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## XO

#### Text: The President of the United States should issue an executive order banning signature strikes carried out by Remotely-Piloted Vehicles.

#### Executive can restrain itself --- it is subject to internal separation of powers

Sales, 12 --- Assistant Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law (7/3/2012, Nathan Alexander Sales, Journal of National Security Law & Policy, “Self-Restraint and National Security,” 6 J. Nat'l Security L. & Pol'y 227, Lexis))

III. Self-Restraint as Cost-Benefit Asymmetry

As we've seen, certain officials within military and intelligence agencies - general counsels, legal advisors, and other watchdogs - are responsible for ensuring that national security operations comply with the relevant domestic and international legal requirements. These players intervene to rule out missions they believe would cross a legal line. But sometimes they go beyond that basic function - ensure compliance with the law, full stop - and reject operations that, while lawful, are thought to be undesirable on policy grounds. That is, they impose self-restraints that are stricter than the applicable laws. Why?[\*261] One way to answer that question is to consider the individual and institutional incentives that color the behavior of military and intelligence officials. Looking at the government's national security apparatus through the lens of public choice theory (especially the idea that bureaucrats are rationally self interested actors who seek to maximize their utility n152) and basic agency relationships (e.g., the relationships between senior policymakers and the subordinates who act on their behalf n153) reveals a complex system in which power is distributed among a number of different nodes. The executive branch "is a "they,' not an "it.'" n154 The national security community in particular is subdivided into various semi-autonomous entities, each of which promotes its own parochial interests within the system and, in so doing, checks the like ambitions of rival entities; n155 the government thus is subject to what Neal Katyal has called the "internal separation of powers." n156 These basic insights into how military and intelligence agencies operate suggest several possible explanations for why self-restraint occurs. As elaborated in this Part, such constraints might result from systematic asymmetries in the expected value calculations of senior policymakers and their lawyers. In addition, as explained in Part IV, self-restraint might occur due to bureaucratic empire building by officials who review operations for compliance with domestic and international law.

## Flex DA

#### Executive self-restraint is key to preserve the ability to respond to crises.

Pildes 12 [Richard H., Sudler Family Professor of Constitutional Law, NYU School of Law and Co-Director, NYU Center on Law and Security. 2/27/12 BOOK REVIEWS LAW AND THE PRESIDENT THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE MADISONIAN REPUBLIC. By Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule. New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press. 2010. Pp. 249. $29.95. New York University Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers]

First, they argue, a President unbound can produce better outcomes than a President bound to follow preexisting legislation: laws (constitutions and statutes) are always written in a specific context in the past, but technology, the economy, international dynamics, and other circumstances that characterize the modern age are exceptionally fluid and constantly shifting. Better to have presidents make their best judgment, all things considered, about the right action in the actual, immediate circumstances at hand than to have them be bound by laws that could not have contemplated these precise circumstances. Second, and central to Posner and Vermeule’s analysis, presidents do remain constrained — not by law, but by politics and the political judgment of others. As scholars since Richard Neustadt, if not earlier, have recognized, the actual, effective powers of a President (as opposed to the formal powers of the office) are directly rooted in, and limited by, his or her ongoing credibility.21 Presidents want the capacity to exercise their best judgment as contexts arise. But other actors in the system, including “the public,” will permit presidents to exercise more or less discretion depending on how credible those presidents are perceived to be (pp. 122–23). Credibility means generalized judgments about presidential performance, such as how well motivated the President is considered to be, how effective his or her actions are judged to be, and how wise or prudent his or her judgments are taken to be. “Credibility” in this context is analogous to what scholars of the Supreme Court have called long-term “diffuse support” for the Court; diffuse support means the willingness of the public to support the Court’s discretionary power, even when people might disagree with particular outcomes, because they generally believe the Court is exercising these powers in sound ways for good reasons.22 The more credible presidents make themselves, the more other actors will permit them to exercise broad discretion — including discretion to ignore or manipulate the law, which is the unique contribution of Posner and Vermeule’s view. Thus, argue Posner and Vermeule, presidents have strong incentives to adopt practices and take actions that establish and maintain their credibility (p. 133). These incentives will lead smart presidents to adopt various sorts of self-binding mechanisms that limit their discretion: commitments to transparency so others can monitor and oversee; or commitments to multilateral approaches in foreign policy so that presidents can act only with approval of other nations; or commitments to ceding some power to independent actors, such as special prosecutors or other institutions within the executive branch; or similar approaches through which presidents accept limits on their own power (pp. 113–53). By acting consistently with these self-adopted constraints, presidents build up their credibility by signaling that they are using their discretion in acceptable ways and should therefore continue to be granted that discretion — including discretion to avoid, circumvent, or ignore the law when, in the President’s best judgment, doing so will produce better outcomes.

#### Restrictions on presidential power cause adversaries to doubt the resolve of U.S. deterrence – causes crisis escalation.

Waxman 8/25 [Matthew Waxman 8/25/13, Professor of Law – Columbia and Adjunct Senior Fellow for Law and Foreign Policy – CFR, “The Constitutional Power to Threaten War,” Forthcoming in Yale Law Journal, vol. 123, August 25, 2013, SSRN]

A claim previously advanced from a presidentialist perspective is that stronger legislative checks on war powers is harmful to coercive and deterrent strategies, because it **establishes easily-visible impediments to the President’s authority** to follow through on threats. This was a common policy argument during the War Powers Resolution debates in the early 1970s. Eugene Rostow, an advocate inside and outside the government for executive primacy, remarked during consideration of legislative drafts that **any serious restrictions** on presidential use of force would mean in practice that “no President could make a credible threat to use force as an instrument of deterrent diplomacy, even to head off **explosive confrontations.”**178 He continued:¶ In the tense and cautious diplomacy of our present relations with the Soviet Union, as they have developed over the last twenty-five years, the authority of the President to set clear and silent limits in advance is perhaps the most important of all the powers in our constitutional armory to prevent confrontations that could carry nuclear implications. … [I]t is the diplomatic power the President needs most under the circumstance of modern life—the power to make a credible threat to use force in order to prevent a confrontation **which might escalate.**179

## Poltics DA

Obama has held off Iran sanctions thus far.

Reuters 3/4 [“U.S. senator still believes in new Iran sanctions bill,” http://news.yahoo.com/u-senator-still-believes-iran-sanctions-bill-163117789.html]

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - U.S. Senator Robert Menendez said on Tuesday he still sees his legislation to impose new sanctions on Iran as the best way to ensure that Iran does not develop a nuclear weapon and prevent military action over its nuclear program. In a speech to the pro-Israel lobby AIPAC, Menendez, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, expressed deep skepticism about Iran's intentions in current negotiations with world powers. "I don't believe we will have sufficient time to effectively impose new sanctions before Iran could produce a nuclear weapon, leaving the West with only two options, a nuclear armed Iran or a military action," Menendez said. "I believe that we can prevent those being the only two options by the legislation that we have proposed with Senator (Mark) Kirk," he said, to loud applause. Menendez, a New Jersey Democrat, and Kirk, an Illinois Republican, were lead authors of a bill to impose new sanctions on Iran if international negotiations on a nuclear agreement falter. President Barack Obama's administration lobbied hard against the bill, saying that it would endanger the delicate talks with Iran. The measure stalled in the Senate and hasn't been brought to the floor for a vote, but Menendez has said he is prepared to push for one when the time is right. "It is clear that only intense, punishing economic pressure influences Iranian leaders," he said.

#### Obama would fight restrictions on his authority --- fiat means he loses

Scheuerman 13 (William, Professor of Political Science at Indiana University, PhD from Harvard, Barack Obama's "war on terror", Eurozine, 3/7, http://www.eurozine.com/pdf/2013-03-07-scheuerman-en.pdf)

Given dual democratic legitimacy, holders of executive power face deeply rooted institutional incentives to retain whatever power or authority has landed¶ in their laps. Fundamentally, their political fate is separate from that of the¶ legislature's. They have to prove −− on their own −− that they deserve the trust placed in them by the electorate. Unlike prime ministers in parliamentary¶ regimes, they also face strict term limits. As astute observers have noted, this¶ provides political life in presidential regimes with a particular sense of urgency¶ since the executive will only have a short span of time in which to advance his¶ or her program. Presidentialism's strict separation of powers means that the¶ executive will soon likely face potentially hostile opponents who have gained a¶ foothold in the legislature. In the US, for example, even presidents recently¶ elected with large majorities immediately need to worry about looming¶ midterm congressional elections. To be sure, even prime ministers in¶ parliamentary systems will want to get things done. But incentives to do so in a¶ high−speed fashion remain more deeply ingrained in presidential systems.¶ These familiar facts about presidentialism allow us to help make sense of¶ Obama's disappointing record. Without doubt, Obama has been personally as¶ well as ideologically committed to reining in Bush−era executive prerogative.¶ Yet he now occupies an institutional position which necessarily makes him averse to far−reaching attempts to limit his own room for effective political¶ and administrative action, especially when the stakes are high, as is manifestly¶ the case in counterterrorism. Understandably, he needs to worry that the¶ electorate will punish him −− and not the Congress or Supreme Court −− for¶ mistakes which might result in deadly terrorist attacks on US citizens. Given the institutional dynamics of a presidential system characterized by more−or−less permanent rivalry, it is hardly surprising that he has held onto so much of the prerogative power successfully claimed for the executive branch¶ by his right−wing predecessor. As Obama's own political advisors have been¶ vocally telling him since 2009, it might indeed prove politically perilous if he¶ were to go too far in abandoning the substantial discretionary powers he enjoys¶ in the war on terror. Unfortunately, their "sound" political advice −− which¶ indeed may have helped Obama get reelected −− simultaneously has had¶ deeply troublesome humanitarian and legal consequences.

Political capital is key to holding off sanctions.

Kaper 2/2 [Stacy, National Journal, 2-2-14, “How Obama Won the War on Iran Sanctions,” http://www.nationaljournal.com/defense/how-obama-won-the-war-on-iran-sanctions-20140202]

The push for new sanctions on Iran has stalled. The Democrats who bucked President Obama to back the sanctions bill are backpedaling mightily—no longer even pretending they're pushing Harry Reid to hold a vote on the measure. And while there's still plenty of chest-pounding and posturing, the debate's end result seems clear: The Senate will wait, at least so long as the negotiations move in the right direction. That's a full flip from just more than a month ago. Before the December recess, the Senate's pro-sanctions faction was surging. Senators—including Democrats who are typically Obama loyalists—were agreeing with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's claim that the nuclear negotiations with Iran bordered on capitulation. So how did Obama—a supposedly feckless president when it comes to handling Congress—turn the tide? Obama's in-person, all-hands-on-deck advocacy campaign with the Senate appears to have advanced his cause, but it's not that simple. The president combined tangible developments abroad with fervent support from the Left, and used it to win out over a fracturing Israel lobby. In the process, he won—at least for now—a foreign policy victory just as his critics were insisting Obama's age of influence was over. "It's a combination of one side not doing that much and the other side doing a lot. The AIPAC guys have not been calling us and usually we would be hearing from them," a Democratic Senate aide said. AIPAC is shorthand for the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, Washington's best-known pro-Israel lobby group. Obama started by reaching out to Congress in their house and his: He sent envoys, including Secretary of State John Kerry, to Capitol Hill, and he invited key players to a White House meeting to make a case that independent Sen. Angus King of Maine labeled "incredibly powerful." But outreach on Iran is nothing new. What is different this time is that, unlike with past rounds of sanctions against Iran where the interplay has been more theoretical, the Islamic republic is actually at the negotiating table, at least going through the motions of entertaining the dismantling of its nuclear-weapons capabilities. Tremendous skepticism remains that the talks will ultimately work—including from inside the administration—but the ongoing talks at least give concerned senators an alternative. And then there was the resurgent progressive movement that capitalized on a war-weary public to push Democrats in Obama's direction. MoveOn.org, Daily Kos, The Huffington Post, and other liberal media outlets have mobilized against Democrats who supported sanctions, accusing them of undermining Obama with warmongering and asking, "Where's the antiwar Left?" Finally, Obama was the beneficiary of weakened opposition. The Israel lobby has succeeded in influencing Iran policy for decades, but it's currently in a state of upheaval. AIPAC has not been beating down doors canvassing Capitol Hill in a concerted campaign as it has in the past, and J Street—AIPAC's younger, rising counterweight—is making the case against sanctions. "The bottom line is that more and more members want to give the administration the space they are asking for to try to negotiate a deal with Iran. If it doesn't work they'll begin to ratchet up the sanctions more," a former senior Democratic Senate aide said. "I believe the administration now has the space they are looking for." Another Senate aide agreed that outside forces are making a difference. "The president's base has gone all-in with his party, cashed in every chit possible, applied every possible pressure point on Democrats, used messaging and rhetoric that fires up the liberal base, and activated grass roots to target Democrats and make them afraid of this bill from the left," said the aide. "Unfortunately it's turned it partisan, and we'll see if Republicans will take the next step."

Deal prevents war and Iran prolif.

Shank and Gould 9/12 [Michael Shank, Ph.D., is director of foreign policy at the Friends Committee on National Legislation. Kate Gould is legislative associate for Middle East policy at FCNL, No Iran deal, but significant progress in Geneva, 9/12/13, http://communities.washingtontimes.com/neighborhood/cause-conflict-conclusion/2013/nov/12/no-iran-deal-significant-progress-geneva/]

Congress should welcome, not stubbornly dismiss, diplomatic efforts to finalize the interim accord and support the continued conversation to reach a more comprehensive agreement. The sanctions that hawks on the Hill are pushing derail such efforts and increase the prospects of war. There is, thankfully, a growing bipartisan contingent of Congress who recognizes that more sanctions could undercut the delicate diplomatic efforts underway. Senator Carl Levin, D-Mich., chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee, cautioned early on that, “We should not at this time impose additional sanctions.” Senator Tim Johnson, D-S.D., chair of the Banking Committee, is still weighing whether to press forward with new sanctions in his committee. Separately, as early as next week, the Senate could vote on Iran sanctions amendments during the chamber’s debate on the must-pass annual defense authorization bill. This caution against new sanctions, coming from these more sober quarters of the Senate, echoes the warnings from a wide spectrum of former U.S. military officials against new sanctions. There is broad recognition by U.S. and Israeli security officials that the military option is not the preferred option; a diplomatic one is. This widespread support for a negotiated solution was highlighted last week when 79 national security heavyweights signed on to a resounding endorsement of the Obama Administration’s latest diplomatic efforts. Any member of Congress rejecting a diplomatic solution moves the United States toward another war in the Middle East. Saying no to this deal-in-the-works, furthermore, brings the world no closer toward the goal of Iran giving up its entire nuclear program. Rather, it would likely result in an unchecked Iranian enrichment program, while the United States and Iran would teeter perilously close on the brink of war. A deal to prevent war and a nuclear-armed Iran is within reach and it would be dangerous to let it slip away. Congress can do the right thing here, for America’s security and Middle East’s stability, and take the higher diplomatic road. Pandering to harsh rhetoric and campaign contributors is no way to sustain a foreign policy agenda. It will only make America and her assets abroad less secure, not more. The time is now to curb Iran’s enrichment program as well as Congress’s obstructionism to a peaceful path forward.

## CP

#### The United States Federal Government should ban signature strikes carried out by Remotely-Piloted Vehicles except in Yemen.

## Case

### Terrorism

#### Signature strikes are needed to fight AQAP

**Saletan 12** William Saletan April 26 2012 Salon Slipping With the Yemenis; We’re escalating our drone campaign in Yemen. Are we getting into a war? [http://www.slate.com/articles/news\_and\_politics/human\_nature/2012/04/ yemen\_s\_drone\_war\_is\_mission\_creep\_drawing\_us\_into\_a\_civil\_war\_.html](http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/human_nature/2012/04/%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20yemen_s_drone_war_is_mission_creep_drawing_us_into_a_civil_war_.html)

Our troops have come home from Iraq. They’re coming home from Afghanistan. Are you ready to send them off to Yemen?

I didn’t think so. Neither is the Obama administration. But Yemen is where al-Qaida is setting up shop. Unless you’re willing to risk another terrorist strike on the United States, we’ll have to stay after these guys. And unless you’re willing to send troops or manned aircraft to do that job, we’ll have to send drones.

That’s why we just expanded, in a limited way, our drone campaign in Yemen. We’re trying to take out the people who are most dangerous to us without getting mired in Yemen’s civil war.

The CIA and the Joint Special Operations Command have been flying killer drones over Yemen for years. Last year, they took out Anwar al-Awlaki. But according to a report by Adam Entous, Siobhan Gorman, and Julian Barnes in today’s Wall Street Journal, the White House has just changed the rules.

Under the old rules, the CIA and JSOC could use the drones over Yemen only for “personality” strikes, in which the target was identified as someone on an approved list of bad guys. Nobody was deliberately killed until we knew who he was and until we investigated his role in al-Qaida.

Last year, the CIA and JSOC asked the White House to relax the rules. They wanted authority to launch “signature” strikes. In a signature strike, you don’t have to know exactly who the target is. You just have to watch his behavior—the Journal cites transporting weapons as an example—and determine that it’s the behavior of a bad guy. The signature rule allows you to target a lot more people. That’s why we’ve launched so many strikes in Pakistan.

But in Pakistan, the signature rule has become pretty lax. What began as a campaign to take out al-Qaida operatives, based on what’s now a decade-old attack on the U.S., has become a broader air war on the Taliban. In the Pakistani frontier regions, the CIA has license to take out fighters who appear to be involved, or intent on getting involved, in the Afghan insurgency. The drone campaign has spread from counterterrorism to counterinsurgency.

The White House doesn’t want to slide into a counterinsurgency role in Yemen. According to the Journal, administration officials “feared they could be manipulated by Yemeni intelligence sources into taking out targets who don't directly threaten the U.S.” So they rejected last year’s request to expand the drone campaign. But proponents of an expanded campaign turned up the heat. They claim to be “tracking several direct threats to the U.S. connected to” al-Qaida in Yemen. And they note that drone operators have improved their ability to avoid civilian casualties.

So the White House has relented. It has authorized signature strikes, with a caveat. Under the new rules, you don’t have to know exactly whom you’re killing. According to the Journal’s paraphrase, you can even target “lower-level fighters.” But you have to “determine that their militant activities are significant enough” to make them “high-value targets,” or that they’re “plotting against U.S. and Western interests.”

The administration thinks this rule will prevent the Yemen drone campaign from slipping into counterinsurgency. I’m skeptical. Yemen’s leaders may distrust the U.S. and its drones, but why shouldn’t the distrust run both ways? The regime has every reason to feed us intelligence that will lead us to take out enemy fighters, regardless of what threat they pose to us. And that agenda coincides with the views of the U.S. military and intelligence officials who advocated the escalation of the drone program. According to the Journal, these officials think “more-aggressive U.S. action is necessary” in part “to help the Yemeni government regain control of southern provinces where [al-Qaida] and its allies hold sway.” One official flatly declares that al-Qaida’s Yemen “insurgency and its terrorist plotting against the West are two sides of the same coin.”

#### Signature strikes in Yemen are based on identification of AQAP presence – AQAP leadership signatures are used

Miller 12 Greg Miller, covers the intelligence beat for The Washington Post April 25, 2012 Washington Post

White House approves broader Yemen drone campaign <http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/white-house-approves-broader-yemen-drone-campaign/2012/04/25/gIQA82U6hT_story.html>

The United States has begun launching drone strikes against suspected al-Qaeda operatives in Yemen under new authority approved by President Obama that allows the CIA and the military to fire even when the identity of those who could be killed is not known, U.S. officials said.

The policy shift marks a significant expansion of the clandestine drone war against an al-Qaeda affiliate that has seized large ­pieces of territory in Yemen and is linked to a series of terrorist plots against the United States.

U.S. officials said that Obama approved the use of “signature” strikes this month and that the killing of an al-Qaeda operative near the border of Yemen’s Marib province this week was among the first attacks carried out under the new authority.

The decision to give the CIA and the U.S. Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) greater leeway is almost certain to escalate a drone campaign that has accelerated significantly this year, with at least nine strikes in under four months. The number is about equal to the sum of airstrikes all last year.

The expanded authority will allow the CIA and JSOC to fire on targets based solely on their intelligence “signatures” — patterns of behavior that are detected through signals intercepts, human sources and aerial surveillance, and that indicate the presence of an important operative or a plot against U.S. interests.

Until now, the administration had allowed strikes only against known terrorist leaders who appear on secret CIA and JSOC target lists and whose location can be confirmed.

Moving beyond those rules of engagement raises substantial risks for the Obama administration, which has sought to avoid being drawn into a fight between insurgents and Yemen’s central government.

Congressional officials have expressed concern that using signature strikes would raise the likelihood of killing militants who are not involved in plots against the United States, angering Yemeni tribes and potentially creating a new crop of al-Qaeda recruits.

Critics have also challenged the legal grounds for expanding the drone campaign in Yemen. In an opinion piece published in The Washington Post on Sunday, Bruce Ackerman, a law professor at Yale University, argued that war measures adopted in the aftermath of the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks were not aimed at al-Qaeda’s Yemeni affiliate and don’t provide Obama “with authority to respond to these threats without seeking further congressional consent.”

The Post reported last week that the CIA was seeking authority to expand the drone campaign in Yemen. The approval of that enhanced authority was first reported Wednesday on the Wall Street Journal’s Web site.

CIA and White House officials declined to comment.

Administration officials stressed that U.S. airstrikes in Yemen will still be under tighter restrictions than they have been in Pakistan. CIA drones flying over Pakistan’s tribal belt are allowed to strike groups of armed militants traveling by truck toward the war in Afghanistan, for example, even when there is no indication of the presence of al-Qaeda operatives or a high-value terrorist.

In Yemen, by contrast, signature strikes will only be allowed when there is clear indication of the presence of an al-Qaeda leader or of plotting against targets in the United States or Americans overseas. In recent months, U.S. spy agencies have collected intelligence indicating plots against American diplomats or U.S. special operations troops who are working alongside Yemeni counter-terrorism units.

But much of the expertise that the CIA and JSOC will employ in Yemen is likely to draw heavily on the agency’s experience in Pakistan. There, officials said, the CIA has become so proficient at monitoring militant groups that it can tell when an al-Qaeda leader is present at a compound through chatter on signals intercepts, security precautions taken before the dignitary’s arrival, as well as the number and behavior of al-Qaeda security personnel around the perimeter of the site.

#### Signature strikes are crucial in taking out leadership – Pakistan experience proves

Miller 12 Greg Miller, April 18, 2012 Washington Post CIA seeks new authority to expand Yemen drone campaign

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/cia-seeks-new-authority-to-expand-yemen-drone-campaign/2012/04/18/gIQAsaumRT_story.html>

Securing permission to use these “signature strikes” would allow the agency to hit targets based solely on intelligence indicating patterns of suspicious behavior, such as imagery showing militants gathering at known al-Qaeda compounds or unloading explosives.

The practice has been a core element of the CIA’s drone program in Pakistan for several years. CIA Director David H. Petraeus has requested permission to use the tactic against the al-Qaeda affiliate in Yemen, which has emerged as the most pressing terrorism threat to the United States, officials said.

If approved, the change would probably accelerate a campaign of U.S. airstrikes in Yemen that is already on a record pace, with at least eight attacks in the past four months.

For President Obama, an endorsement of signature strikes would mean a significant, and potentially risky, policy shift. The administration has placed tight limits on drone operations in Yemen to avoid being drawn into an often murky regional conflict and risk turning militants with local agendas into al-Qaeda recruits.

A senior administration official, who like others spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive internal deliberations, declined to talk about what he described as U.S. “tactics” in Yemen, but he said that “there is still a very firm emphasis on being surgical and targeting only those who have a direct interest in attacking the United States.”

U.S. officials acknowledge that the standard has not always been upheld. Last year, a U.S. drone strike inadvertently killed the American son of al-Qaeda leader Anwar al-Awlaki. The teenager had never been accused of terrorist activity and was killed in a strike aimed at other militants.

Some U.S. officials have voiced concern that such incidents could become more frequent if the CIA is given the authority to use signature strikes.

“How discriminating can they be?” asked a senior U.S. official familiar with the proposal. Al-Qaeda’s affiliate in Yemen “is joined at the hip” with a local insurgency whose main goal is to oust the country’s government, the official said. “I think there is the potential that we would be perceived as taking sides in a civil war.”

U.S. officials said that the CIA proposal has been presented to the National Security Council and that no decision has been reached. Officials from the White House and the CIA declined to comment.

Proponents of the plan said improvements in U.S. intelligence collection in Yemen have made it possible to expand the drone campaign — and use signature strikes — while minimizing the risk of civilian casualties.

They also pointed to the CIA’s experience in Pakistan. U.S. officials said the agency killed more senior al-Qaeda operatives there with signature strikes than with those in which it had identified and located someone on its kill list.

In Pakistan, the CIA “killed most of their ‘list people’ when they didn’t know they were there,” said a former senior U.S. military official familiar with drone operations.

The agency has cited the Pakistan experience to administration officials in arguing, perhaps counterintuitively, that it can be more effective against al-Qaeda’s Yemen affiliate if it doesn’t have to identify its targets before an attack. Obama, however, ruled out a similar push for such authority more than a year ago.

Increasing focus on Yemen

The CIA, the National Security Agency and other spy services have deployed more officers and resources to Yemen over the past several years to augment counterterrorism operations that were previously handled almost exclusively by the U.S. Joint Special Operations Command.

The CIA began flying armed drones over Yemen last year after opening a secret base on the Arabian Peninsula. The agency also has worked with the Saudi and Yemeni intelligence services to build networks of informants — much the way it did in Pakistan before ramping up drone strikes there.

The agency’s strategy in Pakistan was centered on mounting a drone campaign so relentless that it allowed no time between attacks for al-Qaeda operatives to regroup. The use of signature strikes came to be seen as critical to achieving that pace.

The approach involved assembling threads of intelligence from multiple sources to develop telltale “signatures” of al-Qaeda activity based on operatives’ vehicles, facilities, communications equipment and patterns of behavior.

A former senior U.S. intelligence official said the CIA became so adept at this that it could tell what was happening inside an al-Qaeda compound — whether a leader was visiting or explosives were being assembled, for example — based on the location and number of security operatives surrounding the site.

#### Fast and constant signature strikes key – degrades support network

Mudd 13

Philip Mudd, Senior Research Fellow, Counterterrorism Strategy Initiative, CIA analyst since 1985 working in counterterrorism, Foreign Policy, 5/24/13, “Fear Factor”, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/05/24/fear\_factor\_signature\_strikes //jchen

The impact of armed drones during the decade-plus of this intense global counterterrorism campaign is hard to overestimate: Without operational commanders and visionary leaders, terror groups decay into locally focused threats, or disappear altogether. Targeted strikes against al Qaeda leaders and commanders in the years immediately after 9/11 deprived the group of the time and stability required to plot a major strike. But the London subway attacks in July 2005 illustrated the remaining potency of al Qaeda's core in the tribal areas of Pakistan. The threat was fading steadily. But not fast enough.

So-called signature strikes -- in which target selection is based not on identification of an individual but instead on patterns of behavior or unique characteristics that identify a group -- accelerated this decline for simple reasons. Targeting leadership degrades a small percentage of a diffuse terror group, but developing the tactical intelligence required to locate an individual precisely enough to stage a pinpoint strike, in a no-man's land half a world away, is time-consuming and difficult. And it's not a perfect science; the leaders of groups learn over time how to operate more securely. Furthermore, these leaders represent only a fraction of the threat: Osama bin Laden might have been the public face of al Qaeda, but he was supported by a web of document-forgers, bombmakers, couriers, trainers, ideologues, and others. They made up the bulk of al Qaeda and propelled the apparatus that planned the murder of innocents. Bin Laden was the revolutionary leader, but it was the troops who executed his vision.

Signature strikes have pulled out these lower-level threads of al Qaeda's apparatus -- and that of its global affiliates -- rapidly enough that the deaths of top leaders are now more than matched by the destruction of the complex support structure below them. Western conceptions of how organizations work, with hierarchal structures driven by top-level managers, do not apply to al Qaeda and its affiliates. These groups are instead conglomerations of militants, operating independently, with rough lines of communication and fuzzy networks that cross continents and groups. They are hard to map cleanly, in other words. Signature strikes take out whole swaths of these network sub-tiers rapidly -- so rapidly that the groups cannot replicate lost players and their hard-won experience. The tempo of the strikes, in other words, adds sand to the gears of terror organizations, destroying their operational capability faster than the groups can recover.

#### Signature strikes key – killing leaders isn’t enough, need to reduce overall skill and capacity

Llenza 11

Michael Steven Llenza, Senior Navy Fellow at Atlantic Council, Foreign Affairs Specialist NATO ISAF at OSD, “Targeted Killings in Pakistan: A Defense”, Global Security Studies, Spring, 2011, Volume 2, Issue 2 //jchen

A former CIA officer compared the Predator strikes to attacking a beehive one bee at a time, 􏱀you can kill some very important bees, but the hive is going to remain (Raddatz, p.42).􏱁 What counter-terrorism specialists are counting on though is that such strikes will eliminate not just the queen bees, but also their most valuable workers, those with the knowledge that takes years to acquire, such as some of the bomb makers and paramilitary specialists who have been killed. While a long list of charismatic leaders willing to take the fight to the U.S. will probably remain, those who possess the knowledge to actually inflict damage as well as pass on to others the training required to do so, will dwindle. There is therefore good reason to believe that targeted killings will weaken and demoralize organizations that already suffer from no clear institutional structure (Statman). Killing such individuals should in the end make it more difficult for the terror machinery to function (ibid.).

Taliban spokesperson Tariq Azam has stated that their meetings within the FATA no longer take place in direct view of the skies and that they have been forced underground (Khan & Arnoldy). Citizens of the tribal regions have begun to form armed posses and have torched the homes of Taliban members and their supporters as well as destroyed training camps (ibid.). Still drone strikes are a counter-terrorism option, not a counter insurgency strategy. Drone attacks have empowered the people of the region to act against the Taliban but failure on behalf of the government to stabilize the regions will only result in their return (ibid.).

#### Targeting middle leadership is especially effective – incites power struggles

Morehouse 11

Matthew Morehouse, Master’s Thesis for Political Science dissertation, University of Nebraska – Lincoln, “Hellfire and Grey Drones: An Empirical Examination of the Effectiveness of Targeted Killings”, May 2011 //jchen

There are several key findings that flow forth from this data. Firstly, the data demonstrates, consistent with the expectations of the Organizational Behavior Models, the terrorists of Afghanistan and Pakistan can by no means be considered to be a unitary actor. The fact that conflict can erupt between allied organizations such as the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, and even within the same organization (ie. the Taliban), suggests that said groups are not as united as they are commonly believed to be, and that their behavior may be best explained as the result of inter-organizational (and intra-organizational) conflicts. Secondly, it appears that, consistent with the Governmental Politics Model, that group behavior can be the result of internal dynamics within the group. An example of this would be the deaths and injuries that were the result of the conflict over who would take over the regional leadership position after the death of Mehsud. Hence, decisions within the Taliban do not appear to necessarily be governed by rational calculations, as much as they are by the outcomes of internal political battles. Finally, the data suggests that targeted killings can be an effective tool for combating terrorism, but from an oblique perspective. Specifically, this case may be suggestive that the targeting of the mid-level leadership of a terrorist organization may be the most effective course of action for states to take, as opposed to mainly targeting the top leadership of a group. The death of a regional commander, such as the abovementioned case of Mehsud, can lead to internal squabbles over leadership within a group, with a great chance for intra-group (and inter- group) violence to be the result. Hence, states can harm terrorists by setting into motion situations which would likely lead towards terrorists targeting focus (and weapons) towards each other.

#### Even if recruits increase, they’re inexperienced – stopping strikes gives them a chance to learn

Byman 06

Daniel Byman, professor in the Security Studies Program in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service @ Georgetown University, Senior Fellow at Brookings Institution, “Do Targeted Killings Work?”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85 No. 2, Mar-Apr 2006, 95-111 //jchen

Something more than correlation was at work here. Contrary to popular myth, the number of skilled terrorists is quite limited. Bomb makers, terrorism trainers, forgers, recruiters, and terrorist leaders are scarce; they need many months, if not years, to gain enough expertise to be effective. When these individuals are arrested or killed, their organizations are disrupted. The groups may still be able to attract recruits, but lacking expertise, these new recruits will not pose the same kind of threat.

To achieve such an effect on a terrorist group requires a rapid pace of attacks against it. The contrast between the Israeli campaign against Hezbollah in the 198os and that against Hamas and other groups more recently highlights this point. Although Israel killed several Hezbollah leaders after its invasion of Lebanon in 1982, it did so at an almost desultory pace. Potential targets thus did not have to worry constantly about hiding from Israeli strikes, and when members were killed, Hezbollah had time to fully train replacements. Recently, however, in response to Israel's stepped-up campaign, Hamas and other Palestinian groups have found it difficult to replace their lost cadres with equally skilled substitutes . Frequent targeted killings also force surviving terrorists to spend more and more of their time protecting themselves. To avoid elimination, the terrorists must constantly change locations, keep those locations secret, and keep their heads down, all of which reduces the flow of information in their organization and makes internal communications problematic and dangerous.

#### Staying strong is the only way to win hearts and minds – backing down is seen as weakness

Gitz 7 – Dr. Bradley R. Gitz, William Jefferson Clinton Professor of International Politics at Lyon College “Perception as Destiny,” Arkansas Democrat-Gazette (Little Rock), 1/14/07, Lexis)

Muslim majorities will eventually reject Islamism only if it is perceived as being effectively and resolutely resisted, as is happening at present in the horn of Africa. They will accommodate themselves to Islamism regardless of their personal preferences if they feel it is the stronger force and represents their reluctant future. Osama bin Laden would be the first to agree that what we are engaged in is a struggle for the hearts and minds of the world's Muslims and that the single most important variable influencing that struggle is perceptions of who is stronger, the Islamists or us. To the extent that Islamist fanatics appear to be winning because we in the West lack the necessary resolve to use our superior power to resist their advances, our superior values will never get the chance to prove their appeal. The appropriate analogy here comes from the urban war zones of America, where the willingness of law-abiding residents to cooperate with the police in their struggle against drug dealers and street gangs is contingent upon which side they feel can hurt or protect them more. Such people constitute the vast majority of the residents of those neighborhoods and almost certainly want the same things for their children that those living in the affluent suburbs want, but they can only afford to "do the right thing," i.e., help the police identify and arrest the criminals, if they can do so without risking their lives and those of their children. Just as the "good guys" (the police) can prevail in crime-ridden neighborhoods only by receiving the help of the people living there and the people living there will help only if they believe that the police are stronger than the bad guys, moderate Muslims around the world will only reject the terrorists and their governments will cooperate with ours in the struggle against those terrorists only if they believe that we, not the terrorists, will win. Such a struggle is playing out in miniature inside Iraq at present and features almost exactly the same incentive system for ordinary Iraqis. We can build a stable democracy in Iraq only if we can overcome the terrorists and the sectarian militias, but to overcome the terrorists and diminish the appeal of the sectarian militias we must first win the support and confidence of the Iraqi people. The people of Iraq would almost certainly prefer to actively cooperate with us and with the government most of them stood in long lines to elect, but will do so only if it doesn't mean jeopardizing themselves and their families. If the people of Iraq believe that the insurgents are stronger and our will to prevail is too weak, they will accommodate the insurgents who control their neighborhoods and punish those who defy them. If they believe that we are about to throw up our hands and withdraw in frustration, they will find protection wherever they can, most obviously among Iraq's heavily armed sectarian militias. In Vietnam, we lost primarily because the villagers of South Vietnam feared the Viet Cong to a greater extent than they trusted either their army or our soldiers to protect them. Most of them didn't want the kind of oppressive future that communism promised, but then most Muslims don't want to be ruled by the Taliban or al-Qa'ida, either. Thus, what we should never forget when discussing our options in Iraq and elsewhere is that the strength of the other side will be determined by perceptions of our strength and resolve.

#### Restriction on drones creates a slippery slope that makes them completely unusable

Foreign Affairs 12

Omar Bashir, Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Politics at Princeton University and a graduate of the Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics at MIT, “Who Watches the Drones? The Case for Independent Oversight ”, 9/24/12, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138141/omar-s-bashir/who-watches-the-drones //jchen

First, imagine that the government opted for full transparency in its drone programs. That would certainly make the government more accountable, with no special oversight system needed. Officials would release all the necessary information for citizens to assess the ethics of the programs themselves. This would include answers to such questions as: What crimes have targeted individuals allegedly committed? What threats do they pose? Who else might be harmed in a drone attack? How feasible are non-lethal options such as capture? In practice, though, full transparency is neither morally nor strategically ideal. For one, the government has a duty to protect its civilian informants, so there is risk in revealing the government’s sources of information. And potential targets could adjust their behaviors were capture proposals to be debated openly. That would make it all the more difficult for the government to use non-lethal options to round up suspects.

So how much transparency is enough? How can citizens know that the state is not overselling the sensitivity of details that it chooses to withhold? This central dilemma has not been resolved. Well-intentioned legal efforts undertaken by the ACLU and others to force openness about the drone program have only led the government to dig in its heels. It refuses to formally declassify even widely known facets of its operations, let alone release new details. The refusal is absurd on the surface, but it fits into an understandable strategy. Washington does not believe that limited declassifications would appease drone skeptics. As Jack Goldsmith, the Harvard law professor, has explained, Washington fears a slippery slope toward full transparency in the courts that might render one of its most potent counterterrorism weapons unusable.

Presumably to overcome the transparency tug of war, Congress was granted an oversight role in the drone program roughly two years ago. A number of elected representatives with access to sensitive information have thus been making judgments on behalf of the public regarding drones’ morality and effectiveness. But that does not seem to have satisfied anyone. Members of Congress are not ideal guardians: the public might (rightly) believe that representatives would hesitate to speak out about irresponsible drone use because they fear being accused of weakness on terrorism or because they have other political reasons for silence. A collective lack of expertise and busy schedules might also hinder members of Congress in making judgments.

#### Increased restrictions mean terrorists escape

Etzioni 10

Amitai Etzioni, University Professor and Professor of International Relations at The George Washington University, “Unmanned Aircraft Systems: The Moral and Legal Case”, National Defense University, Joint Force Quarterly, JFQ issue 57, 2010 p66 //jchen

One should, though, note that just as the matrix (the decisionmaking apparatus used by the military) can be too accommodating, it can also be too restrictive. In several cases, the delay in making the decision or the strictness of the criteria employed allowed abusive civilians of considerable rank and power to escape. (Bin Laden was given the time to escape to a new location when the Pakistani government delayed giving permission for the attack on its soil in 2004.)

### Norms

#### 1. International norm against drones fail – states won’t give up tech advantage

Megret 13

Frédéric Mégret, Associate-Professor, Faculty of Law, McGill University, Research Chair in the Law of Human Rights and Legal Pluralism, Centre for Human Rights and Legal Pluralism, “The Humanitarian Problem with Drones”, March 5, 2013, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=2228659 //jchen

A good classic example of this is the invention of the crossbow which conferred a very considerable military advantage to those troops that mastered its art; another example is the onset of modern aviation and the possibility, only just barely contemplated towards the end of the First World War, of aerial bombardment. In both cases, an attempt was made to reinstate the laws of war’s broad symmetry by trying to outlaw the weapon. In the case of the crossbow, Pope Innocent II famously pronounced it to be hateful to God and unfit for Christians; in the case of aerial bombardment, a Commission of Jurists was set up as part of the 1921 Washington Conference on the Limitations of armaments which adopted a fairly restrictive code for aerial warfare. It is no surprise that calls to severely regulate or perhaps even outlaw certain means and methods of combat were at their strongest in conditions of technological asymmetry, i.e.: when one side stood to benefit disproportionality from such regulation (the side that did not master the technology).

Both the attempts at regulating the crossbow and aerial bombardment were almost unmitigated catastrophes. In the case of the crossbow, the weapon was first only prohibited between Christians, allowing crusaders to use it at will against the Saracens; but quickly used between Christian nations as well, ultimately showing that a technological advance such as this was too precious to be relinquished against real foes. The Washington conference never led to a Convention and was essentially a fiasco. In both cases, it seems, the normative effort was suspected of, under humanitarian guise, unduly reining in technological progress, not adding much to what could be distilled from general principles of the laws of war, and unduly restricting states’ ability to develop a military advantage. If the precedents of the crossbow and aerial bombardment are any indication, then it is likely that efforts to regulate drone warfare would be headed the same way because it is simply beggars belief to think that powers that have such an edge would voluntarily limit, let alone relinquish it.

#### 2. Even if they model, drone prolif is slow- no investment

Micah Zenko 2013 (Douglas Dillon fellow in the Center for Preventive Action (CPA) at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Previously, he worked for five years at the Harvard Kennedy School and in Washington, DC, at the Brookings Institution, Congressional Research Service, and State Department’s Office of Policy Planning, council on foreign relations, "Reforming US Drone Strike Policies" pdf)

Based on current trends, it is unlikely that most states will have, within ten years, the complete system architecture required to carry out distant drone strikes that would be harmful to U.S. national interests. However, those candidates able to obtain this technology will most likely be states with the financial resources to purchase or the industrial base to manufacture tactical short-range armed drones with limited firepower that lack the precision of U.S. laser-guided munitions; the intelligence collection and military command-and-control capabilities needed to deploy drones via line-of-sight communications; and crossborder adversaries who currently face attacks or the threat of attacks by manned aircraft, such as Israel into Lebanon, Egypt, or Syria; Russia into Georgia or Azerbaijan; Turkey into Iraq; and Saudi Arabia into Yemen. When compared to distant U.S. drone strikes, these contingencies do not require system-wide infrastructure and host-state support. Given the costs to conduct manned-aircraft strikes with minimal threat to pilots, it is questionable whether states will undertake the significant investment required for armed drones in the near term.

#### 3. Norms fail – other countries will reinterpret I-law to justify using drones

Lerner 13

Ben Lerner, Vice President for Government Relations at the Center for Security Policy in Washington, D.C, American Spectator, “Judging ‘Drones’ From Afar”, 3/25/13, http://spectator.org/archives/2013/03/25/judging-drones-from-afar/1

Whatever the potential motivations for trying to codify international rules for using UAVs, such a move would be ill advised. While in theory, every nation that signs onto a treaty governing UAVs will be bound by its requirements, it is unlikely to play out this way in practice. It strains credulity to assume that China, Russia, Iran, and other non-democratic actors will not selectively apply (at best) such rules to themselves while using them as a cudgel with which to bash their rivals and score political points. The United States and its democratic allies, meanwhile, are more likely to adhere to the commitments for which they signed up. The net result: we are boxed in as far as our own self-defense, while other nations with less regard for the rule of law go use their UAVs to take out whomever, whenever, contorting said “rules” as they see fit. One need only look at China’s manipulation of the Law of the Sea Treaty to justify its vast territorial claims at the expense of its neighbors to see how this often plays out.

And who would enforce the treaty’s rules — a third party tribunal? Would it be an apparatus of the United Nations, the same U.N. that assures us that it is not coming after the United States or its allies specifically, even as its investigation takes on as its “immediate focus” UAV operations recently conducted by those countries?

The United States already conducts warfare under the norms of centuries of practice of customary international law in areas such as military necessity and proportionality, as well as the norms to which we committed ourselves when we became party to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the United Nations Charter. These same rules can adequately cover the use of UAVs in the international context. But if the United States were to create or agree to a separate international regime for UAVs, we would subject ourselves to new, politicized “rules” that would needlessly hold back countries that already use UAVs responsibly, while empowering those that do not.

America is in the midst of an important conversation about UAVs. President Obama should state unambiguously that we will not invite others to dictate its outcome.

#### 4. Drone use won’t spread – limited strategic options

Time 12

“Betting Against a Drone Arms Race”, Joseph Singh is a researcher at the Center for a New American Security, 8/13/12, http://nation.time.com/2012/08/13/betting-against-a-drone-arms-race/ //jchen

This recent bout also illustrated a salient point regarding drone technology: most states maintain at least minimal air defenses that can quickly detect and take down drones, as the U.S. discovered when it employed drones at the onset of the Iraq invasion, while Saddam Hussein’s surface-to-air missiles were still active.

What the U.S. also learned, however, was that drones constitute an effective military tool in an extremely narrow strategic context. They are well-suited either in direct support of a broader military campaign, or to conduct targeted killing operations against a technologically unsophisticated enemy.

In a nutshell, then, the very contexts in which we have seen drones deployed. Northern Pakistan, along with a few other regions in the world, remain conducive to drone usage given a lack of air defenses, poor media coverage, and difficulties in accessing the region.

#### 5. Deterrence logic still applies – nations won’t recklessly deploy drones

Time 12

“Betting Against a Drone Arms Race”, Joseph Singh is a researcher at the Center for a New American Security, 8/13/12, http://nation.time.com/2012/08/13/betting-against-a-drone-arms-race/ //jchen

Instead, we must return to what we know about state behavior in an anarchistic international order. Nations will confront the same principles of deterrence, for example, when deciding to launch a targeted killing operation regardless of whether they conduct it through a drone or a covert amphibious assault team.

Drones may make waging war more domestically palatable, but they don’t change the very serious risks of retaliation for an attacking state. Any state otherwise deterred from using force abroad will not significantly increase its power projection on account of acquiring drones.

What’s more, the very states whose use of drones could threaten U.S. security – countries like China – are not democratic, which means that the possible political ramifications of the low risk of casualties resulting from drone use are irrelevant. For all their military benefits, putting drones into play requires an ability to meet the political and security risks associated with their use.

Despite these realities, there remain a host of defensible arguments one could employ to discredit the Obama drone strategy. The legal justification for targeted killings in areas not internationally recognized as war zones is uncertain at best.

Further, the short-term gains yielded by targeted killing operations in Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen, while debilitating to Al Qaeda leadership in the short-term, may serve to destroy already tenacious bilateral relations in the region and radicalize local populations.

Yet, the past decade’s experience with drones bears no evidence of impending instability in the global strategic landscape. Conflict may not be any less likely in the era of drones, but the nature of 21st Century warfare remains fundamentally unaltered despite their arrival in large numbers.

#### 6. Accidental war unlikely

Farley, 13 (Robert, assistant professor at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce – University of Kentucky, April 5, “North Korea and the Fallacy of Accidental Wars”, The Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2013/04/05/north-korea-and-the-fallacy-of-accidental-wars/?all=true)

Accidental wars rarely happen. Historians have demonstrated that most wars initially deemed “accidental,” (perhaps most notably the First World War), have in actuality resulted from deliberative state policy, even if the circumstances of the war were unplanned. While war seems discordant, it actually requires a great deal of cooperation and coordination. Fundamentally, two parties have to agree to conduct a war; otherwise, you have either a punitive raid or an armed surrender negotiation.

#### EU scenario won’t escalate

Weitz, Hudson institute Center for Security Strategies Associate Director and Senior Fellow, 6 [Richard, Summer "Averting a New Great Game in Central Asia," Washington Quarterly, lexis]

Central Asian security affairs have become much more complex than during the original nineteenth-century great game between czarist Russia and the United Kingdom. At that time, these two governments could largely dominate local affairs, but today a variety of influential actors are involved in the region. The early 1990s witnessed a vigorous competition between Turkey and Iran for influence in Central Asia. More recently, India and Pakistan have pursued a mixture of cooperative and competitive policies in the region that have influenced and been affected by their broader relationship. The now independent Central Asian countries also invariably affect the region's international relations as they seek to maneuver among the major powers without compromising their newfound autonomy.

Although Russia, China, and the United States substantially affect regional security issues, they cannot dictate outcomes the way imperial governments frequently did a century ago.

Concerns about a renewed great game are thus exaggerated. The contest for influence in the region does not directly challenge the vital national interests of China, Russia, or the United States, the most important extraregional countries in Central Asian security affairs. Unless restrained, however, competitive pressures risk impeding opportunities for beneficial cooperation among these countries. The three external great powers have incentives to compete for local allies, energy resources, and military advantage, but they also share substantial interests, especially in reducing terrorism and drug trafficking. If properly aligned, the major multilateral security organizations active in Central Asia could provide opportunities for cooperative diplomacy in a region where bilateral ties traditionally have predominated.

#### Bombing PKK inevitable- drones are only for surveillance

Matthews 11

Owen Matthews is a Contributing Editor to Newsweek and The Daily Beast based in Moscow and Istanbul 9-13-2011 <http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/09/13/turkey-s-tricky-drone-diplomacy-with-israel-and-u-s-over-pkk.html>

But even as Erdogan sounds off against Israel, his bellicosity is tempered by the need to keep another common ally—the United States—on board. Indeed Erdogan’s recent cutting of military ties with Israel has in fact made Ankara more reliant on Washington. The Turkish military relies on 10 Israeli-made Heron drones, purchased from Israel in 2004 for $183 million, as its eyes in the sky. But at least five of them are currently undergoing maintenance in Israel—leaving the Turkish military reliant on American Predator drones to spy on Kurdish separatists.

Over the last month the Turkish military has stepped up a war against Kurdish rebels of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, largely based in the mountains of northern Iraq. With the uneasy blessing of the Iraqi Kurdish Regional Government, Turkey has been bombing the PKK on and off since 2007. But this latest campaign is by far the most intensive. According to the Turkish military’s own account, 160 PKK militants have been killed in thousands of air raids. Last week Turkish Foreign Ministry Undersecretary Feridun Sinirlioglu traveled to northern Iraq to placate the Iraqi Kurds and possibly pave the way for ground operations by Turkish troops on Iraqi soil. Gen. Necdet Özel, chief of Turkey’s General Staff, also inspected troops near the border last week, further raising speculation about a ground offensive.

But crucial to all Turkish anti-PKK operations is intelligence gathered by U.S.-operated Predators currently stationed inside Iraqi Kurdistan. Those drones are due to be withdrawn along with the rest of U.S. forces by Dec. 31. But last week Ankara renewed a 2009 request to have six MQ-1 and MQ-6 Predator drones moved to Turkish soil in order to continue the fight against the PKK. Turkey’s original request was squashed after concern from U.S. lawmakers about Erdogan’s friendship with Iran and hostility toward Israel. Since then those concerns have, of course, only intensified—and this time it’s likely that pro-Israeli lobbyists in Washington will strongly oppose more aid to Turkey.

#### Turkey already using air strikes and ground troops versus PKK – not drones

Whitlock 13

Washington Post, Craig Whitlock, covers the Pentagon and national security for The Post, 7/20/13, “U.S. military drone surveillance is expanding to hot spots beyond declared combat zones”, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-07-20/world/40695383\_1\_drone-bases-unarmed-drones-drone-attacks/2 //jchen

An invitation from Turkey

In the fall of 2011, four disassembled Predator drones arrived in crates at Incirlik Air Base in southern Anatolia, a joint U.S.-Turkish military installation.

The drones came from Iraq, where for the previous four years they had been devoted to surveilling that country’s northern mountains. Along with manned U.S. aircraft, the Predators tracked the movements of PKK fighters, sharing video feeds and other intelligence with the Turkish armed forces.

The Kurdish group has long fought to create an autonomous enclave in Turkey, launching cross-border attacks from its hideouts in northern Iraq. Turkey has responded with airstrikes and artillery attacks but has also sent ground troops into Iraq, further destabilizing an already volatile area. The Turkish and U.S. governments both classify the PKK as a terrorist group.

Twitter ban kills EU accession

EurActiv 3-21 “EU leaders tell Turkey: gagging Twitter is unacceptable” *EurActiv*-- is a public service foundation under Belgian law and acts primarily to bring together individuals and organisations seeking to shape European Union policies; March 21, 2014; http://www.euractiv.com/sections/enlargement/eu-leaders-tell-turkey-gagging-twitter-unacceptable-301053

European leaders slammed the Turkish government for banning Twitter this morning (21 March). The ban is yet another incident hampering EU-Turkish accession talks, due to the ongoing crackdown on free speech by Ankara. EurActiv Turkey contributed to this report.¶ Twitter users in Turkey have reported that the social media platform Twitter is blocked since this morning (21 March), as citizens cannot automatically access their accounts. Users are redirected to a statement, thought to come from Turkey's telecommunications authority.¶ The block is likely to come be imposed by the Turkish government in order to gag opposition voices in the run-up to the municipal elections on 30 March. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan on Thursday said in a campaign speech that he would “wipe out” Twitter.¶ Erdogan added: "I don't care what the international community says at all. Everyone will see the power of the Turkish Republic,” the BBC reports.¶ European leaders expressed their dismay of the blatant infringement on the freedom of expression: “This is a sad day. It is against democracy. It is against European values. It is not acceptable,” said EU commissioner for the digital agenda, Neelie Kroes.¶ “Blocking social media is unacceptable in a functioning democracy and rule of law. I call on the Turkish Government to address this issue without delay,” added Dutch MEP for the EPP group, Ria Oomen-Ruijten.¶ Last November, the EU and Turkey reopened their accession negotiations, after a three-year freeze. The negotiations have been running since 2005; freedom of expression is one of the most important stumbling blocks in the talks.

#### EU accession doesn’t solve war—ridiculous

Increased influence kills accession

Paul 11 Amanda, Policy Analyst and Programme Executive, European Policy Centre; “Turkey riding high” *Today’s Zaman*, February 2, 2011 [http://www.todayszaman.com/ columnist-234198-turkey-riding-high.html](http://www.todayszaman.com/%20columnist-234198-turkey-riding-high.html)

While Bağış gave assurances that Ankara remains committed to taking the EU medicine, the Bursa Days event also held no surprises vis-à-vis the EU with a familiar message being conveyed: Turkey is going to solve all the EU’s problems and Turkey is going to make the EU a real global player. To some degree this is true. If Turkey was already in the EU, its response to what is happening in Egypt and elsewhere would probably have been more robust and influential rather than the weak and wishy-washy effort we have seen so far. The EU is seemingly more interested in discussing the never-ending euro crisis saga. Nevertheless, Turkey should not overplay its hand. Just because it is an increasingly important country, this does not give it the right to dictate how the negotiations should be carried out, which seems to be the case. Turkey has legal obligations it needs to meet, no matter how big and powerful it may believe itself to be. The ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) needs the EU -- to maintain stable and continuous foreign investment, for the reform process and for its own legitimacy. On the Cyprus problem, while the EU as a body may say it desires a solution, some member states are happy to allow the problem to fester because they oppose Turkey’s membership. This was clear from the recent visit of Angela Merkel to Cyprus. Following her lead in congratulating the Greek Cypriots for the efforts they are putting into the peace talks, while at the same time condemning Turkey and therefore the Turkish Cypriots for not doing enough, it now seems French President Nicolas Sarkozy is planning to do the same thing with a visit to Cyprus shortly. The EU is supposed to be supporting the UN in their efforts to find a solution. Quite how going to Nicosia and blaming one party is helping the process, I really wonder. It also comes at a time in the talks when both sides need to be more flexible. Merkel and Sarkozy may as well tell Dimitris Christofias, “No need to make any concessions, keep the island divided and keep Turkey out.” The fact is Turkey in the EU is the best insurance policy Cyprus could ever have for a stable, secure and prosperous future. This is what Sarkozy and Merkel should be saying. In Davos, Babacan may have been correct when he said the EU is presently somewhat inward looking. However, I don’t believe he was right to claim the EU no longer has an “open door policy” or that it is a Christian club. Rather, the EU has adopted a “pick and choose carefully” approach to further enlargement. Therefore the door is seemingly closed to big or powerful countries, or countries which have historically been in another big power’s sphere of influence. The EU is not brave enough or visionary enough to look beyond this yet. Nowadays the door is wide open for Croatia, Iceland and all the countries of the Western Balkans. If tomorrow Norway or Switzerland decided they wanted in, I doubt there would be any objections. But of course Turkey is not Iceland or Serbia.

Increased Turkish influence leads to several scenarios for Turkey-Russia war

Bhalla et. al. 9 Reva, Director of Analysis, Middle East and South Asia Analyst, Director of Latin American Operations, STRATFOR; & Lauren Goodrich, Senior Eurasia Analyst, STRATFOR; Russian Peace Foundation; & Peter Zeihan, Analyst, Vice President of Analysis, STRATFOR; US Embassy Australia; Office Coordinator, Center for Political and Strategic Studies; “Turkey and Russia on the Rise” *STRATFOR*, March 17, 2009 [http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20090317\_turkey\_ and\_russia\_rise](http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20090317_turkey_%20and_russia_rise)

There are four zones of overlapping interest for the Turks and Russians.

First, the end of the Soviet empire opened up a wealth of economic opportunities, but very few states have proven adept at penetrating the consumer markets of Ukraine and Russia. Somewhat surprisingly, Turkey is one of those few states. Thanks to the legacy of Soviet central planning, Russian and Ukrainian industry have found it difficult to retool away from heavy industry to produce the consumer goods much in demand in their markets. Because most Ukrainians and Russians cannot afford Western goods, Turkey has carved out a robust and lasting niche with its lower-cost exports; it is now the largest supplier of imports to the Russian market. While this is no exercise in hard power, this Turkish penetration nevertheless is cause for much concern among Russian authorities.

So far, Turkey has been scrupulous about not politicizing these useful trade links beyond some intelligence-gathering efforts (particularly in Ukraine). Considering [Russia’s current financial problems](http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20090302_financial_crisis_and_six_pillars_russian_strength), having a stable source of consumer goods — especially one that is not China — is actually seen as a positive. At least for now, the Russian government would rather see its trade relationship with Turkey stay strong. There will certainly be a clash later — either as Russia weakens or as Turkey becomes more ambitious — but for now, the Russians are content with the trade relationship.

Second, the Russian retreat in the post-Cold War era has opened up the Balkans to Turkish influence. Romania, Bulgaria and the lands of the former Yugoslavia are all former Ottoman possessions, and in their day they formed the most advanced portion of the Ottoman economy. During the Cold War, they were all part of the Communist world, with Romania and Bulgaria formally incorporated into the Soviet bloc. While most of these lands are now absorbed into the European Union, Russia’s ties to its fellow Slavs — most notably the Serbs and Bulgarians — have allowed it a degree of influence that most Europeans choose to ignore. Additionally, Russia has long held a friendly relationship with Greece and Cyprus, both to complicate American policy in Europe and to provide a flank against Turkey. Still, thanks to proximity and trading links, Turkey clearly holds the upper hand in this theater of competition.

But this particular region is unlikely to generate much Turkish-Russian animosity, simply because both countries are in the process of giving up.

Most of the Balkan states are already members of an organization that is unlikely to ever admit Russia or Turkey: the European Union. Russia simply cannot meet the membership criteria, and Cyprus’ membership in essence strikes the possibility of Turkish inclusion. (Any EU member can veto the admission of would-be members.) The EU-led splitting of Kosovo from Serbia over Russian objections was a body blow to Russian power in the region, and the subsequent EU running of Kosovo as a protectorate greatly limited Turkish influence as well. Continuing EU expansion means that Turkish influence in the Balkans will shrivel just as Russian influence already has. Trouble this way lies, but not between Turkey and Russia. If anything, their joint exclusion might provide some room for the two to agree on something.

The third area for Russian-Turkish competition is in energy, and this is where things get particularly sticky. Russia is Turkey’s No. 1 trading partner, with energy accounting for the bulk of the trade volume between the two countries. Turkey depends on Russia for 65 percent of its natural gas and 40 percent of its oil imports. Though Turkey has steadily grown its trade relationship with Russia, it does not exactly approve of Moscow’s penchant for using its energy relations with Europe as a political weapon. Russia has never gone so far as to cut supplies to Turkey directly, but Turkey has been indirectly affected more than once when Russia decided to cut supplies to Ukraine because Moscow felt the need to reassert its writ in Kiev.

Sharing the Turks’ energy anxiety, the Europeans have been more than eager to use Turkey as an energy transit hub for routes that would bypass the Russians altogether in supplying the European market. The [Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline](http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/turkey_implications_blast_btc_pipeline) is one such route, and others, like Nabucco, are still stuck in the planning stages. The Russians have every reason to pressure the Turks into staying far away from any more energy diversification schemes that could cost Russia one of its biggest energy clients — and deny Moscow much of the political leverage it currently holds over the Europeans who are dependent on the Russian energy network.

There are only two options for the Turks in diversifying away from the Russians. The first lies to [Turkey’s south in Iraq](http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/iraq_turkey_igniting_kurdish_rivalry) and [Iran](http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/turkey_iran_ankaras_priorities_shift). Turkey has big plans for Iraq’s oil industry, but it will still take considerable time to upgrade and restore the oil fields and pipelines that have been persistently sabotaged and ransacked by insurgents during the fighting that followed the 2003 U.S. invasion. The Iranians offer another large source of energy for the Turks to tap into, but the political complications attached to dealing with Iran are still too prickly for the Turks to move ahead with concrete energy deals at this time. Complications remain for now, but Turkey will be keeping an eye on its Middle Eastern neighbors for robust energy partnerships in the future.

The second potential [source of energy for the Turks lies in Central Asia](http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/turkey_caucasian_challenge), a region that Russia must keep in its grip at all costs if it hopes to survive in the long run. In many ways this theater is the reverse of the Balkans, where the Russians hold the ethnic links and the Turks the economic advantage. Here, four of the five Central Asian countries — Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan — are Turkic. But as a consequence of the Soviet years, the infrastructure and economies of all four are so hardwired into the Russian sphere of influence that it would take some major surgery to liberate them. But the prize is a rich one: [Central Asia possesses the world’s largest concentration of untapped energy reserves](http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/turkey_eyeing_central_asian_energy_ties). And as the term “central” implies, whoever controls the region can project power into the former Soviet Union, China and South Asia. If the Russians and

Turks are going to fight over something, this is it.

Here Turkey faces a problem, however — it does not directly abut the region. If the Turks are even going to attempt to shift the Central Asian balance of power, they will need a lever. This brings us to the final — and most dynamic — realm of competition: the Caucasus.

Turkey here faces the best and worst in terms of influence projection. The Azerbaijanis do not consider themselves simply Turkic, like the Central Asians, but actually Turkish. If there is a country in the former Soviet Union that would consider not only allying with but actually joining with another state to escape Russia’s orbit, it would be Azerbaijan with Turkey. <CONTINUED>

[Azerbaijan has its own significant energy supplies](http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/azerbaijan_stark_new_energy_landscape), but its real value is in serving as a willing springboard for Turkish influence into Central Asia.

However, the core of Azerbaijan does not border Turkey. Instead, it is on the other side of Armenia, a country that thrashed Azerbaijan in a war over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh enclave and still has deep historical bitterness against the Turks over claims of genocide. Armenia has sold itself to the Russians to keep its Turkish foes at bay.

This means Turkish designs on Central Asia all boil down to the former Soviet state of Georgia. If Turkey can bring Georgia fully under its wing, Turkey can then set about to integrate with Azerbaijan and project influence into Central Asia. But without Georgia, Turkey is hamstrung before it can even begin to reach for the real prize in Central Asia.

Turkey-Russia conflict evolves into great power conflict

Cecire 10 Michael Hikari, independent Black Sea-Eurasia regional analyst and an associate scholar at the Foreign Policy Research Institute; World Politics Review, and TCS Daily “A Turkey V. Russia Showdown” *Eurasia Review*, December 17, 2010 <http://www.eurasiareview.com/analysis/a-turkey-v-russia-showdown-17122010/>

Turkey, a NATO member state and a budding contender for a leadership role in central Eurasia, maintains a large and extremely well-equipped military that is built along NATO standards. Though not a nuclear power, its conventional forces are quite well-trained and might be more than a match for Russia’s famously insubordinate, creaky Caucasus formations that disproportionately rely on militias and conscript-heavy forces. Turkey can also amass more troops more quickly than their Russian counterparts, who patrol vastly longer borders with a concomitant increase in the number of potential security flashpoints that require dedicated garrisons.

It goes without saying that the conventional narrative of the August 2008 war between Russia and Georgia — and indeed the general geopolitical climate in the region — is sufficiently volatile enough without the added variable of a Turkish military confrontation with invading Russian formations. For many reasons, armed conflict between Turkey and Russia would be a major blow to regional and Eurasian security and could set off a much larger, transcontinental war involving NATO and other major powers.

Turkish influence causes rights abuses against Armenians

Sassounian 10 Harout, “Growing Turkish Influence in Middle East Leads to Restrictions in Armenian Rights” *Asbarez*, June 18, 2010 <http://asbarez.com/82267/growing-turkish-influence-in-middle-east-leads-to-restrictions-in-armenian-rights/>

Turkey’s growing influence in the Middle East, even before the naval confrontation with Israel over Gaza, had prompted some Arab countries to restrict the political rights of local Armenian communities.

It is feared that the latest Gaza conflict, which catapulted Prime Minister Erdogan to a heroic stature throughout the Islamic world, would result in further limitations on Armenian activities deemed to be “anti-Turkish.”

In recent months, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria have taken specific actions to place some restrictions on the activities of their Armenian citizens either out of concern for a backlash from Turkey or under direct pressure from Turkish authorities.

A case in point was the Jordanian government’s cancellation of AGBU’s Middle East Young Professionals Forum that was to take place in Amman, June 3-6. Talin Suciyan, reported in The Armenian Weekly that Jordanian authorities had expressed reservations for the gathering of 150 young Armenians from various parts of the world. Suciyan, who was invited to speak on the “Legacy of Hrant Dink” and the Armenian community in Turkey, stated that the organizers were informed the night before that the forum was canceled by orders “from above.” Some observers attributed the cancellation of the AGBU forum to the agreement to set up a Free Trade Zone, which was to be signed between Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Turkey, on June 10. A commentator pointed out the irony of Armenian conferences being allowed to take place in Turkey, but not in Jordan!

Earlier this year, when a Lebanese TV crew was about to enter Syria to record footage on “the Armenian killing fields” in Der Zor, border guards refused to admit them, even though they had secured the necessary filming permits from the Syrian authorities in advance. This incident took place shortly after CBS aired in its “60 Minutes” program a segment on the Armenian Genocide. The program depicted the protruding bones of Armenian Genocide victims from the desert sands of Der Zor. Turkish officials lodged a complaint with the Syrian government for allowing CBS to film an “anti-Turkish” program in their country.

The third incident, unexpectedly, took place in Lebanon, home to one of the most influential Armenian communities in the Diaspora. In a surprise move, government officials banned the airing of Eileen Khatchadourian’s music video, “Zartir Vortyag,” a genocide era song calling for resistance against oppression. Even though the song makes no reference to Turkey, Lebanese authorities were concerned that it would negatively affect Lebanese-Turkish relations.

These are troubling examples of blatant interference with Armenian citizens’ right to free expression. In all three countries, Armenians have long enjoyed the most cordial relations with their respective governments and are viewed by them as loyal citizens. Local Armenian community leaders must strongly protest such arbitrary violations of their basic rights as citizens of these countries. They should consider carrying out a campaign to educate their fellow citizens about the extensive damage Turkey has caused to Arab interests for decades, as a close military ally of Israel.

And stopping the Armenian genocide is d-rule

PanArmenian 8 “Adam Schiff: Genocide recognition is our moral imperative” PanArmenian April 25, 2008 <http://www.panarmenian.net/eng/world/news/25797/>

"I'm Congressman Adam Schiff and I'm very proud to represent one of the largest Armenian communities in the country. Ninety-three years ago, a million and a half people lost their lives for the simple reason that they were Armenian. It began with a round-up of intellectuals. It continued with forced marches in the desert; women and children, parents and grandparents, aunts and uncles perished. Whole families were lost. Almost an entire people were lost.  "Ninety-three years later we still fight in the greatest democracy on earth to recognize the plain facts of what took place. We have witnesses; some of them are here today. There are fewer and fewer witnesses left, though, and while there are witnesses among us we have the strongest moral imperative to recognize what they went through and hat their families went through.  "We have the strongest moral imperative to call that loss exactly what it was - without equivocation, without mitigation - a genocide. And we will fight until we succeed. We have a moral imperative and we have a very practical imperative as well. And the practical imperative is this, although this genocide took place ninety-three years ago, there is also a genocide taking place today half-way around the world.  "And we cannot have the moral authority we need to stand up and ask the world to take action against that genocide if we don't have the courage and the moral rectitude to recognize this genocide and indeed every genocide.  "So this must change, this will change, the fight will go on, we will prevail. I ask your help and God's help that we prevail in time for the survivors to see justice done in their name."

Turkish influence kills EU Balkan influence and Balkan accession

Alic 10 Anes, executive director, ISA Intel; senior analyst, ISN Security Watch; “Turkey’s Growing Influence in the Balkans” *Oil Price* June 9, 2010 http://oilprice.com/Geo-Politics/Europe/Turkeys-Growing-Influence-in-the-Balkans.html

Turkey’s desire to position itself as the regional leader and a conciliatory force is not likely to prove popular with EU member states. The European Union has regarded the Balkans as its territory for the past 15 years, even though its engagement was pursued without either great enthusiasm or a clear strategy. Since the EU decided five years ago to hand over major decision-making powers to Bosnian politicians (a strategy that failed miserably), the reform process has remained stalled. Finally, in October last year, the EU and United States stepped up the pressure, holding several rounds of talks with Bosnian leaders in an attempt to expedite the reforms necessary for the country’s EU membership bid. However, after the first such meeting in October last year it was clear that no progress would be achieved. Even some international officials, including French and British diplomats, are not expecting any major breakthrough, and have again given up trying to persuade Bosnian leaders to engage in further talks. Bosnian officials for their part have indicated that reform is not on the agenda in 2010, as elections are looming in October. The EU has nonetheless scheduled another Balkans summit to take place in Sarajevo in June, hoping to “reinforce the European perspective of the region.” Spain, currently occupying the bloc’s rotating presidency, is planning to invite “relevant partners,” such as the United States, Russia, and Turkey, to attend the meeting. Earlier this year, Serbia, backed by Russia, boycotted a similar meeting in Slovenia because Kosovar leaders had been invited. Following that fiasco, the EU took steps to induce Serbia to cooperate, announcing it would lift restrictions on Serbia’s Stabilization and Association Agreement, a key step before its final EU membership application. It is expected that in June the EU will issue a recommendation on the implementation of a visa-free travel regime for Albania and Bosnia, though technically the two countries met the necessary requirements last October. Meanwhile, EU foreign ministers expressed support late last year for Albania’s request for official EU candidate status. Pull From The East Some international community officials with experience in the western Balkans are proposing a new EU approach to the region. The most promising one, advocated by officials like British diplomat and former high representative to Bosnia Paddy Ashdown, is the creation of an EU special representative office for the entire region, rather than separate offices in each country. This represents a rethink that considers the region as a whole rather than individual countries. Another concern of Western countries is that Turkey’s increasing influence could pull Muslim-majority countries Bosnia and Albania eastward. Still, this concern is overblown, as both are very keen to join the EU. That said, those fears are paralleled by Russia’s growing political and financial influence in the region, primarily in Serbia and Bosnia’s Serb-dominated entity of Republika Srpska. Russia backs Serbia’s position regarding Kosovo. Russian officials say that any support for Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence is immoral and illegal. Russian and Serbian leaders agreed last October to form a joint emergency response center in the Serbian city of Nis. In addition, there have been unconfirmed media reports in recent months that Russia is planning to set up a military base in southern Serbia, bordering Kosovo. Russia has also made inroads into Bosnia, setting itself up as the guarantor and protector of the Republika Srpska in international institutions. In 2008, the Russian state-owned gas company Gazprom took over the Serbian oil industry, while in Bosnia, its presence if felt through the ownership of the Bosnian Serb petroleum and oil industry. On his first official visit to Serbia in October last year, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev announced Moscow’s approval of Serbia’s request for a $6 billion loan. Medvedev was accompanied by a 100-strong delegation, the majority of them businesspeople.  Since Montenegro’s independence from Serbia in 2006, Russian investors have privatized and taken over most state-owned and private companies, and now control most of the tourism sector, the country’s main revenue base. Under Russia’s influence, even though the authorities in Belgrade have declared themselves pro-EU, Montenegro is still debating whether it should join NATO, with only 20 percent of its Serbian population supporting the idea. Turkey’s diplomatic and financial deployment in the Balkans has provoked a prompt response from the EU, which hopes to remain the main authority in the region. And Brussels indeed has a lot of catching up to do, largely because over the past four years it has lost much of its credibility. The United States will also be forced to boost its presence to counter Russia’s Balkan surge. Both the United States and the EU will find that there is a price to pay for having lost interest in the region after 2001.

EU influence key to Balkan stability—brink is now

Schilly 9 Otto, former Federal Minister of the Interior, Germany;  "If the EU reneges on Balkan enlargement it's at its own peril" *Europe's World* Autumn, 2009  [http://www.europesworld.org/NewEnglish/Home\_old/Article/ tabid/191/ArticleType/ArticleView/ArticleID/21490/IftheEUrenegesonBalkanenlargementitsatitsownperil.aspx](http://www.europesworld.org/NewEnglish/Home_old/Article/%20tabid/191/ArticleType/ArticleView/ArticleID/21490/IftheEUrenegesonBalkanenlargementitsatitsownperil.aspx)

Without strong and credible EU hopes, the western Balkans could relapse back into being a genuine threat to security and peace in Europe. The dwindling likelihood of EU membership will also mean the weakening of Brussels’ soft power and of the EU’s influence on the reform process in the region. Along with that there will be an increasing danger of destabilisation and disintegration of the Balkan’s region’s fragile, multi-ethnic countries. Nationalist movements there are already gaining influence, and an erosion of democratic politics is a real threat in democracies that have never been very strong. The western Balkans has also been affected particularly by the global financial crisis and its economic shock waves. The worst-case scenario throughout the western Balkans is that once the combination of inadequate economic growth and weak state institutions is compounded by the dashing of EU membership ambitions, the region could again become a dangerous trouble spot.  But it’s not too late to avert this dire scenario. The EU membership perspective continues to be a crucially important incentive for stabilisation, democratisation and modernisation to continue in the western Balkans, and should be given high priority, and supported in a sustainable way. Far from being allowed to slow down, progress of the Balkan countries towards EU membership should be accelerated and given fresh impetus.

Extinction

Chicago Daily 99 [May 9, “Dogs of War,” Lexis]

We need to stop the war and return to the negotiating table to end the suffering in Kosovo before the "dogs of war" are unleashed and there is no controlling the catastrophic - we're near that point. Most of us realize that in war the unexpected is often the rule, often resulting in chaos. There must be an end to military operations and the ethnic cleansing against Kosovo civilians. Something has gone wrong; the very people we were supposed to be saving are suffering thousands of dead and millions homeless. Dialogue must be aimed at reaching a peaceful settlement that respects the wishes of the inhabitants of Kosovo, while respecting history, international law and minority rights. It seems to me the Clinton administration embarked on a military adventure that has not been thought through. The administration has been dealing with Milosevic for six years. We hear the grim rationale for sending in ground troops "to salvage the credibility of the NATO Alliance." I don't want any American servicemen/women to die for the idea that once you have embarked on a disastrous course of action, you can only continue on ... that's nonsense. On a recent news program the Italian and German foreign ministers stated troop deployment is not acceptable as part of their national defense - the French representative waffled. Both France and Germany have large Muslim populations. The German official said the NATO Alliance weapons, planes, missiles are primarily American with minimum involvement of NATO allies. Let's not forget that Russia has warned NATO countries that this action could culminate in a third world war. The war in the Balkans could easily become the flash point of world conflict resulting in nuclear war and incalculable self-destruction.

#### And it kills EU credibility

Andric 12 Gordana, managing editor, Balkan Investigative Reporting Network’s Belgrade Insight; “EU Enlargement Strategy Pinpoints Balkan Challenges” *Balkan Insight*; October 10, 2012; http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/eu-enlargement-strategy-points-out-balkan-weaknesses

The Enlargement Strategy, presented on Wednesday in Brussels, highlights good governance, administrative capacity, unemployment, regional cooperation and reconciliation, economic reform and social inclusion as major challenges facing the region.¶ “In a context of economic stagnation, there are risks of a lurch towards populism and resistance to essential reforms,” writes the report.¶ The document says that Western Balkan countries must ensure independent, impartial and accountable judicial systems that function efficiently.¶ It highlights corruption and organised crime as major problems in most of the countries concerned.¶ “Corruption remains prevalent in most enlargement countries. Corruption undermines the rule of law, impacts negatively on the business environment and national budgets and affects citizens' everyday life in areas such as healthcare and education,” the document says.¶ The Commission states that the countries must increase efforts to improve their public administrations at all levels.¶ The document points out that freedom of expression remains a serious concern in a number of countries, while civil, political, social, and economic and minority rights were pointed out as key issues.¶ “These fundamental rights are broadly guaranteed in law but issues concerning implementation persist in many cases. In some cases legislative gaps remain,” writes the report.¶ Here are the conclusions and recommendations in the strategy for the Balkan countries.¶ Montenegro:¶ The political criteria continue to be sufficiently met. The opening of accession negotiations in June 2012 reflected its continued progress on key reforms. The screening process has begun and is expected to finish in summer 2013.¶ The accession negotiations integrate the new approach for the chapters on judiciary and fundamental rights and justice, freedom and security, thereby reinforcing the focus on the rule of law.¶ During the negotiations Montenegro will need to further develop a track record in this area with the aim of irreversible reform implementation, in particular with respect to the fight against organised crime and corruption, including at high-level.¶ Macedonia: ¶ The political criteria continue to be sufficiently met. The government has put the EU agenda at the centre of its activity. The High Level Accession Dialogue with the Commission served as a catalyst for accelerating reforms and has contributed to substantial progress in a number of key policy areas.¶ The reform momentum needs to be sustained in all areas in particular to ensure implementation. Focus on the rule of law, including as regards freedom of expression, and on inter-ethnic relations and reconciliation needs to be maintained.¶ The Commission recommends for a fourth time that accession negotiations be opened with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.¶ The Commission believes that moving the accession process of this country to its next stage is necessary in order to consolidate the pace and sustainability of reforms, mitigating the risk of any reversal in this process, as well as to strengthen inter-ethnic relations. It will also bolster the credibility of the EU and act as an encouragement to reform efforts elsewhere in the region.

# 2NC

### SS

#### Drones in Yemen now work – key to prevent AQAP resurgence and Yemen instability

Terrill 13

Andrew Terrill, Research Professor of National Security Affairs, Strategic Studies Institute Middle East Specialist, "Op-Ed: Drones Are Making A Difference In Yemen", <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/index.cfm/articles/Drones-Are-Making-A-Difference-In-Yemen/2013/03/13>

At least in the case of Yemen, drones appear to have been stunningly successful in achieving goals that support the U.S. and Yemeni national interests by helping to defeat the radical group al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). This group is one of the most successful affiliates of the original al-Qaeda group led by Osama bin Laden until his death in 2011. In his struggle against AQAP, Yemeni reform President Abed Rabbu Hadi has spoken publicly of U.S. drones in glowing terms as a way of striking this enemy, while minimizing collateral damage. Several key examples support Hadi’s view of drones as a war-winning system.

The 2011 death of AQAP planner Anwar al-Awlaki in an apparent drone strike is especially informative. Despite Awlaki’s U.S. citizenship, President Obama was reported by Newsweek to have considered him a higher priority for capture or elimination than Ayman al-Zawahiri, bin Laden’s replacement as the leader of “al-Qaeda central.” Federal prosecutors, in a case involving an alleged Awlaki associate, maintain that he was the mastermind behind a variety of terrorist activities including the 2009 “Christmas bomber” plot. In this instance, a terrorist operative and Awlaki “student” sought to blow up a passenger aircraft traveling from Amsterdam to Detroit with 280 passengers aboard.

The unsuccessful bombing scheme appears to have had the diabolical purpose of attempting to provoke the U.S. leadership to invade Yemen in response to these innocent deaths. Such an intervention with ground troops could have produced catastrophic results. Yemen is a highly nationalistic country with around 24 million people and 60 million firearms. Any intervention there could last for years and swell rather than diminish the ranks of AQAP. This disaster was worth avoiding.

Drones may also have saved the United States from a serious foreign policy crisis a second time in Yemen. In May 2012, President Hadi unleashed a strong military offensive against AQAP forces which had seized large portions of several provinces in the south and were administering them in what one AQAP leader described as “the Taliban way.” Hadi had only recently taken office after a long and painful set of international and domestic negotiations to end the 33-year rule of President Ali Abdullah Saleh. If the Yemeni military had been defeated in the confrontation with AQAP, this outcome could well have led to the collapse of the Yemeni reform government and the emergence of anarchy there. Hadi needed every tool he could obtain to help him win.

Drones were widely reported in the U.S. and international press as helping to enable the government victory in southern Yemen, both by providing intelligence to combatant forces and by eliminating key leaders and small groups of individuals. Approximately 4 months after the Yemeni government’s June victory in the south, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta stated that the role of drones in Yemen was “vital,” in one of the first authoritative statements on the combat role of these systems.

In considering these examples, it seems clear that drones are helping to prevent the emergence of an AQAP state in southern Yemen and prevent a major terrorist strike, either of which could create pressure for a risky and expensive U.S. military intervention in Yemen. At some point, a reformed Yemeni military should be effective enough to maintain domestic security without relying on these assets which remain unpopular among large segments of the Yemeni public. Until then, drone use seems like an option that should be kept open to avoid the need for much more frightening choices later.

### A2 Blowback – Yemen

#### No backlash in Yemen

Axe 12

David Axe, American military correspondent who writes on military life and aspects of current conflicts, 8/13/12, “Hidden History: America’s Secret Drone War in Africa”, http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/08/somalia-drones/all/ //jchen

In other countries, however , attitudes might be different. This spring, University of Virginia researcher Chris Swift spent a week interviewing tribal leaders in southern Yemen, another target-rich zone for U.S. drones. Swift found that war-weary rural populations were ambivalent about robot strikes. “Nobody in my cohort [of interview subjects] drew a causal link between drones on one hand and [militant] recruiting on other,” Swift said.

#### Yemen public is more tolerant of drone strikes – resentment decreasing

Terrill 13

W. Andrew Terrill, Strategic Studies Institute, SSI’s Middle East specialist, served as a Middle East nonproliferation analyst for the Inter- national Assessments Division of the Lawrence Liver- more National Laboratory, PhD in international relations from Claremont, “The Struggle for Yemen and the Challenge of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula”, June 2013 //jchen

Hadi’s decision to acknowledge the U.S. use of drones in the struggle against AQAP drew a mixed response in Yemen. Some Yemenis appeared to appre- ciate that he was more open than Saleh and saw his honesty as a break from the past.219 While drone strikes remain highly controversial in Yemen, the Yemeni public also seems to have become somewhat more tol- erant of U.S. drone use over the last year than it was over earlier incidents. This change may be because the internal situation became more alarming, due to the rise of Ansar al-Shariah and the ability of these forces to take and hold a number of Yemeni towns and small cities throughout the Abyan and Shabwa provinces. Yet, even Yemenis who detest AQAP have been quick to maintain that innocent people have been acciden- tally killed by drones and that, at the very least, “tough limitations” must be imposed on such systems if they are to be used.220 This situation will be difficult for the United States, since any serious mistake regarding collateral damage from drones could produce a domestic backlash which Yemeni politicians would be reluctant to ignore.221 Moreover, a variety of powerful Yemeni politicians, including the radical Sunni cleric Abdul- Majeed al-Zindani, have sharply criticized the use of drones in Yemen and stand ready to take political ad- vantage from any future incidents of collateral dam- age.222 Such politicians will almost certainly exaggerate the number of innocents killed in strikes that involve civilian deaths.

#### New recruits are mostly foreign radicals – youth join for $$ and resentment of local government [not drones]

Terrill 13

W. Andrew Terrill, Strategic Studies Institute, SSI’s Middle East specialist, served as a Middle East nonproliferation analyst for the Inter- national Assessments Division of the Lawrence Liver- more National Laboratory, PhD in international relations from Claremont, “The Struggle for Yemen and the Challenge of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula”, June 2013 //jchen

Several U.S. and Yemeni estimates of the number of AQAP members at large were made in the 2010- 11 time frame, and most of them placed that figure at 200-300.79 By early 2012, the number provided by Yemeni sources had grown to at least 700, including members of the insurgent group, Ansar al-Shariah, which the Yemenis and others consider to be part of AQAP.80 Even this larger figure has been proven inad- equate and needs to be put into a broader context. In the past, such estimates included only full-time pro- fessional terrorists and not supporters or sympathiz- ers who might be brought into the organization at a later time. Throughout 2011, an increasing number of AQAP’s supporters and sympathizers seem to have crossed over to become actively involved in the mili- tary struggle against the Yemeni government under the organizational umbrella of Ansar al-Shariah. Vir- tually all serious observers will at least acknowledge that Ansar al-Shariah is affiliated with AQAP, and the Yemeni government considers it to be a front organization for AQAP. This monograph agrees with that evaluation and will later argue that Ansar al-Shariah is AQAP-dominated to the degree that it should be considered an arm of AQAP and not an independent allied organization.

AQAP insurgents in Yemen could number in the thousands, and provided the foot soldiers for the 2011-12 insurgency in southern Yemen. Some senior Yemeni military officers have also referred to Ansar al-Shariah as a “real army,” which demonstrated cour- age and tactical skill during the time frame it was most active.81 The 200-300 number mentioned above might also be dated, since it is often difficult to track AQAP growth, which occurs in two ways. The most straight- forward way is when additional Yemenis choose to join AQAP or Ansar al-Shariah for whatever reasons might be compelling to them. These reasons include disillusionment and anger with the Yemeni govern- ment or with local tribal leaders allied with that gov- ernment but also because there are financial opportu- nities for young men who choose to become fighters for AQAP.82 The second way is for foreign radicals to leave their own country or previous foreign bases of operation and join up with al-Qaeda forces in Ye- men. This process has often occurred in waves, most dramatically with Saudi radicals, but there are also recurring claims that radicals from Pakistan and Af- ghanistan have moved some of their operations to Ye- men in response to problems they are facing in those countries with local security forces and U.S. drone attacks.83 Other statements by Yemeni officials claim that significant numbers of Somali radicals continued to arrive in Yemen to join with AQAP.84

#### Yemen wedding party strike did not kill civilians

Devereaux 14 Ryan Devereaux, journalist covering national security. His work has appeared at The Guardian, RollingStone.com, The Nation, Democracy Now!, The Village Voice and elsewhere. 20 Feb 2014, The Intercept New Details of Attack on Yemeni Wedding Prompt More Demands Obama Explain Drone Policy

<https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/02/20/report-yemen-wedding-drone-strike-may-violated-laws-war/>

Obama administration officials have insisted since the strike that only members of al Qaeda were killed. Defense Department spokesman Bill Speaks reiterated to The Intercept on Wednesday “that the Yemeni Government has stated that the targets of this operation were dangerous senior al Qaeda militants,” but he declined to provide any details or evidence to support that conclusion. National Security Council spokeswoman Caitlin Hayden also declined.

The Associated Press reported Thursday morning that, according to three anonymous U.S. officials, two government investigations concluded that only members of al Qaeda were hit in the strike:

Lt. Gen. Joseph Votel, commander of Joint Special Operations Command, ordered an independent investigation by an Air Force general and the White House requested another by the National Counterterrorism Center. Both concluded no civilians were killed. Votel’s staff also showed lawmakers video of the operation. Two U.S. officials who watched the video and were briefed on the investigations said it showed three trucks in the convoy were hit, all carrying armed men.

### A2 Statistics/Consensus

#### Consensus is wrong – previous studies used flawed methodologies [set the bar too high, didn’t evaluate other factors]

Johnston 12

Patrick B. Johnston, Associate Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation. He wrote this article while he was a fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation and the Empirical Studies of Conflict Project at Stanford University and at the International Security Program at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, “Does Decapitation Work? Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Targeting in Counterinsurgency Campaigns”, International Security, Vol. 36, No. 4 (Spring 2012), pp. 47–79 //jchen

This consensus is premature. Researchers have conducted few systematic assessments of leadership decapitation’s effectiveness; evidence remains scant. 5 But contrary to scholars’ claims that leadership decapitation never works, the evidence appears to be more mixed. In numerous cases, decapitation was vital in degrading and defeating militant groups. In Peru, for example, Shining Path leader Abimeal Guzmán’s 1992 capture crippled the group’s bid for power. In Turkey, the capture of Abdullah Ocalan, leader of the Kurdistan People’s Party, in 1999 precipitated the group’s steep decline. And in Italy, authorities used critical intelligence obtained from captured Red Brigades leaders to dismantle remnants of the organization. 6 Moreover, the research design and methodologies used in nearly all previous studies make it difficult to draw credible conclusions about the impact of leadership decapitation. Three problems are common in the literature. First, the security studies literature, for example, relies uniformly on no-variance de- signs. 7 Yet credible causal inferences cannot be made from studies that only examine cases in which opposing leaders were captured or killed. Second, scholars have tended to use extremely restrictive coding criteria, setting the bar unrealistically high for decapitation to be considered successful; except in cases where the target was quickly and decisively defeated following a leader’s capture or death, scholars have usually coded decapitation as a failure. This is appropriate for evaluating decapitation’s proximate strategic impact, but it is inappropriate for assessing decapitation’s longer-term political, military, and economic effects. Decapitation could have a wide variety of effects—some positive, others potentially negative—that this approach does not capture. 8 A second problem is selection bias. Militant leaders tend to be killed or captured at key junctures in campaigns—periods when governments may already be more likely to win or lose. 9 Security studies scholarship on leadership decapitation—including large- N studies—fails to address this is- sue, which makes it difficult to identify whether decapitation explains the outcomes of interest, or whether other factors that make decapitation more likely to occur actually drive the relationship. This challenge is daunting, both for quantitative and qualitative studies that rely on observational data. An experimental design would solve this problem, but for many of the most important security studies questions, especially the present one, an experiment is neither desirable nor feasible. In these situations, scholars can instead exploit research designs that focus on data where confounding factors are unlikely to cause misleading correlations. Doing so helps scholars to isolate their variable(s) of interest and to avoid making conclusions and policy recommendations based on spurious, misleading findings.

#### Our study best – reviewed 118 case studies

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Patrick B. Johnston, Associate Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation. He wrote this article while he was a fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation and the Empirical Studies of Conflict Project at Stanford University and at the International Security Program at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, “Does Decapitation Work? Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Targeting in Counterinsurgency Campaigns”, International Security, Vol. 36, No. 4 (Spring 2012), pp. 47–79 //jchen

This article addresses these challenges by analyzing a large number of cases in which governments attempted—successfully and unsuccessfully—to remove top militant leaders and the events that followed these attempts.10 This approach relies on a natural experiment to help isolate the importance of militant leaders. To the extent that chance plays a role in the outcome of operations aimed at removing military leaders, this approach can help researchers assess the likelihood that organizations whose leaders were captured or killed would have fared differently had their leadership remained intact.

This approach is valid for identifying the effect of leadership decapitation as long as decapitation operations’ outcomes are not systematically determined by factors unaccounted for in the analysis. This assumption holds up to both anecdotal and systematic scrutiny. As I argue below, the clandestine nature of militant leadership and unforeseen or idiosyncratic circumstances can compromise the chances of even the most well planned operations to succeed. Large-N scrutiny supports this argument. Analysis of 118 decapitation attempts from a sample of 90 counterinsurgency campaigns shows that factors commonly associated with counterinsurgency success generally fail to predict the success or failure of government actions to remove militant leaders.

My results challenge previous claims that removing militant leaders is ineffective or counterproductive. On the contrary, they suggest that leadership decapitation (1) increases the chances of war termination; (2) increases the probability of government victory; (3) reduces the intensity of militant violence; and (4) reduces the frequency of insurgent attacks.

#### Decreasing drone strikes in the past didn’t reduce resentment

Etzioni 13

Amitai Etzioni, professor of in- ternational relations at George Washington University and author of Hot Spots: American Foreign Pol- icy in a Post-Human-Rights World, 4/30/13, “Drones: Say it with figures”, http://www.upi.com/Top\_News/Analysis/Outside-View/2013/04/30/Outside-View-Drones-Say-it-with-figures/UPI-25571367294880/ //jchen

In reality, ample evidence shows that large parts of the population of several Muslim countries resent the United States for numerous and profound reasons, unrelated to drone attacks.

These Muslims consider the United States to be the "Great Satan" because it violates core religious values they hold dear; it promotes secular democratic liberal regimes; it supports women's rights; and it exports a lifestyle that devout Muslims consider hedonistic and materialistic to their countries.

These feelings, data show, are rampant in countries in which no drones attacks have occurred, were common in those countries in which the drones have been employed well before any attacks took place, and continue unabated, even when drone attacks are greatly scaled back.

As Marc Lynch notes in Foreign Affairs:

"A decade ago, anti-Americanism seemed like an urgent problem. Overseas opinion surveys showed dramatic spikes in hostility toward the United States, especially in the Arab world ... It is now clear that even major changes, such as Bush's departure, Obama's support for some of the Arab revolts of 2011, the death of Osama bin Laden, and the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, have had surprisingly little effect on Arab attitudes towards the United States. Anti-Americanism might have ebbed momentarily, but it is once again flowing freely."

#### Strikes reduce the intensity and conflict of terrorist attacks. Blowback theory is wrong – best statistical study

Johnston 12

Patrick B. Johnston, Associate Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation. He wrote this article while he was a fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation and the Empirical Studies of Conflict Project at Stanford University and at the International Security Program at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, “Does Decapitation Work? Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Targeting in Counterinsurgency Campaigns”, International Security, Vol. 36, No. 4 (Spring 2012), pp. 47–79 //jchen

Conclusion

Targeting militant leaders is now a centerpiece of U.S. strategy in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen, but does capturing or killing militant leaders work? Most extant research eschews the notion that removing enemy leaders can help governments achieve military and political goals. Regardless of whether a government’s adversary is a state, a terrorist organization, or a guerrilla insurgency, the scholarly opinion has been that high-value targeting is ineffective at best and counterproductive at worst.

The evidence presented in this article challenges this view. In previous studies, causal inference and generalizability have been difficult given research design and measurement issues. I addressed these issues by employing a datadriven approach in which I analyzed variation in the consequences of successful and failed decapitation attempts in campaigns dating from the mid-1970s. After correcting for the endogeneity and measurement issues that have hindered previous studies, I found that neutralizing insurgent leaders has a substantively large and statistically significant effect on numerous metrics of countermilitancy effectiveness. Specifically, the results showed that removing insurgent leaders increases governments’ chances of defeating insurgencies, reduces insurgent attacks, and diminishes overall levels of violence. Because these effects were estimated by comparing the consequences of successful and failed decapitation attempts, I conducted additional analysis to ensure that the observed effects can be attributed to successful operations against insurgent leaders rather than to blowback from botched high-value targeting missions. This was confirmed to be the case.

Yet the data also show conclusively that killing or capturing insurgent leaders is usually not a silver bullet. Neutralizing insurgent leaders significantly increases governments’ chances of reducing violence, terminating wars, and defeating insurgencies. A variety of different empirical tests consistently demonstrated that governments were more likely to defeat insurgencies following the successful removal of top insurgent leaders, but this probability was consistently estimated at around 25 to 30 percent—a far cry from the silver bullet many look for when they analyze leadership decapitation. Yet this effect indeed provides a sizable advantage, which can help explain why governments continue to invest in high-value targeting despite its legal ambiguity and normative disrepute.

These are not the only findings with policy implications. Importantly, the results do not support the common argument that the costs of failed targeting outweigh the benefits of successful targeting; although there is abundant evidence that capturing or killing insurgent leaders is associated with key metrics of successful counterinsurgency, there is no credible evidence of a martyrdom effect, whereby trying but failing to neutralize militant leaders decreases governments’ chances of defeating insurgencies or increases levels of antigovernment violence. The apparently low costs of failed targeting to operational effectiveness is consistent with choices made by states, such as Israel and the United States, to continue to aggressively target individual members of insurgent and terrorist organizations—including midlevel operatives who can potentially lead them to senior leaders—despite the inherent uncertainty, difficulty, and risks of doing so, and to continue to invest in intelligence capabilities and Special Operations Forces dedicated to kinetic and nonkinetic targeting. The role, responsibilities, and budget of the U.S. Special Operations Command continue to expand even as significant budget cuts become a reality for the Department of Defense. As long as the United States continues to move its fight from the battlefield to the shadows, this trend will likely remain true.

### Norms

### 1nc 1 – Norms Fail

#### Countries use realist calculations for drones – they’ll pick whatever weapons help them

Etzioni 13

Amitai Etzioni, professor of in- ternational relations at George Washington University and author of Hot Spots: American Foreign Pol- icy in a Post-Human-Rights World, “The Great Drone Debate”, March-April 2013, Military Review //jchen

Other critics contend that by the United States using drones, it leads other countries into making and using them. For example, Medea Benjamin, the co- founder of the anti-war activist group CODEPINK and author of a book about drones argues that, “The proliferation of drones should evoke reflection on the precedent that the United States is setting by killing anyone it wants, anywhere it wants, on the basis of secret information. Other nations and non-state enti- ties are watching—and are bound to start acting in a similar fashion.”60 Indeed scores of countries are now manufacturing or purchasing drones. There can be little doubt that the fact that drones have served the United States well has helped to popularize them. However, it does not follow that United States should not have employed drones in the hope that such a show of restraint would deter others. First of all, this would have meant that either the United States would have had to allow terrorists in hard- to-reach places, say North Waziristan, to either roam and rest freely—or it would have had to use bombs that would have caused much greater col- lateral damage.

Further, the record shows that even when the United States did not develop a particular weapon, others did. Thus, China has taken the lead in the development of anti-ship missiles and seemingly cyber weapons as well. One must keep in mind that the international environment is a hostile one. Countries—and especially non-state actors— most of the time do not play by some set of self- constraining rules. Rather, they tend to employ whatever weapons they can obtain that will further their interests. The United States correctly does not assume that it can rely on some non-existent implicit gentleman’s agreements that call for the avoidance of new military technology by nation X or terrorist group Y—if the United States refrains from employing that technology.

#### Other states won’t model US restraint

Max Boot 11, the Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow in National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, 10/9/11, “We Cannot Afford to Stop Drone Strikes,” Commentary Magazine, <http://www.commentarymagazine.com/2011/10/09/drone-arms-race/>

The New York Times engages in some scare-mongering today about a drone ams race. Scott Shane notes correctly other nations such as China are building their own drones and in the future U.S. forces could be attacked by them–our forces will not have a monopoly on their use forever. Fair enough, but he goes further, suggesting our current use of drones to target terrorists will backfire:

If China, for instance, sends killer drones into Kazakhstan to hunt minority Uighur Muslims it accuses of plotting terrorism, what will the United States say? What if India uses remotely controlled craft to hit terrorism suspects in Kashmir, or Russia sends drones after militants in the Caucasus? American officials who protest will likely find their own example thrown back at them.

“The problem is that we’re creating an international norm” — asserting the right to strike preemptively against those we suspect of planning attacks, argues Dennis M. Gormley, a senior research fellow at the University of Pittsburgh and author of Missile Contagion, who has called for tougher export controls on American drone technology. “The copycatting is what I worry about most.”

This is a familiar trope of liberal critics who are always claiming we should forego “X” weapons system or capability, otherwise our enemies will adopt it too. We have heard this with regard to ballistic missile defense, ballistic missiles, nuclear weapons, chemical and biological weapons, land mines, exploding bullets, and other fearsome weapons. Some have even suggested the U.S. should abjure the first use of nuclear weapons–and cut down our own arsenal–to encourage similar restraint from Iran.

The argument falls apart rather quickly because it is founded on a false premise: that other nations will follow our example. In point of fact, Iran is hell-bent on getting nuclear weapons no matter what we do; China is hell-bent on getting drones; and so forth. Whether and under what circumstances they will use those weapons remains an open question–but there is little reason to think self-restraint on our part will be matched by equal self-restraint on theirs. Is Pakistan avoiding nuking India because we haven’t used nuclear weapons since 1945? Hardly. The reason is that India has a powerful nuclear deterrent to use against Pakistan. If there is one lesson of history it is a strong deterrent is a better upholder of peace than is unilateral disarmament–which is what the New York Times implicitly suggests.

Imagine if we did refrain from drone strikes against al-Qaeda–what would be the consequence? If we were to stop the strikes, would China really decide to take a softer line on Uighurs or Russia on Chechen separatists? That seems unlikely given the viciousness those states already employ in their battles against ethnic separatists–which at least in Russia’s case already includes the suspected assassination of Chechen leaders abroad. What’s the difference between sending a hit team and sending a drone?

While a decision on our part to stop drone strikes would be unlikely to alter Russian or Chinese thinking, it would have one immediate consequence: al-Qaeda would be strengthened and could regenerate the ability to attack our homeland. Drone strikes are the only effective weapon we have to combat terrorist groups in places like Pakistan or Yemen where we don’t have a lot of boots on the ground or a lot of cooperation from local authorities. We cannot afford to give them up in the vain hope it will encourage disarmament on the part of dictatorial states.

#### Legal regime has no effect- states will always act in their self interest

Goldsmith and Posner 5 – \*Harvard Law School professor and former US Assistant Attorney General and \*\*Professor of Law at UChicago Law School (Jack L. and Eric A., “The Limits of International Law,” April, <http://www.angelfire.com/jazz/sugimoto/law.pdf>)

The Limits of International Law intends to fill that gap. The book begins with the premise that all states, nearly all the time, make foreign policy decisions, including the decisions whether to enter treaties and comply with international law, based on an assessment of their national interest. Using a simple game-theoretical framework, Goldsmith and Posner argue that international law is intrinsically weak and unstable, because states will comply with international law only when they fear that noncompliance will result in retaliation or other reputational injuries. This framework helps us understand the errors of the international law advocates and their critics. On the one hand, large multilateral treaties that treat all states as equal are unattractive to powerful states, which either refuse to enter the treaties, enter them subject to numerous reservations that undermine the treaties’ obligations, or refuse to comply with them. The problem with these treaties is that they treat states as equals when in fact they are not, and they implicitly rely on collective sanctions when states prefer to free ride. Thus, many human rights treaties are generally not enforced, and so they have little effect on states’ behavior. And the international trade system is mainly a framework in which bilateral enforcement occurs, so powerful states may cooperate with other powerful states but not with weaker states, whose remedies for trade violations are valueless. On the other hand, international law is not empty or meaningless, as many critics have argued. States are able to cooperate with each other, especially on a bilateral basis, and their patterns of cooperation eventually congeal into the customary international norms. Cooperation also occurs within bilateral treaties and within the general frameworks set up in multilateral treaties. In the absence of a world government, the cooperation remains relatively thin, and often erratic; its character changes as the interests and relative power of nations change. But none of this is to claim that international law is phony or illusory or a great public relations game. What it does suggest, however, is that international law has no life of its own, has no special normative authority; it is just the working out of relations among states, as they deal with relatively discrete problems of international cooperation. There is no reason to expect states to enter treaties just for the sake of expanding the domain of international law; and there is no reason to expect states to comply with treaties when their interests and powers change. The aggressive international legalization expected and yearned for by international lawyers just cannot happen as long as there are nearly 200 states with independent interests, agendas, and ideologies. Even democratic states have no reason to commit them- selves to international law when doing so does not serve the interests of the voters.

#### China will be constrained with drones – worried about reputation and precedent-setting

Erickson and Strange 13

Andrew Erickson, associate professor at the Naval War College and an Associate in Research at Harvard University's Fairbank Centre, Austin Strange, researcher at the Naval War College's China Maritime Studies Institute, Foreign Affairs, "China has drones. Now how will it use them?", 5/29/13, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/opinion/China-has-drones-Now-how-will-it-use-them-30207095.html

Indeed, the time to fret about when China and other authoritarian countries will acquire drones is over: they have them. The question now is when and how they will use them. But as with its other, less exotic military capabilities, Beijing has cleared only a technological hurdle - and its behaviour will continue to be constrained by politics.

China has been developing a drone capacity for over half a century, starting with its reverse engineering of Soviet Lavochkin La-17C target drones that it had received from Moscow in the late 1950s. Today, Beijing's opacity makes it difficult to gauge the exact scale of the programme, but according to Ian Easton, an analyst at the Project 2049 Institute, an American think-tank devoted to Asia-Pacific security matters, by 2011 China's air force alone had over 280 combat drones. In other words, its fleet of unmanned aerial vehicles is already bigger and more sophisticated than all but the United States'; in this relatively new field Beijing is less of a newcomer and more of a fast follower. And the force will only become more effective: the Lijian ("sharp sword" in Chinese), a combat drone in the final stages of development, will make China one of the very few states that have or are building a stealth drone capacity.

This impressive arsenal may tempt China to pull the trigger. The fact that a Chinese official acknowledged that Beijing had considered using drones to eliminate the Myanmar drug trafficker, Naw Kham, makes clear that it would not be out of the question for China to launch a drone strike in a security operation against a non-state actor. Meanwhile, as China's territorial disputes with its neighbours have escalated, there is a chance that Beijing would introduce unmanned aircraft, especially since India, the Philippines and Vietnam distantly trail China in drone funding and capacity, and would find it difficult to compete. Beijing is already using drones to photograph the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands it disputes with Japan, as the retired Chinese major-general Peng Guangqian revealed earlier this year, and to keep an eye on movements near the North Korean border.

Beijing, however, is unlikely to use its drones lightly. It already faces tremendous criticism from much of the international community for its perceived brazenness in continental and maritime sovereignty disputes. With its leaders attempting to allay notions that China's rise poses a threat to the region, injecting drones conspicuously into these disputes would prove counterproductive. China also fears setting a precedent for the use of drones in East Asian hotspots that the United States could eventually exploit. For now, Beijing is showing that it understands these risks, and to date it has limited its use of drones in these areas to surveillance, according to recent public statements from China's Defence Ministry.

#### They’ll avoid strikes – don’t want to make sovereignty violations the norm

Erickson and Strange 13

Andrew Erickson, associate professor at the Naval War College and an Associate in Research at Harvard University's Fairbank Centre, Austin Strange, researcher at the Naval War College's China Maritime Studies Institute, Foreign Affairs, "China has drones. Now how will it use them?", 5/29/13, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/opinion/China-has-drones-Now-how-will-it-use-them-30207095.html

The restrictive position that Beijing takes on sovereignty in international forums will further constrain its use of drones. China is not likely to publicly deploy drones for precision strikes or in other military assignments without first having been granted a credible mandate to do so. The gold standard of such an authorisation is a resolution passed by the UN Security Council, the stamp of approval that has permitted Chinese humanitarian interventions in Africa and anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. China might consider using drones abroad with some sort of regional authorisation, such as a country giving Beijing explicit permission to launch a drone strike within its territory. But even with the endorsement of the international community or specific states, China would have to weigh any benefits of a drone strike abroad against the potential for mishaps and perceptions that it was infringing on other countries' sovereignty - something Beijing regularly decries when others do it.

#### Their academic literature proves intent is for surveillance only

Erickson and Strange 13

Andrew Erickson, associate professor at the Naval War College and an Associate in Research at Harvard University's Fairbank Centre, Austin Strange, researcher at the Naval War College's China Maritime Studies Institute, Foreign Affairs, "China has drones. Now how will it use them?", 5/29/13, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/opinion/China-has-drones-Now-how-will-it-use-them-30207095.html

The limitations on China's drone use are reflected in the country's academic literature on the topic. The bulk of Chinese drone research is dedicated to scientific and technological topics related to design and performance. The articles that do discuss potential applications primarily point to major combat scenarios -such as a conflagration with Taiwan or the need to attack a US aircraft carrier - which would presumably involve far more than just drones. Chinese researchers have thought a great deal about the utility of drones for domestic surveillance and law enforcement, as well as for non-combat-related tasks near China's contentious borders. Few scholars, however, have publicly considered the use of drone strikes overseas.

#### Chinese drones inevitable – strategic and economic considerations

Stratfor 13

Stratfor, “China's Expanding Drone Program”, 4/9/13, http://www.irgamag.com/regions/item/2107-chinas-expanding-drone-program //jchen

China is rapidly expanding its research into and production, deployments and sales of unmanned aerial vehicles, colloquially known as drones. The primary role of this growing program is to help Beijing control and monitor disputed territories in the Asia-Pacific region.

Beijing has decided to prioritize its drone program for security and economic reasons. In the security sphere, these machines are very useful for patrolling the East and South China seas, allowing Beijing to maintain a presence in the disputed waters, and play a role in China's anti-access/area denial strategy.

#### Fears of a ‘drones arms race’ is media hype

Moss 13

Trefor Moss, The Diplomat, independent journalist based in Hong Kong. He covers Asian politics, defence and security, and was Asia-Pacific Editor at Jane’s Defence Weekly, 3/2/13, “Here Come…China’s Drones”, http://thediplomat.com/2013/03/02/here-comes-chinas-drones/?all=true //jchen

It’s safe to say, then, that Chinese drones conjure up a particularly intense sense of alarm that the media has begun to embrace as a license to panic. China is indeed developing a range of unmanned aerial vehicles/systems (UAVs/UASs) at a time when relations with Japan are tense, and when those with the U.S. are delicate. But that hardly justifies claims that “drones have taken center stage in an escalating arms race between China and Japan,” or that the “China drone threat highlights [a] new global arms race,” as some observers would have it. This hyperbole was perhaps fed by a 2012 U.S. Department of Defense report which described China’s development of UAVs as "alarming."

That’s quite unreasonable. All of the world’s advanced militaries are adopting drones, not just the PLA. That isn’t an arms race, or a reason to fear China, it’s just the direction in which defense technology is naturally progressing. Secondly, while China may be demonstrating impressive advances, Israel and the U.S. retain a substantial lead in the UAV field, with China—alongside Europe, India and Russia— still in the second tier. And thirdly, China is modernizing in all areas of military technology – unmanned systems being no exception.

#### No escalation – Indian drone already violated air sovereignty before

The Nation 13

The Nation, Zafar Malik, 8/4/13, “Indian drone violates Pak airspace ”, http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/national/04-Aug-2013/indian-drone-violates-pak-airspace //jchen

An Indian drone violated Pakistani airspace near Sialkot on Saturday evoking a formal protest from Pakistani authorities, who have asked the Indians to explain this violation, according to security sources.

According to Chenab Rangers, the green coloured Remote Piloted Vehicle (RPV) entered Pakistani airspace in Sialkot sector near the Bajwat-Chaprar-Sialkot sector at around 1:55pm.

Entering from neighbouring Occupied Jammu and Kashmir and flying at a height of 3,500 feet, the drone penetrated 350 metres into Pakistani airspace. After a one and half minute flight, the RPV was forced back into India after Pakistan Air Force came into action.

Pakistani authorities have reportedly expressed grave concern over this violation and has lodged a strong protest, seeking detailed Indian explanation, the officials said. Earlier in June, two Indian fighter planes had entered Pakistan’s airspace near Head Sulemanki border. The planes were reportedly five to seven miles inside Pakistan.

#### Indian acquisition will take years

Mataram 13

Vande Mataram, “India’s indigenous drones”, 5/14/13, <http://vandemataram.info/indias-indigenous-drones/> //jchen

However, it will take some years before such acquisitions come through. This was evident from the lukewarm response to India’s RIF in June this year for a fleet of stealthy UCAVs. Most of the manufacturers shied away from responding, given that most of their research had not move beyond the prototype level, or they were bound by technology-transfer norms. The US, which is a leader is UCAVs, is out of bounds due to the lack of outcome on technology-sharing agreements with India. Even after the signing of these agreements, transfer of sensitive technology from the US to India is doubtful given the negative reaction of Pakistan – at least, as long as Pakistani involvement is required in the US-led ‘war on terror’. Israel, on the other hand, poses no such obstacles.

With, without Israel

While there is widespread agreement within the Indian military about the growing importance of UAVs and UCAVs, there is a debate about spending billions of rupees on buying these from a single foreign source. Israel and the US came to a head in 2004 over an Israel-China Harpy deal; the US claimed that the Harpy contained US technology, and demanded Israel seize the Harpy fleet that China had sent for upgradation. (Eventually, Israel had to return the fleet to China without doing the required work.) Despite the deepening Indo-US defence ties, there is a thin possibility that the US might repeat the moves it made in 2004 in future upgradation of India’s Harpy fleet, especially if geopolitical compulsions make the US take cognisance of Pakistan’s concern over Indian killer drones. There are also sections that oppose spending so much money on foreign UAVs at a time when India’s own Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) has shown the potential to develop indigenous drones.

#### No Europe/Russia war.

Mandelbaum 11 [In an era of tightening budgets, can America remain a superpower on the cheap? By Michael Mandelbaum Thursday, February 17, 2011; 3:35 PM http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/17/AR2011021704610.html]

By contrast, there is no immediate prospect of war in Europe or East Asia. The United States contributes to peace in both by serving as a buffer between and among regional powers that, while not preparing for armed conflict, do not fully trust one another. In Europe, a U.S. military presence provides reassurance that, should Russia become more aggressive, the United States would be on hand to help deter it, as it did during the Cold War. That same U.S. presence, however, also reassures the Russians that Germany, a 20th century rival, will remain safely anchored in an American-led alliance and will therefore not feel the need, for defensive reasons, to boost its military forces or obtain its own nuclear weapons.

#### No impact to central asia.

Claes, program specialist in USIP’s Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention, 10

(Jonas, United States Institute of Peace, “Preventing Conflict in the “Stans”,” 4-23, http://www.usip.org/files/resources/PB%2021%20Preventing%20Conflict%20in%20the%20Stans.pdf, accessed 11-4-12, CMM)

Despite this litany of conflict drivers, Central Asia has remained relatively peaceful for the past 20 years, apart from the 1992 Tajik civil war. Unlike most regions at low risk of conflict, Central Asia cannot rely on its institutional capacity to pave the road to self-sustainable peace. Although very effective in the short term, some of the factors mitigating conflict are unsustainable sources of stability. ¶ The Soviet legacy, characterized by extreme deprivation and violent suppression, nonetheless operates as a conflict-managing factor in Central Asia. Quantitative studies established a quasi-consensus among scholars on the negative effect of both extreme democracy and extreme autocracy on the risk of civil war, anocracies being most conflict-prone. 6 The brutal Soviet practices hardened and intimidated the population, discouraging popular uprisings. Current law enforcement tools used in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan are often Soviet-inherited and serve as effective yet inhumane conflict management instruments. A recent report by the United Nations Human Rights Committee condemned the human rights situation in Uzbekistan, stressing the excessive use of torture. The Kyrgyz security forces, on the other hand, are rather ineffective, providing a safe-haven to militant groups based in the region. In Tajikistan, the civil conflict bred war fatigue, reducing the odds that an opportunistic leader will be able to mobilize Tajiks to violently undermine their government. ¶Though they cannot assure stability in the long term, some of the region’s financial and socioeconomic lifelines also mitigate conflict in the short term. International, regional, and nongovernmental organizations, as well as individual countries, provide vital assistance to Central Asia’s development. Unfortunately, a significant proportion of the aid is lost to corruption before it reaches its targets. Chinese and Russian capital injections offer some breathing space, as well as crucial investments in economic infrastructure. Yet, as indicated earlier, these benefactors may demand political concessions in return. Migrant remittances also serve as an important source of revenue for the region, especially in Tajikistan, where remittances make up almost half of the country’s gross domestic product—by far the highest number worldwide.7 If Russia were to act upon its recent threats to expel foreign workers, the consequences could be disastrous for Tajikistan’s remittance-based ‘welfare system,’ as it is incapable of reabsorbing its emigrants into society.

#### No war – China will maintain the squo.

Renic 12 [Neil, University of Queensland, ‘Rising China’: A Threat to International Security?, April 13, 2012 http://www.e-ir.info/2012/04/13/rising-china-a-threat-to-international-security/]

Despite alarmist claims to the contrary, the growth of China is unlikely to jeopardise the security of other regional states. When describing the rise of continental powers, Napoleon famously said, ‘the policies of such states are inherent in their geography’ (cited in Kaplan 2010: 23). This is certainly true regarding the rise of contemporary China. Whatever China’s true regional ambitions are, an observation of the East Asian alliance system indicates the improbability of a Chinese “Monroe Doctrine” in the near future. With direct economic and political contestation from both India and Japan, both key allies to the U.S. (Power 2006: 32), any attempt to supplant the U.S. as a regional hegemon, **seems increasingly unlikely.** Nye states that a more probable scenario for East Asia is one in which the U.S., Japan, Australia, India, and others, from a position of strength, engage China and incentivise it to engage more responsibly with the regional community. By again contrasting the rise of China with that of the Soviet Union, likely regional developments are better able to be ascertained. While the Soviet Union was believed to be a ‘highly revisionist state bent on radically overturning the status quo’ (Glaser 2011: 85), virtually **no evidence** suggests China shares these qualities. This highlights the reasonable probability of avoiding war within East Asia, as China continues to rise. Finally, the maintenance of the regional status quo seems increasingly likely, given the direct advantage to China of a significant U.S. naval presence in East Asia. Strategic analyst Khalid R. Al-Rodhan argues that the U.S. naval dominance of East Asia serves China strategically by providing security against terrorism and smuggling, maintaining the balance of power by preventing Japanese militarisation, and contributing to general stability (2007: 52). The fact that the U.S. East Asian naval presence allows China to better focus on domestic matters, strongly suggests that peace can be maintained regionally, as China continues to strengthen. Despite these positive developments, virtual unanimity can be found among those concerned with China’s rise, when focus is placed on the volatility that exists between China and Taiwan.

#### No Indo-Pak war.

Loudon 8 [Bruce, The Australian, Doomsday dread, December 04, 2008, http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,24746635-25837,00.html]

THE doomsayers' published assessments tell the grim story: upwards of 12 million people killed on the first day of a nuclear exchange, more than 150 million dead in a longer nuclear conflict. Devastation and destruction on a scale that is almost unimaginable. A catastrophe that would vastly transcend that seen at Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of World War II. That is why, as India and Pakistan muscle up to each other after the Mumbai massacre and leaders from across the world hurry to counsel cool heads and caution in New Delhi and Islamabad, the unspoken fear everywhere is that the two South Asian neighbours could be pushed into the unthinkable: their fourth war, and one in which they would mobilise their nuclear arsenals. It is, it must be said, **an unlikely prospect.** No one in either capital -- even among the hotheads -- is thinking in those terms. **Experienced strategic analysts rule it out**. "Don't even think about it. It ain't going to happen," one says. But as the crisis over terrorism across South Asia deepens and jihadist groups linked to al-Qa'ida launch devastating attacks such as the one in Mumbai last week -- attacks designed to exacerbate tensions between India and Pakistan -- there is, in the view of most analysts, always the potential for events to tumble out of control and lead to a doomsday nuclear conflagration, with enormous loss of life. "South Asia's a nuclear tinderbox," a leading military analyst in New Delhi tells The Australian. "Yes, of course, I'd just about rule it out in the context of the face-off following the Mumbai attack. "But it's always there, always nagging at the edges of the constant tensions in the subcontinent. And there's no doubt that Osama (bin Laden) is doing his bit to stir the pot and do what he can to increase those tensions, since conflict between India and Pakistan serves the jihadist cause." Yesterday, US military officials in Washington, DC, closely monitoring the situation described the military temperature between the two neighbours as "pretty low right now", adding that although Pakistan has moved some aircraft and air defence units closer to the Indian border since the Mumbai attack, "on the nuclear side there is nothing". Which is hardly surprising, for the political will in both sides, despite the muscle-flexing, is **overwhelmingly against** resort to their nuclear arsenals. India, since it demonstrated its nuclear capability in 1998, has maintained a firm no-first-strike policy and a few days ago Pakistan's President Asif Ali Zardari turned longstanding Pakistani policy on its head (some believe to the annoyance of the country's powerful generals) by articulating a similar stance. On both sides there is a **mood of extreme caution** on the subject of any possible use of nuclear weapons, matched only by the intense secrecy that surrounds their arsenals.

#### Not even close to extinction

Khan 9 [Shamsur Rabb, Newstrack India, Price of an Indo-Pak War, Newstrack India, 1/20, http://www.newstrackindia.com/newsdetails/62680]

Let us turn to unprecedented casualty in case of a nuclear conflict: Natural Resources Defence Council (NRDC), the New York based global think tank, in its report, “The Consequences of Nuclear Conflict between India and Pakistan” has calculated the human costs of an Indo-Pak nuclear conflict. As per NRDC estimates, both countries have a total of 50 to 75 nuclear weapons. Depicting a nuclear war Scenario (10 bombs on 10 South Asian cities), it says that attack on 10 major cities – 5 each in India and Pakistan – would result in a combined death toll of 2,862,581, with 1,506,859 severely injured and 3,382,978 slightly injured. On Indian side, death toll is estimated at 1,690,702, while 892,459 and 2,021,106 would be severely and slightly injured respectively. On Pakistan side, a total of 1,171,879 people would die, while, 614,400 and 1,361,872 are to be severely and slightly injured. In another scenario (24 Ground Bursts), NRDC calculated the consequences of 24 nuclear explosions detonated on the ground – unlike the Hiroshima airburst – resulting in significant amounts of lethal radioactive fallout, which is far more severe nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan. The report was first appeared in the January 14, 2002, issue of Newsweek (A Face-Off with Nuclear Stakes). Contrary to ground burst, exploding a nuclear bomb above the ground does not produce fallout. For example, can we imagine the consequences of ground burst if the “Little Boy” detonated by the US above Hiroshima at an altitude of 1,900 feet could kill 70,000 people in the immediate effect with some 200,000 died up to 1950? NRDC calculated that 22.1 million people in India and Pakistan would be exposed to lethal radiation doses of 600 roentgen equivalents in man or REM (a large amount of radiation) or more in the first two days of the attack. In addition, about 8 million people would receive a radiation dose of 100 to 600 REM causing severe radiation sickness and potentially death. In all, as many as 30 million people of both countries would be eliminated by nuclear war. Besides fallout, blast and fire would cause substantial destruction within roughly a mile-and-a-half of the bomb craters. However, even after such a devastating annihilation of population, about 99 percent of the population in India and 93 percent of the population in Pakistan would survive the second scenario and their respective military forces would still be intact to continue the conflict. In short, there is nothing to gain from a war, just plenty to lose. Albeit loss of human life would be immense it would not be large enough to result in extinction of Indo-Pak populations or even prevent continuation of a military conflict. Thus, the consequences, though horrific, are not strong enough to rule out Indo-Pak conflict in future. Had size of the Indo-Pak nuclear arsenals equal to those of the US and Russia, a complete annihilation of entire population of the Indian sub-continent would have been possible.

# 1NR

#### XO CP key to test the statutory restrictions and need to reign in authority externally. Learning about mechanisms to restrict war powers is specified in the Rez – key to topic education.

#### This is distinct from fiating that the President’s authority no longer exists.

#### The counterplan is predictable – solvency advocates and common sense prove they have to answer the “restraint CP,” especially for ‘war powers authority’

#### Reject the argument, not the team.

#### CP sends the most powerful signal

Zbigniew Brzezinski 12, national security advisor under U.S. President Jimmy Carter, 12/3/12, Obama's Moment, www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/12/03/obamas\_moment

In foreign affairs, the central challenge now facing President Barack Obama is how to regain some of the ground lost in recent years in shaping U.S. national security policy. Historically and politically, in America's system of separation of powers, it is the president who has the greatest leeway for decisive action in foreign affairs. He is viewed by the country as responsible for Americans' safety in an increasingly turbulent world. He is seen as the ultimate definer of the goals that the United States should pursue through its diplomacy, economic leverage, and, if need be, military compulsion. And the world at large sees him -- for better or for worse -- as the authentic voice of America. To be sure, he is not a dictator. Congress has a voice. So does the public. And so do vested interests and foreign-policy lobbies. The congressional role in declaring war is especially important not when the United States is the victim of an attack, but when the United States is planning to wage war abroad. Because America is a democracy, public support for presidential foreign-policy decisions is essential. But no one in the government or outside it can match the president's authoritative voice when he speaks and then decisively acts for America. This is true even in the face of determined opposition. Even when some lobbies succeed in gaining congressional support for their particular foreign clients in defiance of the president, for instance, many congressional signatories still quietly convey to the White House their readiness to support the president if he stands firm for "the national interest." And a president who is willing to do so publicly, while skillfully cultivating friends and allies on Capitol Hill, can then establish such intimidating credibility that it is politically unwise to confront him. This is exactly what Obama needs to do now.

#### it outweighs legal restrictions

Roberts 13 (Kristin, When the Whole World Has Drones, National Journal, 21 March 2013, http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/when-the-whole-world-has-drones-20130321, da 8-1-13) PC

But even without raising standards, tightening up drone-specific restrictions in the standing control regime, or creating a new control agreement (which is never easy to pull off absent a bad-state actor threatening attack), just the process of lining up U.S. policy with U.S. practice would go a long way toward establishing the kind of precedent on use of this technology that America—in five, 10, or 15 years—might find helpful in arguing against another’s actions.¶ A not-insignificant faction of U.S. defense and intelligence experts, Dennis Blair among them, thinks norms play little to no role in global security. And they have evidence in support. The missile-technology regime, for example, might be credited with slowing some program development, but it certainly has not stopped non-signatories—North Korea and Iran—from buying, building, and selling missile systems. But norms established by technology-leading countries, even when not written into legal agreements among nations, have shown success in containing the use and spread of some weapons, including land mines, blinding lasers, and nuclear bombs.¶ Arguably more significant than spotty legal regimes, however, is the behavior of the United States. “History shows that how states adopt and use new military capabilities is often influenced by how other states have—or have not—used them in the past,” Zenko argued. Despite the legal and policy complexity of this issue, it is something the American people have, if slowly, come to care about. Given the attention that Rand Paul’s filibuster garnered, it is not inconceivable that public pressure on drone operations could force the kind of unforeseen change to U.S. policy that it did most recently on “enhanced interrogation” of terrorists.¶ The case against open, transparent rule-making is that it might only hamstring American options while doing little good elsewhere—as if other countries aren’t closely watching this debate and taking notes for their own future policymaking. But the White House’s refusal to answer questions about its drone use with anything but “no comment” ensures that the rest of the world is free to fill in the blanks where and when it chooses. And the United States will have already surrendered the moment in which it could have provided not just a technical operations manual for other nations but a legal and moral one as well.

#### Presidential action is perceived globally.

Sunstein 95 [Cass, Karl N. Llewellyn Professor of Jurisprudence, University of Chicago Law School and Department of Political Science, “An Eighteenth Century Presidency in a Twenty-First Century World” Arkansas Law Review, 48 Ark. L. Rev. 1, Lexis]

With the emergence of the United States as a world power, the President's foreign affairs authority has become far more capacious than was originally anticipated. For the most part this is because the powers originally conferred on the President have turned out - in light of the unanticipated position of the United States in the world - to mean much more than anyone would have thought. The constitutionally granted authorities have led to a great deal of unilateral authority, simply because the United States is so central an actor on the world scene. The posture of the President means a great deal even if the President acts clearly within the scope of his constitutionally-granted power. Indeed, mere words from the President, at a press conference or during an interview, can have enormous consequences for the international community.

#### Obama has motive and capability to circumvent the plan

Jeffrey Crouch 13, assistant professor of American politics at American University, Mark J. Rozell, acting dean and a professor of public policy at George Mason University, and Mitchel A. Sollenberger, associate professor of political science at the University of Michigan-Dearborn, December 2013, The Law: President Obama's Signing Statements and the Expansion of Executive Power, Presidential Studies Quarterly 43.4

Signing statements are a natural result of the vast growth in the exercise of unilateral presidential powers in the modern era. Presidents increasingly seek methods for governing by avoiding the traditional constraints provided by a system of separated powers. The rise of an increasingly powerful and virtually unchecked executive has been aided by various factors, including what Gene Healy (2008) calls a “cult of the presidency” in which power-seeking presidents are seen as the norm and even the ideal. It is hard to imagine a president today suggesting the need to give greater deference to the other branches of government.¶ Nonetheless, the Bush era witnessed a remarkably open and critical national debate over the limits of presidential powers. In 2007-08, presidential candidate Obama made no secret of his disagreement with President Bush's conception of executive powers. Through his pledges during the campaign, Senator Obama gave clear signals that he would not push the outer limits of executive power and that he would respect the system of checks and balances. Maybe he was not exactly promising to scale back the presidency, but he left the unmistakable impression that he would not continue the Bush era trend of runaway executive powers.¶ It is therefore appropriate to criticize President Obama for the actions we have described here because he had promised a higher standard of conduct than that practiced by his predecessors. Longtime observers of the modern presidency should not be surprised, though, as his actions fall into a customary pattern: when a new president sees the utility of a particular power established by his predecessors, he is not going to give that power away. On several occasions now, what President Obama has not been able to achieve through the normal ebb and flow of deliberations with the legislative branch, he has stipulated through the issuance of a signing statement. He has even made quips about how he looks for ways to govern without direct congressional involvement (Savage 2012).¶ The “Unitary Executive” Theory¶ During the George W. Bush presidency, there was substantial scholarly debate over what had been termed the “unitary executive” theory, defined by Stephen Skowronek as the claim “that the Constitution mandates an integrated and hierarchical administration—a unified executive branch—in which all officers performing executive business are subordinate to the President, accountable to his interpretations of their charge, and removable at his discretion” (2009, 2077). Skowronek's definition is drawn from four crucial constitutional provisions relating to presidential power. First, the “executive power” vested in the president by Article II is interpreted broadly by unitary executive theory proponents to justify vast authority over the rest of the executive branch. Second, the “vesting” clause of Article II, which does not contain the “herein granted” language of Article I, seems to imply greater executive power than the explicit words of the Constitution may suggest. Third, the president's oath of office is his responsibility to “preserve, protect and defend the Constitution.” Finally, the “take care” clause—the idea that the president has total control over his subordinates in the executive branch and is responsible to the entire nation for the implementation of the laws—rounds out the list (Skowronek 2009, 2076; see Kelley, forthcoming, 12-13).¶ For legal scholars Steven Calabresi and Christopher Yoo “all of our nation's presidents have believed in the theory of the unitary executive” (2008, 4). Along similar lines, although looking at the question from a political development perspective, Skowronek casts the unitary executive theory backers as the latest in a long line of insurgents. In the past progressives extolled the virtues of a strong presidency; more recently the rebels have been conservatives who see the unitary executive theory as a way to gather power and avoid accountability (Skowronek 2009).¶ The unitary executive theory—at least, in its current form—was essentially a creation of conservative attorneys in the Ronald Reagan Justice Department. As Christopher Kelley and Bryan Marshall note, presidents from Reagan onward have, to some degree, exhibited a belief in the unitary executive theory (2007, 144). After Watergate, the presidency faced unprecedented scrutiny from the public and the mass media, and Congress had passed a series of laws intended to check presidential power, including the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act, the Ethics in Government Act, and the War Powers Resolution (Kelley 2010, 108; see Kelley 2003, 23; Rudalevige 2006). To fight back, lawyers in the Reagan OLC devised plans for the president to act unilaterally, even if against Congress's wishes (Kelley forthcoming, 6).¶ Their actions stimulated a debate over the constitutional powers of the presidency. One prominent critic, Cass Sunstein, writes, “It has become a pervasive view within the executive branch, and to a large degree within the courts, that the original vision of the Constitution put the President on top of a pyramid, with the administration below him. This vision, set out in numerous documents by the Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel, my former home, is not an accurate interpretation of the Constitution. It is basically a fabrication by people of good intentions who have spoken ahistorically” (Sunstein 1993-94, 300).¶ Similarly, it is obvious to Louis Fisher that the president does not have complete control over the executive branch. The Constitution assumes that others will share in the workload: “The Constitution does not empower the President to carry out the law. That would be an impossible assignment. It empowers the President to see that the law is faithfully carried out” (Fisher 2009-10, 591). In the separation of powers system, those executive branch agencies actually executing the laws necessarily have relationships with—and are responsible to—the other branches of government and to the laws passed by Congress, not just the president.¶ The “Decider” Model¶ Peter Shane argues that a different presidential model took hold during the Bush years. Shane contends that the traditional understanding of the president's role is that of the chief executive regarding himself as the “overseer” of the executive branch responsible for “general oversight” and able to “indirectly” influence his subordinates. In contrast, Bush believed more in the “decider” model, which gave him direct input into everything his subordinates might do, “without regard to any limitations Congress might try to impose on the President's power of command” (Shane 2009, 144-45). Shane concludes that the “decider” model is “profoundly undemocratic and deeply dangerous” (2009, 144). It is also contrary to law. Executive officials carry out numerous mandatory and adjudicatory duties pursuant to statutory policy. Presidents and White House aides may not intervene to change the outcomes of those decisions. Many attorneys general have advised presidents that they may not interfere with statutory duties assigned to particular executive officials (Fisher 2009-10, 576-79).¶ Signing statements comfortably fit the “decider” model of presidential power. Scholars identify signing statements as among the current litany of unilateral presidential powers (see Cooper 2002; Moe and Howell 1999), and some see no danger in the exercise of this practice (Ostrander and Sievert 2013a, 2013b). The trouble is that some presidents have used signing statements to revise legislative intent or even to alter the balance of power between the political branches and have thus undermined democratic controls on executive power (Pfiffner 2008, 196; see also Korzi 2011, 197; Fisher 2006, 1).

#### Congressional fights with Obama cause Russian expansionism and miscalculation of our resolve

Nichols and Schindler 9/16 [Tom Nichols and John Schindler are professors of national security at the Naval War College, and fellows of the International History Institute at Boston University. The views expressed are entirely their own. America's Middle East Policy Collapses September 16, 2013 http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/americas-middle-east-policy-collapses-9073]

If there is a policy solution, it begins in Washington. The President, his foreign-policy team, and Congress need to communicate with each other and present a more united face to the world. **Nothing** has provided more raw material for the Russians to work with than our own **conflicting messages, contradictions, and internal squabbles.** We can no longer press for Assad’s ouster, but we can make clear that one iota of noncompliance with this deal will result in a complete abandonment of the Kerry-Lavrov framework. (The President has tried to say this, but with so many qualifications the message was lost.) At that point, we may disagree about whether our next step should be to exact a short-term military price from Syria, to defang the Syrian military in a larger campaign, or to contemplate a new strategy for regime change in Syria. But the current situation, in which Moscow is now the arbiter of great power relations and the rules of war in the Middle East, is unsustainable. It is not only a defeat of the first order for the U.S. and the West in the region, but a danger to long-term peace and security around the world.

### Impact – South Asia

#### Obama cred key to South Asia stability.

Coes 11 [Ben, a former speechwriter in the George H.W. Bush administration, managed Mitt Romney’s successful campaign for Massachusetts Governor in 2002 and author, “The disease of a weak president”, The Daily Caller, http://dailycaller.com/2011/09/30/the-disease-of-a-weak-president/]

The disease of a weak president usually begins with the Achilles’ heel all politicians are born with — the desire to be popular. It leads to pandering to different audiences, people and countries and creates a sloppy, incoherent set of policies. Ironically, it ultimately results in that very politician losing the trust and respect of friends and foes alike. In the case of Israel, those of us who are strong supporters can at least take comfort in the knowledge that Tel Aviv will do whatever is necessary to protect itself from potential threats from its unfriendly neighbors. While it would be preferable for the Israelis to be able to count on the United States, in both word and deed, the fact is right now they stand alone. Obama and his foreign policy team have undercut the Israelis in a multitude of ways. Despite this, I wouldn’t bet against the soldiers of Shin Bet, Shayetet 13 and the Israeli Defense Forces. But Obama’s weakness could — in other places — have implications far, far worse than anything that might ultimately occur in Israel. The triangular plot of land that connects Pakistan, India and China is held together with much more fragility and is built upon a truly foreboding foundation of religious hatreds, radicalism, resource envy and nuclear weapons. If you can only worry about preventing one foreign policy disaster, worry about this one. Here are a few unsettling facts to think about: First, Pakistan and India have fought three wars since the British de-colonized and left the region in 1947. All three wars occurred before the two countries had nuclear weapons. Both countries now possess hundreds of nuclear weapons, enough to wipe each other off the map many times over. Second, Pakistan is 97% Muslim. It is a question of when — not if — Pakistan elects a radical Islamist in the mold of Ayatollah Khomeini as its president. Make no mistake, it will happen, and when it does the world will have a far greater concern than Ali Khamenei or Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and a single nuclear device. Third, China sits at the northern border of both India and Pakistan. China is strategically aligned with Pakistan. Most concerning, China covets India’s natural resources. Over the years, it has slowly inched its way into the northern tier of India-controlled Kashmir Territory, appropriating land and resources and drawing little notice from the outside world. In my book, Coup D’Etat, I consider this tinderbox of colliding forces in Pakistan, India and China as a thriller writer. But thriller writers have the luxury of solving problems by imagining solutions on the page. In my book, when Pakistan elects a radical Islamist who then starts a war with India and introduces nuclear weapons to the theater, America steps in and removes the Pakistani leader through a coup d’état. I wish it was that simple. The more complicated and difficult truth is that we, as Americans, must take sides. We must be willing to be unpopular in certain places. Most important, we must be ready and willing to threaten our military might on behalf of our allies. And our allies are Israel and India. There are many threats out there — Islamic radicalism, Chinese technology espionage, global debt and half a dozen other things that smarter people than me are no doubt worrying about. But the single greatest threat to America is none of these. The single greatest threat facing America and our allies is a weak U.S. president. It doesn’t have to be this way. President Obama could — if he chose — develop a backbone and lead. Alternatively

#### Weak Obama causes multiple scenarios for nuclear war in Asia and South Asia

COES 2011 (Ben, former speechwriter for George H.W. Bush, September 30, “The Disease of a Weak President,” <http://dailycaller.com/2011/09/30/the-disease-of-a-weak-president/>

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#### There is no warrant made in this card – just an assertion. Make them explain the link turn before they can access it.

#### Waxman says the mere existence of Congress is what makes threats credible – the plan doesn’t access this as a unique turn

#### Strong restrictions make the President less likely to exert influence in the future – this is AFTER their cutting

Waxman 8/25 [Matthew Waxman 8/25/13, Professor of Law – Columbia and Adjunct Senior Fellow for Law and Foreign Policy – CFR, “The Constitutional Power to Threaten War,” Forthcoming in Yale Law Journal, vol. 123, August 25, 2013, SSRN]

Even if Congress already wields informal political influence over threatened force, more potent and formal requirements of legislative force authorization or stricter enforcement of existing ones would still probably push U.S. policy a narrower set of commitments and more reserved use of threats – a more selective coercive and deterrent strategy – in several ways. For a President, knowing that he requires legally authorization from Congress to carry through on threats raises the expected political costs of making them (even very popular ones would require spending some political capital to obtain formal legislative backing). A more formal and substantial role for Congress in authorizing the carrying out of threats would also probably amplify some of the informational effects of executive-legislative dialogue and congressional debate described in the previous section: these processes – which could become more robust and attract greater attention – make it difficult to conceal or misrepresent preferences about war and peace, and therefore reduce opportunities for bluffing.