# 1NC

### 1

#### Obama is focused on reaching a debt ceiling deal, but his attention is key.

Bohan 9/11 [Caren, “Delay in Syria vote frees Obama to shift to hefty domestic agenda”, http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=52932]

(Reuters) - Putting off a decision on military strikes on Syria allows President Barack Obama to shift his attention back to a weighty domestic agenda for the fall that includes budget fights, immigration and selecting a new chairman of the Federal Reserve.¶ Obama and his aides have immersed themselves for a week and a half in an intensive effort to win support in Congress for U.S. military action in Syria after a suspected chemical weapons attack last month killed more than 1,400 people.¶ But the effort, which included meetings by Obama on Capitol Hill on Tuesday followed by his televised speech to Americans, seemed headed for an embarrassing defeat, with large numbers of both Democrats and Republicans expressing opposition.¶ The push for a vote on Syria - which has now been delayed - had threatened to crowd out the busy legislative agenda for the final three months of 2013 and drain Obama's political clout, making it harder for him to press his priorities.¶ But analysts said a proposal floated by Russia, which the Obama administration is now exploring, to place Syria's weapons under international control may allow Obama to emerge from a difficult dilemma with minimal political damage.¶ "He dodges a tough political situation this way," said John Pitney, professor of politics at Claremont McKenna College in California.¶ Pitney said the delay in the Syria vote removes a big burden for Obama, given that Americans, who overwhelmingly opposed military intervention in Syria, will now be able to shift their attention to other matters.¶ He said Obama could suffer some weakening of his leverage with Congress. The administration's "full court press" to try to persuade lawmakers to approve military force on Syria was heavily criticized and did not yield much success.¶ "He probably has suffered some damage in Congress because there are probably many people on (Capitol Hill) who have increasing doubts about the basic competence of the administration and that's a disadvantage in any kind of negotiation," Pitney said.¶ BUDGET BATTLES¶ Among Obama's most immediate challenges are two looming budget fights. By September 30, Congress and the president must agree on legislation to keep federal agencies funded or face a government shutdown.¶ Two weeks later, Congress must raise the limit on the country's ability to borrow or risk a possible debt default that could cause chaos in financial markets.¶ On the first budget showdown, Obama may be at a strategic advantage because of divisions among opposition Republicans about whether to use the spending bill to provoke a fight over Obama's signature health care law, known as Obamacare.¶ House Republican leaders are trying to rally the party around a temporary spending measure that would keep the government funded until December 15 but are facing resistance within their own caucus from some conservatives who want to cut off funding for Obamacare, even if it means a government shutdown.¶ The debt limit fight could end up going down to the wire and unnerving financial markets. Republicans want to use that standoff to extract concessions from the Democratic president, such as spending cuts and a delay in the health law. But Obama has said he has no intention of negotiating over the borrowing limit.

#### Obama’s negotiating power is finite – plan trades off with domestic economic priorities.

Moore 9/10 [Heidi, Guardian's US finance and economics editor, “Syria: the great distraction; Obama is focused on a conflict abroad, but the fight he should be gearing up for is with Congress on America's economic security,” http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/sep/10/obama-syria-what-about-sequester]

Political capital – the ability to horse-trade and win political favors from a receptive audience – is a finite resource in Washington. Pursuing misguided policies takes up time, but it also eats up credibility in asking for the next favor. It's fair to say that congressional Republicans, particularly in the House, have no love for Obama and are likely to oppose anything he supports. That's exactly the reason the White House should stop proposing policies as if it is scattering buckshot and focus with intensity on the domestic tasks it wants to accomplish, one at a time.

#### Failure to life the ceiling collapses the global economy.

Davidson 9/10 [Adam, co-founder of NPR’s "Planet Money," Our Debt to Society, New York Times, 9/10/13, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/15/magazine/our-debt-to-society.html?pagewanted=all]

If the debt ceiling isn’t lifted again this fall, some serious financial decisions will have to be made. Perhaps the government can skimp on its foreign aid or furlough all of NASA, but eventually the big-ticket items, like Social Security and Medicare, will have to be cut. At some point, the government won’t be able to pay interest on its bonds and will enter what’s known as sovereign default, the ultimate national financial disaster achieved by countries like Zimbabwe, Ecuador and Argentina (and now Greece). In the case of the United States, though, it won’t be an isolated national crisis. If the American government can’t stand behind the dollar, the world’s benchmark currency, then the global financial system will very likely enter a new era in which there is much less trade and much less economic growth. It would be, by most accounts, the largest self-imposed financial disaster in history. Nearly everyone involved predicts that someone will blink before this disaster occurs. Yet a small number of House Republicans (one political analyst told me it’s no more than 20) appear willing to see what happens if the debt ceiling isn’t raised — at least for a bit. This could be used as leverage to force Democrats to drastically cut government spending and eliminate President Obama’s signature health-care-reform plan. In fact, Representative Tom Price, a Georgia Republican, told me that the whole problem could be avoided if the president agreed to drastically cut spending and lower taxes. Still, it is hard to put this act of game theory into historic context. Plenty of countries — and some cities, like Detroit — have defaulted on their financial obligations, but only because their governments ran out of money to pay their bills. No wealthy country has ever voluntarily decided — in the middle of an economic recovery, no less — to default. And there’s certainly no record of that happening to the country that controls the global reserve currency. Like many, I assumed a self-imposed U.S. debt crisis might unfold like most involuntary ones. If the debt ceiling isn’t raised by X-Day, I figured, the world’s investors would begin to see America as an unstable investment and rush to sell their Treasury bonds. The U.S. government, desperate to hold on to investment, would then raise interest rates far higher, hurtling up rates on credit cards, student loans, mortgages and corporate borrowing — which would effectively put a clamp on all trade and spending. The U.S. economy would collapse far worse than anything we’ve seen in the past several years. Instead, Robert Auwaerter, head of bond investing for Vanguard, the world’s largest mutual-fund company, told me that the collapse might be more insidious. “You know what happens when the market gets upset?” he said. “There’s a flight to quality. Investors buy Treasury bonds. It’s a bit perverse.” In other words, if the U.S. comes within shouting distance of a default (which Auwaerter is confident won’t happen), the world’s investors — absent a safer alternative, given the recent fates of the euro and the yen — might actually buy even more Treasury bonds. Indeed, interest rates would fall and the bond markets would soar. While this possibility might not sound so bad, it’s really far more damaging than the apocalyptic one I imagined. Rather than resulting in a sudden crisis, failure to raise the debt ceiling would lead to a slow bleed. Scott Mather, head of the global portfolio at Pimco, the world’s largest private bond fund, explained that while governments and institutions might go on a U.S.-bond buying frenzy in the wake of a debt-ceiling panic, they would eventually recognize that the U.S. government was not going through an odd, temporary bit of insanity. They would eventually conclude that it had become permanently less reliable. Mather imagines institutional investors and governments turning to a basket of currencies, putting their savings in a mix of U.S., European, Canadian, Australian and Japanese bonds. Over the course of decades, the U.S. would lose its unique role in the global economy. The U.S. benefits enormously from its status as global reserve currency and safe haven. Our interest and mortgage rates are lower; companies are able to borrow money to finance their new products more cheaply. As a result, there is much more economic activity and more wealth in America than there would be otherwise. If that status erodes, the U.S. economy’s peaks will be lower and recessions deeper; future generations will have fewer job opportunities and suffer more when the economy falters. And, Mather points out, no other country would benefit from America’s diminished status. When you make the base risk-free asset more risky, the entire global economy becomes riskier and costlier.

#### Economic collapse causes global nuclear war.

Merlini, Senior Fellow – Brookings, 11

[Cesare Merlini, nonresident senior fellow at the Center on the United States and Europe and chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Italian Institute for International Affairs (IAI) in Rome. He served as IAI president from 1979 to 2001. Until 2009, he also occupied the position of executive vice chairman of the Council for the United States and Italy, which he co-founded in 1983. His areas of expertise include transatlantic relations, European integration and nuclear non-proliferation, with particular focus on nuclear science and technology. A Post-Secular World? DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2011.571015 Article Requests: Order Reprints : Request Permissions Published in: journal Survival, Volume 53, Issue 2 April 2011 , pages 117 - 130 Publication Frequency: 6 issues per year Download PDF Download PDF (~357 KB) View Related Articles To cite this Article: Merlini, Cesare 'A Post-Secular World?', Survival, 53:2, 117 – 130]

Two neatly opposed scenarios for the future of the world order illustrate the range of possibilities, albeit at the risk of oversimplification. The first scenario entails the premature crumbling of the post-Westphalian system. One or more of the acute tensions apparent today evolves into an open and traditional conflict between states, perhaps even involving the use of nuclear weapons. The crisis might be triggered by a collapse of the global economic and financial system, the vulnerability of which we have just experienced, and the prospect of a second Great Depression, with consequences for peace and democracy similar to those of the first. Whatever the trigger, the unlimited exercise of national sovereignty, exclusive self-interest and rejection of outside interference would likely be amplified, emptying, perhaps entirely, the half-full glass of multilateralism, including the UN and the European Union. Many of the more likely conflicts, such as between Israel and Iran or India and Pakistan, have potential religious dimensions. Short of war, tensions such as those related to immigration might become unbearable. Familiar issues of creed and identity could be exacerbated. One way or another, the secular rational approach would be sidestepped by a return to theocratic absolutes, competing or converging with secular absolutes such as unbridled nationalism.

### 2

#### Text: The President of the United States should issue an executive order restricting the executive branch’s authority for targeted killing as a first resort outside zones of active hostilities

#### That solves the case—increases transparency, enables more effective drone policy, and creates drone use norms.

Zenko 13 [Micah, Douglas Dillon Fellow – CFR, Transferring CIA Drone Strikes to the Pentagon Policy Innovation Memorandum No. 31 Transferring CIA Drone Strikes to the Pentagon - transferring-cia-drone-strikes-to-the-pentagon Council on Foreign Relations Press April 2013 http://www.cfr.org/drones/transferring-cia-drone-strikes-pentagon/p30434]

The president should direct that U.S. drone strikes be conducted as DOD Title 10 operations. That decision would enhance U.S. national security in the following ways: Improve the transparency and legitimacy of targeted killings, including what methods are used to prevent civilian harm. Focus the finite resources of the CIA on its original core missions of intelligence collection, analysis, and early warning. (There is no reason for the CIA to maintain a redundant fleet of armed drones, or to conduct military operations that are inherently better suited to JSOC, the premier specialized military organization. As "traditional military activities" under U.S. law, these belong under Title 10 operations.) Place all drone strikes under a single international legal framework, which would be clearly delineated for military operations and can therefore be articulated publicly. Unify congressional oversight of specific operations under the armed services committee, which would end the current situation whereby there is confusion over who has oversight responsibility. Allow U.S. government officials to counter myths and misinformation about targeted killings at home and abroad by acknowledging responsibility for its own strikes. Increase pressure on other states to be more transparent in their own conduct of military and paramilitary operations in nonbattlefield settings by establishing the precedent that the Obama administration claims can have a normative influence on how others use drones.

#### The net benefit is presidential resolve.

### 3

#### Executive self-restraint is key to preserve the ability to respond to crises.

Pildes 12 [Richard H., Sudler Family Professor of Constitutional Law, NYU School of Law and Co-Director, NYU Center on Law and Security. 2/27/12 BOOK REVIEWS LAW AND THE PRESIDENT THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE MADISONIAN REPUBLIC. By Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule. New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press. 2010. Pp. 249. $29.95. New York University Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers]

First, they argue, a President unbound can produce better outcomes than a President bound to follow preexisting legislation: laws (constitutions and statutes) are always written in a specific context in the past, but technology, the economy, international dynamics, and other circumstances that characterize the modern age are exceptionally fluid and constantly shifting. Better to have presidents make their best judgment, all things considered, about the right action in the actual, immediate circumstances at hand than to have them be bound by laws that could not have contemplated these precise circumstances. Second, and central to Posner and Vermeule’s analysis, presidents do remain constrained — not by law, but by politics and the political judgment of others. As scholars since Richard Neustadt, if not earlier, have recognized, the actual, effective powers of a President (as opposed to the formal powers of the office) are directly rooted in, and limited by, his or her ongoing credibility.21 Presidents want the capacity to exercise their best judgment as contexts arise. But other actors in the system, including “the public,” will permit presidents to exercise more or less discretion depending on how credible those presidents are perceived to be (pp. 122–23). Credibility means generalized judgments about presidential performance, such as how well motivated the President is considered to be, how effective his or her actions are judged to be, and how wise or prudent his or her judgments are taken to be. “Credibility” in this context is analogous to what scholars of the Supreme Court have called long-term “diffuse support” for the Court; diffuse support means the willingness of the public to support the Court’s discretionary power, even when people might disagree with particular outcomes, because they generally believe the Court is exercising these powers in sound ways for good reasons.22 The more credible presidents make themselves, the more other actors will permit them to exercise broad discretion — including discretion to ignore or manipulate the law, which is the unique contribution of Posner and Vermeule’s view. Thus, argue Posner and Vermeule, presidents have strong incentives to adopt practices and take actions that establish and maintain their credibility (p. 133). These incentives will lead smart presidents to adopt various sorts of self-binding mechanisms that limit their discretion: commitments to transparency so others can monitor and oversee; or commitments to multilateral approaches in foreign policy so that presidents can act only with approval of other nations; or commitments to ceding some power to independent actors, such as special prosecutors or other institutions within the executive branch; or similar approaches through which presidents accept limits on their own power (pp. 113–53). By acting consistently with these self-adopted constraints, presidents build up their credibility by signaling that they are using their discretion in acceptable ways and should therefore continue to be granted that discretion — including discretion to avoid, circumvent, or ignore the law when, in the President’s best judgment, doing so will produce better outcomes.

#### Congressional restrictions cause adversaries to doubt the resolve of U.S. deterrence – causes crisis escalation.

Waxman 8/25 [Matthew Waxman 8/25/13, Professor of Law – Columbia and Adjunct Senior Fellow for Law and Foreign Policy – CFR, “The Constitutional Power to Threaten War,” Forthcoming in Yale Law Journal, vol. 123, August 25, 2013, SSRN]

A claim previously advanced from a presidentialist perspective is that stronger legislative checks on war powers is harmful to coercive and deterrent strategies, because it establishes easily-visible impediments to the President’s authority to follow through on threats. This was a common policy argument during the War Powers Resolution debates in the early 1970s. Eugene Rostow, an advocate inside and outside the government for executive primacy, remarked during consideration of legislative drafts that any serious restrictions on presidential use of force would mean in practice that “no President could make a credible threat to use force as an instrument of deterrent diplomacy, even to head off explosive confrontations.”178 He continued:¶ In the tense and cautious diplomacy of our present relations with the Soviet Union, as they have developed over the last twenty-five years, the authority of the President to set clear and silent limits in advance is perhaps the most important of all the powers in our constitutional armory to prevent confrontations that could carry nuclear implications. … [I]t is the diplomatic power the President needs most under the circumstance of modern life—the power to make a credible threat to use force in order to prevent a confrontation which might escalate.179

### **4**

Their representations of the Middle East as unstable necessitate Western intervention and justify American belligerence globally

Morten Valbjørn, PhD in the Department of Political Science @ Aarhus, ‘4 [Middle East and Palestine: Global Politics and Regional Conflict, “Culture Blind and Culture Blinded: Images of Middle Eastern Conflicts in International Relations,” p. 63-4]

From this perspective, it is irrelevant to discuss whether the Middle East should be regarded as a region like all the others, as it is the case in the IR mainstream, or as a region like no other, as the essentialists would claim. Rather, regions should be seen as social constructions that are produced through specific discursive practices just like the international system and its various actors. Instead of discussing what the Middle East is, the relational conception of culture regards the Middle East as an imaginary region, where, first and foremost, it is important to focus on how the Middle East has been constructed through discursive practices and how this has extensive consequences on its international relations.

This focus characterizes Edward Said's Orientalism (1995), one of the principal works dealing with the Middle East in applying a relational conception of culture. Despite his principle recognition of the mere existence of societies with a location southeast of the Mediterranean, Said almost completely refrains from dealing with what characterizes these societies (1995: 5). Instead, he focuses on how European and American contexts have described and imagined the Middle East and how a particular "orientalist" way of thinking has functioned as a filter through which the Middle East is constructed as a unique oriental cultural entity. Even though the orientalist representations of the Middle East should have less to do with the Middle East than with the orientalists' own context (1995: 12), this does not mean that these representations are innocent or ineffectual. The European and American identity and way of performing power are thus closely interwoven with the conception of the Middle East as oriental and alien.

The orientalist conception of the Middle East functions as a constituting counterimage of European and American identity, of a so-called occidental culture whose supposedly democratic, rational, and enlightened character is contrasted by the depictions of a despotic, irrational, arid barbaric Orient. According to Said, "the Orient has helped to define Europe (or the West) as its contrasting image" (Said, 1995: 1-2). But orientalism also formed a central element of "a western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient" (Said, 1995: 3). The French and British colonial representation of Middle Eastern societies as passive, backward, and inferior justified and subsequently legitimized their colonization. This close connection between orientalist descriptions of the Middle East and different kinds of performance of power allegedly does not belong only to the past. According to Said, the situation of today bears a lot of resemblance to the time of British and French colonialism. He points to how U.S. military interventions, the Carter Doctrine, and the establishment of Rapid Deployment Forces often have been preceded by popular and academic discussions on the threat from "political Islam" and the like (Said, 1997: 28; see also Farmanfarrnaian, 1992; Sidaway, 1998; McAlister, 2001).

As a consequence of this very different approach to international relations in the Middle East, subscribers to a relational conception of culture, instead of asking what makes the Middle Eastern international relations conflict-ridden, will ask how representations of the Middle East as an unstable "Arc of Crises"-to phrase Zbigniew Brezezinski, President Carter's National Security Advisor-have made "the West" appear impressively peaceful, and made Western military engagement in this part of the world possible, necessary, and for the benefit of the people of the Middle East themselves.

Chinese threat mentality is racist and causes serial policy failure and war

Wei (Master’s at Dartmouth College) 12

(Li Juan, THE AMERICAN CHINA THREAT MENTALITY, Master’s Thesis in Liberal Studies, March 2012, pg. 77-79)

The American China threat mentality has become an effective tool that perpetuates American exceptionalist practice in respect to U.S. relations with China and their dichotomous view of the world. It also helps shape the future trajectory of China‑U.S. relations.

The American China threat mentality basically evolved from three major trends including racial nativism in the late nineteen century, McCarthyist extremism in the Cold War and the new American exceptionalism in the post‑Cold‑War era. This evolution started in the late nineteenth century when racial nativism was in full swing, cultivating the fear of the Chinese immigrants. The climax of this nativist movement was the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act. This fear and exclusion of the Chinese immediately morphed into the fear of Communism during the Cold War. McCarthyism definitely culminated in this paranoia of Communism or Chinese communism in particular. This extremist mindset and practice continued after the Cold War and was further reflected in the new American exceptionalism which supplied the American China threat mentality with the friend‑or‑foe binary opposition and the exceptionalist norm that promoted the American political model and legitimized its transgressions of and exemptions from the rule of law. Moreover, as suggested by Galtung's oscillation model, Americans' misunderstanding of the stark realities of Chinese politics and economy from 1949 to 1958 also enhanced Americans' misperceptions of China and further contributed to this China threat mentality.

Grounded on the friend‑or‑foe rationale and exceptionalist norm, the American China threat mentality not only was reflected in American public opinion of China as well as U.S.‑China policy, but also found its way into the discourse of American mainstream media and scholarly works. The scrutiny of the media discourse and scholarly publications concerning the four pivotal incidents in the history of China‑U.S. relations reveals that mass media reified the American China threat mentality by virtue of using those events as a way to revive Americans' Cold War memory, criticize the Chinese government and therefore accentuate the enemy image of the Chinese government and communism.

In a bigger picture, the American China threat mentality followed a zigzag pattern similar to Galtung's oscillation model. This pattern featured alternating periods of the waxing and waning of the China threat mentality, corresponding to the fluctuation of American public opinion on China. To be specific, the waxing of this China threat mentality was parallel to the 9‑year distribution period and the waning to the 9‑year growth period.

In a similar fashion, China‑U.S. relations showed a curvy pattern as well. From the confrontation and containment in the 1950s to the moderate improvements in the bilateral ties between the two in the 1960s, China‑U.S. relations fluctuated widely. From the nascent opening contacts and rapprochement in 1970s to the increasing military and economic cooperation in the 1980s, the fluctuation of China‑U.S. relations continued. From the strategic engagement in the 1990s to the widespread concerns over China's future economic trajectory and military prowess in the 2000s, China‑U.S. relations oscillated in the same manner. With a clear sight on the similar zigzag patterns of the American China threat mentality and China‑U.S. relations, one can predict that China‑U.S. relations will continue to fluctuate the conceivable future.

With growing interdependence and interweaving economies, America can no longer operate its relations with China by virtue of the American China threat mentality and the dichotomous view of the world. It will be in the interest of our nations to seek common ground while reserving our differences. Moreover, lack of historical perspective and a completely shallow understanding of the roots of Chinese culture in Confucianism, Buddhism and Taoism will only misguide America and create more problems than solve.

Additionally, the misperception of Americans in viewing all Communism as the same lacks the understanding that post‑Cultural Revolution communism in China was a system that while flawed in some ways, worked for the Chinese people. Americans did not dare to admit that the communism at that time in China was actually saving a country of over 500 million people'97 from foreign oppression, domestic tyranny, constant warfare and starvation. It was Americans' imperative in post World War II to contain all of communism in the world which led to American policy seeking to ring China with a circle of strategic holdings. Another reason for America perceiving communism in the world and Chinese communism in particular as a threat was that communism was frequently linked to notables such as Stalin, and this threat of communism was a self‑created and self‑fulfilling fallacy predicated on the paranoiac aspect of American politics, which will only perpetuate actual conflicts or even wars.

#### Aff’s view of terrorism is what makes it possible—designation of people as terrorists allows only the possibility of violence

Schmidt 08 (Dennis J. Schmidt Who Counts? On Democracy, Power, and the Incalculable Research in Phenomenology 38 (2008) 228–243)

In place of any possible sovereign power, today we find the final possible alternative to the present shape of power. What is left as such an alternative is the power of individuals who stand completely apart from sovereignty and the turnover of power. We call such individuals “terrorists”—those whose power is terrible, terrifying, and monstrous—simply because the form of the power they express is outside that which has no outside. What is left, what is expressed by such power, is the assertion of unreason and real powerlessness in the form of the individual.30 What is left is irrational, incalculable, inefficient, non- sense. Such is the only remaining outside of power, and so long as there are no alternatives, such explosive expressions of powerlessness will not cease. Efforts to step outside the static tyranny of the new form of power as it is figured by globalized technology will always have something of desperation about them, something of nihilism, since it is a form of power that will not turn itself over. When the locus of power is no longer able to be contested, when power has calcified and become total leaving no alternative political power, then simple violence, naked brutality, is all that remains as a means of contesting the established power. There has always been political brutality and unspeakable violence; our age did not invent terror and horror. But our age has witnessed an intensification of certain dimensions of violence, an intensification changing the landscape of every exercise of power and turning the attempt to contest power into violence of a new order: open, public spaces can now be dangerous, no one is considered innocent, children have become weapons as well as targets, strangers are threatening, the material shapes of everyday life— airplanes, envelopes, shoes—are turned back upon individuals as weapons. Sovereign nations are not attacked, individuals are attacked. In short, the old forms by which those in power were confronted and power was contested have taken a new form, namely the form of raw violence, and the reason for this is that the power in power is itself a fundamentally new form. Or, so Heidegger would argue.

#### Securitization and its Mediation Ensures Total War and Genocide – Their Representations of [advantage/impacts] Ensure Astonishing Violence.

Karsten **Friis**, UN Sector @ the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, **2k** [*Peace and Conflict Studies* 7.2, “From Liminars to Others: Securitization Through Myths,” http://shss.nova.edu/pcs/journalsPDF/V7N2.pdf#page=2]

The problem with societal securitization is one of **representation**. It is rarely clear in advance who it is that speaks for a community. There is no system of representation as in a state. Since literately anyone can stand up as representatives, there is room for entrepreneurs. It is not surprising if we experience a struggle between different representatives and also their different representations of the society. What they do share, however, is a conviction that they are best at providing (a new) order. If they can do this convincingly, they gain legitimacy. What must be done is to make the uncertain certain and make the unknown an object of knowledge. To present a discernable Other is a way of doing this. The Other is represented as an Other -- as an unified single actor with a similar unquestionable set of core values (i.e. the capital “O”). They are objectified, made into an object of knowledge, by re-presentation of their identity and values. In other words, the representation of the Other is depoliticized in the sense that its inner qualities are treated as given and non-negotiable. In Jef Huysmans (1998:241) words, there is both a need for a mediation of chaos as well as of threat. A mediation of chaos is more basic than a mediation of threat, as it implies making chaos into a meaningful order by a convincing representation of the Self and its surroundings. It is a mediation of “ontological security”, which means “...a strategy of managing the limits of reflexivity ... by fixing social relations into a symbolic and institutional order” (Huysmans 1998:242). As he and others (like Hansen 1998:240) have pointed out, the importance of a threat construction for political identification, is often overstated. The mediation of chaos, of being the provider of order in general, is just as important. This may imply naming an Other but not necessarily as a threat. Such a dichotomization implies a **necessity** to get rid of all the liminars (what Huysmans calls “strangers”). This is because they “...connote a challenge to categorizing practices through the impossibility of being categorized”, and does not threaten the community, “...but the possibility of ordering itself” (Huysmans 1998:241). They are a challenge to the entrepreneur by their very existence. They confuse the dichotomy of Self and Other and thereby the entrepreneur’s mediation of chaos. As mentioned, a liminar can for instance be people of mixed ethnical ancestry but also representations of competing world-pictures. As Eide (1998:76) notes: “Over and over again we see that the “liberals” within a group undergoing a mobilisation process for group conflict are the first ones to go”. The liminars threaten the ontological order of the entrepreneur by challenging his representation of Self and Other and his mediation of chaos, which ultimately undermines the legitimacy of his policy. The liminars may be securitized by some sort of disciplination, from suppression of cultural symbols to ethnic cleansing and expatriation. This is a threat to the ontological order of the entrepreneur, stemming from inside and thus repoliticizing the inside/outside dichotomy. Therefore the liminar must disappear. It must be made into a Self, as several minority groups throughout the world have experienced, or it must be forced out of the territory. A liminar may also become an Other, as its connection to the Self is cut and their former common culture is renounced and made insignificant. In Anne Norton’s (1988:55) words, “The presence of difference in the ambiguous other leads to its classification as wholly unlike and identifies it unqualifiedly with the archetypal other, denying the resemblance to the self.” Then the liminar is no longer an ontological danger (chaos), but what Huysmans (1998:242) calls a mediation of “daily security”. This is not challenging the order or the system as such but has become a visible, clear-cut Other. In places like Bosnia, this naming and replacement of an Other, has been regarded by the securitizing actors as the solution to the ontological problem they have posed. Securitization was not considered a political move, in the sense that there were any choices. It was a necessity: Securitization was a solution based on a depoliticized ontology.10 This way the world-picture of the securitizing actor is not only a representation but also made into reality. The mythical second-order language is made into first-order language, and its “innocent” reality is forced upon the world. To the entrepreneurs and other actors involved it has become a **“natural” necessity** with a need to make order, even if it implies making the world match the map. Maybe that is why war against liminars are so often total; it attempts a total expatriation or a total “solution” (like the Holocaust) and not only a victory on the battlefield. If the enemy is not even considered a legitimate Other, the door may be more open to a kind of violence that is way beyond any war conventions, any jus in bello. This way, securitizing is legitimized: The entrepreneur has succeeded both in launching his world-view and in prescribing the necessary measures taken against it. This is possible by using the myths, by speaking on behalf of the natural and eternal, where truth is never questioned.

#### **Our alternative is to demilitarize the public sphere, bottom up rejection of security politics allows us to move beyond an unsustainable system that leads to inevitable threat escalation**

Lal ’06

(Prerna P., Master of Arts in International Relations @ San Francisco State University, Senior Graduate Thesis, *Critical Security Studies*, “Deconstructing the National Security State: Towards a New Framework of Analysis,” http://prernalal.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/10/css-deconstructing-the-nat-sec-state.pdf)

Throughout this paper, we have seen cases of how national security is an antonym for human security. With this essential realization, Booth (2005, 33) gives three reasons for why the state should not be the referent object of security: “states are unreliable as primary referents because while some are in the business of security some are not; even those which are producers of security represent the means and not the ends; and states are too diverse in their character to serve as the basis for a comprehensive theory of security.” Additionally, the cases of South Africa and Afghanistan prove how the national security state is merely an elite tool, which causes human insecurity at home and abroad. The state treats security as a problem that comes from the outside, rather than as a problem that can arise from domestic issues. The end result of state-centric security is that humans are alienated from discussions about their own security and welfare. The most compelling reason is provided by Hayward Akler (2005, 191) in Critical Security Studies and World Politics, in which he states that “economic collapse, political oppression, scarcity, overpopulation, ethnic rivalry, the destruction of nature, terrorism, crime and disease provide more serious threats to the well-being of individuals and the interest of nations.” Thus, to millions of people, it is not the existence of the Other across the border that poses a security problem, but their own state that is a threat to security. The question that arises next is how to put critical theory into practice and deconstruct the national security state. Critical theory does not offer simple one-shot solutions to the problems created by the neo-realist state and elitist conception of security. To give simple answers would be a performative contradiction, especially after criticizing realism for being intellectually rigid for believing in objective truth. In other words, there are no alternatives; just alternative modes of understanding. However, using the poststructuralist Foucaultian analysis that discourse is power, we can move towards deconstructing the power of the state and elites to securitize using their own tool: discourse. The elites who control the meaning of security and define it in terms that are appropriate to their interests hold tremendous power in the national security state. As Foucault astutely observed, “the exercise of power is always deeply entwined with the production of knowledge and discourse” (Dalby 1998, 4). For too long, language has been used against us to create our reality, thereby obfuscating our lens of the world, depriving us from an objective search for truth and knowledge. The history of colonized people shows how the construction of language defined and justified their oppressed status. In a way, we are colonized through discursive practices and subjected to the reality that the state wants us to see. However, definitions belong to the definer, and it is high time that we questioned and defined our own reality. Thus, citizen action is critical to questioning and deconstructing the national security state and taking away its power to define our security. In On Security, Pearl Alice Marsh (1995, 126) advances the idea of a grassroots statecraft that is defined as “challenging foreign policy of government through contending discursive and speech acts.” This calls for pitting the values of civil society against the state establishment and challenging the American statecraft’s freedom to cast issues and events in a security or militarized framework. The United States has not always been a national security state and neither does it have to maintain that hegemonic and oppressive status in order to exist. It is critical to remember that fundamental changes in our institutions and structures of power do not occur from the top; they originate from the bottom. History is case in point. Citizen action was critical to ending the Red Scare and the Vietnam War, as the American people realized the ludicrousness of framing Vietnam as a security issue, which led to the fall of the Second New Deal, the deaths of thousands of American soldiers and a financial cost that we are still shouldering. In the end, what they need to be secured from and how, is a question best left up to individual Americans and subsequently, civil society. Thus, grassroots citizen action performatively makes individuals the referent subject of security as people would call for the demilitarization and desecuritization of issues that are contrary and irrelevant to human security. There is hope for the future and practical application of critical theory in international relations. As Robert Lipschutz (2000, 61) concludes in After Authority: War, Peace, and Global Politics in the 21st Century, “it was the existence of the Other across the border that gave national security its power and authority; it is the disappearance of the border that has vanquished that power.” Britain, France and Germany set aside their historical enmities and became part of a European community, which has formed a new collective identity and security across borders. Cold War rivals that almost annihilated the world are now friends in the “war against terror.” The apartheid regime in South Africa did collapse eventually. In the past two years, India and Pakistan have been moving towards a more peaceful future that also includes fighting the “war against terror” together. While nation-states that were previously hostile to each other have united to be hostile towards other states, it is not overly idealist to suggest that with each new friendship and alliance, there is one less foe and one less Other. The world is not stable and stagnant, existing in an anarchic, nasty and brutish framework in which states have to endlessly bargain for their self-interest, as realists would like us to believe. On the contrary, international relations and the boundaries constructed by the state are subject to change and ever-transitioning, which presents a compelling case for critical theory as a more realistic framework through which we can view international relations. Therefore, our ultimate search for security does not lie in securing the state from the threat of the enemy across the border, but in removing the state as the referent object of security and moving towards human emancipation. Human emancipation is often cited as the ultimate goal of the CSS project. Kenneth Booth (2005, 181) defines human emancipation as “the theory and practice of inventing humanity, with a view of freeing people, as individuals and collectivities, from contingent and structural oppressions...the concept of emancipation shapes strategies and tactics of resistance, offers a theory of progress for society, and gives a politics of hope for common humanity.” For Booth then, human emancipation is a concern with questioning and changing structures and institutions that oppress us and prevent us from reaching our true potential, a seemingly Marxist and poststructuralist concern. Emancipation and security become two sides of the same coin for Booth (2005, 191), as humans must be freed from their oppressive structures and overthrow physical and human constraints that prevent them from reaching their true potential. However, emancipation is not the end-all solution but a project that can never be fully realized. This may lead some to question the practicality of the concept. Here, I will draw an analogy from Karl Marx, whose idea of human emancipation was communism, a goal that we can see in the horizon, but the closer we get to it, the further away it seems. Yet, when we look back, we see how far we have come. Therefore, human emancipation serves practical purpose as an immanent critique, which can be utilized as a philosophical anchorage for tactical goal setting.

### **Drone Prolif**

#### Increased Turkish influence leads to several scenarios for Turkey-Russia war

Bhalla et. al. 9 Reva, Director of Analysis, Middle East and South Asia Analyst, Director of Latin American Operations, STRATFOR; bachelors of political science, UT Austin; masters in security studies, Georgetown; & Lauren Goodrich, Senior Eurasia Analyst, STRATFOR; Russian Peace Foundation; degree for UT Austin; & Peter Zeihan, Analyst, Vice President of Analysis, STRATFOR; US Embassy Australia; Office Coordinator, Center for Political and Strategic Studies; masters in political and economic development, Patterson School of Diplomacy; postgraduate in Asian Studies, University of Otago; bachelors in political science, Truman State; “Turkey and Russia on the Rise” *STRATFOR*, March 17, 2009 [http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20090317\_turkey\_ and\_russia\_rise](http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20090317_turkey_%20and_russia_rise)

There are four zones of overlapping interest for the Turks and Russians.

First, the end of the Soviet empire opened up a wealth of economic opportunities, but very few states have proven adept at penetrating the consumer markets of Ukraine and Russia. Somewhat surprisingly, Turkey is one of those few states. Thanks to the legacy of Soviet central planning, Russian and Ukrainian industry have found it difficult to retool away from heavy industry to produce the consumer goods much in demand in their markets. Because most Ukrainians and Russians cannot afford Western goods, Turkey has carved out a robust and lasting niche with its lower-cost exports; it is now the largest supplier of imports to the Russian market. While this is no exercise in hard power, this Turkish penetration nevertheless is cause for much concern among Russian authorities.

So far, Turkey has been scrupulous about not politicizing these useful trade links beyond some intelligence-gathering efforts (particularly in Ukraine). Considering [Russia’s current financial problems](http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20090302_financial_crisis_and_six_pillars_russian_strength), having a stable source of consumer goods — especially one that is not China — is actually seen as a positive. At least for now, the Russian government would rather see its trade relationship with Turkey stay strong. There will certainly be a clash later — either as Russia weakens or as Turkey becomes more ambitious — but for now, the Russians are content with the trade relationship.

Second, the Russian retreat in the post-Cold War era has opened up the Balkans to Turkish influence. Romania, Bulgaria and the lands of the former Yugoslavia are all former Ottoman possessions, and in their day they formed the most advanced portion of the Ottoman economy. During the Cold War, they were all part of the Communist world, with Romania and Bulgaria formally incorporated into the Soviet bloc. While most of these lands are now absorbed into the European Union, Russia’s ties to its fellow Slavs — most notably the Serbs and Bulgarians — have allowed it a degree of influence that most Europeans choose to ignore. Additionally, Russia has long held a friendly relationship with Greece and Cyprus, both to complicate American policy in Europe and to provide a flank against Turkey. Still, thanks to proximity and trading links, Turkey clearly holds the upper hand in this theater of competition.

But this particular region is unlikely to generate much Turkish-Russian animosity, simply because both countries are in the process of giving up.

Most of the Balkan states are already members of an organization that is unlikely to ever admit Russia or Turkey: the European Union. Russia simply cannot meet the membership criteria, and Cyprus’ membership in essence strikes the possibility of Turkish inclusion. (Any EU member can veto the admission of would-be members.) The EU-led splitting of Kosovo from Serbia over Russian objections was a body blow to Russian power in the region, and the subsequent EU running of Kosovo as a protectorate greatly limited Turkish influence as well. Continuing EU expansion means that Turkish influence in the Balkans will shrivel just as Russian influence already has. Trouble this way lies, but not between Turkey and Russia. If anything, their joint exclusion might provide some room for the two to agree on something.

The third area for Russian-Turkish competition is in energy, and this is where things get particularly sticky. Russia is Turkey’s No. 1 trading partner, with energy accounting for the bulk of the trade volume between the two countries. Turkey depends on Russia for 65 percent of its natural gas and 40 percent of its oil imports. Though Turkey has steadily grown its trade relationship with Russia, it does not exactly approve of Moscow’s penchant for using its energy relations with Europe as a political weapon. Russia has never gone so far as to cut supplies to Turkey directly, but Turkey has been indirectly affected more than once when Russia decided to cut supplies to Ukraine because Moscow felt the need to reassert its writ in Kiev.

Sharing the Turks’ energy anxiety, the Europeans have been more than eager to use Turkey as an energy transit hub for routes that would bypass the Russians altogether in supplying the European market. The [Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline](http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/turkey_implications_blast_btc_pipeline) is one such route, and others, like Nabucco, are still stuck in the planning stages. The Russians have every reason to pressure the Turks into staying far away from any more energy diversification schemes that could cost Russia one of its biggest energy clients — and deny Moscow much of the political leverage it currently holds over the Europeans who are dependent on the Russian energy network.

There are only two options for the Turks in diversifying away from the Russians. The first lies to [Turkey’s south in Iraq](http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/iraq_turkey_igniting_kurdish_rivalry) and [Iran](http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/turkey_iran_ankaras_priorities_shift). Turkey has big plans for Iraq’s oil industry, but it will still take considerable time to upgrade and restore the oil fields and pipelines that have been persistently sabotaged and ransacked by insurgents during the fighting that followed the 2003 U.S. invasion. The Iranians offer another large source of energy for the Turks to tap into, but the political complications attached to dealing with Iran are still too prickly for the Turks to move ahead with concrete energy deals at this time. Complications remain for now, but Turkey will be keeping an eye on its Middle Eastern neighbors for robust energy partnerships in the future.

The second potential [source of energy for the Turks lies in Central Asia](http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/turkey_caucasian_challenge), a region that Russia must keep in its grip at all costs if it hopes to survive in the long run. In many ways this theater is the reverse of the Balkans, where the Russians hold the ethnic links and the Turks the economic advantage. Here, four of the five Central Asian countries — Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan — are Turkic. But as a consequence of the Soviet years, the infrastructure and economies of all four are so hardwired into the Russian sphere of influence that it would take some major surgery to liberate them. But the prize is a rich one: [Central Asia possesses the world’s largest concentration of untapped energy reserves](http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/turkey_eyeing_central_asian_energy_ties). And as the term “central” implies, whoever controls the region can project power into the former Soviet Union, China and South Asia. If the Russians and

Turks are going to fight over something, this is it.

Here Turkey faces a problem, however — it does not directly abut the region. If the Turks are even going to attempt to shift the Central Asian balance of power, they will need a lever. This brings us to the final — and most dynamic — realm of competition: the Caucasus.

Turkey here faces the best and worst in terms of influence projection. The Azerbaijanis do not consider themselves simply Turkic, like the Central Asians, but actually Turkish. If there is a country in the former Soviet Union that would consider not only allying with but actually joining with another state to escape Russia’s orbit, it would be Azerbaijan with Turkey. <CONTINUED>

[Azerbaijan has its own significant energy supplies](http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/azerbaijan_stark_new_energy_landscape), but its real value is in serving as a willing springboard for Turkish influence into Central Asia.

However, the core of Azerbaijan does not border Turkey. Instead, it is on the other side of Armenia, a country that thrashed Azerbaijan in a war over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh enclave and still has deep historical bitterness against the Turks over claims of genocide. Armenia has sold itself to the Russians to keep its Turkish foes at bay.

This means Turkish designs on Central Asia all boil down to the former Soviet state of Georgia. If Turkey can bring Georgia fully under its wing, Turkey can then set about to integrate with Azerbaijan and project influence into Central Asia. But without Georgia, Turkey is hamstrung before it can even begin to reach for the real prize in Central Asia.

#### Turkey-Russia conflict evolves into great power conflict

Cecire 12-17 Michael Hikari, analyst; Peace Corps Volunteer; Managing Editor, Evolutsia.net; writer for Caspian Business Journal, London Telegraph, World Politics Review, and TCS Daily “A Turkey V. Russia Showdown” *Eurasia Review*, December 17, 2010 <http://www.eurasiareview.com/analysis/a-turkey-v-russia-showdown-17122010/>

Turkey, a NATO member state and a budding contender for a leadership role in central Eurasia, maintains a large and extremely well-equipped military that is built along NATO standards. Though not a nuclear power, its conventional forces are quite well-trained and might be more than a match for Russia’s famously insubordinate, creaky Caucasus formations that disproportionately rely on militias and conscript-heavy forces. Turkey can also amass more troops more quickly than their Russian counterparts, who patrol vastly longer borders with a concomitant increase in the number of potential security flashpoints that require dedicated garrisons.

It goes without saying that the conventional narrative of the August 2008 war between Russia and Georgia — and indeed the general geopolitical climate in the region — is sufficiently volatile enough without the added variable of a Turkish military confrontation with invading Russian formations. For many reasons, armed conflict between Turkey and Russia would be a major blow to regional and Eurasian security and could set off a much larger, transcontinental war involving NATO and other major powers.

#### Turkish influence causes rights abuses against Armenians

Sassounian 10 Harout, “Growing Turkish Influence in Middle East Leads to Restrictions in Armenian Rights” *Asbarez*, June 18, 2010 <http://asbarez.com/82267/growing-turkish-influence-in-middle-east-leads-to-restrictions-in-armenian-rights/>

Turkey’s growing influence in the Middle East, even before the naval confrontation with Israel over Gaza, had prompted some Arab countries to restrict the political rights of local Armenian communities.

It is feared that the latest Gaza conflict, which catapulted Prime Minister Erdogan to a heroic stature throughout the Islamic world, would result in further limitations on Armenian activities deemed to be “anti-Turkish.”

In recent months, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria have taken specific actions to place some restrictions on the activities of their Armenian citizens either out of concern for a backlash from Turkey or under direct pressure from Turkish authorities.

A case in point was the Jordanian government’s cancellation of AGBU’s Middle East Young Professionals Forum that was to take place in Amman, June 3-6. Talin Suciyan, reported in The Armenian Weekly that Jordanian authorities had expressed reservations for the gathering of 150 young Armenians from various parts of the world. Suciyan, who was invited to speak on the “Legacy of Hrant Dink” and the Armenian community in Turkey, stated that the organizers were informed the night before that the forum was canceled by orders “from above.” Some observers attributed the cancellation of the AGBU forum to the agreement to set up a Free Trade Zone, which was to be signed between Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Turkey, on June 10. A commentator pointed out the irony of Armenian conferences being allowed to take place in Turkey, but not in Jordan!

Earlier this year, when a Lebanese TV crew was about to enter Syria to record footage on “the Armenian killing fields” in Der Zor, border guards refused to admit them, even though they had secured the necessary filming permits from the Syrian authorities in advance. This incident took place shortly after CBS aired in its “60 Minutes” program a segment on the Armenian Genocide. The program depicted the protruding bones of Armenian Genocide victims from the desert sands of Der Zor. Turkish officials lodged a complaint with the Syrian government for allowing CBS to film an “anti-Turkish” program in their country.

The third incident, unexpectedly, took place in Lebanon, home to one of the most influential Armenian communities in the Diaspora. In a surprise move, government officials banned the airing of Eileen Khatchadourian’s music video, “Zartir Vortyag,” a genocide era song calling for resistance against oppression. Even though the song makes no reference to Turkey, Lebanese authorities were concerned that it would negatively affect Lebanese-Turkish relations.

These are troubling examples of blatant interference with Armenian citizens’ right to free expression. In all three countries, Armenians have long enjoyed the most cordial relations with their respective governments and are viewed by them as loyal citizens. Local Armenian community leaders must strongly protest such arbitrary violations of their basic rights as citizens of these countries. They should consider carrying out a campaign to educate their fellow citizens about the extensive damage Turkey has caused to Arab interests for decades, as a close military ally of Israel.

#### Failure to resolve the Armenian issue causes Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, escalates to great power war

Geisweller 9 Barnabe F., Columbia U “War in the Caucasus” World Press December 4, 2009 http://www.world press.org/Europe/3459.cfm

War was once again on the horizon in November as Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev threatened to use force if new efforts to resolve the decades-old conflict failed. Only this time, Turkey, an ally of Azerbaijan, has signed two protocols with Armenia to establish diplomatic relations and promising to reopen their border, which Turkey sealed during the war in 1993. Improved Turkish-Armenian relations would do much to defuse a powder keg that would have worldwide ramifications were it to go off, as war between Turkish-backed Azerbaijan and Russian-backed Armenia could rapidly escalate. At the very least, war in a key oil and gas transit region would not bode well for the West. Nagorno-Karabakh has been under the control of Armenian forces since the 1994 ceasefire that brought the war to an end. The territory was created as an autonomous oblast within Azerbaijan against the will of the enclave's majority ethnic Armenians by the Soviet Union in 1923. Tensions between ethnic Armenians and Azerbaijanis came to a head as the Soviet Union began to disintegrate in the late 1980s. Nagorno-Karabakh's parliament voted to secede to Armenia. Later, in a 1991 referendum boycotted by the region's Azerbaijanis, ethnic Armenians voted for the creation of <CONTINUED>

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an independent state. This resulted in a declaration of independence to this day unrecognized by any other country. Full-scale war between the newly declared republic and Azerbaijan ensued. Armenia backed Nagorno-Karabakh and soon became directly involved. By the end of the war, Armenian forces were in control of 16 percent of Azerbaijan, including Nagorno-Karabakh. The new deal between Armenia and Azerbaijan would see Armenian forces return most of the Azeri districts around the ethnic Armenian enclave. Turkey took Azerbaijan's side during the war, joining in on the Azerbaijani blockade of Armenia. Tensions between Turkey and Armenia have run high ever since World War I, and Turkey's refusal to formerly recognize the massacre of over a million Armenians in 1915. The butchery was the first modern genocide, called an "administrative holocaust" by Sir Winston Churchill. But Turkey disputes that the killings amounted to what we now call genocide—defined by the U.N. as a state-sponsored attempt to destroy a group, in whole or in part. Azerbaijan fears a deal between Armenia and Turkey would make it lose leverage over the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. For Turkey, a deal with Armenia would do much to elevate its status as a mediator in the Caucasus, and would presumably help its desperate bid to enter the European Union—something French President Nicholas Sarkozy vehemently opposes. The crippled economy of landlocked Armenia would benefit greatly if Turkey and Azerbaijan were to open their borders. If no resolution is found, it is theoretically possible the violence previously limited to the mountainous enclave could draw in Turkey and Russia. In a worst-case scenario, the embroilment of these two regional powers would bring alliances into play with potentially disastrous consequences—as happened after the single bullet of a Serb nationalist pierced the jugular of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in 1914. Turkey has close relations with the United States and is a member of NATO. Russia and Armenia are members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, along with Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. At the very least, war in the South Caucasus would be yet another destabilizing force in Eastern Europe and Southwest Asia, and a further source of concern for the West's economies. Aliyev, the Azerbaijani president, surely knows starting a war would be bad business for his oil-exporting country, and it would pit him against most of the world powers. It is likely his hawkishness will be limited to rhetoric, though there can be no doubt that his anger at the prospect of a Turkish-Armenian rapprochement is very real. Kosovo's declaration of independence from Serbia may have emboldened Nagorno-Karabakh's ethnic Armenians. But Aliyev's bellicose statements are backed by a domestic arms industry and a military budget far larger than Armenia's. In March 2008, clashes on the border left 16 people dead. Both sides accused each other of triggering the exchange of gunfire. Though it appears the two countries are moving towards peace, the incident shows how easily war could return to the Caucasus.

#### And stopping the Armenian genocide is d-rule

PanArmenian 8 “Adam Schiff: Genocide recognition is our moral imperative” PanArmenian April 25, 2008 <http://www.panarmenian.net/eng/world/news/25797/>

"I'm Congressman Adam Schiff and I'm very proud to represent one of the largest Armenian communities in the country. Ninety-three years ago, a million and a half people lost their lives for the simple reason that they were Armenian. It began with a round-up of intellectuals. It continued with forced marches in the desert; women and children, parents and grandparents, aunts and uncles perished. Whole families were lost. Almost an entire people were lost.  "Ninety-three years later we still fight in the greatest democracy on earth to recognize the plain facts of what took place. We have witnesses; some of them are here today. There are fewer and fewer witnesses left, though, and while there are witnesses among us we have the strongest moral imperative to recognize what they went through and hat their families went through.  "We have the strongest moral imperative to call that loss exactly what it was - without equivocation, without mitigation - a genocide. And we will fight until we succeed. We have a moral imperative and we have a very practical imperative as well. And the practical imperative is this, although this genocide took place ninety-three years ago, there is also a genocide taking place today half-way around the world.  "And we cannot have the moral authority we need to stand up and ask the world to take action against that genocide if we don't have the courage and the moral rectitude to recognize this genocide and indeed every genocide.  "So this must change, this will change, the fight will go on, we will prevail. I ask your help and God's help that we prevail in time for the survivors to see justice done in their name."

#### Turkish influence kills EU Balkan influence and Balkan accession

Alic 10 Anes, executive director, ISA Intel; senior analyst, ISN Security Watch; contributor, Oxford Analytica “Turkey’s Growing Influence in the Balkans” *Oil Price* June 9, 2010 http://oilprice.com/Geo-Politics/Europe/Turkeys-Growing-Influence-in-the-Balkans.html

Turkey’s desire to position itself as the regional leader and a conciliatory force is not likely to prove popular with EU member states. The European Union has regarded the Balkans as its territory for the past 15 years, even though its engagement was pursued without either great enthusiasm or a clear strategy. Since the EU decided five years ago to hand over major decision-making powers to Bosnian politicians (a strategy that failed miserably), the reform process has remained stalled. Finally, in October last year, the EU and United States stepped up the pressure, holding several rounds of talks with Bosnian leaders in an attempt to expedite the reforms necessary for the country’s EU membership bid. However, after the first such meeting in October last year it was clear that no progress would be achieved. Even some international officials, including French and British diplomats, are not expecting any major breakthrough, and have again given up trying to persuade Bosnian leaders to engage in further talks. Bosnian officials for their part have indicated that reform is not on the agenda in 2010, as elections are looming in October. The EU has nonetheless scheduled another Balkans summit to take place in Sarajevo in June, hoping to “reinforce the European perspective of the region.” Spain, currently occupying the bloc’s rotating presidency, is planning to invite “relevant partners,” such as the United States, Russia, and Turkey, to attend the meeting. Earlier this year, Serbia, backed by Russia, boycotted a similar meeting in Slovenia because Kosovar leaders had been invited. Following that fiasco, the EU took steps to induce Serbia to cooperate, announcing it would lift restrictions on Serbia’s Stabilization and Association Agreement, a key step before its final EU membership application. It is expected that in June the EU will issue a recommendation on the implementation of a visa-free travel regime for Albania and Bosnia, though technically the two countries met the necessary requirements last October. Meanwhile, EU foreign ministers expressed support late last year for Albania’s request for official EU candidate status. Pull From The East Some international community officials with experience in the western Balkans are proposing a new EU approach to the region. The most promising one, advocated by officials like British diplomat and former high representative to Bosnia Paddy Ashdown, is the creation of an EU special representative office for the entire region, rather than separate offices in each country. This represents a rethink that considers the region as a whole rather than individual countries. Another concern of Western countries is that Turkey’s increasing influence could pull Muslim-majority countries Bosnia and Albania eastward. Still, this concern is overblown, as both are very keen to join the EU. That said, those fears are paralleled by Russia’s growing political and financial influence in the region, primarily in Serbia and Bosnia’s Serb-dominated entity of Republika Srpska. Russia backs Serbia’s position regarding Kosovo. Russian officials say that any support for Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence is immoral and illegal. Russian and Serbian leaders agreed last October to form a joint emergency response center in the Serbian city of Nis. In addition, there have been unconfirmed media reports in recent months that Russia is planning to set up a military base in southern Serbia, bordering Kosovo. Russia has also made inroads into Bosnia, setting itself up as the guarantor and protector of the Republika Srpska in international institutions. In 2008, the Russian state-owned gas company Gazprom took over the Serbian oil industry, while in Bosnia, its presence if felt through the ownership of the Bosnian Serb petroleum and oil industry. On his first official visit to Serbia in October last year, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev announced Moscow’s approval of Serbia’s request for a $6 billion loan. Medvedev was accompanied by a 100-strong delegation, the majority of them businesspeople.  Since Montenegro’s independence from Serbia in 2006, Russian investors have privatized and taken over most state-owned and private companies, and now control most of the tourism sector, the country’s main revenue base. Under Russia’s influence, even though the authorities in Belgrade have declared themselves pro-EU, Montenegro is still debating whether it should join NATO, with only 20 percent of its Serbian population supporting the idea. Turkey’s diplomatic and financial deployment in the Balkans has provoked a prompt response from the EU, which hopes to remain the main authority in the region. And Brussels indeed has a lot of catching up to do, largely because over the past four years it has lost much of its credibility. The United States will also be forced to boost its presence to counter Russia’s Balkan surge. Both the United States and the EU will find that there is a price to pay for having lost interest in the region after 2001.

#### EU influence key to Balkan stability—brink is now

Schilly 9 Otto, former Federal Minister of the Interior, Germany;  "If the EU reneges on Balkan enlargement it's at its own peril" *Europe's World* Autumn, 2009  [http://www.europesworld.org/NewEnglish/Home\_old/Article/ tabid/191/ArticleType/ArticleView/ArticleID/21490/IftheEUrenegesonBalkanenlargementitsatitsownperil.aspx](http://www.europesworld.org/NewEnglish/Home_old/Article/%20tabid/191/ArticleType/ArticleView/ArticleID/21490/IftheEUrenegesonBalkanenlargementitsatitsownperil.aspx)

Without strong and credible EU hopes, the western Balkans could relapse back into being a genuine threat to security and peace in Europe. The dwindling likelihood of EU membership will also mean the weakening of Brussels’ soft power and of the EU’s influence on the reform process in the region. Along with that there will be an increasing danger of destabilisation and disintegration of the Balkan’s region’s fragile, multi-ethnic countries. Nationalist movements there are already gaining influence, and an erosion of democratic politics is a real threat in democracies that have never been very strong. The western Balkans has also been affected particularly by the global financial crisis and its economic shock waves. The worst-case scenario throughout <CONTINUED>

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the western Balkans is that once the combination of inadequate economic growth and weak state institutions is compounded by the dashing of EU membership ambitions, the region could again become a dangerous trouble spot.  But it’s not too late to avert this dire scenario. The EU membership perspective continues to be a crucially important incentive for stabilisation, democratisation and modernisation to continue in the western Balkans, and should be given high priority, and supported in a sustainable way. Far from being allowed to slow down, progress of the Balkan countries towards EU membership should be accelerated and given fresh impetus.

Extinction

Chicago Daily 99 [May 9, “Dogs of War,” Lexis]

We need to stop the war and return to the negotiating table to end the suffering in Kosovo before the "dogs of war" are unleashed and there is no controlling the catastrophic - we're near that point. Most of us realize that in war the unexpected is often the rule, often resulting in chaos. There must be an end to military operations and the ethnic cleansing against Kosovo civilians. Something has gone wrong; the very people we were supposed to be saving are suffering thousands of dead and millions homeless. Dialogue must be aimed at reaching a peaceful settlement that respects the wishes of the inhabitants of Kosovo, while respecting history, international law and minority rights. It seems to me the Clinton administration embarked on a military adventure that has not been thought through. The administration has been dealing with Milosevic for six years. We hear the grim rationale for sending in ground troops "to salvage the credibility of the NATO Alliance." I don't want any American servicemen/women to die for the idea that once you have embarked on a disastrous course of action, you can only continue on ... that's nonsense. On a recent news program the Italian and German foreign ministers stated troop deployment is not acceptable as part of their national defense - the French representative waffled. Both France and Germany have large Muslim populations. The German official said the NATO Alliance weapons, planes, missiles are primarily American with minimum involvement of NATO allies. Let's not forget that Russia has warned NATO countries that this action could culminate in a third world war. The war in the Balkans could easily become the flash point of world conflict resulting in nuclear war and incalculable self-destruction.

#### 3. ‘Drone wars’ won’t escalate – limited strategic options prevent overuse

Time 12

“Betting Against a Drone Arms Race”, Joseph Singh is a researcher at the Center for a New American Security, 8/13/12, http://nation.time.com/2012/08/13/betting-against-a-drone-arms-race/ //jchen

This recent bout also illustrated a salient point regarding drone technology: most states maintain at least minimal air defenses that can quickly detect and take down drones, as the U.S. discovered when it employed drones at the onset of the Iraq invasion, while Saddam Hussein’s surface-to-air missiles were still active.

What the U.S. also learned, however, was that drones constitute an effective military tool in an extremely narrow strategic context. They are well-suited either in direct support of a broader military campaign, or to conduct targeted killing operations against a technologically unsophisticated enemy.

In a nutshell, then, the very contexts in which we have seen drones deployed. Northern Pakistan, along with a few other regions in the world, remain conducive to drone usage given a lack of air defenses, poor media coverage, and difficulties in accessing the region.

#### 4. Deterrence still applies to drone use

Time 12

“Betting Against a Drone Arms Race”, Joseph Singh is a researcher at the Center for a New American Security, 8/13/12, http://nation.time.com/2012/08/13/betting-against-a-drone-arms-race/ //jchen

Instead, we must return to what we know about state behavior in an anarchistic international order. Nations will confront the same principles of deterrence, for example, when deciding to launch a targeted killing operation regardless of whether they conduct it through a drone or a covert amphibious assault team.

Drones may make waging war more domestically palatable, but they don’t change the very serious risks of retaliation for an attacking state. Any state otherwise deterred from using force abroad will not significantly increase its power projection on account of acquiring drones.

What’s more, the very states whose use of drones could threaten U.S. security – countries like China – are not democratic, which means that the possible political ramifications of the low risk of casualties resulting from drone use are irrelevant. For all their military benefits, putting drones into play requires an ability to meet the political and security risks associated with their use.

Despite these realities, there remain a host of defensible arguments one could employ to discredit the Obama drone strategy. The legal justification for targeted killings in areas not internationally recognized as war zones is uncertain at best.

Further, the short-term gains yielded by targeted killing operations in Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen, while debilitating to Al Qaeda leadership in the short-term, may serve to destroy already tenacious bilateral relations in the region and radicalize local populations.

Yet, the past decade’s experience with drones bears no evidence of impending instability in the global strategic landscape. Conflict may not be any less likely in the era of drones, but the nature of 21st Century warfare remains fundamentally unaltered despite their arrival in large numbers.

#### Turkish doesn’t solve middle east war

Metallidis 11 Effie-Michelle, reporter, The National; Harvard U; “Turkey’s diplomatic ambitions dwarf its real achievements” *The National* February 13, 2011 [http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalcon versation/comment/turkeys-diplomatic-ambitions-dwarf-its-real-achievements](http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalcon%20versation/comment/turkeys-diplomatic-ambitions-dwarf-its-real-achievements)

The Justice and Development Party's (AKP) list of foreign policy goals is long. Turkish officials attempted to mediate Lebanon's political crisis after Saudi Arabia gave up last month; they brokered a nuclear fuel-swap deal with Iran last year when talks with the West broke down; they were close to facilitating a detente between Syria and Israel in 2008; they've offered to mediate between Hamas and Fatah - a role traditionally played by Egypt; and last year they even floated the idea of opening an office for the Taliban in Turkey to move talks along in Afghanistan. While all of these initiatives have raised Ankara's regional standing, none of them has ended in a policy success. Overconfidence as much as regional stability motivates these projects; Turkey's foreign ministry seems unable to cope with such an ambitious agenda. "Although there is much to suggest that Turkey's influence in the world will in fact grow, Ankara's confidence appears dangerously close to becoming hubris," wrote Professor Svante Cornell, of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute at Johns Hopkins University, in a recent article for the Washington Institute. The interest in Egypt, however, seems to have both a domestic and international slant. With parliamentary elections slated for July, a show of strength has bolstered the AKP's popularity with its middle-class constituency and answered domestic criticism that Ankara had not reacted strongly enough. The foreign minister Ahmet Davutoglu seems to have included Egypt in his "zero-problem policy". Unstable neighbours make bad neighbours, a maxim that has steered Turkey foreign relations for the past nine years. Thus Turkey's muscular policy on Egypt, a country that it does not have particularly close ties with (although Mr Davutoglu stressed that Egypt was a "very dear friend in the Middle East" shortly after Mr Mubarak resigned). But while Turkey's newfound role in the region is popular among the public, its involvement has angered others. "Only Egyptians can decide what is good for them, how and when they can do it," Abderahman Salaheldin, Egypt's ambassador to Turkey, told the Turkish paper Zaman before Mr Mubarak's resignation. His comments come after reported diplomatic exchanges from Cairo sent a clear message to Ankara to back off. These sentiments echo the contradictory dynamic that Turkey may face as it presses an ambitious policy of engagement throughout the Middle East. While people across the region may generally welcome Turkey's influence, governments are much more likely to push back. And yet, supporting Egypt was a smart move - the only move, really, that Turkey could take as a country eager to flaunt its democratic credentials. If Egypt emerges as a more democratic nation, Turkey will be seen as having been one of the few countries in the region pressing for change - a boost to its reputation at home, in the West and in public perception.

#### Turkish model doesn’t help Middle East peace

Kalin 11 Ibrahim, columnist, Today’s Zaman; winner, Turkish Writer’s Association, Best Writer; “Is Turkey a Model for the Arab World?” *Today’s Zaman* February 11, 2011 <http://www.todayszaman.com/columnist-235227-is-turkey-a-model-for-the-arab-world.html>

Secondly, conceiving a model for Arab countries is a way of forcing change upon them and would not be very different from President Bush’s failed “democracy and freedom agenda.” What needs to be done in most Arab countries is clear: better governance, ending corruption, establishing institutions of democracy, free and fair elections and better economic policies. These are clear-cut goals and have become universal policies. Arab countries do not need Turkey or another country to implement these policies in their own countries.

#### No Turkish intervention into Syria—recent changes on the situation such as Russia/Syria/US deal prevent escalation.

#### No mid east escalation.

Maloney, Brookings, 7 [Suzanne, Senior Fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, International Herald Tribune Why the Iraq War Won't Engulf the Mideast Iraq, Middle East, Islamic World, Civil War Ray Takeyh, Fellow Steven A. Cook, Fellow June 28, 2007 http://www.brookings.edu/views/op-ed/maloney20070629.htm]

Yet, the Saudis, Iranians, Jordanians, Syrians, and others are very unlikely to go to war either to protect their own sect or ethnic group or to prevent one country from gaining the upper hand in Iraq. The reasons are fairly straightforward. First, Middle Eastern leaders, like politicians everywhere, are primarily interested in one thing: self-preservation. Committing forces to Iraq is an inherently risky proposition, which, if the conflict went badly, could threaten domestic political stability. Moreover, most Arab armies are geared toward regime protection rather than projecting power and thus have little capability for sending troops to Iraq. Second, there is cause for concern about the so-called blowback scenario in which jihadis returning from Iraq destabilize their home countries, plunging the region into conflict. Middle Eastern leaders are preparing for this possibility. Unlike in the 1990s, when Arab fighters in the Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union returned to Algeria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia and became a source of instability, Arab security services are being vigilant about who is coming in and going from their countries. In the last month, the Saudi government has arrested approximately 200 people suspected of ties with militants. Riyadh is also building a 700 kilometer wall along part of its frontier with Iraq in order to keep militants out of the kingdom. Finally, there is no precedent for Arab leaders to commit forces to conflicts in which they are not directly involved. The Iraqis and the Saudis did send small contingents to fight the Israelis in 1948 and 1967, but they were either ineffective or never made it. In the 1970s and 1980s, Arab countries other than Syria, which had a compelling interest in establishing its hegemony over Lebanon, never committed forces either to protect the Lebanese from the Israelis or from other Lebanese. The civil war in Lebanon was regarded as someone else's fight. Indeed, this is the way many leaders view the current situation in Iraq. To Cairo, Amman and Riyadh, the situation in Iraq is worrisome, but in the end it is an Iraqi and American fight. As far as Iranian mullahs are concerned, they have long preferred to press their interests through proxies as opposed to direct engagement. At a time when Tehran has access and influence over powerful Shiite militias, a massive cross-border incursion is both unlikely and unnecessary. So Iraqis will remain locked in a sectarian and ethnic struggle that outside powers may abet, but will remain within the borders of Iraq. The Middle East is a region both prone and accustomed to civil wars. But given its experifence with ambiguous conflicts, the region has also developed an intuitive ability to contain its civil strife and prevent local conflicts from enveloping the entire Middle East.

#### No escalation to SCS war – economic risks are too high

Creehan 12 [Sean Creehan is the Senior Editor of the SAIS Review of International Affairs. He will graduate from Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) in May 2012 with a concentration in Southeast Asian Studies and International Economics. He is a 2004 graduate of Harvard College and proficient in Mandarin Chinese and Indonesian. SAIS Review > Volume 32, Number 1, Winter-Spring 2012, Assessing the Risks of Conflict in the South China Sea]

Regarding Secretary Clinton’s first requirement, the risk of actual closure of the South China Sea remains remote, as instability in the region would affect the entire global economy, raising the price of various goods and commodities. According to some estimates, for example, as much as 50 percent of global oil tanker shipments pass through the South China Sea—that represents more than three times the tanker traffic through the Suez Canal and over five times the tanker traffic through the Panama Canal.4 It is in no country’s interest to see instability there, least of all China’s, given the central economic importance of Chinese exports originating from the country’s major southern ports and energy imports coming through the South China Sea (annual U.S. trade passing through the Sea amounts to $1.2 trillion).5 Invoking the language of nuclear deterrence theory, disruption in these sea lanes implies mutually assured economic destruction, and that possibility should moderate the behavior of all participants. Furthermore, with the United States continuing to operate from a position of naval strength (or at least managing a broader alliance that collectively balances China’s naval presence in the future), the sea lanes will remain open. While small military disputes within such a balance of power are, of course, possible, the economic risks of extended conflict are so great that significant changes to the status quo are unlikely.

### **Terror**

#### Alt Causes –

#### A. Strikes still seen as sovereignty violation

Foreign Affairs 12

Omar Bashir, Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Politics at Princeton University and a graduate of the Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics at MIT, “Who Watches the Drones? The Case for Independent Oversight ”, 9/24/12, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138141/omar-s-bashir/who-watches-the-drones //jchen

Aside from enabling accountability at home, the oversight system could also help with foreign publics and governments. The United States has taken expensive steps in order to avoid perceptions of recklessness abroad: for instance, Georgetown professor David Koplow argues that the Pentagon's recent investments in less-destructive weaponry reflect, in part, a growing emphasis on global perceptions. Washington should thus worry that more than half of respondents in 17 of 20 countries disapprove of U.S. drone strikes, according to a Pew Global survey. An independent oversight program is not going to change minds in Lahore or Karachi, where opposition to drones seems to be driven more by the perceived violation of sovereignty than by indiscriminate killing (there are indications that opposition to drones is actually lower in regions where drone strikes are clustered). Still, because the drone is a salient symbol of American recklessness, oversight might reduce public opposition to U.S. policy in Europe and elsewhere. That would make it easier for foreign leaders to overcome domestic opposition to security cooperation with the United States.

#### B. US support for undemocratic regimes in the Middle East

Lynch 13

Marc Lynch, Associate Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of, Institute for Middle East Studies, George Washington University, Foreign Affairs, “In the Middle East, Haters Gonna Hate ”, May/Jun2013, Vol. 92 Issue 3, p145-152, Amaney Jamal is Associate Professor of Politics at Princeton University,

It is now clear that even major changes, such as Bush's departure, Obama's support for some of the Arab revolts of 2011, the death of Osama bin Laden, and the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, have had surprisingly little effect on Arab attitudes toward the United States. Anti-Americanism might have ebbed momentarily, but it is once again flowing freely. Meanwhile, Islamism is on the rise, and jihadist subcultures are flourishing. And the liberal and secular factions that might have seemed like natural American allies are now voicing some of the loudest complaints: they are angry at the United States when its military intervenes in the region (in Libya) and when it does not (in Syria), and they are outraged when Washington supports democratic elections (in Egypt, where Islamists won) and when it does not (in Bahrain, for example).

The persistence of anti-Americanism in the Arab world is a major theme in Amaney Jamal's Of Empires and Citizens, a provocative work that challenges the terms of a very stale debate among three main camps: those who see Arab anti-Americanism as the product of a deep, unique civilizational hatred; those who see anti-Americanism as simple and predictable resentment of the world's sole superpower, common across the globe and not unique to Arab countries; and those who see it as a rational response to U.S. policies that Arabs believe have systematically harmed their interests.

Jamal most closely follows the third camp, but with a twist. In her telling, anti-Americanism has very little to do with cultural resentments or civilizational hatred and is more than just a natural response to a leading world power. And although she certainly believes that policies such as Washington's "war on terror" and its unwavering support for Israel play a role in shaping Arab attitudes, she argues that they are not the core factors. Instead, Arab anti-Americanism reflects a deeper rejection of undemocratic political systems in Arab countries, which for decades have been underwritten and supported by the United States. She argues that the United States has been the main obstacle to the emergence of democracy in the Middle East, because it has insisted on "pro-American democracy or no democracy at all." It is that support for authoritarian rule, more than other frequently criticized U.S. policies, which she sees as being at the heart of Arab anti-Americanism.

If Jamal is right, then much of the received wisdom of the last decade needs to be reconsidered. Changing U.S. policies,even on high-priority issues such as Israel, would not have much effect on anti-Americanism, and efforts to promote American values in the region by waging a "war of ideas" against radical Islam would be at best irrelevant and at worst counterproductive. In Jamais view, what the United States needs to do is precisely what she believes it cannot do: meaningfully promote Arab democracy.

#### Decreasing drone strikes in the past didn’t reduce resentment

Etzioni 13

Amitai Etzioni, professor of in- ternational relations at George Washington University and author of Hot Spots: American Foreign Pol- icy in a Post-Human-Rights World, 4/30/13, “Drones: Say it with figures”, http://www.upi.com/Top\_News/Analysis/Outside-View/2013/04/30/Outside-View-Drones-Say-it-with-figures/UPI-25571367294880/ //jchen

In reality, ample evidence shows that large parts of the population of several Muslim countries resent the United States for numerous and profound reasons, unrelated to drone attacks.

These Muslims consider the United States to be the "Great Satan" because it violates core religious values they hold dear; it promotes secular democratic liberal regimes; it supports women's rights; and it exports a lifestyle that devout Muslims consider hedonistic and materialistic to their countries.

These feelings, data show, are rampant in countries in which no drones attacks have occurred, were common in those countries in which the drones have been employed well before any attacks took place, and continue unabated, even when drone attacks are greatly scaled back.

As Marc Lynch notes in Foreign Affairs:

"A decade ago, anti-Americanism seemed like an urgent problem. Overseas opinion surveys showed dramatic spikes in hostility toward the United States, especially in the Arab world ... It is now clear that even major changes, such as Bush's departure, Obama's support for some of the Arab revolts of 2011, the death of Osama bin Laden, and the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, have had surprisingly little effect on Arab attitudes towards the United States. Anti-Americanism might have ebbed momentarily, but it is once again flowing freely."

#### No nuclear terror.

Chapman 12 [Stephen, columnist and editorial writer for the Chicago Tribune, CHAPMAN: Nuclear terrorism unlikely May 22, 2012 6:00 AM http://www.oaoa.com/articles/chapman-87719-nuclear-terrorism.html]

Given their inability to do something simple — say, shoot up a shopping mall or set off a truck bomb — it’s reasonable to ask whether they have a chance at something much more ambitious. Far from being plausible, argued Ohio State University professor John Mueller in a presentation at the University of Chicago, “the likelihood that a terrorist group will come up with an atomic bomb seems to be vanishingly small.” The events required to make that happen comprise a multitude of Herculean tasks. First, a terrorist group has to get a bomb or fissile material, perhaps from Russia’s inventory of decommissioned warheads. If that were easy, one would have already gone missing. Besides, those devices are probably no longer a danger, since weapons that are not maintained quickly become what one expert calls “radioactive scrap metal.” If terrorists were able to steal a Pakistani bomb, they would still have to defeat the arming codes and other safeguards designed to prevent unauthorized use. As for Iran, no nuclear state has ever given a bomb to an ally — for reasons even the Iranians can grasp. Stealing some 100 pounds of bomb fuel would require help from rogue individuals inside some government who are prepared to jeopardize their own lives. Then comes the task of building a bomb. It’s not something you can gin up with spare parts and power tools in your garage. It requires millions of dollars, a safe haven and advanced equipment — plus people with specialized skills, lots of time and a willingness to die for the cause. Assuming the jihadists vault over those Himalayas, they would have to deliver the weapon onto American soil. Sure, drug smugglers bring in contraband all the time — but seeking their help would confront the plotters with possible exposure or extortion. This, like every other step in the entire process, means expanding the circle of people who know what’s going on, multiplying the chance someone will blab, back out or screw up. That has heartening implications. If al-Qaida embarks on the project, it has only a minuscule chance of seeing it bear fruit. Given the formidable odds, it probably won’t bother.

#### Hotlines and agreements check.

Ryabikhin et al. 9 [Dr. Leonid RYABIKHIN, Executive Secretary, Committee of Scientist for Global Security and Arms Control;, Senior Fellow, EastWest Institute, General (Ret.) Viktor KOLTUNOV Deputy Director, Institute for Strategic Stability of Rosatom Dr. Eugene MIASNIKOV Senior Research Scientist, Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies, De-alerting: Decreasing the Operational Readiness of Strategic Nuclear Forces\*, Discussion paper presented at the seminar on “Re-framing De-Alert: Decreasing the Operational Readiness of Nuclear Weapons Systems in the U.S.-Russia Context” in Yverdon, Switzerland, 21-23 June 2009]

Analysis of the above arguments shows, that they do not have solid grounds. Today Russian and U.S. ICBMs are not targeted at any state. High alert status of the Russian and U.S. strategic nuclear forces has not been an obstacle for building a strategic partnership. The issue of the possibility of an “accidental” nuclear war itself is hypothetical. Both states have developed and implemented constructive organizational and technical measures that practically exclude launches resulting from unauthorized action of personnel or terrorists. Nuclear weapons are maintained under very strict system of control that excludes any accidental or unauthorized use and guarantees that these weapons can only be used provided that there is an appropriate authorization by the national leadership. Besides that it should be mentioned that even the Soviet Union and the United States had taken important bilateral steps toward decreasing the risk of accidental nuclear conflict. Direct emergency telephone “red line” has been established between the White House and the Kremlin in 1963. In 1971 the USSR and USA signed the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Nuclear War Threat. This Agreement established the actions of each side in case of even a hypothetical accidental missile launch and it contains the requirements for the owner of the launched missile to deactivate and eliminate the missile. Both the Soviet Union and 5 the United States have developed proper measures to observe the agreed requirements.

#### Rationality checks miscalculation.

Quinlan 9 [Sir Michael, co-founder and President Emeritus of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2009, Thinking About Nuclear Weapons: Principle, Problems, Prospects, p. 68-71]

Similar considerations apply to the hypothesis of nuclear war being mistakenly triggered by false alarm. Critics again point to the fact, as it is understood, of numerous occasions when initial steps in alert sequences for US nuclear forces were embarked upon, or at least called for, by indicators mistaken or misconstrued. In none of these instances, it is accepted, did matters get at all near to nuclear launch-extraordinary good fortune again, critics have suggested. But the rival and more logical inference from hundreds of events stretching over sixty years of experience presents itself once more: that the probability of initial misinterpretation leading far towards mistaken launch is **remote.** Precisely because any nuclear-weapon possessor recognizes the vast gravity of any launch, release sequences have many steps, and human decision is repeatedly interposed as well as capping the sequences. To convey that because a first step was prompted the world somehow came close to accidental nuclear war is wild hyperbole, rather like asserting, when a tennis champion has lost his opening service game, that he was nearly beaten in straight sets. History anyway scarcely offers any ready example of major war started by accident even before the nuclear revolution imposed an order-of-magnitude increase in caution. It was occasionally conjectured that nuclear war might be triggered by the real but accidental or unauthorized launch of a strategic nuclear-weapon delivery system in the direction of a potential adversary. No such launch is known to have occurred in over sixty years. The probability of it is therefore **very low.** But even if it did happen, the further hypothesis of its initiating a general nuclear exchange is **far-fetched.** It fails to consider the real situation of decision-makers, as pages 63-4 have brought out. The notion that cosmic holocaust might be mistakenly precipitated in this way belongs to science fiction. One special form of miscalculation appeared sporadically in the speculations of academic commentators, though it was scarcely ever to be encountered-at least so far as my own observation went-in the utterances of practical planners within government. This is the idea that nuclear war might be erroneously triggered, or erroneously widened, through a state under attack misreading either what sort of attack it was being subjected to, or where the attack came from. The postulated misreading of the nature of the attack referred in particular to the hypothesis that if a delivery system-normally a missile-that was known to be capable of carrying either a nuclear or a conventional warhead was launched in a conventional role, the target country might, on detecting the launch through its earlywarning systems, misconstrue the mission as an imminent nuclear strike and immediately unleash a nuclear counter-strike of its own. This conjecture was voiced, for example, as a criticism of the proposals for giving the US Trident SLBM, long associated with nuclear missions, a capability to deliver conventional warheads. Whatever the merit of those proposals (it is not explored here), it is hard to regard this particular apprehension as having any real-life credibility. The flight time of a ballistic missile would not exceed about thirty minutes, and that of a cruise missile a few hours, before arrival on target made its character-conventional or nuclear-unmistakable. No government will need, and no nonlunatic government could wish, to take within so short a span of time a step as enormous and irrevocable as the execution of a nuclear strike on the basis of early-warning information alone without knowing the true nature of the incoming attack. The speculation tends moreover to be expressed without reference either to any realistic political or conflict-related context thought to render the episode plausible, or to the manifest interest of the launching country, should there be any risk of doubt, in ensuring-by explicit communication if necessary-that there was no misinterpretation of its conventionally armed launch.

# 2NC

## EO

### 2NC Perm – Do Both

#### Congressional interference devastates perceptions of Obama’s resolve – sends the signal to global rivals that we don’t have the political will for warfighting.

Newton ’12 [Michael, Prof. of Law – Vanderbilt, CASE WESTERN RESERVE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW•VOL. 45, Inadvertent Implications of the War Powers Resolution]

The corollary to this modern reality, and the second of three inadvertent implications of the Resolution, is that our enemies now focus on American political will as the Achilles heel of our vast capabilities. Prior to the War Powers Resolution, President Eisenhower understood that it was necessary to “seek the cooperation of the Congress. Only with that can we give the reassurance needed to deter aggression.”62 President Clinton understood the importance of clear communication with the Congress and the American people in order to sustain the political legitimacy that is a vital element of modern military operations. Justifying his bombing of targets in Sudan, he argued that the “risks from inaction, to America and the world, would be far greater than action, for that would embolden our enemies, leaving their ability and their willingness to strike us intact.”63 In his letter to Congress “consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” the president reported that the strikes “were a necessary and proportionate response to the imminent threat of further terrorist attacks against U.S. personnel and facilities” and “were intended to prevent and deter additional attacks by a clearly identified terrorist threat.”64 The following day, in a radio address to the nation, the president explained his decision to take military action, stating, “Our goals were to disrupt bin Laden’s terrorist network and destroy elements of its infrastructure in Afghanistan and Sudan. And our goal was to destroy, in Sudan, the factory with which bin Laden’s network is associated, which was producing an ingredient essential for nerve gas.”65 Citing “compelling evidence that the bin Laden network was poised to strike at us again” and was seeking to acquire chemical weapons, the president declared that we simply could not ignore the threat posed, and hence ordered the strikes.66 Similarly, President Clinton understood that intervention in Bosnia could not be successful absent some national consensus, which had been slow to form during the long Bosnian civil war.67 Secretary of State George Schultz provided perhaps the most poignant and pointed example of this truism in his testimony to Congress regarding the deployment of US Marines into Lebanon to separate the warring factions in 1982. On September 21, 1983, he testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and provided a chilling premonition of the bombing that would come only one month later and kill 241 Americans, which was the bloodiest day in the Marine Corps since the battle of Iwo Jima.68 Seeking to bolster legislative support and to better explain the strategic objectives, he explained that: It is not the mission of our marines or of the [Multinational Force in Lebanon] as a whole to maintain the military balance in Lebanon by themselves. Nevertheless, their presence remains one crucial pillar of the structure of stability. They are an important deterrent, a symbol of the international backing behind the legitimate Government of Lebanon, and an important weight in the scales. To remove the marines would put both the Government and what we are trying to achieve in jeopardy. This is why our domestic controversy over the war powers has been so disturbing. Uncertainty about the American commitment can only weaken our effectiveness. Doubts about our staying power can only cause political aggressors to discount our presence or to intensify their attacks in hopes of hastening our departure. An accommodation between the President and Congress to resolve this dispute will help dispel those doubts about our staying power and strengthen our political hand.69 Following the spectacularly successful terrorist attack on the Marine barracks in Beirut, President Reagan withdrew the Marines. Osama bin Laden later cited this as an example of American weakness that could not withstand the jihadist fury he sought.70 The legal battles over the scope and effect of the War Powers Resolution have highlighted the focus on national political will as the fulcrum of successful military operations by requiring assurances that military operations are limited in nature, duration, and scope, and therefore well within the president’s constitutional authority as Commander-in-Chief and chief executive. President Obama’s report to Congress in the context of the Libya operations in 2011 cited precedent from air strikes in Bosnia that took just over two weeks and involved more than 2,300 US sorties and the deployment of US forces in Somalia in 1992 and Haiti in 1993.71 The White House released a memorandum from the OLC, similar to previous interventions, explaining how the authorization to use such force was constitutional on the basis that “‘war’ within the meaning of the [Constitution’s] Declaration of War Clause” does not encompass all military engagements, but only those that are “prolonged and substantial . . . typically involving exposure of U.S. military personnel to significant risk over a substantial period.”72 President Obama consistently maintained that the US role in Libya was limited, unlikely to expose any US persons to attack (especially given the role of missiles and drones and the utter inability of Qaddafi’s forces to strike back with conventional means), and likely to end expeditiously.73 By that logic, it did not require authorization from Congress. The administration ultimately adopted a legal analysis that the US military’s activities fell short of “hostilities,” and thus, the president needed no permission from Congress to continue the mission after the expiration of the sixty-day reporting window specified in the War Powers Resolution.74 The president’s reasoning rested on previous OLC opinions that what counts as war depends on “a fact- specific assessment of the ‘anticipated nature, scope, and duration’ of the planned military operations.”75 Present justifications for bypassing the War Powers Resolution hinge on interpretations that it requires “prolonged and substantial military engagements, typically involving exposure of U.S. military personnel to significant risk over a substantial period.”76 The OLC engaged in similar reasoning in the Bosnia intervention in 1995, explaining that in deciding whether the proposed deployment into Bosnia amounted to a “‘war’ in the constitutional sense, considerable weight was given to the consensual nature and protective purposes of the operation.”77 That deployment was similarly intended to be a limited mission but that mission, in contrast to the present one, was in support of an agreement that the warring parties had reached and it was at the invitation of the parties that led to the belief that little or no resistance to the deployment would occur. Though some scholars argued that the Libya OLC Memorandum defended its reasoning for why the operation did not amount to “war,” it did not address whether the administration believed that it will have to stop operations upon expiration of the sixty-ninety-day clock under the War Powers Resolution.78 The deadline passed with little fanfare. The memorandum also relied upon quite distinguishable precedent to serve as a guiding point in this intervention. Professor Goldsmith argued the opinion broke “new ground . . . in its extension of the ‘no war’ precedents beyond the Bosnia and Haiti situations—which involved consensual peacekeeping-like introductions of ground troops but no significant uses of force—to cover two weeks of non-consensual aerial bombardments.”79 Thus, even as it incentivizes short term, limited deployments, the War Powers Resolution embeds an inevitable constitutional collision between the coordinate branches. Our enemies can rely upon constitutional carping from Congress, and in fact can adapt tactics and statements that seek to undermine political will in the US Congress and among the American people from the first days of an operation. The Resolution helps to ensure that such debates over the national political will take center stage sooner rather than later, and an asymmetric enemy can in theory erode our political will even before it solidifies.

#### Solves the norms advantage—provides a clear explanation of what constitutes a legitimate strike.

Zenko 13 [Micah, Douglas Dillon Fellow – CFR, Transferring CIA Drone Strikes to the Pentagon Policy Innovation Memorandum No. 31 Transferring CIA Drone Strikes to the Pentagon - transferring-cia-drone-strikes-to-the-pentagon Council on Foreign Relations Press April 2013 http://www.cfr.org/drones/transferring-cia-drone-strikes-pentagon/p30434]

A First Step Forward In an interview, President Obama revealed, "I think creating a legal structure, processes, with oversight checks on how we use unmanned weapons is going to be a challenge for me and for my successors for some time to come—partly because technology may evolve fairly rapidly for other countries as well." The Obama administration has two central objectives for its targeted killing reforms: preventing constraints on its ability to conduct lethal operations and setting precedents for the use of armed drones by other states. By law, institutional culture, and customary practice, drone strikes conducted by the CIA cannot reach the minimum thresholds of transparency and accountability required to achieve either objective. JSOC is also a highly secretive organization, but the United States could provide a much clearer and more detailed explanation of the outstanding issues regarding targeted killing without compromising the military's sources and methods—should the president prioritize such change. Moreover, according to a February 2013 poll, U.S. public support for military drone strikes (75 percent) was higher than for those conducted by the CIA (65 percent). Without ending CIA targeted killings, the Obama administration cannot undertake any of the reforms that it has stated are necessary both to ensure drone strikes do not go the way of third-country renditions and enhanced interrogation techniques, but also to establish the precedents of greater openness in how such operations are conducted by others.

## Resolve

### 2NC Anderson

#### 1AC Anderson is in the context of supporting the president’s right to use covert use of force everywhere—distinct from the aff—solvency deficits don’t apply

Kenneth Anderson, Professor of Law, Washington College of Law, American University, and Research Fellow, The Hoover Institution, Stanford University and Member of its Task Force on National Security and the Law, 3/18/10, Rise of the Drones: Unmanned Systems and the Future of War, digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1002&context=pub\_disc\_cong

Congressional oversight mechanisms should also be strengthened in ensuring Congress’s meaningful knowledge and ability to make its views known. (iii) Congress also should consider legislation to clarify once and for all that that covert use of force is lawful under US law and international law of self-defense, and undertake legislation to make clear the legal protection of individual officers.

#### Says overt legislation is key when it insists Obama’s use of force is legitimate

Kenneth Anderson, Professor of Law, Washington College of Law, American University, and Research Fellow, The Hoover Institution, Stanford University and Member of its Task Force on National Security and the Law, 5/11/2009, Targeted Killing in U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy and Law, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2009/5/11%20counterterrorism%20anderson/0511\_counterterrorism\_anderson.pdf

. This is a larger question than the one undertaken here, but on a range of issues including covert action, interrogation techniques, detention policy, and others, a general approach of overt legislation that removes ambiguity is to be preferred. The single most important role for Congress to play in addressing targeted killings, therefore, is the open, unapologetic, plain insistence that the American understanding of international law on this issue of self-defense is legitimate.

### 2NC A2: Solvency Deficits

#### Attempts to constrain Obama will fail.

Pildes 12 [Richard H., Sudler Family Professor of Constitutional Law, NYU School of Law and Co-Director, NYU Center on Law and Security. 2/27/12 BOOK REVIEWS LAW AND THE PRESIDENT THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE MADISONIAN REPUBLIC. By Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule. New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press. 2010. Pp. 249. $29.95. New York University Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers]

The general outlines of this history are familiar. But in a bracing new book, The Executive Unbound, Professors Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule want to take this story to a different quantum level. Posner and Vermeule insist not just that presidential powers have expanded dramatically in recent decades but that these powers are not effectively constrained by law. The stark reality of presidential power, as they put it, is that “law does little to constrain the modern executive” (p. 15). This is true, they assert, not just in exceptional circumstances, such as times of crisis or emergency, but in general in the modern state. This unconstrained power allegedly exists not just with respect to limited substantive arenas, such as foreign affairs or military matters, but across the board, with respect to domestic matters as well.18 Thus, while some have long argued that inter arma enim silent leges (in times of war, the laws are silent),19 Posner and Vermeule argue that the laws are always silent, in effect, when it comes to presidential power. Finally, they contend that this proposition is not just true with respect to some sources of potential legal constraint, such as the Constitution; it is central to their argument that statutes that purport to regulate presidential conduct are also largely ineffective. As they say, “the basic aspiration of liberal legalism to constrain the executive through statutory law has largely failed” (p. 112). Thus, when Congress does impose legislative constraints, Posner and Vermeule assert, the laws are typically vague, leaving ample room for executive discretion. Statutes “have a Potemkin quality: they stand about in the landscape, providing an impressive facade of legal constraint on the executive, but actually blocking very little action that presidents care about” (p. 88). Those legal constraints that do exist, whether constitutional or statutory, are not aggressively enforced by courts — first, because American courts stay out of many controversies concerning presidential power, and second, because when courts do play a role, they defer substantially to executive action and interpretation (pp. 52–58). Indeed, presidents can act directly in the face of even clear law and can force other institutions, such as Congress and the courts, to try to stop them. Much of the time, these other institutions will be unable or unwilling to do so.

#### President will disregard prohibitions or find another justification.

Goldsmith 9/3 [Jack Goldsmith is the Henry L. Shattuck Professor at Harvard Law School, where he teaches and writes about national security law, presidential power, cybersecurity, international law, internet law, foreign relations law, and conflict of laws. Before coming to Harvard, Professor Goldsmith served as Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel from 2003–2004, and Special Counsel to the Department of Defense from 2002–2003. Professor Goldsmith is a member of the Hoover Institution Task Force on National Security and Law. Full bio » It is Hard to Write an AUMF http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/09/it-is-hard-to-write-an-aumf/]

First, Congress needs to pay attention to the distinction between an authorization and a prohibition. Authorizing strikes for sixty days, and only for sixty days, will not by itself prohibit the President from using force beyond sixty days. The reason: the President thinks he has independent, inherent Article II authority to engage in the strikes. If Congress wants to limit the President, it must do so through authorizations combined with prohibitions. The President can in theory disregard a prohibition as a violation of his Commander in Chief power. But in this context, where the constitutional arguments for inherent power are already weak, the arguments for an exclusive presidential power are much weaker yet (and the political costs of defying a congressional restriction in this context would be enormous). Second, limiting the purposes of the attack to avoid toppling Assad’s government won’t by itself stop the President from acting to topple Assad’s government if he can do so pursuant to some more benign purpose, such as deterring use of WMDs. Recall that the administration had no overt authorization from the Security Council to topple Gaddafi. But ultimately it read the Security Council authorization “to take all necessary measures . . . to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya” as sanction to pursue and attack Gaddafi. Writing an AUMF that adequately empowers and constraints the President is hard.

#### Only executive orders can compel executive officers – plan will be ignored.

Zellmer 13 [Sandra Zellmer Robert B. Daugherty Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln College of Law, Faculty Publications Law, College of 1-1-2013 TREADING WATER WHILE CONGRESS IGNORES THE NATION’S ENVIRONMENT Dame Law Review 88:5 (2013), pp. 2323-2398]

Presidents have made extensive use of executive orders since 1789.476 The President is empowered to issue orders to federal agencies as necessary for the “faithful execution of laws passed by Congress.”477 Such orders typically compel “officers of the executive branch . . . to take an action, stop a certain type of activity, alter policy, change management practices, or accept a delegation of authority under which they will henceforth be responsible for the implementation of law.”478 Executive orders are equivalent to laws479 and are entitled to a “strong presumption” of validity.480 So long as the orders are based on a constitu- tional or statutory grant of power to the President, the Supreme Court has upheld them.481 In over 200 years, the courts have overturned only two executive orders.482 These two judicial opinions demonstrate that “the President has no authority to act in any way that supplants the will of Congress, unless his actions draw from a power specifically delegated to him by the Constitution.”483 However, the mere fact that Congress considered but failed to adopt a position subsequently taken up by an executive order does not justify invalidating the order.484

### 2NC A2: Solvency Deficits – Military Affs

#### Military won’t listen – they’ll side with the executive if congress constrains Obama.

Owens 12 [Mackubin Thomas Owens Dr. Owens is professor of national security affairs in the National Security Affairs Department of the Naval War College. From 1999 until 2010, he was also Associate Dean of Academics for Electives and Directed Research. Dr. Owens is a Marine Corps veteran of Vietnam, where as an infantry platoon commander in 1968–69 he was wounded twice and awarded the Silver Star; he retired from the Marine Corps Reserve as a colonel in 1994. He is a senior fellow of the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia and editor of Orbis, as well as a contributing editor to National Review Online and a regular contributor to numerous newspapers, magazines, and journals. His most recent book is US Civil-Military Relations after 9/11: Renegotiating the Civil-Military Bargain (2011). Naval War College Review, Spring 2012, Vol. 65, No. 2 WHAT MILITARY OFFICERS NEED TO KNOW ABOUT CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS http://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/1ef74daf-ebff-4aa4-866e-e1dd201d780e/What-Military-Officers-Need-to-Know-about-Civil-Mi.aspx]

CIVILIAN CONTROL INVOLVES NOT ONLY THE EXECUTIVEBRANCH It involves Congress as well. As the constitutional scholar Edward Corwin oncefamously observed, the Constitution is an “invitation to struggle for the privilegeof directing American foreign policy” between Congress and the president. 13 Butthere is a similar tension at work with regard to civil-military relations. Thosewho neglect the congressional role in American civil-military relations are miss-ing an important element. 14 The military has two civilian masters, and this has implications for civil-military relations that officers must understand. For instance, while the president and secretary of defense control the military when it comes to the use of force, in-cluding strategy and rules of engagement, Congress controls the military directly with regard to force size, equipment, and organization, and indirectly regarding doctrine and personnel. Indeed, Congress is the “force planner” of last resort.The U.S. military accepts civilian control by both Congress and the presidentbut offers advice intended to maintain its own institutional and professionalautonomy. On use of force, the military is usually granted a good deal of leeway regarding the terms and conditions for such use. By not dissenting from executive-branch policy, American military officersimplicitly agree to support presidential decisions on the budget and the use offorce, but they also must recognize an obligation to provide their alternativepersonal views in response to Congress. However, officers must recognize thatCongress exerts its control with less regard for military preferences than forthe political considerations of its individual members and committees. Thus congressional control of the military is strongly influenced by political consider-ations, by what Samuel Huntington called “structural,” or domestic, imperatives as opposed to strategic ones. When the president and Congress are in agreement, the military complies. When the two branches are in disagreement, the military tends to side with the branch that most favors its own views, but never to the point of direct disobedience to orders of the commander in chief. Military officers are obligated to share their views with Congress. Doing so should not be treated as an “end run” undermin-ing civilian control of the military.

#### Military pushback undermines global deterrence – leaks and slowrolling crush leadership.

Owens 12 [Mackubin Thomas Owens Dr. Owens is professor of national security affairs in the National Security Affairs Department of the Naval War College. From 1999 until 2010, he was also Associate Dean of Academics for Electives and Directed Research. Dr. Owens is a Marine Corps veteran of Vietnam, where as an infantry platoon commander in 1968–69 he was wounded twice and awarded the Silver Star; he retired from the Marine Corps Reserve as a colonel in 1994. He is a senior fellow of the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia and editor of Orbis, as well as a contributing editor to National Review Online and a regular contributor to numerous newspapers, magazines, and journals. His most recent book is US Civil-Military Relations after 9/11: Renegotiating the Civil-Military Bargain (2011). Naval War College Review, Spring 2012, Vol. 65, No. 2 WHAT MILITARY OFFICERS NEED TO KNOW ABOUT CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS http://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/1ef74daf-ebff-4aa4-866e-e1dd201d780e/What-Military-Officers-Need-to-Know-about-Civil-Mi.aspx]

According to Kohn, the erosion of civilian control gives rise to “toxic” civil-military relations, which, he argues, damage national security in at least threeways: by paralyzing national security policy; by obstructing or even sabotaging the ability of the United States to intervene in foreign crises or to exercise inter-national leadership; and by undermining the confidence of the military as an institution in its own uniformed leadership. 21 The military has “pushed back” against civilian leadership on numerous occa-sions during the last two decades. This pushback has manifested itself (to use Pe-ter Feaver’s formulation) in various forms of “shirking”—“foot dragging,” “slowrolling,” and leaks to the press designed to undercut policy or individual policymakers. 22 Such actions were rampant during the William Clinton presidency andduring the tenure of Donald Rumsfeld as secretary of defense. Such pushback is based on the claim that civilians are making decisions without paying sufficient attention to the military point of view. This leads to the next principle of civil-military relations: officers have an obligation to make their case as strongly aspossible but do not have the right to “insist” that their advice be accepted. How-ever, there must be a “calculus of dissent.”

### 2NC O/V

#### Empirics prove weakness invites global aggression—resolve actively prevents conflict and solves their escalation scenarios.

Bolton 9 [John R. Bolton 9, Senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute & Former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, “The danger of Obama's dithering,” Los Angeles Times, October 18, http://articles.latimes.com/2009/oct/18/opinion/oe-bolton18]

Weakness in American foreign policy in one region often invites challenges elsewhere, because our adversaries carefully follow diminished American resolve. Similarly, presidential indecisiveness, whether because of uncertainty or internal political struggles, signals that the United States may not respond to international challenges in clear and coherent ways. Taken together, weakness and indecisiveness have proved historically to be a toxic combination for America's global interests. That is exactly the combination we now see under President Obama. If anything, his receiving the Nobel Peace Prize only underlines the problem. All of Obama's campaign and inaugural talk about "extending an open hand" and "engagement," especially the multilateral variety, isn't exactly unfolding according to plan. Entirely predictably, we see more clearly every day that diplomacy is not a policy but only a technique. Absent presidential leadership, which at a minimum means clear policy direction and persistence in the face of criticism and adversity, engagement simply embodies weakness and indecision.

#### U.S. resolve is key to deter China.

Friedberg 12 [Aaron L. Friedberg, Poliitcs and International Affairs at Princeton, Bucking Beijing An Alternative U.S. China Policy September/October 2012 Foreign Affairs]

Absent a strong U.S. response, Chinese planners might eventually come to believe that their growing A2/AD capabilities are sufficiently impressive to scare the United States off from intervening or provoking a confrontation in the region. Worse still, they might convince themselves that if the United States were to intervene, they could cripple its conventional forces in the western Pacific, leaving it with few options other than the threat of nuclear escalation. Maintaining stability requires reducing the likelihood that China's leaders could ever see initiating such an attack as being in their interest. A direct U.S.-Chinese military confrontation is, of course, extremely unlikely. But the aim of the balancing half of U.S. strategy must be to ensure that it remains so, even as China's power grows. Failing to respond adequately to Beijing's buildup could undermine the credibility of the security guarantees that Washington extends to its Asian allies. In the absence of strong signals of continuing commitment and resolve from the United States, its friends may grow fearful of abandonmen1t§ Marked 12:06 § , perhaps eventually losing heart and succumbing to the temptations of appeasement. To prevent them from doing so, Washington will have to do more than talk. Together, the United States and its allies have more than sufficient resources with which to balance China. But if Washington wants its allies to increase their own defense efforts, it will have to seriously respond to China's growing capabilities itself. When it comes to Asia, the United States does not have the option of what The New Yorker first described as the Obama administration's penchant for "leading from behind."

#### Executive flexibility key to check terror.

Royal 11 [JOHN PAUL ROYAL, Institute of World Politics, “War Powers and the Age of Terrorism,” Center for the Study of the Presidency & Congress The Fellows Review http://www.thepresidency.org/storage/Fellows2011/Royal-\_Final\_Paper.pdf]

The international system itself and national security challenges to the United States in particular, underwent rapid and significant change in the first decade of the twenty-first century. War can no longer be thought about strictly in the terms of the system and tradition created by the Treaty of Westphalia over three and a half centuries ago. Non-state actors now possess a level of destructiveness formerly enjoyed only by nation states. Global terrorism, coupled with the threat of weapons of mass destruction developed organically or obtained from rogue regimes, presents new challenges to U.S. national security and place innovative demands on the Constitution’s system of making war. In the past, as summarized in the 9/11 Commission Report, threats emerged due to hostile actions taken by enemy states and their ability to muster large enough forces to wage war: “Threats emerged slowly, often visibly, as weapons were forged, armies conscripted, and units trained and moved into place. Because large states were more powerful, they also had more to lose. They could be deterred" (National Commission 2004, 362). This mindset assumed that peace was the default state for American national security. Today however, we know that threats can emerge quickly. Terrorist organizations half-way around the world are able to wield weapons of unparalleled destructive power. These attacks are more difficult to detect and deter due to their unconventional and asymmetrical nature. In light of these new asymmetric threats and the resultant changes to the international system, peace can no longer be considered the default state of American national security. Many have argued that the Constitution permits the president to use unilateral action only in response to an imminent direct attack on the United States. In the emerging security environment described above, pre-emptive action taken by the executive branch may be needed more often than when nation-states were the principal threat to American national interests. Here again, the 9/11 Commission Report is instructive as it considers the possibility of pre-emptive force utilized over large geographic areas due to the diffuse nature of terrorist networks: In this sense, 9/11 has taught us that terrorism against American interests “over there” should be regarded just as we regard terrorism against America “over here.” In this sense, the American homeland is the planet (National Commission 2004, 362). Furthermore, the report explicitly describes the global nature of the threat and the global mission that must take place to address it. Its first strategic policy recommendation against terrorism states that the: U.S. government must identify and prioritize actual or potential terrorist sanctuaries. For each, it should have a realistic strategy to keep possible terrorists insecure and on the run, using all elements of national power (National Commission 2004, 367). Thus, fighting continues against terrorists in Afghanistan, Yemen, Iraq, Pakistan, the Philippines, and beyond, as we approach the tenth anniversary of the September 11, 2001 attacks. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), especially nuclear weapons, into the hands of these terrorists is the most dangerous threat to the United States. We know from the 9/11 Commission Report that Al Qaeda has attempted to make and obtain nuclear weapons for at least the past fifteen years. Al Qaeda considers the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction to be a religious obligation while “more than two dozen other terrorist groups are pursing CBRN [chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear] materials” (National Commission 2004, 397). Considering these statements, rogue regimes that are openly hostile to the United States and have or seek to develop nuclear weapons capability such as North Korea and Iran, or extremely unstable nuclear countries such as Pakistan, pose a special threat to American national security interests. These nations were not necessarily a direct threat to the United States in the past. Now, however, due to proliferation of nuclear weapons and missile technology, they can inflict damage at considerably higher levels and magnitudes than in the past. In addition, these regimes may pursue proliferation of nuclear weapons and missile technology to other nations and to allied terrorist organizations. The United States must pursue condign punishment and appropriate, rapid action against hostile terrorist organizations, rogue nation states, and nuclear weapons proliferation threats in order to protect American interests both at home and abroad. Combating these threats are the “top national security priority for the United States…with the full support of Congress, both major political parties, the media, and the American people” (National Commission 2004, 361). Operations may take the form of pre-emptive and sustained action against those who have expressed hostility or declared war on the United States. Only the executive branch can effectively execute this mission, authorized by the 2001 AUMF. If the national consensus or the nature of the threat changes, Congress possesses the intrinsic power to rescind and limit these powers.

### 2NC Link

#### Congressional signal sets a precedent against any targeted killing – crushes counterterrorism flexibility.

Anderson 9

Kenneth Anderson, Professor of Law, Washington College of Law, American University, Brookings Institution, “Targeted Killing in U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy and Law”, 5/11/09, http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2009/05/11-counterterrorism-anderson

Yet the problem is still deeper and more immediate than that, for the accepted space for targeted killings is eroding even within what a reasonable American might understand as the four corners of our conflict with al Qaeda. In many situations in which any American president, Obama certainly included, would want to use a targeted killing, it is unclear to some important actors—at the United Nations, among our allies, among international law scholars, and among NGO activists—as a matter of international law that a state of armed conflict actually exists or that a targeted killing can qualify as an act of self-defense. The legal situation, therefore, threatens to become one in which, on the one hand, targeted killing outside of a juridical armed conflict is legally impermissible and, on the other hand, as a practical matter, no targeted killing even within the context of a “war” with al Qaeda is legally permissible, either.

Congress’s role in this area is admittedly a peculiar one. It is mostly—though not entirely—politically defensive in nature. After all, the domestic legal authorities to conduct targeted killings and other “intelligence” uses of force have existed in statutory form at least since the legislation that established the Central Intelligence Agency in 1947 and in other forms long pre-dating that.[ix] The problem is that although domestic legal authority exists for the use of force against terrorists abroad, currents are stirring in international law and elsewhere that move to undermine that authority. Powerful trend and opinion-setting—so-called “soft law”—currents are developing in ways that, over time, promise to make the exercise of this activity ever more difficult and to create a presumption, difficult to overcome, that targeted killing is in fact both illegitimate and, indeed, per se illegal except in the narrowest of war-like conditions. The role of Congress is therefore to reassert, reaffirm, and reinvigorate the category as a matter of domestic law and policy, and as the considered, official view of the United States as a matter of international law.

#### Plan allows Congress to vocally oppose crisis intervention – that destroys international perception of U.S. resolve.

Waxman 8/25 [Matthew Waxman, Professor of Law @ Columbia and Adjunct Senior Fellow for Law and Foreign Policy @ CFR, citing William Howell, Sydney Stein Professor in American Politics @ U-Chicago, and Jon Pevehouse, Professor of Political Science @ U-Wisconsin-Madison, “The Constitutional Power to Threaten War,” Forthcoming in Yale Law Journal, vol. 123, August 25, 2013, SSRN]

When members of Congress vocally oppose a use of force, they undermine the president’s ability to convince foreign states that he will see a fight through to the end. Sensing hesitation on the part of the United States, allies may be reluctant to contribute to a military campaign, and adversaries are likely to fight harder and longer when conflict erupts— thereby raising the costs of the military campaign, decreasing the president’s ability to negotiate a satisfactory resolution, and increasing the probability that American lives are lost along the way. Facing a limited band of allies willing to participate in a military venture and an enemy emboldened by domestic critics, presidents may choose to curtail, and even abandon, those military operations that do not involve vital strategic interests.145

#### Congressional involvement creates murky lines of authority – undermines warfighting.

Wall 12 [Andru, senior official – Alston & Bird, Demystifying the Title 10-Title 50 Debate: Distinguishing Military Operations, Intelligence Activities & Covert Action, Harvard National Security Journal]

Congress’s failure to provide necessary interagency authorities and budget authorizations threatens our ability to prevent and wage warfare. Congress’s stubborn insistence that military and intelligence activities inhabit separate worlds casts a pall of illegitimacy over interagency support, as well as unconventional and cyber warfare. The U.S. military and intelligence agencies work together more closely than perhaps at any time in American history, yet Congressional oversight and statutory authorities sadly remain mired in an obsolete paradigm. After ten years of war, Congress still has not adopted critical recommendations made by the 9/11 Commission regarding congressional oversight of intelligence activities. Congress’s stovepiped oversight sows confusion over statutory authorities and causes Executive Branch attorneys to waste countless hours distinguishing distinct lines of authority and funding. Our military and intelligence operatives work tirelessly to coordinate, synchronize, and integrate their efforts; they deserve interagency authorities and Congressional oversight that encourages and supports such integration.

#### Congressional action hamstrings flexibility.

Grimmett 12 [Richard F. Grimmett Specialist in International Security September 24, 2012 The War Powers Resolution: After Thirty-Eight Years http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42699.pdf]

A contrary view is that the War Powers Resolution is an inappropriate instrument that restricts the President’s effectiveness in foreign policy and should be repealed.89 Those with this perspective believe that the basic premise of the War Powers Resolution is wrong because in it, Congress attempts excessive control of the deployment of U.S. military forces, encroaching on the responsibility of the President.90 Supporters of repeal contend that the President needs more flexibility in the conduct of foreign policy and that the time limitation in the War Powers Resolution is unconstitutional and impractical. Some holding this view contend that Congress has always had the power, through appropriations and general lawmaking, to inquire into, support, limit, or prohibit specific uses of U.S. Armed Forces if there is majority support. The War Powers Resolution does not fundamentally change this equation, it is argued, but it complicates action, misleads military opponents, and diverts attention from key policy questions.

#### Congressional action revitalizes the WPR – that devastates global credibility and readiness.

Nichols 8/25 [Tom, Professor of National Security Affairs, Naval War College and Senior Associate of the Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs, Repeal the War Powers Resolution Posted by Tom on Sunday, August 25, 2013 http://tomnichols.net/blog/2013/08/25/repeal-the-war-powers-resolution/]

The War Powers Resolution was a bad idea then, and it is a bad idea now. As satisfying as it might be in the short term to hobble the president, both parties would come to regret the consequences of such political combat, not least because it would shift greater responsibility for military action onto a Congress that in the long run may not want it — a point raised by then-Rep. Lee Hamilton and others during a failed 1995 effort to repeal the resolution. Worse, the War Powers Act is dangerous to our troops and to our national security. Imagine if it were ever taken seriously as an ongoing restriction on military action: A crisis arises, and the president responds by deploying U.S. forces, perhaps to support an ally or to enforce a United Nations resolution. The clock begins ticking, and after 60 days — or sooner, if Congress so directs — the president must recall U.S. troops. Thus, the resolution in effect tells any enemy that the best strategy against U.S. military force is to hunker down and wait out the 60-day period, in hopes that the resulting political fight in Washington will be messy enough to tear apart the nation and undermine Americans’ will to fight. It is folly to tell any potential enemy that he has 60 days to play one branch of the United States government off against another. Presidents answer to the American people and, in the most extreme instance, to the Senate during impeachment. These mechanisms do not need to be superseded by a contested law that invites the micromanagement of U.S. military operations by 535 additional commanders-in-chief. Legislators from both parties now have a rare opportunity to exercise statesmanship. They can declare that their differences might be deep and principled, but that our political system cannot be shaken during a military conflict. A bipartisan move to repeal the War Powers Resolution — and to protect the necessary ability of presidents to engage in military action now and in the future — would send a powerful message to dictators and terrorists who have always placed their hopes, however vainly, in a mistaken belief that democracies are too divided and too weak to stop them. The War Powers Resolution should be shelved, once and for all, as a danger not to any one president or party, but to the security of the United States.

### Flex

#### Statutory limitations devastate presidential flexibility in a crisis.

Vermueule 6 [Adrian Vermeule, Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, 2006, “THE EMERGENCY CONSTITUTION IN THE POST-SEPTEMBER 11 WORLD ORDER: SELF-DEFEATING PROPOSALS: ACKERMAN ON EMERGENCY POWERS,” Fordham Law Review, Nov., pp.]

The reason for the failure of statutory frameworks is plain. When an emergency or war or crisis arises, the executive needs flexibility; because statutory limitations determined in advance can only reduce flexibility, and do so in a way that does not anticipate the particular requirements of a new emergency, no one has any ex post interest in insisting that these limitations be respected. Ackerman acknowledges the grim historical record but provides no valid reason for thinking that his framework statute – which more ambitious than the other ones - might fare differently.

### U – A2: Syria Hurts Cred

#### Syria didn’t affect presidential powers.

Goldsmith 8/31 [Jack Goldsmith is the Henry L. Shattuck Professor at Harvard Law School, where he teaches and writes about national security law, presidential power, cybersecurity, international law, internet law, foreign relations law, and conflict of laws. Before coming to Harvard, Professor Goldsmith served as Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel from 2003–2004, and Special Counsel to the Department of Defense from 2002–2003. Professor Goldsmith is a member of the Hoover Institution Task Force on National Security and Law. Full bio » Obama’s Request to Congress Will Not Hamstring Future Presidents (Except for Some Humanitarian Interventions) By Jack Goldsmith Saturday, August 31, 2013 at 10:12 PM http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/08/obamas-request-to-congress-will-not-hamstring-future-presidents-except-for-some-humanitarian-interventions/]

Peter Spiro at OJ, and David Rothkopf of FP whom he cites, both say that President Obama’s request for congressional authorization for Syria will allow Congress to hamstring future Presidents from using military force. Rothkopf exaggerates when he says that President Obama reversed “decades of precedent regarding the nature of presidential war powers” by going to Congress here, and Spiro exaggerates when he says that this is “a huge development with broad implications . . . for separation of powers.” What would have been unprecedented, and a huge development for separation of powers, is a unilateral strike in Syria. Seeking congressional authorization here in no way sets a precedent against President using force in national self-defense, or to protect U.S. persons or property, or even (as in Libya) to engage in humanitarian interventions (like Libya) with Security Council support. Moreover, the President and his subordinates have been implying for a while now that they will rely on Article II to use force without congressional authorization against extra-AUMF terrorist threats (and for all we know they already are). There is no reason to think that unilateral presidential military powers for national self-defense are in any way affected by the President’s decision today. That is as it should be.

#### Backing down Syria is irrelevant – perception of being handcuffed matters comparatively more.

McManus 9/11 [University of Wisconsin-Madison Ph.D candidate in political science Roseanne McManus. Threats and Credibility: How Obama’s Decision to Seek Congressional Authorization for Syria May Have Been a Game Changer, The Monkey Cage, http://themonkeycage.org/2013/09/11/threats-and-credibility-how-obamas-decision-to-seek-congressional-authorization-for-syria-may-have-been-a-game-changer/]

My research, available here, shows that factors related to the costs of backing down are rather poor predictors of whether statements of resolve will be effective at influencing the outcome of international disputes. Much better predictors are factors related to whether a leader has the observable ability to follow through on statements. While many theories tend to take a leader’s ability to follow through on statements for granted, I argue that there can be substantial risks and obstacles to following through, such as domestic actors who can block or forestall action (known in political science as veto players) or the danger of domestic backlash if a conflict goes poorly. Therefore, statements of resolve will only be effective if adversaries can observe that a leader has the ability to overcome these risks and obstacles. My statistical analysis shows that US presidential statements of resolve have a greater influence on dispute outcomes when the president has a greater ability to follow through on his statements due to a secure political position and/or hawkish domestic veto players.

#### Syria vote doesn’t affect credibility.

Larison 9/10 [Daniel, Daniel Larison is a senior editor at TAC, where he also keeps a solo blog. He has been published in the New York Times Book Review, Dallas Morning News, Orthodox Life, Front Porch Republic, The American Scene, and Culture11, and is a columnist for The Week. He holds a PhD in history from the University of Chicago, http://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/credibility-and-reputation/?utm\_source=feedly]

It’s true that we can’t know for certain what the consequences of a no vote would be, but we can be reasonably sure that it won’t include the parade of horribles that advocates for intervention have been describing in the last three weeks. There is no reason to think that anyone will doubt U.S. security commitments elsewhere in the world, and it seems very far-fetched that refusing to attack Syria now will prompt other governments to start amassing or using chemical weapons. Authoritarian regimes that have resisted U.S. demands in the past will continue to do so for their own reasons, but it is implausible that they will determine their future behavior based on how the U.S. treats the Syrian government in this case. In short, the commitments that the U.S. has seriously made and kept for many years or decades are not in jeopardy, but the ability or at least the willingness of the president to commit the U.S. to military action through careless and ill-conceived rhetoric may be constrained. As Jim Manzi pointed out, this is a feature, not a bug.

#### Obama’s Syria reasoning only proves the truth of the link.

Gold 9/15 [Dore Gold, an Israeli diplomat who has served in various positions under several Israeli governments. He is the current President of the Jerusalem Center for Public AffairsWhy Obama Went to Congress on Syria SEPTEMBER 15, 2013 6:15 PM 0 COMMENTS http://www.algemeiner.com/2013/09/15/why-obama-went-to-congress-on-syria/]

The answer is that Obama needs Congress not for legality but rather for legitimacy. In fact, Obama stated that he has the legal authority to launch a strike on Syria by himself. When he appeared on August 31, in the Rose Garden of the White House, to announce his decision to turn to Congress, he stated: “Yet, while I believe I have the authority to carry out this military action without specific congressional authorization, I know that the country will be stronger if we take this course, and our actions will be even more effective.” His words indicate that he understands that there is a danger that in the future his decision to turn to Congress in the case of Syria could be exploited and used as a precedent to further restrict the war powers of the president beyond what is written in the War Powers Act, and thereby weaken the global standing of the U.S.

Jenkins 12 [Brian Michael Jenkins, senior adviser to the president at the RAND Corporation, is the author of Will Terrorists Go Nuclear (2008, Prometheus Books) and of several RAND monographs on terrorism-related topics. He formerly served as chair of the Political Science Department at RAND. In anticipation of the 10-year anniversary of 9/11, Jenkins spearheaded the RAND effort to take stock of America's policy reactions and give thoughtful consideration to the future strategy. That effort is presented in The Long Shadow of 9/11: America's Response to Terrorism (Brian Michael Jenkins and John Paul Godges, eds., 2011)., New Challenges to U.S. Counterterrorism Efforts An Assessment of the Current Terrorist Threat Before the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs United States Senate July 11, 2012]

Al Qaeda’s central leadership clearly had nuclear ambitions and made an effort to acquire fissile material and technical expertise. However, there is no evidence that they acquired or even came close to acquiring nuclear weapons, and at some point in the last decade, the organization’s nuclear weapons project turned from an acquisition effort to a propaganda program calculated to excite its followers and frighten its foes. 10

#### Al-Qaeda’s incompetent.

Mueller and Stewart 12 [John Mueller is Senior Research Scientist at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies and Adjunct Professor in the Department of Political Science, both at Ohio State University, and Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute in Washington, D.C. Mark G. Stewart is Australian Research Council Professorial Fellow and Professor and Director at the Centre for Infrastructure Performance and Reliability at the University of Newcastle in Australia. Their book, Terror, Security, and Money: Balancing the Risks, Benefits, and Costs of Homeland Security, was published by Oxford University Press in 2011. The Terrorism Delusion, International Security > Volume 37, Number 1, Summer 2012]

Over the course of time, such essentially delusionary thinking has been internalized and institutionalized in a great many ways. For example, an extrapolation of delusionary proportions is evident in the common observation that, because terrorists were able, mostly by thuggish means, to crash airplanes into buildings, they might therefore be able to construct a nuclear bomb. Brian [End Page 97] Jenkins has run an internet search to discover how often variants of the term “al-Qaida” appeared within ten words of “nuclear.” There were only seven hits in 1999 and eleven in 2000, but the number soared to 1,742 in 2001 and to 2,931 in 2002.47 By 2008, Defense Secretary Robert Gates was assuring a congressional committee that what keeps every senior government leader awake at night is “the thought of a terrorist ending up with a weapon of mass destruction, especially nuclear.”48 Few of the sleepless, it seems, found much solace in the fact that an al-Qaida computer seized in Afghanistan in 2001 indicated that the group’s budget for research on weapons of mass destruction (almost all of it focused on primitive chemical weapons work) was $2,000 to $4,000.49 In the wake of the killing of Osama bin Laden, officials now have many more al-Qaida computers, and nothing in their content appears to suggest that the group had the time or inclination, let alone the money, to set up and staff a uranium-seizing operation, as well as a fancy, super-high-technology facility to fabricate a bomb. This is a process that requires trusting corrupted foreign collaborators and other criminals, obtaining and transporting highly guarded material, setting up a machine shop staffed with top scientists and technicians, and rolling the heavy, cumbersome, and untested finished product into position to be detonated by a skilled crew—all while attracting no attention from outsiders.50 If the miscreants in the American cases have been unable to create and set off even the simplest conventional bombs, it stands to reason that none of them were very close to creating, or having anything to do with, nuclear weapons—or for that matter biological, radiological, or chemical ones. In fact, with perhaps one exception, none seems to have even dreamed of the prospect; and the exception is José Padilla (case 2), who apparently mused at one point about creating a dirty bomb—a device that would disperse radiation—or even possibly an atomic one. His idea about isotope separation was to put uranium into a pail and then to make himself into a human centrifuge by swinging the pail around in great arcs.51 [End Page 98] Even if a weapon were made abroad and then brought into the United States, its detonation would require individuals in-country with the capacity to receive and handle the complicated weapons and then to set them off. Thus far, the talent pool appears, to put mildly, very thin.

## Case

### 2NC Nuclear Terror – Al-Qaeda

#### Best intel proves they’re jokers.

Mueller and Stewart 12 [John Mueller is Senior Research Scientist at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies and Adjunct Professor in the Department of Political Science, both at Ohio State University, and Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute in Washington, D.C. Mark G. Stewart is Australian Research Council Professorial Fellow and Professor and Director at the Centre for Infrastructure Performance and Reliability at the University of Newcastle in Australia. Their book, Terror, Security, and Money: Balancing the Risks, Benefits, and Costs of Homeland Security, was published by Oxford University Press in 2011. The Terrorism Delusion, International Security > Volume 37, Number 1, Summer 2012]

Finally, on May 1, 2012, nearly ten years after the September 2001 terrorist attacks, the most costly and determined manhunt in history culminated in Pakistan when a team of U.S. Navy Seals killed Osama bin Laden, a chief au-thor of the attacks and one of history’s most storied and cartooned villains. Taken away with bin Laden’s bullet-shattered body were written documents and masses of information stored on ªve computers, ten hard drives, and one hundred or more thumb drives, DVDs, and CD-ROMs. This, it was promised, represented a “treasure trove” of information about al-Qaida—“the mother lode,” said one U.S. ofªcial eagerly—that might contain plans for pending at-tacks.4 Poring through the material with great dispatch, however, a task force soon discovered that al-Qaida’s members were primarily occupied with dodg-ing drone missile attacks, complaining about the lack of funds, and watching a lot of pornography.5

### 1NC Nuclear Terror – A2: Ayson

#### Ayson concedes the risk is extremely low and that it might escalate only if the US and Russia and China were already at war.

Ayson 10 [Robert, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand – Victoria University of Wellington, “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects”, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 33(7), July]

A Catalytic Response: Dragging in the Major Nuclear Powers A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the country attacked in the first place, would not necessarily represent the worst of the nuclear worlds imaginable. Indeed, there are reasons to wonder whether nuclear terrorism should ever be regarded as belonging in the category of truly existential threats. A contrast can be drawn here with the global catastrophe that would come from a massive nuclear exchange between two or more of the sovereign states that possess these weapons in significant numbers. Even the worst terrorism that the twenty-first century might bring would fade into insignificance alongside considerations of what a general nuclear war would have wrought in the Cold War period. And it must be admitted that as long as the major nuclear weapons states have hundreds and even thousands of nuclear weapons at their disposal, there is always the possibility of a truly awful nuclear exchange taking place precipitated entirely by state possessors themselves. But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today's and tomorrow's terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington's relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time.The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington's early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country's armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial response to the act of nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier) Washington might decide to order a significant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group. Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret such action as being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of influence and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the “Chechen insurgents' … long-standing interest in all things nuclear.”42 American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow that might require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide.

### Nuclear Terror – A2: State Sponsor

#### No state would give the bomb up.

Craig, IR at Southampton, 11 [Campbell, professor of international relations at the University of Southampton Special Issue: Bringing Critical Realism and Historical Materialism into Critical Terrorism Studies Atomic obsession: nuclear alarmism from Hiroshima to al-Qaeda Critical Studies on Terrorism Volume 4, Issue 1, 2011, April, pages 115-124]

Let us address each of his claims, in reverse order. Mueller suggests that the risk of an act of major nuclear terrorism is exceptionally small, along the lines of an asteroid hitting the earth. Drawing upon his powerful book against terrorism alarmism, Overblown (2006), he shows that serious anti-Western terrorist groups are today widely scattered and disorganized – precisely the wrong kind of arrangement for the sustained and centralized project of building an atomic bomb. Looking for immediate results, terrorist groups are likely to go with what works today, rather than committing to a long-term and likely futile project. He points out, as have other authors, that so-called ‘rogue’ nations, even if they obtain a bomb, are never going to hand it over to terrorists: to do so would utterly negate everything they had worked so hard for. A nation such as Iran that somehow decided to give its bomb to al-Qaeda (leaving aide their completely different objectives) would not only be handing over a weapon that it had spent years and billions to build, and giving up the prestige and deterrence the bomb supposedly confers, it would also be putting itself at acute risk of being on the receiving end of a retaliatory strike once the terrorists did their work. By what rationale would any leader make such a move? The potential costs would be astronomical, the benefits non-existent.

#### No state sponsor.

Mearsheimer 10 [John J. Mearsheimer is the R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. He is on the Advisory Council of The National Interest, and his most recent book, Why Leaders Lie: The Truth About Lying in International Politics, was published in January 2011 by Oxford University Press. Imperial by Design December 16, 2010 <http://nationalinterest.org/article/imperial-by-design-4576>]

This assessment of America’s terrorism problem was flawed on every count. It was threat inflation of the highest order. It made no sense to declare war against groups that were not trying to harm the United States. They were not our enemies; and going after all terrorist organizations would greatly complicate the daunting task of eliminating those groups that did have us in their crosshairs. In addition, there was no alliance between the so-called rogue states and al-Qaeda. In fact, Iran and Syria cooperated with Washington after 9/11 to help quash Osama bin Laden and his cohorts. Although the Bush administration and the neoconservatives repeatedly asserted that there was a genuine connection between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda, they never produced evidence to back up their claim for the simple reason that it did not exist. The fact is that states have strong incentives to distrust terrorist groups, in part because they might turn on them someday, but also because countries cannot control what terrorist organizations do, and they may do something that gets their patrons into serious trouble. This is why there is hardly any chance that a rogue state will give a nuclear weapon to terrorists. That regime’s leaders could never be sure that they would not be blamed and punished for a terrorist group’s actions. Nor could they be certain that the United States or Israel would not incinerate them if either country merely suspected that they had provided terrorists with the ability to carry out a WMD attack. A nuclear handoff, therefore, is not a serious threat. When you get down to it, there is only a remote possibility that terrorists will get hold of an atomic bomb. The most likely way it would happen is if there were political chaos in a nuclear-armed state, and terrorists or their friends were able to take advantage of the ensuing confusion to snatch a loose nuclear weapon. But even then, there are additional obstacles to overcome: some countries keep their weapons disassembled, detonating one is not easy and it would be difficult to transport the device without being detected. Moreover, other countries would have powerful incentives to work with Washington to find the weapon before it could be used. The obvious implication is that we should work with other states to improve nuclear security, so as to make this slim possibility even more unlikely. Finally, the ability of terrorists to strike the American homeland has been blown out of all proportion. In the nine years since 9/11, government officials and terrorist experts have issued countless warnings that another major attack on American soil is probable—even imminent. But this is simply not the case.3 The only attempts we have seen are a few failed solo attacks by individuals with links to al-Qaeda like the “shoe bomber,” who attempted to blow up an American Airlines flight from Paris to Miami in December 2001, and the “underwear bomber,” who tried to blow up a Northwest Airlines flight from Amsterdam to Detroit in December 2009. So, we do have a terrorism problem, but it is hardly an existential threat. In fact, it is a minor threat. Perhaps the scope of the challenge is best captured by Ohio State political scientist John Mueller’s telling comment that “the number of Americans killed by international terrorism since the late 1960s . . . is about the same as the number killed over the same period by lightning, or by accident-causing deer, or by severe allergic reactions to peanuts.”

### \*\*\*\*\*A2: Loose Nukes

#### Theft from Russia or Pakistan is unlikely, and weaponization would fail even if successful.

Chapman 8 (Steve, member of the Chicago Tribune editorial board since 1981, “The Implausibility of Nuclear Terrorism,” http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2008/02/the\_implausibility\_of\_nuclear.html)

Far from being plausible, argued Ohio State University professor John Mueller in a recent presentation at the University of Chicago, "the likelihood that a terrorist group will come up with an atomic bomb seems to be **vanishingly small."** The events required to make that happen comprise a multitude of Herculean tasks. First, a terrorist group has to get a bomb or fissile material, perhaps from Russia's inventory of decommissioned warheads. If that were easy, **one would have already gone missing**. Besides, those devices are probably no longer a danger, since weapons that are not scrupulously maintained (as those have not been) quickly become what one expert calls "**radioactive scrap metal**." If terrorists were able to steal a Pakistani bomb, they would still have to defeat the arming codes and other safeguards designed to prevent unauthorized use. As for Iran, no nuclear state has ever given a bomb to an ally -- for reasons even the Iranians can grasp. Stealing some 100 pounds of bomb fuel would require help from rogue individuals inside some government who are prepared to jeopardize their own lives. The terrorists, notes Mueller, would then have to spirit it "hundreds of miles out of the country over unfamiliar terrain, and probably while being pursued by security forces." Then comes the task of building a bomb. It's not something you can gin up with spare parts and power tools in your garage. It requires millions of dollars, a safe haven and advanced equipment -- plus people with specialized skills, lots of time and a willingness to die for the cause. And if al-Qaida could make a prototype, another obstacle would emerge: There is no guarantee it would work, and there is no way to test it. Assuming the jihadists vault over those Himalayas, they would have to deliver the weapon onto American soil. Sure, drug smugglers bring in contraband all the time -- but seeking their help would confront the plotters with possible exposure or extortion. This, like every other step in the entire process, means expanding the circle of people who know what's going on, multiplying the chance someone will blab, back out or screw up. Mueller recalls that after the Irish Republican Army failed in an attempt to blow up British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, it said, "We only have to be lucky once. You will have to be lucky always." Al-Qaida, he says, faces a very different challenge: For it to carry out a nuclear attack, everything has to go right. For us to escape, only one thing has to go wrong. That has heartening implications. If Osama bin Laden embarks on the project, he has only a minuscule chance of seeing it bear fruit. Given the formidable odds, he probably won't bother.

# 1NR

#### 4. Deterrence still applies to drone use

Time 12

“Betting Against a Drone Arms Race”, Joseph Singh is a researcher at the Center for a New American Security, 8/13/12, http://nation.time.com/2012/08/13/betting-against-a-drone-arms-race/ //jchen

Instead, we must return to what we know about state behavior in an anarchistic international order. Nations will confront the same principles of deterrence, for example, when deciding to launch a targeted killing operation regardless of whether they conduct it through a drone or a covert amphibious assault team.

Drones may make waging war more domestically palatable, but they don’t change the very serious risks of retaliation for an attacking state. Any state otherwise deterred from using force abroad will not significantly increase its power projection on account of acquiring drones.

What’s more, the very states whose use of drones could threaten U.S. security – countries like China – are not democratic, which means that the possible political ramifications of the low risk of casualties resulting from drone use are irrelevant. For all their military benefits, putting drones into play requires an ability to meet the political and security risks associated with their use.

Despite these realities, there remain a host of defensible arguments one could employ to discredit the Obama drone strategy. The legal justification for targeted killings in areas not internationally recognized as war zones is uncertain at best.

Further, the short-term gains yielded by targeted killing operations in Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen, while debilitating to Al Qaeda leadership in the short-term, may serve to destroy already tenacious bilateral relations in the region and radicalize local populations.

Yet, the past decade’s experience with drones bears no evidence of impending instability in the global strategic landscape. Conflict may not be any less likely in the era of drones, but the nature of 21st Century warfare remains fundamentally unaltered despite their arrival in large numbers.

#### **Turkish influence leads to Turkey-Russia War over the Gagauz**

Goble 12-22 Paul, Director of Research and Publications, Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy; vice dean for the social sciences and humanities, Audentes U; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Senior Research Associate, EuroCollege, U of Tartu; worked in US State Department, CIA, International Broadcasting Bureau; Writes for VOA, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty “Growing Turkish Influence Among Gagauz Threatens Russian Interests” *Eurasia Review*, December 22, 2010 http://www.eurasiareview .com/analysis/growing-turkish-influence-among-gagauz-threatens-russian-interests-22122010/

Turkey’s use of “soft power” among the 250,000 Gagauz living in the former Soviet space – 140,000 in Moldova, 40,000 in Ukraine, and 12,000 in Russia itself – represents a growing threat to Russian interests not just in Moldova but across the entire Black Sea region, according to a Russian analyst.

In a commentary on the portal of the Center for Strategic Assessments and Predictions, Vladislav Gulyevich says that the Turkic-speaking but Orthodox Christian Gagauz have been a target of Turkish influence campaigns for almost 20 years, an effort that is bearing fruit and that threatens Moscow’s interests in major ways (www.csef.ru/studies/politics/materials/933/).

The first indication of Ankara’s success was the Gagauz decision to change the alphabet they used from one based on Cyrillic to the Latin script, a change that not only distanced them from the Russians but increased their ties with Turkey, the language of which is very similar to Gagauz.

In 1995, the first Turkish delegations arrived in Gagauzia in Moldova, and they included “not only politicians but also public activists and representatives of Turkish cultural and educational institutions.” As a result, the first Society of Turkish-Gagauz Friendship appeared, a group with links to numerous Turkish foundations.

And then in 2000, Gulyevich continues, the National Assembly of Gagauzia approved the opening of a representative office in Turkey and reached agreement with Ankara about the elimination of Turkish entry visas for residents of the autonomy, a step that mattered because of the increasing number of Gagauz studying in Turkey.

Komrat University, the main Gagauz higher educational institution, has partnerships with five Turkish universities and sends “about 60 students” a year to study there on Ankara-financed scholarships. According to Gulyevich, there are discussions about establishing similar programs for Gagauz students at Baku State University and in several Central Asian schools as well.

Perhaps even more important, there are as many as 50,000 Moldovan citizens in Turkey, “the majority of whom are Gagauz.” At the same time, there is now a Turkish Cultural Center in Komrat as well as a Turkish gymnasium, all organized by TIKA, the Turkish Administration for Cooperation and Development.

TIKA’s Moldovan office is in Chisinau, and certain members of its staff, Grigulyevich continues, are thought to be “activists of various Turkish radical organizations like the Gray Wolves who based themselves in Gagauzia even before the disintegration of the USSR.” Members of that group, he says, also fought for Chechen independence.

Russian analysts have devoted some attention to the Gagauz of Moldova, but Ankara has been interested in the Gagauz elsewhere as well. TIKA now has a special department for the Gagauz of Ukraine, and, again according to Grigulyevich, “the Turkish side constantly positions Gagauzia as a political-economic phenomenon separate from Moldova.”

Ankara not only includes Gagauz representatives from Ukraine in Turkish measures of various kinds but both broadcasts to them in their own language and provides school textbooks for the Gagauz of Ukraine, textbooks which promote the idea that the Gagauz are part of the Turkish world rather than the Slavic one.

All of this effort toward a small nationality many have not heard of is part of Ankara’s effort to transform the Black Sea into “an inner sea of the Turks,” an effort that might be countered by the rise of Greater Romania, something unlikely given Gagauz attitudes, or by expanded Russian efforts among the Gagauz, measures not now on the horizon.

Consequently, despite the historical sympathies of the Gagauz for Russia and Russians, the current leadership of Gagauzia in Moldova “does not hide its sympathies for Ankara.” That does not mean it is opposed to Russia, but over time, Turkey is certainly gaining the upper hand with its various “soft power” programs including highway building.

Indeed, “an entire generation of young people has grown up [in Gagauzia] who recognize perfectly well who is providing real help to the autonomy and its population,” Turkey but not Russia. And that sets the stage at a minimum for conflicts between Russia and Turkey and in the longer term for a fundamental shift in the geopolitical balance of the region.

Moreover, Grigulyevich continues, while Turkish efforts among the Gagauz are not yet explicitly anti-Russian, there is every chance that they will become so, just as they have already in Ankara’s outreach to the Crimean Tatars. At present, Grigulyevich says, Moscow could do something about this, but in the near future, it may be “already too late.”

Cecire 12-17 Michael Hikari, analyst; Peace Corps Volunteer; Managing Editor, Evolutsia.net; writer for Caspian Business Journal, London Telegraph, World Politics Review, and TCS Daily “A Turkey V. Russia Showdown” *Eurasia Review*, December 17, 2010 <http://www.eurasiareview.com/analysis/a-turkey-v-russia-showdown-17122010/>

According to the piece, Turkish leadership during the 2008 war informed their counterparts in Russia that further incursions into Georgia — and specifically in the historically Turkey-aligned, Muslim Georgian region of Adjara – would be responded to with military force from the Republic of Turkey, Georgia’s neighbor and a leg in a great power triad that also includes Russia to the north and Iran to the southeast. Georgia, needless to say, occupies geography at the space where the influence from these three ancient super-civilizations collide. [2]

“According to [an alleged Wikileaks] document,” reads the December 7 article on News.Am, a “Turkish delegation told Medvedev that if Russia conducted military operations near the 100-kilometer zone surrounding the Turkish border, the Turkish side, as a NATO member, would have the right and even be obligated to place their units into military operations and protect the territory of neighboring member states of the alliance.”

If true, this is major news as, if anything, relations between Ankara and Moscow have been most visibly on the up and up over the past few years under the moderate Islamist AKP government despite an entrenched historical rivalry. Just as telling is the extent to which Turkey’s ‘neo-Ottoman’ resurgence has taken hold in the country’s corridors of power and how Turkey’s policymakers see Georgia as a key spoke an emerging Turkish hub.

Turkey, a NATO member state and a budding contender for a leadership role in central Eurasia, maintains a large and extremely well-equipped military that is built along NATO standards. Though not a nuclear power, its conventional forces are quite well-trained and might be more than a match for Russia’s famously insubordinate, creaky Caucasus formations that disproportionately rely on militias and conscript-heavy forces. Turkey can also amass more troops more quickly than their Russian counterparts, who patrol vastly longer borders with a concomitant increase in the number of potential security flashpoints that require dedicated garrisons.

It goes without saying that the conventional narrative of the August 2008 war between Russia and Georgia — and indeed the general geopolitical climate in the region — is sufficiently volatile enough without the added variable of a Turkish military confrontation with invading Russian formations. For many reasons, armed conflict between Turkey and Russia would be a major blow to regional and Eurasian security and could set off a much larger, transcontinental war involving NATO and other major powers.

However, with the sheer enormity of the Wikileaks cablegate database and the drip-drip of the papers’ release, it’s can be a challenge to distinguish between cables that are real and those that are less than demonstrably so. A recent example was the cable that about the US support for the Georgian position during the August war, which showed up in the Georgian media before Wikileaks or any of its Western partner media organizations had released it. [3]

For this reason, and because the cable in question does not seem to appear on any cablegate databases that are currently accessible [4], it was important to follow up on this alleged cable’s source. According to the News.Am article in English, it reports its source as Vlasti.Net, a Russian-language content aggregator. From there, a link goes to another Russian-language source, VVNews.Info, which in turn has yet another link to Georgia Online/Apsny, where the trail ends with no further hypertext sourcing. [5] And between these pages, there is very little in the way of changes in the textual content.  
“Turkey was ready, at the time of the Russo-Georgian war, to enter Adjara with their armed forces if Georgian authorities could not ensure security in the region,” Merabishvili is reported to have said.

This wild goosechase , as well as similar such searches, appear to reveal that there is no actual source online to provide a basis for this extraordinary allegation. At the same time, this allegation does not seem to have been refuted anywhere publicly, although it is certainly possible that it has been so in Turkish, Armenian, or even in a more distant corner of the Russian-language internet. Instead, this same article — or at least extremely close approximations of it — have flooded the Russian-language internet, many of which referring to each other as sources for the information despite the obvious inconsistency of the claim.

One iteration of the article, posted on Newsland.Ru but aggregated from Regnum.Ru, did refer to a non-Russian site as a source, pointing to an apparently Ukraine-based Russian-language website called Zavtra.com.ru. [6] Unfortunately, this too turned out to likely be a useless lead. Even if it was the origin of the rich claim, it provides no link to the cable in question or much of anything else to prove to veracity of the giant claim about the almost Russia-Turkey war.

However, one thing that was on Zavtra, along with many other sites (but not all), was an alleged quote by Georgian interior minister Vano Merabishvili from a supposed March 2009 interview with the “news agency PirWeli [‘first’ in Georgian, possibly referring to the Georgian public broadcaster or many other similarly-named publications, websites, and aggregators].”

“Turkey was ready, at the time of the Russo-Georgian war, to enter Adjara their armed forces if Georgian authorities could not ensure security in the region,” Merabishvili is reported to have said in the interview. Searches in the Russian and Georgian-language media have, so far, failed to verify the accuracy or even the existence of this quote.

The deepest problem is that despite all this resounding lack of firm evidence, there is still very much of a chance that this cable to which so many have referred may turn out to be genuine. If it is genuine, then the geopolitical balance in the region, which has already shown signs of shifting, is much further along than most observers would have dared to forecast with a client-patron relationship between Tbilisi and Ankara a very firm reality.

But if it isn’t true, what else does it mean? The unbelievable persistence of this rumor — and that is all it is until it can receive some kind of actual confirmation — could by itself be demonstrating something. Particularly, the Russian-language news media is systematically (though perhaps unwittingly, though perhaps not) propagating a notion that conflict between Russia and Turkey, its longstanding southern rival (and currently the only regional power with the growth horizon to seriously challenge Russia for central Eurasian and Central Asian hegemony) is a distinct possibility and even some kind of inevitability. The Russian media, of which much of its core machinery continues to operate in close coordination with the organs of state power, is no stranger to fanning flames of resentment against other countries (or cooling them) in pursuit of state policies. This is a standard practice in many autocratic and authoritarian governments, including to some (but much more limited) extent in <CONTINUED>

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Georgia, though it is unquestionably more transparent and pluralistic overall.

If this is the case, the article on the impending war between Turkey and Russia is an extremely important signal whether or not the cable is real. If it is indeed genuine, then Turkey has included Georgia — and specifically autonomous Adjara, over which it still technically has some distant oversight authority per the 1921 Treaty of Kars [7] — as being an essential component of its developing Turkey-oriented system. However, even if it is not based on a genuine cable, the extent to which the article has been disseminated throughout major pillars of the Russian-language internet media (and everything in between) could suggest that certain elements of the Russian government see Turkey as a future, inevitable foe against which Russia should begin to prepare itself.

#### Increased influence kills accession

Paul 11 Amanda, “Turkey riding high” *Today’s Zaman*, February 2, 2011 [http://www.todayszaman.com/ columnist-234198-turkey-riding-high.html](http://www.todayszaman.com/%20columnist-234198-turkey-riding-high.html)

While Bağış gave assurances that Ankara remains committed to taking the EU medicine, the Bursa Days event also held no surprises vis-à-vis the EU with a familiar message being conveyed: Turkey is going to solve all the EU’s problems and Turkey is going to make the EU a real global player. To some degree this is true. If Turkey was already in the EU, its response to what is happening in Egypt and elsewhere would probably have been more robust and influential rather than the weak and wishy-washy effort we have seen so far. The EU is seemingly more interested in discussing the never-ending euro crisis saga. Nevertheless, Turkey should not overplay its hand. Just because it is an increasingly important country, this does not give it the right to dictate how the negotiations should be carried out, which seems to be the case. Turkey has legal obligations it needs to meet, no matter how big and powerful it may believe itself to be. The ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) needs the EU -- to maintain stable and continuous foreign investment, for the reform process and for its own legitimacy. On the Cyprus problem, while the EU as a body may say it desires a solution, some member states are happy to allow the problem to fester because they oppose Turkey’s membership. This was clear from the recent visit of Angela Merkel to Cyprus. Following her lead in congratulating the Greek Cypriots for the efforts they are putting into the peace talks, while at the same time condemning Turkey and therefore the Turkish Cypriots for not doing enough, it now seems French President Nicolas Sarkozy is planning to do the same thing with a visit to Cyprus shortly. The EU is supposed to be supporting the UN in their efforts to find a solution. Quite how going to Nicosia and blaming one party is helping the process, I really wonder. It also comes at a time in the talks when both sides need to be more flexible. Merkel and Sarkozy may as well tell Dimitris Christofias, “No need to make any concessions, keep the island divided and keep Turkey out.” The fact is Turkey in the EU is the best insurance policy Cyprus could ever have for a stable, secure and prosperous future. This is what Sarkozy and Merkel should be saying. In Davos, Babacan may have been correct when he said the EU is presently somewhat inward looking. However, I don’t believe he was right to claim the EU no longer has an “open door policy” or that it is a Christian club. Rather, the EU has adopted a “pick and choose carefully” approach to further enlargement. Therefore the door is seemingly closed to big or powerful countries, or countries which have historically been in another big power’s sphere of influence. The EU is not brave enough or visionary enough to look beyond this yet. Nowadays the door is wide open for Croatia, Iceland and all the countries of the Western Balkans. If tomorrow Norway or Switzerland decided they wanted in, I doubt there would be any objections. But of course Turkey is not Iceland or Serbia.

#### EU accession solves WWIII

Laciner 9 Sedat, ISRO Director and Onsekiz Mart University IR Lecturer; “Turkey's EU Membership: EU's Identity Crisis” *Turkish Weekly*; December 22, 2009; http://www.turkishweekly.net/columnist/3251/

Today’s situation is not different from that of the era of the Second World War. People are so optimistic as if Second World War took place centuries ago. But it was not so long ago, just 50-60 years. At those times, people in Europe killed people due to their different religion or different colour of skin; they burnt, tortured and killed them. We even do not know how many people were killed and massacred. Thus, we talk about the people capable of doing it. Europe has the potential to do such things. That is, being at its peak level of civilization should not hide the reality that it reached its peak level of violence and cruelty as well. European nations massacred more people than those of the rest of the world killed. It is also a place where racism is clearly witnessed. Thus the danger is not totally eliminated; in fact it always exists wherever human beings exist. And now, Europe is moving in the wrong direction there is a radical shift in its direction. And here, Turkey is the only country that can prevent this dangerous shift to the old Europe, the Europe of the Middle Ages, and the Europe of the Second World War. Turkey is able to prevent both the Islamic religious extremism in the East and the Christian religious extremism in the West. At this point, Turkey’s membership to the EU may help to stop all these movements by becoming the true member of the family. It will be the best example of the coexistence of Christians and Muslims.

#### No loose nukes.

Hundley 9/5 [Tom, senior editor at the Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting. This article for Foreign Policy is part of the Pulitzer Center's Gateway project on nuclear security. SEPTEMBER 5, 2012 http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/09/05/race\_to\_the\_end?page=full]

To outsiders, Pakistan appears to be permanently teetering on the brink of collapse. The fact that large swaths of the country are literally beyond the control of the central government is not reassuring. But a weak state does not mean a weak society, and powerful internal dynamics based largely on kinship and tribe make it highly unlikely that Pakistan would ever fall under the control of an outfit like the Taliban. During the country's intermittent bouts of democracy, its civilian leaders have been consistently incompetent and corrupt, but even in the worst of times, the military has maintained a high standard of professionalism. And there is nothing that matters more to the Pakistani military than keeping the nuclear arsenal -- its crown jewels -- out of the hands of India, the United States, and homegrown extremists. "Pakistan struggled to acquire these weapons against the wishes of the world. Our nuclear capability comes as a result of great sacrifice. It is our most precious and powerful weapon -- for our defense, our security, and our political prestige," Talat Masood, a retired Pakistani lieutenant general, told me. "We keep them safe."

#### No threatening programs and current defenses solve.

Orent 9 [Wendy, Ph.D. in anthropology from the University of Michigan, leading freelance science writer, and author of Plague: The Mysterious Past and Terrifying Future of the World's Most Dangerous Disease, "America's Bioterror Bugaboo." Los Angeles Times (Los Angeles, CA) 17 Jul 2009: A.29. SIRS Researcher. Web. 29 January 2010]

After the anthrax letter attacks of October 2001, the Bush administration pledged $57 billion to keep the nation safe from bioterror. Since then, the government has created a vast network of laboratories and institutions to track down and block every remotely conceivable form of bioterror threat. The Obama administration seems committed to continuing the biodefense push, having just appointed a zealous bioterror researcher as undersecretary of science and technology in the Department of Homeland Security. But is the threat really as great as we've been led to believe? Last summer, the FBI concluded that the anthrax letters that killed five Americans came not from abroad but from an American laboratory, the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases. Meanwhile, the Russian bioweapons program was officially shut down in 1992, and it's unlikely that anything remaining of it could pose much of a threat. Iraq, it has turned out, had no active program. And Al Qaeda's rudimentary explorations were interrupted, according to an Army War College report, by the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan.

#### Turkish model doesn’t help Middle East peace

Kalin 11 Ibrahim, columnist, Today’s Zaman; winner, Turkish Writer’s Association, Best Writer; “Is Turkey a Model for the Arab World?” *Today’s Zaman* February 11, 2011 <http://www.todayszaman.com/columnist-235227-is-turkey-a-model-for-the-arab-world.html>

Secondly, conceiving a model for Arab countries is a way of forcing change upon them and would not be very different from President Bush’s failed “democracy and freedom agenda.” What needs to be done in most Arab countries is clear: better governance, ending corruption, establishing institutions of democracy, free and fair elections and better economic policies. These are clear-cut goals and have become universal policies. Arab countries do not need Turkey or another country to implement these policies in their own countries.