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### DA

**Congressional restrictions cause adversaries to doubt the resolve of U.S. deterrence – causes crisis escalation.**

Waxman 8/25 [Matthew Waxman 8/25/13, Professor of Law – Columbia and Adjunct Senior Fellow for Law and Foreign Policy – CFR, “The Constitutional Power to Threaten War,” Forthcoming in Yale Law Journal, vol. 123, August 25, 2013, SSRN]

A claim previously advanced from a presidentialist perspective is that stronger legislative checks on war powers is harmful to coercive and deterrent strategies, because it establishes easily-visible impediments to the President’s authority to follow through on threats. This was a common policy argument during the War Powers Resolution debates in the early 1970s. Eugene Rostow, an advocate inside and outside the government for executive primacy, remarked during consideration of legislative drafts that any serious restrictions on presidential use of force would mean in practice that “no President could make a credible threat to use force as an instrument of deterrent diplomacy, even to head off explosive confrontations.”178 He continued:¶ In the tense and cautious diplomacy of our present relations with the Soviet Union, as they have developed over the last twenty-five years, the authority of the President to set clear and silent limits in advance is perhaps the most important of all the powers in our constitutional armory to prevent confrontations that could carry nuclear implications. … [I]t is the diplomatic power the President needs most under the circumstance of modern life—the power to make a credible threat to use force in order to prevent a confrontation which might escalate.179

**Credible conventional deterrence checks nuclear aggression**

Gerson 09

MICHAEL S. GERSON, research analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses, Policy Fellow with the ONE Campaign, a visiting fellow with the Center for Public Justice, and a former senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations,“Conventional Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age”, Strategic Studies Institute, Autumn 2009 //jchen

Although implicit or explicit nuclear threats may lack credibili- ty against non-WMD regimes, many potential adversaries believe that the United States will use conventional firepower, especially because America has conventional superiority and a demonstrated willingness to use it. Consequently, when dealing with non-WMD-related threats, conventional deterrence will be the most likely mechanism for deterring hostile actions.

According to Admiral Michael Mullen, the current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “A big part of credibility, of course, lies in our convention- al capability. The capability to project power globally and conduct effective theater-level operations . . . remains essential to deterrence effectiveness.”14

Conventional deterrence also plays an important role in preventing nonnuclear aggression by nuclear-armed regimes. Regional nuclear pro- liferation may not only increase the chances for the use of nuclear weap- ons, but, equally important, the possibility of conventional aggression. The potential for conventional conflict under the shadow of mutual nucle- ar deterrence was a perennial concern throughout the Cold War, and that scenario is still relevant. A nuclear-armed adversary may be emboldened to use conventional force against US friends and allies, or to sponsor ter- rorism, in the belief that its nuclear capabilities give it an effective deter- rent against US retaliation or intervention.15 For example, a regime might calculate that it could undertake conventional aggression against a neigh- bor and, after achieving a relatively quick victory, issue implicit or explicit nuclear threats in the expectation that the United States (and perhaps coali- tion partners) would choose not to get involved.

In this context, conventional deterrence can be an important mech- anism to limit options for regional aggression below the nuclear threshold. By deploying robust conventional forces in and around the theater of potential conflict, the United States can credibly signal that it can respond to conventional aggression at the outset, and therefore the opponent can- not hope to simultaneously achieve a quick conventional victory and use nuclear threats to deter US involvement. Moreover, if the United States can convince an opponent that US forces will be engaged at the beginning of hostilities—and will therefore incur the human and financial costs of war from the start—it can help persuade opponents that the United States would be highly resolved to fight even in the face of nuclear threats be- cause American blood and treasure would have already been expended.16 Similar to the Cold War, the deployment of conventional power in the re- gion, combined with significant nuclear capabilities and escalation dom- inance, can help prevent regimes from believing that nuclear possession provides opportunities for conventional aggression and coercion.

**Foreign policy resolve’s key to prevent a host of impacts---now’s key**

Chapin and Hanson 9 – Bernard Chapin- interviewer, and Victor Davis Hanson, the Martin and Illie Anderson senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, December 7, 2009, “Change, weakness, disaster,” online: http://pajamasmedia.com/blog/change-weakness-disaster-obama-answers-from-victor-davis-hanson/

BC: Are we currently sending a message of weakness to our foes and allies? Can anything good result from President Obama’s marked submissiveness before the world? Dr. Hanson: Obama is one bow and one apology away from a circus. The world can understand a kowtow gaffe to some Saudi royals, but not as part of a deliberate pattern. Ditto the mea culpas. Much of diplomacy rests on public perceptions, however trivial. We are now in a great waiting game, as regional hegemons, wishing to redraw the existing landscape — whether China, Venezuela, Iran, North Korea, Pakistan, Syria, etc. — are just waiting to see who’s going to be the first to try Obama — and whether Obama really will be as tenuous as they expect. If he slips once, it will be 1979 redux, when we saw the rise of radical Islam, the Iranian hostage mess, the communist inroads in Central America, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, etc. BC: With what country then — Venezuela, Russia, Iran, etc. — do you believe his global repositioning will cause the most damage? Dr. Hanson: I think all three. I would expect, in the next three years, Iran to get the bomb and begin to threaten ever so insidiously its Gulf neighborhood; Venezuela will probably cook up some scheme to do a punitive border raid into Colombia to apprise South America that U.S. friendship and values are liabilities; and Russia will continue its energy bullying of Eastern Europe, while insidiously pressuring autonomous former republics to get back in line with some sort of new Russian autocratic commonwealth. There’s an outside shot that North Korea might do something really stupid near the 38th parallel and China will ratchet up the pressure on Taiwan. India’s borders with both Pakistan and China will heat up. I think we got off the back of the tiger and now no one quite knows whom it will bite or when.

### K

**The logic of security desires to manage an inherently chaotic world. Disorder and the unknown are identified as evil, producing hostility and conflict. Securing ourselves against ambiguity comes at the cost of all that makes life worthwhile**

Der Derian 98 (James, Professor of International Studies at the Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University “The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard”, On Security, CIAO)

The will to power, then, should not be confused with a Hobbesian perpetual desire for power. It can, in its negative form, produce a reactive and resentful longing for only power, leading, in Nietzsche's view, to a triumph of nihilism. But Nietzsche refers to a positive will to power, an active and affective force of becoming, from which values and meanings--including self-preservation--are produced which affirm life. Conventions of security act to suppress rather than confront the fears endemic to life, for ". . . life itself is essentially appropriation, injury, overpowering of what is alien and weaker; suppression, hardness, imposition of one's own forms, incorporation and at least, at its mildest, exploitation--but why should one always use those words in which slanderous intent has been imprinted for ages." 35 Elsewhere Nietzsche establishes the pervasiveness of agonism in life: "life is a consequence of war, society itself a means to war." 36 But the denial of this permanent condition, the effort to disguise it with a consensual rationality or to hide from it with a fictional sovereignty, are all effects of this suppression of fear.

The desire for security is manifested as a collective resentment of difference--that which is not us, not certain, not predictable. Complicit with a negative will to power is the fear-driven desire for protection from the unknown. Unlike the positive will to power, which produces an aesthetic affirmation of difference, the search for truth produces a truncated life which conforms to the rationally knowable, to the causally sustainable. In The Gay Science , Nietzsche asks of the reader: "Look, isn't our need for knowledge precisely this need for the familiar, the will to uncover everything strange, unusual, and questionable, something that no longer disturbs us? Is it not the instinct of fear that bids us to know? And is the jubilation of those who obtain knowledge not the jubilation over the restoration of a sense of security?" 37

The fear of the unknown and the desire for certainty combine to produce a domesticated life, in which causality and rationality become the highest sign of a sovereign self, the surest protection against contingent forces. The fear of fate assures a belief that everything reasonable is true, and everything true, reasonable. In short, the security imperative produces, and is sustained by, the strategies of knowledge which seek to explain it. Nietzsche elucidates the nature of this generative relationship in The Twilight of the Idols :

The causal instinct is thus conditional upon, and excited by, the feeling of fear. The "why?" shall, if at all possible, not give the cause for its own sake so much as for a particular kind of cause --a cause that is comforting, liberating and relieving. . . . That which is new and strange and has not been experienced before, is excluded as a cause. Thus one not only searches for some kind of explanation, to serve as a cause, but for a particularly selected and preferred kind of explanation--that which most quickly and frequently abolished the feeling of the strange, new and hitherto unexperienced: the most habitual explanations. 38

A safe life requires safe truths. The strange and the alien remain unexamined, the unknown becomes identified as evil, and evil provokes hostility--recycling the desire for security. The "influence of timidity," as Nietzsche puts it, creates a people who are willing to subordinate affirmative values to the "necessities" of security: "they fear change, transitoriness: this expresses a straitened soul, full of mistrust and evil experiences." 39

The unknowable which cannot be contained by force or explained by reason is relegated to the off-world. "Trust," the "good," and other common values come to rely upon an "artificial strength": "the feeling of security such as the Christian possesses; he feels strong in being able to trust, to be patient and composed: he owes this artificial strength to the illusion of being protected by a god." 40 For Nietzsche, of course, only a false sense of security can come from false gods: "Morality and religion belong altogether to the psychology of error : in every single case, cause and effect are confused; or truth is confused with the effects of believing something to be true; or a state of consciousness is confused with its causes." 41

Nietzsche's interpretation of the origins of religion can shed some light on this paradoxical origin and transvaluation of security. In The Genealogy of Morals , Nietzsche sees religion arising from a sense of fear and indebtedness to one's ancestors:

The conviction reigns that it is only through the sacrifices and accomplishments of the ancestors that the tribe exists --and that one has to pay them back with sacrifices and accomplishments: one thus recognizes a debt that constantly grows greater, since these forebears never cease, in their continued existence as powerful spirits, to accord the tribe new advantages and new strength. 42

Sacrifices, honors, obedience are given but it is never enough, for

The ancestors of the most powerful tribes are bound eventually to grow to monstrous dimensions through the imagination of growing fear and to recede into the darkness of the divinely uncanny and unimaginable: in the end the ancestor must necessarily be transfigured into a god . 43

As the ancestor's debt becomes embedded in institutions, the community takes on the role of creditor. Nietzsche mocks this originary, Hobbesian moment: to rely upon an "artificial strength": "the feeling

One lives in a community, one enjoys the advantages of communality (oh what advantages! we sometimes underrate them today), one dwells protected, cared for, in peace and trustfulness, without fear of certain injuries and hostile acts to which the ~~man~~ outside , the "~~man~~ without peace," is exposed . . . since one has bound and pledged oneself to the community precisely with a view to injury and hostile acts. 44

The establishment of the community is dependent upon, indeed it feeds upon, this fear of being left outside. As the castle wall is replaced by written treaty, however, and distant gods by temporal sovereigns, the martial skills and spiritual virtues of the noble warrior are slowly debased and dissimulated. The subject of the individual will to power becomes the object of a collective resentment. The result? The fear of the external other is transvalued into the "love of the neighbor" quoted in the opening of this section, and the perpetuation of community is assured through the internalization and legitimation of a fear that lost its original source long ago.

This powerful nexus of fear, of external and internal otherness, generates the values which uphold the security imperative. Indeed, Nietzsche locates the genealogy of even individual rights, such as freedom, in the calculus of maintaining security:

- My rights - are that part of my power which others not merely conceded me, but which they wish me to preserve. How do these others arrive at that? First: through their prudence and fear and caution: whether in that they expect something similar from us in return (protection of their rights); or in that they consider that a struggle with us would be perilous or to no purpose; or in that they see in any diminution of our force a disadvantage to themselves, since we would then be unsuited to forming an alliance with them in opposition to a hostile third power. Then : by donation and cession. 45

The point of Nietzsche's critical genealogy is to show that the perilous conditions that created the security imperative--and the western metaphysics that perpetuate it--have diminished if not disappeared; yet, the fear of life persists: "Our century denies this perilousness, and does so with a good conscience: and yet it continues to drag along with it the old habits of Christian security, Christian enjoyment, recreation and evaluation." 46 Nietzsche's worry is that the collective reaction against older, more primal fears has created an even worse danger: the tyranny of the herd, the lowering of ~~man~~, the apathy of the last ~~man~~ which controls through conformity and rules through passivity. The security of the sovereign, rational self and state comes at the cost of ambiguity, uncertainty, paradox--all that makes a free life worthwhile. Nietzsche's lament for this lost life is captured at the end of Daybreak in a series of rhetorical questions:

Of future virtues--How comes it that the more comprehensible the world has grown the more solemnities of every kind have decreased? Is it that fear was so much the basic element of that reverence which overcame us in the presence of everything unknown and mysterious and taught us to fall down before the incomprehensible and plead for mercy? And has the world not lost some of its charm for us because we have grown less fearful? With the diminution of our fearfulness has our own dignity and solemnity, our own fearsomeness , not also diminished? 47

It is of course in Nietzsche's lament, in his deepest pessimism for the last ~~man~~, that one finds the celebration of the overman as both symptom and harbinger of a more free-spirited yet fearsome age. Dismissive of utopian engineering, Nietzsche never suggests how he would restructure society; he looks forward only so far as to sight the emergence of "new philosophers" (such as himself?) who would restore a reverence for fear and reevaluate the security imperative. Nietzsche does, however, go back to a pre-Christian, pre-Socratic era to find the exemplars for a new kind of security. In The Genealogy of Morals , he holds up Pericles as an example, for lauding the Athenians for their "rhathymia "--a term that incorporates the notion of "indifference to and contempt for security." 48

It is perhaps too much to expect Nietzsche's message to resonate in late modern times, to expect, at the very time when conditions seem most uncertain and unpredictable, that people would treat fear as a stimulus for improvement rather than cause for retrenchment. Yet Nietzsche would clearly see these as opportune times, when fear could be willfully asserted as a force for the affirmation of difference, rather than canalized into a cautious identity constructed from the calculation of risks and benefits.

**The alternative is to do nothing – this is a policy of resistance that changes the very concept of policymaking. Security Logic is a form of future prediction that always fails. This orientation prescripts a violent engagement with others.**

Mcquillan 08 (Martin Mcquillan, Professor of Literary Theory and Cultural Analysis and Dean of the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at Kingston University, London, Derrida and Policy: Is Deconstruction Really a Social Science? Derrida Today)

One might think that Derrida's invocation of International Law in his later writings would represent an example of a concrete relation between his writing and something that could take the manner of a policy formulation. In fact, while Derrida speaks eloquently of the need for International Law and demonstrates its philosophical genealogy, he actually does very little by way of elaborating what such a law might look like. Once again we return to the insurmountable difficulty of deconstruction's refusal to programme or pre-empt the arrival of an unknowable future. In fact, looked at in these terms, policy-making would seem to have a distinct relation to fortune telling, divination and other such modes of predicting the future. Future-ologists are of course a specialist sub-branch of policy-makers. In the context of university administration, I have never written a 'forward-looking strategic plan' that did not have to be rewritten six months later due to unforeseen circumstances. Derrida's discussion of International Law in the early 1990s was certainly prescient, given the way in which International Law has moved from the margins of legal specialism to become the locus of global politics through the development of the International Criminal Court, the test cases of 'universal jurisdiction', the demands of globalisation and the obfuscations of the war on terror. However, the question of International Law in Derrida remains to be determined according to a double braid of reading: firstly, the deconstruction of the inherited western model of law and ethics which prevails in the discourse on the international, humanitarian and cosmopolitical; secondly, a responsible philosophical response to singular events as they arrive in the present calling for an exercise of public, critical reason. In other words, the deconstruction of International Law will proceed on a provisional and strategic basis. International Law is, of course, only an example for Derrida of a wider mutation in the conditions of sovereignty in the world today. This account of sovereignty is in turn part of a more general undoing of the logocentric schema, in Derrida, which points out that sovereignty as such is always already decentred by its inability to master the unconditionality of the other which it seeks to suppress, thus rendering the sovereign no longer sovereign. For example, the unconditionality of literature makes it both powerless in the sovereign public realm of techno-media-politics and simultaneously the one thing that this sovereignty cannot master, thus demonstrating the impotence of sovereignty and the all-powerful powerlessness of unconditionality. This is a scenario that can be moved around the tropes of the Derridean corpus in so far as it describes the familiar strategies of and resistances to phallogocentrism in a more general sense. Policy without conditions or a policy of unconditionality would seem to be no policy at all, or at least nothing policy-makers would recognise as policy in its proper sense. After all a policy without limits or purpose would be policy without utility and would be of no use to anyone, except as a policy of resistance.

Here is the rub, the moment that one begins to attempt a thought experiment of this kind one runs into immediate and insurmountable difficulties, not because deconstruction has nothing to say to politics or that deconstruction is a weak ontology, parasitical on the strong discourse of political culture but because if one were to take seriously (if not literally) what Derrida has to say about the disarticulation of the inherited metaphysical models of the political, it quickly becomes apparent that a new politics does not require that 'deconstruction' (if such a thing exists) be translated into a number of thematic policy choices but that the entire political model which rests upon policy as an enactable idea be subject to complete and irreversible displacement. Policy-making as it stands is untenable from a deconstructive point of view because political culture as such is untenable. The unconditionality and infinite responsibility of deconstruction, does not mean simply that we should make better policy (or that we should make better policy, simply) but that in doing so the entire apparatus of western political culture be removed and rethought in an unpredictable and emerging future. The frustration that many feel with deconstruction's reading of the political lies in this refusal to provide 'concrete policies'. However, it is this refusal to decide on the undecideable in advance which is the whole point of deconstruction. It is the promise of deconstruction. This is not the same thing as opposition politicians saying they could not say what their expenditure plans would be until they were in government and saw the state of the accounts (that is just a lie for political expediency and such people always have well developed plans for what they would do). The promise of deconstruction would be that in encountering the other, justice ought to be done, even if the progressive structure of the promise relied on the necessary, in principle, ability for promises to be broken or to fail. The politics of deconstruction can then only ever follow the dual strategy we saw above: the critical reading of the western inheritance and the disarticulation of the event as it arrives in the present. In this sense, deconstruction cannot be a political science because it has no means of securing the predictive force necessary to a science. Rather, deconstruction is that which puts all and every such prediction in doubt. As Bismarck remarked, politics is not a science it is an art. Elsewhere, he is said to have noted that it was the art of the possible. As Derek Attridge has put it, for Derrida, it is the art of the impossible (Attridge 2007). It is, nevertheless, an art and as such is on the side of the unconditional rather than the sovereign.

### CP

**The President of the United States should issue an executive order mandating incorporation of preemptive large-scale cyber-attacks into the covert action regime, except in direct support of authorized United States military operations.**

**XO incorporation into covert action regime solves – adds Congressional oversight, creates momentum for future presidents and legislation**

Brecher 13 Aaron Brecher, JD candidate at the UMich Law School, May 2013, “Toward a Domestic Legal Framework for ¶ Offensive Cyberoperations,“ http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/pdfs/111/3/Brecher.pdf

Cyberattacks present a challenge for U.S. policymakers: they are difficult to locate within a clear legal category and there is a significant risk of ¶ uncontrollable consequences associated with their use. As a result, policymakers must choose a paradigm to govern their use that will ensure that the ¶ executive branch is held accountable and shares information with legislators. ¶ This Part argues that the federal government should adopt the presumption that cyberattacks will be carried out under the covert action statute, and ¶ that the best way forward is for the president to issue an executive order ¶ making the covert action regime the presumptive framework for cyberattacks. It includes a brief discussion of why a president might willingly ¶ constrain her discretion by issuing the proposed executive order. It also ¶ shows that while the internal executive processes associated with both military and intelligence legal frameworks help mitigate the risk of ¶ cyberattacks’ misuse by the executive, only the covert action regime provides an adequate role for Congress. Finally, this Part argues that the ¶ executive order option is preferable to one alternative proposed by scholars—enacting legislation—because of the practical difficulties of passing ¶ new legislation. ¶ The covert action regime is the best approach for committing cyberattacks under the current law, as it would facilitate cooperation among ¶ executive agencies. The debate over which agency and set of legal authorities govern cyberattacks has caused no small amount of confusion.145¶ Apparently, an Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”) memorandum declined to ¶ decide which legal regime should govern the use of cyberattacks, and the ¶ uncertainty has led to interagency squabbles, as well as confusion over how ¶ cyberattacks are to be regulated.146 Establishing a presumptive answer would ¶ go far toward resolving this dispute. ¶ Most importantly, adopting the covert action framework as the presumptive legal regime would be a principled way to help ensure constitutional ¶ legitimacy when the president orders a cyberattack.147 There is also reason to ¶ believe that presidential power is intimately bound up in credibility, which in ¶ turn is largely dependent on the perception of presidential compliance with ¶ applicable domestic law.148 A practice of complying with the covert action regime for cyberattacks, both when they do not constitute a use of force and ¶ when it is unclear whether they do, is most likely to be in compliance with ¶ the law. Compliance with the covert action regime would also encourage ¶ covert action procedures in close cases without unduly restricting the executive’s choice to use military authorities in appropriate circumstances. ¶ The executive might also issue the proposed order, even though it would ¶ limit her freedom in some ways, because of the possible benefits of constraining future administrations or preempting legislative intervention.149 For ¶ example, in this context, an administration may choose to follow the finding ¶ and reporting requirements in order to convince Congress that legislative ¶ intervention is unnecessary for proper oversight. This is acceptable if the ¶ covert action regime is in fact adequate on its own. Moreover, if greater ¶ statutory control over cyberattacks is needed, the information shared with ¶ Congress may give Congress the tools and knowledge of the issue necessary ¶ to craft related legislation.150 Additionally, while executive orders are hardly ¶ binding, the inertia following adoption of an order may help constrain future ¶ administrations, which may be more or less trustworthy than the current ¶ one. Creating a presumption through an executive order also establishes a ¶ stable legal framework for cyberattacks that allows law to follow policy in ¶ this new field, and permits decisionmakers to learn more about the nature of ¶ cyberoperations before passing detailed statutes that may result in unintended consequences.

### CP

**The United States federal government should substantially increase restrictions on the war powers authority of the president of the United States by removing the authority to authorize the preemptive use of large-scale cyber-attacks, except for attacks on Iranian nuclear infrastructure and in direct support of authorized United States military operations.**

**The counterplan is mutually exclusive, it does less than the plan, and net beneficial. Functional competition alone is sufficient. Textual competition is bad – it makes adding "not" and doing the opposite of the plan non-competitive.**

**1. Iran prolif**

**A. Cyber attacks disrupt Iran's nuclear weapons acquisition -- attacks are on-going and increasingly sophisticated**

Cohen 13 Tamir Cohen Aug. 15, 2012 Haaretz (Israeli newspaper) Iran threatens to counter cyber warfare with legal action

In effort to defend the country's infrastructure against future cyber-attacks, cabinet announces plan to cutoff government websites from global networks. http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/iran-threatens-to-counter-cyber-warfare-with-legal-action-1.458486

A new virus had attacked nuclear facilities in Natanz and Fordo, a scientist at the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran claimed three weeks ago. The computer virus, he said, was able to shut down command and control equipment based on the Scada system manufactured by Siemens. The attack was similar to that of the Stuxnet virus, which was successful in compromising the same system in 2010.¶ Using a remote access point, the scientist explained, the hackers were able to access a virtual private network (VPN) and paralyze the Siemens hardware and other automated systems at the facilities. The scientist added that from time to time, the workstations played heavy metal music at deafening levels. “I believe they were playing ‘Thunderstruck’ by AC/DC,” the scientist wrote.

**B. Escalates to full scale war and causes extinction**

WIMBUSH ‘7 - Hudson Institute Senior Fellow, Center for Future Security Strategies Director (S. Enders, “The End of Deterrence: A nuclear Iran will change everything.” The Weekley Standard. 1/11/2007, http://www.weeklystandard.com/Utilities/printer\_preview.asp?idArticle=13154&R=162562FD5A)

Iran is fast building its position as the Middle East's political and military hegemon, a position that will be largely unchallengeable once it acquires nuclear weapons. A nuclear Iran will change all of the critical strategic dynamics of this volatile region in ways that threaten the interests of virtually everyone else. The outlines of some of these negative trends are already visible, as other actors adjust their strategies to accommodate what increasingly appears to be the emerging reality of an unpredictable, unstable nuclear power. Iran needn't test a device to shift these dangerous dynamics into high gear; that is already happening. By the time Iran tests, the landscape will have changed dramatically because everyone will have seen it coming. The opportunities nuclear weapons will afford Iran far exceed the prospect of using them to win a military conflict. Nuclear weapons will empower strategies of coercion, intimidation, and denial that go far beyond purely military considerations. Acquiring the bomb as an icon of state power will enhance the legitimacy of Iran's mullahs and make it harder for disgruntled Iranians to oust them. With nuclear weapons, Iran will have gained the ability to deter any direct American threats, as well as the leverage to keep the United States at a distance and to discourage it from helping Iran's regional opponents. Would the United States be in Iraq if Saddam had had a few nuclear weapons and the ability to deliver them on target to much of Europe and all of Israel? Would it even have gone to war in 1991 to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi aggression? Unlikely. Yet Iran is rapidly acquiring just such a capability. If it succeeds, a relatively small nuclear outcast will be able to deter a mature nuclear power. Iran will become a billboard advertising nuclear weapons as the logical asymmetric weapon of choice for nations that wish to confront the United States. It should surprise no one that quiet discussions have already begun in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, and elsewhere in the Middle East about the desirability of developing national nuclear capabilities to blunt Iran's anticipated advantage and to offset the perceived decline in America's protective power. This is just the beginning. We should anticipate that proliferation across Eurasia will be broad and swift, creating nightmarish challenges. The diffusion of nuclear know-how is on the verge of becoming impossible to impede. Advanced computation and simulation techniques will eventually make testing unnecessary for some actors, thereby expanding the possibilities for unwelcome surprises and rapid shifts in the security environment. Leakage of nuclear knowledge and technologies from weak states will become commonplace, and new covert supply networks will emerge to fill the gap left by the neutralization of Pakistani proliferator A. Q. Khan. Non-proliferation treaties, never effective in blocking the ambitions of rogues like Iran and North Korea, will be meaningless. Intentional proliferation to state and non-state actors is virtually certain, as newly capable states seek to empower their friends and sympathizers. Iran, with its well known support of Hezbollah, is a particularly good candidate to proliferate nuclear capabilities beyond the control of any state as a way to extend the coercive reach of its own nuclear politics. Arsenals will be small, which sounds reassuring, but in fact it heightens the dangers and risk. New players with just a few weapons, including Iran, will be especially dangerous. Cold War deterrence was based on the belief that an initial strike by an attacker could not destroy all an opponent's nuclear weapons, leaving the adversary with the capacity to strike back in a devastating retaliatory blow. Because it is likely to appear easier to destroy them in a single blow, small arsenals will increase the incentive to strike first in a crisis. Small, emerging nuclear forces could also raise the risk of preventive war, as leaders are tempted to attack before enemy arsenals grow bigger and more secure. Some of the new nuclear actors are less interested in deterrence than in using nuclear weapons to annihilate their enemies. Iran's leadership has spoken of its willingness--in their words--to "martyr" the entire Iranian nation, and it has even expressed the desirability of doing so as a way to accelerate an inevitable, apocalyptic collision between Islam and the West that will result in Islam's final worldwide triumph. Wiping Israel off the map--one of Iran's frequently expressed strategic objectives--even if it results in an Israeli nuclear strike on Iran, may be viewed as an acceptable trade-off. Ideological actors of this kind may be very different from today's nuclear powers who employ nuclear weapons as a deterrent to annihilation. Indeed, some of the new actors may seek to annihilate others and be annihilated, gloriously, in return. What constitutes deterrence in this world? Proponents of new non-proliferation treaties and many European strategists speak of "managing" a nuclear Iran, as if Iran and the new nuclear actors that will emerge in Iran's wake can be easily deterred by getting them to sign documents and by talking nicely to them. This is a lethal naiveté. We have no idea how to deter ideological actors who may even welcome their own annihilation. We do not know what they hold dear enough to be deterred by the threat of its destruction. Our own nuclear arsenal is robust, but it may have no deterrent effect on a nuclear-armed ideological adversary. This is the world Iran is dragging us into. Can they be talked out of it? Maybe. But it is getting very late to slow or reverse the momentum propelling us into this nuclear no-man's land. We should be under no illusion that talk alone--"engagement"--is a solution. Nuclear Iran will prompt the emergence of a world in which nuclear deterrence may evaporate, the likelihood of nuclear use will grow, and where deterrence, once broken, cannot be restored.

### Arms Race

**No cyberwar – doesn’t accomplish strategic objective and risks are too high**

Libicki 9 Martin Libicki, Adjunct Professor at the Georgetown University Center for Security Studies, “CYBERDETERRENCE¶ AND CYBERWAR,” http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND\_MG877.pdf

No one knows how destructive any one strategic cyberwar attack ¶ would be. Estimates of the damage from today’s cyberattacks within ¶ the United States range from hundreds of billions of dollars to just a ¶ few billion dollars per year.¶ The higher dollar figures suggest that cyberattacks on enemy civilian infrastructures—strategic cyberwar—may be rationalized as a way ¶ to assist military efforts or as a way to coerce the other side to yield to ¶ prevent further suffering. But can strategic cyberwar induce political ¶ compliance the way, say, strategic airpower would? Airpower tends to ¶ succeed when societies are convinced that matters will only get worse. ¶ With cyberattacks, the opposite is more likely. As systems are attacked, ¶ vulnerabilities are revealed and repaired or routed around. As systems ¶ become more hardened, societies become less vulnerable and are likely ¶ to become more, rather than less, resistant to further coercion.¶ Those who would attempt strategic cyberwar also have to worry ¶ about escalation to violence, even strategic violence. War termination ¶ is also not trivial: With attribution so difficult and with capable third ¶ parties abounding (see below), will it be clear when one side has stopped ¶ attacking another?

**No cyber war – deterrence.**

Lewis 11 [Project Director James A. Lewis January 2011 a report of the csis commission on cybersecurity for the 44th presidency Cybersecurity Two Years Later Commission Cochairs Representative James R. Langevin Representative Michael T. McCaul Scott Charney Lt. General Harry Raduege, USAF (ret.) <http://csis.org/files/publication/110128_Lewis_CybersecurityTwoYearsLater_Web.pdf>]

However, we are not engaged in a cyber war. Short of armed conflict, nation-states are unlikely to launch cyber attacks against the United States. **The political risk is too high.** Just as with missiles and aircraft, countries can strike the United States using cyber attack, but they know this would trigger a violent if not devastating response. The risks are too high for frivolous engagement.

**Norms already exist – enough to restrict cyber escalation**

Schmitt 13 Michael N Schmitt, Chairman of the International Law Department at the United States Naval War College, “Cyberspace and International Law: The Penumbral Mist of Uncertainty,” http://www.harvardlawreview.org/issues/126/march13/forum\_1000.php

It has become de rigueur to characterize cyberspace as a new dimension of warfare, one devoid of international law and subject to catastrophic abuse. In fact, malevolent states, cyberterrorists, or malicious hackers will likely exploit cyberspace to strike at global critical infrastructure and other essential cyberassets. The ensuing consequences of such operations could range from the disruption of government functions and economic loss to massive physical destruction and widespread death. The prominent place cyberspace occupied in the Director of National Intelligence’s 2013 worldwide threat assessment was therefore neither hype nor hyperbole.¶ History may help place the concerns regarding cyberoperations in perspective. The appearance of new weaponry has often been accompanied by assertions that such weapons exist beyond the reach of extant principles and rules of international law. In the last century, for instance, such claims arose with respect to, inter alia, machine guns, aircraft, submarines, and nuclear weapons. And in the last few months, controversy has erupted over autonomous weapon systems, following seemingly contradictory arguments from human rights quarters that they are both unlawful per se and should be banned by treaty.¶ Yet, cyberspace is not a lawless firmament. As with the aforementioned weapons, the established norms of the jus pacis, jus ad bellum, and jus in bello govern cyberweapons and their use. Although international law sporadically addresses specific weapons through arms control treaties or express prohibitions on their use, it typically controls them through general principles and rules applicable to all weapons. In the jus ad bellum context, for instance, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has confirmed in the Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion that the U.N. Charter’s use of force provisions, all of which reflect customary law, apply “regardless of the weapons employed.” And the jus in bello’s customary and treaty law requirement of a legal review of new weapons makes no sense unless the weapons are subject to the preexisting rules of international humanitarian law. Accordingly, the full applicability of the existing international legal regime to cyberspace has been accepted by the U.S. government, as evidenced by former State Department Legal Adviser Harold Koh’s comments at the 2012 Cyber Command Legal Conference. The International Group of Experts who prepared the 2013 Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare (Tallinn Manual) took an identical stance.¶ In fact, a thick web of international law norms suffuses cyberspace. These norms both outlaw many malevolent cyberoperations and allow states to mount robust responses. States have a sovereign right to exercise control over cyberinfrastructure and activities on their territory, as well as to protect them from harmful actions. In a principle confirmed in the first ICJ case, Corfu Channel, international law also obligates states to ensure that cyberinfrastructure on their territory is not used for acts that unlawfully affect other states. Most importantly, international law codified in the U.N. Charter’s Article 2(4) prohibits states from directly or indirectly using cyberforce against other states. This rule is the most fundamental legal prohibition governing international relations, one that is often characterized as jus cogens.

**OR, Adversaries won’t comply with rules – too strategic and cheap to break**

Baker 11 Stewart Baker is a former official at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the National Security Agency, 9/30/11, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/09/30/denial\_of\_service?page=0,0&page=full

American lawyers' attempts to limit the scope of cyberwar are just as certain to fail as FDR's limits on air war -- and perhaps more so.¶ It's true that half a century of limited war has taught U.S. soldiers to operate under strict restraints, in part because winning hearts and minds has been a higher priority than destroying the enemy's infrastructure. But it's unwise to put too much faith in the notion that this change is permanent. Those wars were limited because the stakes were limited, at least for the United States. Observing limits had a cost, but one the country could afford. In a way, that was true for the Luftwaffe, too, at least at the start. They were on offense, and winning, after all. But when the British struck Berlin, the cost was suddenly too high. Germans didn't want law and diplomatic restraint; they wanted retribution -- an eye for an eye. When cyberwar comes to America and citizens start to die for lack of power, gas, and money, it's likely that they'll want the same.¶ More likely, really, because Roosevelt's bargain was far stronger than any legal restraints we're likely to see on cyberwar. Roosevelt could count on a shared European horror at the aerial destruction of cities. The modern world has no such understanding -- indeed, no such shared horror -- regarding cyberwar. Quite the contrary. For some of America's potential adversaries, the idea that both sides in a conflict could lose their networked infrastructure holds no horror. For some, a conflict that reduces both countries to eating grass sounds like a contest they might be able to win.¶ What's more, cheating is easy and strategically profitable. America's compliance will be enforced by all those lawyers. Its adversaries' compliance will be enforced by, well, by no one. It will be difficult, if not impossible, to find a return address on their cyberattacks. They can ignore the rules and say -- hell, they are saying -- "We're not carrying out cyberattacks. We're victims too. Maybe you're the attacker. Or maybe it's Anonymous. Where's your proof?"¶ Even if all sides were genuinely committed to limiting cyberwar, as they were in 1939, history shows that it only takes a single error to break the legal limits forever. And error is inevitable. Bombs dropped by desperate pilots under fire go astray -- and so do cyberweapons. Stuxnet infected thousands of networks as it searched blindly for Iran's uranium-enrichment centrifuges. The infections lasted far longer than intended. Should we expect fewer errors from code drafted in the heat of battle and flung at hazard toward the enemy?¶ Of course not. But the lesson of all this for the lawyers and the diplomats is stark: Their effort to impose limits on cyberwar is almost certainly doomed.¶ No one can welcome this conclusion, at least not in the United States. The country has advantages in traditional war that it lacks in cyberwar. Americans are not used to the idea that launching even small wars on distant continents may cause death and suffering at home. That is what drives the lawyers -- they hope to maintain the old world. But they're being driven down a dead end.¶ If America wants to defend against the horrors of cyberwar, it needs first to face them, with the candor of a Stanley Baldwin. Then the country needs to charge its military strategists, not its lawyers, with constructing a cyberwar strategy for the world we live in, not the world we'd like to live in.¶ That strategy needs both an offense and a defense. The offense must be powerful enough to deter every adversary with something to lose in cyberspace, so it must include a way to identify attackers with certainty. The defense, too, must be realistic, making successful cyberattacks more difficult and less effective because resilience and redundancy has been built into U.S. infrastructure.¶ Once the United States has a strategy for winning a cyberwar, it can ask the lawyers for their thoughts. But it can't be done the other way around.

### Allied Coop

**Their Dunlap evidence indicates massive alt causes to allied coop failure**

**Cooperation on international crime and terrorism is strong – self interest guarantees it**

Archick 12 Kristin Archick, CRS Specialist in European Affairs, September 4, 2013, “U.S.-EU Cooperation Against Terrorism,” http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22030.pdf, accessed 9-29-13, CMM)

U.S.-EU Counterterrorism Cooperation: Progress to Date and Ongoing Challenges

As part of the EU’s efforts to combat terrorism since September 11, 2001, the EU made improving law enforcement and intelligence cooperation with the United States a top priority. The previous George W. Bush Administration and many Members of Congress largely welcomed this EU initiative in the hopes that it would help root out terrorist cells in Europe and beyond that could be planning other attacks against the United States or its interests. Such growing U.S.-EU cooperation was in line with the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations that the United States should develop a “comprehensive coalition strategy” against Islamist terrorism, “exchange terrorist information with trusted allies,” and improve border security through better international cooperation. Some measures in the resulting Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458) and in the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-53) mirrored these sentiments and were consistent with U.S.-EU counterterrorism efforts, especially those aimed at improving border controls and transport security.

U.S.-EU cooperation against terrorism has led to a new dynamic in U.S.-EU relations by fostering dialogue on law enforcement and homeland security issues previously reserved for bilateral discussions. Despite some frictions, most U.S. policymakers and analysts view the developing partnership in these areas as positive. Like its predecessor, the Obama Administration has supported U.S. cooperation with the EU in the areas of counterterrorism, border controls, and transport security. At the November 2009 U.S.-EU Summit in Washington, DC, the two sides reaffirmed their commitment to work together to combat terrorism and enhance cooperation in the broader JHA field. In June 2010, the United States and the EU adopted a new “Declaration on Counterterrorism” aimed at deepening the already close U.S.-EU counterterrorism relationship and highlighting the commitment of both sides to combat terrorism within the rule of law. In June 2011, President Obama’s National Strategy for Counterterrorism asserted that in addition to working with European allies bilaterally, “the United States will continue to partner with the European Parliament and European Union to maintain and advance CT efforts that provide mutual security and protection to citizens of all nations while also upholding individual rights.”

**No impact – drug traffickers can’t steal WMD – this ev is just an assertion**

**Single issues not key to legitimacy– perceptions change slowly.**

Gray, International Politics at Reading, 11 [COLIN S. GRAY is Professor of International Poli- tics and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, England. He worked at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (London), and at Hudson Institute (Croton-on-Hudson, NY) before founding the Na- tional Institute for Public Policy, a defense-oriented think tank in the Washington, DC, area. Dr. Gray served for 5 years in the Reagan administration on the President’s General Advisory Committee on Arms SSI Monograph HARD POWER AND SOFT POWER: THE UTILITY OF MILITARY FORCE AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POLICY IN THE 21ST CENTURY Colin S. Gray April 2011]

The error lies in the search for, and inevitable finding of, “golden keys” and “silver bullets” to resolve current versions of en- during problems. Soft-power salesmen have a potent product-mix to sell, but they fail to appreciate the real- ity that **American soft power is** a product **essentially unalterable over a short span of years.** As a country with a cultural or civilizational brand that is unique and mainly rooted in deep historical, geographical, and ideational roots, America is not at liberty to emu- late a major car manufacturer and advertise an exten- sive and varied model range of persuasive soft-power profiles. Of course, some elements of soft power can be emphasized purposefully in tailored word and deed. However, foreign perceptions of the United States are no more developed from a blank page than the American past can be retooled and fine-tuned for contemporary advantage. Frustrating though it may be, a country cannot easily escape legacies from its past.

**Alt Causes – drone strikes, indefinite detention, PRISM/NSA scandal all tank US legitimacy**

**Can’t substitute for hard power.**

Kroenig, Government at Georgetown, et al. 10 [Matthew, Department of Government, Georgetown University Melissa McAdam, Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley Steven Weber, Information School, University of California, Berkeley, Taking Soft Power Seriously, Comparative Strategy, Volume 29, Issue 5 November 2010 , pages 412 – 431]

Foreign policy actors have many reasons to experiment with soft power, not merely because its use can be less costly than hard power. But, soft power comes with its own quite **striking limitations**. Our research suggests that soft power strategies will be **unlikely to succeed** except under fairly restrictive conditions. It may very well be, then, that the U.S. foreign policy elite is at risk of **exaggerating** the effectiveness of soft power (rather than underutilizing it) as a tool of foreign policy. After all, international communication is fraught with difficulties, persuading people to change firmly held political views is hard, and individual attitudes are often thought to have an **insignificant role** in determining international political outcomes. Soft power, therefore, will probably be considered a niche foreign policy option useful for addressing a small fraction of the problems on Washington's foreign policy agenda. Analysts who suggest that soft power can easily be substituted for hard power or who maintain that soft power should provide an overarching guide to the formulation of U.S. foreign policy are **badly mistaken**. It is not conducive to good policy to employ the idea of soft power as a way of arguing against the use of military force, for example.

**Obama won’t deploy legitimacy effectively**

Ford 12

Christopher Ford, Senior Fellow at Hudson Institute in Washington, D.C. He previously served as U.S. Special Representative for Nuclear Nonproliferation, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, and General Counsel to the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, SAIS Review Volume 32, Number 1, Winter-Spring 2012, “Soft on “Soft Power””, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/sais\_review/v032/32.1.ford.html //jchen

Additionally, the “soft power-obsessed” Obama Administration has been remarkably reluctant to employ even limited values-promotion tools at its disposal. Though President Obama spoke favorably about democracy in his much-publicized June 2009 speech to a Muslim audience in Cairo, he defined democracy merely as having “governments that reflect the will of the people” and seemed curiously ambivalent about promoting more specifically American ideas like the right periodically to change their government through free and fair elections, and that no branch of government—nor indeed the government itself—should be permitted to accrue unchallengeable power.

In fact, Obama went out of his way to specify that “[each] nation gives life to this principle [of reflecting the will of the people] in its own way,” and pointedly excluded mention of voting or checks upon unbridled government power in his list of the things for which “all people yearn.” (The closest the president came to describing democratic political choice was to observe that governments “must maintain . . . power through consent, not coercion,” though this is a standard that could presumably be met, at least initially, by a popular despot or an authoritarian oligarchy which takes public opinion into account when making decrees.) This careful neglect of political rights was perhaps incongruous in a speech that began with a lament that “colonialism [had] denied rights and opportunities to many Muslims,”12 particularly for an administration so taken with the supposed virtues of “soft” power projection.

The Obama Administration then approached Iran’s “Green Revolution” with painful rhetorical reticence in 2009–2010, sacrificed candor about Russia’s retreat into autocracy on the altar of an expedient nuclear disarmament-focused “reset” of relations with Moscow, and explicitly promised not to let human rights concerns “interfere” with America’s economic relationship with Beijing.13 The American role in promoting democracy in Egypt in 2011 was also for a time decidedly ambivalent, with U.S. officials still calling for President Hosni Mubarak to stay in office until just before his resignation.14 After a long period of embarrassing silence in which U.S. officials bizarrely quoted assessments describing Syrian dictator Bashar al-Asad as a “reformer,”15 the Obama Administration finally spoke out against his bloody efforts to repress Syria’s pro-democracy movement, ultimately calling on Assad to step down.16 But the contribution of U.S. pronouncements to effecting change in Syria is, at the time of writing, unclear at best. So far, the Obama Administration’s most conspicuous democracy-promotion [End Page 95] effort was a very “hard power” affair: the war that led to the overthrow and execution of Libyan dictator Muammar Qaddafi.

The Obama Administration sought credit as a promoter of democratic values in mid-2011, as leaked stories appeared about State Department-funded efforts to outfit pro-democracy activists in various countries with portable internet and cell phone equipment capable of circumventing government censorship.17 While such efforts seemed to have real potential, a cyber security expert of my acquaintance describes this program as still being depressingly amateurish from a technical perspective. (A colleague of mine at Hudson Institute, Michael Horowitz, also points out that existing web-censorship circumvention services promoted by the U.S. tend to lack the surge capacity needed to deal with user demand during political crises, when access to such capabilities is likely to be most important.18 )

Meanwhile, even as the authorities in Beijing cracked down hard to preclude any possibility of a Chinese “Oolong Revolution” to parallel the “Jasmine Revolution” of democratization in the Arab world,19 the Obama Administration announced plans to terminate the Voice of America’s Mandarin-language radio and television service in China.20 Given the evident terror of China’s Communist leadership at the idea of its citizens becoming enamored with multiparty democracy and political freedom—a fear evident, for instance, in PRC Politburo members’ warnings that “[enemy] forces” are always trying to “undermine and divide China,” and that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) needs a “line of defense to resist Western two-party and multi-party systems, a bi-cameral legislature, the separation of power and other kinds of erroneous ideological interferences”21 —this seems to be quite a remarkable recusal from the field of “soft power” competition.

Despite the rhetoric about “navigating by our values,” therefore, the Obama Administration has been notably ambivalent about actually promoting them—with President Obama himself apparently seeing nothing exceptional about the American system’s embodiment of the very “values” by which we are expected to “navigate.” On one level, this is not surprising, for the president has said that he believes in American exceptionalism only in the sense that people from any country might believe in the special character of their own country.22 Still, such politically-correct relativism is a strange refuge for someone supposedly committed to making “our values” a key component of the “soft power” with which he was supposed to revolutionize U.S. foreign policy.

In terms of potential economic “soft power,” our free market economy obviously imposes significant constraints upon the degree to which the still-vibrant U.S. business and financial sectors can be used in support of broader national objectives. Nevertheless, the use of economic and financial sanctions has long been an aspect of “soft power” projection available to U.S. officials. (Indeed, as I have noted elsewhere, U.S. leaders seem always to have had great faith in their ability to use trade and other economic incentives to accomplish foreign policy goals.23 ) In the 1990s, the U.S. Congress passed a number of laws requiring the imposition of sanctions on foreign entities involved in the proliferation of ballistic missile or weapons of mass [End Page 96] destruction (WMD). The late Senator Jesse Helms, author of much of this legislation, is not usually regarded as a hero by the proponents of “soft power,” but perhaps a re-think is in order.

The Clinton Administration generally opposed the use of “soft power” in the form of nonproliferation sanctions. In the first administration of George W. Bush, however, when such approaches were championed by then-Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton as an “essential tool,”24 American authorities showed considerable enthusiasm for using sanctions to force foreign companies to make a choice between facilitating proliferation and trading with the world’s largest economy. In the most dramatic example of such sanctions, the Bush Administration sanctioned the Chinese company NORINCO in early 2003 for assisting Iran’s ballistic missile program; this move was said to have cost NORINCO something on the order of $100 million in sales in the United States.25

The Bush Administration also used the prospect of relaxing sanctions, albeit combined with the conspicuously “hard power” anti-WMD message sent by the invasion of Iraq, to draw Libya’s Muammar Qaddafi into the internationally-supervised elimination of his WMD programs in 2003–2004. Except for imposing further sanctions against Iran over its nuclear program, (an arena in which some progress has been made, though more as a result of the outrageousness of Iran’s continuing provocations than anything Washington has actually managed to do),26 the Obama Administration has been remarkably uninterested in nonproliferation sanctions.

On the whole, it is certainly true that precisely because we are a free and democratic society, there are sharp limits upon what a president can do to leverage America’s “soft power.” Nevertheless, today’s White House has been curiously diffident about even trying to use the tools it has. It seems to prefer passive approaches even to the “soft power” it has itself rhetorically championed, and is, to all appearances, simply embarrassed about anything that smacks of affirmative global leadership, preferring to “lead from behind”27 in ways that avoid seeming too pushy or “Bush-like” for contemporary sensibilities.

As suggested above, however, taking a passive approach to “soft power” isn’t really exerting power at all: it is just sitting back and hoping for the best. Such an approach may sometimes work, but it does not deserve much credit as a national strategy, and it is not clear what precisely is so “smart” about the use of “soft power.”

### China (still Allied Coop)

**Threat of OCO strikes deescalates Senkaku conflict --- prevents great power war**

Leigh Drogen 13, founder and chief investment officer of Surfview Capital, LLC, a New York based investment management firm, “Why Cyber Weapons Will Make The World Even Safer,” 3/4, http://www.leighdrogen.com/why-cyber-weapons-will-make-the-world-even-safer/

Scene: China has just exchanged fire with Japan over the East China Sea Islands. The US Navy is in theatre and has as promised under its security umbrella treaty with Japan vows to protect the sovereignty of Japanese territory. In response China has threatened to hold US infrastructure (power, water, transportation) hostage and gives the US 48 hours to exit the theatre. The US immediately responds with a similar threat to cripple Chinese infrastructure via cyber attacks unless China relinquishes cyber attacks within 48 hours.¶ Now you can bet your last dollar that the US has been holding war games designed to simulate exactly this scenario. And while we don’t know how they’ve played out, we can make some pretty informed assumptions based on the corollary of nuclear war theory.¶ The ability for foreign agents to hijack critical infrastructure and cripple it within a short period of time is now to the point where we, and our potential adversaries, could face damage many magnitudes higher than a nuclear strike, not in lives lost, but economic, social, and political damage.¶ Cyber warfare has reached a level where we can say that there is mutually assured destruction of critical infrastructure in a war between the US and China.¶ Which is exactly why I’m ready to say that cyber warfare will make the world an even safer place.¶ There is no argument against the claim that nuclear weapons have massively decreased overall warfare across the world since World War II. During that time we haven’t seen a war between two nuclear states.¶ But the more important development, as Tom Friedman loves to point out, we haven’t seen a major conflict between two countries with a McDonalds. Now, look past the frivolity of that statement through to the bigger point, lives lost is no longer the major determinant of why countries decide to forgo war, it is now primarily an economic and social decision.¶ The cost in treasure and political capital that it takes to go to war as a developed economy with another state is massive. The US has had a huge hand in this no doubt playing the world’s policeman since World War II. Police are not very effective at hunting down transgressors, their job is primarily prevention, a job that the US has pretty much perfected at this point.¶ China will not follow through on its cyber war threat because the cost in economic, social, and political damage to the regime from a crippling US cyber attack would be far too much to handle versus the benefit from its move on the islands. What do you think middle and upper class urban Chinese citizens would do if China risked everything they’ve worked so hard to build over the past 25 years for the islands? They risk nothing less than the regime being toppled. They are already walking on thin ice under the unwritten deal they’ve made, continued economic development for the regime’s position in power.¶ Cyber war has reached the level of mutually assured destruction as the damage caused will lead to popular revolt. It certainly would here in the US.¶ The flip side to this argument, as it is made with nuclear weapons, is that non state actors are not tied to the same consequences and therefor are much more dangerous. I would agree, and in the case of cyber war they it’s even scarier as their capability to inflict damage is far greater (this was the theme of Skyfall), it’s hard to obtain and deliver a nuclear weapon.¶ That said, I believe cyber weapons will add to global security as they become more pervasive.

**No escalation SCS – economic risks are too high**

Creehan 12 [Sean Creehan is the Senior Editor of the SAIS Review of International Affairs. He will graduate from Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) in May 2012 with a concentration in Southeast Asian Studies and International Economics. He is a 2004 graduate of Harvard College and proficient in Mandarin Chinese and Indonesian. SAIS Review > Volume 32, Number 1, Winter-Spring 2012, Assessing the Risks of Conflict in the South China Sea]

Regarding Secretary Clinton’s first requirement, the risk of actual closure of the South China Sea remains **remote**, as instability in the region would affect the entire global economy, raising the price of various goods and commodities. According to some estimates, for example, as much as 50 percent of global oil tanker shipments pass through the South China Sea—that represents more than three times the tanker traffic through the Suez Canal and over five times the tanker traffic through the Panama Canal.4 It is in no country’s interest to see instability there, least of all China’s, given the central economic importance of Chinese exports originating from the country’s major southern ports and energy imports coming through the South China Sea (annual U.S. trade passing through the Sea amounts to $1.2 trillion).5 Invoking the language of nuclear deterrence theory, disruption in these sea lanes implies mutually assured economic destruction, and that possibility should moderate the behavior of all participants. Furthermore, with the United States continuing to operate from a position of naval strength (or at least managing a broader alliance that collectively balances China’s naval presence in the future), the sea lanes will remain open. While small military disputes within such a balance of power are, of course, possible, the economic risks of extended conflict are so great that significant changes to the status quo are unlikely.

**China favors concessions and peaceful resolution—regime instability and empirics**

**Asia Times 11** (Sudha Ramachandran, “China plays long game on border disputes,” Jan 27, 2011, <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/MA27Ad02.html>)

A Sino-Tajik border agreement that was ratified recently by Tajikistan's parliament flies in the face of images of China being a "bullying" and "belligerent" power that "will go to any length to fulfill its territorial ambitions". The agreement, which resolves a 130-year-old territorial dispute, requires Tajikistan to cede around 1,000 square kilometers of land in the Pamir Mountains to China. It means that China will receive roughly 3.5% of the 28,000 square kilometers of land it laid claim to. China's territorial concession has been hailed by Tajik Foreign Minister Hamrokhon Zarifi as a "victory for Tajik diplomacy". This is not the first time that China has made concessions to settle its territorial disputes. Under its border agreements with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, for instance, China received just 22% and 32% respectively of the land disputed with these countries. China's boundaries with Central Asia were originally drawn up under what China describes as "unequal treaties". It alleged that as a result of these treaties, Czarist Russia gained territory at its expense. It therefore refused to recognize these boundaries. Although the Soviet Union and China began negotiating a mutually acceptable border, a settlement remained elusive. With the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1990, the new Central Asian Republics - Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan - inherited the disputes with China. In the 1990s, China began negotiating settlements with these countries. Border agreements with Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan were reached in 1996 and 1998 respectively. Border talks with Tajikistan were delayed by the civil war there. However, talks gathered momentum in the late 1990s and an agreement was reached in 2002. It was this agreement that was ratified recently. Analysts have drawn attention to the territorial concessions that China extended to resolve its many disputes. Of its 23 territorial disputes active since 1949, China offered "substantial compromises" in 17, usually agreeing "to accept less than half of the territory being disputed," M Taylor Fravel, associate professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, pointed out in the article "Regime Insecurity and International Cooperation: Explaining China's Compromises in Territorial Disputes," published in the journal International Security. However, there is more to it than meets the eye. The territorial concessions that China is believed to have made are not quite as substantial as they appear to be. Srikanth Kondapalli, a China expert at the Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi pointed out that China's strategy of stepping up territorial claims and then settling for less has enabled it to appear to be making a major territorial concession to reach a border resolution agreement. In several disputes, "whether China actually gave up territory or made a substantial concession is a debatable question," he told Asia Times Online. Still, in the quest for regional stability China overall "has been liberal in border dispute resolution", he said. What has prompted Beijing to seek compromise and extend concessions with regard to territorial disputes involving its land borders? Regime insecurity appears to have been an important motivating factor. According to Fravel, "China's leaders have compromised when faced with internal threats to regime security - the revolt in Tibet, the instability following the Great Leap Forward, the legitimacy crisis after the Tiananmen upheaval, and separatist violence in Xinjiang." The territorial concessions it made to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in order to reach border agreements with them was prompted by a sharp surge in separatist violence in Xinjiang province in the early 1990s. The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the emergence of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan as independent republics stoked long-smoldering Uighur nationalism in Xinjiang and fueled Uighur aspirations for independence. This triggered apprehension in Beijing that Xinjiang would break away. Coming close on the heels of the Tiananmen uprising of 1989, which had undermined the Chinese government's legitimacy, the separatist violence in Xinjiang compounded Chinese regime insecurity, as it posed a threat to China's territorial integrity. This made it imperative for Beijing to nip Uighur unrest in the bud. China's strategy to deal with Uighur separatism has involved ruthless suppression of separatists and economic development of the Xinjiang region. However, the success of this strategy hinged on support from countries bordering Xinjiang - Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Their cooperation was essential to get them to crack down on Uighur separatists taking sanctuary on their soil as well as to build robust trade ties that were needed for economic development in Xinjiang. Beijing thus traded territorial concessions for support from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in its strategy to quell Uighur separatism. With the exception of its territorial disputes with India and Bhutan, China has settled all its other land-border disputes. In contrast, it has resolved none of its maritime border disputes, although the dispute in the Gulf of Tonkin with Vietnam is being discussed and those discussions are at an advanced stage of resolution. China's strategy for resolving its border disputes and the nature of its border-resolution mechanism provide useful pointers to what lies ahead. In the past, "it is when the contestant state is weak that China has moved quickly to resolve the dispute," points out Kondapalli. The way it went about handling its territorial disputes with the Soviet Union is indicative. Although China did discuss them with the Soviet Union, it was only when the USSR disintegrated that Beijing moved quickly to achieve resolution.

**No war – China won’t risk it all and no flashpoints.**

Bremmer 10 [Ian, president of Eurasia Group and the author, most recently, of The End of the Free Market: Who Wins the War between States and Corporations?, Gathering Storm: America and China in 2020 July/August 2010 http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/articles/2010-JulyAugust/full-Bremmer-JA-2010.html]

In addition, **Beijing has no incentive to** mount a global military **challenge** to **U.S. power**. China will one day possess a much more substantial military capacity than it has today, but its economy has **grown so quickly** over the past two decades, and its living standards improved so dramatically, that it is difficult to imagine the kind of catastrophic, game-changing event that would push Beijing to risk it all by posing the West a large-scale military challenge. It has **no incentive** to allow anything less than the most serious threat to its sovereignty to trigger a military conflict that might sever its expanding network of commercial ties with countries all over the world—and with the United States, the European Union, and Japan, in particular. The more familiar flash points are **especially unlikely** to spark a hot war:

Beijing is well aware that no U.S. government will support a Taiwanese bid for independence, and China need not invade an island that it has largely co-opted already, via an offer to much of Taiwan’s business elite of privileged access to investment opportunities on the mainland.

**No US draw-in – China will avoid the threshold for intervention and high costs deter involvement**

Holmes 12

James Holmes, defense analyst for The Diplomat and a professor of strategy at the U.S. Naval War College where he specializes in U.S., Chinese and Indian maritime strategy and U.S. diplomatic and military history. He is co-author of Red Star over the Pacific, an Atlantic Monthly Best Foreign Affairs Book for 2010 and a former US Navy surface warfare officer, “The Nightmare Scenario: A U.S.-China War”, 9/19/12, <http://thediplomat.com/the-naval-diplomat/2012/09/19/the-nightmare-scanerio-a-u-s-china-war/> //jchen

Aristotle observed that every plot has a beginning, a middle, and an end. Let’s take our cue from classical Athens’ philosopher of common sense and start this drama from the beginning, with the American decision for war. Giving the order might seem like the easy part. But whatever the cause of the conflict—whether it’s Taiwan, the Senkakus/Diaoyus impasse, a quarrel over free passage through the South China Sea, or something unforeseen—Beijing will refuse to make Washington’s choice to intervene easy.

In fact, Chinese leaders will go out of their way to make it hard. They will sow doubt and dissension among U.S. leaders. For instance, they will determinedly withhold the stark casus belli—a Pearl Harbor or a 9/11—necessary to rally a liberal republic like the United States around the battle flag. Ambiguity will reign. U.S. leaders should anticipate it.

Staying beneath the provocation threshold constitutes purest common sense for Beijing. Why not play head games with prospective foes? I would. As Shakespeare memorably showed, it takes time and moral courage for an individual to overcome Hamlet-like indecision. Some never do. That’s doubly true in big institutions, where decisions typically emerge from political wrangling among many individuals and groups.

Time spent in internal debate would work in China’s favor in any contingency along the Asian seaboard. It would postpone U.S. military movements, perhaps long enough to let the People’s Liberation Army accomplish its goals before the cavalry arrives. The result: a fait accompli. Even better (from Beijing’s standpoint), the United States might simply stand aside, reckoning the goals of such an enterprise too diffuse and abstract, the likely strategic rewards too few, to justify the costs and dangers inherent in combat operations against a fellow great power.

# 2NC

### PIC

#### Cyber attacks cause permanent setbacks

Dilanian 11 Ken Dilanian, Los Angeles Times January 17, 2011 Iran's nuclear program and a new era of cyber war

http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jan/17/world/la-fg-iran-cyber-war-20110117

Stuxnet also proves it is possible to use malware to seize control of equipment that runs all sorts of features of a modern economy, from power grids to chemical plants. The U.S. and its allies have that capability, but so do Russia and China, experts say.

And Stuxnet may remain a persistent thorn in Iran's side, said German expert Ralph Langner, who first disclosed that Stuxnet had targeted Siemens equipment used in Iran's nuclear program.

In an e-mail, Langner said the Iranians would have to replace all the computer systems in their nuclear program to be sure they were rid of the worm, a tall order for a country under trade sanctions.

Only a reason it needs to be continuous – On-going cyberattacks can constantly delay iran nuclear development

Cohen 13 Tamir Cohen Aug. 15, 2012 Haaretz (Israeli newspaper) Iran threatens to counter cyber warfare with legal action

In effort to defend the country's infrastructure against future cyber-attacks, cabinet announces plan to cutoff government websites from global networks. http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/iran-threatens-to-counter-cyber-warfare-with-legal-action-1.458486

Cyber-warfare against Iran first made headlines in 2010 after the Stuxnet computer virus was detected. The virus was designed to damage command and control systems in Scada-based facilities. It took months until the Iranians were able to patch the system's security breaches and to repair the damages done to the uranium-enrichment centrifuges at Natanz.

Subsequently, Iran reported it was attacked by two other spyware programs which were also attributed by many to Israel and the United States. One of the spywares, named Duqu, was primarily used for surveillance; Flame, the second, used cyber-attack tools and was able to erase data from hosting computers.

#### Cyber attacks make time for solutions – avoid military strikes (same card is also in avoids mil attacks)

Sanger 12 DAVID E. SANGER, June 1, 2012 New York Times Obama Order Sped Up Wave of Cyberattacks Against Iran

<http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/01/world/middleeast/obama-ordered-wave-of-cyberattacks-against-iran.html?_r=0>

“We discussed the irony, more than once,” one of his aides said. Another said that the administration was resistant to developing a “grand theory for a weapon whose possibilities they were still discovering.” Yet Mr. Obama concluded that when it came to stopping Iran, the United States had no other choice.

If Olympic Games failed, he told aides, there would be no time for sanctions and diplomacy with Iran to work. Israel could carry out a conventional military attack, prompting a conflict that could spread throughout the region.

#### Obama ordered better cyber attacks after Stuxnet

Sanger 12 DAVID E. SANGER, June 1, 2012 New York Times Obama Order Sped Up Wave of Cyberattacks Against Iran

<http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/01/world/middleeast/obama-ordered-wave-of-cyberattacks-against-iran.html?_r=0>

WASHINGTON — From his first months in office, President Obama secretly ordered increasingly sophisticated attacks on the computer systems that run Iran’s main nuclear enrichment facilities, significantly expanding America’s first sustained use of cyberweapons, according to participants in the program.

Mr. Obama decided to accelerate the attacks — begun in the Bush administration and code-named Olympic Games — even after an element of the program accidentally became public in the summer of 2010 because of a programming error that allowed it to escape Iran’s Natanz plant and sent it around the world on the Internet. Computer security experts who began studying the worm, which had been developed by the United States and Israel, gave it a name: Stuxnet.

At a tense meeting in the White House Situation Room within days of the worm’s “escape,” Mr. Obama, Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr. and the director of the Central Intelligence Agency at the time, Leon E. Panetta, considered whether America’s most ambitious attempt to slow the progress of Iran’s nuclear efforts had been fatally compromised.

“Should we shut this thing down?” Mr. Obama asked, according to members of the president’s national security team who were in the room.

Told it was unclear how much the Iranians knew about the code, and offered evidence that it was still causing havoc, Mr. Obama decided that the cyberattacks should proceed. In the following weeks, the Natanz plant was hit by a newer version of the computer worm, and then another after that. The last of that series of attacks, a few weeks after Stuxnet was detected around the world, temporarily took out nearly 1,000 of the 5,000 centrifuges Iran had spinning at the time to purify uranium.

#### More sophisticated attacks continue

Wilkins 13 Brett Wilkins, founder and editor of MoralLowGround.com, is an author and social justice advocate based in San Francisco, California. March 27, 2013 Moral Low Ground NATO Study: US-Israeli Stuxnet Cyberattack Against Iran Was an Illegal “Act of Force” http://morallowground.com/2013/03/27/nato-study-us-israeli-stuxnet-cyberattack-against-iran-was-an-illegal-act-of-force/

Although the United States nor Israel has ever publicly acknowledged responsibility for the Stuxnet attacks against Iran, US officials have anonymously admitted to numerous news sources that the two allies carried out the attacks. According to these sources, the cyberattacks, codenamed Olympic Games, begun during the George W. Bush administration and continued during Barack Obama’s tenure. The New York Times reported in June 2012 that Obama “secretly ordered increasingly sophisticated attacks on the computer systems that run Iran’s main nuclear enrichment facilities.”

### Infrastructure

#### International scholars agree stuxnet was an attack on infrastructure and act of force

Waterman 13 Shaun Waterman-The Washington Times Sunday, March 24, 2013 U.S.-Israeli cyberattack on Iran was ‘act of force,’ NATO study found <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/mar/24/us-israeli-cyberattack-on-iran-was-act-of-force->

The 2009 cyberattack by the U.S. and Israel that crippled Iran’s nuclear program by sabotaging industrial equipment constituted “an act of force” and was likely illegal under international law, according to a manual commissioned by NATO’s cyber defense center in Estonia.

“Acts that kill or injure persons or destroy or damage objects are unambiguously uses of force,” according to “The Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare.”

Michael N. Schmitt, the manual’s lead author, told The Washington Times that “according to the U.N. charter, the use of force is prohibited, except in self-defense.”

Under the charter, states may use force in self-defense — and that, some argue, includes “anticipatory self-defense” against an incipient or imminent attack.

The international group of researchers who wrote the manual were unanimous that Stuxnet — the self-replicating cyberweapon that destroyed Iranian centrifuges that were enriching uranium — was an act of force, said Mr. Schmitt, professor of international law at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, R.I.

#### Cyber attacks like Stuxnet on nuclear infrastructure constitute large scale acts of force

Wilkins 13 Brett Wilkins, founder and editor of MoralLowGround.com, is an author and social justice advocate based in San Francisco, California. March 27, 2013 Moral Low Ground NATO Study: US-Israeli Stuxnet Cyberattack Against Iran Was an Illegal “Act of Force” http://morallowground.com/2013/03/27/nato-study-us-israeli-stuxnet-cyberattack-against-iran-was-an-illegal-act-of-force/

A study commissioned by NATO has found that the 2009 US-Israeli cyberattack on Iran’s nuclear program was “an act of force” that was likely a violation of international law.

The Washington Times reports that the study, published in a manual commissioned by NATO’s cyber defense center in Estonia, accuses the US and Israel of violating the United Nations charter by presumably unleashing the Stuxnet computer worm against cascades and centrifuges at Iran’s Natanz uranium enrichment plant in 2009 and 2010, and possibly in 2008 as well. It is known that Stuxnet was developed by Israel and the United States, most likely in a bid to stymie Iran’s ability to develop nuclear weapons, although the US does not acknowledge having any role in the attack. The devastating cyberattacks are believed to have set the Iranian nuclear program back by several years, although US and Israeli military and civilian leaders concur that Iran was not and is not trying to develop nuclear weapons.

“Acts that kill or injure persons or destroy or damage objects are unambiguously uses of force,” the Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare states.

“According to the UN charter, the use of force is prohibited, except in self-defense,” Michael N. Schmitt, the manual’s lead author and professor of international law at the US Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island told the Washington Times.

Schmitt said the study’s authors unanimously agreed that the US-Israeli actions against Iran constituted acts of force, but that they were split over whether or not the cyberattacks rose to the level of “armed attacks.” According to Democracy Now!, some of the authors believed that the US-Israeli actions were indeed an “armed attack” that marked the start of a conflict that entitled Iran to use force to defend itself.

Under the UN charter, an armed attack by one state against another entitles the attacked state to retaliate with force in self-defense. A state of armed conflict then exists, with all involved parties subject to the laws of war, including the Geneva Conventions.

#### Iran proliferation causes regional proliferation.

Brookes, 10 (Peter, a Heritage Foundation senior fellow, is a former deputy assistant secretary of defense, Congressional staffer, CIA and State Department officer, and navy veteran. The Post-Iran Proliferation Cascade. Journal of International Security Affaris. Fall Winter 2010. 19. http://www.securityaffairs.org/issues/2010/19/brookes.php)

In just the last four years, no fewer than fourteen countries in the Middle East and North Africa have announced their intention to pursue civilian nuclear programs–programs which, irrespective of their stated purpose, many believe are a hedge against the possibility of a nuclear Iran.¶ Possible Atomic Aspirants¶ Syria¶ United Arab Emirates¶ Jordan¶ Egypt¶ Yemen¶ Saudi Arabia¶ Bahrain¶ Kuwait¶ Oman¶ Qatar¶ Algeria¶ Libya¶ Morocco¶ Tunisia¶ Of course, it is possible that the intentions of these states are honest ones, spurred on by domestic energy needs. Not all countries are blessed with abundant natural resources, and consequently could be seeking an efficient and durable source of energy. There are even those that may be attempting to diversify their energy sources beyond simply oil and natural gas, or seeking to free up their energy reserves for profitable international export instead of costly domestic consumption. In addition, due to increasing concerns about climate change, some have come to see nuclear power, once considered an expensive investment, as an attractive alternative to fossil fuels, due to its reduced emissions and potential cost efficiency.¶ In some cases, it could also be an issue of national pride–a matter of keeping up with the nuclear Jones-es; or even an effort to demonstrate to your neighbors and the world the scientific and technical achievement involved in developing, building, and safely operating a peaceful, civilian nuclear power industry.¶ Of course, developing an indigenous nuclear industry is a significant undertaking. A nuclear reactor can take a decade and three to ten billion dollars to build. Even more time and money is required if a full nuclear fuel cycle, including enrichment capacity, is desired.¶ But such work is transformative. The development of scientific and technical capabilities for a civilian nuclear power program is instrumental to the subsequent building of the bomb. Even if it remains in compliance with the tenets of the NPT, a state can go quite a long way toward developing a nuclear program with a potential military dimension. Having the necessary nuclear infrastructure, especially that which would provide for a full nuclear fuel cycle, would allow concerned states to offset an Iranian nuclear breakout by possessing the theoretical potential to create a nuclear arsenal themselves.¶ Indeed, some analysts see the construction of nuclear power plants in Saudi Arabia as symbolic of Riyadh’s dread over Iran’s nuclear activities, and as a move which will surely deepen tensions between the cross-Gulf rivals. In fact, many are convinced that the development of an Iranian Shi’a bomb will inevitably be matched by a Saudi Sunni bomb. It has long been rumored the Saudis have a deal with the Pakistanis for access to its nuclear inventory, or the stationing of Islamabad’s nuclear-capable missiles in the Kingdom in the likelihood of a change in Iran’s nuclear status.5¶ Of course, while this is possible, it does pose a number of political and strategic dilemmas for Pakistan, such as the health of its relationship with neighboring Iran, and a potential dilution of its nuclear deterrent against rival India. Egypt, the long-standing leader of the Arab world, operates two research reactors, has significant scientific and technical capabilities on nuclear matters, and is interested in nuclear power. Of course, developing a nuclear program with a military dimension is a possibility; however, doing so would surely hurt its ties with United States, could increase tensions with neighboring Israel, and drain less-than-plentiful government coffers.¶ Other countries that have expressed an interest in nuclear power, such as Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia, are likely doing so because of more local concerns. None of them have significant indigenous energy sources, and as a result are focused on the development of alternative energy sources. But that isn’t true for all of the states that have launched atomic plans. Kuwait and Qatar have significant holdings of oil and natural gas, which makes their respective decisions to pursue a nuclear program difficult to explain in a context other than that of a hedge against Iran’s growing capabilities.¶ And in some cases, these nuclear dreams have started to become reality. For example, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), a country with the fifth largest proven oil reserves in the Middle East, last year completed a “123” agreement with the United States, paving the way for heightened nuclear cooperation and technology transfer between Washington and Abu Dhabi. During the Bush administration, Bahrain, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia also signed Memoranda of Understanding related to nuclear cooperation that–if pursued by the Obama White House–could lead to additional agreements such as the one struck with the UAE.¶ Turkey, another major regional power and NATO member, is also considering its nuclear options. Since taking power in 2002, the country’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) has plotted a friendlier course toward neighboring Iran, a country Ankara historically has seen as a competitor. But despite the current, warm ties, Ankara may eventually come to see Tehran as a regional rival that could “undercut Turkey’s desired role as a respected and powerful mediator between east and west,” according to a 2008 Report to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.6 Indeed, a shift in Ankara’s sentiments toward Tehran could incite interest in a nuclear program with a military dimension. And the current strains in Turkey’s existing relationships with the United States and Europe may make such a decision less taboo than in the past.¶ Then there is Syria. Damascus was caught with its hands in the nuclear cookie jar when Israel destroyed its undeclared nuclear facility at al-Kibar back in 2007. That plant–likely a reactor capable of producing fissile material–was being built with North Korean assistance.7 Of course, Syria’s nuclear activities are not focused on checking Iran; indeed, given the enduring partnership between the two countries, Syria might be receiving nuclear assistance from Iran. Rather, Syria’s strategic efforts are directed toward Israel.¶ Regional states are also banding together in pursuit of nuclear status. Most directly, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)–consisting of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, UAE, and Qatar–is now said to be contemplating a joint nuclear program that would pool resources and share electrical power among member states.8 And although some of the members’ interest in nuclear issues is stronger than others, as evidenced by the existence of separate indigenous programs, many analysts believe this joint effort was sparked specifically in response to Iran’s nuclear activities.9.

#### Israeli military strikes

A. Cyber attacks prevent Israeli military attack

Haaretz 13 Haaretz May 16, 2013 (Israeli newspaper) Stuxnet worm aided Iranian nuclear program, researcher says New report claims that the Stuxnet worm, meant to disrupt operations at Iran's nuclear facilities, may have actually hindered Western diplomatic efforts. http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/stuxnet-worm-aided-iranian-nuclear-program-researcher-says-1.524367

According to a book published a year ago, U.S. President Barack Obama had ordered an escalation of cyber warfare operations, and co-ordinated with Israelis tightened in order to prevent an IDF attack on Iran

#### Israeli strike on Iran triggers world war III.

Reuveny, 10 (Rafael Reuveny is a professor in the School of Public and Environmental Affairs at Indiana University. Con: Unilateral strike could trigger World War III, global depression, [http://gazettextra.com/news/2010/aug/07/con-unilateral-strike-could-trigger-world-war-iii-/#sthash.tGUOoSDf.dpuf](http://gazettextra.com/news/2010/aug/07/con-unilateral-strike-could-trigger-world-war-iii-/" \l "sthash.tGUOoSDf.dpuf))

A unilateral Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities would likely have dire consequences, including a regional war, global economic collapse and a major power clash.¶ For an Israeli campaign to succeed, it must be quick and decisive. This requires an attack that would be so overwhelming that Iran would not dare to respond in full force.¶ Such an outcome is extremely unlikely since the locations of some of Iran’s nuclear facilities are not fully known and known facilities are buried deep underground.¶ All of these widely spread facilities are shielded by elaborate air defense systems constructed not only by the Iranians but also the Chinese and, likely, the Russians as well.¶ By now, Iran has also built redundant command and control systems and nuclear facilities, developed early warning systems, acquired ballistic and cruise missiles and upgraded and enlarged its armed forces.¶ Because Iran is well-prepared, a single, conventional Israeli strike—or even numerous strikes—could not destroy all of its capabilities, giving Iran time to respond.¶ Unlike Iraq, whose nuclear program Israel destroyed in 1981, Iran has a second-strike capability comprised of a coalition of Iranian, Syrian, Lebanese, Hezbollah, Hamas, and, perhaps, Turkish forces. Internal pressure might compel Jordan, Egypt, and the Palestinian Authority to join the assault, turning a bad situation into a regional war.¶ During the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, at the apex of its power, Israel was saved from defeat by President Nixon’s shipment of weapons and planes. Today, Israel’s numerical inferiority is greater, and it faces more determined and better-equipped opponents.¶ Despite Israel’s touted defense systems, Iranian coalition missiles, armed forces, and terrorist attacks would likely wreak havoc on its enemy, leading to a prolonged tit-for-tat.¶ In the absence of massive U.S. assistance, Israel’s military resources may quickly dwindle, forcing it to use its alleged nuclear weapons, as it had reportedly almost done in 1973.¶ An Israeli nuclear attack would likely destroy most of Iran’s capabilities, but a crippled Iran and its coalition could still attack neighboring oil facilities, unleash global terrorism, plant mines in the Persian Gulf and impair maritime trade in the Mediterranean, Red Sea and Indian Ocean.¶ Middle Eastern oil shipments would likely slow to a trickle as production declines due to the war and insurance companies decide to drop their risky Middle Eastern clients. Iran and Venezuela would likely stop selling oil to the United States and Europe.¶ The world economy would head into a tailspin; international acrimony would rise; and Iraqi and Afghani citizens might fully turn on the United States, immediately requiring the deployment of more American troops. Russia, China, Venezuela, and maybe Brazil and Turkey — all of which essentially support Iran — could be tempted to form an alliance and openly challenge the U.S. hegemony.¶ ¶ Russia and China might rearm their injured Iranian protege overnight, just as Nixon rearmed Israel, and threaten to intervene, just as the U.S.S.R. threatened to join Egypt and Syria in 1973. President Obama’s response would likely put U.S. forces on nuclear alert, replaying Nixon’s nightmarish scenario.¶ Iran may well feel duty-bound to respond to a unilateral attack by its Israeli archenemy, but it knows that it could not take on the United States head-to-head. In contrast, if the United States leads the attack, Iran’s response would likely be muted.¶ If Iran chooses to absorb an American-led strike, its allies would likely protest and send weapons, but would probably not risk using force.¶ While no one has a crystal ball, leaders should be risk-averse when choosing war as a foreign policy tool. If attacking Iran is deemed necessary, Israel must wait for an American green light. A unilateral Israeli strike could ultimately spark World War III.

#### jacks credibility

Bolton, senior fellow – AEI, 4/15/’11

(John, <http://www.aei.org/article/103463>)

Inside Iran, we now have confirmation—thanks to disclosures this month by an Iranian opposition group, which have been confirmed by Iranian officials—that the regime has the capability to mass-produce critical components for centrifuges used to enrich uranium to weapons-grade levels. That news proves again the inefficacy of U.N. Security Council resolutions and sanctions against a determined adversary.

Thus Iran's weapons program proceeds full steam ahead, which only emphasizes to would-be proliferators that persistence pays. Moammar Gadhafi surrendered his nuclear weapons program in 2003-04 because he feared becoming the next Saddam Hussein, but he is now undoubtedly cursing his timidity. Had he made seven years of progress toward deliverable nuclear weapons, there would surely be no NATO bombing of his military today.

An Iranian nuclear capability would undoubtedly cause Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey and perhaps others to seek their own deliverable nuclear weapons. We would therefore see a region substantially more in Iran's thrall and far more unstable and dangerous for Washington and its allies.

Moreover, America's failure to stop Iran's nuclear ambitions—which is certainly how it would be perceived worldwide—would be a substantial blow to U.S. influence in general. Terrorists and their state sponsors would see Iran's unchallenged role as terrorism's leading state sponsor and central banker, and would wonder what they have to lose.

## Case

#### No cyberwar - deterrence checks.

Bucci 9 [Steven P., Ph.D in IR, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs, The Confluence of Cyber Crime and Terrorism, Heritage Lecture #1123 June 12, 2009, http://www.heritage.org/research/nationalsecurity/hl1123.cfm]

This kind of large-scale attack can only come from a nation-state and obviously constitutes our most dangerous scenario. It is very fortunate that it is also not a very likely one. The reason is old-fashioned deterrence. In the same way our cyber and physical infrastructures make us vulnerable to this scenario, any attacking nation-state must have its own infrastructure capabilities to be able to execute it. Those cyber capabilities and kinetic forces used in the attack are also potential targets, as is the remainder of the attacker's critical infrastructure. Basically, it is unlikely that a nation-state would do this, because they also have much at stake. Deterrence, in the same way we have understood it for over 50 years, still applies to nation-states in all the ways it does not apply to terrorists, criminals, and other non-state actors. A large-scale cyber attack or cyber-enabled kinetic attack by a peer competitor on another country runs the risk of a large-scale response from the target or the target's allies and friends. While this will not dissuade every nation-state-backed cyber threat--the thousands of probes, minor attacks, and espionage actions prove that--it has continued and will continue to keep this type of nightmare scenario from moving into the "likely" category. Yes, we must prepare for it, but if this is the only thing we prepare for, we will have failed our countries.

#### No cyber war – deterrence.

Lewis 11 [Project Director James A. Lewis January 2011 a report of the csis commission on cybersecurity for the 44th presidency Cybersecurity Two Years Later Commission Cochairs Representative James R. Langevin Representative Michael T. McCaul Scott Charney Lt. General Harry Raduege, USAF (ret.) <http://csis.org/files/publication/110128_Lewis_CybersecurityTwoYearsLater_Web.pdf>]

However, we are not engaged in a cyber war. Short of armed conflict, nation-states are unlikely to launch cyber attacks against the United States. **The political risk is too high.** Just as with missiles and aircraft, countries can strike the United States using cyber attack, but they know this would trigger a violent if not devastating response. The risks are too high for frivolous engagement.

#### Adversaries won’t comply with rules – too strategic and cheap to break

Baker 11 Stewart Baker is a former official at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the National Security Agency, 9/30/11, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/09/30/denial\_of\_service?page=0,0&page=full

American lawyers' attempts to limit the scope of cyberwar are just as certain to fail as FDR's limits on air war -- and perhaps more so.¶ It's true that half a century of limited war has taught U.S. soldiers to operate under strict restraints, in part because winning hearts and minds has been a higher priority than destroying the enemy's infrastructure. But it's unwise to put too much faith in the notion that this change is permanent. Those wars were limited because the stakes were limited, at least for the United States. Observing limits had a cost, but one the country could afford. In a way, that was true for the Luftwaffe, too, at least at the start. They were on offense, and winning, after all. But when the British struck Berlin, the cost was suddenly too high. Germans didn't want law and diplomatic restraint; they wanted retribution -- an eye for an eye. When cyberwar comes to America and citizens start to die for lack of power, gas, and money, it's likely that they'll want the same.¶ More likely, really, because Roosevelt's bargain was far stronger than any legal restraints we're likely to see on cyberwar. Roosevelt could count on a shared European horror at the aerial destruction of cities. The modern world has no such understanding -- indeed, no such shared horror -- regarding cyberwar. Quite the contrary. For some of America's potential adversaries, the idea that both sides in a conflict could lose their networked infrastructure holds no horror. For some, a conflict that reduces both countries to eating grass sounds like a contest they might be able to win.¶ What's more, cheating is easy and strategically profitable. America's compliance will be enforced by all those lawyers. Its adversaries' compliance will be enforced by, well, by no one. It will be difficult, if not impossible, to find a return address on their cyberattacks. They can ignore the rules and say -- hell, they are saying -- "We're not carrying out cyberattacks. We're victims too. Maybe you're the attacker. Or maybe it's Anonymous. Where's your proof?"¶ Even if all sides were genuinely committed to limiting cyberwar, as they were in 1939, history shows that it only takes a single error to break the legal limits forever. And error is inevitable. Bombs dropped by desperate pilots under fire go astray -- and so do cyberweapons. Stuxnet infected thousands of networks as it searched blindly for Iran's uranium-enrichment centrifuges. The infections lasted far longer than intended. Should we expect fewer errors from code drafted in the heat of battle and flung at hazard toward the enemy?¶ Of course not. But the lesson of all this for the lawyers and the diplomats is stark: Their effort to impose limits on cyberwar is almost certainly doomed.¶ No one can welcome this conclusion, at least not in the United States. The country has advantages in traditional war that it lacks in cyberwar. Americans are not used to the idea that launching even small wars on distant continents may cause death and suffering at home. That is what drives the lawyers -- they hope to maintain the old world. But they're being driven down a dead end.¶ If America wants to defend against the horrors of cyberwar, it needs first to face them, with the candor of a Stanley Baldwin. Then the country needs to charge its military strategists, not its lawyers, with constructing a cyberwar strategy for the world we live in, not the world we'd like to live in.¶ That strategy needs both an offense and a defense. The offense must be powerful enough to deter every adversary with something to lose in cyberspace, so it must include a way to identify attackers with certainty. The defense, too, must be realistic, making successful cyberattacks more difficult and less effective because resilience and redundancy has been built into U.S. infrastructure.¶ Once the United States has a strategy for winning a cyberwar, it can ask the lawyers for their thoughts. But it can't be done the other way around.

### Soft power

**Obama won’t deploy legitimacy effectively**

Ford 12

Christopher Ford, Senior Fellow at Hudson Institute in Washington, D.C. He previously served as U.S. Special Representative for Nuclear Nonproliferation, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, and General Counsel to the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, SAIS Review Volume 32, Number 1, Winter-Spring 2012, “Soft on “Soft Power””, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/sais\_review/v032/32.1.ford.html //jchen

Additionally, the “soft power-obsessed” Obama Administration has been remarkably reluctant to employ even limited values-promotion tools at its disposal. Though President Obama spoke favorably about democracy in his much-publicized June 2009 speech to a Muslim audience in Cairo, he defined democracy merely as having “governments that reflect the will of the people” and seemed curiously ambivalent about promoting more specifically American ideas like the right periodically to change their government through free and fair elections, and that no branch of government—nor indeed the government itself—should be permitted to accrue unchallengeable power.

In fact, Obama went out of his way to specify that “[each] nation gives life to this principle [of reflecting the will of the people] in its own way,” and pointedly excluded mention of voting or checks upon unbridled government power in his list of the things for which “all people yearn.” (The closest the president came to describing democratic political choice was to observe that governments “must maintain . . . power through consent, not coercion,” though this is a standard that could presumably be met, at least initially, by a popular despot or an authoritarian oligarchy which takes public opinion into account when making decrees.) This careful neglect of political rights was perhaps incongruous in a speech that began with a lament that “colonialism [had] denied rights and opportunities to many Muslims,”12 particularly for an administration so taken with the supposed virtues of “soft” power projection.

The Obama Administration then approached Iran’s “Green Revolution” with painful rhetorical reticence in 2009–2010, sacrificed candor about Russia’s retreat into autocracy on the altar of an expedient nuclear disarmament-focused “reset” of relations with Moscow, and explicitly promised not to let human rights concerns “interfere” with America’s economic relationship with Beijing.13 The American role in promoting democracy in Egypt in 2011 was also for a time decidedly ambivalent, with U.S. officials still calling for President Hosni Mubarak to stay in office until just before his resignation.14 After a long period of embarrassing silence in which U.S. officials bizarrely quoted assessments describing Syrian dictator Bashar al-Asad as a “reformer,”15 the Obama Administration finally spoke out against his bloody efforts to repress Syria’s pro-democracy movement, ultimately calling on Assad to step down.16 But the contribution of U.S. pronouncements to effecting change in Syria is, at the time of writing, unclear at best. So far, the Obama Administration’s most conspicuous democracy-promotion [End Page 95] effort was a very “hard power” affair: the war that led to the overthrow and execution of Libyan dictator Muammar Qaddafi.

The Obama Administration sought credit as a promoter of democratic values in mid-2011, as leaked stories appeared about State Department-funded efforts to outfit pro-democracy activists in various countries with portable internet and cell phone equipment capable of circumventing government censorship.17 While such efforts seemed to have real potential, a cyber security expert of my acquaintance describes this program as still being depressingly amateurish from a technical perspective. (A colleague of mine at Hudson Institute, Michael Horowitz, also points out that existing web-censorship circumvention services promoted by the U.S. tend to lack the surge capacity needed to deal with user demand during political crises, when access to such capabilities is likely to be most important.18 )

Meanwhile, even as the authorities in Beijing cracked down hard to preclude any possibility of a Chinese “Oolong Revolution” to parallel the “Jasmine Revolution” of democratization in the Arab world,19 the Obama Administration announced plans to terminate the Voice of America’s Mandarin-language radio and television service in China.20 Given the evident terror of China’s Communist leadership at the idea of its citizens becoming enamored with multiparty democracy and political freedom—a fear evident, for instance, in PRC Politburo members’ warnings that “[enemy] forces” are always trying to “undermine and divide China,” and that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) needs a “line of defense to resist Western two-party and multi-party systems, a bi-cameral legislature, the separation of power and other kinds of erroneous ideological interferences”21 —this seems to be quite a remarkable recusal from the field of “soft power” competition.

Despite the rhetoric about “navigating by our values,” therefore, the Obama Administration has been notably ambivalent about actually promoting them—with President Obama himself apparently seeing nothing exceptional about the American system’s embodiment of the very “values” by which we are expected to “navigate.” On one level, this is not surprising, for the president has said that he believes in American exceptionalism only in the sense that people from any country might believe in the special character of their own country.22 Still, such politically-correct relativism is a strange refuge for someone supposedly committed to making “our values” a key component of the “soft power” with which he was supposed to revolutionize U.S. foreign policy.

In terms of potential economic “soft power,” our free market economy obviously imposes significant constraints upon the degree to which the still-vibrant U.S. business and financial sectors can be used in support of broader national objectives. Nevertheless, the use of economic and financial sanctions has long been an aspect of “soft power” projection available to U.S. officials. (Indeed, as I have noted elsewhere, U.S. leaders seem always to have had great faith in their ability to use trade and other economic incentives to accomplish foreign policy goals.23 ) In the 1990s, the U.S. Congress passed a number of laws requiring the imposition of sanctions on foreign entities involved in the proliferation of ballistic missile or weapons of mass [End Page 96] destruction (WMD). The late Senator Jesse Helms, author of much of this legislation, is not usually regarded as a hero by the proponents of “soft power,” but perhaps a re-think is in order.

The Clinton Administration generally opposed the use of “soft power” in the form of nonproliferation sanctions. In the first administration of George W. Bush, however, when such approaches were championed by then-Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton as an “essential tool,”24 American authorities showed considerable enthusiasm for using sanctions to force foreign companies to make a choice between facilitating proliferation and trading with the world’s largest economy. In the most dramatic example of such sanctions, the Bush Administration sanctioned the Chinese company NORINCO in early 2003 for assisting Iran’s ballistic missile program; this move was said to have cost NORINCO something on the order of $100 million in sales in the United States.25

The Bush Administration also used the prospect of relaxing sanctions, albeit combined with the conspicuously “hard power” anti-WMD message sent by the invasion of Iraq, to draw Libya’s Muammar Qaddafi into the internationally-supervised elimination of his WMD programs in 2003–2004. Except for imposing further sanctions against Iran over its nuclear program, (an arena in which some progress has been made, though more as a result of the outrageousness of Iran’s continuing provocations than anything Washington has actually managed to do),26 the Obama Administration has been remarkably uninterested in nonproliferation sanctions.

On the whole, it is certainly true that precisely because we are a free and democratic society, there are sharp limits upon what a president can do to leverage America’s “soft power.” Nevertheless, today’s White House has been curiously diffident about even trying to use the tools it has. It seems to prefer passive approaches even to the “soft power” it has itself rhetorically championed, and is, to all appearances, simply embarrassed about anything that smacks of affirmative global leadership, preferring to “lead from behind”27 in ways that avoid seeming too pushy or “Bush-like” for contemporary sensibilities.

As suggested above, however, taking a passive approach to “soft power” isn’t really exerting power at all: it is just sitting back and hoping for the best. Such an approach may sometimes work, but it does not deserve much credit as a national strategy, and it is not clear what precisely is so “smart” about the use of “soft power.”

#### Doesn’t spill over in between issues.

Brooks and Wohlforth, Government at Dartmouth, 5 [Professors Government – Dartmouth, Perspectives on Politics 3:509-524]

Drawing on rational choice theory, Downs and Jones show that a far more compelling theoretical case can be made that states have multiple reputations—each particular to a specific agreement or issue area. For this reason, they find that "the reputational consequences of defection are usually more bounded" than institutionalist scholarship currently presumes." 67 If America has, for example, one reputation associated with the UN and another regarding the WTO, then lack of compliance with the former organization will in **no way** directly undercut its ability to gain cooperation in the latter. As Downs and Jones note, viewing states as having multiple reputations "helps to explain why, despite the prevalence of the unitary reputation assumption, examples of a state's defection from an agreement in one area (for example, environment) jeopardizing its reputation in every other area (for example, trade and security) **are virtually nonexistent** in the literature."68 This conclusion is consistent with the **two most detailed studies of reputation in IR**, which decisively undercut the notion that states have a general reputation that will strongly influence how other states relate across different issue areas.69 In the end, the current lack of an empirical or theoretical justification for the notion that states carry a single reputation means that we have **no basis** for accepting the institutionalists' argument that America must endorse multilateralism across the board because to do otherwise has consequences that endanger the entire institutional order. That, together with theory's lack of purchase on the issues of coordination costs and bargaining power, invalidates the institutionalist argument about the high cost of unilateralism.

#### China won’t attack.

MacGregor 11 [Lean, Mean Fighting Machine How to slash the Pentagon budget? Declare victory and go home. BY DOUGLAS MACGREGOR | APRIL 26, 2011 http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/04/26/lean\_mean\_fighting\_machine]

For one thing, there is no existential military threat to the United States or to its vital strategic interests. The nuclear arsenals in Russia and China could be used against the United States and its forces, but Russian and Chinese leaders have no incentive to contemplate suicide in a nuclear confrontation with the United States. Russia's diminished million-man armed forces are hard-pressed to modernize, let alone secure their own country, which borders 14 other states. For all its rhetoric, Russia's military focus is on restive Muslim populations in the Caucasus and Central Asia, not on NATO. As for China, its top concern is not military confrontation with the United States, but domestic growing pains, especially the potential for its 1.3 billion people to overwhelm the Communist Party's internal political structures. China's internal focus on modernization and stability militates against external aggression, and this condition is unlikely to change for a very long time. Despite China's ability to steal or buy sophisticated technology, the military establishment cannot quickly or easily translate these technologies into new capabilities, and Beijing knows it.

#### Economics trump all.

Shepard et al. 10 [Kevin, Kelly Fellow at the Pacific Forum CSIS and a research fellow with the Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University, Kim Fassler, Galen Tan, and Wallis Yu, Getting To the Core of US-China Relations, The Heart of the Matter: ‘Core Interests’ in the US-China Relationship PACIFIC FORUM CSIS YOUNG LEADERS Issues & Insights Vol. 10 – No. 21 Honolulu, Hawaii August 2010 http://csis.org/files/publication/issuesinsights\_vol10n21.pdf]

Economic growth is a core interest of both China and the US, and it is the area that usually offers the most opportunities for cooperation, although much of this is in the private sector. On the whole, both countries benefit from their increasing economic ties, with US investment going into China and Chinese goods going to the US. While trade imbalances and currency manipulation may cause chaffing, **economic integration is the driving and stabilizing force in the relationship**. Both countries are keenly aware of the devastating economic effects that a military conflict between them would cause, and **neither wants to test that in reality**. It is **highly unlikely** that either side would be willing to engage in a direct military conflict because of the economic consequences. However, both the US and China are quick to protect their economic interests when they see them threatened, as can be seen in US calls for revaluation of the Chinese Yuan, competition for natural resources and occasional trade disputes. While both sides use heated rhetoric when these conflicts boil to the surface, the two countries are often eager to put the issue behind them by working in a more low-key fashion, largely out of public view.

#### No hotspots, and shared interests outweigh

Etzioni 13

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Haas stops short of pointing out the inevitable conclusion of his analysis: that what we see here is, indeed, another case where a new power rises, the prevailing power cannot accommodate its rise, and, hence, war inevitably ensues. However, he does not spell out which core interests cannot be reconciled. The fact is that since its transition to state capitalism, China has shown no indication of seeking to replace the U.S. as a global power. In effect, it is quite content with the U.S. bearing the costs and risks of building stable governments in the Middle East, securing the flow of oil, and otherwise managing the global commons. Regarding Taiwan, both powers in effect have settled on a tacit acceptance of the status quo with China finding that it can quite effectively draw Taiwan into its orbit via economic cooperation and exchange. China would be extremely foolish to attack Japan’s mainland. Moreover, the United States’ core interests in the region are far from obvious. Surely it needs to live up to its commitments to various allies, but these can be renegotiated, and the remaining ones can be supported via the remote projection of force. There are some areas of conflict, but these pale in comparison to the areas in which the U.S. and China have shared interests, including preserving global financial stability, preventing nuclear proliferation, curbing North Korea, and countering terrorism. Hence the quest for finding peaceful ways of resolving remaining conflicts, such as matters concerning the Exclusive Economic Zone, and the contested islands, and free passage on the high seas. This is what MAR is all about.