### Role of the Ballot

#### The role of the ballot is to vote for the team that does the better debating. Role of the ballot arguments are really just questions of impact comparison. Anything else is arbitrary—everybody can create a self-serving role of the ballot.

### Weigh Aff

#### To win the negative must disprove the desirability of the aff

#### Burden of rejoinder—if the negative does not disprove the desirability of the aff, they have not effectively negated us and you have no reason to vote neg

#### Using pedagogical institutions to make prescriptions for change prevents docile acceptance of oppression. Evaluating the likely consequences of our prescriptions shapes successful social change.

Susan Carle, Law @ American University, 2005 (“Theorizing Agency.” 55 Am. U.L. Rev. 307 lexis)

Precisely because he believed in the power of human agency, Dewey devoted a great deal of his writing to developing prescriptions for change in response to the issues of his times. It is worth quickly surveying some of those prescriptions here because they help illuminate the relationship between Dewey’s theory of the self and his overall philosophic system. Dewey’s deliberative theory ties elegantly into his theory of democracy, which in turn displays an ascetically pleasing “fit”274 with his pedagogical vision. Dewey’s political theory is a large topic, to which he devoted much writing but to which I can give only passing attention. Suffice it to say that Dewey passionately believed in the virtues of democracy; indeed, Dewey scholars have described democracy as Dewey’s deepest preoccupation— the underlying passion that motivated him in his prolific output.275 Unlike philosophers such as John Rawls, however, Dewey uncoupled democracy from the institutions of Western capitalism, and was intensely critical of capitalism as he saw it developing in his lifetime. To Dewey, capitalism spelled economic inequality, which was anathema to his vision of democracy based in local deliberative processes.276 Dewey saw education as the process through which children would acquire the habits that would allow them to become members of a democracy, well equipped for the kind of reflective thought and deliberation that democracy required.277 Thus, education was for Dewey a fundamental method of social progress and reform.278 For this reason, Dewey, unlike most modern philosophers, gave pedagogy a central place in his philosophy. Dewey saw education as the scientific laboratory in which the ideas of pragmatism would be put to the test of experience.279 To Dewey, the ability to engage in good deliberative judgment—to exercise clear foresight on ethical as well as instrumental matters—was a habit that could and should be cultivated through education. Thus Dewey thought that education should not be a “succession of studies but the development of new attitudes towards, and new interests in, experience.”280 No relativist on matters concerning his own place and time, Dewey denounced the “inert stupid quality of current customs,” which “perverts learning into a willingness to follow where others point the way, into conformity, constriction, surrender of scepticism and experiment.”281 In lieu of teaching to new generations habits that represent such “enslavement to old ruts,”282 Dewey wanted to inculcate better habits—“flexible, sensitive” ones that could grow “more varied, more adaptable by practice and use.”283 These, in turn, were the habits Dewey identified as necessary for democracy to succeed. Here, the contrasts with Stanley Fish are stark. Fish, as we have seen, argues that teaching methods of critical analysis to students does not change practice outside the classroom.284 Practice in the world outside the classroom and the doing of theory proceed on two unrelated planes. Dewey, conversely, repudiated the separation of theory and practice as a false dualism, arguing that those who espouse theory for theory’s sake are in fact espousing “two kinds of practice.”285 Moreover, he argued, “[t]hose who wish a monopoly of social power find desirable the separation of habit and thought” because this “dualism enables them to do the thinking and planning, while others remain the docile . . . instruments of execution.”286 Thus, for Dewey, theory was a form of practice in the world that had great potential to fuel political and social change, and the decision to do and teach theory as a practice separate from political and social issues was a political decision with particular normative consequences—namely, the promotion of political disengagement and apathy.287

#### Reality and law are coproductive. Changing our thinking about law helps to reconstitute the material realities that we live in. The K implies an impossible immutable position outside law.

Jane Baron, Law @ Temple – Beasley School of Law, 2003 (“Romancing the Real.” 57 U. Miami L. Rev. 573 lexis)

Yet, imagine that what Gordon said were true. There would be an easily discernable point to doing what we legal academics (and isn't Schlag one of us?) do. If legal conceptions and the social world were connected in some way, then thinking about law would also be a way of thinking about the material world, and trying to change the way we think about law - for instance, to use my earlier example, trying to convince people that property need not be modeled on ownership but on obligation - would be a way of trying to change the material world. Questioning what legal doctrine foregrounds and backgrounds, n46 revealing "nested oppositions" in legal rules, n47 and all manner of similar analyses [\*587] of the patterns and structure of standard legal argumentation, including the kinds of analyses Schlag himself has so often performed (consider The Empty Circles of Liberal Justification n48), would, or could, at least potentially be useful; if we could see and make others see how we ourselves artificially "froze" reality, we could unfreeze it. n49 At the very least, we could begin to think about changing it because we would no longer be victims of belief in reality's immutability. n50 Twenty-plus years of engaging in various versions of this practice have revealed how much more complicated all this is than it originally seemed. From Stanley Fish we learned how silly it might be to envision standing outside one's own structures of belief in order to change them. n51 From feminists and critical race theorists we learned that "we" might not be "we," but multiple intersecting and overlapping "we's" with potentially differing interests and engagements. n52 From law and society folks we learned to question whether there was any relation between lawyers' and judges' ideas about law and actual social practices; if there was little relation to begin with, changes in legal consciousness (even if "we" could actually effect such changes) would be unlikely to have much impact on everyday behaviors. n53 None of this proves that legal change and social change are impossible, only that effecting social change through law is considerably more difficult and chancy than first had been thought. One could see, however, why it might be worth trying to solve (or work around) the problems: thinking about law would still be a way - perhaps now a more nuanced, humbled way - of trying to fix what was wrong with the world. This strategy would not work, of course, if "the world" is intractably out there, isolated from and immune to thought. That is exactly as Schlag presents the world in those excerpts and in the lists culled from them. The question is why, knowing better - that is, having no illusions about a pure factuality unmediated by perspective or shaping - Schlag would choose to portray "reality" that way.

#### Academic debate over policy issues like the response to War Powers is critical to improve policymaking

Stephen M. Walt 11, Professor of International Affairs at Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, July 21, “International Affairs and the Public Sphere”, http://publicsphere.ssrc.org/walt-international-affairs-and-the-public-sphere/

Academics can make at least three distinct contributions to public discourse on global affairs. First, although the digital revolution has made a wealth of information from around the world accessible on a near real-time basis, most of us still lack both extensive direct data on events in far-flung areas and the background knowledge necessary to understand what new developments mean. If our town’s school district is troubled or the local economy is suffering, we can observe that for ourselves and make reasonably well-informed judgments about what might be done about it. But if the issue is the war in Afghanistan, an uprising in Yemen, a naval confrontation in the South China Sea or the prospects that some battered economy will be bailed out successfully, most of us will lack the factual knowledge or conceptual understanding to know what is really going on. Even when basic information is readily available, it may be hard for most of us to put it in the appropriate context or make sense of what it means. ¶ When citizens and leaders seek to grasp the dizzying complexity of modern world politics, therefore, they must inevitably rely upon the knowledge and insights of specialists in military affairs, global trade and finance, diplomatic/international historians, area experts, and many others. And that means relying at least in part on academic scholars who have devoted their careers to mastering various aspects of world affairs and whose professional stature has been established through the usual procedures of academic evaluation (e.g., peer review, confidential assessments by senior scholars, the give-and-take of scholarly debate, etc.). ¶ Second, and more importantly, an independent academic community is an essential counterweight to official efforts to shape public understanding of key foreign policy issues. Governments enjoy enormous information asymmetries in many areas of political life, but these advantages are especially pronounced when dealing with international affairs.[5] Much of what we know about the outside world is ultimately derived from government sources (especially when dealing with national security affairs), and public officials often go to considerable lengths to shape how that information is reported to the public. Not only do governments collect vast amounts of information about the outside world, but they routinely use secrecy laws to control public access to this information. Government officials can shape public beliefs by leaking information strategically, or by co-opting sympathetic journalists whose professional success depends in part on maintaining access to key officials.[6] Given these information asymmetries and their obvious interest in retaining public support for their preferred policies, it is hardly surprising that both democratic and non-democratic leaders use their privileged access to information to build support for specific policies, at times by telling outright lies to their own citizens.[7] ¶ This situation creates few problems when the policies being sold make good strategic sense, but the results can be disastrous when they don’t. In such cases, alternative voices are needed to challenge conventional wisdoms and official rationales, and to suggest different solutions to the problem(s) at hand. Because scholars are protected by tenure and cherish the principle of academic freedom, and because they are not directly dependent on government support for their livelihoods, they are uniquely positioned to challenge prevailing narratives and policy rationales and to bring their knowledge and training to bear on vital policy issues. If we believe that unfettered debate helps expose errors and correct missteps, thereby fostering more effective public policies, then a sophisticated, diverse and engaged scholarly community is essential to a healthy polity. ¶ Third, the scholarly world also offers a potentially valuable model of constructive political disagreement. Political discourse in many countries (and especially the United States) has become increasingly personal and ad hominem, with little attention paid to facts and logic; a trend reinforced by an increasingly competitive and loosely regulated media environment. Within academia, by contrast, even intense disputes are supposed to be conducted in accordance with established canons of logic and evidence. Ad hominem attacks and other forms of character assassination have no place in scholarly discourse and are more likely to discredit those who employ them than those who are attacked. By bringing the norms of academic discourse into the public sphere, academic scholars could help restore some of the civility that has been lost in recent years. ¶ For all of these reasons, it is highly desirable for university-based scholars to play a significant role in public discourse about key real-world issues and to engage directly with policymakers where appropriate. As I have argued elsewhere, academic research can provide policymakers with relevant factual knowledge, provide typologies and frameworks that help policymakers and citizens make sense of emerging trends, and create and test theories that leaders can use to choose among different policy instruments. Academic theories can also be useful when they help policymakers anticipate events, when they identify recurring tendencies or obstacles to success, and when they facilitate the formulation of policy alternatives and the identification of benchmarks that can guide policy evaluation. Because academic scholars are free from daily responsibility for managing public affairs, they are in an ideal position to develop new concepts and theories to help us understand a complex and changing world.[8] ¶ The picture sketched here is obviously something of an ideal type, and I am not suggesting that that the academic world consistently lives up to these expectations. As noted above, university-based scholars of international affairs—and especially the disciplines of political science and history—have increasingly focused on narrow and arcane topics and are contributing less and less to policy formation or public discourse.[9] And when academics do address topics of obvious policy relevance or public interest, the results are often presented in impenetrable, jargon-ridden prose and disseminated in venues that neither policymakers nor the public are likely to read. Even when scholars have something useful to say, in short, their tendency to “speaking in tongues” diminishes their impact on the public sphere**.** ¶Why Is There a Gap between Academia and the Public Sphere?¶ To some degree, the gap between the ivory tower and the world of policy arises because the two spheres have different agendas and operate under different incentives and constraints. Academics focus on developing generalizations and testing conjectures as rigorously as possible, while policymakers and the public are often preoccupied with individual cases (i.e., whatever is in the headlines or in a policymaker’s in-tray). Thus, scholars are delighted whenever they identify a powerful general tendency, but policymakers may be more interested in figuring out how to overcome that general tendency or worried that the case at hand might be an exception to it. Academics strive to make their work as accurate as possible, even if this takes more time, but policymakers cannot always wait until a complete analysis is possible.[10] To take a recent example, policymakers in the Obama administration had to respond to the 2011 “Arab Spring” long before anyone fully understood what was driving these events or where they might lead. Given these different agendas, it is not surprising that policymakers often find academic scholarship to be of less value than the scholars who produce it might wish.

### No Clear Alternative

#### I’m not sure

#### Without specific detailed description of how the alt can work towards solutions you should be highly skeptical of their critique

**Bryant 12** ( levi, prof of philosophy at Collins college, Critique of the Academic Left, http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/11/11/underpants-gnomes-a-critique-of-the-academic-left/)

The problem as I see it is that **this is the worst sort of abstraction** (in the Marxist sense) **and wishful thinking**. Within a Marxo-Hegelian context, a thought is abstract when it ignores all of the mediations in which a thing is embedded. For example, I understand a robust tree abstractly when I attribute its robustness, say, to its genetics alone, ignoring the complex relations to its soil, the air, sunshine, rainfall, etc., that also allowed it to grow robustly in this way. This is the sort of critique we’re always leveling against the neoliberals. They are abstract thinkers. In their doxa that individuals are entirely responsible for themselves and that they completely make themselves by pulling themselves up by their bootstraps, neoliberals ignore all the mediations belonging to the social and material context in which human beings develop that play a role in determining the vectors of their life. They ignore, for example, that George W. Bush grew up in a family that was highly connected to the world of business and government and that this gave him opportunities that someone living in a remote region of Alaska in a very different material infrastructure and set of family relations does not have. To think concretely is to engage in a cartography of these mediations, a mapping of these networks, from circumstance to circumstance (what I call an “onto-cartography”). It is to map assemblages, networks, or ecologies in the constitution of entities.¶ **Unfortunately, the academic left falls prey to its own form of abstraction**. **It’s good at carrying out critiques that denounce various social formations, yet very poor at proposing any sort of realistic constructions of alternatives**. This because it thinks abstractly in its own way, ignoring how networks, assemblages, structures, or regimes of attraction would have to be **remade to create a workable alternative**. Here I’m reminded by the “underpants gnomes” depicted in South Park:¶ The underpants gnomes have a plan for achieving profit that goes like this:¶ Phase 1: Collect Underpants¶ Phase 2: ?¶ Phase 3: Profit!¶ They even have a catchy song to go with their work:¶ Well this is sadly how it often is with the academic left. **Our plan seems to be as follows:¶ Phase 1: Ultra-Radical Critique¶ Phase 2: ?¶ Phase 3: Revolution and complete social transformation!¶** Our problem is that **we seem perpetually stuck at phase 1 without ever explaining what is to be done at phase 2. Often the critiques** articulated at phase 1 **are right**, **but there are nonetheless all sorts of problems** with those critiques nonetheless. In order to reach phase 3, we have to produce new collectives. **In order for new collectives to be produced, people need to be able to hear and understand the critiques developed at phase 1.** Yet **this is where everything begins to fall apart.** **Even though these critiques are often right, we express them in ways that only an academic with a PhD in critical theory** and post-structural theory **can understand**. How exactly is Adorno to produce an effect in the world if only PhD’s in the humanities can understand him? **Who are these things for?** We seem to always ignore these things and then look down our noses with disdain at the Naomi Kleins and David Graebers of the world. To make matters worse, we publish our work in expensive academic journals that only universities can afford, with presses that don’t have a wide distribution, and **give our talks at expensive hotels at academic conferences attended only by other academics**. Again, who are these things for? **Is it an accident that so many activists look away from these things with contempt, thinking their more about an academic industry** and tenure, **than producing change in the world? If a tree falls in a forest and no one is there to hear it, it doesn’t make a sound! Seriously dudes** and dudettes, **what are you doing?¶** But finally, and worst of all, us Marxists and anarchists all too often act like assholes. We denounce others, we condemn them, we berate them for not engaging with the questions we want to engage with, and we vilify them when they don’t embrace every bit of the doxa that we endorse. **We are every bit as off-putting and unpleasant as the fundamentalist minister or the priest of the inquisition** (have people yet understood that Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus was a critique of the French communist party system and the Stalinist party system, and the horrific passions that arise out of parties and identifications in general?). This type of “revolutionary” **is the greatest friend of the reactionary and capitalist because they do more to drive people into the embrace of reigning ideology than to undermine reigning ideology. These are the people that keep Rush Limbaugh in business.** Well done!¶ But this isn’t where our most serious shortcomings lie. **Our most serious shortcomings are to be found at phase 2. We** almost **never make concrete proposals for how things ought to be restructured, for what new material infrastructures and semiotic fields need to be produced**, and when we do, our critique-intoxicated cynics and skeptics immediately jump in with an analysis of all the ways in which these things contain dirty secrets, ugly motives, and are doomed to fail. **How**, I wonder, **are we to do anything at all when we have no concrete proposals?** **We live on a planet of 6 billion people. These 6 billion people are dependent on a certain network of production and distribution to meet the needs of their consumption.** That network of production and distribution does involve the extraction of resources, the production of food, the maintenance of paths of transit and communication, the disposal of waste, the building of shelters, the distribution of medicines, etc., etc., etc.¶ **What are your proposals? How will you meet these problems?** How will you navigate the existing mediations or semiotic and material features of infrastructure? Marx and Lenin had proposals. Do you? Have you even explored the cartography of the problem? Today we are so intellectually bankrupt on these points that we even have theorists speaking of events and acts and talking about a return to the old socialist party systems, ignoring the horror they generated, their failures, and not even proposing ways of avoiding the repetition of these horrors in a new system of organization. Who among our critical theorists is thinking seriously about how to build a distribution and production system that is responsive to the needs of global consumption, avoiding the problems of planned economy, ie., who is doing this in a way that gets notice in our circles? Who is addressing the problems of micro-fascism that arise with party systems (there’s a reason that it was the Negri & Hardt contingent, not the Badiou contingent that has been the heart of the occupy movement). At least the ecologists are thinking about these things in these terms because, well, they think ecologically. Sadly we need something more, a melding of the ecologists, the Marxists, and the anarchists. We’re not getting it yet though, as far as I can tell. Indeed, folks seem attracted to yet another critical paradigm, Laruelle.¶ I would love, just for a moment, to hear a radical environmentalist talk about his ideal high school that would be academically sound. How would he provide for the energy needs of that school? How would he meet building codes in an environmentally sound way? How would she provide food for the students? What would be her plan for waste disposal? And most importantly, how would she navigate the school board, the state legislature, the federal government, and all the families of these students? **What is your plan? What is your alternative?** I think there are alternatives. I saw one that approached an alternative in Rotterdam. **If you want to make a truly revolutionary contribution, this is where you should start. Why should anyone even bother listening to you if you aren’t proposing real plans?** But we haven’t even gotten to that point. Instead we’re like underpants gnomes, saying “revolution is the answer!” **without addressing any of the infrastructural questions of just how revolution is to be produced, what alternatives it would offer, and how we would concretely go about building those alternatives.** Masturbation.**¶** **“Underpants gnome” deserves to be a category in critical theory; a sort of synonym for self-congratulatory masturbation**. We need less critique not because critique isn’t important or necessary– it is –but because we know the critiques, we know the problems. **We’re intoxicated with critique because it’s easy and safe. We best every opponent with critique. We occupy a position of moral superiority with critique. But do we really do anything with critique?** What we need today, more than ever, is composition or carpentry. **Everyone knows something is wrong. Everyone knows this system is destructive and stacked against them.** Even the Tea Party knows something is wrong with the economic system, despite having the wrong economic theory. **None of us, however, are proposing alternatives. Instead we prefer to shout and denounce. Good luck with that.**

### Identity In State

Identity categories necessary, because state and stuff. Puars attempts to do away with them.

Denike 10 [Margaret, Human Rights Program, Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies, Carleton University, Homonormative Collusions and the Subject of Rights: Reading Terrorist Assemblages Feminist Legal Studies Volume 18, Number 1 / April, 2010 85-100]

Among other endeavours, Terrorist Assemblages attempts a practice of sustained critical reading that could elucidate such contingencies, including, as is the object of her focus, those that relate to the convergences of homosexuality and normative nationalisms in certain liberal democracies. She [Duggan] expressly casts her work as a direct departure from the models of “resistant queer identities” (Puar 2007, p. 46) that locate gays and lesbians outside of, or against, a dominant, heteronormative majority, and that frame the human rights claims of queers in terms of their exclusion from, or opposition to, the laws and policies that buttress these norms. For Puar, the tropes that are often used to describe queer identities and locations, for instance, in terms of subjects of “intersecting oppressions”, tend to reify standpoint epistemology and fail to capture the multiple and mobile, shifting formations and contradictory configurations that queerness has come to occupy at this contemporary historical moment. Seeking alternative ways to move LGBT theory from its grounding in accounts of subjectivity and identity, and the layering of descriptive categories such as ‘race’, ‘ethnicity’, and ‘gender’, Puar stages different models that might more effectively explain multiple and mobile engendering processes and racial formations that occur both as a result of—and despite—subject identity and location. She finds such alternatives in Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of ‘assemblage’ (1987) and contemporary theorisations of ‘affect’, as explanatory devices to conceptualise the varying departures and complicities that these categories elide, and, as she puts it, to prioritise movement over placement in talking about what queer bodies do rather than what they are, what queerness has come to mean, how it has come to be felt and deployed. But even as Puar arrives at ‘assemblage’ as a way of reading homo/nationalist formations, we are invariably reminded of the impossibility—if not the impracticality—of leaving representational and identitarian categories behind, not just because they are one of the very conditions of the terrain of ‘homosexuality’ that the book traverses, but because this terrain is sign-posted with the language of legal scholars, courts and human rights advocates where the recognition and interpolation of descriptive identity categories, such as race, sex, sexual orientation or ethnic origin really matters, especially when it comes to framing the way that individuals and groups are treated differently by discriminatory practices and policies on these grounds.

### 2ac

#### Support for the inclusion of women in combat and anti-militarism aren’t mutually exclusive-- We must fight two simultaneous struggles—one broad struggle against the structures of oppression and one pragmatic struggle to make existing struggles less oppressive.

Stachowitsch 13 Saskia, post-doctoral research fellow and lecturer at the Department of Political Science at the University of Vienna; “Feminism and the Current Debates on Women in Combat” *e-International Relations*; February 19, 2013; http://www.e-ir.info/2013/02/19/feminism-and-the-current-debates-on-women-in-combat/

These findings have made feminist positioning on military gender integration ever more complex. The times when standpoints could easily be separated along the lines of equality ethicists (Stiehm 1989) and peace ethicists (Ruddick 1982) are definitely over. But this is not all bad news. Acknowledging these complexities takes the pressure off to exclusively identify with either side. Feminist theory and practice, as a pluralist project, certainly has room for both and feminists will continue to do both, critically engage with military institutions and support equality for women within them.¶ Feminist disagreements over these issues will go on and likely never be settled. Meanwhile, a rights-based approach might still be the safest bet for those wishing to make a non-militaristic point for military gender integration. While some may not perceive the ‘right’ to fight, kill, and die as a desirable objective, focusing on equal access to important state institutions is preferable to arguments that women can fulfil placatory functions in the military or provide the social skills that men lack. Women should not be required to prove that they can do anything ‘better’ than men or bring any specific qualities to military and other institutions to be allowed to participate.¶ In conclusion, there is no easy, straightforward answer to journalists’ questions about the normative evaluation of women’s integration into ground-combat. In the light of feminist research in the areas of military, war, security, foreign policy, and international institutions, we can only conclude that full integration does not need to be ‘good’ for it to be right.¶

#### The military is too great a structuring social force to leave to the realm of masculinity.

Enloe 13 Cynthia, Research Professor at Clark University; “Combat: The Zone of Women’s Liberation?” *The Progressive*; January 24, 2013; http://www.progressive.org/combat-the-zone-of-women-and-liberation

In a country whose popular culture is as profoundly militarized as ours (think Junior ROTC in high schools, think B-22 fly-overs at the opening of the NFL season), it is all too easy to militarize even women’s liberation.¶ Militarization happens any time that the protection of women’s rights is either justified by appealing to military necessity or measured in terms of women’s participation in war-waging.¶ Neither those women nor those men deployed in wartime combat should be imagined by the rest of us as “the real heroes” or the “real patriots.” Infantry bunkers and fighter plane cockpits should not be where genuine “first class citizens” are cultivated.¶ This feminist caveat, though, does not mean that lifting the Pentagon’s artificial ban is insignificant. The military remains one of the most powerful political and cultural institutions in contemporary America. Its influence can be seen in our lopsided federal budget, in our entertainment and sports industries, in our science and technology, in our schools and in our Congress.¶ An institution this powerful cannot be permitted to sustain its entrenched masculinized culture. This, after all, is the same institutional culture that has rewarded mid-level and senior officers for ignoring American male soldiers’ sexual assaults on their female comrades (as documented in the Oscar-nominated film “The Invisible War,” ).

### Reformism Good

#### Alt fails—only reformism sticks

Wright, 07 [Erik Olin, Vilas Distinguished Professor of Sociology at the University of Wisconsin, “Guidelines for Envisioning Real Utopias”, Soundings, April, [www.ssc.wisc.edu/~wright/Published%20writing/Guidelines-soundings.pdf](http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~wright/Published%20writing/Guidelines-soundings.pdf)]

5. Waystations The final guideline for discussions of envisioning real utopias concerns the importance of waystations. The central problem of envisioning real utopias concerns the viability of institutional alternatives that embody emancipatory values**,** but the practical achievability of such institutional designs often **depends upon the existence of smaller steps**, intermediate institutional innovations that move us in the right direction but only partially embody these values**.** Institutional proposals which have an **all-or-nothing quality** to them are both **less likely to be adopted in the first place, and may pose more difficult transition-cost problems** if implemented**.** The catastrophic experience of Russia in the “shock therapy” approach to market reform is historical testimony to this problem. Waystations are a difficult theoretical and practical problem because there are many instances in which partial reforms may have very different consequences than full- bodied changes. Consider the example of unconditional basic income. Suppose that a very limited, below-subsistence basic income was instituted: not enough to survive on, but a grant of income unconditionally given to everyone. One possibility is that this kind of basic income would act mainly as a subsidy to employers who pay very low wages, since now they could attract more workers even if they offered below poverty level earnings. There may be good reasons to institute such wage subsidies, but they would not generate the positive effects of a UBI, and therefore might not function as a stepping stone. What we ideally want**, therefore,** are intermediate reforms that have two main properties: **first,** they concretely demonstrate the virtues of the fuller program of transformation, so they contribute to the ideological battle of **convincing people that the alternative is credible and desirable; and second,** they **enhance the capacity for action of people**, increasing their ability to push further in the future. Waystations that increase popular participation and **bring people together in problem-solving deliberations** for collective purposes are particularly salient in this regard**.** This is what in the 1970s was called “nonreformist reforms”**:** reforms that are **possible within existing institutions** and that **pragmatically solve real problems** while at the same time empowering people in ways which **enlarge their scope of action in the future.**

Without the state authority warlords will take control -- they use violence, exploit the people, and replicate the worst aspects of the state structure

Jackson 3 Paul Jackson, International Development Department of the University of Birmingham, UK (2003):

Warlords as alternative forms of Governance, Small Wars & Insurgencies, 14:2, 131-150 Tandfonline

Use of Violence to Reassert Local Power

With the complete breakdown of moral authority and the law, let alone any means of enforcement, the only recourse is to establish rule through force.

The violence associated with warlords is the most publicised aspect of their activity, and its seeming randomness is undoubtedly one of the most horrific characteristics of warlords. The casual nature of violence within areas held by warlords is symptomatic of the gang culture outlined by Lary in China, but equally resonant of earlier cultures of violence.

Replacement of Formal Structures with Gang Mentality

The collapse of formal structures and norms, including formal military structures, lead warlords to develop their own internal structures. In particular, the replacement of hierarchical structures with gang cultures, with the warlord and close associates at the core of the gang. This gang culture manifests itself in particular ways, not least of which is the fact that gangs act as a spur to further violence by subgroups. In other words, the replacement of formal structures by ad hoc, primitive and personalised control leads to a behavioural logic based on the licensing of gratuitous violence.

The gang culture has a further element of interest: the development of subgroups. These subgroups may be smaller gangs, or alternatively part of the larger group aiming to progress up the pecking order. One of the features of all periods of warlord rule has been the behaviour of smaller groups of armed men on the periphery of the gang, which adds a further element of randomness into the violence. We will return to this below.

### Feminism Coopted By Exceptionalism

#### We get to the bottom of the rabbit hole

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(J. Ann, “Feminist Perspectives on Achieving GlobalSecurity”,Gender in InternationalRelations, 1992, <http://www.ces.uc.pt/ficheiros2/files/Short.pdf)//js>

Masculinity and politics have a long and close association. Characteristics associated with "manliness," such as toughness, courage, power, independence, and even physical strength, have, throughout history,been those most valued in the conduct of politics, particularly international politics. Frequently,manliness has also been associated with violence and the use of force, a type of behavior that, when conducted in the international arena, has been valorized and applauded in the name of defending one's country.This celebration of male power, particularly the glorification of the male warrior, produces more of agender dichotomy than exists in reality for, as R. W. Connell points out, this stereotypical image ofmasculinity does not fit most men. Connell suggests that what he calls "hegemonic masculinity," a type of culturally dominant masculinity that he distinguishes from other subordinated masculinities, is a socially constructed cultural ideal that, while it does not correspond to the actual personality of themajority of men, sustains patriarchal authority and legitimizes a patriarchal political and social orderMasculinity and politics have a long and close association. Characteristics associated with "manliness,"such as toughness, courage, power, independence, and even physical strength, have, throughout history,been those most valued in the conduct of politics, particularly international politics. Frequently,manliness has also been associated with violence and the use of force, a type of behavior that, whenconducted in the international arena, has been valorized and applauded in the name of defending one'scountry.This celebration of male power, particularly the glorification of the male warrior, produces more of a gender dichotomy than exists in reality for, as R. W. Connell points out, this stereotypical image ofmasculinity does not fit most men. Connell suggests that what he calls "hegemonic masculinity," a typeof culturally dominant masculinity that he distinguishes from other subordinated masculinities, is asocially constructed cultural ideal that, while it does not correspond to the actual personality ofthemajority of men, sustains patriarchal authority and legitimizes a patriarchal political and social order

#### Must risk some cooption to matter-- the alt either accomplishes nothing or is just as likely to be coopted as the aff

David **CAMPBELL**Human and Community Development @ UC Davis ‘**1** “Conviction seeking efficacy: Sustainable Agriculture and the politics of cooptation” *Agriculture and Human Values* 18 p.  360-362

**Conclusion**While co-optation cannot be avoided, it need not be framed as posing a stark choice between politically disengaged purity and politically engaged capitulation. As CAFF’s experience suggests, social and political movements retain a significant freedom to craft middle range strategies that adapt to political circumstances while retaining attachments to core values and constituencies. These strategies are by no means easy to conceive or execute, and pose tensions and tradeoffs for movement organizations. However, if framed as a built-in necessity of meeting movement goals given entrenched opposition, the strategies can be implemented in a spirit that sustains organizational vitality, and **broadens political and social impact**. They can also enlarge the democratic sensibilities of movement leaders, increasing their ability to listen, learn, and forge alliances based on shared goals. To be certain, the end results will owe much to the political power of opponents. Critique ofthese opponents, and the structural forces they represent, remains essential to movement organizing. But as CAFF organizers discovered, criticism gains its effective power when it is wedded to an ability to lead by example, and to offer **positive and realistic options**. In this process, tradeoffs cannot be avoided, but neither are they necessarily a zero-sum game in which participants always return to square one.

### Hip Hop Pedagogy

#### Beats aren’t for me. Many ways to construct and perform an argument

#### If they insist dangerous politics of prioritizing methodology and assigning intellectual prerequisites political strategy. Their use of the experience of oppression as the status that defines those who should guide politics harms progressive political strategies. Their particular strategy is part of a larger discourse of recapturing agency through privileging experience as the basis for politics.

Craig Ireland American Culture @ Bilkent 02 "The Appeal to Experience and its Consequences" Cultural Critique 52 Fall 2002p.87-88

" Once an arcane philosophical term, experience over the last three decades has become a general buzzword. By the 1970s, experience spilled over into the streets, so to speak, and it has since then become the stuff of programmatic manifestos and has been enlisted as the found from which microstrategies of resistance and subaltern counterhistories can be erected. But for all the blows and counterblows that have carried on tor over"\*three decades between those who appeal to the counterhegemonic potential of experience and those who see such appeals as naive voluntarism, such debates show no signs of abating. On the contrary, they have become yet more strident, as can be seen by Michael Pickering's recent attempt to rehabilitate the viability of the term "experience" for subaltern historiography by turning to E. P. Thompson and Dilthey and, more recently still, by Sonia Kruks's polemical defense of experience for subaltern inquiry by way of a reminder that poststructuralist critics of experience owe much to those very thinkers, from Sartre to Merleau-Ponty, whom they have debunked as if in oedipal rebellion against their begetters. Such debates over experience have so far gravitated around issues of epistemology and agency, pitting those who debunk experience as the stuff of an antiquated philosophy of consciousness against those who argue that subaltern experience provides an enclave against strong structural determination. Lost in such debates, however, have been the potential consequences of appeals to immediate experience as a ground for subaltern agency and specificity. And it is just such potential consequences that will be examined here, These indeed demand our attention, for more is at stake in the appeal to experience than some epistemological faux pas. By so wagering on the perceived immediacy of experience as the evidence for subaltern specificity and counterhegemonic action, appeals to immediate experience, however laudable their goal, end up unwittingly naturalizing what is in fact historical, and, in so doing, they leave the door as wide-open to a progressive politics of identity as to a retreat to neoethnic tribalism. Most alarming about such appeals to experience is not some failure of epistemological nerve – it is instead their ambiguous political and social ramifications. And these have reverberate beyond academia and found an echo in para-academia – so much so that experience has increasingly become the core concept or key word of subaltern groups and the rallying call for what Craig Calhoun calls the “new social movements” in which “experience is made the pure ground of knowledge, the basis of an essentialized standpoint of critical awareness” (468 n.64). The consequences of such appeals to experience can best be addressed not by individually considering disparate currents, but by seeking their common denominator. And in this regard, E.P. Thompson will occupy the foreground. It is safe to say that what started as an altercation between Thompson and Althusser has since spawned academic and para-academic "histories from below" and subaltern cultural inquiries that, for all their differences, share the idea that the identities and counterhistories of the disenfranchised can be buttressed by the specificity of a group's concrete experiences. Much theorizing on experience by certain cultural and historiographical trends, as many have already pointed out, has been but a variation on a persistent Thompsonian theme in which Thompson's "kind of use of experience has the same foundational status if we substitute 'women's' or 'black' or 'lesbian' or 'homosexual' for 'working class'" (Scott, 786)

### 1ar Card

#### Endorsing one state action doesn’t legitimize the state

Mervyn **Frost**, U of Kent, **1996**, Ethics in Int’l Relations, p. 90-1

A first objection which seems inherent in Donelan’s approach is that utilizing the modern state domain of discourse in effect sanctifies the state: it assumes that people will always live in states and that it is not possible within such a language to consider alternatives to the system. This objection is not well founded, by having recourse to the ordinary language of international relations I am not thereby committed to argue that the state system as it exists is the best mode of human political organization or that people ought always to live in states as we know them. As I have said, my argument is that whatever proposals for piecemeal or large-scale reform of the state system are made, they must of necessity be made in the language of the modern state. Whatever proposals are made, whether in justification or in criticism of the state system, will have to make use of concepts which are at present part and parcel of the theory of states. Thus,for example. any proposal for a new global institutional arrangement superseding the state system will itself have to be justified, and that justification will have to include within it reference to a new and good form of individual citizenship, reference to a new legislative machinery equipped with satisfactory checks and balances, reference to satisfactory law enforcement procedures, reference to a satisfactory arrangement for distributing the goods produced in the world, and so on. All of these notions are notions which have been developed and finely honed within the theory of the modern state. It is not possible to imagine a justification of a new world order succeeding which used, for example, feudal, or traditional/tribal, discourse. More generally there is no worldwide language of political morality which is not completely shot through with state-related notions such as citizenship, rights under law, representative government and so on.