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#### A topical affirmative must defend statutory or judicial restrictions on war powers authority of the president in one of the topically designated list areas

#### A topical plan is limited to restricting the President’s authority over the military

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(Robert, “Dubitable Security Threats and Low Intensity Interventions as the Achilles' Heel of War Powers,” 32 Miss. C. L. Rev. 9)

A numerical comparison indicates that the Framer's intended for Congress to be the dominant branch in war powers. Congressional war powers include the prerogative to "declare war;" "grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal," which were operations that fall short of "war"; "make Rules for Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces;" "organize, fund, and maintain the nation's armed forces;" "make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water," "raise and support Armies," and "provide and maintain a Navy." [n25](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.771738.1261791409&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T17974748742&parent=docview&rand=1376677997032&reloadEntirePage=true#n25) In contrast, the President is endowed with one war power, named as the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy. [n26](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.771738.1261791409&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T17974748742&parent=docview&rand=1376677997032&reloadEntirePage=true#n26)¶ The Commander-in-Chief authority is a core preclusive power, predominantly designating that the President is the head of the military chain of command when Congress activates the power. [n27](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.771738.1261791409&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T17974748742&parent=docview&rand=1376677997032&reloadEntirePage=true#n27) Moreover, peripheral Commander-in-Chief powers are bridled by statutory and treaty restrictions [n28](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.771738.1261791409&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T17974748742&parent=docview&rand=1376677997032&reloadEntirePage=true#n28) because the President "must respect any constitutionally legitimate restraints on the use of force that Congress has enacted." [n29](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.771738.1261791409&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T17974748742&parent=docview&rand=1376677997032&reloadEntirePage=true#n29) However, even if Congress has not activated war powers, the President does possess inherent authority to expeditiously and unilaterally react to defend the nation when confronted with imminent peril. [n30](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.771738.1261791409&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T17974748742&parent=docview&rand=1376677997032&reloadEntirePage=true#n30) Explicating the intention behind granting the President this latitude, Alexander Hamilton explained that "it is impossible to foresee or to define the extent and variety of national exigencies, or the correspondent extent and variety of the means which may be necessary to satisfy them." [n31](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.771738.1261791409&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T17974748742&parent=docview&rand=1376677997032&reloadEntirePage=true#n31) The Framers drew a precise distinction by specifying that the President was empowered "to repel and not to commence war." [n32](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.771738.1261791409&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T17974748742&parent=docview&rand=1376677997032&reloadEntirePage=true#n32)

#### Vote neg because they destroy limits – it’s impossible for us to effectively research every potential subject of every single affirmative.

#### Predictable limits are a precondition for negative participation and effective dialogue and clash

Galloway 7—Samford Comm prof (Ryan, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 28, 2007)

Debate as a dialogue sets an argumentative table, where all parties receive a relatively fair opportunity to voice their position. Anything that fails to allow participants to have their position articulated denies one side of the argumentative table a fair hearing. The affirmative side is set by the topic and fairness requirements. While affirmative teams have recently resisted affirming the topic, in fact, the topic selection process is rigorous, taking the relative ground of each topic as its central point of departure.¶ Setting the affirmative reciprocally sets the negative. The negative crafts approaches to the topic consistent with affirmative demands. The negative crafts disadvantages, counter-plans, and critical arguments premised on the arguments that the topic allows for the affirmative team. According to fairness norms, each side sits at a relatively balanced argumentative table.¶ When one side takes more than its share, competitive equity suffers. However, it also undermines the respect due to the other involved in the dialogue. When one side excludes the other, it fundamentally denies the personhood of the other participant (Ehninger, 1970, p. 110). A pedagogy of debate as dialogue takes this respect as a fundamental component. A desire to be fair is a fundamental condition of a dialogue that takes the form of a demand for equality of voice. Far from being a banal request for links to a disadvantage, fairness is a demand for respect, a demand to be heard, a demand that a voice backed by literally months upon months of preparation, research, and critical thinking not be silenced.¶ Affirmative cases that suspend basic fairness norms operate to exclude particular negative strategies. Unprepared, one side comes to the argumentative table unable to meaningfully participate in a dialogue. They are unable to “understand what ‘went on…’” and are left to the whims of time and power (Farrell, 1985, p. 114). Hugh Duncan furthers this line of reasoning:¶ Opponents not only tolerate but honor and respect each other because in doing so they enhance their own chances of thinking better and reaching sound decisions. Opposition is necessary because it sharpens thought in action. We assume that argument, discussion, and talk, among free an informed people who subordinate decisions of any kind, because it is only through such discussion that we reach agreement which binds us to a common cause…If we are to be equal…relationships among equals must find expression in many formal and informal institutions (Duncan, 1993, p. 196-197).¶ Debate compensates for the exigencies of the world by offering a framework that maintains equality for the sake of the conversation (Farrell, 1985, p. 114).¶ For example, an affirmative case on the 2007-2008 college topic might defend neither state nor international action in the Middle East, and yet claim to be germane to the topic in some way. The case essentially denies the arguments that state action is oppressive or that actions in the international arena are philosophically or pragmatically suspect. Instead of allowing for the dialogue to be modified by the interchange of the affirmative case and the negative response, the affirmative subverts any meaningful role to the negative team, preventing them from offering effective “counter-word” and undermining the value of a meaningful exchange of speech acts. Germaneness and other substitutes for topical action do not accrue the dialogical benefits of topical advocacy.

#### The impact outweighs—deliberative debate models impart skills vital to respond to existential threats

Christian O. Lundberg 10 Professor of Communications @ University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, “Tradition of Debate in North Carolina” in Navigating Opportunity: Policy Debate in the 21st Century By Allan D. Louden, p. 311

The second major problem with the critique that identifies a naivety in articulating debate and democracy is that it presumes that the primary pedagogical outcome of debate is speech capacities. But the democratic capacities built by debate are not limited to speech—as indicated earlier, debate builds capacity for critical thinking, analysis of public claims, informed decision making, and better public judgment. If the picture of modem political life that underwrites this critique of debate is a pessimistic view of increasingly labyrinthine and bureaucratic administrative politics, rapid scientific and technological change outpacing the capacities of the citizenry to comprehend them, and ever-expanding insular special-interest- and money-driven politics, it is a puzzling solution, at best, to argue that these conditions warrant giving up on debate. If democracy is open to rearticulation, it is open to rearticulation precisely because as the challenges of modern political life proliferate, the citizenry's capacities can change, which is one of the primary reasons that theorists of democracy such as Ocwey in The Public awl Its Problems place such a high premium on education (Dewey 1988,63, 154). Debate provides an indispensible form of education in the modem articulation of democracy because it builds precisely the skills that allow the citizenry to research and be informed about policy decisions that impact them, to sort through and evaluate the evidence for and relative merits of arguments for and against a policy in an increasingly information-rich environment, and to prioritize their time and political energies toward policies that matter the most to them.

The merits of debate as a tool for building democratic capacity-building take on a special significance in the context of information literacy. John Larkin (2005, HO) argues that one of the primary failings of modern colleges and universities is that they have not changed curriculum to match with the challenges of a new information environment. This is a problem for the course of academic study in our current context, but perhaps more important, argues Larkin, for the future of a citizenry that will need to make evaluative choices against an increasingly complex and multimediated information environment (ibid-). Larkin's study tested the benefits of debate participation on information-literacy skills and concluded that in-class debate participants reported significantly higher self-efficacy ratings of their ability to navigate academic search databases and to effectively search and use other Web resources:

To analyze the self-report ratings of the instructional and control group students, we first conducted a multivariate analysis of variance on all of the ratings, looking jointly at the effect of instmction/no instruction and debate topic . . . that it did not matter which topic students had been assigned . . . students in the Instnictional [debate) group were significantly more confident in their ability to access information and less likely to feel that they needed help to do so----These findings clearly indicate greater self-efficacy for online searching among students who participated in (debate).... These results constitute strong support for the effectiveness of the project on students' self-efficacy for online searching in the academic databases. There was an unintended effect, however: After doing ... the project, instructional group students also felt more confident than the other students in their ability to get good information from Yahoo and Google. It may be that the library research experience increased self-efficacy for any searching, not just in academic databases. (Larkin 2005, 144)

Larkin's study substantiates Thomas Worthcn and Gaylcn Pack's (1992, 3) claim that debate in the college classroom plays a critical role in fostering the kind of problem-solving skills demanded by the increasingly rich media and information environment of modernity. Though their essay was written in 1992 on the cusp of the eventual explosion of the Internet as a medium, Worthcn and Pack's framing of the issue was prescient: the primary question facing today's student has changed from how to best research a topic to the crucial question of learning how to best evaluate which arguments to cite and rely upon from an easily accessible and veritable cornucopia of materials.

There are, without a doubt, a number of important criticisms of employing debate as a model for democratic deliberation. But cumulatively, the evidence presented here warrants strong support for expanding debate practice in the classroom as a technology for enhancing democratic deliberative capacities. The unique combination of critical thinking skills, research and information processing skills, oral communication skills, and capacities for listening and thoughtful, open engagement with hotly contested issues argues for debate as a crucial component of a rich and vital democratic life. In-class debate practice both aids students in achieving the best goals of college and university education, and serves as an unmatched practice for creating thoughtful, engaged, open-minded and self-critical students who are open to the possibilities of meaningful political engagement and new articulations of democratic life.

Expanding this practice is crucial, if only because the more we produce citizens that can actively and effectively engage the political process, the more likely we are to produce revisions of democratic life that are necessary if democracy is not only to survive, but to thrive. Democracy faces a myriad of challenges, including: domestic and international issues of class, gender, and racial justice; wholesale environmental destruction and the potential for rapid climate change; emerging threats to international stability in the form of terrorism, intervention and new possibilities for great power conflict; and increasing challenges of rapid globalization including an increasingly volatile global economic structure. More than any specific policy or proposal, an informed and active citizenry that deliberates with greater skill and sensitivity provides one of the best hopes for responsive and effective democratic governance, and by extension, one of the last best hopes for dealing with the existential challenges to democracy [in an] increasingly complex world.

#### Academic debate over policy issues like the response to War Powers is critical to improve policymaking---the K’s abstractions cedes the political

Stephen M. Walt 11, Professor of International Affairs at Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, July 21, “International Affairs and the Public Sphere”, http://publicsphere.ssrc.org/walt-international-affairs-and-the-public-sphere/

Academics can make at least three distinct contributions to public discourse on global affairs. First, although the digital revolution has made a wealth of information from around the world accessible on a near real-time basis, most of us still lack both extensive direct data on events in far-flung areas and the background knowledge necessary to understand what new developments mean. If our town’s school district is troubled or the local economy is suffering, we can observe that for ourselves and make reasonably well-informed judgments about what might be done about it. But if the issue is the war in Afghanistan, an uprising in Yemen, a naval confrontation in the South China Sea or the prospects that some battered economy will be bailed out successfully, most of us will lack the factual knowledge or conceptual understanding to know what is really going on. Even when basic information is readily available, it may be hard for most of us to put it in the appropriate context or make sense of what it means. ¶ When citizens and leaders seek to grasp the dizzying complexity of modern world politics, therefore, they must inevitably rely upon the knowledge and insights of specialists in military affairs, global trade and finance, diplomatic/international historians, area experts, and many others. And that means relying at least in part on academic scholars who have devoted their careers to mastering various aspects of world affairs and whose professional stature has been established through the usual procedures of academic evaluation (e.g., peer review, confidential assessments by senior scholars, the give-and-take of scholarly debate, etc.). ¶ Second, and more importantly, an independent academic community is an essential counterweight to official efforts to shape public understanding of key foreign policy issues. Governments enjoy enormous information asymmetries in many areas of political life, but these advantages are especially pronounced when dealing with international affairs.[5] Much of what we know about the outside world is ultimately derived from government sources (especially when dealing with national security affairs), and public officials often go to considerable lengths to shape how that information is reported to the public. Not only do governments collect vast amounts of information about the outside world, but they routinely use secrecy laws to control public access to this information. Government officials can shape public beliefs by leaking information strategically, or by co-opting sympathetic journalists whose professional success depends in part on maintaining access to key officials.[6] Given these information asymmetries and their obvious interest in retaining public support for their preferred policies, it is hardly surprising that both democratic and non-democratic leaders use their privileged access to information to build support for specific policies, at times by telling outright lies to their own citizens.[7] ¶ This situation creates few problems when the policies being sold make good strategic sense, but the results can be disastrous when they don’t. In such cases, alternative voices are needed to challenge conventional wisdoms and official rationales, and to suggest different solutions to the problem(s) at hand. Because scholars are protected by tenure and cherish the principle of academic freedom, and because they are not directly dependent on government support for their livelihoods, they are uniquely positioned to challenge prevailing narratives and policy rationales and to bring their knowledge and training to bear on vital policy issues. If we believe that unfettered debate helps expose errors and correct missteps, thereby fostering more effective public policies, then a sophisticated, diverse and engaged scholarly community is essential to a healthy polity. ¶ Third, the scholarly world also offers a potentially valuable model of constructive political disagreement. Political discourse in many countries (and especially the United States) has become increasingly personal and ad hominem, with little attention paid to facts and logic; a trend reinforced by an increasingly competitive and loosely regulated media environment. Within academia, by contrast, even intense disputes are supposed to be conducted in accordance with established canons of logic and evidence. Ad hominem attacks and other forms of character assassination have no place in scholarly discourse and are more likely to discredit those who employ them than those who are attacked. By bringing the norms of academic discourse into the public sphere, academic scholars could help restore some of the civility that has been lost in recent years. ¶ For all of these reasons, it is highly desirable for university-based scholars to play a significant role in public discourse about key real-world issues and to engage directly with policymakers where appropriate. As I have argued elsewhere, academic research can provide policymakers with relevant factual knowledge, provide typologies and frameworks that help policymakers and citizens make sense of emerging trends, and create and test theories that leaders can use to choose among different policy instruments. Academic theories can also be useful when they help policymakers anticipate events, when they identify recurring tendencies or obstacles to success, and when they facilitate the formulation of policy alternatives and the identification of benchmarks that can guide policy evaluation. Because academic scholars are free from daily responsibility for managing public affairs, they are in an ideal position to develop new concepts and theories to help us understand a complex and changing world.[8] ¶ The picture sketched here is obviously something of an ideal type, and I am not suggesting that that the academic world consistently lives up to these expectations. As noted above, university-based scholars of international affairs—and especially the disciplines of political science and history—have increasingly focused on narrow and arcane topics and are contributing less and less to policy formation or public discourse.[9] And when academics do address topics of obvious policy relevance or public interest, the results are often presented in impenetrable, jargon-ridden prose and disseminated in venues that neither policymakers nor the public are likely to read. Even when scholars have something useful to say, in short, their tendency to “speaking in tongues” diminishes their impact on the public sphere**.** ¶Why Is There a Gap between Academia and the Public Sphere?¶ To some degree, the gap between the ivory tower and the world of policy arises because the two spheres have different agendas and operate under different incentives and constraints. Academics focus on developing generalizations and testing conjectures as rigorously as possible, while policymakers and the public are often preoccupied with individual cases (i.e., whatever is in the headlines or in a policymaker’s in-tray). Thus, scholars are delighted whenever they identify a powerful general tendency, but policymakers may be more interested in figuring out how to overcome that general tendency or worried that the case at hand might be an exception to it. Academics strive to make their work as accurate as possible, even if this takes more time, but policymakers cannot always wait until a complete analysis is possible.[10] To take a recent example, policymakers in the Obama administration had to respond to the 2011 “Arab Spring” long before anyone fully understood what was driving these events or where they might lead. Given these different agendas, it is not surprising that policymakers often find academic scholarship to be of less value than the scholars who produce it might wish.

#### Advocacy skills turn case: Merely pointing to an inadequacy of status quo politics is futile – comparative institutional analysis is vital to realization of the 1ac moralizing

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(Neil, “Imperfect Alternatives: Choosing Institutions in Law, Economics, and Public Policy,” p. 41-42)

Even the constitutions of totalitarian states have contained high-sounding announcements of rights. The welfare of the populace depends on the presence of institutions capable of translating high-sounding principles into substance. Issues of institutional representation and participation seem especially important for the least advantaged, who almost by definition have had difficulties with representation and participation in existing institutional processes. If representation and participation are important for resolving the simpler version of the difference principle, they would seem even more important in confronting the more complicated standard that Michelman derives from Rawls. They would seem more important yet when society faces the immense task of fulfilling a measure of justice that seeks to integrate this difference principle with the concepts of equal opportunity and liberty. Determining the character of the legislature or agency given the task of this integration seems central here. The real content of Rawlsian justice depends on such a determination. Any theory of justice capable of even minimally capturing our basic sensibilities has many loosely defined components. Because such loosely defined elements and complicated standards are inherent in goal choice and articulation, the character of institutions that will define and apply these goals becomes an essential – perhaps the essential – component in the realization of the just society. The more complex and vaguely defined the conception of the good, the more central becomes the issue of who decides – the issue of instiutional choice. The discussion of Boomer showed that these questions of institutional choice dominate issues of resource allocation efficiency—a definition of the social good more confined and better defined than broader conceptions of the good such as Rawls’s theory of justice. The lessons about the importance and complexity of institutional choice derived from Boomer are even more appropriate with more complex definitions of the good.

#### Limited and prepared debate is crucial to personal agency and is only possible in a switch-side debate format where debaters sometimes defend views they do not completely agree with

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(Patricia, "Fighting Without Hatred:Hannah Ar endt ' s Agonistic Rhetoric" JAC 22.2 2003)

Arendt is probably most famous for her analysis of totalitarianism (especially her The Origins of Totalitarianism andEichmann in Jerusa¬lem), but the recent attention has been on her criticism of mass culture (The Human Condition). Arendt's main criticism of the current human condition is that the common world of deliberate and joint action is fragmented into **solipsistic and unreflective behavior**. In an especially lovely passage, she says that in mass society people are all **imprisoned in the subjectivity of their own singular experience**, which does not cease to be singular if the same experience is multiplied innumerable times. The end of the common world has come when it is seen only under one aspect and is permitted to present itself in only one perspective. (Human 58) What Arendt so beautifully describes is that isolation and individualism are not corollaries, and may even be antithetical because obsession with one's own self and the particularities of one's life prevents one from engaging in conscious, deliberate, collective action. Individuality, unlike isolation, depends upon a collective with whom one argues in order to direct the common life. Self-obsession, even (especially?) when coupled with isolation from one' s community is far from apolitical; it has political consequences. Perhaps a better way to put it is that **it is political precisely because it** aspires to be apolitical. This fragmented world in which many people live simultaneously and even similarly but not exactly together is what Arendt calls the "social." Arendt does not mean that group behavior is impossible in the realm of the social, but that social behavior consists "in some way of isolated individuals, incapable of solidarity or mutuality, who **abdicate their human capacities** and responsibilities to a projected 'they' or 'it,' with **disastrous consequences**, **both for other people and eventually for themselves**" (Pitkin 79). One can behave, butnot act. For someone like Arendt, a German-assimilated Jew, one of the most frightening aspects of the Holocaust was the ease with which a **people who had not been extraordinarily anti-Semitic could be put to work industriously and efficiently on the genocide of the Jews**. And what was striking about the perpetrators of the genocide, ranging from minor functionaries who facilitated the murder transports up to major figures on trial at Nuremberg, was their **constant and apparently sincere insistence that they were not responsible**. For Arendt, this was not a peculiarity of the German people, but of the current human and heavily bureaucratic condition of twentieth-century culture: we do not consciously choose to engage in life's activities; we drift into them, or we do them out of a desire to conform. Even while we do them, we do not acknowledge an active, willed choice to do them; instead, we attribute our behavior to necessity, and we perceive ourselves as determined—determined by circumstance, by accident, by what "they" tell us to do. We do something from within the anonymity of a mob that we would never do as an individual; we do things for which we will not take responsibility. Yet, whether or not people acknowledge responsibil¬ity for the consequences of their actions, those consequences exist. Refusing to accept responsibility can even make those consequences worse, in that the people who enact the actions in question, because they do not admit their own agency, cannot be persuaded to stop those actions. They are simply doing their jobs. In a **totalitarian system**, however, everyone is simply doing his or her job; there never seems to be anyone who can explain, defend, and change the policies. Thus, it is, as Arendt says, rule by nobody. It is illustrative to contrast Arendt's attitude toward discourse to Habermas'. While both are critical of modern bureaucratic and totalitar¬ian systems, Arendt's solution is the **playful and competitive space of** agonism; it is not the rational-critical public sphere. The "actual content of political life" is "the joy and the gratification that arise out of being in company with our peers, out of acting together and appearing in public, out of inserting ourselves into the world by word and deed, thus acquiring and sustaining our personal identity and beginning something entirely new" ("Truth" 263). According to Seyla Benhabib, Arendt's public realm emphasizes the **assumption of competition,** and it "represents that space of appearances in which moral and political greatness, heroism, and preeminence are revealed, displayed, shared with others. This is a competitive space in which one competes for recognition, precedence, and acclaim" (78). These qualities are displayed, but not entirely for purposes of acclamation; they are not displays of one's self, but of ideas and arguments, **of one's thought**. When Arendt discusses Socrates' thinking in public, she emphasizes his performance: "He performed in the marketplace the way the flute-player performed at a banquet. It is sheer performance, sheer activity"; nevertheless, it was thinking: "What he actually did was to make public, in discourse, the thinking process" {Lectures 37). Pitkin summarizes this point: "Arendt says that the heroism associated with politics is not the mythical machismo of ancient Greece but something more like the existential leap into action and public exposure" (175-76). Just as it is not machismo, although it does have considerable ego involved, so it is not instrumental rationality; Arendt's discussion of the kinds of discourse involved in public action include myths, stories, and personal narratives. Furthermore, the competition is not ruthless; it does not imply a willingness to triumph at all costs. Instead, it involves something like having such a passion for ideas and politics that one is willing to take risks. One tries to **articulate the best argument, propose the best policy, design the best laws, make the best response**. This is a risk in that one might lose; advancing an argument means that **one must be open to the criticisms others will make of it**. The situation is agonistic **not because the participants manufacture or seek conflict**, but because **conflict** is a necessary consequence of difference. This attitude is reminiscent of Kenneth Burke, who did not try to find a language free of domination but who instead theorized a way that the very tendency toward hierarchy in language might be used against itself (for more on this argument, see Kastely). Similarly, Arendt does not propose a public realm of neutral, rational beings who escape differences to live in the discourse of universals; she envisions one of different people who argue with passion, vehemence, and integrity. Continued… Eichmann perfectly exemplified what Arendt famously called the "banal¬ity of evil" but that might be better thought of as the bureaucratization of evil (or, as a friend once aptly put it, the evil of banality). That is, he was able to engage in mass murder **because he was** able not to think about it, especially **not from the perspective of the victims**, and he was able to **exempt himself from personal responsebility** by telling himself (and anyone else who would listen) that he was just following orders. It was the bureaucratic system that enabled him to do both. He was not exactly passive; he was, on the contrary, very aggressive in trying to do his duty. He behaved with the "ruthless, competitive exploitation" and "inauthen-tic, self-disparaging conformism" that characterizes those who people totalitarian systems (Pitkin 87). Arendt's theorizing of totalitarianism has been justly noted as one of her strongest contributions to philosophy. She saw that a situation like Nazi Germany is different from the conventional understanding of a tyranny. Pitkin writes, Totalitarianism cannot be understood, like earlier forms of domination, as the ruthless exploitation of some people by others, whether the motive be selfish calculation, irrational passion, or devotion to some cause. Understanding totalitarianism's essential nature requires solving the **central mystery of the holocaust**—the objectively useless and indeed dysfunctional, **fanatical pursuit of a** purely ideological policy, a pointless process to which the people enacting it have fallen captive. (87) Totalitarianism is closely connected to bureaucracy; it is oppression by rules, rather than by people who have willfully chosen to establish certain rules. It is the triumph of the social. Critics (both friendly and hostile) have paid considerable attention to Arendt's category of the "social," largely because, despite spending so much time on the notion, Arendt remains vague on certain aspects of it. Pitkin appropriately compares Arendt's concept of the social to the Blob, the type of monster that figured in so many post-war horror movies. That Blob was "an evil monster from outer space, entirely external to and separate from us [that] had fallen upon us intent on debilitating, absorb¬ing, and ultimately destroying us, gobbling up our distinct individuality and turning us into robots that mechanically serve its purposes" (4). Pitkin is critical of this version of the "social" and suggests that Arendt meant (or perhaps should have meant) something much more complicated. The simplistic version of the social-as-Blob can itself be an instance of Blob thinking; Pitkin's criticism is that Arendt talks at times as though the social comes from outside of us and has fallen upon us, turning us into robots. Yet, Arendt's major criticism of the social is that it involves seeing ourselves as victimized by something that comes from outside our own behavior. I agree with Pitkin that Arendt's most powerful descriptions of the social (and the other concepts similar to it, such as her discussion of totalitarianism, imperialism, Eichmann, and parvenus) emphasize that these processes are not entirely out of our control but that they happen to us when, and because, we keep refusing to make active choices. We create the social through negligence. It is not the sort of force in a Sorcerer's Apprentice, which once let loose cannot be stopped; on the contrary, it continues to exist because we structure our world to reward social behavior. Pitkin writes, "From childhood on, in virtually all our institutions, we reward euphemism, salesmanship, slo¬gans, and we punish and suppress truth-telling, originality, thoughtful-ness. So we continually cultivate ways of (not) thinking that induce the social" (274). I want to emphasize this point, as it is important for thinking about criticisms of some forms of the social construction of knowledge: **denying our own agency is what enables the social to thrive**. To put it another way, theories of powerlessness are self-fulfilling prophecies. Arendt grants that there are people who willed the Holocaust, but she insists that totalitarian systems result not so much from the Hitlers or Stalins as from the bureaucrats who may or may not agree with the established ideology but who enforce the rules for no stronger motive than a desire to avoid trouble with their superiors (see Eichmann and Life). They do not think about what they do. One might prevent such occurrences—or, at least, resist the modern tendency toward totalitarian¬ism—by thought: "critical thought is in principle anti-authoritarian" (Lectures 38). By "thought" Arendt does not mean eremitic contemplation; in fact, she has great contempt for what she calls "professional thinkers," refusing herself to become a philosopher or to call her work philosophy. Young-Bruehl, Benhabib, and Pitkin have each said that Heidegger represented just such a professional thinker for Arendt, and his embrace of Nazism epitomized the genuine dangers such "thinking" can pose (see Arendt's "Heidegger"). "Thinking" is not typified by the isolated con¬templation of philosophers; it requires the arguments of others and close attention to the truth. It is easy to overstate either part of that harmony. One must consider carefully the arguments and viewpoints of others: Political thought is representative. I form an opinion by considering a given issue from different viewpoints, by making present to my mind the standpoints of those who are absent; that is, I represent them. This process of representation does not blindly adopt the actual views of those who stand somewhere else, and hence look upon the world from a different perspective; this is a question neither of empathy, as though I tried to be or to feel like somebody else, nor of counting noses and joining a majority but of being and thinking in my own identity where actually I am not. The more people's standpoints I have present in my mind while I am ponder¬ing a given issue, and the better I can imagine how I would feel and think if I were in their place, the stronger will be my capacity for represen¬tative thinking and the more valid my final conclusions, my opinion. ("Truth" 241) There are two points to emphasize in this wonderful passage. First, one does not get these standpoints in one's mind through imagining them, but through listening to them; thus, good thinking requires that one hear the arguments of other people. Hence, as Arendt says, "**critical thinking**, while still a solitary business, does not cut itself off from' all others.'" Thinking is, in this view, **necessarily public discourse**: critical thinking is possible "**only** where the standpoints of all others are open to inspection" (Lectures 43). Yet, it is not a discourse in which one simply announces one's stance; **participants are interlocutors** and not just speakers; they must listen. Unlike many current versions of public discourse, this view presumes that speech matters. It is not asymmetric manipulation of others, nor merely an economic exchange; it must **be a world into which one enters and** by which one might be changed**.** Second, passages like the above make some readers think that Arendt puts too much faith in discourse and too little in truth (see Habermas). But Arendt is no crude relativist; she believes in truth, and she believes that there are facts that can be more or less distorted. She does not believe that reality is constructed by discourse, or that truth is indistinguishable from falsehood. She insists tha^ the truth has a different pull on us and, consequently, that it has a difficult place in the world of the political. Facts are different from falsehood because, while they can be distorted or denied, especially when they are inconvenient for the powerful, they also have a certain positive force that falsehood lacks: "Truth, though powerless and always defe ated in a head-on clash with the powers that be, possesses a strength of its own: whatever those in power may contrive, they are unable to discover or invent a viable substitute for it. Persuasion and violence can destroy truth, but they cannot replace it" ("Truth" 259). Facts have a strangely resilient quality partially because a lie "tears, as it were, a hole in the fabric of factuality. As every historian knows, one can spot a lie by noticing incongruities, holes, or the j unctures of patched-up places" ("Truth" 253). While she is sometimes discouraging about our ability to see the tears in the fabric, citing the capacity of totalitarian governments to create the whole cloth (see "Truth" 252-54), she is also sometimes optimistic. InEichmann in Jerusalem, she repeats the story of Anton Schmidt—a man who saved the lives of Jews—and concludes that such stories cannot be silenced (230-32). For facts to exert power in the common world, however, these stories must be told. Rational truth (such as principles of mathematics) might be perceptible and demonstrable through individual contemplation, but "factual truth, on the contrary, is always related to other people: it concerns events and circumstances in which many are involved; it is established by witnesses and depends upon testimony; it exists only to the extent that it is spoken about, even if it occurs in the domain of privacy. It is political by nature" (23 8). Arendt is neither a positivist who posits an autonomous individual who can correctly perceive truth, nor a relativist who positively asserts the inherent relativism of all perception. Her description of how truth functions does not fall anywhere in the three-part expeditio so prevalent in bothrhetoric and philosophy: it is not expressivist, positivist, or social constructivist. Good thinking depends upon good public argument, and good public argument depends upon access to facts: "Freedom of opinion is a farce unless factual information is guaranteed" (238). The sort of thinking that Arendt propounds takes the form of action only when it is public argument, and, as such, it is particularly precious: "For if no other test but the experience of being active, no other measure but the extent of sheer activity were to be applied to the various activities within the vita activa, it might well be that thinking as such would surpass them all" (Human 325). Arendt insists that it is "the same general rule— Do not contradict yourself (not your self but your thinking ego)—that determines both thinking and acting" (Lectures 3 7). In place of the mildly resentful conformism that fuels totalitarianism, Arendt proposes what Pitkin calls "a tough-minded, open-eyed readiness to perceive and judge reality for oneself, in terms of concrete experience and independent, critical theorizing" (274). The paradoxical nature of agonism (that it must involve both individuality and commonality) makes it difficult to maintain, as the temptation is great either to think one's own thoughts without reference to anyone else or to let others do one's thinking. Arendt's Polemical Agonism As I said, agonism does have its advocates within rhetoric—Burke, Ong, Sloane, Gage, and Jarratt, for instance—but while each of these theorists proposes a form of conflictual argument, not one of these is as adversarial as Arendt's. Agonism can emphasize persuasion, as does John Gage's textbook The Shape of Reason or William Brandt et al.'s The Craft of Writing. That is, the goal of the argument is to identify the disagreement and then construct a text that gains the assent of the audience. This is not the same as what Gage (citing Thomas Conley) calls "asymmetrical theories of rhetoric": theories that "presuppose an active speaker and a passive audience, a speaker whose rhetorical task is therefore to do something to that audience" ("Reasoned" 6). Asymmetric rhetoric is not and cannot be agonistic. Persuasive agonism still **values conflict, disagreement, and equality** among interlocutors, but it **has the goal of reaching agreement,** as when Gage says that the process of argument should enable one's reasons to be "understood and believed" by others (Shape 5; emphasis added). Arendt's version is what one might call polemical agonism: it puts less emphasis on gaining assent, and it is exemplified both in Arendt's own writing and in Donald Lazere's "Ground Rules for Polemicists" and "Teaching the Political Conflicts." Both forms of agonism (persuasive and polemical) require substantive debate at two points in a long and recursive process. First, one engages in debate in order to invent one's argument; even silent thinking is a "dialogue of myself with myself (Lectures 40). The difference between the two approaches to agonism is clearest when one presents an argument to an audience assumed to be an opposition. In persuasive agonism, one plays down conflict and moves through reasons to try to persuade one's audience. In polemical agonism, however, one's intention is not necessarily to prove one's case, but to make public one' s thought in order to test it. In this way, communicability serves the same function in philosophy that replicability serves in the sciences; it is how one tests the validity of one's thought. In persuasive agonism, success is achieved through persuasion; in polemical agonism, success may be marked through the quality of subsequent controversy. Arendt quotes from a letter Kant wrote on this point: You know that I do not approach reasonable objections with the intention merely of refuting them, but that in thinking them over I always weave them into my judgments, and afford them the opportunity of overturning all my most cherished beliefs. I entertain the hope that by thus viewing my judgments impartially from the standpoint of others some third view that will improve upon my previous insight may be obtainable. {Lectures 42) Kant's use of "impartial" here is interesting: he is not describing a stance that is free of all perspective; it is impartial only in the sense that it is not his own view. This is the same way that Arendt uses the term; she does not advocate any kind of positivistic rationality, but instead a "universal interdependence" ("Truth" 242). She does not place the origin of the "disinterested pursuit of truth" in science, but at "the moment when Homer chose to sing the deeds of the Trojans no less than those of the Achaeans, and to praise the glory of Hector, the foe and the defeated man, no less than the glory of Achilles, the hero of his kinfolk" ("Truth" 262¬63). It is useful to note that Arendt tends not to use the term "universal," opting more often for "common," by which she means both what is shared and what is ordinary, a usage that evades many of the problems associated with universalism while preserving its virtues (for a brief butprovocative application of Arendt's notion of common, see Hauser 100-03). In polemical agonism, there is a sense in which one' s main goal is not to persuade one's readers; persuading one's readers, if this means that they fail to see errors and flaws in one' s argument, might actually be a sort of failure. It means that one wishes to put forward an argument that makes clear what one's stance is and why one holds it, but with the intention of provoking critique and counterargument. Arendt describes Kant's "hope" for his writings not that the number of people who agree with him would increase but "that the circle of his examiners would gradually be en¬larged" {Lectures 39); he wanted interlocutors, not acolytes. This is not consensus-based argument, nor is it what is sometimes called "consociational argument," nor is this argument as mediation or conflict resolution. Arendt (and her commentators) use the term "fight," and they mean it. When Arendt describes the values that are necessary in our world, she says, "They are a sense of honor, desire for fame and glory, the spirit of fighting without hatred and 'without the spirit of revenge,' and indifference to material advantages" {Crises 167). Pitkin summarizes Arendt's argument: "Free citizenship presupposes the ability to fight— openly, seriously, with commitment, and about things that really mat¬ter—without fanaticism, without seeking to exterminate one's oppo¬nents" (266). My point here is two-fold: first, there is not a simple binary opposition between persuasive discourse and eristic discourse, the conflictual versus the collaborative, or argument as opposed to debate. Second, while polemical agonismrequires diversity among interlocutors, and thus seems an extraordinarily appropriate notion, and while it may be a useful corrective to too much emphasis on persuasion, it seems to me that polemical agonism could easily slide into the kind of wrangling that is simply frustrating. Arendt does not describe just how one is to keep the conflict useful. Although she rejects the notion that politics is "no more than a battlefield of partial, conflicting interests, where nothing countfs] but pleasure and profit, partisanship, and the lust for dominion," she does not say exactly how we are to know when we are engaging in the existential leap of argument versus when we are lusting for dominion ("Truth" 263). Like other proponents of agonism, Arendt argues that rhetoric does **not lead individuals or communities to ultimate Truth**; it leads to decisions that will necessarily have to be reconsidered. Even Arendt, who tends to express a greater faith than many agonists (such as Burke, Sloane, or Kastely) in the ability of individuals to perceive truth, insists that self-deception is always a danger, so public discourse is necessary as a form of testing (see especially Lectures and "Truth"). She remarks that it is difficult to think beyond one's self-interest and that "nothing, indeed, is more common, even among highly sophisticated people, than the blind obstinacy that becomes manifest in lack of imagination and failure to judge" ("Truth" 242). Agonism demands that one simultaneously trust and doubt one' s own perceptions, **rely on one's own judgment and consider the judgments of others, think for oneself and imagine how others think.** The question remains whether this is a kind of thought in which everyone can engage. Is the agonistic public sphere (whether political, academic, or scientific) only available to the few? Benhabib puts this criticism in the form of a question: "That is, is the 'recovery of the public space' under conditions of modernity necessarily an elitist and antidemocratic project that can hardly be reconciled with the demand for universal political emancipa¬tion and the universal extension of citizenship rights that have accompa¬nied modernity since the American and French Revolutions?" (75). This is an especially troubling question not only because Arendt's examples of agonistic rhetoric are from elitist cultures, but also because of com¬ments she makes, such as this one from The Human Condition: "As a living experience, thought has always been assumed, perhaps wrongly, to be known only to the few. It may not be presumptuous to believe that these few have not become fewer in our time" {Human 324). Yet, there are important positive political consequences of agonism**.** Arendt' s own promotion of the agonistic sphere helps to explain how **the system** could be actively moral. It is not an overstatement to say that a central theme in Arendt's work is the **evil of conformity**—the fact that the modern bureaucratic state **makes possible extraordinary evil** carried out by people who do not even have any ill will toward their victims. It does so by "imposing innumerable and various rules, all of which tend to 'normalize' its members, to make them behave, to exclude spontaneous action or outstanding achievement" (Human 40). It keeps people from thinking, and it keeps them behaving. The agonistic model's celebration of achievement and verbal skill **undermines the political force of conformity**, so it is **a force against the bureaucratizing of evil.** If people think for themselves, **they will resist dogma**; if people think of themselves as one of many, they will empathize; if people can do both, **they will resist totalitarianism**. And if they talk about what they see, tell their stories, argue about their perceptions, and listen to one another—that is, engage in rhetoric—then they are engaging in antitotalitarian action. In post-Ramistic rhetoric, it is a convention to have a thesis, and one might well wonder just what mine is—whether I am arguing for or against Arendt's agonism. Arendt does not lay out a pedagogy for us to follow (although one might argue that, if she had, it would lookmuch like the one Lazere describes in "Teaching"), so I am not claiming that greater attention to Arendt would untangle various pedagogical problems that teachers of writing face. Nor am I claiming that applying Arendt's views will resolve theoretical arguments that occupy scholarly journals. I am saying, on the one hand, that Arendt's connection of argument and thinking, as well as her perception that both serve to thwart totalitarian¬ism, suggest that agonal rhetoric (despite the current preference for collaborative rhetoric) is the best discourse for a diverse and inclusive public sphere. On the other hand, Arendt's advocacy of agonal rhetoric is troubling (and, given her own admiration for Kant, this may be intentional), especially in regard to its potential elitism, masculinism, failure to describe just how to keep argument from collapsing into wrangling, and apparently cheerful acceptance of hierarchy. Even with these flaws, Arendt describes something we would do well to consider thoughtfully: a fact-based but not positivist, communally grounded but not relativist, adversarial but not violent, independent but not expressivist rhetoric.

### Cap K

#### **The history of Black-Jewish coalitional politics is the history of capitalism. Coalitions were founded brought together in anti-capitalist struggle and torn apart by the forces of capitalism. The affirmative’s class-ignorant call for inter-racial coalition is doomed to fail, only a Black-Jewish coalition that begins with class struggle and ends with the overthrow of capitalism can make a lasting challenge to anti-blackness.**

Landy 91 Sy, founder and former National Secretary, League for the Revolutionary Party; founder, Communist Organization for the Fourth International; former committee member, Revolutionary Socialist League; former member, Independent Socialist League; “Behind the Black/Jewish Confrontation: Racist Offensive Heightens” Proletarian Revolution no. 40; Fall, 1991; <http://lrp-cofi.org/PR/racistoffensive40.html>

For blacks in America today, the nightmare of racism is obvious. The frightening problem is that none of the prominent leaderships, whether “integrationist” or “nationalist,” offers a way out. There is an alternative, but that requires reorienting the entire struggle.¶ Dreams into Nightmares¶ As a result of the gains won in the 1960’s, by the early ’70’s there was real hope for equality and a decent life among blacks. Job opportunities began to open up, at least for some, thus giving hope to others. The right to a serious education and the chance for a decent income seemed to have been secured. After generations of slavery and then degrading wage-slavery at the bottom of the heap, at last better things seemed possible.¶ School integration was promoted as the way for black youth to get the same opportunities as middle-class whites. It hasn’t happened. A few months ago the Urban League issued its annual State of Black America. In it Dr. David Swinton summed up his statistical analysis of today’s American condition:¶ The degree of racial inequality is higher as we begin the 1990’s than at any other time in the last 20 years... . Both in absolute terms and in comparison to white Americans, Blacks have high unemployment rates, low rates of employment, inferior occupational distribution and low wages and earnings. Blacks have low incomes and high poverty rates. They own little wealth, and no significant progress is being made to improve the status of Blacks and to close the gaps... .¶ As for the benefits of integrated schools, other studies point out that nearly two-thirds of black youth still go to predominantly minority schools, and one-third are in out-rightly segregated schools with 90% or more of black students. And open admissions to college, given escalating tuition charges and major cutbacks, don’t exist in the real world even where it’s promised.¶ Just look at the black ghettoes today, the “inner cities”: public services that do not serve, schools that do not teach, workers without work. Whole neighborhoods terrorized by crime, crack, cops and filth; streets filled with young people with nothing to do and no hope.¶ This is not so say that no blacks gained from the years of struggle. A black “middle class” (actually, professionals, lower-rung business people and labor aristocrats) has developed. A recent study shows that one in seven black families earn $50,000 a year or more, compared with one in seventeen black families with that income, inflation adjusted, in 1967. The rise was noteworthy even though whites still are far ahead, with one out of three families in the $50,000 bracket.¶ As with whites, black professionals and some better-off workers are fleeing the central cities for the suburbs. The ghettoes thus lock together the less mobile, less affluent and unemployed workers – along with growing numbers of lumpenproletarians who prey on them. The latter are constantly being created and re-created by capitalism. The ghettoes are awash in rising tension and anxiety.¶ Foreboding is not limited to the ghettoes: it also commutes to the suburbs. The declining economy undermines all the middle strata and adds to the insecurity fostered by racism and reaction. Unemployment is rising, despite George Bush’s fatuous assurances that the recession is over; 13.5 of the total population now lives below the conservative official poverty line. Real income fell by 3 in 1990 alone, continuing its long stagnation. In this context, the relative affluence of the black middle class is tenuous at best.¶ Front-page headlines in the New York Times tell it all: “Unions at a Loss to Reverse Falling Fortunes of Workers.” “Part-Time Hirings Bring Deep Change in U.S. Workplaces - 40-Hour Week is Eroded - As Companies Reduce Costs, Many Workers Can’t Find Full Hours or Benefits.”¶ When even the white working class is getting it in the neck, the disproportionate suffering of black workers accelerates rapidly. Swinton’s report concludes:¶ The consistency of these results for the last decade leads to one inescapable conclusion. The disadvantaged economic status of the African-American population is a permanent feature of the American economy. The permanence of this disadvantage status implies that it is perpetuated by the normal operations of the American economy.¶ In a word, capitalism is inescapably racist. Not surprisingly, social explosions are occurring in U.S. cities. The wonder is that they haven’t been bigger and more violent.¶ New York: Blacks and Jews¶ Street rioting broke out in Crown Heights, a largely black neighborhood of Brooklyn in late August. The trigger was an accident in which a Hasidic Jew, driving in the police-escorted entourage of Lubavitcher Rabbi Menachem Schneerson, ran over two black children and killed one, seven-year-old Gavin Cato. In the riot, a visiting Australian Jew, Yankel Rosenbaum, was stabbed; he died at a city hospital after getting the negligent treatment normally reserved for blacks.¶ The details of the accident, the differing accounts of what the police and ambulances did are important but not decisive. The incident was a spark which set off the social dynamite built into the conflict between the desperate ghetto and the surrounding society.¶ Many Jewish leaders denounced the riot as anti-Semitic. Some even labeled it another Kristallnacht, the infamous orgy of anti-Jewish rioting, looting and murdering in Nazi Germany in 1938. Reverend Al Sharpton denied the charges of anti-Semitism: “This is a classical example of trying to turn the victim into the victimizer.”¶ But the Crown Heights rioters were anti-Semitic. Chants of “Heil Hitler” and the like have no other meaning. But Sharpton, demagogue though he is, is absolutely right in pointing out that the Jewish leaders treat the oppressed as the oppressors. Kristallnacht is a monstrously distorted analogy. In Germany the Nazis were in power; all the brute force of the state was arrayed against the Jewish victims. In Brooklyn the cops beat and arrested dozens of blacks and protected the politically influential Hasidic leaders.¶ The “Heil Hitlers” did not mean that blacks are Nazis; they were the screams of violently frustrated people. The rioters knew that the Nazis despised blacks as well as Jews. But they also knew that such slogans would deeply hurt their Hasidic antagonists. And the Lubavitchers are a particularly reactionary Jewish religious sect, notoriously insensitive to outsiders – including other Jews, but especially their black neighbors. Racism is rife among them in Crown Heights. Even so, it remains true that general anti-Jewish sentiment is a factor among blacks.¶ Denouncing this sentiment, Jewish spokesmen often retort that Jews participated in and helped finance civil rights efforts, and two Jewish youths were killed in the desegregation fight. This argument gets a mixed response, since blacks perceive a patronizing attitude and a demand for power over the movement by Jewish leaders. There are also very real feelings that Jews, who were also oppressed, should be held to their claims of a higher morality. But they do not behave that way in their everyday relations with blacks.¶ There are Jewish bosses who exploit black labor; there are real estate agents and landlords who operate slums. There are middle-class and petty-bourgeois Jews who live nearby and, while hardly wealthy by American bourgeois standards, look down upon impoverished blacks. It is not surprising that the black population is not immune to the anti-Semitism of capitalist society, which invokes the Jews – the “international Jewish banking conspiracy” – as a substitute and scapegoat for the capitalist class as a whole.¶ Attitudes among blacks toward Jews are actually very mixed. Blacks are also aware of the injustices perpetrated against Jews in the U.S. as well as Europe, as well as of the acts of solidarity to the black struggle by some Jews. A study by the Anti-Defamation League in 1967 found that blacks were the least anti-Semitic Christian group in the U.S. and, significantly, that the more “militant” a black person was, the less likely he or she was to be anti-white or anti-Jewish.¶ However, in the absence of deep class consciousness throughout society, the crimes and insults of local Jewish capitalists, prominent media bosses and official Jewish organizations are far more visible than the efforts of Jewish leftists and workers. The adaptation of most Jews to Zionism – before Hitler a decidedly minority view – and the unmistakable positioning of Israel on the imperialist side of the world divide among nations, have also alienated blacks who solidarize with the oppressed Palestinians.¶ Moreover, the Jewish bourgeoisie and the increasingly conservative leaders of the Jewish organizations act as if they were now fully established in the U.S. ruling class. As political attacks against blacks mount, they too use code words like “quotas” and “preferential hiring” to keep blacks down. As often as not they are in the forefront of the racist assault.¶ The Discovery of “Black Anti-Semitism”¶ The charge of “black anti-Semitism” is of fairly recent vintage. Jewish leaders began pointing to it in the late 1960’s, when the black movement began moving away from legalistic civil rights and charting an independent course. Before that, the “liberal-labor coalition” which led the political drive for civil rights was headed by the labor unions, Northern Democrats, the big Jewish organizations and the mainline white churches. They were the senior partners; black groups like the NAACP, SCLC and CORE were assigned lesser parts.¶ Under the pressure of the ghetto uprisings that swept inner-city America, “black power” forces grew and the grand alliance segmented. While capitalism could still afford to make concessions to the black revolt in the late 1960’s, signs of the shrinking pie were already evident. The liberal labor and white ethnic leaders looked after their own and were not at all delighted to learn that blacks wanted an equal share.¶ Ordinary Jews had a mixed consciousness toward blacks. On the one hand, they saw blacks as another persecuted people. On the other, they feared rising crime and urban blight and associated these with blacks, swallowing the pervasive racism of U.S. society. Having mostly moved up into the white-collar working class, they also feared that their precarious acceptance on the edge of mainstream America would be endangered by the advance of “too many” blacks.¶ The turning point towards neo-conservatism was the New York teachers’ strike of 1968. Before then the main Jewish organizations had minimized occasional reports of black anti-Semitism, justifiably warning instead against what they called a “Jewish backlash.” Faced with a ruling-class attack against unions, the heads of the largely Jewish teachers’ union chose to lash back against black “community control” leaders rather than confront their bourgeois “friends.” And given the discriminatory practices of most unions, it was no wonder that many blacks were misled into attacks on union rights. The union heads used this to re-channel labor’s response. Albert Shanker & Co. took a handful of ugly anti-Semitic leaflets and broadcast them widely in newspaper ads and articles. Thus “black anti-Semitism” was born.¶ In accepting this outrageous generalization, the Jewish organizations betrayed their own followers. As the capitalist pie shrinks further, U.S. capitalism will not hesitate to learn from the Nazis and turn mass hatred and rebellion against a familiar scapegoat, the Jews. Jewish leaders toadying to the capitalists and pointing accusingly at blacks will not deflect the far more dangerous and mounting white anti-Semitism and will have done little or nothing to fight against it.¶ It is also true that sections of the black radical leadership discovered the utility of anti-Semitism at the same time. Rebelling against the dominant “integrationist” middle-class leaders, politically impotent junior partners in the liberal coalition, these “nationalists” echoed mass economic demands and claimed a bigger stake. Because of their own class outlook, they denied the class system was the enemy. They directed their outrage against other ethnic groups in order to congeal their “nation” – rather than fight for leadership of the working class that the vast majority of blacks belong to.¶ Thus both Jewish and black leaders found “black anti-Semitism” a useful weapon in trying to tie their working-class followers to their own narrow programs. They succeeded only partly. Many Jewish workers fear correctly that their “acceptance” in American society will be short-lived; keeping blacks down is no protection. And most blacks know that their problems do not derive from any particular ethnic conspiracy.¶ Pawns in Their Game¶ All over the world nationalist hatreds seem to be mounting at an unprecedented pace. Blood is spilling in India, South Africa, Yugoslavia, the USSR. Fascists swagger again in not only Germany but also France and Britain. There is method in the madness. World capitalism is on the edge of a new depression. The bourgeoisies cannot afford to buy off the masses they rule over, so their only hope is to divide the exploited and oppressed. Mass anger is turned away from capitalism – imperialism on the world scale – toward other nationalities or races.¶ This turmoil is not simply a question of national rivalries rekindled. Capitalism uses certain peoples as pawns to oppress others. In some countries this is clear: Germans in Germany are set against Turkish, Kurdish, Vietnamese and African “guest workers.” Elsewhere it is less clear but still true, as in Yugoslavia. (See the article in this issue.) In South Africa not only are whites mobilized against blacks, but so are some Zulus used as pawns against other blacks.¶ The uproar in the U.S. is part of this pattern of capitalist barbarism. In Bensonhurst, scene of a recent racist murder in New York, Italian working-class youth, many of them increasingly hopeless about their futures, are rallied against blacks. In Crown Heights it is the Jews, the most disposable of possible pawns.¶ The capitalists form a tiny class, dependent upon such pawns to do their dirty work. Since the pawns are mostly petty bourgeois and workers, they are acting against their own fundamental interests. Thus, with a class-conscious strategy, many of them can be redirected. It is vital to distinguish between leaders and led, between fascist cadres and frustrated masses. But it is equally crucial to win the misled elements not by any concession to racism but by posing the sharpest alternatives to capitalist oppression.¶ In the U.S. it is a question not of separate nations but of ethnicity and race. We oppose all forms of bigotry – national, racial, ethnic, religious, etc. Wherever whites are set against blacks, revolutionaries of all races side with the blacks against the pawns of capital. Our position is based on the understanding that class is the central, determinant question. We therefore oppose the integrationism of the liberal coalitionists, including the “rainbow” and “gorgeous mosaic” claptrap designed to accommodate workers to their exploiters. We can’t all live in peace and harmony while some of “us” are grabbing all of what’s left of the economic pie.¶ “Nationalists” are often conservative and religious, but given the capitulatory nature of liberal integrationism, they often attract far more radical adherents. Their separatism offers no alternative but demagogic attacks against other racial and ethnic groups to bind rebellious masses to opportunism.¶ Black Workers Must Lead¶ Al Sharpton said of the Crown Heights rioters: “Nobody controls these kids but these kids do respect us. They don’t do what we say but they don’t disrespect us; they don’t throw bottles at us like they do at ... Dinkins.” (Village Voice, Oct. 8.) None of the middle-class leaders control the volatile forces of the black populace. But riots by themselves are not a way out. In the ’60’s and ’70’s the ghetto rebellions forced the capitalists to give in to some demands, to offer palliatives and sops. “Affirmative action” and “preferential hiring” provided only enough for a few to rise, and that only for a while. But there were gains.¶ No longer. Now capitalism is bent on taking back what it once conceded. Racial riots can only bash some of the pawns (and some innocent people) and at best deal out a little justice to the cops. But they are not strong enough to win gains. As well, they bolster popular support for the rulers’ “beef up the police” clamor, a deadly answer to demands for aid made by working people, blacks included.¶ The time is ripe for the working class to take the lead. The key fact in the U.S. class struggle is that blacks are not simply victims. Black workers are disproportionately employed in the industrial workforce and are critical to the economies of most cities. New York’s bourgeoisie, for example, could be stopped cold if the largely black transit, municipal and hospital unions went on strike. And blacks can reach other workers as well. The anger of the exploited, oppressed and unemployed can be mobilized either racially or as a class against their real enemy, capitalism. That is the choice.¶ Black workers have shown their militancy in the past. In the wildcat strike wave of the early 1970’s, white workers for the first time showed their willingness to follow black workers’ leadership in strike after strike. But they have so far not taken the leadership of the liberation struggle itself. That has been in the hands of middle-class blacks: liberals and radicals, integrationists and separatists. This must change.¶ United Revolutionary Party Needed¶ The strategy of battling for crumbs – even for bigger crumbs – has failed. It is time for the alternative, to oppose capitalism as a system. In fact, that is the only way to obtain even crumbs! Black workers, together with Latinos and others who cannot gain equality under capitalism, will demand an end to givebacks, to job losses and factory closures, to cutbacks in public services, to racist inequality and injustice. Jewish workers too need to break with their pro-capitalist leaders and once again become a strong component of the revolutionary movement.¶ We call on revolutionary workers of all races and nationalities to join with us in the struggle to create a genuine party of the working class. Such an organization would fight in the unions not only for a defensive general strike. It would prove through the general strike that the working class has the power to transform society. The class can then fight for a decent living wage for all, for sharing the necessary work among all available workers so that unemployment disappears, for workers’ control of working conditions.¶ Such demands would mean a frontal attack on the capitalists’ prerogative to rule as they see fit. Hence the workers’ party must be a revolutionary, authentic communist party. It must say: if capitalism cannot provide what the working class needs, then capitalism will be ended.¶ Ending capitalism is the major step for abolishing racism as well. The past struggle proves that blacks will never attain job security and wage equality under capitalism. Blacks will always be the last hired and first fired. The revolutionary struggle is therefore doubly important for black workers.¶ In no way does this mean that black workers, in the interest of leading the whole working class, should subordinate their outrage against racism. Quite the opposite. In the past it was blacks’ proven capacity to fight against injustice that won white workers to their side in the class struggle. It is primarily whites who have to learn that racism is self-defeating and only benefits the bosses.

#### The unchecked spread of neoliberal capitalism necessitates extermination in the name of profit – ensures poverty and environmental and cultural destruction, culminating in eventual extinction.

Cole 11 [Dr. Mike Cole is Emeritus Research Professor in Education and Equality at Bishop Grosseteste University College Lincoln, Lincoln, UK. His most recent book is Racism and Education in the U.K. and the U.S.: towards a socialist alternative (New York and London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011 RACISM AND EDUCATION IN THE U.K. AND THE U.S. Palgrave Macmillan (June 7, 2011), pgs. 180-182]

Neo-liberal capitalism, in being primarily about expanding opportunities for large multinational companies, has undermined the power of nation¬states and exacerbated the negative effects of globalization on such services as healthcare, education, water and transport (Martinez and Garcia, 2000). However, the current hegemonic role of business in schooling is para¬mount in convincing workers and future workers that socialism is off the agenda. Marxist educators and other Left radicals should expose this myth. Students have a right to discuss different economic and political systems such as twenty-first-century democratic socialism. This is particularly press¬ing given the current economic recession. It is easier in general for discussion in schools to embrace issues of gender, “race,” disability, sexual orientation, and social class when social class relates just to attainment than to address social class in the context of overthrowing capitalism, and replacing it with world democratic socialism, where participatory democracy is central. The latter may thus be seen as the last taboo, and, of course, understandably so. It is time to move forward and bring such discussions into schools, colleges, and universities, Marxist and other Left educators can make the case that such considerations are a perfectly reasonable democratic demand. Global capitalism is out of control, and the very survival of our planet is dependent on dialogical education that considers the socialist alternative, an alternative distanced from the distortions of Marx by Stalinism. No longer can socialism be divorced from environmental and ecologi¬cal issues. McLaren and Houston (2005, p, 167) have argued that “escalat¬ing environmental problems at all geographical scales from local to global have become a pressing reality that critical educators can no longer afford to ignore.” They go on to cite “the complicity between global profiteering, resource colonization, and the wholesale ecological devastation that has become a matter of everyday life for most species on the planet.” Following Kahn (2003), they state the need for “a critical dialogue between social and eco-justice” (McLaren and Houston 2005, p. 168). They call for a dialec¬tics of ecological and environmental justice to reveal the malign interaction between capitalism, imperialism, and ecology that has created widespread environmental degradation that has dramatically accelerated with the onset of neo-liberalism. World capitalism’s environmentally racist (Bullard et al., 2007) effects in both the “developing” and “developed” world should be discussed openly and freely in the educational institutions. As far as the “developing world” is concerned, there are, for example, such issues as the environmentally dev-astating method of extraction of natural resources utilized by multinational corporations in numerous “developing” countries that have devastated eco-systems and destroyed cultures and livelihoods (World Council of Churches, 1994, cited in Robinson, 2000), with toxic waste polluting groundwater, soil and the atmosphere (e.g., Robinson, 2000). In addition, there is trans¬boundary dumping of hazardous waste by developed countries to develop¬ing nations, usually in sub-Sahara Africa (e.g., Ibitayo et al., 2008; see also Blanco, 2010 on Latin America). As far as the “developed” world is concerned, in the U.S., for example, people of color are concentrated around hazardous waste facilities-more than half of the nine million people living within two miles of such facilities are minorities (Bullard et al., 2007). Finally, there is the ubiquitous issue of climate change, itself linked to the totally destructive impact of capitalism. Joel Kovel (2010) has described cli-mate change as “a menace without parallel in the whole history of humanity.” However, on a positive note, he argues that “[it]s spectacular and dramatic character can generate narratives capable of arousing general concern and thus provide a stimulus to build movements of resistance.” Climate change is linked to loss to the planet of living things—also a rallying point for young people. For Marxist educators, this provides a good inroad for linking envi¬ronment, global capitalism, and arguments for the socialist alternative. As Kovel (2010) puts it, only within the framework of a revolutionary ecoso- cialist society can we deal with the twinned crises of climate change and spe¬cies loss—and others as well—within a coherent program centered around the flourishing of life.” Capitalism and the destruction of the environment are inextricably linked, to the extent that it is becoming increasingly apparent that saving the environment is dependent on the destruction of capitalism. Debate should therefore include a consideration of the connections between global capital¬ism and environmental destruction, as well as a discussion of the socialist alternative. The need for environmental issues to be allied to socialism is paramount. As Nick Beams (2009) notes, all the “green” opponents of Marxism view “the overthrow of the capitalist system by means of the socialist revolution as the key to resolving the problems of global warming” as either “unrealis¬tic,” “not immediate enough,” or believe that socialism is hostile to nature. Beams (ibid.) argues that, in reality, “the system of market relations is based on the separation of the producers from the means of production, and it is this separation—-the metabolic rift between [human beings] and nature— that is the source of the crisis.” In other words, instead of the real producers of wealth (the working class) having control over what they produce and rationally assigning this to human need, goods are irrationally produced for profit. Beams (ibid.) quotes Marx (1894 [1966] p. 959) as follows: Freedom. ..can consist only in this, that socialised man, the associated pro¬ducers, govern the human metabolism with nature in a rational way, bringing it under their collective control instead of being dominated by it as a blind power; accomplishing it with the least expenditure of energy and in conditions most worthy and appropriate for their human nature. As Beams (2009) concludes, “[f]ar from Marx being outdated, the world has, so to speak, caught up with Marx.”

#### The role of the ballot is to endorse the best political strategy for addressing all manifestations of exploitation and oppression. Debates about transforming society must center on what constitutes the best method for addressing ongoing struggles

McGregor 13 [Sheila McGregor Marxism and women’s oppression today International Socialism Issue: 138 Posted: 10 April 13 http://www.isj.org.uk/index.php4?id=885&issue=138]

Revolutionary socialists take part in all struggles against exploitation and oppression, whether they are against austerity measures, sexual violence, the impact of war, police racism or the growth of fascist organisations, attempting to unite the maximum number of forces in any given struggle. At the same time, revolutionary socialists are concerned not only with combatting the particular effects of exploitation and oppression, but also with taking the struggle forward so as to break the very chains of exploitation, which give rise to all forms of oppression. Thus involvement in struggle is both a practical question of how best to build a protest or strike and an ideological question of how to win those you are struggling alongside to an understanding that it is not enough to win over the particular struggle, but that what is required is a revolutionary transformation of society. When people embark on a struggle over an issue, they usually come with a mixture of ideas about the society they live in, what they are fighting for and how best to achieve their goal. Inherent in any struggle is a debate about how to take it forward. Struggles against sexism are no exception to this.

#### Only beginning with class relations can eliminate the ideological machinery which legitimizes and extends class domination and racist practices. Materialist critique of the historical relationship between the means of production and the process of racialization in the United States should mark the starting point of the transformation of exploitative class and market relations.

San Juan 8 [E. San Juan, Jr., Filipino American literary academic, mentor, cultural reviewer, civic intellectual, activist, writer, essayist, video/film maker, editor, and poet whose works related to the Filipino Diaspora in English and Filipino languages have been translated into German, Russian, French, Italian, and Chinese.[2] As an author of books on race and cultural studies,[3] he was a “major influence on the academic world”.[2] He was the director of the Philippines Cultural Studies Center in Storrs, Connecticut in the United States.[1] In 1999, San Juan, Jr. received the Centennial Award for Achievement in Literature from the Cultural Center of the Philippines because of his contributions to Filipino and Filipino American Studies.[2] FROM RACE/RACISM TO CLASS STRUGGLE: On Critical Race Theory Posted on October 4, 2008 FROM RACE TO CLASS STRUGGLE: A RE-TURN OF CRITICAL RACE THEORY, THE PHILIPPINES MATRIX PROJECT http://philcsc.wordpress.com/2008/10/04/from-raceracism-to-class-struggle-on-critical-race-theory/]

Given its composition, and the pervasive climate of reaction, the Forum could not of course endorse a radical approach that would focus on the elimination of the exploitation of labor (labor power as commodity) as a necessary first step. Given its limits, it could not espouse a need for a thoroughgoing change of the material basis of social production and reproduction—the latter involving the hegemonic rule of the propertied bloc in each society profiting from the unequal division of labor and the unequal distribution of social wealth—on which the institutional practices of racism (apartheid, discrimination, genocide) thrive. “Race is the modality in which class is lived,” as Stuart Hall remarks concerning post-1945 Britain (Solomos 1986, 103). Without the political power in the hands of the democratic-popular masses under the leadership of the working class, the ideological machinery (laws, customs, religion, state bureaucracy) that legitimizes class domination, with its attendant racist practices, cannot be changed. What is required is a revolutionary process that mobilizes a broad constituency based on substantive equality and social justice as an essential part of the agenda to dissolve class structures; any change in the ideas, beliefs, and norms would produce changes in the economic, political and social institutions, which would in turn promote wide-ranging changes in social relations among groups, sectors, and so on. Within a historical-materialist framework, the starting point and end point for analyzing the relations between structures in any sociohistorical totality cannot be anything else but the production and reproduction of material existence. The existence of any totality follows transformation rules whereby it is constantly being restructured into a new formation (Harvey 1973). These rules reflect the dialectical unfolding of manifold contradictions constituting the internal relations of the totality. Within this conflicted, determinate totality, race cannot be reduced to class, nor can class be subsumed by race, since those concepts express different forms of social relations. What is the exact relation between the two? This depends on the historical character of the social production in question and the ideological-political class struggles defining it. In his valuable treatise, The Invention of the White Race, Theodore Allen has demonstrated the precise genealogy and configuration of racism in the U.S. It first manifested itself when the European colonial settlers based on private property in land and resources subdued another social order based on collective, tribal tenure of land and resources, denying the latter any social identity—“social death” for Native Americans. We then shift our attention to the emergence of the white race and its system of racial oppression with the defeat of Bacon’s Rebellion in 1677 and the establishment of a system of lifetime hereditary bond servitude (for African Americans): “The insistence on the social distinction between the poorest member of the oppressor group and any member, however propertied, of the oppressed group, is the hallmark of racial oppression” (Allen 1997, 243). In effect, white supremacy defining the nature of civil society was constructed at a particular historical conjuncture demanded by class war. The result is a flexible and adjustable system that can adjust its racial dynamics in order to divide the subordinates, resist any critique of its ideological legitimacy, and prevent any counter-hegemonic bloc of forces from overthrowing class rule. Class struggle intervenes through its impact in the ideological-political sphere of civil society. Racial categories operate through the mediation of civil society which (with the class-manipulated State) regulate personal relations through the reifying determinations of value, market exchange, and capital. Harry Chang comments on the social mediation of racial categories: “Blacks and whites constitute social blocks in a developed setting of ‘mass society’ in which social types (instead of persons) figure as basic units of economic and political management…The crucial intervention of objectification, i.e., relational poles conceived as the intrinsic quality of objects in relation, must not be neglected here. Racial formation in a country is an aspect of class formation, but the reason races are not classes lies in this objectification process (or fetishization)” (1985, 43). Commodity fetishism enables the ideology of racism (inferiority tied to biology, genetics, cultural attributes) to register its effects in common-sense thinking and routine behavior in class-divided society (Lukacs 1971). Because market relations hide unequal power relations, sustained ideological critique and transformative collective actions are imperative. This signifies the heuristic maxim of “permanent revolution” (Lefevbre 1968, 171) in Marxist thought: any long-term political struggle to abolish capitalism as a system of extracting surplus value through a system of the unequal division of labor (and rewards) needs to alter the institutions and practices of civil society that replicate and strengthen the fetishizing or objectifying mechanism of commodity production and exchange (the capitalist mode of production). If racism springs from the reification of physical attributes (skin color, eye shape) to validate the differential privileges in a bourgeois regime, then the abolition of labor-power as a commodity will be a necessary if not sufficient step in doing away with the conditions that require racial privileging of certain groups in class-divided formations. Racism is not an end in itself but, despite its seeming autonomy, an instrumentality of class rule.

### Case

#### **The affirmative tells a story of the relationship between two distinct and individual groups—black people and Jews. This binary construction erases and** marginalizes the **United States’ sizeable population of black Jews. That reifies anti-blackness and makes a genuine Black-Jewish coalition impossible.**

Hirsch-Allen 5 Jake, “From Egypt to Harlem: Blacks and Jews, Black Jews” *New Voices*; December 14, 2005; http://newvoices.org/2005/12/14/0043-5/

The story of the relationship between Jews and blacks characterizes much about race relations through the 21st century. The story is told again and again of the positive relationships blacks and Jews should and, indeed, have had at times in American history: our combined narratives of oppression, our struggles for social justice and demands to be respected as legitimate parts of American society.¶ We also hear the converse story: how, despite their similarities, Jews and blacks have continually failed to come together, how the Jews became white and turned their backs on blacks as they became part of the mainstream. Author and critic James Baldwin described the tension as follows: “The Jew has been taught – and, too often, accepts – the legend of Negro inferiority; and the Negro, on the other hand, has found nothing in his experience with Jews to counteract the legend of Semitic greed.”¶ This story of the relationship between Jews and blacks has been told as a narrative of the failure to forge a partnership in the face of oppression. As all old stories with entrenched sides, perhaps the problem lies more in the way we are telling these stories than with history itself.¶ Many scholars trace the tension back to the days of the slave trade. Louis Farrakhan and the Nation of Islam’s The Secret Relationship Between Blacks and Jews, argues that “Jews carved for themselves a monumental culpability in the slave trade,” and many Jews deny all culpability. Neither claim, recent scholarship attests, has much truth in it. Jews, like Catholics and Protestants, were no better or worse than most during the era of slavery. And like those of other religions, Jewish slave masters passed their religion onto their slaves, creating what Walter Isaac, a doctoral student at Temple University calls “African-American Judaism.”¶ The story of African-American Judaism is just beginning to be told. Mr. Isaac believes that, at this point, his job is simply to tell the story, to get the history and the facts straight, before anything else can happen. The story goes back to the very roots of Judaism, as its Diaspora spread throughout the Middle East to North, Central and West Africa. Though some continue living in Africa to this day, much of the resultant communities were decimated during the slave trade or uprooted to America. One of the more recent twists started with the many children were borne of sexual relations between master and slave. These so-called “mulatto Jews,” Isaac notes, were the subject of a large discourse in the antebellum and Reconstruction North and South. A number of synagogue and personal documents contain references to questions about the authenticity of their Jewishness: Could you train them in Jewish law? Could you let them in the synagogues? Could they be buried in the cemetery? Next to their masters?¶ Though many 19th-century American Jews were involved with black Jews, Isaac argues that the new wave of European Jews who came in the following decades had no conception of the entire phenomenon. They dismissed the communities out of hand, partially out of confusion, and partially out of a deep desire to pass as part of the white American mainstream.¶ Isaac is not alone in his quest to reconstruct the history of black Jewry. The Institute for Jewish and Community Studies, an independent group in San Francisco, has just published In Every Tongue: The Racial and Ethnic Diversity of the Jewish People. Authored by Diane Tobin, Gary Tobin and Scott Rubin, the volume attests to the enduring presence and importance of African-American and other diverse forms of Judaism. It is one of the first studies of Jewish demographics to lay all the numbers on the line and count black Jews as part of the diverse American Jewish community. They conclude that out of the 6 million Jews currently alive in America, nearly 500,000, more than eight percent, are black, Latino, Asian or Native American, with about 100,000 of them being African-American.¶ The erasure of black Jews is a much more immediate problem than this deep history of migration and language. Even in discussions in communities and on campuses about the relationships between blacks and Jews, the very existence of black Jews is not mentioned.¶ When Isaac first moved to Philadelphia, he asked the local Jewish Federation where he could learn about African-American Jews in the city. The woman there said she didn’t know about any black Jews in Philadelphia, or anywhere for that matter. Upon arriving in the city, Isaac drove up and down the main thoroughfare of Broad Street and immediately found several black Jewish congregations. These congregations exist throughout America, from the three in Isaacs’ hometown of Jacksonville, Florida, to the one up the road from where I wrote this essay in Harlem, New York.¶ The existence of these unrecognized congregations is yet another reminder of the absurdity and injustice of refusing to acknowledge black Jewish communities. As long as we continue to tell two distinct histories of blacks and Jews, we will never come to terms with our troubled past, present or future.¶ We will, furthermore, not understand what Judaism itself is. Dialoguing with African-Americans inside the Jewish community will bring to light varied and divergent practices and rituals. The point will not be to claim that these practices are as “authentic” as any other kind of Judaism, but rather that their existence challenges our very notions of what authenticity in Judaism means.

# 2NC – T

#### Discussion of the state makes sense for Black-Jewish alliances – empirically, the most effective of these coalitions centered around the state and potential reforms. An open debate discussing its merits and drawbacks is essential to informing their movement – can’t just assume the state is evil

Greenberg 6 Cheryl Lynn, Paul E. Raether Distinguished Professor of History, Trinity College; “ Troubling the Waters: Black-Jewish Relations in the American Century” *Princeton University* Press; 2006; http://press.princeton.edu/chapters/i8154.html

If we look beyond these trees of black-Jewish relations for a moment, we also discover a forest: twentieth-century American liberalism, the larger political framework in which these organizations operated. Reshaped in the century’s early decades, liberalism became for a brief span of time transcendent, only to lose much of its relevance and political credibility by the century’s close. I suggest that the history of political relations between African Americans and American Jews reflects, in microcosm, the history of American liberalism. Not only have African Americans and Jewish Americans long been America’s quintessential liberals, they have been so because of their deep commitment to what they understand to be its tenets: cultural pluralism, individual equality, and the obligation of the state to protect and extend both. The potency of postwar coalitions both resulted from and reflected the triumph of postwar liberalism; their subsequent decline can be traced to the fate of liberalism in the turbulent 1960s and beyond. Both an intellectual construct and a political label, liberalism in the United States has had varied and often contradictory meanings over the life of the American republic, and I can do little more than trace its barest outlines here. Its origins lay in Enlightenment Europe, where it stood against despotism and religious control and extolled individual freedom. Yet most nineteenth-century liberals lived quite comfortably with racism, female disenfranchisement, and other positions we would today view as contradictions, understanding them as part of the natural order within which liberalism operated. Furthermore, given its origins in resistance to tyranny, traditional liberalism feared the state as potential usurper of rights and sought to minimize its power and reach. In the United States this distrust of government remained until the (often ignored) urgings of Progressives, the central planning of World War I, the New Deal, and finally World War II revealed to many liberals the power of the state to do good.¶ By the 1940s American liberalism had taken on a new character, chastened by Nazi racism, emboldened by new ideas of state power, heartened by the triumph of democracy, energized by anticolonialism but fearful of communism—or anything that looked like communism. This postwar liberalism has at its root four basic assumptions. First, rights accrue to individuals, not groups. Second, although achievement depends on the individual, the state has a role to play in guaranteeing equality of opportunity (but not equality of outcome). Third, in a capitalist democracy, liberalism stresses reform rather than revolution, compromise rather than confrontation. Finally, as its goal for civil society, liberalism enthrones pluralism, the championing of difference within a broadly agreed-upon framework of what constitutes socially acceptable behavior. The modern concept of liberalism is more complex than this, of course, but it is along these axes of individualism, moderation, limited state intervention, and pluralism that I suggest that the black-Jewish political relationship operated, and later, came apart.¶ ¶ Chapter 1 sets the stage for our inquiry. Despite their very different histories, by the early twentieth century both blacks and Jews in the United States faced discrimination and bigotry based on involuntary, inherited characteristics. While antiblack racism was always the more pervasive and deep-seated, both Jews and blacks endured exclusion from certain jobs, neighborhoods, schools, and social facilities. Racist and anti-Semitic references were prevalent in the media as well as in polite conversation, and while racism was certainly the more pernicious, both had been known to erupt into violence. All this impelled both communities to establish agencies to protect and promote their rights and opportunities; these ranged from mass to elite, nationalist to integrationist, local to national, conservative to radical.17¶ At the same time that each community was navigating its own way through the American system, the two groups came into increasing contact with each other. A black migration northward intersected with an eastern European Jewish immigration to American urban centers, North and South. This led to greater interaction, for better and for worse, and also to a greater awareness of each other’s difficulties. Coupled with their commitment to safeguarding their own culture in the face of coercive assimilation, this awareness prompted a sense of identification between these apparently fellow victims, despite Jewish racism and black anti-Semitism.¶ The evidence we have suggests this affinity was more than the political calculation of elites. African Americans from all parts of the country reported that they considered the Jews a people apart, and a potential ally. Their newspapers bemoaned Jews’ slaughter in European pogroms and praised their mutual aid societies and their commitment to union organizing. Black women in Harlem gathered baby supplies for refugees of Polish pogroms. The Amsterdam News explained such “tender feelings”: “only these two [groups] knew what it meant to drink the bitter dregs of race prejudice.”18¶ Most Jews, in turn, endorsed African American civil rights. Black workers trying to unionize in 1920 looked to the Workmen’s Circle and other Jewish groups for help “because the Jews can sympathize and empathize more with them,” the Jewish Daily Forward believed. “Many of us ourselves were oppressed in Old Russia as the Negroes are in free America.... We can understand them better and sound their appeal wide and quickly.”19 Liberal Jews, who interpreted their religion as a universalist call to arms, joined those from even more secularized, frequently socialist, backgrounds, whose stress on internationalism and on class had already led them to a concern for black civil rights.20¶ Where black and Jewish interests and concerns overlapped, individuals began, tentatively, to cooperate. Agencies followed, more slowly. Over time these contacts broadened into a more committed collaboration between civil rights organizations in the two communities. The economic and political struggles of the 1930s (subject of chapter 2) and World War II (chapter 3), served as the pivots for change. Both the burdens and the possibilities of the age affected African and Jewish Americans profoundly. Government now acknowledged its role in extending equality; liberal organizations could thus win meaningful advances. Each success brought increased strength and prestige to the groups that won it and encouraged the formation of even more potent political alliances. Meanwhile, developments in Europe underlined the dangers of fascism and the real—and horrific—implications of racism. And the incarceration of Japanese Americans in internment camps revealed that it could happen here. Thus the benefits of cooperation and the means to cooperate converged in the postwar years, and an active black and Jewish political partnership was born. This partnership was never seamless, and full unity was never achieved—nor sought. Nonetheless, the number of programs and goals shared by advocacy groups in the two communities had multiplied, and the positive initial experiences of cooperation encouraged the development of more expansive coalitions.¶ After the war, black and Jewish civil rights agencies spearheaded battles to establish fair employment, fair housing, and anti-Klan legislation; challenge restrictive housing covenants; and dismantle restrictions based on “race, religion, or national origin” in employment, private clubs, and colleges. They worked jointly on educational campaigns to challenge bigotry and promote pluralism. This partnership was concretized in the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights (1951), whose two leaders were an African American and a Jew. These organizations also collaborated in challenging restrictions leveled solely against one group or the other. They joined in the fight against segregated schools, transportation, and other public facilities; struggled to lift restrictions on the immigration of refugees; and formed coalitions with other ethnic, racial, religious, and labor groups to promote civil rights and civil liberties. All this is considered in chapter 4.¶ But this collaboration took place on the institutional level. Many Jews held racist views; few African Americans were immune to anti-Semitism. Although each group encountered discrimination, the experiences of most Jews diverged from those of most African Americans. Anti-Semitism in the United States was almost always less vicious than racism, and it certainly declined more quickly. Jews might be restricted from colleges, country clubs, and exclusive neighborhoods, but Jim Crow was an indignity and an economic barrier Jews never had to endure. Most significantly—and in part this explains the last two observations—almost all Jews were white people. Not only could many Jews therefore “pass,” but social and economic opportunities were often based on skin color rather than on ethnicity or religion. Thus Jews’ color and their job skills facilitated mobility into entrepreneurial positions, and into white-collar work generally by the 1940s and ’50s, while most African Americans remained trapped at the bottom of any occupational field they were permitted to enter at all.¶ In spatial terms, by the 1930s and ’40s upwardly mobile Jews in the North began moving out of neighborhoods—ghettos—that African Americans had begun moving into, while keeping their jobs, stores, and other real-estate investments there. As their incomes rose, Jewish housewives began hiring African Americans as domestics, and Jewish businesses hired black employees. In the South, Jews opened or expanded businesses in an otherwise barely entrepreneurial region, serving the local black as well as white population. Thus, precisely at the time that Jewish and black civil rights organizations began to reach out to each other, Jews had also become landlords, rental agents, social workers, teachers, employers, and shopkeepers in black communities. For the masses of blacks and Jews, then, relations took place in interchanges where Jews generally held greater power.¶ By the early 1940s, these entrepreneurial and class tensions threatened to derail the fragile coalition, and black and Jewish agencies therefore set out explicitly to address them. African Americans demanded that Jewish groups intervene with Jewish businesses to stop exploitative and racist practices, while Jews lamented black anti-Semitism and defended the Jewish record regarding black civil rights. In this way community conflicts surfaced within organizational interactions. Meanwhile, elites in both communities led most of their civil rights organizations. The paternalism those elites could exhibit toward those they sought to help only inflamed feelings further.21 The actions and responses of both sides reveal the deep fissures that class tensions created within an otherwise productive collaboration; these issues are explored alongside organizational developments in the book’s first four chapters.22¶ Despite these tensions—or more accurately, helping to fuel them— both blacks and Jews shared the presumption that Jews would treat blacks more fairly than other whites would, because of the shared bond they both perceived in their historical experience of oppression. This enhanced mutual expectations that common cause might be made and was important for the forging of political ties. But while genuinely felt, the claim of black and Jewish kinship through suffering, made by both blacks and Jews, also obscured racial and class differences between the two communities and created unrealistically high expectations on both sides. When these expectations were disappointed, as in cases of economic strife, and when that mutual support weakened in later decades (the subject of chapter 6), the bitterness and recriminations proved particularly difficult to handle. Here, then, was the irony of the “golden age” of black-Jewish collaboration. That period of cooperation did indeed produce remarkable progress in civil rights. But at the same time it was wracked by tensions that constrained collaboration and prefigured the later collapse of mutual purpose.¶ Before proceeding with that story, however, chapter 5 pauses to explore liberal black and Jewish agencies’ responses to anticommunism, crucial for understanding the relationship between American liberalism and black-Jewish relations. The postwar liberalism of pluralism, integration, and civil equality was always tempered by the cold war and the awareness that just beyond our borders, and even within them, lay direct threats to the American Way of Life. This was the era of the (second) Red Scare, colloquially known as McCarthyism after its most famous instigator.¶ Black and Jewish organizations found themselves enmeshed in a contradiction. On the one hand, most considered communism an ideology antithetical to the values of democracy, individual freedom, and entrepreneurial capitalism they embraced. On the other hand, many avid anticommunists were also racists and anti-Semites, painting civil rights organizations as subversive foreign agents bent on overthrowing American civilization. Both to protect their own programs and to defend the civil liberties necessary to a liberal democracy, black and Jewish organizations simultaneously proclaimed their own anticommunism and challenged the more draconian pieces of anticommunist legislation. They narrowed their conception of equality from human rights to civic rights while they campaigned on behalf of those rights even when accused of disloyalty. These contradictions shaped black-Jewish relations, liberalism, and the civil rights movement as surely as did economics and racial politics, and their implications are explored at some length before we return in chapter 6 to the chronological narrative.¶ The class tensions between most blacks and Jews that had long threatened their political collaboration intensified with the mass action of the 1960s. Jews’ greater success in achieving middle-class status made them hesitant to employ confrontational tactics and aroused their suspicion of outspoken black leaders. And to some extent, blacks and Jews began to diverge in their goals. If the desire for liberal civil rights legislation promoted a “grand alliance,” the struggle to define true equality and determine methods of enforcement spurred its unraveling.¶ This difference of views became public in the 1978 affirmative action case of Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, when black and Jewish agencies, disagreeing over the policy’s approaches and mechanisms, took opposing sides. But the decline in cooperation predated Bakke, spurred by several failures of liberals in the previous decade to live up to their stated civil rights commitments. Those failures provoked an increasing nationalism and militancy within the black community, which increased fear and resentment among Jews. Both turned inward and away from coalition. Or at least it seemed that way, as the diatribes of black anti-Semites and the neoconservatism of many Jews dominated public discussion of black-Jewish relations by the 1980s.¶ But it is not that simple, chapter 6 suggests. Once again, the contradictions and ambiguities of the multiple black-Jewish stories make such generalizations impossible. I argue that neither black-Jewish relations nor black and Jewish liberalism are in as much decline as current wisdom has it. The book concludes with a look at the election of 2000, notable for (among other things) two striking black-Jewish moments.¶ Facile claims about the ending of a black-Jewish political partnership because of black extremism or Jewish self-serving manipulation miss the complexity and drama of the civil rights struggle. If there is a tragedy in the weakening of black-Jewish ties it is ultimately not about blacks or Jews, but rather about the loss of momentum in the struggle for justice. Perhaps a clearer understanding of both the real limits and noblest goals of the black-Jewish relationship can help forge a new, broader partnership. And perhaps understanding the limits of liberalism in a racialized state can help liberalism become truer to its own ideals.¶

This creates a topical version of the aff – any restriction of PWP and a discussion of how black and jewish coalitions can form around this particular political movement.

### 2NC Limits O/V

#### Their interpretation undermines preparation and clash—they open the floodgates to an infinite number of 1ACs which affirm some esoteric methodology.

#### That matters—

#### 1—Topical fairness requirements are key to effective dialogue— they monopolize strategy which makes the discussion one-sided and subverts any meaningful neg role. The aff can simply pick a topic to soapbox on and render the neg’s prep useless. Turns education claims – debate is shallow absent preparation because we can’t expand or contribute to any of the aff’s arguments

#### 2—Hold their claims to a high threshold—can’t know whether or not they are true because we didn’t have opportunity to contest.

#### This is impacted by Lundberg – deliberative debate is key to foster critical thinking skills that can be applied to all aspects of life – creates incentive to learn and research a variety of important issues like democracy, the environment, etc.

#### Turns their otherization claims – The deliberative model best represents the interests of the marginalized – without the framework of debate, hierarchical dominance and exclusion are more likely

Tonn, 5 Mari Boor Tonn, Associate Professor of Communication at the University of Maryland, 2005 (“Taking Conversation, Dialogue, and Therapy Public” Rhetoric & Public Affairs Vol. 8, No. 3)

This widespread recognition thataccess to public deliberative processes and the ballotis a baseline of any genuine democracy points to the most curious irony of the conversation movement: portions of its constituency. Numbering among the most fervid dialogic loyalists have been some feminists and multiculturalists who represent groups historically denied both the right to speak in public and the ballot. Oddly, some feminists who championed the slogan “The Personal Is Political” to emphasize ways relational power can oppress tend to ignore similar dangers lurking in the appropriation of conversation and dialogue in public deliberation. Yet the conversational model’s emphasis on empowerment through intimacy can duplicate the power networks that traditionally excluded females and nonwhites and gave rise to numerous, sometimes necessarily uncivil,demands for democratic inclusion. Formalized participation structures in deliberative processes obviously cannot ensure the elimination of relational power blocs, but, as Freeman pointed out, the absence of formal rules leaves relational power unchecked and potentially capricious. Moreover, the privileging of the self, personal experiences, and individual perspectives of reality intrinsic in the conversational paradigm mirrors justifications once used by dominant groups who used their own lives, beliefs, and interests as templates for hegemonic social premises to oppress women, the lower class, and people of color. Paradigms infused with the therapeutic language of emotional healing and coping likewise flirt with the type of psychological diagnoses once ascribed to disaffected women. But as Betty Friedan’s landmark 1963 The Feminist Mystique argued, the cure for female alienation was neither tranquilizers nor attitude adjustments fostered through psychotherapy but, rather, unrestricted opportunities.102 The price exacted by promoting approaches to complex public issues— models that cast conventional deliberative processes, including the marshaling of evidence beyond individual subjectivity, as “elitist” or “monologic”—can be steep. Consider comments of an aide to President George W. Bush made before reports concluding Iraq harbored no weapons of mass destruction, the primary justification for a U.S.-led war costing thousands of lives. Investigative reporters and other persons sleuthing for hard facts, he claimed, operate “in what we call the reality-based community.” Such people “believe that solutions emerge from [the] judicious study of discernible reality.” Then baldly flexing the muscle afforded by increasingly popular social-constructionist and poststructuralist models for conflict resolution, he added: “That’s not the way the world really works anymore . . . We’re an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. And while you’re studying that reality— judiciously, as you will—we’ll act again, creating other new realities.”103 The recent fascination with public conversation and dialogue most likely is a product of frustration with the tone of much public, political discourse. Such concerns are neither new nor completely without merit. Yet, as Burke insightfully pointed out nearly six decades ago, “A perennial embarrassment in liberal apologetics has arisen from its ‘surgical’ proclivity: its attempt to outlaw a malfunction by outlawing the function.” The attempt to eliminate flaws in a process by eliminating the entire process, he writes, “is like trying to eliminate heart disease by eliminating hearts.”104 Because public argument anddeliberative processes are the “heart” of true democracy, supplanting those models with social and therapeutic conversation and dialogue jeopardizes the very pulse and lifeblood of democracy itself.

#### Abandoning points of stasis result in the tyranny of structurelessness which inevitably annihilates the marginalized other

Tonn, 5 Mari Boor Tonn, Associate Professor of Communication at the University of Maryland, 2005 (“Taking Conversation, Dialogue, and Therapy Public” Rhetoric & Public Affairs Vol. 8, No. 3)

In certain ways, Schudson’s initial reluctance to dismiss public conversation echoes my own early reservations, given the ideals of egalitarianism, empowerment, and mutual respect conversational advocates champion. Still**,** in the spirit of the dialectic ostensibly underlying dialogic premises, this essay argues that various negative consequences can result from transporting conversational and therapeutic paradigms into public problem solving. In what follows, I extend Schudson’s critique of a conversational model for democracy in two ways: First, whereas Schudson primarily offers a theoretical analysis, I interrogate public conversation as a praxis in a variety of venues, illustrating how public “conversation” and “dialogue” have been coopted to silence rather than empower marginalized or dissenting voices. In practice, public conversation easily can emulate what feminist political scientist Jo Freeman termed “the tyranny of structurelessness” in her classic 1970 critique of consciousness- raising groups in the women’s liberation movement,15 as well as the key traits Irving L. Janis ascribes to “groupthink.”16 Thus, contrary to its promotion as a means to neutralize hierarchy and exclusion in the public sphere, public conversation can and has accomplished the reverse. When such moves are rendered transparent, public conversation and dialogue, I contend, risk increasing rather than diminishing political cynicism and alienation. Second, whereas Schudson focuses largely on ways a conversational model for democracy may mute an individual’s voice in crafting a resolution on a given question at a given time, I draw upon insights of Dana L. Cloud and others to consider ways in which a therapeutic, conversational approach to public problems can stymie productive, collective action in two respects.17 First, because conversation has no clearly defined goal, a public conversation may engender inertia as participants become mired in repeated airings of personal experiences without a mechanism to lend such expressions direction and closure. As Freeman aptly notes, although “[u]nstructured groups may be very effective in getting [people] to talk about their lives[,] they aren’t very good for getting things done. Unless their mode of operation changes, groups flounder at the point where people tire of ‘just talking.’”18 Second, because the therapeutic bent of much public conversation locates social ills and remedies within individuals or dynamics of interpersonal relationships, public conversations and dialogues risk becoming substitutes for policy formation necessary to correct structural dimensions of social problems. In mimicking the emphasis on the individual in therapy, Cloud warns, the therapeutic rhetoric of “healing, consolation, and adaptation or adjustment” tends to “encourage citizens to perceive political issues, conflicts, and inequities as personal failures subject to personal amelioration.”19

#### While there were revolutionary elements to the the Panthers, the core of its philosophy was a policy agenda set out in the Ten Point program. Here are some of those policy actions demanded of the federal government

Huey Newton 66 Written: October 15, 1966 Source: War Against the Panthers, by Huey P. Newton, 1980   
Transcription/Markup & corrections: MIM/Brian Baggins Online Version: Marxist History Archive (marxists.org) 2001

http://www.marxists.org/history/usa/workers/black-panthers/1966/10/15.htm

The Ten-Point Program

1. We Want Freedom. We Want Power To Determine

The Destiny Of Our Black Community.

We believe that Black people will not be free until we are able to determine our destiny.

2. We Want Full Employment For Our People.

We believe that the federal government is responsible and obligated to give every man employment or a guaranteed income. We believe that if the White American businessmen will not give full employment, then the means of production should be taken from the businessmen and placed in the community so that the people of the community can organize and employ all of its people and give a high standard of living.

3. We Want An End To The Robbery By The Capitalists Of Our Black Community.

We believe that this racist government has robbed us, and now we are demanding the overdue debt of forty acres and two mules. Forty acres and two mules were promised 100 years ago as restitution for slave labor and mass murder of Black people. We will accept the payment in currency which will be distributed to our many communities. The Germans are now aiding the Jews in Israel for the genocide of the Jewish people. The Germans murdered six million Jews. The American racist has taken part in the slaughter of over fifty million Black people; therefore, we feel that this is a modest demand that we make.

4. We Want Decent Housing Fit For The Shelter Of Human Beings.

We believe that if the White Landlords will not give decent housing to our Black community, then the housing and the land should be made into cooperatives so that our community, with government aid, can build and make decent housing for its people.

5. We Want Education For Our People That Exposes The True Nature Of This Decadent American Society.

We Want Education That Teaches Us Our True History And Our Role In The Present-Day Society.

We believe in an educational system that will give to our people a knowledge of self. If a man does not have knowledge of himself and his position in society and the world, then he has little chance to relate to anything else.

6. We Want All Black Men To Be Exempt From Military Service.

We believe that Black people should not be forced to fight in the military service to defend a racist government that does not protect us. We will not fight and kill other people of color in the world who, like Black people, are being victimized by the White racist government of America. We will protect ourselves from the force and violence of the racist police and the racist military, by whatever means necessary.

7. We Want An Immediate End To Police Brutality And Murder Of Black People.

We believe we can end police brutality in our Black community by organizing Black self-defense groups that are dedicated to defending our Black community from racist police oppression and brutality. The Second Amendment to the Constitution of the United States gives a right to bear arms. We therefore believe that all Black people should arm themselves for self- defense.

8. We Want Freedom For All Black Men Held In Federal, State, County And City Prisons And Jails.

We believe that all Black people should be released from the many jails and prisons because they have not received a fair and impartial trial.

9. We Want All Black People When Brought To Trial To Be Tried In Court By A Jury Of Their Peer Group Or People From Their Black Communities, As Defined By The Constitution Of The United States.

We believe that the courts should follow the United States Constitution so that Black people will receive fair trials. The Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution gives a man a right to be tried by his peer group. A peer is a person from a similar economic, social, religious, geographical, environmental, historical and racial background. To do this the court will be forced to select a jury from the Black community from which the Black defendant came. We have been, and are being, tried by all-White juries that have no understanding of the "average reasoning man" of the Black community.

10. We Want Land, Bread, Housing, Education, Clothing, Justice And Peace.

When, in the course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another, and to assume, among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the laws of nature and nature's God entitle them, a decent respect of the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation.

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. That, to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed; that, whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or abolish it, and to institute a new government, laying its foundation on such principles, and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness. Prudence, indeed, will dictate that governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and, accordingly, all experience hath shown that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed. But, when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same object, evinces a design to reduce them under absolute despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such government, and to provide new guards for their future security.

# 1NR – Cap K

### Coping Mech Link

Coping mech

Burris 10 Greg, writer; “Coping with Capitalism” *Dissident Voice*; April 14, 2010; http://dissidentvoice.org/2010/04/coping-with-capitalism/

The most famous part of Frantz Fanon’s classic 1961 text The Wretched of the Earth is its powerful first chapter, “Concerning Violence,” a hard-hitting call to arms against the injustice and exploitation of European colonialism. What often goes unnoticed from the book is the series of anecdotes presented in its final pages: case studies of patients that came to Fanon seeking psychiatric help during Algeria’s bloody struggle for independence. Particularly notable is the story of a 30-year-old French police inspector, married with three children, who spent his days torturing Algerian prisoners and his nights plagued by terrible dreams and violent impulses towards his family. He first sought therapy after sadistically tying his wife to a chair and beating her. The offense? She had protested his physical abuse of their 20-month-old infant. ¶ The solution to the torturer’s problem is immediately obvious: stop torturing. Indeed, one does not have to be a Sigmund Freud to connect the dots linking his abuse of loved ones back to his grisly occupation. The French torturer, however, did not resign from his day job. Instead, he continued working full-time while in Fanon’s care and had no apparent intention of quitting. This was not, as one might surmise, a result of denial. Indeed, the police inspector was not blind to the fact that his job was the source of his violent tendencies. As Fanon reported, “This man knew perfectly well that his disorders were directly caused by the kind of activity that went on inside the rooms where interrogations were carried out.” Nevertheless, the patient asked Fanon “to help him to go on torturing Algerian patriots without any prickling of conscience, without any behavior problems and with complete equanimity.”1 In other words, the French torturer only wanted help finding an effective coping strategy for dealing with the side-effects of his hideous vocation.¶ The case of Fanon’s mentally disturbed torturer has many parallels in modern society. Today there seems to be a great tendency for people suffering from the side-effects of certain activities to treat the negative symptoms without bothering to evaluate their cause. This includes the use of prescribed medication both to lose weight and to calm down those children who do not get the attention they need. In this way, we are allowed to mindlessly continue on with the same damaging practices and life-styles that caused our initial complaints to begin with.¶ A similar observation has often been made by Slavoj Žižek who sees a striking paradox in the capitalist marketplace. In The Puppet and the Dwarf, for instance, he writes, “On today’s market, we find a whole series of products deprived of their malignant property: coffee without caffeine, cream without fat, beer without alcohol.”2 There is a direct parallel here between Fanon’s torturer and current market trends; both represent attempts at treating the symptom without dealing with its causes. What seems to be lost on those who partake in such easy (but ultimately empty) solutions is that by removing the harmful contents from harmful products we tend to forget that those harmful products are perhaps best not consumed in the first place.¶ This detachment of the symptom from its cause can also result in a failure to recognize that the two were ever connected. As Žižek has pointed out, “The ultimate example [of this trend] is arguably a chocolate laxative, available in the USA, with the paradoxical injunction: Do you have constipation? Eat more of this chocolate! (that is, of the very thing that causes constipation).”3 Indeed, did not this exact situation arise when, after the tragic September 11 attacks, President Bush sidestepped the issue of the economic grievances that had led to that atrocity and instead provided the American public with his own chocolate laxative, an instruction to consume: “Get on board. Do your business around the country. Fly and enjoy America’s great destination spots. Get down to Disney World in Florida. Take your families and enjoy life the way we want it to be enjoyed.”4 ¶ Of course, the Bush administration had no stranglehold on such ill-conceived remedies, and indeed, in the context of US politics, the championing of chocolate laxative solutions is a bipartisan affair. Thus, the catastrophic 2008 financial meltdown was dealt with by inundating the money mismanagers who caused it with even more money, redistributing public wealth into private hands on a massive scale. Likewise, the Obama administration’s strategy for taming the abusive practices of for-profit health insurance companies has been to secure even more customers for that industry, making the purchase of private insurance mandatory for all citizens. In both of these cases, the cause of our problems is presented as the solution.¶ This same idea might also apply to all of those frightening tales of US veterans who turn their war-time instincts upon their loved ones after returning home. Most recently, a soldier in Washington State was accused of submitting his four-year-old daughter to water torture for failing to recite her ABCs.5 Such cases are typically treated as monstrous and inexplicable aberrations — the doings of a few “bad apples” — rather than as byproducts of the standard operating procedure. So ingrained is this theme in the popular imagination that it has formed the plotline of several examples of Hollywood cinema. Notable here is Brothers (2009), a film in which the character of Captain Sam Cahill, played by Tobey Maguire, returns from Afghanistan a changed man. Before entering the war, he had represented the all-American ideal: his father’s favorite son, the head of a happy family, the husband of a beautiful wife, and the father of two lovely girls. In short, he was an upstanding citizen, living a life of luxury in a large, comfortable home in small town USA. After being captured, tortured, and forced to murder his friend by a smarmy group of vile Afghan terrorists, he returns to his consumerist paradise unstable and unfriendly, paranoid and ready at any moment to crack. The war apparently served as the great corrupter.¶ Not surprisingly, Brothers ends on a positive note with Cahill receiving what appears to be beneficial psychiatric treatment. Conspicuously absent from the film is any connection between the various wars out there with the social structures back home. To the contrary, therapy serves as a method of bringing Cahill back into the fold of normality without acknowledging that this normality caused the war in the first place. Thus, the film does not recognize that its two diametrically opposed spheres — the Cahill family’s life of luxury and the death and destruction in Afghanistan — are, in fact, two sides of the same coin. As with Žižek’s chocolate laxative, Brothers suggests that the remedy to the symptom is indulging even more in its cause.¶ This is, of course, not to say that therapy does not work. To the contrary, therapeutic practices like meditation, religious experience, and spirituality can, in fact, serve as effective coping methods. But this is precisely what makes them so dangerous. By soothing our symptomatic aches, these treatments act as a kind of anesthetic, dulling the pain and diverting our attention away from the systemic causes of our unpleasant maladies. As Dana Cloud put it in her study Control and Consolation in American Culture and Politics, “the therapeutic […] dislocates political conflicts onto individuals or families, privatizes both the experience of oppression and possible modes of resistance to it, and translates political questions into psychological issues to be resolved through personal, psychological change.”6 Thus, while therapy may indeed deliver instant gratification, such remedies remain incredibly short-sighted as long as they address problems only at the level of the individual and do not point towards the larger, structural causes behind the bothersome symptoms.¶ What happens, then, if we take these observations yet a step further and apply them to the realm of politics? Does the same lesson not also pertain to typical attitudes towards the global “war on terror”? If our wars abroad are, by themselves, the cause of our various societal ills, then we just simply need to get out. While the general call for withdrawal is one that all who are concerned for human life should wholeheartedly endorse, we should not lose sight of the bigger picture. Blaming the war entirely for today’s various problems is far too easy, and such a diagnosis acts to obscure the raw truth that merely withdrawing from Afghanistan or Iraq without also addressing those wars’ structural causes will do nothing to prevent the next conflict. Indeed, to treat the wars simply as a misguided policy decision or as a monstrous aberration serves only to hide the sinister reality that the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were, in fact, created by the political and economic structures of our very own society. Ignoring this while simultaneously indulging in the happy consumerist fantasy would be tantamount to treating constipation with Žižek’s chocolate laxative. The path to war begins at home, and we must recognize that the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are also symptoms — symptoms of the capitalist empire.¶ Thus, in the same way that Fanon’s torturer wanted to carry on with his business of torturing, just without the bothersome nightmares, does not the liberal anti-war movement today seek to carry on with the business of capitalism, just without its malignant symptoms? Indeed, the economic disparities and grievances that lie behind many of the globe’s acts of violence — both by states and by terrorists — are never really addressed. To do so would, in fact, require a fundamental rethinking of the capitalist fabric of the US state, something nobody within the system is willing to do. To truly address these issues would require that we treat the cause of the symptoms rather than just the symptoms. Or, to put it another way, if we want to end the wars that are caused by capitalism, we must work to overturn the capitalist system itself. Just like those people who think they can lose weight merely by gorging on “healthy” junk food and just like Fanon’s torturer who wanted to cure his nightmares through therapy, those who today believe they can continue to enjoy their capitalist cake and eat it too — just without the unpleasantries of terrorism, torture, and war — are only kidding themselves.

### More History: Cap Fractured Coalitions

Greenberg 6 Cheryl Lynn, Paul E. Raether Distinguished Professor of History, Trinity College; “ Troubling the Waters: Black-Jewish Relations in the American Century” *Princeton University* Press; 2006; http://press.princeton.edu/chapters/i8154.html

The class tensions between most blacks and Jews that had long threatened their political collaboration intensified with the mass action of the 1960s. Jews’ greater success in achieving middle-class status made them hesitant to employ confrontational tactics and aroused their suspicion of outspoken black leaders. And to some extent, blacks and Jews began to diverge in their goals. If the desire for liberal civil rights legislation promoted a “grand alliance,” the struggle to define true equality and determine methods of enforcement spurred its unraveling.