## Case

#### Weighing rights against the lives of others inevitably leads to genocide.

Dillon, ’99 [Michael; Professor Politics, University of Lancaster, Political Theory, April 99, Vol. 27 Issue 2, p155, 21p “Another Justice”]

Otherness is born(e) within the self as an integral part of itself and in such a way that it always remains an inherent stranger to itself.([n33](http://web16.epnet.com/#bib33)) It derives from the lack, absence, or ineradicable incompleteness which comes from having no security of tenure within or over that of which the self is a particular hermeneutical manifestation; namely, being itself. The point about the human, betrayed by this absence, is precisely that it is not sovereignly self-possessed and complete, enjoying undisputed tenure in and of itself. Modes of justice therefore reliant upon such a subject lack the very foundations in the self that they most violently insist upon seeing inscribed there. This does not, however, mean that the dissolution of the subject also entails the dissolution of Justice. Quite the reverse. The subject was never a firm foundation for justice, much less a hospitable vehicle for the reception of the call of another Justice. It was never in possession of that self-possession which was supposed to secure the certainty of itself, of a self-possession that would enable it ultimately to adjudicate everything. The very indexicality required of sovereign subjectivity gave rise rather to a commensurability much more amenable to the expendability required of the political and material economies of mass societies than it did to the singular, invaluable, and uncanny uniqueness of the self. The value of the subject became the standard unit of currency for the political arithmetic of States and the political economies of capitalism.([n34](http://web16.epnet.com/#bib34)) They trade in it still to devastating global effect. The technologisation of the political has become manifest and global. Economies of evaluation necessarily require calculability.(n35) Thus no valuation without mensuration and no mensuration without indexation. Once rendered calculable, however, units of account are necessarily submissible not only to valuation but also, of course, to devaluation. Devaluation, logically, can extend to the point of counting as nothing. Hence, no mensuration without demensuration either. There is nothing abstract about this: the declension of economies of value leads to the zero point of holocaust. However liberating and emancipating systems of value--rights--may claim to be, for example, they run the risk of counting out the invaluable. Counted out, the invaluable may then lose its purchase on life. Herewith, then, the necessity of championing the invaluable itself. For we must never forget that, "we are dealing always with whatever exceeds measure."(n36) But how does that necessity present itself?. Another Justice answers: as the surplus of the duty to answer to the claim of Justice over rights. That duty, as with the advent of another Justice, is integral to the lack constitutive of the human way of being.

## A2: Framework

#### Demanding a plan text and forcing us to be coherent, logical and packaged is violent policing of our expression that has no basis in the resolution.

Butler ‘4 [2004, Judith Butler is a Professor of Rhetoric and Comparative Literature at U.C. Berkeley, “Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence”, pg. xix-xxi]

Dissent and debate depend upon the inclusion of those who maintain critical views of state policy and civic culture remaining part of a larger public discussion of the value of policies and politics. To charge those who voice critical views with treason, terrorist-sympathizing, anti-Semitism, moral relativism, postmodernism, juvenile behavior, collaboration, anachronistic Leftism, is to seek to destroy the credibility not of the views that are held, but of the very persons who hold them. It produces the climate of fear in which to voice a certain view is to risk being branded and shamed with heinous appellation. To continue to voice one’s views under those conditions is not easy, since one must not only discount the truth of appellation, but brave the stigma that seizes up from the public domain. Dissent is quelled, in part, through threatening the speaking subject with an uninhabitable identification. Because it would be heinous to identify as treasonous, as a collaborator, one fails to speak, or one speaks in throttled ways, in order to sidestep the terrorizing identification that threatens to take hold. This strategy for quelling dissent and limiting the reach of critical debate happens not only through a series of shaming tactics which have a certain psychological terrorizations as their effect, but they work as well by producing what will and will not count as a viable speaking subject and a reasonable opinion within the public domain. It is precisely because one does not want to lose one’s status as a viable speaking being that ones does not say what one thinks. Under social conditions that regulate identifications and the sense of viability to this degree, censorship operates implicitly and forcefully. The line that circumscribes what is speakable and what is livable also function as an instrument of censorship. To decide what views will count as reasonable within the public domain, however, is to decide what will and will not count as the public sphere of debate. And if someone holds vies that are not in line with the nationalist norm, that person comes to lack credibility as a speaking person, and the media is not open to him or her (though the internet, interestingly, is). The foreclosure of critique -empties the public domain of debate and democratic contestation itself, so that debate becomes the exchange of views among the like-minded, and criticism, which ought to be central to any democracy, becomes a fugitive and suspect activity. Public Policy, including foreign policy, often seeks to restrain the public sphere from being open to certain forms of debate and the circulation of media coverage. One way a hegemonic understanding of politics is achieved is through circumscribing what will and will not be admissible as part of the of the public sphere itself. Without disposing populations in such a way that war seems good and right and true, no war can claim popular consent, and no administration can maintain popularity. To produce what will constitute the public sphere, however, it is necessary to control the way in which people see, how they hear, what they see. The constraints are not only on content—certain images of dead bodies in Iraq, for instance, are considered unacceptable for public visual consumption—but on what “can” be heard, read, seen, felt, and known. The public sphere of appearance is one way to establish what will count as reality, and what will not. It is also a way of establishing whose lives can be marked as lives, and whose deaths will count as deaths. Our capacity to feel and to apprehend hangs in the balance. But so, too, does the fate of the reality of certain lives and deaths as well as the ability to think critically and publicly about the effects of war.

## A2: Terror DA

#### Their simplification of terrorism perpetuates the harms by oversimplifying a complex event—exploiting fears of future strikes is a self-destructive process that ultimately risks seeking such strikes to justify future violence.

Derrida ‘3  
Jacques, the original postmodernist, Philosophy in a Time of Terror p 107-9

The most terrorist? This question is at once necessary and destined to remain without any answer. Necessary because it takes into account and essential fact: all terrorism presents itself as a response in a situation that continues to escalate. It amounts to saying “I am resorting to terrorism as a last resort, because the other is more terrorist than I am; I am defending myself, counterattacking; the real terrorist, the worst, is the one who will have deprived me of every other means of responding before presenting himself, the first aggressor as a victim.” It is in this way that the United States, Israel, wealthy nations and colonial or imperialist powers are accused of practicing state terrorism and thus of being more terrorist than the terrorist of whom they say they are the victims. The pattern is well known, so I won’t belabor it. But it is difficult to write it off purely and simply, even if it is sometimes applied in a simplistic and abusive fashion. Yet the question you are asking, that of a more or less in terrorism should also not be settled through a purely objectively quantitative logic. For this question can give rise to no such formal evaluation. Terrorist acts try to produce psychic effects (conscious or unconscious) and symbolic or symptomatic relations that might take numerous detours an incalculable number of them, in truth. The quality or intensity of the emotions is provoked (whether conscious or unconscious) is not always proportionate to the number of victims or the amount of damage. In situations and cultures where the media do not spectacularize the event, the killing of thousands of people in a very short period of time might provoke fewer psychic and political effects than the assassination of a single individual in another country, culture, or nation-state with highly developed media resources. And does terrorism have to work only through death? Can’t one terrorize without killing? And does killing necessarily mean putting to death? Isn’t it also a “letting die”? Can’t “letting die”, “not wanting to know that one is letting others die”—hundreds of millions of human beings, from hunger, AIDS, lack of medical treatment, and so on—also be part of a more or less conscious and deliberate terrorist strategy? We are perhaps wrong to assume so quickly that all terrorism is voluntary, sonscious, organized, deliberate, intentionally calculated” there are historical and political situations where terror operates, so to speak as if by itself, as the simple result of some apparatus, because of the relations of force in place, without anyone, any conscious subject, any person any “I”, being really conscious of it or feeling itself responsible for it. All situations of social or national structural oppression produce a terror that is not natural (insofar as it is organized, institutional), and all these situations depend on this terror without those who benefit from them ever organizing terrorist acts or ever being treated as terrorists. The narrow, too narrow meaning commonly given today to the word “terrorism” gets circulated in various ways in the discourse that dominates the public space, and first of all through the technoeconomic power of the media. What would September 11 have been without television? This question has already been asked and explored, so I will not insist on it here. But we must recall that maximum media coverage was in the common interest of the perpetrators of September 11, the terrorist, and those who, in the name of the victims, wanted to declare war on terrorism. Between these two parties, such media coverage was, like the good sense of which Descartes speaks, the most widely shared thing in the world. More than the destruction of the Twin Towers or the attack on the Pentagon, more than the killing of thousands of people the real terrorism consisted of and in fact, began by exposing and exploiting, having exposed and exploited, the image of this terror by the target itself. This target (the United States, let’s say and anyone who supports or is allied with them in the world, and this knows almost no limits today) had it in its own interest (the same interest it shares with its sworn enemies) to expose its vulnerability, to give the greatest possible coverage to the aggression against which it wishes to protect itself. This is again the same autoimmunitary perversion. Or perhaps it would be better to say “pervertibility” so as to name a possibility, a risk, or a threat whose virtuality does not take the form of an evil intention, an evil spirit or a will to do harm. But this virtuality alone is enough to frighten, even terrify. It is the ineradicable root of terror and thus of a terrorism. Implacably. Endlessly. Let me add her e a reminder: there is nothing purely modern in this relation between media and terror, in a terrorism that operates by propagating within the public space images or rumors aimed at terrifying the so called civilian population. It is true, of course, that with radio and television what is called organized propaganda” something that is in fact relatively modern has, in the last century, and already during WWI, played an essential role in “declared” war. It will have gone hand in hand with bombing campaigns (whether conventional or atomic) that could not differentiate between civilian and military any more than the resistance movements and the oppressions of those movements could. It was thus already impossible during the two world wars to distinguish rigorously between war and terrorism.

#### The War on Terrorism is a never ending war against alterity. This infinite war culminates in extinction.

Machowski 2010 (Mattehew http://www.matthewmachowski.com/2010/09/derrida-islam-9-11.html)

The global politics have since become increasingly multipolar, whereas the Western public has grown to be more acutely aware of the world’s cultural and civilisational heterogeneity.[3] But above all, the past nine years have witnessed a momentous return of Islam to the fore of the political discourse. Islam has even been purported to play a more profound role in shaping the twenty-first century Europe than any other major force, including the US, Russia, or even the European Union.[4] Similarly, Derrida argued that the challenge between Islam and the Western democracy is “perhaps the greatest, if not the only, political issue of the future.”[5] Islam, in the post-9/11 world, has numerously been associated with Islamism and terrorism. The contemporary European public discourse is replete with frequent warnings against the ‘Islamic threats’ to our security and culture. Both the recent ‘burka’ controversy in Belgium or France, and the dispute over the constructions of minarets in Switzerland perfectly exemplify the European unwariness with their Muslim population.[6] The Mohammedan faith is meant to become the ‘new threat’ and the new ‘other’ that would supposedly define the European identity by “invoking a kind of societal cold war between Europe and Islam.” This article therefore attempts to deconstruct these ideas and indicate a variety of possible ‘readings’ of Islam through the Derridean philosophy. It is hereby argued that not only does Derrida allow for a new reinterpretation and a clearer, more authentic understanding of Islam as ‘the other’, but also reminds the Muslims of the essential plurality of their religion. Moreover, it enables us to do away with much of the propaganda surrounding the 9/11 and reminds us of two fundamentally crucial human mechanisms, i.e. the act of forgiveness and of hospitality, that will arguably lead to a better more humane future, where Islam and the West will not stand as two distant poles but rather two indispensible, cross-culturally fertilising ingredients of our common civilisation. Providing an answer to the above-stated research question requires a pursuit of a truly Derridean project of deconstructing the main aspects of the discussed problématique. It is argued here that an identification of some of the significant power relations and interests connoted through the concept of the ‘other’, with all its implications for the present-day Islam, will provide for a greater appreciation of the politico-theological characteristics popularly attributed to this religion. This process will also uncover the inherent complexity of the Islamic religious pluralism and its organic links to other Abrahamic religions – Judaism and Christianity; a link so often suppressed. Moreover, the Derridean deconstruction, understood here, after Newman, as a “way of reading texts with the intention of making these texts question themselves,”[7] enables us to stipulate the inherent contradiction between the Islamist pursuit of claiming the Quran’s singularity and its true heterogeneity of meanings.[8] Finally, a deconstruction of the meanings of the 9/11 attacks, its origins, its ‘autoimmunitary nature’, and its significance for the Western media and governmental propaganda of the early 21st century will provide for a more accurate, even if still ambiguous, reading of Islam in the West.

#### Disad puts the self first which makes war endless and the banality of violence impossible to respond to. The ethical response is giving your decision to the other.

Caputo 2003 (WITHOUT SOVEREIGNTY, WITHOUT BEING: UNCONDITIONALITY, THE COMING GOD AND DERRIDA’S DEMOCRACY TO COME Extracts of this article have previously been published in France Today, the Journal of French Travel and Culture, <http://www.francetoday.com/>.)

The question, is there something that lays claim to us unconditionally but without power or force, is directed at “us,” all of us—Americans and Europeans, democrats and theologians, Westerners and non-Westerners—anyone who is associated with the cruel logic of sovereignty. The democracy to come calls for a new revolution, another and still more radically democratic revolution, a revolution in the name of the democracy to come, in which we will break more decisively still with the ancien régime of sovereignty itself, dreaming of the incalculable possibility of the impossible, of a democracy without sovereignty. Dreaming of the incalculable, but also calculating, because one must count very carefully and carefully devise ways of counting how the member voices of the democratic assembly will count, who will be allowed to vote, at what age, with what status, etc. (V, 63). That revolution that is being called for will also cut deeply into our psyche and our psychology, because it will force us to reconceive the self, that famous liberal individual, in terms of the other one who lays claims to me, even as it will cut into our theology, because it will force us to reimagine God without sovereignty. God forbid! What is called for in and by the democracy to come is the unconditional gift, which does not seek a return on one’s investment, the gift, in which the self gives up its power, the power of the “I can,” the power of the possible, which is what constitutes a self. What we have asked of the king, we now must ask of ourselves: to give up power, to share and divide it. What is called for is a self that shares its power in a gift without return, a self without ipseity. What is called for is unconditional hospitality to the other, to the stranger and the immigrant, to the tired, the hungry and huddled masses. What is called for is a transforming and transfixing revolution in which the self turns itself inside out and lets itself by claimed by the other.

#### Failure to come to terms with preference of life results inside of a self-destructive auto-immunity where the targets we aim at the other come to be wielded against the self. We must deconstruct this divide.

Derrida ‘6 [originally published in 1993] Jacques Derrida *Specters of Marx* Translated by Peggy Kamuf p 175-177

This logic and this topology of the paradoxical hunt (whose figure, beginning before Plato, will have have traversed the whole history of philosophy, more precisely of the ontological inquest or inquisition) should not be treated as a rhetorical ornament when one reads The Manifesto of the Communist Party: its first sentences, as we saw, immediately associate the figure of haunting with that of hunting. This is the very experience of conjuration. The conjuration is on all sides, in the camp of the powers of old Europe (who are leading a "holy hunt" against the communist specter), but also in the opposite camp where they are also on a hunt. There, two great hunters, Marx and Stirner, are in principle sworn to the same conjuration. But the first accuses the other of betraying and serving the adversary, Christian Europe in sum. The first begrudges the second his having been the first to place the specter at the center of his system, his logic, and his rhetoric, even if it was only to expulse it. Isn't that inadmissible? He begrudges him [II lui en veut] , he wants not to want the same thing as him and it is not a thing: the ghost. Like him, and like all those who are occupied by specters, he welcomes them only in order to chase them. As soon as there is some specter, hospitality and exclusion go together. One is only occupied with ghosts by being occupied with exorcising them, kicking them out the door. That is what Marx and Stirner have in common: nothing other than this ghost hunt, but nothing but this singular nothing that a ghost remains. All the same, let us not forget that, unlike the spirit, for example, or the idea or simply thought, this nothing is a nothing that takes on a body. And since the two adversaries want to conjure away this body, nothing can efface in this regard a resemblance between them that is by definition troubling. The deconstructive critiques that Marx will address to the Stirnerian "historical constructions" or "montages" risk coming back at him like a boomerang. Whence the endless, relentless pursuit. Endless because it maintains itself by itself, it is talking with itself [il s'entretient de lui-meme]. He wants to classify [classer], he can only chase [chasser]. The pursuit pursues relentlessly, as we were suggesting, a kind of double or brother. Both of them love life, which is always the case but never goes without saying for finite beings: they know that life does not go without death, and that death is not beyond, outside of life, unless one inscribes the beyond in the inside, in the essence of the living. They both share, apparently like you and me, an unconditional preference for the living body. But precisely because of that, they wage an endless war against whatever represents it, whatever is not the body but belongs to it, comes back to prosthesis and delegation, repetition, differance. The living ego is auto-immune, which is what they do not want to know. To protect its life, to constitute itself as unique living ego, to relate, as the same, to itself it is necessarily led to welcome the other within (so many figures of death: differance of the technical apparatus, iterability, non-uniqueness, prosthesis, synthetic image, simulacrum, all of which begins with language, before language), it must therefore take the immune defenses apparently meant for the non-ego, the enemy, the opposite, the adversary and direct them at once for itself and against itself. Marx " thinks he is a better expert (a better "scholar" of ghosts), let us @: recall that he says in effect to Saint Max: I know my way around specters better than you; the ghost is my affair [is looking at me: ~a me regarde], if you want to save life and conjure away the livingdead, you must not go at it immediately, abstractly, egologically, fantasmatically, with the word, with the language act of a phantasmagoreuein; you must pass through the laborious ordeal of the detour, you must traverse and work on the practical structures, the solid mediations of real, .. empirical" actuality, and so forth. Otherwise, you will have conjured away only the phantomality of the body, not the body itself of the ghost, namely, the reality of the State, Emperor, Nation, Fatherland, and so on. But obviously, for the time of this detour, you must accept to take into account the autonomous, relatively autonomous body of ghostly reality.

#### Nuclear war is a text – its reference is what makes it a threat.

Derrida ’84 Jacques Derrida; Catherine Porter; Philip Lewis, “No Apocalypse, Not Now (Full Speed Ahead, Seven Missiles, Seven Missives)” Diacritics, Vol. 14, No. 2, Nuclear Criticism. (Summer, 1984), pp. 20-31

Third reason. In our techno-scientitico-mifitaro-diplomatic incompetence, we may con-sider ourselves, however, as competent as others to deal with a phenomenon whose essen-tial feature is that of being fabulously textual, through and through. Nuclear weaponry depends, more than any weaponry in the past, it seems, upon structures of information and communication, structures of language, Including non-vocalizable language, structures of codes and graphic decoding. But the phenomenon is fabulously textual also to the extent that, for the moment, a nuclear war has not taken place: one can only talk and write about it. You will say, perhaps: but it is not the first time; the other wars, too, so long as they hadn't taken place, were only talked about and written about. And as to the fright of imaginary anticipation, what might prove that a European in the period following the war of 1870 might not have been more terrified by the "technological" image of the bombings and exterminations of the Second World War (even supposing he had been able to form such an image) than we are by the image we can construct for ourselves of a nuclear war? The logic of this argument is not devoid of value, especially if one is thinking about a limited and "clean" nuclear war. But it loses its value in the face of the hypothesis of a total nuclear war, which, as a hypothesis, or, if you prefer, as a fantasy, or phantasm, conditions every discourse and all strategies. Unlike the other wars, which have all been preceded by wars of more or less the same type in human memory (and gunpowder did not mark a radical break in this respect), nuclear war has no precedent. It has never occurred, itself; it is a non-event. The explosion of American bombs in 1945 ended a "classical," conventional war; it did not set off a nuclear war. The terrifying reality of the nuclear conflict can only be the signified referent, never the real referent (present or past) of a discourse or a text. At least today apparently. And that sets us to thinking about today, our day, the presence of this present in and through that fabulous textuality. Better than ever and more than ever. The growing multiplication of the discourse— indeed, of the literature — on this subject may constitute a process of fearful domestication, the anticipatory assimilation of that unanticipatable entirely-other. For the moment, today, one may say that a non-localizable nuclear war has not occurred; it has exis-tence only through what is said of it, only where it is talked about. Some might call it a fable, then, a pure invention: in the sense in which it is said that a myth, an image, a fiction, a utopia, a rhetorical figure, a fantasy, a phantasm, are inventions. It may also be called a speculation, even a fabulous specularization. The breaking of the mirror would be, finally, through an act of language, the very occurrence of nuclear war. Who can swear that our unconscious is not expecting this? dreaming of it, desiring it? You will perhaps find it shock-ing to find the nuclear issue reduced to a fable. But then I haven't said simply that. I have recalled that a nuclear war is for the time being a fable, that is, something one can only talk about But who can fail to recognize the massive "reality “ of nuclear weaponry and of the ter- rifying forces of destruction that are being stockpiled and capitalized everywhere, that are corning to constitute the very movement of capitalization. One has to distinguish between this "reality" of the nuclear age and the fiction of war. But, and this would perhaps be the imperative of a nuclear criticism, one must also be careful to interpret critically this critical or diacritical distinction. For the "reality" of the nuclear age and the fable of nuclear war are perhaps distinct, but they are not two separate things. It is the war (in other words the (able) that triggers this fabulous war effort, this senseless capitalization of sophisticated weaponry, this speed race in search of speed, this crazy precipitation which, through techno-science, through al the techno-scientific inventiveness that it motivates, structures not only the army, diplomacy, politics, but the whole of the human socius today, everything that is named by the old words culture, civilization, aihriung, schofe, pandeia. "Reality," let's say the encom-passing institution of the nuclear age, is constructed by the fable, on the basis of an event that has never happened (except in fantasy, and that is not nothing at alp, an event of which one can only speak, an event whose advent remains an invention by men (in all the senses of the word "invention") or which, rather, remains to be invented. An invention because it depends upon new technical mechanisms, to be sure, but an invention also because it does not exist and especially because, at whatever point it should come into existence, it would be a grand premiere appearance. Fourth reason. Since we are speaking of fables, of language, of fiction and fantasy, writing and rhetoric, let us go even further. Nuclear war does not depend on language just because we can do nothing but speak of it — and then as something that has never occurred. It does not depend on language just because the "incompetents" on all sides can speak of it only in the mode of gossip or of doxa (opinion) — and the dividing line between doxa and episteme starts to blur as soon as there is no longer any such thing as an absolutely legitimizable competence for a phenomenon which is no longer strictly techno-scientific but techno-miktaro-politico-diplomatic through and through, and which brings into play the doxa or incompetence even in its calculations. There is nothing but doxa, opinion, "belief." One can no longer oppose belief and science, doxa and episteme, once one has reached the decisive place at the nuclear age, in other words, once one has arrived at the critical place of the nuclear age. In this critical place, there is no more room for a distinction between belief and science, thus no more space for a "nuclear criticism" strictly speaking. Nor even for a truth in that sense. No truth, no apocalypse. (As you know. Apocalypse means Revelation, of Truth, Un-veiling.) No, nuclear war is not only fabulous because one can only talk about it, but because the extraordinary sophistication of its technologies—which are also the technologies of delivery, sending, dispatching, of the missile in general, of mission, missive, emission, and transmission, like all techne — the extraordinary sophistication of these technologies coexists, cooperates in an essential way with sophistry, psycho-rhetoric, and the most cursory, the most archaic, the most crudely opinionated psychagogy, the most vulgar psychology. We can therefore consider ourselves competent because the sophistication of the nuclear strategy can never do without a sophistry of belief and the rhetorical simulation of a text.

## A2: Virilio

Deconstruction reconstitutes the world.

Spivak ‘97 [an Indian theorist, philosopher and University Professor at Columbia University, where she is a founding member of the school's Institute for Comparative Literature and Society, “Jacques Derrida OF GRAMMATOLOGY” Translated by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak,” <http://www.mohamedrabeea.com/books/book1_3997.pdf>]

Speaking of the hymen, Derrida emphasizes the role of the blank spaces of the page in the play of meaning. Analogically, Derrida himself often devotes his attention to th text in its margins, so to speak. He examines the minute particulars of an undecidable moment, nearly imperceptible displacements, that might otherwise escape the reader’s eye. Reading Foucault, he concentrates on three pages out of 673. Reading Rousseau, he chooses a text that is far from “central.” Reading Heidegger, he proceeds to write a note on a note to Sein and Zeit. His method, as he says to Jean-Louis Houdebine, perhaps a little too formulaically, is reversal and displacement. It is not enough “simply to neutralize the binary oppositions of metaphysics.” We must recognize that, within the familiar philosophical oppositions, there is always “a violent ((lxxvii)) hierarchy. One of the two terms controls the other (axiologically, logically, etc.), holds the superior position. To deconstruct the opposition is first .. . to overthrow [renverser] the hierarchy.” (Pos F 57, Pos E. I. 36) To fight violence with violence. In the Grammatology this structural phase would be represented by all those pages where, all apologies to the contrary, the polemical energy seems clearly engaged in putting writing above speech. But in the next phase of deconstruction, this reversal must be displaced, the winning term put under erasure. The critic must make room for “the irruptive emergence of a new ‘concept,’ a concept which no longer allows itself to be understood in terms of the previous regime [system of oppositions].” In terms of our book, this would be the aspect that “allows for the dissonant emergence of a writing inside of speech, thus disorganizing all the received order and invading the whole sphere of speech” (Pos E I. 36). To locate the promising marginal text, to disclose the undecidable moment, to pry it loose with the positive lever of the signifier; to reverse the resident hierarchy, only to displace it; to dismantle in order to reconstitute what is always already inscribed. Deconstruction in a nutshell. But take away the assurance of the text’s authority, the critic’s control, and the primacy of meaning, and the possession of this formula does not guarantee much. Why should we undo and redo a text at all? Why not assume that words and the author “mean what they say?” It is a complex question. Here let us examine Derrida’s most recent meditation upon the desire of deconstruction. Derrida acknowledges that the desire of deconstruction may itself be-come a desire to reappropriate the text actively through mastery, to show the text what it “does not know.” And as she deconstructs, all protestations to the contrary, the critic necessarily assumes that she at least, and for the time being, means what she says. Even the declaration of her vulnerability must come, after all, in the controlling language of demonstration and reference. In other words, the critic provisionally forgets that her own text is necessarily self-deconstructed, always already a palimpsest. The desire of deconstruction has also the opposite allure. Deconstruction seems to offer a way out of the closure of knowledge. By inaugurating the open-ended indefiniteness of textuality —by thus “placing in the abyss” (mettre en abîme), as the French expression would literally have it—it shows us the lure of the abyss as freedom. The fall into the abyss of deconstruction inspires us with as much pleasure as fear. We are intoxicated with the prospect of never hitting bottom.Thus a further deconstruction deconstructs deconstruction, both as the search for a foundation (the critic behaving as if she means what she says in her text), and as the pleasure of the bottomless. The tool for this, as ((lxxviii)) indeed for any deconstruction, is our desire, itself a deconstructive and grammatological structure that forever differs from (we only desire what is not ourselves) and defers (desire is never fulfilled) the text of our selves. Deconstruction can therefore never be a positive science. For we are in a bind, in a “double (read abyssal) bind,” Derrida’s newest nickname for the schizophrenia of the “sous rature.” 81 We must do a thing and its opposite, and indeed we desire to do both, and so on indefinitely. Deconstruction is a perpetually self-deconstructing movement that is inhabited by differance. No text is ever fully deconstructing or deconstructed. Yet the critic provisionally musters the metaphysical resources of criticism and performs what declares itself to be one (unitary) act of deconstruction. As I point out on pages Ixxxi–lxxxii, the kinship with Freud’s interminable and terminable analysis, involving both subject and analyst, is here not to be ignored.

#### Doesn’t solve the aff – they posit ethics as conditional. Decision is the utmost ethical responsibility and must be made unconditionally.

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The fact of democracy is the breaching of democracy’s closure in all forms of totalisation and calculation; its openness to the other as absolute. In this case, the democratic relation is not given in advance, but must issue out of a decision that is freely made. We may decide to do something, but the decision itself, in its very act, is that which exceeds all motivation and purpose. Decisions must decide absolutely, where what one decides upon might not be. Decisions are not even reducible to chance or the dice throw, since these presume a state of affairs that can be calculated. Decisions are existential risks, if you like, the risking of the fact that what is, is as it is. Decisions are thus responsibilities that we have in existing, in the face of undecidable otherness. As Derrida puts it, the exposure of undecidability does not mean that we cannot decide; rather that we must decide, but decide on the basis of the undecidability of that about which we decide: ‘if I speak so often of the incalculable and the undecidable it’s not out of a simple predilection for play nor in order to neutralise decision: on the contrary, I believe there is no responsibility, no ethico-political decision, that must not pass through the proofs of the incalculable or the undecidable. Otherwise, everything would be reducible to calculation, program, causality’ (Derrida 1995, 273). The imperative of the decision is not a matter of deciding for something, but of invoking the power to decide as absolutely essential to an existence in such a way that does not immediately surrender it to calculation, prediction and the already decided. To decide in this way (but is there any other way?) is to invoke a power that exceeds self reﬂection, the power of critique as praxis: a way of doing that is itself the very thing that it enacts. 10 As a praxis, freedom enacts itself in the decision to be free. As Nancy puts it, we cannot decide for freedom since we are already free in our capacity to decide (Nancy 1993, 142 ff.). A decision is free insofar as it is a ‘letting being be in its ﬁnite singularity’ (Nancy 1993, 142). As a decision for existence, the decision does not make us good or morally right, but ‘frees us for duty and right, and for the perversion of the one and the other’ (Nancy 1993, 143). 11 It is rendering us capable of morality, rather than an act of being moral. The decision has to be thought in terms other than freedom as a simple self-positing of virtue. How then do we decide if we cannot decide for democracy in the name of freedom?