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#### Statutory is limits by legislation

Black's Law 6 Black's Law Dictionary Free Online Legal Dictionary 2nd Ed. 2006 http://thelawdictionary.org/statutory-restriction/

What is STATUTORY RESTRICTION?

Limits or controls that have been place on activities by its ruling legislation.

Judicial is by court or judge

Dean's Law Dictionary 12 <http://www.lawdictionaryonline.com/home_search.php>

Judicial:

adj. Of, relating to, or by the court or a judge. Pertaining or appropriate to courts of justice, or to a judge; practiced or conformed to in the administration of justice; sanctioned or ordered by a court; as, judicial power; judicial proceedings; a judicial sale. Fitted or apt for judging or de....

#### Violation – the affirmative does not defend a statutory or judicial restriction on war powers authority

#### The mechanism of statutory or judicial restrictions on war powers is the debate. Procedural requirements and their effectiveness determine whether we can or cannot curtail the military.

Dehn 11 John C. Dehn, Assistant Professor, Department of Law, United States Military Academy Temple Law Review Spring, 2011 83 Temp. L. Rev. 599 ARTICLE: THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF AND THE NECESSITIES OF WAR: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

B. The Constitutional Design and Military Regulation There is little question that the Framers adopted a new approach to command and control of national armed forces. By vesting Commander-in-Chief authority in the President while placing the authority to raise, maintain, govern, and regulate the military in Congress, the Constitution broke with the condition then existing in Great Britain. Alexander Hamilton described the difference as follows:¶ The president is to be commander in chief of the army and navy of the United States. In this respect his authority would be nominally the same with that of the king of Great Britain, but in substance much inferior to it. It would amount to nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces, as first general and admiral of the confederacy; while that of the British king extends to the declaring of war, and to the raising and regulating of fleets and armies; all which, by the constitution under consideration, would appertain to the legislature. [n57](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.328472.6824377424&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T18289623894&parent=docview&rand=1380754736175&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n57) While some commentary has suggested that this relative vesting of constitutional powers over the military implies that the President has no power to regulate the military, [n58](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.328472.6824377424&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T18289623894&parent=docview&rand=1380754736175&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n58) this is clearly inaccurate. The directive authority of military command equates to a near infinite power of internal regulation. [n59](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.328472.6824377424&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T18289623894&parent=docview&rand=1380754736175&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n59) A commander need not repeatedly issue the same order to assert his or her directive authority over routine tasks. Effective command requires that many directives be made generally applicable and remain in effect until rescinded or superseded. [n60](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.328472.6824377424&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T18289623894&parent=docview&rand=1380754736175&reloadEntirePage=true#n60) Therefore, some power to establish standing orders, or regulations, must necessarily exist. [n61](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.328472.6824377424&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T18289623894&parent=docview&rand=1380754736175&reloadEntirePage=true#n61) As Madison explained, "no axiom is more clearly established in law, or in reason, than that wherever the end is required, the means are authorized; wherever a general power to do a thing is given, every particular power necessary for doing it is included." [n62](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.328472.6824377424&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T18289623894&parent=docview&rand=1380754736175&reloadEntirePage=true#n62) This understanding was later echoed by Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland. [n63](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.328472.6824377424&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T18289623894&parent=docview&rand=1380754736175&reloadEntirePage=true#n63) [\*613] Equally clear was both Madison and Marshall's belief that these "necessary' powers are implied from the nature of the power expressly granted. [n64](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.328472.6824377424&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T18289623894&parent=docview&rand=1380754736175&reloadEntirePage=true#n64) The general directive authority intrinsic to "military command" is undoubtedly why the Supreme Court has consistently upheld the internal regulatory authority of the Commander-in-Chief and his subordinate commanders. [n65](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.328472.6824377424&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T18289623894&parent=docview&rand=1380754736175&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n65)

#### Vote neg—they explode limits –

#### Preparation and clash—we can never be prepared to debate each individual viewpoint or ideology the aff might choose. Makes it impossible to be negative – structural bias to the aff because they speak last and permute alternatives—strategic fairness is key to engaging a well-prepared opponent

#### Academic debate over policy issues like the response to War Powers is critical to improve policymaking---the K’s abstractions cedes the political

Stephen M. Walt 11, Professor of International Affairs at Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, July 21, “International Affairs and the Public Sphere”, http://publicsphere.ssrc.org/walt-international-affairs-and-the-public-sphere/

Academics can make at least three distinct contributions to public discourse on global affairs. First, although the digital revolution has made a wealth of information from around the world accessible on a near real-time basis, most of us still lack both extensive direct data on events in far-flung areas and the background knowledge necessary to understand what new developments mean. If our town’s school district is troubled or the local economy is suffering, we can observe that for ourselves and make reasonably well-informed judgments about what might be done about it. But if the issue is the war in Afghanistan, an uprising in Yemen, a naval confrontation in the South China Sea or the prospects that some battered economy will be bailed out successfully, most of us will lack the factual knowledge or conceptual understanding to know what is really going on. Even when basic information is readily available, it may be hard for most of us to put it in the appropriate context or make sense of what it means. ¶ When citizens and leaders seek to grasp the dizzying complexity of modern world politics, therefore, they must inevitably rely upon the knowledge and insights of specialists in military affairs, global trade and finance, diplomatic/international historians, area experts, and many others. And that means relying at least in part on academic scholars who have devoted their careers to mastering various aspects of world affairs and whose professional stature has been established through the usual procedures of academic evaluation (e.g., peer review, confidential assessments by senior scholars, the give-and-take of scholarly debate, etc.). ¶ Second, and more importantly, an independent academic community is an essential counterweight to official efforts to shape public understanding of key foreign policy issues. Governments enjoy enormous information asymmetries in many areas of political life, but these advantages are especially pronounced when dealing with international affairs.[5] Much of what we know about the outside world is ultimately derived from government sources (especially when dealing with national security affairs), and public officials often go to considerable lengths to shape how that information is reported to the public. Not only do governments collect vast amounts of information about the outside world, but they routinely use secrecy laws to control public access to this information. Government officials can shape public beliefs by leaking information strategically, or by co-opting sympathetic journalists whose professional success depends in part on maintaining access to key officials.[6] Given these information asymmetries and their obvious interest in retaining public support for their preferred policies, it is hardly surprising that both democratic and non-democratic leaders use their privileged access to information to build support for specific policies, at times by telling outright lies to their own citizens.[7] ¶ This situation creates few problems when the policies being sold make good strategic sense, but the results can be disastrous when they don’t. In such cases, alternative voices are needed to challenge conventional wisdoms and official rationales, and to suggest different solutions to the problem(s) at hand. Because scholars are protected by tenure and cherish the principle of academic freedom, and because they are not directly dependent on government support for their livelihoods, they are uniquely positioned to challenge prevailing narratives and policy rationales and to bring their knowledge and training to bear on vital policy issues. If we believe that unfettered debate helps expose errors and correct missteps, thereby fostering more effective public policies, then a sophisticated, diverse and engaged scholarly community is essential to a healthy polity. ¶ Third, the scholarly world also offers a potentially valuable model of constructive political disagreement. Political discourse in many countries (and especially the United States) has become increasingly personal and ad hominem, with little attention paid to facts and logic; a trend reinforced by an increasingly competitive and loosely regulated media environment. Within academia, by contrast, even intense disputes are supposed to be conducted in accordance with established canons of logic and evidence. Ad hominem attacks and other forms of character assassination have no place in scholarly discourse and are more likely to discredit those who employ them than those who are attacked. By bringing the norms of academic discourse into the public sphere, academic scholars could help restore some of the civility that has been lost in recent years. ¶ For all of these reasons, it is highly desirable for university-based scholars to play a significant role in public discourse about key real-world issues and to engage directly with policymakers where appropriate. As I have argued elsewhere, academic research can provide policymakers with relevant factual knowledge, provide typologies and frameworks that help policymakers and citizens make sense of emerging trends, and create and test theories that leaders can use to choose among different policy instruments. Academic theories can also be useful when they help policymakers anticipate events, when they identify recurring tendencies or obstacles to success, and when they facilitate the formulation of policy alternatives and the identification of benchmarks that can guide policy evaluation. Because academic scholars are free from daily responsibility for managing public affairs, they are in an ideal position to develop new concepts and theories to help us understand a complex and changing world.[8] ¶ The picture sketched here is obviously something of an ideal type, and I am not suggesting that that the academic world consistently lives up to these expectations. As noted above, university-based scholars of international affairs—and especially the disciplines of political science and history—have increasingly focused on narrow and arcane topics and are contributing less and less to policy formation or public discourse.[9] And when academics do address topics of obvious policy relevance or public interest, the results are often presented in impenetrable, jargon-ridden prose and disseminated in venues that neither policymakers nor the public are likely to read. Even when scholars have something useful to say, in short, their tendency to “speaking in tongues” diminishes their impact on the public sphere**.** ¶Why Is There a Gap between Academia and the Public Sphere?¶ To some degree, the gap between the ivory tower and the world of policy arises because the two spheres have different agendas and operate under different incentives and constraints. Academics focus on developing generalizations and testing conjectures as rigorously as possible, while policymakers and the public are often preoccupied with individual cases (i.e., whatever is in the headlines or in a policymaker’s in-tray). Thus, scholars are delighted whenever they identify a powerful general tendency, but policymakers may be more interested in figuring out how to overcome that general tendency or worried that the case at hand might be an exception to it. Academics strive to make their work as accurate as possible, even if this takes more time, but policymakers cannot always wait until a complete analysis is possible.[10] To take a recent example, policymakers in the Obama administration had to respond to the 2011 “Arab Spring” long before anyone fully understood what was driving these events or where they might lead. Given these different agendas, it is not surprising that policymakers often find academic scholarship to be of less value than the scholars who produce it might wish.

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#### Appeals to individual experiences of oppression mark a turn away from collective material economic violence – papers over the real of history by producing a façade of specific resistance.

McLaren 10 [Peter, Professor in the Division of Urban Schooling, the Graduate School of Education and Information Studies, UCLA, Peer Reviewed Title: Revolutionary Critical Pedagogy Journal Issue: InterActions: UCLA Journal of Education and Information Studies, 6(2) Author: McLaren, Peter, University of California, Los Angeles Publication Date: 2010]

New mechanisms of accumulation have spurred the development of a model in which transnational fractions of capital have become dominant. They include a cheapening of labor and the growth of flexible, deregulated and deunionized labor where women always experience super-exploitation in relation to men; the dramatic expansion of finance capital; the creation of a global and regulatory structure to facilitate the emerging global circuits of accumulation; and neoliberal structural adjustment programs which seek to create the conditions for frictionless operations of emerging transnational capital across borders and between countries. The role of the nation-state has changed to meet globally uniform laws that protect capital against the interests of the international working class. The nation-state still serves local capital, but it can no longer fetter the transnational movement of capital with its endless chains of accumulation. The cultural turn in much of current postmodern and postcolonial criticism is not a passing trend but rather a structural feature of capitalism. Particularly during times of crisis, capitalism turns to culture to solve the contradictions that it cannot resolve in its actual material practices (Ebert & Zavardadeh, 2008). Through the medium of experience, the individual is mistaken as the source of social practices and this process of misidentification becomes a capitalist archestrategy that marginalizes collectivity and protects the individual as the foundation of entrepreneurial capitalism. Consequently, the well-being of the collectivity is replaced by a “politics of consumption” that champions the singularities of individuals by ennobling the desire to obtain and consume objects of pleasure. Experience in this view becomes non-theoretical and beyond the real of history. This is precisely why we need to locate all human experience in a world-historical frame; that is, within specific social relations of production.

#### Their myopic focus on a particular manifestation of oppression does not provide a specific explanation for the broader linking of struggles – inhibits the possibility for transformative politics.

Heideman 12 [Paul M. Heideman Rutgers University, Newark, pmheideman@gmail.com Historical Materialism Volume 20, Issue 2, pages 210- 221 Beyond Black and White: Transforming African-American Politics, Manning Marable, Second Edition, London: Verso, 2009]

This theorisation of transformative politics is further weakened by its failure to specify any agency that could bring it about. Marable comes close to specifying such an agency with his repeated call to look to ‘the most oppressed sectors of our society’ for a vision of social transformation (pp. xv, 80, 310). Such a call is clearly inadequate. It simply does not follow that the most oppressed sectors of society are best positioned to carry out its most thorough remaking. The homeless, for example, are certainly among the most oppressed groups in the United States (especially in the age of the destruction of free public space and the social safety-net), yet this position does not automatically impart the most radical dynamics to their struggle. Indeed, struggles for squatters’ rights and shelters very rarely break out of localised confrontations with municipal authorities. 8 Additionally, Marable offers no account of how the disparate struggles of the oppressed (for example, the fight against anti-immigrant racism and the fight for the rights of the disabled) are to be unified, beyond the assertion that every confrontation with inequality automatically is linked to every other. Such an inadequate account of social-movement agency deeply weakens whatever strengths Marable’s theory of transformative politics may possess.

#### The unchecked spread of neoliberal capitalism necessitates extermination in the name of profit – ensures poverty and environmental and cultural destruction, culminating in eventual extinction.

Cole 11 [Dr. Mike Cole is Emeritus Research Professor in Education and Equality at Bishop Grosseteste University College Lincoln, Lincoln, UK. His most recent book is Racism and Education in the U.K. and the U.S.: towards a socialist alternative (New York and London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011 RACISM AND EDUCATION IN THE U.K. AND THE U.S. Palgrave Macmillan (June 7, 2011), pgs. 180-182]

Neo-liberal capitalism, in being primarily about expanding opportunities for large multinational companies, has undermined the power of nation¬states and exacerbated the negative effects of globalization on such services as healthcare, education, water and transport (Martinez and Garcia, 2000). However, the current hegemonic role of business in schooling is para¬mount in convincing workers and future workers that socialism is off the agenda. Marxist educators and other Left radicals should expose this myth. Students have a right to discuss different economic and political systems such as twenty-first-century democratic socialism. This is particularly press¬ing given the current economic recession. It is easier in general for discussion in schools to embrace issues of gender, “race,” disability, sexual orientation, and social class when social class relates just to attainment than to address social class in the context of overthrowing capitalism, and replacing it with world democratic socialism, where participatory democracy is central. The latter may thus be seen as the last taboo, and, of course, understandably so. It is time to move forward and bring such discussions into schools, colleges, and universities, Marxist and other Left educators can make the case that such considerations are a perfectly reasonable democratic demand. Global capitalism is out of control, and the very survival of our planet is dependent on dialogical education that considers the socialist alternative, an alternative distanced from the distortions of Marx by Stalinism. No longer can socialism be divorced from environmental and ecologi¬cal issues. McLaren and Houston (2005, p, 167) have argued that “escalat¬ing environmental problems at all geographical scales from local to global have become a pressing reality that critical educators can no longer afford to ignore.” They go on to cite “the complicity between global profiteering, resource colonization, and the wholesale ecological devastation that has become a matter of everyday life for most species on the planet.” Following Kahn (2003), they state the need for “a critical dialogue between social and eco-justice” (McLaren and Houston 2005, p. 168). They call for a dialec¬tics of ecological and environmental justice to reveal the malign interaction between capitalism, imperialism, and ecology that has created widespread environmental degradation that has dramatically accelerated with the onset of neo-liberalism. World capitalism’s environmentally racist (Bullard et al., 2007) effects in both the “developing” and “developed” world should be discussed openly and freely in the educational institutions. As far as the “developing world” is concerned, there are, for example, such issues as the environmentally dev-astating method of extraction of natural resources utilized by multinational corporations in numerous “developing” countries that have devastated eco-systems and destroyed cultures and livelihoods (World Council of Churches, 1994, cited in Robinson, 2000), with toxic waste polluting groundwater, soil and the atmosphere (e.g., Robinson, 2000). In addition, there is trans¬boundary dumping of hazardous waste by developed countries to develop¬ing nations, usually in sub-Sahara Africa (e.g., Ibitayo et al., 2008; see also Blanco, 2010 on Latin America). As far as the “developed” world is concerned, in the U.S., for example, people of color are concentrated around hazardous waste facilities-more than half of the nine million people living within two miles of such facilities are minorities (Bullard et al., 2007). Finally, there is the ubiquitous issue of climate change, itself linked to the totally destructive impact of capitalism. Joel Kovel (2010) has described cli-mate change as “a menace without parallel in the whole history of humanity.” However, on a positive note, he argues that “[it]s spectacular and dramatic character can generate narratives capable of arousing general concern and thus provide a stimulus to build movements of resistance.” Climate change is linked to loss to the planet of living things—also a rallying point for young people. For Marxist educators, this provides a good inroad for linking envi¬ronment, global capitalism, and arguments for the socialist alternative. As Kovel (2010) puts it, only within the framework of a revolutionary ecoso- cialist society can we deal with the twinned crises of climate change and spe¬cies loss—and others as well—within a coherent program centered around the flourishing of life.” Capitalism and the destruction of the environment are inextricably linked, to the extent that it is becoming increasingly apparent that saving the environment is dependent on the destruction of capitalism. Debate should therefore include a consideration of the connections between global capital¬ism and environmental destruction, as well as a discussion of the socialist alternative. The need for environmental issues to be allied to socialism is paramount. As Nick Beams (2009) notes, all the “green” opponents of Marxism view “the overthrow of the capitalist system by means of the socialist revolution as the key to resolving the problems of global warming” as either “unrealis¬tic,” “not immediate enough,” or believe that socialism is hostile to nature. Beams (ibid.) argues that, in reality, “the system of market relations is based on the separation of the producers from the means of production, and it is this separation—-the metabolic rift between [human beings] and nature— that is the source of the crisis.” In other words, instead of the real producers of wealth (the working class) having control over what they produce and rationally assigning this to human need, goods are irrationally produced for profit. Beams (ibid.) quotes Marx (1894 [1966] p. 959) as follows: Freedom. ..can consist only in this, that socialised man, the associated pro¬ducers, govern the human metabolism with nature in a rational way, bringing it under their collective control instead of being dominated by it as a blind power; accomplishing it with the least expenditure of energy and in conditions most worthy and appropriate for their human nature. As Beams (2009) concludes, “[f]ar from Marx being outdated, the world has, so to speak, caught up with Marx.”

#### The role of the ballot is to endorse the best political strategy for addressing all manifestations of exploitation and oppression. Debates about transforming society must center on what constitutes the best method for addressing ongoing struggles

McGregor 13 [Sheila McGregor Marxism and women’s oppression today International Socialism Issue: 138 Posted: 10 April 13 http://www.isj.org.uk/index.php4?id=885&issue=138]

Revolutionary socialists take part in all struggles against exploitation and oppression, whether they are against austerity measures, sexual violence, the impact of war, police racism or the growth of fascist organisations, attempting to unite the maximum number of forces in any given struggle. At the same time, revolutionary socialists are concerned not only with combatting the particular effects of exploitation and oppression, but also with taking the struggle forward so as to break the very chains of exploitation, which give rise to all forms of oppression. Thus involvement in struggle is both a practical question of how best to build a protest or strike and an ideological question of how to win those you are struggling alongside to an understanding that it is not enough to win over the particular struggle, but that what is required is a revolutionary transformation of society. When people embark on a struggle over an issue, they usually come with a mixture of ideas about the society they live in, what they are fighting for and how best to achieve their goal. Inherent in any struggle is a debate about how to take it forward. Struggles against sexism are no exception to this.

#### The noble intentions of the affirmative’s approach do not absolve it of its sins of complicity with the violent project of capitalism. Any attempt to rectify the flaws of the 1AC as a rhetorical artifact are at best disingenuous and should be rejected.

Tomlinson 13 [Barbara Tomlinson, Department of Feminist Studies, University of California, Santa Barbara, To Tell the Truth and Not Get Trapped: Desire, Distance, and Intersectionality at the Scene of Argument, Signs, Vol. 38, No. 4, Summer 2013]

Structures of dominance are the conditions of possibility for antisubordination arguments. Feminists cannot escape all the traps set by the racialized and gendered history of the disciplines, but we can destabilize them, explore their contradictions, and work through them to open up new possibilities. Yet intending our arguments to be resistant or oppositional cannot make them so. Discursive effects cannot be known in advance or assumed to reflect the intentions of those who argue; we cannot know fully or control the consequences of our own roles in the circulation of discourses. Rather, as Michel Foucault argues, “We must make allowance for the complex and unstable process whereby discourse can be both an instrument and an effect of power, but also a stumbling block, a point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy” (1980, 101). The specific arguments we make, their rhetorical form and evidence, and the consequences we draw from them all can be points of resistance or stumbling blocks that trap us into deploying dominant discourses when we think we are resisting them. Yet these discourses are what we have—the sites, the circumstances, and the means—to understand ourselves and change our conditions. Because we lack a fully theorized understanding of the scene of argument as a shared social space, we often consign rhetorical choices to matters of private choice and personal style. Yet while much of the labor that goes into writing is conducted in solitude, writing is a quintessentially social act. All writers enter a dialogue already in progress. “The word in language,” Bakhtin observes, “is half someone else’s” (1981, 293). The scene of argument is populated by many different writers, readers, reviewers, editors, and teachers. It is shaped by practices and processes inside institutions that all of us help to construct, in graduate programs, journal and manuscript review processes, panels at professional meetings, and informal prestige networks. Rhetoric matters not just because we want to present the ideas we already have eloquently and effectively but also because the scene of argument is a site where new ideas are produced and old ideas modified and rendered obsolete. My purpose here is not to scold or praise individual authors but instead to advance an understanding of the scene of argument as a shared social resource, as an entity for which we are all responsible, yet also as a terrain laden with traps. As Toni Cade Bambara explained three decades ago, principled political writing entails fusing together the diverse strands of knowledge that disciplinary frames tear apart. Such writing requires us to resist the predisposition that the disciplines promote “to accept fragmented truths and distortions as the whole” (1980, 154). Dominant modes of thinking and habits of academic life can authorize promoting and echoing partial truths with confidence, even certainty, as if they were the whole. Our job, as Bambara explains it, is “to tell the truth and not get trapped” (1983, 14). I demonstrate here that some critiques of intersectionality fall into patterned rhetorical frameworks and tropes that serve as traps to interfere with the ability to tell the truth.

### Case

#### The affirmative’s apolitical deployment of PTSD works to depoliticize the people who were victims of trauma in the first place. The lack of political stance in the 1ac and 2ac make this particularly clear. They obscure focus away from the war apparatus that causes PTSD to begin with and redirect it towards the pathologized individual who is portrayed as simply in need of therapy.

#### This turns the case—it removes the political voices of veterans from the political—silencing any normative claims they might have to make about the war apparatus and rendering any political claim they do make into a personal claim about PTSD.

Their psychologization of trauma forecloses a communal response to grief, only the alt can solve

Howell 7 Alison, Assistant Professor of Political Science, affiliate member, Department of Women and Gender Studies, Rutgers University; “Victims or Madmen? The Diagnostic Competition over “Terrorist” Detainees at Guantánamo Bay” *International Political Sociology* vol. 1 issue 1 pp. 29-47; March, 2007; http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1749-5687.2007.00003.x/full

In a similar vein, Jenny Edkins has argued that PTSD acts to depoliticize trauma in that those diagnosed “are to accept the route to cure suggested by therapy. Political action is ruled out. Any attempt at such action … is interpreted as an expression of their disease. It is an ‘acting out’ of their symptoms, nothing more” (Edkins 2003:50). Attempted suicide or “self-harm” incidents, among the detainees, have thus been reduced—by both sides of the debate—to an “acting out” of their symptoms, and as an expression of their purported psychological state. But as Edkins argues, survivors of events “have something to tell us about … power and political community in the contemporary Western world” (Edkins 2003:51). For instance, the medicalization and pathologization of the experiences of Vietnam veterans removed their memories from the realm of the political (wherein the decision of the state to conscript soldiers and send them to war could be examined) and has been supplanted through a focus on the disorder of individuals (Edkins 2003:42). As Summerfield (2001:98) argues in relation to PTSD, and the medicalization of life in general: “distress is relocated from the social arena to the clinical arena,” allowing for sources of distress to escape sufficient scrutiny. Again, while the medicalization of the experience of the detainees through their representation as psychologically impaired does raise political questions about the conditions of detention, it forecloses other pressing political concerns, and has the unintended consequence of participating in the pathologization of the detainees in ways that reproduce racialized images of “Islamic terrorist” madmen. This further contributes to the reproduction of the conditions of possibility for the very practices of detention that human rights organizations rightfully decry. They also further authorize the psy disciplines: disciplines implicated in questionable practices of control and management that often result in involuntary incarceration in the West.

#### Trading autobiographical narrative for the ballot commodifies one’s identity and has limited impact on the culture that one attempt’s to reform – when autobiographical narrative “wins,” it subverts its own most radical intentions by becoming an exemplar of the very culture under indictment

Coughlin 95—associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School. (Anne, REGULATING THE SELF: AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL PERFORMANCES IN OUTSIDER SCHOLARSHIP, 81 Va. L. Rev. 1229)

Although Williams is quick to detect insensitivity and bigotry in remarks made by strangers, colleagues, and friends, her taste for irony fails her when it comes to reflection on her relationship with her readers and the material benefits that her autobiographical performances have earned for her. n196 Perhaps Williams should be more inclined to thank, rather than reprimand, her editors for behaving as readers of autobiography invariably do. When we examine this literary faux pas - the incongruity between Williams's condemnation of her editors and the professional benefits their publication secured her - we detect yet another contradiction between the outsiders' use of autobiography and their desire to transform culture radically. Lejeune's characterization of autobiography as a "contract" reminds us that autobiography is a lucrative commodity. In our culture, members of the reading public avidly consume personal stories, n197 which surely explains why first-rate law journals and academic presses have been eager to market outsider narratives. No matter how unruly the self that it records, an autobiographical performance transforms that self into a form of "property in a moneyed economy" n198 and into a valuable intellectual [\*1283] asset in an academy that requires its members to publish. n199 Accordingly, we must be skeptical of the assertion that the outsiders' splendid publication record is itself sufficient evidence of the success of their endeavor. n200

Certainly, publication of a best seller may transform its author's life, with the resulting commercial success and academic renown. n201 As one critic of autobiography puts it, "failures do not get published." n202 While writing a successful autobiography may be momentous for the individual author, this success has a limited impact on culture. Indeed, the transformation of outsider authors into "success stories" subverts outsiders' radical intentions by constituting them as exemplary participants within contemporary culture, willing to market even themselves to literary and academic consumers. n203 What good does this transformation do for outsiders who are less fortunate and less articulate than middle-class law professors? n204 Although they style themselves cultural critics, the [\*1284] storytellers generally do not reflect on the meaning of their own commercial success, nor ponder its entanglement with the cultural values they claim to resist. Rather, for the most part, they seem content simply to take advantage of the peculiarly American license, identified by Professor Sacvan Bercovitch, "to have your dissent and make it too." n205

#### The executive branch excludes women from participating in combat

Urias. 4 ARNULFO URIAS, J.D. Candidate, University of Southern California Law School, 2005;

Southern California Review of Law and Women's Studies Fall, 2004 14 S. Cal. Rev. L. & Women's Stud. 83

NOTE: THE POLITICS OF BIOLOGY: EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY AND THE EXCLUSION OF WOMEN FROM COMBAT \*

[\*89] In 1993, Congress passed the 1994 Defense Authorization Act (DAA) and repealed the final remnants of the exclusion policy in the United States Code, which included the prohibition of women from combat vessels. n46 The DAA eliminated the last two surviving prohibitions from CEL: the ban of women on warships and combat aircrafts. n47 In doing so, however, Congress did not impart complete freedom on women to occupy combat positions; instead, it merely removed the explicit prohibition of women in combat, shifting the authority to exclude onto the services themselves. Furthermore, Congress favored keeping the combat restriction on women -- so much so that it included language in the DAA instructing the Secretary of Defense to inform Congress before any service changed its exclusion policy. n48 In the report accompanying the DAA, Congress stated its plans to "exercise close oversight on these or any other planned changes to the assignment policy for women, particularly if these changes could result in women serving in units whose mission requires routine engagement in direct combat on the ground." n49 Nonetheless, in 1993, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin directed the different military services to open up as many service positions (known as Military Occupational Specialties, or MOSs) as possible to women and to research future opportunities for women in the military. n50 However, he explicitly allowed them to continue prohibiting women from "units engaged in direct combat on the ground, assignments where physical requirements are prohibitive and assignments where the costs of appropriate berthing and privacy arrangements are prohibitive." n51 He also permitted the services to "propose additional exceptions, together with the justification for such exceptions, as they deem appropriate." n52 Because the latter two grounds for excluding women, financial cost and additional exceptions, are matters of judgment, their boundaries are so elastic that they may be broken and even revoked. However, the first permissive [\*90] restriction on women, the prohibition of women from front-line combat, remains a relatively bright-line rule. n53

#### Privileging combat experience reifies civic structures that exclude and marginalize women

Novkov, 8 (Julie Novkov, Chair, Department of Political Science, University at Albany, SUNY, Sacrifice and Civic Membership: Who Earns Rights, and When?, Maryland/Georgetown Discussion Group on Constitutionalism, University of Maryland School of Law, March 7-8, 2008, http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1097&context=schmooze\_papers)

Holmes was tapping into an important dynamic that has operated through the span of American history – the dynamic link between military service and sacrifice and citizenship. In light of the US’s current engagement in warfare, many scholars have turned to re-examine this dynamic, thinking through the significance of an all-volunteer military and the nature of the National Guard’s citizen-soldiers (see, in particular, Feldman 2008). This focus on citizenship and its meaning has been productive in advancing our theorizing on the factors that contribute to state actors’ and individuals’ attributions of citizenship in times of war. But at the same time, civil libertarians have cautioned about the tendency of the government to restrict rights during wartime. Focusing on abuses in Guantanamo Bay, domestic surveillance, and the creeping use of torture by the US military and other individuals acting through or for the United States, academics and lawyers have raised consciousness about the erosion of rights and ethical and humane standards of conduct in this war, but by extension in wartime generally. This extension encompasses the severe limits on freedom of speech and expression cropping up at various points when the US was involved in wars, but particularly during and after the Civil War and World Wars I and II, and also highlights the restrictions on due process pursued by Lincoln during the Civil War. Historical institutionalist scholars, however, have noted an interesting anomaly. While generally scholars correctly perceive wartime as a time of rights curtailment, in the wake of at least some military conflicts, people of color have seen advances in their rights and in their access to full citizenship. Mary Dudziak presented a comprehensive historical argument for her claim that African Americans saw significant gains in their access to rights because of their crucial rhetorical and political situation in the Cold War ideological struggles (Dudziak 2000). Daniel Kryder has built off of that argument, showing that the political and military imperatives of building up the United States’ arsenal and securing reelection led Roosevelt to embrace racial reform during World War II (Kryder 2001). Philip Klinkner and Rogers Smith have argued that African Americans have generally gained rights in the context of their civic participation as key contributors in moments of crisis in the United States, identifying the advances of Reconstruction and of the post World War II era as the primary examples (Klinkner and Smith 1999). And Mark Graber has developed this insight further in a piece arguing explicitly that wars have generally provided opportunities for extending equality rights to racial minorities (Graber 2006). While these scholars disagree on the precise mechanism and the causal chains that have led to the expansion and extension of rights to people of color during wartime, they agree that some relationship exists. They also agree that, whether the relationship between service and sacrifice in times of crisis and the granting of rights is based in ethics, political pragmatism, or power relations, it is the service and sacrifice that set the dynamic into motion. In a sense, they argue Holmes’ position in reverse: rather than citizenship’s receiving its highest and noblest expression through military service and sacrifice, serving as a crucial component in a time of military crisis provides the groundwork for extending the scope of citizenship. Reading race into the discussions of civic membership thus provides a useful opportunity to reexamine the common belief that national crises generally produce curtailments in civil liberties and rights. But how far does this revision extend? In particular, what happens if gender is read into the analysis? Cynthia Enloe (2001) has argued that masculinity, particularly as expressed through military ideology, is related to civic membership. Carl Stychin (1998) likewise articulates a vision of ideal citizenship that strongly privileges heterosexual and masculine service to the state through the military, drawing connections between this ideal and the American military’s intermittent efforts to frame homosexuals as security threats. And Gretchen Ritter has highlighted how, despite women’s expanded opportunities in the workplace during the military mobilization of World War II, women generally experienced constrictions of their social and civic capacities to act as public members of the state in the wake of the war (Ritter 2006). This paper considers two moments that scholars generally agree featured advances for African Americans’ citizenship – the end of the Civil War and Reconstruction, and World War II and its immediate aftermath – and reads these moments through lenses of race and gender. I consider the conjunction of acknowledged sacrifices and contributions to the state, the rights advances achieved, and the gendered and racialized conceptions of citizen service emerging out of both post-war periods. This conjunction suggests that the kind of citizenship that people of color gained during and after wartime crises depended upon gendered and racialized hierarchies that valued the masculine service of soldiering by African American men but provided no parallel framework for valuing feminine service – because the path of producing and rearing children for the state was closed to women of color as a form of valued and desired civic service. Both in the Civil War and post-Civil War period and in the World War II and post-WWII period, the expansion of citizenship rights to incorporate African Americans took place at the intersection of race and gender through their connection to civic service.

#### The 1ac engages in dangerous politics of prioritizing methodology and assigning intellectual prerequisites to political strategy. Their use of the experience of oppression as the status that defines those who should guide politics harms progressive political strategies. Their particular strategy is part of a larger discourse of recapturing agency through privileging experience as the basis for politics.

Craig Ireland American Culture @ Bilkent 02 "The Appeal to Experience and its Consequences" Cultural Critique 52 Fall 2002p.87-88

" Once an arcane philosophical term, experience over the last three decades has become a general buzzword. By the 1970s, experience spilled over into the streets, so to speak, and it has since then become the stuff of programmatic manifestos and has been enlisted as the found from which microstrategies of resistance and subaltern counterhistories can be erected. But for all the blows and counterblows that have carried on tor over"\*three decades between those who appeal to the counterhegemonic potential of experience and those who see such appeals as naive voluntarism, such debates show no signs of abating. On the contrary, they have become yet more strident, as can be seen by Michael Pickering's recent attempt to rehabilitate the viability of the term "experience" for subaltern historiography by turning to E. P. Thompson and Dilthey and, more recently still, by Sonia Kruks's polemical defense of experience for subaltern inquiry by way of a reminder that poststructuralist critics of experience owe much to those very thinkers, from Sartre to Merleau-Ponty, whom they have debunked as if in oedipal rebellion against their begetters. Such debates over experience have so far gravitated around issues of epistemology and agency, pitting those who debunk experience as the stuff of an antiquated philosophy of consciousness against those who argue that subaltern experience provides an enclave against strong structural determination. Lost in such debates, however, have been the potential consequences of appeals to immediate experience as a ground for subaltern agency and specificity. And it is just such potential consequences that will be examined here, These indeed demand our attention, for more is at stake in the appeal to experience than some epistemological faux pas. By so wagering on the perceived immediacy of experience as the evidence for subaltern specificity and counterhegemonic action, appeals to immediate experience, however laudable their goal, end up unwittingly naturalizing what is in fact historical, and, in so doing, they leave the door as wide-open to a progressive politics of identity as to a retreat to neoethnic tribalism. Most alarming about such appeals to experience is not some failure of epistemological nerve – it is instead their ambiguous political and social ramifications. And these have reverberate beyond academia and found an echo in para-academia – so much so that experience has increasingly become the core concept or key word of subaltern groups and the rallying call for what Craig Calhoun calls the “new social movements” in which “experience is made the pure ground of knowledge, the basis of an essentialized standpoint of critical awareness” (468 n.64). The consequences of such appeals to experience can best be addressed not by individually considering disparate currents, but by seeking their common denominator. And in this regard, E.P. Thompson will occupy the foreground. It is safe to say that what started as an altercation between Thompson and Althusser has since spawned academic and para-academic "histories from below" and subaltern cultural inquiries that, for all their differences, share the idea that the identities and counterhistories of the disenfranchised can be buttressed by the specificity of a group's concrete experiences. Much theorizing on experience by certain cultural and historiographical trends, as many have already pointed out, has been but a variation on a persistent Thompsonian theme in which Thompson's "kind of use of experience has the same foundational status if we substitute 'women's' or 'black' or 'lesbian' or 'homosexual' for 'working class'" (Scott, 786)

#### The pedagogy of the oppressed sounds appealing, but regulates consciousness under the disguise of difference. Making the speaker the gateway for listening to the speech demands ever-greater levels of purification and escalating rhetoric of oppressive history as the source for authority.

Rob Moore, Cambridge and Johan Muller, University of Cape Town, 99, “The Discourse of Voice and the Problem of Knowledge and Identity in the Sociology of Education" British Journal of Sociology of Education 20 (2) p. 199-200

The pedagogic device (Bernstein, 1990) of voice discourse promotes a methodology in which the explication of a method’s social location precludes the need to examine the content of its data as grounds for valid explanation. Who says it is what counts, not what is said: This approach favours an ethnography that claims to reveal the cultural specificity of the category – the ‘voice’ of membership. What is held to be the facts, to be the case, is only so – and can only be so – from a particular perspective. The world thus viewed is a patchwork of incommensurable and exclusive voices or standpoints. Through the process of sub-dicision, increasingly more particularized identity categories come into being, each claiming the unique specificity of its distinctive experience and the knowledge authorized by it. The consequence of the abolition of the knowledge boundary that follows from the epistemological theses of postmodernism is the increasing specialization of social categories (See Maton, 1998). Maton describes this process of proliferation in terms of the way such ‘knower’ discourses….base their legitimation upon the privileged insight of a knower, and work at maintaining strong boundaries around their definition of this knower – they celebrate difference where ‘truth’ is defined by the ‘knower’ or ‘voice’. As each voice is brought into the choir, the category of the privileged ‘knower’ becomes smaller, each strongly bounded from one another, for each ‘voice’ has its own privileged and specialized knowledge. The client ‘knower’ group thus fragments, each fragment with its own representative…The procession of the excluded thus becomes, in terms of the privileged ‘knower’, an accretion of adjectives, the ‘hyphenation’ which knower modes often proclaim as progress. In summary, with the emergence of each new category of knower, the categories of knowers become smaller, leading to proliferation and fragmentation within the knowledge formation. (ibid, p. 17) As Maton argues, this move promotes a fundamental change in the principle of legitimation – from what is known (and how) to who knows it. The device that welds knowledge to standpoint, voice and experience, produces a result that is inherently unstable, because the anchor for the voice is an inferior authenticity that can never be demonstrated, only claimed (Taylor, 1992; Siegel, 1997; Fuss, 1990, 1995). Since all such claims are power claims, the authenticity of the voice is constantly prone to a purifying challenge. If you do not believe it you are not one of us’ (Hammersly & Gomm, 1997, para. 3.3) that gears down to ever more rarefied specializations or iterations of the voice category; an unstoppable spiral that Bernstein (1997, p. 176) has referred to as the ‘shrinking of the moral imagination [10]. As Bernstein puts it, ‘The voice of a social category (academic discourse, gender subject, occupational subject) is constructed by the degree of specialization of the discursive rules regulation and legitimizing the form of communication’ (1990, p. 23). If categories of either agents or discourse are specialized, then each category necessarily has its own specific identity and its own specific boundaries. The speciality of each category is created, maintained and reproduced only if the relations between the categories of which a given category is a member are preserved. What is to be preserved? The insulation between the categories. It is the strength of the insulation that creates a space in which a category can become specific. If a category wishes to increase its specificity, it has to appropriate the means to produce the necessary insulation that is the prior condition to its appropriating specificity. (ibid.) Collection codes employ an organization of knowledge to specialize categories of person, integrated codes employ an organization of persons to specialize categories of knowledge (Bernstein, 1977, pp. 106-111) The instability of the social categories associated with voice discourse reflects the fact that there is no stable and agreed-upon way of constructing such categories. By their nature, they are always open to contestation and further fragmentation. In principle, there is no terminal point where ‘identities’ can finally come to rest. It is for this reason that this position can reappear so frequently across time and space within the intellectual field – the same move can be repeated endlessly under the disguise of ‘difference’. In Bernstein’s terms, the organization of knowledge is, most significantly, a device for the regulation of consciousness.

The pedagogic device is thus a symbolic ruler of consciousness in its selective creation, positioning and oppositioning of pedagogic subjects. It is the condition for the production, reproduction, and transformation of culture. The question is: whose ruler, what consciousness? (1990, p. 189) The relativistic challenge to epistemologically grounded strong classifications of knowledge removes the means whereby social categories and their relations can be strongly theorized and effectively researched in a form that is other than arbitrary and can be challenged by anyone choosing to assert an alternative perspective or standpoint.

#### There should be no methodological prerequisites for participation in argument and education. This is the only way to give the force of argument and rigorous testing of any idea that is necessary for progressive politics to win the public sphere.

Rob Moore, Cambridge, and Johan Muller, University of Cape Town 99 "The Discourse of Voice and the Problem of Knowledge and Identity in the Sociology of Education" British Journal of Sociology of Education 20 (2) p.

Our purpose in this paper is to raise some issues about epistemological debates and approaches to knowledge in the sociology of education. Our starting point is the observation that since the phenomenologically inspired New Sociology of Education in the early 1970s to postmodernism today, approaches that question epistemological claims about the objectivity of knowledge (and the status of science, reason and rationality more generally) have occupied an influential position in the field. In earlier times this approach was often referred to as the 'sociology of knowledge' perspective. Yet then as now, it is precisely the idea of knowledge that is being challenged. Such approaches adopt. or at least favour or imply, a form of perspectivism which sees knowledge and truth claims as being relative to a culture, form of life or standpoint and, therefore, ultimately representing a particular perspective and social interest rather than independent, universalistic criteria. They complete this reduction by translating knowledge claims into statements about knowers. Knowledge is dissolved into knowing and priority is given to experience as specialised by category membership and identity (Maton, 1998). For instance, a so-called 'dominant' or 'hegemonic' form of knowledge, represented in the school curriculum, is identified as 'bourgeois', 'male', or 'white’ – as reflecting the perspectives, standpoints and interests of dominant social groups. Today, the most common form of this approach is that which, drawing upon postmodernist and poststructuralist perspectives, adopts a discursive concern with the explication of ‘voice’. Its major distinction is that between the dominant voice and those (‘Others’) silenced or marginalized by its hegemony. As Philip Wexler (1997, p.9) has recently observed: The postmodern emphasis on discourse and identity remain overwhelmingly the dominant paradigm in school research, and with few exceptions, gives few signs of abating’ (see also Delamont, 1997). The main move is to attach knowledge to categories of knowers and to their experience and subjectivities. This privileges and specialises the subject in terms of its membership category as a subordinated voice. Knowledge forms and knowledge relations are translated as social standpoints and power relationships between groups. This is more a sociology of knowers and their relationships than of knowledge. What we will term 'voice discourse' is our principle concern, here. Historically, this approach has also been associated with concerns to reform pedagogy in a progressive direction. At the time of the New Sociology of Education in the early 1970s, this move was expressed in the debate between 'new' sociologists such as Michael Young (1971, 1976) and the philosophical position associated with R.S. Peters and Paul Hirst. More recently, it has been associated with developments such as anti-sexist, multicultural and postcolonial education, and with postmodernist critiques of the 'Enlightenment Project' and 'grand narratives'. The crucial issue, for such approaches, is that where social differentiation in education and the reproduction of social inequalities arc associated with principles of exclusion structured in and through educational knowledge. Hence, the critique of knowledge and promotion of progressive pedagogy is understood as facilitating a move from social and educational exclusion to inclusion and the promotion of social justice. This history can be summarised as follows: in the early 1970s, the New Sociology of Education produced a critique of insulated knowledge codes by adopting a 'sociology of knowledge' perspective that claimed to demystify their epistemological pretensions to cognitive superiority by revealing their class base and form. Knowledge relations were transcribed as class relations [1]. In the late 1970s, feminism challenged the masculinist bias of class analysis and turned attention to the gendered character of educational relations, rewriting knowledge relations in terms of patriarchy. This was in turn followed by a focus upon race. In the 1980s, the primary categories employed by gender and race approaches fragmented as various groups contested the vanguardist claims of the earlier proponents of those perspectives to be representing the interests of women or blacks in general. The category 'woman', for instance, fragmented into groups such as women of colour, non-heterosexual women, working-class women, third-world women and African women (Wolpe, 1998). These fractions of gender and race were further extended by a range of sexualities and, to some degree (although never so successfully), by disabilities. Under this pressure of fragmentation, there was a rapid shift away from political universalism to a thoroughgoing celebration of difference and diversity; of decentred hyphenated or iterative models of the self and, consequently, of identity politics. This poststructuralist celebration of diversity is associated with proclamations of inclusiveness that oppose the alleged exclusiveness of the dominant knowledge form that is revealed when its traditional claims to universalism and objectivity are shown for what they really arc – the disguised standpoints and interests of dominant groups. On this basis, epistemology and the sociology of knowledge are presented as antithetical. The sociology of knowledge undertakes to demystify epistemological knowledge claims by revealing their social base and standpoint. At root, this sociology of knowledge debunks epistemology. The advocacy of progressive moral and political arguments becomes conflated with a particular set of (anti-) epistemological arguments (Siegel, 1995; Maton, 1999). At this descriptive level, these developments are usually presented as marking a progressive advance whereby the assault upon the epistemological claims of the dominant or ‘hegemonic' knowledge code (rewritten in its social form as 'power') enables a succession of previously marginalised, excluded and oppressed groups to enter the central stage, their histories to be recovered and their 'voices' joined freely and equally with those already there [2]. Within this advance, the voice of reason (revealed as that of the ruling class white heterosexual male) is reduced simply to one among many, of no special distinction. This is advance through the multiplication of categories and their differences. Disparities of access and representation in education were (and are) rightly seen as issues that need addressing and remedying, and in this respect constitute a genuine politics. It is important to stress, here, that the issues are real issues and the work done on their behalf is real work. But the question is: is this politics best pursued in this way? The tendency we are intending to critique, then, assumes an internal relation between: (a) theories of knowledge (epistemological or sociological); (b) forms of education (traditional or progressive); and (c) social relations (between dominant and subordinated groups). This establishes the political default settings whereby epistemologically grounded, knowledge-based forms of education are politically conservative, while ‘integrated’ (Bernstein, 1977) or ‘hybrid’ (Muller & Taylor, 1995) knowledge codes are progressive. On this basis, socially, progressive causes are systematically detached from epistemologically powerful knowledge structures and from their procedures for generating and promoting truths of fact and value. For us the crucial problem, here, is that these default settings have the effect of undermining the very argumentative force that progressive causes in fact require in order to press their claims. The position of voice discourse and its cognate forms within the sociology of education has, also, profoundly affected theory and research within the field, with little attention being paid to structural level concerns with social stratification and a penchant for small-scale, qualitative ethnographic methods and ‘culturalist’ concerns with discursive positioning and identity (Moore, 1996a; Hatcher 1998). We will argue that this perspective is not only politically self-defeating, but also intellectually incoherent – that, in fact, progressive claims implicitly presuppose precisely the kind of ‘conservative’ epistemology that they tend to reject and that, to be of value, the sociology of education should produce knowledge in the strong sense. This is important because the effects of the (anti-) epistemological thesis undermine the possibilities of producing precisely that kind of knowledge required to support the moral/political objectives. Indeed, the dubious epistemological assumption may lead not only to an ‘analytical nihilism that is contrary to (their) political project’ (Ladwig, 1995, p.222), but also, to pedagogic conclusions that are actively counterproductive and ultimately work against the educational interests of precisely those groups they are meant to help (Stone, 1981; Dowling, 1994). We agree, thus, with Siegel that, ‘…it is imperative that defenders of radical pedagogy distinguish their embrace of particular moral/political these from untenable, allegedly related, epistemological ones; (ibid, p. 34).

#### Privileging the methodology of the oppressed flips knowledge hierarchies without breaking them down. There is no reason to believe the self-evidence of oppressed groups any more than oppressors – Both are insulated forms of knowing.

Ilan Gur-ze-ev Senior Lecturer Philosophy of Education @ Haifa '98 "Toward a nonrepressive critical pedagogy" Educational

Theoiy Fall 48 (4) p.

Prom this perspective, the consensus reached by the reflective subject taking part in the dialogue offered by critical pedagogy is naive, especially in light of its declared anti-intellectualism on the one hand and its pronounced glorification of the "feelings." "experience." and self-evident knowledge of the group on the other. Critical pedagogy, in its different versions, claims to inhere and overcome the foundationaiism and transcendentalism of the Enlightenment's emancipatory – and ethnocentric — arrogance, as exemplified by ideology-critique, psychoanalysis, or traditional metaphysics. Marginalized feminist knowledge, like the marginalized, neglected, and ridiculed knowledge of the Brazilian farmers, as presented by Freire or Kathleen Weiler, is represented as legitimate and relevant knowledge, in contrast to its representation as the hegemonic instrument of representation and education, This knowledge is portrayed as a relevant, legitimate, and superior alternative to hegemonic education and the knowledge this represents in the center. It is said to represent an identity that is desirable and promises to function "successfully." However, neither the truth value of the marginalized collective memory nor knowledge is cardinal here. "Truth" is replaced by knowledge whose supreme criterion is its self-evidence, namely the potential productivity of its creative violence, while the dialogue in which adorers of "difference" take part is implicitly represented as one of the desired productions of this violence. My argument is that this marginalized and repressed self-evident knowledge has no superiority over the self-evident knowledge of the oppressors. Relying on the knowledge of weak, controlled, and marginalized groups, their memory and their conscious interests, is no less naive and dangerous than relying on hegemonic knowledge. This is because the critique of Western transcendentalism, foundationaiism, and ethnocentrism declines into an uncritical acceptance of marginalized knowledge. which becomes foundationalistic and ethnocentric in presenting "the truth." "the facts." or "the real interests of the group" -- even if conceived as valid only for the group concerned. This position cannot avoid vulgar realism and naive positivism based on the "facts" of self-evident knowledge ultimately realized against the self-evidence of other groups.

#### Preference for strategies of the oppressed is a false promise that generates dogmatism and totalitarianism.

Ilan Gur-ze-ev, Senior Lecturer Philosophy of Education @ Haifa, 98, “Toward a nonrepressive critical pedagogy” Educational Theory, Fall 48 (4)

My argument regarding Freire's project is that its noncritical and automatic preference for the self-evident knowledge of the oppressed over that of the oppressors is dangerous. The self-evidence of "the people." or any social or cultural group, even when developed to reflectivity bv a grand leader-educator, is not without a terroristic potential. On the one hand, the idea is that the educational leader is responsible for the success of the project, while by the same token he {not she) has to be a total lover and be totally loved. This is within the framework of a praxis whose starting point is the self-evidence of the group and earthly politics. This opens the pate to totalitarianism as earthly heaven. These poles, with violence as their secret connection, are manifested in other poles in the system, as personified in the identification of Freire with Che Guevara or Fidel Castro, and his own acceptance by his followers as a guru who encourages groups and creates the horizon of their dialogues. It seems to me that the thinkers of both the first generation of the Frankfurt School, such as Adorno and Horkheimer, and of its second generation, such as Habermas and Karl Otto Apel, acknowledged the danger of this kind of education. Thev understood the difference between the negation of social conditions alien to ideals of solidarity, understanding, and transcendence and the positive Utopia of "love." The latter was a false promise that in effect produced a kind of "dialogue" reproducing the inner logic of existing power relations: it prevented transcendence and struggle for autonomy of the individual. Such an education blocks the possibility of counter-education, which is conditioned by an alternative critique. Counter-education as a starting point for a nonrepressive critique does not rush into easy optimism, positive utopianism, and "love" of the kind that Freire promised. Within the framework of such a positive Utopia, education constitutes itself either on the self-evidence of the group or on that of the leader-educator. That is why this kind of critical pedagogy is always in danger of overflowing into verbalism, dogmatism, or violence. Since Freire is careful to exclude the third option, his critical pedagogy is practically realized within the horizons of verbalism and dogmatism, which constantly threaten the project with unreflective acceptance of the false consciousness and knowledge of the repressed groups, who are unprepared for reflection upon the dialogical process in which they are involved. Freire challenges this threat not within radical philosophical education but within political half-conservatism,[20]

#### Simply affirming the strategy of the oppressed risks quashing internal dissent and critique. We should avoid uncritical acceptance of a particular strategy or ‘resistance’ in general.

Joe Cleary, English @ National Univ. of Ireland (Maynooth), 2002, Literature, Partition and the Nation-State, p. 195-197

If conditions of geographical dispersal create problems of one kind, the demands of political commitment can generate difficulties of an- other order. That progressive Palestinian writers, including novelists, are called on to align themselves with the national-popular struggle may be accepted as a given; what remains open to question is which causes or strategies the writer should endorse and what constitutes effective 'resistance literature'. For some, the mere intention to oppositionality, expressed in the rhetoric of protest and militancy, will constitute a revolutionary literature. Others have rightly pointed out, however, that the fact that the writer wills or intends a work to be oppositional is no guarantee that it will actually be so. As Benita Parry observes, the Zhadnovist demand that Russian literature should serve the Soviet modernisation project engendered only 'an official literature', which saw literature surrender its critical function and offer up 'vapid fabrications of an heroic and optimistic populace'18 at a time when the dilemmas of the communist venture needed seriously to be engaged. The manifest difference between the Russian and the Palestinian situation is that between the tyranny of an oppressive bureaucratic state and the very different kind of tyranny that goes with a condition of statelessness. But in situations of extremity of whatever kind, an obvious difficulty for the writer is that the pressure to maintain solidarity with an oppressed people can exercise its own Kind or tyranny and can serve to smother dissent for critique because some will always dismiss anything that refuses the current consensus among the oppressed as an unaffordable luxury. The whole concept of literature as a weapon of 'resistance' also lends itself to the idea that literanire should be affirmative: that its duty is to endorse the value of struggle, to celebrate those who do struggle, to will the people on to victory. But the sheer determination to struggle is not always enough since, as noted earlier, the real difficulty for the Palestinians has never been resistance per se but, rather, how best to articulate and co-ordinate that resistance. A literature that simply celebrates the will to resist; and that fails to ask whether the goals or strategies employed are sufficient, runs the risk of simply becoming an official literature of reifying the very idea of resistance itself and of commodifying the sacrifices expended in its name. In so doing, the writer not only runs the risk of betraying art's critical function, but of sanctioning the reckless squander of the people's most precious resource. The suggestion developed here is that in the Palestinian context (as in other colonised and peripheral regions) there are powerful pressures that compel the writer towards realist narrative, but that the social and historical conditions that would allow the realist novel to flourish do not always exist in such situations. It might be tempting to conclude, therefore, that the Palestinian writer should simply abandon the clumsy machinery of social realism for more flexible modernist or postmodernist techniques. Nevertheless, the thesis which I want to develop in this chapter is that what distinguishes the most ambitious Palestinian novels is that the drive for narrative realism, for fidelity of detail, for the synoptic view, is not surrendered but that due to the exigencies of the situation that social realist drive is in fact shot through with what, following Theodor Adorno, we can call an essentially modernist sensibility. For Adorno, modernism's essential gesture is negative. By this he means, as Neil Lazarus has written, that modernist works 'alluded to the existence of domination and violence through their own internal ruptures and contradictions - ruptures that were unavoidable because they traced the scars and contours of social antagonisms and constraints'.19 In its ruthless refusal to affirm the world, in its relentless fidelity to the suffering of modern man, modernism's negativity disclosed itself, for Adorno, as essentially critical. Modernism's cardinal virtue, that is, was to register without compromise 'the ways in which the administered world thwarted the realization of Utopia'.20 Hence, for Adorno, even in the most opaque, elusive and ostensibly apolitical of modernist works, an aesthetic of emancipation could be discovered. Indeed, the works he championed most were those that were most determinedly resistant to self- conscious ideological appropriation - and hence neutralisation. This was because it was these works that most strenuously attempted to evade the reduction of everything to the logic of commodification that Adomo identified as a cardinal feature of the modern world system.

#### Framework of oppressed peoples as the guide for strategy can’t deal with the complexity of social problems. They try to paper over all the important questions about resolving issues between different identities and oppressions with a blanket method – That encourages a totalitarian approach.

Ilan GUR-ZE’EV Senior Lecturer Philosophy of Education @ Haifa ‘01 "Challenging the Deception of Leftist Emancipatory Education" Pedagogy, Culture and Society 9 (2) p. 282-284

According to Mayn's transformative adult education, the oppressed 'voices' will be liberated by the powers of the integration of a coalition of social groups in unified political action by 'the party' and effective, persuasive emancipatory political education enhanced 1 strong educator. All these are supposed to ensure the acceptance by the oppressed\* of the revolutionary teaching in a manner that will ensure the replacement of the hegemonic ideology and "common sense’ by ‘good sense' (p. 138). Mayo, like so many other leftist educators seem accept uncritically the optimism immanent to the multicultural disco(and to a lesser degree the post-colonialist and some trends in p modern feminist discourses) concerning the possibilities of coalition the marginalised, the oppressed, the silenced and their discourses. If we have to ask Mayo and the post-modern academic left in general: what will ensure/make possible the consensus among the various conflicting groups of oppressed people? What will ensure/make possible nonmanipulative persuasion among groups that have different identities, different knowledge and interests, and different yardsticks to evaluate the claims of the Other and the relevant/legitimate response to her/his claims/threats? In what sense is the violence of normalising education within and among oppressed groups different from the violence of 'The hegemonic groups? What is the meaning of the frame where there is no exclusive locus to evaluate or respond to the challenges of being produced or manipulated by violence, language, intersubjeetivity, and the disappearance of God, as well as the human who killed him in order to initiate a new beginning? In what sense is the transformation within a multicultural framework more than mere violent normalising education and better than that of the hegemonic order on the one hand and of the Marxian project, on the other? In what sense is the educational alternative suggested by Mayo to be considered 'transformation' or 'emancipation', a break in the continuum, and not another manifestation of the Same? The promised 'transformation', according to Mayo, will prevent new versions of totalitarianism. This hope is anchored in what he sees as real achievements manifested in the successful revolutionary regimes in Africa (Guinea-Bissau), Cuba, and Nicaragua (pp.82, 160, 167-168, 170). The supposed 'emancipation' or 'transformation' in these violently manipulated totalitarian/dictatorial societies is not problematised here, even in light of the teaching of Freire according to which oppression is always present even in the oppressed. Mayo, who is probably attempting to counter the de-politiclsation of the post-modern left, offers a much simpler educational agenda. All we have to do Is be committed enough; be unconditionally decisive and tearless, and, of course, realise the correct interpretation of the correct thinkers as presented by him. Then, so it seems from his text, capitalism and all other manifestations of evil will be defeated and vanish from the earth. Here the concepts of 'there is nothing outside the text' and 'nothing is exterior to the revolution' meet each other. They join forces in a dogmatic textual ritual, which has become banal; it represents past tragic/revolutionary heroism as a farce. The revolutionary rhetoric as a farce can still entertain a diminishing circle of 'revolutionaries' and deceive wide strata of people who are really oppressed and who suffer in the most concrete existential, political, and metaphysical levels. Mayo and his revolutionary academic post-modern leftist colleagues are not wrong in refusing to accept capitalism, and its culture industry or in pinpointing actual oppression on so many levels and dimensions of private and public life. The problem with Mayo's work and with many post-modern leftist thinkers/activists lies in their unreflective reception of fashionable rhetoric, which becomes a deceptive dogma, part of alternative violent normalising education. A such, they should be challenged as part of tin; resistance to all version of normalising education. This does not mean, of course, that there is n difference between deceptive leftist revolutionary emancipatory project and other, neo-liberal or Fascist ones, which they try to resist an challenge. However, does it all add up, in the end, to anything that make an essential difference'.' Like so many other post-modern leftist authors, Mayo also pays tribute to the ideas of radical democracy (p. 131), anti-fundamentalist hybridity, perpetual 'border-crossing' of identities, knowledge, teacher student relationships, and acknowledgement of the centrality of difference and the otherness of the Other (p.66). Every fashionable writer, politically correct ideal, and rhetorical gesture seems to be included In this text in a well-intentioned uncritical manner, yet still with insistence on a dogmatic totalitarian framework in naive anticipation of 'the revolution', the party" and the most correct version of emancipatory pedagogic/political knowledge ... So, for example, the writer sees no problem uniting Gramsci's concept of proletariat revolution and Foucault’s concept of resistance into a normalisation process of institutionalised power/knowledge relations. Without any conceptualisation, problematisation or historical reconstruction of the situation in the Third World countries, in the affluent West, or on the neglected margins of the industrialised countries, Mayo offers Ills reader; an ideal picture of the revolutionary adult educator who integrate; Foucault's concept of the specific Intellectual with Gramsci's idea of the 'organic intellectual' (p. 175). At the same time he recycles Gramsci's concept of the proletarian revolution via educational work, which is also a political praxis, in the factories by workers councils and revolutionary schools (p. 75). On the one hand, he defends Gramsci's Eurocentrism and his elitist conception of the proper relationships between the Marxist educator and .the proletariat. However, on the other hand, he tries to offer an apologetics which turns Gramsci almost into a 'soft' postmodernist of the contemporary American political left (p. 144).

# 2NC

Veterans can speak out on issues – they testify before Congress

VFW 12

VVFW NATIONAL COMMANDER TO TESTIFY BEFORE CONGRESS TODAY

Wednesday, March 7, 2012

VFW Legislative Conference Gives Voice to Veterans' Issues

http://heroes.vfw.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=8021

[object Object]

Nearly 300 VFW leaders are in Washington, D.C., this week to let lawmakers know the top legislative priorities of America’s veterans, service members and their families.

Today, VFW National Commander Richard L. DeNoyer will testify before a joint session of the House and Senate Veterans Affairs Committees. Video of the testimony will be posted this afternoon at www.vfw.org.

Foremost among goals this year is to protect the VA budget from mandatory cuts if sequestration occurs, and to defeat the Defense Department’s negative quality of life proposals that would restrict military pay, substantially increase Tricare costs on military dependents and retirees and civilianize the military retirement system.

Other high-interest topics range from military transition and employment assistance programs to education, the proper care and treatment of wounded warriors, women veterans, the 1.7 million VA claims workload and combating veteran suicides and homelessness, among others.

Other conference highlights:

House Armed Services Committee Chairman “Buck” McKeon (R-Calif.) was presented with the 2012 VFW Congressional Award.

The Marine Corps Wounded Warrior Regiment received the VFW Gold Medal & Citation.

Winners of the VFW Voice of Democracy and Patriot’s Pen competition were named.

VFW National Commander Richard L. DeNoyer and his wife, Theresa, attended a White House dinner to salute Iraq War veterans.

Scores of VFW members, including Iraq and Afghanistan veterans, visited the Hill to meet with individual lawmakers on key issues.

Witness Testimony of Mr. Ray Kelley, Director of National Legislative Service, Veterans of Foreign Wars

[Hearing on 10/30/2013: Focused Issues on Dignified Burials: A National Cemetery Update](http://veterans.house.gov/hearing/%E2%80%9Cfocused-issues-on-dignified-burials-a-national-cemetery-update)

http://veterans.house.gov/witness-testimony/mr-ray-kelley-3

MR. CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE:

On behalf of the men and women of the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States (VFW) and our Auxiliaries, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to testify today on issues regarding the National Cemetery Administration.

#### Structural determinism of experience. Fullerton's assertion that any desire for government action is an oppressive example of false consciousness. Implying that ordinary people cannot be trusted with naming their own reality but must accept the methodology of the oppressed re-creates hierarchy.

Reginald Leamon Robinson, Law @ Howard ’04 "Human Agency, Negated Subjectivity, and White Structural Oppression: An Analysis of Critical Race Practice/Praxis" 53 Am. U.L. Rev. 1361 L/N

Can these ordinary people name their own reality? This question confesses another methodological contradiction. Race Crits like Williams and Yamamoto argue that structural forces rob ordinary people of their right to live as relatively unmediated citizens. These forces emit spirit-murdering stories that infect ordinary people. Whites consume these stories too, which convince them that worthy citizens benefit in a liberal society. If society mesmerizes ordinary people with these stories, are the authors immune? Using postmodernist tools, how do we remember our unmediated selves so that we can effectively violate these stories? Under structuralism, ordinary people cannot truly remember this Self, so on what source can ordinary people rely to name their own reality that helps recall that they have always been earthly gods? None. Ordinary people live as ever-questioning victims who are heartlessly mocked by liberal legalisms like Justice. By declaring that society mocks them and denies them Justice, ordinary people have effectively boiled their stories down to an oft-told sad tale of "structure" versus "agency." in a term: structural determinism. B. Structural Determinism As an antisubordination practice, Williams' Practice and Yamamoto's Praxis grow out of structural determinism. For didactic purposes, I divide this sociological concept into two parts: structuralism and determinism. Structuralism n!30 directly links "words" and "reality." nl31 It relates things to things. Speaker A talks of things, and even if ordinary people, the listeners, cannot actually "observe" these things, they become accustomed to experiencing the things as real, external forces. nl32 Speaker A reveals how society's underlying structure shapes an individual's experience or group's life, nl 33 For Race Crits, an unseen thing like white racism limits and constrains how people believe, think, feel, and act. nl34 [\*1383] Determinism states that a clear, narrow set of factors cause social events in a relatively predictable way. nl 35 Broadly speaking, determinism is any theory, like CRT, that explains the world ("e.g.. white racism) by definable factors. nl36 This approach negates a host of other factors, including human agency, n 137 As such, Race Crits can argue against the relative autonomy of ordinary people like blacks so that they can pursue other political ends. By so doing. Race Crits can say that things (or a set of things) cause ordinary people to be subtextual victims; thus explaining the moment-to-moment existence of, say, the black community. If these things victimize ordinary people, it follows that ordinary people lack meaningful human agency. In this wav, determinism becomes a reductionist model, emphasizing a limited range of causal social factors that explains why ordinary people like Mexicans suffer racism and racial discrimination. n138 And so within the concept of structural determinism. Race Crits state that they "focus on ways in which the entire structure of legal thought, or at least of major doctrines like the First Amendment, influences its content, always tending toward maintaining the status quo." nl39 Delgado and Stefancic go on to say that "once we understand how our categories, tools, and doctrines influence us, we may escape their sway and work more effectively for liberation." nl40 That is, structural determinism represents a "concept that a mode of thought or widely shared practice determines significant social outcomes, usually without our conscious knowledge." nl41 Yet, despite these determining factors, Delgado, like Williams and Yamamoto, suggests that the buried, negated subject will rise to act. Structural determinism informs not only CRT but also Practice and Praxis, in which the negated subject has only the power to identify structural forces that explain American Indian oppression and interracial conflicts. For example, Yamamoto declares that blacks can be victims and victimizers. n142 If they victimize, can they have agency? More broadly, does such victimizing of victims presuppose that blacks have always had agency, a kind of purposeful human action that sits astride core beliefs? Did Yamamoto mean that at the "borderlands" n143 blacks operate on false consciousness, a racist implant that destroys the respect and self-restraint they would otherwise express toward other blacks? Acting as duress, this [\*1384] implant prevents him from forming the criminal mind and volitional will to act criminally against other blacks. Should they be free from state prosecution? The mindset doctrine works seamlessly with structural determinism, thus suggesting that ordinary people cannot likewise name their own reality without reifying dominant values. Accordingly, Yamamoto insists that in the material inquiry, the consortium must reassess group cultural traits and re-articulate racial identities and relationships. n144 This reassessment and re-articulation vet structural forces like misogyny that turn black men against their lovers. n145

#### Their critical intention is irrelevant. We have to assess the consequences of the discourse of experience as the basis for politics. Even if the intent is progressive, their method sets the stage for reactionary forces in any given identity group.

Craig Ireland American Culture @ Bilkent 02,"The Appeal to Experience and its Consequences" Cultural Critique 52 Fall 2002 p. 97

It may seem unfair to impute to certain experience-oriented theories an argument that, when carried to its logical conclusion, can as readily foster an emancipatory politics of identity as it can neoethnic tribalism. The potential for biologism hardly represents the intentions of experience-oriented theories; these, after all, focus on the immediacy of experience, rather than on the essence of a group, in order to avoid strong structural determination on the one hand, and the naturalizing of class or subaltern groups on the other. But if there cannot be a discursive differentiation of one experience from another – the counterhegemonic potential of experience is predicated on its discursive immediacy, and mediation is relegated to a supplemental and retrospective operation – and if a nondiscursive or ideologically uncontaminated common ground becomes the guarantor of group authenticity, then the criterion for group specificity must be those elements that unite groups in nondiscursive ways. And such elements can as readily be those of a group’s shared unmediated experience, such as oppression, as they can be those of a group’s biological characteristics. At best, “the evidence of experience,” Scott notes, “becomes the evidence for the fact of difference, rather than a way of exploring how differences are established” (796); at worst, the wager on the immediacy of experience fosters tribalistic reflexes that need but a little prodding before turning into those rabid, neoethnic "micro fascisms" against which Felix Guattari warned in his last essay before his death (26-27).

#### Asserting the "strategy is useful for us" doesnt contain the discursive consequences of their experience-based politics. Their method is a form of recolonization-it colonizes a particuur space for a complete identity defined by the 1ac

Craig Ireland American Culture @ Bilkent ’02 "The Appeal to Experience and its Consequences" Cultural Critique 52 Fall 2002 p.99-100

What is surprising about the Thompsonian model of class or subaltern identity and culture is that, for all its glaring shortcomings, it should continue to seduce numerous academic and para-academic subaltern endeavors to this day. Part of the explanation for this lies in the other arguments it makes in conjunction with its appeal to immediate experience. One such complementary argument tells us that the specter of neoethnic tribalism, while an admittedly potential consequence of appeals to immediate experience, can nonetheless be contained insofar as group experience is retrospectively articulated or mediated by the miero-ricit of a local culture. Because of its proximity to those sharing experiences specific or natural to a particular subaltern group, such a local culture – so the argument runs – not only retrospectively articulates subaltern experience in terms 'other than those established in advance by the dominant cultural order; but "is also not tempted, because of its regional or local character, by the somber totalitarian ways of metanarratives and other pretensions to universality. As such, so the argument continues, a local culture is less prone toward the repression of difference. Although Thompsonian-inspired theories of experience do aim less at the universalization than at the sharp demarcation and differentiation of a group’s experiences, and in shooing they do in fact cultivate difference rather than smother it, they do not necessarily guarantee a course of political action, or even a politics of identity, any kinder and gentler than those metanarrative machinations they hoped to supplant. Mechanisms of exclusion are no less present just because they have been regionalized. In fact, the cultural model proposed by Thompsonian experience-oriented theories entails less that differences be cultivated within groups than that they be evacuated, or cleansed, so as to prevent the contamination of group specificity, it is on a culture's proximity to or affinity with a group (as opposed to a culture either imposed from above or imported from elsewhere) that is predicated the efficiency with which a local culture can heed the specificity of a group's nonmediated experiences, articulate these in terms of the group's local mores and interests, and harness them for counterhegemonic political action. A group's "difference," in other words, is sustainable only if it both bypasses its absorption into dominant ideology – lest appropriation ensue – and avoids its dissipation into groups and cultures different from itself – lest there follow entropy and therefore a weakening of resistance.

# 1NR

#### Focus on discourse and self empowerment trades off with CLASS STRUGGLE. The mapping of your political struggle makes us feel good on the inside but still leaves us at the mercy of the system at lart.

#### Zavarzadeh, 1994

(Mas'ud, “The Stupidity that Consumption is Just as Productive as Production (Marx, *Theories of Surplus-Value*),” The Alternative Orange Vol. 4 No. 1, Fall/Winter, http://www.etext.org/Politics/AlternativeOrange/4/v4n1\_cpp.html)

Reading and writing as stories of power-and-resistance are now part of the curriculum of reading and interpretation in the ludic academy. Students are taught how to detect trajectories of power in TV texts, advertisements, novels, films, face-to-face conversations.... To occupy students with power analysis is one of the devices that the pedagogy of pleasure uses to produce false consciousness in them: they think that through power analysis they have got hold of the logic of the society in which they live, and if they can put an end to power relations, a good society will emerge. All the have to do to make such a society possible is to notice the code of power in conversations between a man and a woman; an ad for an automobile; a body gesture of a white male to an African American... when in reality the logic of the social is formed in the site of production. The ludic protocol of reading produces false consciousness in students by teaching them that power is the key to agency: that people can in fact empower themselves by becoming aware of the workings of power and by learning, through such awareness, to “speak for themselves." One can speak for oneself all one wants, but without economic access such speaking for oneself is simply one of many devices for reform and the suppression of revolutionary praxis in the radical democracy advocated by the post-al left. Empowerment is a material practice: it is achieved only by seizing ownership of the means of production from private owners. But the pedagogy of pleasure substitutes descriptive code-reading for rigorous conceptual analysis, thereby producing half-literate subjects of labor whose main skill is to “read” cultural practices—"reading” the news, playing with the rhetorical moves of a political speech, detecting “power” signs all over the place.... These a-conceptual, dialogic, anecdotal readers of codes of power form the reserve army of labor for capitalism. To teach students conceptual understanding of the world (scientific analysis of the everyday to develop class consciousness) is, in the pedagogy of pleasure, a violent act (banking pedagogy, or as R-2 puts it to “bury you with books"). The complicity of the post-al left with capitalism through its pedagogy of pleasure is, of course, caused by the fact that any revolutionary change aimed at ending exploitation (not simply domination) will also end the class privileges of the post-al left. R-4's text is quite telling on this point: in a moment of reflection, which in bourgeois rhetoric carries the signs of “honesty," R-4 announces, “I write these words as a an academic (neo)marxist whose health insurance, state retirement, and tax-deferred annuity are impeccably Republican." R-4's “honest” moment is a “complicated” warning to revolutionaries by reminding them that they are beneficiaries of the “system," and if any really radical action (which goes beyond the reformism that she/he calls “neo-marxism") is taken, their very privileges will be in danger. The un-said of this “honest” confession is, of course, that someone like me, who is working towards a revolutionary transformation (and OR‐3's cartoon affirms R-4 on this point) is dis-honest and hypocritical: how could I be in the system and criticize it? How could I speak for the “other"? I addressed some of these issues in my “Reading My Readers," which has made R-4 to call it a site of violence ("a kind of textual Chernobyl"). The other un-said of R-4's confession is, of course, that a decent job that feeds a human being, a health care plan that attends to his/her human needs, a retirement plan that makes sure that in his/her old age she/he is not thrown into the streets should be provided only to those who accept the premises of the system. Jobs for reformists only! Health care for the supporters of the system only! Jobs, health care, retirement plans... are in R-4's confession, a bribe for cooperation, for going along, for being collegial, for being dialogical... to this neo-marxist, jobs (economic access) are not part of basic human rights—they are graft for the reformist. This is the post-al left in its most lucid moment.

Merely being reactive to US policy lets the war-mongers set the agenda—our strategy must directly fight the state and capitalism, not merely get the government to change its policy.

Herod 2001 (James, “A Stake, Not a Mistake: On Not Seeing the Enemy”, October, http://www.jamesherod.info/index.php?sec=paper&id=9&print=y&PHPSESSID=4387a9147ad42723ea101944dd538914)

      The 'peace now' protesters strike a similar stance. Of course, it was heartening to see an anti-war movement blossom almost immediately. But it was also disheartening. It meant that radicals were letting the war-mongers set the agenda. Instead of continuing the fight against neoliberalism and its institutions, and against capitalism, oppositionists suddenly dropped all this to launch an anti-war campaign. The candlelight vigils, especially, seemed to me a pathetic response to a war-mongering, repressive government. This happens again and again. The government launches a war of aggression, and the peaceniks take to the streets, with their candles, crying "peace now" and "no more war". Do they ever win? Have they ever stopped even one war? Do they ever even think about how they could win? Doesn't the inefficacy of their response prove that they are not really serious about peace? Do they ever think about ways of actually stopping the murderers rather than just pleading with them not to kill? They keep saying that peace cannot be achieved by going to war. Who says the US government wants peace!? They quote A.J. Muste as saying that war is not the way to peace; peace is the way. Is this relevant? Does it make sense to quote such thoughts to a government that has always engaged, from its inception two hundred years ago, in systematic mass murder?

      Similarly with the bulk of the other progressive commentators. They are just trying to change the government's policy, not stop them and deprive them of power. Here is a typical sentence. Rahul Mahajan and Robert Jensen write: "The next step is for us to build a movement that can change our government's barbaric and self-destructive policy."[13] You see, from the government's point of view, its policy is not barbaric or self-destructive. It is intelligent, self-serving, and self-preserving. Mahajan and Jensen actually pretty much admit this in their piece, by reasoning that "This war is about the extension of U.S. power. It has little to do with bringing the terrorists to justice, or with vengeance." (Such a view is rather rare among progressives actually.) They argue that there are three other motives for the war, from the government's point of view: the desire to defend "imperial credibility", to control "oil and natural gas of Central Asia," and "to push a right-wing domestic agenda." Nevertheless, in spite of these insights, they still stop short of realizing that they therefore have to fight, stop, and neutralize the government, rather than just change its policy. Given who the government is, who it serves (capital, the rich), and what its interests and priorities are, it can't change its policies into those favored by progressives, not and survive as an imperial power that is.

**.) The Me- The 1ac cares very much for his particular subject position. They want to tell you what it is like to experience the world soley based on their particularized way of living in the world. The link to this arguement is very clear when the 1ac attempts to articulate what it is like for "him" to epxerience the world - this form of politics is reductionist and too personal.**

This makes resistance to capitalism impossible. Your question should not be "what is MY" subject position, but what is "OUR" subject position.

Kirsch 1

Max H. Kirsch, Associate Professor at Florida Atlantic University. P 65-7. 2001. Queer Theory and Social Change.

My argument has been that the development of theory which takes the idea of the self- contained individual for granted is a part of this process of class struggl**e.** Postmodernism and post-structuralism, as examples of academic theory that reifies the self, serve the goals of the capitalist enterprise by promoting the isolation of the individual and the fragmentation of resistance. Fragmentation and isolation are strategies of capitalist management. These strategies would have the owners of capital in charge of thought and action. Resistance to capitalist managerial tactics is embedded in class struggle, which is dependent on identification, both energetically and economically, and the communities that support the identification process. Queer theory, as currently focused, is embedded in the context of class oppositions, and, paradoxically, the consequences of the theory are not what it appears to avow or what it contends it is. Instead of a force that opposes the dominance of power by those that controlcapital, it works as a part of the ideological mechanism that those in power seek to further. With the language of past radical movements, Queer theory works against the struggle it claims to engage, and as reified self-involvement it militates against the construction and building of communities. It disengages the energetic level of alliances and interpersonal relations, only to refocus efforts on the reductionistic deconstruction of texts interpreted only for personal use. The presence of conflict among peoples is tied to the struggle to maintain community and identity. What presents as senseless bigotry, sometimes resulting in genocide, is rooted in the anxious fight to maintain families, communities, and ensure survival. These are not individual functions. Their strategies, misconceived and misdirected, are a direct consequence of the loss of self-empowerment and control over everyday life. Capitalism, in this way, gives rise to psychological as well as social consequences.

Hardt and Negri rely on a flawed theory of globalization as a social network, which results in a theory of resistance which leaves the economic relations of capital intact.

Wilkie 2006

(Rob, Red Critique, Winter/Spring, “Global Networks, Imperial Culture”, <http://www.redcritique.org/WinterSpring2006/globalnetworksimperialculture.htm>)

It is said that the labor theory of value has lost its explanatory effectivity because globalization represents a fundamental transformation in the relations between capital and labor resulting from the shift from an industrial to a post-industrial and now to a technological society built not on the exploitation of labor but the generation of knowledge. For example, in his seminal book, *The Rise of the Network Society*, Manuel Castells articulates the basic premise of globalization as emerging from developments in technology that, he argues, are transforming "the material basis of society" (1) from the industrial age in which value is produced by labor to an informational age of knowledge and cultural exchange in which "value added is mainly generated by information" (243). He writes that as a result of the application of new scientific developments in communication and management technologies to production, capitalism has, for the first time, become global, shaping all social relationships. However, what is significant about Castells' argument, in the context of debates over capitalist development, is of course not only his claim that globalization constitutes the universalization of capital globally, but that the new universality of capitalism is founded on the interconnection of informational networks, the global flows of messages and images; in short, on cultural changes which blur the boundaries between owners and workers, production and consumption, labor and exchange. Instead of a class conflict over the control of the means of production, Castells describes global capitalism as defined by a cultural struggle over consumption between the "interacting" who, he argues, are able to "selec[t] their multidirectional circuits of communication" (371), and the "interacted", who are limited to "a restricted number of prepackaged choices" (374).

The most popular version of this narrative on the left is, of course, Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt's Empire. Negri and Hardt's theory of empire, which draws from Castells' theory of globalization as a social network, is based upon a similar assumption that with the growth of the productive capacity of capitalism and its expansion globally, the source of value has also shifted from productive labor to "immaterial labor", including service labor, knowledge labor, and labor that "produces or manipulates affects" (*Multitude* 108). Since, from their view, resources produced through the new forms of labor (such as "affect") cannot ever be "fully captured" by capital (*Multitude* 146) because they exceed the boundaries of the working day, the "multitude" whose labor this represents is becoming "an autonomous agent of production" (*Empire* 405) that is not dependent on capital to set it in motion. Thus, the site of contestation is no longer the extraction of surplus labor but rather the political control of this multitude and thus their creative powers. In other words, for Negri and Hardt, insofar as "proletarian internationalism" represents the "outside" of an earlier, "national" stage of capitalism (*Empire* 48), the globalization of production means that "there is no longer an 'outside' to capital" (*Multitude* 102) and thus workers whose surplus labor is exploited as a collective are no longer the agent(s) of change. Instead, Negri and Hardt posit an "impure politics" of the multitude based on finding "the potential for liberation that exists within Empire" (*Empire* 46) and thus, despite the radical rhetoric, that all that is necessary in the end for the development of what they describe as a "spontaneous and elementary communism" (*Empire* 294) is the formation of a counter-empire that only differs from the current social relations politically but not necessarily economically.

The deep influence of the work of Castells and Hardt and Negri in ideologically displacing surplus value as the basis of the expansion of capital and thus of the urgent need to transform the property relations at the core of capitalist production can be seen in the fact that this is a theory of globalization which is shared not only by critics of corporate globalization such as Naomi Klein, who argues that in the factories of the new global economy "the classic Marxist division between owners and workers doesn't quite work" (226). It is also the logic of globalization's most vocal supporters, such as Thomas Friedman, for whom it represents the potential end of *any* limits to capitalism, whether it is the geographic outside of the periphery, or the economic outside of class (*The World is Flat*).

In other words, despite **their local differences what links all of these theories of globalization is that they represent globalization as largely "constituted" by cultural processes which, through technological advances, have escaped the determinacy of the economic. In doing so they suggest that the main terrain of struggle and freedom for workers rests in the legal, political, and cultural surfaces of capitalism rather than in changing the underlying economic relations that determine class inequality. The main crux of their argument, in other words, is to deny the continued existence of exploitation and therefore to deny the historical relation of globalization to class society by making it appear that changes in the "culture" of the workplace—for example, the shift from the rigid structures of Fordism to the "flexible" structures of Post-Fordism—bring about a fundamental material change in the class position of workers.**

#### We don’t represent capitalism as an insurmountable monolith – our link arguments identify specific ways their method props up capitalism.

#### 2. Reject Gibson-Graham – they were bought off by imperialists.

Wendland 6 [Joel Wendland, editor of Political Affairs, a Marxist magazine, “Book Review: A Postcapitalist Politics, by J.K. Gibson-Graham,” Political Affairs, 12/27/06, http://www.politicalaffairs.net/article/articleview/4602/]

While their excavation of important cooperative projects provides worthwhile lessons for people interested in socialist alternatives to capitalism and imperialism that look beyond no longer existing models for a broader socialist concept, there is a disturbing element to this book as evidenced by the location of this book within the framework of those very relationships that Gibson-Graham ignore. For example, in the preface to this book, Gibson-Graham acknowledge the receipt of a grant from the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) for the research on Jagna. While Gibson-Graham are likely to regard their relationship to AusAID as an innocent one – something like, we used their money for our own subversive purposes – the relationship is fraught with negative implications. According to Australian economist Tim Anderson, under the right-wing Howard government, AusAID’s explicit mission has been transformed from promoting general international "poverty reduction" projects to providing resources to such projects linked to Australia’s "national interest." Anderson notes that prior to Howard AusAID served as a mechanism (within the international jurisdiction of the IMF and World Bank) to impose neoliberal imperatives on regional countries. In other words, aid from AusAid came with "good governance" conditions that have come to typify neoliberal projects funded by wealthy countries. Under Howard, however, this role has shifted from merely forcing aided countries to adhere the general principles of the globalizing project (austerity, shrinking public sectors, etc.) to also promoting specific Australian interests such as Australian based corporate enterprises. To be blunt, the role of AusAid, according to Anderson, has become one of promoting Australian imperialism among its neighbors in the Asian Pacific islands. Reading Gibson-Graham and their affiliation with Australian imperialism in the light of Said’s project mentioned at the opening of this review is revealing. Thus we may see why Gibson-Graham’s relationship to AusAID is not innocent. Indeed, read with the linkage Said sought to expose in mind, it is possible to understand why Gibson-Graham have rejected socialist alternatives to capitalism and national liberationist alternatives to imperialism. Specifically, by mapping non-capitalist and underdeveloped sectors in Jagna and discouraging socialist, broad class, international and national alternatives, Gibson-Graham’s work aids in opening the Philippines to Australia’s imperialist agenda.

1. Gibson-Graham’s discursive focus is epistemologically flawed and dooms their movement to failure

Poitevin 1 (Rene, sociology@NYU, Socialist Reivew, <http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3952/is_200101/ai_n8932891/?tag=mantle_skin;content>, accessed: 30 June 2011, JT)

A third feature of J.K. Gibson-Graham's work, in particular, and of the whole radical democracy tradition, in general, is its post-structuralist extremism.26 For postmodern Marxists it is not enough to point out that, as both Foucault and Habermas argue, we inhabit an intellectual regime characterized by a paradigm shift from the "philosophy of consciousness" to the "philosophy of language."27 Nor is it good enough for postmodern/post-Marxists to recognize the pitfalls embedded in Hegelian epistemology and argue instead, as Spivak does, for strategic-- uses-of-essentialism as a corrective to the excesses of teleological thinking and fixed notions of class.28 No way. As far as postmodern Marxism is concerned, the only way to compensate for constructions of capitalism that are too totalizing is through the unconditional surrender of the Marxist project. As J.K. Gibson-Graham themselves make clear, "to even conceive of 'capitalism' as 'capitalisms' is still taking 'capitalism' for granted."29 And to try to redistribute the heavy theoretical and political burden placed upon the proletariat by reconfiguring political agency through "race-class-gender," as opposed to just class, is still a futile endeavor: essentialism is still essentialism whether one essentializes around one or three categories. This strand of post-structuralism, one that once again, can be directly traced back to Laclau and Mouffe's Hegemony and Socialist Strategy,30 is predicated on the faulty epistemological premise that what really matters is "discourse." As Laclau and Mouffe clarify, "our analysis rejects the distinction between discursive and nondiscursive practices. It offirms that every object is constituted as an object of discourse."31 The problem with this approach is that once we enter this world of epistemological foundationalism predicated on the claim that there is "nothing but discourse," we enter a world of relativism in which all we can do is "create discursive fixings," as J.K. Gibson-Graham themselves prescribe, that will guarantee that "any particular analysis will never find the ultimate cause of events."32 It is this ideological postmodern insistence on reducing all of social reality to discourse that ultimately overloads its theoretical apparatus and causes it to buckle beneath them. The Amherst School's "provisional ontology" is incapable of escaping the performative trap of trying to get rid of essentialism by essentializing all of reality as "discursive." The postmodern Marxist approach to ontology boils down to substituting in political practice every occurrence of "continuity" with "discontinuity" as a way to get rid of essentialism and macro-narratives. Even Foucault, the great master of discontinuity, distances himself from such mirror-reversal solutions when theorizing the limits of discourse and accounting for the "divergence, the distances, the oppositions, the differences" that constitute the episteme of a period.33

Gibson-Graham’s method surrenders to capitalism and allows the alt to become co-opted

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I begin with the postmodern (mis)appropriation of Althusser's notion of "overdetermination," namely the intuition that reality is so complex that it is better understood as a multicausal process rather than as a "structural" or systemic mechanism, as in the traditional Marxist explanation of capitalism. Then, through a close reading of J.K. Gibson-Graham's (which is the professional name of scholars Julie Graham and Katherine Gibson), The End of Capitalism (As We Knew It),2 I show that despite its intuitive analytical appeal and theoretical sophistication, their book espouses an unconvincing and ultimately reactionary postmodern/post-Marxist politics - one that is ultimately predicated around how to make capitalism more user friendly. I will show that to practice or "perform" postmodern Marxist politics in our present situation is not to engage in what the Amherst School of postmodern Marxism describes as a "politics of opportunity and attainment,"3 but to practice the politics of surrender instead. I will make clear that what ultimately gives internal consistency to many of the critiques of postmodern and post-Marxist theorists is a profound distortion and co-optation of the most critical, unique, and politically mobilizing features of Marxist theory, on one hand, combined with a renaturalization of a capitalism predicated on liberal notions of social and economic reform, on the other.4

#### A totalizing view of capitalism is critical for analyzing and fixing the problems of urban structuring and racial inequality

(Kimberly DeFazio, English Department at the University of Wisconsin, Jan/feb2002 redcritique.org/JanFeb02/Urbanposttheoryclassandthecity.htm)

What I am referring to in my paper as urban "post-theory" are the various strategies by which dominant theory de-conceptualizes and de-totalizes the city in order to crisis manage the contradictions of class society by blurring the lines of social inequality. Following the postmodern attack against the "totalitarianism" of metanarratives, post-theory is a theory against "theory" as a means for grasping the local in relation to the totality of social relations. It substitutes for "totalizing" materialist theory a theory of "difference"—that is, a meditation on the "specificity" and "indeterminacy" of local differences, which are assumed to exceed systematic explanation. Exemplary of urban post-theory, which substitutes an indeterminate and elusive "complexity" for a rigorous materialist conceptual analysis, is Edward Soja's Postmetropolis, which I am using in this essay as my tutor text. Soja argues that "the contemporary urban social order can no longer be defined effectively by such conventional and familiar modes of social stratification as the class-divided Dual City of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat" (265) and as such what is necessary is to discover the "differences" and "heterogeneity" within the existing global relations. As Soja makes clear: "older polarities have not disappeared. . .[but] a much more polymorphous and fractured social geometry has taken shape" in cities (265). What is necessary to note here is that post-al urban theory does not deny that (class) binaries still exist. Rather class is "complicated" through a deconstructive logic of hybridity, which underwrites Soja's text. Following the protocols of postmodernism, Soja includes class in a constantly shifting "series" of identities—what he calls a "polymorphous" "geometry", which cannot be "contained" by any binary logic (265). On the conceptual logic of hybridity, which as Soja explains, "literally inject[s]" one binary term into another "and vice versa" (199), Soja's text "includes" class, to produce an in-between space which is a space of inclusive differences—that is, a "class" without distinction and without antagonism. The suggestion here is that an emphasis on "difference" is more "inclusive", more democratic than binary logic. But a reading of class which displaces class antagonism is aimed at completely displacing the explanatory value of class as a relation to the means of production—that is, the Marxist theory of class in which one's class position is not a subjective or imagined relation, nor a question of "lifestyle" determined by "consumption" practices, but rather determined objectively by whether one must sell her labor in order to survive, or whether one owns the means of production and therefore profits from the labor of others. The ideological effectivity of the hybrid "third space" of indeterminacy is that it analytically blurs the boundaries between the exploiter and exploited. Social structures are suspended in the post-al theoretical imaginary and urban politics becomes a site of political ambivalence, play and oscillation beyond the antagonism of labor and capital: a supplemental city (what de Certeau refers to as "a gigantic rhetoric of excess"). In such a space, there can be no decisive theory of social relations, and therefore no decisive position from which to combat social inequality. The "complication" of class, in short, is a means of dissimulating the contradictions of global capital, by positing a new "complex" and "complexifying" urban order—urban in-between-ness. I will return in more detail the relation between the assertion of "difference" and the abandonment of struggles for equality later on. But first it is necessary to examine the theory of the "concrete" that is being privileged under the name of "hybridity," "difference" and "particularity," and why this notion of the concrete is viewed as enabling for social struggles—so enabling that it can replace "equality" as a social priority. This question of the concrete is important moreover because the emphasis on the "concrete" informs all of cultural theory today. So, what is meant by the "concrete"? The underlying assumption of post-theory, as I have suggested, is that theory erases specificity and difference; to "reduce" urban life, for instance, to matters of "race" or "class" is to suppress the (in-between) differences of urban life—which is more effectively understood, from this position, on its own particular terms. This is another way of saying that the concrete is understood to exceed conceptuality—the concrete is an excessive particularity, which cannot be contained by any theory; in fact it "resists" conceptuality. It is for this reason that post-theory rejects Marxism as too "general," "totalizing," and "abstract". But one needs to ask: does urban post-theory exceed the very "abstractions" it claims to oppose? Is Soja's "specificity" of "inbetween-ness" really an example of a concrete "beyond" theory?

#### 3. Their argument is a strawman – reject it.

Poitevin 1 [Rene, Professor of Sociology at NYU, Socialist Review,

http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_qa3952/is\_200101/ai\_n8932891/?tag=mantle\_skin;content]

The End of Capitalism (As We Knew It) begs another question: Who are they going after? Is it capitalism or is it Marx? Their book spends so much time on what is supposedly wrong with Marxism that at times it reads more like The End of Marxism As We Knew It. This approach is typical of a pattern that, to quote Wendy Brown, "responds less to the antidemocratic forces of our time than to a ghostly philosophical standoff between historically abstracted formulations of Marxism and liberalism. In other words, this effort seeks to resolve a problem in a (certain) history of ideas rather than a problem in history."19 Simply put, postmodern Marxist politics has more to do with the micropolitics of the ivory tower than with the plight of the workers who clean their campuses. However, once it becomes clear that a necessary condition for the primacy of postmodern theory and politics is that Marxism has to go (otherwise you do not have to become a postmodern to address their concerns), J.K. Gibson-Graham's anti-Marxist hostility, while actively embracing the Marxist label in order to render it useless, makes a lot of sense. And once again, all this is done with impeccable logic: Given that Marxism is still the only doctrine that calls for the systematic overthrow of capitalism, getting rid of Marx(ism) is also to get rid of the need for revolution with a big "R."20 One of the problems with trying to make the case for postmodern Marxism is that in order to get rid of Marxism and declare its tradition obsolete, you have to distort its legacy by constructing a straw man. This straw man-reading of Marx is predicated upon the double maneuver of collapsing Marxist history into Stalinism, on the one hand, and reducing Marxist theory to "essentialism," "totality," and "teleology," on the other. As J.K. Gibson-Graham themselves acknowledge, without any regrets, "Indeed, as many of our critics sometimes charge, we have constructed a 'straw man.'"21 What is left out of their quasi-humorous dismissal of Marxism is the complicity of such a straw man in the long history of red-baiting and anti-Marxist repression in this country and around the world.

#### 4. A totalizing image of capitalism is necessary to motivate its destruction and to avert extinction.

Herod 4 [James, author of several books on capitalism and social activist since 1968, “Getting Free,” 2004 http://site.www.umb.edu/faculty/salzman\_g/Strate/GetFre/06.htm]

This is an important distinction, because capitalism has proved impervious to reforms, as a system. We can sometimes in some places win certain concessions from it (usually only temporary ones) and win some (usually short-lived) improvements in our lives as its victims, but we cannot reform it piecemeal, as a system. Thus our strategy of gutting and eventually destroying capitalism requires at a minimum a totalizing image, an awareness that we are attacking an entire way of life and replacing it with another, and not merely reforming one way of life into something else. Many people may not be accustomed to thinking about entire systems and social orders, but everyone knows what a lifestyle is, or a way of life, and that is the way we should approach it. The thing is this: in order for capitalism to be destroyed millions and millions of people must be dissatisfied with their way of life. They must want something else and see certain existing things as obstacles to getting what they want. It is not useful to think of this as a new ideology. It is not merely a belief-system that is needed, like a religion, or like Marxism, or Anarchism. Rather it is a new prevailing vision, a dominant desire, an overriding need. What must exist is a pressing desire to live a certain way, and not to live another way. If this pressing desire were a desire to live free, to be autonomous, to live in democratically controlled communities, to participate in the self-regulating activities of a mature people, then capitalism could be destroyed. Otherwise we are doomed to perpetual slavery and possibly even to extinction.

The inevitable prioritization of capitalist interests is the root cause of nuclear conflict

Meszaros 6 (Istvan, Prof Emeritus of Philosophy @ U of Sussex, “The Structural Crisis of Politics” The Monthly Review Vol. 58.4 September JF)

Are the legitimate political institutions of our societies in a position to redress even the most perilous situations by democratic intervention in the process of actual decision making, as traditional political discourse keeps reassuring us, despite all evidence to the contrary? Only the most optimistic—and rather naïve—could assert and sincerely believe that such a happy state of affairs happens to be the case. For the principal Western powers have, quite unimpeded, embarked in the last few years on devastating wars using authoritarian devices—like the “executive prerogative” and the “Royal Prerogative”—without consulting their peoples on such grave matters, and ruthlessly brushing aside the framework of international law and the appropriate decision making organs of the United Nations.4 The United States arrogates to itself as its moral right to act as it pleases, whenever it pleases, even to the point of using nuclear weapons—not only preemptively but even preventively—against whichever country it pleases, whenever its claimed “strategic interests” so decree. And all this is done by the United States as the pretended champion and guardian of “democracy and liberty,” slavishly followed and supported in its unlawful actions by our “great democracies.” Once upon a time the acronym MAD—mutually assured destruction—was used to describe the existing state of nuclear confrontation. Now that the “neoconservatives” can no longer pretend that the United States (and the West in general) are threatened by nuclear annihilation, the acronym has been turned into literal madness, as the “legitimate policy orientation” of institutionalized military/political insanity. This is in part the consequence of neoconservative disappointments about the Iraq war. For “American neo-cons had hoped the invasion of Iraq would set in train a domino effect across the region, with the people of Iran and other oil-rich states rising up to demand western-style freedoms and democracy. Unfortunately the reverse has been true, in Iran at least.”5 But it is much worse than that, because a whole system of institutionally entrenched and secured “strategic thinking,” centered on the Pentagon itself, lurks behind it. This is what makes the new MADNESS so dangerous for the entire world, including the United States whose worst enemies are precisely such “strategic thinkers.” Unfortunately, the United States is by no means the only country which should be characterized in such terms. There are many others as well in which the political decision making functions are monopolized by very similar self-legitimating consensual institutional arrangements, with negligibly little (if any) difference between them, notwithstanding the occasional change in personnel at the top level. I will confine myself in this regard to the discussion of one prominent case, the United Kingdom (or Great Britain). This particular country—traditionally promoting itself as the “mother country of democracy” on account of the historic Magna Carta—under the premiership of Tony Blair eminently qualifies for the same dubious distinction of “one-party system with two right wings,” just like the powerful North American state. The Iraq war was rubber stamped in the British Parliament by both the Conservative Party and “New Labor,” with the help of more or less obvious legal manipulations and violations. Thus we can now read that “Transcripts of evidence given in private by the attorney general, Lord Goldsmith, to an official inquiry suggest that the crucial advice on the legality of war, presented to parliament in his name, was written for him by two of Tony Blair’s closest allies….The former foreign secretary Robin Cook said last night that having resigned the day before the war started, he had never heard Lord Goldsmith make the legal case in cabinet. ‘I now think he never formally wrote a second opinion,’ he told The Guardian.”10 Naturally, the subsequent public exposure and condemnation of such practices by prominent legal experts, concerning “Bush and Blair’s illegal war,” makes no difference whatsoever.11 For the vested interests of global hegemonic imperialism—unhesitatingly and humiliatingly served by the political consensual system of a former major imperialist power—must prevail at all cost.