# T

#### A. Topic requires statutory or judicial restrictions

Statutory is limits by legislation

Black's Law 6 Black's Law Dictionary Free Online Legal Dictionary 2nd Ed. 2006 http://thelawdictionary.org/statutory-restriction/

What is STATUTORY RESTRICTION?

Limits or controls that have been place on activities by its ruling legislation.

Judicial is by court or judge

Dean's Law Dictionary 12 <http://www.lawdictionaryonline.com/home_search.php>

Judicial:

adj. Of, relating to, or by the court or a judge. Pertaining or appropriate to courts of justice, or to a judge; practiced or conformed to in the administration of justice; sanctioned or ordered by a court; as, judicial power; judicial proceedings; a judicial sale. Fitted or apt for judging or de....

#### Restriction is a something that restrains

Merriam Webster 13 Merriam- Webster 2013 http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/restriction

re·stric·tion noun \ri-ˈstrik-shən\

Definition of RESTRICTION

1 : something that restricts: as

a : a regulation that restricts or restrains <restrictions for hunters>

b : a limitation on the use or enjoyment of property or a facility

2: an act of restricting : the condition of being restricted

#### B. Violation: They don’t meet either of the definitions

#### C. Vote neg

#### 1. Limits – there are an infinite number of possible actors that can demand a decrease in presidential powers – only legal statutes and judicial restrictions limit the topic

#### 2. Ground – generics are based off of the mechanism – avoids the practical issues of implementation

#### 3. Extra t – they claim advantages based off of the discourse of the 1ac. This makes the aff a moving target and skews neg preparation.

# CP

#### Jackie and I contend that the President of the United States should, through assemblages, engage in self-review in the area of indefinite detention and the intersection of identities that detain the terrorist.

#### Executive self-restraint is key to preserve the ability to respond to crises.

Pildes 12 [Richard H., Sudler Family Professor of Constitutional Law, NYU School of Law and Co-Director, NYU Center on Law and Security. 2/27/12 BOOK REVIEWS LAW AND THE PRESIDENT THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE MADISONIAN REPUBLIC. By Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule. New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press. 2010. Pp. 249. $29.95. New York University Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers]

First, they argue, a President unbound can produce better outcomes than a President bound to follow preexisting legislation: laws (constitutions and statutes) are always written in a specific context in the past, but technology, the economy, international dynamics, and other circumstances that characterize the modern age are exceptionally fluid and constantly shifting. Better to have presidents make their best judgment, all things considered, about the right action in the actual, immediate circumstances at hand than to have them be bound by laws that could not have contemplated these precise circumstances. Second, and central to Posner and Vermeule’s analysis, presidents do remain constrained — not by law, but by politics and the political judgment of others. As scholars since Richard Neustadt, if not earlier, have recognized, the actual, effective powers of a President (as opposed to the formal powers of the office) are directly rooted in, and limited by, his or her ongoing credibility.21 Presidents want the capacity to exercise their best judgment as contexts arise. But other actors in the system, including “the public,” will permit presidents to exercise more or less discretion depending on how credible those presidents are perceived to be (pp. 122–23). Credibility means generalized judgments about presidential performance, such as how well motivated the President is considered to be, how effective his or her actions are judged to be, and how wise or prudent his or her judgments are taken to be. “Credibility” in this context is analogous to what scholars of the Supreme Court have called long-term “diffuse support” for the Court; diffuse support means the willingness of the public to support the Court’s discretionary power, even when people might disagree with particular outcomes, because they generally believe the Court is exercising these powers in sound ways for good reasons.22 The more credible presidents make themselves, the more other actors will permit them to exercise broad discretion — including discretion to ignore or manipulate the law, which is the unique contribution of Posner and Vermeule’s view. Thus, argue Posner and Vermeule, presidents have strong incentives to adopt practices and take actions that establish and maintain their credibility (p. 133). These incentives will lead smart presidents to adopt various sorts of self-binding mechanisms that limit their discretion: commitments to transparency so others can monitor and oversee; or commitments to multilateral approaches in foreign policy so that presidents can act only with approval of other nations; or commitments to ceding some power to independent actors, such as special prosecutors or other institutions within the executive branch; or similar approaches through which presidents accept limits on their own power (pp. 113–53). By acting consistently with these self-adopted constraints, presidents build up their credibility by signaling that they are using their discretion in acceptable ways and should therefore continue to be granted that discretion — including discretion to avoid, circumvent, or ignore the law when, in the President’s best judgment, doing so will produce better outcomes.

# Resolve DA

#### Congressional restrictions cause adversaries to doubt the resolve of U.S. deterrence – causes crisis escalation.

Waxman 8/25 [Matthew Waxman 8/25/13, Professor of Law – Columbia and Adjunct Senior Fellow for Law and Foreign Policy – CFR, “The Constitutional Power to Threaten War,” Forthcoming in Yale Law Journal, vol. 123, August 25, 2013, SSRN]

A claim previously advanced from a presidentialist perspective is that stronger legislative checks on war powers is harmful to coercive and deterrent strategies, because it **establishes easily-visible impediments to the President’s authority** to follow through on threats. This was a common policy argument during the War Powers Resolution debates in the early 1970s. Eugene Rostow, an advocate inside and outside the government for executive primacy, remarked during consideration of legislative drafts that **any serious restrictions** on presidential use of force would mean in practice that “no President could make a credible threat to use force as an instrument of deterrent diplomacy, even to head off **explosive confrontations.”**178 He continued:¶ In the tense and cautious diplomacy of our present relations with the Soviet Union, as they have developed over the last twenty-five years, the authority of the President to set clear and silent limits in advance is perhaps the most important of all the powers in our constitutional armory to prevent confrontations that could carry nuclear implications. … [I]t is the diplomatic power the President needs most under the circumstance of modern life—the power to make a credible threat to use force in order to prevent a confrontation **which might escalate.**179

#### Credible conventional deterrence checks nuclear aggression

Gerson 09

MICHAEL S. GERSON, research analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses, Policy Fellow with the ONE Campaign, a visiting fellow with the Center for Public Justice, and a former senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations,“Conventional Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age”, Strategic Studies Institute, Autumn 2009 //jchen

Although implicit or explicit nuclear threats may lack credibili- ty against non-WMD regimes, many potential adversaries believe that the United States will use conventional firepower, especially because America has conventional superiority and a demonstrated willingness to use it. Consequently, when dealing with non-WMD-related threats, conventional deterrence will be the most likely mechanism for deterring hostile actions.

According to Admiral Michael Mullen, the current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “A big part of credibility, of course, lies in our convention- al capability. The capability to project power globally and conduct effective theater-level operations . . . remains essential to deterrence effectiveness.”14

Conventional deterrence also plays an important role in preventing nonnuclear aggression by nuclear-armed regimes. Regional nuclear pro- liferation may not only increase the chances for the use of nuclear weap- ons, but, equally important, the possibility of conventional aggression. The potential for conventional conflict under the shadow of mutual nucle- ar deterrence was a perennial concern throughout the Cold War, and that scenario is still relevant. A nuclear-armed adversary may be emboldened to use conventional force against US friends and allies, or to sponsor ter- rorism, in the belief that its nuclear capabilities give it an effective deter- rent against US retaliation or intervention.15 For example, a regime might calculate that it could undertake conventional aggression against a neigh- bor and, after achieving a relatively quick victory, issue implicit or explicit nuclear threats in the expectation that the United States (and perhaps coali- tion partners) would choose not to get involved.

In this context, conventional deterrence can be an important mech- anism to limit options for regional aggression below the nuclear threshold. By deploying robust conventional forces in and around the theater of potential conflict, the United States can credibly signal that it can respond to conventional aggression at the outset, and therefore the opponent can- not hope to simultaneously achieve a quick conventional victory and use nuclear threats to deter US involvement. Moreover, if the United States can convince an opponent that US forces will be engaged at the beginning of hostilities—and will therefore incur the human and financial costs of war from the start—it can help persuade opponents that the United States would be highly resolved to fight even in the face of nuclear threats be- cause American blood and treasure would have already been expended.16 Similar to the Cold War, the deployment of conventional power in the re- gion, combined with significant nuclear capabilities and escalation dom- inance, can help prevent regimes from believing that nuclear possession provides opportunities for conventional aggression and coercion.

#### Foreign policy resolve’s key to prevent a host of impacts---now’s key

Chapin and Hanson 9 – Bernard Chapin- interviewer, and Victor Davis Hanson, the Martin and Illie Anderson senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, December 7, 2009, “Change, weakness, disaster,” online: http://pajamasmedia.com/blog/change-weakness-disaster-obama-answers-from-victor-davis-hanson/

BC: Are we currently sending a message of weakness to our foes and allies? Can anything good result from President Obama’s marked submissiveness before the world? Dr. Hanson: Obama is one bow and one apology away from a circus. The world can understand a kowtow gaffe to some Saudi royals, but not as part of a deliberate pattern. Ditto the mea culpas. Much of diplomacy rests on public perceptions, however trivial. We are now in a great waiting game, as regional hegemons, wishing to redraw the existing landscape — whether China, Venezuela, Iran, North Korea, Pakistan, Syria, etc. — are just waiting to see who’s going to be the first to try Obama — and whether Obama really will be as tenuous as they expect. If he slips once, it will be 1979 redux, when we saw the rise of radical Islam, the Iranian hostage mess, the communist inroads in Central America, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, etc. BC: With what country then — Venezuela, Russia, Iran, etc. — do you believe his global repositioning will cause the most damage? Dr. Hanson: I think all three. I would expect, in the next three years, Iran to get the bomb and begin to threaten ever so insidiously its Gulf neighborhood; Venezuela will probably cook up some scheme to do a punitive border raid into Colombia to apprise South America that U.S. friendship and values are liabilities; and Russia will continue its energy bullying of Eastern Europe, while insidiously pressuring autonomous former republics to get back in line with some sort of new Russian autocratic commonwealth. There’s an outside shot that North Korea might do something really stupid near the 38th parallel and China will ratchet up the pressure on Taiwan. India’s borders with both Pakistan and China will heat up. I think we got off the back of the tiger and now no one quite knows whom it will bite or when.

**Status seeking is inevitable --- heg is key to solve war**

**Wohlforth 9** – professor of government at Dartmouth (William, “Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War,” World Affairs, January, project muse)

The upshot is a near scholarly consensus that unpolarity’s consequences for great power conflict are indeterminate and that a power shift resulting in a return to bipolarity or multipolarity will not raise the specter of great power war. This article questions the consensus on two counts. First, I show that it depends crucially on a dubious assumption about human motivation. Prominent theories of war are based on the assumption that people are mainly motivated by the instrumental pursuit of tangible ends such as physical security and material prosperity. This is why such theories seem irrelevant to interactions among great powers in an international environment that diminishes the utility of war for the pursuit of such ends. Yet we know that **people are motivated by a great many noninstrumental motives, not least by concerns regarding their social status. 3 As John Harsanyi noted, “Apart from economic payoffs, social status (social rank) seems to be the most important incentive and motivating force of social behavior.”4 This proposition rests on much firmer scientific ground now than when Harsanyi expressed it a generation ago, as cumulating research shows that humans appear to be hardwired for sensitivity to status and that relative standing is a powerful and independent motivator** of behavior.5 [End Page 29] Second, I question the dominant view that status quo evaluations are relatively independent of the distribution of capabilities. If the status of states depends in some measure on their relative capabilities, and if states derive utility from status, then different distributions of capabilities may affect levels of satisfaction, just as different income distributions may affect levels of status competition in domestic settings. 6 Building on research in psychology and sociology, I argue that even capabilities distributions among major powers foster ambiguous status hierarchies, which generate more dissatisfaction and clashes over the status quo. And the more stratified the distribution of capabilities, the less likely such status competition is. **Unipolarity thus generates far fewer incentives than either bipolarity or multipolarity for direct great power positional competition over status.** Elites in the other major powers continue to prefer higher status, but **in a unipolar system they face comparatively weak incentives to translate that preference into costly action**. And the absence of such incentives matters because social status is a positional good—something whose value depends on how much one has in relation to others.7 “If everyone has high status,” Randall Schweller notes, “no one does.”8 While one actor might increase its status, all cannot simultaneously do so. High status is thus inherently scarce, and **competitions for status tend to be zero sum**.9

**We control empirics**

**Wohlforth 8—**Daniel Webster Professor of Government, Dartmouth. BA in IR, MA in IR and MPhil and PhD in pol sci, Yale (William, Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War, October 2008, World Politics Vol. 61, Iss. 1; pg. 28, 31 pgs, Proquest)

Despite increasingly compelling findings concerning the importance of status seeking in human behavior, research on its connection to war waned some three decades ago.38 Yet empirical studies of the relationship between both systemic and dyadic capabilities distributions and war have continued to cumulate. If the relationships implied by the status theory run afoul of well-established patterns or general historical findings, then there is little reason to continue investigating them. **The clearest empirical implication** of the theory **is that** status **competition is unlikely to cause great power military conflict in unipolar systems**. If status competition is an important contributory cause of great power war, then, ceteris paribus, unipolar systems should be markedly less war-prone than bipolar or multipolar systems. And this appears to be the case. As Daniel Geller notes in a review of the empirical literature: "**The only polar structure that appears to influence conflict probability is unipolarity**."39 In addition, a larger number of studies at the dyadic level support the related expectation that narrow capabilities gaps and ambiguous or unstable capabilities hierarchies increase the probability of war.40 These studies are based entirely on post-sixteenth-century European history, and most are limited to the post-1815 period covered by the standard data sets. Though the systems coded as unipolar, near-unipolar, and hegemonic are all marked by a high concentration of capabilities in a single state, these studies operationalize unipolarity in a variety of ways, often very differently from the definition adopted here. An ongoing collaborative project looking at ancient interstate systems over the course of two thousand years suggests that historical systems that come closest to the definition of unipolarity used here exhibit precisely the behavioral properties implied by the theory. 41 As David C. Kang's research shows, the East Asian system between 1300 and 1900 was an unusually stratified unipolar structure, with an economic and militarily dominant China interacting with a small number of geographically proximate, clearly weaker East Asian states.42 Status politics existed, but actors were channeled by elaborate cultural understandings and interstate practices into clearly recognized ranks. Warfare was exceedingly rare, and the major outbreaks occurred precisely when the theory would predict: when China's capabilities waned, reducing the clarity of the underlying material hierarchy and increasing status dissonance for lesser powers. Much more research is needed, but initial exploration of other arguably unipolar systems-for example, Rome, Assyria, the Amarna system-appears consistent with the hypothesis.43 Status Competition and Causal Mechanisms Both theory and evidence demonstrate convincingly that competition for status is a driver of human behavior, and social identity theory and related literatures suggest the conditions under which it might come to the fore in great power relations. Both the systemic and dyadic findings presented in large-N studies are broadly consistent with the theory, but they are also consistent with power transition and other rationalist theories of hegemonic war.

**War is at its lowest level in history because of US primacy---best statistical studies prove**

**Owen 11** John M. Owen Professor of Politics at University of Virginia PhD from Harvard "DON’T DISCOUNT HEGEMONY" Feb 11 www.cato-unbound.org/2011/02/11/john-owen/dont-discount-hegemony/

Andrew Mack and his colleagues at the Human Security Report Project are to be congratulated. Not only do they present a study with a striking conclusion, driven by data, free of theoretical or ideological bias, but they also do something quite unfashionable: they bear good news. Social scientists really are not supposed to do that. Our job is, if not to be Malthusians, then at least to point out disturbing trends, looming catastrophes, and the imbecility and mendacity of policy makers. And then it is to say why, if people listen to us, things will get better. We do this as if our careers depended upon it, and perhaps they do; for if all is going to be well, what need then for us?¶ Our colleagues at Simon Fraser University are brave indeed. That may sound like a setup, but it is not. I shall challenge neither the data nor the general conclusion that violent conflict around the world has been decreasing in fits and starts since the Second World War. When it comes to violent conflict among and within countries, **things have been getting better**. (The trends have not been linear—Figure 1.1 actually shows that the frequency of interstate wars peaked in the 1980s—but the 65-year movement is clear.) Instead I shall accept that Mack et al. are correct on the macro-trends, and focus on their explanations they advance for these remarkable trends. With apologies to any readers of this forum who recoil from academic debates, this might get mildly theoretical and even more mildly methodological.¶ Concerning international wars, one version of the “nuclear-peace” theory is not in fact laid to rest by the data. It is certainly true that nuclear-armed states have been involved in many wars. They have even been attacked (think of Israel), which falsifies the simple claim of “assured destruction”—that any nuclear country A will deter any kind of attack by any country B because B fears a retaliatory nuclear strike from A.¶ But the most important “nuclear-peace” claim has been about mutually assured destruction, which obtains between two robustly nuclear-armed states. The claim is that (1) rational states having second-strike capabilities—enough deliverable nuclear weaponry to survive a nuclear first strike by an enemy—will have an overwhelming incentive not to attack one another; and (2) we can safely assume that nuclear-armed states are rational. It follows that states with a second-strike capability will not fight one another.¶ Their colossal atomic arsenals neither kept the United States at peace with North Vietnam during the Cold War nor the Soviet Union at peace with Afghanistan. But the argument remains strong that those arsenals did help keep the United States and Soviet Union at peace with each other. Why non-nuclear states are not deterred from fighting nuclear states is an important and open question. But in a time when calls to ban the Bomb are being heard from more and more quarters, we must be clear about precisely what the broad trends toward peace can and cannot tell us. They may tell us nothing about why we have had no World War III, and little about the wisdom of banning the Bomb now.¶ Regarding the **downward trend in international war**, Professor Mack is friendlier to more palatable theories such as the “**democratic peace**” (democracies do not fight one another, and the proportion of democracies has increased, hence less war); the interdependence or “**commercial peace**” (states with extensive economic ties find it irrational to fight one another, and interdependence has increased, hence less war); and the notion that people around the world are more anti-war than their forebears were. Concerning the downward trend in civil wars, he favors theories of economic growth (where commerce is enriching enough people, violence is less appealing—a logic similar to that of the “commercial peace” thesis that applies among nations) and the end of the Cold War (which end reduced superpower support for rival rebel factions in so many Third-World countries).¶ These are all **plausible mechanisms for peace**. What is more, none of them excludes any other; all could be working toward the same end. That would be somewhat puzzling, however. Is the world just lucky these days? How is it that an array of peace-inducing factors happens to be working coincidentally in our time, when such a magical array was absent in the past? The answer may be that one or more of these mechanisms reinforces some of the others, or perhaps some of them are mutually reinforcing. Some scholars, for example, have been focusing on whether economic growth might support democracy and vice versa, and whether both might support international cooperation, including to end civil wars.¶ We would still need to explain how this charmed circle of causes got started, however. And here let me raise another factor, perhaps even less appealing than the “nuclear peace” thesis, at least outside of the United States. That factor is what international relations scholars call hegemony—specifically **American hegemony**.¶ A theory that many regard as discredited, but that refuses to go away, is called hegemonic stability theory. The theory emerged in the 1970s in the realm of international political economy. It asserts that **for the global economy to remain open**—for countries to keep barriers to trade and investment low—**one powerful country must take the lead**. Depending on the theorist we consult, “taking the lead” entails paying for global public goods (keeping the sea lanes open, providing liquidity to the international economy), coercion (threatening to raise trade barriers or withdraw military protection from countries that cheat on the rules), or both. The theory is skeptical that international cooperation in economic matters can emerge or endure absent a hegemon. The distastefulness of such claims is self-evident: they imply that it is good for everyone the world over if one country has more wealth and power than others. More precisely, they imply that it has been good for the world that the United States has been so predominant.¶ There is no obvious reason why hegemonic stability theory could not apply to other areas of international cooperation, including in security affairs, human rights, international law, peacekeeping (UN or otherwise), and so on. What I want to suggest here—suggest, not test—is that **American hegemony might just be a deep cause of the steady decline of political deaths in the world**.¶ How could that be? After all, the report states that United States is the third most war-prone country since 1945. Many of the deaths depicted in Figure 10.4 were in wars that involved the United States (the Vietnam War being the leading one). Notwithstanding politicians’ claims to the contrary, a candid look at U.S. foreign policy reveals that the country is as ruthlessly self-interested as any other great power in history.¶ The answer is that U.S. hegemony might just be a **deeper cause of the proximate causes** outlined by Professor Mack. Consider economic growth and openness to foreign trade and investment, which (so say some theories) **render violence irrational**. American power and policies may be responsible for these in two related ways. First, at least since the 1940s Washington has **prodded other countries to embrace the market capitalism** that entails economic openness and produces **sustainable economic growth**. The United States promotes capitalism for selfish reasons, of course: its own domestic system depends upon growth, which in turn depends upon the efficiency gains from economic interaction with foreign countries, and the more the better. During the Cold War most of its allies accepted some degree of market-driven growth.¶ Second, the U.S.-led western victory in the Cold War damaged the credibility of alternative paths to development—communism and import-substituting industrialization being the two leading ones—and **left market capitalism the best model**. The end of the Cold War also involved an end to the billions of rubles in Soviet material support for regimes that tried to make these alternative models work. (It also, as Professor Mack notes, **eliminated the superpowers’ incentives to feed civil violence** in the Third World.) What we call **globalization** is **caused in part by the emergence of the United States as the global hegemon**.¶ The same case can be made, with somewhat more difficulty, concerning the **spread of democracy**. Washington has supported democracy only under certain conditions—the chief one being the absence of a popular anti-American movement in the target state—but those conditions have become much more widespread following the collapse of communism. Thus in the 1980s the Reagan administration—the most anti-communist government America ever had—began to dump America’s old dictator friends, starting in the Philippines. Today Islamists tend to be anti-American, and so the Obama administration is skittish about democracy in Egypt and other authoritarian Muslim countries. But general U.S. material and moral support for liberal democracy remains strong.

**The world getting better now because heg is peaceful**

**Busby 12** Josh, Assistant Professor of Public Affairs and a fellow in the RGK Center for Philanthropy and Community Service as well as a Crook Distinguished Scholar at the Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law, <http://duckofminerva.blogspot.com/2012/01/get-real-chicago-ir-guys-out-in-force.html>

**Is Unipolarity Peaceful?** As evidence, **Monteiro provides metrics of the number of years during which great powers have been at war.** For the unipolar era since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been at war 13 of those 22 years or 59% (see his Table 2 below). Now, **I've been following** some of **the discussion by** and about Steven **Pinker** and Joshua Goldstein's [work](http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/18/opinion/sunday/war-really-is-going-out-of-style.html?pagewanted=all) **that suggests the world is becoming more peaceful** **with** interstate wars and intrastate **wars becoming more rare**. I was struck by the graphic that Pinker used in a Wall Street Journal [piece](http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904106704576583203589408180.html) back in September that drew on the Uppsala Conflict Data, which shows a steep decline in the number of deaths per 100,000 people. **How do we square this account by Monteiro of a unipolar world that is not peaceful** (**with the U.S. at war during this period in Iraq twice, Afghanistan, Kosovo**) **and** **Pinker's account which suggests declining violence in the contemporary period**? **Where Pinker is focused on systemic outcomes, Monteiro's measure merely reflect years during which the great powers are at war**. Under unipolarity, there is only one great power so the measure is partial and not systemic. However, Monteiro's theory aims to be systemic rather than partial. In critiquing Wohlforth's early work on unipolarity stability, Monteiro notes: Wohlforth’s argument does not exclude all kinds of war. Although power preponderance allows the unipole to manage conflicts globally, this argument is not meant to apply to relations between major and minor powers, or among the latter (17). So presumably, **a more adequate test of the peacefulness or not of unipolarity** (at least for Monteiro) **is not the number of years the great power has been at** **war but whether the system as a whole is becoming more peaceful under unipolarity compared** to previous eras, including wars between major and minor powers or wars between minor powers and whether the wars that do happen are as violent as the ones that came before. Now, as Ross Douthat pointed [out](http://douthat.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/10/17/steven-pinkers-history-of-violence/), Pinker's argument isn't based on a logic of benign hegemony. It could be that even if the present era is more peaceful, unipolarity has nothing to do with it. Moreover, **Pinker may be wrong**. Maybe the world isn't all that peaceful. I keep thinking about the places I don't want to go to anymore because they are violent (Mexico, Honduras, El Salvador, Nigeria, Pakistan, etc.) As Tyler Cowen [noted](http://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2011/10/steven-pinker-on-violence.html), the measure Pinker uses to suggest violence is a per capita one, which doesn't get at the absolute level of violence perpetrated in an era of a greater world population. **But, if my read of other** [**reports**](http://www.hsrgroup.org/human-security-reports/20092010/graphs-and-tables.aspx) **based on Uppsala data is right, war is becoming more rare and less deadly** (though later [data](http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/charts_and_graphs/) suggests lower level armed conflict may be increasing again since the mid-2000s). The apparent violence of the contemporary era may be something of a presentist bias and reflect our own lived experience and the ubiquity of news media **.Even if the U.S. has been at war for the better part of unipolarity, the deadliness is declining, even compared with Vietnam, let alone World War II.** Does Unipolarity Drive Conflict? So**, I** kind of took **issue with the Monteiro's premise that unipolarity is not peaceful**. What about his argument that unipolarity drives conflict? Monteiro suggests that the unipole has three available strategies - defensive dominance, offensive dominance and disengagement - though is less likely to use the third. Like Rosato and Schuessler, Monteiro suggests because other states cannot trust the intentions of other states, namely the unipole, that minor states won't merely bandwagon with the unipole. Some "recalcitrant" minor powers will attempt to see what they can get away with and try to build up their capabilities. As an aside, in Rosato and Schuessler world, unless these are located in strategically important areas (i.e. places where there is oil), then the unipole (the United States) should disengage. **In Monteiro's world**, **disengagement would inexorably lead to instability and draw in the U.S. again** (though I'm not sure this necessarily follows), but neither defensive or offensive dominance offer much possibility for peace either since it is U.S. power in and of itself that makes other states insecure, even though they can't balance against it.

### Terrorism Da

#### Releasing detainees causes terrorism

McConnell 9 Mitch, Senate Minority Leader; “Don’t Close It” *Washington Post*; March 15, 2009; http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2009-03-15/opinions/36843891\_1\_detainees-guantanamo-bay-dangerous-terrorists

According to Pentagon reports, detainees who have been released from Guantanamo appear to be reengaging in terrorism at higher rates, with the current rate of those either suspected or confirmed of reengaging in terrorism at about 12 percent. There's a reason for this: Among the roughly 250 inmates who remain at Guantanamo are the worst of the worst, including dozens of proud and self-proclaimed members of al-Qaeda. Many have been directly involved in some of the worst terrorist attacks in history, including some who had direct knowledge of the Sept. 11 attacks. Others have trained or funded terrorists, made bombs or presented themselves as potential suicide bombers. As the pool of inmates has shrunk, those who remain are simply more dangerous, not less. ¶ These people are among the least likely to be controlled if and when they return home. More than a third of the detainees who have already been released were from Saudi Arabia, which has its own detention and rehabilitation system. But our confidence in that system has been shaken by recent reports that at least one former Saudi detainee has returned to fighting. More worrisome is the prospect of releasing Yemeni detainees, about half the remaining population at Guantanamo, since Yemen has shown little ability to control even the most dangerous terrorists we release.

#### The plan is a huge PR victory for Al Qaeda—emboldens them

Aldicott 9 Jeffrey F., Distinguished Professor of Law and the director of the Center for Terrorism Law at St. Mary’s University School of Law; “Addicott: Keep GITMO Open” *Times Free Press*; January 11, 2009; http://www.timesfreepress.com/news/2009/jan/11/addicott-keep-gtimo-open/

The War on Terror demands moral as well as strategic clarity. Accordingly, it is not merely the use of military force against the “Taliban, al-Qa’eda, or associated forces,” identified by the 2006 Military Commissions Act as enemy combatants. This War is also a public relations battle against the unrelenting waves of duplicitous propaganda lodged against almost every aspect of America’s war effort to include attacks on our military commissions’ process and our lawful detention of enemy combatants at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base.¶ If soon to be President Obama “closes down GITMO,” he will be providing a significant propaganda victory to our enemies. Even if Obama is attempting to derail the constant maligning of our detention operations in Guantanamo Bay, he is mistaken in the assumption that closing down the facility will result in a public relations victory.¶ Closing down GITMO would create a public relations disaster that would expend far beyond the logistical problems of what to do with the 80 or so detainees slated for trial by military commissions, the 60 or so detainees that the United States wants to release but can find no nation in the world to take them, and the remaining 110 or so detainees that are deemed to pose a continuing terror threat to America or its allies.¶ The propaganda campaigns against our efforts in GITMO come from our terrorist enemies, but they also come from a variety of ideologues who have never even visited GITMO, or, if they have, are so blinded by a predetermined agenda that they nevertheless call the military commissions process illegal, or accuse our military guards and interrogators of conducting command-directed physical and mental torture.¶ The detention facility may not be “Club GITMO,” as commentator Rush Limbaugh is fond of calling it, but it is a fact that the most professional military on the planet conducts “safe, humane, legal and transparent care and custody of detained enemy combatants” at GITMO.¶ It’s necessary to understand three fundamental and irrefutable facts to truly appreciate what’s happening at GITMO:¶ (1) America is engaged in a real war as authorized by our Congress and President;¶ (2) under the law of war, America has the legal right to detain enemy combatants indefinitely until the war is over; and¶ (3) America has never formulated or practiced a policy that violates the rule of law in the context of interrogation practices against any detainee.¶ Military commissions are authorized by Congress and are perfectly lawful under the law of war. In fact, the rules associated with these military commissions reveal that the accused war criminals at GITMO are provided with more due process rights than allowed for by any military commissions process in the history of military commissions, in the history of warfare. Clearly, the fact that the “media” refused to give more than a passing blink to the recent conviction by military commission of al-Qa’eda enemy combatant al-Bahlul, speaks volumes – the process is valid and working well.¶ As accusations of abuse go, the record is equally clear. Despite the spurious allegations of torture at GITMO by some of the more the 500 detainees who have been released, not one has ever proved credible (not all liars are terrorists but all terrorists are liars).¶ Propaganda plays a pivotal role in determining the ebb and flow of success in the War on Terror. There is no question that America has made errors in judgment that have needed correction. But closing GITMO will not stop the negative distortions leveled against the United States regarding military commissions and detention operations. It will only embolden the false perception that we have somehow been acting in violation of the law of war. In contrast to the closing and demolition of Abu Ghraib as an act of atonement for the crimes of a handful of renegade soldiers, there is absolutely nothing at GITMO that we need to atone for.

#### Extinction

#### Ayson 10

Robert Ayson 10, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington, 2010 (“After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Volume 33, Issue 7, July, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via InformaWorld)

A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the country attacked in the first place, would not necessarily represent the worst of the nuclear worlds imaginable. Indeed, there are reasons to wonder whether nuclear terrorism should ever be regarded as belonging in the category of truly existential threats. A contrast can be drawn here with the global catastrophe that would come from a massive nuclear exchange between two or more of the sovereign states that possess these weapons in significant numbers. Even the worst terrorism that the twenty-first century might bring would fade into insignificance alongside considerations of what a general nuclear war would have wrought in the Cold War period. And it must be admitted that as long as the major nuclear weapons states have hundreds and even thousands of nuclear weapons at their disposal, there is always the possibility of a truly awful nuclear exchange taking place precipitated entirely by state possessors themselves. But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible thatsome sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weaponsbetween two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift **immediately** to state possessors**.** Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhapsIran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan**.** But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington’s early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil mightalso raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial response to the act of nuclear terrorism(as discussed earlier)Washington might decide to order a significant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group. Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret such action as being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of influence and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the “Chechen insurgents’ … long-standing interest in all things nuclear.”42 American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow that might require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide. There is also the question of how other nuclear-armed states respond to the act of nuclear terrorism on another member of that special club. It could reasonably be expected that following a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States, both Russia and China would extend immediate sympathy and support to Washington and would work alongside the United States in the Security Council. But there is just a chance, albeit a slim one, where the support of Russia and/or China is less automatic in some cases than in others. For example, what would happen if the United States wished to discuss its right to retaliate against groups based in their territory? If, for some reason, Washington found the responses of Russia and China deeply underwhelming, (neither “for us or against us”) might it also suspect that they secretly were in cahoots with the group, increasing (again perhaps ever so slightly) the chances of a major exchange. If the terrorist group had some connections to groups in Russia and China, or existed in areas of the world over which Russia and China held sway, and if Washington felt that Moscow or Beijing were placing a curiously modest level of pressure on them, what conclusions might it then draw about their culpability? If Washington decided to use, or decided to threaten the use of, nuclear weapons, the responses of Russia and China would be crucial to the chances of avoiding a more serious nuclear exchange. They might surmise, for example, that while the act of nuclear terrorism was especially heinous and demanded a strong response, the response simply had to remain below the nuclear threshold. It would be one thing for a non-state actor to have broken the nuclear use taboo, but an entirely different thing for a state actor, and indeed the leading state in the international system, to do so. If Russia and China felt sufficiently strongly about that prospect, there is then the question of what options would lie open to them to dissuade the United States from such action: and as has been seen over the last several decades, the central dissuader of the use of nuclear weapons by states has been the threat of nuclear retaliation. If some readers find this simply too fanciful, and perhaps even offensive to contemplate, it may be informative to reverse the tables. Russia, which possesses an arsenal of thousands of nuclear warheads and that has been one of the two most important trustees of the non-use taboo, is subjected to an attack of nuclear terrorism. In response, Moscow places its nuclear forces very visibly on a higher state of alert and declares that it is considering the use of nuclear retaliation against the group and any of its state supporters. How would Washington view such a possibility? Would it really be keen to support Russia’s use of nuclear weapons, including outside Russia’s traditional sphere of influence? And if not, which seems quite plausible, what options would Washington have to communicate that displeasure? If China had been the victim of the nuclear terrorism and seemed likely to retaliate in kind, would the United States and Russia be happy to sit back and let this occur? In the charged atmosphere immediately after a nuclear terrorist attack, how would the attacked country respond to pressure from other major nuclear powers not to respond in kind? The phrase “how dare they tell us what to do” immediately springs to mind. Some might even go so far as to interpret this concern as a tacit form of sympathy or support for the terrorists. This might not help the chances of nuclear restraint.

# Case

#### The aff does nothing to change the fact that people are detained – their evidence is not contextual to being detained based on identity but just being detained

#### Any way you slice it, they lead to worse detention—status quo is good and a delay CP for the aff

Daskal 13 Jennifer, fellow and adjunct professor at Georgetown Law Center; senior counterterrorism counsel, Human Rights Watch; counsel to the assistant attorney general for national security at the Department of Justice; “Don’t Close Guantánamo” *New York Times*; January 10, 2013; http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/11/opinion/dont-close-guantanamo.html

IN 2010, I was branded a member of the “Al Qaeda 7” — a notorious label attached to Department of Justice lawyers who were mocked by critics claiming they had “flocked to Guantánamo to take up the cause of the terrorists.” My crime: I advocated for the closure of the detention facility — a position that has also been taken up by the likes of former President George W. Bush, former Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates and former Secretary of State Colin L. Powell — and for more humane living conditions for those imprisoned there.¶ At the time, I reacted defensively. I was indignant. I insisted on the legitimacy of my convictions. But even then the writing was on the wall. For a core group of detainees, closing Guantánamo would not mean release or prosecution, as most human rights and civil liberties groups have long advocated. Rather, it would mean relocation to the United States, or elsewhere, for continued detention.¶ Now, almost four years later, I have changed my mind. Despite recognizing the many policy imperatives in favor of closure, despite the bipartisan support for this position, and despite the fact that 166 men still languish there, I now believe that Guantánamo should stay open — at least for the short term.¶ While I have been slow to come to this realization, the signs have been evident for some time. Three years ago, Barack Obama’s administration conducted a comprehensive review of the Guantánamo detainees and concluded that about four dozen prisoners couldn’t be prosecuted, but were too dangerous to be transferred or released. They are still being held under rules of war that allow detention without charge for the duration of hostilities.¶ Others happened to hail from Yemen. Although many of them were cleared for transfer, the transfers were put on indefinite hold because of instability in Yemen, the fear that some might join Al Qaeda forces, and Yemen’s inability to put adequate security measures in place.¶ While the specific numbers have most likely shifted over time, the basic categories persist. These are men whom the current administration will not transfer, release or prosecute, so long as the legal authority to detain, pursuant to the law of war, endures.¶ President Obama raised the hopes of the human rights community when during his re-election campaign he once again said the detention center should be closed. But it was not clear whether he had a viable plan, and any such plan would almost certainly involve moving many of the detainees into continued detention in the United States, where their living conditions would almost certainly deteriorate.¶ Guantánamo in 2013 is a far cry from Guantánamo in 2002. Thanks to the spotlight placed on the facility by human rights groups, international observers and detainees’ lawyers, there has been a significant, if not uniform, improvement in conditions.¶ The majority of Guantánamo detainees now live in communal facilities where they can eat, pray and exercise together. If moved to the United States, these same men would most likely be held in military detention in conditions akin to supermax prisons — confined to their cells 22 hours a day and prohibited from engaging in group activities, including communal prayer. The hard-won improvements in conditions would be ratcheted back half a decade to their previous level of harshness.¶ And Guantánamo would no longer be that failed experiment on an island many miles away. The Obama administration would be affirmatively creating a new system of detention without charge for terrorism suspects on American soil, setting a precedent and creating a facility readily available to future presidents wanting to rid themselves of a range of potentially dangerous actors.¶ The political reality is that closure of Guantánamo is unlikely to happen anytime soon, and if it did, it would do more harm than good. We should instead focus on finding places to transfer those cleared to leave the facility and, more important, on defining the end to the war.¶ In a recent speech, Jeh Johnson, then the Department of Defense general counsel, discussed a future “tipping point” at which Al Qaeda would be so decimated that the armed conflict would be deemed over. Statements from high level officials suggest that this point may be near. And as the United States pulls out of Afghanistan, there is an increasingly strong argument that the war against Al Qaeda is coming to a close. With the end of the conflict, the legal justification for the detentions will finally disappear.¶ At that point, the remaining men in Guantánamo can no longer be held without charge, at least not without running afoul of basic constitutional and international law prohibitions. Only then is there a realistic hope for meaningful closure, not by recreating a prison in the United States but through the arduous process of transferring, releasing or prosecuting the detainees left there.¶ In the meantime, we should keep Guantánamo open.

The Aff is ensures a New Imperialist STate – In Resisting the homosexual/heterosexual divide, Puar recreates other dichotomies

Natalie Oswin, Prof. of Geography @ National Univ. Singapore, ‘8 [Prog Hum Geogr 2008; 32; 89, Critical geographies and the uses of sexuality: deconstructing queer space, p. sage]

Through their attention to racial politics as part of the multidimensionality of queer lives, these scholars rewrite the dominant narrative of radical, colonized, claimed queer space. As Puar insists, ‘the claiming of space – any space, even the claiming of queer space – [is] a process informed by **histories of colonization**, these histories operating in tandem with the disruptive and potentially transgressive specifics at hand’ (2002: 936). The presumption of an inherent progressiveness of gay and lesbian or queer reterritorializations of hitherto ‘straight’ space is challenged by the recognition that homosexuals or queers can be included amongst those who participate in the deployment of sexual normativities. And we are thus taken beyond the heterosexual/ homosexual binary to a usage of queer theory as an approach that critiques the class, race and gender specifi c dimensions of homonormativities and heteronormativities.8 Such work contains the seeds of a geographical utilization of queer theory that does not simply describe and reify the spaces of sexual ‘others’. But, to realize the promise of this alternative approach, **a recurrent limitation must be recognized**. Though committed to intersectional analysis, the politics of identity still lingers in the work by Elder, Nast, Puar and Rushbrook discussed above. The recognition of the fragmented geographies of power across the homosexual/ heterosexual divide is important. But while this binary is done away with, **others hang on.** Specifically, **descriptions of maleness/ femaleness, whiteness/non-whiteness, and privileged/non-privileged remain rather too neat.** The result is a depiction of dominant gay white males while faith is placed in women and queers of colour as still radical subjects. But the politics of normalization are not limited to gay white males. As Roderick Ferguson states: ‘The demand for a racialized heteronormativity released polymorphous exclusions targeting women, people of color, and gays and lesbians at the same time that **it became a regulatory regime, working** to inspire conformity among women, people of color, and homosexuals’ (2004: 86). Thus the temptation to rely on specifi c queer saviours is less promising than a queer approach that has no fixed political referent. Rather than abstract calls for ‘unity across difference’ and the presumptive admonishment of generic subjects or spaces, analysis of particular embodiments can more effectively communicate the singularities of unequal power relations. The next section explores work that advances such critique beyond identity politics.

The LInk to Themselves - The Aff’s Demand For Queerness outside of quote “Dominate Sexual Exceptionalism” Creates a New Dualism Between “Monstrous US Exceptionalism” and Radical Queer Politics

Gavin Brown, Dept of Geography @ Univ. of Leicester, ‘9 [*Environment and Planning* A, <http://ideas.repec.org/a/pio/envira/v41y2009i6p1496-1510.html>]

In contrast to the theorisations of Duggan and Richardson, Nast has located these social and economic changes firmly within the reconfigured racist, patriarchal privi- lege of `` `normative' gay white male masculinities'' (2002, page 878). Her work has been critiqued for collapsing the real lived experience of the majority of gay white men (in the USA) into a stereotype of the affluent gay white consumer (Elder, 2002; Sothern, 2004). For Sothern (2004, page 187), Nast presents a ``very unqueer notion of [a] queer masculinity'' that is uniformly shaped by neoliberalism and ``devoid of any of the multiplicity, performativity and contradictions queer theory has struggled to theorize''. Oswin (2005, page 84) **has argued that** both Nast and Sothern **rely on stereo- types in order to seek a means to counter neoliberal** normalizations of gay life by ``insisting that there can be a queer **politics outside ... complicity''** with these regimes. She advocates taking a ``more ambivalent approach to queer geographies of normal- ization'' (page 81), coaxing out the figure of **the `complicit queer'**, who is always embroiled in neoliberal practices and relations to some extent. If these neoliberal practices of normalisation pose a threat to the long-rehearsed theoretical interventions of queer studies then the search for an `authentic, noncomplicit queer' can appeal as a means of avoiding asking ourselves awkward and difficult questions about the on-going potential of queer radical politics. In contrast, Oswin (2005, page 84) suggests that, ``instead of thinking complicit **space as total and negative**, we might reconceptualise it as ambivalent and porous, as an undetermined set of processes that simultaneously enables both resistance and capitulation. ... If both resistance and capitulation are enabled in and through complicity then a complicit queerness can still present a threat. But it is not the threat we thought it was, we may have to look harder and in different, unforeseen places to detect it, and we may not always like what we find.'' Oswin's (2005; 2007; 2008) conceptualisation of complicit queer space serves as a timely reminder that lesbian and gay space can produce and reinforce various norma- tivities (not just around sexuality, but through the intersections of sexuality with class, gender, ethnicity. and nation). It reminds us that queer critique has always been not just concerned with the reproduction of normativities, but a poststructuralist challenge to identity politics and binary thinking. Gay space is not inherently more resistive or transgressive than heterosexual space; and, consequently, queer geographers must recognise that if there are many heterosexualities (Hubbard, 2007) then it is a folly to position heterosexual space as always oppressive and restricting the lives of lesbians, gay men, and other sexual and gender `dissidents'. The real potential of queer thinking is to undermine binary understandings of sexuality and gender rather than reinforcing them.

Attempts to abandon all catagories and identities fail. Practical considerations of policy matter.

Denike 10 [Margaret, Human Rights Program, Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies, Carleton University, Homonormative Collusions and the Subject of Rights: Reading Terrorist Assemblages Feminist Legal Studies Volume 18, Number 1 / April, 2010 85-100]

Among other endeavours, Terrorist Assemblages attempts a practice of sustained critical reading that could elucidate such contingencies, including, as is the object of her focus, those that relate to the convergences of homosexuality and normative nationalisms in certain liberal democracies. She [Duggan] expressly casts her work as a direct departure from the models of “resistant queer identities” (Puar 2007, p. 46) that locate gays and lesbians outside of, or against, a dominant, heteronormative majority, and that frame the human rights claims of queers in terms of their exclusion from, or opposition to, the laws and policies that buttress these norms. For Puar, the tropes that are often used to describe queer identities and locations, for instance, in terms of subjects of “intersecting oppressions”, tend to reify standpoint epistemology and fail to capture the multiple and mobile, shifting formations and contradictory configurations that queerness has come to occupy at this contemporary historical moment. Seeking alternative ways to move LGBT theory from its grounding in accounts of subjectivity and identity, and the layering of descriptive categories such as ‘race’, ‘ethnicity’, and ‘gender’, Puar stages different models that might more effectively explain multiple and mobile engendering processes and racial formations that occur both as a result of—and despite—subject identity and location. She finds such alternatives in Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of ‘assemblage’ (1987) and contemporary theorisations of ‘affect’, as explanatory devices to conceptualise the varying departures and complicities that these categories elide, and, as she puts it, to prioritise movement over placement in talking about what queer bodies do rather than what they are, what queerness has come to mean, how it has come to be felt and deployed. But even as Puar arrives at ‘assemblage’ as a way of reading homo/nationalist formations, we are invariably reminded of the impossibility—if not the impracticality—of leaving representational and identitarian categories behind, not just because they are one of the very conditions of the terrain of ‘homosexuality’ that the book traverses, but because this terrain is sign-posted with the language of legal scholars, courts and human rights advocates where the recognition and interpolation of descriptive identity categories, such as race, sex, sexual orientation or ethnic origin really matters, especially when it comes to framing the way that individuals and groups are treated differently by discriminatory practices and policies on these grounds.

#### 1. No root cause of war.

Gat, Political Science at Tel Aviv, 9 [Azar, Chair of the Department of Political Science at Tel Aviv University, So Why Do People Fight? Evolutionary Theory and the Causes of War, European Journal of International Relations, 2009, Vol. 15(4): 571–599, http://ejt.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/15/4/571]

Thus attempts to find the root cause of war in the nature of either the individual, the state, or the international system are **fundamentally misplaced**. In all these ‘levels’ there are necessary but not sufficient causes for war, and **the whole cannot be broken into pieces**.13 People’s needs and desires — which may be pursued violently — as well as the resulting quest for power and the state of mutual apprehension which fuel the security dilemma are all **molded in human nature** (some of them existing only as options, potentials, and skills in a behavioral ‘tool kit’); they are so molded because of strong evolutionary pressures that have shaped humans in their struggle for survival over geological times, when all the above literally constituted matters of life and death. The violent option of human competition has been largely curbed within states, yet is occasionally taken up on a large scale between states because of the anarchic nature of the inter-state system. However, returning to step one, international anarchy in and of itself would not be an explanation for war were it not for the potential for violence in a fundamental state of competition over scarce resources that is imbedded in reality and, consequently, in human nature. The necessary and sufficient causes of war — that obviously have to be filled with the **particulars of the case** in any specific war — are thus as follows: politically organized actors that operate in an environment where no superior authority effectively monopolizes power resort to violence when they assess it to be their most cost-effective option for winning and/or defending evolution-shaped objects of desire, and/or their power in the system that can help them win and/or defend those desired goods. Wars have been fought for the attainment of the same objects of human desire that underlie the human motivational system in general — only by violent means, through the use of force. Politics — internal and external — of which war is, famously, a continuation, is the activity intended to achieve at the intra- and inter-state ‘levels’ the very same evolution-shaped human aims we have already seen. Some writers have felt that ‘politics’ does not fully encompass the causes of war. Even Thayer (2004: 178–9), who correctly argues that evolutionary theory explains ultimate human aims, nonetheless goes on to say, inconsistently, that Clausewitz needs extension because war is caused not only by political reasons but also by the evolutionarily rooted search for resources, as if the two were separate, with politics being somehow different and apart, falling outside of the evolutionary logic. What is defined as ‘politics’ is of course a matter of semantics, and like all definitions is largely arbitrary. Yet, as has been claimed here, if not attributed to divine design, organisms’ immensely complex mechanisms and the behavioral propensities that emanate from them — including those of human beings — ultimately could only have been ‘engineered’ through evolution. The challenge is to lay out how evolution-shaped human desires relate to one another in motivating war. The desire and struggle for scarce resources — wealth of all sorts — have always been regarded as a prime aim of ‘politics’ and an obvious motive for war. They seem to require little further elaboration. By contrast, reproduction does not appear to figure as a direct motive for war in large-scale societies. However, as we saw, appearance is often deceptive, for somatic and reproductive motives are the two inseparable sides of the same coin. In modern societies, too, sexual adventure remained central to individual motivation in going to war, even if it usually failed to be registered at the level of ‘state politics.’ This may be demonstrated by the effects of the sexual revolution since the 1960s, which, by lessening the attraction of foreign adventure for recruits and far increasing the attraction of staying at home, may have contributed to advanced societies’ growing aversion to war. Honor, status, glory, and dominance — both individual and collective — enhanced access to somatic and reproductive success and were thus hotly pursued and defended, even by force. The security dilemma sprang from this state of actual and potential competition, in turn pouring more oil onto its fire. Power has been the universal currency through which all of the above could be obtained and/or defended, and has been sought after as such, in an often escalating spiral. Kinship — expanding from family and tribe to peoples — has always exerted overwhelming influence in determining one’s loyalty and willingness to sacrifice in the defense and promotion of a common good. Shared culture is a major attribute of ethnic communities, in the defense of which people can be invested as heavily as in the community’s political independence and overall prosperity. Finally, religious and secular ideologies have been capable of stirring enormous zeal and violence; for grand questions of cosmic and socio-political order have been perceived as possessing paramount practical significance for securing and promoting life on earth and/or in the afterlife. In the human problem-solving menus, ideologies function as the most general blueprints. Rather than comprising a ‘laundry list’ of causes for war, all of the above partake in the **interconnected human motivational system**, originally shaped by the calculus of survival and reproduction.

#### 2. War decreasing disproves your root cause claims.

Fettweis 10 [Christopher J., fifth year doctoral student in the University of Maryland's Department of Government and Politics. His primary interests include US foreign and national security policies. His dissertation, currently titled The Geopolitics of Energy and the Obsolescence of Major War, focuses on the relationship between oil and conflict. Mr. Fettweis has a BA in History from the University of Notre Dame, Threat and Anxiety in US Foreign Policy, April 2010 Survival, 52:2, 59 - 82]

Not only is the invasion and conquest of the United States virtually unthinkable, but warfare of all kinds is everywhere on the decline. Since the end of the Cold War, inter-and intra-national conflict and crises have **steadily declined** in number and intensity.18 The risk for the average person of dying in battle has plummeted since the Second World War, especially since the end of the Cold War.19 The incidence of new wars is also at an **all-time low**.20 Only one international war has been fought since the invasion of Iraq, and it can be counted only if the common understanding of 'war' is stretched a bit. Despite the sound and fury that accompanied the 2008 Russo-Georgian clash, the combined battle-death figure appears to be under 1,000, which means it would not even qualify as a war using the most-used definitions.21 By virtually all measures, **the world is a far more peaceful place than it has been at any time in recorded history.**

#### 3. Enemyship is an inevitable psychological response – most recent and comprehensive studies.

Sullivan et al. 10 [Daniel Sullivan1, Mark J. Landau1, Zachary K. Rothschild1, 1Department of Psychology, University of Kansas, An Existential Function of Enemyship: Evidence That People Attribute Influence to Personal and Political Enemies to Compensate for Threats to Control, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, March 2010, Vol. 98, No. 3, p 434-449]

General Discussion On the basis of Becker’s (1969) existential theorizing, we have proposed that perceiving the self as having powerful enemies serves a psychological function for the individual by compensating for threatened perceptions of control over one’s environment. Specifically, enemies serve as psychological focal points for what are otherwise diffuse threats to one’s life and well-being that are impossible to fully anticipate or control. This analysis suggests that people will imbue enemy figures with exaggerated influence and power when feelings of control are threatened and that perceiving powerful enemies capable of perpetrating diffuse misdeeds will bolster feelings of personal control by reducing perceptions of chaotic risks in one’s environment. The **current studies provide the first empirical tests of these claims.** Study 1 showed that when people were reminded of the prevalence of chaotic hazard in their environment, those individuals characterized by dispositionally low feelings of personal control were more likely to view a personal enemy as having influence over their lives, but this effect did not extend to perceptions of a generically aversive other. Study 2 provided a conceptual replication of this effect on perceptions of a political enemy in a more ecologically valid context, with an experimental manipulation of perceived control over chaotic hazards. In accord with predictions, situationally reduced feelings of personal control increased participants’ belief that a public enemy figure—the opponent of their chosen candidate in the 2008 U.S. presidential election—was wielding power to surreptitiously manipulate the election. This study furthermore showed that the hypothesized effect was not simply due to an increase in generalized suspiciousness, concern with unwanted election outcomes, or generally negative evaluations of the enemy candidate. Supplementing Becker’s (1969) analysis with M. Douglas’s (1966) account of cultural differences in enemyship, we hypothesized that enemyship will be an **especially attractive means** of compensating for control threats when the broader social system is perceived as disordered and incapable of providing protection from harm, whereas bolstering the perceived strength of the system will be the preferred response when the system appears ordered and secure. The results of Study 3 supported this hypothesis: Participants led to view the prevailing system as disordered responded to a control threat by viewing a personal enemy as responsible for negative occurrences in their lives and by denying the influence of random forces on negative occurrences. However, these participants were no more likely to attribute positive life events to a friend’s influence. In contrast, and in line with Kay et al.’s (2008) findings, participants led to view the system as ordered responded to control threats by bolstering their belief in the system’s order and strength. Study 4 tested whether perceiving an enemy capable of causing diffuse harms would actually decrease perceived risk in the world and thereby bolster feelings of personal control. As predicted, control-threatened participants who were exposed to an ambiguously powerful enemy (but not one whose powers were explicitly known or who was weak) showed reduced perceptions of chaotic risk, which in turn bolstered perceptions of personal control. Taken together, the current studies are the **first** to systematically examine the psychological function served by perceiving powerful enemies in the world, while additionally providing evidence of the psychological process by which enemies serve a control-restorative function, and the situational conditions under which people are more likely to exaggerate an enemy’s power and influence as a means of compensating for personal control concerns.

#### Security discourse never has fixed implications --- force them to prove our specific claims are wrong, not that it’s risky in the abstract. This approach enables a holistic approach to security that solves their impacts while avoiding risks of actual threats.

Richard Wyn Jones, Professor International Politics – Aberystwyth University, ’99 (*Security, Strategy, and Critical Theory*, p. 155-163)

It is arguable, however, that a more fundamental problem remains in Wæver’s particular understanding of speech act theory itself. Wæver seems to regard the content of security as **fixed**; that is, he believes that the implications of calling an issue a “security problem” **cannot be challenged**, only the objects to which that label is applied. In the earlier, avowedly state–centric version of speech act theory, Wæver viewed the consequences of securitization as **inherently conservative**: “The language game of security is... a jus necessitatis for threatened elites, and this it must remain” (Wæver 1995: 56). This broad thrust has been retained (including the state–centrism?) in the latest formulation of the theory, which argues that to securitize an issue is to render it “so important that it should not be exposed to the normal haggling of politics but should be dealt with decisively by top leaders prior to other issues” (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998: 29). But the notion that the implications of securitization—the meaning of security—are fixed can be challenged at both the **empirical level** and at the **level of** the **theory** of language. Empirically, there can be no doubt that the theory and practice of traditional security have come under unprecedented scrutiny over the past twenty or so years. In particular, notions of “common security” have been advanced based on the argument that there can be no long–term resolution of threats through unilateral, militarized, **zero–sum action**. Rather, it is only a **holistic** and **empathetic** approach to security that can hope to ameliorate threats (the emergence of such an approach can be traced through the following independent, international commissions: the Commission on International Development Issues [1980]; the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues [1982]; the Commission on Global Governance [1995]). Moreover, the experience of the end of the Cold War demonstrates that such a conception of security can become **influential** (a point returned to and developed further in Chapter 6). This suggests that contrary to the opinions of Wæver or indeed Deudney, the meaning of security is not necessarily fixed but is open to argumentation and dispute. Theoretically, this criticism of Wæver is buttressed by a Habermasian understanding of speech acts. Habermas’s “universal pragmatics,” which forms the general framework for his understanding of speech acts, was outlined in Chapter 3. His specific views on speech acts are summarized by Outhwaite: Contra conceptions of language as just a factual representation of states of affairs, or their negative counterpart in which it is seen as mere rhetoric, [in Habermas’s approach] the three validity–claims of truth, normative rightness and expressive truthfulness or sincerity are given equal importance. (Outhwaite 1994: 131) This understanding of speech acts has major implications for alternative approaches to the theory and practice of security. It suggests that when the label “security” is attached to particular issues, it generates validity–claims that are open to redemption or refutation through argumentation. Thus, for example, if a state treats the continued existence of a minority language within its borders as a threat to national security (as is the case with Turkey and Kurdish, and as was the case until recently with the United Kingdom and Irish), this behavior is susceptible to critique on the grounds of truth, rightness, and sincerity. In this case, the truth of the claim that a minority language is a threat to the state may be questioned. The normative rightness of persecuting a minority culture in the name of national security may also be called into doubt, as well the sincerity of those advocating this policy (whose interests are really being served by such a claim?). Another example of how validity–claims are brought into play through the use of the term “security” is a decision by a government to base another state’s nuclear weapons on its territory to counter a threat that it perceives as emanating from a third country (as was the case with the deployment of U.S. cruise missiles in the United Kingdom in the early 1980s). In this case the questions that might arise during the process of redeeming the validity–claims implicit in this scenario would include: Does the third country really pose a threat to the state deciding to host nuclear weapons? What is the evidence concerning both material capabilities and intentions? Could not nuclear weapons and nuclearism pose a greater threat to security than any putative aggressor? Is it right to threaten death and destruction to millions of innocents in the name of national security? Should a state be privileged in this way? Is the decision to deploy nuclear weapons a sincere response to a perceived threat, or is it a result of intra–alliance politics? Or does it reflect pressure from a self–interested military–industrial–academic complex? As these examples demonstrate, once security discourse is viewed in terms of a series of validity–claims subject to redemption through argumentation **rather than a take–it–or–leave–it package** of militarized assumptions and responses, a more fluid picture emerges than the one presented by Wæver or Deudney. Understood in Habermasian terms, the speech act of security cannot simply be narrowed by prior definition to exclude all threats other than those that are military in nature—rather, the breadth of the concept is **subject to debate**. Similarly, the meaning—the implications—of securitizing a particular issue **cannot be regarded as fixed**. However, I am not arguing that it is easy to challenge the traditions that are attached to a particular concept. **Simply to talk about something differently does not** necessarily **lead to different** forms of **behavior**: **Practice cannot simply be reduced to theory**. But argumentation and disputation can have—and have had—profound effects even on the practice of security (a theme pursued in Chapter 6.)

#### The US does not inherently corrupt everything it touches – reject the reactionary nature of the alternative.

Turan **Kayaoğlu,** Visiting Fellow, Brookings Doha Center, 3/15/2012 (http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2012/0315\_muslim\_relations\_kayaoglu.aspx?rssid=foreign+policy&utm\_source=feedburner&utm\_medium=feed&utm\_campaign=Feed%3A+BrookingsRSS%2Fprograms%2Fforeignpolicy+%28Brookings%3A+Programs+-+Foreign+Policy%29&utm\_content=Google+Reader)

The Assad regime’s violent crackdown on the Syrian opposition has led to a surprising development: The United States and segments of the Islamic world are now working together in the United Nations Security Council to authorize humanitarian intervention. Even in the midst of the ongoing crisis, meanwhile, some Muslim groups have rejected this effort because of their wholesale disapproval of any American involvement. This stance is based on a skewed characterization of American relations with the Islamic world, built largely on post 9/11 narratives. The current situation, however, offers a new platform for cooperation that should be embraced, not rejected. First of all, there is no denying that many aspects of U.S. policy have fed Muslim and Arab mistrust and hatred of America. US involvement in the Middle East has been driven by support of dictatorial regimes or interventions aimed at advancing its strategic position and securing oil supplies. Furthermore, since the birth of the State of Israel, the United States has committed itself to the Zionist ideal, often over the plight of displaced Palestinians; the price has been the loss of support among Muslims across the world. For much of the American public, meanwhile, the “war on terror” has been, in fact, a war on Islam. America’s complex relations with Muslims, however, **cannot be reduced** to only these negative instances. There also are many examples of U.S.-Muslim collaboration and, today, evolving interests are drawing the two closer together. For every example of American imperialism, there is a counter example of a U.S. ”anti-colonial” policy. For example, it was the US pressure that compelled Britain and France to end their occupation of the Suez in 1956. U.S. support of the mujahideen helped end Soviet occupation in Afghanistan in the 1980s. More recently, American-led intervention ended the massacre of Muslims in Bosnia and Kosovo. Various U.S. interventions in the interest of religious freedom have been helped Muslim minorities, as in the case of Chinese Muslims. The State Department’s International Religious Freedom Report 2010 criticized the actions of Chinese authorities, ranged from forceful removal of Muslim women’s headscarves and confiscating passports to preventing Muslims from going on Hajj and imprisoning activists and their family members. If the lot of Chinese Muslims improves in the future, no doubt they will owe much to American pressure on China. Of the 7 million American Muslims, two out of three are foreign-born. Some came to the U.S. as refugees. These groups include well-known cases from Bosnia, Iraq, and Somalia, as well as lesser-known groups such as the Cham Muslims from Cambodia and Meshket Turks (Ahiskalilar) from Central Asia. True to its historical legacy, the United States has continued to provide a haven for Muslims fleeing persecution, conflict and war. American-Muslim collaboration during the Arab Spring has further strengthened this relationship. While Mohamed Bouazizi’s self-immolation ignited large-scale protests in Tunisia, dispatches between American diplomats and autocratic leaders of the Middle East, revealed by WikiLeaks, described extensive palace corruption, providing additional fuel to the protests. In Egypt, the initial American reluctance to call for the ouster of long-standing ally Hosni Mubarak gave way to US President Barack Obama’s cautious support for protesters and stern warnings against the use of violence. Taking this approach to support the Arab Spring one step further, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton pledged that the United States would work with Al-Nahda in Tunisia “because America respects the right of the Tunisian people to choose their own leaders.” Collaboration between the Arab League and the U.S. on Libya offers a final example in which the NATO-led intervention saw U.S. forces fighting alongside those of several Arab countries. Overall, the Obama administration has shown balanced leadership throughout the past year’s events. The administration’s overly cautious attitude signaled a shift from the forceful intervention of the Bush era to genuine dialogue and calculated engagement with a range of groups in the region, including Islamists. This fresh American approach appears to be well received by Muslims. As the Brookings 2011 Arab Public Opinion Poll indicated, favorable views of the United States in the region stand at 26 percent. While still low, this is a significant increase from 10 percent in 2010. Moreover, 24 percent of those polled believed the US played a constructive role in the Arab Spring, placing it behind only Turkey and France. American involvement in Muslim affairs in general — and during the Arab Spring, in particular — clearly cannot be characterized as simply having a malevolent intent. This is not to say that the climate of relations between Muslims and America has reached optimal warmth, nor that a Libya-like intervention in Syria conducted by Muslim states and America would be sure to succeed. But it is time to reject the shortsighted reactionary position that intervention is suspicious solely because the US supports it. Ending bloodshed should be the priority — not preventing American involvement at any cost.

# 2NC

#### Limits are key to their movement – we can’t know the rightness or wrongness of their idea unless we have access to literature on both sides. This undermines support for their advocacy

Underwood, Prof of Communication Studies, 2k1(Psychology of Communication,

http://www.cultsock.ndirect.co.uk/MUHome/cshtml/psy/hovland3.html)

Whether or not you should include arguments for and against your case depends very much on your audience.If you know that they already agree with you, a one-sided argument is quite acceptable. If they areopposed to your point of view, then a one-sided message will actually be less effective, being dismissed as biased. Even if your audience don't know much about the subject, but do know that there are counterarguments (even if they don't know what they are) will lead them to reject your views as biased.Hovland'sinvestigations into mass propaganda used to change soldiers' attitudes also suggests that the intelligence of thereceivers is an important factor, a two-sided argument tending to be more persuasive with the more intelligent audience.

#### Nuclear war would result in massive political repression, turns their K advantage.

Martin 02 (Brian, Professor of Social Sciences at the University of Wollongong, Australia, “Activism after nuclear war?,” Published by TFF (Transnational Foundation for Peace and Future Research), March, http://www.uow.edu.au/~bmartin/pubs/02tff.html)

In the event of nuclear war, as well as death and destruction there will be serious political consequences. Social activists should be prepared. ¶ The confrontation between Indian and Pakistani governments earlier this year showed that military use of nuclear weapons is quite possible. There are other plausible scenarios. A US military attack against Iraq could lead Saddam Hussein to release chemical or biological weapons, providing a trigger for a US nuclear strike. Israeli nuclear weapons might also be unleashed. Another possibility is accidental nuclear war.¶ Paul Rogers in his book Losing Control says that the risk of nuclear war has increased due to proliferation, increased emphasis on nuclear war-fighting, reduced commitment to arms control (especially by the US government) and Russian reliance on nuclear arms as its conventional forces disintegrate.¶ A major nuclear war could kill hundreds of millions of people. But less catastrophic outcomes are possible. A limited exchange might kill "only" tens or hundreds of thousands of people. Use of nuclear "bunker-busters" might lead to an immediate death toll in the thousands or less.¶ Nuclear war would also lead to increased political repression. Martial law might be declared. Activists would be targeted for surveillance or arrest. Dissent would become even riskier. War always brings restraints on civil liberties.¶ The political aftermath of September 11 - increased powers for police forces and spy agencies, increased intolerance of and controls over political dissent - is just a taste of what would be in store in the aftermath of nuclear war.¶ Being prepared for nuclear war is not defeatism but realism. Indeed, being prepared may make nuclear war less likely, as I argued 20 years ago in an article titled "How the peace movement should be preparing for nuclear war". Many of the points I made then are just as relevant today.

### A2 Perm – Do the CP

#### Do the counterplan severs out of the plan’s statutory mechanism –

#### 1. “The” means all parts of the USFG.

Merriam Webster http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/the

—used as a function word before a noun or a substantivized adjective to indicate reference to a group as a whole <the elite>

#### 2. “Statutory restrictions” require congressional action. EOs are extra-statutory.

Allen 86 William H. Allen, Member of the District of Columbia Bar. Virginia Law Review MARCH, 1986 72 Va. L. Rev. 235 ARTICLE: THE DURABILITY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT. lexis

Finally, executive orders in the last three administrations have imposed across-the-board extra-statutory restrictions on major rulemaking by executive agencies. These orders have supplied some of the guidance for major rulemaking thought to be lacking in section 553. The Ford Administration required that an inflationary impact statement accompany all "major legislative proposals, regulations, and rules" promulgated by executive branch agencies. n87 The Carter Administrations's comparable program required a preliminary regulatory analysis when major rules were proposed and a final regulatory analysis when such rules were promulgated. n88 The regulatory analysis was similar to the Ford inflation impact statement but did not require an explicit cost/benefit analysis. [\*252] Finally, the Reagan Administration imposed an even more comprehensive set of requirements. Its executive order calls for a preliminary regulatory impact analysis for major rules when proposed and a final regulatory impact analysis for such rules when promulgated. The order requires major rules to satisfy a cost/benefit standard if permitted by the agency's governing statute, and it empowers the Office of Management and Budget to review major rules before they are issued. n89

#### Severance is a voting issue – key to preserve clash and stable negative preparation.

### Detention – Prez Circumvents

#### President will circumvent due process and detention – he’ll pretend it’s nonprosecution

McNeal 8 [Gregory, Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of Law. The author previously served as an academic consultant to the former Chief Prosecutor, Department of Defense Office of Military Commissions, “ARTICLE: BEYOND GUANTANAMO, OBSTACLES AND OPTIONS,” August 08, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. Colloquy 29]

3. Executive Forum-Discretion--Any reform which allows for adjudication of guilt in different forums, each with differing procedural protections, raises serious questions of legitimacy and also incentivizes the Executive to use "lesser" forms of justice--nonprosecution or prosecutions by military commission. In this section, my focus is on the incentives which compel the Executive to not prosecute, or to prosecute in military commissions rather than Article III courts. Understanding the reason for these discretionary decisions will guide reformers pondering whether a new system will actually be used by the next President.¶ There are two primary concerns that executive actors face when selecting a forum: protecting intelligence and ensuring trial outcomes. Executive forum-discretion is a different form of prosecutorial discretion with a different balancing inquiry from the one engaged in by courts. Where prosecutorial discretion largely deals with the charges a defendant will face, executive forum-discretion impacts the procedural protections a defendant can expect at both the pretrial and trial phase. Where balancing by Courts largely focuses on ensuring a just outcome which protects rights, the balancing engaged in by executive actors has inwardly directed objectives [\*50] which value rights only to the degree they impact the Executive's self interest.¶ Given the unique implications flowing from forum determinations, reformers can benefit from understanding why an executive actor chooses one trial forum over another. I contend that there are seven predictive factors that influence executive discretion; national security court reformers should be aware of at least the two most salient predictive factors: trial outcomes and protection of intelligence equities. n112 The Executive's balancing of factors yields outcomes with direct implications for fundamental notions of due process and substantial justice. Any proposed reform is incomplete without thoroughly addressing the factors that the Executive balances.

## 2nc signal

**CP sends the most powerful signal**

Zbigniew Brzezinski 12, national security advisor under U.S. President Jimmy Carter, 12/3/12, Obama's Moment, www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/12/03/obamas\_moment

In foreign affairs, the central challenge now facing President Barack Obama is how to regain some of the ground lost in recent years in shaping U.S. national security policy. Historically and politically, in America's system of separation of powers, it is the president who has the greatest leeway for decisive action in foreign affairs. He is viewed by the country as responsible for Americans' safety in an increasingly turbulent world. He is seen as the ultimate definer of the goals that the United States should pursue through its diplomacy, economic leverage, and, if need be, military compulsion. And the world at large sees him -- for better or for worse -- as the authentic voice of America. To be sure, he is not a dictator. Congress has a voice. So does the public. And so do vested interests and foreign-policy lobbies. The congressional role in declaring war is especially important not when the United States is the victim of an attack, but when the United States is planning to wage war abroad. Because America is a democracy, public support for presidential foreign-policy decisions is essential. But no one in the government or outside it can match the president's authoritative voice when he speaks and then decisively acts for America. This is true even in the face of determined opposition. Even when some lobbies succeed in gaining congressional support for their particular foreign clients in defiance of the president, for instance, many congressional signatories still quietly convey to the White House their readiness to support the president if he stands firm for "the national interest." And a president who is willing to do so publicly, while skillfully cultivating friends and allies on Capitol Hill, can then establish such intimidating credibility that it is politically unwise to confront him. This is exactly what Obama needs to do now.

# 1NR

#### Prefer our statistically proven impacts

Liberal democracy checks their impacts

**O’Kane, 1997** (“Modernity, the Holocaust, and politics”, Economy and Society, February, ebsco)

Chosen policies cannot be relegated to the position of immediate condition (Nazis in power) in the explanation of the Holocaust. Modern bureaucracy is not ‘intrinsically capable of genocidal action’ (Bauman 1989: 106). Centralized state coercion has no natural move to terror. In the explanation of modern genocides it is chosen policies which play the greatest part, whether in effecting bureaucratic secrecy, organizing forced labour, implementing a system of terror, harnessing science and technology or introducing extermination policies, as means and as ends. As Nazi Germany and Stalin’s USSR have shown, furthermore, those chosen policies of genocidal government turned away from and not towards modernity. The choosing of policies, however, is not independent of circumstances. An analysis of the history of each case plays an important part in explaining where and how genocidal governments come to power and analysis of political institutions and structures also helps towards an understanding of the factors which act as obstacles to modern genocide. But it is not just political factors which stand in the way of another Holocaust in modern society. Modern societies have not only pluralist democratic political systems but also economic pluralism where workers are free to change jobs and bargain wages and where independent firms, each with their own independent bureaucracies, exist in competition with state-controlled enterprises. In modern societies this economic pluralism both promotes and is served by the open scientific method. By ignoring competition and the capacity for people to move between organizations whether economic, political, scientific or social, Bauman overlooks crucial but also very ‘ordinary and common’ attributes of truly modern societies. It is these very ordinary and common attributes of modernity which stand in the way of modern genocides.

The LInk to Themselves - The Aff’s Demand For Queerness outside of quote “Dominate Sexual Exceptionalism” Creates a New Dualism Between “Monstrous US Exceptionalism” and Radical Queer Politics

Gavin Brown, Dept of Geography @ Univ. of Leicester, ‘9 [*Environment and Planning* A, <http://ideas.repec.org/a/pio/envira/v41y2009i6p1496-1510.html>]

In contrast to the theorisations of Duggan and Richardson, Nast has located these social and economic changes firmly within the reconfigured racist, patriarchal privi- lege of `` `normative' gay white male masculinities'' (2002, page 878). Her work has been critiqued for collapsing the real lived experience of the majority of gay white men (in the USA) into a stereotype of the affluent gay white consumer (Elder, 2002; Sothern, 2004). For Sothern (2004, page 187), Nast presents a ``very unqueer notion of [a] queer masculinity'' that is uniformly shaped by neoliberalism and ``devoid of any of the multiplicity, performativity and contradictions queer theory has struggled to theorize''. Oswin (2005, page 84) **has argued that** both Nast and Sothern **rely on stereo- types in order to seek a means to counter neoliberal** normalizations of gay life by ``insisting that there can be a queer **politics outside ... complicity''** with these regimes. She advocates taking a ``more ambivalent approach to queer geographies of normal- ization'' (page 81), coaxing out the figure of **the `complicit queer'**, who is always embroiled in neoliberal practices and relations to some extent. If these neoliberal practices of normalisation pose a threat to the long-rehearsed theoretical interventions of queer studies then the search for an `authentic, noncomplicit queer' can appeal as a means of avoiding asking ourselves awkward and difficult questions about the on-going potential of queer radical politics. In contrast, Oswin (2005, page 84) suggests that, ``instead of thinking complicit **space as total and negative**, we might reconceptualise it as ambivalent and porous, as an undetermined set of processes that simultaneously enables both resistance and capitulation. ... If both resistance and capitulation are enabled in and through complicity then a complicit queerness can still present a threat. But it is not the threat we thought it was, we may have to look harder and in different, unforeseen places to detect it, and we may not always like what we find.'' Oswin's (2005; 2007; 2008) conceptualisation of complicit queer space serves as a timely reminder that lesbian and gay space can produce and reinforce various norma- tivities (not just around sexuality, but through the intersections of sexuality with class, gender, ethnicity. and nation). It reminds us that queer critique has always been not just concerned with the reproduction of normativities, but a poststructuralist challenge to identity politics and binary thinking. Gay space is not inherently more resistive or transgressive than heterosexual space; and, consequently, queer geographers must recognise that if there are many heterosexualities (Hubbard, 2007) then it is a folly to position heterosexual space as always oppressive and restricting the lives of lesbians, gay men, and other sexual and gender `dissidents'. The real potential of queer thinking is to undermine binary understandings of sexuality and gender rather than reinforcing them.

Attempts to abandon all catagories and identities fail. Practical considerations of policy matter.

Denike 10 [Margaret, Human Rights Program, Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies, Carleton University, Homonormative Collusions and the Subject of Rights: Reading Terrorist Assemblages Feminist Legal Studies Volume 18, Number 1 / April, 2010 85-100]

Among other endeavours, Terrorist Assemblages attempts a practice of sustained critical reading that could elucidate such contingencies, including, as is the object of her focus, those that relate to the convergences of homosexuality and normative nationalisms in certain liberal democracies. She [Duggan] expressly casts her work as a direct departure from the models of “resistant queer identities” (Puar 2007, p. 46) that locate gays and lesbians outside of, or against, a dominant, heteronormative majority, and that frame the human rights claims of queers in terms of their exclusion from, or opposition to, the laws and policies that buttress these norms. For Puar, the tropes that are often used to describe queer identities and locations, for instance, in terms of subjects of “intersecting oppressions”, tend to reify standpoint epistemology and fail to capture the multiple and mobile, shifting formations and contradictory configurations that queerness has come to occupy at this contemporary historical moment. Seeking alternative ways to move LGBT theory from its grounding in accounts of subjectivity and identity, and the layering of descriptive categories such as ‘race’, ‘ethnicity’, and ‘gender’, Puar stages different models that might more effectively explain multiple and mobile engendering processes and racial formations that occur both as a result of—and despite—subject identity and location. She finds such alternatives in Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of ‘assemblage’ (1987) and contemporary theorisations of ‘affect’, as explanatory devices to conceptualise the varying departures and complicities that these categories elide, and, as she puts it, to prioritise movement over placement in talking about what queer bodies do rather than what they are, what queerness has come to mean, how it has come to be felt and deployed. But even as Puar arrives at ‘assemblage’ as a way of reading homo/nationalist formations, we are invariably reminded of the impossibility—if not the impracticality—of leaving representational and identitarian categories behind, not just because they are one of the very conditions of the terrain of ‘homosexuality’ that the book traverses, but because this terrain is sign-posted with the language of legal scholars, courts and human rights advocates where the recognition and interpolation of descriptive identity categories, such as race, sex, sexual orientation or ethnic origin really matters, especially when it comes to framing the way that individuals and groups are treated differently by discriminatory practices and policies on these grounds.

### Yes Predictions

#### Even if predictions aren’t perfect, we can still reach some conclusion about human behavior.

Miller 2 (Katherine Miller, Prof. of Communication at Texas A&M, Communication theories: Perspectives, processes, and contexts, 2002, p 35-36)

If positivism, in its classical and logical forms, is largely rejected, what philosophical foundation should take its place as a framework for social research? Very different answers to this question have been proposed. Some social researchers argue that flaws in the positivist foundation require a radically different philosophy of sci- encee, one in which the realist ontology, objec- ive epistemology, and value-free axiology of positivism are vehemently rejected and replaced with forms of inquiry that honor nominalism, subjectivism, and omnipresent values. The posi- tions of these scholars are discussed in great detail in Chapters 4 and 5 as we consider interpretive and critical petspectives on communication theory. However, some scholars believe that a rejection of positivism does not require a total rejection of realism, objectivity, and the scientific goal of value-free inquiry. However, these scholars reject the notion of absolute truth, reject the unassailable foundation of observation, and reject the assumption of an always steady and upward accumulation of knowledge. In these rejections, scholars have forged a new philosophy of science that D. C. Phillips (1987, 1990, 1992) has called post-positivism. The metatheoretical tenets of this position are discussed in the next section. Metatheoretical Commitments Ontology In Chapter 2, we discussed three ontological positions: the realist, the nominalist, and the social constructionist. To summarize, a realist believes in a hard and solid reality of physical and social objects, a nominalist proposes that the reality of social entities exists only in the names and labels we provide for them, and a social constructionist emphasizes the ways in which social meanings are created through historical and contemporary interaction. Both the realist and the social constructionist positions make contributions to the ontology of post-positivist researchers in the communication discipline. Researchers in the post-positivist tradition can be seen as realists in that they support the position that phenomena exist independent of our perceptions and theories about them (Phillips, 1987). However, this realism is tempered by the argument that humans cannot fully apprehend that reality and that the driving mechanisms in the social and physical world cannot be fully understood. As J. D. Smith (1990, p. 171) states, "Realism is essential . . . because it poses 'at least in principle, a standard by which all human societies and their beliefs can be judged: they can all have beliefs about the world which turn out to be mistaken'" (Trigg, 1985, p. 22). Phillips argues, however, that a post-positivist ontology does not deny the notions inherent in approaches advocating a "social construction of reality" (Berger & Luckmann, 1967). Rather, Phillips (1990) draws the distinction between beliefs about the reality and the objective reality (pp. 42-43). Making this distinction allows a post-positivist scholar to appreciate (and investigate) multiple realities that are constructed by social collectives through communicative inter-action. For example, a post-positivist scholar could study the ways that beliefs about the imminent end of the world influence the behaviors of mountain survivalists, members of cults, and fundamental religious groups. However, the fact that a social group has arrived at certain beliefs about the world does not make those beliefs about the social or physical world necessarily true. As Phillips (1990) notes, "It is clear that Freudians believe in the reality of the id and superego and the rest, and they act as if these are realities; but their believing in these things does not make them real" (p. 43). It could be further argued that post-positivism is consistent with social constructionist views in two important ways. First, many post-positivists would argue that the process of social construction occurs in relatively patterned ways that are amenable to the type of social scientific investigation undertaken by post-positivists. Individuals have free will and creativity but they exercise that creativity in ways that are often (though not always, certainly) patterned and predictable. In the field of mass communication, Barbara Wilson (1994) argues convincingly for this point regarding her own study of children's responses to the mass media: I believe that children's interpretations and responses are as richly individualistic as snow-flakes. However, I also believe that there are common patterns that characterize a majority of young viewers and that those patterns are as predictable and explainable as the basic process by which all those unique snowflakes are formed from water, (p. 25) Second, many post-positivists would argue that social constructions are regularly reified and treated as objective by actors in the social world. Thus, it is reasonable to study the impact of these reified constructions on our communicative lives. Tompkins (1997) has made this argument with regard to his organizational communication research with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA): The engineers, scientists, managers, bureau-crats, and other kinds of members did not believe in a socially constructed world. They believed the rockets they made did in fact go to the moon. Moreover, they believed that NASA and the contractor firms who worked for them were real. They believed that these organizations could succeed or fail by objective criteria and that their bosses could hire or fire, reward or penalize individuals—actions with real consequences, (p. 369) Thus, a social constructionist ontology is consistent with a post-positivist position that emphasizes both the patterned nature of the social construction process and the regular and predictable effects that reified social constructions have on social actors. Thus, the ontology of post-positivism is not necessarily the belief in a hard, immutable, and unchanging social world implied in a strict realist stance. Rather, a post-positivist ontology entails a belief in regularity and pattern in our interactions with others. The ways in which these regularities and patterns are studied within post-positivist theory are considered in the next section.

A coherent policy response is necessary to avert catastrophe.

Jeroen Gunning, Lecturer in International Politics @ Univ. of Wales, ‘7 [*Government and Opposition* 42.3, “A Case for Critical Terrorism Studies?” p. Blackwell-synergy]

The notion of emancipation also crystallizes the need for policy engagement. For, unless a ‘critical’ field seeks to be policy relevant, which, as Cox rightly observes, means **combining** ‘critical’ and ‘problem-solving’ approaches, it does not fulfil its ‘emancipatory’ potential.94 One of the temptations of ‘critical’ approaches is to **remain** mired in critique and deconstruction without moving beyond this to reconstruction and **policy** relevance.Vital as such critiques are, the challenge of a critically constituted field is also to engage with policy makers – and ‘terrorists’ – and work towards the realization of new paradigms, new practices, and a transformation, however modestly, of **political structures**. That, after all, is the original meaning of the notion of ‘immanent critique’ that has historically underpinned the ‘critical’ project and which, in Booth's words, involves ‘the discovery of the latent potentials in situations on which to build political and social progress’, as opposed to putting forward utopian arguments that are not realizable. Or, as Booth wryly observes, ‘this means building with one's feet **firmly on the ground**, not **constructing castles** in the air’ and asking ‘what it means for real people in real places’.96 Rather than simply critiquing the status quo, or noting the problems that come from an un-problematized acceptance of the state, a ‘critical’ approach must, in my view, also concern itself with offering concrete a**lternative**s. Even while historicizing the state and oppositional violence, and challenging the state's role in reproducing oppositional violence, it must wrestle with the fact that ‘the concept of the modern state and sovereignty embodies a **coherent response** to many of the **central problems** of political life’, and in particular to ‘the place of violence in political life’. Even while ‘de-essentializing and deconstructing claims about security’, it must concern itself with ‘how security is to be redefined’, and in particular on what theoretical basis.97 Whether because those critical of the status quo are wary of becoming co-opted by the structures of power (and their emphasis on instrumental rationality),98 or because policy makers have, for obvious reasons (including the failure of many ‘critical’ scholars to offer policy relevant advice), a greater affinity with ‘traditional’ scholars, the role of ‘expert adviser’ is more often than not filled by ‘traditional’ scholars.99 The result is that policy makers **are insufficiently challenged to question** the basis of their policies and develop new policies based on immanent critiques. A notable exception is the readiness of European Union officials to enlist the services of both ‘traditional’ and ‘critical’ scholars to advise the EU on how better to understand processes of radicalization.100 But this would have been impossible if more critically oriented scholars such as Horgan and Silke had not been ready to cooperate with the EU. Striving to be policy relevant does not mean that one has to accept the validity of the term ‘terrorism’ or stop investigating the political interests behind it. Nor does it mean that each piece of research must have policy relevance or that one has to limit one's research to what is relevant for the state, since the ‘critical turn’ implies a move beyond state-centric perspectives. End-users could, and should, thus include both state and non-state actors such as the Foreign Office and the Muslim Council of Britain and Hizb ut-Tahrir; the Northern Ireland Office and the IRA and the Ulster Unionists; the Israeli government and Hamas and Fatah (as long as the overarching principle is to reduce the political use of terror, whoever the perpetrator). It does mean, though, that a critically constituted field must work hard to bring together all the fragmented voices from beyond the ‘terrorism field’, to maximize both the field's rigour and its policy relevance. Whether a critically constituted ‘terrorism studies’ will attract the fragmented voices from outside the field depends largely on how broadly the term ‘critical’ is defined. Those who assume ‘critical’ to mean ‘Critical Theory’ or ‘poststructuralist’ may not feel comfortable identifying with it if they do not themselves subscribe to such a narrowly defined ‘critical’ approach. Rather, to maximize its inclusiveness, I would follow Williams and Krause's approach to ‘critical security studies’, which they define simply as bringing together ‘many perspectives that have been considered outside of the mainstream of the discipline’.101 This means refraining from establishing new criteria of inclusion/exclusion beyond the (normative) expectation that scholars self-reflexively question their conceptual framework, the origins of this framework, their methodologies and dichotomies; and that they historicize both the state and ‘terrorism’, and consider the security and context of all, which implies among other things an attempt at empathy and cross-cultural understanding.102 Anything more normative would limit the ability of such a field to create a genuinely interdisciplinary, non-partisan and innovative framework, and exclude valuable insights borne of a broadly ‘critical’ approach, such as those from conflict resolution studies who, despite working within a ‘traditional’ framework, offer important insights by moving beyond a narrow military understanding of security to a broader understanding of human security and placing violence in its wider social context.103 Thus, a poststructuralist **has no greater claim** to be part of this ‘critical’ field than a realist who looks beyond the state at the interaction between the violent group and their wider social constituency.104

Our Middle East scholarship is good

Halliday 93

Fred Halliday, IR at LSE, 93, “ ‘Orientalism’ and its Critics” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 20(2) pp.145-146

The Middle East is not unique, except possibly in the content of the myths that are propagated about it, from within and without. The political, economic, social and cultural activities of the peoples of this region have their peculiarities and differences, as much between each other , as in terms of one Middle East contrasted with the outside world. Material concerns, jokes, the pleasures of good food, and the horrors of political oppression, are theirs as much as any other peoples in the world. The development of social science in general will never be completed, and each specific issue, or country, or incident, poses questions for it. But we are no more precluded by our concepts from understanding the Middle East, and no more limited in our ideas, whatever their origins, than in addressing any other area of the world. In normative terms, we have, perhaps, allowed the discussion to be too inffected by relativism and doubt as to the validity of universal standards, in the face of a mistaken, and often self-interested, critique of imperialism and Western norms. Perhaps I could sum this up by adapting a slogan: *na gharbzadegi, na sharqzadegi*, neither westoxification nor eastoxification. Let us therefore go beyond this unnecessarily polarized and in some ways methodologically impoverished debate and continue with the job of studying these societies. I have warned against the perils of tafsir, but I will end with the words from the Qur’an that can be easily and I hope not too arbitrarily interpreted to justify this enterprise, wa ja’alnakum shu’uban wa-qaba’ila li-ta’arafu. ‘And I have created peoples and trives so that they could get to know each other.’42 That could be the motto for our necessarily unfinished, and unfinishable, endavour.

#### Identifying root cause is not only incorrect, but destructive. Justifies atrocities and solution failures.

Morson 07 (Gary, Professor of Slavic Studies, Russian Literature and History at Northwestern, “Anna Karenina In Our Time: Seeing More Wisely,” P. 152-4)

If Levin resembled so may intellectuals in his time and ours, he might seek “root cause” (as we would call it today) of all these failures. Much as the generals an historians satirized in War and Peace mistakenly seek the cause of historical events in a single decision, an much as revolutionaries often reduce the complexities of social ills to a single conspiracy or institution, so intellectuals often view complexity as a delusion to be explained away by a few simple underlying laws. It is just this habit of thought that feeds utopianism, because if the diversity of evil an misery had a single cause, then one could eliminate it by changing only one thing What could be easier? Abolish private property, alter the way children are educated, pass laws to regulate morals according to a given code, and evil will disappear or, at least, radically diminish. Behold, I make all new things But Levin learns that there is no single cause for what has gone wrong. Looking back on the twentieth century, we may wonder whether the root cause of the worst human misery is the belief that there is a root cause of human misery. In fact, many things happen contingently, just “for some reason.” Friction When l.evin attends the elections, he tries to handle some business for his sister, but discovers that somehow it cannot be done. In Dostoevsky, the reason would be "administrative ecstasy," the sheer delight bureaucrats take in making petitioners cringe, plead, or wait. But nothing of the sort happens here, and the problem is not one of intent at all. No one has any interest in thwarting Levin, so he cannot understand what goes wrong. When conspiracy theorists find they cannot accomplish something as easily as expected, they typically ask cut bono? (who benefits?) ro discover the obstacle. Some person or group must have caused the failure. Defeat means sabotage. This way of thinking presumes that behind every action there must be an intent, whether conscious or unconscious. Such a view rules out the possibility that mere contingency or friction accounts for the difficulty. flic military theorist Carl von Clauscwitz deemed friction, in this special metaphorical sense, an essential concept in understanding armies. Without using this word, Tolstoy regarded the same phenomenon as pertaining not just to war but to everything social. "If one has never personally experienced war," Clauscwitz explains, one cannot understand in what difficulties constantly mentioned really consist. . . . Everything looks simple; the knowledge required docs not look remarkable, the strategic options are so obvious that by comparison the simplest problem of higher mathematics has an impressive scientific dignity. Once war has actually been seen the difficulties become clear; but it is extremely difficult to describe the unseen, all-pervading element that brings about this change of perspective. Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult. 'Die difficulties accumulate and end by producing a kind of friction that is inconceivable unless one has experienced war. (Clausewitz, 119) The unseen, all-pervading element: For Tolstoy, similar difficulties arise when dealing with bureaucracy, introducing changes in agriculture, and implementing reforms. A Tolstoyan perspective is easily imagined today. Social problems look so simple: people in underdeveloped countries are poor, so give their governments foreign aid; workers arc unemployed, so hire them to perform needed government services; schools do not educate, so raise teachers' salaries; the state regulatory commission keeps energy prices too high, so partially privatize the system: answers seem so obvious, but in practice reforms rarely have the intended effect. They produce unintended consequences, which themselves have consequences; and, as Isaiah Berlin liked to point our, no one can foresee the consequences of consequences of consequences. Experience may teach one to expect certain kinds of difficulties, but some can never be anticipated, lhcrc is always friction: "Countless minor incidents —the kind you can never really foresee—combine to lower the general level of performance, so that one always falls far short of the intended goal" (Clauscwitz, 119). No one is deliberately impeding Levin's efforts for his sister. By the same token, no one is trying to thwart his agricultural reforms. Sabotage is out of the question. "All this happened not because anyone felt ill will toward Levin or his farm; on the contrary, he knew that they [rhe peasants] liked him [and] thought him a simple gentleman (their highest praise)" (340). Friction defeats the reforms. But where does this friction come from and how might one best deal with it? TTic Elemental Force 'Ihe bailiff and peasants recognize in advance when a plan is bound to fail, and at lasr l.evin, instead of growing angry, pays artention to what they say: The bailiff listened attentively, and obviously made an effort to approve of his employer's projects. But still he had that look Levin knew so well that always irritated him, a look of hopelessness and despondency. That look said: " Ihat's all very well, but as God wills." Nothing mortified Levin so much as that tone. But it was common to all the bailiffs he had ever had. They had all taken up that attitude toward his plans, and so now he was not angered by it but mortified, and felr all the more roused ro struggle against this, as it seemed, elemental force continually ranged against him, for which he could find no other expression than "as God wills." (165) Ihe elementalforce: this concept is central to both Tolstoy's great novels. Tolstoy uses a few similar terms for it. In War and Peace, he refers to an elemental force shaping individual lives (W&P, 648) and to "the elemental life of the swarm" constituting the cumulative effect of countless people's small actions governed by no overarching law. In Anna Karentna, he calls the elemental force a "brutal force" when its outcome is cruel. Ihe rough equivalent of friction for Clause-witz, the elemental force applies more widely. Clauscwitz's explanation stops at friction, but Tolstoy takes the elemental force as a starting point for understanding why some plans arc more likely to fail than others. In order to grasp the course of events more easily, we tend to reduce the countless infinitesimal forces making up the elemental force to a single cause. After all, it is impossible to enumerate innumerable actions. And so historians and social scientists naturally look for some super-cause that sums up all those small actions. They may presume laws or postulate narrative neatness. Tolstoy relentlessly exposed the logical fallacies in both forms of simplification, which, at some point, either assume what is to be proven or proceed as if it were already proven. Historians, social theorists, and biographers favor generalizations or symmetries permitting a clear analysis or simple story. They find what they seek, their success demonstrates not that complexity has been adequately explained but that when a discipline demands a certain sort of explanation it is bound to be “discovered.” In disciplines pretending to be social sciences, it is repeatedly discovered that things are not as complex as they appear.

#### Not root cause

Brian Martin, Professor of Science, Technology and Society at the University of Wollongong, ’90 (<http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/pubs/90uw/uw13.html>)

In this chapter and in the six preceding chapters I have examined a number of structures and factors which have some connection with the war system. There is much more that could be said about any one of these structures, and other factors which could be examined. Here I wish to note one important point: **attention should not be focussed on one single factor** to the exclusion of others. This is often done for example by some Marxists who look only at capitalism as a root of war and other social problems, and by some feminists who attribute most problems to patriarchy. The danger of **monocausal explanations** is that they may **lead to an inadequate political practice.** **The 'revolution' may be followed by the** persistence or even **expansion of many problems which were not addressed by the single-factor perspective**. The one connecting feature which I perceive in the structures underlying war is an unequal distribution of power. This unequal distribution is socially organised in many different ways, such as in the large-scale structures for state administration, in capitalist ownership, in male domination within families and elsewhere, in control over knowledge by experts, and in the use of force by the military. Furthermore, these different systems of power are interconnected. They often support each other, and sometimes conflict. This means that the struggle against war can and must be undertaken at many different levels. It ranges from struggles to undermine state power to struggles to undermine racism, sexism and other forms of domination at the level of the individual and the local community. Furthermore, the different struggles need to be linked together. That is the motivation for analysing the roots of war and developing strategies for grassroots movements to uproot them.

#### War causes their impacts

Joshua S. Goldstein (prof of IR @ American U, Wash D.C.) ‘1 War and Gender: How Gender Shapes the War System and Vice Versa. Cambridge University Press. pp. 412

First, peace activists face a dilemma in thinking about causes of war and working for peace. Many peace scholars and activists support the approach, “if you want peace, work for justice.” Then, if one believes that sexism contributes to war, one can work for gender justice specifically (perhaps among others) in order to pursue peace. This approach brings strategic allies to the peace movement (women, labor, minorities), but rests on the assumption that injustices cause war. The evidence in this book suggests that causality runs at least as **strongly the other way**. **War is not a product of capitalism, imperialism, gender, innate aggression, or any other single cause**, although these influence wars’ outbreaks and outcomes. Rather, war has in part **fueled and sustained these and other injustices**. So, “if you want peace, work for peace.” Indeed, if you want justice (gender and others), work for peace. Causality does not run just upward through the levels of analysis, from types of individuals, societies, and governments up to war. It runs downward too. Enloe suggests that changes in attitudes towards war and the military may be the most important way to “reverse women’s oppression.” The dilemma is that peace work focused on justice brings to the peace movement energy, allies, and moral grounding, yet, in light of this book’s evidence, the emphasis on injustice as the main cause of war seems to be **empirically inadequate**.10

### War Down

Both absolute poverty and war deaths are at their lowest levels because of US hegemony – shocks to the international system have historically produced the worst violence

Barnett 11

(Thomas P.M. Barnett, Former Senior Strategic Researcher and Professor in the Warfare Analysis & Research Department, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, U.S. Naval War College American military geostrategist and Chief Analyst at Wikistrat., worked as the Assistant for Strategic Futures in the Office of Force Transformation in the Department of Defense, “The New Rules: Leadership Fatigue Puts U.S., and Globalization, at Crossroads,” March 7 <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/8099/the-new-rules-leadership-fatigue-puts-u-s-and-globalization-at-crossroads>,

It is worth first examining the larger picture: We live in a time of arguably the greatest structural change in the global order yet endured, with this historical moment's most amazing feature being its relative and absolute lack of mass violence. That is something to consider when Americans contemplate military intervention in Libya, because if we do take the step to prevent larger-scale killing by engaging in some killing of our own, we will not be adding to some fantastically imagined global death count stemming from the ongoing "megalomania" and "evil" of American "empire." We'll be engaging in the same sort of system-administering activity that has marked our stunningly successful stewardship of global order since World War II. Let me be more blunt: As the guardian of globalization, the U.S. military has been the greatest force for peace the world has ever known. Had America been removed from the global dynamics that governed the 20th century, the mass murder never would have ended. Indeed, it's entirely conceivable there would now be no identifiable human **civilization left**, once nuclear weapons entered the killing equation. But the world did not keep sliding down that path of perpetual war. Instead, America stepped up and changed everything by ushering in our now-perpetual great-power peace. We introduced the international liberal trade order known as globalization and played loyal Leviathan over its spread. What resulted was the collapse of empires, an explosion of democracy, the persistent spread of human rights, the liberation of women, the doubling of life expectancy, a roughly 10-fold increase in adjusted global GDP and a profound and persistent reduction in battle deaths from state-based conflicts. That is what American "hubris" actually delivered. Please remember that the next time some TV pundit sells you the image of "unbridled" American military power as the cause of global disorder instead of its cure. With self-deprecation bordering on self-loathing, we now imagine a post-American world that is anything but. Just watch who scatters and who steps up as the Facebook revolutions erupt across the Arab world. While we might imagine ourselves the status quo power, we remain the world's most vigorously revisionist force. As for the sheer "evil" that is our military-industrial complex, again, let's examine what the world looked like before that establishment reared its ugly head. The last great period of global structural change was the first half of the 20th century, a period that saw a death toll of about 100 million across two world wars. That comes to an average of 2 million deaths a year in a world of approximately 2 billion souls. Today, with far more comprehensive worldwide reporting, researchers report an average of less than 100,000 battle deaths annually in a world fast approaching 7 billion people. Though admittedly crude, these calculations suggest a 90 percent absolute drop and a 99 percent relative drop in deaths due to war. We are clearly headed for a world order characterized by multipolarity, something the American-birthed system was designed to both encourage and accommodate. But given how things turned out the last time we collectively faced such a fluid structure, we would do well to keep U.S. power, in all of its forms, deeply embedded in the geometry to come. To continue the historical survey, after salvaging Western Europe from its half-century of civil war, the U.S. emerged as the progenitor of a new, far more just form of globalization -- one based on actual free trade rather than colonialism. America then successfully replicated globalization further in East Asia over the second half of the 20th century, setting the stage for the Pacific Century now unfolding. As a result, the vector of structure-building connectivity shifted from trans-Atlantic to trans-Pacific. But if the connectivity push of the past several decades has been from West to East, with little connectivity extended to the South outside of the narrow trade of energy and raw materials, the current connectivity dynamic is dramatically different. Now, the dominant trends are: first, the East cross-connecting back to the West via financial and investment flows as well as Asian companies "going global"; and second, the East creating vast new connectivity networks with the South through South-South trade and investment. The challenge here is how to adjust great-power politics to these profound forces of structural change. Because of the West's connectivity to the East, we are by extension becoming more deeply connected to the unstable South, with China as the primary conduit. Meanwhile, America's self-exhausting post-Sept. 11 unilateralist bender triggered the illusion -- all the rage these days -- of a G-Zero, post-American world. The result, predictably enough for manic-depressive America, is that we've sworn off any overall responsibility for the South, even as we retain the right to go anywhere and kill any individuals -- preferably with flying robots -- that we deem immediately threatening to our narrowly defined national security interests. The problem with this approach is that China has neither the intention nor the ability to step up and play anything resembling a responsible Leviathan over the restive South, where globalization's advance -- again, with a Chinese face -- produces a lot of near-term instability even as it builds the basis for longer-term stability.

Small wars won’t escalate in a world of free trade and stable great power competition

Mandelbaum 1999 Professor of American Foreign Policy at Johns Hopkins University (Michael, Christian A. Herter Professor of American Foreign Policy, The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University; Director, Project on East-West Relations, Council on Foreign Relations “Is Major War Obsolete?”)

Prof. Mandelbaum: Well, as I said in response to [an earlier] comment, I do not envision the end of foreign policy. I do not envision...here I do think that we have a disagreement. I think that we do understand escalation quite well and we do have good reasons to believe that it won’t happen. Korea is the hardest case, to be sure, but we had peripheral conflict drawing in the great powers because the great powers saw their interests at stake and believed that if they suffered a setback in the periphery it would come closer to home. This was the domino theory. With the advance, at least, of great-power rivalry what happens in the periphery becomes much less important and we’ve already seen that. And if I may again indulge myself by reading from the original article, “ ...when the world is integrated powerful countries can justify fighting weak adversaries or waging war far from their borders, or both, on the grounds of self defense...” That is you stop them there because otherwise it’ll come closer. “ When the war is disaggregated, the rationale loses its force. One of the most vivid examples of the workings of an integrated international system was the scramble for Africa at the end of the nineteenth century when the European powers rushed to stake out positions and control territory simply to preempt their rivals. The opposite dynamic was recently on display in the Balkans. The collapse of authority in Europe’s poorest and most backward country in 1997 set off a scramble from Albania. The countries of western Europe maneuvered to avoid taking any responsibility for its fate. The Italians, handicapped by geographic proximity, were the losers.”

World getting better

Steven Pinker is Professor of psychology at Harvard University "Violence Vanquished" Sept 24 2011 (online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904106704576583203589408180.html)

The fifth trend, which I call the New Peace, involves war in the world as a whole, including developing nations. Since 1946, several organizations have tracked the number of armed conflicts and their human toll world-wide. The bad news is that for several decades, the decline of interstate wars was accompanied by a bulge of civil wars, as newly independent countries were led by inept governments, challenged by insurgencies and armed by the cold war superpowers. The less bad news is that civil wars tend to kill far fewer people than wars between states. And the best news is that, since the peak of the cold war in the 1970s and '80s, organized conflicts of all kinds—civil wars, genocides, repression by autocratic governments, terrorist attacks—have declined throughout the world, and their death tolls have declined even more precipitously. The rate of documented direct deaths from political violence (war, terrorism, genocide and warlord militias) in the past decade is an unprecedented few hundredths of a percentage point. Even if we multiplied that rate to account for unrecorded deaths and the victims of war-caused disease and famine, it would not exceed 1%. The most immediate cause of this New Peace was the demise of communism, which ended the proxy wars in the developing world stoked by the superpowers and also discredited genocidal ideologies that had justified the sacrifice of vast numbers of eggs to make a utopian omelet. Another contributor was the expansion of international peacekeeping forces, which really do keep the peace—not always, but far more often than when adversaries are left to fight to the bitter end. Finally, the postwar era has seen a cascade of "rights revolutions"—a growing revulsion against aggression on smaller scales. In the developed world, the civil rights movement obliterated lynchings and lethal pogroms, and the women's-rights movement has helped to shrink the incidence of rape and the beating and killing of wives and girlfriends. In recent decades, the movement for children's rights has significantly reduced rates of spanking, bullying, paddling in schools, and physical and sexual abuse. And the campaign for gay rights has forced governments in the developed world to repeal laws criminalizing homosexuality and has had some success in reducing hate crimes against gay people. \* \* \* \* Why has violence declined so dramatically for so long? Is it because violence has literally been bred out of us, leaving us more peaceful by nature? This seems unlikely. Evolution has a speed limit measured in generations, and many of these declines have unfolded over decades or even years. Toddlers continue to kick, bite and hit; little boys continue to play-fight; people of all ages continue to snipe and bicker, and most of them continue to harbor violent fantasies and to enjoy violent entertainment. It's more likely that human nature has always comprised inclinations toward violence and inclinations that counteract them—such as self-control, empathy, fairness and reason—what Abraham Lincoln called "the better angels of our nature." Violence has declined because historical circumstances have increasingly favored our better angels. The most obvious of these pacifying forces has been the state, with its monopoly on the legitimate use of force. A disinterested judiciary and police can defuse the temptation of exploitative attack, inhibit the impulse for revenge and circumvent the self-serving biases that make all parties to a dispute believe that they are on the side of the angels. We see evidence of the pacifying effects of government in the way that rates of killing declined following the expansion and consolidation of states in tribal societies and in medieval Europe. And we can watch the movie in reverse when violence erupts in zones of anarchy, such as the Wild West, failed states and neighborhoods controlled by mafias and street gangs, who can't call 911 or file a lawsuit to resolve their disputes but have to administer their own rough justice.

Inequality Declining

Relative inequality decreasing

Kenny 10 [Charles, a contributing editor to Foreign Policy, is author of the forthcoming book Getting Better: Why Global Development Is Succeeding and How We Can Improve the World Even More, Best. Decade. Ever. SEPT. / OCT. 2010 http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/08/16/best\_decade\_ever?page=full]

But these horrific events, though mortal and economic catastrophes for many millions, don't sum up the decade as experienced by most of the planet's 6-billion-plus people. For all its problems, the first 10 years of the 21st century were in fact **humanity's finest**, a time when more people lived better, longer, more peaceful, and more prosperous lives than ever before. Consider that in 1990, roughly half the global population lived on less than $1 a day; by 2007, the proportion had shrunk to 28 percent -- and it will be lower still by the close of 2010. That's because, though the financial crisis briefly stalled progress on income growth, it was just a hiccup in the decade's relentless GDP climb. Indeed, average worldwide incomes are at their highest levels ever, at roughly $10,600 a year -- and have risen by as much as a quarter since 2000. Some 1.3 billion people now live on more than $10 a day, suggesting the continued expansion of the global middle class. Even better news is that growth has been faster in poor places like sub-Saharan Africa than across the world as a whole. There are still 1 billion people who go to bed each night desperately hungry, but cereal prices are now a fraction of what they were in the 1960s and 1970s. That, alongside continued income growth, is why the proportion of the developing world's population classified as "undernourished" fell from 34 percent in 1970 to 17 percent in 2008, even at the height of a global spike in food prices. Agricultural productivity, too, continues to climb: From 2000 to 2008, cereal yields increased at nearly twice the rate of population growth in the developing world. And though famine continues to threaten places such as Zimbabwe, hundreds of millions of people are eating more -- and better -- each day.

No impact to income inequality – neolib solves absolute income growth which is comparatively more important

Larry Obhof, JD @ Yale, 2003 (“WHY GLOBALIZATION? A LOOK AT GLOBAL CAPITALISM AND ITS EFFECTS”. University of Florida Journal of Law & Public Policy. Fall 2003)

It is clear that trade, capital and labor flows, and technology exchange lead to a larger economic pie for all countries involved. n82 Although these transactions typically have some distributional consequences, such consequences are dwarfed by the net contribution to national income. n83 Higher growth rates in globalizing developing countries have translated into higher incomes for the poor. Absolute poverty has declined dramatically in countries such as China and Vietnam following market reforms; millions of people are better off as a result. n84 Even with its increased inequality, "China has seen the most spectacular reduction of poverty in world history - which was supported by opening its economy to foreign trade and investment." n85 This leaves some important questions. Does inequality matter most? If, as both theory and empirical analyses suggest, globalization leads to significant growth for all sectors of a society, should we even worry about the effect on income distribution? The simple reality is that relative wages, and even relative employment, are not as important as the changes in absolute terms. If an unequal distribution gives everyone, even the worst-off person, a larger degree of wealth, does justice not require the unequal distribution rather than a strictly equal one? Liberal theorists correctly maintain that it does. n86 An unequal distribution of wealth is justified if it is better for those at the bottom, because it is the best way to promote the interests of the worst-off people in society. One only needs to look to our southern neighbor to see this principle in action. As noted above, 20 million Mexicans live on less than $ 2 per day. n87 Does justice prevail if they are left in dire poverty in order to prevent inequality from increasing? Of course not. The most important question is what effect trade will have on the absolute status of the poor. If someone lives on $ 1 per day, and someone else lives on $ 100, is it not better for the [\*108] poorer person to live on $ 5 and have the richer person live on $ 600? Is this not objectively better for the poorer person than a more equal distribution of $ 2 and $ 100, respectively? The relevant questions about globalization should ask whether the poor can now afford more food, medicine, shelter, and clothing. Perhaps in a perfect world, given perfect choices, income equality would be paramount. In an imperfect world that presents only limited choices, the most important thing that can be done for the poor of the world is to ensure that they be given the means to support themselves and procure basic necessities. There is no vehicle, other than economic growth, that can achieve this result.

C. Relative international income inequality

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B. Openness and Between-Country Inequality Has globalization led to greater inequality between developed and developing countries? That depends on how one interprets the question. Data indicates that globalization may have decreased income inequality between developed and globalizing developing countries. During the 1990s, per capita income grew faster in developing countries that were open to international trade than in developed countries by a ratio of more than two-to-one. n71 Per capita income experienced little or no growth, however, in countries that did not globalize. The income gap therefore increased between non-globalizing, undeveloped countries and developed countries. The difference in performance between globalizing and non-globalizing countries accounts for the general lack of convergence between rich and poor countries taken together. n72 This pattern has been consistent over time. Consider, for example, the experiences of globalizing countries from 1870-1913. Economists estimate that mass migration and international capital flows were responsible for between one-third and one-half of the income convergence between the Scandinavian countries and Britain, and up to 88% of the convergence between Scandinavian countries and the United States. n73 The same factors accounted for over two-thirds of the convergence of Ireland and Italy with Britain, and nearly all of the convergence of Ireland and Italy with the United States. n74 Countries that did not become more open did not converge. Iberia, for example, failed to import significant capital or to otherwise become more global during the period. Its average income gained no ground relative to that of its developed and more globalized counterparts. n75 [\*106] While rising global prosperity has not benefitted all regions, and the global distribution of income remains skewed, the picture is more encouraging than many believe. "Less than 10 percent of the developing world's population live in countries where average income declined [since 1970], while 70 percent live in countries where per capita income growth exceeded that of industrial countries." n76 Indeed, the late twentieth century was marked by convergence. Data shows that between-country inequality has fallen since the mid-1970s or the early 1980s. n77 Both economic theory and experience tell us that this decline will continue to be accelerated by increased globalization. n78 What factors explain the rising inequality between developed and non- globalizing, undeveloped countries? In addition to different efficiencies enjoyed by more open economies, one must look to superior technological progress in wealthier countries. n79 Economic integration leads to a diffusion of ideas across borders, and thus to greater innovation and production. n80 Countries that do not globalize cannot reap the full benefits of technological change and therefore limit their own growth relative to more open economies. Increasing integration leads to greater growth. The converse is also true: restrictions on integration stunt economic growth, and with it, income levels. Protectionism therefore leads to long- term inequality in low-income countries. Those who are concerned with inequality should support increasing openness and other policies that will "help poor countries converge macroeconomically on the rich." n81 [\*107]

Neolib solves state violence – prefer statistics.

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The last three decades have witnessed an unprecedented expansion of market-based reforms and the profusion of economic freedom in the international system. This shift in economic policy has sparked a debate about whether free markets are superior to state controls. Numerous studies have compared the neoliberal and statist policies on issues of production capacity, economic growth, commercial volumes, and egalitarianism. An overlooked research agenda, however, is the relationship between levels of economic freedom and violence within countries. Proponents of the statist approach might note that a strong government can bend the market to its will, directing activity toward policies necessary to achieve greater levels of gross domestic product and growth. By extracting more resources for the economy, a powerful state can redistribute benefits to keep the populace happy. Higher taxes can also pay for an army and police force that intimidate people. Such governments range from command economies of totalitarian systems to autocratic dictators and military juntas. Other economically unfree systems include some of the authoritarian “Asian tigers.” A combination of historical evidence, modern theorists, and statistical findings, however, has indicated that a reduced role for the state in regulating economic transactions is associated with a decrease in internal conflicts. Countries where the government dominates the commercial realm experience an increase in the level of domestic violence. Scholars have traced the history of revolutions to explain the relationship between statism and internal upheavals. Contemporary authors also posit a relationship between economic liberty and peace. Statistical tests show a strong connection between economic freedom and conflict reduction during the past three decades.

#### Imperialism is key to protect human rights.

Shaw, 2001,

Martin, Professor of International Relations at Sussex University, The unfinished global revolution: intellectuals and the new politics of international relations,

It sometimes seems that critical international theorists have left the state aside. Critics evacuate the harsher edges of worldpolitics for the soft ‘non-realist’territory of political economy, gender and civil society. No such refuge is possible, however. Economic and gender inequalities will not be solved so long as the repressive state is untamed. The new international relations will have to formulate its response to the continuing role of organized violence in the world order. A loose ‘governance without government’67is too easily supported. While Booth is obviously right that all government is imperfect, the differences between ‘relatively decent’ and tyrannical government, both nationally and globally, are absolutely critical.Without addressing the nature of contemporary global state networks, and a serious discussion of the ways in which they can be developed into an adequate global authority framework sustained by and sustaining local democracies, we have hardly begun to fashion a new agenda. World events repeatedly thrust these issues into our faces, but in the wider public debate too, many—lacking an understanding of the new situation—fall back on old ways of thought. The idea of absolute state sovereignty is resurrected by many who should know better, to defend the autonomy of repressive, even genocidal states. Louise Arbour, retiring Chief Prosecutor of the International War Crimes Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, provided a terse comment on this move. ‘Since the creation of this Tribunal,the Rwanda Tribunal,the Rome statute’,she says,‘… there is now a much more ambitious agenda: the one of peace with justice, where no one can hijack the concept of state sovereignty and use it to guarantee his own impunity. These are yesterday’s visions of a peaceful world.’68 That these are indeed ‘yesterday’s visions’is clear from the selective way in which they are used. It is a curious anti-imperialism that attacks the so-called ‘imperialism of human rights’69 but provides the defence of sovereignty to the imperialism of genocidal oppression.70 Something is wrong with the radical tradition, when as distinguished a representative as Edward Said could write of the Kosovo war that what he found ‘most distressing’ was the ‘destruction from the air’ wrought by American power71—not the genocidal massacres by Serbian forces that prompted NATO’s (admittedly problematic) response Said has reminded us recently of what Thompson called the ‘Natopolitan’world, in which many intellectuals were indirectly on the payroll of the CIA.72What he did not acknowledge was its Stalinist counterpart, in which intellectuals sold their souls to the KGB and the Stasi. And there was an anti-Cold War world, in which those who refused the choice of NATO and the Warsaw Pact elaborated their ideas. Although those of us in this intellectual third world turned down the lucre of the blocs, this did not guarantee lasting validity to our ideas. In the new global era, many characteristic assumptions of the old anti Cold War left appear increasingly as prejudices. A whole generation has not let go of a mindset, four elements of which are problematic in the new situation. Most fundamental is a residual Third Worldist ideology. According to this, Western, especially American, imperialism is the touchstone for all world politics. Said’s anachronistic conclusion about Kosovo was to ask: ‘When will the smaller, lesser, weaker peoples realize that this America is to be resisted at all costs, not pandered to or given in to naively?’73There are strong criticisms to be made of American and NATO policies in Kosovo. However **a systematic blindness lies behind the continuing belief that America is the principal problem, coupled with the failure to recognize the need for international action** against genocide.74 From this viewpoint, non-Western states are potential sites of resistance, organizers of ‘underdeveloped political economies’75 which can contest the dominant form. While sovereignty in general may be regarded as a political form of capitalist social relations76, the sovereignty of non-Western states must be defended from Western power. Yet to support Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo, or Chinese over Tibet, gives sustenance to forms of colonial domination deeply mired in blood. Critics ﬁnd themselves in an inversion of the double standard of which they accuse NATO: if it is right to support Timorese self-determination against Indonesian claims to sovereignty, how can the same right be denied to the Kosovans or Tibetans?77 Second, there are echoes of the intellectual left’s ambiguous attitudes to Communism itself. A residual afﬁnity for post-Communist states makes NATO’s attack on rump Yugoslavia particularly shocking.78 Left-wing critics were especially offended by NATO’s sidelining of Russia, but ignored how the unstable and self- serving character of the Yeltsin government’s positions made it a unreliable partner.79 Indeed Russia’s imperial role in the former Soviet area, reﬂected in a reluctance to support international justice, makes it a problematic player, however necessary is its participation in European and world security systems. Third, there is a rather pious attitude to the UnitedNations, seen as requiring a consensus of the world’s major states to act as a legitimate world centre. Thus leftwing critics were often disingenuous in their criticisms of NATO’s failure to seek UN authorization—ignoring Russian and Chinese determination to veto any action against Yugoslavia, in the light of their own imperial repression in Chechnya, Tibet, and so on. They also ignored, of course, the anachronistic character of the Security Council veto itself. Finally, there is the generalized paciﬁsm of anti-Cold War politics. To my mind, this is the element of this position with by far the greatest continuing salience. The horror at aerial bombardment has deep roots in modern history—for many older people based on childhood experience,80 for others resonating from the nuclear threat. Objections to the use of airpower are compounded by complaints about ‘thefastidiousness articulated about the loss of American lives’, which Said was not alone in ﬁnding ‘positively revolting’.81 Nevertheless, this concern too often remains at the level of abstract criticism, and fails to specify the kinds of alternative power-projection that might address the dire situations of people like the Kosovans or Timorese. Indeed critics of bombing also often reject not only other forms of military power, but international political and legal interventions, as mere Western power-projection.82A simple paciﬁsm was only partially viable during the Cold War (even then there were reasonable demands for ‘alternative defence policies’). It does little to address the realities of global politics, in which a relatively modest use of military power may protect a threatened civilian population. Underlying these speciﬁc positions, of course, is the continuing socialist critique of a capitalist world. Democratization is also often seen as a new form of Western or American power.83 Ironically, this functionalist approach attributes too much power to the West, and too little to the movements that are forging global democratic change. It is a very limited sort of socialist understanding that fails to grasp the potential of democracy to open up social reform. This socialism has not learnt the fundamental lesson of its twentieth century failures: no genuine social change is possible without political democracy and individual freedom.