# 1NC

## Topicality

#### Restriction is a prohibition on authority

Northglenn 11 (City of Northglenn Zoning Ordinance, “Rules of Construction – Definitions”, http://www.northglenn.org/municode/ch11/content\_11-5.html)

Section 11-5-3. Restrictions. As used in this Chapter 11 of the Municipal Code, theterm "restriction" shall mean a prohibitive regulation. Any use, activity, operation, building, structure or thing which is the subject of a restriction is prohibited, and no such use, activity, operation, building, structure or thing shall be authorized by any permit or license.

#### Violation – they advocate the US simply stop detaining bodies, not a restriction of its authority to do so.

#### Self-restraint is distinct from restriction – one is self-imposed, the other is externally imposed.

#### Allowing internal regulation means literally infinite different affs

Dehn 11 John C. Dehn, Assistant Professor, Department of Law, United States Military Academy Temple Law Review Spring, 2011 83 Temp. L. Rev. 599 ARTICLE: THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF AND THE NECESSITIES OF WAR: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

B. The Constitutional Design and Military Regulation There is little question that the Framers adopted a new approach to command and control of national armed forces. By vesting Commander-in-Chief authority in the President while placing the authority to raise, maintain, govern, and regulate the military in Congress, the Constitution broke with the condition then existing in Great Britain. Alexander Hamilton described the difference as follows:¶ The president is to be commander in chief of the army and navy of the United States. In this respect his authority would be nominally the same with that of the king of Great Britain, but in substance much inferior to it. It would amount to nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces, as first general and admiral of the confederacy; while that of the British king extends to the declaring of war, and to the raising and regulating of fleets and armies; all which, by the constitution under consideration, would appertain to the legislature. [n57](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.328472.6824377424&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T18289623894&parent=docview&rand=1380754736175&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n57) While some commentary has suggested that this relative vesting of constitutional powers over the military implies that the President has no power to regulate the military, [n58](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.328472.6824377424&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T18289623894&parent=docview&rand=1380754736175&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n58) this is clearly inaccurate. The directive authority of military command equates to a near infinite power of internal regulation. [n59](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.328472.6824377424&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T18289623894&parent=docview&rand=1380754736175&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n59) A commander need not repeatedly issue the same order to assert his or her directive authority over routine tasks. Effective command requires that many directives be made generally applicable and remain in effect until rescinded or superseded. [n60](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.328472.6824377424&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T18289623894&parent=docview&rand=1380754736175&reloadEntirePage=true#n60) Therefore, some power to establish standing orders, or regulations, must necessarily exist. [n61](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.328472.6824377424&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T18289623894&parent=docview&rand=1380754736175&reloadEntirePage=true#n61) As Madison explained, "no axiom is more clearly established in law, or in reason, than that wherever the end is required, the means are authorized; wherever a general power to do a thing is given, every particular power necessary for doing it is included." [n62](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.328472.6824377424&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T18289623894&parent=docview&rand=1380754736175&reloadEntirePage=true#n62) This understanding was later echoed by Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland. [n63](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.328472.6824377424&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T18289623894&parent=docview&rand=1380754736175&reloadEntirePage=true#n63) [\*613] Equally clear was both Madison and Marshall's belief that these "necessary' powers are implied from the nature of the power expressly granted. [n64](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.328472.6824377424&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T18289623894&parent=docview&rand=1380754736175&reloadEntirePage=true#n64) The general directive authority intrinsic to "military command" is undoubtedly why the Supreme Court has consistently upheld the internal regulatory authority of the Commander-in-Chief and his subordinate commanders. [n65](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.328472.6824377424&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T18289623894&parent=docview&rand=1380754736175&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n65)

#### College students and academic communities have an obligation to learn and discuss governmental policies

Shaw 09

Douglas B. Shaw, associate dean for planning, research, and external relations and as an assistant professor of international affairs at George Washington University's [Elliott School of International Affairs](http://www.gwu.edu/~elliott/) 26 May 2009 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Reintroducing arms control to higher education

http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/op-eds/reintroducing-arms-control-to-higher-education

When it comes to nuclear disarmament, **N**uclear **T**hreat **I**nitiative **Chair**man Sam **Nunn has admitted that** "we can't see the top of the mountain." In part, this is because **the U.S. higher education community lags behind in educating the next generation of** nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament **experts and scholars**. **The drift** **of resources, course offerings, and scholarly attention** **away from nuclear weapons** **has obscured the growth of** at least four sets of **implicit tensions** **within the nuclear epistemic community, and it is now up to higher education institutions** to surface and manage these tensions.

The first set of tensions involves the transformation of nonproliferation regime institutions. This comes, in part, from the temptation to look backward in nuclear negotiations. The U.N. General Assembly has failed to control nuclear weapons. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and other commitments embedded in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) are years overdue. The "thirteen steps" on a practical path toward nuclear disarmament identified at the 2000 NPT Review Conference are a good start, but there have been few new ideas to realize the potential of technological, political, and social developments. Higher education must educate a next generation to look forward in examining these institutions. Prudent and verifiable progress may include new fora for negotiations, new governmental structures, new issue linkages, and new technologies and procedures for enhancing global confidence.

The second set of tensions involves universality. In reality, the exclusive superpower prerogative over the nuclear future ended long ago. Every human being is threatened by nuclear weapons and has a legitimate stake in nuclear negotiations. But vastly more people need to understand these topics in order to create a global order that can control nuclear weapons permanently. Moving forward, useful negotiations will involve an increasing number of parties--and this must extend beyond inviting the British, French, and Chinese to participate directly in U.S.-Russian strategic arms reduction negotiations or the pursuit of a global nuclear weapons convention. More far-reaching and innovative solutions must be put forward. For example, we might consider how follow-on generations of nuclear safeguard enhancements might expand the use of transparency. In addition, we might consider confidence-building measures that enhance global verification in the arms reduction process or reinforce nuclear weapon states' negative security assurances.

Peaceful uses of nuclear energy encompass a third group of tensions. The prospect of "power too cheap to meter" has tantalized leaders into compromises about proliferation risk since the dawn of the nuclear age. President Dwight D. Eisenhower's vision of "Atoms for Peace" led to these compromises being written into the NPT and the mandate of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Internationalization of the nuclear fuel supply, the dilution of international safeguards to suit any one state, the spread of nuclear power to additional countries, and the widening understanding of plutonium as an energy resource may each have a purpose, but they also imply identifiable risks for the future. Going forward, experts must be trained to assess these current challenges to nuclear energy. They must also look further afield and learn to examine the effects climate change and oil dependence will have on future proliferation compromises since such new risks will undoubtedly accompany any "nuclear renaissance."

Most importantly, a fourth group of tensions involves deterrence stability on the way to zero. Deterrence isn't a reliable piece of hardware, so we must be increasingly clear about why we have nuclear weapons, what we imagine destroying, how many we need available on short notice, and how others will react to our choices. Currently, Al Qaeda aims to provoke the United States to overreact, and at the same time, is attempting to convince the world the United States must be resisted. But in a key moment we may find that the fear nuclear weapons are built to instill doesn't necessarily serve our interests. The perceptions of allies and billions of innocent bystanders too often are assumed irrelevant or even requiring a larger nuclear arsenal for "extended deterrence." Looking forward, it is incumbent that the soundness and costs of each of these assumptions are continuously tested and improved.

**The trade-offs between uncertain paths forward should be explicitly debated both by today's experts and tomorrow's nascent explorers.** **These tensions** of zero--institutional transformation, universality, peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and deterrence--**will never be cleanly resolved. But if we're lucky, we will be managing them long after the legal abolition of nuclear weapons. Learning to do so effectively is the work of a generation, and we are a generation behind in preparing our best and brightest for this work. This suggests an intimidating, but attainable, goal for higher education institutions.**

## Cap K

#### Indefinite Detention is not spurred by racism, but rather the authoritarian neoliberal state which pre-empts dissent

Loo 13

Dennis Loo Associate Professor of Sociology at Cal Poly Pomona, 4/27/13, "Courting Catastrophe: Neoliberalism's Provoking of Disasters on the Micro and Macro Levels", http://dennisloo.com/Sample-Data-Articles/courting-catastrophe-neoliberalism-s-provoking-of-disasters-on-the-micro-and-macro-levels.html //jchen

As they laud their respect for the rule of law and for democracy and liberty, neoliberals have been systematically insulating the government and corporate world, especially the highest executive levels, from the people’s opinions and voices, creating an executive that is not accountable or even supervised by any other governmental branch or by the People. This reflects a momentous shift in governmental norms worldwide that begin in the 1970s known as public order policies that treat everyone as a suspect and where governmental coercion can be used upon you pre-emptively, even if you have committed no crime. What was displayed as a dystopian future in the film Minority Report, in other words, is now the emergent standard of governance. These policies have been instituted under the signboard of the “war on terror” but their inception date from before 9/11 and are not being carried out because of anti-state terrorism. This explains the adoption of expressly fascist laws such as Obama’s open use of assassination of those he alone has designated as enemies of the state and the National Defense Authorization Act of 2012 that, upon Obama’s request, included American citizens picked up on U.S. soil as among those who can, simply by accusation, be arrested and held indefinitely without a right to challenge their detention.

Neoliberals’ insistence on what amounts to dictatorial powers and their campaign to override the rule of law is necessary because if their true agenda were publicly unveiled, it would go down to ignominious defeat since their agenda means the relentless exploitation of the vast majority of humanity and the pillaging of the environment. Neoliberal policies systematically stick it to the public and deprive them of the means to life. Given this, there is no way that they can stay in power if they don’t utilize increasingly unfettered forms of power. That explains the yawning gap between what they’re doing and what they are saying about what they’re doing: they can only get their way through misrepresentation, manipulation, and force. Authorities’ forcible evictions of the Occupy encampments in spite of and in fact, in significant respect, due to the popularity of Occupy, are an example of authorities’ intolerance for dissent and exposés of their policies.

#### Their myopic focus on a particular manifestation of oppression does not provide a specific explanation for the broader linking of struggles – inhibits the possibility for transformative politics.

Heideman 12 [Paul M. Heideman Rutgers University, Newark, pmheideman@gmail.com Historical Materialism Volume 20, Issue 2, pages 210- 221 Beyond Black and White: Transforming African-American Politics, Manning Marable, Second Edition, London: Verso, 2009]

This theorisation of transformative politics is further weakened by its failure to specify any agency that could bring it about. Marable comes close to specifying such an agency with his repeated call to look to ‘the most oppressed sectors of our society’ for a vision of social transformation (pp. xv, 80, 310). Such a call is clearly inadequate. It simply does not follow that the most oppressed sectors of society are best positioned to carry out its most thorough remaking. The homeless, for example, are certainly among the most oppressed groups in the United States (especially in the age of the destruction of free public space and the social safety-net), yet this position does not automatically impart the most radical dynamics to their struggle. Indeed, struggles for squatters’ rights and shelters very rarely break out of localised confrontations with municipal authorities. 8 Additionally, Marable offers no account of how the disparate struggles of the oppressed (for example, the fight against anti-immigrant racism and the fight for the rights of the disabled) are to be unified, beyond the assertion that every confrontation with inequality automatically is linked to every other. Such an inadequate account of social-movement agency deeply weakens whatever strengths Marable’s theory of transformative politics may possess.

#### The continued existence of capitalism forms the basis for all inequalities and oppressions. We do not deny that racialized violence happens and is important to address, but absent a rejection of the class system racism will continue to be deployed as a means to divide and rule the working class and to preserve increasingly wide material disparities.

Taylor 11 [Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor, doctoral candidate in the department of African-American studies at Northwestern University, Race, class and Marxism, January 4, 2011 http://socialistworker.org/2011/01/04/race-class-and-marxism]

Marxists argue that capitalism is a system that is based on the exploitation of the many by the few. Because it is a system based on gross inequality, it requires various tools to divide the majority--racism and all oppressions under capitalism serve this purpose. Moreover, oppression is used to justify and "explain" unequal relationships in society that enrich the minority that live off the majority's labor. Thus, racism developed initially to explain and justify the enslavement of Africans--because they were less than human and undeserving of liberty and freedom. Everyone accepts the idea that the oppression of slaves was rooted in the class relations of exploitation under that system. Fewer recognize that under capitalism, wage slavery is the pivot around which all other inequalities and oppressions turn. Capitalism used racism to justify plunder, conquest and slavery, but as Karl Marx pointed out, it also used racism to divide and rule--to pit one section of the working class against another and thereby blunt class consciousness. To claim, as Marxists do, that racism is a product of capitalism is not to deny or diminish its importance or impact in American society. It is simply to explain its origins and the reasons for its perpetuation. Many on the left today talk about class as if it is one of many oppressions, often describing it as "classism." What people are really referring to as "classism" is elitism or snobbery, and not the fundamental organization of society under capitalism. Moreover, it is popular today to talk about various oppressions, including class, as intersecting. While it is true that oppressions can reinforce and compound each other, they are born out of the material relations shaped by capitalism and the economic exploitation that is at the heart of capitalist society. In other words, it is the material and economic structure of society that gave rise to a range of ideas and ideologies to justify, explain and help perpetuate that order. In the United States, racism is the most important of those ideologies.

#### The unchecked spread of neoliberal capitalism necessitates extermination in the name of profit – ensures poverty and environmental and cultural destruction, culminating in eventual extinction.

Cole 11 [Dr. Mike Cole is Emeritus Research Professor in Education and Equality at Bishop Grosseteste University College Lincoln, Lincoln, UK. His most recent book is Racism and Education in the U.K. and the U.S.: towards a socialist alternative (New York and London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011 RACISM AND EDUCATION IN THE U.K. AND THE U.S. Palgrave Macmillan (June 7, 2011), pgs. 180-182]

Neo-liberal capitalism, in being primarily about expanding opportunities for large multinational companies, has undermined the power of nation¬states and exacerbated the negative effects of globalization on such services as healthcare, education, water and transport (Martinez and Garcia, 2000). However, the current hegemonic role of business in schooling is para¬mount in convincing workers and future workers that socialism is off the agenda. Marxist educators and other Left radicals should expose this myth. Students have a right to discuss different economic and political systems such as twenty-first-century democratic socialism. This is particularly press¬ing given the current economic recession. It is easier in general for discussion in schools to embrace issues of gender, “race,” disability, sexual orientation, and social class when social class relates just to attainment than to address social class in the context of overthrowing capitalism, and replacing it with world democratic socialism, where participatory democracy is central. The latter may thus be seen as the last taboo, and, of course, understandably so. It is time to move forward and bring such discussions into schools, colleges, and universities, Marxist and other Left educators can make the case that such considerations are a perfectly reasonable democratic demand. Global capitalism is out of control, and the very survival of our planet is dependent on dialogical education that considers the socialist alternative, an alternative distanced from the distortions of Marx by Stalinism. No longer can socialism be divorced from environmental and ecologi¬cal issues. McLaren and Houston (2005, p, 167) have argued that “escalat¬ing environmental problems at all geographical scales from local to global have become a pressing reality that critical educators can no longer afford to ignore.” They go on to cite “the complicity between global profiteering, resource colonization, and the wholesale ecological devastation that has become a matter of everyday life for most species on the planet.” Following Kahn (2003), they state the need for “a critical dialogue between social and eco-justice” (McLaren and Houston 2005, p. 168). They call for a dialec¬tics of ecological and environmental justice to reveal the malign interaction between capitalism, imperialism, and ecology that has created widespread environmental degradation that has dramatically accelerated with the onset of neo-liberalism. World capitalism’s environmentally racist (Bullard et al., 2007) effects in both the “developing” and “developed” world should be discussed openly and freely in the educational institutions. As far as the “developing world” is concerned, there are, for example, such issues as the environmentally dev-astating method of extraction of natural resources utilized by multinational corporations in numerous “developing” countries that have devastated eco-systems and destroyed cultures and livelihoods (World Council of Churches, 1994, cited in Robinson, 2000), with toxic waste polluting groundwater, soil and the atmosphere (e.g., Robinson, 2000). In addition, there is trans¬boundary dumping of hazardous waste by developed countries to develop¬ing nations, usually in sub-Sahara Africa (e.g., Ibitayo et al., 2008; see also Blanco, 2010 on Latin America). As far as the “developed” world is concerned, in the U.S., for example, people of color are concentrated around hazardous waste facilities-more than half of the nine million people living within two miles of such facilities are minorities (Bullard et al., 2007). Finally, there is the ubiquitous issue of climate change, itself linked to the totally destructive impact of capitalism. Joel Kovel (2010) has described cli-mate change as “a menace without parallel in the whole history of humanity.” However, on a positive note, he argues that “[it]s spectacular and dramatic character can generate narratives capable of arousing general concern and thus provide a stimulus to build movements of resistance.” Climate change is linked to loss to the planet of living things—also a rallying point for young people. For Marxist educators, this provides a good inroad for linking envi¬ronment, global capitalism, and arguments for the socialist alternative. As Kovel (2010) puts it, only within the framework of a revolutionary ecoso- cialist society can we deal with the twinned crises of climate change and spe¬cies loss—and others as well—within a coherent program centered around the flourishing of life.” Capitalism and the destruction of the environment are inextricably linked, to the extent that it is becoming increasingly apparent that saving the environment is dependent on the destruction of capitalism. Debate should therefore include a consideration of the connections between global capital¬ism and environmental destruction, as well as a discussion of the socialist alternative. The need for environmental issues to be allied to socialism is paramount. As Nick Beams (2009) notes, all the “green” opponents of Marxism view “the overthrow of the capitalist system by means of the socialist revolution as the key to resolving the problems of global warming” as either “unrealis¬tic,” “not immediate enough,” or believe that socialism is hostile to nature. Beams (ibid.) argues that, in reality, “the system of market relations is based on the separation of the producers from the means of production, and it is this separation—-the metabolic rift between [human beings] and nature— that is the source of the crisis.” In other words, instead of the real producers of wealth (the working class) having control over what they produce and rationally assigning this to human need, goods are irrationally produced for profit. Beams (ibid.) quotes Marx (1894 [1966] p. 959) as follows: Freedom. ..can consist only in this, that socialised man, the associated pro¬ducers, govern the human metabolism with nature in a rational way, bringing it under their collective control instead of being dominated by it as a blind power; accomplishing it with the least expenditure of energy and in conditions most worthy and appropriate for their human nature. As Beams (2009) concludes, “[f]ar from Marx being outdated, the world has, so to speak, caught up with Marx.”

#### The role of the ballot is to endorse the best political strategy for addressing all manifestations of exploitation and oppression. Debates about transforming society must center on what constitutes the best method for addressing ongoing struggles

McGregor 13 [Sheila McGregor Marxism and women’s oppression today International Socialism Issue: 138 Posted: 10 April 13 http://www.isj.org.uk/index.php4?id=885&issue=138]

Revolutionary socialists take part in all struggles against exploitation and oppression, whether they are against austerity measures, sexual violence, the impact of war, police racism or the growth of fascist organisations, attempting to unite the maximum number of forces in any given struggle. At the same time, revolutionary socialists are concerned not only with combatting the particular effects of exploitation and oppression, but also with taking the struggle forward so as to break the very chains of exploitation, which give rise to all forms of oppression. Thus involvement in struggle is both a practical question of how best to build a protest or strike and an ideological question of how to win those you are struggling alongside to an understanding that it is not enough to win over the particular struggle, but that what is required is a revolutionary transformation of society. When people embark on a struggle over an issue, they usually come with a mixture of ideas about the society they live in, what they are fighting for and how best to achieve their goal. Inherent in any struggle is a debate about how to take it forward. Struggles against sexism are no exception to this.

#### Only beginning with class relations can eliminate the ideological machinery which legitimizes and extends class domination and racist practices. Materialist critique of the historical relationship between the means of production and the process of racialization in the United States should mark the starting point of the transformation of exploitative class and market relations.

San Juan 8 [E. San Juan, Jr., Filipino American literary academic, mentor, cultural reviewer, civic intellectual, activist, writer, essayist, video/film maker, editor, and poet whose works related to the Filipino Diaspora in English and Filipino languages have been translated into German, Russian, French, Italian, and Chinese.[2] As an author of books on race and cultural studies,[3] he was a “major influence on the academic world”.[2] He was the director of the Philippines Cultural Studies Center in Storrs, Connecticut in the United States.[1] In 1999, San Juan, Jr. received the Centennial Award for Achievement in Literature from the Cultural Center of the Philippines because of his contributions to Filipino and Filipino American Studies.[2] FROM RACE/RACISM TO CLASS STRUGGLE: On Critical Race Theory Posted on October 4, 2008 FROM RACE TO CLASS STRUGGLE: A RE-TURN OF CRITICAL RACE THEORY, THE PHILIPPINES MATRIX PROJECT http://philcsc.wordpress.com/2008/10/04/from-raceracism-to-class-struggle-on-critical-race-theory/]

Given its composition, and the pervasive climate of reaction, the Forum could not of course endorse a radical approach that would focus on the elimination of the exploitation of labor (labor power as commodity) as a necessary first step. Given its limits, it could not espouse a need for a thoroughgoing change of the material basis of social production and reproduction—the latter involving the hegemonic rule of the propertied bloc in each society profiting from the unequal division of labor and the unequal distribution of social wealth—on which the institutional practices of racism (apartheid, discrimination, genocide) thrive. “Race is the modality in which class is lived,” as Stuart Hall remarks concerning post-1945 Britain (Solomos 1986, 103). Without the political power in the hands of the democratic-popular masses under the leadership of the working class, the ideological machinery (laws, customs, religion, state bureaucracy) that legitimizes class domination, with its attendant racist practices, cannot be changed. What is required is a revolutionary process that mobilizes a broad constituency based on substantive equality and social justice as an essential part of the agenda to dissolve class structures; any change in the ideas, beliefs, and norms would produce changes in the economic, political and social institutions, which would in turn promote wide-ranging changes in social relations among groups, sectors, and so on. Within a historical-materialist framework, the starting point and end point for analyzing the relations between structures in any sociohistorical totality cannot be anything else but the production and reproduction of material existence. The existence of any totality follows transformation rules whereby it is constantly being restructured into a new formation (Harvey 1973). These rules reflect the dialectical unfolding of manifold contradictions constituting the internal relations of the totality. Within this conflicted, determinate totality, race cannot be reduced to class, nor can class be subsumed by race, since those concepts express different forms of social relations. What is the exact relation between the two? This depends on the historical character of the social production in question and the ideological-political class struggles defining it. In his valuable treatise, The Invention of the White Race, Theodore Allen has demonstrated the precise genealogy and configuration of racism in the U.S. It first manifested itself when the European colonial settlers based on private property in land and resources subdued another social order based on collective, tribal tenure of land and resources, denying the latter any social identity—“social death” for Native Americans. We then shift our attention to the emergence of the white race and its system of racial oppression with the defeat of Bacon’s Rebellion in 1677 and the establishment of a system of lifetime hereditary bond servitude (for African Americans): “The insistence on the social distinction between the poorest member of the oppressor group and any member, however propertied, of the oppressed group, is the hallmark of racial oppression” (Allen 1997, 243). In effect, white supremacy defining the nature of civil society was constructed at a particular historical conjuncture demanded by class war. The result is a flexible and adjustable system that can adjust its racial dynamics in order to divide the subordinates, resist any critique of its ideological legitimacy, and prevent any counter-hegemonic bloc of forces from overthrowing class rule. Class struggle intervenes through its impact in the ideological-political sphere of civil society. Racial categories operate through the mediation of civil society which (with the class-manipulated State) regulate personal relations through the reifying determinations of value, market exchange, and capital. Harry Chang comments on the social mediation of racial categories: “Blacks and whites constitute social blocks in a developed setting of ‘mass society’ in which social types (instead of persons) figure as basic units of economic and political management…The crucial intervention of objectification, i.e., relational poles conceived as the intrinsic quality of objects in relation, must not be neglected here. Racial formation in a country is an aspect of class formation, but the reason races are not classes lies in this objectification process (or fetishization)” (1985, 43). Commodity fetishism enables the ideology of racism (inferiority tied to biology, genetics, cultural attributes) to register its effects in common-sense thinking and routine behavior in class-divided society (Lukacs 1971). Because market relations hide unequal power relations, sustained ideological critique and transformative collective actions are imperative. This signifies the heuristic maxim of “permanent revolution” (Lefevbre 1968, 171) in Marxist thought: any long-term political struggle to abolish capitalism as a system of extracting surplus value through a system of the unequal division of labor (and rewards) needs to alter the institutions and practices of civil society that replicate and strengthen the fetishizing or objectifying mechanism of commodity production and exchange (the capitalist mode of production). If racism springs from the reification of physical attributes (skin color, eye shape) to validate the differential privileges in a bourgeois regime, then the abolition of labor-power as a commodity will be a necessary if not sufficient step in doing away with the conditions that require racial privileging of certain groups in class-divided formations. Racism is not an end in itself but, despite its seeming autonomy, an instrumentality of class rule.

#### Their myopic focus on a particular manifestation of oppression does not provide a specific explanation for the broader linking of struggles – inhibits the possibility for transformative politics.

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#### The continued existence of capitalism forms the basis for all inequalities and oppressions. We do not deny that racialized violence happens and is important to address, but absent a rejection of the class system racism will continue to be deployed as a means to divide and rule the working class and to preserve increasingly wide material disparities.

Taylor 11 [Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor, doctoral candidate in the department of African-American studies at Northwestern University, Race, class and Marxism, January 4, 2011 http://socialistworker.org/2011/01/04/race-class-and-marxism]

Marxists argue that capitalism is a system that is based on the exploitation of the many by the few. Because it is a system based on gross inequality, it requires various tools to divide the majority--racism and all oppressions under capitalism serve this purpose. Moreover, oppression is used to justify and "explain" unequal relationships in society that enrich the minority that live off the majority's labor. Thus, racism developed initially to explain and justify the enslavement of Africans--because they were less than human and undeserving of liberty and freedom. Everyone accepts the idea that the oppression of slaves was rooted in the class relations of exploitation under that system. Fewer recognize that under capitalism, wage slavery is the pivot around which all other inequalities and oppressions turn. Capitalism used racism to justify plunder, conquest and slavery, but as Karl Marx pointed out, it also used racism to divide and rule--to pit one section of the working class against another and thereby blunt class consciousness. To claim, as Marxists do, that racism is a product of capitalism is not to deny or diminish its importance or impact in American society. It is simply to explain its origins and the reasons for its perpetuation. Many on the left today talk about class as if it is one of many oppressions, often describing it as "classism." What people are really referring to as "classism" is elitism or snobbery, and not the fundamental organization of society under capitalism. Moreover, it is popular today to talk about various oppressions, including class, as intersecting. While it is true that oppressions can reinforce and compound each other, they are born out of the material relations shaped by capitalism and the economic exploitation that is at the heart of capitalist society. In other words, it is the material and economic structure of society that gave rise to a range of ideas and ideologies to justify, explain and help perpetuate that order. In the United States, racism is the most important of those ideologies.

#### The unchecked spread of neoliberal capitalism necessitates extermination in the name of profit – ensures poverty and environmental and cultural destruction, culminating in eventual extinction.

Cole 11 [Dr. Mike Cole is Emeritus Research Professor in Education and Equality at Bishop Grosseteste University College Lincoln, Lincoln, UK. His most recent book is Racism and Education in the U.K. and the U.S.: towards a socialist alternative (New York and London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011 RACISM AND EDUCATION IN THE U.K. AND THE U.S. Palgrave Macmillan (June 7, 2011), pgs. 180-182]

Neo-liberal capitalism, in being primarily about expanding opportunities for large multinational companies, has undermined the power of nation¬states and exacerbated the negative effects of globalization on such services as healthcare, education, water and transport (Martinez and Garcia, 2000). However, the current hegemonic role of business in schooling is para¬mount in convincing workers and future workers that socialism is off the agenda. Marxist educators and other Left radicals should expose this myth. Students have a right to discuss different economic and political systems such as twenty-first-century democratic socialism. This is particularly press¬ing given the current economic recession. It is easier in general for discussion in schools to embrace issues of gender, “race,” disability, sexual orientation, and social class when social class relates just to attainment than to address social class in the context of overthrowing capitalism, and replacing it with world democratic socialism, where participatory democracy is central. The latter may thus be seen as the last taboo, and, of course, understandably so. It is time to move forward and bring such discussions into schools, colleges, and universities, Marxist and other Left educators can make the case that such considerations are a perfectly reasonable democratic demand. Global capitalism is out of control, and the very survival of our planet is dependent on dialogical education that considers the socialist alternative, an alternative distanced from the distortions of Marx by Stalinism. No longer can socialism be divorced from environmental and ecologi¬cal issues. McLaren and Houston (2005, p, 167) have argued that “escalat¬ing environmental problems at all geographical scales from local to global have become a pressing reality that critical educators can no longer afford to ignore.” They go on to cite “the complicity between global profiteering, resource colonization, and the wholesale ecological devastation that has become a matter of everyday life for most species on the planet.” Following Kahn (2003), they state the need for “a critical dialogue between social and eco-justice” (McLaren and Houston 2005, p. 168). They call for a dialec¬tics of ecological and environmental justice to reveal the malign interaction between capitalism, imperialism, and ecology that has created widespread environmental degradation that has dramatically accelerated with the onset of neo-liberalism. World capitalism’s environmentally racist (Bullard et al., 2007) effects in both the “developing” and “developed” world should be discussed openly and freely in the educational institutions. As far as the “developing world” is concerned, there are, for example, such issues as the environmentally dev-astating method of extraction of natural resources utilized by multinational corporations in numerous “developing” countries that have devastated eco-systems and destroyed cultures and livelihoods (World Council of Churches, 1994, cited in Robinson, 2000), with toxic waste polluting groundwater, soil and the atmosphere (e.g., Robinson, 2000). In addition, there is trans¬boundary dumping of hazardous waste by developed countries to develop¬ing nations, usually in sub-Sahara Africa (e.g., Ibitayo et al., 2008; see also Blanco, 2010 on Latin America). As far as the “developed” world is concerned, in the U.S., for example, people of color are concentrated around hazardous waste facilities-more than half of the nine million people living within two miles of such facilities are minorities (Bullard et al., 2007). Finally, there is the ubiquitous issue of climate change, itself linked to the totally destructive impact of capitalism. Joel Kovel (2010) has described cli-mate change as “a menace without parallel in the whole history of humanity.” However, on a positive note, he argues that “[it]s spectacular and dramatic character can generate narratives capable of arousing general concern and thus provide a stimulus to build movements of resistance.” Climate change is linked to loss to the planet of living things—also a rallying point for young people. For Marxist educators, this provides a good inroad for linking envi¬ronment, global capitalism, and arguments for the socialist alternative. As Kovel (2010) puts it, only within the framework of a revolutionary ecoso- cialist society can we deal with the twinned crises of climate change and spe¬cies loss—and others as well—within a coherent program centered around the flourishing of life.” Capitalism and the destruction of the environment are inextricably linked, to the extent that it is becoming increasingly apparent that saving the environment is dependent on the destruction of capitalism. Debate should therefore include a consideration of the connections between global capital¬ism and environmental destruction, as well as a discussion of the socialist alternative. The need for environmental issues to be allied to socialism is paramount. As Nick Beams (2009) notes, all the “green” opponents of Marxism view “the overthrow of the capitalist system by means of the socialist revolution as the key to resolving the problems of global warming” as either “unrealis¬tic,” “not immediate enough,” or believe that socialism is hostile to nature. Beams (ibid.) argues that, in reality, “the system of market relations is based on the separation of the producers from the means of production, and it is this separation—-the metabolic rift between [human beings] and nature— that is the source of the crisis.” In other words, instead of the real producers of wealth (the working class) having control over what they produce and rationally assigning this to human need, goods are irrationally produced for profit. Beams (ibid.) quotes Marx (1894 [1966] p. 959) as follows: Freedom. ..can consist only in this, that socialised man, the associated pro¬ducers, govern the human metabolism with nature in a rational way, bringing it under their collective control instead of being dominated by it as a blind power; accomplishing it with the least expenditure of energy and in conditions most worthy and appropriate for their human nature. As Beams (2009) concludes, “[f]ar from Marx being outdated, the world has, so to speak, caught up with Marx.”

#### The role of the ballot is to endorse the best political strategy for addressing all manifestations of exploitation and oppression. Debates about transforming society must center on what constitutes the best method for addressing ongoing struggles

McGregor 13 [Sheila McGregor Marxism and women’s oppression today International Socialism Issue: 138 Posted: 10 April 13 http://www.isj.org.uk/index.php4?id=885&issue=138]

Revolutionary socialists take part in all struggles against exploitation and oppression, whether they are against austerity measures, sexual violence, the impact of war, police racism or the growth of fascist organisations, attempting to unite the maximum number of forces in any given struggle. At the same time, revolutionary socialists are concerned not only with combatting the particular effects of exploitation and oppression, but also with taking the struggle forward so as to break the very chains of exploitation, which give rise to all forms of oppression. Thus involvement in struggle is both a practical question of how best to build a protest or strike and an ideological question of how to win those you are struggling alongside to an understanding that it is not enough to win over the particular struggle, but that what is required is a revolutionary transformation of society. When people embark on a struggle over an issue, they usually come with a mixture of ideas about the society they live in, what they are fighting for and how best to achieve their goal. Inherent in any struggle is a debate about how to take it forward. Struggles against sexism are no exception to this.

#### Only beginning with class relations can eliminate the ideological machinery which legitimizes and extends class domination and racist practices. Materialist critique of the historical relationship between the means of production and the process of racialization in the United States should mark the starting point of the transformation of exploitative class and market relations.

San Juan 8 [E. San Juan, Jr., Filipino American literary academic, mentor, cultural reviewer, civic intellectual, activist, writer, essayist, video/film maker, editor, and poet whose works related to the Filipino Diaspora in English and Filipino languages have been translated into German, Russian, French, Italian, and Chinese.[2] As an author of books on race and cultural studies,[3] he was a “major influence on the academic world”.[2] He was the director of the Philippines Cultural Studies Center in Storrs, Connecticut in the United States.[1] In 1999, San Juan, Jr. received the Centennial Award for Achievement in Literature from the Cultural Center of the Philippines because of his contributions to Filipino and Filipino American Studies.[2] FROM RACE/RACISM TO CLASS STRUGGLE: On Critical Race Theory Posted on October 4, 2008 FROM RACE TO CLASS STRUGGLE: A RE-TURN OF CRITICAL RACE THEORY, THE PHILIPPINES MATRIX PROJECT http://philcsc.wordpress.com/2008/10/04/from-raceracism-to-class-struggle-on-critical-race-theory/]

Given its composition, and the pervasive climate of reaction, the Forum could not of course endorse a radical approach that would focus on the elimination of the exploitation of labor (labor power as commodity) as a necessary first step. Given its limits, it could not espouse a need for a thoroughgoing change of the material basis of social production and reproduction—the latter involving the hegemonic rule of the propertied bloc in each society profiting from the unequal division of labor and the unequal distribution of social wealth—on which the institutional practices of racism (apartheid, discrimination, genocide) thrive. “Race is the modality in which class is lived,” as Stuart Hall remarks concerning post-1945 Britain (Solomos 1986, 103). Without the political power in the hands of the democratic-popular masses under the leadership of the working class, the ideological machinery (laws, customs, religion, state bureaucracy) that legitimizes class domination, with its attendant racist practices, cannot be changed. What is required is a revolutionary process that mobilizes a broad constituency based on substantive equality and social justice as an essential part of the agenda to dissolve class structures; any change in the ideas, beliefs, and norms would produce changes in the economic, political and social institutions, which would in turn promote wide-ranging changes in social relations among groups, sectors, and so on. Within a historical-materialist framework, the starting point and end point for analyzing the relations between structures in any sociohistorical totality cannot be anything else but the production and reproduction of material existence. The existence of any totality follows transformation rules whereby it is constantly being restructured into a new formation (Harvey 1973). These rules reflect the dialectical unfolding of manifold contradictions constituting the internal relations of the totality. Within this conflicted, determinate totality, race cannot be reduced to class, nor can class be subsumed by race, since those concepts express different forms of social relations. What is the exact relation between the two? This depends on the historical character of the social production in question and the ideological-political class struggles defining it. In his valuable treatise, The Invention of the White Race, Theodore Allen has demonstrated the precise genealogy and configuration of racism in the U.S. It first manifested itself when the European colonial settlers based on private property in land and resources subdued another social order based on collective, tribal tenure of land and resources, denying the latter any social identity—“social death” for Native Americans. We then shift our attention to the emergence of the white race and its system of racial oppression with the defeat of Bacon’s Rebellion in 1677 and the establishment of a system of lifetime hereditary bond servitude (for African Americans): “The insistence on the social distinction between the poorest member of the oppressor group and any member, however propertied, of the oppressed group, is the hallmark of racial oppression” (Allen 1997, 243). In effect, white supremacy defining the nature of civil society was constructed at a particular historical conjuncture demanded by class war. The result is a flexible and adjustable system that can adjust its racial dynamics in order to divide the subordinates, resist any critique of its ideological legitimacy, and prevent any counter-hegemonic bloc of forces from overthrowing class rule. Class struggle intervenes through its impact in the ideological-political sphere of civil society. Racial categories operate through the mediation of civil society which (with the class-manipulated State) regulate personal relations through the reifying determinations of value, market exchange, and capital. Harry Chang comments on the social mediation of racial categories: “Blacks and whites constitute social blocks in a developed setting of ‘mass society’ in which social types (instead of persons) figure as basic units of economic and political management…The crucial intervention of objectification, i.e., relational poles conceived as the intrinsic quality of objects in relation, must not be neglected here. Racial formation in a country is an aspect of class formation, but the reason races are not classes lies in this objectification process (or fetishization)” (1985, 43). Commodity fetishism enables the ideology of racism (inferiority tied to biology, genetics, cultural attributes) to register its effects in common-sense thinking and routine behavior in class-divided society (Lukacs 1971). Because market relations hide unequal power relations, sustained ideological critique and transformative collective actions are imperative. This signifies the heuristic maxim of “permanent revolution” (Lefevbre 1968, 171) in Marxist thought: any long-term political struggle to abolish capitalism as a system of extracting surplus value through a system of the unequal division of labor (and rewards) needs to alter the institutions and practices of civil society that replicate and strengthen the fetishizing or objectifying mechanism of commodity production and exchange (the capitalist mode of production). If racism springs from the reification of physical attributes (skin color, eye shape) to validate the differential privileges in a bourgeois regime, then the abolition of labor-power as a commodity will be a necessary if not sufficient step in doing away with the conditions that require racial privileging of certain groups in class-divided formations. Racism is not an end in itself but, despite its seeming autonomy, an instrumentality of class rule.

#### Centering class in our analysis does not deny individuals’ experiences of racism and violence. Instead, beginning from the question of class as primary antagonism enables more effective struggles against race and other manifestations of oppression.

Smith 6 [Sharon Smith is also the author of Women and Socialism: Essays on Women’s Liberation (Haymarket Books, 2005). Her writings appear regularly in Socialist Worker newspaper and the ISR. Race, class, and "whiteness theory" ISR Issue 46, March–April 2006 http://isreview.org/issues/46/whiteness.shtml]

Meyerson counters this set of assumptions, proposing that Marx’s emphasis on the centrality of class relations brings oppression to the forefront, as a precondition for working-class unity: Marxism properly interpreted emphasizes the primacy of class in a number of senses. One, of course, is the primacy of the working class as a revolutionary agent—a primacy which does not, as often thought, render women and people of color “secondary.” Such an equation of white male and working class, as well as a corresponding division between a “white” male working class identity and all the others, whose identity is thereby viewed as either primarily one of gender and race or hybrid, is a view this essay contests all along the way. The primacy of class means that building a multiracial, multi-gendered international working-class organization or organizations should be the goal of any revolutionary movement: the primacy of class puts the fight against racism and sexism at the center. The intelligibility of this position is rooted in the explanatory primacy of class analysis for understanding the structural determinants of race, gender and class oppression. Oppression is multiple and intersecting but its causes are not.18 Designating class as the primary antagonism in capitalist society bears no inference on the “importance” of racism, as Roediger claims. Marxism merely assumes a causal relationship—that white supremacy as a system was instituted by capital, to the detriment of labor as a whole. Marxist theory rests on the assumption that white workers do not benefit from a system of white supremacy. Indeed, Marx argued of slavery, the most oppressive of all systems of exploitation, “In the United States of America, every independent workers’ movement was paralyzed as long as slavery disfigured part of the republic. Labor cannot emancipate itself in the white skin where in the black it is branded.”19 Marx was not alone in assuming that racism, by dividing the working class along ideological lines, harmed the class interests of both white and Black workers. Abolitionist Frederick Douglass stated unambiguously of slaveholders, “They divided both to conquer each.”20 Douglass elaborated, “Both are plundered and by the same plunderers. The slave is robbed by his master, of all his earnings above what is required for his physical necessities; and the white man is robbed by the slave system, because he is flung into competition with a class of laborers who work without wages.”21 Capitalism forces workers to compete with each other. The unremitting pressure from a layer of workers—be they low-wage or unemployed—is a constant reminder that workers compete for limited jobs that afford a decent standard of living. The working class has no interest in maintaining a system that thrives upon inequality and oppression. Indeed, all empirical evidence shows quite the opposite. When the racist poll tax was passed in the South, imposing property and other requirements designed to shut out Black voters, many poor whites also lost the right to vote. After Mississippi passed its poll tax law, the number of qualified white voters fell from 130,000 to 68,000.22 The effects of segregation extended well beyond the electoral arena. Jim Crow segregation empowered only the rule of capital. Whenever employers have been able to use racism to divide Black from white workers, preventing unionization, both Black and white workers earn lower wages. This is just as true in recent decades as it was 100 years ago. Indeed, as Shawki points out of the 1970s, “In a study of major metropolitan areas Michael Reich found a correlation between the degree of income inequality between whites and Blacks and the degree of income inequality between whites.”23 The study concluded: But what is most dramatic—in each of these blue-collar groups, the Southern white workers earned less than Northern Black workers. Despite the continued gross discrimination against Black skilled craftsmen in the North, the “privileged” Southern whites earned 4 percent less than they did. Southern male white operatives averaged…18 percent less than Northern Black male operatives. And Southern white service workers earned…14 percent less than Northern Black male service workers.”24 Racism against Blacks and other racially oppressed groups serves both to lower the living standards of the entire working class and to weaken workers’ ability to fight back. Whenever capitalists can threaten to replace one group of workers with another—poorly paid—group of workers, neither group benefits. Thus, the historically nonunion South has not only depressed the wages of Black workers, but also lowered the wages of Southern white workers overall—and prevented the labor movement from achieving victory at important junctures. So even in the short term the working class as a whole has nothing to gain from oppression.

#### The noble intentions of the affirmative’s political approach do not absolve it of its sins of complicity with the violent project of capitalism. Any attempt to rectify the flaws of the 1AC as a rhetorical artifact are at best disingenuous and should be rejected.

Tomlinson 13 [Barbara Tomlinson, Department of Feminist Studies, University of California, Santa Barbara, To Tell the Truth and Not Get Trapped: Desire, Distance, and Intersectionality at the Scene of Argument, Signs, Vol. 38, No. 4, Summer 2013]

Structures of dominance are the conditions of possibility for antisubordination arguments. Feminists cannot escape all the traps set by the racialized and gendered history of the disciplines, but we can destabilize them, explore their contradictions, and work through them to open up new possibilities. Yet intending our arguments to be resistant or oppositional cannot make them so. Discursive effects cannot be known in advance or assumed to reflect the intentions of those who argue; we cannot know fully or control the consequences of our own roles in the circulation of discourses. Rather, as Michel Foucault argues, “We must make allowance for the complex and unstable process whereby discourse can be both an instrument and an effect of power, but also a stumbling block, a point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy” (1980, 101). The specific arguments we make, their rhetorical form and evidence, and the consequences we draw from them all can be points of resistance or stumbling blocks that trap us into deploying dominant discourses when we think we are resisting them. Yet these discourses are what we have—the sites, the circumstances, and the means—to understand ourselves and change our conditions. Because we lack a fully theorized understanding of the scene of argument as a shared social space, we often consign rhetorical choices to matters of private choice and personal style. Yet while much of the labor that goes into writing is conducted in solitude, writing is a quintessentially social act. All writers enter a dialogue already in progress. “The word in language,” Bakhtin observes, “is half someone else’s” (1981, 293). The scene of argument is populated by many different writers, readers, reviewers, editors, and teachers. It is shaped by practices and processes inside institutions that all of us help to construct, in graduate programs, journal and manuscript review processes, panels at professional meetings, and informal prestige networks. Rhetoric matters not just because we want to present the ideas we already have eloquently and effectively but also because the scene of argument is a site where new ideas are produced and old ideas modified and rendered obsolete. My purpose here is not to scold or praise individual authors but instead to advance an understanding of the scene of argument as a shared social resource, as an entity for which we are all responsible, yet also as a terrain laden with traps. As Toni Cade Bambara explained three decades ago, principled political writing entails fusing together the diverse strands of knowledge that disciplinary frames tear apart. Such writing requires us to resist the predisposition that the disciplines promote “to accept fragmented truths and distortions as the whole” (1980, 154). Dominant modes of thinking and habits of academic life can authorize promoting and echoing partial truths with confidence, even certainty, as if they were the whole. Our job, as Bambara explains it, is “to tell the truth and not get trapped” (1983, 14). I demonstrate here that some critiques of intersectionality fall into patterned rhetorical frameworks and tropes that serve as traps to interfere with the ability to tell the truth.

## CounterAdvocacy

## Jackie and I advocate the United Snakes of Amerikkka stop lockin up bodies except the bodies of convicted child molesters.

#### Imprisonment incapacitates offenders – it removes them, preventing commission of the crime

Hess 9 Kären M. Hess 2009, Introduction to Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice. ninth edition p 520 Google Books

Incapacitation refers to making it impossible for offenders to commit further offenses. Incapacitation can take many forms. One of the earliest forms was banishmnent, also referred to as social death. Some people feel this is the ultimate punishment, more devastating than being executed. In preliterate societies, offenders were often cast out of the village. Most recently England banished its outlaws and undesirables to Australia and then to the United States.

Other forms of incapacitation make it physically impossible for a criminal act to be repeated. A thief whose hands are cut off will not easily steal again. A castrated male will be unable to rape again. An incarcerated child molester will not be able to abuse children while in prison. And, obviously, a murderer who is executed will kill no more. Currently, the most common method of incapacitation is incarceration. While imprisoned a criminal is no longer a threat to society. The most extreme for of incapacitation is capital punishment.

#### We have a moral obligation to protect children

Parisi 10 Joe Parisi , Wisconsin State Representative 2-22-10

Child Victims Act Provides Opportunity for Justice, Healing, and Accountability <http://legis.wisconsin.gov/assembly/asm48/news/Informational%20Columns/2.22.10%20Child%20Victims%20Act.pdf>

One of the most important roles of government is to protect people who are vulnerable to

abuse and mistreatment. For many reasons, children are quite susceptible to sexual,

physical, and emotional abuse, especially at the hands of adults who are in a position of

trust or authority. As an elected official, I believe that I have a duty to both protect

children who have already been abused and do everything in my power to prevent more

children from being abused. This is why I have authored the “Child Victims Act

(CVA),” which gives victims of childhood sexual assault the opportunity to hold

perpetrators accountable in court and will help prevent the further sexual victimization of

children.

## Case

#### Trading autobiographical narrative for the ballot commodifies one’s identity and has limited impact on the culture that one attempt’s to reform – when autobiographical narrative “wins,” it subverts its own most radical intentions by becoming an exemplar of the very culture under indictment

Coughlin 95—associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School. (Anne, REGULATING THE SELF: AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL PERFORMANCES IN OUTSIDER SCHOLARSHIP, 81 Va. L. Rev. 1229)

Although Williams is quick to detect insensitivity and bigotry in remarks made by strangers, colleagues, and friends, her taste for irony fails her when it comes to reflection on her relationship with her readers and the material benefits that her autobiographical performances have earned for her. n196 Perhaps Williams should be more inclined to thank, rather than reprimand, her editors for behaving as readers of autobiography invariably do. When we examine this literary faux pas - the incongruity between Williams's condemnation of her editors and the professional benefits their publication secured her - we detect yet another contradiction between the outsiders' use of autobiography and their desire to transform culture radically. Lejeune's characterization of autobiography as a "contract" reminds us that autobiography is a lucrative commodity. In our culture, members of the reading public avidly consume personal stories, n197 which surely explains why first-rate law journals and academic presses have been eager to market outsider narratives. No matter how unruly the self that it records, an autobiographical performance transforms that self into a form of "property in a moneyed economy" n198 and into a valuable intellectual [\*1283] asset in an academy that requires its members to publish. n199 Accordingly, we must be skeptical of the assertion that the outsiders' splendid publication record is itself sufficient evidence of the success of their endeavor. n200

Certainly, publication of a best seller may transform its author's life, with the resulting commercial success and academic renown. n201 As one critic of autobiography puts it, "failures do not get published." n202 While writing a successful autobiography may be momentous for the individual author, this success has a limited impact on culture. Indeed, the transformation of outsider authors into "success stories" subverts outsiders' radical intentions by constituting them as exemplary participants within contemporary culture, willing to market even themselves to literary and academic consumers. n203 What good does this transformation do for outsiders who are less fortunate and less articulate than middle-class law professors? n204 Although they style themselves cultural critics, the [\*1284] storytellers generally do not reflect on the meaning of their own commercial success, nor ponder its entanglement with the cultural values they claim to resist. Rather, for the most part, they seem content simply to take advantage of the peculiarly American license, identified by Professor Sacvan Bercovitch, "to have your dissent and make it too." n205

#### The 1ac engages in dangerous politics of prioritizing methodology and assigning intellectual prerequisites to political strategy. Their use of the experience of oppression as the status that defines those who should guide politics harms progressive political strategies. Their particular strategy is part of a larger discourse of recapturing agency through privileging experience as the basis for politics.

Craig Ireland American Culture @ Bilkent 02 "The Appeal to Experience and its Consequences" Cultural Critique 52 Fall 2002p.87-88

" Once an arcane philosophical term, experience over the last three decades has become a general buzzword. By the 1970s, experience spilled over into the streets, so to speak, and it has since then become the stuff of programmatic manifestos and has been enlisted as the found from which microstrategies of resistance and subaltern counterhistories can be erected. But for all the blows and counterblows that have carried on tor over"\*three decades between those who appeal to the counterhegemonic potential of experience and those who see such appeals as naive voluntarism, such debates show no signs of abating. On the contrary, they have become yet more strident, as can be seen by Michael Pickering's recent attempt to rehabilitate the viability of the term "experience" for subaltern historiography by turning to E. P. Thompson and Dilthey and, more recently still, by Sonia Kruks's polemical defense of experience for subaltern inquiry by way of a reminder that poststructuralist critics of experience owe much to those very thinkers, from Sartre to Merleau-Ponty, whom they have debunked as if in oedipal rebellion against their begetters. Such debates over experience have so far gravitated around issues of epistemology and agency, pitting those who debunk experience as the stuff of an antiquated philosophy of consciousness against those who argue that subaltern experience provides an enclave against strong structural determination. Lost in such debates, however, have been the potential consequences of appeals to immediate experience as a ground for subaltern agency and specificity. And it is just such potential consequences that will be examined here, These indeed demand our attention, for more is at stake in the appeal to experience than some epistemological faux pas. By so wagering on the perceived immediacy of experience as the evidence for subaltern specificity and counterhegemonic action, appeals to immediate experience, however laudable their goal, end up unwittingly naturalizing what is in fact historical, and, in so doing, they leave the door as wide-open to a progressive politics of identity as to a retreat to neoethnic tribalism. Most alarming about such appeals to experience is not some failure of epistemological nerve – it is instead their ambiguous political and social ramifications. And these have reverberate beyond academia and found an echo in para-academia – so much so that experience has increasingly become the core concept or key word of subaltern groups and the rallying call for what Craig Calhoun calls the “new social movements” in which “experience is made the pure ground of knowledge, the basis of an essentialized standpoint of critical awareness” (468 n.64). The consequences of such appeals to experience can best be addressed not by individually considering disparate currents, but by seeking their common denominator. And in this regard, E.P. Thompson will occupy the foreground. It is safe to say that what started as an altercation between Thompson and Althusser has since spawned academic and para-academic "histories from below" and subaltern cultural inquiries that, for all their differences, share the idea that the identities and counterhistories of the disenfranchised can be buttressed by the specificity of a group's concrete experiences. Much theorizing on experience by certain cultural and historiographical trends, as many have already pointed out, has been but a variation on a persistent Thompsonian theme in which Thompson's "kind of use of experience has the same foundational status if we substitute 'women's' or 'black' or 'lesbian' or 'homosexual' for 'working class'" (Scott, 786)

#### The pedagogy of the oppressed sounds appealing, but regulates consciousness under the disguise of difference. Making the speaker the gateway for listening to the speech demands ever-greater levels of purification and escalating rhetoric of oppressive history as the source for authority.

Rob Moore, Cambridge and Johan Muller, University of Cape Town, 99, “The Discourse of Voice and the Problem of Knowledge and Identity in the Sociology of Education" British Journal of Sociology of Education 20 (2) p. 199-200

The pedagogic device (Bernstein, 1990) of voice discourse promotes a methodology in which the explication of a method’s social location precludes the need to examine the content of its data as grounds for valid explanation. Who says it is what counts, not what is said: This approach favours an ethnography that claims to reveal the cultural specificity of the category – the ‘voice’ of membership. What is held to be the facts, to be the case, is only so – and can only be so – from a particular perspective. The world thus viewed is a patchwork of incommensurable and exclusive voices or standpoints. Through the process of sub-dicision, increasingly more particularized identity categories come into being, each claiming the unique specificity of its distinctive experience and the knowledge authorized by it. The consequence of the abolition of the knowledge boundary that follows from the epistemological theses of postmodernism is the increasing specialization of social categories (See Maton, 1998). Maton describes this process of proliferation in terms of the way such ‘knower’ discourses….base their legitimation upon the privileged insight of a knower, and work at maintaining strong boundaries around their definition of this knower – they celebrate difference where ‘truth’ is defined by the ‘knower’ or ‘voice’. As each voice is brought into the choir, the category of the privileged ‘knower’ becomes smaller, each strongly bounded from one another, for each ‘voice’ has its own privileged and specialized knowledge. The client ‘knower’ group thus fragments, each fragment with its own representative…The procession of the excluded thus becomes, in terms of the privileged ‘knower’, an accretion of adjectives, the ‘hyphenation’ which knower modes often proclaim as progress. In summary, with the emergence of each new category of knower, the categories of knowers become smaller, leading to proliferation and fragmentation within the knowledge formation. (ibid, p. 17) As Maton argues, this move promotes a fundamental change in the principle of legitimation – from what is known (and how) to who knows it. The device that welds knowledge to standpoint, voice and experience, produces a result that is inherently unstable, because the anchor for the voice is an inferior authenticity that can never be demonstrated, only claimed (Taylor, 1992; Siegel, 1997; Fuss, 1990, 1995). Since all such claims are power claims, the authenticity of the voice is constantly prone to a purifying challenge. If you do not believe it you are not one of us’ (Hammersly & Gomm, 1997, para. 3.3) that gears down to ever more rarefied specializations or iterations of the voice category; an unstoppable spiral that Bernstein (1997, p. 176) has referred to as the ‘shrinking of the moral imagination [10]. As Bernstein puts it, ‘The voice of a social category (academic discourse, gender subject, occupational subject) is constructed by the degree of specialization of the discursive rules regulation and legitimizing the form of communication’ (1990, p. 23). If categories of either agents or discourse are specialized, then each category necessarily has its own specific identity and its own specific boundaries. The speciality of each category is created, maintained and reproduced only if the relations between the categories of which a given category is a member are preserved. What is to be preserved? The insulation between the categories. It is the strength of the insulation that creates a space in which a category can become specific. If a category wishes to increase its specificity, it has to appropriate the means to produce the necessary insulation that is the prior condition to its appropriating specificity. (ibid.) Collection codes employ an organization of knowledge to specialize categories of person, integrated codes employ an organization of persons to specialize categories of knowledge (Bernstein, 1977, pp. 106-111) The instability of the social categories associated with voice discourse reflects the fact that there is no stable and agreed-upon way of constructing such categories. By their nature, they are always open to contestation and further fragmentation. In principle, there is no terminal point where ‘identities’ can finally come to rest. It is for this reason that this position can reappear so frequently across time and space within the intellectual field – the same move can be repeated endlessly under the disguise of ‘difference’. In Bernstein’s terms, the organization of knowledge is, most significantly, a device for the regulation of consciousness.

The pedagogic device is thus a symbolic ruler of consciousness in its selective creation, positioning and oppositioning of pedagogic subjects. It is the condition for the production, reproduction, and transformation of culture. The question is: whose ruler, what consciousness? (1990, p. 189) The relativistic challenge to epistemologically grounded strong classifications of knowledge removes the means whereby social categories and their relations can be strongly theorized and effectively researched in a form that is other than arbitrary and can be challenged by anyone choosing to assert an alternative perspective or standpoint.

#### There should be no methodological prerequisites for participation in argument and education. This is the only way to give the force of argument and rigorous testing of any idea that is necessary for progressive politics to win the public sphere.

Rob Moore, Cambridge, and Johan Muller, University of Cape Town 99 "The Discourse of Voice and the Problem of Knowledge and Identity in the Sociology of Education" British Journal of Sociology of Education 20 (2) p.

Our purpose in this paper is to raise some issues about epistemological debates and approaches to knowledge in the sociology of education. Our starting point is the observation that since the phenomenologically inspired New Sociology of Education in the early 1970s to postmodernism today, approaches that question epistemological claims about the objectivity of knowledge (and the status of science, reason and rationality more generally) have occupied an influential position in the field. In earlier times this approach was often referred to as the 'sociology of knowledge' perspective. Yet then as now, it is precisely the idea of knowledge that is being challenged. Such approaches adopt. or at least favour or imply, a form of perspectivism which sees knowledge and truth claims as being relative to a culture, form of life or standpoint and, therefore, ultimately representing a particular perspective and social interest rather than independent, universalistic criteria. They complete this reduction by translating knowledge claims into statements about knowers. Knowledge is dissolved into knowing and priority is given to experience as specialised by category membership and identity (Maton, 1998). For instance, a so-called 'dominant' or 'hegemonic' form of knowledge, represented in the school curriculum, is identified as 'bourgeois', 'male', or 'white’ – as reflecting the perspectives, standpoints and interests of dominant social groups. Today, the most common form of this approach is that which, drawing upon postmodernist and poststructuralist perspectives, adopts a discursive concern with the explication of ‘voice’. Its major distinction is that between the dominant voice and those (‘Others’) silenced or marginalized by its hegemony. As Philip Wexler (1997, p.9) has recently observed: The postmodern emphasis on discourse and identity remain overwhelmingly the dominant paradigm in school research, and with few exceptions, gives few signs of abating’ (see also Delamont, 1997). The main move is to attach knowledge to categories of knowers and to their experience and subjectivities. This privileges and specialises the subject in terms of its membership category as a subordinated voice. Knowledge forms and knowledge relations are translated as social standpoints and power relationships between groups. This is more a sociology of knowers and their relationships than of knowledge. What we will term 'voice discourse' is our principle concern, here. Historically, this approach has also been associated with concerns to reform pedagogy in a progressive direction. At the time of the New Sociology of Education in the early 1970s, this move was expressed in the debate between 'new' sociologists such as Michael Young (1971, 1976) and the philosophical position associated with R.S. Peters and Paul Hirst. More recently, it has been associated with developments such as anti-sexist, multicultural and postcolonial education, and with postmodernist critiques of the 'Enlightenment Project' and 'grand narratives'. The crucial issue, for such approaches, is that where social differentiation in education and the reproduction of social inequalities arc associated with principles of exclusion structured in and through educational knowledge. Hence, the critique of knowledge and promotion of progressive pedagogy is understood as facilitating a move from social and educational exclusion to inclusion and the promotion of social justice. This history can be summarised as follows: in the early 1970s, the New Sociology of Education produced a critique of insulated knowledge codes by adopting a 'sociology of knowledge' perspective that claimed to demystify their epistemological pretensions to cognitive superiority by revealing their class base and form. Knowledge relations were transcribed as class relations [1]. In the late 1970s, feminism challenged the masculinist bias of class analysis and turned attention to the gendered character of educational relations, rewriting knowledge relations in terms of patriarchy. This was in turn followed by a focus upon race. In the 1980s, the primary categories employed by gender and race approaches fragmented as various groups contested the vanguardist claims of the earlier proponents of those perspectives to be representing the interests of women or blacks in general. The category 'woman', for instance, fragmented into groups such as women of colour, non-heterosexual women, working-class women, third-world women and African women (Wolpe, 1998). These fractions of gender and race were further extended by a range of sexualities and, to some degree (although never so successfully), by disabilities. Under this pressure of fragmentation, there was a rapid shift away from political universalism to a thoroughgoing celebration of difference and diversity; of decentred hyphenated or iterative models of the self and, consequently, of identity politics. This poststructuralist celebration of diversity is associated with proclamations of inclusiveness that oppose the alleged exclusiveness of the dominant knowledge form that is revealed when its traditional claims to universalism and objectivity are shown for what they really arc – the disguised standpoints and interests of dominant groups. On this basis, epistemology and the sociology of knowledge are presented as antithetical. The sociology of knowledge undertakes to demystify epistemological knowledge claims by revealing their social base and standpoint. At root, this sociology of knowledge debunks epistemology. The advocacy of progressive moral and political arguments becomes conflated with a particular set of (anti-) epistemological arguments (Siegel, 1995; Maton, 1999). At this descriptive level, these developments are usually presented as marking a progressive advance whereby the assault upon the epistemological claims of the dominant or ‘hegemonic' knowledge code (rewritten in its social form as 'power') enables a succession of previously marginalised, excluded and oppressed groups to enter the central stage, their histories to be recovered and their 'voices' joined freely and equally with those already there [2]. Within this advance, the voice of reason (revealed as that of the ruling class white heterosexual male) is reduced simply to one among many, of no special distinction. This is advance through the multiplication of categories and their differences. Disparities of access and representation in education were (and are) rightly seen as issues that need addressing and remedying, and in this respect constitute a genuine politics. It is important to stress, here, that the issues are real issues and the work done on their behalf is real work. But the question is: is this politics best pursued in this way? The tendency we are intending to critique, then, assumes an internal relation between: (a) theories of knowledge (epistemological or sociological); (b) forms of education (traditional or progressive); and (c) social relations (between dominant and subordinated groups). This establishes the political default settings whereby epistemologically grounded, knowledge-based forms of education are politically conservative, while ‘integrated’ (Bernstein, 1977) or ‘hybrid’ (Muller & Taylor, 1995) knowledge codes are progressive. On this basis, socially, progressive causes are systematically detached from epistemologically powerful knowledge structures and from their procedures for generating and promoting truths of fact and value. For us the crucial problem, here, is that these default settings have the effect of undermining the very argumentative force that progressive causes in fact require in order to press their claims. The position of voice discourse and its cognate forms within the sociology of education has, also, profoundly affected theory and research within the field, with little attention being paid to structural level concerns with social stratification and a penchant for small-scale, qualitative ethnographic methods and ‘culturalist’ concerns with discursive positioning and identity (Moore, 1996a; Hatcher 1998). We will argue that this perspective is not only politically self-defeating, but also intellectually incoherent – that, in fact, progressive claims implicitly presuppose precisely the kind of ‘conservative’ epistemology that they tend to reject and that, to be of value, the sociology of education should produce knowledge in the strong sense. This is important because the effects of the (anti-) epistemological thesis undermine the possibilities of producing precisely that kind of knowledge required to support the moral/political objectives. Indeed, the dubious epistemological assumption may lead not only to an ‘analytical nihilism that is contrary to (their) political project’ (Ladwig, 1995, p.222), but also, to pedagogic conclusions that are actively counterproductive and ultimately work against the educational interests of precisely those groups they are meant to help (Stone, 1981; Dowling, 1994). We agree, thus, with Siegel that, ‘…it is imperative that defenders of radical pedagogy distinguish their embrace of particular moral/political these from untenable, allegedly related, epistemological ones; (ibid, p. 34).

#### Treating Nommo as a interruption of whiteness flattens different cultural and racial projects within both whiteness and blackness.

John McClendon Associate Professor of African American and American Cultural Studies at Bates College (Ji "Philosophy

of Language and the African American Experience: Are There Metaphilosophical Implications?" The Journal of Speculative

Philosophy 18.4 (2004) 305-310 MUSE

Philosophy, Yancy clearly shows, is not removed from the institutional practice of racism. Besides, the road to recovering a more humane sense about the doing of philosophy is to go beyond the constraining boundaries imposed by the dominant conception of African American language and its underlying racism. This racist conception offers up a view of African American language that ultimately renders it as substandard and pathological. This pathology, Yancy and Smitherman contend, in turn neglects the rich heritage of culture semiotics and nuanced meanings, which are intrinsically intertwined with the African American experience (Yancy 2004,283-84). Yancy's overriding thesis is not only the claim that there are philosophical gems locked away in the African American locutional experience: in addition, he argues that this language that so brightly radiates from African American culture is not only a site of investigation fan object of inquiry") but also a viable means as a mode for philosophical inquiry. This is all possible since in terms of a general principle, Yancy holds that modes of philosophical inquiry are at root cultural undertakings (Karp and Masoio 2000). In this manner of thinking about metaphilosophy, Yancy reiterates and extends the tradition within African American philosophy toward which Alain Locke, the first Black Rhodes Scholar and gadfly of the Harlem Renaissance, [End Page 307] dedicated so much of his intellectual efforts. Yancy, who is steeped with a substantive comprehension of the history of African American philosophy, brings into bold relief how the very definition, tasks, substance, and scope of philosophy—or, in a word, metaphilosophy—cannot expect to develop in a progressive manner without due attention to the collective lives and language practices of African Americans (Locke 1983). Here I do want to give a cautionary suggestion. Yancy must stay alert to the fact that a common culture, or shared experiences and even the enduring heritage of having the same language, is not a sufficient condition for claiming there exists, among African Americans, some kind of spontaneously arrived at common ontology, where ontology is taken as philosophical in substance. Furthermore, it seems this very premise—about the actual existence of a common African American ontology— subsequently grounds Yancy's notion about how African American language is foundational to the construction of a new conception of metaphilosophy. Now when we take into account the fact that theory is always distinct from experience, we must accordingly recognize the differentia specifica is none other than the matter of the distinction between the inquiries into experience vis-a-vis the lived experience. The determinate theoretical responses to common experience (and I take philosophy to be the most abstract form of theory) are always critical reflections adjoined to an inquiry about collective existence; thus, theory remains mediated and distanced from the immediacy of experience. The mediated relationship of the theoretical (ontology) to the empirical (lived experience) means there is room for a conceptual space, which allows for the description, definition, and interpretation of experience. This necessary space between the theoretical and the empirical is why common experiences are not a sufficient condition for sharing a common ontology. Additionally, the function of various forms of social stratification—especially the impact of class contradictions—harbors the real possibility for different ideological responses to commonly experienced conditions of life. In the manner of the Marxist conception of ideology, as found in The German Ideology, I presume that philosophy (ontology) is a form of ideology (Marx and Engels 1976). Hence, only on the presupposition that the African American community is socially homogeneous can it plausibly he argued that African Americans all share the same ontology. Given it is not the case that the African American community is homogeneous, then there is no plausible warranting for the belief that all African Americans share a common ontology. This leads directly to point three and my charge of Yancy's (and Smitherman's) vindicationism, where he argues that resistance to white supremacy is the defining characteristic of African American culture and hence language. When African American vindicationism is bereft of dialectical theory and method, as a determinate philosophical approach to African American culture, it neglects a very important aspect of the historical dialectic of African American [End Page 308] culture, viz, that African American culture is not in any way a monolithically formed culture where there are only manifestations of resistance. There is more to African American history and culture than a continuous line of resistance to oppression, for, by way of example, not all African Americans sang the spirituals with an eve to Joining the Underground Railroad (Fisher 1990). Some believed that freedom was wearing a robe in "heahen" and that washing in the blood of Jesus would make one "as white as the snow," Or that lovaitv to Massa was the highest virtue and resistance and revolt were of the greatest follv. The modem dav connotation for "Uncle Tom" did not enter the lexicon of African American language without the historical presence of real, existing "Toms." It is no accident that there is the current exercise in African American locution of playing on this word (Tom) whenever Supreme Court Justice, Clarence "Tom-to-us" is mentioned among African American political speakers. After all, the historical record indicates that the failure of Gabriel Prosser's. Denmark Vesev's. and Nat Turner's slave insurrections were due in part to other slaves that were more loval to Massa than their own liberation. Mind you that those who ratted out the slave revolts shared in the same language, ate the same food, lived the same experiences, but also had a different worldview (conception of reality) and set of values. The idea that social ontology and identity among African Americans, past and present, are preeminently the same for all is the sort of reductionism that flattens out the cultural, social, nolitical. and ideological landscape called African American culture. Albeit, resistance is cardinal and crucial to any description, definition, and interpretation of African American culture, nonetheless, it is not exhaustive of its actualities and even of its future possibilities. African American culture in its full substance and scope is more complex than a singular thrust in the monodirection of resistance. Rather, African American culture historically constitutes an ensemble of traditions in which we are able, for analytical purposes, to locate what are two primary and yet contradictory forms, viz. one of resistance and another of accommodation. This internal dialectic is undermined when a scenario of resistance sans accommodation gains support via vindicationism. In conclusion, the Yancy/Smitherman thesis about the importance of African American language is a needed corrective to the hegemonic perspective that relegates African American language to a form of substandard speech and African American culture to the dismal state of pathology. In providing this service, they present to us what are new avenues for the philosophy of language to creatively explore. Alternatively, Yancy's accent on the African American collective lived experience as the source for a common ontology affixed with the vindicationist conception of African American culture, where resistance becomes the only viable cultural/political tradition, is problematic. Moreover, I think it is precisely the common ontology and vindicationist theses that function as the twin pillars on which Yancy builds his case for not only viewing African American language [End Page 309] as a viable object of philosophical inquiry but also making the stronger claim that African American language can act as the basis for the construction of metaphilosophy. Here, I would only say that given my aforesaid arguments concerning the lack of evidential and logical support for a distinctive African American ontology and along my charges about the inherent weaknesses with vindicationism, the matter and manner of how African American language would serve in the reconceptualization of metaphilosophy remain open questions. 1

#### Culture, not language, constitutes reality and thought

**Faccone 2K**

Claudia Faccone, Robert Kearns, Ashley Kopp, Elizabeth Watson April 19, 2000

The Effects of Language on Thought http://www.unc.edu/~jdumas/projects/languagethought.htm

**The issue of whether or not language influences thought is tricky since more than one factor affects thought patterns.** Many researchers have used differing languages to study the relationship between language and thought, and they have come up with many different hypotheses. We propose that although specific languages would affect the part of the brain that one uses**, it is not language alone that produces "linguistically" differentiated thought patterns. Rather it is one’s culture.**

**Though different linguistic cultures have specific language for certain ideas and concepts, the culture they are raised in most likely produce their differentiated ways of thinking**. In the United States of America, where English is the predominate language, school systems have a specific method of teaching their curriculum to students. Though not all students are able to grasp this teaching process, most are; this method, taught to them by their teachers, becomes a large part of their thought processes. If one takes into account the idea of society and its impact on thought processes, then both the linguistic universalism and linguistic relativity theories are applicable. Humans are biologically capable of learning any language, but once an individual has passed a certain age, he/she is less likely to develop new language skills. **At that point, culture will use the knowledge of words from education to teach a specific way of analyzing the world. It is the culture, not purely language, which facilitates a different way of thinking. Consequently, this is the extra piece of the puzzle that so many scholars have left out in their research endeavors concerning the relationship between thought and language.**

#### Privileging the methodology of the oppressed flips knowledge hierarchies without breaking them down. There is no reason to believe the self-evidence of oppressed groups any more than oppressors – Both are insulated forms of knowing.

Ilan Gur-ze-ev Senior Lecturer Philosophy of Education @ Haifa '98 "Toward a nonrepressive critical pedagogy" Educational

Theoiy Fall 48 (4) p.

Prom this perspective, the consensus reached by the reflective subject taking part in the dialogue offered by critical pedagogy is naive, especially in light of its declared anti-intellectualism on the one hand and its pronounced glorification of the "feelings." "experience." and self-evident knowledge of the group on the other. Critical pedagogy, in its different versions, claims to inhere and overcome the foundationaiism and transcendentalism of the Enlightenment's emancipatory – and ethnocentric — arrogance, as exemplified by ideology-critique, psychoanalysis, or traditional metaphysics. Marginalized feminist knowledge, like the marginalized, neglected, and ridiculed knowledge of the Brazilian farmers, as presented by Freire or Kathleen Weiler, is represented as legitimate and relevant knowledge, in contrast to its representation as the hegemonic instrument of representation and education, This knowledge is portrayed as a relevant, legitimate, and superior alternative to hegemonic education and the knowledge this represents in the center. It is said to represent an identity that is desirable and promises to function "successfully." However, neither the truth value of the marginalized collective memory nor knowledge is cardinal here. "Truth" is replaced by knowledge whose supreme criterion is its self-evidence, namely the potential productivity of its creative violence, while the dialogue in which adorers of "difference" take part is implicitly represented as one of the desired productions of this violence. My argument is that this marginalized and repressed self-evident knowledge has no superiority over the self-evident knowledge of the oppressors. Relying on the knowledge of weak, controlled, and marginalized groups, their memory and their conscious interests, is no less naive and dangerous than relying on hegemonic knowledge. This is because the critique of Western transcendentalism, foundationaiism, and ethnocentrism declines into an uncritical acceptance of marginalized knowledge. which becomes foundationalistic and ethnocentric in presenting "the truth." "the facts." or "the real interests of the group" -- even if conceived as valid only for the group concerned. This position cannot avoid vulgar realism and naive positivism based on the "facts" of self-evident knowledge ultimately realized against the self-evidence of other groups.

#### Preference for strategies of the oppressed is a false promise that generates dogmatism and totalitarianism.

Ilan Gur-ze-ev, Senior Lecturer Philosophy of Education @ Haifa, 98, “Toward a nonrepressive critical pedagogy” Educational Theory, Fall 48 (4)

My argument regarding Freire's project is that its noncritical and automatic preference for the self-evident knowledge of the oppressed over that of the oppressors is dangerous. The self-evidence of "the people." or any social or cultural group, even when developed to reflectivity bv a grand leader-educator, is not without a terroristic potential. On the one hand, the idea is that the educational leader is responsible for the success of the project, while by the same token he {not she) has to be a total lover and be totally loved. This is within the framework of a praxis whose starting point is the self-evidence of the group and earthly politics. This opens the pate to totalitarianism as earthly heaven. These poles, with violence as their secret connection, are manifested in other poles in the system, as personified in the identification of Freire with Che Guevara or Fidel Castro, and his own acceptance by his followers as a guru who encourages groups and creates the horizon of their dialogues. It seems to me that the thinkers of both the first generation of the Frankfurt School, such as Adorno and Horkheimer, and of its second generation, such as Habermas and Karl Otto Apel, acknowledged the danger of this kind of education. Thev understood the difference between the negation of social conditions alien to ideals of solidarity, understanding, and transcendence and the positive Utopia of "love." The latter was a false promise that in effect produced a kind of "dialogue" reproducing the inner logic of existing power relations: it prevented transcendence and struggle for autonomy of the individual. Such an education blocks the possibility of counter-education, which is conditioned by an alternative critique. Counter-education as a starting point for a nonrepressive critique does not rush into easy optimism, positive utopianism, and "love" of the kind that Freire promised. Within the framework of such a positive Utopia, education constitutes itself either on the self-evidence of the group or on that of the leader-educator. That is why this kind of critical pedagogy is always in danger of overflowing into verbalism, dogmatism, or violence. Since Freire is careful to exclude the third option, his critical pedagogy is practically realized within the horizons of verbalism and dogmatism, which constantly threaten the project with unreflective acceptance of the false consciousness and knowledge of the repressed groups, who are unprepared for reflection upon the dialogical process in which they are involved. Freire challenges this threat not within radical philosophical education but within political half-conservatism,[20]

# 2NC

#### Capitalism necessitates instruments of labor like gender –

Cotter 8 [Jennifer Cotter, PhD. University of Pittsburgh, Class, the Digital, and (Immaterial) Feminism http://www.redcritique.org/FallWinter2008/classthedigitalandimmaterialfeminism.htm]

But the material reality of "gender" is not at root, a code, construct, aesthetic design, nor is it the "embodiment" of these codes in the physical and aesthetic design of technology, rather, it is a social relation of capital. Gender differences and relations are historically (re)produced out of the social division of labor and property relations. By social division of labor and property relations, to be clear, I mean class: the social division of labor and property between those who privately own the means of production and therefore live and profit off the surplus-labor of workers, and all of the rest who only own their labor to sell in order to survive and are exploited. Gender relations are a site of social struggle in capitalism because gender in class society is what Marx and Engels call an "instrument of labor" making it more or less expensive to use (Manifesto 491). Gender becomes useful to capital, as an instrument of labor, to raise or lower the rate of exploitation by, for example, organizing workers into divided and competing labor forces which can be pitted against each other in order to divide class solidarity and cheapen the cost of labor. Gender relations are also useful for capital as an instrument of labor, by serving as tool in controlling the rate of growth and development of the surplus-labor producing population. For example, in historical conditions in which capital needs to reproduce the surplus-labor producing population in absolute terms (adding a new generation of workers), gender serves as a means to push women into reproductive labor and childbearing. Moreover, in historical conditions of production in which capital is looking to deepen the exploitation of the current workforce within capitalism, gender has served as a tool to manipulate the rate of exploitation within the working day by devaluing the labor-power of women, pulling them into production at a cheaper rate, pushing men out, and, as a consequence lowering the wages of men as well. Gender, in short, is a tool of class warfare by the ruling class against workers. The use of gender as an instrument of labor is rooted in capital's dependence on labor-power as the only commodity that produces value. As an instrument of labor, gender relations can be culturally modified, revised, etc. depending on what is most profitable to capital under the existing historical conditions of production. What is not changed, however, with these cultural modifications in gender relations, is the social relations of production based on the exploitation of surplus-labor. Production for profit is not transformed without abolishing private ownership of the means of production. "Materiality" legitimates getting rid of an outdated ideology of gender that capitalism no longer needs, while doing nothing to address gender as an instrument of labor to increase the rate of exploitation and profit.

#### Voting negative constitutes an endorsement of a class-centered political approach as the compass for broader challenges to manifestations of structural violence. Identifying particular groups’ needs in advance hamstrings the emancipatory potential of resistance to inequalities.

Therborn 12 [Göran Therborn is a professor of sociology at Cambridge University and is amongst the most highly cited contemporary Marxian-influenced sociologists. New Left Review 78, November-December 2012 CLASS IN THE 21ST CENTURY http://newleftreview.org/II/78/goran-therborn-class-in-the-21st-century]

On a local scale we can already find many initiatives of this kind. The Bolivian cocaleros could use the movement-building skills and experience of unemployed miners. One of the trade unions in Maputo, having seen its members driven out of formal employment, has organized an association of street vendors. [48] This is not the only time this has happened: in fact, street vendors now have their own international, StreetNet, with its headquarters in South Africa. In Mexico City they constitute a political force which the mayor has to take into account. Indian women working in the informal economy have established their own structures of mutual aid in cities like Mumbai, Chennai and Ahmedabad, and in the national Self-Employed Women’s Association. [49] Trade unions have often been channels for wide popular protests against rising prices and authoritarian regimes, most recently in Tunisia during the revolt against Ben Ali. Formal-sector workers have taken the lead, but trade-union demands have been supported by broad social coalitions stretching beyond those layers. One example would be the Asian ‘floor wage’ campaign in the garment industry, a transnational initiative that emerged from the World Social Forum in Mumbai and was supported by unions, women’s organizations and development NGOs. [50] Class in this context becomes a compass of orientation—towards the classes of the people, the exploited, oppressed and disadvantaged in all their variety—rather than a structural category to be filled with ‘consciousness’. The social alliances on which future transformations will base themselves have yet to be formed, and no ‘leading role’ can be assigned to any group in advance. But without a class compass, even the best social movements are unlikely to overcome the inequalities of modern capitalism.

#### Intersectionality is a ruse disguised to conceal and obscure questions of class.

Lindisfarne and Neale 13 [Nancy Lindisfarne has lived and worked as an anthropologist in Afghanistan, Turkey and Syria, has taught at Soas (among other institutions), where she supervised the doctoral work of several of the contributors, and has published extensively on various issues, usually concerned with gender and the Middle East, and Jonathan Neale, What gender does Issue: 139 Posted: 5 July 13 International Socialist Quarterly]

The process continues. At the end of the 1990s the idea of “intersectionality” became popular. This is the idea that gender, race and class are simultaneously created together, in the same space—they “intersect”. There are two problems here. First, created by whom? Class, gender and race are analytical categories and aspects of human experience. Aspects and categories do not do things. Only people do things to each other. But speaking as if categories were human avoids looking at which particular people dominate the intersection. So a key question is who created these categories, and why? The second problem is a strong implicit belief that race, class and gender must be of equal weight in the intersection. This is odd. There is no logical reason for such an assumption and no plausible theoretical basis for it. In practice, it seems another device to hide questions of class. For instance, most books and articles on intersectionality start by name checking gender, race and class, but the rest of the book or article is then about gender and/or race, and class has vanished from the analysis.104

#### nommo fractures the possibility of any collective resistance by its isolation of an authentic black subject as the only viable agent of resistance

Clarke ‘4 (Lynn, “Talk About Talk: Promises, Risks, and a Proposition Out of Nommo,” Journal of Speculative Philosophy, 18:4)  
Returning to the question of creative power's compass—Yancy's account of Nommo raises problems here as well. In the account, recall, the word's generative function funds "an oppositional way of speaking" (Yancy 2004, 289). Among other products, the speech acts of resistance manifest themselves in a black identity and reality based on a presumption of shared interests among African American selves.[4](http://muse.jhu.edu.monstera.cc.columbia.edu:2048/journals/journal_of_speculative_philosophy/v018/18.4clarkel.html#FOOT4#FOOT4) At the same time, however, Nommo's creative force is conceptually detached from the word's power to constitute intersubjective relations between selves and others within the African American community. Thus, Yancy's concept of Nommo only admits a generative power to create identification among blacks who already agree to the presence and terms of shared interest. The power of this Nommo fails to reach those African Americans who disagree with black majoritarian terms. This relatively minimal compass of power suggests that Nommo's potential to define black community and reality may need to be reconceptualized beyond the presumptions of shared experience and common values to consider Nommo's potential to forge relations between African Americans who are divided on the terms of their present and future. The question of Nommo's compass of power is also significant for relations between African American selves and European American others. Though it may not appear to be of immediate relevance to the task of theorizing a language spoken among African Americans, the question may still be worth raising for at least two reasons: Yancy's linguistic theory of AAL is offered in the name of black Americans, and a cursory look at political discourse within the African American community reveals a centuries-old controversy over whether (or in what contexts) blacks should integrate with or separate from whites. Given the unresolved status of this controversy, African Americans may benefit from renewed discussion and debate on the terms of integration and separation and the attitude that distinguish and relate them. If so, AAL may have a role to play in the important talk ahead. Either way, the presence of these two concepts in black public discourse suggests that relations between black and white Americans is not a settled issue for the community in whose name AAL has been defined and thought. The question of Nommo's power to constitute relations between blacks and whites may therefore be relevant to thinking and defining AAL. If black and white racial division is a cause for concern in the U.S., the concept of Nommo as instrumental power butts upon a problem of relation much like the one we encountered with dissent among African Americans. Specifically, Yancy's and others' accounts of Nommo do not address the word's power to forge relations between African Americans and the white benefactors of racial [End Page 321] and racist thinking in America. Cast in relation to the production of "hidden transcripts" (Scott 1990), the power of Nommo in the aforementioned accounts is constrained to a resistance that risks foreclosing the capacity of humans to collectively define their selves and world(s). Recalling Fanon, the risk speaks to the question of whether, upon self-consciousness, an oppressed group may "choose action (or passivity) with respect to the real source of the conflict—that is, tow

ard the social structures" (Fanon 1967, 100). The choice to act would require a concept of Nommo that works to mend division and invite intersubjective dialogue and debate about racial and racist thinking and their pernicious affects on black and white Americans, and others. Together, the question of Nommo's creative compass of power, along with the problem of holding creative power accountable to intersubjective reason, point to the risk of conceptualizing language in such a way that the word's instrumental force is disconnected from the argumentative form of communication. To leave this connection unnamed and unthought in an account of AAL is to proceed according to at least two questionable presuppositions about contemporary speech situations in which Nommo is uttered: the speaker of AAL is of good moral character; and the speaker and audience are united on their preferred form of life and the terms of their identification. While these presuppositions may have been appropriate in the past times and spaces to which African "tradition(s)" refer, today both premises are untenable in the U.S. and elsewhere in the African diaspora. Speakers regularly express a will to power and, increasingly, communities are a mixture of identities, cultural traditions, and forms of life. Present contingencies warrant an account of Nommo that invites reflection upon the products of invention attributed to AAL.[5](http://muse.jhu.edu.monstera.cc.columbia.edu:2048/journals/journal_of_speculative_philosophy/v018/18.4clarkel.html#FOOT5#FOOT5) So far, informed by a rhetorical philosophical approach to language, I have discussed certain promises and risks of framing a linguistic theory of AAL in Nommo as creative power. Regarding the promises, the architectonic force of Nommo is the possibility of expressing social trauma, and of defining the self and her experience of the world. In facilitating these acts of speech and definition, Nommo fosters subjectivity and a vital sense of human agency. Moreover, self-identity, the representation of private experience, and the practiced capacity to define one's sense of self and world, are all necessary to the work of struggle. Finally, a concept of the productive force of the word acknowledges the mutual interdependence of personhood and community and the role of creativity in fashioning the terms of social existence and, potentially, common life. Framing AAL in a theory of Nommo offers philosophers of language an opportunity to appreciate and think the potential of AAL to contribute to thriving black community. Important, these promises of invention do not come without risks. A sole focus on Nommo's power to define the self and his sense of the world forecloses the potential of speech to create relations between self and other. Similarly, the potential of Nommo to move between and relate particular [End Page 322] interests, to connect creative power to the force of communicative reason without collapsing one into the other, is squandered before it appears. The linguistic resistance attributed to AAL transforms the terms of identity and reality, but leaves unaccounted-for those members of the African American community who do not see their selves, their experiences, their values, or their interests in the newly created terms. Too, in this particular linguistic theory of AAL, the important question of affecting resistance towards collective transgression of racialized norms is at worse overlooked, and at best deferred until a time yet to be named.

#### Appeals to individual experiences of oppression mark a turn away from collective material economic violence – papers over the real of history by producing a façade of specific resistance.

McLaren 10 [Peter, Professor in the Division of Urban Schooling, the Graduate School of Education and Information Studies, UCLA, Peer Reviewed Title: Revolutionary Critical Pedagogy Journal Issue: InterActions: UCLA Journal of Education and Information Studies, 6(2) Author: McLaren, Peter, University of California, Los Angeles Publication Date: 2010]

New mechanisms of accumulation have spurred the development of a model in which transnational fractions of capital have become dominant. They include a cheapening of labor and the growth of flexible, deregulated and deunionized labor where women always experience super-exploitation in relation to men; the dramatic expansion of finance capital; the creation of a global and regulatory structure to facilitate the emerging global circuits of accumulation; and neoliberal structural adjustment programs which seek to create the conditions for frictionless operations of emerging transnational capital across borders and between countries. The role of the nation-state has changed to meet globally uniform laws that protect capital against the interests of the international working class. The nation-state still serves local capital, but it can no longer fetter the transnational movement of capital with its endless chains of accumulation. The cultural turn in much of current postmodern and postcolonial criticism is not a passing trend but rather a structural feature of capitalism. Particularly during times of crisis, capitalism turns to culture to solve the contradictions that it cannot resolve in its actual material practices (Ebert & Zavardadeh, 2008). Through the medium of experience, the individual is mistaken as the source of social practices and this process of misidentification becomes a capitalist archestrategy that marginalizes collectivity and protects the individual as the foundation of entrepreneurial capitalism. Consequently, the well-being of the collectivity is replaced by a “politics of consumption” that champions the singularities of individuals by ennobling the desire to obtain and consume objects of pleasure. Experience in this view becomes non-theoretical and beyond the real of history. This is precisely why we need to locate all human experience in a world-historical frame; that is, within specific social relations of production.

#### Identity politics are the ultimate basis of banal homogeneity-endless numbers of groups demand recognition only to be marked for capitalist targeting, such as distinctive fashions or specialty magazines.

Badiou 3

Alain Badiou, Professor of Philosophy at the European Graduate School in Saas-Fee, Switzerland, Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism, p.9-11

Our world is in no way as "complex’ as those who wish to ensure Its perpetuation claim. It is even, in its broad outline, perfectly simple -J On the one hand, there is an extension of the automatisms of capital, fulfilling one of Marx's inspired predictions: the world finally configured!, but as a market, as a world-market. This configuration imposes the rule of an abstract homogenization. Everything that circulates falls under the unity of a count, while inversely, only what lets itself be counted in this way can circulate Moreover, this is the norm that illuminates a paradox few have pointed out: in the hour of generalized circulation and the phantasm of instantaneous cultural communication, laws and regulations forbidding the circulation of persons are being multiplied everywhere. So. it is that in France, never have fewer foreigners settled than in the recent period! Free circulation of what lets itself be counted, yes, and above all of capital, which is the count of the count. Free circulation of that uncountable infinity constituted by a singular human life, never! For capitalist monetary abstraction is certainly a singularity, but a singularity that has no consideration fir any singularity whatsoever: singularity as indifferent to the persistent infinity of existence as is to the eventual becoming of truths. On the other side, there is a process of fragmentation into closed identities, and the culturalist and relativist ideology that accompanies this fragmentation. Both processes are perfectly intertwined. For each identification (the creation or cobbling together of identity) creates a figure that provides a material for its investment by the market. There is nothing more captive, so far as commercial investment is concerned, nothing more amenable to the invention of new figures of monetary homogeneity, than a community and its territory or territories. The semblance of nonequivalence is required so that equivalence itself can constitute a process. What inexhaustible potential for mercantile investments in this upsurge- taking the form to communities demanding recognition and so called cultural singularities – of women, homosexuals, and disabled Arabs! And these infinite combinations of predicative traits, what a godsend! Black homosexuals, disabled Serbs, Catholic pedophiles, moderate Muslims married priests, ecologist yuppies, the sub save unemployed, prematurely aged youth! Each time, a social image authorizes new products, specialized magazines, improved shopping malls, "free" radio stations, targeted advertising networks, and finally, heady "public debates" at peak viewing times. Deleuze put it perfectly: capitalist deterritorialization requires a constant reterritorialization. Capital demands a permanent creation of subjective and territorial identities in order for its principle of movement to homogenize its space of action: identities. Moreover, that never demand anything but the right to be exposed in the same way as others to the uniform prerogatives of the market. The capitalist logic of the general equivalent and the identitarian and cultural logic of communities or minorities form an articulated whole. This articulation plays a constraining role relative to every truth procedure. It is organic ally without truth.

#### Their use of language as a model for politics obscures class conflict.

Anderson, 83 (Perry, is a member of the editorial committee of New Left Review, and the author of Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism (1974), Lineages of the Absolutist State (1974), Considerations on Western Marxism (1976), and Arguments within English Marxism (1980). In the Tracks of Historical Materialism. P 90-93)

These local objections, conclusive as they may be for the disciplines in question, nevertheless do not in themselves convey the general reason why language is no fitting model for any other human practice. We can see the distance between them· most clearly, perhaps, if we recollect Levi-Strauss's argument in The Savage Mind that language provides an apodictic experience of a totalizing and dialectical reality anterior and exterior to the consciousness and will of any speaking subject, whose utterances on the contrary are never conscious totaliz­ ations of linguistic laws. But in fact the relation between langue and parole is a peculiarly aberrant compass for plotting the diverse positions of structure and subject in the world outside language. This is so for at least three basic reasons. Firstly, linguistic structures have an ex­ ceptionally low coefficient of historical mobility, among social institu­ tions. Altering very slowly and, with few and recent exceptions, unconsciously, they are in that respect quite unlike economic, political or religious structures, whose rates of change - once the threshold of class society has been reached - have generally been incomparably faster. Secondly, however, this characteristic immobility of language as a structure is accompanied by a no less exceptional inventivity of the subject within it: the obverse of the rigidity of langue is the volatile liberty of parole. For utterance has no material constraint whatever: words are free, in the double sense of the term. They cost nothing to produce, and can be multiplied and manipulated at will, within the laws of meaning. All other major social practices are subject to the laws of natural scarcity: persons, goods or powers cannot be generated ad libitum and ad infinitum. Yet the very freedom of the speaking subject is curiously inconsequential : that is, its effects on the structure in return are in normal circumstances virtually nil. Even the greatest writers, whose genius has influenced whole cultures, have typically altered the language relatively little. This, of course, at once indicates the third peculiarity of the structure-subject relationship in language: namely, the subject of speech is axiomatically individual- 'don't speak all together' being the customary way of saying that plural speech is non-speech, that which cannot be heard. By contrast, the relevant subjects in the domain of economic, cultural, political or military structures are first and foremost collective: nations, classes castes, groups, generations. Precisely because this is so, the agency of these subjects is capable of effecting profound transformations of those structures. This fundamental distinction is an insurmountable barrier to any transposition of linguistic models to historical processes of a wider sort. The opening move of structuralism, in other words, is a speculative aggrandisement of language that lacks any comparative credentials.

### Impact – Capitalism Root Cause of White Supremacy

Selfa 10 [Lance Selfa is a frequent contributor to the International Socialist Review, and writes a column on U.S. politics in Socialist Worker newspaper. He is the author of The Democrats: A Critical History. The roots of racism, October 21, 2010 http://socialistworker.org/2010/10/21/the-roots-of-racism]

Racism is a particular form of oppression. It stems from discrimination against a group of people based on the idea that some inherited characteristic, such as skin color, makes them inferior to their oppressors. Yet the concepts of "race" and "racism" are modern inventions. They arose and became part of the dominant ideology of society in the context of the African slave trade at the dawn of capitalism in the 1500s and 1600s. Although it is a commonplace for academics and opponents of socialism to claim that Karl Marx ignored racism, Marx in fact described the processes that created modern racism. His explanation of the rise of capitalism placed the African slave trade, the European extermination of indigenous people in the Americas and colonialism at its heart. In Capital, Marx writes: The discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement and entombment in mines of the indigenous population of the continent, the beginnings of the conquest and plunder of India, and the conversion of Africa into a preserve for the commercial hunting of black skins are all things that characterize the dawn of the era of capitalist production. Marx connected his explanation of the role of the slave trade in the rise of capitalism to the social relations that produced racism against Africans. In Wage Labor and Capital, written 12 years before the American Civil War, he explains: What is a Negro slave? A man of the black race. The one explanation is as good as the other. A Negro is a Negro. He only becomes a slave in certain relations. A cotton spinning jenny is a machine for spinning cotton. It only becomes capital in certain relations. Torn away from these conditions, it is as little capital as gold by itself is money, or as sugar is the price of sugar. In this passage, Marx shows no prejudice to Blacks ("a man of the black race," "a Negro is a Negro"), but he mocks society's equation of "Black" and "slave" ("one explanation is as good as another"). He shows how the economic and social relations of emerging capitalism thrust Blacks into slavery ("he only becomes a slave in certain relations"), which produce the dominant ideology that equates being African with being a slave. These fragments of Marx's writing give us a good start in understanding the Marxist explanation of the origins of racism. As the Trinidadian historian of slavery Eric Williams put it: "Slavery was not born of racism: rather, racism was the consequence of slavery." And, one should add, the consequence of modern slavery at the dawn of capitalism. While slavery existed as an economic system for thousands of years before the conquest of America, racism as we understand it today did not exist. The classical empires of Greece and Rome were based on slave labor. But ancient slavery was not viewed in racial terms. Slaves were most often captives in wars or conquered peoples. If we understand white people as originating in what is today Europe, then most slaves in ancient Greece and Rome were white. Roman law made slaves the property of their owners, while maintaining a "formal lack of interest in the slave's ethnic or racial provenance," wrote Robin Blackburn in The Making of New World Slavery. Over the years, slave manumission produced a mixed population of slave and free in Roman-ruled areas, in which all came to be seen as "Romans." The Greeks drew a sharper line between Greeks and "barbarians," those subject to slavery. Again, this was not viewed in racial or ethnic terms, as the socialist historian of the Haitian Revolution, C.L.R. James, explained: [H]istorically, it is pretty well proved now that the ancient Greeks and Romans knew nothing about race. They had another standard--civilized and barbarian--and you could have white skin and be a barbarian, and you could be black and civilized. More importantly, encounters in the ancient world between the Mediterranean world and Black Africans did not produce an upsurge of racism against Africans. In Before Color Prejudice, Howard University classics professor Frank Snowden documented innumerable accounts of interaction between the Greco-Roman and Egyptian civilizations and the Kush, Nubian, and Ethiopian kingdoms of Africa. He found substantial evidence of integration of Black Africans in the occupational hierarchies of the ancient Mediterranean empires and Black-white intermarriage. Black and mixed race gods appeared in Mediterranean art, and at least one Roman emperor, Septimius Severus, was an African. Between the 10th and 16th centuries, the chief source of slaves in Western Europe was Eastern Europe. In fact, the word "slave" comes from the word "Slav," the people of Eastern Europe. This outline doesn't mean to suggest a "pre-capitalist" Golden Age of racial tolerance, least of all in the slave societies of antiquity. Empires viewed themselves as centers of the universe and looked on foreigners as inferiors. Ancient Greece and Rome fought wars of conquest against peoples they presumed to be less advanced. Religious scholars interpreted the Hebrew Bible's "curse of Ham" from the story of Noah to condemn Africans to slavery. Cultural and religious associations of the color white with light and angels and the color black with darkness and evil persisted. But none of these cultural or ideological factors explain the rise of New World slavery or the "modern" notions of racism that developed from it. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - The African slave trade The slave trade lasted for a little more than 400 years, from the mid-1400s, when the Portuguese made their first voyages down the African coast, to the abolition of slavery in Brazil in 1888. Slave traders took as many as 12 million Africans by force to work on the plantations in South America, the Caribbean and North America. About 13 percent of slaves (1.5 million) died during the Middle Passage--the trip by boat from Africa to the New World. The African slave trade--involving African slave merchants, European slavers and New World planters in the traffic in human cargo--represented the greatest forced population transfer ever. The charge that Africans "sold their own people" into slavery has become a standard canard against "politically correct" history that condemns the European role in the African slave trade. The first encounters of the Spanish and Portuguese, and later the English, with African kingdoms revolved around trade in goods. Only after the Europeans established New World plantations requiring huge labor gangs did the slave trade begin. African kings and chiefs did indeed sell into slavery captives in wars or members of other communities. Sometimes, they concluded alliances with Europeans to support them in wars, with captives from their enemies being handed over to the Europeans as booty. The demands of the plantation economies pushed "demand" for slaves. Supply did not create its own demand. In any event, it remains unseemly to attempt to absolve the European slavers by reference to their African partners in crime. As historian Basil Davidson rightly argues about African chiefs' complicity in the slave trade: "In this, they were no less 'moral' than the Europeans who had instigated the trade and bought the captives." Onboard, Africans were restricted in their movements so that they wouldn't combine to mutiny on the ship. In many slave ships, slaves were chained down, stacked like firewood with less than a foot between them. On the plantations, slaves were subjected to a regimen of 18-hour workdays. All members of slave families were set to work. Since the New World tobacco and sugar plantations operated nearly like factories, men, women and children were assigned tasks, from the fields to the processing mills. Slaves were denied any rights. Throughout the colonies in the Caribbean to North America, laws were passed establishing a variety of common practices: Slaves were forbidden to carry weapons, they could marry only with the owner's permission, and their families could be broken up. They were forbidden to own property. Masters allowed slaves to cultivate vegetables and chickens, so the master wouldn't have to attend to their food needs. But they were forbidden even to sell for profit the products of their own gardens. Some colonies encouraged religious instruction among slaves, but all of them made clear that a slave's conversion to Christianity didn't change their status as slaves. Other colonies discouraged religious instruction, especially when it became clear to the planters that church meetings were one of the chief ways that slaves planned conspiracies and revolts. It goes without saying that slaves had no political or civil rights, with no right to an education, to serve on juries, to vote or to run for public office. The planters instituted barbaric regimes of repression to prevent any slave revolts. Slave catchers using tracker dogs would hunt down any slaves who tried to escape the plantation. The penalties for any form of slave resistance were extreme and deadly. One description of the penalties slaves faced in Barbados reports that rebellious slaves would be punished by "nailing them down on the ground with crooked sticks on every Limb, and then applying the Fire by degrees from Feet and Hands, burning them gradually up to the Head, whereby their pains are extravagant." Barbados planters could claim a reimbursement from the government of 25 pounds per slave executed. The African slave trade helped to shape a wide variety of societies from modern Argentina to Canada. These differed in their use of slaves, the harshness of the regime imposed on slaves, and the degree of mixing of the races that custom and law permitted. But none of these became as virulently racist--insisting on racial separation and a strict color bar--as the English North American colonies that became the United States. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Unfree labor in the North American colonies Notwithstanding the horrible conditions that African slaves endured, it is important to underscore that when European powers began carving up the New World between them, African slaves were not part of their calculations. When we think of slavery today, we think of it primarily from the point of view of its relationship to racism. But planters in the 17th and 18th centuries looked at it primarily as a means to produce profits. Slavery was a method of organizing labor to produce sugar, tobacco and cotton. It was not, first and foremost, a system for producing white supremacy. How did slavery in the U.S. (and the rest of the New World) become the breeding ground for racism? For much of the first century of colonization in what became the United States, the majority of slaves and other "unfree laborers" were white. The term "unfree" draws the distinction between slavery and servitude and "free wage labor" that is the norm in capitalism. One of the historic gains of capitalism for workers is that workers are "free" to sell their ability to labor to whatever employer will give them the best deal. Of course, this kind of freedom is limited at best. Unless they are independently wealthy, workers aren't free to decide not to work. They're free to work or starve. Once they do work, they can quit one employer and go to work for another. But the hallmark of systems like slavery and indentured servitude was that slaves or servants were "bound over" to a particular employer for a period of time, or for life in the case of slaves. The decision to work for another master wasn't the slave's or the servant's. It was the master's, who could sell slaves for money or other commodities like livestock, lumber or machinery. The North American colonies started predominantly as private business enterprises in the early 1600s. Unlike the Spanish, whose conquests of Mexico and Peru in the 1500s produced fabulous gold and silver riches for Spain, settlers in places like the colonies that became Maryland, Rhode Island, and Virginia made money through agriculture. In addition to sheer survival, the settlers' chief aim was to obtain a labor force that could produce the large amounts of indigo, tobacco, sugar and other crops that would be sold back to England. From 1607, when Jamestown was founded in Virginia to about 1685, the primary source of agricultural labor in English North America came from white indentured servants. The colonists first attempted to press the indigenous population into labor. But the Indians refused to be become servants to the English. Indians resisted being forced to work, and they escaped into the surrounding area, which, after all, they knew far better than the English. One after another, the English colonies turned to a policy of driving out the Indians. The colonists then turned to white servants. Indentured servants were predominantly young white men--usually English or Irish--who were required to work for a planter master for some fixed term of four to seven years. The servants received room and board on the plantation but no pay. And they could not quit and work for another planter. They had to serve their term, after which they might be able to acquire some land and to start a farm for themselves. They became servants in several ways. Some were prisoners, convicted of petty crimes in Britain, or convicted of being troublemakers in Britain's first colony, Ireland. Many were kidnapped off the streets of Liverpool or Manchester, and put on ships to the New World. Some voluntarily became servants, hoping to start farms after they fulfilled their obligations to their masters. For most of the 1600s, the planters tried to get by with a predominantly white, but multiracial workforce. But as the 17th century wore on, colonial leaders became increasingly frustrated with white servant labor. For one thing, they faced the problem of constantly having to recruit labor as servants' terms expired. Second, after servants finished their contracts and decided to set up their farms, they could become competitors to their former masters. And finally, the planters didn't like the servants' "insolence." The mid-1600s were a time of revolution in England, when ideas of individual freedom were challenging the old hierarchies based on royalty. The colonial planters tended to be royalists, but their servants tended to assert their "rights as Englishmen" to better food, clothing and time off. Most laborers in the colonies supported the servants. As the century progressed, the costs of servant labor increased. Planters started to petition the colonial boards and assemblies to allow the large-scale importation of African slaves. Black slaves worked on plantations in small numbers throughout the 1600s. But until the end of the 1600s, it cost planters more to buy slaves than to buy white servants. Blacks lived in the colonies in a variety of statuses--some were free, some were slaves, some were servants. The law in Virginia didn't establish the condition of lifetime, perpetual slavery or even recognize African servants as a group different from white servants until 1661. Blacks could serve on juries, own property and exercise other rights. Northampton County, Virginia, recognized interracial marriages and, in one case, assigned a free Black couple to act as foster parents for an abandoned white child. There were even a few examples of Black freemen who owned white servants. Free Blacks in North Carolina had voting rights. In the 1600s, the Chesapeake society of eastern Virginia had a multiracial character, according to historian Betty Wood: There is persuasive evidence dating from the 1620s through the 1680s that there were those of European descent in the Chesapeake who were prepared to identify and cooperate with people of African descent. These affinities were forged in the world of plantation work. On many plantations, Europeans and West Africans labored side by side in the tobacco fields, performing exactly the same types and amounts of work; they lived and ate together in shared housing; they socialized together; and sometimes they slept together. The planters' economic calculations played a part in the colonies' decision to move toward full-scale slave labor. By the end of the 17th century, the price of white indentured servants outstripped the price of African slaves. A planter could buy an African slave for life for the same price that he could purchase a white servant for 10 years. As Eric Williams explained: Here, then, is the origin of Negro slavery. The reason was economic, not racial; it had to do not with the color of the laborer, but the cheapness of the labor. [The planter] would have gone to the moon, if necessary, for labor. Africa was nearer than the moon, nearer too than the more populous countries of India and China. But their turn would soon come. Planters' fear of a multiracial uprising also pushed them towards racial slavery. Because a rigid racial division of labor didn't exist in the 17th century colonies, many conspiracies involving Black slaves and white indentured servants were hatched and foiled. We know about them today because of court proceedings that punished the runaways after their capture. As historians T.H. Breen and Stephen Innes point out, "These cases reveal only extreme actions, desperate attempts to escape, but for every group of runaways who came before the courts, there were doubtless many more poor whites and blacks who cooperated in smaller, less daring ways on the plantation." The largest of these conspiracies developed into Bacon's Rebellion, an uprising that threw terror into the hearts of the Virginia Tidewater planters in 1676. Several hundred farmers, servants and slaves initiated a protest to press the colonial government to seize Indian land for distribution. The conflict spilled over into demands for tax relief and resentment of the Jamestown establishment. Planter Nathaniel Bacon helped organize an army of whites and Blacks that sacked Jamestown and forced the governor to flee. The rebel army held out for eight months before the Crown managed to defeat and disarm it. Bacon's Rebellion was a turning point. After it ended, the Tidewater planters moved in two directions: first, they offered concessions to the white freemen, lifting taxes and extending to them the vote; and second, they moved to full-scale racial slavery. Fifteen years earlier, the Burgesses had recognized the condition of slavery for life and placed Africans in a different category as white servants. But the law had little practical effect. "Until slavery became systematic, there was no need for a systematic slave code. And slavery could not become systematic so long as an African slave for life cost twice as much as an English servant for a five-year term," wrote historian Barbara Jeanne Fields. Both of those circumstances changed in the immediate aftermath of Bacon's Rebellion. In the entire 17th century, the planters imported about 20,000 African slaves. The majority of them were brought to North American colonies in the 24 years after Bacon's Rebellion. In 1664, the Maryland legislature passed a law determining who would be considered slaves on the basis of the condition of their father--whether their father was slave or free. It soon became clear, however, that establishing paternity was difficult, but that establishing who was a person's mother was definite. So the planters changed the law to establish slave status on the basis of the mother's condition. Now white slaveholders who fathered children by slave women would be guaranteed their offspring as slaves. And the law included penalties for "free" women who slept with slaves. But what's most interesting about this law is that it doesn't really speak in racial terms. It attempts to preserve the property rights of slaveholders and establish barriers between slave and free which were to become hardened into racial divisions over the next few years. Taking the Maryland law as an example, Fields made this important point: Historians can actually observe colonial Americans in the act of preparing the ground for race without foreknowledge of what would later arise on the foundation they were laying. [T]he purpose of the experiment is clear: to prevent the erosion of slaveowners' property rights that would result if the offspring of free white women impregnated by slave men were entitled to freedom. The language of the preamble to the law makes clear that the point was not yet race. Race does not explain the law. Rather, the law shows society in the act of inventing race. After establishing that African slaves would cultivate major cash crops of the North American colonies, the planters then moved to establish the institutions and ideas that would uphold white supremacy. Most unfree labor became Black labor. Laws and ideas intended to underscore the subhuman status of Black people--in a word, the ideology of racism and white supremacy--emerged full-blown over the next generation.

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#### Privileging the methodology of the oppressed flips knowledge hierarchies without breaking them down. There is no reason to believe the self-evidence of oppressed groups any more than oppressors – Both are insulated forms of knowing.

Ilan Gur-ze-ev Senior Lecturer Philosophy of Education @ Haifa '98 "Toward a nonrepressive critical pedagogy" Educational

Theoiy Fall 48 (4) p.

Prom this perspective, the consensus reached by the reflective subject taking part in the dialogue offered by critical pedagogy is naive, especially in light of its declared anti-intellectualism on the one hand and its pronounced glorification of the "feelings." "experience." and self-evident knowledge of the group on the other. Critical pedagogy, in its different versions, claims to inhere and overcome the foundationaiism and transcendentalism of the Enlightenment's emancipatory – and ethnocentric — arrogance, as exemplified by ideology-critique, psychoanalysis, or traditional metaphysics. Marginalized feminist knowledge, like the marginalized, neglected, and ridiculed knowledge of the Brazilian farmers, as presented by Freire or Kathleen Weiler, is represented as legitimate and relevant knowledge, in contrast to its representation as the hegemonic instrument of representation and education, This knowledge is portrayed as a relevant, legitimate, and superior alternative to hegemonic education and the knowledge this represents in the center. It is said to represent an identity that is desirable and promises to function "successfully." However, neither the truth value of the marginalized collective memory nor knowledge is cardinal here. "Truth" is replaced by knowledge whose supreme criterion is its self-evidence, namely the potential productivity of its creative violence, while the dialogue in which adorers of "difference" take part is implicitly represented as one of the desired productions of this violence. My argument is that this marginalized and repressed self-evident knowledge has no superiority over the self-evident knowledge of the oppressors. Relying on the knowledge of weak, controlled, and marginalized groups, their memory and their conscious interests, is no less naive and dangerous than relying on hegemonic knowledge. This is because the critique of Western transcendentalism, foundationaiism, and ethnocentrism declines into an uncritical acceptance of marginalized knowledge. which becomes foundationalistic and ethnocentric in presenting "the truth." "the facts." or "the real interests of the group" -- even if conceived as valid only for the group concerned. This position cannot avoid vulgar realism and naive positivism based on the "facts" of self-evident knowledge ultimately realized against the self-evidence of other groups.

#### Preference for strategies of the oppressed is a false promise that generates dogmatism and totalitarianism.

Ilan Gur-ze-ev, Senior Lecturer Philosophy of Education @ Haifa, 98, “Toward a nonrepressive critical pedagogy” Educational Theory, Fall 48 (4)

My argument regarding Freire's project is that its noncritical and automatic preference for the self-evident knowledge of the oppressed over that of the oppressors is dangerous. The self-evidence of "the people." or any social or cultural group, even when developed to reflectivity bv a grand leader-educator, is not without a terroristic potential. On the one hand, the idea is that the educational leader is responsible for the success of the project, while by the same token he {not she) has to be a total lover and be totally loved. This is within the framework of a praxis whose starting point is the self-evidence of the group and earthly politics. This opens the pate to totalitarianism as earthly heaven. These poles, with violence as their secret connection, are manifested in other poles in the system, as personified in the identification of Freire with Che Guevara or Fidel Castro, and his own acceptance by his followers as a guru who encourages groups and creates the horizon of their dialogues. It seems to me that the thinkers of both the first generation of the Frankfurt School, such as Adorno and Horkheimer, and of its second generation, such as Habermas and Karl Otto Apel, acknowledged the danger of this kind of education. Thev understood the difference between the negation of social conditions alien to ideals of solidarity, understanding, and transcendence and the positive Utopia of "love." The latter was a false promise that in effect produced a kind of "dialogue" reproducing the inner logic of existing power relations: it prevented transcendence and struggle for autonomy of the individual. Such an education blocks the possibility of counter-education, which is conditioned by an alternative critique. Counter-education as a starting point for a nonrepressive critique does not rush into easy optimism, positive utopianism, and "love" of the kind that Freire promised. Within the framework of such a positive Utopia, education constitutes itself either on the self-evidence of the group or on that of the leader-educator. That is why this kind of critical pedagogy is always in danger of overflowing into verbalism, dogmatism, or violence. Since Freire is careful to exclude the third option, his critical pedagogy is practically realized within the horizons of verbalism and dogmatism, which constantly threaten the project with unreflective acceptance of the false consciousness and knowledge of the repressed groups, who are unprepared for reflection upon the dialogical process in which they are involved. Freire challenges this threat not within radical philosophical education but within political half-conservatism,[20]

Their focus on bringing the “voices” of the oppressed into debate exclude those who literally do not have a voice

Lacey 10 (Teacher, MA in English, “The Conversations Metaphor and Ableism”, 9/6, <http://equality101.net/?p=1886> Accessed 2/10/11)

In my [last post](http://equality101.net/?p=1809), I discussed how I might use the seemingly elementary activity of show-and-tell to introduce students to a foundational concept of college-level composition: the Burkean Parlor metaphor. Frequently expressed as the simpler conversation metaphor, this metaphor illustrates what thinkers, researchers, scholars and, most importantly, writers do: we listen to a conversation; we form our own opinions about this topic of conversation as a result of listening; we eventually add our own voices (**opinions)** to the conversation; and our voices become part of the conversation that others listen to and use to form their opinions.

As I prepared for one of my classes today, I came across the following passage in a chapter called “Reading Rhetorically: The Writer as Strong Reader”:

The goal of this chapter is to help you become a more powerful reader of academic texts, prepared to take part in the conversations of the disciplines you study. To this end, we explain two kinds of thinking and writing essential to your college reading:

Your ability to listen carefully to a text, to recognize its parts and their functions, and to summarize its ideas

Your ability to formulate strong responses to texts by interacting with them, either by agreeing with, interrogating, or actively opposing them

(Ramage, Bean, and Johnson, Allyn & Bacon Guide to Writing, 5th ed., pg. 109)

Clearly, the conversation metaphor is a useful and important framework that has the capacity to help college students understand college-level writing in a new and more applicable way. This metaphor has helped me explain why we do research at all and how composition classes are relevant outside of the required course structure at the university.

Butafter reading this passage, it struck me that this metaphor — built on the notions of listening and speaking — might actually be ableist in effect. It might leave out many students who can still participate in composition meaningfully but who don’t have the ability to listen (or hear) or to speak. I’m not sure why this never occurred to me before. I’ve taught the conversation metaphor to students with hearing difficulties without thinking twice about what I was saying. Despite the ableist language in the metaphor used to present this concept, I think the concept itself is still valuable. So how can we modify this metaphor to accommodate for all students? The easy answer is to change the language and comparison involved. We could use the more situation-neutral language of rhetoric: the rhetor (who can be a speaker, a writer, an artist, a thinker — anyone who puts a message in some form out to an audience) takes in the messages about a particular topic of the rhetors around him/her, uses those messages to learn and to develop an opinion, and then adds his/her own response to the collection of messages surrounding this topic for other would-be rhetors to take in. This conception is rather vague, though, and lacks the benefit of a realistic setting to deliver the metaphor and to demonstrate that what we do as composers in college reflects what we do as workers, family members, citizens, and activists beyond the college classroom. Perhaps a more updated version of this metaphor would use the setting of an online chat room. Instead of entering a parlor — which is an outdated term anyway — to listen and speak to people already engaged in conversation, perhaps you enter a chat room where you read and learn more about conversations that have been ongoing since before other chat users were in the room. While this is a more realistic setting for the concept of participating in a discourse community, there are still touches of ableism (being able to read — though many individuals with visual impairment use devices to allow them to read either print or Braille from their computers) and classism (access to the Web and time to participate in chat rooms).

As the composition field continues to become more relevant as students engage with all kinds of texts and participate in all kinds of discourse communities, we who promote these foundational concepts must remain cognizant that we are considering all of our students. While communication is a human endeavor, we don’t all communicate in the same ways, and it is vital that composition/rhetoric make that basic fact a part of the daily work of teaching students how to critically engage with texts and contribute to their communities.

1. Voting Issue – Ableist Speech strengthens the oppression they attempt to resist

Wheelchair Dancer, 8

(“On Making Argument: Disability and Language”, <http://cripwheels.blogspot.com/2008/04/on-making-argument-disability-and.html> Accessed: 2/10/11)  
If you are feeling a little bit of resistance, here, I'd ask you to think about it. If perhaps what I am saying feels like a burden -- too much to take on? a restriction on your carefree speech? -- perhaps that feeling can also serve as an indicator of how pervasive and thus important the issue is. As a community, we've accepted that commonly used words can be slurs, and as a rule, we avoid them, hopefully in the name of principle, but sometimes only in the name of civility. Do you go around using derivatives of the b**\*ch** word?If you do, I bet you check which community you are in**....** Same thing for the N word**.** These days, **depending on your age,** you might say something is retarded **or spastic,** but you probably never say that it's gay. I'd like to suggest that society as a whole has not paid the same kind of attention to disabled people's concerns about language. By not paying attention to the literal value, the very real substantive, physical, psychological, sensory, and emotional experiences that come with these linguistic moves, we have created a negative rhetorical climate. In this world, it is too easy for feminists and people of colour to base their claims on argumentative strategies that depend, as their signature moves, on marginalizing the experience of disabled people and on disparaging their appearance and bodies. Much of the blogosphere discourse of the previous weeks has studied the relationships between race, (white) feminism and feminists, and WOC bloggers. To me, the intellectual takeaway has been an emerging understanding of how, in conversation, notions of appropriation, citation, ironization, and metaphorization can be deployed as strategies of legitimation and exclusion. And, as a result, I question how "oppressed, minoritized" groups differentiate themselves from other groups in order to seek justice and claim authority. Must we always define ourselves in opposition and distance to a minoritized and oppressed group that can be perceived as even more unsavory than the one from which one currently speaks?  
As I watched the discussion about who among the feminist and WOC bloggers has power and authority and how that is achieved, I began to recognise a new power dynamic both on the internet and in the world at large. Feminism takes on misogyny. The WOC have been engaging feminism. But from my point of view, a wide variety of powerful feminist and anti-racist discourse is predicated on negative disability stereotyping. There's a kind of hierarchy here: the lack of awareness about disability, disability culture and identity, and our civil rights movement has resulted in a kind of domino effect where disability images are the metaphor of last resort: the bottom, the worst. Disability language has about it a kind of untouchable quality -- as if the horror and weakness of a disabled body were the one true, reliable thing, a touchstone to which we can turn when we know we can't use misogynistic or racist language. When we engage in these kinds of argumentative strategies, we exclude a whole population of people whose histories are intricately bound up with ours. When we deploy these kinds of strategies to underscore the value of our own existence in the world, we reaffirm and strengthen the systems of oppression that motivated us to speak out in the first place.

#### resistance/empowerment via the ballot can only instill an adaptive politics of being and effaces the institutional constraints that reproduce structural violence

Brown 95—prof at UC Berkely (Wendy, States of Injury, 21-3)

For some, fueled by opprobrium toward regulatory norms or other mo- dalities of domination, the language of "resistance" has taken up the ground vacated by a more expansive practice of freedom. For others, it is the discourse of “empowerment” that carries the ghost of freedom's valence ¶ 22¶. Yet as many have noted, insofar as resistance is an effect of the regime it opposes on the one hand, and insofar as its practitioners often seek to void it of normativity to differentiate it from the (regulatory) nature of what it opposes on the other, it is at best politically rebellious; at worst, politically amorphous. Resistance stands against, not for; it is re- action to domination, rarely willing to admit to a desire for it, and it is neutral with regard to possible political direction. Resistance is in no way constrained to a radical or emancipatory aim. a fact that emerges clearly as soon as one analogizes Foucault's notion of resistance to its companion terms in Freud or Nietzsche. Yet in some ways this point is less a critique of Foucault, who especially in his later years made clear that his political commitments were not identical with his theoretical ones (and un- apologetically revised the latter), than a sign of his misappropriation. For Foucault, resistance marks the presence of power and expands our under- standing of its mechanics, but it is in this regard an analytical strategy rather than an expressly political one. "Where there is power, there is resistance, and yet. or rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority to power. . . . (T]he strictly relational character of power relationships . . . depends upon a multiplicity of points of resis- tance: these play the role of adversary, target, support, or handle in power relations.\*39 This appreciation of the extent to which resistance is by no means inherently subversive of power also reminds us that it is only by recourse to a very non-Foucaultian moral evaluation of power as bad or that which is to be overcome that it is possible to equate resistance with that which is good, progressive, or seeking an end to domination. ¶ If popular and academic notions of resistance attach, however weakly at times, to a tradition of protest, the other contemporary substitute for a discourse of freedom—“empowerment”—would seem to correspond more closely to a tradition of idealist reconciliation. The language of resistance implicitly acknowledges the extent to which protest always transpires inside the regime; “empowerment,” in contrast, registers the possibility of generating one’s capacities, one’s “self-esteem,” one’s life course, without capitulating to constraints by particular regimes of power. But in so doing, contemporary discourses of empowerment too often signal an oddly adaptive and harmonious relationship with domination insofar as they locate an individual’s sense of worth and capacity in the register of individual feelings, a register implicitly located on some- thing of an otherworldly plane vis-a-vis social and political power. In this regard, despite its apparent locution of resistance to subjection, contem- porary discourses of empowerment partake strongly of liberal solipsism—the radical decontextualization of the subject characteristic of¶ 23¶ liberal discourse that is key to the fictional sovereign individualism of liberalism. Moreover, in its almost exclusive focus on subjects’ emotionalbearing and self-regard, empowerment is a formulation that converges with a regime’s own legitimacy needs in masking the power of the regime.¶ This is not to suggest that talk of empowerment is always only illusion or delusion. It is to argue, rather, that while the notion of empowerment articulates that feature of freedom concerned with action, with being more than the consumer subject figured in discourses of rights and eco- nomic democracy, contemporary deployments of that notion also draw so heavily on an undeconstructed subjectivity that they risk establishing a wide chasm between the (experience of) empowerment and an actual capacity to shape the terms of political, social, or economic life. Indeed, the possibility that one can “feel empowered” without being so forms an important element of legitimacy for the antidemocratic dimensions of liberalism.

#### Culture, not language, constitutes reality and thought

**Faccone 2K**

Claudia Faccone, Robert Kearns, Ashley Kopp, Elizabeth Watson April 19, 2000

The Effects of Language on Thought http://www.unc.edu/~jdumas/projects/languagethought.htm

**The issue of whether or not language influences thought is tricky since more than one factor affects thought patterns.** Many researchers have used differing languages to study the relationship between language and thought, and they have come up with many different hypotheses. We propose that although specific languages would affect the part of the brain that one uses**, it is not language alone that produces "linguistically" differentiated thought patterns. Rather it is one’s culture.**

**Though different linguistic cultures have specific language for certain ideas and concepts, the culture they are raised in most likely produce their differentiated ways of thinking**. In the United States of America, where English is the predominate language, school systems have a specific method of teaching their curriculum to students. Though not all students are able to grasp this teaching process, most are; this method, taught to them by their teachers, becomes a large part of their thought processes. If one takes into account the idea of society and its impact on thought processes, then both the linguistic universalism and linguistic relativity theories are applicable. Humans are biologically capable of learning any language, but once an individual has passed a certain age, he/she is less likely to develop new language skills.

**At that point, culture will use the knowledge of words from education to teach a specific way of analyzing the world. It is the culture, not purely language, which facilitates a different way of thinking. Consequently, this is the extra piece of the puzzle that so many scholars have left out in their research endeavors concerning the relationship between thought and language.**