Permutation do the plan as a line of flight. **Deleuze would fundamentally agree that our methodology is a good way to break down ideological binaries which escapes from normative thought processes. Deleuze encourages a breakdown of binary thinking.**

Brian Massumi, 1983 (Professor at U of Montreal, Masters and Doctoral degrees in French Literature from Yale University and completed postdoctoral work at Stanford University.; Ph. D., is a political theorist, writer and philosopher; A Thousand Plateaus, Introduction)

"State philosophy" is another word for the representational thinking that has characterized Western metaphysics since Plato, but has suffered an at least momentary setback during the last quarter century at the hands of Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, and poststructuralist theory generally. As described by Deleuze,16 it reposes on a double identity: of the thinking subject, and of the concepts it creates and to which it lends its own presumed attributes of sameness and constancy**.** The subject, its concepts, and also the objects in the world to which the concepts are applied have a shared, internal essence: the self-resemblance at the basis of identity. Representational thought is analogical; its concern is to establish a correspondence between these symmetrically structured domains. The faculty of judgment is the policeman of analogy, assuring that each of the three terms is honestly itself, and that the proper correspondences obtain. In thought its end is truth, in action justice. The weapons it wields in their pursuit are limitative distribution (the determination of the exclusive set of properties possessed by each term in contradistinction to the others: logos, law) and hierarchical ranking (the measurement of the degree of perfection of a term's self-resemblance in relation to a supreme standard, man, god, or gold: value, morality). The modus operandi is negation: x = x = not y. Identity, resemblance, truth, justice, and negation. The rational foundation for order. The established order, of course: philosophers have traditionally been employees of the State. The collusion between philosophy and the State was most explicitly enacted in the first decade of the nineteenth century with the foundation of the University of Berlin, which was to become the model for higher learning throughout Europe and in the United States. The goal laid out for it by Wilhelm von Humboldt (based on proposals by Fichte and Schleiermacher) was the "spiritual and moral training of the nation," to be achieved by "deriving everything from an original principle" (truth), by "relating everything to an ideal" (justice), and by "unifying this principle and this ideal in a single Idea" (the State). The end product would be "a fully legitimated subject of knowledge and society"17—each mind an analogously organized mini-State morally unified in the supermind of the State. Prussian mind-meld.18 More insidious than the well-known practical cooperation between university and government (the burgeoning military funding of research) is its philosophical role in the propagation of the form of representational thinking itself, that "properly spiritual absolute State" endlessly reproduced and disseminated at every level of the social fabric. Deconstruction-influenced feminists such as Helene Cixous and Luce Irigaray have attacked it under the name "phallogocentrism" (what the most privileged model of rocklike identity is goes without saying). In the introduction to A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari describe it as the "arborescent model" of thought (the proudly erect tree under whose spreading boughs latter-day Platos conduct their class). "Nomad thought" does not immure itself in the edifice of an ordered interiority; it moves freely in an element of exteriority**.** It does not repose on identity; it rides difference. It does not respect the artificial division between the three domains of representation, subject, concept, and being; it replaces restrictive analogy with a conductivity that knows no bounds. The concepts it creates do not merely reflect the eternal form of a legislating subject, but are defined by a communicable force in relation to which their subject, to the extent that they can be said to have one, is only secondary. They do not reflect upon the world but are immersed in a changing state of things. A concept is a brick. It can be used to build the courthouse of reason. Or it can be thrown through the window. What is the subject of the brick? The arm that throws it? The body connected to the arm? The brain encased in the body? The situation that brought brain and body to such a juncture? All and none of the above. What is its object? The window? The edifice? The laws the edifice shelters? The class and other power relations encrusted in the laws? All and none of the above. "What interests us are the circumstances."19 Because the concept in its unrestrained usage is a set of circumstances, at a volatile juncture. It is a vector: the point of application of a force moving through a space at a given velocity in a given direction. The concept has no subject or object other than itself. It is an act. Nomad thought replaces the closed equation of representation, x = x = not y (I = I = not you) with an open equation:.. . + y + z + a + ...(...+ arm + brick + window + . . .). Rather than analyzing the world into discrete components, reducing their manyness to the One of identity, and ordering them by rank, it sums up a set of disparate circumstances in a shattering blow**.** It synthesizes a multiplicity of elements without effacing their heterogeneity or hindering their potential for future rearranging (to the contrary). The modus operandi of nomad thought is affirmation, even when its apparent object is negative. Force is not to be confused with power. Force arrives from outside to break constraints and open new vistas. Power builds walls. The space of nomad thought is qualitatively different from State space. Air against earth. State space is "striated," or gridded. Movement in it is confined as by gravity to a horizontal plane, and limited by the order of that plane to preset paths between fixed and identifiable points. Nomad space is "smooth," or open-ended. One can rise up at any point and move to any other. Its mode of distribution is the nomos: arraying oneself in an open space (hold the street), as opposed to the logos of entrenching oneself in a closed space (hold the fort). A Thousand Plateaus is an effort to construct a smooth space of thought. It is not the first such attempt. Like State philosophy, nomad thought goes by many names. Spinoza called it "ethics." Nietzsche called it the "gay science." Artaud called it "crowned anarchy." To Maurice Blanchot, it is the "space of literature." To Foucault, "outside thought."20 In this book, Deleuze and Guattari employ the terms "pragmatics" and "schizoanalysis," and in the introduction describe a rhizome network strangling the roots of the infamous tree. One of the points of the book is that nomad thought is not confined to philosophy. Or that the kind of philosophy it is comes in many forms. Filmmakers and painters are philosophical thinkers to the extent that they explore the potentials of their respective mediums and break away from the beaten paths.21 On a strictly formal level, it is mathematics and music that create the smoothest of the smooth spaces.22 In fact, Deleuze and Guattari would probably be more inclined to call philosophy music with content than music a rarefied form of philosophy. Which returns to our opening question.How should A Thousand Plateaus be played? When you buy a record there are always cuts that leave you cold. You skip them. You don't approach a record as a closed book that you have to take or leave. Other cuts you may listen to over and over again. They follow you. You find yourself humming them under your breath as you go about your daily business**.**

#### Doesn’t solve the aff – they posit ethics as conditional. Decision is the utmost ethical responsibility and must be made unconditionally.

Mules ‘10 Senior Lecturer in Cultural Studies at Central Queensland University and Adjunct Senior Lecturer in the School of English, Media Studies and Art History, The University of Queensland 2010 Warwick Derrida Today 3.1 http://www.euppublishing.com/doi/pdfplus/10.3366/drt.2010.0007

The fact of democracy is the breaching of democracy’s closure in all forms of totalisation and calculation; its openness to the other as absolute. In this case, the democratic relation is not given in advance, but must issue out of a decision that is freely made. We may decide to do something, but the decision itself, in its very act, is that which exceeds all motivation and purpose. Decisions must decide absolutely, where what one decides upon might not be. Decisions are not even reducible to chance or the dice throw, since these presume a state of affairs that can be calculated. Decisions are existential risks, if you like, the risking of the fact that what is, is as it is. Decisions are thus responsibilities that we have in existing, in the face of undecidable otherness. As Derrida puts it, the exposure of undecidability does not mean that we cannot decide; rather that we must decide, but decide on the basis of the undecidability of that about which we decide: ‘if I speak so often of the incalculable and the undecidable it’s not out of a simple predilection for play nor in order to neutralise decision: on the contrary, I believe there is no responsibility, no ethico-political decision, that must not pass through the proofs of the incalculable or the undecidable. Otherwise, everything would be reducible to calculation, program, causality’ (Derrida 1995, 273). The imperative of the decision is not a matter of deciding for something, but of invoking the power to decide as absolutely essential to an existence in such a way that does not immediately surrender it to calculation, prediction and the already decided. To decide in this way (but is there any other way?) is to invoke a power that exceeds self reﬂection, the power of critique as praxis: a way of doing that is itself the very thing that it enacts. 10 As a praxis, freedom enacts itself in the decision to be free. As Nancy puts it, we cannot decide for freedom since we are already free in our capacity to decide (Nancy 1993, 142 ff.). A decision is free insofar as it is a ‘letting being be in its ﬁnite singularity’ (Nancy 1993, 142). As a decision for existence, the decision does not make us good or morally right, but ‘frees us for duty and right, and for the perversion of the one and the other’ (Nancy 1993, 143). 11 It is rendering us capable of morality, rather than an act of being moral. The decision has to be thought in terms other than freedom as a simple self-positing of virtue. How then do we decide if we cannot decide for democracy in the name of freedom?

#### There can be no separation from the academy – only a deconstruction of rationality and freedom can appropriate those concepts in a counter-hegemonic manner.

Derrida ‘3 [Jacques Derrida, THE “WORLD” OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT TO COME (EXCEPTION, CALCULATION, SOVEREIGNTY)\* 2003 Pg. 43-44]

What must be thought here, then, is this inconceivable and unknowable thing, a freedom that would no longer be the power of a subject, a freedom without autonomy, a heteronomy without servitude, in short, something like a passive decision. We would thus have to rethink the philosophemes of the decision, of activity and passivity, as well as potentiality and actuality. It is thus rational, legitimately rational, to interrogate or deconstruct—without however discrediting—the fertile distinction between constative and performative. Similarly, beyond law, debt, and duty, it would be necessary to rethink rationally a hyperethics or hyper-politics that does not settle for acting simply “according to duty ( pichtmässig)” or even (to take up the Kantian distinction that founds practical reason) “from duty” or “out of pure duty (eigentlich 44 jacques derrida aus Picht, aus reiner Picht).”12 Such a hyper-ethics or hyper-politics would carry us unconditionally beyond the economic circle of duty or of the task (Picht or Aufgabe), of the debt to be reappropriated or annulled, of what one knows must be done, of what thus still depends on a programmatic and normative knowledge that need only be carried out. The hiatus between these two equally rational postulations of reason, this excess of a reason that of itself exceeds itself and so opens onto its future, its to-come, its becoming, this exposition to the incalculable event, would also be the irreducible spacing of the very faith, credit, or belief without which there would be no social bond, no address to the other, no uprightness or honesty, no promise to be honored, and so no honor, no faith to be sworn or pledge to be given. This hiatus opens the rational space of a hypercritical faith, one without dogma and without religion, irreducible to any and all religious or implicitly theocratic institutions. It is what I’ve called elsewhere the awaiting without horizon of a messianicity without messianism. It goes without saying that I do not detect here even the slightest hint of irrationalism, obscurantism, or extravagance. This faith is another way of keeping within reason [raison garder], however mad it might appear. If the minimal semantic kernel we might retain from the various lexicons of reason, in every language, is the ultimate possibility of, if not a consensus, at least an address universally promised and unconditionally entrusted to the other, then reason remains the element or very air of a faith without church and without credulity, the raison d’être of the pledge, of credit, of testimony beyond proof, the raison d’être of any belief in the other, that is, of their belief and of our belief in them—and thus also of any perjury. For as soon as reason does not close itself off to the event that comes, the event of what or who comes, assuming it is not irrational to think that the worst can always happen, and well beyond what Kant thinks under the name “radical evil,” then only the infinite possibility of the worst and of perjury can grant the possibility of the good, of veracity and sworn faith. This possibility remains infinite, but as the very possibility of an auto-immunitary finitude.

#### The aff is a positive will to power and expression – we are self-creative and reflexive via deconstruction. The friction between the 1AC and 1NC methodologies are able to induce new tropes of political reality via deconstructive juxtaposition.

Spivak ‘97 [an Indian theorist, philosopher and University Professor at Columbia University, where she is a founding member of the school's Institute for Comparative Literature and Society, “Jacques Derrida OF GRAMMATOLOGY” Translated by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak,” <http://www.mohamedrabeea.com/books/book1_3997.pdf>]

Speaking of the hymen, Derrida emphasizes the role of the blank spaces of the page in the play of meaning. Analogically, Derrida himself often devotes his attention to the text in its margins, so to speak. He examines the minute particulars of an undecidable moment, nearly imperceptible displacements, that might otherwise escape the reader’s eye. Reading Foucault, he concentrates on three pages out of 673. Reading Rousseau, he chooses a text that is far from “central.” Reading Heidegger, he proceeds to write a note on a note to Sein and Zeit. His method, as he says to Jean-Louis Houdebine, perhaps a little too formulaically, is reversal and displacement. It is not enough “simply to neutralize the binary oppositions of metaphysics.” We must recognize that, within the familiar philosophical oppositions, there is always “a violent ((lxxvii)) hierarchy. One of the two terms controls the other (axiologically, logically, etc.), holds the superior position. To deconstruct the opposition is first .. . to overthrow [renverser] the hierarchy.” (Pos F 57, Pos E. I. 36) To fight violence with violence. In the Grammatology this structural phase would be represented by all those pages where, all apologies to the contrary, the polemical energy seems clearly engaged in putting writing above speech. But in the next phase of deconstruction, this reversal must be displaced, the winning term put under erasure. The critic must make room for “the irruptive emergence of a new ‘concept,’ a concept which no longer allows itself to be understood in terms of the previous regime [system of oppositions].” In terms of our book, this would be the aspect that “allows for the dissonant emergence of a writing inside of speech, thus disorganizing all the received order and invading the whole sphere of speech” (Pos E I. 36). To locate the promising marginal text, to disclose the undecidable moment, to pry it loose with the positive lever of the signifier; to reverse the resident hierarchy, only to displace it; to dismantle in order to reconstitute what is always already inscribed. Deconstruction in a nutshell. But take away the assurance of the text’s authority, the critic’s control, and the primacy of meaning, and the possession of this formula does not guarantee much. Why should we undo and redo a text at all? Why not assume that words and the author “mean what they say?” It is a complex question. Here let us examine Derrida’s most recent meditation upon the desire of deconstruction. Derrida acknowledges that the desire of deconstruction may itself be-come a desire to reappropriate the text actively through mastery, to show the text what it “does not know.” And as she deconstructs, all protestations to the contrary, the critic necessarily assumes that she at least, and for the time being, means what she says. Even the declaration of her vulnerability must come, after all, in the controlling language of demonstration and reference. In other words, the critic provisionally forgets that her own text is necessarily self-deconstructed, always already a palimpsest. The desire of deconstruction has also the opposite allure. Deconstruction seems to offer a way out of the closure of knowledge. By inaugurating the open-ended indefiniteness of textuality —by thus “placing in the abyss” (mettre en abîme), as the French expression would literally have it—it shows us the lure of the abyss as freedom. The fall into the abyss of deconstruction inspires us with as much pleasure as fear. We are intoxicated with the prospect of never hitting bottom.Thus a further deconstruction deconstructs deconstruction, both as the search for a foundation (the critic behaving as if she means what she says in her text), and as the pleasure of the bottomless. The tool for this, as ((lxxviii)) indeed for any deconstruction, is our desire, itself a deconstructive and grammatological structure that forever differs from (we only desire what is not ourselves) and defers (desire is never fulfilled) the text of our selves. Deconstruction can therefore never be a positive science. For we are in a bind, in a “double (read abyssal) bind,” Derrida’s newest nickname for the schizophrenia of the “sous rature.” 81 We must do a thing and its opposite, and indeed we desire to do both, and so on indefinitely. Deconstruction is a perpetually self-deconstructing movement that is inhabited by differance. No text is ever fully deconstructing or deconstructed. Yet the critic provisionally musters the metaphysical resources of criticism and performs what declares itself to be one (unitary) act of deconstruction. As I point out on pages Ixxxi–lxxxii, the kinship with Freud’s interminable and terminable analysis, involving both subject and analyst, is here not to be ignored.

#### Nietzsche and Derrida are basically the same argument. The nature of unconditional hospitality, form of criticism, and acceptance of difference.

Ronell 08 (Untread and Untried Nietzsche Reads Derridemocracy Avital Ronell diacritics, Volume 38, Numbers 1-2, Spring-Summer 2008, pp. 158-171 (Article) Published by The Johns Hopkins University Press)

So maybe it started out in my unconscious. It should have been dropped at once, but I was imprinted. He himself breaches the name, watches it respell itself, cower, bloat, and assume a hint of meaning. In the Carte postale, his name at one point gets stamped as “J’accepte”—Jacques resignified as the affirmation of acceptance. Maybe a selective acceptance, or maybe there’s room enough now for my uncs. An instance of unconditional hospitality, total acceptance: like a package you sign for without knowing what it contains. Or maybe “J’accepte” refers to an inflection of destiny before which one surrenders—more passive, more giving than any act of affirmation. A lot can be said when a name proves able to switch semantic gears, absorbing a trace of readability. Still, **if anyone teaches us to desist from tampering frivolously with the proper name, it is Jacques Derrida.** Understanding why he put the brakes on name engineering, I was nonetheless powerless to stop a morph from entering my head or hands—I’m not sure which receptors where catch his meaning, or where to situate my uncs. Let me put it this way. The affirmation for which Jacques signs allows me to clear some abysses, run through discursive barriers to a place where Nietzsche encouraged the colloquy of science and art with the poetic word. If we did not have art to talk us down from the scientific ledge, he sort of says, we would all have committed suicide—this bit about suicide he says verbatim. Art prepares us for the traumatic detachment from truth on which science stands firm. Science receives its power pills and toxic spills from poetry and art. Let me back up to explore these assertions in terms of Nietzsche’s unfinished business with Derrida and the affirmations that they share. Where to locate their points of entry today? Nietzsche puts his mark on Derrida, but Derrida also makes it necessary to recon- figure Nietzsche, to shake up some of the old philological certitudes and shake out some of the unsaid that continues to hide out in the open spaces of an ever-unfinished oeuvre. The force of improvisation available to Derrida, and by which such acts as naming can be altered, belongs to a moment in the culture of experiment announced by Friedrich Nietzsche. His peculiar brand of scientificity encourages morphs and mutations: science, for Nietzsche, licenses probes that scour the rhetorical unconscious and rewrite the word on the street. Often the Nietzschean unsaid bears a feminine trace. The reading pact con- figured by Derrida and Nietzsche, by a Nietzsche read and shot through with Derrida, requires us to consider how Nietzsche called for Derrida, put a search on him as he formulated the roadmap for a future philosophy. On the one hand, Nietzsche’s flair for experiment conjugates well with Derrida’s sensibility for improvisation. Let us stay with this hand; it’s a good hand. Nowadays the state is openly attacking science. Nietzsche saw it through his future- seeing night goggles: religion is a veto on science. Some of the exploits of Nietzsche’s risk taking are still on Derrida’s watch. The untread and untried in Nietzsche continue to agitate in a work that is set up with specific triggers for what Nietzsche saw as a scientific culture. Nietzsche installed his thought as a test site, a space where the “hardest tests” can be tried and where failure is part of the semantic and historical adventure to be undertaken. My temptation would be to put Derrida’s thought on aporia in there (about which he said, in conversation with a group of philosophers, that Heidegger most likely would have disapproved4) and set it up against Nietzsche’s abyssal proving grounds. One need only consider Nietzsche and Derrida on the elements of testing to see where functional features of their thought are crucially linked. The philosophy of the future, Nietzsche projects, belongs to the testers and attempters, to those who are willing to risk themselves on the *versuch*: “A new species of philosophers is coming up: I venture to baptize them with a name that is not free of danger. As I unriddle them, insofar as they allow themselves to be unriddled—for it belongs to their nature to want to remain riddles at some point—these philosophers of the future may have a right—it might also be a wrong—to be called attempters(*versucher*: tempters, testers, experimenters). This name itself is in the end a mere attempt and, if you will, a temptation” [52]. The very act of conjuring and naming the future philosopher belongs to the species of which Nietzsche speaks, for he has ventured to take the risk of positing, of outfitting futurity. Inviting danger, he tests the name and brings on the future by means of an experiment in positing, “a mere attempt” that, constructed as a test, is vulnerable to its own destruction. The future philosophers that Nietzsche calls forth in this passage have a right that “might also be wrong,” which is to say that, as he establishes them, giving them rights and existence, Nietzsche equally inserts the code authorizing their refutability. in *Beyond Good and evil,* a book that was supposed to wrap it all up for him following the extravagance he had permitted himself with *Zarathustra,* Nietzsche spoke of physics as just another interpretation of the world: “It is perhaps just dawning on five or six minds,” he calculates, “that physics, too, is only an interpretation and exegesis of the world (to suit us, if I may say so!) and not a world-explanation” [§14 21]. By no means in- tending to underwrite a mere dismissal, Nietzsche set physics close to religion, which he understands as another, if unquestionably neurotic, interpretation of the world. In *Beyond Good and evil* Nietzsche in fact situates science close to conscience, effecting a linguistic parentage for which both German and English allow. Until now science has been the bad conscience of our era, winning out over other, often more decadent but possibly more replenishing interpretive behaviors.

#### Deconstruction is the culture of experimentation Nietzsche desired.

Ronell 08 (Untread and Untried Nietzsche Reads Derridemocracy Avital Ronell diacritics, Volume 38, Numbers 1-2, Spring-Summer 2008, pp. 158-171 (Article) Published by The Johns Hopkins University Press)

Let us bring our focus to an aspect of science that Nietzsche more or less discovered, implemented, posited, and which he links to an affirmable democracy—that is to say, to the experimental culture from which his work takes off. Thus, even though Nietzsche can be seen as an anti-democrat, a largely unprobed dimension of his thought provides a rigorous grid for evaluating political formations and exigencies. The conduit for establishing a progressive political science in Nietzsche is circuited through his understanding of scientific structures and their material implications. Nietzsche sets up a lab in *Beyond Good and evil* rather explicitly. A number of his other works pivot on the “experimental disposition” and treat themselves as experimental efforts. Nietzsche’s text incorporates the history of lab culture, which is linked to political innovation. As Derrida has else- where argued, there is a Nietzsche of the left and of the right, just as there is a Hegel—or marx—of the left and of the right [see *the ear of the other*]. Democracy is itself viewed in terms of a trial, a perpetual test case, never off the hook of its purported levels of achievement. If democracy increasingly depends upon an understanding of incessant try- outs and continual self-testing, reactionary modernity, too, has made use of experimental practice and the tropes of testing. The rhetoric and practices of testing go far beyond what one was willing to see. Politically constellated atrocity is fastened onto the techno- logical grid. Nietzsche, alone in his desert, was already picking up signals from a future pockmarked by Nazi experimentation, part of whose devastation consisted in setting up the camps as massively unrestricted laboratories—the most unregulated scientific sites in modern history. To this day, ethical questions arise concerning the usability of results stemming from these experiments. Nietzsche, with characteristic ambivalence, saw at least three sides of the coin and tried to navigate between the horror and the fascination that experimental culture provoked in him. Let us try to move on and travel along the edges of what Nietzsche massively designated as the experimental disposition. His first appointment is with the philosopher. It is scheduled for the future and is still coming at us.

#### The elimination of the civilians is not resentmount, the reading they have turns Nietzsche into a fascist in support of Cheney and Bush.

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If the inventory is set up in terms of serial “nots” this is no doubt because Nietzsche needs to enact the complicity of the *Versuch* with its linguistic appointees: the tester or attempter must *desist* from adhering to the temptation that calls. The act, if such it is, of desistence is not as such a negative one, as Derrida has argued in his reading of Lacoue- Labarthe: “Without being negative, or being subject to a dialectic, it both organizes and disorganizes what it appears to determine” [“Desistance” 41]. Being tested, which brings together attempter with the tempting, does not fall purely into the zone of action or its purported other—passivity—but engages both at once. Already the locution “being tested,” always awkward and slightly wrenching, invites the intervention of the passive where action or at least some activity is indicated. The test takes one through the magnetizing sites to which one is spontaneously, nearly naturally, attracted. This could be a resting place, a shelter and solace overseen by the friendly protectors of the pleasure principle. But Nietzsche, like the other guy, takes the test beyond the pleasure principle. Elsewhere Nietzsche states that pity toppled the gods; pity, the most dangerous affect, counts for the one to which we are most prone. We are tempted and tested by pity, roped in by its grim allure, and even if we are not gods, pity can make us crumble and christianize. (This does not mean that Nietzsche advocates the vulgarity of some forms of indifference. Only that action and intervention should not eventuate from pity, as do “benevolent racism” and the like. Liberal pity policies would be nauseating to Nietzsche; they are not radical, strong, or loving enough. Of course nowadays, I would even take liberal pity.) Science belongs to the list of the desisted—“resistance” would come off as too strong a term, too repressive and dependent on what presents itself. The inclusion of science in the subtle athletics of the “not” may reflect the way Nietzsche had to break away from his scientific niche of philology, but there is more to it. It is not just a matter of releasing oneself from a scientific commitment in order to pass the Nietzschean test. As the other term in the partnership, science itself stands to lose from too tight a grip and needs eventually to loosen the bond. A true temptress, science fascinates, perhaps seduces and lulls. It captivates and often enough gives one a high, an intoxicating sense of one’s own capacity for mastery. Yet science itself is implicated in the relation thus structured. For science not only curates the test from a place of superiority, but is itself subject to the rigors and renewals of testing. So even if it invites the blindness of fascination and the sum of addictive returns, science needs to be released if only to go under, to dissolve its substantial mask and be turned over to fresh scientific probes.