#### Perm Do Both: The friction between the 1AC and 1NC methodologies are able to induce new tropes of political reality via deconstructive juxtaposition. Their

Spivak ‘97 [an Indian theorist, philosopher and University Professor at Columbia University, where she is a founding member of the school's Institute for Comparative Literature and Society, “Jacques Derrida OF GRAMMATOLOGY” Translated by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak,” <http://www.mohamedrabeea.com/books/book1_3997.pdf>]

Speaking of the hymen, Derrida emphasizes the role of the blank spaces of the page in the play of meaning. Analogically, Derrida himself often devotes his attention to the text in its margins, so to speak. He examines the minute particulars of an undecidable moment, nearly imperceptible displacements, that might otherwise escape the reader’s eye. Reading Foucault, he concentrates on three pages out of 673. Reading Rousseau, he chooses a text that is far from “central.” Reading Heidegger, he proceeds to write a note on a note to Sein and Zeit. His method, as he says to Jean-Louis Houdebine, perhaps a little too formulaically, is reversal and displacement. It is not enough “simply to neutralize the binary oppositions of metaphysics.” We must recognize that, within the familiar philosophical oppositions, there is always “a violent ((lxxvii)) hierarchy. One of the two terms controls the other (axiologically, logically, etc.), holds the superior position. To deconstruct the opposition is first .. . to overthrow [renverser] the hierarchy.” (Pos F 57, Pos E. I. 36) To fight violence with violence. In the Grammatology this structural phase would be represented by all those pages where, all apologies to the contrary, the polemical energy seems clearly engaged in putting writing above speech. But in the next phase of deconstruction, this reversal must be displaced, the winning term put under erasure. The critic must make room for “the irruptive emergence of a new ‘concept,’ a concept which no longer allows itself to be understood in terms of the previous regime [system of oppositions].” In terms of our book, this would be the aspect that “allows for the dissonant emergence of a writing inside of speech, thus disorganizing all the received order and invading the whole sphere of speech” (Pos E I. 36). To locate the promising marginal text, to disclose the undecidable moment, to pry it loose with the positive lever of the signifier; to reverse the resident hierarchy, only to displace it; to dismantle in order to reconstitute what is always already inscribed. Deconstruction in a nutshell. But take away the assurance of the text’s authority, the critic’s control, and the primacy of meaning, and the possession of this formula does not guarantee much. Why should we undo and redo a text at all? Why not assume that words and the author “mean what they say?” It is a complex question. Here let us examine Derrida’s most recent meditation upon the desire of deconstruction. Derrida acknowledges that the desire of deconstruction may itself be-come a desire to reappropriate the text actively through mastery, to show the text what it “does not know.” And as she deconstructs, all protestations to the contrary, the critic necessarily assumes that she at least, and for the time being, means what she says. Even the declaration of her vulnerability must come, after all, in the controlling language of demonstration and reference. In other words, the critic provisionally forgets that her own text is necessarily self-deconstructed, always already a palimpsest. The desire of deconstruction has also the opposite allure. Deconstruction seems to offer a way out of the closure of knowledge. By inaugurating the open-ended indefiniteness of textuality —by thus “placing in the abyss” (mettre en abîme), as the French expression would literally have it—it shows us the lure of the abyss as freedom. The fall into the abyss of deconstruction inspires us with as much pleasure as fear. We are intoxicated with the prospect of never hitting bottom.Thus a further deconstruction deconstructs deconstruction, both as the search for a foundation (the critic behaving as if she means what she says in her text), and as the pleasure of the bottomless. The tool for this, as ((lxxviii)) indeed for any deconstruction, is our desire, itself a deconstructive and grammatological structure that forever differs from (we only desire what is not ourselves) and defers (desire is never fulfilled) the text of our selves. Deconstruction can therefore never be a positive science. For we are in a bind, in a “double (read abyssal) bind,” Derrida’s newest nickname for the schizophrenia of the “sous rature.” 81 We must do a thing and its opposite, and indeed we desire to do both, and so on indefinitely. Deconstruction is a perpetually self-deconstructing movement that is inhabited by differance. No text is ever fully deconstructing or deconstructed. Yet the critic provisionally musters the metaphysical resources of criticism and performs what declares itself to be one (unitary) act of deconstruction. As I point out on pages Ixxxi–lxxxii, the kinship with Freud’s interminable and terminable analysis, involving both subject and analyst, is here not to be ignored.

A retreat is privileged narcissism that abdicates political responsibility in favor of political apathy. WHITE SCHOLARS MUST FIND WAYS TO SPEAK ABOUT RACE.

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Another difficulty related to talking about race is what Alcoff has called "the problem of speaking for others." White people's voices have always been privileged, even if they are attempting to resist racism. If one pretends one's own privileged social location has no impact on her ability to make epistemic claims, the result may very well be the continuation or (re)production of oppression. Indeed, one part of the experience of oppression is to be (mis)representecl by others who enjoy the power to speak and to be heard by virtue of their social location. Another is to go unheard in an overwhelming cacophony of privileged voices (Alcoff 6-7). On the other hand, a retreat from argument may constitute a kind of privileged narcissism that abdicates political responsibility and social interconnectedness in favor of political apathy. It is safer for a white privileged person to walk away from these issues or to refuse the discussion of racialized personal experience in abstract conversation about racism. Even if the choice to be silent is principled, it can often lead to political inefficacy. Refusing to talk about white privilege will not make it go away. Worse still, a retreat may only serve to "conceal the actual authorizing power of the retreating intellectual" (Alcoff 22), and thus, constitute nothing less than complicity with whiteness' rhetorical silence. The question we must answer, then, is this: can white scholars speak to the issue of racism without speaking for or crowding out the voices of people of color? It is important to find a way to answer this question affirmatively because otherwise, in the wake of white critics' retreat into political apathy and social disconnectedness, all the moral and political work of resisting racism is left solely to people of color.

#### Racial violence cites the structures and movements of language to gain potency. Instead of focusing on the individual words we have to identify the relations between words.

Johndruff ‘7 [Mike Johndruff, studies relations between the intellect and literature from the Enlightenment to the age of modern literary studies, “Language, Racism, and Beyond” November 23rd 2007]

Jacques Derrida says in "Racism's Last Word" (a short text from 1983 on apartheid) something extremely interesting with respect to how we try to hold racism and especially racist language accountable: he says, "no racism without a language." But Derrida means by this something more precise: The point is not that acts of racial violence are only words but rather that they have to have a word. -"Racism's Last Word" in Psyche: Inventions of the Other, Volume 1, 379. Two things are being said here: first, words are never "only words"--Derrida could have put the two words in quotes. The point here should be obvious, but the text--in particular its lack of quotes, which must be supplemented--indicates that it should be remembered: language, and in particular racist language, says something. It never says nothing, never is "mere" language. But second, this sentence in a different register (and along the trajectory of its most forceful thrust) indicates that racial violence never just manifests itself in words. Words are not the only way racial violence manifests itself. So, in a way, what is being said is that words are "only words." But at this point it is crucial to read these two points together, so that we come up with the following: words are not merely the only manifestation of racial violence, but they are not this only insofar as they are never "without a language." That is, racial violence never just manifests itself in ("mere") words because it is never without language. This paradox is expressed in the last part of the sentence: racial violence is more than mere words because it "has to have" words. The crucial thing for Derrida is this "has to have," the necessity of the linguistic, and not the linguistic itself. Many, many people still make the mistake that Derrida simply applies what one critic called once by the name of "semiological reductionism:" that is, a reduction of everything to movements of the signifier and to language more generally. For Derrida, however, racism does not have to have words because everything is words--that is, because racism and acts of racism can be understood under a broad definition of language. Indeed, this is the main thing I wanted to stress here, for though the paradox we just delimited is interesting, it can be absolutely misunderstood and misapplied if we understand it this way. Racial violence never just manifests itself in mere words because it is never without language--but this is not because racial violence is just another name for language. This cannot explain language being "mere" language for Derrida, "only language:" that is, being a limited set of something larger, more expansive--"racial violence." In Derrida, language still maintains its limited sphere of operation, refusing to open itself out into the model on which everything operates. This does not mean that everything does not need, like racial violence, the structures of language in some way. If this is grasped, the crucial distinction has just been made. The necessity of racial violence having to have words, having to have recourse to language, is not because racial violence is just language, but because racial violence cites the structures and movements of language in order to be different than language, in order to be itself as other than language, to be more than mere language. Thus, there is no racism without language. But racism is not just merely words. It is the citation of the structure of language, and thus needs words in such a way that words cannot be viewed as "only words" if we see this citation at work. Any of these words then will be bigger than just words, signs, but will indicate something larger than themselves that gets performed on their model. Practically, it is obvious what is at stake: the fate of a category of law that could punish hate speech as an act (cf.Only Words by Catherine MacKinnon). Derrida would be gutting this category if he asserted everything is language: all racial violence would be hate speech. And many people act like this is what Derrida is saying. But what is really being addressed by Derrida here is how a juridical notion of hate speech does not and will not adequately do what it wants to do--get rid of racisim. This is because there is indeed something other than this speech--acts of racial violence. But these, according to Derrida, are not without recourse to words, to hate speech. So everything revolves around not just deterring hate speech: racism will not be combated if one merely deals with only words. We have to deal with the necessity in racism that invokes language, that cannot be without words. So punishing hate speech as an act like terrorism, as MacKinnon (brilliantly, and with much justification) suggests, doesn't yet get at the complexity of the acts of violence involved in racism and in hate (and thus makes her disturbingly ignore hate when it occurs in other forms than heterosexual sexual abuse--most notably, in instances of homophobia: for a better analysis of the legal ramifications of speech read Judith Butler's Excitable Speech). I moved fast here because I have a lot to do--but I hope it is clear that the challenge Derrida is leveling here is to not merely see how what he says just reduces everything to language. This injunction to (re)reading Derrida is found in the lack of the quotes, and amounts to the following: if you can't go some lengths to account for the lack of these quotes, you might want to think about whether you are making things too simple regarding the relationship of language to social action and justice, politics, or anything beyond (should I have put this beyond in quotes?) language. I'll leave you with what Derrida continues with: ...but rather that they have to have a word. Even though it alleges blood, color, birth or, rather, because it uses this naturalist and sometimes creationist discourse, racism always betrays the perversion of a human "talking animal." It institutes, declares, writes, inscribes, prescribes. A system of marks, it designs places in order to assign forced residence or to close off borders. It does not discern, it discriminates.

#### Memory is not about preserving the past but turning towards the future. Reorienting the memory of the Enlightenment through deconstruction problematizes whiteness.

Borradori ‘3 [Giovanna Borradori, professor of philosophy at Vassar college, Interview with Jacques Derrida “Philosophy in a Time of Terror” pg. 170-172]

Derrida’s reflection on the Europe-to-come began in 1990 when he was asked by the Italian philosopher Gianni Vattimo to respond to the question of European cultural identity. It was just a few months after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Surprisingly, given his usual tendency to refrain from axiomatic statements, on that occasion Derrida did offer one: “What is proper to a culture is not to be identical with itself.”43 This assertion confirms his belief in the ethical value of heterogeneity and difference, which I addressed by discussing the exclusive and in­clusive function of geographical boundaries, including the Berlin Wall, in the second section of this essay. For Derrida, identity entails internal differentiation or, in his formulation, “difference with itself.” Indeed, self-relation produces culture; but there is no culture without a relation to the other. No culture has a single origin: it is in the very nature of culture to explore difference and to develop a systematic openness to­ward others within one’s culture as well as in other cultures. On the one hand, European cultural identity cannot be dispersed ... It cannot and must not be dispersed into a myriad of provinces, into a mul­tiplicity of self-enclosed idioms or petty little nationalisms, each one jeal­ous and untranslatable. It cannot and must not renounce places of great circulation or heavy traffic, the great avenues or thoroughfares of transla­tion and communication, and thus, of mediatization. But, on the other hand, it cannot and must not accept the capital of a centralizing authority that, by means of its trans-European mechanisms ... would control and standardize.44 Beyond Eurocentrism and anti-Eurocentrism, two programs that Der­rida characterizes as “unforgettable” but “exhausted,” what is the cul­tural identity that we are responsible for? What memory and what promise does the name Europe evoke? For whom and before whom are we responsible? Derrida lists two kinds of responsibility. There is responsibility toward memory and responsibility toward oneself. While responsibility toward oneself underlines die need for a personal and unconditional commitment to the process of decision-making, re­sponsibility towards memory calls for a historical self-understanding based on difference and heterogeneity.44 To be responsible for this memory of Europe, we need to transform it to the point of reinventing it. In this way, we won’t simply either repeat or abhor its name. This transformation will occur only if we accept the possibility of an impos­sibility, the experience of aporia. It is necessary to make ourselves the guardians of an idea of Europe, of a difference of Europe, but of a Europe that consists precisely in not clos­ing itself off in its identity and in advancing itself in an exemplary way to­wards what it is not, toward the other heading or the heading of the other.46 The notion of capital features in the title that Derrida gave to his short book on Europe: The Other Heading. The book is meant to respond to the political promise of a unified Europe by taking responsibility for Europe’s past—a past that Derrida hopes will both protect and redirect Europe to another heading, another destination. Geographically, Eu­rope has understood itself as a promontory, a cape or a headland: the extreme portion of Eurasia and the point of departure for discoveries and colonization. Even though the need for a physical capital, a single metropolis that has the function of the heart of a nation, has consider­ably aged, the “discourse of the capital” is still intact. This discourse is intertwined with the question of European identity. European culture is responsible for the emergence of the ideal of the nation-state “headed” by a capital city. Paris, Berlin, Rome, Brussels, Amsterdam, Madrid, are all capitals in this very strong sense. The word capital comes from the Latin for head, caput, which also appears in a variety of other expressions, such as the headlines of a newspaper or the head­ing, the title, of a book. Europe, for Derrida, is the name for the head­ing of culture, the exemplary heading of all cultures. Taking responsibility for Europe means responding to the com­plexity constituting its past, present, and future, and reinventing their relations. Sovereignty, which Derrida renames “discourse of the capi­tal” is first on the list. In order to reinvent Europe and, at the same time, taking responsibility for its heritage, we need to believe in paradoxical contaminations, such as “the memory of a past that has never been present,” or “the memory of the future.” After all, Derrida points out, the movement of memory is not necessarily tied to the past. Memory is not only about preserving and conserving the past, it is always already turned toward the future, “toward the promise, toward what is coming, what is arriving, what is happening tomorrow.”47 This other heading is the direction in which Europe, the actual Europe, should be traveling. This is also the direction toward a new form of sovereignty, urgently demanded if cosmopolitanism is to be­come a political reality in the post-9/11 world. This destination is nei­ther new nor old but the memory of a past that has never been present. This is the memory of the promise of the Enlightenment: freedom and equality for all.

#### The striving for unity and coherence is the hallmark of whiteness. Deconstruction is a logic of disintegration that would generate radical and open subjectivities.

Wadham ‘3 [Ben Wadham, TASA Conference University of New England, “The Turn to Whiteness: Race, Nationand Cultural Sociology” December 2003]

There are two points of note here: firstly, that identity is considered relational and hierarchical. There are multiple forms of cultural relations, for example gender is differentiated (Connell 1995), as is race or class (Frankenberg 1993, 1997). Secondly, it is also useful to consider the 'logics of identity', that is, the ways that particular identities position themselves within cultural relations (Hall 1992). Adorn° and Horkheimer (1973) describe the hegemonic logic of identity within Western philosophy, and Western cultures more generally, as a dialectic of Enlightenment. This dialectic refers to the way that the Self valorises identity and the Other is marginalised as an assertion of difference. This reification of Self and Other occludes incommensurability, that is, this subject tan only conceive others on his terms. In some way everything must be commensurable, able to be rationalised on the terms of the hegemonic subject. In the context of Australian racialisation whiteness has become that cocoon where an exclusive national identity has developed. This dialectic of Enlightenment, alternatively described as identitarian thinking, is where the Self articulates the Other as a threat to cultural and individual security, where the destabilisation of the hegemonic order is experienced as disorder, and where multiplicity is dangerous and commensurability paramount (O'Neill 1999: 9). This striving for unity and coherence marks the hegemonic subject and is, I argue, the hallmark of the white, masculinist, bourgeois Self (Adorno 1996, 1973; Becker-Schmidt 1999). It can be described as manifesting a closed subjectivity (Jameson 1990: 9). We can think about the logic of identity as relational, that is, identitarian thinking presents the hegemonic logic of identification while others' logics of identity sit in relations of subordination, complicity or radical alterity to this logic and its associated identities, discursive regimes and cultural practices. In other words, there are different ways of thinking and identifying and different logics of identity. Bhabha's (1990a) work on the third space, Adorno's logic of disintegration (1973), or Derrida's (1982) deconstruction are different ways of talking about the potential for critical and reflexive thought. It is argued that a logic of disintegration would generate open, radical and inclusive subjectivities.

#### There can be no separation from reason – only a deconstruction of rationality and freedom can appropriate those concepts in a counter-hegemonic manner.

Derrida ‘3 [Jacques Derrida, THE “WORLD” OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT TO COME (EXCEPTION, CALCULATION, SOVEREIGNTY)\* 2003 Pg. 43-44]

What must be thought here, then, is this inconceivable and unknowable thing, a freedom that would no longer be the power of a subject, a freedom without autonomy, a heteronomy without servitude, in short, something like a passive decision. We would thus have to rethink the philosophemes of the decision, of activity and passivity, as well as potentiality and actuality. It is thus rational, legitimately rational, to interrogate or deconstruct—without however discrediting—the fertile distinction between constative and performative. Similarly, beyond law, debt, and duty, it would be necessary to rethink rationally a hyperethics or hyper-politics that does not settle for acting simply “according to duty ( pichtmässig)” or even (to take up the Kantian distinction that founds practical reason) “from duty” or “out of pure duty (eigentlich 44 jacques derrida aus Picht, aus reiner Picht).”12 Such a hyper-ethics or hyper-politics would carry us unconditionally beyond the economic circle of duty or of the task (Picht or Aufgabe), of the debt to be reappropriated or annulled, of what one knows must be done, of what thus still depends on a programmatic and normative knowledge that need only be carried out. The hiatus between these two equally rational postulations of reason, this excess of a reason that of itself exceeds itself and so opens onto its future, its to-come, its becoming, this exposition to the incalculable event, would also be the irreducible spacing of the very faith, credit, or belief without which there would be no social bond, no address to the other, no uprightness or honesty, no promise to be honored, and so no honor, no faith to be sworn or pledge to be given. This hiatus opens the rational space of a hypercritical faith, one without dogma and without religion, irreducible to any and all religious or implicitly theocratic institutions. It is what I’ve called elsewhere the awaiting without horizon of a messianicity without messianism. It goes without saying that I do not detect here even the slightest hint of irrationalism, obscurantism, or extravagance. This faith is another way of keeping within reason [raison garder], however mad it might appear. If the minimal semantic kernel we might retain from the various lexicons of reason, in every language, is the ultimate possibility of, if not a consensus, at least an address universally promised and unconditionally entrusted to the other, then reason remains the element or very air of a faith without church and without credulity, the raison d’être of the pledge, of credit, of testimony beyond proof, the raison d’être of any belief in the other, that is, of their belief and of our belief in them—and thus also of any perjury. For as soon as reason does not close itself off to the event that comes, the event of what or who comes, assuming it is not irrational to think that the worst can always happen, and well beyond what Kant thinks under the name “radical evil,” then only the infinite possibility of the worst and of perjury can grant the possibility of the good, of veracity and sworn faith. This possibility remains infinite, but as the very possibility of an auto-immunitary finitude.

#### Ontological Blackness DA: The neg reinscribes a notion of ontological blackness that effaces black bodies’ individuality. Race becomes replicated within black racial discourses so that ontological blackness becomes the “blackness that whiteness created,” a black aesthetic that signifies the totality of black existence.

Anderson ’95 [Victor – Assistant Professor of Christian Ethics at Vanderbilt Divinity School; PhD in religion, ethics and politics from Princeton University, “BEYOND ONTOLOGICAL BLACKNESS: An Essay on African American Religious and Cultural Criticism]

Race linguistically designates ethnic groups of human beings. Sometimes these groups are identified by nationalities, families, or languages (Omi and Winant 1995, 4). Race has here an accidental quality rather than a formal status. For that persons belong to specific ethnic groups has to do with the historical development of particular human communities, their encounters with other human communities, and the economic conditions under which these communities propagate themselves. This use of race is one that is likely to guide cultural anthropologists, and it is central to the claims that I make for the critical study of race throughout this book. However, in many of the cultural studies that I examine, mostly philosophical and theological ones, race is often regarded as a topic in metaphysical ontology. In metaphysical ontology, race denotes essential properties (essences), such that to lack any one property renders one a member of pseudospecies. According to Erik Erikson, the idea of pseudospecies is connected with group identity formation (1968, 41-41). As human groups construct their identities in relation to other animal groups, they develop categorical ways of solidifying their cultural and social identities. One way that they reassure their social and cultural identities is by defining them in terms of positive qualities that they wish to affirm while projecting negative ones onto others, rendering others false instances of species. Pseudospecies is the name Erikson gives for this othering activity. Erikson warns that while such activities appear to be present through almost every group that we know of, “the pseudospecies…is one of the more sinister aspects of all group identity (1968, 42). For according to Erikson, “there are also ‘pseudo’ aspects in all identity which endanger the individual” (42). Race is one classification under which human group differentiation occurs. In this book, I am interested in the ways that race determines black identity in African American cultural philosophy and theology. The second theme of the book is to make problematic the historic representational functions that race language has had in these cultural studies. In the West, racial representation is closely identified with the Western aesthetic category of genius. (In chapter 4, I give an extensive account of the idea of genius in European aesthetic theory.) In their attempts to give ideological justification for the imperialist ethos that inaugurated the age of Europe, European intellectuals defined their age and themselves as heroic, epochal, and exhibiting racial genius. Comparatively speaking, then, this racial aesthetic renders the other (non-Europeans) a false species, lacking in essential properties which make European genius representative of universal human genius. The third theme is that the cult of European genius, with its essentially heroic, epochal, and culture-advancing qualities, has likewise determined how African Americans represent themselves as the mirror of European genius: ontological blackness signifies the blackness that whiteness created. Beyond Ontological Blackness focusses on the cult of black heroic genius. I use the word cult here to designate dispositions of devotion, loyalty, and admiration for racial categories and the essentialized principles that determine black identity. And racial genius refers to the exceptional, sometimes essentialized cultural qualities that positively represent the racial group in the action of at least one of the group’s members. Insofar as the one member’s actions are said to represent the genius of the group (whether that member is a Sojourner Truth, a Marian Anderson, a Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., a Malcolm X, a Michael Jordan, or a Jessye Norman) that member also exhibits the heroic qualities of the race. Of course, as the notion of pseudospecies shows, such racial reasoning can also give way to negative categorical judgments about the race. Therefore, ontological blackness entails a type of categorical racial reasoning and a black aesthetic – a collective racial consciousness expressive and representational of African American genius.

#### Turns all offense: ontological blackness distorts homogenizes the conditions of Black life and experience which is at odds with the new postmodern cultural politics of black identity.

Anderson ’95 [Victor – Assistant Professor of Christian Ethics at Vanderbilt Divinity School; PhD in religion, ethics and politics from Princeton University, “BEYOND ONTOLOGICAL BLACKNESS: An Essay on African American Religious and Cultural Criticism]

As a critic of the categorical and representational functions of ontological blackness, I suggest that there are good critical reasons for pressing beyond its centrality in black cultural studies. First, in its categorical and representational functions, ontological blackness distorts far too much of the conditions of African American life and experience in the United States. African American life and experience are structured by dispersed and not always commensurable interests of class, gender, sexual differentials, and race. Therefore, racial identity is not total, although it is always present. From a religious point of view, when race is made total, then ontological blackness is idolatrous, approaching racial henotheism. As a religious critic whose religious and moral sensibilities are derived from a radical monotheistic faith, I find myself at odds with such a cultural idolatry. A second warrant for pressing beyond ontological blackness is that the idea is incommensurable with the demand for a new cultural politics of black identity that meaningfully relates to the conditions of postmodern North American life. A list of African American literary and cultural critics calling for a new politics of black identity includes Cornel West, bell hooks, Toni Morrison, Alice Walker, Henry Lewis Gates, Jr., Houston Baker, Jr., Darlene Clark Hine, Wilson J. Moses, Michael Dyson, and Joe Wood. The new cultural politics of difference takes seriously the ways that ontological blackness alienates African Americans who pursue genuine interests in personal fulfillment along class, gender, ethnic, and sexual differentials. The fourth theme governing this book is that those racial discourses that derive their legitimacy from ontological blackness are at odds with contemporary postmodern black life.