# 1NC

## Resolve

#### We affirm the entirety of the 1ac except their advocacy of restriction on presidential war powers

#### Restrictions on presidential powers cause adversaries to doubt the resolve of U.S. deterrence – causes crisis escalation.

Waxman 8/25 [Matthew Waxman 8/25/13, Professor of Law – Columbia and Adjunct Senior Fellow for Law and Foreign Policy – CFR, “The Constitutional Power to Threaten War,” Forthcoming in Yale Law Journal, vol. 123, August 25, 2013, SSRN]

A claim previously advanced from a presidentialist perspective is that stronger legislative checks on war powers is harmful to coercive and deterrent strategies, because it **establishes easily-visible impediments to the President’s authority** to follow through on threats. This was a common policy argument during the War Powers Resolution debates in the early 1970s. Eugene Rostow, an advocate inside and outside the government for executive primacy, remarked during consideration of legislative drafts that **any serious restrictions** on presidential use of force would mean in practice that “no President could make a credible threat to use force as an instrument of deterrent diplomacy, even to head off **explosive confrontations.”**178 He continued:¶ In the tense and cautious diplomacy of our present relations with the Soviet Union, as they have developed over the last twenty-five years, the authority of the President to set clear and silent limits in advance is perhaps the most important of all the powers in our constitutional armory to prevent confrontations that could carry nuclear implications. … [I]t is the diplomatic power the President needs most under the circumstance of modern life—the power to make a credible threat to use force in order to prevent a confrontation **which might escalate.**179

#### Credible conventional deterrence checks nuclear aggression

Gerson 09

MICHAEL S. GERSON, research analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses, Policy Fellow with the ONE Campaign, a visiting fellow with the Center for Public Justice, and a former senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations,“Conventional Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age”, Strategic Studies Institute, Autumn 2009 //jchen

Although implicit or explicit nuclear threats may lack credibili- ty against non-WMD regimes, many potential adversaries believe that the United States will use conventional firepower, especially because America has conventional superiority and a demonstrated willingness to use it. Consequently, when dealing with non-WMD-related threats, conventional deterrence will be the most likely mechanism for deterring hostile actions.

According to Admiral Michael Mullen, the current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “A big part of credibility, of course, lies in our convention- al capability. The capability to project power globally and conduct effective theater-level operations . . . remains essential to deterrence effectiveness.”14

Conventional deterrence also plays an important role in preventing nonnuclear aggression by nuclear-armed regimes. Regional nuclear pro- liferation may not only increase the chances for the use of nuclear weap- ons, but, equally important, the possibility of conventional aggression. The potential for conventional conflict under the shadow of mutual nucle- ar deterrence was a perennial concern throughout the Cold War, and that scenario is still relevant. A nuclear-armed adversary may be emboldened to use conventional force against US friends and allies, or to sponsor ter- rorism, in the belief that its nuclear capabilities give it an effective deter- rent against US retaliation or intervention.15 For example, a regime might calculate that it could undertake conventional aggression against a neigh- bor and, after achieving a relatively quick victory, issue implicit or explicit nuclear threats in the expectation that the United States (and perhaps coali- tion partners) would choose not to get involved.

In this context, conventional deterrence can be an important mech- anism to limit options for regional aggression below the nuclear threshold. By deploying robust conventional forces in and around the theater of potential conflict, the United States can credibly signal that it can respond to conventional aggression at the outset, and therefore the opponent can- not hope to simultaneously achieve a quick conventional victory and use nuclear threats to deter US involvement. Moreover, if the United States can convince an opponent that US forces will be engaged at the beginning of hostilities—and will therefore incur the human and financial costs of war from the start—it can help persuade opponents that the United States would be highly resolved to fight even in the face of nuclear threats be- cause American blood and treasure would have already been expended.16 Similar to the Cold War, the deployment of conventional power in the re- gion, combined with significant nuclear capabilities and escalation dom- inance, can help prevent regimes from believing that nuclear possession provides opportunities for conventional aggression and coercion.

## FW

#### Our interpretation is that an affirmative should defend a topical action by the United States federal government.

#### Statutory is limits by legislation

Black's Law 6 Black's Law Dictionary Free Online Legal Dictionary 2nd Ed. 2006 http://thelawdictionary.org/statutory-restriction/

What is STATUTORY RESTRICTION?

Limits or controls that have been place on activities by its ruling legislation.

Judicial is by court or judge

Dean's Law Dictionary 12 <http://www.lawdictionaryonline.com/home_search.php>

Judicial:

adj. Of, relating to, or by the court or a judge. Pertaining or appropriate to courts of justice, or to a judge; practiced or conformed to in the administration of justice; sanctioned or ordered by a court; as, judicial power; judicial proceedings; a judicial sale. Fitted or apt for judging or de....

#### Most predictable—the agent and verb indicate a debate about hypothetical government action

Jon M Ericson 3, Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb combination. For example, should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action through governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase free trade, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

#### A general subject isn’t enough—debate requires a specific point of difference

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Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007.¶ Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference.¶ To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose.¶ Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### This is an independent voting issue – even if they don’t have to defend the state, they should defend a parametricization of their method. The aff only discusses issues with existing scholarship without proposing an alternative or defending an alternative system of knowledge- even if they do, they need to defend a particular context where that method should be applied.

#### ---The devil is in the details—the mechanism of statutory or judicial restrictions on war powers is the debate. Procedural requirements and their effectiveness determine whether we can or cannot curtail the military.

Dehn 11 John C. Dehn, Assistant Professor, Department of Law, United States Military Academy Temple Law Review Spring, 2011 83 Temp. L. Rev. 599 ARTICLE: THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF AND THE NECESSITIES OF WAR: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

B. The Constitutional Design and Military Regulation There is little question that the Framers adopted a new approach to command and control of national armed forces. By vesting Commander-in-Chief authority in the President while placing the authority to raise, maintain, govern, and regulate the military in Congress, the Constitution broke with the condition then existing in Great Britain. Alexander Hamilton described the difference as follows:¶ The president is to be commander in chief of the army and navy of the United States. In this respect his authority would be nominally the same with that of the king of Great Britain, but in substance much inferior to it. It would amount to nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces, as first general and admiral of the confederacy; while that of the British king extends to the declaring of war, and to the raising and regulating of fleets and armies; all which, by the constitution under consideration, would appertain to the legislature. [n57](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.328472.6824377424&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T18289623894&parent=docview&rand=1380754736175&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n57) While some commentary has suggested that this relative vesting of constitutional powers over the military implies that the President has no power to regulate the military, [n58](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.328472.6824377424&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T18289623894&parent=docview&rand=1380754736175&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n58) this is clearly inaccurate. The directive authority of military command equates to a near infinite power of internal regulation. [n59](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.328472.6824377424&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T18289623894&parent=docview&rand=1380754736175&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n59) A commander need not repeatedly issue the same order to assert his or her directive authority over routine tasks. Effective command requires that many directives be made generally applicable and remain in effect until rescinded or superseded. [n60](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.328472.6824377424&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T18289623894&parent=docview&rand=1380754736175&reloadEntirePage=true#n60) Therefore, some power to establish standing orders, or regulations, must necessarily exist. [n61](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.328472.6824377424&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T18289623894&parent=docview&rand=1380754736175&reloadEntirePage=true#n61) As Madison explained, "no axiom is more clearly established in law, or in reason, than that wherever the end is required, the means are authorized; wherever a general power to do a thing is given, every particular power necessary for doing it is included." [n62](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.328472.6824377424&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T18289623894&parent=docview&rand=1380754736175&reloadEntirePage=true#n62) This understanding was later echoed by Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland. [n63](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.328472.6824377424&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T18289623894&parent=docview&rand=1380754736175&reloadEntirePage=true#n63) [\*613] Equally clear was both Madison and Marshall's belief that these "necessary' powers are implied from the nature of the power expressly granted. [n64](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.328472.6824377424&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T18289623894&parent=docview&rand=1380754736175&reloadEntirePage=true#n64) The general directive authority intrinsic to "military command" is undoubtedly why the Supreme Court has consistently upheld the internal regulatory authority of the Commander-in-Chief and his subordinate commanders. [n65](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.328472.6824377424&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T18289623894&parent=docview&rand=1380754736175&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n65)

#### Vote neg—they undermine debate’s transformative potential—

#### 1. Preparation and clash—changing the topic post facto manipulates balance of prep, which structurally favors the aff because they speak last and permute alternatives—strategic fairness is key to engaging a well-prepared opponent

#### Topical fairness requirements are key to effective dialogue—monopolizing strategy and prep makes the discussion one-sided and subverts any meaningful neg role

Galloway 7—Samford Comm prof (Ryan, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 28, 2007)

Debate as a dialogue sets an argumentative table, where all parties receive a relatively fair opportunity to voice their position. Anything that fails to allow participants to have their position articulated denies one side of the argumentative table a fair hearing. The affirmative side is set by the topic and fairness requirements. While affirmative teams have recently resisted affirming the topic, in fact, the topic selection process is rigorous, taking the relative ground of each topic as its central point of departure.¶ Setting the affirmative reciprocally sets the negative. The negative crafts approaches to the topic consistent with affirmative demands. The negative crafts disadvantages, counter-plans, and critical arguments premised on the arguments that the topic allows for the affirmative team. According to fairness norms, each side sits at a relatively balanced argumentative table.¶ When one side takes more than its share, competitive equity suffers. However, it also undermines the respect due to the other involved in the dialogue. When one side excludes the other, it fundamentally denies the personhood of the other participant (Ehninger, 1970, p. 110). A pedagogy of debate as dialogue takes this respect as a fundamental component. A desire to be fair is a fundamental condition of a dialogue that takes the form of a demand for equality of voice. Far from being a banal request for links to a disadvantage, fairness is a demand for respect, a demand to be heard, a demand that a voice backed by literally months upon months of preparation, research, and critical thinking not be silenced.¶ Affirmative cases that suspend basic fairness norms operate to exclude particular negative strategies. Unprepared, one side comes to the argumentative table unable to meaningfully participate in a dialogue. They are unable to “understand what ‘went on…’” and are left to the whims of time and power (Farrell, 1985, p. 114). Hugh Duncan furthers this line of reasoning:¶ Opponents not only tolerate but honor and respect each other because in doing so they enhance their own chances of thinking better and reaching sound decisions. Opposition is necessary because it sharpens thought in action. We assume that argument, discussion, and talk, among free an informed people who subordinate decisions of any kind, because it is only through such discussion that we reach agreement which binds us to a common cause…If we are to be equal…relationships among equals must find expression in many formal and informal institutions (Duncan, 1993, p. 196-197).¶ Debate compensates for the exigencies of the world by offering a framework that maintains equality for the sake of the conversation (Farrell, 1985, p. 114).¶ For example, an affirmative case on the 2007-2008 college topic might defend neither state nor international action in the Middle East, and yet claim to be germane to the topic in some way. The case essentially denies the arguments that state action is oppressive or that actions in the international arena are philosophically or pragmatically suspect. Instead of allowing for the dialogue to be modified by the interchange of the affirmative case and the negative response, the affirmative subverts any meaningful role to the negative team, preventing them from offering effective “counter-word” and undermining the value of a meaningful exchange of speech acts. Germaneness and other substitutes for topical action do not accrue the dialogical benefits of topical advocacy.

#### 2. Substantive constraints on the debate are key to actualize effective pluralism and agonistic democracy

John Dryzek 6, Professor of Social and Political Theory, The Australian National University, Reconciling Pluralism and Consensus as Political Ideals, American Journal of Political Science,Vol. 50, No. 3, July 2006, Pp. 634–649

A more radical contemporary pluralism is suspicious of liberal and communitarian devices for reconciling difference. Such a critical pluralism is associated with agonists such as Connolly (1991), Honig (1993), and Mouffe (2000), and difference democrats such as Young (2000). As Honig puts it, “Difference is just another word for what used to be called pluralism” (1996, 60). Critical pluralists resemble liberals in that they begin from the variety of ways it is possible to experience the world, but stress that the experiences and perspectives of marginalized and oppressed groups are likely to be very different from dominant groups. They also have a strong suspicion ofliberal theory that looks neutral but in practice supports and serves the powerful.

Difference democrats are hostile to consensus, partly because consensus decisionmaking (of the sort popular in 1970s radical groups) conceals informal oppression under the guise of concern for all by disallowing dissent (Zablocki 1980). But the real target is political theory that deploys consensus, especially deliberative and liberal theory. Young (1996, 125–26) argues that the appeals to unity and the common good that deliberative theorists under sway of the consensus ideal stress as the proper forms of political communication can often be oppressive. For deliberation so oriented all too easily equates the common good with the interests of the more powerful, thus sidelining legitimate concerns of the marginalized. Asking the underprivileged to set aside their particularistic concerns also means marginalizing their favored forms of expression, especially the telling of personal stories (Young 1996, 126).3 Speaking for an agonistic conception of democracy (to which Young also subscribes; 2000, 49–51), Mouffe states:

To negate the ineradicable character of antagonism and aim at a universal rational consensus— that is the real threat to democracy. Indeed, this can lead to violence being unrecognized and hidden behind appeals to “rationality,” as is often the case in liberal thinking. (1996, 248)

Mouffe is a radical pluralist: “By pluralism I mean the end of a substantive idea of the good life” (1996, 246). But neither Mouffe nor Young want to abolish communication in the name of pluralism and difference; much of their work advocates sustained attention to communication. Mouffe also cautions against uncritical celebration of difference, for some differences imply “subordination and should therefore be challenged by a radical democratic politics” (1996, 247). Mouffe raises the question of the terms in which engagement across difference might proceed. Participants should ideally accept that the positions of others are legitimate, though not as a result of being persuaded in argument. Instead, it is a matter of being open to conversion due to adoption of a particular kind of democratic attitude that converts antagonism into agonism, fighting into critical engagement, enemies into adversaries who are treated with respect. Respect here is notjust (liberal) toleration, but positive validation of the position of others. For Young, a communicative democracy would be composed of people showing “equal respect,” under “procedural rules of fair discussion and decisionmaking” (1996, 126). Schlosberg speaks of “agonistic respect” as “a critical pluralist ethos” (1999, 70).

Mouffe and Young both want pluralism to be regulated by a particular kind of attitude, be it respectful, agonistic, or even in Young’s (2000, 16–51) case reasonable.Thus neither proposes unregulated pluralism as an alternative to (deliberative) consensus. This regulation cannot be just procedural, for that would imply “anything goes” in terms of the substance of positions. Recall thatMouffe rejects differences that imply subordination. Agonistic ideals demand judgments about what is worthy of respect and what is not. Connolly (1991, 211) worriesabout dogmatic assertions and denials of identity that fuel existential resentments that would have to be changed to make agonism possible. Young seeks “transformation of private, self-regarding desires into public appeals to justice” (2000, 51). Thus for Mouffe, Connolly, and Young alike, regulative principles for democratic communication are not just attitudinal or procedural; they also refer to the substance of the kinds of claims that are worthy of respect. These authors would not want to legislate substance and are suspicious of the content of any alleged consensus. But in retreating from “anything goes” relativism, they need principles to regulate the substance of what rightfully belongs in democratic debate.

#### Limited and prepared debate where both sides has an equitable distribution of arguments matters. It’s crucial to personal agency and is only possible in a switch-side debate format where debaters sometimes defend views they do not completely agree with

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(Patricia, "Fighting Without Hatred:Hannah Ar endt ' s Agonistic Rhetoric" JAC 22.2 2003)

Arendt is probably most famous for her analysis of totalitarianism (especially her The Origins of Totalitarianism andEichmann in Jerusa¬lem), but the recent attention has been on her criticism of mass culture (The Human Condition). Arendt's main criticism of the current human condition is that the common world of deliberate and joint action is fragmented into solipsistic and unreflective behavior. In an especially lovely passage, she says that in mass society people are all imprisoned in the subjectivity of their own singular experience, which does not cease to be singular if the same experience is multiplied innumerable times. The end of the common world has come when it is seen only under one aspect and is permitted to present itself in only one perspective. (Human 58) What Arendt so beautifully describes is that isolation and individualism are not corollaries, and may even be antithetical because obsession with one's own self and the particularities of one's life prevents one from engaging in conscious, deliberate, collective action. Individuality, unlike isolation, depends upon a collective with whom one argues in order to direct the common life. Self-obsession, even (especially?) when coupled with isolation from one' s community is far from apolitical; it has political consequences. Perhaps a better way to put it is that it is political precisely because it aspires to be apolitical. This fragmented world in which many people live simultaneously and even similarly but not exactly together is what Arendt calls the "social." Arendt does not mean that group behavior is impossible in the realm of the social, but that social behavior consists "in some way of isolated individuals, incapable of solidarity or mutuality, who abdicate their human capacities and responsibilities to a projected 'they' or 'it,' with disastrous consequences, both for other people and eventually for themselves" (Pitkin 79). One can behave, butnot act. For someone like Arendt, a German-assimilated Jew, one of the most frightening aspects of the Holocaust was the ease with which a people who had not been extraordinarily anti-Semitic could be put to work industriously and efficiently on the genocide of the Jews. And what was striking about the perpetrators of the genocide, ranging from minor functionaries who facilitated the murder transports up to major figures on trial at Nuremberg, was their constant and apparently sincere insistence that they were not responsible. For Arendt, this was not a peculiarity of the German people, but of the current human and heavily bureaucratic condition of twentieth-century culture: we do not consciously choose to engage in life's activities; we drift into them, or we do them out of a desire to conform. Even while we do them, we do not acknowledge an active, willed choice to do them; instead, we attribute our behavior to necessity, and we perceive ourselves as determined—determined by circumstance, by accident, by what "they" tell us to do. We do something from within the anonymity of a mob that we would never do as an individual; we do things for which we will not take responsibility. Yet, whether or not people acknowledge responsibil¬ity for the consequences of their actions, those consequences exist. Refusing to accept responsibility can even make those consequences worse, in that the people who enact the actions in question, because they do not admit their own agency, cannot be persuaded to stop those actions. They are simply doing their jobs. In a totalitarian system, however, everyone is simply doing his or her job; there never seems to be anyone who can explain, defend, and change the policies. Thus, it is, as Arendt says, rule by nobody. It is illustrative to contrast Arendt's attitude toward discourse to Habermas'. While both are critical of modern bureaucratic and totalitar¬ian systems, Arendt's solution is the playful and competitive space of agonism; it is not the rational-critical public sphere. The "actual content of political life" is "the joy and the gratification that arise out of being in company with our peers, out of acting together and appearing in public, out of inserting ourselves into the world by word and deed, thus acquiring and sustaining our personal identity and beginning something entirely new" ("Truth" 263). According to Seyla Benhabib, Arendt's public realm emphasizes the assumption of competition, and it "represents that space of appearances in which moral and political greatness, heroism, and preeminence are revealed, displayed, shared with others. This is a competitive space in which one competes for recognition, precedence, and acclaim" (78). These qualities are displayed, but not entirely for purposes of acclamation; they are not displays of one's self, but of ideas and arguments, of one's thought. When Arendt discusses Socrates' thinking in public, she emphasizes his performance: "He performed in the marketplace the way the flute-player performed at a banquet. It is sheer performance, sheer activity"; nevertheless, it was thinking: "What he actually did was to make public, in discourse, the thinking process" {Lectures 37). Pitkin summarizes this point: "Arendt says that the heroism associated with politics is not the mythical machismo of ancient Greece but something more like the existential leap into action and public exposure" (175-76). Just as it is not machismo, although it does have considerable ego involved, so it is not instrumental rationality; Arendt's discussion of the kinds of discourse involved in public action include myths, stories, and personal narratives. Furthermore, the competition is not ruthless; it does not imply a willingness to triumph at all costs. Instead, it involves something like having such a passion for ideas and politics that one is willing to take risks. One tries to articulate the best argument, propose the best policy, design the best laws, make the best response. This is a risk in that one might lose; advancing an argument means that one must be open to the criticisms others will make of it. The situation is agonistic not because the participants manufacture or seek conflict, but because conflict is a necessary consequence of difference. This attitude is reminiscent of Kenneth Burke, who did not try to find a language free of domination but who instead theorized a way that the very tendency toward hierarchy in language might be used against itself (for more on this argument, see Kastely). Similarly, Arendt does not propose a public realm of neutral, rational beings who escape differences to live in the discourse of universals; she envisions one of different people who argue with passion, vehemence, and integrity. Continued… Eichmann perfectly exemplified what Arendt famously called the "banal¬ity of evil" but that might be better thought of as the bureaucratization of evil (or, as a friend once aptly put it, the evil of banality). That is, he was able to engage in mass murder because he was able not to think about it, especially not from the perspective of the victims, and he was able to exempt himself from personal responsebility by telling himself (and anyone else who would listen) that he was just following orders. It was the bureaucratic system that enabled him to do both. He was not exactly passive; he was, on the contrary, very aggressive in trying to do his duty. He behaved with the "ruthless, competitive exploitation" and "inauthen-tic, self-disparaging conformism" that characterizes those who people totalitarian systems (Pitkin 87). Arendt's theorizing of totalitarianism has been justly noted as one of her strongest contributions to philosophy. She saw that a situation like Nazi Germany is different from the conventional understanding of a tyranny. Pitkin writes, Totalitarianism cannot be understood, like earlier forms of domination, as the ruthless exploitation of some people by others, whether the motive be selfish calculation, irrational passion, or devotion to some cause. Understanding totalitarianism's essential nature requires solving the central mystery of the holocaust—the objectively useless and indeed dysfunctional, fanatical pursuit of a purely ideological policy, a pointless process to which the people enacting it have fallen captive. (87) Totalitarianism is closely connected to bureaucracy; it is oppression by rules, rather than by people who have willfully chosen to establish certain rules. It is the triumph of the social. Critics (both friendly and hostile) have paid considerable attention to Arendt's category of the "social," largely because, despite spending so much time on the notion, Arendt remains vague on certain aspects of it. Pitkin appropriately compares Arendt's concept of the social to the Blob, the type of monster that figured in so many post-war horror movies. That Blob was "an evil monster from outer space, entirely external to and separate from us [that] had fallen upon us intent on debilitating, absorb¬ing, and ultimately destroying us, gobbling up our distinct individuality and turning us into robots that mechanically serve its purposes" (4). Pitkin is critical of this version of the "social" and suggests that Arendt meant (or perhaps should have meant) something much more complicated. The simplistic version of the social-as-Blob can itself be an instance of Blob thinking; Pitkin's criticism is that Arendt talks at times as though the social comes from outside of us and has fallen upon us, turning us into robots. Yet, Arendt's major criticism of the social is that it involves seeing ourselves as victimized by something that comes from outside our own behavior. I agree with Pitkin that Arendt's most powerful descriptions of the social (and the other concepts similar to it, such as her discussion of totalitarianism, imperialism, Eichmann, and parvenus) emphasize that these processes are not entirely out of our control but that they happen to us when, and because, we keep refusing to make active choices. We create the social through negligence. It is not the sort of force in a Sorcerer's Apprentice, which once let loose cannot be stopped; on the contrary, it continues to exist because we structure our world to reward social behavior. Pitkin writes, "From childhood on, in virtually all our institutions, we reward euphemism, salesmanship, slo¬gans, and we punish and suppress truth-telling, originality, thoughtful-ness. So we continually cultivate ways of (not) thinking that induce the social" (274). I want to emphasize this point, as it is important for thinking about criticisms of some forms of the social construction of knowledge: denying our own agency is what enables the social to thrive. To put it another way, theories of powerlessness are self-fulfilling prophecies. Arendt grants that there are people who willed the Holocaust, but she insists that totalitarian systems result not so much from the Hitlers or Stalins as from the bureaucrats who may or may not agree with the established ideology but who enforce the rules for no stronger motive than a desire to avoid trouble with their superiors (see Eichmann and Life). They do not think about what they do. One might prevent such occurrences—or, at least, resist the modern tendency toward totalitarian¬ism—by thought: "critical thought is in principle anti-authoritarian" (Lectures 38). By "thought" Arendt does not mean eremitic contemplation; in fact, she has great contempt for what she calls "professional thinkers," refusing herself to become a philosopher or to call her work philosophy. Young-Bruehl, Benhabib, and Pitkin have each said that Heidegger represented just such a professional thinker for Arendt, and his embrace of Nazism epitomized the genuine dangers such "thinking" can pose (see Arendt's "Heidegger"). "Thinking" is not typified by the isolated con¬templation of philosophers; it requires the arguments of others and close attention to the truth. It is easy to overstate either part of that harmony. One must consider carefully the arguments and viewpoints of others: Political thought is representative. I form an opinion by considering a given issue from different viewpoints, by making present to my mind the standpoints of those who are absent; that is, I represent them. This process of representation does not blindly adopt the actual views of those who stand somewhere else, and hence look upon the world from a different perspective; this is a question neither of empathy, as though I tried to be or to feel like somebody else, nor of counting noses and joining a majority but of being and thinking in my own identity where actually I am not. The more people's standpoints I have present in my mind while I am ponder¬ing a given issue, and the better I can imagine how I would feel and think if I were in their place, the stronger will be my capacity for represen¬tative thinking and the more valid my final conclusions, my opinion. ("Truth" 241) There are two points to emphasize in this wonderful passage. First, one does not get these standpoints in one's mind through imagining them, but through listening to them; thus, good thinking requires that one hear the arguments of other people. Hence, as Arendt says, "critical thinking, while still a solitary business, does not cut itself off from' all others.'" Thinking is, in this view, necessarily public discourse: critical thinking is possible "only where the standpoints of all others are open to inspection" (Lectures 43). Yet, it is not a discourse in which one simply announces one's stance; participants are interlocutors and not just speakers; they must listen. Unlike many current versions of public discourse, this view presumes that speech matters. It is not asymmetric manipulation of others, nor merely an economic exchange; it must be a world into which one enters and by which one might be changed. Second, passages like the above make some readers think that Arendt puts too much faith in discourse and too little in truth (see Habermas). But Arendt is no crude relativist; she believes in truth, and she believes that there are facts that can be more or less distorted. She does not believe that reality is constructed by discourse, or that truth is indistinguishable from falsehood. She insists tha^ the truth has a different pull on us and, consequently, that it has a difficult place in the world of the political. Facts are different from falsehood because, while they can be distorted or denied, especially when they are inconvenient for the powerful, they also have a certain positive force that falsehood lacks: "Truth, though powerless and always defe ated in a head-on clash with the powers that be, possesses a strength of its own: whatever those in power may contrive, they are unable to discover or invent a viable substitute for it. Persuasion and violence can destroy truth, but they cannot replace it" ("Truth" 259). Facts have a strangely resilient quality partially because a lie "tears, as it were, a hole in the fabric of factuality. As every historian knows, one can spot a lie by noticing incongruities, holes, or the j unctures of patched-up places" ("Truth" 253). While she is sometimes discouraging about our ability to see the tears in the fabric, citing the capacity of totalitarian governments to create the whole cloth (see "Truth" 252-54), she is also sometimes optimistic. InEichmann in Jerusalem, she repeats the story of Anton Schmidt—a man who saved the lives of Jews—and concludes that such stories cannot be silenced (230-32). For facts to exert power in the common world, however, these stories must be told. Rational truth (such as principles of mathematics) might be perceptible and demonstrable through individual contemplation, but "factual truth, on the contrary, is always related to other people: it concerns events and circumstances in which many are involved; it is established by witnesses and depends upon testimony; it exists only to the extent that it is spoken about, even if it occurs in the domain of privacy. It is political by nature" (23 8). Arendt is neither a positivist who posits an autonomous individual who can correctly perceive truth, nor a relativist who positively asserts the inherent relativism of all perception. Her description of how truth functions does not fall anywhere in the three-part expeditio so prevalent in bothrhetoric and philosophy: it is not expressivist, positivist, or social constructivist. Good thinking depends upon good public argument, and good public argument depends upon access to facts: "Freedom of opinion is a farce unless factual information is guaranteed" (238). The sort of thinking that Arendt propounds takes the form of action only when it is public argument, and, as such, it is particularly precious: "For if no other test but the experience of being active, no other measure but the extent of sheer activity were to be applied to the various activities within the vita activa, it might well be that thinking as such would surpass them all" (Human 325). Arendt insists that it is "the same general rule— Do not contradict yourself (not your self but your thinking ego)—that determines both thinking and acting" (Lectures 3 7). In place of the mildly resentful conformism that fuels totalitarianism, Arendt proposes what Pitkin calls "a tough-minded, open-eyed readiness to perceive and judge reality for oneself, in terms of concrete experience and independent, critical theorizing" (274). The paradoxical nature of agonism (that it must involve both individuality and commonality) makes it difficult to maintain, as the temptation is great either to think one's own thoughts without reference to anyone else or to let others do one's thinking. Arendt's Polemical Agonism As I said, agonism does have its advocates within rhetoric—Burke, Ong, Sloane, Gage, and Jarratt, for instance—but while each of these theorists proposes a form of conflictual argument, not one of these is as adversarial as Arendt's. Agonism can emphasize persuasion, as does John Gage's textbook The Shape of Reason or William Brandt et al.'s The Craft of Writing. That is, the goal of the argument is to identify the disagreement and then construct a text that gains the assent of the audience. This is not the same as what Gage (citing Thomas Conley) calls "asymmetrical theories of rhetoric": theories that "presuppose an active speaker and a passive audience, a speaker whose rhetorical task is therefore to do something to that audience" ("Reasoned" 6). Asymmetric rhetoric is not and cannot be agonistic. Persuasive agonism still values conflict, disagreement, and equality among interlocutors, but it has the goal of reaching agreement, as when Gage says that the process of argument should enable one's reasons to be "understood and believed" by others (Shape 5; emphasis added). Arendt's version is what one might call polemical agonism: it puts less emphasis on gaining assent, and it is exemplified both in Arendt's own writing and in Donald Lazere's "Ground Rules for Polemicists" and "Teaching the Political Conflicts." Both forms of agonism (persuasive and polemical) require substantive debate at two points in a long and recursive process. First, one engages in debate in order to invent one's argument; even silent thinking is a "dialogue of myself with myself (Lectures 40). The difference between the two approaches to agonism is clearest when one presents an argument to an audience assumed to be an opposition. In persuasive agonism, one plays down conflict and moves through reasons to try to persuade one's audience. In polemical agonism, however, one's intention is not necessarily to prove one's case, but to make public one' s thought in order to test it. In this way, communicability serves the same function in philosophy that replicability serves in the sciences; it is how one tests the validity of one's thought. In persuasive agonism, success is achieved through persuasion; in polemical agonism, success may be marked through the quality of subsequent controversy. Arendt quotes from a letter Kant wrote on this point: You know that I do not approach reasonable objections with the intention merely of refuting them, but that in thinking them over I always weave them into my judgments, and afford them the opportunity of overturning all my most cherished beliefs. I entertain the hope that by thus viewing my judgments impartially from the standpoint of others some third view that will improve upon my previous insight may be obtainable. {Lectures 42) Kant's use of "impartial" here is interesting: he is not describing a stance that is free of all perspective; it is impartial only in the sense that it is not his own view. This is the same way that Arendt uses the term; she does not advocate any kind of positivistic rationality, but instead a "universal interdependence" ("Truth" 242). She does not place the origin of the "disinterested pursuit of truth" in science, but at "the moment when Homer chose to sing the deeds of the Trojans no less than those of the Achaeans, and to praise the glory of Hector, the foe and the defeated man, no less than the glory of Achilles, the hero of his kinfolk" ("Truth" 262¬63). It is useful to note that Arendt tends not to use the term "universal," opting more often for "common," by which she means both what is shared and what is ordinary, a usage that evades many of the problems associated with universalism while preserving its virtues (for a brief butprovocative application of Arendt's notion of common, see Hauser 100-03). In polemical agonism, there is a sense in which one' s main goal is not to persuade one's readers; persuading one's readers, if this means that they fail to see errors and flaws in one' s argument, might actually be a sort of failure. It means that one wishes to put forward an argument that makes clear what one's stance is and why one holds it, but with the intention of provoking critique and counterargument. Arendt describes Kant's "hope" for his writings not that the number of people who agree with him would increase but "that the circle of his examiners would gradually be en¬larged" {Lectures 39); he wanted interlocutors, not acolytes. This is not consensus-based argument, nor is it what is sometimes called "consociational argument," nor is this argument as mediation or conflict resolution. Arendt (and her commentators) use the term "fight," and they mean it. When Arendt describes the values that are necessary in our world, she says, "They are a sense of honor, desire for fame and glory, the spirit of fighting without hatred and 'without the spirit of revenge,' and indifference to material advantages" {Crises 167). Pitkin summarizes Arendt's argument: "Free citizenship presupposes the ability to fight— openly, seriously, with commitment, and about things that really mat¬ter—without fanaticism, without seeking to exterminate one's oppo¬nents" (266). My point here is two-fold: first, there is not a simple binary opposition between persuasive discourse and eristic discourse, the conflictual versus the collaborative, or argument as opposed to debate. Second, while polemical agonismrequires diversity among interlocutors, and thus seems an extraordinarily appropriate notion, and while it may be a useful corrective to too much emphasis on persuasion, it seems to me that polemical agonism could easily slide into the kind of wrangling that is simply frustrating. Arendt does not describe just how one is to keep the conflict useful. Although she rejects the notion that politics is "no more than a battlefield of partial, conflicting interests, where nothing countfs] but pleasure and profit, partisanship, and the lust for dominion," she does not say exactly how we are to know when we are engaging in the existential leap of argument versus when we are lusting for dominion ("Truth" 263). Like other proponents of agonism, Arendt argues that rhetoric does not lead individuals or communities to ultimate Truth; it leads to decisions that will necessarily have to be reconsidered. Even Arendt, who tends to express a greater faith than many agonists (such as Burke, Sloane, or Kastely) in the ability of individuals to perceive truth, insists that self-deception is always a danger, so public discourse is necessary as a form of testing (see especially Lectures and "Truth"). She remarks that it is difficult to think beyond one's self-interest and that "nothing, indeed, is more common, even among highly sophisticated people, than the blind obstinacy that becomes manifest in lack of imagination and failure to judge" ("Truth" 242). Agonism demands that one simultaneously trust and doubt one' s own perceptions, rely on one's own judgment and consider the judgments of others, think for oneself and imagine how others think. The question remains whether this is a kind of thought in which everyone can engage. Is the agonistic public sphere (whether political, academic, or scientific) only available to the few? Benhabib puts this criticism in the form of a question: "That is, is the 'recovery of the public space' under conditions of modernity necessarily an elitist and antidemocratic project that can hardly be reconciled with the demand for universal political emancipa¬tion and the universal extension of citizenship rights that have accompa¬nied modernity since the American and French Revolutions?" (75). This is an especially troubling question not only because Arendt's examples of agonistic rhetoric are from elitist cultures, but also because of com¬ments she makes, such as this one from The Human Condition: "As a living experience, thought has always been assumed, perhaps wrongly, to be known only to the few. It may not be presumptuous to believe that these few have not become fewer in our time" {Human 324). Yet, there are important positive political consequences of agonism. Arendt' s own promotion of the agonistic sphere helps to explain how the system could be actively moral. It is not an overstatement to say that a central theme in Arendt's work is the evil of conformity—the fact that the modern bureaucratic state makes possible extraordinary evil carried out by people who do not even have any ill will toward their victims. It does so by "imposing innumerable and various rules, all of which tend to 'normalize' its members, to make them behave, to exclude spontaneous action or outstanding achievement" (Human 40). It keeps people from thinking, and it keeps them behaving. The agonistic model's celebration of achievement and verbal skill undermines the political force of conformity, so it is a force against the bureaucratizing of evil. If people think for themselves, they will resist dogma; if people think of themselves as one of many, they will empathize; if people can do both, they will resist totalitarianism. And if they talk about what they see, tell their stories, argue about their perceptions, and listen to one another—that is, engage in rhetoric—then they are engaging in antitotalitarian action. In post-Ramistic rhetoric, it is a convention to have a thesis, and one might well wonder just what mine is—whether I am arguing for or against Arendt's agonism. Arendt does not lay out a pedagogy for us to follow (although one might argue that, if she had, it would lookmuch like the one Lazere describes in "Teaching"), so I am not claiming that greater attention to Arendt would untangle various pedagogical problems that teachers of writing face. Nor am I claiming that applying Arendt's views will resolve theoretical arguments that occupy scholarly journals. I am saying, on the one hand, that Arendt's connection of argument and thinking, as well as her perception that both serve to thwart totalitarian¬ism, suggest that agonal rhetoric (despite the current preference for collaborative rhetoric) is the best discourse for a diverse and inclusive public sphere. On the other hand, Arendt's advocacy of agonal rhetoric is troubling (and, given her own admiration for Kant, this may be intentional), especially in regard to its potential elitism, masculinism, failure to describe just how to keep argument from collapsing into wrangling, and apparently cheerful acceptance of hierarchy. Even with these flaws, Arendt describes something we would do well to consider thoughtfully: a fact-based but not positivist, communally grounded but not relativist, adversarial but not violent, independent but not expressivist rhetoric.

#### Academic debate over policy issues like the response to War Powers is critical to improve policymaking

Stephen M. Walt 11, Professor of International Affairs at Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, July 21, “International Affairs and the Public Sphere”, http://publicsphere.ssrc.org/walt-international-affairs-and-the-public-sphere/

Academics can make at least three distinct contributions to public discourse on global affairs. First, although the digital revolution has made a wealth of information from around the world accessible on a near real-time basis, most of us still lack both extensive direct data on events in far-flung areas and the background knowledge necessary to understand what new developments mean. If our town’s school district is troubled or the local economy is suffering, we can observe that for ourselves and make reasonably well-informed judgments about what might be done about it. But if the issue is the war in Afghanistan, an uprising in Yemen, a naval confrontation in the South China Sea or the prospects that some battered economy will be bailed out successfully, most of us will lack the factual knowledge or conceptual understanding to know what is really going on. Even when basic information is readily available, it may be hard for most of us to put it in the appropriate context or make sense of what it means. ¶ When citizens and leaders seek to grasp the dizzying complexity of modern world politics, therefore, they must inevitably rely upon the knowledge and insights of specialists in military affairs, global trade and finance, diplomatic/international historians, area experts, and many others. And that means relying at least in part on academic scholars who have devoted their careers to mastering various aspects of world affairs and whose professional stature has been established through the usual procedures of academic evaluation (e.g., peer review, confidential assessments by senior scholars, the give-and-take of scholarly debate, etc.). ¶ Second, and more importantly, an independent academic community is an essential counterweight to official efforts to shape public understanding of key foreign policy issues. Governments enjoy enormous information asymmetries in many areas of political life, but these advantages are especially pronounced when dealing with international affairs.[5] Much of what we know about the outside world is ultimately derived from government sources (especially when dealing with national security affairs), and public officials often go to considerable lengths to shape how that information is reported to the public. Not only do governments collect vast amounts of information about the outside world, but they routinely use secrecy laws to control public access to this information. Government officials can shape public beliefs by leaking information strategically, or by co-opting sympathetic journalists whose professional success depends in part on maintaining access to key officials.[6] Given these information asymmetries and their obvious interest in retaining public support for their preferred policies, it is hardly surprising that both democratic and non-democratic leaders use their privileged access to information to build support for specific policies, at times by telling outright lies to their own citizens.[7] ¶ This situation creates few problems when the policies being sold make good strategic sense, but the results can be disastrous when they don’t. In such cases, alternative voices are needed to challenge conventional wisdoms and official rationales, and to suggest different solutions to the problem(s) at hand. Because scholars are protected by tenure and cherish the principle of academic freedom, and because they are not directly dependent on government support for their livelihoods, they are uniquely positioned to challenge prevailing narratives and policy rationales and to bring their knowledge and training to bear on vital policy issues. If we believe that unfettered debate helps expose errors and correct missteps, thereby fostering more effective public policies, then a sophisticated, diverse and engaged scholarly community is essential to a healthy polity. ¶ Third, the scholarly world also offers a potentially valuable model of constructive political disagreement. Political discourse in many countries (and especially the United States) has become increasingly personal and ad hominem, with little attention paid to facts and logic; a trend reinforced by an increasingly competitive and loosely regulated media environment. Within academia, by contrast, even intense disputes are supposed to be conducted in accordance with established canons of logic and evidence. Ad hominem attacks and other forms of character assassination have no place in scholarly discourse and are more likely to discredit those who employ them than those who are attacked. By bringing the norms of academic discourse into the public sphere, academic scholars could help restore some of the civility that has been lost in recent years. ¶ For all of these reasons, it is highly desirable for university-based scholars to play a significant role in public discourse about key real-world issues and to engage directly with policymakers where appropriate. As I have argued elsewhere, academic research can provide policymakers with relevant factual knowledge, provide typologies and frameworks that help policymakers and citizens make sense of emerging trends, and create and test theories that leaders can use to choose among different policy instruments. Academic theories can also be useful when they help policymakers anticipate events, when they identify recurring tendencies or obstacles to success, and when they facilitate the formulation of policy alternatives and the identification of benchmarks that can guide policy evaluation. Because academic scholars are free from daily responsibility for managing public affairs, they are in an ideal position to develop new concepts and theories to help us understand a complex and changing world.[8] ¶ The picture sketched here is obviously something of an ideal type, and I am not suggesting that that the academic world consistently lives up to these expectations. As noted above, university-based scholars of international affairs—and especially the disciplines of political science and history—have increasingly focused on narrow and arcane topics and are contributing less and less to policy formation or public discourse.[9] And when academics do address topics of obvious policy relevance or public interest, the results are often presented in impenetrable, jargon-ridden prose and disseminated in venues that neither policymakers nor the public are likely to read. Even when scholars have something useful to say, in short, their tendency to “speaking in tongues” diminishes their impact on the public sphere**.** ¶Why Is There a Gap between Academia and the Public Sphere?¶ To some degree, the gap between the ivory tower and the world of policy arises because the two spheres have different agendas and operate under different incentives and constraints. Academics focus on developing generalizations and testing conjectures as rigorously as possible, while policymakers and the public are often preoccupied with individual cases (i.e., whatever is in the headlines or in a policymaker’s in-tray). Thus, scholars are delighted whenever they identify a powerful general tendency, but policymakers may be more interested in figuring out how to overcome that general tendency or worried that the case at hand might be an exception to it. Academics strive to make their work as accurate as possible, even if this takes more time, but policymakers cannot always wait until a complete analysis is possible.[10] To take a recent example, policymakers in the Obama administration had to respond to the 2011 “Arab Spring” long before anyone fully understood what was driving these events or where they might lead. Given these different agendas, it is not surprising that policymakers often find academic scholarship to be of less value than the scholars who produce it might wish.

## Cap K

#### Storytelling as a political strategy prevents necessary conceptual analysis of history – storytelling creates a false consciousness which prevents any change from the status quo

Zavarzadeh, 2003

(Mas'ud, “The Pedagogy of Totality,” Journal of Advanced Composition Theory 23.1, http://redcritique.org/FallWinter2003/thepedagogyoftotality.htm)

Michael Berube's essay in *The Chronicle of Higher Education* (October 5, 2001, B-5) is exemplary of the lessons in empathy to avoid the analytical. It is rhetorically a masterful lesson in the erasure of all traces of thinking about the "event" in part because it preemptively announces itself as an intervention in ignorance ("Ignorance Is a Luxury We Cannot Afford"). After describing how he had shelved "the course assignments" in his classes to devote "most of the rest of the week…to a discussion of [students's] reactions to the attack", he narrates a range of readings of the "event" and concludes that the "most troubling" analyses of the "event" were from the political left, some of which were coming uncomfortably close to justifying the indiscriminate slaughter of innocents. Many students immediately connected the attack to various American operations in the Middle East, and I wanted them to be very careful about how they made those connections. Of course, I said, of course the attacks must be placed in the broader context of the history of U.S. foreign policy in Asia and the Middle East. But any analysis that did not start from a position of solidarity with, and compassion for, the victims, their families, and the extraordinary rescue workers in New York and Washington was an analysis not worth time and attention (B-5). What Berube's teaching seeks is moral clarity, which has become the conservative touchstone in reading the "event" (William J. Bennett, Why We Fight: Moral Clarity and the War on Terrorism) not analytical critique. Berube moves quickly to block by "clarification" any attempt at such a critique by saturating the session with details (what he calls "background information"): "Very well, some students replied, but what does it mean to 'place the attacks in the broader context of U.S. foreign policy'? Here, not surprisingly, what my students wanted and needed most was basic background information" (B-5). What follows, in the name of curing ignorance, are stories about U.S. foreign policy but no conceptual analysis: Was it true, they asked, that the CIA once financed and trained bin Laden? Well, yes, I said, but at the time, in the 1980s, we financed just about anyone who showed up and offered to drive the Soviets out of Afghanistan. No, we didn't have the same kind of relationship to bin Laden that we had to Noriega or Pinochet or the Shah or Somoza or any of the other dictators we'd propped up in the course of waging the cold war. The "story" in contemporary pedagogy (which has opportunistically concluded that knowledge is a story and all concepts are tropes) performs an essential ideological task: it offers a non-explanatory explanation and thus constructs an "enlightened false consciousness" in the classroom (Peter Sloterdijk, *Critique of Cynical Reason*, 5-6). Teaching by stories produces knowingness not knowledge and consequently cultivates a savvy cynicism about ideas, analysis, and explanation. It rejects causal explanations (in fact it dismisses the very idea of "cause-effect") and puts in its place vaguely plotted details that hint at moving but have no analytical yield: the pleasures of stories replace the cognitive. This is important because no account of the "event" can forget the CIA. However, most accounts of the "event", evoke the CIA to obscure its role by telling CIA stories of high intrigue in exotic lands and thus divert attention from the other CIA whose role is crucial in understanding the "event". The CIA which is openly discussed and critiqued to obtain radical credentials for the story-teller is, as Berube's tale demonstrates, a political agency of the US Government. The other CIA—the one that is covered up by these narrative details—is only officially a political agency of the State. In practice, it is the gendarme of American capitalism: it is an economic not a political outfit.

#### The continued existence of capitalism forms the basis for all inequalities and oppressions. We do not deny that racialized violence happens and is important to address, but absent a rejection of the class system racism will continue to be deployed as a means to divide and rule the working class and to preserve increasingly wide material disparities.

Taylor 11 [Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor, doctoral candidate in the department of African-American studies at Northwestern University, Race, class and Marxism, January 4, 2011 http://socialistworker.org/2011/01/04/race-class-and-marxism]

Marxists argue that capitalism is a system that is based on the exploitation of the many by the few. Because it is a system based on gross inequality, it requires various tools to divide the majority--racism and all oppressions under capitalism serve this purpose. Moreover, oppression is used to justify and "explain" unequal relationships in society that enrich the minority that live off the majority's labor. Thus, racism developed initially to explain and justify the enslavement of Africans--because they were less than human and undeserving of liberty and freedom. Everyone accepts the idea that the oppression of slaves was rooted in the class relations of exploitation under that system. Fewer recognize that under capitalism, wage slavery is the pivot around which all other inequalities and oppressions turn. Capitalism used racism to justify plunder, conquest and slavery, but as Karl Marx pointed out, it also used racism to divide and rule--to pit one section of the working class against another and thereby blunt class consciousness. To claim, as Marxists do, that racism is a product of capitalism is not to deny or diminish its importance or impact in American society. It is simply to explain its origins and the reasons for its perpetuation. Many on the left today talk about class as if it is one of many oppressions, often describing it as "classism." What people are really referring to as "classism" is elitism or snobbery, and not the fundamental organization of society under capitalism. Moreover, it is popular today to talk about various oppressions, including class, as intersecting. While it is true that oppressions can reinforce and compound each other, they are born out of the material relations shaped by capitalism and the economic exploitation that is at the heart of capitalist society. In other words, it is the material and economic structure of society that gave rise to a range of ideas and ideologies to justify, explain and help perpetuate that order. In the United States, racism is the most important of those ideologies.

#### The unchecked spread of neoliberal capitalism necessitates extermination in the name of profit – ensures poverty and environmental and cultural destruction, culminating in eventual extinction.

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Neo-liberal capitalism, in being primarily about expanding opportunities for large multinational companies, has undermined the power of nation¬states and exacerbated the negative effects of globalization on such services as healthcare, education, water and transport (Martinez and Garcia, 2000). However, the current hegemonic role of business in schooling is para¬mount in convincing workers and future workers that socialism is off the agenda. Marxist educators and other Left radicals should expose this myth. Students have a right to discuss different economic and political systems such as twenty-first-century democratic socialism. This is particularly press¬ing given the current economic recession. It is easier in general for discussion in schools to embrace issues of gender, “race,” disability, sexual orientation, and social class when social class relates just to attainment than to address social class in the context of overthrowing capitalism, and replacing it with world democratic socialism, where participatory democracy is central. The latter may thus be seen as the last taboo, and, of course, understandably so. It is time to move forward and bring such discussions into schools, colleges, and universities, Marxist and other Left educators can make the case that such considerations are a perfectly reasonable democratic demand. Global capitalism is out of control, and the very survival of our planet is dependent on dialogical education that considers the socialist alternative, an alternative distanced from the distortions of Marx by Stalinism. No longer can socialism be divorced from environmental and ecologi¬cal issues. McLaren and Houston (2005, p, 167) have argued that “escalat¬ing environmental problems at all geographical scales from local to global have become a pressing reality that critical educators can no longer afford to ignore.” They go on to cite “the complicity between global profiteering, resource colonization, and the wholesale ecological devastation that has become a matter of everyday life for most species on the planet.” Following Kahn (2003), they state the need for “a critical dialogue between social and eco-justice” (McLaren and Houston 2005, p. 168). They call for a dialec¬tics of ecological and environmental justice to reveal the malign interaction between capitalism, imperialism, and ecology that has created widespread environmental degradation that has dramatically accelerated with the onset of neo-liberalism. World capitalism’s environmentally racist (Bullard et al., 2007) effects in both the “developing” and “developed” world should be discussed openly and freely in the educational institutions. As far as the “developing world” is concerned, there are, for example, such issues as the environmentally dev-astating method of extraction of natural resources utilized by multinational corporations in numerous “developing” countries that have devastated eco-systems and destroyed cultures and livelihoods (World Council of Churches, 1994, cited in Robinson, 2000), with toxic waste polluting groundwater, soil and the atmosphere (e.g., Robinson, 2000). In addition, there is trans¬boundary dumping of hazardous waste by developed countries to develop¬ing nations, usually in sub-Sahara Africa (e.g., Ibitayo et al., 2008; see also Blanco, 2010 on Latin America). As far as the “developed” world is concerned, in the U.S., for example, people of color are concentrated around hazardous waste facilities-more than half of the nine million people living within two miles of such facilities are minorities (Bullard et al., 2007). Finally, there is the ubiquitous issue of climate change, itself linked to the totally destructive impact of capitalism. Joel Kovel (2010) has described cli-mate change as “a menace without parallel in the whole history of humanity.” However, on a positive note, he argues that “[it]s spectacular and dramatic character can generate narratives capable of arousing general concern and thus provide a stimulus to build movements of resistance.” Climate change is linked to loss to the planet of living things—also a rallying point for young people. For Marxist educators, this provides a good inroad for linking envi¬ronment, global capitalism, and arguments for the socialist alternative. As Kovel (2010) puts it, only within the framework of a revolutionary ecoso- cialist society can we deal with the twinned crises of climate change and spe¬cies loss—and others as well—within a coherent program centered around the flourishing of life.” Capitalism and the destruction of the environment are inextricably linked, to the extent that it is becoming increasingly apparent that saving the environment is dependent on the destruction of capitalism. Debate should therefore include a consideration of the connections between global capital¬ism and environmental destruction, as well as a discussion of the socialist alternative. The need for environmental issues to be allied to socialism is paramount. As Nick Beams (2009) notes, all the “green” opponents of Marxism view “the overthrow of the capitalist system by means of the socialist revolution as the key to resolving the problems of global warming” as either “unrealis¬tic,” “not immediate enough,” or believe that socialism is hostile to nature. Beams (ibid.) argues that, in reality, “the system of market relations is based on the separation of the producers from the means of production, and it is this separation—-the metabolic rift between [human beings] and nature— that is the source of the crisis.” In other words, instead of the real producers of wealth (the working class) having control over what they produce and rationally assigning this to human need, goods are irrationally produced for profit. Beams (ibid.) quotes Marx (1894 [1966] p. 959) as follows: Freedom. ..can consist only in this, that socialised man, the associated pro¬ducers, govern the human metabolism with nature in a rational way, bringing it under their collective control instead of being dominated by it as a blind power; accomplishing it with the least expenditure of energy and in conditions most worthy and appropriate for their human nature. As Beams (2009) concludes, “[f]ar from Marx being outdated, the world has, so to speak, caught up with Marx.”

#### The role of the ballot is to endorse the best political strategy for addressing all manifestations of exploitation and oppression. Debates about transforming society must center on what constitutes the best method for addressing ongoing struggles

McGregor 13 [Sheila McGregor Marxism and women’s oppression today International Socialism Issue: 138 Posted: 10 April 13 http://www.isj.org.uk/index.php4?id=885&issue=138]

Revolutionary socialists take part in all struggles against exploitation and oppression, whether they are against austerity measures, sexual violence, the impact of war, police racism or the growth of fascist organisations, attempting to unite the maximum number of forces in any given struggle. At the same time, revolutionary socialists are concerned not only with combatting the particular effects of exploitation and oppression, but also with taking the struggle forward so as to break the very chains of exploitation, which give rise to all forms of oppression. Thus involvement in struggle is both a practical question of how best to build a protest or strike and an ideological question of how to win those you are struggling alongside to an understanding that it is not enough to win over the particular struggle, but that what is required is a revolutionary transformation of society. When people embark on a struggle over an issue, they usually come with a mixture of ideas about the society they live in, what they are fighting for and how best to achieve their goal. Inherent in any struggle is a debate about how to take it forward. Struggles against sexism are no exception to this.

#### Only beginning with class relations can eliminate the ideological machinery which legitimizes and extends class domination and racist practices. Materialist critique of the historical relationship between the means of production and the process of racialization in the United States should mark the starting point of the transformation of exploitative class and market relations.

San Juan 8 [E. San Juan, Jr., Filipino American literary academic, mentor, cultural reviewer, civic intellectual, activist, writer, essayist, video/film maker, editor, and poet whose works related to the Filipino Diaspora in English and Filipino languages have been translated into German, Russian, French, Italian, and Chinese.[2] As an author of books on race and cultural studies,[3] he was a “major influence on the academic world”.[2] He was the director of the Philippines Cultural Studies Center in Storrs, Connecticut in the United States.[1] In 1999, San Juan, Jr. received the Centennial Award for Achievement in Literature from the Cultural Center of the Philippines because of his contributions to Filipino and Filipino American Studies.[2] FROM RACE/RACISM TO CLASS STRUGGLE: On Critical Race Theory Posted on October 4, 2008 FROM RACE TO CLASS STRUGGLE: A RE-TURN OF CRITICAL RACE THEORY, THE PHILIPPINES MATRIX PROJECT http://philcsc.wordpress.com/2008/10/04/from-raceracism-to-class-struggle-on-critical-race-theory/]

Given its composition, and the pervasive climate of reaction, the Forum could not of course endorse a radical approach that would focus on the elimination of the exploitation of labor (labor power as commodity) as a necessary first step. Given its limits, it could not espouse a need for a thoroughgoing change of the material basis of social production and reproduction—the latter involving the hegemonic rule of the propertied bloc in each society profiting from the unequal division of labor and the unequal distribution of social wealth—on which the institutional practices of racism (apartheid, discrimination, genocide) thrive. “Race is the modality in which class is lived,” as Stuart Hall remarks concerning post-1945 Britain (Solomos 1986, 103). Without the political power in the hands of the democratic-popular masses under the leadership of the working class, the ideological machinery (laws, customs, religion, state bureaucracy) that legitimizes class domination, with its attendant racist practices, cannot be changed. What is required is a revolutionary process that mobilizes a broad constituency based on substantive equality and social justice as an essential part of the agenda to dissolve class structures; any change in the ideas, beliefs, and norms would produce changes in the economic, political and social institutions, which would in turn promote wide-ranging changes in social relations among groups, sectors, and so on. Within a historical-materialist framework, the starting point and end point for analyzing the relations between structures in any sociohistorical totality cannot be anything else but the production and reproduction of material existence. The existence of any totality follows transformation rules whereby it is constantly being restructured into a new formation (Harvey 1973). These rules reflect the dialectical unfolding of manifold contradictions constituting the internal relations of the totality. Within this conflicted, determinate totality, race cannot be reduced to class, nor can class be subsumed by race, since those concepts express different forms of social relations. What is the exact relation between the two? This depends on the historical character of the social production in question and the ideological-political class struggles defining it. In his valuable treatise, The Invention of the White Race, Theodore Allen has demonstrated the precise genealogy and configuration of racism in the U.S. It first manifested itself when the European colonial settlers based on private property in land and resources subdued another social order based on collective, tribal tenure of land and resources, denying the latter any social identity—“social death” for Native Americans. We then shift our attention to the emergence of the white race and its system of racial oppression with the defeat of Bacon’s Rebellion in 1677 and the establishment of a system of lifetime hereditary bond servitude (for African Americans): “The insistence on the social distinction between the poorest member of the oppressor group and any member, however propertied, of the oppressed group, is the hallmark of racial oppression” (Allen 1997, 243). In effect, white supremacy defining the nature of civil society was constructed at a particular historical conjuncture demanded by class war. The result is a flexible and adjustable system that can adjust its racial dynamics in order to divide the subordinates, resist any critique of its ideological legitimacy, and prevent any counter-hegemonic bloc of forces from overthrowing class rule. Class struggle intervenes through its impact in the ideological-political sphere of civil society. Racial categories operate through the mediation of civil society which (with the class-manipulated State) regulate personal relations through the reifying determinations of value, market exchange, and capital. Harry Chang comments on the social mediation of racial categories: “Blacks and whites constitute social blocks in a developed setting of ‘mass society’ in which social types (instead of persons) figure as basic units of economic and political management…The crucial intervention of objectification, i.e., relational poles conceived as the intrinsic quality of objects in relation, must not be neglected here. Racial formation in a country is an aspect of class formation, but the reason races are not classes lies in this objectification process (or fetishization)” (1985, 43). Commodity fetishism enables the ideology of racism (inferiority tied to biology, genetics, cultural attributes) to register its effects in common-sense thinking and routine behavior in class-divided society (Lukacs 1971). Because market relations hide unequal power relations, sustained ideological critique and transformative collective actions are imperative. This signifies the heuristic maxim of “permanent revolution” (Lefevbre 1968, 171) in Marxist thought: any long-term political struggle to abolish capitalism as a system of extracting surplus value through a system of the unequal division of labor (and rewards) needs to alter the institutions and practices of civil society that replicate and strengthen the fetishizing or objectifying mechanism of commodity production and exchange (the capitalist mode of production). If racism springs from the reification of physical attributes (skin color, eye shape) to validate the differential privileges in a bourgeois regime, then the abolition of labor-power as a commodity will be a necessary if not sufficient step in doing away with the conditions that require racial privileging of certain groups in class-divided formations. Racism is not an end in itself but, despite its seeming autonomy, an instrumentality of class rule.

#### Centering class in our analysis does not deny individuals’ experiences of racism and violence. Instead, beginning from the question of class as primary antagonism enables more effective struggles against race and other manifestations of oppression.

Smith 6 [Sharon Smith is also the author of Women and Socialism: Essays on Women’s Liberation (Haymarket Books, 2005). Her writings appear regularly in Socialist Worker newspaper and the ISR. Race, class, and "whiteness theory" ISR Issue 46, March–April 2006 http://isreview.org/issues/46/whiteness.shtml]

Meyerson counters this set of assumptions, proposing that Marx’s emphasis on the centrality of class relations brings oppression to the forefront, as a precondition for working-class unity: Marxism properly interpreted emphasizes the primacy of class in a number of senses. One, of course, is the primacy of the working class as a revolutionary agent—a primacy which does not, as often thought, render women and people of color “secondary.” Such an equation of white male and working class, as well as a corresponding division between a “white” male working class identity and all the others, whose identity is thereby viewed as either primarily one of gender and race or hybrid, is a view this essay contests all along the way. The primacy of class means that building a multiracial, multi-gendered international working-class organization or organizations should be the goal of any revolutionary movement: the primacy of class puts the fight against racism and sexism at the center. The intelligibility of this position is rooted in the explanatory primacy of class analysis for understanding the structural determinants of race, gender and class oppression. Oppression is multiple and intersecting but its causes are not.18 Designating class as the primary antagonism in capitalist society bears no inference on the “importance” of racism, as Roediger claims. Marxism merely assumes a causal relationship—that white supremacy as a system was instituted by capital, to the detriment of labor as a whole. Marxist theory rests on the assumption that white workers do not benefit from a system of white supremacy. Indeed, Marx argued of slavery, the most oppressive of all systems of exploitation, “In the United States of America, every independent workers’ movement was paralyzed as long as slavery disfigured part of the republic. Labor cannot emancipate itself in the white skin where in the black it is branded.”19 Marx was not alone in assuming that racism, by dividing the working class along ideological lines, harmed the class interests of both white and Black workers. Abolitionist Frederick Douglass stated unambiguously of slaveholders, “They divided both to conquer each.”20 Douglass elaborated, “Both are plundered and by the same plunderers. The slave is robbed by his master, of all his earnings above what is required for his physical necessities; and the white man is robbed by the slave system, because he is flung into competition with a class of laborers who work without wages.”21 Capitalism forces workers to compete with each other. The unremitting pressure from a layer of workers—be they low-wage or unemployed—is a constant reminder that workers compete for limited jobs that afford a decent standard of living. The working class has no interest in maintaining a system that thrives upon inequality and oppression. Indeed, all empirical evidence shows quite the opposite. When the racist poll tax was passed in the South, imposing property and other requirements designed to shut out Black voters, many poor whites also lost the right to vote. After Mississippi passed its poll tax law, the number of qualified white voters fell from 130,000 to 68,000.22 The effects of segregation extended well beyond the electoral arena. Jim Crow segregation empowered only the rule of capital. Whenever employers have been able to use racism to divide Black from white workers, preventing unionization, both Black and white workers earn lower wages. This is just as true in recent decades as it was 100 years ago. Indeed, as Shawki points out of the 1970s, “In a study of major metropolitan areas Michael Reich found a correlation between the degree of income inequality between whites and Blacks and the degree of income inequality between whites.”23 The study concluded: But what is most dramatic—in each of these blue-collar groups, the Southern white workers earned less than Northern Black workers. Despite the continued gross discrimination against Black skilled craftsmen in the North, the “privileged” Southern whites earned 4 percent less than they did. Southern male white operatives averaged…18 percent less than Northern Black male operatives. And Southern white service workers earned…14 percent less than Northern Black male service workers.”24 Racism against Blacks and other racially oppressed groups serves both to lower the living standards of the entire working class and to weaken workers’ ability to fight back. Whenever capitalists can threaten to replace one group of workers with another—poorly paid—group of workers, neither group benefits. Thus, the historically nonunion South has not only depressed the wages of Black workers, but also lowered the wages of Southern white workers overall—and prevented the labor movement from achieving victory at important junctures. So even in the short term the working class as a whole has nothing to gain from oppression.

#### The noble intentions of the affirmative’s political approach do not absolve it of its sins of complicity with the violent project of capitalism. Any attempt to rectify the flaws of the 1AC as a rhetorical artifact are at best disingenuous and should be rejected.

Tomlinson 13 [Barbara Tomlinson, Department of Feminist Studies, University of California, Santa Barbara, To Tell the Truth and Not Get Trapped: Desire, Distance, and Intersectionality at the Scene of Argument, Signs, Vol. 38, No. 4, Summer 2013]

Structures of dominance are the conditions of possibility for antisubordination arguments. Feminists cannot escape all the traps set by the racialized and gendered history of the disciplines, but we can destabilize them, explore their contradictions, and work through them to open up new possibilities. Yet intending our arguments to be resistant or oppositional cannot make them so. Discursive effects cannot be known in advance or assumed to reflect the intentions of those who argue; we cannot know fully or control the consequences of our own roles in the circulation of discourses. Rather, as Michel Foucault argues, “We must make allowance for the complex and unstable process whereby discourse can be both an instrument and an effect of power, but also a stumbling block, a point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy” (1980, 101). The specific arguments we make, their rhetorical form and evidence, and the consequences we draw from them all can be points of resistance or stumbling blocks that trap us into deploying dominant discourses when we think we are resisting them. Yet these discourses are what we have—the sites, the circumstances, and the means—to understand ourselves and change our conditions. Because we lack a fully theorized understanding of the scene of argument as a shared social space, we often consign rhetorical choices to matters of private choice and personal style. Yet while much of the labor that goes into writing is conducted in solitude, writing is a quintessentially social act. All writers enter a dialogue already in progress. “The word in language,” Bakhtin observes, “is half someone else’s” (1981, 293). The scene of argument is populated by many different writers, readers, reviewers, editors, and teachers. It is shaped by practices and processes inside institutions that all of us help to construct, in graduate programs, journal and manuscript review processes, panels at professional meetings, and informal prestige networks. Rhetoric matters not just because we want to present the ideas we already have eloquently and effectively but also because the scene of argument is a site where new ideas are produced and old ideas modified and rendered obsolete. My purpose here is not to scold or praise individual authors but instead to advance an understanding of the scene of argument as a shared social resource, as an entity for which we are all responsible, yet also as a terrain laden with traps. As Toni Cade Bambara explained three decades ago, principled political writing entails fusing together the diverse strands of knowledge that disciplinary frames tear apart. Such writing requires us to resist the predisposition that the disciplines promote “to accept fragmented truths and distortions as the whole” (1980, 154). Dominant modes of thinking and habits of academic life can authorize promoting and echoing partial truths with confidence, even certainty, as if they were the whole. Our job, as Bambara explains it, is “to tell the truth and not get trapped” (1983, 14). I demonstrate here that some critiques of intersectionality fall into patterned rhetorical frameworks and tropes that serve as traps to interfere with the ability to tell the truth.

## CASE

#### Trading autobiographical narrative for the ballot commodifies one’s identity and has limited impact on the culture that one attempt’s to reform – when autobiographical narrative “wins,” it subverts its own most radical intentions by becoming an exemplar of the very culture under indictment

Coughlin 95—associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School. (Anne, REGULATING THE SELF: AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL PERFORMANCES IN OUTSIDER SCHOLARSHIP, 81 Va. L. Rev. 1229)

Although Williams is quick to detect insensitivity and bigotry in remarks made by strangers, colleagues, and friends, her taste for irony fails her when it comes to reflection on her relationship with her readers and the material benefits that her autobiographical performances have earned for her. n196 Perhaps Williams should be more inclined to thank, rather than reprimand, her editors for behaving as readers of autobiography invariably do. When we examine this literary faux pas - the incongruity between Williams's condemnation of her editors and the professional benefits their publication secured her - we detect yet another contradiction between the outsiders' use of autobiography and their desire to transform culture radically. Lejeune's characterization of autobiography as a "contract" reminds us that autobiography is a lucrative commodity. In our culture, members of the reading public avidly consume personal stories, n197 which surely explains why first-rate law journals and academic presses have been eager to market outsider narratives. No matter how unruly the self that it records, an autobiographical performance transforms that self into a form of "property in a moneyed economy"

n198 and into a valuable intellectual [\*1283] asset in an academy that requires its members to publish. n199 Accordingly, we must be skeptical of the assertion that the outsiders' splendid publication record is itself sufficient evidence of the success of their endeavor. n200

Certainly, publication of a best seller may transform its author's life, with the resulting commercial success and academic renown. n201 As one critic of autobiography puts it, "failures do not get published." n202 While writing a successful autobiography may be momentous for the individual author, this success has a limited impact on culture. Indeed, the transformation of outsider authors into "success stories" subverts outsiders' radical intentions by constituting them as exemplary participants within contemporary culture, willing to market even themselves to literary and academic consumers. n203 What good does this transformation do for outsiders who are less fortunate and less articulate than middle-class law professors? n204 Although they style themselves cultural critics, the [\*1284] storytellers generally do not reflect on the meaning of their own commercial success, nor ponder its entanglement with the cultural values they claim to resist. Rather, for the most part, they seem content simply to take advantage of the peculiarly American license, identified by Professor Sacvan Bercovitch, "to have your dissent and make it too." n205

#### Performance is not a mode of resistance - it gives too much power to the audience because the performer is structurally blocked from controlling the (re)presentation of their representations. Appealing to the ballot is a way of turning over one’s identity to the same reproductive economy that underwrites liberalism

Phelan 96—chair of New York University's Department of Performance Studies (Peggy, Unmarked: the politics of performance, ed published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005, 146

Performance’s only life is in the present. Performance cannot be saved, recorded, documented, or otherwise participate in the circulation of representations of representations: once it does so, it becomes something other than performance. To the degree that performance attempts to enter the economy of reproduction it betrays and lessens the promise of its own ontology. Performance’s being, like the ontology of subjectivity proposed here, becomes itself through disappearance.

The pressures brought to bear on performance to succumb to the laws of the reproductive economy are enormous. For only rarely in this culture is the “now” to which performance addresses its deepest questions valued. (This is why the now is supplemented and buttressed by the documenting camera, the video archive.) Performance occurs over a time which will not be repeated. It can be performed again, but this repetition itself marks it as “different.” The document of a performance then is only a spur to memory, an encouragement of memory to become present.

#### This is precisely why autobiography is so easily coopted by liberalism – autobiography IS the practice of the liberal autonomous subject *par excellence* – this same notion of the liberal subject has historically been responsible for the Western conquest of the world.

#### Even if their best intention is to resist the liberal subject, autobiography is understood by its consuming audience as the assertion of the classic autonomous subject – this subverts the political potential of performance by rendering one’s experience legible to the terms of liberalism .

Coughlin 95—associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School. (Anne, REGULATING THE SELF: AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL PERFORMANCES IN OUTSIDER SCHOLARSHIP, 81 Va. L. Rev. 1229)

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IV. The Autobiographical Self

The outsider narratives do not reflect on another feature of autobiographical discourse that is perhaps the most significant obstacle to their goal to bring to law an understanding of the human self that will supersede the liberal individual. Contrary to the outsiders' claim that their personalized discourse infuses law with their distinctive experiences and political perspectives, numerous historians and critics of autobiography have insisted that those who participate in autobiographical discourse speak not in a different voice, but in a common voice that reflects their membership in a culture devoted to liberal values. n206 As Sacvan Bercovitch puts it, American cultural ideals, including specifically the mythic connection between the "heroic individual ... [and] the values of free enterprise," are "epitomized in autobiography." n207 In his seminal essay on the subject, Professor Georges Gusdorf makes an observation that seems like a prescient warning to outsiders who would appropriate autobiography as their voice. He remarks that the practice of writing about one's own self reflects a belief in the autonomous individual, which is "peculiar to Western man, a concern that has been of good use in his systematic conquest of the [\*1285] universe and that he has communicated to men of other cultures; but those men will thereby have been annexed by a sort of intellectual colonizing to a mentality that was not their own." n208 Similarly, Albert Stone, a critic of American autobiography, argues that autobiographical performances celebrate the Western ideal of individualism, "which places the self at the center of its world." n209 Stone begins to elucidate the prescriptive character of autobiographical discourse as he notes with wonder "the tenacious social ideal whose persistence is all the more significant when found repeated in personal histories of Afro-Americans, immigrants, penitentiary prisoners, and others whose claims to full individuality have often been denied by our society." n210

Precisely because it appeals to readers' fascination with the self-sufficiency, resiliency and uniqueness of the totemic individual privileged by liberal political theory, there is a risk that autobiographical discourse is a fallible, even co-opted, instrument for the social reforms envisioned by the outsiders. By affirming the myths of individual success in our culture, autobiography reproduces the [\*1286] political, economic, social and psychological structures that attend such success. n211 In this light, the outsider autobiographies unwittingly deflect attention from collective social responsibility and thwart the development of collective solutions for the eradication of racist and sexist harms. Although we may suspect in some cases that the author's own sense of self was shaped by a community whose values oppose those of liberal individualism, her decision to register her experience in autobiographical discourse will have a significant effect on the self she reproduces. n212 Her story will solicit the public's attention to the life of one individual, and it will privilege her individual desires and rights above the needs and obligations of a collectivity.

Moreover, literary theorists have remarked the tendency of autobiographical discourse to override radical authorial intention. Even where the autobiographer self-consciously determines to resist liberal ideology and represents her life story as the occasion to announce an alternative political theory, "the relentless individualism of the genre subordinates" her political critique. n213 Inevitably, at least within American culture, the personal narrative engrosses the readers' imagination. Fascinated by the travails and triumphs of the developing autobiographical self, readers tend to construe the text's political and social observations only as another aspect of the author's personality.

Paradoxically, although autobiography is the product of a culture that cultivates human individuality, the genre seems to make available only a limited number of autobiographical protagonists. n214 Many theorists have noticed that when an author assumes the task of defining her own, unique subjectivity, she invariably reproduces herself as a character with whom culture already is well-acquainted. n215 While a variety of forces coerce the autobiographer [\*1287] to conform to culturally sanctioned human models, n216 the pressures exerted by the literary market surely play a significant role. The autobiographer who desires a material benefit from her performance must adopt a persona that is intelligible, if not enticing, to her audience. n217 As I will illustrate in the sections that follow, the outsider narratives capitalize on, rather than subvert, autobiographical protagonists that serve the values of liberalism.

#### The very act of articulating why performance ought be attached to the ballot casts performance within the terms of liberalism’s discursive economy – this reduces their performance to a form of aesthetic formalism, this subordinates the political potential of performance to the narrow disciplinary concerns of academic knowledge production

Phelan ‘96—chair of New York University's Department of Performance Studies (Peggy, Unmarked: the politics of performance, ed published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005,

In his 1981 article Representation and the Limits of Interpretation, Eric E. Peterson delves into the problems of wedding post-structuralism and interpretation in terms of the limits of representation. He concedes that for oral interpretation “representation is a powerful force in the theoretical understanding of our practice. Not only does it allow us to distinguish oral interpretation from similar literary, theatrical, and speech arts; but it also provides a theoretical justification for the existence of oral interpretation as a discipline distinct from other disciplines” (24). Peterson formulated these arguments even before oral interpretation shifted to the broader term performance studies, but his predictions were insightful. Peterson maps out potential disciplinary costs of thinking representation in a certain way. He continues, saying that the cost of “securing this place for oral interpretation is the increasing objectification of our practice and subjectification of our practitioners. By objectifying our practice, we mean that the conceptualization of art as representation precludes the examination of the very activity of representing” (24). This causes the field to continually wrap itself up in disciplinary techniques for the “accumulation of knowledge and the exercise of power” (24) through interpretation, instead of focusing on the eroticization of performance practice itself. Peterson argues for reinvestigating the process of performance as art, not subject-object relations.

#### The 1ac engages in dangerous politics of prioritizing methodology and assigning intellectual prerequisites to political strategy. Their use of the experience of oppression as the status that defines those who should guide politics harms progressive political strategies. Their particular strategy is part of a larger discourse of recapturing agency through privileging experience as the basis for politics.

Craig Ireland American Culture @ Bilkent 02 "The Appeal to Experience and its Consequences" Cultural Critique 52 Fall 2002p.87-88

" Once an arcane philosophical term, experience over the last three decades has become a general buzzword. By the 1970s, experience spilled over into the streets, so to speak, and it has since then become the stuff of programmatic manifestos and has been enlisted as the found from which microstrategies of resistance and subaltern counterhistories can be erected. But for all the blows and counterblows that have carried on tor over"\*three decades between those who appeal to the counterhegemonic potential of experience and those who see such appeals as naive voluntarism, such debates show no signs of abating. On the contrary, they have become yet more strident, as can be seen by Michael Pickering's recent attempt to rehabilitate the viability of the term "experience" for subaltern historiography by turning to E. P. Thompson and Dilthey and, more recently still, by Sonia Kruks's polemical defense of experience for subaltern inquiry by way of a reminder that poststructuralist critics of experience owe much to those very thinkers, from Sartre to Merleau-Ponty, whom they have debunked as if in oedipal rebellion against their begetters. Such debates over experience have so far gravitated around issues of epistemology and agency, pitting those who debunk experience as the stuff of an antiquated philosophy of consciousness against those who argue that subaltern experience provides an enclave against strong structural determination. Lost in such debates, however, have been the potential consequences of appeals to immediate experience as a ground for subaltern agency and specificity. And it is just such potential consequences that will be examined here, These indeed demand our attention, for more is at stake in the appeal to experience than some epistemological faux pas. By so wagering on the perceived immediacy of experience as the evidence for subaltern specificity and counterhegemonic action, appeals to immediate experience, however laudable their goal, end up unwittingly naturalizing what is in fact historical, and, in so doing, they leave the door as wide-open to a progressive politics of identity as to a retreat to neoethnic tribalism. Most alarming about such appeals to experience is not some failure of epistemological nerve – it is instead their ambiguous political and social ramifications. And these have reverberate beyond academia and found an echo in para-academia – so much so that experience has increasingly become the core concept or key word of subaltern groups and the rallying call for what Craig Calhoun calls the “new social movements” in which “experience is made the pure ground of knowledge, the basis of an essentialized standpoint of critical awareness” (468 n.64). The consequences of such appeals to experience can best be addressed not by individually considering disparate currents, but by seeking their common denominator. And in this regard, E.P. Thompson will occupy the foreground. It is safe to say that what started as an altercation between Thompson and Althusser has since spawned academic and para-academic "histories from below" and subaltern cultural inquiries that, for all their differences, share the idea that the identities and counterhistories of the disenfranchised can be buttressed by the specificity of a group's concrete experiences. Much theorizing on experience by certain cultural and historiographical trends, as many have already pointed out, has been but a variation on a persistent Thompsonian theme in which Thompson's "kind of use of experience has the same foundational status if we substitute 'women's' or 'black' or 'lesbian' or 'homosexual' for 'working class'" (Scott, 786)

#### The pedagogy of the oppressed sounds appealing, but regulates consciousness under the disguise of difference. Making the speaker the gateway for listening to the speech demands ever-greater levels of purification and escalating rhetoric of oppressive history as the source for authority.

Rob Moore, Cambridge and Johan Muller, University of Cape Town, 99, “The Discourse of Voice and the Problem of Knowledge and Identity in the Sociology of Education" British Journal of Sociology of Education 20 (2) p. 199-200

The pedagogic device (Bernstein, 1990) of voice discourse promotes a methodology in which the explication of a method’s social location precludes the need to examine the content of its data as grounds for valid explanation. Who says it is what counts, not what is said: This approach favours an ethnography that claims to reveal the cultural specificity of the category – the ‘voice’ of membership. What is held to be the facts, to be the case, is only so – and can only be so – from a particular perspective. The world thus viewed is a patchwork of incommensurable and exclusive voices or standpoints. Through the process of sub-dicision, increasingly more particularized identity categories come into being, each claiming the unique specificity of its distinctive experience and the knowledge authorized by it. The consequence of the abolition of the knowledge boundary that follows from the epistemological theses of postmodernism is the increasing specialization of social categories (See Maton, 1998). Maton describes this process of proliferation in terms of the way such ‘knower’ discourses….base their legitimation upon the privileged insight of a knower, and work at maintaining strong boundaries around their definition of this knower – they celebrate difference where ‘truth’ is defined by the ‘knower’ or ‘voice’. As each voice is brought into the choir, the category of the privileged ‘knower’ becomes smaller, each strongly bounded from one another, for each ‘voice’ has its own privileged and specialized knowledge. The client ‘knower’ group thus fragments, each fragment with its own representative…The procession of the excluded thus becomes, in terms of the privileged ‘knower’, an accretion of adjectives, the ‘hyphenation’ which knower modes often proclaim as progress. In summary, with the emergence of each new category of knower, the categories of knowers become smaller, leading to proliferation and fragmentation within the knowledge formation. (ibid, p. 17) As Maton argues, this move promotes a fundamental change in the principle of legitimation – from what is known (and how) to who knows it. The device that welds knowledge to standpoint, voice and experience, produces a result that is inherently unstable, because the anchor for the voice is an inferior authenticity that can never be demonstrated, only claimed (Taylor, 1992; Siegel, 1997; Fuss, 1990, 1995). Since all such claims are power claims, the authenticity of the voice is constantly prone to a purifying challenge. If you do not believe it you are not one of us’ (Hammersly & Gomm, 1997, para. 3.3) that gears down to ever more rarefied specializations or iterations of the voice category; an unstoppable spiral that Bernstein (1997, p. 176) has referred to as the ‘shrinking of the moral imagination [10]. As Bernstein puts it, ‘The voice of a social category (academic discourse, gender subject, occupational subject) is constructed by the degree of specialization of the discursive rules regulation and legitimizing the form of communication’ (1990, p. 23). If categories of either agents or discourse are specialized, then each category necessarily has its own specific identity and its own specific boundaries. The speciality of each category is created, maintained and reproduced only if the relations between the categories of which a given category is a member are preserved. What is to be preserved? The insulation between the categories. It is the strength of the insulation that creates a space in which a category can become specific. If a category wishes to increase its specificity, it has to appropriate the means to produce the necessary insulation that is the prior condition to its appropriating specificity. (ibid.) Collection codes employ an organization of knowledge to specialize categories of person, integrated codes employ an organization of persons to specialize categories of knowledge (Bernstein, 1977, pp. 106-111) The instability of the social categories associated with voice discourse reflects the fact that there is no stable and agreed-upon way of constructing such categories. By their nature, they are always open to contestation and further fragmentation. In principle, there is no terminal point where ‘identities’ can finally come to rest. It is for this reason that this position can reappear so frequently across time and space within the intellectual field – the same move can be repeated endlessly under the disguise of ‘difference’. In Bernstein’s terms, the organization of knowledge is, most significantly, a device for the regulation of consciousness.

The pedagogic device is thus a symbolic ruler of consciousness in its selective creation, positioning and oppositioning of pedagogic subjects. It is the condition for the production, reproduction, and transformation of culture. The question is: whose ruler, what consciousness? (1990, p. 189) The relativistic challenge to epistemologically grounded strong classifications of knowledge removes the means whereby social categories and their relations can be strongly theorized and effectively researched in a form that is other than arbitrary and can be challenged by anyone choosing to assert an alternative perspective or standpoint.

#### There should be no methodological prerequisites for participation in argument and education. This is the only way to give the force of argument and rigorous testing of any idea that is necessary for progressive politics to win the public sphere.

Rob Moore, Cambridge, and Johan Muller, University of Cape Town 99 "The Discourse of Voice and the Problem of Knowledge and Identity in the Sociology of Education" British Journal of Sociology of Education 20 (2) p.

Our purpose in this paper is to raise some issues about epistemological debates and approaches to knowledge in the sociology of education. Our starting point is the observation that since the phenomenologically inspired New Sociology of Education in the early 1970s to postmodernism today, approaches that question epistemological claims about the objectivity of knowledge (and the status of science, reason and rationality more generally) have occupied an influential position in the field. In earlier times this approach was often referred to as the 'sociology of knowledge' perspective. Yet then as now, it is precisely the idea of knowledge that is being challenged. Such approaches adopt. or at least favour or imply, a form of perspectivism which sees knowledge and truth claims as being relative to a culture, form of life or standpoint and, therefore, ultimately representing a particular perspective and social interest rather than independent, universalistic criteria. They complete this reduction by translating knowledge claims into statements about knowers. Knowledge is dissolved into knowing and priority is given to experience as specialised by category membership and identity (Maton, 1998). For instance, a so-called 'dominant' or 'hegemonic' form of knowledge, represented in the school curriculum, is identified as 'bourgeois', 'male', or 'white’ – as reflecting the perspectives, standpoints and interests of dominant social groups. Today, the most common form of this approach is that which, drawing upon postmodernist and poststructuralist perspectives, adopts a discursive concern with the explication of ‘voice’. Its major distinction is that between the dominant voice and those (‘Others’) silenced or marginalized by its hegemony. As Philip Wexler (1997, p.9) has recently observed: The postmodern emphasis on discourse and identity remain overwhelmingly the dominant paradigm in school research, and with few exceptions, gives few signs of abating’ (see also Delamont, 1997). The main move is to attach knowledge to categories of knowers and to their experience and subjectivities. This privileges and specialises the subject in terms of its membership category as a subordinated voice. Knowledge forms and knowledge relations are translated as social standpoints and power relationships between groups. This is more a sociology of knowers and their relationships than of knowledge. What we will term 'voice discourse' is our principle concern, here. Historically, this approach has also been associated with concerns to reform pedagogy in a progressive direction. At the time of the New Sociology of Education in the early 1970s, this move was expressed in the debate between 'new' sociologists such as Michael Young (1971, 1976) and the philosophical position associated with R.S. Peters and Paul Hirst. More recently, it has been associated with developments such as anti-sexist, multicultural and postcolonial education, and with postmodernist critiques of the 'Enlightenment Project' and 'grand narratives'. The crucial issue, for such approaches, is that where social differentiation in education and the reproduction of social inequalities arc associated with principles of exclusion structured in and through educational knowledge. Hence, the critique of knowledge and promotion of progressive pedagogy is understood as facilitating a move from social and educational exclusion to inclusion and the promotion of social justice. This history can be summarised as follows: in the early 1970s, the New Sociology of Education produced a critique of insulated knowledge codes by adopting a 'sociology of knowledge' perspective that claimed to demystify their epistemological pretensions to cognitive superiority by revealing their class base and form. Knowledge relations were transcribed as class relations [1]. In the late 1970s, feminism challenged the masculinist bias of class analysis and turned attention to the gendered character of educational relations, rewriting knowledge relations in terms of patriarchy. This was in turn followed by a focus upon race. In the 1980s, the primary categories employed by gender and race approaches fragmented as various groups contested the vanguardist claims of the earlier proponents of those perspectives to be representing the interests of women or blacks in general. The category 'woman', for instance, fragmented into groups such as women of colour, non-heterosexual women, working-class women, third-world women and African women (Wolpe, 1998). These fractions of gender and race were further extended by a range of sexualities and, to some degree (although never so successfully), by disabilities. Under this pressure of fragmentation, there was a rapid shift away from political universalism to a thoroughgoing celebration of difference and diversity; of decentred hyphenated or iterative models of the self and, consequently, of identity politics. This poststructuralist celebration of diversity is associated with proclamations of inclusiveness that oppose the alleged exclusiveness of the dominant knowledge form that is revealed when its traditional claims to universalism and objectivity are shown for what they really arc – the disguised standpoints and interests of dominant groups. On this basis, epistemology and the sociology of knowledge are presented as antithetical. The sociology of knowledge undertakes to demystify epistemological knowledge claims by revealing their social base and standpoint. At root, this sociology of knowledge debunks epistemology. The advocacy of progressive moral and political arguments becomes conflated with a particular set of (anti-) epistemological arguments (Siegel, 1995; Maton, 1999). At this descriptive level, these developments are usually presented as marking a progressive advance whereby the assault upon the epistemological claims of the dominant or ‘hegemonic' knowledge code (rewritten in its social form as 'power') enables a succession of previously marginalised, excluded and oppressed groups to enter the central stage, their histories to be recovered and their 'voices' joined freely and equally with those already there [2]. Within this advance, the voice of reason (revealed as that of the ruling class white heterosexual male) is reduced simply to one among many, of no special distinction. This is advance through the multiplication of categories and their differences. Disparities of access and representation in education were (and are) rightly seen as issues that need addressing and remedying, and in this respect constitute a genuine politics. It is important to stress, here, that the issues are real issues and the work done on their behalf is real work. But the question is: is this politics best pursued in this way? The tendency we are intending to critique, then, assumes an internal relation between: (a) theories of knowledge (epistemological or sociological); (b) forms of education (traditional or progressive); and (c) social relations (between dominant and subordinated groups). This establishes the political default settings whereby epistemologically grounded, knowledge-based forms of education are politically conservative, while ‘integrated’ (Bernstein, 1977) or ‘hybrid’ (Muller & Taylor, 1995) knowledge codes are progressive. On this basis, socially, progressive causes are systematically detached from epistemologically powerful knowledge structures and from their procedures for generating and promoting truths of fact and value. For us the crucial problem, here, is that these default settings have the effect of undermining the very argumentative force that progressive causes in fact require in order to press their claims. The position of voice discourse and its cognate forms within the sociology of education has, also, profoundly affected theory and research within the field, with little attention being paid to structural level concerns with social stratification and a penchant for small-scale, qualitative ethnographic methods and ‘culturalist’ concerns with discursive positioning and identity (Moore, 1996a; Hatcher 1998). We will argue that this perspective is not only politically self-defeating, but also intellectually incoherent – that, in fact, progressive claims implicitly presuppose precisely the kind of ‘conservative’ epistemology that they tend to reject and that, to be of value, the sociology of education should produce knowledge in the strong sense. This is important because the effects of the (anti-) epistemological thesis undermine the possibilities of producing precisely that kind of knowledge required to support the moral/political objectives. Indeed, the dubious epistemological assumption may lead not only to an ‘analytical nihilism that is contrary to (their) political project’ (Ladwig, 1995, p.222), but also, to pedagogic conclusions that are actively counterproductive and ultimately work against the educational interests of precisely those groups they are meant to help (Stone, 1981; Dowling, 1994). We agree, thus, with Siegel that, ‘…it is imperative that defenders of radical pedagogy distinguish their embrace of particular moral/political these from untenable, allegedly related, epistemological ones; (ibid, p. 34).

# 2NC

## Resolve

#### Avoiding conflict is the only option- Peace isn’t a natural state

Kagan, Hillhouse Professor of History at Yale, 1997 (Donald, “Roles and Missions.” Orbis, Spring, Volume 41)

Few, if any, nations in the history of the world have ever enjoyed such a favorable situation. It stands to reason that the keystone of American strategy should be an effort to preserve and sustain the situation as well and as long as possible. America's most vital interest, therefore, is maintaining the general peace, for war has been the swiftest, most expensive, and most devastating means of changing the balance of international power. But peace does not keep itself, although one of the most common errors in modern thinking about international relations is the assumption that peace is natural and can be preserved merely by having peace-seeking nations avoid provocative actions. The last three-quarters of the twentieth century strongly suggests the opposite conclusion: major war is more likely to come when satisfied states neglect their defenses and fail to take an active part in the preservation of peace. It is vital to understand that the current relatively peaceful and secure situation is neither inevitable nor immutable. It reflects two conditions built up with tremendous effort and expense during the last half century: the great power of the United States and the general expectation that Americans will be willing to use that power when necessary. The diminution of U.S. power and credibility, which would follow on a policy of reduced responsibility, would thus not be a neutral act that would leave the situation as it stands. Instead, it would be a critical step in undermining the stability of the international situation. Calculations based on the absence of visible potential enemies would immediately be made invalid by America's withdrawal from its current position as the major bulwark supporting the world order. The cost of the resulting upheaval in wealth, instability, and the likelihood of war would be infinitely greater than the cost of continuing to uphold the existing international structure.

#### State power is inevitable – working within American primacy is the only way to reduce violence – the alternative ignores the reality of international relations

Elshtain ‘7 (Jean Bethke, Prof. Social and Politics Ethics – U. Chicago, and Chair in Foundations of American Freedom – Georgetown U., Studies in Christian Ethics, “Against the New Utopianism”, 20:1, Ebsco)

Neo-Kantianism, of whatever stripe, is rather a far cry from arguments some of us have mounted that aspires to a world of 'minimally decent states' and a commitment to the principle of 'equal moral regard' for human beings. This 'equal moral regard' sounds rather Kantian, to be sure, but it is not an absolute principle in practice — it is an aspiration. One appreciates the tragedy that on this earth even good and decent principles cannot be wholly realised. Surprisingly, even this rather more modest call for minimally decent states — and the assumption that such states will in one way or another likely be democratic — is taxed with a disguised form of moral imperialism, with ethnocentrism, and the encouragement of the use of force. I suspect this has happened because 'the new internationalists', myself included, point out that American constitutional principles constitute universal claims, not particular ones, and that these universal claims, e.g. 'all persons are created equal', really means all persons. As everyone knows, much of the domestic history of American political life involves contestation to achieve in practice the universalism embedded in the American experiment in principle. Further, I and others argue that there is no way around American power. The question is whether, on balance, it is used for good or ill. For the new Utopians, American power is often the problem and in the wilder forms of European anti-Americanism, America functions as the repository of all that is disgusting, crass, wicked, manipulative, etc. in the world. The mere existence of American power somehow stifles and strangles the rest of the world — on and on in this vein. For example, Anthony Burke claims that the new internationalism traffics in 'fear-soaked rhetoric', and labels the war against Saddam's republic of fear an 'unimaginable break' with international norms; Abu Ghraib is construed as the norm rather than an aberration (which makes criminal prosecution of the perpetrators rather inexplicable — if indeed their disgusting display was the norm we would give them medals, not indict them); the idea of state sovereignty is blasted as 'violent and exclusivist ... lingering like a latent illness in the very depths of modern cosmopolitanism'.\* The metaphor of disease is fascinating here. But who are the physicians to heal the international order? For Kant they are the moral philosophers. For Burke and so many others, it is a fantasy United Nations — quite unlike the one we actually have — and international law, universally accepted and endorsed and enforced -although their arguments are often rather thin concerning how just these laws are to be enforced and by whom. Given that the United Nations today is composed of delegates who lopsidedly represent undemocratic and corrupt regimes, this strikes me as a not terribly helpful argument. Moreover, why should an International Court of Justice dominated by Europeans be any more 'universal' than claims launched by a democratic state premised on universal propositions? In sum, the Kantian vision relies on a dualistic contrast between 'perpetual peace' and 'perpetual war' that is a chimera. The new Utopians ignore or downplay moral and political ambiguity and nuance, the smudginess of real human lives and history. Those of us who believe the universe is not 'heal-able' (if there is such a word) are often taxed with being imperialists if we express the hope that American power can help to stabilise and provide order in international affairs and, at the same time, defeatists precisely because we — or at least I — share St Augustine's conviction that on this earth it will remain impossible to perfectly reconcile human wills. Pace the critics, this is not a counsel of defeatism at all; rather, it represents hope by contrast to optimism. Hope that the world can be made less brutal and less unjust, and this means more respect for human rights and more democratic forms insofar as democracy involves respect for persons qua persons. Saying this does not dictate any particular form of government save that no one is born to be a slave, to be tormented, or to be slaughtered because of who he or she is — whether American or Israeli or Palestinian, whether Jew or Christian or Muslim, whether male or female. The new neo-Kantian universalism — or new utopianism — is a mixture of un-tethered idealism, hoping for the triumph of good will and a world in which international bodies supplant states, international law supersedes multiple civic laws, and there is at some point a definitive abandonment of the use of force in international affairs. For us 'new internationalists' — if we accept the designation and I am not wild about it — we find the real challenge to our position not so much from the new Utopians — I believe their arguments can be rather readily answered — but from serious classical realists who set the bar lower, insisting that the best we can do is to forestall the worst and not hope for some good. There is great wisdom in this posture — forestalling the worst is no small achievement — but, contrary to some interpreters of Augustine, I believe there is also warrant for a measure of hopefulness within his arguments concerning political life and order.

#### Privileging the methodology of the oppressed flips knowledge hierarchies without breaking them down. There is no reason to believe the self-evidence of oppressed groups any more than oppressors – Both are insulated forms of knowing.

Ilan Gur-ze-ev Senior Lecturer Philosophy of Education @ Haifa '98 "Toward a nonrepressive critical pedagogy" Educational

Theoiy Fall 48 (4) p.

Prom this perspective, the consensus reached by the reflective subject taking part in the dialogue offered by critical pedagogy is naive, especially in light of its declared anti-intellectualism on the one hand and its pronounced glorification of the "feelings." "experience." and self-evident knowledge of the group on the other. Critical pedagogy, in its different versions, claims to inhere and overcome the foundationaiism and transcendentalism of the Enlightenment's emancipatory – and ethnocentric — arrogance, as exemplified by ideology-critique, psychoanalysis, or traditional metaphysics. Marginalized feminist knowledge, like the marginalized, neglected, and ridiculed knowledge of the Brazilian farmers, as presented by Freire or Kathleen Weiler, is represented as legitimate and relevant knowledge, in contrast to its representation as the hegemonic instrument of representation and education, This knowledge is portrayed as a relevant, legitimate, and superior alternative to hegemonic education and the knowledge this represents in the center. It is said to represent an identity that is desirable and promises to function "successfully." However, neither the truth value of the marginalized collective memory nor knowledge is cardinal here. "Truth" is replaced by knowledge whose supreme criterion is its self-evidence, namely the potential productivity of its creative violence, while the dialogue in which adorers of "difference" take part is implicitly represented as one of the desired productions of this violence. My argument is that this marginalized and repressed self-evident knowledge has no superiority over the self-evident knowledge of the oppressors. Relying on the knowledge of weak, controlled, and marginalized groups, their memory and their conscious interests, is no less naive and dangerous than relying on hegemonic knowledge. This is because the critique of Western transcendentalism, foundationaiism, and ethnocentrism declines into an uncritical acceptance of marginalized knowledge. which becomes foundationalistic and ethnocentric in presenting "the truth." "the facts." or "the real interests of the group" -- even if conceived as valid only for the group concerned. This position cannot avoid vulgar realism and naive positivism based on the "facts" of self-evident knowledge ultimately realized against the self-evidence of other groups.

## Framework

#### The aff will always win that the principles of their advocacy are good in the abstract – we can only debate the merits of their framework if they defend the specific consequences of political implementation

Ignatieff 4—Prof of Human Rights @ Harvard

Michael, *Lesser Evils* p. 20-1

As for moral perfectionism, this would be the doctrine that a liberal state should never have truck with dubious moral means and should spare its officials the hazard of having to decide between lesser and greater evils. A moral perfectionist position also holds that states can spare their officials this hazard simply by adhering to the universal moral standards set out in human rights conventions and the laws of war. There are two problems with a perfectionist stance, leaving aside the question of whether it is realistic. The first is that articulating nonrevocable, nonderogable moral standards is **relatively easy. The problem is deciding how to apply them in specific cases.** What is the line between interrogation and torture, between targeted killing and unlawful assassination, between preemption and aggression? Even when legal and moral distinctions between these are clear in the abstract, **abstractions are less than helpful when political leaders have to choose between them in practice.** Furthermore, the problem with perfectionist standards is that they contradict each other. The same person who shudders, rightly, at the prospect of torturing a suspect might be prepared to kill the same suspect in a preemptive attack on a terrorist base. Equally, the perfectionist commitment to the right to life might preclude such attacks altogether and restrict our response to judicial pursuit of offenders through process of law. Judicial responses to the problem of terror have their place, but they are no substitute for military operations when terrorists possess bases, training camps, and heavy weapons. To stick to a perfectionist commitment to the right to life when under terrorist attack might achieve moral consistency at the price of leaving us defenseless in the face of evildoers. Security, moreover, is a human right, and thus respect for one right might lead us to betray another.

Two clear violations:

A.) No advocacy statement- allows the aff to shift their contextualization of their method in every speech- need to have a statement of synthesis that they’ll defend as the advocacy- it literally makes it impossible to debate because what they say they defend now, they won’t say they defend in the 2AR

B.) Contextualization of method- they defend the desirability of a method of scholarship, but not a specific place or actor to implement it- lack of stable actor or mechanism makes it literally impossible to debate- performance of the body is key to in what context- if its every context, then they are basically hypotesting- that leads to counterwarrants that crush ability to effectively clash

#### examples

Only clash allows us to minimize harmful effects of that persuasion because it subjects all attempts at persuasion to rigorous scrutiny

Talisse 5—Professor of Philosophy @Vandy

Robert, *Philosophy & Social Criticism*, Deliberativist responses to activist challenges, 31(4) p. 429-431

The argument thus far might appear to turn exclusively upon different conceptions of what reasonableness entails. The deliberativist view I have sketched holds that reasonableness involves some degree of what we may call epistemic modesty. On this view, the reasonable citizen seeks to have her beliefs reﬂect the best available reasons, and so she enters into public discourse as a way of testing her views against the objections and questions of those who disagree; hence she implicitly holds that her present view is open to reasonable critique and that others who hold opposing views may be able to offer justiﬁcations for their views that are at least as strong as her reasons for her own. Thus any mode of politics that presumes that discourse is extraneous to questions of justice and justiﬁcation is unreasonable. The activist sees no reason to accept this. Reasonableness for the activist consists in the ability to act on reasons that upon due reﬂection seem adequate to underwrite action; discussion with those who disagree need not be involved. According to the activist, there are certain cases in which he does in fact know the truth about what justice requires and in which there is no room for reasoned objection. Under such conditions, the deliberativist’s demand for discussion can only obstruct justice; it is therefore irrational. It may seem that we have reached an impasse. However, there is a further line of criticism that the activist must face. To the activist’s view that at least in certain situations he may reasonably decline to engage with persons he disagrees with (107), the deliberative democrat can raise the phenomenon that Cass Sunstein has called ‘group polarization’ (Sunstein, 2003; 2001a: ch. 3; 2001b: ch. 1). To explain: consider that political activists cannot eschew deliberation altogether; they often engage in rallies, demonstrations, teach-ins, workshops, and other activities in which they are called to make public the case for their views. Activists also must engage in deliberation among themselves when deciding strategy. Political movements must be organized, hence those involved must decide upon targets, methods, and tactics; they must also decide upon the content of their pamphlets and the precise messages they most wish to convey to the press. Often the audience in both of these deliberative contexts will be a self-selected and sympathetic group of like-minded activists. Group polarization is a well-documented phenomenon that has ‘been found all over the world and in many diverse tasks’; it means that ‘members of a deliberating group predictably move towards a more extreme point in the direction indicated by the members’ predeliberation tendencies’ (Sunstein, 2003: 81–2). Importantly, in groups that ‘engage in repeated discussions’ over time, the polarization is even more pronounced (2003: 86 Hence discussion in a small but devoted activist enclave that meets regularly to strategize and protest ‘should produce a situation in which individuals hold positions more extreme than those of any individual member before the series of deliberations began’ (ibid.) 17 The fact of group polarization is relevant to our discussion because the activist has proposed that he may reasonably decline to engage in discussion with those with whom he disagrees in cases in which the requirements of justice are so clear that he can be conﬁdent that he has the truth. Group polarization suggests that deliberatively confronting those with whom we disagree is essential even when we have the truth. For even if we have the truth, if we do not engage opposing views, but instead deliberate only with those with whom we agree, our view will shift progressively to a more extreme point, and thus we lose the truth. In order to avoid polarization, deliberation must take place within heterogeneous ‘argument pools’ (Sunstein, 2003: 93). This of course does not mean that there should be no groups devoted to the achievement of some common political goal; it rather suggests that engagement with those with whom one disagrees is essential to the proper pursuit of justice. Insofar as the activist denies this, he is unreasonable.

#### And, lack of clash turns the case- without deliberative engagement of debate, hierarchical dominance and exclusion are more likely

Tonn 5—Prof of Communication @ Maryland

Mari Boor, Taking Conversation, Dialogue, and Therapy Public, Rhetoric & Public Affairs 8.3 (2005) 405-430, muse

This widespread recognition that access to public deliberative processes and the ballot is a baseline of any genuine democracy points to the most curious irony of the conversation movement: portions of its constituency. Numbering among the most fervid dialogic loyalists have been some feminists and multiculturalists who represent groups historically denied both the right to speak in public and the ballot. Oddly, some feminists who championed the slogan "The Personal Is Political" to emphasize ways relational power can oppress tend to ignore similar dangers lurking in the appropriation of conversation and dialogue in public deliberation. Yet the conversational model's emphasis on empowerment through intimacy can duplicate the power networks that traditionally excluded females and nonwhites and gave rise to numerous, sometimes necessarily uncivil, demands for democratic inclusion. Formalized participation structures in deliberative processes obviously cannot ensure the elimination of relational power blocs, but, as Freeman pointed out, the absence of formal rules leaves relational power unchecked and potentially capricious. Moreover, the privileging of the self, personal experiences, and individual perspectives of reality intrinsic in the conversational paradigm mirrors justifications once used by dominant groups who used their own lives, beliefs, and interests as templates for hegemonic social premises to oppress women, the lower class, and people of color. Paradigms infused with the therapeutic language of emotional healing and coping likewise flirt with the type of psychological diagnoses once ascribed to disaffected women. But as Betty Friedan's landmark 1963 The Feminist Mystique argued, the cure for female alienation was neither tranquilizers nor attitude adjustments fostered through psychotherapy but, rather, unrestricted opportunities.102 [End Page 423] The price exacted by promoting approaches to complex public issues—models that cast conventional deliberative processes, including the marshaling of evidence beyond individual subjectivity, as "elitist" or "monologic"—can be steep. Consider comments of an aide to President George W. Bush made before reports concluding Iraq harbored no weapons of mass destruction, the primary justification for a U.S.-led war costing thousands of lives. Investigative reporters and other persons sleuthing for hard facts, he claimed, operate "in what we call the reality-based community." Such people "believe that solutions emerge from [the] judicious study of discernible reality." Then baldly flexing the muscle afforded by increasingly popular social-constructionist and poststructuralist models for conflict resolution, he added: "That's not the way the world really works anymore . . . We're an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. And while you're studying that reality—judiciously, as you will—we'll act again, creating other new realities."103 The recent fascination with public conversation and dialogue most likely is a product of frustration with the tone of much public, political discourse. Such concerns are neither new nor completely without merit. Yet, as Burke insightfully pointed out nearly six decades ago, "A perennial embarrassment in liberal apologetics has arisen from its 'surgical' proclivity: its attempt to outlaw a malfunction by outlawing the function." The attempt to eliminate flaws in a process by eliminating the entire process, he writes, "is like trying to eliminate heart disease by eliminating hearts."104 Because public argument and deliberative processes are the "heart" of true democracy, supplanting those models with social and therapeutic conversation and dialogue jeopardizes the very pulse and lifeblood of democracy itself.

#### Context and stability are PREREQUISITE for innovation – communicative creativity is grounding for novelty.

Anolli 5

L. Anolli, S. Duncan Jr., M.S. Magnusson and G. Riva (Eds.)

The Hidden Structure of Interaction: From Neurons to Culture Patterns

Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2005 – © All rights reserved - <http://www.emergingcommunication.com>

Louis Marie Anolli ( Alba , 9 November 1945 ) is a psychologist Italian . Biography [ edit ] He graduated in philosophy in 1971 from the ' Catholic University of Sacred Heart of Milan under the guidance of Giorgio Zunino, specializes in Developmental Psychology in 1975. In 1972 he won a scholarship and began his ministerial research in psychometrics and psychology of perception with the sound development of visual perception. Then he is interested in developmental psychology (with the volume and material aimed structured games), the analysis of the organization (with the book written by Mara Palazzoli Selvini On the organization), social psychology (with the volume Sense and meaning of work). Became associate professor in 1982 at the Catholic University of Milan for the teaching of Applied Psychology, in 1986 Professor of Social Psychology DICENTA University of Milan. In 1993, teaches General Psychology at ' Sacred Heart Catholic University of Milan, in 1997 Psychology of Communication, Psychology of Culture in 2001. In 2003, teaches Psychology of Communication at the University of Milan-Bicocca. In recent years expanded its study of the psychology of communication with facial expressions using FACS (Facial Action Coding System) Paul Ekman and Wallace Friesen, and published volumes of the 2002 Psychology and Foundations of communication psychology in 2006.

Standard context is the context that presents a high routine regularity in the repetition of interactions, sequence of events and communicative exchanges. In such a way, we can assume that context regularity is equivalent to meaning regularity. No communicative act, like an utterance, a gesture and so on, exists without being context related, since it is always indexed in a standard context of use. The meaning of such a communicative act is given by the mental representation of standard context regularity. On the other hand, thanks to production processes, communicative formats are neither totally constrained nor completely determined by the past and by context regularity, but they expect and produce variations and deviations as an effect of contingent conditions and novel unpredictable aspects that every communicative situation potentially brings on itself. Context regularity is the outcome of a historical and cultural process, not a logical necessity, and the past neither determines nor constrains the present, although the former steers the latter. In this way, contextual variations may always, in theory and in practice, take place related to the hic et nunc situation. Given this double process of re-production and production, regularity and variation are two essential constituents of meaning reciprocally presupposed and implied. Without regularity there is no awareness of variation and vice versa. That is, variation in itself does not deny regularity, but demands it. As the standard communicative format is regular and stable, it contains in itself a range of unpredictability and interpretability conditions of meaning, as well as a set of applicability norms of communicative practices, since it provides the signification and indexing criteria.

Clash key to value to life- without ability to think critically about what we want, we fall back into old routines like only watching television- must have the ability to question those traditions deeply

Kymlicka ‘3

(Will, professor of philosophy @ Queens University. Contemporary Political Thought: A Reader And Guide. Edited by Alan Finlayson, pp. 496-498)

The defining feature of liberalism is that it ascribes certain fundamental freedoms to each individual. In particular, it grants people a very wide freedom of choice in terms of how they lead their lives. It allows people to choose a conception of the good life, and then allows them to reconsider that decision, and adopt a new and hopefully better plan of life. Why should people be free to choose their own plan of life? After all, we know that some people will make imprudent decisions, wasting their time on hopeless or trivial pursuits. Why then should the government not intervene to protect us from making mistakes, and to compel us to lead the truly good life? There are a variety of reasons why this is not a good idea: governments may not be trustworthy; Some individuals have idiosyncratic needs which are difficult for even a well-intentioned government to take into account; supporting controversial conceptions of the good may lead to civil strife. Moreover, paternalistic restrictions on liberty often simply do not work — lives do not go better by being led from the outside, in accordance with values the person does not endorse. Dworkin calls this the ‘endorsement constraint’, and argues that ‘no component contributes to the value of a life without endorsement … it is implausible to think that someone can lead a better life against the grain of his profound ethical convictions than at peace with them’ (Dworkin 1989: 486). However, the fact that we can get it wrong is important, because (paradoxically) it provides another argument for liberty. Since we can be wrong about the worth or value of what we are currently doing, and since no one wants to lead a life based on false beliefs about its worth, it is of fundamental importance that we be able rationally to assess our conceptions of the good in the light of new information or experiences, and to revise them if they are not worthy of our continued allegiance. This assumption that our beliefs about the good life are fallible and revisable is widely endorsed in the liberal tradition — from John Stuart Mill to the most prominent contemporary American liberals, such as John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin. (Because of their prominence, I will rely heavily on the works of Rawls and Dworkin in the rest of this chapter.) As Rawls puts it, individuals ‘do not view themselves as inevitable tied to the pursuit of the particular conception of the good and its final ends which they espouse at any given time’. Instead, they are ‘capable of revising and changing this conception’. They can ‘stand back’ from their current ends to ‘survey and assess’ their worthiness (Rawls 1980: 544; cf. Mill 1912: 122; Dworkin 1913). So we have two preconditions for leading a good life. The first is that we lead our life from the inside, in accordance with our beliefs about what gives value to life. Individuals must therefore have the resources and liberties needed to lead their lives in accordance with their beliefs about value, without fear of discrimination or punishment. Hence the traditional liberal concern with individual privacy, and opposition to ‘the enforcement of morals’. The second precondition is that we be free to question those beliefs, to examine them in light of whatever information, examples, and arguments our culture can provide. Individuals must therefore have the conditions necessary to acquire an awareness of different views about the good life, and an ability to examine these views intelligently. Hence the equally traditional liberal concern for education, and freedom of expression and association. These liberties enable us to judge what is valuable, and to learn about other ways of life.

# 1NR

San Juan 8 [E. San Juan, Jr., Filipino American literary academic, mentor, cultural reviewer, civic intellectual, activist, writer, essayist, video/film maker, editor, and poet whose works related to the Filipino Diaspora in English and Filipino languages have been translated into German, Russian, French, Italian, and Chinese.[2] As an author of books on race and cultural studies,[3] he was a “major influence on the academic world”.[2] He was the director of the Philippines Cultural Studies Center in Storrs, Connecticut in the United States.[1] In 1999, San Juan, Jr. received the Centennial Award for Achievement in Literature from the Cultural Center of the Philippines because of his contributions to Filipino and Filipino American Studies.[2] FROM RACE/RACISM TO CLASS STRUGGLE: On Critical Race Theory Posted on October 4, 2008 FROM RACE TO CLASS STRUGGLE: A RE-TURN OF CRITICAL RACE THEORY, THE PHILIPPINES MATRIX PROJECT http://philcsc.wordpress.com/2008/10/04/from-raceracism-to-class-struggle-on-critical-race-theory/]

The concept of reproductive labor involves the complex dialectic of culture, politics, economy, and the mediation of the private and public in everyday life. Anderson illustrates the theoretical usefulness of this concept: Domestic work—mental, physical, and emotional labor—is reproductive work, and reproductive work is not confined to the maintenance of physical bodies: people are social, cultural, and ideological beings, not just units of labor, and reproductive labor is not organized exclusively for the labor market, although market forces affect it. Under capitalism, human beings’ social relations find expression and are mediated by patterns of consumption. Reproductive labor, then, not only produces workers; it also produces consumers of the products of capitalism, consumers from the cradle (cot or basket? Bed or crib?) to the grave (marble or granite? Embossed or engraved?) (2004, 264) Domestic work thus reproduces lifestyle, status, beliefs—in effect, the hierarchical system of social relations where identities are defined, the sphere of desire and pleasure marked out, and life-chances charted in reciprocal interaction with the framework of production relations. More important, Anderson’s dialectical approach connects the systemic with the sociocultural and ideological when she posits domestic service as the selling of the self in the global market, the marketing of personhood: The domestic worker is not equated socially with her employer in the act of exchange because the fiction of labour power cannot be maintained; it is “personhood” that is being commodified. Moreover, the worker’s caring function, her performance of tasks constructed as degrading, demonstrates the employer’s power to command her self. Having allegedly sold her personhood, the domestic worker is both person and non-person. She is, like the prostitute, a person who is not a person, someone for whom all obligations can be discharged in cash (2000, 121). Positivist social science has generated empirical microstudies of individual life-histories of women workers. It has even documented the statistics of the feminization and “housewifization” of labor. But they have not been able to take into account the pressure of complex global and local socioeconomic forces at work in the national and international migration of women and the ideologies they propagate. We need to register the varying impact of structural adjustment policies on “sending” neocolonies like the Philippines, the histories of colonialism, imperialism, and patriarchy; national debt; the growth of agribusiness; the role of finance capital and outsourcing, as well as laws both national and international. And concomitant with this, the diverse collective modes of resistance and opposition to the effects of such forces. The analysis and evaluation of this totality of forces and their mutual interaction is what a historical materialist approach seeks to carry out. From this perspective, racial justice and gender parity may not be sufficient. Daniel Bensaid’s comment is relevant here: “Theories of justice and the critique of political economy are irreconcilable. Conceived as the protection of the private sphere, liberal politics seals the holy alliance between the nightwatchman state and the market of opinions in which individual interests are supposed to be harmonized…. Marx’s Capital establishes the impossibility of allocating the collective productivity of social labour individually. Whereas the theory of justice rests on the atomism of contractual procedures, and on the formalist fiction of mutual agreement (whereby individuals become partners in a cooperative adventure for their mutual advantage), social relations of exploitation are irreducible to intersubjective relations” (2002, 158). It is of course important to always maintain vigilance on the mystifying use of “race,” on the practice of racialization, in any location, whether in the privacy of the family home, school, factory, or state institutions (court, prison, police station, legislature). Grace Chang (2000) has meticulously documented how people of color, exploited immigrants and refugees, have themselves used racist images and rhetoric in their role as “gatekeepers” to the racialized class system. However, I think that without framing all these within the total picture of the crisis of capital and its globalized restructuring from the late seventies up to the present, without understanding the continued domination of labor by capital globally, we cannot effectively counteract the racism that underwrites the relation of domination and subordination between nationalities, classes, and genders. The critique of an authoritarian state and questionable policies sanctioned by the USA Patriot Act is necessary. In doing so, naming the system and understanding its operations would be useful in discovering precisely that element of self-activity, of agency, that has supposedly been erased in totalizing metanarratives such as the “New World Order,” the “New American Century” that will end ideology and history, and in revolutionary projects of achieving racial justice and equality. As the familiar quote goes, we do make history—but not under circumstances of our choosing. So the question is, as always, what alternatives do we have to carry out which goals at what time and place.

Burris 10 Greg, writer; “Coping with Capitalism” *Dissident Voice*; April 14, 2010; http://dissidentvoice.org/2010/04/coping-with-capitalism/

The most famous part of Frantz Fanon’s classic 1961 text The Wretched of the Earth is its powerful first chapter, “Concerning Violence,” a hard-hitting call to arms against the injustice and exploitation of European colonialism. What often goes unnoticed from the book is the series of anecdotes presented in its final pages: case studies of patients that came to Fanon seeking psychiatric help during Algeria’s bloody struggle for independence. Particularly notable is the story of a 30-year-old French police inspector, married with three children, who spent his days torturing Algerian prisoners and his nights plagued by terrible dreams and violent impulses towards his family. He first sought therapy after sadistically tying his wife to a chair and beating her. The offense? She had protested his physical abuse of their 20-month-old infant. ¶ The solution to the torturer’s problem is immediately obvious: stop torturing. Indeed, one does not have to be a Sigmund Freud to connect the dots linking his abuse of loved ones back to his grisly occupation. The French torturer, however, did not resign from his day job. Instead, he continued working full-time while in Fanon’s care and had no apparent intention of quitting. This was not, as one might surmise, a result of denial. Indeed, the police inspector was not blind to the fact that his job was the source of his violent tendencies. As Fanon reported, “This man knew perfectly well that his disorders were directly caused by the kind of activity that went on inside the rooms where interrogations were carried out.” Nevertheless, the patient asked Fanon “to help him to go on torturing Algerian patriots without any prickling of conscience, without any behavior problems and with complete equanimity.”1 In other words, the French torturer only wanted help finding an effective coping strategy for dealing with the side-effects of his hideous vocation.¶ The case of Fanon’s mentally disturbed torturer has many parallels in modern society. Today there seems to be a great tendency for people suffering from the side-effects of certain activities to treat the negative symptoms without bothering to evaluate their cause. This includes the use of prescribed medication both to lose weight and to calm down those children who do not get the attention they need. In this way, we are allowed to mindlessly continue on with the same damaging practices and life-styles that caused our initial complaints to begin with.¶ A similar observation has often been made by Slavoj Žižek who sees a striking paradox in the capitalist marketplace. In The Puppet and the Dwarf, for instance, he writes, “On today’s market, we find a whole series of products deprived of their malignant property: coffee without caffeine, cream without fat, beer without alcohol.”2 There is a direct parallel here between Fanon’s torturer and current market trends; both represent attempts at treating the symptom without dealing with its causes. What seems to be lost on those who partake in such easy (but ultimately empty) solutions is that by removing the harmful contents from harmful products we tend to forget that those harmful products are perhaps best not consumed in the first place.¶ This detachment of the symptom from its cause can also result in a failure to recognize that the two were ever connected. As Žižek has pointed out, “The ultimate example [of this trend] is arguably a chocolate laxative, available in the USA, with the paradoxical injunction: Do you have constipation? Eat more of this chocolate! (that is, of the very thing that causes constipation).”3 Indeed, did not this exact situation arise when, after the tragic September 11 attacks, President Bush sidestepped the issue of the economic grievances that had led to that atrocity and instead provided the American public with his own chocolate laxative, an instruction to consume: “Get on board. Do your business around the country. Fly and enjoy America’s great destination spots. Get down to Disney World in Florida. Take your families and enjoy life the way we want it to be enjoyed.”4 ¶ Of course, the Bush administration had no stranglehold on such ill-conceived remedies, and indeed, in the context of US politics, the championing of chocolate laxative solutions is a bipartisan affair. Thus, the catastrophic 2008 financial meltdown was dealt with by inundating the money mismanagers who caused it with even more money, redistributing public wealth into private hands on a massive scale. Likewise, the Obama administration’s strategy for taming the abusive practices of for-profit health insurance companies has been to secure even more customers for that industry, making the purchase of private insurance mandatory for all citizens. In both of these cases, the cause of our problems is presented as the solution.¶ This same idea might also apply to all of those frightening tales of US veterans who turn their war-time instincts upon their loved ones after returning home. Most recently, a soldier in Washington State was accused of submitting his four-year-old daughter to water torture for failing to recite her ABCs.5 Such cases are typically treated as monstrous and inexplicable aberrations — the doings of a few “bad apples” — rather than as byproducts of the standard operating procedure. So ingrained is this theme in the popular imagination that it has formed the plotline of several examples of Hollywood cinema. Notable here is Brothers (2009), a film in which the character of Captain Sam Cahill, played by Tobey Maguire, returns from Afghanistan a changed man. Before entering the war, he had represented the all-American ideal: his father’s favorite son, the head of a happy family, the husband of a beautiful wife, and the father of two lovely girls. In short, he was an upstanding citizen, living a life of luxury in a large, comfortable home in small town USA. After being captured, tortured, and forced to murder his friend by a smarmy group of vile Afghan terrorists, he returns to his consumerist paradise unstable and unfriendly, paranoid and ready at any moment to crack. The war apparently served as the great corrupter.¶ Not surprisingly, Brothers ends on a positive note with Cahill receiving what appears to be beneficial psychiatric treatment. Conspicuously absent from the film is any connection between the various wars out there with the social structures back home. To the contrary, therapy serves as a method of bringing Cahill back into the fold of normality without acknowledging that this normality caused the war in the first place. Thus, the film does not recognize that its two diametrically opposed spheres — the Cahill family’s life of luxury and the death and destruction in Afghanistan — are, in fact, two sides of the same coin. As with Žižek’s chocolate laxative, Brothers suggests that the remedy to the symptom is indulging even more in its cause.¶ This is, of course, not to say that therapy does not work. To the contrary, therapeutic practices like meditation, religious experience, and spirituality can, in fact, serve as effective coping methods. But this is precisely what makes them so dangerous. By soothing our symptomatic aches, these treatments act as a kind of anesthetic, dulling the pain and diverting our attention away from the systemic causes of our unpleasant maladies. As Dana Cloud put it in her study Control and Consolation in American Culture and Politics, “the therapeutic […] dislocates political conflicts onto individuals or families, privatizes both the experience of oppression and possible modes of resistance to it, and translates political questions into psychological issues to be resolved through personal, psychological change.”6 Thus, while therapy may indeed deliver instant gratification, such remedies remain incredibly short-sighted as long as they address problems only at the level of the individual and do not point towards the larger, structural causes behind the bothersome symptoms.¶ What happens, then, if we take these observations yet a step further and apply them to the realm of politics? Does the same lesson not also pertain to typical attitudes towards the global “war on terror”? If our wars abroad are, by themselves, the cause of our various societal ills, then we just simply need to get out. While the general call for withdrawal is one that all who are concerned for human life should wholeheartedly endorse, we should not lose sight of the bigger picture. Blaming the war entirely for today’s various problems is far too easy, and such a diagnosis acts to obscure the raw truth that merely withdrawing from Afghanistan or Iraq without also addressing those wars’ structural causes will do nothing to prevent the next conflict. Indeed, to treat the wars simply as a misguided policy decision or as a monstrous aberration serves only to hide the sinister reality that the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were, in fact, created by the political and economic structures of our very own society. Ignoring this while simultaneously indulging in the happy consumerist fantasy would be tantamount to treating constipation with Žižek’s chocolate laxative. The path to war begins at home, and we must recognize that the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are also symptoms — symptoms of the capitalist empire.¶ Thus, in the same way that Fanon’s torturer wanted to carry on with his business of torturing, just without the bothersome nightmares, does not the liberal anti-war movement today seek to carry on with the business of capitalism, just without its malignant symptoms? Indeed, the economic disparities and grievances that lie behind many of the globe’s acts of violence — both by states and by terrorists — are never really addressed. To do so would, in fact, require a fundamental rethinking of the capitalist fabric of the US state, something nobody within the system is willing to do. To truly address these issues would require that we treat the cause of the symptoms rather than just the symptoms. Or, to put it another way, if we want to end the wars that are caused by capitalism, we must work to overturn the capitalist system itself. Just like those people who think they can lose weight merely by gorging on “healthy” junk food and just like Fanon’s torturer who wanted to cure his nightmares through therapy, those who today believe they can continue to enjoy their capitalist cake and eat it too — just without the unpleasantries of terrorism, torture, and war — are only kidding themselves.

#### Their myopic focus on a particular manifestation of oppression does not provide a specific explanation for the broader linking of struggles – inhibits the possibility for transformative politics.

Heideman 12 [Paul M. Heideman Rutgers University, Newark, pmheideman@gmail.com Historical Materialism Volume 20, Issue 2, pages 210- 221 Beyond Black and White: Transforming African-American Politics, Manning Marable, Second Edition, London: Verso, 2009]

This theorisation of transformative politics is further weakened by its failure to specify any agency that could bring it about. Marable comes close to specifying such an agency with his repeated call to look to ‘the most oppressed sectors of our society’ for a vision of social transformation (pp. xv, 80, 310). Such a call is clearly inadequate. It simply does not follow that the most oppressed sectors of society are best positioned to carry out its most thorough remaking. The homeless, for example, are certainly among the most oppressed groups in the United States (especially in the age of the destruction of free public space and the social safety-net), yet this position does not automatically impart the most radical dynamics to their struggle. Indeed, struggles for squatters’ rights and shelters very rarely break out of localised confrontations with municipal authorities. 8 Additionally, Marable offers no account of how the disparate struggles of the oppressed (for example, the fight against anti-immigrant racism and the fight for the rights of the disabled) are to be unified, beyond the assertion that every confrontation with inequality automatically is linked to every other. Such an inadequate account of social-movement agency deeply weakens whatever strengths Marable’s theory of transformative politics may possess.

#### Waving Flag proves the way these coping mechanisms actually work to make corporations stronger

Though Cowards Flinch 10 “Football and freedom at World Cup 2010” http://thoughcowardsflinch.com/2010/06/20/football-and-freedom-at-world-cup-2010/

“When I get older, I will be stronger, they’ll call me freedom just like a waving flag.” This is the chorus to K’naan’s anthem to the 2010 world cup – and no one who is a football fan can fail to be moved both by the sentiments and the stunning visuals set to the music, from the tear-jerking moments to the high drama to the comradeship of players and fans.¶ Sport is and always has been intensely political. Whether the question is how the world cup affects South Africa, especially the poorest - put to no few interviewees by white European journalists – or the fact that commentators around the world were forced to remember the Soweto uprisings through their anniversary, World Cup 2010 is no different.¶ Interlaced into the above song are images of Nelson Mandela’s march to freedom, set to lyrics which are quite political in context: “Give me freedom, give me fire, give me reason, take me higher”. What all this obscures is that in reality this is a marketing campaign by Coca-Cola. It is not an artist celebrating his joy at the meeting and friendship of nations through sport.¶ In fact there is an ‘original’ version of K’naan’s song, from his recent album, Troubadour. It contains lyrics like the following snippet:¶ So many wars, settling scores¶ Bringing us promises, leaving us poor¶ I heard them say, love is the way¶ Love is the answer, that’s what they say,¶ But look how they treat us, make us believers¶ We fight their battles, then they deceive us¶ Try to control us, they couldn’t hold us¶ Cause we just move forward like Buffalo Soldiers¶ It’s basically a song about racism, war, poverty and a fight against these things. Coca-Cola, on the other hand, have diluted all this content to as little as they could without basically getting rid of the song entirely. In place of the most political lyrics, there is chanting and words about football.¶ Marketing magazing Billboard Biz recorded that Coca Cola “loved the song but noted that lyrical references to ‘a violent prone, poor people zone’ and people ‘struggling, fighting to eat’ didn’t fit the campaign’s themes”. Despite these things all being true about the continent of Africa, which in 2010 is the centre of the vortex of wealth and media attention coat-tailing the World Cup.¶ I’m not saying that K’naan is somehow ‘pure’ and Coca-Cola is somehow the anti-christ, having unfairly taken this song and basically prostituted it. Even the distorted ‘celebration mix’ contains sentiments which are worthwhile. In fact what Coca-Cola have done makes perfect sense.¶ They have taken something liable to strike a cord with popular sympathies, diluted it to taste and then utilised it to promote a product. It’s brilliant. It’s so common we don’t even think about it these days; humour, solidarity, love – basically every human emotion and expression worth having and with general applicability is used like this.¶ In this case, the song is even translated into languages other than English (for which it was originally written) to give it global appeal. In short, a global corporation intent on profiteering from a cynical marketing campaign can also appear as the guardians of diversity and local identity, from a certain point of view.¶ Mostly this disgusts me. And yet…there’s something good to take away as well.¶ Outside of the West, the cry ‘give me freedom’ resounds and ruling classes tremble. Whether it’s Iran, Burma, Thailand or Greece, the basic message explicit to the original version of this song is that one day we will shake off parasitic leaders and be free – and the political actions of these countries give the force to this message.¶ In Western Europe, we’re all too often inclined to think that the age of a redemptive politics is dead – that we’re consigned to basically tinkering around the edges and that there is no room for a panoramic vision of change. Even the mass movements of the last thirty have contained only a minority of those people with genuine aspirations for wholesale political change.¶ Yet across Europe this song, which is basically about that, is getting airplay, with a message attempting to tap into a persistent sense of solidarity, of wanting to belong as an equal and wanting others to belong as equals. If these beliefs weren’t widespread and waiting for a real movement to utilise them, Coca-Cola wouldn’t bother with them. ¶ However vacuous a gesture, whatever echoes of a Live8 style (without the advantages of raising money for charity, though minus the disadvantages of tits walking round with their armbands believing concerts change the world) it all may seem, that thought is still enough to make me smile.¶

This makes resistance to capitalism impossible. Your question should not be "what is MY" subject position, but what is "OUR" subject position.

Kirsch 1

Max H. Kirsch, Associate Professor at Florida Atlantic University. P 65-7. 2001. Queer Theory and Social Change.

My argument has been that the development of theory which takes the idea of the self- contained individual for granted is a part of this process of class struggl**e.** Postmodernism and post-structuralism, as examples of academic theory that reifies the self, serve the goals of the capitalist enterprise by promoting the isolation of the individual and the fragmentation of resistance. Fragmentation and isolation are strategies of capitalist management. These strategies would have the owners of capital in charge of thought and action. Resistance to capitalist managerial tactics is embedded in class struggle, which is dependent on identification, both energetically and economically, and the communities that support the identification process. Queer theory, as currently focused, is embedded in the context of class oppositions, and, paradoxically, the consequences of the theory are not what it appears to avow or what it contends it is. Instead of a force that opposes the dominance of power by those that controlcapital, it works as a part of the ideological mechanism that those in power seek to further. With the language of past radical movements, Queer theory works against the struggle it claims to engage, and as reified self-involvement it militates against the construction and building of communities. It disengages the energetic level of alliances and interpersonal relations, only to refocus efforts on the reductionistic deconstruction of texts interpreted only for personal use. The presence of conflict among peoples is tied to the struggle to maintain community and identity. What presents as senseless bigotry, sometimes resulting in genocide, is rooted in the anxious fight to maintain families, communities, and ensure survival. These are not individual functions. Their strategies, misconceived and misdirected, are a direct consequence of the loss of self-empowerment and control over everyday life. Capitalism, in this way, gives

#### The symbolic demand for abolition of the privileges intrinsic to whiteness trades off with the focus on advancing transformation of the structure which defines economic and social relations. Their political strategy fails in the specific context of educational establishments by confusing allies and accelerating divisions on the grounds of race, class, and culture.

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Advocating ‘the abolition of the privileges of the white skin’ is useless as a unifier and counter-productive as a political rallying point, as is the ‘the abolition of the white race’. As Jan Clausen, put it in a letter to the editor published in Ignatiev and Garvey (1996, p. 274): The slogan ‘abolish the white race’ has a certain shock value, and expresses a real and valid anger and indignation – emotions I share. As a guide to action, it is worthless insofar as it implies that such ‘abolition’ can somehow happen on a symbolic or mental level, apart from thoroughgoing social transformation ... Of course you are quite right that ‘whiteness’ is an ideological product, but as such it represents not only distorted mental constructs but the distorted structural relations out of which these constructs arise and which they continually reinvigorate. Moreover, with its single issue focus, it is difficult to see how RT provides a resolution to Preston and Chadderton’s ‘ongoing search ... [for ways of] building collective resistance’. Of course, the ‘white race’ is a social construct as is the notion of ‘race’ per se. One day perhaps, in a socialist world, we can do away with all perceptions of ‘race’ and ‘whiteness’, but (tactically) now is not the time. For example, were the promotion of ‘the abolition of the white skin’, or worse ‘the abolition of the white race’ to be routinely promoted in educational establishments, it would most likely cause severe confusion and indeed mayhem. Unproductive divisions on grounds of ‘race’, class and culture would undoubtedly accelerate. Could this be one of the reasons why Preston has abandoned his previous focus (e.g. 2007, 2010) on education in schools and concentrated on public pedagogy?