to jouissance…"(132).

One might fault Edelman, as John Brenkman has, for transposing a rule of language onto the order of being. But even if one takes his equation seriously, one must ask what is gained by actively occupying a structurally necessary role. In other words, if the Real must exist for the Symbolic to function, then the abyss will remain whether homosexuals agree to inhabit it or not. Edelman acknowledges this reality but argues that if homosexuals exit the abyss a new subaltern will be compelled to enter it. Better, then, to remain inside and mirror back to heterosexuality what troubles it most—meaninglessness, death and antisocial desire. Unfortunately, Edelman provides few details as to how we might accomplish this task, and his insistence elsewhere that the powers-that-be will clamp down with unmitigated force to repress and disavow the encroaching Real renders such a strategy less than appealing. At one point he encourages queers to pursue a more traditional politics alongside his radical recommendation (29), but he fails to acknowledge that if the former succeeds—and the dominant culture brings queers and/or their practices into its fold—then the latter's intended audience will no longer be listening.

#### Edelman’s radical negativity precludes engagement with politics and papers over real oppression – Edelman’s theory is ultra-masculine

Floyd 12 [Kevin, Associate Professor of English at Kent State University, where he teaches courses on Marxism, queer studies, and twentieth-century U.S. literature and culture The Importance of Being Childish: Queer Utopians and Historical Contradiction1 SOURCEWorks & Days;Spring/Fall2012, Vol. 30 Issue 1/2, p323]

I have suggested that Edelman’s argument that “queer” should identify itself with the negativity of the death drive is a secretly utopian argument, that to embrace reproductive futurism’s figuration of “queer” as the destruction of the actual is also to embrace a figuration of utopia. But this brings us back to the relation between utopia and politics. The opposition in Edelman’s analysis between the signifier “queer” and the signifier “politics” could not be more absolute; for Edelman, “queer” and “politics” are in structural and irreconcilable contradiction with each other. We might critique Edelman’s argument for a kind of formalism, for abstracting both “queer” and “politics” in the mutual exclusivity he posits between them (a formalism Marxist intellectuals, it needs to be said, sometimes seem to replicate, as dismissive of queer thought as they imagine queer thought to be of Marxism). Or, recalling Balakrishnan’s remark quoted above, we might instead construe this radically ahistorical argument as a symptom of the damaged life we still inhabit, of an historical situation the time of capital makes difficult even to grasp as an historical situation. Thinking the death of the social, thinking utopia, is of course a radically totalizing way of thinking. The difficulty of the delicate balance between totalization and nontotalization in Adorno is that he refuses the subjective capacity to grasp totality fully in thought, even while insisting that value, “the lattice of socialization,” as Minima Moralia puts it, represents an objectively and violently total system which threatens to erase individual particularity altogether. One of Minima Moralia’s best-known formulations, “the whole is the false,” to this extent carries two meanings: subjectively, the conceptual whole is false; but the objective totality of capital is also false (MM 50). Edelman’s performance of totalization, in contrast, presumes omniscience, transcendence, the very vantage Adorno programmatically rejects (even as he also insists that it can never be entirely eluded).21 What Edelman claims for his analysis is an unproblematized bird’seye- view of the social as such (which only Lacan, apparently, can throw into relief), a clear, anything but individual vantage on its defining logic, as if his own analysis were not situated within that same totality – much less conditioned and limited by history which, as far as he is concerned, can hardly be said to exist. For Edelman, the structural totality oriented toward a narcissistic future is false, but the conceptual totality is true. And it is precisely this presumption of omniscience in Edelman which sets his claims apart most emphatically from Muñoz’s, where, to the contrary, utopia takes the form not of pure, abstract negativity, but of performative and aesthetic gestures from within urban spaces in which the historical, he suggests, can still be glimpsed, spaces increasingly erased by neoliberalism’s temporal and spatial logics. Muñoz returns us to earth – though the political implications of this return are less clear than the historical ones, as I will suggest. His book is nothing if not an archive of those sexual and social practices that have begun to vanish from view as the sexually revolutionary energies of the fifties and sixties have given way to their containment by privatization and the fetish of gay rights. He elaborates a contemporary urban terrain of practice at once aesthetic and social, a practice of queer world making, which he reads in Blochian terms as “laden with potentiality,” underscoring the socioeconomic, governmental, and racist violence routinely visited on those practices within the neoliberal city. Here the utopian is anything but abstract and conceptual; it emerges practically, “from below,” and under threat. Muñoz’s critique of Edelman turns precisely on the abstract character of Edelman’s analysis. In No Future, as Muñoz puts it, queerness is “a singular abstraction that can be subtracted and isolated from a larger social matrix;” specifically, “queer” is in Edelman both white and “crypto-universal” (CU 94). Pointing out, in what has become one of the most widely referenced formulations in recent queer studies, that “racialized kids, queer kids, are not the sovereign princes of futurity” (CU 95), Muñoz finds in everyday queer practices glimpses of a Blochian “‘not-yet’ where queer youths of color actually get to grow up” (CU 96). He explicitly identifies with queer youth of color – informing us that he was once one himself – and unfolds a critique of neoliberal urbanism from this point of view. His explicitly Blochian analysis is in this respect also implicitly Adornian: the child is most salient here as a figure not for an airtight, utterly predictable future, but for a precarious standpoint from which that future might begin to look less predictable. The violence of Giuliani’s New York City manifests itself in this account in a range of ways – in the infamous zoning ordinances, for example, which, serving the interests of real estate speculators, have also begun to shred the delicate social infrastructure of queer world making. It is also exemplified, of course, by the police: Muñoz recounts a demonstration in Washington Square Park, in the wake of Matthew Shepard’s murder, to which the state responded, as usual, with one of neoliberal urbanism’s defining imperatives, dispersal: “the state understands the need to keep us from knowing ourselves, knowing our masses” (CU 64). Utopian practices emerge in this account from within economically, infrastructurally precarious queer worlds of color in particular, bars like the now defunct Magic Touch in Jackson Heights, in which Muñoz locates those indispensable practices of interracial and interclass “contact” eloquently described by Samuel Delany.22 It is not too strong, in this context, to refer to this contemporary governmental dispersal of forms of queer sociality as “disappearance” – the verb as well as the noun – with all its brutal implications. Writing of the period in which Giuliani claimed credit for a drop in crime rates, Muñoz writes that “walking through the East or West Village, Chelsea, Brooklyn, or neighborhoods in Queens, queers have become very accustomed to seeing posters with the pictures of some queer person, often a queer person of color, who has been murdered or has ‘disappeared’” (CU 63). The utopian is defined here not by its abstract negativity, but by its practical inseparability from damaged life. In a discussion of Kevin Aviance, Muñoz proposes the ways in which this famous black drag performer “affirms the racialized ontology of the pier queen” (CU 74). Aviance’s flamboyant gestures evoke, that is, not only the homo fabulousness that has always been legible as a utopian gesture in Bloch’s sense; these gestures also evoke those vogueing contests one could once discover near the piers at the end of Christopher Street, where queer youth of color have tried to create a world for themselves – spaces that have begun to vanish in the last ten to fifteen years, as new condominiums and security forces have appeared in their place, explicitly appealing to gay clients and effacing the storied queer history of the piers, even as it has turned that history into yet another marketing ploy.23 (Progress!) Muñoz proposes seeing not only “celebration” in Aviance’s movements, but also “the strong trace of black and queer racialized survival” (CU 80). Again we encounter the indispensability of childish imagination; Aviance’s utopian enactments register a damaged present. Aviance, indeed, evokes the marginal sociality of the piers in those significantly less marginal spaces that cater to white gay men: on a stage high above a sweaty, dancing, largely white and tenaciously macho all-male crowd, he performs “gestures [which] connote the worlds of queer suffering that these huddled men attempt to block out but cannot escape, and the pleasures of being swish and queeny that they cannot admit to in their quotidian lives” (CU 79). Muñoz’s archive is one of utopian practices which carry positive content and which have also learned to be fully prepared for disappointment, for failure. Here, as in Bloch, hope is the practical consciousness of a relationship to the future which is inseparable from anxiety, from danger.24 Muñoz in this way defamiliarizes Edelman’s temporality of repetition, following an Adornian logic, insisting on the discontinuity that conditions continuity, on the indeterminacy and irreducibly historical character of the “not yet.” Utopia is exclusively the death of the present only if that present is fully positive, self-identical; but for Muñoz, the present, which we may well apprehend as self-identical, we are nonetheless to comprehend in terms of lack: “Queer cultural production is both an acknowledgement of the lack that is endemic to any heteronormative rendering of the world and a building, a ‘world making’ in the face of that lack” (CU 118). In Muñoz, “something’s missing”25 – something we can catch Blochian glimpses of if we attend to damaged, utopian practices the spatial and temporal logics of neoliberalism threaten to make “no longer conscious.” Edelman, by contrast, would have us believe that nothing is missing, that there really is no alternative: what is missing is precisely nothing, what is missing is only the abstract negativity of the actual’s total destruction. And if this abstract destruction is the point at which Edelman’s Lacan seems to absorb Edelman’s Adorno – negativity once again made equivalent to deconstruction, Adorno once again pulled into the service of deconstruction – this same death drive is also Edelman’s utopia, in spite of his efforts to contain the latter within a logic of sameness. This is also the point, as I have argued, at which Adorno will not be absorbed, the point at which the restless dialectic turns No Future’s identification of Lacan and Adorno into its non-identification with itself. Muñoz, meanwhile, highlights what Edelman manages in spite of himself to miss, that the future’s mere repetition of the present is anything but inevitable, that the future promised by a certain neoliberal temporality, a certain enforcement of more of the same, of speculation as such (about the future value of marriage licenses, for example), is a future that erases history, a future to which that temporality wants to take only some of us, those of us it wouldn’t just rather lock up. It is a future that “disappears” the history Muñoz wants us to remember, as it “disappears” the children he wants us to remember. This is the ultimate importance of Bloch for Muñoz: he shares with Bloch a willful insistence on the “not yet,” a determination to see an apparently neutralized political present as “laden with potentiality,” to find political hope in the face of abundant evidence of its absence, in the face of privatization, lockdown, “security.” If the queer youth of color with which Muñoz identifies can be construed as potential points of resistance, these points of resistance are also, he suggests, already vanishing. Muñoz may then seem, finally, as pessimistic about the political as Edelman; he insists that “queer idealism may be the only way to usher in a new mode of radicalism that can perhaps release queer politics from its current death grip” (CU 172) – the historically specific death grip, for example, of the Human Rights Campaign. We might even say that a pessimism about political practice, and a preference for the critical potential of idealism, is something else he shares with Adorno. But if queer politics are impossible here as well, they are also indispensable, and so vanishing points of resistance will be retained urgently as memory, as ideal, as a way of thinking the history that cannot be experienced. If Muñoz’s forthright idealism seems on the one hand to grant Edelman’s formal separation of “queer” from “politics,” he also insists that this separation is the product of a history we are by no means doomed to repeat.

The permutation is a means of recognizing the transformative potential of the future as an untouched ground for social change, queerness needs to draw strength from its own aggressive confrontation with heterosexuality, rather than accept the negativity projected onto it by heterosexuality.

Bateman 2006 (R Benjamin Bateman, doctoral candidate in English at the University of Virginia, Spring 2006, The Minnesota Review, online: <http://www.theminnesotareview.org/journal/ns6566/bateman_r_benjamin_ns6566_stf1.shtml>)

Certain readers might chafe at Edelman's suggestion that Butler's politics is insufficiently radical. After all, Butler has been criticized, like Edelman, for trafficking in recondite theories and postmodern argot and for failing to offer a viable model of political agency. To be sure, Butler's post-structuralist and Foucaultian commitments constrain her ability to posit a stable political agent and to conceive a politics that would radically oppose, rather than merely reinforce or marginally reinflect, a dominant cultural order. But in her recent work, perhaps most strikingly in 2004's Undoing Gender, Butler has turned to the "question of social transformation" (the title of UG's tenth chapter), arguing, quite programmatically, that social transformation "…is a question of developing, within law, within psychiatry, within social and literary theory, a new legitimating lexicon for the gender complexity that we have always been living" (219). Lest she be accused of nominalism, Butler stresses the importance of real bodies in forging such a vocabulary: "…the body is that which can occupy the norm in myriad ways, exceed the norm, rework the norm, and expose realities to which we thought we were confined as open to transformation" (217). While Edelman rejects the future as a site of social reproduction, Butler prizes it as a space of uncertainty, an ambiguous terrain upon which competing and perhaps unforeseeable claims will be made and new social orders elaborated.

Butler's model offers queer theory a brighter future than Edelman's, not simply because it confers agency upon social actors and highlights the social's capacity for transformation, but because it supersedes the liberal inclusiveness for which Edelman faults it. Butler's queer world is not one in which the dominant order remains stable as it incorporates, or ingests, peripheral sexualities into its fold. Rather, it is one in which the periphery remakes the center,

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rearticulating what it means to be "normal" or "American" or "queer." Thus, queers do not simply enter society on heterosexuality's terms; they recast such terms, seizing upon instabilities in signification to elaborate previously unarticulated and perhaps unanticipatable ways of life. Edelman's point that 'queer' names "the resistance of the social to itself" (2002) combats the very anti-futurism he endorses; in this formulation, queerness functions as the force that prevents a particular social order from coinciding with itself, from congealing into a futureless nightmare. Queer, then, might denote the instability of all norms and social orders, their intrinsic capacity for change

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#### We’ll impact turn cooption-- Their fear of cooption tanks alt solvency-- even if the aff is coopted, taking the risk can lead to real change

**Zizek 4**Slavoj, Senior Researcher, U of Ljubljana“Liberation Hurts: An Interview with Slavoj Zizek”; THE ELECTRONIC BOOK REVIEW; July 1, 2004; [www.electronicbookreview.com/v3/servlet/ebr?comman=view\_essay&essay\_id=rasmussen](http://www.electronicbookreview.com/v3/servlet/ebr?comman=view_essay&essay_id=rasmussen).

Zizek: I’m trying to avoid two extremes. One extreme is the traditional pseudo-radical position which says, “If you engage in politics - helping trade unions or combating sexual harassment, whatever - you’ve been co-opted and so on. Then you have the other extreme which says, “Ok, you have to do something.” I think both are wrong. **I hate** those**pseudo-radicals who dismiss every concrete action by saying that “This will all be co-opted.” Of course, everything can be co-opte**d [chuckles] **but this is just a nice excuse to do absolutely nothing**.**Of course, there is a danger**that - to use the old Maoist term, popular in European student movements thirty some years ago, “the long march through institutions” will last so long that you’ll end up part of the institution. **We need more than ever, a parallax view - a double perspective. You engage in acts, being aware of their limitations. This does not mean that you act with your fingers crossed. No,you fully engage, but with the awareness that - the ultimate wager** in the almost Pascalian sense -**is not simply that this act will succeed, but that the very failure of this act will trigger a much more radical process**

#### Congress can effectively curtail the presidents war powers.

Howell and Pevehouse, 07 (Willam G. Howell, Prof @ U Chicago, Jon C. Pevehouse, Prof @ U Chicago. While Dangers Gather: Congressional Checks on Presidential War Powers. Xii-xiii)

In several ways' this book advances our understanding of the domestic politics of war. For starters, it considers many more manifestations of congressional influence than previous scholars have recognized. Inter- branch struggles do not typically resemble duels wherein the president and Congress mark ten strides and fire, leaving the victor rr".rJing and the vanquished bleeding in the dirt. In politics, both often end up ,nlounded, just as both can claim a measure of success. The trick, \*e think, is to ac- count for a fuller range of possible outcomes when two branches of gov- ernment, with opposing objectives and differenr resources at theirlis- posal, square off against one another. This book does more rhan identify instances when Congress, with one carefully fired shot, fells a president. It documents those occasions when it maims him, whe n jt grurrs a rimb, and- perhaps most importantly, when a president walks away from a fight he feared losing. If we hold as our standard of proof the obliteration of white House military planning, we overlook the copious ways in which Congress influences presidential decisions about how often to use force, which kinds of foreign crises warrant actions and which kinds do not, the timing of a deployment, and its scope. The counterfactual to a world of congressional irrelevance does ,not require the elimination of the largest and most vital deploymenrs from the historical record. Instead, the correct counterfactual may be a delayed deployment in some in\_ stances' a shorter one in others, or the ,.urrigrr-.nt oi national priorities in others still. This book also pays careful attention to the mechanisms by which Congress manages to influence presidential decision making on the use of force' Sometimes Congress intervenes directly, establishiig reporting re- quirements, setting budgets, holding hearings, or passing l"\*, that re\_ strict the scope or duration of military deployment in these in\_ stances, the connection between the action, tirut-corrg..r, takes and the decisions that presidents make are more easily discerned. In other rn stances, though, congressional influence follows a more circuitous route When members of Congress proclaim their reluctance to use force abroad they may encourage U.S. adversaries who then fight longer and hardel jusr as they may influence the public's willingness to back their president in either case, the president may have cause to scale back or even aban don a military venture, even though Congress has not passed a single bil or resolution that formally curtails his war powers. He does so, though not so much because Congress itself matters, but rather because the ac tions that members take set in motion forces that materially impact hi capacity to wage war successfully. Additionally, this book assembles and analyzes a tremendous amoun of data. Some datasets allow us to systematically examine Congress' influence over the frequency with which presidents deploy troops abroad others allow us to examine whether Congress affects the probability tha presidents respond militarily to different kinds of foreign crises. We introduce another dataset-the only of its kind-that allows us to trac congressional deliberation about an impending military ventured througl a wide variety of local and national print and television media outlets; we then compile other observational and experimental public opinion data that allow us to examine whether congressional influence over the media extends to influence over public's willingness to support a war. 'We knov of no other book on the domestic politics of war that compiles so man' or so diverse a set of original databases.

Congress has effectively enforced specific statutory restrictions – examples prove

Fisher 97 Louis Fisher, Senior Specialist in Separation of Powers, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress

U.C. Davis Journal of International Law & Policy Spring, 1997 3 U.C. Davis J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 107

Presidential Independence and the Power of the Purse \*

II. STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS

Through its prerogative to authorize programs and appropriate funds, Congress can define and limit presidential power by withholding all or part of an appropriation. n20 It may attach "riders" to appropriations measures to proscribe specific actions. n21 It has become the custom in Congress to admit certain "limitations" in an appropriations bill. Since Congress, under its rules, may decline to appropriate for a purpose authorized by law, "so it may by limitation prohibit the use of the money for part of the purpose while appropriating for the remainder of it." n22

It is sometimes argued that the power of the purse is ineffective in [\*111] restraining presidential wars. Senator Jacob Javits said that Congress "can hardly cut off appropriations when 500,000 American troops are fighting for their lives, as in Vietnam." n23 The short answer is that Congress can and has used the power of the purse to restrict presiden tial war power. If members of Congress are worried about American troops fighting for their lives in a futile war that is unrelated to American national interests, those lives are not protected by voting for continued funding. The proper and sensible action is to terminate appropriations and bring the troops home. Members need to make that case to their con-stituents. It can be done.

Congress used the power of the purse to end the war in Vietnam. n24 In 1976, by adopting the Clark amendment, n25 Congress prohibited the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) from operating in Angola other than to gather intelligence. Legislation also prohibited the CIA from conducting military or paramilitary operations in Angola and denied any appropriated funds to finance directly or indirectly any type of military assistance to Angola. n26

Beginning in 1982, Congress drafted increasingly tighter language to prohibit the use of appropriated funds to assist the Contras in Nicaragua. In 1986, Congress placed language in an appropriations bill to restrict the President's military role in Central America by stipulating that U.S. personnel "may not provide any training or other service, or otherwise participate directly or indirectly in the provision of any assistance, to the Nicaraguan democratic resistance pursuant to this title within those areas of Honduras and Costa Rica which are within 20 miles of the border with Nicaragua." n27 The statute defined U.S. personnel to mean "any member of the United States Armed Forces who is on active duty or is performing inactive duty training" and any employee of any department, agency, or other component of the executive branch. n28 The clear purpose was to prevent military activities in Honduras and Costa Rica from spilling over into Nicaragua. The Reagan Administration never offered any constitutional objections to this statutory restriction.

Statutory restrictions were again used in 1991, when Congress authorized President Bush to use military force against Iraq. The statutory authority was explicitly linked to UN Security Council Resolution 678, which was adopted to expel Iraq from Kuwait. n29 Thus, the legislation did not [\*112] authorize any wider action, such as using U.S. forces to invade and occupy Iraq, perhaps by reaching as far into the country as Baghdad. Two years later, Congress established a deadline for U.S. troops to leave Somalia. No funds could be used for military action after March 31, 1994, unless the President requested an extension from Congress and received express statutory authority. n30 From 1993 to 1995, Congress considered, but discarded, language to prohibit the use of appropriated funds for the invasion of Haiti and the deployment of U.S. ground troops to Bosnia. n31

#### We’ll impact turn cooption-- Their fear of cooption tanks alt solvency-- even if the aff is coopted, taking the risk can lead to real change

**Zizek 4**Slavoj, Senior Researcher, U of Ljubljana“Liberation Hurts: An Interview with Slavoj Zizek”; THE ELECTRONIC BOOK REVIEW; July 1, 2004; [www.electronicbookreview.com/v3/servlet/ebr?comman=view\_essay&essay\_id=rasmussen](http://www.electronicbookreview.com/v3/servlet/ebr?comman=view_essay&essay_id=rasmussen).

Zizek: I’m trying to avoid two extremes. One extreme is the traditional pseudo-radical position which says, “If you engage in politics - helping trade unions or combating sexual harassment, whatever - you’ve been co-opted and so on. Then you have the other extreme which says, “Ok, you have to do something.” I think both are wrong. **I hate** those**pseudo-radicals who dismiss every concrete action by saying that “This will all be co-opted.” Of course, everything can be co-opte**d [chuckles] **but this is just a nice excuse to do absolutely nothing**.**Of course, there is a danger**that - to use the old Maoist term, popular in European student movements thirty some years ago, “the long march through institutions” will last so long that you’ll end up part of the institution. **We need more than ever, a parallax view - a double perspective. You engage in acts, being aware of their limitations. This does not mean that you act with your fingers crossed. No,you fully engage, but with the awareness that - the ultimate wager** in the almost Pascalian sense -**is not simply that this act will succeed, but that the very failure of this act will trigger a much more radical process**

#### **Plan destroys Obama**

Loomis 7 Dr. Andrew J. Loomis is a Visiting Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, and Department of Government at Georgetown University, “Leveraging legitimacy in the crafting of U.S. foreign policy”, March 2, 2007, pg 36-37, http://citation.allacademic.com//meta/p\_mla\_apa\_research\_citation/1/7/9/4/8/pages179487/p179487-36.php

Declining political authority encourages defection. American political analyst Norman Ornstein writes of the domestic context, In a system where a President has limited formal power, perception matters. The reputation for success—the belief by other political actors that even when he looks down, a president will find a way to pull out a victory—is the most valuable resource a chief executive can have. Conversely, the widespread belief that the Oval Office occupant is on the defensive, on the wane or without the ability to win under adversity can lead to disaster, as individual lawmakers calculate who will be on the winning side and negotiate accordingly. In simple terms, winners win and losers lose more often than not. Failure begets failure. In short, a president experiencing declining amounts of political capital has diminished capacity to advance his goals. As a result, political allies perceive a decreasing benefit in publicly tying themselves to the president, and an increasing benefit in allying with rising centers of authority. A president’s incapacity and his record of success are interlocked and reinforce each other. Incapacity leads to political failure, which reinforces perceptions of incapacity. This feedback loop accelerates decay both in leadership capacity and defection by key allies. The central point of this review of the presidential literature is that the sources of presidential influence—and thus their prospects for enjoying success in pursuing preferred foreign policies—go beyond the structural factors imbued by the Constitution. Presidential authority is affected by ideational resources in the form of public perceptions of legitimacy. The public offers and rescinds its support in accordance with normative trends and historical patterns, non-material sources of power that affects the character of U.S. policy, foreign and domestic.